OCTOBER TERM, 1992

															Syllabus

															WITHROW v. WILLIAMS

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 91-1030. Argued November 3, 1992-Decided April 21, 1993

															After a police sergeant threatened to "lock [him] up" during a
station house interrogation about a double murder, respondent
Williams made inculpatory statements. He was then advised of his
rights under Mi randa v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , waived
those rights, and made more inculpatory statements. The Michigan
trial court declined to suppress his statements on the ground that
he had been given timely Miranda warnings, and he was
convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes. Williams
subsequently commenced this habeas action pro se, alleging a Miranda violation as his principal ground for relief. The
District Court granted relief, finding that all statements made
between the sergeant's incarceration threat and Williams' receipt
of Miranda warnings should have been suppressed. Without
conducting an evidentiary hearing or entertaining argument, the
court also ruled that the statements Williams made after receiving
the Miranda warnings should have been suppressed as
involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals agreed on both points and affirmed,
summarily rejecting the argument that the rule in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.
S. 465 -that when a State has given a full and fair chance to
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not
available to a state prisoner alleging that his conviction rests on
evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search or
seizure-should apply to bar habeas review of Williams' Miranda claim.

															Held:

															1. Stone's restriction on the exercise of federal habeas
jurisdiction does not extend to a state prisoner's claim that his
conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of the Miranda safeguards. The Stone rule was not
jurisdictional in nature, but was based on prudential concerns
counseling against applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , on
collateral review. Miranda differs from Mapp with
respect to such concerns, and Stone consequently does not
apply. In contrast to Mapp, Miranda safeguards a fundamental
trial right by protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Moreover, Miranda facilitates
the correct ascertainment of guilt by guarding against the use of
unreliable statements at trial. Finally, and most importantly,
eliminating review of 681 Miranda claims would not significantly benefit the
federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance
the cause of federalism in any substantial way. The burdens placed
on busy federal courts would not be lightened, since it is
reasonable to suppose that virtually every barred Miranda claim would simply be recast as a due process claim that the
particular conviction rested on an involuntary confession.
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to expect that, after 27 years of
Mi randa, the overturning of state convictions on the basis
of that case will occur frequently enough to be a substantial cost
of review or to raise federal-state tensions to an appreciable
degree. Pp. 686-695.

															2. The District Court erred in considering the involuntariness
of the statements Williams made after receiving the Miranda warnings. The habeas petition raised no independent due process
claim, and the record is devoid of any indication that petitioner
consented under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to the
determination of such a claim. Moreover, petitioner was manifestly
prejudiced by the court's failure to afford her an opportunity to
present evidence bearing on that claim's resolution. pp.
695-696. 944 F.2d
284 , affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

															SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with
respect to Part III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to
Parts I, II, and IV, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, post, p. 697. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p.715. Jeffrey Caminsky argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were John D. O'Hair and Timothy A.
Baughman. Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, and
Ronald J. Mann. Seth P. Waxman, by appointment of the Court, 504 U. S.
983, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Scott L. Nelson and Daniel P. O'Neil. *

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, 682 JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), we
held that when a State has given a full and fair chance to litigate
a Fourth Amendment claim, federal habeas review is not available to
a state prisoner alleging that his conviction rests on evidence

															Deputy Attorney General, and Mark L. Krotoski, Special
Assistant Attorney General, James H. Evans, Attorney General
of Alabama, Charles E. Cole, Attorney General of Alaska, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston
Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton, Attorney General of Colorado, Richard N. Palmer, Chief
State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Warren Price III, Attorney
General of Hawaii, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of
Idaho, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris
Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney
General of Massachusetts, Michael C. Moore, Attorney
General of Mississippi, William L. Webster, Attorney General
of Missouri, Marc Racicot, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue
Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, John P. Arnold, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Robert J. Del
Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney
General of North Carolina, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of
Ohio, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark W Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles
W Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, R. Paul Van
Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Mary Sue Terry, Attorney
General of Virginia, Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney
General of Washington, Mario J. Palumbo, Attorney
General of West Virginia, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney
General of Wyoming; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement,
Inc., et al. by Thomas J. Charron, Bernard J. Farber, Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W Schmidt, and James P.
Manak; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger. Larry W Yackle, Steven R. Shapiro, Leslie A. Harris, and John
A. Powell filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al. as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

															Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Bar
Association by Talbot D'Alemberte and William J. Mertens; and for the Police Foundation et al. by Joseph
D. Tydings and Michael Millemann. 683 obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure. Today we
hold that Stone's restriction on the exercise of federal
habeas jurisdiction does not extend to a state prisoner's claim
that his conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of
the safeguards mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).

															I

															Police officers in Romulus, Michigan, learned that respondent,
Robert Allen Williams, Jr., might have information about a double
murder committed on April 6, 1985. On April 10, two officers called
at Williams's house and asked him to the police station for
questioning. Williams agreed to go. The officers searched Williams,
but did not handcuff him, and they all drove to the station in an
unmarked car. One officer, Sergeant David Early, later testified
that Williams was not under arrest at this time, although a
contemporaneous police report indicates that the officers arrested
Williams at his residence. App. 12a-13a, 24a-26a.

															At the station, the officers questioned Williams about his
knowledge of the crime. Although he first denied any involvement,
he soon began to implicate himself, and the officers continued
their questioning, assuring Williams that their only concern was
the identity of the "shooter." After consulting each other, the
officers decided not to advise Williams of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
48a. When Williams persisted in denying involvement, Sergeant Early
reproved him: "You know everything that went down. You just don't want to talk
about it. What it's gonna amount to is you can talk about it now
and give us the truth and we're gonna check it out and see if it
fits or else we're simply gonna charge you and lock you up and you
can just tell it to a defense attorney and let him try and prove
differently." Ibid. 684 The reproof apparently worked, for Williams then admitted he had
furnished the murder weapon to the killer, who had called Williams
after the crime and told him where he had discarded the weapon and
other incriminating items. Williams maintained that he had not been
present at the crime scene.

															Only at this point, some 40 minutes after they began questioning
him, did the officers advise Williams of his Miranda rights.
Williams waived those rights and during subsequent questioning made
several more inculpatory statements. Despite his prior denial,
Williams admitted that he had driven the murderer to and from the
scene of the crime, had witnessed the murders, and had helped the
murderer dispose of incriminating evidence. The officers
interrogated Williams again on April 11 and April 12, and, on April
12, the State formally charged him with murder.

															Before trial, Williams moved to suppress his responses to the
interrogations, and the trial court suppressed the statements of
April 11 and April 12 as the products of improper delay in
arraignment under Michigan law. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 90a-91a.
The court declined to suppress the statements of April 10, however,
ruling that the police had given Williams a timely warning of his Miranda rights. Id., at 90a. A bench trial led to
Williams's conviction on two counts each of first-degree murder and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and
resulted in two concurrent life sentences. The Court of Appeals of
Michigan affirmed the trial court's ruling on the April 10
statements, People v. Williams, 171 Mich. App. 234,
429 N. W. 2d 649 (1988), and the Supreme Court of Michigan denied
leave to appeal, 432 Mich. 913, 440 N. W. 2d 416 (1989). We denied
the ensuing petition for writ of certiorari. Williams v. Michigan, 493 U. S. 956 (1989).

															Williams then began this action pro se by petitioning for
a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, alleging a violation
of his Miranda rights as the principal ground for
relief. 685 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. 90CV-70256, p. 5 (ED
Mich.). The District Court granted relief, finding that the police
had placed Williams in custody for Miranda purposes when Sergeant
Early had threatened to "lock [him] up," and that the trial court
should accordingly have excluded all statements Williams had made
between that point and his receipt of the Miranda warnings. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 49a-52a. The court also concluded, though neither
Williams nor petitioner had addressed the issue, that Williams's
statements after receiving the Miranda warnings were involuntary
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
likewise subject to suppression. App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a-71a.
The court found that the totality of circumstances, including
repeated promises of lenient treatment if he told the truth, had
overborne Williams's will. 1

															The Court of Appeals affirmed, 944 F.2d
284 (CA6 1991), holding the District Court correct in
determining the police had subjected Williams to custodial
interrogation before giving him the requisite Miranda advice, and
in finding the statements made after receiving the Miranda warnings
involuntary. Id., at 289-290. The Court of Appeals summarily
rejected the argument that the rule in Stone v. Pow ell, 428 U.
S. 465 (1976), should apply to bar habeas review of Williams's
Miranda claim. 944 F. 2d, at 291. We granted certiorari to resolve
the significant issue thus presented. 503 U. S. 983 (1992).2

															1 The District Court mistakenly believed that the trial court
had allowed the introduction of the statements Williams had made on
April 12, and its ruling consequently extended to those statements
as well. App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a-75a.

															2JU8TICE SCALIA argues in effect that the rule in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), should extend to all claims
on federal habeas review. See post, at 719-720. With
respect, that reasoning goes beyond the question on which we
granted certiorari, Pet. for Cert. 1 ("where the premise of [a]
Fifth Amendment ruling is a finding of a Miranda violation, where
the petitioner has had one full and fair opportunity to raise the
Miranda claim 686 II

															We have made it clear that Stone's limitation on federal
habeas relief was not jurisdictional in nature,3 but rested on
prudential concerns counseling against the application of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on collateral review. See Stone, supra, at 494-495, n. 37; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.
S. 436 , 447 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.) (discussing
equitable principles underlying Stone); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477
U. S. 365 , 379, n. 4 (1986); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 , 103
(1980) (Stone concerns "the prudent exercise of
federal-court jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2254"); cf. 28 U. S.
C. § 2243 (court entertaining habeas petition shall "dispose of the
matter as law and justice require"). We simply concluded in Stone that the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on
collateral review outweighed any potential advantage to be gained
by applying it there. Stone, supra, at 489-495.

															We recognized that the exclusionary rule, held applicable to the
States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), "is
not a personal constitutional right"; it fails to redress "the
injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure" at
issue, "for any '[r]eparation comes too late.'" Stone,
supra, at 486 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 ,
637 (1965)). The rule serves instead to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations, and we reasoned that its application on
collateral review would only marginally advance this interest in
deterrence. Stone, 428 U. S., at 493. On the other side of
the ledger, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule on
habeas

															in state court, should collateral review of the same claim on a
habeas corpus petition be precluded?"), and we see no good reason
to address it in this case.

															3 Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) provides: "The Supreme Court, a
Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States." 687 were comparatively great. We reasoned that doing so would not
only exclude reliable evidence and divert attention from the
central question of guilt, but would also intrude upon the public
interest in "'(i) the most effective utilization of limited
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and
state systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the
constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is
founded.'" Id., at 491, n. 31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 259 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).

															Over the years, we have repeatedly declined to extend the rule
in Stone beyond its original bounds. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U. S. 307 (1979), for example, we denied a request to apply Stone to bar habeas consideration of a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim of insufficient evidence to support a state
conviction. We stressed that the issue was "central to the basic
question of guilt or innocence," Jackson, 443 U. S., at 323,
unlike a claim that a state court had received evidence in
violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, and we found
that to review such a claim on habeas imposed no great burdens on
the federal courts. Id., at 321-322.

															After a like analysis, in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), we decided against extending Stone to foreclose
habeas review of an equal protection claim of racial discrimination
in selecting a state grand-jury foreman. A charge that state
adjudication had violated the direct command of the Fourteenth
Amendment implicated the integrity of the judicial process, we
reasoned, Rose, 443 U. S., at 563, and failed to raise the
"federalism concerns" that had driven the Court in Stone. 443 U. S., at 562. Since federal courts had granted relief to state
prisoners upon proof of forbidden discrimination for nearly a
century, we concluded, "confirmation that habeas corpus remains an
appropriate vehicle by which federal courts are to exercise their
Fourteenth Amendment 688 responsibilities" would not likely raise tensions between the
state and federal judicial systems. Ibid. In a third instance, in Kimmelman v. Morrison,
supra, we again declined to extend Stone, in that case
to bar habeas review of certain claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment. We explained that unlike the
Fourth Amendment, which confers no "trial right," the Sixth confers
a "fundamental right" on criminal defendants, one that "assures the
fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process." 477
U. S., at 374. We observed that because a violation of the right
would often go unremedied except on collateral review, "restricting
the litigation of some Sixth Amendment claims to trial and direct
review would seriously interfere with an accused's right to
effective representation." Id., at 378.

															In this case, the argument for extending Stone again
falls short.4 To understand why, a brief review of the derivation
of the Miranda safeguards, and the purposes they were
designed to serve, is in order.

															The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. In Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897), the
Court held that the Clause barred the introduction in federal cases
of involuntary confessions made in response to custodial
interrogation. We did not recognize the Clause's applicability to
state cases until 1964, however, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 ; and,
over the course of 30 years, beginning with the decision in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), we
analyzed the admissibility of confessions in such cases as a
question of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Stone,
The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 99,
101-102. Under this ap-

															4 We have in the past declined to address the application of Stone in this context. See, e. g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.
S. 195 , 201, n. 3 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 , 87,
n. 11 (1977). 689 proach, we examined the totality of circumstances to determine
whether a confession had been "'made freely, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort.'" Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 , 513 (1963)
(quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 , 623
(1896)); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 223-227 (discussing totality-of-circumstances approach). See
generally 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2
(1984). Indeed, we continue to employ the totality-of-circumstances
approach when addressing a claim that the introduction of an
involuntary confession has violated due process. E. g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104 , 109-110
(1985).

															In Malloy, we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Fifth Amendment privilege against
selfincrimination, and thereby opened Bram's doctrinal
avenue for the analysis of state cases. So it was that two years
later we held in Miranda that the privilege extended to
state custodial interrogations. In Miranda, we spoke of the
privilege as guaranteeing a person under interrogation "the right
'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will,'" 384 U. S., at 460 (quoting Malloy,
supra, at 8), and held that "without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation ... contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise
do so freely." 384 U. S., at 467. To counter these pressures we
prescribed, absent "other fully effective means," the now-familiar
measures in aid of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege: "He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity 690 to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or
make a statement." Id., at 479. Unless the prosecution can demonstrate the warnings and waiver
as threshold matters, we held, it may not overcome an objection to
the use at trial of statements obtained from the person in any
ensuing custodial interrogation. See ibid.; cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 , 721-723
(1975) (permitting use for impeachment purposes of statements taken
in violation of Miranda). Petitioner, supported by the United States as amicus
curiae, argues that Miranda's safeguards are not
constitutional in character, but merely "prophylactic," and that in
consequence habeas review should not extend to a claim that a state
conviction rests on statements obtained in the absence of those
safeguards. Brief for Petitioner 91-93; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14-15. We accept petitioner's premise for
purposes of this case, but not her conclusion.

															The Miranda Court did of course caution that the
Constitution requires no "particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process," and left it open to a
State to meet its burden by adopting "other procedures ... at least
as effective in apprising accused persons" of their rights. 384 U.
S., at 467. The Court indeed acknowledged that, in barring
introduction of a statement obtained without the required warnings, Miranda might exclude a confession that we would not condemn
as "involuntary in traditional terms," id., at 457, and for this
reason we have sometimes called the Miranda safeguards
"prophylactic" in nature. E. g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195 ,
203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523 , 528
(1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 , 305
(1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 , 654
(1984); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 , 444
(1974) 691 (Miranda Court "recognized that these procedural safeguards were
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected"). But cf. Quarles, supra, at 660
(opinion of O'CONNOR, J.) (Miranda Court "held unconstitutional,
because inherently compelled, the admission of statements derived
from in-custody questioning not preceded by an explanation of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the consequences of
forgoing it"). Calling the Miranda safeguards "prophylactic,"
however, is a far cry from putting Miranda on all fours with Mapp,
or from rendering Miranda subject to Stone.

															As we explained in Stone, the Mapp rule "is not a personal
constitutional right," but serves to deter future constitutional
violations; although it mitigates the juridical consequences of
invading the defendant's privacy, the exclusion of evidence at
trial can do nothing to remedy the completed and wholly
extrajudicial Fourth Amendment violation. Stone, 428 U. S., at 486.
Nor can the Mapp rule be thought to enhance the soundness of the
criminal process by improving the reliability of evidence
introduced at trial. Quite the contrary, as we explained in Stone,
the evidence excluded under Mapp "is typically reliable and often
the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant." 428 U. S., at 490.

															Miranda differs from Mapp in both respects. "Prophylactic"
though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards "a
fundamental trial right." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 ,
264 (1990) (emphasis added); cf. Kimmelman, 477 U. S., at 377
(Stone does not bar habeas review of claim that the personal trial
right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated). The
privilege embodies "principles of humanity and civil liberty, which
had been secured in the mother country only after years of
struggle," Bram, 168 U. S., at 544, and reflects 692 "many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: ...
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance
by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load;' our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life;' our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a
protection to the innocent.'" Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n
of New York Harbor, 378 U. S. 52 , 55 (1964)
(citations omitted).

															Nor does the Fifth Amendment "trial right" protected by Miranda serve some value necessarily divorced from the
correct ascertainment of guilt. "'[A] system of criminal law
enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses' than a
system relying on independent investigation." Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 448, n. 23 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U. S. 478 , 488-489 (1964)). By bracing against "the possibility
of unreliable statements in every instance of incustody
interrogation," Miranda serves to guard against "the use of
unreliable statements at trial." Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U. S.
719 , 730 (1966); see also Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at 240 (Miranda "Court made it clear that the basis for decision
was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself");
Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary
Rule after Stone v. Powell, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 40
(1982); cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979) (Stone does not bar habeas review of claim of racial
discrimination 693 in selection of grand-jury foreman, as this claim goes to the
integrity of the judicial process).

															Finally, and most importantly, eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly benefit the federal
courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the
cause of federalism in any substantial way. As one amicus concedes, eliminating habeas review of Miranda issues would
not prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction
rested on an involuntary confession. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 17. Indeed, although counsel could provide us
with no empirical basis for projecting the consequence of adopting
petitioner's position, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-11, 19-21, it seems
reasonable to suppose that virtually all Miranda claims
would simply be recast in this way.5

															If that is so, the federal courts would certainly not have heard
the last of Miranda on collateral review. Under the due
process approach, as we have already seen, courts look to the
totality of circumstances to determine whether a confession was
voluntary. Those potential circumstances include not only the
crucial element of police coercion, Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U. S. 157 , 167 (1986); the length of the interrogation, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 , 153-154
(1944); its location, see Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 , 441
(1961); its continuity, Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 , 561
(1954); the defendant's maturity, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 ,
599-601 (1948) (opinion of Douglas, J.); education, Clewis v. Texas, 386
U. S. 707 , 712 (1967); physical condition, Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390
U. S. 519 , 520-521 (1968) (per curiam); and mental
health, Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 , 196
(1957). They also include the failure of police to advise the
defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel
present

															5JU8TICE O'CONNOR is confident that many such claims would be
unjustified, see post, at 708-709, but that is beside the
point. Justifiability is not much of a gatekeeper on habeas. 694 during custodial interrogation. Haynes v. Washington,
373 U. S. 503, 516-517 (1963); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 17; see also Schneckloth, supra, at 226 (discussing factors). We could lock the front door against Miranda, but not the back.

															We thus fail to see how abdicating Miranda's bright-line
(or, at least, brighter-line) rules in favor of an exhaustive
totality-of-circumstances approach on habeas would do much of
anything to lighten the burdens placed on busy federal courts. See
P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 188 (3d ed.
1988, Supp. 1992); Halpern, supra, at 40; Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 891 (1981); see
also Quarles, 467 U. S., at 664 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fare v. Michael c., 439 U. S. 1310 , 1314
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers)) (Miranda's" 'core
virtue'" was" 'afford[ing] police and courts clear guidance on the
manner in which to conduct a custodial investigation' "). We
likewise fail to see how purporting to eliminate Miranda issues from federal habeas would go very far to relieve such
tensions as Miranda may now raise between the two judicial
systems. Relegation of habeas petitioners to straight
involuntariness claims would not likely reduce the amount of
litigation, and each such claim would in any event present a legal
question requiring an "independent federal determination" on
habeas. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S., at 112.

															One might argue that tension results between the two judicial
systems whenever a federal habeas court overturns a state
conviction on finding that the state court let in a voluntary
confession obtained by the police without the Miranda safeguards. And one would have to concede that this has occurred in
the past, and doubtless will occur again. I t is not reasonable,
however, to expect such occurrences to be frequent enough to amount
to a substantial cost of reviewing 695 Miranda claims on habeas or to raise federal-state
tensions to an appreciable degree. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 21. We
must remember in this regard that Miranda came down some 27
years ago. In that time, law enforcement has grown in
constitutional as well as technological sophistication, and there
is little reason to believe that the police today are unable, or
even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda's requirements.
See Quarles, supra, at 663 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 , 304 (1980)
(Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment)) (" 'meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement
practices have adjusted to its strictures' "); Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Mi randa, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 435, 455-457
(1987).6 And if, finally, one should question the need for federal
collateral review of requirements that merit such respect, the
answer simply is that the respect is sustained in no small part by
the existence of such review. "It is the occasional abuse that the
federal writ of habeas corpus stands ready to correct." Jackson, 443 U. S., at 322.

															III

															One final point should keep us only briefly. As he had done in
his state appellate briefs, on habeas Williams raised only one
claim going to the admissibility of his statements to the police:
that the police had elicited those statements without satisfying
the Miranda requirements. See supra, at 684. In her
answer, petitioner addressed only that claim. See Brief in Support
of Answer in No. 90CV-70256 DT, p. 3 (ED Mich.). The District
Court, nonetheless, without an evidentiary hearing or even
argument, went beyond the habeas petition and found the statements
Williams made after re-

															6 It should indeed come as no surprise that one of the
submissions arguing against the extension of Stone in this
case comes to us from law enforcement organizations. See Brief for
Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae. 696 ceiving the Miranda warnings to be involuntary under due process
criteria. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner objected to the
District Court's due process enquiry on the ground that the habeas
petition's reference to Miranda rights had given her insufficient
notice to address a due process claim. Brief for
Respondent-Appellant in No. 90-2289, p. 6 (CA6). Petitioner pursues
the objection here. See Pet. for Cert. 1; Brief for Petitioner
14-15, n. 2.

															Williams effectively concedes that his habeas petition raised no
involuntariness claim, but he argues that the matter was tried by
the implied consent of the parties under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(b),7 and that petitioner can demonstrate no prejudice
from the District Court's action. See Brief for Respondent 41-42,
n. 22. The record, however, reveals neither thought, word, nor deed
of petitioner that could be taken as any sort of consent to the
determination of an independent due process claim, and petitioner
was manifestly prejudiced by the District Court's failure to afford
her an opportunity to present evidence bearing on that claim's
resolution. The District Court should not have addressed the
involuntariness question in these circumstances.8

															7The relevant part of Rule 15(b) provides: ''When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues." See 28 U. S. C. § 2254
Rule 11 (application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to habeas
petitions); 1 J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 17.2 (1988) (Rule 15 applies in habeas actions).

															8We need not address petitioner's arguments that Williams failed
to exhaust the involuntariness claim in the state courts and that
the District Court applied a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.
S. 288 (1989). Of course, we also express no opinion on the
merits of the involuntariness claim. 697 IV

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring
in part and dissenting in part.

															Today the Court permits the federal courts to overturn on habeas
the conviction of a double murderer, not on the basis of an
inexorable constitutional or statutory command, but because it
believes the result desirable from the standpoint of equity and
judicial administration. Because the principles that inform our
habeas jurisprudence-finality, federalism, and fairness-counsel
decisively against the result the Court reaches, I respectfully
dissent from this holding.

															I

															The Court does not sit today in direct review of a statecourt
judgment of conviction. Rather, respondent seeks relief by
collaterally attacking his conviction through the writ of habeas
corpus. While petitions for the writ of habeas corpus are now
commonplace-over 12,000 were filed in 1990, compared to 127 in
1941-their current ubiquity ought not detract from the writ's
historic importance. See L. Mecham, Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 191 (1991)
(1990 figures); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 446, n. 2
(1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (1941 figures). "The Great Writ" can
be traced through the common law to well before the founding of
this Nation; its role as a "prompt and efficacious remedy for
whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints" is beyond
question. Fay, 372 U. S., at 401-402. As Justice Harlan
explained: "Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is today, as it has always
been, a fundamental safeguard against unlawful 698 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J. custody .... Although the wording of earlier statutory
provisions has been changed, the basic question before the court to
which the writ is addressed has always been the same: in the
language of the present statute, on the books since 1867, is the
detention complained of 'in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States'?" Id., at 449 (dissenting
opinion). Nonetheless, we repeatedly have recognized that collateral
attacks raise numerous concerns not present on direct review. Most
profound is the effect on finality. It goes without saying that, at
some point, judicial proceedings must draw to a close and the
matter deemed conclusively resolved; no society can afford forever
to question the correctness of its every judgment. "[T]he writ,"
however, "strikes at finality," McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 ,
491 (1991), depriving the criminal law "of much of its deterrent
effect," Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 , 309 (1989)
(plurality opinion), and sometimes preventing the law's just
application altogether, see McCleskey, supra, at 491. "No
one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society
as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall
tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation." Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 , 691 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Mc Cleskey, supra, at 492.

															In our federal system, state courts have primary responsibility
for enforcing constitutional rules in their own criminal trials.
When a case comes before the federal courts on habeas rather than
on direct review, the judicial role is "significantly different." Mackey, supra, at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Accord, Teague, supra, at 306-308. Most
important here, federal courts on direct review adjudicate every
issue of federal law properly presented; in contrast, "federal
courts have never had a similar obligation on habeas corpus." Mackey, supra, at 682 699 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the
Court explains today, federal courts exercising their habeas powers
may refuse to grant relief on certain claims because of "prudential
concerns" such as equity and federalism. Ante, at 686. This
follows not only from the express language of the habeas statute,
which directs the federal courts to "dispose of [habeas petitions]
as law and justice require," 28 U. s. C. § 2243, but from our
precedents as well. In Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536 (1976), we
stated that "[t]his Court has long recognized that in some
circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly
administration of criminal justice require a federal court to forgo
the exercise of its habeas corpus power." Id., at 539.
Accord, Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern
Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653 , 653-654
(1992) ("Whether [a] claim is framed as a habeas petition or as a
[42 U. S. C.] § 1983 action, [what is sought is] an equitable
remedy"; as a result, equity must be "take[n] into consideration"); Fay v. Noia, supra, at 438 ("[H]abeas corpus has
traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles"); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195 , 213 (1989)
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has long recognized that
habeas corpus [is] governed by equitable principles" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

															Concerns for equity and federalism resonate throughout our
habeas jurisprudence. In 1886, only eight years after Congress gave
the federal courts power to issue writs ordering the release of
state prisoners, this Court explained that courts could accommodate
federalism and comity concerns by withholding relief until after
state proceedings had terminated. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 , 251-253.
Accord, Fay, supra, at 418-419. More recently, we relied on
those same concerns in holding that new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure do not apply retroactively on habeas. Teague,
supra, at 306. Our treatment of successive petitions and
procedurally defaulted claims similarly is governed by equitable
principles. McCleskey, 499 U. S., at 489-491 700 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															(successive petitions); id., at 490 (procedurally defaulted
claims); Fay, supra, at 438 (procedurally defaulted claims).
Most telling of all, this Court continuously has recognized that
the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side-a sufficient showing of
actual innocence-is normally sufficient, standing alone, to
outweigh other concerns and justify adjudication of the prisoner's
constitutional claim. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 , 340-347
(1992) (actual innocence of penalty); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U. S. 478 , 496 (1986) (federal courts may reach procedurally
defaulted claims on a showing that a constitutional violation
probably resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
person); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436 , 454 (1986)
(colorable showing of actual innocence suffices to excuse
successive claim); see also Teague v. Lane, supra, at
313 (where absence of procedure seriously diminishes the likelihood
of an accurate conviction, a new rule requiring the procedure may
be applied retroactively on habeas).

															Nonetheless, decisions concerning the availability of habeas
relief warrant restraint. Nowhere is the Court's restraint more
evident than when it is asked to exclude a substantive category of
issues from relitigation on habeas. Although we recognized the
possibility of excluding certain types of claims long ago, see Mackey, supra, at 683 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), only once has this Court found that the
concerns of finality, federalism, and fairness supported such a
result; that was in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). Ante, at 686. Since then, the Court has refused to bar
additional categories of claims on three different occasions. Ante, at 687-688.

															Today we face the question whether Stone v. Powell should extend to bar claims on habeas that the prophylactic rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), had
been violated. Continuing the tradition of caution in this area,
the Court answers that question in the negative. This time I must
disagree. In my view, the "prudential concerns," 701 ante, at 686, that inform our habeas jurisprudence
counsel the exclusion of Miranda claims just as strongly as
they did the exclusionary rule claims at issue in Stone itself.

															II

															In Stone, the Court explained that the exclusionary rule
of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), was
not an inevitable product of the Constitution but instead "'a
judicially created remedy.''' Stone, supra, at 486 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 349
(1974)). By threatening to exclude highly probative and sometimes
critical evidence, the exclusionary rule "is thought to encourage
those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their
value system." Stone, 428 U. S., at 492. The deterrent
effect is strong: Any transgression of the Fourth Amendment carries
the risk that evidence will be excluded at trial. Nonetheless, this
increased sensitivity to Fourth Amendment values carries a high
cost. Exclusion not only deprives the jury of probative and
sometimes dispositive evidence, but also "deflects the truthfinding
process and often frees the guilty." Id., at 490. When that
happens, it is not just the executive or the judiciary but all of
society that suffers: The executive suffers because the police lose
their suspect and the prosecutor the case; the judiciary suffers
because its processes are diverted from the central mission of
ascertaining the truth; and society suffers because the populace
again finds a guilty and potentially dangerous person in its midst,
solely because a police officer bungled.

															While that cost is considered acceptable when a case is on
direct review, the balance shifts decisively once the case is on
habeas. There is little marginal benefit to enforcing the
exclusionary rule on habeas; the penalty of exclusion comes too
late to produce a noticeable deterrent effect. Id., at 493.
Moreover, the rule "divert[s attention] from the ultimate question
of guilt," squanders scarce federal judicial re- 702 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															sources, intrudes on the interest in finality, creates friction
between the state and federal systems of justice, and upsets the
"'constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is
founded.'" Id., at 490, 491, n. 31 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 259 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)). Because application of the exclusionary
rule on habeas "offend[s] important principles of federalism and
finality in the criminal law which have long informed the federal
courts' exercise of habeas jurisdiction," Duckworth, 492 U.
S., at 208 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), we held in Stone that
such claims would no longer be cognizable on habeas so long as the
State already had provided the defendant with a full and fair
opportunity to litigate.

															I continue to believe that these same considerations apply to Miranda claims with equal, if not greater, force. See Duckworth, supra, at 209 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Like
the suppression of the fruits of an illegal search or seizure, the
exclusion of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is
not constitutionally required. This Court repeatedly has held that Miranda's warning requirement is not a dictate of the Fifth
Amendment itself, but a prophylactic rule. See, e. g.,
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171 , 176
(1991); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344 , 350
(1990); Duckworth, supra, at 203; New York v. Quarles, 467
U. S. 649 , 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 ,
442-446 (1974). Because Miranda "sweeps more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself," it excludes some confessions even
though the Constitution would not. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 ,
306 (1985). Indeed, "in the individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine [often] provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm." Id., at 307. Miranda's overbreadth, of course, is not without
justification. The exclusion of unwarned statements provides a
strong incentive for the police to adopt "procedural safeguards," Miranda, 384 U. S., at 444, against the exaction of 703 compelled or involuntary statements. It also promotes
institutional respect for constitutional values. But, like the
exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence, Miranda's prophylactic rule does so at a substantial cost. Unlike involuntary
or compelled statements-which are of dubious reliability and are
therefore inadmissible for any purpose-confessions obtained in
violation of Miranda are not necessarily untrustworthy. In
fact, because voluntary statements are "trustworthy" even
when obtained without proper warnings, Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U. S.
719 , 731 (1966), their suppression actually impairs the
pursuit of truth by concealing probative information from the trier
of fact. See Harvey, supra, at 350 (Miranda "result[s] in the exclusion of some voluntary and reliable
statements"); Elstad, supra, at 312 (loss of "highly
probative evidence of a voluntary confession" is a "high cost [for]
law enforcement"); McNeil, supra, at 181 (because "the ready
ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an
unmitigated good," the exclusion of such confessions renders
society "the loser"); Tucker, supra, at 461 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("[H]aving relevant and probative
testimony, not obtained by actual coercion ... aides] in the
pursuit of truth"); Miranda, supra, at 538 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting) ("Particularly when corroborated, ... such [voluntary]
confessions have the highest reliability and significantly
contribute to the certitude with which we may believe the accused
is guilty").

															When the case is on direct review, that damage to the
truth-seeking function is deemed an acceptable sacrifice for the
deterrence and respect for constitutional values that the Miranda rule brings. But once a case is on collateral
review, the balance between the costs and benefits shifts; the
interests of federalism, finality, and fairness compel
Mi randa's exclusion from habeas. The benefit of enforcing Miranda through habeas is marginal at best. To the extent Miranda ensures the exclusion of involuntary statements,
that task can be performed more accurately by adjudicating 704 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															the voluntariness question directly. See Johnson, supra, at 730-731. And, to the extent exclusion of voluntary but unwarned
confessions serves a deterrent function, "[t]he awarding of habeas
relief years after conviction will often strike like lightning, and
it is absurd to think that this added possibility ... will have any
appreciable effect on police training or behavior." Duckworth,
supra, at 211 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Judge Friendly made
precisely the same point 18 years earlier: "[T]he deterrent value
of permitting collateral attack," he explained, "goes beyond the
point of diminishing returns." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142,
163 (1970).

															Despite its meager benefits, the relitigation of Miranda claims on habeas imposes substantial costs. Just like the
application of the exclusionary rule, application of Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas consumes scarce
judicial resources on an issue unrelated to guilt or innocence. No
less than the exclusionary rule, it undercuts finality. It creates
tension between the state and federal courts. And it upsets the
division of responsibilities that underlies our federal system. But
most troubling of all, Miranda's application on habeas
sometimes precludes the just application of law altogether. The
order excluding the statement will often be issued "years after
trial, when a new trial may be a practical impossibility." Duckworth, 492 U. S., at 211 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).
Whether the Court admits it or not, the grim result of applying Miranda on habeas will be, time and time again, "the release
of an admittedly guilty individual who may pose a continuing threat
to society." Ibid. Any rule that so demonstrably renders truth and society "the
loser," McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S., at 181,
"'bear[s] a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully
limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by
deterring official lawlessness,'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 , 908, n. 6 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 , 257- 705 258 (1983) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment)). That burden is
heavier still on collateral review. In light of the meager
deterrent benefit it brings and the tremendous costs it imposes, in
my view application of Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas
"falls short" of justification. Ante, at 688.

															III

															The Court identifies a number of differences that, in its view,
distinguish this case from Stone v. Powell. Ante, at
691-695. I am sympathetic to the Court's concerns but find them
misplaced nonetheless.

															The first difference the Court identifies concerns the nature of
the right protected. Miranda, the Court correctly points
out, fosters Fifth Amendment, rather than Fourth Amendment, values. Ante, at 691. The Court then offers a defense of the Fifth
Amendment, reminding us that it is "'a fundamental trial right' " that reflects" 'principles of humanity and civil
liberty'''; that it was secured" 'after years of struggle'''; and
that it does not serve "some value necessarily divorced from the
correct ascertainment of guilt." Ante, at 691-692 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 , 364
(1990), and Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 , 544
(1897)). The Court's spirited defense of the Fifth Amendment is, of
course, entirely beside the point. The question is not whether true Fifth Amendment claims-the extraction and use of compelled testimony-should be cognizable on habeas. It is
whether violations of Miranda's prophylactic rule, which
excludes from trial voluntary confessions obtained without the
benefit of Miranda's now-familiar warnings, should be. The
questions are not the same; nor are their answers.

															To say that the Fifth Amendment is a "'fundamental trial right,'" ante, at 691 (quoting United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, supra, at 264), is thus both correct and
irrelevant. Miranda's warning requirement may bear many
labels, but "fundamental trial right" is not among them. Long
before 706 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J. Miranda was decided, it was well established that the
Fifth Amendment prohibited the introduction of compelled or
involuntary confessions at trial. And long before Miranda, the courts enforced that prohibition by asking a simple and direct
question: Was "the confession the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice," or was the defendant's will "overborne"? Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S., at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 , 602
(1961)); see ante, at 688-689; see, e. g., Bram v. United States, supra. Miranda's innovation was its
introduction of the warning requirement: It commanded the police to
issue warnings (or establish other procedural safeguards) before
obtaining a statement through custodial interrogation. And it
backed that prophylactic rule with a similarly prophylactic
remedy-the requirement that unwarned custodial statements, even if
wholly voluntary, be excluded at trial. Mi randa, 384 U. S.,
at 444. Excluding violations of Miranda's prophylactic
suppression requirement from habeas would not leave true Fifth
Amendment violations unredressed. Prisoners still would be able to
seek relief by "invok[ing] a substantive test of voluntariness" or
demonstrating prohibited coercion directly. Johnson, 384 U.
S., at 730; Elstad, 470 U. S., at 307-308 (statements
falling outside Miranda's sweep analyzed under voluntariness
standard). The Court concedes as much. Ante, at 693
("[E]liminating habeas review of Miranda issues would not
prevent a state prisoner from simply converting his barred Miranda claim into a due process claim that his conviction
rested on an involuntary confession").

															Excluding Miranda claims from habeas, then, denies
collateral relief only in those cases in which the prisoner's
statement was neither compelled nor involuntary but merely obtained
without the benefit of Miranda's prophylactic warnings. The
availability of a suppression remedy in such cases cannot be
labeled a "fundamental trial right," for there is no constitutional
right to the suppression of voluntary state- 707 ments. Quite the opposite: The Fifth Amendment, by its terms,
prohibits only compelled self-incrimination; it makes no
mention of "unwarned" statements. U. S. Const., Arndt. 5 ("No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself" (emphasis added)). On that much, our cases
could not be clearer. See, e. g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 448 ("Cases which involve the SelfIncrimination
Clause must, by definition, involve an element of coercion, since
the Clause provides only that a person shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself"); see Elstad,
supra, at 306-307; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.
S., at 654-655, and n. 5. As a result, the failure to issue
warnings does "not abridge [the] constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, but depart[s] only from the
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in
Mi randa." Tucker, supra, at 446. If the principles of
federalism, finality, and fairness ever counsel in favor of
withholding relief on habeas, surely they do so where there is no
constitutional harm to remedy.

															Similarly unpersuasive is the Court's related argument, ante, at 692, that the Fifth Amendment trial right is not
"necessarily divorced" from the interest of reliability. Whatever
the Fifth Amendment's relationship to reliability, Mi randa's prophylactic rule is not merely "divorced" from the quest for truth
but at war with it as well. The absence of Miranda warnings
does not by some mysterious alchemy convert a voluntary and
trustworthy statement into an involuntary and unreliable one. To
suggest otherwise is both unrealistic and contrary to precedent. As
I explained above, we have held over and over again that the
exclusion of unwarned but voluntary statements not only fails to
advance the cause of accuracy but impedes it by depriving the jury
of trustworthy evidence. Supra, at 703. In fact, we have
determined that the damage Miranda does to the truthseeking
mission of the criminal trial can become intolerable. We therefore
have limited the extent of the suppression rem- 708 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															edy, see Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 , 224-226
(1971) (unwarned but voluntary statement may be used for
impeachment), and dispensed with it entirely elsewhere, see Quarles, supra (unwarned statement may be used for any
purpose where statement was obtained under exigent circumstances
bearing on public safety). And at least one Member of this Court
dissented from Miranda itself because it "establish[ed] a
new ... barrier to the ascertainment of truth by the judicial
process." Miranda, supra, at 542 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
Consequently, I agree with the Court that Miranda's relationship to accurate verdicts is an important consideration
when deciding whether to permit Miranda claims on habeas.
But it is a consideration that weighs decisively against the
Court's decision today.

															The consideration the Court identifies as being "most
importan[t]" of all, ante, at 693, is an entirely pragmatic
one. Specifically, the Court "project[s]" that excluding Miranda questions from habeas will not significantly promote
efficiency or federalism because some Miranda issues are
relevant to a statement's voluntariness. Ante, at 693-695.
It is true that barring Miranda claims from habeas poses no
barrier to the adjudication of voluntariness questions. But that
does not make it "reasonable to suppose that virtually all Miranda claims [will] simply be recast" and litigated as
voluntariness claims. Ante, at 693. Involuntariness requires
coercive state action, such as trickery, psychological pressure, or
mistreatment. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157 , 167 (1986)
("[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the
finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' "); ante, at
693 (referring to "the crucial element of police coercion"). A Miranda claim, by contrast, requires no evidence of police
overreaching whatsoever; it is enough that law enforcement officers
commit a technical error. Even the forgetful failure to issue
warnings to the most wary, knowledgeable, and sea- 709 soned of criminals will do. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 468
("[WJe will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the
defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given").
Given the Court's unqualified trust in the willingness of police
officers to satisfy Miranda's requirements, ante, at
695, its suggestion that their every failure to do so involves
coercion seems to me ironic. If the police have truly grown in
"constitutional ... sophistication," ibid., then certainly
it is reasonable to suppose that most technical errors in the
administration of Miranda's warnings are just that.

															In any event, I see no need to resort to supposition. The
published decisions of the lower federal courts show that what the
Court assumes to be true demonstrably is not. In case after case,
the courts are asked on habeas to decide purely technical Miranda questions that contain not even a hint of police
overreaching. And in case after case, no voluntariness issue is
raised, primarily because none exists. Whether the suspect was in
"custody," 1 whether or not there

															1 See, e. g., Schiro v. Clark, 963 F.2d
962 , 974-975 (CA7 1992) (defendant approached officer in
halfway house and asked to speak to him; not in custody); Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d
490 ,504 (CA11991) (fisherman asked to produce document
on board his own, docked boat; no custody); Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d
926 , 950-952 (CA7 1991) (voluntary appearance for
presentence report interview; not in custody), cert. denied, 505 U.
S. 1208 (1992); Carlson v. State, 945 F.2d
1026 , 1028-1029 (CA8 1991) (suspect questioned at his
home; no custody); Davis v. Kemp, 829 F.2d
1522 , 1535 (CAll 1987) (defendant voluntarily went to police
station in absence of evidence that there was probable cause for
arrest; not in custody), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 929 (1988); Cobb v. Perini, 832 F.2d
342 , 345-347 (CA6 1987) (investigatory Terry-stop; not in custody), cert. denied, 486 U. S. 1024
(1988); Leviston v. Black, 843
F.2d 302 , 304 (CA8) (injail interview initiated by
incarcerated defendant; no custody), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 865
(1988); Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910
F.2d 691 , 693-694 (CAW) (drunk driver questioned at accident
scene before arrest; not in custody), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1014
(1990). 710 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															was "interrogation," 2 whether warnings were given or were
adequate,3 whether the defendant's equivocal statement constituted
an invocation of rights,4 whether waiver was knowing and
intelligent 5-this is the stuff that Miranda claims are made of.
While these questions create litigable issues under Miranda, they
generally do not indicate the existence of coercion-pressure
tactics, deprivations, or exploitations of the defendant's
weaknesses-sufficient to establish involuntariness.

															2 See, e. g., Endress v. Dugger, 880 F.2d
1244 , 1246-1250 (CAll 1989) (defendant volunteered information
without questioning), cert. denied, 495 U. S. 904 (1990); United
States ex rel. Church v. De Robertis, 771 F.2d
1015 , 1018-1020 (CA7 1985) (placing defendant's brother in cell
with him not interrogation); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d
870 , 873-875 (CA5) (en banc) (officer's surprised exclamation,
"What is this?" upon finding condom filled with white powder,
constituted interrogation), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 860 (1980); Phillips v. Attorney General of California, 594 F.2d
1288 , 1290-1291 (CA9 1979) (defendant volunteered information
after officer stated that he wished to see interior of defendant's
plane).

															3 See, e. g., Chambers v. Lockhart, 872 F.2d
274 , 275-276 (CA8) (omission of right to free appointed
counsel), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 938 (1989); Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d
1492 , 1500-1501 (CAll) (no warning that videotape of confession
could be used), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 945 (1989); Crespo v. Armontrout, 818 F.2d
684 , 685-686 (CA8) (when and whether warnings were given),
cert. denied, 484 U. S. 978 (1987); De La Rosa v. Texas, 743 F.2d
299 , 301-302 (CA5 1984) (officer's explanation of the warnings
alleged to be misleading), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1065 (1985); Stanley v. Zant, 697 F. 2d 955, 972 (CA111983)
(allegedly misleading waiver form), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1219
(1984).

															4 See, e. g., Bobo v. Kolb, 969
F.2d 391 , 395-398 (CA7 1992) (standing mute); Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d
836 , 841-843 (CA111987) (equivocal invocation of right to
silence), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1077-1078 (1988); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d
1012 , 1017-1019 (CA111987) (spontaneous resumption of
discussion after cutting off questioning), cert. denied, 488 U. S.
934 (1988).

															5 See, e. g., Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d
1176 , 1179-1180 (CA9 1990) (validity of implied waiver in light
of defendant's "background, experience, and conduct"), cert.
denied, 499 U. S. 979 (1991); Fike v. James, 833 F.2d
1503 , 1506-1507 (CA111987) (defendant's initiation of contact
waived previous invocation of rights). 711 Even assuming that many Miranda claims could "simply be
recast" as voluntariness claims, it does not follow that barring Miranda's prophylactic rule from habeas would unduly
complicate their resolution. The Court labels Miranda a
"bright-line (or, at least, brighter-line) rul[eJ" and
involuntariness an "exhaustive totality-of-circumstances approach," ante, at 694, but surely those labels overstate the
differences. Miranda, for all its alleged brightness, is not
without its difficulties; and voluntariness is not without its
strengths. JusTICE WHITE so observed in his Miranda dissent,
noting that the Court could not claim that "judicial time and effort ... will be conserved because of the
ease of application of the [Miranda] rule. [Miranda] leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody,
whether his statements were spontaneous or the product of
interrogation, whether the accused has effectively waived his
rights, ... all of which are certain to prove productive of
uncertainty during investigation and litigation during
prosecution." Miranda, supra, at 544-545. Experience has proved JUSTICE WHITE'S prediction correct. Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves. The
task of determining whether a defendant is in "custody" has proved
to be "a slippery one." Elstad, 470 U. S., at 309; see, e. g., n. 1, supra (custody cases). And the
supposedly "bright" lines that separate interrogation from
spontaneous declaration, the exercise of a right from waiver, and
the adequate warning from the inadequate, likewise have turned out
to be rather dim and ill defined. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291 (1980) (interrogation); n. 2, supra (interrogation); nn. 4 and 5, supra (waiver and invocation);
n. 3, supra (adequacy of warnings). Yet Miranda requires those lines to be drawn with precision in each case.

															The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, on the other hand,
permits each fact to be taken into account without re- 712 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															sort to formal and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the
difficulty of producing a yes-or-no answer to questions that are
often better answered in shades and degrees, the voluntariness
inquiry often can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than
more onerous. Thus, it is true that the existence of warnings is
still a consideration under the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, ante, at 693-694, but it is unnecessary to
determine conclusively whether "custody" existed and triggered the
warning requirement, or whether the warnings given were sufficient.
It is enough that the habeas court look to the warnings or their
absence, along with all other factors, and consider them in
deciding what is, after all, the ultimate question: whether the
confession was compelled and involuntary or the product of a free
and unimpaired will. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S., at 225-226.

															Nor does continued application of Miranda's prophylactic
rule on habeas dispense with the necessity of testing confessions
for voluntariness. While Miranda's conclusive presumption of
coercion may sound like an impenetrable barrier to the introduction
of compelled testimony, in practice it leaks like a sieve. Miranda, for example, does not preclude the use of an
unwarned confession outside the prosecution's case in chief, Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975);
involuntary statements, by contrast, must be excluded from trial
for all purposes, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 398
(1978). Miranda does not preclude admission of the fruits of
an unwarned statement, see Oregon v. Elstad, supra; but under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, we require the
suppression of not only compelled confessions but tainted
subsequent confessions as well, Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707 ,
710 (1967). Finally, Miranda can fail to exclude some truly
involuntary statements: It is entirely possible to extract a
compelled statement despite the most precise and accurate of
warnings. 713 See Johnson, 384 U. S., at 730 (warnings are only one
factor in determining voluntariness).

															The Court's final rationale is that, because the federal courts
rarely issue writs for Miranda violations, eliminating Miranda claims from habeas will not decrease
state-federal tensions to an appreciable degree. Ante, at
694-695. The relative infrequency of relief, however, does not
diminish the intrusion on state sovereignty; it diminishes only our
justification for intruding in the first place. After all, even if
relief is denied at the end of the day, the State still must divert
its scarce prosecutorial resources to defend an otherwise final
conviction. If relief is truly rare, efficiency counsels in favor
of dispensing with the search for the prophylactic rule violation
in a haystack; instead, the federal courts should concentrate on
the search for true Fifth Amendment violations by adjudicating the
questions of voluntariness and compulsion directly. I therefore
find it of little moment that the Police Foundation et al. support
respondent. Ante, at 695, n. 6. Those who bear the primary
burden of defending state convictions in federal courts-including
36 States and the National District Attorneys Association-
resoundingly support the opposite side. See Brief for California et
al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., and the National District Attorneys Association,
Inc., as Amici Curiae; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae (United States must defend against claims
raised by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. § 2255).

															The Court's response, that perhaps the police respect the Miranda rule as a result of "the existence of [habeas]
review," ante, at 695, is contrary to both case law and
common sense. As explained above, there is simply no reason to
think that habeas relief, which often "'strike[s] like lightning'"
years after conviction, contributes much additional deterrence
beyond the threat of exclusion during state proceedings. See supra, at 704 (quoting Duckworth, 492 U. S., at 211
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring)). Accord, Friendly, 38 714 Opinion of O'CONNOR, J.

															U. Chi. L. Rev., at 163. And our decision in Stone expressly so held: "The view that the deterrence ... would be
furthered rests on the dubious assumption that law enforcement
authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal
flaws ... that went undetected at trial and on appeal." 428 U. S.,
at 493 (footnote omitted). The majority offers no justification for
disregarding our decision in Stone; nor does it provide any
reason to question the truth of Stone's observation.

															IV

															As the Court emphasizes today, Miranda's prophylactic
rule is now 27 years old; the police and the state courts have
indeed grown accustomed to it. Ante, at 695. But it is
precisely because the rule is well accepted that there is little
further benefit to enforcing it on habeas. We can depend on law
enforcement officials to administer warnings in the first instance
and the state courts to provide a remedy when law enforcement
officers err. None of the Court's asserted justifications for
enforcing Miranda's prophylactic rule through habeas-neither
reverence for the Fifth Amendment nor the concerns of reliability,
efficiency, and federalism-counsel in favor of the Court's chosen
course. Indeed, in my view they cut in precisely the opposite
direction. The Court may reconsider its decision when presented
with empirical data. See ante, at 693 (noting absence of
empirical data); ante, at 688 (holding only that today's argument in favor of extending Stone "falls short").
But I see little reason for such a costly delay. Logic and
experience are at our disposal now. And they amply demonstrate that
applying Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas does not
increase the amount of justice dispensed; it only increases the
frequency with which the admittedly guilty go free. In my view, Miranda imposes such grave costs and produces so little
benefit on habeas that its continued application is neither
tolerable nor justified. Accordingly, I join Part III of the
Court's opinion but respectfully dissent from the remainder. 715 JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

															The issue in this case-whether the extraordinary remedy of
federal habeas corpus should routinely be available for claimed
violations of Miranda rights-involves not jurisdiction to issue the writ, but the equity of
doing so. In my view, both the Court and JUSTICE O'CONNOR disregard
the most powerful equitable consideration: that Williams has
already had full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim. He
had the opportunity to raise it in the Michigan trial court; he did
so and lost. He had the opportunity to seek review of the trial
court's judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals; he did so and
lost. Finally, he had the opportunity to seek discretionary review
of that Court of Appeals judgment in both the Michigan Supreme
Court and this Court; he did so and review was denied. The question
at this stage is whether, given all that, a federal habeas court
should now reopen the issue and adjudicate the Miranda claim
anew. The answer seems to me obvious: it should not. That would be
the course followed by a federal habeas court reviewing a federal conviction; it mocks our federal system to accord
state convictions less respect.

															I

															By statute, a federal habeas court has jurisdiction over any
claim that a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws" of the United States. See 28 U. S. C. §§
2241(c)(3), 2254(a), 2255. While that jurisdiction does require a
claim of legal error in the original proceedings, cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993), it
is otherwise sweeping in its breadth. As early as 1868, this Court
described it in these terms: "This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It
brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court
and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitu- 716 Opinion of SCALIA, J.

															tion, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen this
jurisdiction." Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318, 325326
(1868).

															Our later case law has confirmed that assessment. Habeas
jurisdiction extends, we have held, to federal claims for which an
opportunity for full and fair litigation has already been provided
in state or federal court, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 ,
458-459 (1953); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S.
217, 223-224 (1969), to procedurally defaulted federal claims,
including those over which this Court would have no jurisdiction on
direct review, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 , 426,
428-429 (1963); Kaufman, supra, at 223; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.
S. 72 , 90-91 (1977); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.
S. 722, 750 (1991), and to federal claims of a state criminal
defendant awaiting trial, see Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 , 251
(1886).

															But with great power comes great responsibility. Habeas
jurisdiction is tempered by the restraints that accompany the
exercise of equitable discretion. This is evident from the text of
the federal habeas statute, which provides that writs of habeas
corpus "may be granted"-not that they shall be
granted-and enjoins the court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(a), 2243 (emphases
added). That acknowledgment of discretion is merely the
continuation of a long historic tradition. In English law, habeas
corpus was one of the so-called "prerogative" writs, which included
the writs of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. Duker, The
English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path to
Fame, 53 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 983, 984, n. 2 (1978); 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 132 (1768). "[A]s in the case of all other prerogative
writs," habeas would not issue "as of mere course," but rather
required a showing "why the extraordinary power of the crown is
called in to the party's assistance." Ibid. And even where
the writ was issued to compel production of the 717 prisoner in court, the standard applied to determine whether
relief would be accorded was equitable: The court was to "determine
whether the case of [the prisoner's] commitment be just, and
thereupon do as to justice shall appertain." 1 id., at 131.

															This Court has frequently rested its habeas decisions on
equitable principles. In one of the earliest federal habeas cases, Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 201 (1830), Chief Justice
Marshall wrote: "No doubt exists respecting the power [of the Court
to issue the writ]; the question is, whether this be a case in
which it ought to be exercised." And in Ex parte Royall, the
Court, while affirming that a federal habeas court had "the power"
to discharge a state prisoner awaiting trial, held that it was "not
bound in every case to exercise such a power." 117 U. S., at 251.
The federal habeas statute did "not deprive the court of
discretion," which "should be exercised in the light of the
relations existing, under our system of government, between the
judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States." Ibid. This doctrine continues to be reflected in our modern cases. In
declining to extend habeas relief to all cases of state procedural
default, the Court in Fay v. Noia said: "Discretion
is implicit in the statutory command that the judge ... 'dispose of
the matter as law and justice require,' 28 U. S. C. § 2243; and
discretion was the flexible concept employed by the federal courts
in developing the exhaustion rule." 372 U. S., at 438. See also Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 88. In fashioning this
Court's retroactivity doctrine, the plurality in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.
S. 288 , 308-310 (1989), also relied on equitable
considerations. And in a case announced today, holding that the
harmless-error standard for habeas corpus is less onerous than the
one for direct review, the Court carries on this tradition by
expressly considering equitable principles such as "finality,"
"comity," and "federalism." Brecht v. Abrahamson,
ante, at 635-636. 718 Opinion of SCALIA, J.

															Indeed, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR notes, this Court's jurisprudence
has defined the scope of habeas corpus largely by means of such
equitable principles. See ante, at 698-700 (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The use of these
principles, which serve as "gateway[s]" through which a habeas
petitioner must pass before proceeding to the merits of a
constitutional claim, "is grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of
habeas courts." Herrera v. Collins, supra, at
404.

															II

															As the Court today acknowledges, see ante, at 686-687,
the rule of Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), is
simply one application of equitable discretion. It does not deny a
federal habeas court jurisdiction over Fourth Amendment claims, but
merely holds that the court ought not to entertain them when the
petitioner has already had an opportunity to litigate them fully
and fairly. See id., at 495, n. 37. It is therefore not correct to
say that applying Stone to the present case involves
"eliminating review of Miranda claims" from federal habeas, ante, at 693, or that the Court is being "asked to exclude a
substantive category of issues from relitigation on habeas," ante, at 700 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). And it is therefore unnecessary to discuss at
length the value of Miranda rights, as though it has been
proposed that since they are particularly worthless they deserve
specially disfavored treatment. The proposed rule would treat Miranda claims no differently from all other claims, taking account of all equitable factors, including the opportunity
for full and fair litigation, in determining whether to provide
habeas review. Wherein Mi randa and Fourth Amendment claims
differ from some other claims, is that the most significant
countervailing equitable factor (possibility that the assigned
error produced the conviction of an innocent person) will
ordinarily not exist.

															At common law, the opportunity for full and fair litigation of
an issue at trial and (if available) direct appeal was not 719 only a factor weighing against reaching the merits of an
issue on habeas; it was a conclusive factor, unless the
issue was a legal issue going to the jurisdiction of the trial
court. See Ex parte Watkins, supra, at 202-203; W. Church,
Habeas Corpus § 363 (1884). Beginning in the late 19th century,
however, that rule was gradually relaxed, by the device of holding
that various illegalities deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
See, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874) (no
jurisdiction to impose second sentence in violation of Double
Jeopardy Clause); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 , 376-377
(1880) (no jurisdiction to try defendant for violation of
unconstitutional statute); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309 (1915) (no
jurisdiction to conduct trial in atmosphere of mob domination); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923)
(same); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 468 (1938)
(no jurisdiction to conduct trial that violated defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel). See generally Wright v. West, 505 U.
S. 277 , 285-286 (1992) (opinion of THOMAS, J.); Fay,
supra, at 450-451 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Finally, the
jurisdictional line was openly abandoned in Waley v. Johnston, 316
U. S. 101 , 104-105 (1942). See P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P.
Mishkin, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 1502 (3d ed. 1988) (hereinafter Hart and
Wechsler).

															But to say that prior opportunity for full and fair litigation
no longer automatically precludes from consideration even
nonjurisdictional issues is not to say that such prior opportunity
is no longer a relevant equitable factor. Reason would suggest that
it must be, and Stone v. Powell, supra, establishes
that it is. Thus, the question before us is not whether a holding
unique to Fourth Amendment claims (and resting upon nothing more
principled than our estimation that Fourth Amendment exclusion
claims are not very important) should be expanded to some other
arbitrary category beyond that; but rather, whether the general
principle that is the only valid justification for Stone v. Powell should for some 720 Opinion of SCALIA, J.

															reason not be applied to Miranda claims. I think
the answer to that question is clear: Prior opportunity to litigate
an issue should be an important equitable consideration in any
habeas case, and should ordinarily preclude the court from reaching
the merits of a claim, unless it goes to the fairness of the trial
process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result.

															Our case law since Stone is entirely consistent with this
view. As the Court notes, ante, at 687-688, we have held
that the rule in Stone does not apply in three cases. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U. S. 365 (1986),
involved alleged denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
which unquestionably goes to the fairness of the trial process. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979),
involved alleged discrimination by the trial court in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. We concluded that since the "same trial
court will be the court that initially must decide the merits of
such a claim," and since the claim involved an assertion that "the
state judiciary itself has purposely violated the Equal Protection
Clause," no opportunity for a full and fair state hearing existed. Id., at 561; see also id., at 563. And Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),
involved a claim that "no rational trier of fact could have found
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," id., at 324, which is
obviously a direct challenge to the accuracy of the ultimate
result.

															III

															The rule described above-or indeed a rule even somewhat more
limiting of habeas review than that-is followed in federal
postconviction review of federal convictions under 28 U. S.
C. § 2255. In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217 (1969),
which held that res judicata does not bar § 2255 habeas review of
constitutional issues, we stated that a district court had
"discretion" to refuse to reach the merits of a constitutional
claim that had already been raised and resolved against the
prisoner at trial and on direct review. 721 Id., at 227, n. 8. Since Kaufman, federal courts
have uniformly held that, absent countervailing considerations,
district courts may refuse to reach the merits of a constitutional
claim previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. See, e.
g., Giacalone v. United States, 739
F.2d 40 , 42-43 (CA2 1984); United States v. Orejuela, 639 F.2d
1055 , 1057 (CA3 1981); Stephan v. United States, 496 F.2d
527 , 528-529 (CA6 1974), cert. denied sub nom.
Marchesani v. United States, 423 U. S. 861 (1975); see
also 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 593, p. 439, n.
26 (1982); Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1064-1066 (1970). Thus, a prior opportunity for
full and fair litigation is normally dispositive of a federal
prisoner's habeas claim. If the claim was raised and rejected on
direct review, the habeas court will not readjudicate it absent
countervailing equitable considerations; if the claim was not
raised, it is procedurally defaulted and the habeas court will not
adjudicate it absent countervailing equitable considerations (e.
g., actual innocence or cause and prejudice, see United
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152 (1982)).

															Because lower federal courts have not generally recognized their
discretion to deny habeas relief in state cases where opportunity
for full and fair litigation was accorded, the peculiar state of
current federal habeas practice is this:

															State courts routinely see their criminal convictions vacated by
federal district judges, but federal courts see their criminal
convictions afforded a substantial measure of finality and respect.
See Hart and Wechsler 1585. Only one theory can possibly justify
this disparity-the theory advanced in Fay v. Noia, that a federal forum must be afforded for every federal claim of a
state criminal defendant. * See 372 U. S., at

															*Of course a federal forum is theoretically available in this
Court, by writ of certiorari. Quite obviously, however, this mode
of review cannot be generally applied due to practical limitations.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 526 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 722 Opinion of SCALIA, J.

															418. In my view, that theory is profoundly wrong for several
reasons.

															First, it has its origin in a misreading of our early
precedents. Fay interpreted the holding of Ex parte
Royall that federal courts had discretion not to entertain the
habeas claims of state prisoners prior to the conclusion of
state-court proceedings-as containing the implication that after conclusion of those proceedings there would be plenary
federal review of all constitutional claims. 372 U. S., at
420. In fact, however, Royall had noted and affirmed the
common-law rule that claims of error not going to the jurisdiction
of the convicting court could ordinarily be entertained only on
writ of error, not on habeas corpus. 117 U. S., at 253. See Fay,
supra, at 453-454 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 255 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring). Royall contained no hint of a
suggestion that a federal habeas court should afford state-court
judgments less respect than federal-court judgments. To the
contrary, it maintained the traditional view that federal and state
courts have equal responsibility for the protection of federal
constitutional rights. The discretion of the federal habeas court
"should be exercised," it said, "in the light of the relations
existing, under our system of government, between the judicial
tribunals of the Union and of the States, ... courts equally bound
to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." 117 U.
S., at 251. And in describing the proper disposition of a federal
habeas petition filed after state conviction, Royall cited Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), which involved a
federal habeas attack on a federal conviction. See 117 U.
S., at 253. Thus, Royall is properly understood as saying
that the federal habeas statute guaranteed state prisoners, not a
federal forum for all their federal claims, but rather the same
rights to federal habeas relief that federal prisoners
possessed.

															Worse than misreading case precedent, however, the federal
right/federal forum theory misperceives the basic struc- 723 ture of our national system. That structure establishes this
Court as the supreme judicial interpreter of the Federal
Constitution and laws, but gives other federal courts no higher or
more respected a role than state courts in applying that "Law of
the Land" -which it says all state courts are bound by, and all
state judges must be sworn to uphold. U. S. Const., Art. VI. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 , 637
(1884); Ex parte Royall, supra, at 251; Brown, 344 U.
S., at 499 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). It would be a strange
constitution that regards state courts as second-rate instruments
for the vindication of federal rights and yet makes no mandatory
provision for lower federal courts (as our Constitution does not).
And it would be an unworkable constitution that requires
redetermination in federal courts of all issues of pervasive
federal constitutional law that arise in state-court
litigation.

															Absent indication to the contrary, state courts should be
presumed to have applied federal law as faithfully as federal
courts. See Ex parte Royall, supra, at 252; Brecht v. Abrahamson, ante, at 636. A federal court entertaining
collateral attack against a state criminal conviction should accord
the same measure of respect and finality as it would to a federal
criminal conviction. As it exercises equitable discretion to
determine whether the merits of constitutional claims will be
reached in the one, it should exercise a similar discretion for the
other. The distinction that has arisen in lower court practice is
unsupported in law, utterly impractical and demeaning to the States
in its consequences, and must be eliminated.

															***

															While I concur in Part III of the Court's opinion, I cannot
agree with the rest of its analysis. I would reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for a determination
whether, given that respondent has already been afforded an
opportunity for full and fair litigation in the 724 Opinion of SCALIA, J.

															courts of Michigan, any unusual equitable factors counsel in
favor of readjudicating the merits of his Miranda claim on habeas
corpus.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a state prisoner's claim that their conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights is not subject to the restriction on federal habeas jurisdiction outlined in Stone v. Powell. The Court found that Stone's rule was based on prudential concerns related to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which differs from Miranda in terms of safeguarding fundamental trial rights and facilitating correct ascertainment of guilt. The Court also noted that eliminating review of Miranda claims would not significantly benefit federal courts or advance federalism. The Court emphasized the importance of presuming that state courts have applied federal law faithfully and accorded the same respect and finality to state criminal convictions as federal ones.