NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 10–680

															_________________

															CAROL HOWES, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. RANDALL LEE FIELDS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit

															[February 21, 2012]

															Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that our precedents clearly establish that a prisoner
is in custody within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436 (1966), if the prisoner is taken aside and questioned about
events that occurred outside the prison walls. Our decisions,
however, do not clearly establish such a rule, and therefore the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that this rule provides a
permissible basis for federal habeas relief under the relevant
provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Indeed, the rule applied by
the court below does not represent a correct interpretation of our Miranda case law. We therefore reverse.

															I

															While serving a sentence in a Michigan jail,
Randall Fields was escorted by a corrections officer to a
conference room where two sheriff’s deputies questioned him about
allegations that, before he came to prison, he had engaged in
sexual conduct with a 12-year-old boy. In order to get to the
conference room, Fields had to go down one floor and pass through a
locked door that separated two sections of the facility. See App.
to Pet. for Cert. 66a, 69a. Fields arrived at the conference room
between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m.[ 1 ]
and was questioned for between five and seven hours.[ 2 ]

															At the beginning of the interview, Fields was
told that he was free to leave and return to his cell. See id., at 70a. Later, he was again told that he could leave
whenever he wanted. See id., at 90a. The two interviewing
deputies were armed during the interview, but Fields remained free
of handcuffs and other restraints. The door to the conference room
was sometimes open and sometimes shut. See id., at
70a–75a.

															About halfway through the interview, after
Fields had been confronted with the allegations of abuse, he became
agitated and began to yell. See id., at 80a, 125a. Fields
testified that one of the deputies, using an expletive, told him to
sit down and said that “if [he] didn’t want to cooperate, [he]
could leave.” Id., at 89a; see also id., at 70a–71a.
Fields eventually confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy.
According to Fields’ testimony at a suppression hearing, he said
several times during the interview that he no longer wanted to talk
to the deputies, but he did not ask to go back to his cell prior to
the end of the interview. See id., at 92a–93a.

															When he was eventually ready to leave, he had to
wait an additional 20 minutes or so because a corrections officer
had to be summoned to escort him back to his cell, and he did not
return to his cell until well after the hour when he generally
retired.[ 3 ] At no time was
Fields given Miranda warnings or advised that he did not
have to speak with the deputies.

															The State of Michigan charged Fields with
criminal sexual conduct. Relying on Miranda , Fields moved to
suppress his confession, but the trial court denied his motion.
Over the renewed objection of defense counsel, one of the
interviewing deputies testified at trial about Fields’ admissions.
The jury convicted Fields of two counts of third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, and the judge sentenced him to a term of 10 to 15
years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed, rejecting Fields’ contention that his statements
should have been suppressed because he was subjected to custodial
interrogation without a Miranda warning. The court ruled
that Fields had not been in custody for pur- poses of Miranda during the interview, so no Miranda warnings
were required. The court emphasized that Fields was told that he
was free to leave and return to his cell but that he never asked to
do so. The Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

															Fields then filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in Federal District Court, and the court granted
relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the interview in
the conference room was a “custodial interrogation” within the
meaning of Miranda because isolation from the general prison
population combined with questioning about conduct occurring
outside the prison makes any such interrogation custodial per
se . The Court of Appeals reasoned that this Court clearly
established in Mathis v. United States , 391 U.S. 1 (1968), that “ Miranda warnings must be administered when law
enforcement officers remove an inmate from the general prison
population and interrogate him regarding criminal conduct that took
place outside the jail or prison.” 617 F.3d 813, 820 (CA6 2010);
see also id., at 818 (“The central holding of Mathis is that a Miranda warning is required whenever an
incarcerated individual is isolated from the general prison
population and interrogated, i.e.[,] questioned in a manner likely
to lead to self-incrimination, about conduct occurring outside of
the prison”). Because Fields was isolated from the general prison
population and interrogated about conduct occurring in the outside
world, the Court of Appeals found that the state court’s decision
was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by
this Court in Mathis . 617 F. 3d, at 823.

															We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___
(2011).

															II

															Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant a state
prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus if the
state-court adjudication pursuant to which the prisoner is held
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  28
U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). In this context, “clearly
established law” signifies “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta,
of this Court’s decisions.” Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S.
362 , 412 (2000).

															In this case, it is abundantly clear that our
precedents do not clearly establish the categorical rule on which
the Court of Appeals relied, i.e., that the questioning of a
prisoner is always custodial when the prisoner is removed from the
general prison population and questioned about events that occurred
outside the prison. On the contrary, we have repeatedly declined to
adopt any categorical rule with respect to whether the questioning
of a prison inmate is custodial.

															In Illinois v. Perkins , 496 U.S.
292 (1990), where we upheld the admission of un-Mirandized
statements elicited from an inmate by an undercover officer
masquerading as another inmate, we noted that “[t]he bare fact of
cus- tody may not in every instance require a warning even when
the suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but
we do not have occasion to explore that issue here .” Id ., at 299 (emphasis added). Instead, we simply “reject[ed]
the argument that Miranda warnings are required whenever a
suspect is in custody in a technical sense and converses with
someone who happens to be a government agent.” Id ., at
297.

															Most recently, in Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U. S. ___ (2010), we expressly declined to
adopt a bright-line rule for determining the applicability of Miranda in prisons. Shatzer considered whether a
break in custody ends the presumption of involuntariness
established in Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S.
477 (1981), and, if so, whether a prisoner’s return to the
general prison population after a custodial interrogation
constitutes a break in Miranda custody. See 559 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 3–4). In considering the latter question, we
noted first that “[w]e have never decided whether
incarceration constitutes custody for Miranda purposes, and
have indeed explicitly declined to address the issue.” Id .,
at ___ (slip op., at 13) (citing Perkins , supra, at
299; emphasis added). The answer to this question, we noted, would
“depen[d] upon whether [incar- ceration] exerts the coercive
pressure that Miranda was designed to guard against—the
‘danger of coercion [that] results from the interaction of
custody and official inter- rogation.’ ” 559 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting Perkins , supra, at
297).

															In concluding that our precedents establish a
categorical rule, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the
decision in Mathis , but the Court of Appeals misread the
holding in that case. In Mathis , an inmate in a state prison
was questioned by an Internal Revenue agent and was subsequently
convicted for federal offenses. The Court of Appeals held that Miranda did not apply to this interview for two reasons: A
criminal investigation had not been commenced at the time of the
interview, and the prisoner was incarcerated for an “unconnected
offense.” Mathis v . United States , 376 F.2d 595, 597
(CA5 1967). This Court rejected both of those grounds for
distinguishing Miranda, 391 U. S., at 4, and thus the
holding in Mathis is simply that a prisoner who otherwise
meets the requirements for Miranda custody is not taken
outside the scope of Miranda by either of the two factors on
which the Court of Appeals had relied. Mathis did not hold
that imprisonment, in and of itself, is enough to constitute Miranda custody.[ 4 ] Nor,
contrary to respondent’s submission, see Brief for Respondent 14,
did Oregon v . Mathiason , 429
U.S. 492 , 494 (1977) (per curiam) , which simply
restated in dictum the holding in Mathis .

															The Court of Appeals purported to find support
for its per se rule in Shatzer , relying on our
statement that “[n]o one questions that Shatzer was in custody for Miranda purposes” when he was interviewed. 559 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 13). But this statement means only that the
issue of custody was not contested before us. It strains credulity
to read the statement as constituting an “unambiguous conclusion”
or “finding” by this Court that Shatzer was in custody. 617
F. 3d, at 822.

															Finally, contrary to respondent’s suggestion,
see Brief for Respondent 12–15, Miranda itself did not
clearly establish the rule applied by the Court of Appeals. Miranda adopted a “set of prophylactic measures” designed to
ward off the “ ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial
interrogation,” Shatzer, supra, at ___ (slip op., at
4) (quoting Miranda , 384 U. S., at 467), but Miranda did not hold that such pressures are always present
when a prisoner is taken aside and questioned about events outside
the prison walls. Indeed, Miranda did not even establish
that police questioning of a suspect at the station house is always
custodial. See Mathiason , supra, at 495 (declining to
find that Miranda warnings are required “simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect”).

															In sum, our decisions do not clearly establish
that a prisoner is always in custody for purposes of Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population
and questioned about conduct outside the prison.[ 5 ]

															III

															Not only does the categorical rule applied
below go well beyond anything that is clearly established in our
prior decisions, it is simply wrong. The three elements of that
rule—(1) imprisonment, (2) questioning in private, and (3)
questioning about events in the outside world—are not necessarily
enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes.

															A

															As used in our Miranda case law,
“custody” is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are
thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In
determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the
initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of “the objective
cir- cumstances of the interrogation,” Stansbury v. Califor- nia, 511 U.S.
318 , 322–323, 325 (1994) (per curiam) , a
“reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v .
Keohane , 516 U.S.
99 , 112 (1995). And in order to determine how a suspect would
have “gauge[d]” his “freedom of movement,” courts must examine “all
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Stansbury , supra, at 322, 325 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Relevant factors include the location of the
questioning, see Shatzer , supra, at ___–___ (slip
op., at 13–16), its duration, see Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U.S.
420 , 437–438 (1984), statements made during the interview, see Mathiason , supra, at 495; Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S.
652 , 665 (2004); Stansbury , supra, at 325, the
presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning,
see New York v. Quarles , 467
U.S. 649 , 655 (1984), and the release of the interviewee at the
end of the questioning, see California v. Beheler , 463 U.S.
1121 , 1122–1123 (1983) (per curiam) .

															Determining whether an individual’s freedom of
movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the
analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement
amount to custody for purposes of Miranda . We have
“decline[d] to accord talismanic power” to the freedom-of-movement
inquiry, Berkemer , supra, at 437, and have instead
asked the additional question whether the relevant environment
presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda . “Our cases
make clear . . . that the freedom-of-movement test
identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.” Shatzer , 559 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 14).

															This important point is illustrated by our
decision in Berkemer v . McCarty , supra. In
that case, we held that the roadside questioning of a motorist who
was pulled over in a routine traffic stop did not constitute
custodial interrogation. Id., at 423, 441–442. We
acknowledged that “a traffic stop significantly curtails the
‘freedom of action’ of the driver and the passengers,” and that it
is generally “a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop
one’s car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission.” Id ., at 436. “[F]ew motorists,” we noted,
“would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to
leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do
so.” Ibid . Nevertheless, we held that a person detained as a
result of a traffic stop is not in Miranda custody because
such detention does not “sufficiently impair [the detained
person’s] free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination
to require that he be warned of his consti- tutional rights.” 468
U. S., at 437. As we later put it, the “temporary and
relatively nonthreatening detention in- volved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody,” Shatzer , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) (citation
omitted). See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S.
1 (1968).

															It may be thought that the situation in Berkemer —the questioning of a motorist subjected to a brief
traffic stop—is worlds away from those present when an inmate is
questioned in a prison, but the same cannot be said of Shatz er, where we again distinguished between restraints on
freedom of movement and Miranda custody. Shatzer, as
noted , concerned the Edwards prophylactic rule, which
limits the ability of the police to initiate further questioning of
a suspect in Miranda custody once the suspect invokes the
right to counsel. We held in Shatzer that this rule does not
apply when there is a sufficient break in custody between the
suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel and the initiation of
subsequent questioning. See 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
13-16). And, what is significant for present purposes, we further
held that a break in custody may occur while a suspect is serving a
term in prison. If a break in custody can occur while a prisoner is
serving an uninterrupted term of imprisonment, it must follow that
imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation
within the meaning of Miranda .

															There are at least three strong grounds for this
conclusion. First, questioning a person who is already serving a
prison term does not generally involve the shock that very often
accompanies arrest. In the paradigmatic Miranda situation—a
person is arrested in his home or on the street and whisked to a
police station for questioning—detention represents a sharp and
ominous change, and the shock may give rise to coercive pressures.
A person who is “cut off from his normal life and companions,” Shatzer , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7), and abruptly
transported from the street into a “police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda , 384 U. S., at 456, may feel coerced into
answering questions.

															By contrast, when a person who is already
serving a term of imprisonment is questioned, there is usually no
such change. “Interrogated suspects who have previously been
convicted of crime live in prison.” Shatzer, 559 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 14). For a person serving a term of
incarceration, we reasoned in Shatzer , the ordinary
restrictions of prison life, while no doubt unpleasant, are
expected and familiar and thus do not involve the same “inherently
compelling pressures” that are often present when a suspect is
yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside world and
subjected to interrogation in a police station. Id., at ___
(slip op., at 4).

															Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not
been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured
into speaking by a longing for prompt release. When a person is
arrested and taken to a station house for interrogation, the person
who is questioned may be pressured to speak by the hope that, after
doing so, he will be allowed to leave and go home. On the other
hand, when a prisoner is questioned, he knows that when the
questioning ceases, he will remain under confinement. Id., at ___– ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 14–15, n. 8).

															Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not
been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement
officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the
duration of his sentence. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at
14–15). And “where the possibility of parole exists,” the
interrogating officers probably also lack the power to bring about
an early release. Ibid . “When the suspect has no reason to
think that the listeners have official power over him, it should
not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he
expects from his listeners.” Perkins , 496 U. S., at
297. Under such circumstances, there is little “basis for the
assumption that a suspect . . . will feel compelled to speak by the
fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of [a] more
lenient treatment should he confess.” Id. , at 296–297.

															In short, standard conditions of confinement and
associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily implicate
the same interests that the Court sought to protect when it
afforded special safeguards to persons subjected to custodial
interrogation. Thus, service of a term of imprisonment, without
more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody.

															B

															The two other elements included in the Court
of Appeals’ rule—questioning in private and questioning about
events that took place outside the prison—are likewise
insufficient.

															Taking a prisoner aside for questioning—as
opposed to questioning the prisoner in the presence of fellow
inmates—does not necessarily convert a “noncustodial situation
. . . to one in which Miranda applies.” Mathiason , 429 U. S., at 495. When a person who is not
serving a prison term is questioned, isolation may contribute to a
coercive atmosphere by preventing family members, friends, and
others who may be sympathetic from providing either advice or
emotional support. And without any such assistance, the person who
is questioned may feel overwhelming pressure to speak and to
refrain from asking that the interview be terminated.

															By contrast, questioning a prisoner in private
does not generally remove the prisoner from a supportive
atmosphere. Fellow inmates are by no means necessarily friends. On
the contrary, they may be hostile and, for a variety of reasons,
may react negatively to what the questioning reveals. In the
present case, for example, would respondent have felt more at ease
if he had been questioned in the presence of other inmates about
the sexual abuse of an adolescent boy? Isolation from the general
prison population is often in the best interest of the interviewee
and, in any event, does not suggest on its own the atmosphere of
coercion that concerned the Court in Miranda .

															It is true that taking a prisoner aside for
questioning may necessitate some additional limitations on his
freedom of movement. A prisoner may, for example, be removed from
an exercise yard and taken, under close guard, to the room where
the interview is to be held. But such procedures are an ordinary
and familiar attribute of life behind bars. Escorts and special
security precautions may be standard procedures regardless of the
purpose for which an inmate is removed from his regular routine and
taken to a special location. For example, ordinary prison procedure
may require such measures when a prisoner is led to a meeting with
an attorney.

															Finally, we fail to see why questioning about
criminal activity outside the prison should be regarded as having a
significantly greater potential for coercion than questioning under
otherwise identical circumstances about criminal activity within
the prison walls. In both instances, there is the potential for
additional criminal liability and punishment. If anything, the
distinction would seem to cut the other way, as an inmate who
confesses to misconduct that occurred within the prison may also
incur administrative penalties, but even this is not enough to tip
the scale in the direction of custody. “The threat to a citizen’s
Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to
neutralize” is neither mitigated nor magnified by the location of
the conduct about which questions are asked. Berkemer, 468
U. S., at 435, n. 22.

															For these reasons, the Court of Appeals’
categorical rule is unsound.

															IV

															A

															When a prisoner is questioned, the
determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the
interrogation. These include the language that is used in summoning
the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the
interrogation is conducted. See Yarborough , 541 U. S.,
at 665. An inmate who is removed from the general prison population
for questioning and is “thereafter . . . subjected to
treatment” in connection with the interrogation “that renders him
‘in custody’ for practical purposes . . . will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda .” Berkemer , 468 U. S., at 440.

															“Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in
those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated.” Id., at 437; see Shatzer ,
559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Mathiason , supra, at 495. Confessions voluntarily made by prisoners in
other situations should not be suppressed. “Voluntary confessions
are not merely a proper element in law enforcement, they are an
unmitigated good, essential to society’s compelling interest in
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” Shatzer , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 9) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

															B

															The record in this case reveals that
respondent was not taken into custody for purposes of Miranda . To be sure, respondent did not invite the interview
or consent to it in advance, and he was not advised that he was
free to decline to speak with the deputies. The following facts
also lend some support to respondent’s argument that Miranda ’s custody requirement was met: The interview lasted
for between five and seven hours in the evening and continued well
past the hour when respondent generally went to bed; the deputies
who questioned respondent were armed; and one of the deputies,
according to respondent, “[u]sed a very sharp tone,” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 76a, and, on one occasion, profanity, see id., at
77a.

															These circumstances, however, were offset by
others. Most important, respondent was told at the outset of the
interrogation, and was reminded again thereafter, that he could
leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted. See id., at 89a–90a (“I was told I could get up and leave whenever I
wanted”); id ., at 70a–71a. Moreover, respondent was not
physically restrained or threatened and was interviewed in a
well-lit, average-sized conference room, where he was “not
uncomfortable.” Id., at 90a; see id ., at 71a,
88a–89a. He was offered food and water, and the door to the
conference room was sometimes left open. See id., at 70a,
74a. “All of these objective facts are consistent with an
interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have
felt free to terminate the interview and leave.” Yarborough, supra, at 664–665.

															Because he was in prison, respondent was not
free to leave the conference room by himself and to make his own
way through the facility to his cell. Instead, he was escorted to
the conference room and, when he ultimately decided to end the
interview, he had to wait about 20 minutes for a corrections
officer to arrive and escort him to his cell. But he would have
been subject to this same restraint even if he had been taken to
the conference room for some reason other than police questioning;
under no circumstances could he have reasonably expected to be able
to roam free.[ 6 ] And while
respondent testified that he “was told . . . if I did not
want to cooperate, I needed to go back to my cell,” these words did
not coerce cooperation by threatening harsher conditions. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 71a; see id ., at 89a (“I was told, if I
didn’t want to cooperate, I could leave”). Returning to his cell
would merely have returned him to his usual environment. See Shatzer , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 14)
(“Interrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of crime
live in prison. When they are released back into the general prison
population, they return to their accustomed surroundings and daily
routine—they regain the degree of control they had over their lives
prior to the interrogation”).

															Taking into account all of the circumstances of
the questioning—including especially the undisputed fact that
respondent was told that he was free to end the questioning and to
return to his cell—we hold that respondent was not in custody
within the meaning of Miranda .

															*  *  *

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

															Reversed. Notes 1 Fields testified that he
left his cell around 8 p.m. and that the in-terview began around
8:30 p.m. App. to Pet. for Cert. 77a. Both the Michigan Court of
Appeals and the Sixth Circuit stated that the interview began
between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. See id., at 4a, 54a. 2 The Court of Appeals
stated that the interview lasted for approximately seven hours, see id., at 4a, a figure that appears to be basedon the
testimony of one of the interviewing deputies, see id., at
123a. Fields put the number of hours between five and five and a
half, saying the interview began around 8:30 p.m. and continued
until 1:30 a.m. or 2 a.m. See id., at 77a. The Michigan
Court of Appeals stated that the interview ended around midnight,
which would put the length of the interview at between three and
five hours. 3 Fields testified that his
normal bedtime was 10:30 p.m. or 11 p.m. See id., at
78a. 4 Indeed, it is impossible
to tell from either the opinion of this Court or that of the court
below whether the prisoner’s interview was routine or whether there
were special features that may have created an especially coercive
atmosphere. 5 The state-court decision
applied the traditional context-specific analysis to determine
whether the circumstances of respondent’s interrogation gave rise
to “the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard
against.” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13).
The court first observed: “That a defendant is in prison for an
unrelated offense when being questioned does not, without
more , mean that he was in custody for the purpose of
determining whether Miranda warnings were required.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 56a (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis
added). In this case, the court noted, the “defendant was
unquestionably in custody, but on a matter unrelated to the
interrogation.” Ibid . The Sixth Circuit concluded that the
state court thereby limited Miranda in a way rejected by Mathis v. United States , 391 U.S.
1 (1968), and “curtail[ed] the warnings to be given persons
under interrogation by officers based on the reason why the person
is in custody.” Id., at 4–5. We think the better reading is
that the state court merely meant to draw a distinction between
incarceration and Miranda custody. This reading is supported
by the state court’s subsequent consideration of whether the facts
of the case were likely to create an atmosphere of coercion. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 56a. 6 Respondent did not
testify to the contrary. The following colloquy occurred at his Miranda hearing: “Q. You’re not generally allowed to just
roam around Lenawee County Jail on your own, are you? “A. No, I
never have. “Q. So wouldn’t it make sense to you, since you had
that experience, that in fact you would have been escorted just
like you were escorted . . . into this conference room?
“A. That makes common sense. “Q. So when they said that you were
free to leave and you get up—could get up and go and all you had to
do was tell them you wanted to go, in your mind, did you understand
that to mean that somebody would come get you and take you back to
your cell? “A. But that doesn’t give me freedom to just get up and
walk away. “Q. I understand it doesn’t— “A. So, no. “Q. The
question is this, sir, not whether you had freedom to get up and
walk away, but did you understand that what that meant was that a
jailer would come get you and— “A. No— “Q. —take you back to your
cell? “A. I did not understand that. “Q. You didn’t? “A. No. “Q.
Why not? That’s how you got there. “A. Because I did not know if a
jailer would take me back or if one of those gentlemen would take
me back. “Q. But you understood that, if you asked, one of them or
a jailer would take you back to your cell? “A. I assumed that. “Q.
And you believed that to be true? “A. I assumed that.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 91a–92a. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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															No. 10–680

															_________________

															CAROL HOWES, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. RANDALL LEE FIELDS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit

															[February 21, 2012]

															Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer and
Justice Sotomayor join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															Given this Court’s controlling decisions on what
counts as “custody” for Miranda purposes, I agree that the
law is not “clearly established” in respondent Fields’s favor. See, e.g. , Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U. S. ___, ___
(2010) (slip op., at 13–16); Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S.
99 , 112 (1995). But I disagree with the Court’s further
determination that Fields was not in custody under Miranda .
Were the case here on direct review, I would vote to hold that Miranda precludes the State’s introduction of Fields’s
confession as evidence against him. Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436 (1966), reacted to police interrogation tactics that eroded
the Fifth Amendment’s ban on compulsory self-incrimination. The
opinion did so by requiring interrogators to convey to suspects the
now-familiar warnings: The suspect is to be informed, prior to
interrogation, that he “has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed.” Id. , at 444.

															Under what circumstances are Miranda warnings required? Miranda tells us “in all settings in
which [a person’s] freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way.” Id ., at 467. Given the reality that police
interrogators “trad[e] on the weakness of individuals,” i.e. , their “insecurity about [themselves] or [their]
surroundings,” id ., at 455, the Court found the
preinterrogation warnings set out in the opinion “indispensable,” id. , at 469. Those warnings, the Court elaborated, are “an
absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere,” id. , at 468; they “insure” that
the suspect is timely told of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and
his freedom to exercise it, id. , at 469.

															Fields, serving time for disorderly conduct,
was, of course, “i[n] custody,” but not “for purposes of Miranda ,” the Court concludes. Ante , at 14. I would
not train, as the Court does, on the question whether there can be
custody within custody. Instead, I would ask, as Miranda put
it, whether Fields was subjected to “incommunicado interrogation
. . . in a police-dominated atmosphere,” 384 U. S., at
445, whether he was placed, against his will, in an inherently
stressful situation, see id. , at 468, and whether his
“freedom of action [was] curtailed in any significant way,” id. , at 467. Those should be the key questions, and to each
I would answer “Yes.”

															As the Court acknowledges, Fields did not invite
or consent to the interview. Ante , at 14. He was removed
from his cell in the evening, taken to a conference room in the
sheriff’s quarters, and questioned by two armed deputies long into
the night and early morning. Ibid . He was not told at the
outset that he had the right to decline to speak with the deputies. Ibid. Shut in with the armed officers, Fields felt
“trapped.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a. Although told he could
return to his cell if he did not want to cooperate, id. , at
71a–72a, Fields believed the deputies “would not have allowed [him]
to leave the room,” id. , at 72a. And with good reason. More
than once, “he told the officers . . . he did not want to
speak with them anymore.” 617 F.3d 813, 815 (CA6 2010). He was
given water, App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a, but not his evening
medications, id. , at 79a.[ 1 ]* Yet the Court concludes that Fields was in “an
interrogation environment in which a reasonable person would have
felt free to terminate the interview and leave.” Ante , at 15
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S.
652 , 665 (2004)).

															Critical to the Court’s judgment is “the
undisputed fact that [Fields] was told that he was free to end the
questioning and to return to his cell.” Ante , at 17. Never
mind the facts suggesting that Fields’s submission to the overnight
interview was anything but voluntary. Was Fields “held for
interrogation”? See Miranda , 384 U. S., at 471. Brought to,
and left alone with, the gun-bearing deputies, he surely was in my
judgment. Miranda instructed that such a person
“must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Ibid. Those warnings, along with “warnings of the right to
remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence
against [the speaker],” Miranda explained, are necessary
“prerequisite[s] to [an] interrogation” compatible with the Fifth
Amendment. Ibid . Today, for people already in prison, the
Court finds it adequate for the police to say: “You are free to
terminate this interrogation and return to your cell.” Such a
statement is no substitute for one ensuring that an individual is
aware of his rights.

															For the reasons stated, I would hold that the
“incommunicado interrogation [of Fields] in a police-dominated
atmosphere,” id. , at 445, without informing him of his
rights, dishonored the Fifth Amendment privilege Miranda was
designed to safeguard. Notes 1 * Each night, Fields took
an antidepressant and, due to his kidney transplant surgery, two
antirejection medications. App. to Pet. for Cert. 79a.

Summary: The Supreme Court case of Howes v. Fields (2012) dealt with the question of whether a prisoner is considered to be in custody for the purposes of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) when questioned about events that occurred outside the prison. The Court held that the prisoner, Randall Fields, was not in custody during the interrogation and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. Fields was serving a sentence in a Michigan jail when he was escorted by a corrections officer to a conference room for questioning by two sheriff's deputies about allegations of sexual conduct with a minor before his incarceration. Fields was told he was free to leave and return to his cell, and the door to the conference room was sometimes open. The Court concluded that Fields was in an interrogation environment where a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave, and thus, Miranda warnings were not necessary.