U.S. Supreme Court Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67 (1976) Mathews v. Diaz No. 73-1046 Argued January 13,
1975 Reargued January 12,
1976 Decided June 1, 1976 426 U.S.
67 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA Syllabus Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o (2) qualifies for enrollment in
the Medicare supplemental medical insurance program residents of
the United States who are 65 or older, but in subsection (b) denies
eligibility to aliens unless they have been admitted for permanent
residence and also have resided in the United States for at least
five years. Appellee Diaz filed a class action suit in the District
Court attacking the constitutionality of § 1395 o (2)(b),
and thereafter the District Court granted leave to add appellees
Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint,
which alleged that Clara had been disqualified for the same reasons
as Diaz (lack of citizenship, nonadmission for permanent residence,
and inability to meet the five-year residence requirement), but
explained that Espinosa, though lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, had not attempted to enroll because he could not meet
the durational residence requirement. Appellant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that appellees had not exhausted their
administrative remedies. Two days later, Espinosa applied for
enrollment, and so advised the court. Though none of the appellees
completely exhausted available avenues for administrative review,
appellant acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara
raised no disputed factual issues, and that the interlocutory
denials of their applications should be treated as final for
purposes of this litigation, and conceded that Espinosa's
application could not be allowed under the statute. The District
Court overruled appellant's motion and held that the five-year
residence requirement violated due process and that, since it could
not be severed from the requirement of admission for permanent
residence, the alien eligibility provisions of §
1395 o (2)(B) were entirely unenforceable. Held: 1. The District Court had jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim,
which (unlike the other appellees' claims) squarely raises the
question of the constitutionality of the five-year residence
requirement. Pp. 426 U. S.
74 -77. Page 426 U. S. 68 (a) Espinosa's filing of an application, though not made until
he had become a party, met the nonwaivable jurisdictional condition
imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) that a claim for benefits under the
Social Security Act shall have been presented to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, and the pleadings may be treated as
properly supplemented by appellant's stipulation that Espinosa had
filed an application. P. 426 U. S.
75 .

															(b) Appellant's stipulation that Espinosa's application would be
denied for failure to meet the durational residence requirement was
tantamount to a denial of the application, and constituted a waiver
of the exhaustion requirements, and thus satisfied the statutory
requirement of a hearing and final decision. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 . Cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.
S. 636 n. 6, 420 U. S. 641 n. 8. Pp. 426 U. S.
75 -77.

															2. The statutory classification in § 1395 o (2)(B) does
not deprive appellees of liberty or property in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 426 U. S.
77 -87.

															(a) Congress, which has broad power over immigration and
naturalization and regularly makes rules regarding aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens, has no constitutional
duty to provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to
citizens; the real question here is not whether discrimination
between aliens and citizens is permissible, as it clearly is, but
whether the statutory discrimination within the class of aliens is
permissible. Pp. 426 U. S.
77 -80.

															(b) The political branches of government have considerable
flexibility in responding to changing world conditions, and
judicial review of decisions made by the Congress or the President
in the area of immigration and naturalization is narrow. The party
challenging the constitutionality of the particular line Congress
has drawn has the burden of advancing principled reasoning that
will at once invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line
separating some aliens from others. Pp. 426 U. S.
81 -82.

															(c) This case essentially involves only a claim that it would
have been more reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different
requirements of the same kind. The requirements chosen by Congress
render eligible those aliens who may reasonably be assumed to have
a greater affinity with the United States, and this Court is
especially reluctant to question such a policy choice of degree.
Pp. 426 U. S.
82 -84. 361 F. Supp.
1 , reversed. Page 426 U. S. 69 STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

															MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The question presented by the Secretary's appeal is whether
Congress may condition an alien's eligibility for participation in
a federal medical insurance program on continuous residence in the
United States for a five-year period and admission for permanent
residence. The District Court held that the first condition was
unconstitutional, and that it could not be severed from the second.
Since we conclude that both conditions are constitutional, we
reverse.

															Each of the appellees is a resident alien who was lawfully
admitted to the United States less than five years ago. Appellees
Diaz and Clara are Cuban refugees who remain in this country at the
discretion of the Attorney General; appellee Espinosa has been
admitted for permanent Page 426 U. S. 70 residence. All three are over 65 years old, and have been denied
enrollment in the Medicare Part B supplemental medical insurance
program established by § 1831 et seq. of the Social
Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, as added, 79 Stat. 301, and as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395, et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp.
IV). [ Footnote 1 ] They brought
this action to challenge the statutory basis for that denial.
Specifically, they attack 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o (2) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV), which grants eligibility to resident citizens who are 65
or older but denies eligibility to comparable aliens unless they
have been admitted for permanent residence and also have resided in
the United States for at least five years. [ Footnote 2 ] Appellees Diaz and Clara meet neither
requirement; appellee Espinosa meets only the first.

															On August 18, 1972, Diaz filed a class action complaint in the
United States District Court for the Southern Page 426 U. S. 71 District of Florida alleging that his application for enrollment
had been denied on the ground that he was not a citizen and had
neither been admitted for permanent residence nor resided in the
United States for the immediately preceding five years. He further
alleged that numerous other persons had been denied enrollment in
the Medicare Part B program for the same reasons. He sought relief
on behalf of a class of persons who have been or will be denied
enrollment in the Medicare insurance program for failure to meet
the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o (2) (1970 ed., Supp.
IV). Since the complaint prayed for a declaration that §
1395 o (2) was unconstitutional and for an injunction
requiring the Secretary to approve all applicants who had been
denied eligibility solely for failure to comply with its
requirements, a three-judge court was constituted.

															On September 28, 1972, the District Court granted leave to add
Clara and Espinosa as plaintiffs and to file an amended complaint.
That pleading alleged that Clara had been denied enrollment for the
same reasons as Diaz, but explained that Espinosa, although a
permanent resident since 1971, had not attempted to enroll because
he could not meet the durational residence requirement, and
therefore any attempt would have been futile. The amended complaint
sought relief on behalf of a subclass represented by Espinosa --
that is, aliens admitted for permanent residence who have been or
will be denied enrollment for failure to meet the five-year
continuous residence requirement -- as well as relief on behalf of
the class represented by Diaz and Clara. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 426 U. S. 72 On October 24, 1972, the Secretary moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground, among others, that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because none of the
plaintiffs had exhausted his administrative remedies under the
Social Security Act. Two days later, on October 26, 1972, Espinosa
filed his application for enrollment with the Secretary. He
promptly brought this fact to the attention of the District Court,
without formally supplementing the pleadings.

															None of the appellees completely exhausted available avenues for
administrative review. Nevertheless, the Page 426 U. S. 73 Secretary acknowledged that the applications of Diaz and Clara
raised no disputed issues of fact, and therefore the interlocutory
denials of their applications should be treated as final for the
purpose of this litigation. This satisfied the jurisdictional
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 , 422 U. S.
763 -767; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.
S. 636 , 420 U. S. 641 n. 8. The Secretary did not make an equally unambiguous concession
with respect to Espinosa, but, in colloquy with the court, he
acknowledged that Espinosa had filed an application which could not
be allowed under the statute. [ Footnote 4 ] The District Court overruled the Secretary's
motion to dismiss and decided the merits on cross-motions for
summary judgment.

															The District Court held that the five-year residence requirement
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [ Footnote 5 ] and that, since it could
not be severed from the requirement of admission for permanent
residence, the alien eligibility provisions of §
1395 o (2)(B) were entirely unenforceable. Diaz v.
Weinberger, 361 F. Supp.
1 (1973). The District Court reasoned that, "even though
fourteenth amendment notions of equal protection are not entirely
congruent with fifth amendment concepts of due process," id. at 9, the danger of unjustifiable discrimination
against aliens in the enactment of welfare programs is so great, in
view of their complete lack of representation in the political
process, that this federal statute should be tested under the same
pledge of equal protection as a state statute. So tested, the court
concluded that the statute was invalid because it was not both
rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. It
rejected the desire to preserve the fiscal Page 426 U. S. 74 integrity of the program, or to treat some aliens as less
deserving than others, as adequate justification for the statute.
Accordingly, the court enjoined the Secretary from refusing to
enroll members of the class and subclass represented by
appellees.

															The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. [ Footnote 6 ] We noted probable jurisdiction. Weinberger v. Diaz, 416 U.S. 980. After hearing argument
last Term, we set the case for reargument. 420 U.S. 959. We now
consider (1) whether the District Court had jurisdiction over
Espinosa's claim; (2) whether Congress may discriminate in favor of
citizens and against aliens in providing welfare benefits; and (3)
if so, whether the specific discriminatory provisions in §
1395 o (2)(B) are constitutional. I Espinosa's claim squarely raises the question whether the
requirement of five years' continuous residence is constitutional,
a question that is not necessarily presented by the claims of Diaz
and Clara. For if the requirement of admission for permanent
residence is valid, their applications were properly denied even if
the durational residence requirement is ineffective. [ Footnote 7 ] We Page 426 U. S. 75 must therefore decide whether the District Court had
jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim.

															We have little difficulty with Espinosa's failure to file an
application with the Secretary until after he was joined in the
action. Although 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) establishes filing of an
application as a nonwaivable condition of jurisdiction, Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 , 424 U. S. 328 ; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 764 ,
Espinosa satisfied this condition while the case was pending in the
District Court. A supplemental complaint in the District Court
would have eliminated this jurisdictional issue; [ Footnote 8 ] since the record discloses, both
by affidavit and stipulation, that the jurisdictional condition was
satisfied, it is not too late, even now, to supplement the
complaint to allege this fact. [ Footnote 9 ] Under these circumstances, we treat the
pleadings as properly supplemented by the Secretary's stipulation
that Espinosa had filed an application.

															A further problem is presented by the absence of any formal
administrative action by the Secretary denying Espinosa's
application. Section 405(g) requires a final decision by the
Secretary after a hearing as a prerequisite of jurisdiction. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra at 424 U. S.
328 -330; Weinberger v. Salfi, supra at 422 U. S.
763 -765. However, Page 426 U. S. 76 we held in Salfi that the Secretary could waive the
exhaustion requirements which this provision contemplates, and that
he had done so in that case. Id. at 422 U. S.
765 -767; accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, supra at 424 U. S.
329 -330 (dictum); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. at 420 U. S. 641 n. 8. We reach a similar conclusion here.

															The plaintiffs in Salfi alleged that their claims had
been denied by the local and regional Social Security offices and
that the only question was one of constitutional law, beyond the
competence of the Secretary to decide. These allegations did not
satisfy the exhaustion requirements of § 405(g) or the Secretary's
regulations, but the Secretary failed to challenge the sufficiency
of the allegations on this ground. We interpreted this failure as a
determination by the Secretary that exhaustion would have been
futile, and deferred to his judgment that the only issue presented
was the constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security
Act.

															The same reasoning applies to the present case. Although the
Secretary moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, at the hearing on the motion, he stipulated that no facts
were in dispute, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary
judgment, and that the only issue before the District Court was the
constitutionality of the statute. [ Footnote 10 ] As in Salfi, this constitutional
question is beyond the Secretary's competence. Indeed, the
Secretary has twice stated in this Court that he stipulated in the
District Court that Espinosa's application would be denied for
failure to meet the durational residence requirement. [ Footnote 11 ] For jurisdictional
purposes, we Page 426 U. S. 77 treat the stipulation in the District Court as tantamount to a
decision denying the application and as a waiver of the exhaustion
requirements. Cf. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra at 420 U. S. 640 n. 6, 420 U. S. 641 n. 8.

															We conclude, as we did in Salfi, that the Secretary's
submission of the question for decision on the merits by the
District Court satisfied the statutory requirement of a hearing and
final decision. We hold that Espinosa's claim, as well as the
claims of Diaz and Clara, must be decided. II There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction
of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S.
33 , 339 U. S. 48 -51; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.
S. 228 , 163 U. S. 238 ; see Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.
S. 481 , 282 U. S. 489 .
Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary,
or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. Wong Yang Sung, supra; Wong Wing, supra. Page 426 U. S. 78 The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are
protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages
of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must
be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host
of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that
a legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify
attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other;
[ Footnote 12 ] and the class
of aliens is itself a heterogeneous Page 426 U. S. 79 multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this
country. [ Footnote 13 ]

															In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization Page 426 U. S. 80 and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens
[ Footnote 14 ] and the
reservation of the power to deport [ Footnote 15 ] have no permissible counterpart in the
Federal Government's power to regulate the conduct of its own
citizenry. [ Footnote 16 ] The
fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from
citizens does not, in itself, imply that such disparate treatment
is "invidious."

															I n particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare
benefits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits
for all alien. Neither the overnight visitor, the
unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat,
nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable
constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious
sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of
its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests may
take into account the character of the relationship between the
alien and this country: Congress may decide that, as the alien's
tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal
share of that munificence.

															The real question presented by this case is not whether
discrimination between citizens and aliens is permissible; rather,
it is whether the statutory discrimination within the
class of aliens -- allowing benefits to some aliens but not to
others -- is permissible. We turn to that question. Page 426 U. S. 81 III For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for
regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the
Federal Government. [ Footnote
17 ] Since decisions in these matters may implicate our
relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of
classifications must be defined in the light of changing political
and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a
character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the
Executive than to the Judiciary. This very case illustrates the
need for flexibility in policy choices, rather than the rigidity
often characteristic of constitutional adjudication. Appellees Diaz
and Clara are but two of over 440,000 Cuban refugees who arrived in
the United States between 1961 and 1972. [ Footnote 18 ] And the Cuban parolees are but one of
several categories of aliens who have been admitted in order to
make a humane response to a natural catastrophe or an international
political situation. [ Footnote
19 ] Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to
changing world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest
caution. [ Footnote 20 ] The
reasons Page 426 U. S. 82 that preclude judicial review of political questions [ Footnote 21 ] also dictate a narrow
standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the
President in the area of immigration and naturalization.

															Since it is obvious that Congress has no constitutional duty to
provide all aliens with the welfare benefits provided to
citizens, the party challenging the constitutionality of the
particular line Congress has drawn has the burden of advancing
principled reasoning that will at once invalidate that line and yet
tolerate a different line separating some aliens from others. In
this case, the appellees have challenged two requirements -- first,
that the alien be admitted as a permanent resident, and, second,
that his residence be of a duration of at least five years. But if
these requirements were eliminated, surely Congress would at least
require that the alien's entry be lawful; even then, unless mere
transients are to be held constitutionally entitled to benefits,
some durational requirement would certainly be appropriate. In
short, it Page 426 U. S. 83 is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to make an alien's
eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his
residence. Since neither requirement is wholly irrational, this
case essentially involves nothing more than a claim that it would
have been more reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different
requirements of the same kind.

															We may assume that the five-year line drawn by Congress is
longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the
program. [ Footnote 22 ] We
may also assume that unnecessary hardship is incurred by persons
just short of qualifying. But it remains true that some line is
essential, that any line must produce some harsh and apparently
arbitrary consequences, and, of greatest importance, that those who
qualify under the test Congress has chosen may reasonably be
presumed to have a greater affinity with the United States than
those who do not. In short, citizens and those who are most like
citizens qualify. Those who are less like citizens do not.

															The task of classifying persons for medical benefits, like the
task of drawing lines for federal tax purposes, inevitably requires
that some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to
favored treatment be placed on different sides of the line; the
differences between the Page 426 U. S. 84 eligible and the ineligible are differences in degree, rather
than differences in the character of their respective claims. When
this kind of policy choice must be made, we are especially
reluctant to question the exercise of congressional judgment.
[ Footnote 23 ] In this case,
since appellees have not identified a principled basis for
prescribing a different standard than the one selected by Congress,
they have, in effect, merely invited us to substitute our judgment
for that of Congress in deciding which aliens shall be eligible to
participate in the supplementary insurance program on the same
conditions as citizens. We decline the invitation. IV The cases on which appellees rely are consistent with our
conclusion that this statutory classification does not deprive them
of liberty or property without due process of law. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 ,
provides the strongest support for appellees' position. That case
holds that state statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident
aliens, or to aliens not meeting a requirement of durational
residence within the United States, violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and encroach upon the exclusive
federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens. Of course,
the latter ground of decision actually supports our holding today
that it is the business of the political branches of the Federal
Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal
Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of
aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly
different considerations, because it concerns the relationship
between Page 426 U. S. 85 aliens and the States, rather than between aliens and the
Federal Government.

															Insofar as state welfare policy is concerned, [ Footnote 24 ] there is little, if any, basis
for treating persons who are citizens of another State differently
from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are
noncitizens as far as the State's interests in administering its
welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by a State of the
category of persons who are not citizens of that State into
subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent
justification, whereas a comparable classification by the Federal
Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its
business. Furthermore, whereas the Constitution inhibits every
State's power to restrict travel across its own borders, Congress
is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over
travel across the borders of the United States. [ Footnote 25 ]

															The distinction between the constitutional limits on state power
and the constitutional grant of power to the Federal Government
also explains why appellees' reliance on Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 , is
misplaced. That case involved Arizona's requirement of durational
residence within a county in order to receive nonemergency medical
care at the Page 426 U. S. 86 county's expense. No question of alienage was involved. Since
the sole basis for the classification between residents impinged on
the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel within the United
States, the holding in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 , required that it be justified by a compelling
state interest. [ Footnote
26 ] Finding no such justification, we held that the requirement
violated the Equal Protection Clause. This case, however, involves
no state impairment of the right to travel -- nor indeed any
impairment whatever of the right to travel within the United
States; the predicate for the equal protection analysis in those
cases is simply not present. Contrary to appellees'
characterization, it is not "political hypocrisy" to recognize that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Page 426 U. S. 87 limits on state powers are substantially different from the
constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over
immigration and naturalization.

															Finally, we reject the suggestion that U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno , 413 U.
S. 528 , lends relevant support to appellees' claim. No
question involving alienage was presented in that case. Rather, we
found that the denial of food stamps to households containing
unrelated members was not only unsupported by any rational basis,
but actually was intended to discriminate against certain
politically unpopular groups. This case involves no impairment of
the freedom of association of either citizens or aliens.

															We hold that § 1395 o (2)(B) has not deprived appellees
of liberty or property without due process of law.

															The judgment of the District Court is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The Medicare Part B medical insurance program for the aged
covers a part of the cost of certain physicians' services, home
health care, outpatient physical therapy, and other medical and
health care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). The program
supplements the Medicare Part A hospital insurance plan, § 1811 et seq. of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620,
as added, 79 Stat. 291, and as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395c et
seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), and it is financed in equal
parts by the United States and by monthly premiums paid by
individuals aged 65 or older who choose to enroll. 42 U.S.C. §
1395r(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o (1970 ed. and Supp. IV)
provides:

															"Every individual who -- (1) is entitled to hospital insurance
benefits under Part A, or (2) has attained age 65 and is a resident
of the United States, and is either (A) a citizen or (b) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence who has resided in the
United States continuously during the 5 years immediately preceding
the month in which he applies for enrollment under this part, is
eligible to enroll in the insurance program established by this
part."

															This case does not raise any issues involving subsection
(1).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The District Court certified a class and a subclass, defined,
respectively, as follows:

															"All immigrants residing in the United States who have attained
the age of 65 and who have been or will be denied enrollment in the
supplemental medical insurance program under Medicare, 42 U.S.C. §
1395, et seq. (1970), because they are not aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence who have resided in the United
States continuously during the five years immediately preceding the
month in which they apply for enrollment as required by [42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 o (2)(B) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)]."

															" * * * *" "All immigrants lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States who have attained the age of 65 and who have been or
will be denied enrollment in the supplemental medical insurance
program under Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 1395, et seq. (1970),
solely because of their failure to meet the five-year continuous
residency requirement of [42 U.S.C. § 1395 o (2)(b) (1970
ed., Supp. IV)]." Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp.
1 , 7 (1973) (footnote omitted).

															These class certifications are erroneous. The District Court did
not possess jurisdiction over the claims of the members of the
plaintiff class and subclass who "will be denied" enrollment. Those
who "will be denied" enrollment, as the quoted phrase is used in
the certification, are those who have yet to be denied enrollment
by formal administrative decision. See id. at 6-7, and n.
7. But the complaint does not allege, and the record does not show,
that the Secretary has taken any action with respect to such
persons that is tantamount to a denial. It follows that the
District Court lacked jurisdiction over their claims, see
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 , 422 U. S. 764 ,
and that the class and subclass are too broadly defined. In view of
our holding that the statute is constitutional, we need not decide
whether a narrower class and subclass could have been properly
certified.

															[ Footnote 4 ] See infra at 426 U. S. 76 -77,
and n. 11.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															"[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S.Const., Amdt.
5.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Secretary asserted jurisdiction in this Court by direct
appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253. Since we possess jurisdiction
under § 1252, which provides for direct appeal to this Court from a
judgment of a federal court holding a federal statute
unconstitutional in a civil action to which a federal officer is a
party, we need not decide whether an appeal lies under § 1253. Weinberger v. Salfi, supra at 422 U. S. 763 n. 8.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Diaz and Clara contend that the requirement of lawful admission
for permanent residence should be construed so that it is satisfied
by aliens, such as they, who have been paroled into the United
States at the discretion of the Attorney General. However, such
aliens remain in the United States at the discretion of the
Attorney General, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), and hence cannot have been
"lawfully admitted for permanent residence," as §
1395 o (2)(b) requires.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 15(d); Security Ins. Co. of New Haven v.
United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444, 447-449 (CA9
1964).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															"Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon
terms, in the trial or appellate courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1653.
Although the defect in Espinosa's allegations must be cured by
supplemental pleading, instead af amended pleading, the statutory
purpose of avoiding needless sacrifice to defective pleading
applies equally to this case. See Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 , 420 U. S. 744 n. 9; Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.
S. 402 , 395 U. S.
407 -408, and n. 3. Despite Espinosa's failure to
supplement the complaint, the District Court was aware that he had
filed his application; since the Secretary stipulated that the
application had been filed, the defect in the pleadings surely did
not prejudice him.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Record on Appeal 224-227. See Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Record on
Appeal 259-260.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Jurisdictional Statement 3 n. 3; Brief for Appellant 5 n. 5. In
his Supplemental Brief, filed after our decision in Salfi, the Secretary argues that the District Court did not possess
jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim because it was not until after
the District Court had issued its injunction that the Secretary
resolved an unspecified factual issue presented by Espinosa's
application, and that such a belated confirmation that Espinosa's
application should be denied could not confer jurisdiction upon the
District Court nunc pro tunc. Supplemental Brief for
Appellant 4, and n. 1. However, the District Court's jurisdiction
was not founded upon the Secretary's subsequent confirmation that
Espinosa's application should be denied, but rather upon the
Secretary's stipulation in the District Court that no factual
issues remained, that the case was ripe for disposition by summary
judgment, and that the only issue was the constitutionality of the
statute. Even though Salfi had not been decided when he so
stipulated, he is not now free to withdraw his stipulation, and no
reason appears why he should be permitted to do so.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The Constitution protects the privileges and immunities only of
citizens, Amdt. 14, § 1; see Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the
right to vote only of citizens. Amdts. 15, 19, 24, 26. It requires
that Representatives have been citizens for seven years, Art. I, §
2, cl. 2, and Senators citizens for nine, Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, and
that the President be a "natural born Citizen." Art. II, § 1, cl.
5.

															A multitude of federal statutes distinguish between citizens and
aliens. The whole of Title 8 of the United States Code, regulating
aliens and nationality, is founded on the legitimacy of
distinguishing between citizens and aliens. A variety of other
federal statutes provide for disparate treatment of aliens and
citizens. These include prohibitions and restrictions upon
Government employment of aliens, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5571;
22 U.S.C. § 1044(e), upon private employment of aliens, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2279; 12 U.S.C. § 72, and upon
investments and businesses of aliens, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §
619; 47 U.S.C. § 17; statutes excluding aliens from benefits
available to citizens, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 931 (1970 ed. and
Supp. IV); 46 U.S.C. § 1171(a), and from protections extended to
citizens, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1526; 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1970
ed., Supp. IV); and statutes imposing added burdens upon aliens, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6851(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). Several
statutes treat certain aliens more favorably than citizens. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1586(e); 50 U.S.C.App. § 453 (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV). Other statutes, similar to the one at issue in this
case, provide for equal treatment of citizens and aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. 10 U.S.C. § 8253; 18 U.S.C. §
613(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Still others equate citizens and
aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens. E.g., 43 U.S.C. § 161; 30 U.S.C. § 22. Yet others
condition equal treatment of an alien upon reciprocal treatment of
United States citizens by the alien's own country. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 7435(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2502.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The classifications among aliens established by the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), illustrate the diversity
of aliens and their ties to this country. Aliens may be immigrants
or nonimmigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). Immigrants, in turn, are
divided into those who are subject to numerical limitations upon
admissions and those who are not. The former are subdivided into
preference classifications which include: grown unmarried children
of citizens; spouses and grown unmarried children of aliens
lawfully admitted for permanent residence; professionals and those
with exceptional ability in the sciences or arts; grown married
children of citizens; brothers and sisters of citizens; persons who
perform specified permanent skilled or unskilled labor for which a
labor shortage exists; and certain victims of persecution and
catastrophic natural calamities who were granted conditional entry
and remained in the United States at least two years. 8 U.S.C. §§
1153(a)(1)-(7). Immigrants not subject to certain numerical
limitations include: children and spouses of citizens and parents
of citizens at least 21 years old; natives of independent countries
of the Western Hemisphere; aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence returning from temporary visits abroad; certain former
citizens who may reapply for acquisition of citizenship; certain
ministers of religion; and certain employees or former employees of
the United States Government abroad. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27),
1151(a), (b). Nonimmigrants include: officials and employees of
foreign governments and certain international organizations; aliens
visiting temporarily for business or pleasure; aliens in transit
through this country; alien crewmen serving on a vessel or
aircraft; aliens entering pursuant to a treaty of commerce and
navigation to carry on trade or an enterprise in which they have
invested; aliens entering to study in this country; certain aliens
coming temporarily to perform services or labor or to serve as
trainees; alien representatives of the foreign press or other
information media; certain aliens coming temporarily to participate
in a program in their field of study or specialization; aliens
engaged to be married to citizens; and certain alien employees
entering temporarily to continue to render services to the same
employers. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). In addition to lawfully admitted
aliens, there are, of course, aliens who have entered
illegally.

															[ Footnote 14 ] Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.
S. 753 , 408 U. S.
765 -770.

															[ Footnote 15 ] Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 , 347 U. S.
530 -532; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S.
584 -591.

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 , 381 U. S. 13 -16; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.
S. 500 , 378 U. S.
505 -514; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.
S. 116 , 357 U. S.
125 -130.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															"[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct
of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a
republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely
immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra at 342 U. S.
588 -589 (footnote omitted). Accord, e.g.,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, supra at 408 U. S.
765 -767; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 , 149 U. S.
711 -713.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Cuban Refugee Center -- Weekly Statistical Report for November
13-17, 1972, App. 40.

															[ Footnote 19 ] See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(7), 1182(d)(5).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															An unlikely, but nevertheless possible, consequence of holding
that appellees are constitutionally entitled to welfare benefits
would be a further extension of similar benefits to over 440,000
Cuban parolees.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															"It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe
a political question, although each has one or more elements which
identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision al ready made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question." Baker v Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S.
217 .

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															The District Court held that the durational residence
requirement was not rationally related to maintaining the fiscal
integrity of the Medicare Part B program, because the program is
financed on a "current cost" basis, half by appropriations from the
general revenues and half by premiums from enrolled individuals;
because aliens who do not meet the residence requirement would
constitute no greater burden on the general revenues than enrolled
citizens who have not paid federal taxes or who pay their premiums
from federally subsidized welfare benefits; because aliens, like
citizens, must pay federal taxes; and because the residency
requirement only postpones treatment of aliens until costlier
medical care is necessary. Diaz v. Weinberger, 361 F.
Supp. at 10-12.

															[ Footnote 23 ] Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
768 -774; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 , 397 U. S.
483 -487.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															We have left open the question whether a State may prohibit
aliens from holding elective or important nonelective positions or
whether a State may, in some circumstances, consider the alien
status of an applicant or employee in making an individualized
employment decision. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.
S. 634 , 413 U. S.
646 -649; In re Griffiths, 413 U.
S. 717 , 413 U. S.
728 -729, and n. 21.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															"State alien residency requirements that either deny welfare
benefits to noncitizens or condition them on long-time residency,
equate with the assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal
policy, to deny entrance and abode. Since such laws encroach upon
exclusive federal power, they are constitutionally
impermissible." Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 , 403 U. S.
380 .

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															In Shapiro v. Thompson, we held that state-imposed
requirements of durational residence within the State for receipt
of welfare benefits denied equal protection because such
requirements unconstitutionally burdened the right to travel
interstate. Since the requirements applied to aliens and citizens
alike, we did not decide whether the right to travel interstate was
conferred only upon citizens. However, our holding was predicated
expressly on the requirement

															"that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."

															394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 629 . See Graham v. Richardson, supra at 403 U. S.
375 -376, 403 U. S.
377 -380.

															Appellees also gain no support from Washington v.
Legrant, 394 U. S. 618 , a
case decided with Shapiro v. Thompson. Legrant involved a congressionally imposed requirement of one year's
residence within the District of Columbia for receipt of welfare
benefits. As in Shapiro v. Thompson, no question of
alienage was involved. We held that the requirement violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for the same reasons that
the state-imposed durational residency requirements violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 394 U.S. at 394 U. S.
641 -642. Unlike the situation in Shapiro and Legrant, the durational residency requirement in this case
could at most deter only the travel of aliens into the United
States. The power of Congress to prevent the travel of aliens into
this country cannot seriously be questioned.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The case of Mathews v. Diaz (1976) concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute that restricted eligibility for a Medicare supplemental insurance program to certain aliens. The program was established under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2), which allowed residents of the United States aged 65 or older to enroll, but subsection (b) excluded aliens unless they had been admitted for permanent residence and had resided in the country for at least five years.

The appellees, including Diaz, Clara, and Espinosa, challenged the statute on constitutional grounds. The District Court held that the five-year residence requirement violated due process and rendered the alien eligibility provisions unenforceable. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the jurisdiction and the constitutionality of the residence requirement.

The Court first determined that it had jurisdiction over Espinosa's claim, as he had filed an application for enrollment after becoming a party to the case, meeting a non-waivable jurisdictional condition. The Court then turned to the constitutional issue, considering whether the five-year residence requirement violated the Due Process Clause or the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.

The Court upheld the constitutionality of the residence requirement, finding that it was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of the program. The Court noted that Congress has broad power over the admission and exclusion of aliens and that the requirement did not infringe on any fundamental rights.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the five-year residence requirement for aliens in the Medicare supplemental insurance program was constitutional.