U.S. Supreme Court Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States No. 515 Argued October 5,
1964 Decided December 14,
1964 379
U.S. 241 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA Syllabus Appellant, the owner of a large motel in Atlanta, Georgia, which
restricts its clientele to white persons, three-fourths of whom are
transient interstate travelers, sued for declaratory relief and to
enjoin enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contending that
the prohibition of racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation affecting commerce exceeded Congress' powers under
the Commerce Clause and violated other parts of the Constitution. A
three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of Title
II, §§ 201(a), (b)(1) and (c)(1), the provisions attacked, and, on
appellees' counterclaim, permanently enjoined appellant from
refusing to accommodate Negro guests for racial reasons. Held: 1. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a valid exercise
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause as applied to a place
of public accommodation serving interstate travelers. Civil
Right Cases, 109 U. S. 3 ,
distinguished. Pp. 379 U. S.
249 -262.

															(a) The interstate movement of persons is "commerce" which
concerns more than one State. Pp. 379 U. S.
255 -256.

															(b) The protection of interstate commerce is within the
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause whether or
not the transportation of persons between States is "commercial."
P. 379 U. S.
256 .

															(c) Congress' action in removing the disruptive effect which it
found racial discrimination has on interstate travel is not
invalidated because Congress was also legislating against what it
considered to be moral wrongs. P. 379 U. S.
257 .

															(d) Congress had power to enact appropriate legislation with
regard to a place of public accommodation such as appellant's motel
even if it is assumed to be of a purely "local" character, as
Congress' power over interstate commerce extends to the regulation
of local incidents thereof which might have a substantial and
harmful effect upon that commerce. P. 379 U. S.
258 .

															(2) The prohibition in Title II of racial discrimination in
public accommodations affecting commerce does not violate the
Fifth Page 379 U. S. 242 Amendment as being a deprivation of property or liberty without
due process of law. Pp. 379 U. S.
258 -261.

															(3) Such prohibition does not violate he Thirteenth Amendment as
being "involuntary servitude." P. 379 U.S. 261 . 231 F.
Supp. 393 , affirmed.

															MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This is a declaratory judgment action, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and §
2202 (1958 ed.), attacking the constitutionality of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. Page 379 U. S. 243 241, 243. [ Footnote 1 ] In
addition to declaratory relief, the complaint sought an injunction
restraining the enforcement of the Act and damages against
appellees based on allegedly resulting injury in the event
compliance was required. Appellees counterclaimed for enforcement
under § 206(a) of the Act and asked for a three-judge district
court under § 206(b). A three-judge court, empaneled under § 206(b)
as well as 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958 ed.), sustained the validity of
the Act and issued a permanent injunction on appellees'
counterclaim restraining appellant from continuing to violate the
Act which remains in effect on order of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, 85 S.
Ct. 1. We affirm the judgment.

															1. The Factual Background and Contentions of the
Parties. The case comes here on admissions and stipulated facts.
Appellant owns and operates the Heart of Atlanta Motel, which has
216 rooms available to transient guests. The motel is located on
Courtland Street, two blocks from downtown Peachtree Street. It is
readily accessible to interstate highways 75 and 85 and state
highways 23 and 41. Appellant solicits patronage from outside the
State of Georgia through various national advertising media,
including magazines of national circulation; it maintains over 50
billboards and highway signs within the State, soliciting patronage
for the motel; it accepts convention trade from outside Georgia and
approximately 75% of its registered guests are from out of State.
Prior to passage of the Act, the motel had followed a practice of
refusing to rent rooms to Negroes, and it alleged that it intended
to continue to do so. In an effort to perpetuate that policy, this
suit was filed.

															The appellant contends that Congress, in passing this Act,
exceeded its power to regulate commerce under Art. I, Page 379 U. S. 244 § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United States; that the
Act violates the Fifth Amendment because appellant is deprived of
the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it
wishes, resulting in a taking of its liberty and property without
due process of law and a taking of its property without just
compensation; and, finally, that, by requiring appellant to rent
available rooms to Negroes against its will, Congress is subjecting
it to involuntary servitude in contravention of the Thirteenth
Amendment.

															The appellees counter that the unavailability to Negroes of
adequate accommodations interferes significantly with interstate
travel, and that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has power to
remove such obstructions and restraints; that the Fifth Amendment
does not forbid reasonable regulation, and that consequential
damage does not constitute a "taking" within the meaning of that
amendment; that the Thirteenth Amendment claim fails because it is
entirely frivolous to say that an amendment directed to the
abolition of human bondage and the removal of widespread
disabilities associated with slavery places discrimination in
public accommodations beyond the reach of both federal and state
law.

															At the trial, the appellant offered no evidence, submitting the
case on the pleadings, admissions and stipulation of facts;
however, appellees proved the refusal of the motel to accept Negro
transients after the passage of the Act. The District Court
sustained the constitutionality of the sections of the Act under
attack (§§ 201(a), (b)(1) and (c)(1)) and issued a permanent
injunction on the counterclaim of the appellees. It restrained the
appellant from "[r]efusing to accept Negroes as guests in the motel
by reason of their race or color" and from

															"[m]aking any distinction whatever upon the basis of race or
color in the availability of the goods, services, facilities, Page 379 U. S. 245 privileges, advantages or accommodations offered or made
available to the guests of the motel, or to the general public,
within or upon any of the premises of the Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc."

															2. The History of the Act. Congress first evidenced its interest in civil rights
legislation in the Civil Rights or Enforcement Act of April 9,
1866. [ Footnote 2 ] There
followed four Acts, [ Footnote
3 ] with a fifth, the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,
[ Footnote 4 ] culminating the
series. In 1883, this Court struck down the public accommodations
sections of the 1875 Act in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 . No
major legislation in this field had been enacted by Congress for 82
years when the Civil Rights Act of 1957 [ Footnote 5 ] became law. It was followed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1960. [ Footnote
6 ] Three years later, on June 19, 1963, the late President
Kennedy called for civil rights legislation in a message to
Congress to which he attached a proposed bill. Its stated purpose
was

															"to promote the general welfare by eliminating discrimination
based on race, color, religion, or national origin in . . . public
accommodations through the exercise by Congress of the powers
conferred upon it . . . to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments to regulate commerce among the several
States, and to make laws necessary and proper to execute the powers
conferred upon it by the Constitution."

															H.R.Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 14. Page 379 U. S. 246 Bills were introduced in each House of the Congress, embodying
the President's suggestion, one in the Senate being S. 1732
[ Footnote 7 ] and one in the
House H.R. 7152. However, it was not until July 2, 1964, upon the
recommendation of President Johnson, that the Civil Rights Act of
1964, here under attack, was finally passed.

															After extended hearings, each of these bills was favorably
reported to its respective house, H.R. 7152 on November 20, 1963,
H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., and S. 1732 on February
10, 1964, S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. Although each bill
originally incorporated extensive findings of fact, these were
eliminated from the bills as they were reported. The House passed
its bill in January, 1964, and sent it to the Senate. Through a
bipartisan coalition of Senators Humphrey and Dirksen, together
with other Senators, a substitute was worked out in informal
conferences. This substitute was adopted by the Senate and sent to
the House, where it was adopted without change. This expedited
procedure prevented the usual report on the substitute bill in the
Senate as well as a Conference Committee report ordinarily filed in
such matters. Our only frame of reference as to the legislative
history of the Act is, therefore, the hearings, reports and debates
on the respective bills in each house.

															The Act as finally adopted was most comprehensive, undertaking
to prevent, through peaceful and voluntary settlement,
discrimination in voting as well as in places of accommodation and
public facilities, federally secured programs, and in employment.
Since Title II is the only portion under attack here, we confine
our consideration to those public accommodation provisions. Page 379 U. S. 247 3. Title II of the Act. This Title is divided into seven sections, beginning with §
201(a), which provides that:

															"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin."

															There are listed in § 201(b) four classes of business
establishments, each of which "serves the public" and "is a place
of public accommodation" within the meaning of § 201(a) "if its
operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by
it is supported by State action." The covered establishments
are:

															"(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment
located within a building which contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor
of such establishment as his residence;"

															"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria . . . [not here involved];"

															"(3) any motion picture house . . . [not here involved];"

															"(4) any establishment . . . which is physically located within
the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this
subsection, or . . . within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment . . . [not here
involved]."

															Section 201(c) defines the phrase "affect commerce" as applied
to the above establishments. It first declares that "any inn,
hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests" affects commerce per se. Restaurants,
cafeterias, etc., in class two affect Page 379 U. S. 248 commerce only if they serve or offer to serve interstate
travelers or if a substantial portion of the food which they serve
or products which they sell have "moved in commerce." Motion
picture houses and other places listed in class three affect
commerce if they customarily present films, performances, etc.,
"which move in commerce." And the establishments listed in class
four affect commerce if they are within, or include within their
own premises, an establishment "the operations of which affect
commerce." Private clubs are excepted under certain conditions. See § 201(e).

															Section 201(d) declares that "discrimination or segregation" is
supported by state action when carried on under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation or any custom or usage required or
enforced by officials of the State or any of its subdivisions.

															In addition, § 202 affirmatively declares that all persons

															"shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or place,
from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination
or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or
political subdivision thereof."

															Finally, § 203 prohibits the withholding or denial, etc., of any
right or privilege secured by § 201 and § 202 or the intimidation,
threatening or coercion of any person with the purpose of
interfering with any such right or the punishing, etc., of any
person for exercising or attempting to exercise any such right.

															The remaining sections of the Title are remedial ones for
violations of any of the previous sections. Remedies are limited to
civil actions for preventive relief. The Attorney General may bring
suit where he has

															"reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons
is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to Page 379 U. S. 249 the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title,
and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described.
. . ."

															§ 206(a).

															A person aggrieved may bring suit, in which the Attorney General
may be permitted to intervene. Thirty days' written notice before
filing any such action must be given to the appropriate authorities
of a State or subdivision the law of which prohibits the act
complained of and which has established an authority which may
grant relief therefrom. § 204(c). In States where such condition
does not exist, the court, after a case is filed, may refer it to
the Community Relations Service, which is established under Title X
of the Act. § 204(d). This Title establishes such service in the
Department of Commerce, provides for a Director to be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and grants
it certain powers, including the power to hold hearings, with
reference to matters coming to its attention by reference from the
court or between communities and persons involved in disputes
arising under the Act.

															4. Application of Title II to Heart of Atlanta
Motel. It is admitted that the operation of the motel brings it within
the provisions of § 201(a) of the Act, and that appellant refused
to provide lodging for transient Negroes because of their race or
color, and that it intends to continue that policy unless
restrained.

															The sole question posed is, therefore, the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to these facts. The
legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress based the
Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as its power to regulate interstate commerce
under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution. Page 379 U. S. 250 The Senate Commerce Committee made it quite clear that the
fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate "the deprivation of
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to
public establishments." At the same time, however, it noted that
such an objective has been and could be readily achieved "by
congressional action based on the commerce power of the
Constitution." S.Rep. No. 872, supra, at 16-17. Our study
of the legislative record, made in the light of prior cases, has
brought us to the conclusion that Congress possessed ample power in
this regard, and we have therefore not considered the other grounds
relied upon. This is not to say that the remaining authority upon
which it acted was not adequate, a question upon which we do not
pass, but merely that, since the commerce power is sufficient for
our decision here, we have considered it alone. Nor is § 201(d) or
§ 202, having to do with state action, involved here. and we do not
pass upon either of those sections.

															5. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883),
and their Application. In light of our ground for decision, it might be well at the
outset to discuss the Civil Rights Cases, supra, which
declared provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
unconstitutional. 18 Stat. 335, 336. We think that decision
inapposite and without precedential value in determining the
constitutionality of the present Act. Unlike Title II of the
present legislation, the 1875 Act broadly proscribed discrimination
in "inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement," without limiting the categories of
affected businesses to those impinging upon interstate commerce. In
contrast, the applicability of Title II is carefully limited to
enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the
interstate flow of goods and people, Page 379 U. S. 251 except where state action is involved. Further, the fact that
certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently
involved in interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the
ambit of the commerce power is not necessarily dispositive of the
same question today. Our populace had not reached its present
mobility, nor were facilities, goods and services circulating as
readily in interstate commerce as they are today. Although the
principles which we apply today are those first formulated by Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), the conditions of
transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must
apply those principles to the present state of commerce. The sheer
increase in volume of interstate traffic alone would give
discriminatory practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact
upon the Nation's commerce than such practices had on the economy
of another day. Finally, there is language in the Civil Rights
Cases which indicates that the Court did not fully consider whether
the 1875 Act could be sustained as an exercise of the commerce
power. Though the Court observed that

															"no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in
the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments
[Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth],"

															the Court went on specifically to note that the Act was not
"conceived" in terms of the commerce power, and expressly pointed
out:

															"Of course, these remarks [as to lack of congressional power] do
not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct
and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject,
accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the
States, as in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. . . . In
these cases, Congress has Page 379 U. S. 252 power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in
every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in
respect thereof."

															At 18 [argument of counsel omitted from electronic version].
Since the commerce power was not relied on by the Government and
was without support in the record, it is understandable that the
Court narrowed its inquiry and excluded the Commerce Clause as a
possible source of power. In any event, it is clear that such a
limitation renders the opinion devoid of authority for the
proposition that the Commerce Clause gives no power to Congress to
regulate discriminatory practices now found substantially to affect
interstate commerce. We therefore conclude that the Civil
Rights Cases have no relevance to the basis of decision here,
where the Act explicitly relies upon the commerce power and where
the record is filled with testimony of obstructions and restraints
resulting from the discriminations found to be existing. We now
pass to that phase of the case.

															6. The Basis of Congressional Action. While the Act, as adopted, carried no congressional findings,
the record of its passage through each house is replete with
evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or color places
upon interstate commerce. See Hearings before Senate
Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No.
872, supra; Hearings before Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before House
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the Judiciary on
miscellaneous proposals regarding Civil Rights, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 4; H.R.Rep. No. 914, supra. This testimony
included the fact that our people have become increasingly mobile,
with millions of people of all races traveling from State to State;
that Negroes in particular have been the subject of discrimination
in transient accommodations, having to travel great distances Page 379 U. S. 253 to secure the same; that often they have been unable to obtain
accommodations, and have had to call upon friends to put them up
overnight, S.Rep. No. 872, supra, at 14-22, and that these
conditions had become so acute as to require the listing of
available lodging for Negroes in a special guidebook which was
itself "dramatic testimony to the difficulties" Negroes encounter
in travel. Senate Commerce Committee Hearings, supra, at
692-694. These exclusionary practices were found to be nationwide,
the Under Secretary of Commerce testifying that there is "no
question that this discrimination in the North still exists to a
large degree" and in the West and Midwest as well. Id. at
735, 744. This testimony indicated a qualitative, as well as
quantitative, effect on interstate travel by Negroes. The former
was the obvious impairment of the Negro traveler's pleasure and
convenience that resulted when he continually was uncertain of
finding lodging. As for the latter, there was evidence that this
uncertainty stemming from racial discrimination had the effect of
discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the
Negro community. Id. at 744. This was the conclusion not
only of the Under Secretary of Commerce, but also of the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, who wrote the
Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee that it was his

															"belief that air commerce is adversely affected by the denial to
a substantial segment of the traveling public of adequate and
desegregated public accommodations." Id. at 12-13. We shall not burden this opinion with
further details, since the voluminous testimony presents
overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels
impedes interstate travel.

															7. The Power of Congress Over Interstate Travel. The power of Congress to deal with these obstructions depends on
the meaning of the Commerce Clause. Its meaning was first
enunciated 140 years ago by the great Page 379 U. S. 254 Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), in these words:

															"The subject to be regulated is commerce, and . . . to ascertain
the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning
of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to
traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities .
. . , but it is something more: it is intercourse . . . between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.
[At 22 U. S. 189 -190.]"

															" * * * *" "To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution
informs us, to commerce 'with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian tribes.'"

															"It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words
comprehend every species of commercial intercourse. . . . No sort
of trade can be carried on . . . to which this power does not
extend. [At 22 U. S. 193 -194.]"

															" * * * *" "The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce
'among the several States.' The word 'among' means intermingled. .
. ."

															" * * * *" ". . . [I]t may very properly be restricted to that commerce
which concerns more States than one. . . . The genius and character
of the whole government seem to be that its action is to be applied
to all the . . . internal concerns [of the Nation] which affect the
States generally, but not to those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which
it is not necessary Page 379 U. S. 255 to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general
powers of the government. [At 22 U. S.
194 -195.]"

															" * * * * " "We are now arrived at the inquiry -- What is this power?"

															"It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are
prescribed in the constitution. . . . If, as has always been
understood, the sovereignty of Congress . . . is plenary as to
those objects [specified in the Constitution], the power over
commerce . . . is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which
their constituents possess at elections are, in this, as in many
other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole
restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely
solely, in all representative governments. [At 22 U. S.
196 -197.]"

															In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the
Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the activity
sought to be regulated is "commerce which concerns more States than
one" and has a real and substantial relation to the national
interest. Let us now turn to this facet of the problem.

															That the "intercourse" of which the Chief Justice spoke included
the movement of persons through more Page 379 U. S. 256 States than one was settled as early as 1849, in the Passenger
Cases , 7 How. 283, where Mr. Justice McLean stated:
"That the transportation of passengers is a part of commerce is not
now an open question." At 48 U. S. 401 .
Again, in 1913, Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court,
said:

															"Commerce among the States, we have said, consists of
intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the
transportation of persons and property." Hoke v. United States, 227 U.
S. 308 , 227 U. S. 320 .
And only four years later, in 1917, in Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S. 470 , Mr.
Justice Day held for the Court:

															"The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has
long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress,
under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority of
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from
immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no
longer open to question."

															At 242 U. S. 491 .
Nor does it make any difference whether the transportation is
commercial in character. Id. at 242 U. S.
484 -486. In Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.
S. 373 (1946), Mr. Justice Reed observed as to the
modern movement of persons among the States:

															"The recent changes in transportation brought about by the
coming of automobiles [do] not seem of great significance in the
problem. People of all races travel today more extensively than in
1878, when this Court first passed upon state regulation of racial
segregation in commerce. [It but] emphasizes the soundness of this
Court's early conclusion in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S.
485 ."

															At 328 U. S.
383 .

															The same interest in protecting interstate commerce which led
Congress to deal with segregation in interstate Page 379 U. S. 257 carriers and the white slave traffic has prompted it to extend
the exercise of its power to gambling, Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); to criminal enterprises, Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925); to deceptive practices in the sale of products, Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.
S. 385 (1959); to fraudulent security transactions, Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119 (1953); to misbranding of drugs, Weeks v. United States, 245 U. S. 618 (1918); to wages and hours, United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941); to members of labor unions, Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937);
to crop control, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.
S. 111 (1942); to discrimination against shippers, United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 333 U.
S. 169 (1948); to the protection of small business from
injurious price-cutting, Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954); to resale price maintenance, Hudson Distributors, Inc.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U. S. 386 (1964), Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); to professional football, Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U. S. 445 (1957), and to racial discrimination by owners and managers of
terminal restaurants, Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.
S. 454 (1960).

															That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of
these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing Title
II of this Act, Congress was also dealing with what it considered a
moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming
evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has
had on commercial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered
Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis
for the exercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the
fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with
which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong. Page 379 U. S. 258 It is said that the operation of the motel here is of a purely
local character. But, assuming this to be true, "[i]f it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze." United States
v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.
S. 460 , 336 U. S. 464 (1949). See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
supra. As Chief Justice Stone put it in United States v.
Darby, supra: "The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined
to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the
exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. See McCulloch v. Maryland , 4
Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 421 ."

															At 312 U. S. 118 .
Thus, the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof,
including local activities in both the States of origin and
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon
that commerce. One need only examine the evidence which we have
discussed above to see that Congress may -- as it has -- prohibit
racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however "local"
their operations may appear.

															Nor does the Act deprive appellant of liberty or property under
the Fifth Amendment. The commerce power invoked here by the
Congress is a specific and plenary one authorized by the
Constitution itself. The only questions are: (1) whether Congress
had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by
motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether
the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and
appropriate. Page 379 U. S. 259 If they are, appellant has no "right" to select its guests as it
sees fit, free from governmental regulation.

															There is nothing novel about such legislation. Thirty-two States
[ Footnote 8 ] now have it on
their books either by statute or executive order, and many cities
provide such regulation. Some of these Acts go back four-score
years. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that such laws Page 379 U. S. 260 do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Perhaps the first such holding was in the Civil
Rights Cases themselves, where Mr. Justice Bradley for the
Court inferentially found that innkeepers,

															"by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are
bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper
accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith
apply for them."

															At 100 U. S.
25 .

															As we have pointed out, 32 States now have such provisions and
no case has been cited to us where the attack on a state statute
has been successful, either in federal or state courts. Indeed, in
some cases, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause objections
have been specifically discarded in this Court. Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S. 28 , 333 U. S. 34 n.
12 (1948). As a result, the constitutionality of such state
statutes stands unquestioned. "The authority of the Federal
Government over interstate commerce does not differ," it was held
in United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.
S. 533 (1939), "in extent or character from that
retained by the states over intrastate commerce." At 307 U. S.
569 -570. See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 (1944).

															It is doubtful if, in the long run, appellant will suffer
economic loss as a result of the Act. Experience is to the contrary
where discrimination is completely obliterated as to all public
accommodations. But whether this be true or not is of no
consequence, since this Court has specifically held that the fact
that a "member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic
losses not shared by others . . . has never been a barrier" to such
legislation. Bowles v. Willingham, supra, at 321 U. S. 518 .
Likewise, in a long line of cases, this Court has reflected the
claim that the prohibition of racial discrimination in public
accommodations interferes with personal liberty. See District
of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co. , 346 U.S. Page 379 U. S. 261 100 (1953), and cases there cited, where we concluded that
Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the District of Columbia
"as broad as the police power of a state," which included the power
to adopt "a law prohibiting discriminations against Negroes by the
owners and managers of restaurants in the District of Columbia." At 346 U. S. 110 .
Neither do we find any merit in the claim that the Act is a taking
of property without just compensation. The cases are to the
contrary. See Legal Tender
Cases , 12 Wall. 457, 79 U. S. 551 (1870); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502 (1923); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155 (1958).

															We find no merit in the remainder of appellant's contentions,
including that of "involuntary servitude." As we have seen, 32
States prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations.
These laws but codify the common law innkeeper rule, which long
predated the Thirteenth Amendment. It is difficult to believe that
the Amendment was intended to abrogate this principle. Indeed, the
opinion of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases is to the contrary
as we have seen, it having noted with approval the laws of "all the
States" prohibiting discrimination. We could not say that the
requirements of the Act in this regard are in any way "akin to
African slavery." Butler v. Perry, 240 U.
S. 328 , 240 U. S. 332 (1916).

															We therefore conclude that the action of the Congress in the
adoption of the Act as applied here to a motel which concededly
serves interstate travelers is within the power granted it by the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court
for 140 years. It may be argued that Congress could have pursued
other methods to eliminate the obstructions it found in interstate
commerce caused by racial discrimination. But this is a matter of
policy that rests entirely with the Congress, not with the courts.
How obstructions in commerce Page 379 U. S. 262 may be removed -- what means are to be employed -- is within the
sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject only
to one caveat -- that the means chosen by it must be reasonably
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. We cannot say
that its choice here was not so adapted. The Constitution requires
no more. Affirmed. | 379
U.S. 241 app| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT "TITLE II-- INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES
OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION"

															"SEC. 201. (a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin."

															"(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of
this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action: "

															" (1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment
located within a building which contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor
of such establishment as his residence;"

															" (2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any
such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment;
or any gasoline station; " Page 379 U. S. 263 " (3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
and"

															" (4) any establishment (A)(i) which is physically located
within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this
subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds itself
out as serving patrons of such covered establishment."

															" (c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within
the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments
described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b); (2) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial
portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products
which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b), it
customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams,
exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in
commerce, and (4) in the case of an establishment described in
paragraph (4) of subsection (b), it is physically located within
the premises of, or there is physically located within its
premises, an establishment the operations of which affect commerce
within the meaning of this subsection. For purposes of this
section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or
between the District of Columbia and any State, or between any
foreign country or any territory or possession and any State or the
District of Columbia, or between points in the same State but
through any other State or the District of Columbia or a foreign
country."

															" (d) Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is
supported by State action within the meaning of this title if such
discrimination or segregation (1) is carried Page 379 U. S. 264 on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or
(2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or
enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision
thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political
subdivision thereof."

															" (e) The provisions of this title shall not apply to a private
club or other establishment not, in fact, open to the public,
except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are
made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment
within the scope of subsection (b)."

															"SEC. 202. All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any
establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any
kind on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if
such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State
or any agency or political subdivision thereof."

															"SEC. 203. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to
withhold or deny, or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of
any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (b)
intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any person with the purpose of interfering with
any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202, or (c) punish
or attempt to punish any person for exercising or attempting to
exercise any right or privilege secured by section 201 or 202."

															"SEC. 204. (a) Whenever any person has engaged or there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in
any act or practice prohibited by section 203, a civil action for
preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order, may be
instituted by the person aggrieved and, upon timely application,
the court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to
intervene in such civil action if he certifies that the case Page 379 U. S. 265 is of general public importance. Upon application by the
complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just,
the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may
authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment
of fees, costs, or security."

															"(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this title, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs,
and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person."

															"(c) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by
this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a
State, which has a State or local law prohibiting such act or
practice and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority
to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no
civil action may be brought under subsection (a) before the
expiration of thirty days after written notice of such alleged act
or practice has been given to the appropriate State or local
authority by registered mail or in person, provided that the court
may stay proceedings in such civil action pending the termination
of State or local enforcement proceedings."

															"(d) In the case of an alleged act or practice prohibited by
this title which occurs in a State, or political subdivision of a
State, which has no State or local law prohibiting such act or
practice, a civil action may be brought under subsection (a): Provided, That the court may refer the matter to the
Community Relations Service established by title X of this Act for
as long as the court believes there is a reasonable possibility of
obtaining voluntary compliance, but for not more than sixty days: Provided further, That upon expiration of such sixty-day
period, the court may extend such period for an additional Page 379 U. S. 266 period, not to exceed a cumulative total of one hundred and
twenty days, if it believes there then exists a reasonable
possibility of securing voluntary compliance."

															"SEC. 205. The Service is authorized to make a full
investigation of any complaint referred to it by the court under
section 204(d) and may hold such hearings with respect thereto as
may be necessary. The Service shall conduct any hearings with
respect to any such complaint in executive session, and shall not
release any testimony given therein except by agreement of all
parties involved in the complaint with the permission of the court,
and the Service shall endeavor to bring about a voluntary
settlement between the parties."

															"SEC. 206. (a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in
a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of
the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or practice
is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of
the rights herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil
action in the appropriate district court of the United States by
filing with it a complaint (1) signed by him (or in his absence the
Acting Attorney General), (2) setting forth facts pertaining to
such pattern or practice, and (3) requesting such preventive
relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order or other order against the person or
persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as he deems
necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein
described."

															"(b) In any such proceeding the Attorney General may file with
the clerk of such court a request that a court of three judges be
convened to hear and determine the case. Such request by the
Attorney General shall be accompanied by a certificate that, in his
opinion, the case is of general public importance. A copy of the
certificate Page 379 U. S. 267 and request for a three-judge court shall be immediately
furnished by such clerk to the chief judge of the circuit (or in
his absence, the presiding circuit judge of the circuit) in which
the case is pending. Upon receipt of the copy of such request it
shall be the duty of the chief judge of the circuit or the
presiding circuit judge, as the case may be, to designate
immediately three judges in such circuit, of whom at least one
shall be a circuit judge and another of whom shall be a district
judge of the court in which the proceeding was instituted, to hear
and determine such case, and it shall be the duty of the judges so
designated to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination
thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited. An
appeal from the final judgment of such court will lie to the
Supreme Court."

															"In the event the Attorney General fails to file such a request
in any such proceeding, it shall be the duty of the chief judge of
the district (or in his absence, the acting chief judge) in which
the case is pending immediately to designate a judge in such
district to hear and determine the case. In the event that no judge
in the district is available to hear and determine the case, the
chief judge of the district, or the acting chief judge, as the case
may be, shall certify this fact to the chief judge of the circuit
(or in his absence, the acting chief judge) who shall then
designate a district or circuit judge of the circuit to hear and
determine the case."

															"It shall be the duty of the judge designated pursuant to this
section to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable
date and to cause the case to be in every way expedited."

															"SEC. 207. (a) The district courts of the United States shall
have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this title
and shall exercise the same without regard Page 379 U. S. 268 to whether the aggrieved party shall have exhausted any
administrative or other remedies that may be provided by law."

															"(b) The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive
means of enforcing the rights based on this title, but nothing in
this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local
agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State
law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or
ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or
accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal,
which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such
right."

															[ Footnote 1 ] See 379
U.S. 241 app|>Appendix.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															14 Stat. 27.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Slave Kidnaping Act, 14 Stat. 50; Peonage Abolition Act of March
2, 1867, 14 Stat. 546; Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140;
Anti-Lynching Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															18 Stat. 335.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															71 Stat. 634.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															74 Stat. 86.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															S. 1732 dealt solely with public accommodations. A second Senate
bill, S. 1731, contained the entire administration proposal. The
Senate Judiciary Committee conducted the hearings on S. 1731, while
the Committee on Commerce considered S. 1732.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The following statutes indicate States which have enacted public
accommodation laws:

															Alaska Stat., §§ 11.60.230 to 11.60.240 (1962); Cal. Civil Code,
§§ 51 to 54 (1954); Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann., §§ 25-1-1 to 25-2-5 (1953);
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann., § 53-35 (1963 Supp.); Del.Code Ann., Tit. 6, c.
45 (1963); Idaho Code Ann., §§ 18-7301 to 18-7303 (1963 Supp.);
Ill.Ann.Stat. (Smith-Hurd ed.), c. 38, §§ 13-1 to 13-4 (1964), c.
43, § 133 (1944); Ind.Ann.Stat. (Burns ed.), §§ 10-901 to 10-914
(1956, and 1963 Supp.); Iowa Code Ann., §§ 735.1 and 735.2 (1950);
Kan.Gen.Stat.Ann., § 21-2424 (1961 Supp.); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., c.
137, § 50 (1954); Md.Ann.Code, Art. 49B, § 11 (1964);
Mass.Ann.Laws, c. 140, §§ 5 and 8 (1957), c. 272, §§ 92A and 98
(1963 Supp.); Mich.Stat.Ann., §§ 28.343 and 28.344 (1962);
Minn.Stat.Ann., § 327.09 (1947); Mont.Rev.Codes Ann., § 64-211
(1962); Neb.Rev.Stat., §§ 20-101 and 20-102 (1962);
N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann., §§ 354:1, 354:2, 354:4 and 354:5 (1955, and 1963
Supp.); N.J.Stat.Ann., §§ 10:1-2 to 10:1-7 (1960), §§ 18:25-1 to
18:25-6 (1964 Supp.); N.M.Stat.Ann., §§ 49-8-1 to 49-8-7 (1963
Supp.); N.Y. Civil Rights Law (McKinney ed.), Art. 4, §§ 40 and 41
(1948, and 1964 Supp.), Exec.Law, Art. 15, §§ 290 to 301 (1951, and
1964 Supp.), Penal Law, Art. 46, §§ 513 to 515 (1944);
N.D.Cent.Code, § 12-22-30 (1963 Supp.); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. (Page's
ed.), §§ 2901.35 and 2901.36 (1954); Ore.Rev.Stat., §§ 30.670,
30.675 and 30.680 (1963); Pa.Stat.Ann., Tit. 18, § 4654 (1963);
R.I.Gen.Laws Ann., §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-6 (1956); S.Dak.Sess.Laws,
c. 58 (1963); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, §§ 1451 and 1452 (1958);
Wash.Rev.Code, §§ 49.60.010 to 49.60.170, and § 9.91.010;
Wis.Stat.Ann., § 942.04 (1958); Wyo.Stat.Ann., §§ 6-83.1 and 6-83.2
(1963 Supp.).

															In 1963, the Governor of Kentucky issued an executive order
requiring all governmental agencies involved in the supervision or
licensing of businesses to take all lawful action necessary to
prevent racial discrimination.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring. * In the first of these two cases, the Heart of Atlanta Motel, a
large motel in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, appeals from an order of
a three-judge United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia enjoining it from continuing to violate Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ Footnote 2/1 ] by refusing to accept Negroes as lodgers
solely because of their race. In the second case, the Acting
Attorney General of the United States and a United States Attorney
appeal from a judgment of a three-judge United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama holding that Title II
cannot constitutionally be applied to Ollie's Barbecue, a
restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, which serves few if any
interstate travelers but which buys a substantial quantity of food
which has moved in interstate commerce. It is undisputed that both
establishments had and intended to continue a policy against
serving Negroes. Both claimed that Congress Page 379 U. S. 269 had exceeded its constitutional powers in attempting to compel
them to use their privately owned businesses to serve customers
whom they did not want to serve.

															The most immediately relevant parts of Title II of the Act,
which, if valid, subject this motel and this restaurant to its
requirements are set out below. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The language of that Title shows that
Congress, in passing it, intended to exercise -- at least in part
-- power granted in the Constitution Page 379 U. S. 270 by Art. I, § 8, "To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States. . . ." Thus, § 201(b) of Title II, by its terms, is limited
in application to a motel or restaurant of which the "operations
affect [interstate] commerce, or if discrimination or segregation
by it is supported by State action." [ Footnote 2/3 ] The "State action" provision need not
concern us here, since there is no contention that Georgia or
Alabama has at this time given any support whatever to these
establishments' racially discriminatory practices. The basic
constitutional question decided by the courts below, and which this
Court must now decide, is whether Congress exceeded its powers to
regulate interstate commerce and pass all laws necessary and proper
to such regulation in subjecting either this motel or this
restaurant to Title II's commands that applicants for food and
lodging be served without regard to their color. And if the
regulation is otherwise within the congressional commerce power,
the motel and the restaurant proprietors further contend that it
would be a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment to
compel them to serve Negroes against their will. [ Footnote 2/4 ] I agree that all these constitutional
contentions must be rejected. I It requires no novel or strained interpretation of the Commerce
Clause to sustain Title II as applied in either Page 379 U. S. 271 of these cases. At least since Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, decided in 1824 in an opinion by
Chief Justice John Marshall, it has been uniformly accepted that
the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States is
plenary, "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed
in the constitution." 9 Wheat. at 22 U. S. 196 . Nor
is "Commerce" as used in the Commerce Clause to be limited to a
narrow, technical concept. It includes not only, as Congress has
enumerated in the Act, "travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication," but also all other unitary
transactions and activities that take place in more States than
one. That some parts or segments of such unitary transactions may
take place only in one State cannot, of course, take from Congress
its plenary power to regulate them in the national interest.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] The facilities and
instrumentalities used to carry on this commerce, such as
railroads, truck lines ships, rivers, and even highways, are also
subject to congressional regulation so far as is necessary to keep
interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms. The Daniel
Ball , 10 Wall. 557.

															Furthermore, it has long been held that the Necessary and Proper
Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, adds to the commerce power of Congress
the power to regulate local instrumentalities operating within a
single State if their activities burden the flow of commerce among
the States. Thus, in the Shreveport Case, Houston, E. & W.
T. R. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 , 234 U. S.
353 -354, this Court recognized that Congress could not
fully carry out its responsibility to protect interstate commerce
were its constitutional power to regulate that commerce to be
strictly limited to prescribing the rules for controlling the
things Page 379 U. S. 272 actually moving in such commerce or the contracts, transactions,
and other activities, immediately concerning them. Regulation of
purely intrastate railroad rates is primarily a local problem for
state, rather than national, control. But the Shreveport
Case sustained the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
and the Necessary and Proper Clause to control purely intrastate
rates, even though reasonable, where the effect of such rates was
found to impose a discrimination injurious to interstate commerce.
This holding that Congress had power under these clauses not merely
to enact laws governing interstate activities and transactions, but
also to regulate even purely local activities and transactions
where necessary to foster and protect interstate commerce, was
amply supported by Mr. Justice (later Mr. Chief Justice) Hughes'
reliance upon many prior holdings of this Court extending back to Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. [ Footnote 2/6 ] And, since the Shreveport Case, this Court has steadfastly followed, and indeed has emphasized time
and time again, that Congress has ample power to protect interstate
commerce from activities adversely and injuriously affecting it,
which, but for this adverse effect on interstate commerce, would be
beyond the power of Congress to regulate. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Page 379 U. S. 273 Congress in § 201 declared that the racially discriminatory
"operations" of a motel of more than five rooms for rent or hire do
adversely affect interstate commerce if it "provides lodging to
transient guests . . . ," and that a restaurant's "operations"
affect such commerce if (1) "it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers" or (2) "a substantial portion of the food
which it serves . . . has moved in [interstate] commerce." Congress
thus described the nature and extent of operations which it wished
to regulate, excluding some establishments from the Act either for
reasons of policy or because it believed its powers to regulate and
protect interstate commerce did not extend so far. There can be no
doubt that the operations of both the motel and the restaurant here
fall squarely within the measure Congress chose to adopt in the Act
and deemed adequate to show a constitutionally prohibitable adverse
effect on commerce. The choice of policy is, of course, within the
exclusive power of Congress; but whether particular operations
affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial, rather than a legislative, question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court. I agree that, as applied to this motel
and this restaurant, the Act is a valid exercise of congressional
power, in the case of the motel because the record amply
demonstrates that its practice of discrimination tended directly to
interfere with interstate travel, and, in the case of the
restaurant, because Congress had ample basis for concluding that a
widespread practice of racial discrimination by restaurants buying
as substantial a quantity of goods shipped from other States as
this restaurant buys could distort or impede interstate trade. Page 379 U. S. 274 The Heart of Atlanta Motel is a large 216-room establishment
strategically located in relation to Atlanta and interstate
travelers. It advertises extensively by signs along interstate
highways and in various advertising media. As a result of these
circumstances, approximately 75% of the motel guests are transient
interstate travelers. It is thus an important facility for use by
interstate travelers who travel on highways, since travelers in
their own cars must find lodging places to make their journeys
comfortably and safely.

															The restaurant is located in a residential and industrial
section of Birmingham, 11 blocks from the nearest interstate
highway. Almost all, if not all, its patrons are local people,
rather than transients. It has seats for about 200 customers and
annual gross sales of about $350,000. Most of its sales are of
barbecued meat sandwiches and pies. Consequently, the main
commodity it purchases is meat, of which, during the 12 months
before the District Court hearing, it bought $69,683 worth
(representing 46% of its total expenditures for supplies), which
had been shipped into Alabama from outside the State. Plainly, 46%
of the goods it sells is a "substantial" portion and amount.
Congress concluded that restaurants which purchase a substantial
quantity of goods from other States might well burden and disrupt
the flow of interstate commerce if allowed to practice racial
discrimination, because of the stifling and distorting effect that
such discrimination on a wide scale might well have on the sale of
goods shipped across state lines. Certainly this belief would not
be irrational even had there not been a large body of evidence
before the Congress to show the probability of this adverse effect.
[ Footnote 2/8 ] Page 379 U. S. 275 The foregoing facts are more than enough, in my judgment, to
show that Congress acting within its discretion and judgment has
power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause
to bar racial discrimination in the Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Ollie's Barbecue. I recognize that every remote, possible,
speculative effect on commerce should not be accepted as an
adequate constitutional ground to uproot and throw into the discard
all our traditional distinctions between what is purely local, and
therefore controlled by state laws, and what affects the national
interest and is therefore subject to control by federal laws. I
recognize too that some isolated and remote lunchroom which sells
only to local people and buys almost all its supplies in the
locality may possibly be beyond the reach of the power of Congress
to regulate commerce, just as such an establishment is not covered
by the present Act. But, in deciding the constitutional power of
Congress in cases like the two before us, we do not consider the
effect on interstate commerce of only one isolated, individual,
local event, without regard to the fact that this single local
event, when added to many others of a similar nature, may impose a
burden on interstate commerce by reducing its volume or distorting
its flow. Labor Board v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U. S. 224 ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 , 317 U. S.
127 -128; United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100 , 312 U. S. 123 ; Labor Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.
S. 601 , 306 U. S.
608 -609; cf. Hotel Employees Local No. 26 v.
Leedom, 358 U. S. 99 . There
are approximately 20,000,000 Negroes in our country. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Many of them are able to, and
do, travel among the States in automobiles. Certainly it would
seriously discourage such travel by them if, as evidence before the
Congress indicated has been true in the past, [ Footnote 2/10 ] they should in the Page 379 U. S. 276 future continue to be unable to find a decent place along their
way in which to lodge or eat. Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 . And
the flow of interstate commerce may be impeded or distorted
substantially if local sellers of interstate food are permitted to
exclude all Negro consumers. Measuring, as this Court has so often
held is required, by the aggregate effect of a great number of such
acts of discrimination, I am of the opinion that Congress has
constitutional power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses to protect interstate commerce from the injuries bound to
befall it from these discriminatory practices.

															Long ago, this Court, again speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall, said:

															"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." M'Culloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 421 .
By this standard, Congress acted within its power here. In view of
the Commerce Clause, it is not possible to deny that the aim of
protecting interstate commerce from undue burdens is a legitimate
end. In view of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, it is not possible to deny that the aim of protecting
Negroes from discrimination is also a legitimate end. [ Footnote 2/11 ] The means Page 379 U. S. 277 adopted to achieve these ends are also appropriate, plainly
adopted to achieve them, and not prohibited by the Constitution,
but consistent with both its letter and spirit. II The restaurant and motel proprietors argue also, however, that
Congress violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
requiring that they serve Negroes if they serve others. This
argument comes down to this: that the broad power of Congress to
enact laws deemed necessary and proper to regulate and protect
interstate commerce is practically nullified by the negative
constitutional commands that no person shall be deprived of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law," and that private
property shall not be "taken" for public use without just
compensation. In the past, this Court has consistently held that
regulation of the use of property by the Federal Government or by
the States does not violate either the Fifth or the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.
S. 726 ; District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson
Co., 346 U. S. 100 ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.
S. 365 ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.
S. 502 . A regulation such as that found in Title II does
not even come close to being a "taking" in the constitutional
sense. Cf. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U. S. 155 . And
a more or less vague clause like the requirement for due process,
originally meaning "according to Page 379 U. S. 278 the law of the land" would be a highly inappropriate provision
on which to rely to invalidate a "law of the land" enacted by
Congress under a clearly granted power like that to regulate
interstate commerce. Moreover, it would be highly ironical to use
the guarantee of due process -- a guarantee which plays so
important a part in the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment adopted
with the predominant aim of protecting Negroes from discrimination
-- in order to strip Congress of power to protect Negroes from
discrimination. [ Footnote
2/12 ] III For the foregoing reasons, I concur in holding that the
anti-racial discrimination provisions of Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 are valid as applied to this motel and this
restaurant. I should add that nothing in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3 , which
invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, [ Footnote 2/13 ] gives the slightest support to the
argument that Congress is without power under the Commerce Clause
to enact the present legislation, since, in the Civil Rights
Cases, this Court expressly left undecided the validity of
such antidiscrimination legislation if rested on the Commerce
Clause. See 109 U.S. at 109 U. S. 119 ; see also Butts v. Merchants & Miners Transp. Co., 230 U. S. 126 , 230 U. S. 132 .
Nor does any view expressed in my dissenting opinion in Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U. S. 226 , 378 U. S. 318 ,
in which MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE joined, affect
this conclusion in the slightest, for that opinion stated only that
the Fourteenth Amendment, in and of itself, without implementation
by a law passed by Congress, does not bar racial discrimination in
privately owned places of business in the absence of state action.
The opinion did not discuss the power of Congress under Page 379 U. S. 279 the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses or under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass a law forbidding such
discrimination. See 378 U.S. at 378 U. S. 318 , 378 U. S. 326 , 378 U. S.
342 -343 and n. 44. Because the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as applied here, is wholly valid under the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, there is no need to consider whether
this Act is also constitutionally supportable under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress "power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."

															* [This opinion applies also to No. 543, Katzenbach v.
McClung, post, p. 379 U. S.
294 .]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															78 Stat. 243-246, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964 ed.).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Section 201 of the Act, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964
ed.), provides in part:

															"(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin."

															"(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of
this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action: "

															"(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment
located within a building which contains not more than five rooms
for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor
of such establishment as his residence;"

															"(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including, but not limited to, any
such facility located on the premises of any retail establishment;
or any gasoline station;"

															" * * * *" "(e) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within
the meaning of this title if (1) it is one of the establishments
described in paragraph (1) of subsection (b); (2) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial
portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products
which it sells, has moved in commerce. . . . For purposes of this
section, 'commerce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States. . .
."

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															This last definitional clause of § 201(b), together with § 202,
shows a congressional purpose also to rely in part on § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids any State to deny due process
or equal protection of the laws. There is no contention in these
cases that Congress relied on the fifth section of the Fourteenth
Amendment granting it "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of" the Amendment.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The motel also argues that the law violates the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition of slavery or involuntary servitude and
takes private property for public use without just compensation, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn., 322 U. S. 533 , 322 U. S.
546 -547; Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.
1 , 262 U. S. 33 -36; Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375 , 196 U. S.
398 -399.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"The genius and character of the whole government seem to be
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States
generally, but not to those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which
it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some
of the General powers of the Government." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 9 Wheat. at 22 U. S. 195 .
(Emphasis supplied.)

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See, e.g., Labor Board v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U. S. 224 ; Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.
S. 143 ; United States v. Women's Sportswear
Manufacturers Assn., 336 U. S. 460 ; United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.
S. 689 ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.
S. 111 ; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110 ; United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 ; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 ; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 . See also Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20 .

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce on S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, Ser. 26, pp.
18-19 (Attorney General Kennedy), 623-630 (Secretary of Labor
Wirtz); Part 2 Ser. 26, pp. 695-700 (Under Secretary of Commerce
Roosevelt).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Bureau of the Census, 1964 Statistical Abstract of the United
States, 25 (18,872,000 Negroes by 1960 census).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.,
15-18.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															We have specifically upheld the power of Congress to use the
commerce power to end racial discrimination. Boynton v.
Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 ; Henderson v. United States, 339 U.
S. 816 ; Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S.
80 ; cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S.
31 ; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.
S. 373 . Compare cases in which the commerce
power has been used to advance other ends not entirely commercial: e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100 (Fair Labor Standards Act); United States v.
Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (National Firearms Act); Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 (Federal Kidnaping Act); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (National Motor Vehicle Theft Act); United States v.
Simpson, 252 U. S. 465 (Act
forbidding shipment of liquor into a "dry" State); Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U. S. 470 (White-Slave Traffic [Mann] Act); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (White-Slave Traffic [Mann] Act); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U. S. 45 (Pure
Food and Drugs Act); Lottery Case, 188 U.
S. 321 (Act forbidding interstate shipment of lottery
tickets).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The motel's argument that Title II violates the Thirteenth
Amendment is so insubstantial that it requires no further
discussion.

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															18 Stat 335

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.* I Though I join the Court's opinions, I am somewhat reluctant
here, as I was in Edwards v. California, 314 U.
S. 160 , 314 U. S. 177 ,
to rest solely on the Commerce Clause. My reluctance is not due to
any conviction that Congress lacks power to regulate commerce in
the interests of human rights. It is, rather, my belief that the
right of people to be free of state action that discriminates
against them because of race, like the "right of persons to move
freely from State to State" ( Edwards v. California, supra, at 314 U. S.
177 ), "occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit,
steel and coal across state lines." Ibid. Moreover, when
we come to the problem of abatement in Hamm v. City of Rock
Hill, post, p. 379 U. S. 306 ,
decided this day, the result reached by the Court is, for me, much
more obvious as a protective measure under the Fourteenth Amendment
than under the Commerce Clause. For the former deals with the
constitutional status of the individual, not with the impact on
commerce of local activities or vice versa. Page 379 U. S. 280 Hence, I would prefer to rest on the assertion of legislative
power contained in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states:
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article" -- a power which the
Court concedes was exercised at least in part in this Act.

															A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a more
settling effect, making unnecessary litigation over whether a
particular restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of
the Act or whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler.
Under my construction, the Act would apply to all customers in all
the enumerated places of public accommodation. And that
construction would put an end to all obstructionist strategies, and
finally close one door on a bitter chapter in American history.

															My opinion last Term in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.
S. 226 , 378 U. S. 242 ,
makes clear my position that the right to be free of discriminatory
treatment (based on race) in places of public accommodation --
whether intrastate or interstate -- is a right guaranteed against
state action by the Fourteenth Amendment, and that state
enforcement of the kind of trespass laws which Maryland had in that
case was state action within the meaning of the Amendment. II I think the Court is correct in concluding that the Act is not
founded on the Commerce Clause to the exclusion of the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining the reach of an
exertion of legislative power, it is customary to read various
granted powers together. See Veazie Bank v.
Fenno , 8 Wall. 533, 75 U. S.
548 -549; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.
S. 580 , 112 U. S.
595 -596; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R.
Co., 160 U. S. 668 , 160 U. S. 683 .
As stated in McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
421 :

															"We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government
are limited, and that its limits are Page 379 U. S. 281 not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of
the constitution must allow to the national legislature that
discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it
confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional."

															The "means" used in the present Act are, in my view,
"appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to the end of enforcing
Fourteenth Amendment rights [ Footnote
3/1 ] as well as protecting interstate commerce.

															Section 201(a) declares in Fourteenth Amendment language the
right of equal access:

															"All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin."

															The rights protected are clearly within the purview of our
decisions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Page 379 U. S. 282 "State action" -- the key to Fourteenth Amendment guarantees --
is defined by § 201(d) as follows:

															"Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported
by State action within the meaning of this title if such
discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2) is carried on under
color of any custom or usage required or enforced by officials
of the State or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is
required by action of the State or political subdivision
thereof."

															(Italics added.)

															That definition is within our decision of Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 , for the
"discrimination" in the present cases is "enforced by officials of
the State," i.e., by the state judiciary under the
trespass laws. [ Footnote 3/3 ] As we
wrote in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, 334 U. S. 19 :

															"We have no doubt that there has been state action in these
cases in the full and complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed
facts disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers of
properties upon which they desired to establish homes. The owners
of the properties were willing sellers, and contracts of sale were
accordingly consummated. It is clear that, but for the active
intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint."

															"These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States
have merely abstained from action, leaving private individuals free
to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are
cases in which the States have made available to such
individuals Page 379 U. S. 283 the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on
the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in
premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to
acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell. The difference
between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive
covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied
rights of property available to other members of the community and
being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on an equal
footing."

															Section 202 declares the right of all persons to be free from
certain kinds of state action at any public establishment
-- not just at the previously enumerated places of public
accommodation:

															"All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment
or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such
discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or
any agency or political subdivision thereof."

															Thus, the essence of many of the guarantees embodied in the Act
are those contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.

															The Commerce Clause, to be sure, enters into some of the
definitions of "place of public accommodation" in §§ 201(b) and
(c). Thus, a "restaurant" is included, § 201(b)(2), "if . . . it
serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial
portion of the food which it serves . . . has moved in commerce." §
201(c)(2). But any "motel" is included

															"which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an
establishment located within a building which contains not more
than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by
the proprietor Page 379 U. S. 284 of such establishment as his residence."

															§§ 201(b)(1) and (c)(1). Providing lodging "to transient guests"
is not strictly Commerce Clause talk, for the phrase aptly
describes any guest -- local or interstate.

															Thus, some of the definitions of "place of public accommodation"
in § 201(b) are in Commerce Clause language, and some are not.
Indeed, § 201(b) is explicitly bifurcated. An establishment "which
serves the public is a place of public accommodation," says §
201(b), under either of two conditions: first, "if its
operations affect commerce" or, second, "if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action."

															The House Report emphasizes these dual bases on which the Act
rests (H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 20) -- a
situation which a minority recognized was being attempted and which
it opposed. Id., pp. 98-101.

															The Senate Committee laid emphasis on the Commerce Clause.
S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 12-13. The use of the
Commerce Clause to surmount what was thought to be the obstacle of
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 , is
mentioned. Ibid. And the economic aspects of the problems
of discrimination are heavily accented. Id. p. 109 U. S. 17 et seq. But it is clear that the objectives of the
Fourteenth Amendment were by no means ignored. As stated in the
Senate Report:

															"Does the owner of private property devoted to use as a public
establishment enjoy a property right to refuse to deal with any
member of the public because of that member's race, religion, or
national origin? As noted previously, the English common law
answered this question in the negative. It reasoned that one who
employed his private property for purposes of commercial gain by
offering goods or services to the public must stick to his bargain.
It is to be remembered that the right of the private Page 379 U. S. 285 property owner to serve or sell to whom he pleased was never
claimed when laws were enacted prohibiting the private property
owner from dealing with persons of a particular race. Nor were such
laws ever struck down as an infringement upon this supposed right
of the property owner."

															"But there are stronger and more persuasive reasons for not
allowing concepts of private property to defeat public
accommodations legislation. The institution of private property
exists for the purpose of enhancing the individual freedom and
liberty of human beings. This institution assures that the
individual need not be at the mercy of others, including
government, in order to earn a livelihood and prosper from his
individual efforts. Private property provides the individual with
something of value that will serve him well in obtaining what he
desires or requires in his daily life."

															"Is this time-honored means to freedom and liberty now to be
twisted so as to defeat individual freedom and liberty? Certainly
denial of a right to discriminate or segregate by race or religion
would not weaken the attributes of private property that make it an
effective means of obtaining individual freedom. In fact, in order
to assure that the institution of private property serves the end
of individual freedom and liberty, it has been restricted in many
instances. The most striking example of this is the abolition of
slavery. Slaves were treated as items of private property, yet
surely no man dedicated to the cause of individual freedom could
contend that individual freedom and liberty suffered by
emancipation of the slaves."

															"There is not any question that ordinary zoning laws place far
greater restrictions upon the rights of private property owners
than would public accommodations Page 379 U. S. 286 legislation. Zoning laws tell the owner of private property to
what type of business his property may be devoted, what structures
he may erect upon that property, and even whether he may devote his
private property to any business purpose whatsoever. Such laws and
regulations restricting private property are necessary so that
human beings may develop their communities in a reasonable and
peaceful manner. Surely the presence of such restrictions does not
detract from the role of private property in securing individual
liberty and freedom."

															"Nor can it be reasonably argued that racial or religious
discrimination is a vital factor in the ability of private property
to constitute an effective vehicle for assuring personal freedom.
The pledge of this Nation is to secure freedom for every
individual; that pledge will be furthered by elimination of such
practices." Id. pp. 109 U. S.
22 -23.

															Thus, while I agree with the Court that Congress, in fashioning
the present Act, used the Commerce Clause to regulate racial
segregation, it also used (and properly so) some of its power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															I repeat what I said earlier, that our decision should be based
on the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby putting an end to all
obstructionist strategies and allowing every person -- whatever his
race, creed, or color -- to patronize all places of public
accommodation without discrimination whether he travels interstate
or intrastate.

															* [This opinion applies also to No. 543, Katzenbach v.
McClung, post, p. 379 U. S.
294 .]

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															For a synopsis of the legislative history see the 379
U.S. 241 app2|>Appendix to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.
S. 244 (discrimination in restaurant); Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U. S. 267 (discrimination in restaurant); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (discrimination in restaurant); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 (discrimination in city park); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (discrimination in public school system); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (discrimination in voting).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The Georgia trespass law is found in Ga.Code Ann., § 26-3005
(1963 Supp.), and that of Alabama in Ala.Code, Tit. 14, § 426 (1958
Recomp.).

															| 379
U.S. 241 app2| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS,
CONCURRING. (1) The Administration Bill (as introduced in the House
by Congressman Celler, it was H.R. 7152).

															Unlike the Act as it finally became law, this bill (a) contained
findings (pp. 10-13) which described discrimination Page 379 U. S. 287 in places of public accommodation and in findings (h) and (i)
connected this discrimination to state action and invoked
Fourteenth Amendment powers to deal with the problem, and (b) in
setting forth the public establishments which were covered, it used
only commerce-type language, and did not contain anything like the
present § 201(d) and its link to § 201(b) -- the "or" clause in §
201(b). Nor did the bill contain the present § 202.

															In the hearings before the House Judiciary Subcommittee, the
Attorney General stated clearly and repeatedly that, while the bill
relied "primarily" on the Commerce Clause, it was also intended to
rest on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hearings before
Subcommittee No. 5, House Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1375-1376, 1388, 1396, 1410, 1417-1419.

															(2) The Subcommittee Bill (as reported to the full
House Judiciary Committee).

															The Attorney General testified against portions of this bill. He
reiterated that the administration bill rested on the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as on the Commerce Clause: see Hearings, House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 7152, as amended by
Subcommittee No. 5, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 2693, 2700, 2764. But
this bill added for the first time a provision similar to the
present § 201(d) -- only much broader. See id. at 2656,
first full paragraph. (Apparently this addition was in response to
the urgings of those who wanted to broaden the bill and who failed
to comprehend that the administration bill already rested, despite
its commerce language, on the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Attorney
General feared that the new provision went too far. Further, the
new provision, unlike the present § 201(d) but like the present §
202, did not limit coverage to those establishments specifically
defined as places of public accommodation; rather, it referred to
all businesses operating under state Page 379 U. S. 288 "authorization, permission, or license." See id. at
2656. The Attorney General objected to this: Congress ought not to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment generally, but rather ought to
specify the establishments that would be covered. See id. at 2656, 2675-2676, 2726. This the administration bill had done by
covering only those establishments which had certain commercial
characteristics.

															Subsequently, the Attorney General indicated that he would
accept a portion of the Subcommittee additions that ultimately
became §§ 201(d) and 202; but he made it clear that he did not
understand that these additions removed the Fourteenth Amendment
foundation which the administration had placed under its bill. He
did not understand that these additions confined the Fourteenth
Amendment foundation of the bill to the additions alone; the
commerce language sections were still supported in the alternative
by the Fourteenth Amendment. See especially id. at 2764; compare p. 2727 with p. 2698. The Subcommittee
said that it made these additions in order to insure that the
Fourteenth Amendment was relied on. See id. at 2763; also Subcommittee Hearings, supra, 1413-1421. And
the Attorney General repeated at p. 2764 that he would agree to
whatever language was necessary to make it clear that the bill
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Commerce
Clause.

															Therefore it seems clear that a dual motive was behind the
addition of what ultimately became §§ 201(d) and 202: (1) to expand
the coverage of the Act; (2) to make it clear that Congress was
invoking its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.

															(3) The Committee Bill (as reported to the House).

															This bill contains the present §§ 201(d) and 202, except that
"state action" is given an even broader definition in § 201(d) as
then written than it has in the present § 201(d). Page 379 U. S. 289 The House Report has the following statement:

															"Section 201(d) delineates the circumstances under which
discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported by
State action within the meaning of title II."

															H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 21. On p. 117 of the
Report, Representative Cramer says:

															"The 14th amendment approach to public accommodations [in the
committee bill, as contrasted with the administration bill] is not
limited to the narrower definition of 'establishment' under the
interstate commerce approach, and covers broad State 'custom or
usage' or where discrimination is 'fostered or encouraged' by State
action (sec. 201(d))."

															By implication, the committee has merely broadened the coverage
of the administration's bill by adding the explicit state action
language; it has not thereby removed the Fourteenth Amendment
foundation from the commerce language coverage.

															Congressman Celler introduced into the Congressional Record a
series of memoranda on the constitutionality of the various titles
of the bill; at pp. 1524-1526* the Fourteenth Amendment is
discussed; at p. 1526, it is suggested that the Thirteenth
Amendment is to be regarded as "additional authority" for the
legislation.

															At p. 1917, Congressman Willis introduces an amendment to strike
out "transient guests" and to replace these words with "interstate
travelers." As reported, says Congressman Willis, the bill boldly
undertakes to regulate intrastate commerce, at least to this
extent. Ibid. The purpose of the amendment is simply to
relate "this bill to the powers of Congress." Ibid. Congressman Celler, the floor manager of the bill, will not accept
the amendment, which introduces an element of uncertainty into the
scope of the bill's coverage. At p. 1924, Congressman Page 379 U. S. 290 Lindsay makes remarks indicating that it is his understanding
that the commerce language portions of § 201 rest only on the
Commerce Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment is invoked to
support only § 201(d).

															But at p. 1926, Congressman MacGregor, a member of the Judiciary
Subcommittee, states, in response to Congressman Willis' challenge
to the constitutionality of the "transient guests" coverage,
that:

															"When the gentleman from Louisiana seeks in subparagraph (1) on
page 43 [§ 201(b)(1)] to tightly circumscribe the number of inns,
hotels, and motels to be covered under this legislation, he does
violence to the 1883 Supreme Court decision where it defines the
authority of the Congress under the 14th amendment. . . . Mr.
Chairman, in light of the 1883 Supreme Court decision cited by the
gentleman from Louisiana, and in light of a score of subsequent
decisions, it is precisely the legislative authority granted in the
14th amendment that we seek here to exercise."

															At pp. 1962-1968, there is the discussion surrounding the
passage of the Goodell amendment striking the word "encouraged"
from § 201(d)(2) of the bill as reported. Likewise in these pages
there is the discussion concerning the Willis amendment to the
Goodell amendment: this amendment eliminated the word "fostered."
After the adoption of these amendments, the custom or usage had to
be "required or enforced" by the State -- not merely "fostered or
encouraged" -- in order to constitute "state action" within the
meaning of the Act.

															At p. 1964, Congressman Smith of Virginia offered an amendment
as a substitute to the Goodell amendment that would have eliminated
the "custom or usage" language altogether. Congressman Celler said
in defense of the bill as reported:

															"[C]ustom or usage is not constituted merely by a practice in a
neighborhood or by popular attitude in a particular community. It
consists of a practice which, though not embodied in law, receives
notice and sanction to the extent that it is enforced by Page 379 U. S. 291 the officialdom of the State or locality"

															(pp. 1964-1965). The Smith Amendment was rejected by the House
(p. 1967).

															It would seem that the action on this Smith substitute and the
statement by Congressman Celler mean that a State's enforcement of
the custom of segregation in places of public accommodation by the
use of its trespass laws is a violation of § 201(d)(2).

															(4) The House Bill. The House bill was placed directly on the Senate calendar, and
did not go to committee. The Dirksen-Mansfield substitute adopted
by the Senate made only one change in §§ 201 and 202: it changed
"a" to "the" in § 201(d)(3). Senator Dirksen nowhere made any
explicit references to the constitutional bases of Title II. Thus,
it is fair to assume that the Senate's understanding on this
question was no different from the House's view. The Senate
substitute was adopted without change by the House on July 2, 1964,
and signed by the President on the same day.

															*All citations are to Vol. 110, Congressional Record.

															MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, concurring.*

															I join in the opinions and judgments of the Court, since I
agree

															"that the action of the Congress in the adoption of the Act as
applied here . . . is within the power granted it by the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court for 140
years," ante at 379 U.S.
261 .

															The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, as
the Court recognizes, and as I would underscore, is the vindication
of human dignity, and not mere economics. The Senate Commerce
Committee made this quite clear:

															"The primary purpose of . . . [the Civil Rights Act], then, is
to solve this problem, the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials Page 379 U. S. 292 of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination is not
simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the
humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must
surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of
the public because of his race or color. It is equally the
inability to explain to a child that, regardless of education,
civility, courtesy, and morality, he will be denied the right to
enjoy equal treatment even though he be a citizen of the United
States and may well be called upon to lay down his life to assure
this Nation continues."

															S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 16.

															Moreover, that this is the primary purpose of the Act is
emphasized by the fact that, while 201(c) speaks only in terms of
establishments which "affect commerce," it is clear that Congress
based this section not only on its power under the Commerce Clause,
but also on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 4/1 ] The cases cited in the Court's opinions
are conclusive that Congress could exercise its Page 379 U. S. 293 powers under the Commerce Clause to accomplish this purpose. As
§§ 201(b) and (c) are undoubtedly a valid exercise of the Commerce
Clause power for the reasons stated in the opinions of the Court,
the Court considers that it is unnecessary to consider whether it
is additionally supportable by Congress' exertion of its power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															In my concurring opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226 , 378 U. S. 317 ,
however, I expressed my conviction that § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees to all Americans the constitutional right "to
be treated as equal members of the community with respect to public
accommodations," and that

															"Congress [has] authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, to implement the rights
protected by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the give-and-take
of the legislative process, Congress can fashion a law drawing the
guidelines necessary and appropriate to facilitate practical
administration and to distinguish between genuinely public and
private accommodations."

															The challenged Act is just such a law, and, in my view, Congress
clearly had authority under both § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

															* [This opinion applies also to No. 543, Katzenbach v.
McClung, post, p. 379 U. S.
294 .]

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															Hearings in Congress, as well as statements by administration
spokesmen, show that the original bill, presented by the
administration, was so based even though it contained no clause
which resembled § 201(d) -- the so-called "state action" provision
-- which even mentioned "state action." See, e.g., Hearings before Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1732, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 23, 27-28, 57, 74, 230, 247-248, 250, 252-253,
256, 259; Hearings before Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1731,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., 151, 152, 186; Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1396, 1410; Hearings before House Judiciary
Committee on H.R. 7152, as amended by Subcommittee No. 5, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 2693, 2699-2700; S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 2. The later additions of "state action" language to §
201(a) and § 201(d) did not remove the dual Commerce
Clause-Fourteenth Amendment support from the rest of the bill, for
those who added this clause did not intend thereby to bifurcate its
constitutional basis. This language and § 201(d) were added, first,
in order to make certain that the Act would cover all or almost all
of the situations as to which this Court might hold that § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment applied. Senator Hart stated that not to do so
would "embarrass Congress because . . . the reach of the
administration bill would be less inclusive than that
Court-established right." Hearings before Senate Commerce
Committee, supra, at 256. See also id. at
259-262. Second, the sponsors of § 201(d) were trying to make even
clearer the Fourteenth Amendment basis of Title II. See,
e.g., Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House
Committee, supra, at 1413-1418; Hearings before the Senate
Commerce Committee, supra, at 259-262. There is no
indication that they thought the inclusion of § 201(d) would remove
the Fourteenth Amendment foundation of the rest of the title.
Third, the history of the bill after provisions similar to § 201(d)
were added contains references to the dual foundation of all Title
II provisions before us. See Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 5 of the House Committee, supra, at 1396, 1410;
Hearings before House Judiciary Committee, supra, at 2693,
2699-2700; 110 Cong.Rec.1925-1928.

Summary: In *Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations affecting interstate commerce. The Court ruled that Congress had the power to regulate local incidents of interstate commerce, including racial discrimination in public accommodations, under the Commerce Clause. The Court also rejected arguments that the Act violated the Fifth or Thirteenth Amendments. This decision affirmed the expansion of federal power to address racial discrimination and protect equal rights.