U.S. Supreme Court Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806 (1975) Faretta v. California No. 73-5772 Argued November 19,
1974 Decided June 30, 1975 422
U.S. 806 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT Syllabus The Sixth Amendment as made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth guarantees that a defendant in a state criminal trial
has an independent constitutional right of self-representation and
that he may proceed to defend himself without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so, and, in this case,
the state courts erred in forcing petitioner against his will to
accept a state-appointed public defender and in denying his request
to conduct his own defense. Pp. 422 U. S.
812 -836.

															Vacated and remanded.

															STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and POWELL, JJ., joined. BURGER,
C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST,
JJ., joined, post, p. 422 U. S. 836 .
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 422 U. S.
846 . Page 422 U. S. 807 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution
guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal
court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel
before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.
This clear constitutional rule has emerged from a series of cases
decided here over the last 50 years. [ Footnote 1 ] The question before us now is whether a
defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to
proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and
intelligently elects to do so. Stated another way, the question is
whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its
criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he
insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. It is not an easy
question, but we have concluded that a State may not
constitutionally do so. I Anthony Faretta was charged with grand theft in an information
filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cal. At the
arraignment, the Superior Court Judge assigned to preside at the
trial appointed the public defender to represent Faretta. Well
before the date of trial, however, Faretta requested that he be
permitted to represent himself. Questioning by the judge revealed
that Faretta had once represented himself in a criminal
prosecution, that he had a high school education, and that he did
not want to be represented by the public defender because he
believed that that office was "very loaded down with . . . a heavy
case load." The judge Page 422 U. S. 808 responded that he believed Faretta was "making a mistake," and
emphasized that, in further proceedings, Faretta would receive no
special favors. [ Footnote 2 ]
Nevertheless, after establishing that Faretta wanted to represent
himself and did not want a lawyer, the judge, in a "preliminary
ruling," accepted Faretta's waiver of the assistance of counsel.
The judge indicated, however, that he might reverse this ruling if
it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent
himself.

															Several weeks thereafter, but still prior to trial, the judge sua sponte held a hearing to inquire into Faretta's
ability to conduct his own defense, and questioned him specifically
about both the hearsay rule and the state law governing the
challenge of potential jurors. [ Footnote 3 ] After consideration Page 422 U. S. 809 of Faretta's answers and observation of his demeanor, the judge
ruled that Faretta had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver
of his right to the assistance Page 422 U. S. 810 of counsel, and also ruled that Faretta had no constitutional
right to conduct his own defense. [ Footnote 4 ] The judge, accordingly, reversed his earlier
ruling permitting self-representation, and again appointed the
public defender to represent Faretta. Faretta's subsequent request
for leave to act as co-counsel was rejected, as were his efforts to
make certain motions on his own behalf. [ Footnote 5 ] Throughout Page 422 U. S. 811 the subsequent trial, the judge required that Faretta's defense
be conducted only through the appointed lawyer from the public
defender's office. At the conclusion of the trial, the Jury found
Faretta guilty as charged, and the judge sentenced him to
prison.

															The California Court of Appeal, relying upon a then-recent
California Supreme Court decision that had expressly decided the
issue, [ Footnote 6 ] affirmed
the trial judge's ruling that Faretta had no federal or state
constitutional right Page 422 U. S. 812 to represent himself. [ Footnote
7 ] Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed Faretta's
conviction. A petition for rehearing was denied without opinion,
and the California Supreme Court denied review. [ Footnote 8 ] We granted certiorari. 415 U.S.
975. II In the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been
protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First
Congress and signed by President Washington one day before the
Sixth Amendment Page 422 U. S. 813 was proposed, provided that,

															"in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of . .
. counsel. . . ."

															The right is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654.

															With few exceptions, each of the several States also accords a
defendant the right to represent himself in any criminal case.
[ Footnote 9 ] The Constitutions
of 36 States explicitly confer that right. [ Footnote 10 ] Moreover, many state courts
have Page 422 U. S. 814 expressed the view that the right is also supported by the
Constitution of the United States. [ Footnote 11 ]

															This Court has more than once indicated the same view. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.
S. 269 , 317 U. S. 279 ,
the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a "correlative right to
dispense with a lawyer's help." The defendant in that case,
indicted for federal mail fraud violations, insisted on conducting
his own defense without benefit of counsel. He also requested a
bench trial and signed a waiver of his right to trial by jury. The
prosecution consented to the waiver of a jury, and the waiver was
accepted by the court. The defendant was convicted, but the Court
of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that a person
accused of a felony could not competently waive his right to trial
by jury except upon the advice of a lawyer. This Court reversed,
and reinstated the conviction, holding that

															"an accused, in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice,
and with the considered approval of the court, may waive trial by
jury, and so likewise may he competently and intelligently waive
his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel." Id. at 317 U. S.
275 .

															The Adams case does not, of course, necessarily resolve
the issue before us. It held only that "the Constitution Page 422 U. S. 815 does not force a lawyer upon a defendant." Id. at 317 U. S. 279 .
[ Footnote 12 ] Whether the
Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant
is a different question. But the Court in Adams did
recognize, albeit in dictum, an affirmative right of
self-representation:

															"The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal
formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of
an accused's position before the law. . . ."

															. . . What were contrived as protections for the accused should
not be turned into fetters. . . . To deny an accused a choice of
procedure in circumstances in which he, though a layman, is as
capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to impair
the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as
empty verbalisms.

															". . . When the administration of the criminal law . . . is
hedged about, as it is, by the Constitutional safeguards for the
protection of an accused, to deny him in the exercise of his free
choice the right to dispense with some of these safeguards . . . is
to imprison a man in his privileges, and call it the
Constitution." Id. at 317 U. S.
279 -280 (emphasis added). In other settings as well, the
Court has indicated that Page 422 U. S. 816 a defendant has a constitutionally protected right to represent
himself in a criminal trial. For example, in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 , the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
gives the accused a right to be present at all stages of the
proceedings where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his
absence. This right to "presence" was based upon the premise that
the

															"defense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be
present at the examination of jurors or the summing up of counsel, for it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or
suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether and
conduct the trial himself. " Id. at 291 U. S. 106 (emphasis added). And in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.
S. 266 , the Court, in holding that a convicted person
had no absolute right to argue his own appeal, said this holding
was in "sharp contrast" to his "recognized privilege of conducting
his own defense at the trial." Id. at 334 U. S.
285 .

															The United States Courts of Appeals have repeatedly held that
the right of self-representation is protected by the Bill of
Rights. In United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized that the Sixth
Amendment grants the accused the rights of confrontation of
compulsory process for witnesses in his favor, and of assistance of
counsel as minimum procedural requirements in federal criminal
prosecutions. The right to the assistance of counsel, the court
concluded, was intended to supplement the other rights of the
defendant, and not to impair "the absolute and primary right to
conduct one's own defense in propria persona. " Id. at 274. The court found support for its decision in
the language of the 1789 federal statute; in the statutes and rules
governing criminal procedure, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and
Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 44; in the many state constitutions that
expressly guarantee self-representation; Page 422 U. S. 817 and in this Court's recognition of the right in Adams and Price. On these grounds, the Court of Appeals held
that implicit in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process of
law, and implicit also in the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
right to the assistance of counsel, is "the right of the accused
personally to manage and conduct his own defense in a criminal
case." 330 F.2d at 274. See also United States ex rel.
Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (CA2); MacKenna v.
Ellis, 263 F.2d 35, 41 (CA5); United States v.
Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169-1170 (CA6); Lowe v. United
States, 418 F.2d 100, 103 (CA7); United States v.
Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 733 (CA8); Haslam v. United
States, 431 F.2d 362, 365 (CA9); compare United States v.
Dougherty, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 86, 473 F.2d 1113, 1123
(intimating right is constitutional but finding it unnecessary to
reach issue) with Brown v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C.
77, 79-80, 264 F.2d 363, 365-366 (plurality opinion stating right
is no more than statutory in nature).

															This Court's past recognition of the right of
self-representation, the federal court authority holding the right
to be of constitutional dimension, and the state constitutions
pointing to the right's fundamental nature form a consensus not
easily ignored. "[T]he mere fact that a path is a beaten one," Mr.
Justice Jackson once observed, "is a persuasive reason for
following it." [ Footnote 13 ]
We confront here a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our
people, as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an
unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend
himself if he truly wants to do so. Page 422 U. S. 818 III This consensus is soundly premised. The right of
self-representation finds support in the structure of the Sixth
Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial jurisprudence
from which the Amendment emerged. A The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of the rights
necessary to a full defense:

															"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

															Because these rights are basic to our adversary system of
criminal justice, they are part of the "due process of law" that is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the
criminal courts of the States. [ Footnote 14 ] The rights to notice, confrontation, and
compulsory process, when taken together, guarantee that a criminal
charge may be answered in a manner now considered fundamental to
the fair administration of American justice -- through the calling
and interrogation of favorable witnesses, the cross-examination of
adverse witnesses, and the orderly introduction of evidence. In
short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary
criminal trial to make a defense as we know it. See California
v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 , 399 U. S. 176 (Harlan, J., concurring). Page 422 U. S. 819 The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall
be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the
right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must
be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," who must
be "confronted with the witnesses against him," and who must be
accorded "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to
self-representation -- to make one's own defense personally -- is
thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.
[ Footnote 15 ] The right to
defend Page 422 U. S. 820 is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the
consequences if the defense fails.

															The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the
"assistance" of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still
an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment
contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed
by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant -- not an
organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and
his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the
accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of
the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a
master, [ Footnote 16 ] and
the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character
upon which the Amendment insists. It is true that, when a defendant
chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and
tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding
decisions of trial strategy in many areas. Cf. Henry v.
Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443 , 379 U. S. 451 ; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1 , 384 U. S. 7 ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 439 .
This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant's
consent, at the Page 422 U. S. 821 outset, to accept counsel as his representative. An unwanted
counsel "represents" the defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in
such representation, the defense presented is not the defense
guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it
is not his defense. B The Sixth Amendment, when naturally read, thus implies a right
of self-representation. This reading is reinforced by the
Amendment's roots in English legal history.

															In the long history of British criminal jurisprudence, there was
only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel
upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal
was the Star Chamber. That curious institution, which flourished in
the late 16th and early 17th centuries, was of mixed executive and
Judicial character, and characteristically departed from common law
traditions. For those reasons, and because it specialized in trying
"political" offenses, the Star Chamber has, for centuries,
symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. [ Footnote 17 ] The Star Chamber not merely
allowed, but required, defendants to have counsel. The defendant's
answer to an indictment was not accepted unless it was signed by
counsel. When counsel refused to sign the answer, for whatever
reason, the defendant was Page 422 U. S. 822 considered to have confessed. [ Footnote 18 ] Stephen commented on this procedure:

															"There is something specially repugnant to justice in using
rules of practice in such a manner as Page 422 U. S. 823 to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the
professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his
defence."

															1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 341-342
(1883). The Star Chamber was swept away in 1641 by the
revolutionary fervor of the Long Parliament. The notion of
obligatory counsel disappeared with it.

															By the common law of that time, it was not representation by
counsel, but self-representation, that was the practice in
prosecutions for serious crime. At one time, every litigant was
required to "appear before the court in his own person and conduct
his own cause in his own words." [ Footnote 19 ] While a right to counsel developed early in
civil cases and in cases of misdemeanor, a prohibition against the
assistance of counsel continued for centuries in prosecutions for
felony or treason. [ Footnote
20 ] Thus, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the accused felon or
traitor stood alone, with neither counsel nor the benefit of other
rights -- to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process -- that
we now associate with a genuinely fair adversary proceeding. The
trial was merely a "long argument between the prisoner and the Page 422 U. S. 824 counsel for the Crown." [ Footnote 21 ] As harsh as this now seems, at least

															"the prisoner was allowed to make what statements he liked. . .
. Obviously, this public oral trial presented many more
opportunities to a prisoner than the secret enquiry based on
written depositions, which, on the continent, had taken the place
of a trial. [ Footnote
22 ]"

															With the Treason Act of 1695, there began a long and important
era of reform in English criminal procedure. The 1695 statute
granted to the accused traitor the rights to a copy of the
indictment, to have his witnesses testify under oath, and "to make
. . . full Defence, by Counsel learned in the Law." [ Footnote 23 ] It also provided for court
appointment of counsel, but only if the accused so
desired. [ Footnote
24 ] Page 422 U. S. 825 Thus, as new rights developed, the accused retained his
established right "to make what statements he liked." [ Footnote 25 ] The right to counsel
was viewed as guaranteeing a choice between representation by
counsel and the traditional practice of self-representation. The
ban on counsel in felony cases, which had been substantially eroded
in the courts, [ Footnote 26 ]
was finally eliminated by statute in 1836. [ Footnote 27 ] In more recent years, Parliament
has provided for court appointment of counsel in serious criminal
cases, but only at the accused's request. [ Footnote 28 ] At no point in this process of
reform in England was counsel ever forced upon the Page 422 U. S. 826 defendant. The common law rule, succinctly stated in R. v.
Woodward, [1944] K.B. 118, 119, [1944] 1 All E.R. 159 160, has
evidently always been that "no person charged with a criminal
offence can have counsel forced upon him against his will."
[ Footnote 29 ] See 3
Halsbury's Laws of England � 1141, pp. 624-625 (4th ed.1973); R. v. Maybury, 11 L.T.R. (n.s.) 566 (Q.B. 1865). C In the American Colonies, the insistence upon a right of
self-representation was, if anything, more fervent than in
England.

															The colonists brought with them an appreciation of the virtues
of self-reliance and a traditional distrust of lawyers. When the
Colonies were first settled,

															"the lawyer was synonymous with the cringing Attorneys-General
and Solicitors-General of the Crown, and the arbitrary Justices of
the King's Court, all bent on the conviction of those who opposed
the King's prerogatives, and twisting the law to secure
convictions. [ Footnote
30 ]"

															This prejudice gained strength in the Colonies, where
"distrust Page 422 U. S. 827 of lawyers became an institution." [ Footnote 31 ] Several Colonies prohibited pleading for
hire in the 17th century. [ Footnote 32 ] The prejudice persisted into the 18th
century, as "the lower classes came to identify lawyers with the
upper class." [ Footnote 33 ]
The years of Revolution and Confederation saw an upsurge of
anti-lawyer sentiment, a "sudden revival, after the War of the
Revolution, of the old dislike and distrust of lawyers as a class."
[ Footnote 34 ] In the heat of
these sentiments, the Constitution was forged.

															This is not to say that the Colonies were slow to recognize the
value of counsel in criminal cases. Colonial judges soon departed
from ancient English practice and allowed accused felons the aid of
counsel for their defense. [ Footnote 35 ] At the same time, however, the basic right
of Page 422 U. S. 828 self-representation was never questioned. We have found no
instance where a colonial court required a defendant in a criminal
case to accept as his representative an unwanted lawyer. Indeed,
even where counsel was permitted, the general practice continued to
be self-representation. [ Footnote 36 ]

															The right of self-representation was guaranteed in many colonial
charters and declarations of rights. These early documents
establish that the "right to counsel" meant to the colonists a
right to choose between pleading through a lawyer and representing
oneself. [ Footnote 37 ] After
the Page 422 U. S. 829 Declaration of Independence, the right of self-representation,
along with other rights basic to the making of a defense, entered
the new state constitutions in wholesale fashion. [ Footnote 38 ] The right to counsel was
clearly thought to Page 422 U. S. 830 supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself,
[ Footnote 39 ] utilizing his
personal rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory process.
And when the Colonies or newly independent States provided by
statute, rather than by constitution, for court appointment of
counsel in criminal cases, they also meticulously preserved the
right of the accused to defend himself personally. [ Footnote 40 ] Page 422 U. S. 831 The recognition of the right of self-representation was not
limited to the state lawmakers. As we have noted, § 35 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, signed one day before the Sixth Amendment
was proposed, guaranteed in the federal courts the right of all
parties to "plead and manage their own causes personally or by the
assistance of . . . counsel." 1 Stat. 92. See 28 U.S.C. §
1654. At the time James Madison drafted the Sixth Amendment, some
state constitutions guaranteed an accused the right to be heard "by
himself" and by counsel; others provided that an accused was to be
"allowed" counsel. [ Footnote
41 ] The various state proposals for the Bill of Rights had
similar variations in terminology. [ Footnote 42 ] Page 422 U. S. 832 In each case, however, the counsel provision was embedded in a
package of defense rights granted personally to the accused. There
is no indication that the differences in phrasing about "counsel"
reflected any differences of principle about self-representation.
No State or Colony had ever forced counsel upon an accused; no
spokesman had ever suggested that such a practice would be
tolerable, much less advisable. If anyone had thought that the
Sixth Amendment, as drafted, failed to protect the long-respected
right of self-representation, there would undoubtedly have been
some debate or comment on the issue. But there was none.

															In sum, there is no evidence that the colonists and the Framers
ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that
this right might be considered inferior to the right of assistance
of counsel. To the contrary, the colonists and the Framers, as well
as their English ancestors, always conceived of the right to
counsel as an "assistance" for the accused, to be used, at his
option, in defending himself. The Framers selected in the Sixth
Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of
self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of
consistent history. IV There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused
to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this
Court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no
accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded
the right to the assistance of counsel. See Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 ; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 . For
it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that
the help of a lawyer is essential to assure Page 422 U. S. 833 the defendant a fair trial. [ Footnote 43 ] And a strong argument can surely be made
that the whole thrust of those decisions must inevitably lead to
the conclusion that a State may constitutionally impose a lawyer
upon even an unwilling defendant.

															But it is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor,
has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to
say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does
not want. The value of state-appointed counsel was not
unappreciated by the Founders, [ Footnote 44 ] yet the notion of compulsory counsel was
utterly foreign to them. And whatever else may be said of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no Page 422 U. S. 834 doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice.
[ Footnote 45 ]

															It is undeniable that, in most criminal prosecutions, defendants
could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own
unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily
accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a
lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only
imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to
believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not
inconceivable that, in some rare instances, the defendant might, in
fact, present his case more effectively by conducting his own
defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages.
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer
or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.
It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to
decide whether, in his particular case, counsel is to his
advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately
to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 , 397 U. S.
350 -351 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). [ Footnote 46 ] Page 422 U. S. 835 V When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated
with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent
himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forgo those
relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 304 U. S.
464 -465. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708 , 332 U. S.
723 -724 (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a
defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a
lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose
self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. at 317 U. S.
279 .

															Here, weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and unequivocally
declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and
did not want counsel. The record affirmatively shows that Faretta
was literate, competent, and understanding, and that he was
voluntarily exercising his informed free will. The trial judge had
warned Faretta that he thought it was a mistake not to accept Page 422 U. S. 836 the assistance of counsel, and that Faretta would be required to
follow all the "ground rules" of trial procedure. [ Footnote 47 ] We need make no assessment of
how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the
hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern
challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. [ Footnote 48 ] For his technical legal
knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his
knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.

															In forcing Faretta, under these circumstances, to accept against
his will a state-appointed public defender, the California courts
deprived him of his constitutional right to conduct his own
defense. Accordingly, the judgment before us is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ] See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45 ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458 ; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455 ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.
S. 335 ; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 .

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The judge informed Faretta:

															"You are going to follow the procedure. You are going to have to
ask the questions right. If there is an objection to the form of
the question and it is properly taken, it is going to be sustained.
We are going to treat you like a gentleman. We are going to respect
you. We are going to give you every chance, but you are going to
play with the same ground rules that anybody plays. And you don't
know those ground rules. You wouldn't know those ground rules any
more than any other lawyer will know those ground rules until he
gets out and tries a lot of cases. And you haven't done it."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The colloquy was as follows:

															"THE COURT: In the Faretta matter, I brought you back down here
to do some reconsideration as to whether or not you should continue
to represent yourself."

															"How have you been getting along on your research?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Not bad, your Honor."

															"Last night, I put in the mail a 995 motion, and it should be
with the Clerk within the next day or two."

															"THE COURT: Have you been preparing yourself for the intricacies
of the trial of the matter?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, your Honor, I was hoping that the case
could possibly be disposed of on the 995."

															"Mrs. Ayers informed me yesterday that it was the Court's policy
to hear the pretrial motions at the time of trial. If possible,
your Honor, I would like a date set as soon as the Court deems
adequate after they receive the motion, sometime before trial."

															"THE COURT: Let's see how you have been doing on your
research."

															"How many exceptions are there to the hearsay rule?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, the hearsay rule would, I guess, be called
the best evidence rule, your Honor. And there are several
exceptions in case law, but in actual statutory law, I don't feel
there is none."

															"THE COURT: What are the challenges to the jury for cause?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, there is twelve peremptory challenges.
"

															"THE COURT: And how many for cause?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, as many as the Court deems valid."

															"THE COURT: And what are they? What are the grounds for
challenging a juror for cause?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well. numerous grounds to challenge a witness --
I mean, a juror, your Honor, one being the juror is perhaps
suffered, was a victim of the same type of offense, might be
prejudiced toward the defendant. Any substantial ground that might
make the juror prejudice[d] toward the defendant."

															"THE COURT: Anything else?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, a relative perhaps of the victim."

															"THE COURT: Have you taken a look at that code section to see
what it is?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Challenge a juror?"

															"THE COURT: Yes. ,"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. I have done -- "

															"THE COURT: What is the code section?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: On voir diring a jury, your Honor?"

															"THE COURT: Yes."

															"THE DEFENDANT: I am not aware of the section right
off-hand."

															"THE COURT: What code is it in?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, the research I have done on challenging
would be in Witkins Jurisprudence."

															"THE COURT: Have you looked at any of the codes to see where
these various things are taken up?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor, I haven't."

															"THE COURT: Have you looked in any of the California Codes with
reference to trial procedure?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor."

															"THE COURT: What codes?"

															"THE DEFENDANT: I have done extensive research in the Penal
Code, your Honor, and the Civil Code."

															"THE COURT: If you have done extensive research into it, then
tell me about it."

															"THE DEFENDANT: On empaneling a jury, your Honor?"

															"THE COURT: Yes."

															"THE DEFENDANT: Well, the District Attorney and the defendant,
defense counsel, has both the right to 12 peremptory challenges of
a jury. These 12 challenges are undisputable. Any reason that the
defense or prosecution should feel that a juror would be inadequate
to try the case or to rule on a case, they may then discharge that
juror."

															"But if there is a valid challenge due to grounds of prejudice
or some other grounds, that these aren't considered in the 12
peremptory challenges. There are numerous, and the defendant, the
defense and the prosecution both have the right to make any inquiry
to the jury as to their feelings toward the case."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The judge concluded:

															"[T]aking into consideration the recent case of People
versus Sharp, where the defendant apparently does not have a
constitutional right to represent himself, the Court finds that the
ends of justice and requirements of due process require that the
prior order permitting the defendant to represent himself in pro per should be and is hereby revoked. That privilege is
terminated."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Faretta also urged without success that he was entitled to
counsel of his choice, and three times moved for the appointment of
a lawyer other than the public defender. These motions, too, were
denied.

															[ Footnote 6 ] People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448 ,
499 P.2d 489.

															When Sharp was tried, the California Constitution expressly
provided that the accused in a criminal prosecution had the right
"to appear and defend, in person and with counsel." Cal.Const.,
Art. 1, § 13. In an earlier decision, the California Supreme Court
had held that this language meant that the accused had the right to
appear by himself or with counsel. People v.
Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d
777 , 336 P.2d 937. This view was rejected in Sharp, the California Supreme Court there holding that the defendant in a
criminal prosecution has no right under the State or the Federal
Constitution to represent himself at trial. See generally Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure
57-60 (4th ed.1974); Note, 10 Calif.Western L.Rev.196 (1973); Note,
24 Hastings L.J. 431 (1973); Comment, 64 J.Crim.L. 240 (1973).

															Although immaterial to the court's decision, shortly before Sharp was decided on appeal, the California Constitution
had been amended to delete the right of self-representation from
Art. 1, § 13, and to empower the legislature expressly "to require
the defendant in a felony case to have the assistance of counsel."
The new statutes, on their face, require counsel only in capital
cases. See Cal.Penal Code §§ 686(2), 686.1, 859, 987 (1970
and Supp. 1975). In other than capital cases, the accused retains,
by statutory terms, a right "to appear and defend in person and
with counsel." § 686(2). However, this language tracks the old
language of Art. 1, § 13, of the California Constitution, and, in
construing the constitutional language in Sharp to exclude
any right of self-representation under former Art. 1, § 13, of the
State Constitution, the California Supreme Court also stated that §
686(2) does not provide any right of self-representation.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The Court of Appeal also held that the trial court had not

															"abused its discretion in concluding that Faretta had not made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to be represented by
counsel,"

															since "Faretta did not appear aware of the possible consequences
of waiving the opportunity for skilled and experienced
representation at trial."

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The California courts' conclusion that Faretta had no
constitutional right to represent himself was made in the context
of the following not unusual rules of California criminal
procedure: an indigent criminal defendant has no right to appointed
counsel of his choice. See Drumgo v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930 ,
506 P.2d 1007; People v. Miller, 7 Cal. 3d 562 ,
574, 498 P.2d 1089, 1097; People v. Massie, 66 Cal. 2d
899 , 910, 428 P.2d 869, 876-877; People v.
Taylor, 259 Cal. App.
2d 448 , 450-451, 66 Cal. Rptr. 514, 515-517. The appointed
counsel manages the lawsuit, and has the final say in all but a few
matters of trial strategy. See, e.g., People v.
Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 894 ,
905, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015; People v. Foster, 67 Cal. 2d
604 , 606-607, 432 P.2d 976, 977-978; People v.
Monk, 56 Cal. 2d
288 , 299, 363 P.2d 865, 870-871; see generally Rhay v.
Browder, 342 F.2d 345, 349 (CA9). A California conviction will
not be reversed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel
except in the extreme case where the quality of representation was
so poor as to render the trial a "farce or a sham." People v.
Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d
460 , 386 P.2d 487; see People v. Miller, supra at 573,
498 P.2d at 1096-1097; People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694 ,
709, 464 P.2d 64, 73; People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d
678 , 689, 452 P.2d 329, 334; People v.
Reeves, 64 Cal. 2d
766 , 774, 415 P.2d 35, 39.

															[ Footnote 9 ] See, e.g., Mackreth v. Wilson, 31 Ala.App. 191, 15 So.
2d 112; Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 451
P.2d 1014; People v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d
570 , 268 N.E.2d 2 ; Blanton v. State, 229 Ind. 701, 98 N.E.2d
186 ; Westberry v. State, 254 A.2d
44 (Me.); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 87
N.E.2d 192; People v. Haddad, 306 Mich. 556, 11 N.W.2d
240; State v. McGhee, 184 Neb. 352, 167 N.W.2d
765 ; Zasada v. State, 19 N.J.Super. 589, 89 A.2d 45 ; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53
N.E.2d 356; State v. Pritchard, 227 N.C. 168, 41 S.E.2d
287; State v. Hollman, 232 S.C. 489, 102 S.E.2d
873 ; State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d
121 ; State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 ; State v. Woodall, 5 Wash. App. 901, 491 P.2d 680. See
generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961); 5 R. Anderson,
Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 2016 (1957).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Some States grant the accused the right to be heard, or to
defend, in person and by counsel: Ariz.Const., Art. 2, § 24;
Ark.Const., Art. 2, § 10; Colo.Const., Art. 2, § 16; Conn.Const.,
Art. 1, § 8; Del.Const., Art. 1, § 7; Idaho Const., Art. 1, § 13;
Ill.Const., Art. 1, § 8; Ind.Const., Art. 1, § 13; Ky.Const. Bill
of Rights, § 11; Mo.Const., Art. 1, § 18(a); Mont.Const., Art. 3, §
16; Nev.Const., Art. 1, § 8; N.H.Const., pt. 1, Art. 15;
N.M.Const., Art. 2, § 14; N.Y.Const., Art. 1, § 6; N.D.Const., Art.
1, § 13; Ohio Const., Art. 1, § 10; Okla.Const., Art. 2, § 20;
Ore.Const., Art. 1, § 11; Pa.Const., Art. 1, § 9; S.D.Const., Art.
6, § 7; Tenn.Const., Art. 1, § 9; Utah Const., Art. 1, § 12;
Vt.Const., c. 1, Art. 10; Wis.Const., Art. 1, § 7; see La.Const.,
Art. 1, § 9.

															Others grant the right to defend in person or by counsel:
Kan.Const.Bill of Rights, § 10; Mass.Const., pt. 1, Art. 12;
Neb.Const., Art. 1, § 11; Wash.Const., Art. 1, § 22.

															Still others provide the accused the right to defend either by
himself, by counsel, or both: Ala.Const., Art. 1, § 6; Fla.Const.,
Art. 1, § 16; Me.Const., Art. 1, § 6; Miss.Const., Art. 3, § 26;
S.C.Const., Art. 1 , § 14; Tex.Const., Art . 1 , § 10.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See, e.g., Lockard v. State, supra; People v. Nelson, supra;
Blanton v. State, supra; Zasada v. State, supra; People v.
McLaughlin, supra; State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d
164 ; State v. Verna, 9 Ore.App. 620, 498 P.2d
793 .

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The holding of Adams was reaffirmed in a different
context in Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.
S. 173 , 329 U. S.
174 -175, where the Court again adverted to the right of
self-representation:

															"Neither the historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality
it derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person the right to defend himself or to confess guilt. Under
appropriate circumstances, the Constitution requires that counsel
be tendered; it does not require that, under all circumstances,
counsel be forced upon a defendant."

															(Emphasis added.) See also Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.
S. 155 , 355 U. S.
161 .

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Jackson, Full Faith and Credit -- The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 Col.L.Rev. 1, 26 (1945).

															[ Footnote 14 ] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (right
to counsel); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.
S. 400 (right of confrontation); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (right
to compulsory process). See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 , 333 U. S.
273 .

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															This Court has often recognized the constitutional stature of
rights that, though not literally expressed in the document, are
essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process. It is
now accepted, for example, that an accused has a right to be
present at all stages of the trial where his absence might
frustrate the fairness of the proceedings, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 ; to
testify on his own behalf, see Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 , 401 U. S. 225 ; Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605 , 406 U. S. 612 ; cf. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570 ; and
to be convicted only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 ; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 .

															The inference of rights is not, of course, a mechanical
exercise. In Singer v. United States, 380 U. S.
24 , the Court held that an accused has no right to a
bench trial, despite his capacity to waive his right to a jury
trial. In so holding, the Court stated that "[t]he ability to waive
a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right
to insist upon the opposite of that right." Id. at 380 U. S. 34 -35.
But that statement was made only after the Court had
concluded that the Constitution does not affirmatively protect any
right to be tried by a judge. Recognizing that an implied right
must arise independently from the design and history of the
constitutional text, the Court searched for, but could not find,
any "indication that the colonists considered the ability to waive
a jury trial to be of equal importance to the right to demand one." Id. at 380 U. S. 26 .
Instead, the Court could locate only "isolated instances" of a
right to trial by judge, and concluded that these were "clear
departures from the common law." Ibid. We follow the approach of Singer here. Our concern is
with an independent right of self-representation. We do
not suggest that this right arises mechanically from a defendant's
power to waive the right to the assistance of counsel. See
supra at 422 U. S.
814 -815. On the contrary, the right must be
independently found in the structure and history of the
constitutional text.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Such a result would sever the concept of counsel from its
historic roots. The first lawyers were personal friends of the
litigant, brought into court by him so that he might "take counsel' with them" before pleading. 1 F. Pollock & F.
Maitland, The History of English Law 211 (2d ed.1909). Similarly,
the first "attorneys" were personal agents, often lacking any
professional training, who were appointed by those litigants who
had secured royal permission to carry on their affairs through a
representative, rather than personally. Id. at
212-213. [ Footnote 17 ]

															"The court of star chamber was an efficient, somewhat arbitrary
arm of royal power. It was at the height of its career in the days
of the Tudor and Stuart kings. Star chamber stood for swiftness and
power; it was not a competitor of the common law so much as a
limitation on it -- a reminder that high state policy could not
safely be entrusted to a system so chancy as English law. . .
."

															L. Friedman, A History of American Law 23 (1973). See
generally 5 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 155-214
(1927).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															"The proceedings before the Star Chamber began by a Bill
'engrossed in parchment and filed with the clerk of the court.' It
must, like the other pleadings, be signed by counsel. . . .
However, counsel were obliged to be careful what they signed. If
they put their hands to merely frivolous pleas, or otherwise
misbehaved themselves in the conduct of their cases, they were
liable to rebuke, suspension, a fine, or imprisonment."

															Holdsworth, supra, n 17, at 178-179. Counsel, therefore, had to be cautious
that any pleadings they signed would not unduly offend the Crown. See 1 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England
340-341 (1883).

															This presented not merely a hypothetical risk for the accused.
Stephen gives the following account of a criminal libel trial in
the Star Chamber:

															"In 1632, William Prynne was informed against for his book
called Histrio Mastiz. Prynne's answer was, amongst other
things, that his book had been licensed, and one of the counsel,
Mr. Holbourn, apologised, not without good cause, for his style. .
. . His trial was, like the other Star Chamber proceedings,
perfectly decent and quiet, but the sentence can be described only
as monstrous. He was sentenced to be disbarred and deprived of his
university degrees; to stand twice in the pillory, and to have one
ear cut off each time; to be fined �5,000; and to be perpetually
imprisoned, without books, pen, ink, or paper. . . ."

															"Five years after this, in 1637, Prynne, Bastwick, and Burton,
were tried for libel, and were all sentenced to the same punishment
as Prynne had received in 1632, Prynne being branded on the cheeks
instead of losing his ears."

															"The procedure in this case appears to me to have been as harsh
as the sentence was severe, though I do not think it has been so
much noticed. . . . Star Chamber defendants were not only allowed
counsel, but were required to get their answers signed by counsel.
The effect of this rule, and probably its object, was that no
defence could be put before the Court which counsel would not take
the responsibility of signing -- a responsibility which, at that
time, was extremely serious. If counsel would not sign the
defendant's answer, he was taken to have confessed the information.
Prynne's answer was of such a character that one of the counsel
assigned to him refused to sign it at all, and the other did not
sign it till after the proper time. Bastwick could get no one to
sign his answer. Burton's answer was signed by counsel, but was set
aside as impertinent. Upon the whole, the case was taken to be
admitted by all the three, and judgment was passed on them
accordingly. . . ."

															Stephen, supra, at 340-341.

															That Prynne's defense was foreclosed by the refusal of assigned
counsel to endorse his answer is all the more shocking when it is
realized that Prynne was himself a lawyer. I. Brant, The Bill of
Rights 106 (1965). On the operation of the Star Chamber generally, see Barnes, Star Chamber Mythology, 5 Am.J.Legal Hist.
1-11 (1961), and Barnes, Due Process and Slow Process in the Late
Elizabethan -- Early Stuart Star Chamber, 6 Am.J.Legal Hist.
221-249, 315-346 (1962).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Pollock & Maitland, supra, n 16, at 211.

															[ Footnote 20 ] Ibid. See also Stephen, supra, n 18, at 341.

															[ Footnote 21 ] Id. at 326.

															The trial would begin with accusations by counsel for the Crown.
The prisoner usually asked, and was granted, the privilege of
answering separately each matter alleged against him:

															"[T]he trial became a series of excited altercations between the
prisoner and the different counsel opposed to him. Every statement
of counsel operated as a question to the prisoner, . . . the
prisoner either admitting or denying or explaining what was alleged
against him. The result was that . . . the examination of the
prisoner . . . was the very essence of the trial, and his answers
regulated the production of the evidence. . . . As the argument
proceeded, the counsel [for the Crown] would frequently allege
matters which the prisoner denied and called upon them to prove.
The proof was usually given by reading depositions, confessions of
accomplices, letters, and the like. . . . When the matter had been
fully inquired into . . . , the presiding judge 'repeated,' or
summed up to the jury, the matters alleged against the prisoner and
the answers given by him, and the jury gave their verdict." Id. at 325-326.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Holdsworth, supra, n 17, at 195-196.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1. The right to call witnesses under oath was
extended to felony cases by statute in 1701. 1 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 9,
§ 3.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The statute provided, in pertinent part, that the accused

															"shall be received and admitted to make his and their full
Defence, by Counsel learned in the Law, and to make any Proof that
he or they can produce by lawful Witness or Witnesses, who shall
then be upon Oath, for his and their just Defence in that Behalf;
and in case any Person or Persons so accused or indicted shall
desire Counsel, the Court before whom such Person or Persons shall
be tried, or some Judge of that Court, shall and is hereby
authorized and required immediately, upon his or their Request, to
assign to such Person and Persons such and so many Counsel, not
exceeding Two, as the Person or Persons shall desire, to whom such
Counsel shall have free Access at all seasonable Hours, any Law or
Usage to the contrary notwithstanding."

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Holdsworth, supra, n 17, at 195.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															In Mary Blandy's 1752 murder trial, for example, the court
declared that counsel for the defendant could not only speak on
points of law raised by the defense, but could also examine defense
witnesses and cross-examine those of the Crown. 18 How.St.Tr. 1117.
Later in that century, judges often allowed counsel for the accused
"to instruct him what questions to ask, or even to ask questions
for him, with respect to matters of fact . . . [or] law." 4 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *355-356.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1. The statute provided, in
pertinent part, that the accused

															"shall be admitted, after the Close of the Case for the
Prosecution, to make full Answer and Defence thereto by Counsel
learned in the Law, or by Attorney in Courts where Attornies
practise as Counsel."

															[ Footnote 28 ] See, e.g., Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7,
c. 38, § 1; Poor Prisoners' Defense Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5,
c. 32; Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c.
51.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															Counsel had been appointed for the defendant Woodward, but
withdrew shortly before trial. When the trial court appointed a
substitute counsel, the defendant objected: "I would rather not
have legal aid. I would rather conduct the case myself." The trial
court insisted, however, that the defendant proceed to trial with
counsel, and a conviction resulted. On appeal, the Crown did not
even attempt to deny a basic right of self-representation, but
argued only that the right had been waived when the accused
accepted the first counsel. The Court of Appeal rejected this
argument:

															"The prisoner, right at the beginning [of the trial], said that
he wished to defend himself . . . , and he was refused what we
think was his right to make his own case to the jury instead of
having it made for him by counsel."

															This, the court held, was an "injustice to the prisoner," and,
"although there was a good deal of evidence against the prisoner,"
the court quashed the conviction.

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															C. Warren, A History of the American Bar 7 (1911).

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															D. Boorstin, The Americans; The Colonial Experience 197
(1958).

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641) in Art.
26 provided:

															"Every man that findeth himselfe unfit to plead his owne cause
in any Court shall have Libertie to imploy any man against whom the
Court doth not except, to helpe him, Provided he give him noe fee
or reward for his paines. . . ."

															Pleading for hire was also prohibited in 17th century Virginia,
Connecticut, and the Carolinas. Friedman, supra, n 17, at 81.

															[ Footnote 33 ] Id. at 82

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															Warren, supra, n. 30, at 212.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															For example, Zephaniah Swift, in one of the first American
colonial treatises on law, made clear that a right to counsel was
recognized in Connecticut. He wrote:

															"We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of
the common law of England that, when a man is on trial for his
life, he shall be refused counsel and denied those means of defence
which are allowed when the most trifling pittance of property is in
question. The flimsy pretence that the court are to be counsel for
the prisoner will only heighten our indignation at the practice,
for it is apparent to the least consideration that a court can
never furnish a person accused of a crime with the advice, and
assistance necessary to make his defence. . . ."

															"Our ancestors, when they first enacted their laws respecting
crimes, influenced by the illiberal principles which they had
imbibed in their native country, denied counsel to prisoners to
plead for them to anything but points of law. It is manifest that
there is as much necessity for counsel to investigate matters of
fact, as points of law, if truth is to be discovered."

															2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut
398-399 (1796).

															Similarly, colonial Virginia at first based its court
proceedings on English judicial customs, but, "[b]y the middle of
the eighteenth century, the defendant was permitted advice of
counsel if he could afford such services." H. Rankin, Criminal
Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia 67, 89
(1965).

															[ Footnote 36 ] See, e.g., id. at 89-90.

															[ Footnote 37 ] See, e.g., the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, Art. 26
(1641), supra, n 32.

															Similarly, the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, in
1677, provided, for all cases, civil and criminal,

															"that no person or persons shall be compelled to fee any
attorney or councillor to plead his cause, but that all persons
have free liberty to plead his own cause, if he please."

															The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682, perhaps "the most
influential of the Colonial documents protecting individual
rights," 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History
130 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz), provided:

															"That, in all courts, all persons of all persuasions may freely
appear in their own way, and according to their own manner, and
there personally plead their own cause themselves; or, if unable,
by their friends. . . ."

															That provision was no doubt inspired by William Penn's belief
that an accused should go free if he could personally persuade a
jury that it would be unjust to convict him. In England, 12 years
earlier, Penn, after preaching a sermon in the street, had been
indicted and tried for disturbing the peace. Penn conceded that he
was "unacquainted with the formality of the law," but requested
that he be given a fair hearing and the "liberty of making my
defence." The request was granted, Penn represented himself, and,
although the judges jailed him for contempt, the jury acquitted him
of the charge. "The People's Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted,
in the Trial of William Penn and William Mead, 1670," reproduced in
1 Schwartz 144, 147. See The Trial of William Penn, 6
How.St.Tr. 951 (1670), cited in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 , 397 U. S. 353 (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.).

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															Article IX of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, in 1776,
guaranteed "[t]hat, in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a
man hath a right to be heard by himself and his council. . . ." The
Vermont Declaration of Rights (Art. X) in 1777 protected the right
of self-representation with virtually identical language. The
Georgia Constitution (Art. LVIII), in 1777, declared that its
provisions barring the unauthorized practice of law were "not
intended to exclude any person from that inherent privilege of
every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause." In 1780, the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Art. XII, provided that the
accused had a right to be heard "by himself, or his counsel at his
election." The New Hampshire Bill of Rights (Art. XV), in 1783,
affirmed the right of the accused "to be fully heard in his defence
by himself, and counsel." In 1792, the Delaware Constitution (Art.
I, § 7) preserved the right in language modeled after Art. IX of
the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights. Similarly, in 1798, Georgia
included in its Constitution (Art. III, § 8) a provision that
protected the right of the accused to defend "by himself or
counsel, or both." Other state constitutions did not express in
literal terms a right of self-representation, but those documents
granted all defense rights to the accused personally, and phrased
the right of counsel in such fashion as to imply the existence of
the antecedent liberty. See Del. Declaration of Rights, §
14 (1776) (right "to be allowed counsel"); Md.Declaration of
Rights, Art. XIX (1776) (right "to be allowed counsel");
N.J.Const., Art. XVI (1776) (criminals to have "same privileges of
. . . counsel, as their prosecutors"); N.Y.Const., Art. XXXIV
(1777) ("shall be allowed counsel").

															[ Footnote 39 ]

															The Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right
of a free people. Underlying this belief was not only the
anti-lawyer sentiment of the populace, but also the "natural law"
thinking that characterized the Revolution's spokesmen. See P. Kauper, The Higher Law and the Rights of Man in a
Revolutionary Society, a lecture in the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research series on the American
Revolution, Nov. 7, 1973, extracted in 18 U. of Mich.Law School Law
Quadrangle Notes, No. 2, p. 9 (1974). For example, Thomas Paine,
arguing in support of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights,
said:

															"Either party . . . has a natural right to plead his own cause;
this right is consistent with safety; therefore it is retained; but
the parties may not be able, . . . therefore, the civil right of
pleading by proxy, that is, by a council, is an appendage to the
natural right [of self-representation]. . . ."

															Thomas Paine on a Bill of Rights, 1777, reprinted in 1 Schwartz
316.

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															Statutes providing for appointment of counsel on request of the
accused were enacted by Delaware in 1719, 1 Laws of the State of
Delaware, 1700-1797, p. 66 (Adams 1797); by Pennsylvania in 1718, 3
Stats. at Large of Pennsylvania 199 (Busch 1896); and by South
Carolina in 1731, Laws of the Province of South Carolina 518-519
(Trott 1736). Appointment was also the practice in Connecticut in
the latter part of the 18th century; appointment apparently was
sometimes made even when the accused failed to request counsel, if
he appeared in need of a lawyer, but there is no indication
appointment was ever made over the objection of the accused. See Swift, supra, n 35, at 392. Free-choice appointment remained the rule as the new
Republic emerged. See the 1791 statute of New Hampshire,
Laws of New Hampshire 247 (Melcher 1792), and the 1795 statute of
New Jersey, § 2, Acts of the Nineteenth General Assembly of the
State of New Jersey 1012.

															[ Footnote 41 ] See counsel provisions in n 38, supra. [ Footnote 42 ]

															In ratifying the Constitution, three States urged that a right
to counsel provision be added by way of amendment. Virginia and
North Carolina proposed virtually identical packages of a
defendant's rights, each including the provision that an accused be
"allowed" counsel. 2 Schwartz 841, 967. The package proposed by New
York provided that the accused "ought to . . . have . . . the
assistance of Council for his defense." Id. at 913. The
idea of proposing amendments upon ratification had begun with the
Pennsylvania dissenters from ratification, whose proposed package
of a defendant's rights provided for the accused's "right . . . to
be heard by himself and his counsel." Id. at 664-665. It
can be seen that Madison's precise formulation -- "the right . . .
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" -- varied in
phrasing from each of the proposals.

															"The available debates on the various proposals throw no light
on the significance or the interpretation which Congress attributed
to the right to counsel."

															W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 23
(1955).

															[ Footnote 43 ]

															As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 :

															"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small, and
sometimes no, skill in the science of law. If charged with crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial
without a proper charge and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of
the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in
any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due
process in the constitutional sense." Id. at 287 U. S.
69 .

															[ Footnote 44 ] See n 38, supra, for colonial appointment statutes that predate the
Sixth Amendment. Federal law provided for appointment of counsel in
capital cases at the request of the accused as early as 1790, 1
Stat. 118.

															[ Footnote 45 ] See, e.g., U.S.Const., Amdt. 1. Freedom of choice is
not a stranger to the constitutional design of procedural
protections for a defendant in a criminal proceeding. For example,
"[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so." Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 , 401 U. S. 225 . See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605 , 406 U. S. 612 ; Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U. S. 570 . Cf. Brown v. United States, 356 U.
S. 148 .

															[ Footnote 46 ]

															We are told that many criminal defendants representing
themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption of their
trials. But the right of self-representation has been recognized
from our beginnings by federal law and by most of the States, and
no such result has thereby occurred. Moreover, the trial judge may
terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately
engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. See Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 . Of
course, a State may -- even over objection by the accused --
appoint a "standby counsel" to aid the accused if and when the
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused
in the event that termination of the defendant's
self-representation is necessary. See United States v.
Dougherty, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 76, 87-89, 473 F.2d 1113,
1124-1126.

															The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the
dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Thus,
whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant
who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the
quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of "effective
assistance of counsel."

															[ Footnote 47 ] See n 2, supra. [ Footnote 48 ] See n 3, supra. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

															This case, like Herring v. New York, post, p. 422 U. S. 853 ,
announced today, is another example of the judicial tendency to
constitutionalize what is thought "good." That effort fails on its
own terms here, because there is nothing desirable or useful in
permitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and
inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his own defense to
criminal charges. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
Moreover, there is no constitutional basis for Page 422 U. S. 837 the Court's holding, and it can only add to the problems of an
already malfunctioning criminal justice system. I therefore
dissent. I The most striking feature of the Court's opinion is that it
devotes so little discussion to the matter which it concedes is the
core of the decision, that is, discerning an independent basis in
the Constitution for the supposed right to represent oneself in a
criminal trial. [ Footnote 2/2 ] See ante at 422 U. S.
818 -821, and n. 15. Its ultimate assertion that such a
right is tucked between the lines of the Sixth Amendment is
contradicted by the Amendment's language and its consistent
judicial interpretation.

															As the Court seems to recognize, ante at 422 U. S. 820 ,
the conclusion that the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
are "personal" to an accused reflects nothing more than the obvious
fact that it is he who is on trial, and therefore has need of a
defense. [ Footnote 2/3 ] But neither
that nearly Page 422 U. S. 838 trivial proposition nor the language of the Amendment, which
speaks in uniformly mandatory terms, leads to the further
conclusion that the right to counsel is merely supplementary and
may be dispensed with at the whim of the accused. Rather, this
Court's decisions have consistently included the right to counsel
as an integral part of the bundle making up the larger "right to a
defense as we know it." For example, in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), the Court reversed a summary contempt conviction at the
hands of a "one-man grand jury," and had this to say:

															"We . . . hold that failure to afford the petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge of
false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law. A
person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense -- a right to his day in
court -- are basic in our system of jurisprudence, and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against
him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel." Id. at 333 U. S. 273 . See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 , 407 U. S. 27 -33
(1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.
S. 335 , 372 U. S. 344 (1963).

															The reason for this hardly requires explanation. The fact of the
matter is that, in all but an extraordinarily small number of
cases, an accused will lose whatever defense he may have if he
undertakes to conduct the trial himself. The Court's opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), puts the point eloquently:

															"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small, and
sometimes no, skill in the science of law. If charged with crime,
he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may Page 422 U. S. 839 be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect." Id. at 287 U. S.
69 .

															Obviously, these considerations do not vary depending upon
whether the accused actively desires to be represented by counsel
or wishes to proceed pro se. Nor is it accurate to
suggest, as the Court seems to later in its opinion, that the
quality of his representation at trial is a matter with which only
the accused is legitimately concerned. See ante at 422 U. S. 834 .
Although we have adopted an adversary system of criminal justice, see Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, the prosecution is more
than an ordinary litigant, and the trial judge is not simply an
automaton who insures that technical rules are adhered to. Both are
charged with the duty of insuring that justice, in the broadest
sense of that term, is achieved in every criminal trial. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 , 373 U. S. 87 ,
and n. 2 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U. S.
78 , 295 U. S. 88 (1935). That goal is ill-served, and the integrity of and public
confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is
obtained due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive
counsel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by the lame
explanation that the defendant simply availed himself of the
"freedom" "to go to jail under his own banner. . . ." United
States ex rel. Page 422 U. S. 840 Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (CA2 1965). The
system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument
of self-destruction.

															In short, both the "spirit and the logic" of the Sixth Amendment
are that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest
possible defense; in the vast majority of cases, this command can
be honored only by means of the expressly guaranteed right to
counsel, and the trial judge is in the best position to determine
whether the accused is capable of conducting his defense. True
freedom of choice and society's interest in seeing that justice is
achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court retains
discretion to reject any attempted waiver of counsel and insist
that the accused be tried according to the Constitution. This
discretion is as critical an element of basic fairness as a trial
judge's discretion to decline to accept a plea of guilty. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 , 404 U. S. 262 (1971). II The Court's attempt to support its result by collecting dicta
from prior decisions is no more persuasive than its analysis of the
Sixth Amendment. Considered in context, the cases upon which the
Court relies to "beat its path" either lead it nowhere or point in
precisely the opposite direction.

															In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.
S. 269 (1942), and Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946), the defendants had competently waived counsel, but later
sought to renounce actions taken by them while proceeding pro
se. In both cases, this Court upheld the convictions, holding
that neither an uncounseled waiver of jury trial nor an uncounseled
guilty plea is inherently defective under the Constitution. The
language which the Court so carefully excises from those opinions
relates not to an affirmative right of self-representation, but
to Page 422 U. S. 841 the consequences of waiver. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In Adams, for example, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was careful to point out that his reference to
a defendant's "correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help"
meant only that "[h]e may waive his Constitutional right to
assistance of counsel . . . ," 317 U.S. at 317 U. S. 279 . See United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 733 (CA8 1970).
But, as the Court recognizes, the power to waive a constitutional
right does not carry with it the right to insist upon its opposite. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 , 380 U. S. 34 -35
(1965).

															Similarly, in Carter, the Court's opinion observed that
the Constitution "does not require that, under all
circumstances, counsel be forced upon a defendant," citing Adams, 329 U.S. at 329 U. S.
174 -175 (emphasis added). I, for one, find this
statement impossible to square with the Court's present holding
that an accused is absolutely entitled to dispense with a lawyer's
help under all conditions. Thus, although Adams and Carter support the Court's conclusion that a defendant who
represents himself may not thereafter disaffirm his deliberate
trial decisions, see ante at 422 U. S.
834 -835, n. 46, they provide it no comfort regarding the
primary issue in this case. [ Footnote
2/5 ] Page 422 U. S. 842 Far more nearly in point is Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266 (1948), where this Court held that, although the courts of appeals
possess the power to command that a prisoner be produced to argue
his own appeal, the exercise of that power is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. An examination of the whole of the Court's
reasoning on this point is instructive:

															"The discretionary nature of the power in question grows out of
the fact that a prisoner has no absolute right to argue his own
appeal, or even to be present at the proceedings in an appellate
court. The absence of that right is in sharp contrast to his
constitutional prerogative of being present in person at each
significant stage of a felony prosecution, and to his recognized
privilege of conducting his own defense at the trial. Lawful
incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system. Among those so limited
is the otherwise unqualified right given by § 272 of the Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 394 [now § 1654], to parties in all the courts of
the United States to 'plead and manage their own causes
personally.'" Id. at 334 U. S.
285 -286 (citations omitted). It barely requires emphasis
that this passage contrasts the "constitutional prerogative" to be
present at trial with the "recognized privilege" of
self-representation, and strongly implies that the latter arises
only from the federal statute. It is difficult to imagine a
position less consistent with Price v. Johnston than that
taken by the Court today. Page 422 U. S. 843 The Court of Appeals cases relied upon by the Court are likewise
dubious authority for its views. Only one of those cases, United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (CA2 1964), even
attempted a reasoned analysis of the issue, and the decision in
that case was largely based upon the misreading of Adams and Price which the Court perpetuates in its opinion
today. See 330 F.2d at 275. In every other case cited ante at 422 U. S. 817 ,
the Courts of Appeals assumed that the right of self-representation
was constitutionally based, but found that the right had not been
violated and affirmed the conviction under review. It is highly
questionable whether such holdings would even establish the law of
the Circuits from which they came.

															In short, what the Court represents as a well traveled road is,
in reality, a constitutional trail which it is blazing for the
first time today, one that has not even been hinted at in our
previous decisions. Far from an interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, it is a perversion of the provision to which we gave
full meaning in Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger
v. Hamlin. III Like MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, I hesitate to participate in the
Court's attempt to use history to take it where legal analysis
cannot. Piecing together shreds of English legal history and early
state constitutional and statutory provisions, without a full
elaboration of the context in which they occurred or any evidence
that they were relied upon by the drafters of our Federal
Constitution, creates more questions than it answers, and hardly
provides the firm foundation upon which the creation of new
constitutional rights should rest. We are well reminded that this
Court once employed an exhaustive analysis of English and colonial
practices regarding the Page 422 U. S. 844 right to counsel to justify the conclusion that it was
fundamental to a fair trial and, less than 10 years later, used
essentially the same material to conclude that it was not. Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 287 U. S. 60 -65, with Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , 316 U. S.
465 -471 (1942).

															As if to illustrate this point, the single historical fact cited
by the Court which would appear truly relevant to ascertaining the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment proves too much. As the Court points
out, ante at 422 U. S. 831 ,
§ 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided a statutory right to
self-representation in federal criminal trials. The text of the
Sixth Amendment, which expressly provides only for a right to
counsel, was proposed the day after the Judiciary Act was signed.
It can hardly be suggested that the Members of the Congress of
1789, then few in number, were unfamiliar with the Amendment's
carefully structured language, which had been under discussion
since the 1787 Constitutional Convention. And it would be most
remarkable to suggest, had the right to conduct one's own defense
been considered so critical as to require constitutional
protection, that it would have been left to implication. Rather,
under traditional canons of construction, inclusion of the right in
the Judiciary Act and its omission from the constitutional
amendment drafted at the same time by many of the same men,
supports the conclusion that the omission was intentional.

															There is no way to reconcile the idea that the Sixth Amendment
impliedly guaranteed the right of an accused to conduct his own
defense with the contemporaneous action of the Congress in passing
a statute explicitly giving that right. If the Sixth Amendment
created a right to self-representation, it was unnecessary for
Congress to enact any statute on the subject at all. Page 422 U. S. 845 In this case, therefore, history ought to lead judges to
conclude that the Constitution leaves to the judgment of
legislatures, and the flexible process of statutory amendment, the
question whether criminal defendants should be permitted to conduct
their trials pro se. See Betts v. Brady, supra. And the fact that we have not hinted at a contrary view for 185
years is surely entitled to some weight in the scales. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Cf. Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U. S. 22 , 260 U. S. 31 (1922). IV Society has the right to expect that, when courts find new
rights implied in the Constitution, their potential effect upon the
resources of our criminal justice system will be considered.
However, such considerations are conspicuously absent from the
Court's opinion in this case.

															It hardly needs repeating that courts at all levels are already
handicapped by the unsupplied demand for competent advocates, with
the result that it often takes far longer to complete a given case
than experienced counsel would require. If we were to assume that
there will be widespread exercise of the newly discovered
constitutional right to self-representation, it would almost
certainly follow that there will be added congestion in the courts,
and that the quality of justice will suffer. Moreover, the Court
blandly assumes that, once an accused has elected to defend
himself, he will be bound by his choice, and not be heard to
complain of it later. Ante at 422 U. S.
834 -835, n. 46. This assumption ignores the role of
appellate review, for the reported cases are replete with instances
of a convicted defendant being relieved of a Page 422 U. S. 846 deliberate decision even when made with the advice of
counsel. See Silber v. United States, 370 U.
S. 717 (1962). It is totally unrealistic, therefore, to
suggest that an accused will always be held to the consequences of
a decision to conduct his own defense. Unless, as may be the case,
most persons accused of crime have more wit than to insist upon the
dubious benefit that the Court confers today, we can expect that
many expensive and good faith prosecutions will be nullified on
appeal for reasons that trial courts are now deprived of the power
to prevent. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Absent a statute giving a right to self-representation, I
believe that trial courts should have discretion under the
Constitution to insist upon representation by counsel if the
interests of justice so require. However, I would note that the
record does not support the Court's characterization of this case
as one in which that occurred. Although he requested, and initially
was granted, permission to proceed pro se, petitioner has
expressed no dissatisfaction with the lawyer who represented him,
and has not alleged that his defense was impaired, or that his
lawyer refused to honor his suggestions regarding how the trial
should be conducted. In other words, to use the Court's phrase,
petitioner has never contended that " his defense" was not
fully presented. Instances of overbearing or ineffective counsel
can be dealt with without contriving broad constitutional rules of
dubious validity.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court deliberately, and, in my view, properly, declines to
characterize this case as one in which the defendant was denied a
fair trial. See Herring v. New York, post at 422 U. S. 871 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Court's attempt to derive support for its position from the
fact that the Sixth Amendment speaks in terms of the "Assistance of
Counsel" requires little comment. It is most curious to suggest
that an accused who exercises his right to "assistance" has thereby
impliedly consented to subject himself to a "master." Ante at 422 U. S. 820 .
And counsel's responsibility to his client and role in the
litigation do not vary depending upon whether the accused would
have preferred to represent himself.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Indeed, the portion of the Court's quotation which warns against
turning constitutional protections into "fetters" refers to the
right to trial by jury, not the right to counsel. See Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.
S. 269 , 317 U. S. 279 (1942). This Court has, of course, squarely held that there is no
constitutional right to dispense with a jury. Singer v. United
States, 380 U. S. 24 (1965).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															No more relevant is Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1934). The reference in that case to an accused's "power . . . to
supersede his lawyers" simply helped explain why his defense might
"be made easier" if he were "permitted to be present at the
examination of jurors or the summing up of counsel. . . ." Id. at 291 U. S. 106 .
Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court made plain that this
right was rooted in considerations of fundamental fairness, and was
to be distinguished from those conferred by the Confrontation
Clause. See id. at 291 U. S. 107 .
The Court's present reliance on the Snyder dicta is
therefore misplaced. See 422
U.S. 806 fn2/2|>n.2, supra. [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The fact that Congress has retained a statutory right to
self-representation suggests that it has also assumed that the
Sixth Amendment does not guarantee such a right. See 28
U.S.C. § 1654.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Some of the damage we can anticipate from a defendant's
ill-advised insistence on conducting his own defense may be
mitigated by appointing a qualified lawyer to sit in the case as
the traditional "friend of the court." The Court does not foreclose
this option. See ante at 422 U. S.
834 -835, n. 46.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

															Today, the Court holds that the Sixth Amendment guarantees to
every defendant in a state criminal trial the right to proceed
without counsel whenever he elects to do so. I find no textual
support for this conclusion in the language of the Sixth Amendment.
I find the historical evidence relied upon by the Court to be
unpersuasive, especially in light of the recent history of criminal
procedure. Finally, I fear that the right to self-representation
constitutionalized today frequently will cause procedural confusion
without advancing any significant strategic interest of the
defendant. I therefore dissent. I The starting point, of course, is the language of the Sixth
Amendment:

															"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy Page 422 U. S. 847 the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

															It is self-evident that the Amendment makes no direct reference
to self-representation. Indeed, the Court concedes that the right
to self-representation is "not stated in the Amendment in so many
words." Ante at 422 U. S.
819 .

															It could be argued that the right to assistance of counsel
necessarily carries with it the right to waive assistance of
counsel. The Court recognizes, however, ante at 422 U. S.
819 -820, n. 15, that it has squarely rejected any
mechanical interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for a unanimous Court in Singer v. United
States, 380 U. S. 24 , 380 U. S. 34 -35
(1965), stated: "The ability to waive a constitutional right does
not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite
of that right."

															Where, then, in the Sixth Amendment does one find this right to
self-representation? According to the Court, it is "necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment." Ante at 422 U. S. 819 .
The Court's chain of inferences is delicate, and deserves scrutiny.
The Court starts with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment is
"a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full defense." Ante at 422 U. S. 818 .
From this proposition, the Court concludes that the Sixth Amendment
"constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to
make a defense as we know it." Ibid. Up to this point, at
least as a general proposition, the Court's reasoning is
unexceptionable. Page 422 U. S. 848 The Court, however, then concludes that, because the specific
rights in the Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused, the
accused must have a right to exercise those rights personally.
Stated somewhat more succinctly, the Court reasons that, because
the accused has a personal right to "a defense as we know it," he
necessarily has a right to make that defense personally. I
disagree. Although I believe the specific guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment are personal to the accused, I do not agree that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees any particular procedural method of
asserting those rights. If an accused has enjoyed a speedy trial by
an impartial jury in which he was informed of the nature of the
accusation, confronted with the witnesses against him, afforded the
power of compulsory process, and represented effectively by
competent counsel, I do not see that the Sixth Amendment requires
more.

															The Court suggests that thrusting counsel upon the accused
against his considered wish violates the logic of the Sixth
Amendment because counsel is to be an assistant, not a master. The
Court seeks to support its conclusion by historical analogy to the
notorious procedures of the Star Chamber. The potential for
exaggerated analogy, however, is markedly diminished when one
recalls that petitioner is seeking an absolute right to
self-representation. This is not a case where defense counsel,
against the wishes of the defendant or with inadequate
consultation, has adopted a trial strategy that significantly
affects one of the accused's constitutional rights. For such
overbearing conduct by counsel, there is a remedy. Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U. S. 1 (1966); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 372 U. S. 439 (1963). Nor is this a case where distrust, animosity, or other
personal differences between the accused and his would-be counsel
have rendered effective representation unlikely or impossible. Page 422 U. S. 849 See Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1169-1170 (CA9
1970). See also Anders v. California, 386 U.
S. 738 (1967). Nor is this even a case where a defendant
has been forced, against his wishes, to expend his personal
resources to pay for counsel for his defense. See generally
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40 (1974); James v. Strange, 407 U.
S. 128 (1972). Instead, the Court holds that any
defendant in any criminal proceeding may insist on representing
himself regardless of how complex the trial is likely to be and
regardless of how frivolous the defendant's motivations may be. I
cannot agree that there is anything in the Due Process Clause or
the Sixth Amendment that requires the States to subordinate the
solemn business of conducting a criminal prosecution to the
whimsical -- albeit voluntary -- caprice of every accused who
wishes to use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political
self-gratification.

															The Court seems to suggest that, so long as the accused is
willing to pay the consequences of his folly, there is no reason
for not allowing a defendant the right to self-representation. Ante at 422 U. S. 834 . See also United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348
F.2d 12, 15 (CA2 1965) ("[E]ven in cases where the accused is
harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense, respect
for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail
under his own banner if he so desires. . . ."). That view ignores
the established principle that the interest of the State in a
criminal prosecution "is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78 , 295 U. S. 88 (1935). See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 37 .
For my part, I do not believe that any amount of pro se pleading can cure the injury to society of an unjust result, but I
do believe that a just result should prove to be an effective balm
for almost any frustrated pro se defendant. Page 422 U. S. 850 II The Court argues that its conclusion is supported by the
historical evidence on self-representation. It is true that
self-representation was common, if not required, in 18th century
English and American prosecutions. The Court points with special
emphasis to the guarantees of self-representation in colonial
charters, early state constitutions, and § 35 of the first
Judiciary Act as evidence contemporaneous with the Bill of Rights
of widespread recognition of a right to self-representation.

															I do not participate in the Court's reliance on the historical
evidence. To begin with, the historical evidence seems to me to be
inconclusive in revealing the original understanding of the
language of the Sixth Amendment. At the time the Amendment was
first proposed, both the right to self-representation and the right
to assistance of counsel in federal prosecutions were guaranteed by
statute. The Sixth Amendment expressly constitutionalized the right
to assistance of counsel, but remained conspicuously silent on any
right of self-representation. The Court believes that this silence
of the Sixth Amendment as to the latter right is evidence of the
Framers' belief that the right was so obvious and fundamental that
it did not need to be included "in so many words" in order to be
protected by the Amendment. I believe it is at least equally
plausible to conclude that the Amendment's silence as to the right
of self-representation indicates that the Framers simply did not
have the subject in mind when they drafted the language.

															The paucity of historical support for the Court's position
becomes far more profound when one examines it against the
background of two developments in the more recent history of
criminal procedure. First, until the middle of the 19th century,
the defendant in a criminal proceeding in this country was almost
always disqualified Page 422 U. S. 851 from testifying as a witness because of his "interest" in the
outcome. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.
S. 570 (1961). Thus, the ability to defend "in person"
was frequently the defendant's only chance to present his side of
the case to the judge or jury. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 50 Tenn. 232 (1871). Such Draconian rules of evidence, of course,
are now a relic of the past, because virtually every State has
passed a statute abrogating the common law rule of
disqualification. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 365 U. S.
575 -577, 365 U. S. 596 .
With the abolition of the common law disqualification, the right to
appear "in person" as well as by counsel lost most, if not all, of
its original importance. See Grano, The Right to Counsel:
Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 Minn.L.Rev. 1175,
1192-1194 (1970).

															The second historical development is this Court's elaboration of
the right to counsel. The road the Court has traveled from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 (1972), need not be recounted here. For our purposes,
it is sufficient to recall that, from start to finish, the
development of the right to counsel has been based on the premise
that representation by counsel is essential to ensure a fair trial.
The Court concedes this, and acknowledges that

															"a strong argument can surely be made that the whole thrust of
those decisions must inevitably lead to the conclusion that a State
may constitutionally impose a lawyer upon even an unwilling
defendant." Ante at 422 U. S. 833 .
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that self-representation must be
allowed despite the obvious dangers of unjust convictions in order
to protect the individual defendant's right of free choice. As I
have already indicated, I cannot agree to such a drastic
curtailment of the interest of the State in seeing that justice is
done in a real and objective sense. Page 422 U. S. 852 III In conclusion, I note briefly the procedural problems that, I
suspect, today's decision will visit upon trial courts in the
future. Although the Court indicates that a pro se defendant necessarily waives any claim he might otherwise make of
ineffective assistance of counsel, ante at 422 U. S.
834 -835, n. 46, the opinion leaves open a host of other
procedural questions. Must every defendant be advised of his right
to proceed pro se? If so, when must that notice be given? Since the
right to assistance of counsel and the right to self-representation
are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right to be
measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to
proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional right
to assistance of standby counsel? How soon in the criminal
proceeding must a defendant decide between proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in mid-trial? May a
violation of the right to self-representation ever be harmless
error? Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant
differently than it would professional counsel? I assume that many
of these questions will be answered with finality in due course.
Many of them, however, such as the standards of waiver and the
treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of
every defendant who elects to exercise his right to
self-representation. The procedural problems spawned by an absolute
right to self-representation will far outweigh whatever tactical
advantage the defendant may feel he has gained by electing to
represent himself.

															If there is any truth to the old proverb that "one who is his
own lawyer has a fool for a client," the Court by its opinion today
now bestows a constitutional right on one to make a fool of
himself.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to represent themselves without a lawyer if they voluntarily and intelligently choose to do so. The court decided that states cannot force a lawyer upon a defendant who wishes to conduct their own defense.