U.S. Supreme Court Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984) Berkemer v. McCarty No. 83-710 Argued April 18, 1984 Decided July 2, 1984 468
U.S. 420 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus After observing respondent's car weaving in and out of a highway
lane, an officer of the Ohio State Highway Patrol forced respondent
to stop and asked him to get out of the car. Upon noticing that
respondent was having difficulty standing, the officer concluded
that respondent would be charged with a traffic offense and would
not be allowed to leave the scene, but respondent was not told that
he would be taken into custody. When respondent could not perform a
field sobriety test without falling, the officer asked him if he
had been using intoxicants, and he replied that he had consumed two
beers and had smoked marihuana a short time before. The officer
then formally arrested respondent and drove him to a county jail,
where a blood test failed to detect any alcohol in respondent's
blood. Questioning was then resumed, and respondent again made
incriminating statements, including an admission that he was
"barely" under the influence of alcohol. At no point during this
sequence was respondent given the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 .
Respondent was charged with the misdemeanor under Ohio law of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs, and when the state court denied his motion to exclude
the various incriminating statements on the asserted ground that
their admission into evidence would violate the Fifth Amendment
because respondent had not been informed of his constitutional
rights prior to his interrogation, he pleaded "no contest," and was
convicted. After the conviction was affirmed on appeal by the
Franklin County Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court denied
review, respondent filed an action in Federal District Court for
habeas corpus relief. The District Court dismissed the petition,
but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals prior to custodial
interrogation, whether the offense investigated is a felony or a
misdemeanor traffic offense, and that respondent's post-arrest
statements, at least, were inadmissible. Held: 1. A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to
the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the
offense of which he is suspected or for which Page 468 U. S. 421 he was arrested. Thus, respondent's statements made at the
station house were inadmissible, since he was "in custody" at least
as of the moment he was formally arrested and instructed to get
into the police car, and since he was not informed of his
constitutional rights at that time. To create an exception to the Miranda rule when the police arrest a person for allegedly
committing a misdemeanor traffic offense and then question him
without informing him of his constitutional rights would
substantially undermine the rule's simplicity and clarity, and
would introduce doctrinal complexities, particularly with respect
to situations where the police, in conducting custodial
interrogations, do not know whether the person has committed a
misdemeanor or a felony. The purposes of the Miranda safeguards as to ensuring that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, relieving the inherently
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, and
freeing courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary, are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of
persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of
persons suspected of felonies. Pp. 468 U. S.
428 -435.

															2. The roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop does not constitute "custodial interrogation"
for the purposes of the Miranda rule. Although an ordinary
traffic stop curtails the "freedom of action" of the detained
motorist and imposes some pressures on the detainee to answer
questions, such pressures do not sufficiently impair the detainee's
exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require
that he be warned of his constitutional rights. A traffic stop is
usually brief, and the motorist expects that, while he may be given
a citation, in the end, he most likely will be allowed to continue
on his way. Moreover, the typical traffic stop is conducted in
public, and the atmosphere surrounding it is substantially less
"police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation
at issue in Miranda and subsequent cases in which Miranda has been applied. However, if a motorist who has
been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he
is entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda. In this case, the initial stop of respondent's car, by
itself, did not render him "in custody," and respondent has failed
to demonstrate that, at any time between the stop and the arrest,
he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with
a formal arrest. Although the arresting officer apparently decided
as soon as respondent stepped out of his car that he would be taken
into custody and charged with a traffic offense, the officer never
communicated his intention to respondent. A policeman's
unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect
was "in custody" at a particular time; the Page 468 U. S. 422 only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation. Since respondent was
not taken into custody for the purposes of Miranda until
he was formally arrested, his statements made prior to that point
were admissible against him. Pp. 468 U. S.
435 -442.

															3. A determination of whether the improper admission of
respondent's postarrest statements constituted "harmless error"
will not be made by this Court for the cumulative reasons that (i)
the issue was not presented to the Ohio courts or to the federal
courts below, (ii) respondent's admissions made at the scene of the
traffic stop and the statements he made at the police station were
not identical, and (iii) the procedural posture of the case makes
the use of harmless error analysis especially difficult, because
respondent, while preserving his objection to the denial of his
pretrial motion to exclude the evidence, elected not to contest the
prosecution's case against him and thus has not yet had an
opportunity to try to impeach the State's evidence or to present
evidence of his own. Pp. 468 U. S.
442 -445.

															716 F.2d 361, affirmed.

															MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 468 U. S.
445 .

															JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents two related questions: First, does our
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), govern the admissibility of statements
made during custodial interrogation by a suspect accused of a
misdemeanor traffic Page 468 U. S. 423 offense? Second, does the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a traffic stop constitute custodial
interrogation for the purposes of the doctrine enunciated in Miranda? I A The parties have stipulated to the essential facts. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-1. On the evening of March 31, 1980,
Trooper Williams of the Ohio State Highway Patrol observed
respondent's car weaving in and out of a lane on Interstate Highway
270. After following the car for two miles, Williams forced
respondent to stop and asked him to get out of the vehicle. When
respondent complied, Williams noticed that he was having difficulty
standing. At that point,

															"Williams concluded that [respondent] would be charged with a
traffic offense, and therefore his freedom to leave the scene was
terminated." Id. at A-2. However, respondent was not told that he
would be taken into custody. Williams then asked respondent to
perform a field sobriety test, commonly known as a "balancing
test." Respondent could not do so without falling.

															While still at the scene of the traffic stop, Williams asked
respondent whether he had been using intoxicants. Respondent
replied that "he had consumed two beers and had smoked several
joints of marijuana a short time before." Ibid. Respondent's speech was slurred, and Williams had difficulty
understanding him. Williams thereupon formally placed respondent
under arrest and transported him in the patrol car to the Franklin
County Jail.

															At the jail, respondent was given an intoxilyzer test to
determine the concentration of alcohol in his blood. [ Footnote 1 ] The test did not detect any
alcohol whatsoever in respondent's system. Williams then resumed
questioning respondent Page 468 U. S. 424 in order to obtain information for inclusion in the State
Highway Patrol Alcohol Influence Report. Respondent answered
affirmatively a question whether he had been drinking. When then
asked if he was under the influence of alcohol, he said, "I guess,
barely." Ibid. Williams next asked respondent to indicate
on the form whether the marihuana he had smoked had been treated
with any chemicals. In the section of the report headed "Remarks,"
respondent wrote, "No ang[el] dust or PCP in the pot. Rick
McCarty." App. 2.

															At no point in this sequence of events did Williams or anyone
else tell respondent that he had a right to remain silent, to
consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney appointed for him
if he could not afford one. B Respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Ohio
Rev.Code Ann. § 4511.19 (Supp.1983). Under Ohio law, that offense
is a first-degree misdemeanor and is punishable by fine or
imprisonment for up to six months. § 2929.21 (1982). Incarceration
for a minimum of three days is mandatory. § 4511.99
(Supp.1983).

															Respondent moved to exclude the various incriminating statements
he had made to Trooper Williams on the ground that introduction
into evidence of those statements would violate the Fifth Amendment
insofar as he had not been informed of his constitutional rights
prior to his interrogation. When the trial court denied the motion,
respondent pleaded "no contest," and was found guilty. [ Footnote 2 ] He was sentenced to 90 Page 468 U. S. 425 days in jail, 80 of which were suspended, and was fined $300,
$100 of which was suspended.

															On appeal to the Franklin County Court of Appeals, respondent
renewed his constitutional claim. Relying on a prior decision by
the Ohio Supreme Court, which held that the rule announced in Miranda "is not applicable to misdemeanors," State v.
Pyle, 19 Ohio St.2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970), the Court of Appeals rejected
respondent's argument and affirmed his conviction. State v.
McCarty, No. 80AP-680 (Mar. 10, 1981). The Ohio Supreme Court
dismissed respondent's appeal on the ground that it failed to
present a "substantial constitutional question." State v.
McCarty, No. 81-710 (July 1, 1981).

															Respondent then filed an action for a writ of habeas corpus in
the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. [ Footnote 3 ] The District Court
dismissed the petition, holding that

															" Miranda warnings do not have to be given prior to
in-custody interrogation of a suspect arrested for a traffic
offense." McCarty v. Herdman, No. C-2-81-1118 (Dec. 11,
1981).

															A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that

															" Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals prior to custodial interrogation, whether the offense
investigated be a felony or a misdemeanor traffic offense." McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d 361, 363 (1983) (emphasis
in original). In applying this principle to the facts of the case,
the Court of Appeals distinguished between the statements made by
respondent before and after his formal arrest. [ Footnote 4 ] The postarrest statements, the court
ruled, were Page 468 U. S. 426 plainly inadmissible; because respondent was not warned of his
constitutional rights prior to or "[a]t the point that Trooper
Williams took [him] to the police station," his ensuing admissions
could not be used against him. Id. at 364. The court's
treatment of respondent's prearrest statements was less clear. It
eschewed a holding that "the mere stopping of a motor vehicle
triggers Miranda, " ibid., but did not expressly
rule that the statements made by respondent at the scene of the
traffic stop could be used against him. In the penultimate
paragraph of its opinion, the court asserted that "[t]he failure to
advise [respondent] of his constitutional rights rendered at
least some of his statements inadmissible," ibid. (emphasis added), suggesting that the court was uncertain as to the
status of the prearrest confessions. [ Footnote 5 ] "Because [respondent] was convicted on
inadmissible evidence," the court deemed it necessary to vacate his
conviction and order the District Court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus. Ibid. [ Footnote
6 ] However, the Court of Appeals did not specify which
statements, if any, could be used against respondent in a retrial.
We granted certiorari to resolve confusion in the federal and state
courts regarding the applicability of our ruling in Page 468 U. S. 427 Miranda to interrogations involving minor offenses
[ Footnote 7 ] and to questioning
of motorists detained pursuant to traffic stops. [ Footnote 8 ] 464 U.S. 1038 (1984). Page 468 U. S. 428 II The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . .
." It is settled that this provision governs state as well as
federal criminal proceedings. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 , 378 U. S. 8 (1964).

															In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), the Court addressed the problem of how
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment could be protected from the coercive pressures
that can be brought to bear upon a suspect in the context of
custodial interrogation. The Court held:

															"[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of [a]
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise
it, the Page 468 U. S. 429 following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed." Id. at 384 U. S. 444 (footnote omitted).

															In the years since the decision in Miranda, we have
frequently reaffirmed the central principle established by that
case: if the police take a suspect into custody and then ask him
questions without informing him of the rights enumerated above, his
responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his
guilt. [ Footnote 9 ] See,
e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 , 451 U. S.
466 -467 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 , 446 U. S.
297 -298 (1980) (dictum); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 , 394 U. S.
326 -327 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 , 391 U. S. 3 -5
(1968). [ Footnote 10 ]

															Petitioner asks us to carve an exception out of the foregoing
principle. When the police arrest a person for allegedly committing
a misdemeanor traffic offense and then ask him questions without
telling him his constitutional rights, petitioner argues, his
responses should be admissible against him. [ Footnote 11 ] We cannot agree. Page 468 U. S. 430 One of the principal advantages of the doctrine that suspects
must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody
is the clarity of that rule.

															" Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police
and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in
conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under
what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation
are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which benefits the
accused and the State alike, has been thought to outweigh the
burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes on law
enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the suppression of
trustworthy and highly probative evidence even though the
confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth Amendment
analysis." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 , 442 U. S. 718 (1979).

															The exception to Miranda proposed by petitioner would
substantially undermine this crucial advantage of the doctrine. The
police often are unaware when they arrest a person whether he may
have committed a misdemeanor or a felony. Consider, for example,
the reasonably common situation in which the driver of a car
involved in an accident is taken into custody. Under Ohio law, both
driving while under the influence of intoxicants and negligent
vehicular homicide are misdemeanors, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2903.07,
4511.99 (Supp.1983), while reckless vehicular homicide is a felony,
§ 2903.06 (Supp.1983). When arresting a person for causing a
collision, the police may not know which of these offenses he may
have committed. Indeed, the nature of his offense may depend upon
circumstances unknowable to the police, such as whether the suspect
has previously committed Page 468 U. S. 431 a similar offense [ Footnote
12 ] or has a criminal record of some other kind. It may even
turn upon events yet to happen, such as whether a victim of the
accident dies. It would be unreasonable to expect the police to
make guesses as to the nature of the criminal conduct at issue
before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect. [ Footnote 13 ]

															Equally importantly, the doctrinal complexities that would
confront the courts if we accepted petitioner's proposal would be
Byzantine. Difficult questions quickly spring to mind: for
instance, investigations into seemingly minor offenses sometimes
escalate gradually into investigations into more serious matters;
[ Footnote 14 ] at what point
in the evolution of an affair of this sort would the police be
obliged to give Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody?
What evidence would be necessary to establish that an arrest for a
misdemeanor offense Page 468 U. S. 432 was merely a pretext to enable the police to interrogate the
suspect (in hopes of obtaining information about a felony) without
providing him the safeguards prescribed by Miranda? [ Footnote 15 ] The litigation
necessary to resolve such matters would be time-consuming and
disruptive of law enforcement. And the end result would be an
elaborate set of rules, interlaced with exceptions and subtle
distinctions, discriminating between different kinds of custodial
interrogations. [ Footnote
16 ] Neither the police nor criminal defendants would benefit
from such a development.

															Absent a compelling justification, we surely would be unwilling
so seriously to impair the simplicity and clarity of the holding of Miranda. Neither of the two arguments proffered by
petitioner constitutes such a justification. Petitioner first
contends that Miranda warnings are unnecessary when a
suspect is questioned about a misdemeanor traffic offense, because
the police have no reason to subject such a suspect to the sort of
interrogation that most troubled the Court in Miranda. We
cannot agree that the dangers of police abuse are so slight in this
context. For example, the offense of driving while intoxicated is
increasingly regarded in many jurisdictions as a very serious
matter. [ Footnote 17 ]
Especially when the intoxicant at issue is a narcotic drug, rather
than alcohol, the police sometimes have difficulty obtaining
evidence of this crime. Under such circumstances, the incentive for
the police to try to induce the defendant to incriminate Page 468 U. S. 433 himself may well be substantial. Similar incentives are likely
to be present when a person is arrested for a minor offense but the
police suspect that a more serious crime may have been committed. See supra. at 468 U. S.
431 -432.

															We do not suggest that there is any reason to think improper
efforts were made in this case to induce respondent to make
damaging admissions. More generally, we have no doubt that, in
conducting most custodial interrogations of persons arrested for
misdemeanor traffic offenses, the police behave responsibly, and do
not deliberately exert pressures upon the suspect to confess
against his will. But the same might be said of custodial
interrogations of persons arrested for felonies. The purposes of
the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, [ Footnote 18 ] to relieve the " inherently compelling
pressures'" generated by the custodial setting itself, "`which work
to undermine the individual's will to resist,'" [ Footnote 19 ] and, as much as possible, to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try
to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were
voluntary. [ Footnote 20 ]
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of
persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of
persons suspected of felonies. Page 468 U. S.
434 Petitioner's second argument is that law enforcement would be
more expeditious and effective in the absence of a requirement that
persons arrested for traffic offenses be informed of their rights.
Again, we are unpersuaded. The occasions on which the police arrest
and then interrogate someone suspected only of a misdemeanor
traffic offense are rare. The police are already well accustomed to
giving Miranda warnings to persons taken into custody.
Adherence to the principle that all suspects must be given
such warnings will not significantly hamper the efforts of the
police to investigate crimes.

															We hold therefore that a person subjected to custodial
interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural
safeguards enunciated in Miranda [ Footnote 21 ] regardless of the nature or
severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for which he
was arrested.

															The implication of this holding is that the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the statements made by respondent at the
County Jail were inadmissible. There can be no question that
respondent was "in custody" at least as of the moment he was
formally placed under arrest and instructed to get into the police
car. Because he was not informed of Page 468 U. S. 435 his constitutional rights at that juncture, respondent's
subsequent admissions should not have been used against him. III To assess the admissibility of the self-incriminating statements
made by respondent prior to his formal arrest, we are obliged to
address a second issue concerning the scope of our decision in Miranda: whether the roadside questioning of a motorist
detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
"custodial interrogation." Respondent urges that it should,
[ Footnote 22 ] on the ground
that Miranda, by its terms, applies whenever "a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way, " 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 444 (emphasis added); see id. at 384 U. S. 467 .
[ Footnote 23 ] Page 468 U. S. 436 Petitioner contends that a holding that every detained motorist
must be advised of his rights before being questioned would
constitute an unwarranted extension of the Miranda doctrine.

															It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop
significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and
the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of
most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's signal to
stop one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. E.g., Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 4511.02 (1982).
[ Footnote 24 ] Certainly few
motorists would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull
over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told
they might do so. [ Footnote
25 ] Partly for these reasons, we have long acknowledged
that

															"stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a
'seizure' Page 468 U. S. 437 within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendmen[t], even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 440 U. S. 653 (1979) (citations omitted).

															However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in
the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to
the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which
the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we
must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights.

															Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger
that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 384 U. S. 467 .
First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is
presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside
detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist's expectations, when
he sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will
be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that
he may then be given a citation, but that, in the end, he most
likely will be allowed to continue on his way. [ Footnote 26 ] In this respect, Page 468 U. S. 438 questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite
different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id. at 384 U. S. 451 .
[ Footnote 27 ]

															Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop
are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the
police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed,
uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some
discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces.
Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at
least to some degree. Passersby, on foot or in other cars, witness
the interaction of officer and motorist. This exposure to public
view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous policeman to use
illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and
diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he
will be subjected to abuse. The fact that the detained motorist
typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen
further mutes his sense of vulnerability. In short, the
atmosphere Page 468 U. S. 439 surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less
"police dominated" than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation
at issue in Miranda itself, see 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 445 , 384 U. S.
491 -498, and in the subsequent cases in which we have
applied Miranda. [ Footnote 28 ]

															In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more
analogous to a so-called " Terry stop," see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
than to a formal arrest. [ Footnote 29 ] Under the Fourth Amendment, we have held, a
policeman who lacks probable cause but whose "observations lead him
reasonably to suspect" that a particular person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime, may detain that person
briefly [ Footnote 30 ] in
order to "investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873 , 422 U. S. 881 (1975). "[T]he stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in
scope to the justification for their initiation.'" Ibid. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 29 .)
Typically, this means that the officer may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try
to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's
suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. And, unless
the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to
arrest him, [ Footnote 31 ] he
must then be Page 468 U. S. 440 released. [ Footnote 32 ]
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this
sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary
traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. Respondent contends that to "exempt" traffic stops from the
coverage of Miranda will open the way to widespread abuse.
Policemen will simply delay formally arresting detained motorists,
and will subject them to sustained and intimidating interrogation
at the scene of their initial detention. Cf. State v.
Roberti, 293 Ore. 59, 95, 644 P.2d
1104 , 1125 (1982) (Linde, J., dissenting) (predicting the
emergence of a rule that "a person has not been significantly
deprived of freedom of action for Miranda purposes as long
as he is in his own car, even if it is surrounded by several patrol
cars and officers with drawn weapons"), withdrawn on
rehearing, 293 Ore. 236, 646 P.2d
1341 (1982), cert. pending, No. 82315. The net result,
respondent contends, will be a serious threat to the rights that
the Miranda doctrine is designed to protect.

															We are confident that the state of affairs projected by
respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated
with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.
S. 1121 , 463 U. S.
1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been
detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to
treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.
S. 492 , 429 U. S. 495 (1977) (per curiam). Page 468 U. S. 441 Admittedly, our adherence to the doctrine just recounted will
mean that the police and lower courts will continue occasionally to
have difficulty deciding exactly when a suspect has been taken into
custody. Either a rule that Miranda applies to all traffic
stops or a rule that a suspect need not be advised of his rights
until he is formally placed under arrest would provide a clearer,
more easily administered line. However, each of these two
alternatives has drawbacks that make it unacceptable. The first
would substantially impede the enforcement of the Nation's traffic
laws -- by compelling the police either to take the time to warn
all detained motorists of their constitutional rights or to forgo
use of self-incriminating statements made by those motorists --
while doing little to protect citizens' Fifth Amendment rights.
[ Footnote 33 ] The second
would enable the police to circumvent the constraints on custodial
interrogations established by Miranda. Turning to the case before us, we find nothing in the record
that indicates that respondent should have been given Miranda warnings at any point prior to the time Trooper
Williams placed him under arrest. For the reasons indicated above,
we reject the contention that the initial stop of respondent's car,
by itself, rendered him "in custody." And respondent has failed to
demonstrate that, at any time between the initial stop and the
arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those
associated with a formal arrest. Only a short period of time
elapsed between the stop and the arrest. [ Footnote 34 ] At no point during that interval was
respondent Page 468 U. S. 442 informed that his detention would not be temporary. Although
Trooper Williams apparently decided as soon as respondent stepped
out of his car that respondent would be taken into custody and
charged with a traffic offense, Williams never communicated his
intention to respondent. A policeman's unarticulated plan has no
bearing on the question whether a suspect was "in custody" at a
particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man
in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.
[ Footnote 35 ] Nor do other
aspects of the interaction of Williams and respondent support the
contention that respondent was exposed to "custodial interrogation"
at the scene of the stop. From aught that appears in the
stipulation of facts, a single police officer asked respondent a
modest number of questions and requested him to perform a simple
balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists.
[ Footnote 36 ] Treatment of
this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional
equivalent of formal arrest.

															We conclude, in short, that respondent was not taken into
custody for the purposes of Miranda until Williams
arrested him. Consequently, the statements respondent made prior to
that point were admissible against him. IV We are left with the question of the appropriate remedy. In his
brief, petitioner contends that, if we agree with the Page 468 U. S. 443 Court of Appeals that respondent's postarrest statements should
have been suppressed, but conclude that respondent's prearrest
statements were admissible, we should reverse the Court of Appeals'
judgment on the ground that the state trial court's erroneous
refusal to exclude the postarrest admissions constituted "harmless
error" within the meaning of Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). Relying on Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.
S. 371 (1972), petitioner argues that the statements
made by respondent at the police station "were merely recitations
of what respondent had already admitted at the scene of the traffic
arrest," and therefore were unnecessary to his conviction. Brief
for Petitioner 25. We reject this proposed disposition of the case
for three cumulative reasons.

															First, the issue of harmless error was not presented to any of
the Ohio courts, to the District Court, or to the Court of Appeals.
[ Footnote 37 ] Though, when
reviewing a judgment of a federal court, we have jurisdiction to
consider an issue not raised below, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 , 446 U. S. 17 , n.
2 (1980), we are generally reluctant to do so, Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S. 147 ,
n. 2 (1970). [ Footnote
38 ]

															Second, the admissions respondent made at the scene of the
traffic stop and the statements he made at the police station were
not identical. Most importantly, though respondent at the scene
admitted having recently drunk beer and smoked marihuana, not until
questioned at the station did he Page 468 U. S. 444 acknowledge being under the influence of intoxicants, an
essential element of the crime for which he was convicted.
[ Footnote 39 ] This fact
assumes significance in view of the failure of the intoxilyzer test
to discern any alcohol in his blood.

															Third, the case arises in a procedural posture that makes the
use of harmless error analysis especially difficult. [ Footnote 40 ] This is not a case in
which a defendant, after denial of a suppression motion, is given a
full trial resulting in his conviction. Rather, after the trial
court ruled that all of respondent's self-incriminating statements
were admissible, respondent elected not to contest the
prosecution's case against him, while preserving his objection to
the denial of his pretrial motion. [ Footnote 41 ] As a result, respondent has not yet had an
opportunity to try to impeach the State's evidence or to present
evidence of his own. For example, respondent alleges that, at the
time of his arrest, he had an injured back and a limp, [ Footnote 42 ] and that those ailments
accounted for his difficulty getting out of the car and performing
the balancing test; because he pleaded "no contest," he never had a
chance to make that argument to a jury. It is difficult enough, on
the basis of a complete record of a trial and the parties'
contentions regarding the relative importance of each portion of
the evidence presented, to determine whether the erroneous
admission of particular material affected the outcome. Without the
benefit of such a record in this case, we decline to rule that Page 468 U. S. 445 the trial court's refusal to suppress respondent's postarrest
statements "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 386 U. S. 24 .
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															For a description of the technology associated with the
intoxilyzer test, see California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479 , 467 U. S.
481 -482 (1984).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2937.07 (1982) provides, in pertinent
part:

															"If the plea be 'no contest' or words of similar import in
pleading to a misdemeanor, it shall constitute a stipulation that
the judge or magistrate may make [a] finding of guilty or not
guilty from the explanation of circumstances, and if guilt be
found, impose or continue for sentence accordingly."

															"Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(H) provides:"

															"The plea of no contest does not preclude a defendant from
asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in
ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															On respondent's motion, the state trial court stayed execution
of respondent's sentence pending the outcome of his application for
a writ of habeas corpus. State v. McCarty, No.
80-TF-C-123915 (Franklin County Mun.Ct., July 28, 1981).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															In differentiating respondent's various admissions, the Court of
Appeals accorded no significance to the parties' stipulation that
respondent's "freedom to leave the scene was terminated" at the
moment Trooper Williams formed an intent to arrest respondent. The
court reasoned that a " reasonable man' test," not a subjective
standard, should control the determination of when a suspect is
taken into custody for the purposes of Miranda. McCarty v. Herdman, 716 F.2d at 362, n. 1 (quoting Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1397 (CA9
1969)). [ Footnote 5 ]

															Judge Wellford, dissenting, observed: "As I read the opinion,
the majority finds that McCarty was not in custody until he was
formally placed under arrest." 716 F.2d at 364. The majority
neither accepted nor disavowed this interpretation of its
ruling.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Judge Wellford's dissent was premised on his view that the
incriminating statements made by respondent after he was formally
taken into custody were "essentially repetitious" of the statements
he made before his arrest. Reasoning that the prearrest statements
were admissible, Judge Wellford argued that the trial court's
failure to suppress the postarrest statements was "harmless error." Id. at 365.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In Clay v. Riddle, 541 F.2d 456 (1976), the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that persons arrested for
traffic offenses need not be given Miranda warnings. Id. at 457. Several state courts have taken similar
positions. See State v. Bliss, 238 A.2d
848 , 850 (Del.1968); County of Dade v. Callahan, 259
So. 2d 504, 507 (Fla.App.1971), cert. denied, 265 So. 2d
50 (Fla.1972); State v. Gabrielson, 192 N.W.2d 792 , 796 (Iowa 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); State v.
Angelo, 251 La. 250, 254-255, 203 So. 2d
710 , 711-717 (1967); State v. Neal, 476 S.W.2d
547 , 553 (Mo.1972); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 15-16, 268 A.2d
1 , 9 (1970). Other state courts have refused to limit in this
fashion the reach of Miranda. See Campbell v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 552, 479 P.2d 685 ,
695 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 775, 438
N.E.2d 60 , 63 (1982); State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 35, 178 N.W.2d
888 , 891 (1970); State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320,
327-328, 204 S.E.2d
843 , 848 (1974); State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d
404 , 409 (N.D.1980) ( Miranda applicable at least to
"more serious [traffic] offense[s] such as driving while
intoxicated"); State v. Buchholz, 11 Ohio St.3d 24, 28,
462 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (1984) (overruling State v. Pyle, 19
Ohio St.2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1007 (1970), and holding that " Miranda warnings must
be given prior to any custodial interrogation regardless of whether
the individual is suspected of committing a felony or
misdemeanor"); State v. Roberti, 293 Ore. 59, 644 P.2d
1104 , on rehearing, 293 Ore. 236, 646 P.2d
1341 (1982), cert. pending, No. 82-315; Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 305-306, 412 A.2d
517 , 521 (1980); Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 ,
1333 (Utah 1979); State v. Darnell, 8 Wash. App. 627, 628,
508 P.2d 613, 615, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The lower courts have dealt with the problem of roadside
questioning in a wide variety of ways. For a spectrum of positions, see State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 256, 431 P.2d 691,
696 (1967) ( Miranda warnings must be given as soon as the
policeman has "reasonable grounds" to believe the detained motorist
has committed an offense); Newberry v.
State, 552
S.W.2d 457 , 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) ( Miranda applies
when there is probable cause to arrest the driver and the policeman
"consider[s the driver] to be in custody and would not . . . let
him leave"); State v. Roberti, 293 Ore., at 236, 646 P.2d
at 1341 ( Miranda applies as soon as the officer forms an
intention to arrest the motorist); People v. Ramirez, 199
Colo. 367, 372, n. 5, 609 P.2d
616 , 618, n. 5 (1980) (en banc); State v. Darnell,
supra, at 629-630, 508 P.2d at 615 (driver is "in custody" for Miranda purposes at least by the time he is asked to take
a field sobriety test); Commonwealth v. Meyer, supra, at
307, 412 A.2d at 521-522 (warnings are required as soon as the
motorist "reasonably believes his freedom of action is being
restricted"); Lowe v. United States, supra, at 1394, 1396; State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 205-206, 203 S.E.2d
849 , 850 (1974) ( Miranda is inapplicable to a traffic
stop until the motorist is subjected to formal arrest or the
functional equivalent thereof); Allen v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 63-64, 390 F.2d 476, 478-479 ("[S]ome inquiry
can be made [without giving Miranda warnings] as part of
an investigation notwithstanding limited and brief restraints by
the police in their effort to screen crimes from relatively routine
mishaps"), modified, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 404 F.2d 1335
(1968); Holman v. Cox, supra, at 1333 ( Miranda applies upon formal arrest).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In Harris v. New York, 401 U.
S. 222 (1971), the Court did sanction use of statements
obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach the defendant
who had made them. The Court was careful to note, however, that the
jury had been instructed to consider the statements "only in
passing on [the defendant's] credibility and not as evidence of
guilt." 4 01 U.S. at 401 U. S.
223 .

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The one exception to this consistent line of decisions is New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984). The Court held in that case that, when the police arrest a
suspect under circumstances presenting an imminent danger to the
public safety, they may, without informing him of his
constitutional rights, ask questions essential to elicit
information necessary to neutralize the threat to the public. Once
such information has been obtained, the suspect must be given the
standard warnings.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Not all of petitioner's formulations of his proposal are
consistent. At some points in his brief and at oral argument,
petitioner appeared to advocate an exception solely for drunken
driving charges; at other points, he seemed to favor a line between
felonies and misdemeanors. Because all of these suggestions suffer
from similar infirmities, we do not differentiate among them in the
ensuing discussion.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Thus, under Ohio law, while a first offense of negligent
vehicular homicide is a misdemeanor, a second offense is a felony.
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.07 (Supp.1983). In some jurisdictions, a
certain number of convictions for drunken driving triggers a
quantum jump in the status of the crime. In South Dakota, for
instance, first and second offenses for driving while intoxicated
are misdemeanors, but a third offense is a felony. See Solem v.
Helm, 463 U. S. 277 , 463 U. S. 280 ,
n. 4 (1983).

															[ Footnote 13 ] Cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.
S. 740 , 466 U. S. 761 (1984) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (observing that officers in the
field frequently "have neither the time nor the competence to
determine" the severity of the offense for which they are
considering arresting a person).

															It might be argued that the police would not need to make such
guesses; whenever in doubt, they could ensure compliance with the
law by giving the full Miranda warnings. It cannot be
doubted, however, that in some cases, a desire to induce a suspect
to reveal information he might withhold if informed of his rights
would induce the police not to take the cautious course.

															[ Footnote 14 ] See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 442 F.
Supp. 176 (Md.1977) (investigation of erratic driving developed
into inquiry into narcotics offenses and terminated in a charge of
possession of a sawed-off shotgun); United States v.
Hatchel, 329 F.
Supp. 113 (Mass.1971) (investigation into offense of driving
the wrong way on a one-way street yielded a charge of possession of
a stolen car).

															[ Footnote 15 ] Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 , 414 U. S. 221 ,
n. 1 (1973); id. at 414 U. S. 238 ,
n. 2 (POWELL, J., concurring) (discussing the problem of
determining if a traffic arrest was used as a pretext to legitimate
a warrantless search for narcotics).

															[ Footnote 16 ] Cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S.
663 -664 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part).

															[ Footnote 17 ] See Brief for State of Ohio as Amicus Curiae 18-21 (discussing the "National Epidemic Of Impaired Drivers" and
the importance of stemming it); cf. South Dakota v.
Neville, 459 U. S. 553 , 459 U. S.
558 -559 (1983); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.
S. 637 , 402 U. S. 657 , 402 U. S. 672 (1971) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

															[ Footnote 18 ] See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291 , 446 U. S. 299 , 446 U. S. 301 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 , 384 U. S.
445 -458 (1966).

															[ Footnote 19 ] Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420 , 465 U. S. 430 (1984) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 384 U. S.
467 ); see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.
S. 454 , 451 U. S. 467 (1981); United States v. Washington, 431 U.
S. 181 , 431 U. S. 187 ,
n. 5 (1977).

															[ Footnote 20 ] Cf. Developments in the Law -- Confessions, 79
Harv.L.Rev. 935, 954-984 (1966) (describing the difficulties
encountered by state and federal courts, during the period
preceding the decision in Miranda, in trying to
distinguish voluntary from involuntary confessions).

															We do not suggest that compliance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subsequent
confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable
argument that a self-incriminating statement was "compelled"
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to
the dictates of Miranda are rare.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															The parties urge us to answer two questions concerning the
precise scope of the safeguards required in circumstances of the
sort involved in this case. First, we are asked to consider what a
State must do in order to demonstrate that a suspect who might have
been under the influence of drugs or alcohol when subjected to
custodial interrogation nevertheless understood and freely waived
his constitutional rights. Second, it is suggested that we decide
whether an indigent suspect has a right, under the Fifth Amendment,
to have an attorney appointed to advise him regarding his responses
to custodial interrogation when the alleged offense about which he
is being questioned is sufficiently minor that he would not have a
right, under the Sixth Amendment, to the assistance of appointed
counsel at trial, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.
S. 367 (1979). We prefer to defer resolution of such
matters to a case in which law enforcement authorities have at
least attempted to inform the suspect of rights to which he is
indisputably entitled.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															In his brief, respondent hesitates to embrace this proposition
fully, advocating instead a more limited rule under which
questioning of a suspect detained pursuant to a traffic stop would
be deemed "custodial interrogation" if and only if the police
officer had probable cause to arrest the motorist for a crime. See Brief for Respondent 39-40, 46. This ostensibly more
modest proposal has little to recommend it. The threat to a
citizen's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed
to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an
interrogating officer's suspicions. And, by requiring a policeman
conversing with a motorist constantly to monitor the information
available to him to determine when it becomes sufficient to
establish probable cause, the rule proposed by respondent would be
extremely difficult to administer. Accordingly, we confine our
attention below to respondent's stronger argument: that all traffic
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. [ Footnote 23 ]

															It might be argued that, insofar as the Court of Appeals
expressly held inadmissible only the statements made by respondent
after his formal arrest, and respondent has not filed a
cross-petition, respondent is disentitled at this juncture to
assert that Miranda warnings must be given to a detained
motorist who has not been arrested. See, e.g., United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U. S. 397 , 421 U. S. 401 ,
n. 2 (1975). However, three considerations, in combination, prompt
us to consider the question highlighted by respondent. First, as
indicated above, the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the time
at which Miranda became applicable is ambiguous; some of
the court's statements cast doubt upon the admissibility of
respondent's prearrest statements. See supra at 468 U. S.
425 -426. Without undue strain, the position taken by
respondent before this Court thus might be characterized as an
argument in support of the judgment below, which respondent is
entitled to make. Second, the relevance of Miranda to the
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop is an
issue that plainly warrants our attention, and with regard to which
the lower courts are in need of guidance. Third, and perhaps most
importantly, both parties have briefed and argued the question.
Under these circumstances, we decline to interpret and apply
strictly the rule that we will not address an argument advanced by
a respondent that would enlarge his rights under a judgment, unless
he has filed a cross-petition for certiorari.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															Examples of similar provisions in other States are:
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 28-622, 28-622.01 (1976 and Supp.1983-1984);
Cal.Veh.Code Ann. §§ 2800, 2800.1 (West Supp.1984); Del.Code Ann.,
Tit. 21, § 4103 (1979); Fla.Stat. § 316.1935 (Supp.1984);
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, � 11-204 (1983); N.Y. Veh. &
Traf.Law § 1102 (McKinney Supp.1983-1984); Nev.Rev.Stat. §
484.348(1) (1983); 75 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 3733(a) (1977); Wash.Rev.Code
§ 46.61.020 (1983).

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Indeed, petitioner frankly admits that

															"[n]o reasonable person would feel that he was free to ignore
the visible and audible signal of a traffic safety enforcement
officer. . . . Moreover, it is nothing short of sophistic to state
that a motorist ordered by a police officer to step out of his
vehicle would reasonabl[y] or prudently believe that he was at
liberty to ignore that command."

															Brief for Petitioner 16-17.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															State laws governing when a motorist detained pursuant to a
traffic stop may or must be issued a citation instead of taken into
custody vary significantly, see Y. Kamisar, W. LaFave,
& J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 402, n. a (5th ed.1980),
but no State requires that a detained motorist be arrested unless
he is accused of a specified serious crime, refuses to promise to
appear in court, or demands to be taken before a magistrate. For a
representative sample of these provisions, see Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 28-1053, 28-1054 (1976); Ga.Code Ann. §
40-13-53 (Supp.1983); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 8-2105, 8-2106 (1982);
Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 484.793, 484.795, 484.797, 484.799, 484.805
(1983); Ore.Rev.Stat. 484.353 (1983); S.D.Codified Laws § 32-33-2
(Supp.1983); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., Art. 6701d, §§ 147, 148 (Vernon
1977); Va.Code § 46.1-178 (Supp.1983). Cf. National
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Uniform Vehicle
Code and Model Traffic Ordinance §§ 16-203 -- 16-206 (Supp.1979)
(advocating mandatory release on citation of all drivers except
those charged with specified offenses, those who fail to furnish
satisfactory self-identification, and those as to whom the officer
has "reasonable and probable grounds to believe . . . will
disregard a written promise to appear in court").

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															The brevity and spontaneity of an ordinary traffic stop also
reduces the danger that the driver, through subterfuge, will be
made to incriminate himself. One of the investigative techniques
that Miranda was designed to guard against was the use by
police of various kinds of trickery -- such as "Mutt and Jeff"
routines -- to elicit confessions from suspects. See 384
U.S. at 384 U. S.
448 -455. A police officer who stops a suspect on the
highway has little chance to develop or implement a plan of this
sort. Cf. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the
Constitution: Terry, Sibror, Peters, and Beyond, 67
Mich.L.Rev. 39, 99 (1968).

															[ Footnote 28 ] See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 , 394 U. S. 325 (1969) (suspect arrested and questioned in his bedroom by four
police officers); Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S.
1 , 391 U. S. 2 -3
(1968) (defendant questioned by a Government agent while in
jail).

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															No more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops
resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention
authorized in Terry. We of course do not suggest that a
traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds
set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															Nothing in this opinion is intended to refine the constraints
imposed by the Fourth Amendment on the duration of such detentions. Cf. Sharpe v. United States, 712 F.2d 65 (CA4 1983), cert. granted, 467 U.S. 1250 (1984).

															[ Footnote 31 ] Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.
S. 143 , 407 U. S. 148 (1972).

															[ Footnote 32 ] Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 34 (WHITE, J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															Contrast the minor burdens on law enforcement and significant
protection of citizens' rights effected by our holding that Miranda governs custodial interrogation of persons accused
of misdemeanor traffic offenses. See supra at 468 U. S.
432 -434.

															[ Footnote 34 ] Cf. Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa., at 301, 307, 412
A.2d at 518-519, 522 (driver who was detained for over one-half
hour, part of the time in a patrol car, held to have been in
custody for the purposes of Miranda by the time he was
questioned concerning the circumstances of an accident).

															[ Footnote 35 ] Cf. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.
S. 341 , 425 U. S.
346 -347 (1976) (" I t was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the
strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the
questioning was conducted, which led the Court to impose the Miranda requirements with regard to custodial
questioning'") (quoting United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d
471, 473 (CA2 1969)); People v. P., 21
N.Y.2d 1 , 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260 (1967) (an objective,
reasonable man test is appropriate because, unlike a subjective
test, it "is not solely dependent either on the self-serving
declarations of the police officers or the defendant, nor does it
place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or
idiosyncracies of every person whom they question").

															[ Footnote 36 ] Cf. United States v. Schultz, 442 F. Supp. at 180
(suspect who was stopped for erratic driving, subjected to
persistent questioning in the squad car about drinking alcohol and
smoking marihuana, and denied permission to contact his mother held
to have been in custody for the purposes of Miranda by the
time he confessed to possession of a sawed-off shotgun).

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Judge Wellford, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, did address
the issue of harmless error, see n 6, supra, but without the benefit of
briefing by the parties. The majority of the panel of the Court of
Appeals did not consider the question.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															Nor did petitioner mention harmless error in his petition to
this Court. Absent unusual circumstances, cf. n 23, supra, we are chary
of considering issues not presented in petitions for certiorari. See this Court's Rule 21.1(a) ("Only the questions set
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be considered
by the Court").

															[ Footnote 39 ]

															This case is thus not comparable to Milton v.
Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371 (1972), in which a confession presumed to be inadmissible contained
no information not already provided by three admissible
confessions. See id. at 407 U. S.
375 -376.

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															Because we do not rule that the trial court's error was
harmless, we need not decide whether harmless error analysis is
even applicable to a case of this sort.

															[ Footnote 41 ]

															Under Ohio law, respondent had a right to pursue such a course. See n 2, supra. [ Footnote 42 ]

															Indeed, respondent points out that he told Trooper Williams of
these ailments at the time of his arrest, and their existence was
duly noted in the Alcohol Influence Report. See App.
2.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															The only question presented by the petition for certiorari reads
as follows:

															"Whether law enforcement officers must give ' Miranda warnings' to individuals arrested for misdemeanor traffic
offenses."

															In Parts I, II, and IV of its opinion, the Court answers that
question in the affirmative, and explains why that answer requires
that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed. Part III of
the Court's opinion is written for the purpose of discussing the
admissibility of statements made by respondent "prior to his formal
arrest," see ante at 468 U. S. 435 .
That discussion is not necessary to the disposition of the case,
nor necessary to answer the only question presented by the
certiorari petition. Indeed, the Court of Appeals quite properly
did not pass on the question answered in Part III, since it was
entirely unnecessary to the judgment in this case. It thus wisely
followed the cardinal rule that a court should not pass on a
constitutional question in advance of the necessity of deciding it. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.
S. 288 , 297 U. S. 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

															Lamentably, this Court fails to follow the course of judicial
restraint that we have set for the entire federal judiciary. In
this case, it appears the reason for reaching out to decide a
question not passed upon below and unnecessary to the judgment is
that the answer to the question upon which we granted review is so
clear under our settled precedents that the majority -- its
appetite for deciding constitutional questions Page 468 U. S. 446 only whetted -- is driven to serve up a more delectable issue to
satiate it. I had thought it clear, however, that no matter how
interesting or potentially important a determination on a question
of constitutional law may be,

															"broad considerations of the appropriate exercise of judicial
power prevent such determinations unless actually compelled by the
litigation before the Court." Barr v. Matteo, 355 U. S. 171 , 355 U. S. 172 (1957) (per curiam). Indeed, this principle of restraint grows in
importance the more problematic the constitutional issue is. See New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.
S. 246 , 467 U. S. 251 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring).

															Because I remain convinced that the Court should abjure the
practice of reaching out to decide cases on the broadest grounds
possible, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.
S. 605 , 465 U. S.
619 -620 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U. S. 555 , 465 U. S. 579 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U. S. 324 , 465 U. S.
327 -328 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring); United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180 , 467 U. S. 193 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Firefighters v.
Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 , 467 U. S.
590 -591 (1984) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see also, University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , 438 U. S.
411 -412 (1978) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U. S. 658 , 436 U. S. 714 (1978) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part); cf. Snepp v. United
States, 444 U. S. 507 , 444 U. S.
524 -525 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting), I do not join
Part III of the Court's opinion.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984):

Issue:
Whether an individual must be given Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense they are suspected of committing.

Facts:
A police officer pulled over the respondent, McCarty, for weaving in and out of a highway lane. The officer noticed McCarty was having difficulty standing and concluded he would be charged with a traffic offense. At no point was McCarty informed of his Miranda rights. After failing a field sobriety test, McCarty admitted to consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana. He was then formally arrested and taken to a county jail, where he made further incriminating statements.

Procedural History:
McCarty was charged with a misdemeanor under Ohio law for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. He filed a motion to exclude his incriminating statements on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The motion was denied, and he pleaded "no contest," resulting in a conviction. The conviction was affirmed on appeal, but the Federal District Court for Habeas Corpus Relief dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Miranda warnings must be given regardless of the offense investigated.

Holding:
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that an individual subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings, regardless of the nature or severity of the suspected offense. McCarty's statements at the station house were inadmissible as he was not informed of his rights when he was formally arrested.

Justice Stevens's Concurrence:
Justice Stevens concurred with the judgment but disagreed with the Court's decision to address the admissibility of McCarty's statements made prior to his formal arrest, as it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case and fell outside the scope of the certiorari petition. He emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and criticized the Court for deciding on a broader issue than was necessary.