U.S. Supreme Court Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) Meyer v. State of
Nebraska No. 325 Argued February 23,
1923 Decided June 4, 1923 262
U.S. 390 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEBRASKA Syllabus A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any
private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern
language, other than English, to any child who has not attained and
successfully Page 262 U. S. 391 passed the eighth grade, invades the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State. P. 262 U. S.
399 .

															So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an
instructor who taught reading in German, to a child of ten years,
in a parochial school.

															107 Neb. 657, reversed.

															ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a
conviction for infraction of a statute against teaching of foreign
languages to young children in schools. Page 262 U. S. 396 MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court
for Hamilton County, Nebraska, under an information which charged
that, on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial
School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German
language to Raymond Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not
attained Page 262 U. S. 397 and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is
based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in
the State of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919, which follows [Laws
1919, c. 249.]:

															"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in
any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any
subject to any person in any language other than the English
language."

															"Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate
of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in
which the child resides."

															"Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction,
shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars
($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in
the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each
offense."

															"Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in
force from and after its passage and approval."

															The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of
conviction. 107 Neb. 657. It declared the offense charged and
established was "the direct and intentional teaching of the German
language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the
eighth grade," in the parochial school maintained by Zion
Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, a collection of Biblical stories
being used therefor. And it held that the statute forbidding this
did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid
exercise of the police power. The following excerpts from the
opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the
conclusion.

															"The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature
had seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners, Page 262 U. S. 398 who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate
their children in the language of their native land. The result of
that condition was found to be inimical to our own safety. To allow
the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught
from early childhood the language of the country of their parents
was to rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was
to educate them so that they must always think in that language,
and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and
sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The
statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the
education of all children be conducted in the English language, but
that, until they had grown into that language and until it had
become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any
other language. The obvious purpose of this statute was that the
English language should be and become the mother tongue of all
children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute
comes reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v.
State, 132 N.E. (Ohio) 20; State v. Bartels, 181 N.W.
(Ia.) 508."

															"It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in
that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily
interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign
ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their
children taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not
well taken, for it assumes that every citizen finds himself
restrained by the statute. The hours which a child is able to
devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. It must
have ample time for exercise or play. Its daily capacity for
learning is comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its
education, therefore, from among the many that might be taught, is
obviously necessary. The legislature no doubt had in mind the
practical operation of the law. The law affects few citizens,
except those of foreign lineage. Page 262 U. S. 399 Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in
rare instances, have never deemed it of importance to teach their
children foreign languages before such children have reached the
eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the
statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens
generally, which, it appears, was a restriction of no real
consequence."

															The problem for our determination is whether the statute, as
construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty
guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment.
"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."

															While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House
Cases , 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746 ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 ; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 ; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 ; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.
S. 357 ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.
S. 312 ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 ; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474. The
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered Page 262 U. S. 400 with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by
legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to
effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper
exercise of police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject
to supervision by the courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 , 152 U. S.
137 .

															The American people have always regarded education and
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which
should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares,

															"Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged."

															Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station
in life, and nearly all the States, including Nebraska, enforce
this obligation by compulsory laws.

															Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools
conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves
thereto. The calling always has been regarded as useful and
honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge
of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful.
Heretofore it has been commonly looked upon as helpful and
desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as
part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are
within the liberty of the Amendment.

															The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any
subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language
until the pupil has attained and successfully passed the eighth
grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve.
The Supreme Court of the State has held that "the so-called ancient
or dead languages" are not "within the spirit or the purpose of Page 262 U. S. 401 the act." Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v.
McKelvie, 187 N.W. 927. Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not
proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian and every other
alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the legislature has
attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire
knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education
of their own.

															It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic
development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in
foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn English and
acquire American ideals, and "that the English language should be
and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this State."
It is also affirmed that the foreign born population is very large,
that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign
leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are
thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type,
and the public safety is imperiled.

															That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution
extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to
those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly
advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech,
but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution -- a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited
means.

															For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
which should provide:

															"That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their
children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own
child, Page 262 U. S. 402 nor any child his parent. . . . The proper officers will take
the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there
they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate
quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when
they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious,
unknown place, as they should be."

															In order to submerge the individual. and develop ideal citizens,
Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted
their subsequent education and training to official guardians.
Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual
and State were wholly different from those upon which our
institutions rest, and it hardly will be affirmed that any
legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a
State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the
Constitution.

															The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people
with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate
experiences during the late war and aversion toward every
characteristic of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to
quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed
the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with
rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain
enough, and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and
domestic tranquility has been shown.

															The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and
to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a
requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not
questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to
prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. Those
matters are not within the present controversy. Our concern is with
the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams
v. Page 262 U. S. 403 Tanner, supra, p. 244 U. S. 594 ,
pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily
useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation
may be entirely proper. No emergency has arisen which renders
knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly
harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to
conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the
State.

															As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which
involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other
matters, there seems no adequate foundation for the suggestion that
the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his
mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign
language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and
experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals
or understanding of the ordinary child.

															The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. Reversed. [See the separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES, concurred in by MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, in the next case,
at p. 262 U. S. 412 , infra. ]

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a state law prohibiting the teaching of any language other than English in schools, including private and parochial institutions, violated the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeded the state's power. The Court recognized the state's interest in fostering a homogeneous population and preparing citizens to understand civic discussions, but found that the means employed by the state were arbitrary and exceeded its authority. The Court emphasized the importance of language instruction at a young age and noted that it was not harmful to a child's health, morals, or understanding. The judgment was reversed, protecting the liberty of instructors to teach languages other than English.


U.S. Supreme Court Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) Board of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth No. 71-162 Argued January 18,
1972 Decided June 29, 1972 408
U.S. 564 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent, hired for a fixed term of one academic year to teach
at a state university, was informed without explanation that he
would not be rehired for the ensuing year. A statute provided that
all state university teachers would be employed initially on
probation, and that only after four years' continuous service would
teachers achieve permanent employment "during efficiency and good
behavior," with procedural protection against separation.
University rules gave a nontenured teacher "dismissed" before the
end of the year some opportunity for review of the "dismissal," but
provided that no reason need be given for nonretention of a
nontenured teacher, and no standards were specified for
reemployment. Respondent brought this action claiming deprivation
of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, alleging infringement of (1)
his free speech right because the true reason for his nonretention
was his criticism of the university administration, and (2) his
procedural due process right because of the university's failure to
advise him of the reason for its decision. The District Court
granted summary judgment for the respondent on the procedural
issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The Fourteenth Amendment does not require
opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured
state teacher's contract unless he can show that the nonrenewal
deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a
"property" interest in continued employment, despite the lack of
tenure or a formal contract. Here, the nonretention of respondent,
absent any charges against him or stigma or disability foreclosing
other employment, is not tantamount to a deprivation of "liberty,"
and the terms of respondent's employment accorded him no "property"
interest protected by procedural due process. The courts below
therefore erred in granting summary judgment for the respondent on
the procedural due process issue. Pp. 408 U. S.
569 -579.

															446 F.2d 806, reversed and remanded. Page 408 U. S. 565 STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
BURGER C.J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 408 U. S. 603 .
DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 408 U. S. 579 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J.,
joined, post, p. 408 U. S. 604 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 408 U. S. 587 .
POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the case Page 408 U. S. 566 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In 1968, the respondent, David Roth, was hired for his first
teaching job as assistant professor of political science at
Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was hired for a fixed term
of one academic year. The notice of his faculty appointment
specified that his employment would begin on September 1, 1968, and
would end on June 30, 1969. [ Footnote 1 ] The respondent completed that term. But he was
informed that he would not be rehired for the next academic
year.

															The respondent had no tenure rights to continued employment.
Under Wisconsin statutory law, a state university teacher can
acquire tenure as a "permanent" employee only after four years of
year-to-year employment. Having acquired tenure, a teacher is
entitled to continued employment "during efficiency and good
behavior." A relatively new teacher without tenure, however, is,
under Wisconsin law, entitled to nothing beyond his one-year
appointment. [ Footnote 2 ] There
are no statutory Page 408 U. S. 567 or administrative standards defining eligibility for
reemployment. State law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to
rehire a nontenured teacher for another year to the unfettered
discretion of university officials.

															The procedural protection afforded a Wisconsin State University
teacher before he is separated from the University corresponds to
his job security. As a matter of statutory law, a tenured teacher
cannot be "discharged except for cause upon written charges" and
pursuant to certain procedures. [ Footnote 3 ] A nontenured teacher, similarly, is protected
to some extent during his one-year term. Rules promulgated
by the Board of Regents provide that a nontenured teacher
"dismissed" before the end of the year may have some opportunity
for review of the "dismissal." But the Rules provide no real
protection for a nontenured teacher who simply is not reemployed
for the next year. He must be informed by February 1 "concerning
retention or nonretention for the ensuing year." But "no reason for
non-retention need be given. No review or appeal is provided in
such case." [ Footnote 4 ] Page 408 U. S. 568 In conformance with these Rules, the President of Wisconsin
State University-Oshkosh informed the respondent before February 1,
1969, that he would not be rehired for the 1969-1970 academic year.
He gave the respondent no reason for the decision and no
opportunity to challenge it at any sort of hearing.

															The respondent then brought this action in Federal District
Court alleging that the decision not to rehire him for the next
year infringed his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He attacked the
decision both in substance and procedure. First, he alleged that
the true reason for the decision was to punish him for certain
statements critical of the University administration, and that it
therefore violated his right to freedom of speech. [ Footnote 5 ] Page 408 U. S. 569 Second, he alleged that the failure of University officials to
give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an opportunity
for a hearing violated his right, to procedural due process of
law.

															The District Court granted summary judgment for the respondent
on the procedural issue, ordering the University officials to
provide him with reasons and a hearing. 310 F.
Supp. 972 . The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting,
affirmed this partial summary judgment. 446 F.2d 806. We granted
certiorari. 404 U.S. 909. The only question presented to us at this
stage in the case is whether the respondent had a constitutional
right to a statement of reasons and a hearing on the University's
decision not to rehire him for another year. [ Footnote 6 ] We hold that he did not. I The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are
implicated, the right Page 408 U. S. 570 to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. [ Footnote 7 ] But the range of interests protected
by procedural due process is not infinite.

															The District Court decided that procedural due process
guarantees apply in this case by assessing and balancing the
weights of the particular interests involved. It concluded that the
respondent's interest in reemployment at Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh outweighed the University's interest in denying
him reemployment summarily. 310 F. Supp. at 977-979. Undeniably,
the respondent's reemployment prospects were of major concern to
him -- concern that we surely cannot say was insignificant. And a
weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the
form of hearing required in particular situations by procedural due
process. [ Footnote 8 ] But, to
determine whether Page 408 U. S. 571 due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look
not to the "weight," but to the nature, of the interest at stake. See Morrissey v. Brewer, ante at 408 U. S. 481 .
We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of liberty and property.

															"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They are
among the

															"[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to
gather meaning from experience. . . . [T]hey relate to the whole
domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded
this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains
unchanged." National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.
S. 582 , 337 U. S. 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For that reason, the Court has fully
and finally rejected the wooden distinction between "rights" and
"privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights. [ Footnote 9 ] The Court has also made clear that the
property interests protected by Page 408 U. S. 572 procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of
real estate, chattels, or money. [ Footnote 10 ] By the same token, the Court has required
due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort
of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process. [ Footnote 11 ]

															Yet, while the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic
limitations on the protection of procedural due process, it has at
the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words "liberty"
and "property" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be given some meaning. II "While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term
has received much consideration and some of the included things
have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
. . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 , 262 U. S. 399 .
In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. See, e.g., Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 , 347 U. S.
499 -500; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 645 . Page 408 U. S. 573 There might be cases in which a State refused to reemploy a
person under such circumstances that interests in liberty would be
implicated. But this is not such a case.

															The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make
any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and
associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of
his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of
dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a
different case. For

															"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice
and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.
S. 433 , 400 U. S. 437 . Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 , 344 U. S. 191 ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 , 328 U. S.
316 -317; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.
S. 331 , 349 U. S. 352 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). See Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 , 367 U. S. 898 .
In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute
the charge before University officials. [ Footnote 12 ] In the present case, however, there is no
suggestion whatever that the respondent's "good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity" is at stake.

															Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining
to reemploy the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities. The State, for example, did not invoke
any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public
employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again,
would Page 408 U. S. 574 be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not only of present
government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is
no small injury. . . ." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v.
McGrath, supra, at 341 U. S. 185 (Jackson, J., concurring). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 , 239 U. S. 41 .
The Court has held, for example, that a State, in regulating
eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose
a range of opportunities "in a manner . . . that contravene[s] . .
. Due Process," Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 , 353 U. S. 238 ,
and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a full
prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 , 373 U. S. 103 . See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 367 U. S. 898 .
In the present case, however, this principle does not come into
play. [ Footnote 13 ]

															To be sure, the respondent has alleged that the nonrenewal of
his contract was based on his exercise of his right to freedom of
speech. But this allegation is not now before us. The District
Court stayed proceedings on this issue, and the respondent has yet
to prove that Page 408 U. S. 575 the decision not to rehire him was, in fact, based on his free
speech activities. [ Footnote
14 ]

															Hence, on the record before us, all that clearly appears is that
the respondent was not rehired for one year at one university. It
stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived
of "liberty" when he simply is not rehired in one job, but remains
as free as before to seek another. Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, supra, at 367 U. S.
895 -896. Page 408 U. S. 576 III The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is
a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already
acquired in specific benefits. These interests -- property
interests -- may take many forms.

															Thus, the Court has held that a person receiving welfare
benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining
eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those
benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 .
[ Footnote 15 ] See
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603 , 363 U. S. 611 .
Similarly, in the area of public employment, the Court has held
that a public college professor dismissed from an office held under
tenure provisions, Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551 , and
college professors and Page 408 U. S. 577 staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 ,
have interests in continued employment that are safeguarded by due
process. Only last year, the Court held that this principle
"proscribing summary dismissal from public employment without
hearing or inquiry required by due process" also applied to a
teacher recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but
nonetheless with a clearly implied promise of continued employment. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U. S. 207 , 403 U. S.
208 .

															Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by
procedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily
undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a
hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those
claims.

															Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law -- rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits. Thus, the welfare recipients in Goldberg v.
Kelly, supra, had a claim of entitlement to welfare payments
that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them. The
recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the
statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right
to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so. Page 408 U. S. 578 Just as the welfare recipients' "property" interest in welfare
payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so the
respondent's "property" interest in employment at Wisconsin State
University-Oshkosh was created and defined by the terms of his
appointment. Those terms secured his interest in employment up to
June 30, 1969. But the important fact in this case is that they
specifically provided that the respondent's employment was to
terminate on June 30. They did not provide for contract renewal
absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they made no provision for
renewal whatsoever.

															Thus, the terms of the respondent's appointment secured
absolutely no interest in reemployment for the next year. They
supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to
reemployment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or
University rule or policy that secured his interest in reemployment
or that created any legitimate claim to it. [ Footnote 16 ] In these circumstances, the
respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, but he
did not have a property interest sufficient to require the
University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to
renew his contract of employment. IV Our analysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this
case in no way indicates a view that an opportunity for a hearing
or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or would not, be
appropriate or wise in public Page 408 U. S. 579 colleges and universities. [ Footnote 17 ] For it is a written Constitution that we
apply. Our role is confined to interpretation of that
Constitution.

															We must conclude that the summary judgment for the respondent
should not have been granted, since the respondent has not shown
that he was deprived of liberty or property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals,
accordingly, is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this
case.

															[For concurring opinion of MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, see
post, p. 408 U. S.
603 .]

															[For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, see
post, p. 408 U. S.
604 .]

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The respondent had no contract of employment. Rather, his formal
notice of appointment was the equivalent of an employment
contract.

															The notice of his appointment provided that:

															" David F. Roth is hereby appointed to the faculty of
the Wisconsin State University Position number 0262. (Location:) Oshkosh as (Rank:) Assistant Professor of
(Department:) Political Science this (Date:) first day of (Month:) September (Year:) 1968. "

															The notice went on to specify that the respondent's "appointment
basis" was for the "academic year." And it provided that

															"[r]egulations governing tenure are in accord with Chapter
37.31, Wisconsin Statutes. The employment of any staff member for
an academic year shall not be for a term beyond June 30th of the
fiscal year in which the appointment is made." See n 2, infra. [ Footnote 2 ]

															Wis.Stat. § 37.31(1) (1967), in force at the time, provided in
pertinent part that:

															"All teachers in any state university shall initially be
employed on probation. The employment shall be permanent, during
efficiency and good behavior after 4 years of continuous service in
the state university system as a teacher."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Wis.Stat. § 37.31(1) further provided that:

															"No teacher who has become permanently employed as herein
provided shall be discharged except for cause upon written charges.
Within 30 days of receiving the written charges, such teacher may
appeal the discharge by a written notice to the president of the
board of regents of state colleges. The board shall cause the
charges to be investigated, hear the case and provide such teacher
with a written Statement as to their decision."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The Rules, promulgated by the Board of Regents in 1967,
provide:

															"RULE I -- February first is established throughout the State
University system as the deadline for written notification of
non-tenured faculty concerning retention or non-retention for the
ensuing year. The President of each University shall give such
notice each year on or before this date."

															"RULE II -- During the time a faculty member is on probation, no
reason for non-retention need be given. No review or appeal is
provided in such case."

															"RULE III -- 'Dismissal' as opposed to 'Non-Retention' means
termination of responsibilities during an academic year. When a
nontenure faculty member is dismissed he has no right under
Wisconsin Statutes to a review of his case or to appeal. The
President may, however, in his discretion, grant a request for a
review within the institution, either by a faculty committee or by
the President, or both. Any such review would be informal in nature
and would be advisory only."

															"RULE IV -- When a non-tenure faculty member is dismissed he may
request a review by or hearing before the Board of Regents. Each
such request will be considered separately and the Board will, in
its discretion, grant or deny same in each individual case."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															While the respondent alleged that he was not rehired because of
his exercise of free speech, the petitioners insisted that the
nonretention decision was based on other, constitutionally valid
grounds. The District Court came to no conclusion whatever
regarding the true reason for the University President's decision.
"In the present case," it stated,

															"it appears that a determination as to the actual bases of [the]
decision must await amplification of the facts at trial. . . .
Summary judgment is inappropriate." 310 F.
Supp. 972 , 982.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The courts that have had to decide whether a nontenured public
employee has a right to a statement of reasons or a hearing upon
nonrenewal of his contract have come to varying conclusions. Some
have held that neither procedural safeguard is required. E.g.,
Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (CA6); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (CA10); Freeman v. Gould Special School
District, 405 F.2d 1153 (CA8). At least one court has held
that there is a right to a statement of reasons, but not a hearing. Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F.2d 1182 (CA1).
And another has held that both requirements depend on whether the
employee has an "expectancy" of continued employment. Ferguson
v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (CA5).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be
afforded opportunity for some kind of a hearing,

															"except for extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.
S. 371 , 401 U. S.
379 .

															"While '[m]any controversies have raged about . . . the Due
Process Clause,' . . . it is fundamental that, except in emergency
situations (and this is not one), due process requires that, when a
State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . , it must
afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective." Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 , 402 U. S. 542 .
For the rare and extraordinary situations in which we have held
that deprivation of a protected interest need not be preceded by
opportunity for some kind of hearing, see, e.g., Central Union
Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 , 254 U. S. 566 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.
S. 589 , 283 U. S. 597 ; Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.
S. 594 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															"The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 401 U. S. 378 . See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 , 397 U. S. 263 ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420 . The
constitutional requirement of opportunity for some form of hearing
before deprivation of a protected interest, of course, does not
depend upon such a narrow balancing process. See n 7, supra. [ Footnote 9 ]

															In a leading case decided many years ago, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that public employment in
general was a "privilege," not a "right," and that procedural due
process guarantees therefore were inapplicable. Bailey v.
Richardson, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 182 F.2d 46, aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918. The basis of this holding
has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years. For, as MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN wrote for the Court only last year,

															"this Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional
rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as
a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 , 403 U. S. 374 . See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, ante at 408 U. S. 482 ; Bell v. Burson, supra, at 402 U. S. 539 ; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, at 397 U. S. 262 ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 627 n. 6; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.
S. 563 , 391 U. S. 568 ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , 374 U. S.
404 .

															[ Footnote 10 ] See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.
S. 207 , 403 U. S. 208 ; Bell v. Burson, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. [ Footnote 11 ]

															"Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' [in the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause] with any great precision,
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily
restraint." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 , 347 U. S. 499 . See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 645 .

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person
an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his
name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny
him future employment for other reasons.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by one
university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties
for a professor in his subsequent academic career." 310 F. Supp. at
979. And the Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary
judgment largely on the premise that "the substantial adverse
effect non-retention is likely to have upon the career interests of
an individual professor" amounts to a limitation on future
employment opportunities sufficient to invoke procedural due
process guarantees. 446 F.2d at 809. But even assuming, arguendo, that such a "substantial adverse effect" under
these circumstances would constitute a state-imposed restriction on
liberty, the record contains no support for these assumptions.
There is no suggestion of how nonretention might affect the
respondent's future employment prospects. Mere proof, for example,
that his record of nonretention in one job, taken alone, might make
him somewhat less attractive to some other employers would hardly
establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a
deprivation of "liberty." Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 .

															[ Footnote 14 ] See n 5, supra. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, argued that
opportunity for a hearing and a statement of reasons were required
here "as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions
improperly motivated by exercise of protected rights." 446 F.2d at
810 (emphasis supplied). While the Court of Appeals recognized the
lack of a finding that the respondent's nonretention was based on
exercise of the right of free speech, it felt that the respondent's
interest in liberty was sufficiently implicated here because the
decision not to rehire him was made "with a background of
controversy and unwelcome expressions of opinion." Ibid. When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free
speech or free press, this Court has on occasion held that
opportunity for a fair adversary hearing must precede the action,
whether or not the speech or press interest is clearly protected
under substantive First Amendment standards. Thus, we have required
fair notice and opportunity for an adversary hearing before an
injunction is issued against the holding of rallies and public
meetings. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.
S. 175 . Similarly, we have indicated the necessity of
procedural safeguards before a State makes a large-scale seizure of
a person's allegedly obscene books, magazines, and so forth. A
Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 ; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.
S. 717 . See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S.
51 ; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S.
58 . See generally Monaghan, First Amendment
"Due Process," 83 Harv.L.Rev. 518.

															In the respondent's case, however, the State has not directly
impinged upon interests in free speech or free press in any way
comparable to a seizure of books or an injunction against meetings.
Whatever may be a teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in
holding a teaching job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.

															[ Footnote 15 ] Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.
S. 117 , is a related case. There, the petitioner was a
lawyer who had been refused admission to practice before the Board
of Tax Appeals. The Board had

															"published rules for admission of persons entitled to practice
before it, by which attorneys at law admitted to courts of the
United States and the States, and the District of Columbia, as well
as certified public accountants duly qualified under the law of any
State or the District, are made eligible. . . . The rules further
provide that the Board may, in its discretion, deny admission to
any applicant, or suspend or disbar any person after
admission." Id. at 270 U. S. 119 .
The Board denied admission to the petitioner under its
discretionary power, without a prior hearing and a statement of the
reasons for the denial. Although this Court disposed of the case on
other grounds, it stated, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
that the existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the
petitioner an interest and claim to practice before the Board to
which procedural due process requirements applied. It said that the
Board's discretionary power

															"must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be
exercised after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and
opportunity to answer for the applicant as would constitute due
process." Id. at 270 U. S.
123 .

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															To to sure, the respondent does suggest that most teachers hired
on a year-to-year basis by Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh are,
in fact, rehired. But the District Court has not found that there
is anything approaching a "common law" of remployment, see
Perry v. Sindermann, post at 408 U. S. 602 ,
so strong as to require University officials to give the respondent
a statement of reasons and a hearing on their decision not to
rehire him.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See, e.g., Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of
Faculty Appointments, 56 AAUP Bulletin No. 1, p. 21 (Spring
1970).

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

															Respondent Roth, like Sindermann in the companion case, had no
tenure under Wisconsin law and, unlike Sindermann, he had had only
one year of teaching at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh -- where
during 1968-1969 he had been Assistant Professor of Political
Science and International Studies. Though Roth was rated by the
faculty as an excellent teacher, he had publicly criticized the
administration for suspending an entire group of 94 black students
without determining individual guilt. He also criticized the
university's regime as being authoritarian and autocratic. He used
his classroom to discuss what was being done about the Page 408 U. S. 580 black episode; and one day, instead of meeting his class, he
went to the meeting of the Board of Regents.

															In this case, as in Sindermann, an action was started
in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ Footnote 2/1 ] claiming in part that the decision of
the school authorities not to rehire was in retaliation for his
expression of opinion. The District Court, in partially granting
Roth's motion for summary judgment, held that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the university to give a hearing to teachers
whose contracts were not to be renewed and to give reasons for its
action. 310 F.
Supp. 972 , 983. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 446 F.2d
806.

															Professor Will Herberg, of Drew University, in writing of
"academic freedom" recently said:

															"[I]t is sometimes conceived as a basic constitutional right
guaranteed and protected under the First Amendment."

															"But, of course, this is not the case. Whereas a man's right to
speak out on this or that may be guaranteed and protected, he can
have no imaginable human or constitutional right to remain a member
of a university faculty. Clearly, the right to academic freedom is
an acquired one, yet an acquired right of such value to society
that, in the minds of many, it has verged upon the
constitutional."

															Washington Sunday Star, Jan. 23, 1972, B-3, col. 1. Page 408 U. S. 581 There may not be a constitutional right to continued employment
if private schools and colleges are involved. But Prof. Herberg's
view is not correct when public schools move against faculty
members. For the First Amendment, applicable to the States by
reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects the individual against
state action when it comes to freedom of speech and of press and
the related freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment; and the
Fourteenth protects "liberty" and "property" as stated by the Court
in Sindermann. No more direct assault on academic freedom can be imagined than
for the school authorities to be allowed to discharge a teacher
because of his or her philosophical, political, or ideological
beliefs. The same may well be true of private schools, if, through
the device of financing or other umbilical cords, they become
instrumentalities of the State. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the
constitutional theory in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 , 354 U. S.
261 -262 (concurring in result):

															"Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to
findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of
nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this
true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of
what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man
and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of
anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related
areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of
manageable division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of
holistic perplexities. For society's good -- if understanding be an
essential need of society -- inquiries into these problems,
speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon
them, must be left as unfettered Page 408 U. S. 582 as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into
this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise
government and the people's wellbeing, except for reasons that are
exigent and obviously compelling."

															We repeated that warning in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U. S. 589 , 385 U. S.
603 :

															"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."

															When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the
reasons for dismissal or for nonrenewal of an employment contract
must be examined to see if the reasons given are only a cloak for
activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution. A statutory
analogy is present under the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 151 et seq. While discharges of employees for
"cause" are permissible ( Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U. S. 203 , 379 U. S.
217 ), discharges because of an employee's union
activities are banned by § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). So the
search is to ascertain whether the stated ground was the real one
or only a pretext. See J. P. Stevens Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d
292, 300.

															In the case of teachers whose contracts are not renewed, tenure
is not the critical issue. In the Sweezy case, the
teacher, whose First Amendment rights we honored, had no tenure,
but was only a guest lecturer. In the Keyishian case, one
of the petitioners (Keyishian himself) had only a "one-year-term
contract" that was not renewed. 385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 592 .
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 , one
of the petitioners was Page 408 U. S. 583 a teacher whose "contract for the ensuing school year was not
renewed" ( id. at 364 U. S. 483 )
and two others who refused to comply were advised that it made
"impossible their reemployment as teachers for the following school
year." Id. at 364 U. S. 484 .
The oath required in Keyishian and the affidavit listing
memberships required in Shelton were both, in our view, in
violation of First Amendment rights. Those cases mean that
conditioning renewal of a teacher's contract upon surrender of
First Amendment rights is beyond the power of a State.

															There is sometimes a conflict between a claim for First
Amendment protection and the need for orderly administration of the
school system, as we noted in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 391 U. S. 569 .
That is one reason why summary judgments in this class of cases are
seldom appropriate. Another reason is that careful factfinding is
often necessary to know whether the given reason for nonrenewal of
a teacher's contract is the real reason or a feigned one.

															It is said that, since teaching in a public school is a
privilege, the State can grant it or withhold it on conditions. We
have, however, rejected that thesis in numerous cases, e.g.,
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 , 403 U. S. 374 . See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 1439 (1968). In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.
S. 146 , 327 U. S. 156 ,
we said that Congress may not, by withdrawal of mailing privileges,
place limitations on freedom of speech which it could not do
constitutionally if done directly. We said in American
Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.
S. 382 , 339 U. S. 402 ,
that freedom of speech was abridged when the only restraint on its
exercise was withdrawal of the privilege to invoke the facilities
of the National Labor Relations Board. In Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 , we
held that an applicant could not be denied the opportunity Page 408 U. S. 584 for public employment because he had exercised his First
Amendment rights. And in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.
S. 513 , we held that a denial af a tax exemption unless
one gave up his First Amendment rights was an abridgment of
Fourteenth Amendment rights.

															As we held in Speiser v. Randall, supra, when a State
proposes to deny a privilege to one who it alleges has engaged in
unprotected speech, Due Process requires that the State bear the
burden of proving that the speech was not protected. "[T]he protection of the individual against arbitrary action' . . .
[is] the very essence of due process," Slochower v. Board of
Education, 350 U. S. 551 , 350 U. S. 559 ,
but where the State is allowed to act secretly behind closed doors
and without any notice to those who are affected by its actions,
there is no check against the possibility of such "arbitrary
action." Moreover, where "important interests" of the citizen are
implicated ( Bell v. Burson, 402 U.
S. 535 , 402 U. S. 539 )
they are not to be denied or taken away without due process. Ibid. Bell v. Burson involved a driver's license.
But also included are disqualification for unemployment
compensation ( Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 ), discharge from public employment ( Slochower
v. Board of Education, supra ), denial of tax exemption
( Speiser v. Randall, supra ), and withdrawal of welfare
benefits ( Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 ). And see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 . We
should now add that nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, whether or
not he has tenure, is an entitlement of the same importance and
dignity. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.
S. 886 , is not opposed. It held that a cook employed in
a cafeteria in a military installation was not entitled to a
hearing prior Page 408 U. S. 585 to the withdrawal of her access to the facility. Her employer
was prepared to employ her at another of its restaurants, the
withdrawal was not likely to injure her reputation, and her
employment opportunities elsewhere were not impaired. The Court
held that the very limited individual interest in this one Job did
not outweigh the Government's authority over an important federal
military establishment. Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is
tantamount in effect to a dismissal, and the consequences may be
enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a permanent
scar and effectively limits any chance the teacher has of being
rehired as a teacher, at least in his State.

															If this nonrenewal implicated the First Amendment, then Roth was
deprived of constitutional rights because his employment was
conditioned on a surrender of First Amendment rights; and, apart
from the First Amendment, he was denied due process when he
received no notice and hearing of the adverse action contemplated
against him. Without a statement of the reasons for the discharge
and an opportunity to rebut those reasons -- both of which were
refused by petitioners -- there is no means short of a lawsuit to
safeguard the right not to be discharged for the exercise of First
Amendment guarantees.

															The District Court held, 310 F.Supp. at 979-980:

															"Substantive constitutional protection for a university
professor against nonretention in violation of his First Amendment
rights or arbitrary nonretention is useless without procedural
safeguards. I hold that minimal procedural due process includes a
statement of the reasons why the university intends not to retain
the professor, notice of a hearing at which he may respond to the
stated reasons, and a hearing if the professor appears at the
appointed Page 408 U. S. 586 time and place. At such a hearing, the professor must have a
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence relevant to the stated
reasons. The burden of going forward and the burden of proof rests
with the professor. Only if he makes a reasonable showing that the
stated reasons are wholly inappropriate as a basis for decision or
that they are wholly without basis in fact would the university
administration become obliged to show that the stated reasons are
not inappropriate or that they have a basis in fact."

															It was that procedure that the Court of Appeals approved. 446
F.2d at 809-810. The Court of Appeals also concluded that, though
the § 1983 action was pending in court, the court should stay its
hand until the academic procedures had been completed. [ Footnote 2/2 ] As stated by the Court of
Appeals in Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (CA5):

															"School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate
forums for initially determining issues of this type, both for the
convenience of the parties and in order to bring academic expertise
to bear in resolving the nice issues of administrative discipline,
teacher competence and school policy, which so frequently must be
balanced in reaching a proper determination." Id. at 944-945.

															That is a permissible course for district courts to take, though
it does not relieve them of the final determination Page 408 U. S. 587 whether nonrenewal of the teacher's contract was in retaliation
for the exercise of First Amendment rights or a denial of due
process.

															Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Section 1983 reads as follows:

															"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, hall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Such a procedure would not be contrary to the well settled rule
that § 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of other remedies. See, e.g., Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.
S. 249 (1971); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.
S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167 (1961). One of the allegations in the complaint
was that respondent was denied any effective state remedy, and the
District Court's staying its hand thus furthered, rather than
thwarted, the purposes of § 1983.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

															Respondent was hired as an assistant professor of political
science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for the 1968-1969
academic year. During the course of that year, he was told that he
would not be rehired for the next academic term, but he was never
told why. In this case, he asserts that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution entitled
him to a statement of reasons and a hearing on the University's
decision not to rehire him for another year. [ Footnote 3/1 ] This claim was sustained by the District
Court, which granted respondent summary judgment, 310 F.
Supp. 972 , and by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the District Court. 446 F.2d 806. This Court today
reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and rejects
respondent's claim. I dissent.

															While I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion, setting forth
the proper framework for consideration of the issue presented, and
also with those portions of Parts II and III of the Court's opinion
that assert that a public employee is entitled to procedural due
process whenever a State stigmatizes him by denying employment, or
injures his future employment prospects severely, or whenever the
State deprives him of a property Page 408 U. S. 588 interest, I would go further than the Court does in defining the
terms "liberty" and "property."

															The prior decisions of this Court, discused at length in the
opinion of the Court, establish a principle that is as obvious as
it is compelling -- i.e., federal and state governments
and governmental agencies are restrained by the Constitution from
acting arbitrarily with respect to employment opportunities that
they either offer or control. Hence, it is now firmly established
that whether or not a private employer is free to act capriciously
or unreasonably with respect to employment practices, at least
absent statutory [ Footnote 3/2 ] or
contractual [ Footnote 3/3 ]
controls, a government employer is different. The government may
only act fairly and reasonably.

															This Court has long maintained that

															"the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
to secure." Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 , 239 U. S. 1 (1915)
(Hughes, J.). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 , 262 U. S. 399 (1923). It has also established that the fact that an employee has
no contract guaranteeing work for a specific future period does not
mean that as the result of action by the government he may be
"discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason." Truax
v. Raich, supra, at 239 U. S.
38 .

															In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is
entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason for
denying the employment. This is the "property" right that I believe
is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that cannot be denied
"without due process of law." And it is also liberty -- Page 408 U. S. 589 liberty to work -- which is the "very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.

															This Court has often had occasion to note that the denial of
public employment is a serious blow to any citizen. See, e.g.,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.
S. 123 , 341 U. S. 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 , 328 U. S.
316 -317 (1946). Thus, when an application for public
employment is denied or the contract of a government employee is
not renewed, the government must say why, for it is only when the
reasons underlying government action are known that citizens feel
secure and protected against arbitrary government action.

															Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, benefits
that governments offer in modern-day life. When something as
valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the government may
not reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that
its actions are fair and equitable. And it is procedural due
process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our
protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable
government action.

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS has written that:

															"It is not without significance that most of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much
of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice.
Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main
assurance that there will be equal justice under law." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 341 U. S. 179 (concurring opinion). And Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said that
"[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the Page 408 U. S. 590 history of procedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 , 324 U. S. 414 (1945) (separate opinion). With respect to occupations controlled
by the government, one lower court has said that

															"[t]he public has the right to expect its officers . . . to make
adjudications on the basis of merit. The first step toward insuring
that these expectations are realized is to require adherence to the
standards of due process; absolute and uncontrolled discretion
invites abuse." Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (CA5 1964).

															We have often noted that procedural due process means many
different things in the numerous contexts in which it applies. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.
S. 535 (1971). Prior decision have held that an
applicant for admission to practice as an attorney before the
United States Board of Tax Appeals may not be rejected without a
statement of reasons and a chance for a hearing on disputed issues
of fact; [ Footnote 3/4 ] that a
tenured teacher could not be summarily dismissed without notice of
the reasons and a hearing; [ Footnote
3/5 ] that an applicant for admission to a state bar could not
be denied the opportunity to practice law without notice of the
reasons for the rejection of his application and a hearing;
[ Footnote 3/6 ] and even that a
substitute teacher who had been employed only two months could not
be dismissed merely because she refused to take a loyalty oath
without an inquiry into the specific facts of her case and a
hearing on those in dispute. [ Footnote
3/7 ] I would follow these cases and hold that respondent was
denied due process when his contract was not renewed and he was not
informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to respond. Page 408 U. S. 591 It may be argued that to provide procedural due process to all
public employees or prospective employees would place an
intolerable burden on the machinery of government. Cf. Goldberg
v. Kelly, supra. The short answer to that argument is that it
is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. Whenever an
application for employment is denied, an employee is discharged, or
a decision not to rehire an employee is made, there should be some
reason for the decision. It can scarcely be argued that government
would be crippled by a requirement that the reason be communicated
to the person most directly affected by the government's
action.

															Where there are numerous applicants for jobs, it is likely that
few will choose to demand reasons for not being hired. But, if the
demand for reasons is exceptionally great, summary procedures can
be devised that would provide fair and adequate information to all
persons. As long as the government has a good reason for its
actions it need not fear disclosure. It is only where the
government acts improperly that procedural due process is truly
burdensome. And that is precisely when it is most necessary.

															It might also be argued that to require a hearing and a
statement of reasons is to require a useless act, because a
government bent on denying employment to one or more persons will
do so regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed in its
path. Perhaps this is so, but a requirement of procedural
regularity at least renders arbitrary action more difficult.
Moreover, proper procedures will surely eliminate some of the
arbitrariness that results, not from malice, but from innocent
error.

															"Experience teaches . . . that the affording of procedural
safeguards, which by their nature serve to illuminate the
underlying facts, in itself, often operates to prevent erroneous
decisions on the merits Page 408 U. S. 592 from occurring." Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.
S. 341 , 373 U. S. 366 (1963). When the government knows it may have to justify its
decisions with sound,reasons, its conduct is likely to be more
cautious, careful, and correct.

															Professor Gellhorn put the argument well:

															"In my judgment, there is no basic division of interest between
the citizenry on the one hand and officialdom on the other. Both
should be interested equally in the quest for procedural
safeguards. I echo the late Justice Jackson in saying:"

															"Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the
sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the
Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains
on a system of justice"

															"-- blunders which are likely to occur when reasons need not be
given and when the reasonableness and indeed legality of judgments
need not be subjected to any appraisal other than one's own. . .
."

															Summary of Colloquy on Administrative Law, 6 J.Soc.Pub. Teachers
of Law 70, 73 (1961).

															Accordingly, I dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Respondent has also alleged that the true reason for the
decision not to rehire him was to punish him for certain statements
critical of the University. As the Court points out, this issue is
not before us at the present time.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.
S. 424 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] Cf. Note, Procedural "Due Process" in Union
Disciplinary Proceedings, 57 Yale L.J. 1302 (1948).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.
S. 117 (1926).

															[ Footnote 3/5 ] Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.
S. 551 (1956).

															[ Footnote 3/6 ] Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S.
96 (1963).

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.
S. 207 (1971).

Summary: In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme Court ruled that a nontenured state teacher does not have a procedural due process right to a hearing before their contract is not renewed, unless they can show a deprivation of "liberty" or a "property" interest in continued employment. The Court found that the respondent, David Roth, who was not rehired after his fixed-term contract expired, had neither a "liberty" nor "property" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that procedural due process protections only apply when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit, which was not the case for Roth due to his lack of tenure or a formal contract.