U.S. Supreme Court New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981) New York v. Belton No. 80-328 Argued April 27, 1981 Decided July 1, 1981 453
U.S. 454 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK Syllabus An automobile in which respondent was one of the occupants was
stopped by a New York State policeman for traveling at an excessive
rate of speed. In the process of discovering that none of the
occupants owned the car or was related to the owner, the policeman
smelled burnt marihuana and saw on the floor of the car an envelope
suspected of containing marihuana. He then directed the occupants
to get out of the car and arrested them for unlawful possession of
marihuana. After searching each of the occupants, he searched the
passenger compartment of the car, found a jacket belonging to
respondent, unzipped one of the pockets, and discovered cocaine.
Subsequently, respondent was indicted for criminal possession of a
controlled substance. After the trial court had denied his motion
to suppress the cocaine seized from his jacket pocket, respondent
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, while preserving his
claim that the cocaine had been seized in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and
seizure, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The search of respondent's jacket was a search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and hence did not violate
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The jacket, being located
inside the passenger compartment of the car, was "within the
arrestee's immediate control" within the meaning of Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 ,
wherein it was held that a lawful custodial arrest creates a
situation justifying the contemporaneous warrantless search of the
arrestee and of the immediately surrounding area. Not only may the
police search the passenger compartment of the car in such
circumstances, they may also examine the contents of any containers
found in the passenger compartment. And such a container may be
searched whether it is open or closed, since the justification for
the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the
container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. Pp. 453 U. S.
457 -463.

															50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, reversed.

															STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., Page 453 U. S. 455 filed a concurring statement, post, p. 453 U. S. 463 .
STEVENS, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 453 U. S. 463 .
BRENNAN, J., post, p. 453 U. S. 463 ,
and WHITE, J., post, p. 453 U. S. 472 ,
filed dissenting opinions, in which MARSHALL, J., joined.

															JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															When the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful
custodial arrest, does the constitutionally permissible scope of a
search incident to his arrest include the passenger compartment of
the automobile in which he was riding? That is the question at
issue in the present case. I On April 9, 1978, Trooper Douglas Nicot, a New York State
policeman driving an unmarked car on the New York Thruway, was
passed by another automobile traveling at an excessive rate of
speed. Nicot gave chase, overtook the speeding vehicle, and ordered
its driver to pull it over to the side of the road and stop. There
were four men in the car, one of whom was Roger Belton, the
respondent in this case. The policeman asked to see the driver's
license and automobile registration, and discovered that none of
the men owned the vehicle or was related to its owner. Meanwhile,
the policeman had smelled burnt marihuana, and had seen on Page 453 U. S. 456 the floor of the car an envelope marked "Supergold" that he
associated with marihuana. He therefore directed the men to get out
of the car, and placed them under arrest for the unlawful
possession of marihuana. He patted down each of the men and "split
them up into four separate areas of the Thruway at this time so
they would not be in physical touching area of each other." He then
picked up the envelope marked "Supergold" and found that it
contained marihuana. After giving the arrestees the warnings
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 , the state policeman searched each one of them.
He then searched the passenger compartment of the car. On the back
seat, he found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton. He
unzipped one of the pockets of the jacket and discovered cocaine.
Placing the jacket in his automobile, he drove the four arrestees
to a nearby police station.

															Belton was subsequently indicted for criminal possession of a
controlled substance. In the trial court, he moved that the cocaine
the trooper had seized from the jacket pocket be suppressed. The
court denied the motion. Belton then pleaded guilty to a lesser
included offense, but preserved his claim that the cocaine had been
seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.
S. 283 . The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure,
reasoning that, "[o]nce defendant was validly arrested for
possession of marihuana, the officer was justified in searching the
immediate area for other contraband." 68 App.Div.2d 198, 201, 416
N.Y.S.2d 922, 925.

															The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that

															"[a] warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an
unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident to a
lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the arrestee
or a confederate might gain access to the article."

															50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421. Two judges
dissented. Page 453 U. S. 457 They pointed out that the

															"search was conducted by a lone peace officer who was in the
process of arresting four unknown individuals whom he had stopped
in a speeding car owned by none of them and apparently containing
an uncertain quantity of a controlled substance. The suspects were
standing by the side of the car as the officer gave it a quick
check to confirm his suspicions before attempting to transport them
to police headquarters. . . ." Id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424. We granted certiorari to
consider the constitutionally permissible scope of a search in
circumstances such as these. 449 U.S. 1109. II It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that
the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a
neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so. This
Court has recognized, however, that "the exigencies of the
situation" may sometimes make exemption from the warrant
requirement "imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 335 U. S. 456 .
Specifically, the Court held in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 ,
that a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies
the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested
and of the immediately surrounding area. Such searches have long
been considered valid because of the need "to remove any weapons
that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape," and the need to prevent the concealment or
destruction of evidence. Id. at 395 U. S.
763 .

															The Court's opinion in Chimel emphasized the principle
that, as the Court had said in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 19 ,
"[t]he scope of [a] search must be strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." Quoted in Chimel v. California, supra, at 395 U. S. 762 .
Thus, while the Court in Chimel found "ample
justification" for a search of "the area from within which [an
arrestee] Page 453 U. S. 458 might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," the
Court found

															"no comparable justification . . . for routinely searching any
room other than that in which an arrest occurs -- or, for that
matter for searching through all the desk drawers or other closed
or concealed areas in that room itself."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
763 .

															Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest may be stated clearly enough, courts have
discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific cases. Yet,
as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments

															"can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of
rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of
privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement."

															LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S.Ct.Rev. 127,
142. This is because

															"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the
exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in
their day-to-day activities, and thus ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of
the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily
engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle
nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff
upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but
they may be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in
the field.'" Id. at 141. In short,

															"[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 , 442 U. S.
213 -214. Page 453 U. S. 459 So it was that, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 , the
Court hewed to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and
predictably enforced:

															"[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of
the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment." Id. at 442 U. S. 235 .
In so holding, the Court rejected the suggestion that

															"there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or
not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority
for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest." Ibid. But no straightforward rule has emerged from the litigated cases
respecting the question involved here -- the question of the proper
scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a
lawful custodial arrest of its occupants. The difficulty courts
have had is reflected in the conflicting views of the New York
judges who dealt with the problem in the present case, and is
confirmed by a look at even a small sample drawn from the narrow
class of cases in which courts have decided whether, in the course
of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of the
occupants of an automobile, police may search inside the automobile
after the arrestees are no longer in it. On the one hand, decisions
in cases such as United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309
(CA8 1980); United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (CA9
1977); and United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (CA5
1973), have upheld such warrantless searches as incident to lawful
arrests. On the other hand, in cases such as United States v.
Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (CA8 1980), and United States v.
Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (CA5 1980), such searches, in comparable
factual circumstances, have been held constitutionally invalid.
[ Footnote 1 ]

															When a person cannot know how a court will apply a Page 453 U. S. 460 settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person
cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a
policeman know the scope of his authority. While the Chimel case established that a search incident to an
arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control
of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of "the
area within the immediate control of the arrestee" when that area
arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is
its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases suggests the
generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass
of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
generally, even if not inevitably, within "the area into which an
arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
ite[m]." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 763 .
In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases
requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the
area that may be searched in light of that generalization.
Accordingly, we hold that, when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, [ Footnote 2 ] he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile. [ Footnote 3 ]

															It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine
the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of
the arrestee, so also will containers in it be within his reach.
[ Footnote 4 ] United States
v. Robinson, supra; 358 U. S. S.
461� v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 .
Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is open or
closed, since the justification for the search is not that the
arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the
lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy
interest the arrestee may have. Thus, while the Court in Chimel@ held that the police could not search all the drawers in an
arrestee's house simply because the police had arrested him at
home, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach could
be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the
police. 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
763 .

															It is true, of course, that these containers will sometimes be
such that they could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the
criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested. However, in United States v. Robinson, the Court rejected the argument
that such a container -- there a "crumpled up cigarette package" --
located during a search of Robinson incident to his arrest could
not be searched:

															"The authority to search the person incident to a lawful
custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to
discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons
or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification."

															414 U.S. at 414 U. S.
235 .

															The New York Court of Appeals relied upon United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 , in
concluding that the search and seizure in the present case were
constitutionally invalid. [ Footnote
5 ] But neither of those Page 453 U. S. 462 cases involved an arguably valid search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest. As the Court pointed out in the Chadwick case:

															"Here the search was conducted more than an hour after federal
agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long
after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore
cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any
other exigency."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 15 . And
in the Sanders case, the Court explicitly stated that it
did not

															"consider the constitutionality of searches of luggage incident
to the arrest of its possessor. See, e.g., United States v.
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973). The State
has not argued that respondent's suitcase was searched incident to
his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not within his
'immediate control' at the time of the search."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 764 ,
n. 11. (The suitcase in question was in the trunk of the taxicab. See n 4, supra. ) III It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a
lawful custodial arrest on a charge of possessing marihuana. The
search of the respondent's jacket followed immediately upon that
arrest. The jacket was located inside the passenger compartment of
the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he
was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have
concluded was "within the arrestee's immediate control" within the
meaning of the Chimel case. [ Footnote 6 ] The search of the jacket, therefore, was a Page 453 U. S. 463 search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and it did not
violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the
judgment is reversed. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The state court cases are in similar disarray. Compare,
e.g., Hinkel v. Anchorage, 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980), with Ulesky v. State, 379 So. 2d 121
(Fla.App.1979).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The validity of the custodial arrest of Belton has not been
questioned in this case. Cf. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 , 414 U. S. 266 (concurring opinion) .

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic
context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established
in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches
incident to lawful custodial arrests.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															"Container" here denotes any object capable of holding another
object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments,
consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the
passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing,
and the like. Our holding encompasses only the interior of the
passenger compartment of an automobile, and does not encompass the
trunk.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															It seems to have been the theory of the Court of Appeals that
the search and seizure in the present case could not have been
incident to the respondent's arrest, because Trooper Nicot, by the
very act of searching the respondent's jacket and seizing the
contents of its pocket, had gained "exclusive control" of them. 50
N.Y.2d 447, 451, 407 N.E.2d 420, 422. But, under this fallacious
theory, no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest
would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee's
person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his
"exclusive control."

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Because of this disposition of the case, there is no need here
to consider whether the search and seizure were permissible under
the so-called "automobile exception." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 .

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring.

															Because it is apparent that a majority of the Court is unwilling
to overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
S. 643 (1961), and because the Court does not find it
necessary to consider the "automobile exception" in its disposition
of this case, ante at 453 U. S.
462 -463, n. 6, see Robbins v. California, ante p. 453 U. S. 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), I join the opinion of the Court.

															JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in the judgment.

															For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Robbins
v. California, ante p. 453 U. S. 444 ,
I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST that these two cases should
be decided in the same way, and I also agree with THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEWART, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and
JUSTICE REHNQUIST that this judgment should be reversed.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															In Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969), this Court carefully analyzed more than
50 years of conflicting precedent governing the permissible scope
of warrantless searches incident to custodial arrest. The Court
today turns its back on the product of that analysis, formulating
an arbitrary "bright-line" rule applicable to "recent" occupants of
automobiles that fails to reflect Chimel's underlying
policy justifications. While the Court claims to leave Chimel intact, see ante at 453 U. S. 460 ,
n. 3, I fear that its unwarranted abandonment of Page 453 U. S. 464 the principles underlying that decision may signal a wholesale
retreat from our carefully developed "search incident to arrest"
analysis. I dissent. I It has long been a fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment
analysis that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be
narrowly construed. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 , 442 U. S.
759 -760 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 , 437 U. S.
393 -394 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S.
454 -455 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S.
30 , 399 U. S. 34 (1970); Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.
S. 493 , 357 U. S. 499 (1958). Predicated on the Fourth Amendment's essential purpose of
"shield[ing] the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his
privacy," Jones v. United States, supra, at 357 U. S. 498 ,
this principle carries with it two corollaries. First, for a search
to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, it must be " strictly
tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 19 (1968), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 , 387 U. S. 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). See Chimel v. California,
supra, at 395 U. S. 762 ; Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 , 412 U. S. 295 (1973). Second, in determining whether to grant an exception to the
warrant requirement, courts should carefully consider the facts and
circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons
supporting the exception, rather than on any bright-line rule of
general application. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 , 392 U. S. 59 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964). [ Footnote 2/1 ] The Chimel exception to the warrant requirement was
designed with two principal concerns in mind: the safety of the
arresting officer and the preservation of easily concealed or
destructible evidence. Recognizing that a suspect might have Page 453 U. S. 465 access to weapons or contraband at the time of arrest, the Court
declared:

															"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of
course, be governed by a like rule."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
762 -763.

															The Chimel standard was narrowly tailored to address
these concerns: it permits police officers who have effected a
custodial arrest to conduct a warrantless search

															"of the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control' -- construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." Id. at 395 U. S. 763 .
It thus places a temporal and a spatial limitation on searches
incident to arrest, excusing compliance with the warrant
requirement only when the search " is substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate
vicinity of the arrest.'" Shipley v. California, 395 U. S. 818 , 395 U. S. 819 (1969), quoting Stoner v. California, 376 U.
S. 483 , 376 U. S. 486 (1964). See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 14 -15
(1977); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.
S. 216 , 391 U. S. 220 (1968); Preston v. United States, supra, at 376 U. S. 367 ; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.
S. 800 , 415 U. S. 810 (1974) (STEWART, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 2/2 ] When the arrest has been Page 453 U. S. 466 consummated and the arrestee safely taken into custody, the
justifications underlying Chimel's limited exception to
the warrant requirement cease to apply: at that point, there is no
possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or contraband. See Chimel v. California, supra, at 395 U. S.
764 .

															In its attempt to formulate a

															"'single, familiar standard . . . to guide police officers, who
have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront,'" ante at 453 U. S. 458 ,
quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200 , 442 U. S.
213 -214 (1979) the Court today disregards these
principles, and instead adopts a fiction -- that the interior of a
car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has
recently been in the car. The Court thus holds:

															"[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile .
. . [and] may also examine the contents of any containers found
within the passenger compartment. . . ." Ante at 453 U. S. 460 .
In so holding, the Court ignores both precedent and principle, and
fails to achieve its objective of providing police officers with a
more workable standard for determining the permissible scope of
searches incident to arrest. II As the facts of this case make clear, the Court today
substantially expands the permissible scope of searches incident to
arrest by permitting police officers to search areas and containers
the arrestee could not possibly reach at the time of arrest. These
facts demonstrate that at the time Belton and his three companions
were placed under custodial arrest -- which was after they had been
removed from the car patted down, and separated -- none of them
could have reached the jackets that had been left on the back seat
of the car. The Page 453 U. S. 467 New York Court of Appeals described the sequence of events as
follows:

															"On April 9, 1978, defendant and three companions were traveling
on the New York State Thruway in Ontario County when their car was
stopped by a State trooper for speeding. Upon approaching the
vehicle, the officer smelled the distinct odor of marihuana
emanating from within and observed on the floor an envelope which
he recognized as a type that is commonly used to sell the
substance. At that point, the officer ordered the occupants out of
the vehicle, patted each down, removed the envelope from the floor
and ascertained that it contained a small amount of marihuana."

															" After the marihuana was found, the individuals, still
standing outside the car, were placed under arrest. The officer
then reentered the vehicle, searched the passenger
compartment, and seized the marihuana cigarette butts lying in
the ashtrays. He also rifled through the pockets of five
jackets on the back seat. Upon opening the zippered pocket of
one of them, he discovered a small amount of cocaine and
defendant's identification."

															50 N.Y.2d 447, 449, 407 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1980) (emphasis added).
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Concluding that
a

															"warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may not be upheld as a search incident
to a lawful arrest where there is no longer any danger that the
arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the
article, " ibid. (emphasis added), the court further stated:

															"One searches the record in vain for support of the dissenter's
claim that, at the time of the arrest -- the point from which the
predicate for the warrantless search is measured -- 'the jackets
were within reach of the four suspects Page 453 U. S. 468 and had not yet been reduced to the exclusive control of the
officer.'" Id. at 452, n. 2, 407 N.E.2d at 423, n. 2, quoting id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424 (dissenting opinion).

															By approving the constitutionality of the warrantless search in
this case, the Court carves out a dangerous precedent that is not
justified by the concerns underlying Chimel. Disregarding
the principle "that the scope of a warrantless search must be
commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from the
warrant requirement," Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 295 ,
the Court for the first time grants police officers authority to
conduct a warrantless "area" search under circumstances where there
is no chance that the arrestee "might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
at 395 U. S. 763 .
Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be the
same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions
in the patrol car before placing them under arrest, and even if his
search had extended to locked luggage or other inaccessible
containers located in the back seat of the car.

															This expansion of the Chimel exception is both
analytically unsound and inconsistent with every significant
"search incident to arrest" case we have decided in which the issue
was whether the police could lawfully conduct a warrantless search
of the area surrounding the arrestee. See, e.g., United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 15 (search of footlocker "conducted more than an hour after federal
agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long
after respondents were securely in custody" not incident to
arrest); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
456 -457, and n. 11 (search of car in driveway not
incident to arrest in house); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 47 (1970) (warrantless search of car invalid once arrestee has been
placed in police custody); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 35 (area of immediate control does not extend to inside of house when
suspect is arrested on front step); Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 220 Page 453 U. S. 469 (search of car after occupant placed in custody and taken to
courthouse not valid as incident to arrest); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 368 (search of car not valid as incident to arrest: although suspects
were in car when arrested, they were in custody at police station
when car was searched). These cases demonstrate that the crucial
question under Chimel is not whether the arrestee could ever have reached the area that was searched, but whether
he could have reached it at the time of arrest and search. If not,
the officer's failure to obtain a warrant may not be excused.
[ Footnote 2/4 ] By disregarding this
settled doctrine, the Court does a great disservice not only to stare decisis, but to the policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment, as well. III The Court seeks to justify its departure from the principles
underlying Chimel by proclaiming the need for a new
"bright-line" rule to guide the officer in the field. As we pointed
out in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 393 ,
however, "the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never, by itself, justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment." Moreover, the Court's attempt to forge a "bright-line"
rule fails on its own terms. While the "interior/trunk" distinction
may provide a workable guide in certain routine cases -- for
example, where the officer arrests the driver of a car and then
immediately searches the seats and floor -- in the long run, I
suspect it will create far more problems than it solves. The
Court's new approach leaves open too many questions and, more
important, it provides the police and the courts with too few tools
with which to find the answers.

															Thus, although the Court concludes that a warrantless search of
a car may take place even though the suspect was Page 453 U. S. 470 arrested outside the car, it does not indicate how long after
the suspect's arrest that search may validly be conducted. Would a
warrantless search incident to arrest be valid if conducted five
minutes after the suspect left his car? Thirty minutes? Three
hours? Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close
proximity to the car when the search is conducted? Does it matter
whether the police formed probable cause to arrest before or after
the suspect left his car? And why is the rule announced
today necessarily limited to searches of cars? What if a suspect is
seen walking out of a house where the police, peering in from
outside, had formed probable cause to believe a crime was being
committed? Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter the
house to conduct a search incident to arrest? Even assuming today's
rule is limited to searches of the "interior" of cars -- an
assumption not demanded by logic -- what is meant by "interior"?
Does it include locked glove compartments, the interior of door
panels, or the area under the floorboards? Are special rules
necessary for station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage
compartment may be reached through the interior, or taxicabs, where
a glass panel might separate the driver's compartment from the rest
of the car? Are the only containers that may be searched those that
are large enough to be "capable of holding another object"? Or does
the new rule apply to any container, even if it "could hold neither
a weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect
was arrested"? Compare ante at 453 U. S.
460 -461. n. 4, with ante at 453 U.S. 461 .

															The Court does not give the police any "bright-line" answers to
these questions. More important, because the Court's new rule
abandons the justifications underlying Chimel, it offers no
guidance to the police officer seeking to work out these answers
for himself. As we warned in Chimel: "No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any
point of rational limitation once the search is allowed to go
beyond the area from which the person arrested Page 453 U. S. 471 might obtain weapons or evidentiary items."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 766 . See also Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 437 U. S. 393 .
By failing to heed this warning, the Court has undermined, rather
than furthered, the goal of consistent law enforcement: it has
failed to offer any principles to guide the police and the courts
in their application of the new rule to nonroutine situations.

															The standard announced in Chimel is not nearly as
difficult to apply as the Court suggests. To the contrary, I
continue to believe that Chimel provides a sound, workable
rule for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search
incident to arrest. Under Chimel, searches incident to
arrest may be conducted without a warrant only if limited to the
person of the arrestee, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), or to the area within the arrestee's "immediate control."
While it may be difficult in some cases to measure the exact scope
of the arrestee's immediate control, relevant factors would surely
include the relative number of police officers and arrestees, the
manner of restraint placed on the arrestee, and the ability of the
arrestee to gain access to a particular area or container.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] Certainly there will
be some close cases, but when in doubt, the police can always turn
to the rationale underlying Chimel -- the need to prevent
the arrestee from reaching weapons or contraband -- before Page 453 U. S. 472 exercising their judgment. A rule based on that rationale should
provide more guidance than the rule announced by the Court today.
Moreover, unlike the Court's rule, it would be faithful to the
Fourth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															As we noted in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 , 282 U. S. 357 (1931): "There is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															"'Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search
made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to
the arrest.'" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 47 (1970), quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. at 376 U. S.
367 .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See also 50 N.Y.2d at 454, n. 2, 407 N.E.2d at 423, n.
2; Tr. Of Oral Arg. 4-5; App. A-36.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															"'We cannot be true to [the Fourth Amendment] and excuse the
absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek
exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of
the situation make that course imperative.'" Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 761 ,
quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 , 335 U. S. 456 (1948).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Court sets up a strawman when it claims that, under the
"exclusive control" approach taken by the Court of Appeals,

															"no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest
would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee's
person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his
'exclusive control.'" Ante at 453 U.S.
461 -462, n. 5. If a police officer could obtain exclusive
control of an article by simply holding it in his hand, I would
certainly agree with the Court. But as we recognized in United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 433 U. S. 14 -15
(1977), exclusive control means more than that. It means sufficient
control that there is no significant risk that the arrestee or his
confederates "might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 763 .
The issue of exclusive control presents a question of fact to be
decided under the circumstances of each case, just as the New York
Court of Appeals has decided it here.

															JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

															In Robbins v. California, ante p. 453 U. S. 420 , it
was held that a wrapped container in the trunk of a car could not
be searched without a warrant even though the trunk itself could be
searched without a warrant because there was probable cause to
search the car, and even though there was probable cause to search
the container as well. This was because of the separate interest in
privacy with respect to the container. The Court now holds that, as
incident to the arrest of the driver or any other person in an
automobile, the interior of the car and any container found
therein, whether locked or not, may be not only seized, but also
searched, even absent probable cause to believe that contraband or
evidence of crime will be found. As to luggage, briefcases, or
other containers, this seems to me an extreme extension of Chimel, and one to which I cannot subscribe. Even if the
decision in Robbins had been otherwise and United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977),
and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), had been overruled, luggage found in the trunk of a car
could not be searched without probable cause to believe it
contained contraband or evidence. Here, searches of luggage,
briefcases, and other containers in the interior of an auto are
authorized in the absence of any suspicion whatsoever that they
contain anything in which the police have a legitimate interest.
This calls for more caution than the Court today exhibits, and,
with respect, I dissent.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The Supreme Court ruled that a search of a car occupant's jacket during a lawful custodial arrest did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the police may search the passenger compartment of a car and any containers found within it during a lawful arrest, regardless of whether the container is open or closed. The Court reasoned that the justification for the search is not the lack of privacy interest, but the lawful arrest itself. This decision extended the ruling in Chimel v. California, which allowed for the warrantless search of an arrestee and their immediate surroundings.

Dissenting opinions argued that the decision was an extreme extension of Chimel, and that searches of containers within a car should require probable cause to believe they contain contraband or evidence.