NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the preliminary print of the United States
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1027

															_________________

															RYAN AUSTIN COLLINS, PETITIONER v. VIRGINIA

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of virginia

															[May 29, 2018]

															Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the question whether the automobile exception
to the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, uninvited and
without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to
search a vehicle parked therein. It does not.

															I

															Officer Matthew McCall of the Albemarle County Police Department
in Virginia saw the driver of an orange and black motorcycle with
an extended frame commit a traffic infraction. The driver eluded
Officer McCall’s attempt to stop the motorcycle. A few weeks later,
Officer David Rhodes of the same department saw an orange and black
motorcycle traveling well over the speed limit, but the driver got
away from him, too. The officers compared notes and concluded that
the two incidents involved the same motorcyclist.

															Upon further investigation, the officers learned that the
motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner
Ryan Collins. After discovering photographs on Collins’ Facebook
profile that featured an orange and black motorcycle parked at the
top of the driveway of a house, Officer Rhodes tracked down the
address of the house, drove there, and parked on the street. It was
later established that Collins’ girlfriend lived in the house and
that Collins stayed there a few nights per week.[ 1 ]

															From his parked position on the street, Officer Rhodes saw what
appeared to be a motorcycle with an extended frame covered with a
white tarp, parked at the same angle and in the same location on
the driveway as in the Facebook photograph. Officer Rhodes, who did
not have a warrant, exited his car and walked toward the house. He
stopped to take a photograph of the covered motorcycle from the
sidewalk, and then walked onto the residential property and up to
the top of the driveway to where the motorcycle was parked. In
order “to investigate further,” App. 80, Officer Rhodes pulled off
the tarp, revealing a motorcycle that looked like the one from the
speeding incident. He then ran a search of the license plate and
vehicle identification numbers, which confirmed that the motorcycle
was stolen. After gathering this information, Officer Rhodes took a
photograph of the uncovered motorcycle, put the tarp back on, left
the property, and returned to his car to wait for Collins.

															Shortly thereafter, Collins returned home. Officer Rhodes walked
up to the front door of the house and knocked. Collins answered,
agreed to speak with Officer Rhodes, and admitted that the
motorcycle was his and that he had bought it without title. Officer
Rhodes then arrested Collins.

															Collins was indicted by a Virginia grand jury for receiving
stolen property. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the
evidence that Officer Rhodes had obtained as a result of the
warrantless search of the motorcycle. Collins argued that Officer
Rhodes had trespassed on the curtilage of the house to conduct an
investigation in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court
denied the motion and Collins was convicted.

															The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed. It assumed that the
motorcycle was parked in the curtilage of the home and held that
Officer Rhodes had probable cause to believe that the motorcycle
under the tarp was the same motorcycle that had evaded him in the
past. It further concluded that Officer Rhodes’ actions were lawful
under the Fourth Amendment even absent a warrant because “numerous
exigencies justified both his entry onto the property and his
moving the tarp to view the motorcycle and record its
identification number.” 65 Va. App. 37, 46, 773 S. E. 2d 618,
623 (2015).

															The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed on different reasoning.
It explained that the case was most properly resolved with
reference to the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception. 292 Va.
486, 496–501, 790 S. E. 2d 611, 616–618 (2016). Under that
framework, it held that Officer Rhodes had probable cause to
believe that the motorcycle was contraband, and that the
warrantless search therefore was justified. Id., at 498–499,
790 S. E. 2d, at 617.

															We granted certiorari, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now
reverse.

															II

															The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that the “right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” This case arises at the intersection of two components
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement and the protection extended to
the curtilage of a home.

															A

															1

															The Court has held that the search of an automobile can be
reasonable without a warrant. The Court first articulated the
so-called automobile exception in Carroll v. United
States ,267 U. S. 132 (1925). In that case, law enforcement
officers had probable cause to believe that a car they observed
traveling on the road contained illegal liquor. They stopped and
searched the car, discovered and seized the illegal liquor, and
arrested the occupants. Id., at 134–136. The Court upheld
the warrantless search and seizure, explaining that a “necessary
difference” exists between searching “a store, dwelling house or
other structure” and searching “a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile” because a “vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id., at 153.

															The “ready mobility” of vehicles served as the core
justification for the automobile exception for many years. California v. Carney ,471 U. S. 386, 390 (1985)
(citing, e.g., Cooper v. California ,386 U. S.
58, 59 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney ,399 U. S. 42,
51–52 (1970)). Later cases then introduced an additional rationale
based on “the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling
on the public highways.” Carney, 471 U. S., at 392. As
the Court explained in South Dakota v. Opperman ,428
U. S. 364 (1976):

															“Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence,
police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust
fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other
safety equipment are not in proper working order.” Id., at
368.

															In announcing each of these two justifications, the Court took
care to emphasize that the rationales applied only to automobiles
and not to houses, and therefore supported “treating automobiles
differently from houses” as a constitutional matter. Cady v. Dombrowski ,413 U. S. 433, 441 (1973).

															When these justifications for the automobile exception “come
into play,” officers may search an automobile without having
obtained a warrant so long as they have probable cause to do so. Carney , 471 U. S., at 392–393.

															2

															Like the automobile exception, the Fourth Amendment’s protection
of curtilage has long been black letter law. “[W]hen it comes to
the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines ,569 U. S. 1, 6 (2013). “At
the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Silverman v. United States ,365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961)). To give full
practical effect to that right, the Court considers curtilage—“the
area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the
home’ ”—to be “ ‘part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes.’ ” Jardines , 569 U. S., at 6
(quoting Oliver v. United States ,466 U. S. 170,
180 (1984)). “The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially
a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where
privacy expectations are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo ,476 U. S. 207, 212–213 (1986).

															When a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the
curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment has occurred. Jardines , 569 U. S., at
11. Such conduct thus is presumptively unreasonable absent a
warrant.

															B

															1

															With this background in mind, we turn to the application of
these doctrines in the instant case. As an initial matter, we
decide whether the part of the driveway where Collins’ motorcycle
was parked and subsequently searched is curtilage.

															According to photographs in the record, the driveway runs
alongside the front lawn and up a few yards past the front
perimeter of the house. The top portion of the driveway that sits
behind the front perimeter of the house is enclosed on two sides by
a brick wall about the height of a car and on a third side by the
house. A side door provides direct access between this partially
enclosed section of the driveway and the house. A visitor
endeavoring to reach the front door of the house would have to walk
partway up the driveway, but would turn off before entering the
enclosure and instead proceed up a set of steps leading to the
front porch. When Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle, it was
parked inside this partially enclosed top portion of the driveway
that abuts the house.

															The “ ‘conception defining the curtilage’ is
. . . familiar enough that it is ‘easily understood from
our daily experience.’ ” Jardines , 569 U. S., at 7
(quoting Oliver , 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12). Just
like the front porch, side garden, or area “outside the front
window,” Jardines, 569 U. S., at 6, the driveway
enclosure where Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle constitutes
“an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home
life extends,’ ” and so is properly considered curtilage, id., at 7 (quoting Oliver , 466 U. S., at 182,
n. 12).

															2

															In physically intruding on the curtilage of Collins’ home to
search the motorcycle, Officer Rhodes not only invaded Collins’
Fourth Amendment interest in the item searched, i.e., the
motorcycle, but also invaded Collins’ Fourth Amendment interest in
the curtilage of his home. The question before the Court is whether
the automobile exception justifies the invasion of the
curtilage.[ 2 ] The answer is no.

															Applying the relevant legal principles to a slightly different
factual scenario confirms that this is an easy case. Imagine a
motorcycle parked inside the living room of a house, visible
through a window to a passerby on the street. Imagine further that
an officer has probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was
involved in a traffic infraction. Can the officer, acting without a
warrant, enter the house to search the motorcycle and confirm
whether it is the right one? Surely not.

															The reason is that the scope of the automobile exception extends
no further than the automobile itself. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron ,518 U. S. 938, 940 (1996)
( per curiam ) (explaining that the automobile exception
“permits police to search the vehicle”); Wyoming v. Houghton ,526 U. S. 295, 300 (1999) (“[T]he Framers
would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the
warrantless search of containers within an automobile”).
Virginia asks the Court to expand the scope of the automobile
exception to permit police to invade any space outside an
automobile even if the Fourth Amendment protects that space.
Nothing in our case law, however, suggests that the automobile
exception gives an officer the right to enter a home or its
curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant. Expanding the
scope of the automobile exception in this way would both undervalue
the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its
curtilage and “ ‘untether’ ” the automobile exception
“ ‘from the justifications underlying’ ” it. Riley v. California , 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
10) (quoting Arizona v. Gant ,556 U. S. 332, 343
(2009)).

															The Court already has declined to expand the scope of other
exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry
into the home. The reasoning behind those decisions applies equally
well in this context. For instance, under the plain-view doctrine,
“any valid warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence” requires
that the officer “have a lawful right of access to the object
itself.” Horton v. California ,496 U. S. 128,
136–137 (1990); see also id., at 137, n. 7
(“ ‘[E]ven where the object is contraband, this Court has
repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may
not enter and make a warrantless seizure’ ”); G. M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States ,429 U. S. 338, 354 (1977)
(“It is one thing to seize without a warrant property resting in an
open area . . . , and it is quite another thing to effect
a warrantless seizure of property . . . situated on
private premises to which access is not otherwise available for the
seizing officer”). A plain-view seizure thus cannot be justified if
it is effectuated “by unlawful trespass.” Soldal v. Cook
County ,506 U. S. 56, 66 (1992). Had Officer Rhodes seen
illegal drugs through the window of Collins’ house, for example,
assuming no other warrant exception applied, he could not have
entered the house to seize them without first obtaining a
warrant.

															Similarly, it is a “settled rule that warrantless arrests in
public places are valid,” but, absent another exception such as
exigent circumstances, officers may not enter a home to make an
arrest without a warrant, even when they have probable cause. Payton v. New York ,445 U. S. 573, 587–590
(1980). That is because being “ ‘arrested in the home involves
not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion
of the sanctity of the home.’ ” Id. , at 588–589
(quoting United States v. Reed , 572 F. 2d 412,
423 (CA2 1978)). Likewise, searching a vehicle parked in the
curtilage involves not only the invasion of the Fourth Amendment
interest in the vehicle but also an invasion of the sanctity of the
curtilage.

															Just as an officer must have a lawful right of access to any
contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without
a warrant, and just as an officer must have a lawful right of
access in order to arrest a person in his home, so, too, an officer
must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search
it pursuant to the automobile exception. The automobile exception
does not afford the necessary lawful right of access to search a
vehicle parked within a home or its curtilage because it does not
justify an intrusion on a person’s separate and substantial Fourth
Amendment interest in his home and curtilage.

															As noted, the rationales underlying the automobile exception are
specific to the nature of a vehicle and the ways in which it is
distinct from a house. See Part II–A–1, supra . The
rationales thus take account only of the balance between the
intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in his
vehicle and the governmental interests in an expedient search of
that vehicle; they do not account for the distinct privacy interest
in one’s home or curtilage. To allow an officer to rely on the
automobile exception to gain entry into a house or its curtilage
for the purpose of conducting a vehicle search would unmoor the
exception from its justifications, render hollow the core Fourth
Amendment protection the Constitution extends to the house and its
curtilage, and transform what was meant to be an exception into a
tool with far broader application. Indeed, its name alone should
make all this clear enough: It is, after all, an exception for
automobiles.[ 3 ]

															Given the centrality of the Fourth Amendment interest in the
home and its curtilage and the disconnect between that interest and
the justifications behind the automobile exception, we decline
Virginia’s invitation to extend the automobile exception to permit
a warrantless intrusion on a home or its curtilage.

															III

															A

															Virginia argues that this Court’s precedent indicates that the
automobile exception is a categorical one that permits the
warrantless search of a vehicle anytime, anywhere, including in a
home or curtilage. Specifically, Virginia points to two decisions
that it contends resolve this case in its favor. Neither is
dispositive or persuasive.

															First, Virginia invokes Scher v. United States ,305
U. S. 251 (1938). In that case, federal officers received a
confidential tip that a particular car would be transporting
bootleg liquor at a specified time and place. The officers
identified and followed the car until the driver “turned into a
garage a few feet back of his residence and within the curtilage.” Id., at 253. As the driver exited his car, an officer
approached and stated that he had been informed that the car was
carrying contraband. The driver acknowledged that there was liquor
in the trunk, and the officer proceeded to open the trunk, find the
liquor, arrest the driver, and seize both the car and the liquor. Id., at 253–254. Although the officer did not have a search
warrant, the Court upheld the officer’s actions as reasonable. Id., at 255. Scher is inapposite. Whereas Collins’ motorcycle was
parked and unattended when Officer Rhodes intruded on the curtilage
to search it, the officers in Scher first encountered the
vehicle when it was being driven on public streets, approached the
curtilage of the home only when the driver turned into the garage,
and searched the vehicle only after the driver admitted that it
contained contraband. Scher by no means established a
general rule that the automobile exception permits officers to
enter a home or its curtilage absent a warrant. The Court’s brief
analysis referenced Carroll , but only in the context of
observing that, consistent with that case, the “officers properly
could have stopped” and searched the car “just before [petitioner]
entered the garage,” a proposition the petitioner did “not
seriously controvert.” Scher, 305 U. S., at 254–255.
The Court then explained that the officers did not lose their
ability to stop and search the car when it entered “the open garage
closely followed by the observing officer” because “[n]o search was
made of the garage.” Id., at 255. It emphasized that
“[e]xamination of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without
objection and upon admission of probable guilt,” and cited two
search-incident-to-arrest cases. Ibid. (citing Agnello v. United States ,269 U. S. 20, 30
(1925); Wisniewski v. United States , 47 F. 2d
825, 826 (CA6 1931)). Scher ’s reasoning thus was both case
specific and imprecise, sounding in multiple doctrines,
particularly, and perhaps most appropriately, hot pursuit. The
decision is best regarded as a factbound one, and it certainly does
not control this case.

															Second, Virginia points to Labron ,518 U. S. 938,
where the Court upheld under the automobile exception the
warrantless search of an individual’s pickup truck that was parked
in the driveway of his father-in-law’s farmhouse. Id., at
939–940; Commonwealth v. Kilgore , 544 Pa. 439, 444, 677 A.2d
311 , 313 (1995). But Labron provides scant support for
Virginia’s position. Unlike in this case, there was no indication
that the individual who owned the truck in Labron had any
Fourth Amendment interest in the farmhouse or its driveway, nor was
there a determination that the driveway was curtilage.

															B

															Alternatively, Virginia urges the Court to adopt a more limited
rule regarding the intersection of the automobile exception and the
protection afforded to curtilage. Virginia would prefer that the
Court draw a bright line and hold that the automobile exception
does not permit warrantless entry into “the physical threshold of a
house or a similar fixed, enclosed structure inside the curtilage
like a garage.” Brief for Respondent 46. Requiring officers to make
“case-by-case curtilage determinations,” Virginia reasons,
unnecessarily complicates matters and “raises the potential for
confusion and . . . error.” Id., at 46–47
(internal quotation marks omitted).

															The Court, though, has long been clear that curtilage is
afforded constitutional protection. See Oliver , 466
U. S., at 180. As a result, officers regularly assess whether
an area is curtilage before executing a search. Virginia provides
no reason to conclude that this practice has proved to be
unadministrable, either generally or in this context. Moreover,
creating a carveout to the general rule that curtilage receives
Fourth Amendment protection, such that certain types of curtilage
would receive Fourth Amendment protection only for some purposes
but not for others, seems far more likely to create confusion than
does uniform application of the Court’s doctrine.

															In addition, Virginia’s proposed rule rests on a mistaken
premise about the constitutional significance of visibility. The
ability to observe inside curtilage from a lawful vantage point is
not the same as the right to enter curtilage without a warrant for
the purpose of conducting a search to obtain information not
otherwise accessible. Cf. Cir- aolo , 476 U. S., at
213–214 (holding that “physically non- intrusive” warrantless
aerial observation of the curtilage of a home did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, and could form the basis for probable cause to
support a warrant to search the curtilage). So long as it is
curtilage, a parking patio or carport into which an officer can see
from the street is no less entitled to protection from trespass and
a warrantless search than a fully enclosed garage.

															Finally, Virginia’s proposed bright-line rule automatically
would grant constitutional rights to those persons with the
financial means to afford residences with garages in which to store
their vehicles but deprive those persons without such resources of
any individualized consideration as to whether the areas in which
they store their vehicles qualify as curtilage. See United
States v. Ross ,456 U. S. 798, 822 (1982) (“[T]he
most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the
same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion”).

															IV

															For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the automobile
exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a
home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein. We
leave for resolution on remand whether Officer Rhodes’ warrantless
intrusion on the curtilage of Collins’ house may have been
reasonable on a different basis, such as the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Virginia is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Virginia does not dispute that
Collins has Fourth Amendment standing. See Minnesota v. Olson ,495 U. S. 91, 96–100 (1990). 2 Helpfully, the parties have
simplified matters somewhat by each making a concession. Petitioner
concedes “for purposes of this appeal” that Officer Rhodes had
probable cause to believe that the motorcycle was the one that had
eluded him, Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 3, and Virginia
concedes that “Officer Rhodes searched the motorcycle,” Brief for
Respondent 12. 3 The dissent concedes that “the degree
of the intrusion on privacy” is relevant in determining whether a
warrant is required to search a motor vehicle “located on private
property.” Post , at 5–6 (opinion of Alito, J.). Yet it
puzzlingly asserts that the “privacy interests at stake” here are
no greater than when a motor vehicle is searched “on public
streets.” Post, at 3–4. “An ordinary person of common
sense,” post, at 2, however, clearly would understand that
the privacy interests atstake in one’s private residential property
are far greater than on a public street. Contrary to the dissent’s
suggestion, it is of no significance that the motorcycle was parked
just a “short walk up the driveway.” Ibid . The driveway was
private, not public, property, and the motorcycle was parked in the
portion of the driveway beyond where a neighbor would venture, in
an area “intimately linked to the home, . . . where
privacy expectations are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo ,476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986). Nor does it matter
that Officer Rhodes“did not damage any property,” post , at
2, for an officer’s care in conducting a search does not change the
character of the place being searched. And, as we explain, see infra , at 13–14, it is not dispositive that Officer Rhodes
did not “observe anything along the way” to the motorcycle “that he
could not have seen from the street,” post, at 2. Law
enforcement officers need not “shield their eyes when passing by a
home on public thoroughfares,” Ciraolo , 476 U. S., at
213, but the ability visually to observe an area protected by the
Fourth Amendment does not give officers the green light physically
to intrude on it. See Florida v. Jardines ,569
U. S. 1, 7–8 (2013). It certainly does not permit an officer
physically to intrude on curtilage, remove a tarp to reveal license
plate and vehicle identification numbers, and use those numbers to
confirm that the defendant committed a crime. The dissent also
mistakenly relies on a law enacted by the First Congress and
mentioned in Carroll v. United States ,267 U. S.
132, 150–151 (1925), that authorized the warrantless search of
vessels. Post , at 4–5, n. 3. The dissent thinks it
implicit in that statute that “officers could cross private
property such as wharves in order to reach and board those
vessels.” Ibid. Even if it were so that a police officer
could have entered a private wharf to search a vessel, that would
not prove he could enter the curtilage of a home to do so. To the
contrary, whereas the statute relied upon in Carroll authorized warrantless searches of vessels, it expressly required
warrants to search houses. See 267 U. S., at 150–157; Act of
July 31, 1789, §24,1Stat.43. Here, Officer Rhodes did not invade a
private wharf to undertake a search; he invaded the curtilage of a
home. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1027

															_________________

															RYAN AUSTIN COLLINS, PETITIONER v. VIRGINIA

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
virginia

															[May 29, 2018]

															Justice Thomas, concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly
resolves the Fourth Amendment question in this case. Notably, the
only reason that Collins asked us to review this question is
because, if he can prove a violation of the Fourth Amendment, our
precedents require the Virginia courts to apply the exclusionary
rule and potentially suppress the incriminating evidence against
him. I write separately because I have serious doubts about this
Court’s authority to impose that rule on the States. The assumption
that state courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule is
legally dubious, and many jurists have complained that it
encourages “distort[ions]” in substantive Fourth Amendment law, Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U. S. 128, 157 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire , 403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J. L.
& Pub. Pol’y 111, 112 (2003).

															The Fourth Amendment, as relevant here, protects
the people from “unreasonable searches” of “their . . .
houses.” As a general rule, warrantless searches of the curtilage
violate this command. At the founding, curtilage was considered
part of the “hous[e]” itself. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 225 (1769) (“[T]he capital house protects and
privileges all its branches and appurtenants, if within the
curtilage”). And except in circumstances not present here, house
searches required a specific warrant. See W. Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602–1791, p. 743
(2009) (Cuddihy); Donahue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1237–1240 (2016); Davies, Recovering the
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 643–646
(1999). A warrant was required even if the house was being searched
for stolen goods or contraband—objects that, unlike cars, are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment at all. Id., at 647–650;
see also Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S.
132, 150–152 (1925) (Taft, C. J.) (discussing founding-era
evidence that a search warrant was required when stolen goods and
contraband were “concealed in a dwelling house” but not when they
were “in course of transportation and concealed in a movable
vessel”). Accordingly, the police acted “unreasonabl[y]” when they
searched the curtilage of Collins’ house without a
warrant.[ 1 ]

															While those who ratified the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments would agree that a constitutional violation
occurred here, they would be deeply confused about the posture of
this case and the remedy that Collins is seeking. Historically, the
only remedies for unconstitutional searches and seizures were “tort
suits” and “self-help.” Utah v. Strieff , 579
U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 4). The exclusionary
rule—the practice of deterring illegal searches and seizures by
suppressing evidence at criminal trials—did not exist. No such rule
existed in “Roman Law, Napoleonic Law or even the Common Law of
England.” Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 Am. U.
L. Rev. 1 (1964). And this Court did not adopt the federal
exclusionary rule until the 20th century. See Weeks v. United States , 232 U. S. 383 (1914). As late as 1949,
nearly two-thirds of the States did not have an exclusionary rule.
See Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U. S. 25, 29 (1949).
Those States, as then-Judge Cardozo famously explained, did not
understand the logic of a rule that allowed “[t]he criminal . . .
to go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore , 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587
(1926).

															The Founders would not have understood the logic
of the exclusionary rule either. Historically, if evidence was
relevant and reliable, its admissibility did not “depend upon the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of the mode, by which it [was]
obtained.” United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie , 26
F. Cas. 832, 843 (No. 15, 551) (CC Mass. 1822) (Story, J.);
accord, 1 S. Greenleaf, Evidence §254a, pp. 825–826 (14th ed.
1883) (“[T]hat . . . subjects of evidence may have been
. . . unlawfully obtained . . . is no valid
objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the
issue”); 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2183, p. 626 (2d ed. 1923)
(“[I]t has long been established that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means through which the
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence” (emphasis deleted)).
And the common law sometimes reflected the inverse of the
exclusionary rule: The fact that someone turned out to be guilty
could justify an illegal seizure. See Gelston v. Hoyt , 3 Wheat. 246, 310 (1818) (Story, J.) (“At common law,
any person may at his peril, seize for a forfeiture to the
government; and if the government adopt his seizure, and the
property is condemned, he will be completely justified”); 2 W.
Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 77 (1721) (“And where a Man arrests
another, who is actually guilty of the Crime for which he is
arrested, . . . he needs not in justifying it, set forth
any special Cause of his Suspicion”).

															Despite this history, the Court concluded in Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S. 643 (1961), that the
States must apply the federal exclusionary rule in their own
courts. Id., at 655.[ 2 ] Mapp suggested that the exclusionary rule was required by
the Constitution itself. See, e.g., id., at 657
(“[T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments”); id., at 655 (“[E]vidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court”); id., at 655–656 (“[I]t was . . . constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of the
right to privacy—be also insisted upon”).[ 3 ] But that suggestion could not withstand even the
slightest scrutiny. The exclusionary rule appears nowhere in the
Constitution, postdates the founding by more than a century, and
contradicts several longstanding principles of the common law. See supra, at 2–3; Cuddihy 759–760; Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 786 (1994); Kaplan, The
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027,
1030–1031 (1974).

															Recognizing this, the Court has since rejected Mapp ’s “ ‘[e]xpansive dicta’ ” and clarified that
the exclusionary rule is not required by the Constitution. Davis v. United States , 564 U. S. 229, 237
(2011) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U. S.
586, 591 (2006)). Suppression, this Court has explained, is not “a
personal constitutional right.” United States v. Calandra , 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974); accord, Stone v. Powell , 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976). The
Fourth Amendment “says nothing about suppressing evidence,” Davis , supra , at 236, and a prosecutor’s “use of
fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth
Amendment wrong,’ ” United States v. Leon , 468
U. S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Calandra , supra ,
at 354).[ 4 ] Instead, the
exclusionary rule is a “judicially created” doctrine that is
“prudential rather than constitutionally mandated.” Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott , 524 U. S.
357, 363 (1998); accord, Herring v. United States ,
555 U. S. 135, 139 (2009); Arizona v. Evans , 514
U. S. 1, 10 (1995); United States v. Janis , 428
U. S. 433, 459–460 (1976).[ 5 ]

															Although the exclusionary rule is not part of
the Constitution, this Court has continued to describe it as
“federal law” and assume that it applies to the States. Evans , supra ; Massachusetts v. Sheppard , 468 U. S. 981, 991 (1984). Yet the Court has
never attempted to justify this assumption. If the exclusionary
rule is federal law, but is not grounded in the Constitution or a
federal statute, then it must be federal common law. See Monaghan,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10
(1975). As federal common law, however, the exclusionary rule
cannot bind the States.

															Federal law trumps state law only by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause, which makes the “Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties . . . the supreme Law of the Land,”
Art. VI, cl. 2. When the Supremacy Clause refers to
“[t]he Laws of the United States made in Pursuance [of the
Constitution],” it means federal statutes, not federal common law.
Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74
Ohio St. L. J. 559, 572–599 (2013) (Ramsey); Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 Texas L. Rev. 1321,
1334–1336, 1338–1367 (2001) (Clark); see also Gibbons v. Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 211 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.) (“The
appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers
. . . supremacy on laws . . . is to
. . . the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
constitution”); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 500 (1954) (“[T]he supremacy clause is
limited to those ‘Laws’ of the United States which are passed by
Congress pursuant to the Constitution”). By referencing laws “made
in Pursuance” of the Constitution, the Supremacy Clause
incorporates the requirements of Article I, which force Congress to
stay within its enumerated powers, §8, and follow the cumbersome
procedures for enacting federal legislation, §7. See Wyeth v. Levine , 555 U. S. 555, 585–587 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States §1831, pp. 693–694 (1833);
Clark 1334. Those procedures—especially the requirement that bills
pass the Senate, where the States are represented equally and
Senators were originally elected by state legislatures—safeguard
federalism by making federal legislation more difficult to pass and
more responsive to state interests. See Ramsey 565; Clark
1342–1343. Federal common law bypasses these procedures and would
not have been considered the kind of “la[w]” that can bind the
States under the Supremacy Clause. See Ramsey 564–565, 568, 574,
581; Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1231, 1275 (1985).

															True, this Court, without citing the Supremacy
Clause, has recognized several “enclaves of federal judge-made law
which bind the States.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino , 376 U. S. 398, 426 (1964); see, e.g.,
id., at 427–428 (foreign affairs); Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. , 304 U. S. 92,
110 (1938) (disputes between States); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. , 317 U. S. 239, 245 (1942)
(admiralty); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States ,
318 U. S. 363, 366 (1943) (certain rights and obligations of
the United States); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of
Ala. , 353 U. S. 448, 456–457 (1957) (aspects of federal
labor law). To the extent these enclaves are delegations of
lawmaking authority from the Constitution or a federal statute,
they do not conflict with the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause (though they might be illegitimate for other reasons). See
Ramsey 568–569; Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A
Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100,
131–132 (1985). To the extent these enclaves are not rooted in the
Constitution or a statute, their pre-emptive force is questionable.
But that is why this Court has “limited” them to a
“ ‘few’ ” “narrow areas” where “the authority and duties
of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved” or where
“the interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. , 451 U. S. 630,
640–641 (1981) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler , 373
U. S. 647, 651 (1963)). Outside these narrow enclaves, the
general rule is that “[t]here is no federal general common law” and
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the State.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U. S.
64, 78 (1938).

															These precedents do not support requiring the
States to apply the exclusionary rule. As explained, the
exclusionary rule is not rooted in the Constitution or a federal
statute. This Court has repeatedly rejected the idea that the rule
is in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, expressly or
implicitly. See Davis , 564 U. S., at 236; Leon ,
468 U. S., at 905–906; cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 11) (explaining that
reading implied remedies into the Constitution is “a ‘disfavored’
judicial activity”). And the exclusionary rule does not implicate
any of the special enclaves of federal common law. It does not
govern the sovereign duties of the United States or disputes of an
interstate or international character. Instead, the rule governs
the methods that state police officers use to solve crime and the
procedures that state courts use at criminal trials—subjects that
the Federal Government generally has no power to regulate. See United States v. Morrison , 529 U. S. 598, 618
(2000) (explaining that “[t]he regulation” and “vindication” of
intrastate crime “has always been the province of the States”); Smith v. Phillips , 455 U. S. 209, 221 (1982)
(“Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial
proceedings”). These are not areas where federal common law can
bind the States.[ 6 ]

															*  *  *

															In sum, I am skeptical of this Court’s
authority to impose the exclusionary rule on the States. We have
not yet revisited that question in light of our modern precedents,
which reject Mapp ’s essential premise that the exclusionary
rule is required by the Constitution. We should do so. Notes 1 Collins did not live at
the house; he merely stayed there with his girlfriend several times
a week. But Virginia does not contest Collins’ assertion that the
house is his, so I agree with the Court that Virginia has forfeited
any argument to the contrary. See ante, at 2, n. 1; United States v. Jones , 565 U. S. 400, 404,
n. 2 (2012). 2 Twelve years before Mapp , the Court declined to apply the federal exclusionary
rule to the States. See Wolf v. Colorado , 338
U. S. 25 (1949). Wolf denied that the Constitution
requires the exclusionary rule, since “most of the English-speaking
world” does not apply that rule and alternatives such as civil
suits and internal police discipline do not “fal[l] below the
minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause.” Id., at 29, 31. In Mapp , the Court overruled Wolf and
applied the exclusionary rule to the States, even though no party
had briefed or argued that question. See 367 U. S., at
672–674, and nn. 4–6 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Stewart, The
Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1365, 1368 (1983). 3 Justice Black, the
essential fifth vote in Mapp , did not agree that the Fourth
Amendment contains an exclusionary rule. See 367 U. S., at
661–662 (concurring opinion) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not
itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such
evidence, and I am extremely doubtful that such a provision could
prop-erly be inferred”). But he concluded that, when the police
seize private papers, suppression is required by a combination of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . See id., at
662–666. 4 The exclusionary rule is
not required by the Due Process Clause either. Given its
nonexistent historical foundation, the exclusionary rule cannot be
a “settled usag[e] and mod[e] of proceeding existing in the common
and statute law of England, before the emigration of our
ancestors.” Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 277 (1856). And the rule “has ‘no
bearing on . . . the fairness of the trial.’ ” Desist v. United States , 394 U. S. 244, 254, n. 24
(1969). If anything, the exclusionary rule itself “ ‘offends
basic concepts of the criminal justice system’ ” and exacts a
“ ‘costly toll upon truth-seeking.’ ” Herring v. United States , 555 U. S. 135, 141 (2009). “The
[excluded] evidence is likely to be the most reliable that could
possibly be obtained [and thus] exclusion rather than admission
creates the danger of a verdict erroneous on the true facts.” H.
Friendly, Benchmarks 260 (1967). 5 These statements cannot
be dismissed as mere dicta. Cf. Dickerson v. United
States , 530 U. S. 428, 438–441, and n. 2 (2000)
(constitutionalizing the rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966), despite earlier
precedents to the contrary). The nonconstitutional status of the
exclusionary rule is why this Court held in Stone v. Powell , 428 U. S. 465, 482–495 (1976), that violations
are not cognizable on federal habeas review. Cf. Dickerson , supra , at 439 n. 3. And the nonconstitutional status of
the rule is why this Court has created more than a dozen exceptions
to it, which apply even when the Fourth Amendment is concededly
violated. See United States v. Weaver , 808 F. 3d
26, 49 (CADC 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (collecting cases);
cf. Dickerson , supra , at 441. 6 Of course, the States are free
to adopt their own exclusionary rules as a matter of state law. But
nothing in the Federal Constitution requires them to do so. Even
assuming the Constitution requires particular state-law remedies
for federal constitutional violations, it does not require the
exclusionary rule. The “sole purpose” of the exclusionary rule is
“to deter future Fourth Amendment violations”; it does not
“ ‘redress’ ” or “ ‘repair’ ” past ones. Davis v. United States , 564 U. S. 229, 236–237
(2011). This Court has noted the lack of evidence supporting its
deterrent effect, see United States v. Janis , 428
U. S. 433, 450, n. 22 (1976), and this Court has recognized
the effectiveness of alternative deterrents such as state tort law,
state criminal law, internal police discipline, and suits under 42
U. S. C. §1983, see Hudson v. Michigan , 547
U. S. 586, 597–599 (2006). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1027

															_________________

															RYAN AUSTIN COLLINS, PETITIONER v. VIRGINIA

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
virginia

															[May 29, 2018]

															Justice Alito, dissenting.

															The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable”
searches. What the police did in this case was entirely reasonable.
The Court’s decision is not.

															On the day in question, Officer David Rhodes was
standing at the curb of a house where petitioner, Ryan Austin
Collins, stayed a couple of nights a week with his girlfriend. From
his vantage point on the street, Rhodes saw an object covered with
a tarp in the driveway, just a car’s length or two from the curb.
It is undisputed that Rhodes had probable cause to believe that the
object under the tarp was a motorcycle that had been involved a few
months earlier in a dangerous highway chase, eluding the police at
speeds in excess of 140 mph. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22; App. to Pet.
for Cert. 67. Rhodes also had probable cause to believe that
petitioner had been operating the motorcycle[ 1 ] and that a search of the motorcycle would
provide evidence that the motorcycle had been stolen.[ 2 ]

															If the motorcycle had been parked at the curb,
instead of in the driveway, it is undisputed that Rhodes could have
searched it without obtaining a warrant. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9;
Reply Brief 1. Nearly a century ago, this Court held that officers
with probable cause may search a motor vehicle without obtaining a
warrant. Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S.
132, 153, 155–156 (1925). The principal rationale for this
so-called automobile or motor-vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement is the risk that the vehicle will be moved during the
time it takes to obtain a warrant. Id. , at 153; California v. Carney , 471 U. S. 386, 390–391
(1985). We have also observed that the owner of an automobile has a
diminished expectation of privacy in its contents. Id. , at
391–393.

															So why does the Court come to the conclusion
that Officer Rhodes needed a warrant in this case? Because, in
order to reach the motorcycle, he had to walk 30 feet or so up the
driveway of the house rented by petitioner’s girlfriend, and by
doing that, Rhodes invaded the home’s “curtilage.” Ante , at
6–7. The Court does not dispute that the motorcycle, when parked in
the driveway, was just as mobile as it would have been had it been
parked at the curb. Nor does the Court claim that Officer Rhodes’s
short walk up the driveway did petitioner or his girlfriend any
harm. Rhodes did not damage any property or observe anything along
the way that he could not have seen from the street. But, the Court
insists, Rhodes could not enter the driveway without a warrant, and
therefore his search of the motorcycle was unreasonable and the
evidence obtained in that search must be suppressed.

															An ordinary person of common sense would react
to the Court’s decision the way Mr. Bumble famously responded when
told about a legal rule that did not comport with the reality of
everyday life. If that is the law, he exclaimed, “the law is a
ass—a idiot.” C. Dickens, Oliver Twist 277 (1867).

															The Fourth Amendment is neither an “ass” nor an
“idiot.” Its hallmark is reasonableness, and the Court’s strikingly
unreasonable decision is based on a misunderstanding of Fourth
Amendment basics.

															The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects.” A “house,” for Fourth Amendment purposes, is not limited
to the structure in which a person lives, but by the same token, it
also does not include all the real property surrounding a dwelling.
See, e.g. , Florida v. Jardines , 569 U. S.
1, 6 (2013); United States v. Dunn , 480 U. S.
294, 300–301 (1987). Instead, a person’s “house” encompasses the
dwelling and a circumscribed area of surrounding land that is given
the name “curtilage.” Oliver v. United States , 466
U. S. 170, 180 (1984). Land outside the curtilage is called an
“open field,” and a search conducted in that area is not considered
a search of a “house” and is therefore not governed by the Fourth
Amendment. Ibid. Ascertaining the boundaries of the
curtilage thus determines only whether a search is governed by the
Fourth Amendment. The concept plays no other role in Fourth
Amendment analysis.

															In this case, there is no dispute that the
search of the motorcycle was governed by the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore whether or not it occurred within the curtilage is not of
any direct importance. The question before us is not whether there
was a Fourth Amendment search but whether the search was
reasonable. And the only possible argument as to why it might not
be reasonable concerns the need for a warrant. For nearly a
century, however, it has been well established that officers do not
need a warrant to search a motor vehicle on public streets so long
as they have probable cause. Carroll , supra , at 153,
156; see also, e.g. , Pennsylvania v. Labron ,
518 U. S. 938, 940 (1996) ( per curiam ); Carney , supra , at 394; South Dakota v. Opperman , 428
U. S. 364, 367–368 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney ,
399 U. S. 42, 50–51 (1970). Thus, the issue here is whether
there is any good reason why this same rule should not apply when
the vehicle is parked in plain view in a driveway just a few feet
from the street.

															In considering that question, we should ask
whether the reasons for the “automobile exception” are any less
valid in this new situation. Is the vehicle parked in the driveway
any less mobile? Are any greater privacy interests at stake? If the
answer to those questions is “no,” then the automobile exception
should apply. And here, the answer to each question is emphatically
“no.” The tarp-covered motorcycle parked in the driveway could have
been uncovered and ridden away in a matter of seconds. And Officer
Rhodes’s brief walk up the driveway impaired no real privacy
interests.

															In this case, the Court uses the curtilage
concept in a way that is contrary to our decisions regarding other,
exigency-based exceptions to the warrant requirement. Take, for
example, the “emergency aid” exception. See Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U. S. 398 (2006). When officers reasonably
believe that a person inside a dwelling has urgent need of
assistance, they may cross the curtilage and enter the building
without first obtaining a warrant. Id. , at 403–404. The same
is true when officers reasonably believe that a person in a
dwelling is destroying evidence. See Kentucky v. King , 563 U. S. 452, 460 (2011). In both of those
situations, we ask whether “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.” Brigham City , supra , at 403 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona , 437
U. S. 385, 394 (1978)). We have not held that the need to
cross the curtilage independently necessitates a warrant, and there
is no good reason to apply a different rule here.[ 3 ]

															It is no answer to this argument that the
emergency-aid and destruction-of-evidence exceptions require an
inquiry into the practicality of obtaining a warrant in the
particular circumstances of the case. Our precedents firmly
establish that the motor-vehicle exception, unlike these other
exceptions, “has no separate exigency requirement.” Maryland v. Dyson , 527 U. S. 465, 466–467 (1999) ( per
curiam ). It is settled that the mobility of a motor vehicle
categorically obviates any need to engage in such a case-specific
inquiry. Requiring such an inquiry here would mark a substantial
alteration of settled Fourth Amendment law.

															This does not mean, however, that a warrant is
never needed when officers have probable cause to search a motor
vehicle, no matter where the vehicle is located. While a
case-specific inquiry regarding exigency would be
inconsistent with the rationale of the motor-vehicle exception, a
case-specific inquiry regarding the degree of intrusion on
privacy is entirely appropriate when the motor vehicle to be
searched is located on private property. After all, the ultimate
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether a search is
reasonable, and that inquiry often turns on the degree of the
intrusion on privacy. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Court,
an affirmance in this case would not mean that officers could
perform a warrantless search if a motorcycle were located inside a
house. See ante , at 7. In that situation, the intrusion on
privacy would be far greater than in the present case, where the
real effect, if any, is negligible.

															I would affirm the decision below and therefore
respectfully dissent. Notes 1 Petitioner had a photo on
his Facebook profile of a motorcycle that resembled the unusual
motorcycle involved in the prior highway chase. See ante , at
1–2 (majority opinion). 2 Rhodes suspected the
motorcycle was stolen based on a conversation he had with the man
who had sold the motorcycle to petitioner. See App.
57–58. 3 Indeed, I believe that
the First Congress implicitly made the same judgment in enacting
the statute on which Carroll v. United States , 267
U. S. 132 (1925), relied when the motor-vehicle exception was
first recognized. Since the First Congress sent the Bill of Rights
to the States for ratification, we have often looked to laws
enacted by that Congress as evidence of the original understanding
of the meaning of those Amendments. See, e.g. , id. ,
at 150–151; Town of Greece v. Galloway , 572
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 7–8); United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez , 462 U. S. 579,
585–586 (1983); United States v. Ramsey , 431
U. S. 606, 616–617 (1977). Carroll itself noted that
the First Congress enacted a law authorizing officers to search
vessels without a warrant. 267 U. S., at 150–151. Although
this statute did not expressly state that these officers could
cross private property such as wharves in order to reach and board
those vessels, I think that was implicit. Otherwise, the statute
would very often have been ineffective. And when Congress later
enacted similar laws, it made this authorization express. See, e.g. , An Act Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other
Purposes, §5, 14Stat. 179. For this reason, Officer Rhodes’s
conduct in this case is consistent with the original understanding
of the Fourth Amendment, as explicated in Carroll .

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a police officer cannot enter the private property (curtilage) of a home without a warrant to search a vehicle, even if there is probable cause to believe it is stolen. This case affirms that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, which allows warrantless searches of vehicles, does not extend to private residential property. The officer's search of the petitioner's motorcycle, parked in his girlfriend's driveway, violated the Fourth Amendment.


U.S. Supreme Court Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) Humphrey's Executor v. United States* No. 667 Argued 1, 1935 Decided May 27, 1935 295
U.S. 602 CERTIFICATE FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS Syllabus 1. The Federal Trade Commission Act fixes the terms of the
Commissioners and provides that any Commissioner may be removed by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office. Held that Congress intended to restrict the power
of removal to one or more of those causes. Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U. S. 311 ,
distinguished. Pp. 295 U. S. 621 , 295 U. S.
626 .

															2. This construction of the Act is confirmed by a consideration
of the character of the Commission -- an independent, nonpartisan
body of experts, charged with duties neither political nor
executive, but predominantly quasi -judicial and quasi -legislative, and by the legislative history of the
Act. P. 295 U. S.
624 .

															3. When Congress provides for the appointment of officers whose
functions, like those of the Federal Trade Commissioners, are of
Legislative and judicial quality, rather than executive, and limits
the grounds upon which they may be removed from office, the
President has no constitutional power to remove them for reasons
other than those so specified. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 ,
limited, and expressions in that opinion in part disapproved. Pp. 295 U. S. 626 , 295 U. S.
627 . Page 295 U. S. 603 The Myers case dealt with the removal of a postmaster,
an executive officer restricted to executive functions and charged
with no duty at all related to either the legislative or the
judicial power. The actual decision in the Myers case
finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of
the units in the executive department, and, hence, inherently
subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by the
Chief Executive, whose subordinate he is. That decision goes no
farther than to include purely executive officers. The Federal
Trade Commission, in contrast, is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative
or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are
performed without executive leave, and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control. To the extent that it
exercises any executive function -- as distinguished from executive
power in the constitutional sense -- it does so in the discharge
and effectuation of its quasi -legislative or quasi -judicial powers, or as an agency of the legislative
or judicial departments of the Government. Pp. 295 U. S.
627 -628.

															4. The authority of Congress, in creating quasi -legislative or quasi -judicial agencies, to
require them to act in discharge of their duties independently of
executive control cannot well be doubted, and that authority
includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their
removal except for cause in the meantime. P. 295 U.S. 629 .

															5. The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others has
often been stressed, and is hardly open to serious question. So
much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers of
these departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which
recognizes their essential coequality. P. 295 U.S. 629 .

															6. Whether the power of the President to remove an officer shall
prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the power by
fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except for cause
will depend upon the character of the office. To the extent that,
between the decision in the Myers case, which sustains the
unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, and the present decision that such power does not extend
to an office Page 295 U. S. 604 such as that here involved there shall remain a field of doubt,
such cases as may fall within it are left for future consideration
and determination as they may arise. P. 295 U. S.
631 .

															7. While the general rule preclude the use of congressional
debates to explain the meaning of the words of a statute, they may
be considered as reflecting light upon its general purposes and the
evils which it sought to remedy. P. 295 U. S.
625 .

															8. Expressions in an opinion which are beyond the point involved
do not come within the rule of stare decisis. P. 295 U. S.
626 .

															CERTIFICATE from the Court of Claims, propounding questions
arising on a claim for the salary withheld from the plaintiff's
testator, from the time when the President undertook to remove him
from office to the time of his death. Page 295 U. S. 618 MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims against the United
States to recover a sum of money alleged to be due the deceased for
salary as a Federal Trade Commissioner from October 8, 1933, when
the President undertook to remove him from office, to the time of
his death on February 14, 1934. The court below has certified to
this court two questions (Act of February 13, 1925, § 3(a), c. 229,
43 Stat. 936, 939; 28 U.S.C. § 288) in respect of the power of the
President to make the removal. The material facts which give rise
to the questions are as follows:

															William E. Humphrey, the decedent, on December 10, 1931, was
nominated by President Hoover to succeed himself as a member of the
Federal Trade Commission, and was confirmed by the United States
Senate. He was duly commissioned for a term of seven years expiring
September 25, 1938; and, after taking the required oath of office,
entered upon his duties. On July 25, 1933, President Roosevelt
addressed a letter to the commissioner asking for his resignation,
on the ground

															"that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect
to the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively
with personnel of my own selection,"

															but disclaiming any reflection upon the commissioner personally
or upon his services. The commissioner replied, asking time to
consult Page 295 U. S. 619 his friends. After some further correspondence upon the subject,
the President, on August 31, 1933, wrote the commissioner
expressing the hope that the resignation would be forthcoming, and
saying:

															"You will, I know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and
my mind go along together on either the policies or the
administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly, I
think it is best for the people of this country that I should have
a full confidence."

															The commissioner declined to resign, and on October 7, 1933, the
President wrote him:

															"Effective as of this date, you are hereby removed from the
office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission."

															Humphrey never acquiesced in this action, but continued
thereafter to insist that he was still a member of the commission,
entitled to perform its duties and receive the compensation
provided by law at the rate of $10,000 per annum. Upon these and
other facts set forth in the certificate, which we deem it
unnecessary to recite, the following questions are certified:

															"1. Do the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, stating that 'any commissioner may be removed by
the President for inefficiency, neglect of duly, or malfeasance in
office,' restrict or limit the power of the President to remove a
commissioner except upon one or more of the causes named?"

															"If the foregoing question is answered in the affirmative, then
-- "

															"2. If the power of the President to remove a commissioner is
restricted or limited as shown by the foregoing interrogatory and
the answer made thereto, is such a restriction or limitation valid
under the Constitution of the United States?"

															The Federal Trade Commission Act, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717; 15
U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, creates a commission of five Page 295 U. S. 620 members to be appointed by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, and § 1 provides:

															"Not more than three of the commissioners shall be members of
the same political party. The first commissioners appointed shall
continue in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven
years, respectively, from the date of the taking effect of this
Act, the term of each to be designated by the President, but their
successors shall be appointed for terms of seven years, except that
any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. The
commission shall choose a chairman from its own membership. No
commissioner shall engage in any other business, vocation, or
employment. Any commissioner may be removed by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. . . ."

															Section 5 of the act in part provides:

															"That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby
declared unlawful."

															"The commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common
carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, from using
unfair methods of competition in commerce."

															In exercising this power, the commission must issue a complaint
stating its charges and giving notice of hearing upon a day to be
fixed. A person, partnership, or corporation proceeded against is
given the right to appear at the time and place fixed and show
cause why an order to cease and desist should not be issued. There
is provision for intervention by others interested. If the
commission finds the method of competition is one prohibited by the
act, it is directed to make a report in writing stating its
findings as to the facts, and to issue and cause to be served a
cease and desist order. If the order is disobeyed, the commission
may apply to the appropriate circuit court of Page 295 U. S. 621 appeals for its enforcement. The party subject to the order may
seek and obtain a review in the circuit court of appeals in a
manner provided by the act.

															Section 6, among other things, gives the commission wide powers
of investigation in respect of certain corporations subject to the
act and in respect of other matters, upon which it must report to
Congress with recommendations. Many such investigations have been
made, and some have served as the basis of congressional
legislation.

															Section 7 provides:

															"That in any suit in equity brought by or under the direction of
the Attorney General as provided in the antitrust Acts, the court
may, upon the conclusion of the testimony therein, if it shall be
then of opinion that the complainant is entitled to relief, refer
said suit to the commission, as a master in chancery, to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of decree therein. The commission
shall proceed upon such notice to the parties and under such rules
of procedure as the court may prescribe, and upon the coming in of
such report such exceptions may be filed and such proceedings had
in relation thereto as upon the report of a master in other equity
causes, but the court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or
in part, and enter such decree as the nature of the case may in its
judgment require." First. The question first to be considered is whether,
by the provisions of § 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
already quoted, the President's power is limited to removal for the
specific causes enumerated therein. The negative contention of the
government is based principally upon the decision of this court in Shrutleff v. United States, 189 U.
S. 311 . That case involved the power of the President to
remove a general appraiser of merchandise appointed under the Act
of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 131. Section 12 of the act provided for
the appointment by the President, by and with the advice and
consent Page 295 U. S. 622 of the Senate, of nine general appraisers of merchandise, who
"may be removed from office at any time by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The
President removed Shurtleff without assigning any cause therefor.
The Court of Claims dismissed plaintiff's petition to recover
salary, upholding the President's power to remove for causes other
than those stated. In this court, Shurtleff relied upon the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, but this court held
that, while the rule expressed in the maxim was a very proper one,
and founded upon justifiable reasoning in many instances, it

															"should not be accorded controlling weight when to do so would
involve the alteration of the universal practice of the government
for over a century and the consequent curtailment of the powers of
the executive in such an unusual manner."

															What the court meant by this expression appears from a reading
of the opinion. That opinion -- after saying that no term of office
was fixed by the act and that, with the exception of judicial
officers provided for by the Constitution, no civil officer had
ever held office by life tenure since the foundation of the
government -- points out that to construe the statute as contended
for by Shurtleff would give the appraiser the right to hold office
during his life or until found guilty of some act specified in the
statute, the result of which would be a complete revolution in
respect of the general tenure of office, effected by implication
with regard to that particular office only.

															"We think it quite inadmissible," the court said (pp. 189 U. S. 316 , 189 U. S.
318 ),

															"to attribute an intention on the part of Congress to make such
an extraordinary change in the usual rule governing the tenure of
office, and one which is to be applied to this particular office
only, without stating such intention in plain and explicit
language, instead of leaving it to be implied from doubtful
inferences. . . . We cannot bring ourselves to the belief that
Congress ever Page 295 U. S. 623 intended this result while omitting to use language which would
put that intention beyond doubt."

															These circumstances, which led the court to reject the maxim as
inapplicable, are exceptional. In the face of the unbroken
precedent against life tenure, except in the case of the judiciary,
the conclusion that Congress intended that, from among all other
civil officers, appraisers alone should be selected to hold office
for life was so extreme as to forbid, in the opinion of the court,
any ruling which would produce that result if it reasonably could
be avoided. The situation here presented is plainly and wholly
different. The statute fixes a term of office, in accordance with
many precedents. The first commissioners appointed are to continue
in office for terms of three, four, five, six, and seven years,
respectively, and their successors are to be appointed for terms of
seven years -- any commissioner being subject to removal by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office. The words of the act are definite and unambiguous.

															The government says the phrase "continue in office" is of no
legal significance, and, moreover, applies only to the first
commissioners. We think it has significance. It may be that,
literally, its application is restricted as suggested; but it
nevertheless lends support to a view contrary to that of the
government as to the meaning of the entire requirement in respect
of tenure; for it is not easy to suppose that Congress intended to
secure the first commissioners against removal except for the
causes specified, and deny like security to their successors.
Putting this phrase aside, however, the fixing of a definite term
subject to removal for cause, unless there be some countervailing
provision or circumstance indicating the contrary, which here we
are unable to find, is enough to establish the legislative intent
that the term is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause.
But if the intention of Page 295 U. S. 624 Congress that no removal should be made during the specified
term except for one or more of the enumerated causes were not clear
upon the face of the statute, as we think it is, it would be made
clear by a consideration of the character of the commission and the
legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage of
the act. The commission is to be nonpartisan, and it must, from the
very nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is
charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the
law. Its duties are neither political nor executive, but
predominantly quasi -judicial and quasi -legislative. Like the Interstate Commerce
Commission, its members are called upon to exercise the trained
judgment of a body of experts "appointed by law and informed by
experience." Illinois Central R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 206 U. S. 441 , 206 U. S. 454 ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 235 , 283 U. S.
238 -239. The legislative reports in both houses of
Congress clearly reflect the view that a fixed term was necessary
to the effective and fair administration of the law. In the report
to the Senate (No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 10-11) the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce, in support of the bill which
afterwards became the act in question, after referring to the
provision fixing the term of office at seven years, so arranged
that the membership would not be subject to complete change at any
one time, said:

															"The work of this commission will be of a most exacting and
difficult character, demanding persons who have experience in the
problems to be met -- that is, a proper knowledge of both the
public requirements and the practical affairs of industry. It is
manifestly desirable that the terms of the commissioners shall be
long enough to give them an opportunity to acquire the expertness
in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that
comes from experience. " Page 295 U. S. 625 The report declares that one advantage which the commission
possessed over the Bureau of Corporations (an executive subdivision
in the Department of Commerce which was abolished by the act) lay
in the fact of its independence, and that it was essential that the
commission should not be open to the suspicion of partisan
direction. The report quotes (p. 22) a statement to the committee
by Senator Newlands, who reported the bill, that the tribunal
should be of high character and

															"independent of any department of the government . . . a board
or commission of dignity, permanence, and ability, independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and independent in
character."

															The debates in both houses demonstrate that the prevailing view
was that the commission was not to be "subject to anybody in the
government, but . . . only to the people of the United States";
free from "political domination or control" or the "probability or
possibility of such a thing"; to be "separate and apart from any
existing department of the government -- not subject to the orders
of the President."

															More to the same effect appears in the debates, which were long
and thorough, and contain nothing to the contrary. While the
general rule precludes the use of these debates to explain the
meaning of the words of the statute, they may be considered as
reflecting light upon its general purposes and the evils which it
sought to remedy. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643 , 283 U. S.
650 .

															Thus, the language of the act, the legislative reports, and the
general purposes of the legislation as reflected by the debates all
combine to demonstrate the Congressional intent to create a body of
experts who shall gain experience by length of service -- a body
which shall be independent of executive authority except in its
selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave
or hindrance Page 295 U. S. 626 of any other official or any department of the government. To
the accomplishment of these purposes it is clear that Congress was
of opinion that length and certainty of tenure would vitally
contribute. And to hold that, nevertheless, the members of the
commission continue in office at the mere will of the President
might be to thwart, in large measure, the very ends which Congress
sought to realize by definitely fixing the term of office.

															We conclude that the intent of the act is to limit the executive
power of removal to the causes enumerated, the existence of none of
which is claimed here, and we pass to the second question. Second. To support its contention that the removal
provision of § 1, as we have just construed it, is an
unconstitutional interference with the executive power of the
President, the government's chief reliance is Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 . That
case has been so recently decided, and the prevailing and
dissenting opinions so fully review the general subject of the
power of executive removal, that further discussion would add
little of value to the wealth of material there collected. These
opinions examine at length the historical, legislative and judicial
data bearing upon the question, beginning with what is called "the
decision of 1789" in the first Congress and coming down almost to
the day when the opinions were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of
the volume in which they are printed. Nevertheless, the narrow
point actually decided was only that the President had power to
remove a postmaster of the first class without the advice and
consent of the Senate as required by act of Congress. In the course
of the opinion of the court, expressions occur which tend to
sustain the government's contention, but these are beyond the point
involved, and, therefore do not come within the rule of stare
decisis. Insofar as they are out of harmony with the views
here set forth, these expressions are disapproved. A like situation
was Page 295 U. S. 627 presented in the case of Cohens v.
Virginia , 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U. S. 399 ,
in respect of certain general expressions in the opinion in Marbury v.
Madison , 1 Cranch 137. Chief Justice Marshall, who
delivered the opinion in the Marbury case, speaking again
for the court in the Cohens case, said:

															"It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions,
in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they
may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a
subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The
reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the
Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent.
Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on
all other cases is seldom completely investigated."

															And he added that these general expressions in the case of Marbury v. Madison were to be understood with the
limitations put upon them by the opinion in the Cohens case. See also Carroll v. Lessee of
Carroll , 16 How. 275, 57 U. S.
286 -287; O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 , 289 U. S.
550 .

															The office of a postmaster is so essentially unlike the office
now involved that the decision in the Myers case cannot be
accepted as controlling our decision here. A postmaster is an
executive officer restricted to the performance of executive
functions. He is charged with no duty at all related to either the
legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in the Myers case finds support in the theory that such an
officer is merely one of the units in the executive department,
and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable
power of removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid
he is. Putting aside dicta, which may be followed if sufficiently
persuasive but which are not controlling, the necessary reach of
the decision goes far enough to include Page 295 U. S. 628 all purely executive officers. It goes no farther; much less
does it include an officer who occupies no place in the executive
department, and who exercises no part of the executive power vested
by the Constitution in the President.

															The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created
by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in
the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein
prescribed, and to perform other specified duties as a legislative
or as a judicial aid. Such a body cannot in any proper sense be
characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive. Its duties are
performed without executive leave, and, in the contemplation of the
statute, must be free from executive control. In administering the
provisions of the statute in respect of "unfair methods of
competition" -- that is to say, in filling in and administering the
details embodied by that general standard -- the commission acts in
part quasi -legislatively and in part quasi -judicially. In making investigations and reports
thereon for the information of Congress under 6, in aid of the
legislative power, it acts as a legislative agency. Under § 7,
which authorizes the commission to act as a master in chancery
under rules prescribed by the court, it acts as an agency of the
judiciary. To the extent that it exercises any executive function
-- as distinguished from executive power in the constitutional
sense -- it does so in the discharge and effectuation of its quasi -legislative or quasi -judicial powers, or as
an agency of the legislative or judicial departments of the
government.* Page 295 U. S. 629 If Congress is without authority to prescribe causes for removal
of members of the trade commission and limit executive power of
removal accordingly, that power at once becomes practically
all-inclusive in respect of civil officers with the exception of
the judiciary provided for by the Constitution. The Solicitor
General, at the bar, apparently recognizing this to be true, with
commendable candor, agreed that his view in respect of the
removability of members of the Federal Trade Commission
necessitated a like view in respect of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Court of Claims. We are thus confronted with the
serious question whether not only the members of these quasi -legislative and quasi -judicial bodies, but
the judges of the legislative Court of Claims, exercising judicial
power ( Williams v. United States, 289 U.
S. 553 , 289 U. S.
565 -567), continue in office only at the pleasure of the
President.

															We think it plain under the Constitution that illimitable power
of removal is not possessed by the President in respect of officers
of the character of those just named. The authority of Congress, in
creating quasi -legislative or quasi -judicial
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted, and that
authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the
period during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid
their removal except for cause in the meantime. For it is quite
evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of
another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of
independence against the latter's will.

															The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others has
often been stressed, and is hardly open to serious question. So
much is implied in Page 295 U. S. 630 the very fact of the separation of the powers of these
departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which recognizes
their essential coequality. The sound application of a principle
that makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing
his control in the house of another who is master there. James
Wilson, one of the framers of the Constitution and a former justice
of this court, said that the independence of each department
required that its proceedings "should be free from the remotest
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers."
Andrews, The Works of James Wilson (1896), vol. 1, p. 367. And Mr.
Justice Story, in the first volume of his work on the Constitution,
4th ed., § 530, citing No. 48 of the Federalist, said that neither
of the departments in reference to each other "ought to possess,
directly or indirectly, an overruling influence in the
administration of their respective powers." And see O'Donoghue
v. United States, supra., at pp. 289 U. S.
530 -531.

															The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within
this principle, since its coercive influence threatens the
independence of a commission which is not only wholly disconnected
from the executive department, but which, as already fully appears,
was created by Congress as a means of carrying into operation
legislative and judicial powers, and as an agency of the
legislative and judicial departments.

															In the light of the question now under consideration, we have
reexamined the precedents referred to in the Myers case,
and find nothing in them to justify a conclusion contrary to that
which we have reached. The so-called "decision of 1789" had
relation to a bill proposed by Mr. Madison to establish an
executive Department of Foreign Affairs. The bill provided that the
principal officer was "to be removable from office by the President
of the United States." This clause was changed to read "whenever
the principal officer shall be removed Page 295 U. S. 631 from office by the President of the United States," certain
things should follow, thereby, in connection with the debates,
recognizing and confirming, as the court thought in the Myers case, the sole power of the President in the matter.
We shall not discuss the subject further, since it is so fully
covered by the opinions in the Myers case, except to say
that the office under consideration by Congress was not only purely
executive, but the officer one who was responsible to the
President, and to him alone, in a very definite sense. A reading of
the debates shows that the President's illimitable power of removal
was not considered in respect of other than executive officers. And
it is pertinent to observe that, when, at a later time, the tenure
of office for the Comptroller of the Treasury was under
consideration, Mr. Madison quite evidently thought that, since the
duties of that office were not purely of an executive nature, but
partook of the judiciary quality as well, a different rule in
respect of executive removal might well apply. 1 Annals of
Congress, cols. 611-612.

															In Marbury v. Madison, supra, pp. 5 U. S. 162 , 5 U. S. 165 -166,
it is made clear that Chief Justice Marshall was of opinion that a
justice of the peace for the District of Columbia was not removable
at the will of the President, and that there was a distinction
between such an officer and officers appointed to aid the President
in the performance of his constitutional duties. In the latter
case, the distinction he saw was that "their acts are his acts,"
and his will, therefore, controls; and, by way of illustration, he
adverted to the act establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs,
which was the subject of the "decision of 1789."

															The result of what we now have said is this: whether the power
of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the
authority of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite
term and precluding a removal except for cause will depend upon the
character of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the
power of the President Page 295 U. S. 632 alone to make the removal, is confined to purely executive
officers, and, as to officers of the kind here under consideration,
we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term for
which the officer is appointed except for one or more of the causes
named in the applicable statute. To the extent that, between the
decision in the Myers case, which sustains the
unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive
officers, and our present decision that such power does not extend
to an office such as that here involved, there shall remain a field
of doubt, we leave such cases as may fall within it for future
consideration and determination as they may arise. In accordance
with the foregoing, the questions submitted are answered. Question No. 1, Yes. Question No. 2, Yes. * The docket title of this case is: Rathbun, Executor v.
United States. * The provision of § 6(d) of the act which authorizes the
President to direct an investigation and report by the commission
in relation to alleged violations of the antitrust acts is so
obviously collateral to the main design of the act as not to
detract from the force of this general statement as to the
character of that body.

Summary:
In Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), the Supreme Court upheld the restriction on the President's power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), establishing a key precedent for independent regulatory agencies in the United States.

The Court distinguished between executive officers, who could be removed at will by the President, and officers with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties, like the FTC, whose removal should be restricted to the causes specified by Congress. This decision affirmed Congress's ability to create independent agencies with a degree of protection from presidential control, a significant development in the US system of checks and balances.