U.S. Supreme Court San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez No. 71-1332 Argued October 12,
1972 Decided March 21,
1973 411 U.S.
1 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS Syllabus The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in
Texas is a product of state and local participation. Almost half of
the revenues are derived from a largely state-funded program
designed to provide a basic minimum educational offering in every
school. Each district supplements state aid through an ad
valorem tax on property within its jurisdiction. Appellees
brought this class action on behalf of school children said to be
members of poor families who reside in school districts having a
low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas system's
reliance on local property taxation favors the more affluent and
violates equal protection requirements because of substantial
inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting
primarily from differences in the value of assessable property
among the districts. The District Court, finding that wealth is a
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fundamental"
right, concluded that the system could be upheld only upon a
showing, which appellants failed to make, that there was a
compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded
that appellants failed even to Page 412 U. S. 2 demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's
system. Held: 1. This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws
under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is
reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage
of suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental
rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution. Pp. 411 U. S.
18 -44.

															(a) The Texas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. It
has not been shown to discriminate against any definable class of
"poor" people or to occasion discriminations depending on the
relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as
the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their
individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor
school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect.
Pp. 411 U. S.
18 -28.

															(b) Nor does the Texas school financing system impermissibly
interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty.
Though education is one of the most important services performed by
the State, it is not within the limited category of rights
recognized by this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if
some identifiable quantum of education is arguably entitled to
constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise of other
constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas
system fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that
purpose. Pp. 411 U. S.
29 -39.

															(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke
strict scrutiny, since it involves the most delicate and difficult
questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy,
and federalism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of
review. Pp. 411 U. S.
40 -44.

															2. The Texas system does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly imperfect, the
system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it
permits and encourages participation in and significant control of
each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 411 U. S.
44 -53. 337 F.
Supp. 280 , reversed.

															POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. Page 411 U. S. 3 STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 411 U. S. 59 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 411 U. S. 62 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and
BRENNAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 411 U. S. 63 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J.,
joined, post, p. 411 U. S. 70 . Page 411 U. S. 4 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public
education was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children
attend the elementary and secondary Page 411 U. S. 5 schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, an urban
school district in San Antonio, Texas. [ Footnote 1 ] They brought a class action on behalf of
school children throughout the State who are members of minority
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts having a low
property tax base. Named as defendants [ Footnote 2 ] were the State Board of Education, the
Commissioner of Education, the State Attorney General, and the
Bexar County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The complaint Page 411 U. S. 6 was filed in the summer of 1968, and a three-judge court was
impaneled in January, 1969. [ Footnote 3 ] In December, 1971, [ Footnote 4 ] the panel rendered its judgment in a per
curiam opinion holding the Texas school finance system
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote
5 ] The State appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction to
consider the far-reaching constitutional questions presented. 406
U.S. 966 (1972). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse
the decision of the District Court. I The first Texas State Constitution, promulgated upon Texas'
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a
system of free schools. [ Footnote
6 ] Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach to the
financing of its schools, relying on mutual participation by the
local school districts and the State. As early as 1883, the
state Page 411 U. S. 7 constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local
school districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with
the consent of local taxpayers for the "erection . . . of school
buildings" and for the "further maintenance of public free
schools." [ Footnote 7 ] Such
local funds as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed
to each district from the State's Permanent and Available School
Funds. [ Footnote 8 ] The
Permanent School Fund, its predecessor established in 1854 with
$2,000,000 realized from an annexation settlement, [ Footnote 9 ] was thereafter endowed with
millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued
source of income for school support. [ Footnote 10 ] The Available School Fund, which received
income from the Permanent School Fund as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and other designated taxes,
[ Footnote 11 ] served as the
disbursing arm for most state educational funds throughout the late
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 1918, an
increase in state property taxes was used to finance a program
providing free textbooks throughout the State. [ Footnote 12 ]

															Until recent times, Texas was a predominantly rural State, and
its population and property wealth were spread Page 411 U. S. 8 relatively evenly across the State. [ Footnote 13 ] Sizable differences in the value of
assessable property between local school districts became
increasingly evident as the State became more industrialized and as
rural-to-urban population shifts became more pronounced. [ Footnote 14 ] The location of
commercial and industrial property began to play a significant role
in determining the amount of tax resources available to each school
district. These growing disparities in population and taxable
property between districts were responsible in part for
increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for
education. [ Footnote 15 ] In
due time, it became apparent to those concerned with financing
public education that contributions from the Available School Fund
were not sufficient to ameliorate these disparities. [ Footnote 16 ] Prior to 1939, the
Available School Fund contributed money to every school district at
a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. [ Footnote 17 ] Although the amount was increased several
times in the early 1940's, [ Footnote 18 ] Page 411 U. S. 9 the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1945. [ Footnote 19 ]

															Recognizing the need for increased state funding to help offset
disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing
educational requirements, the state legislature, in the late
1940's, undertook a thorough evaluation of public education with an
eye toward major reform. In 1947, an 18-member committee, composed
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore alternative
systems in other States and to propose a funding scheme that would
guarantee a minimum or basic educational offering to each child and
that would help overcome inter-district disparities in taxable
resources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of the
Gilmer-Aikin bills, named for the Committee's co-chairmen,
establishing the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program. [ Footnote 20 ] Today, this Program
accounts for approximately half of the total educational
expenditures in Texas. [ Footnote
21 ]

															The Program calls for state and local contributions to a fund
earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses,
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its
general revenues, finances approximately 80% of the Program, and
the school districts are responsible -- as a unit -- for providing
the remaining 20%. The districts' share, known as the Local Fund
Assignment, is apportioned among the school districts Page 411 U. S. 10 under a formula designed to reflect each district's relative
taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254
counties pursuant to a complicated economic index that takes into
account the relative value of each county's contribution to the
State's total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricultural
activities. It also considers each county's relative share of all
payrolls paid within the State and, to a lesser extent, considers
each county's share of all property in the State. [ Footnote 22 ] Each county's assignment is
then divided among its school districts on the basis of each
district's share of assessable property within the county.
[ Footnote 23 ] The district,
in turn, finances its share of the Assignment out of revenues from
local property taxation.

															The design of this complex system was twofold. First, it was an
attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have an
equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts
by placing the heaviest burden on the school districts most capable
of paying. Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school district to
contribute to the education of its children, [ Footnote 24 ] but that would not, by itself,
exhaust any district's resources. [ Footnote 25 ] Today every school district does impose a
property tax from which it derives locally expendable Page 411 U. S. 11 funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its Local
Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program.

															In the years since this program went into operation in 1949,
expenditures for education -- from state as well as local sources
-- have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967, expenditures
increased approximately 500%. [ Footnote 26 ] In the last decade alone, the total public
school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion, [ Footnote 27 ] and these increases
have been reflected in consistently rising per-pupil expenditures
throughout the State. [ Footnote
28 ] Teacher salaries, by far the largest item in any school's
budget, have increased dramatically -- the state supported minimum
salary for teachers possessing college degrees has risen from
$2,400 to $6,000 over the last 20 years. [ Footnote 29 ]

															The school district in which appellees reside, the Edgewood
Independent School District, has been compared throughout this
litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent School District. This
comparison between the least and most affluent districts in the San
Antonio area serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual
system of finance operates, and to indicate the extent to which
substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressive
progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven public school
districts in the metropolitan area. Approximately 22,000 students
are enrolled in its 25 elementary Page 411 U. S. 12 and secondary schools. The district is situated in the core-city
sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominantly
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the student
population is Mexican-American and over 6% is Negro. The average
assessed property value per pupil is $5,960 -- the lowest in the
metropolitan area -- and the median family income ($4,686) is also
the lowest. [ Footnote 30 ] At
an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property -- the
highest in the metropolitan area -- the district contributed $26 to
the education of each child for the 1967-1968 school year above its
Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. The
Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local
total of $248. [ Footnote 31 ]
Federal funds added another $108, for a total of $356 per pupil.
[ Footnote 32 ]

															Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San
Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, are
situated in a residential community quite unlike the Edgewood
District. The school population is predominantly "Anglo," having
only 18% Mexican-Americans Page 411 U. S. 13 and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil
exceeds $49,000, [ Footnote
33 ] and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the
local tax rate of $.85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil
over and above its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district was able to
supply $558 per student. Supplemented by a $36 per-pupil grant from
federal sources, Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil.

															Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide the only
complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, [ Footnote 34 ] more recent partial
statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing
state aid has been significant. For the 1970-1971 school year, the
Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per
pupil, a 62% increase over the 1967-1968 school year. Indeed, state
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-1968 school
budget from local, state, and federal sources. Alamo Heights
enjoyed a similar increase under the Foundation Program, netting
$491 per pupil in 1970-1971. [ Footnote 35 ] These recent figures Page 411 U. S. 14 also reveal the extent to which these two districts' allotments
were funded from their own required contributions to the Local Fund
Assignment. Alamo Heights, because of its relative wealth, was
required to contribute out of its local property tax collections
approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% of its Foundation grant.
Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is
about 2.4% of its grant. [ Footnote 36 ] It appears then that, at least as to these
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect a rough
approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of each.
[ Footnote 37 ] Page 411 U. S. 15 Despite these recent increases, substantial inter-district
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to
prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State
[ Footnote 38 ] still exist.
And it was Page 411 U. S. 16 these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the
amounts of money collected through local property taxation, that
led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of
public school financing violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
District Court held that the Texas system discriminates on the
basis of wealth in the manner in which education is provided for
its people. 337 F. Supp. at 282. Finding that wealth is a "suspect"
classification, and that education is a "fundamental" interest, the
District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only
if the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling
ate interest. Id. at 282-284. On this issue the court
concluded that

															"[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling
state interests . . . they fail even to establish a reasonable
basis for these classifications." Id. at 284.

															Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted dual
system of financing education could not withstand the strict
judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in
reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental
constitutional rights [ Footnote
39 ] or that involve suspect classifications. [ Footnote 40 ] If, as previous decisions have
indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not
entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State,
rather than the complainants, must carry a "heavy burden of
justification," that the State must Page 411 U. S. 17 demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with
"precision," and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate
objectives, and that it has selected the "less drastic means" for
effectuating its objectives, [ Footnote 41 ] the Texas financing system and its
counterpart in virtually every other State will not pass muster.
The State candidly admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas
system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection."
[ Footnote 42 ] Apart from its
concession that educational financing in Texas has "defects"
[ Footnote 43 ] and
"imperfections," [ Footnote
44 ] the State defends the system's rationality with vigor, and
disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable
basis."

															This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We must
decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public
education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or
impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial
scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court should be
affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to
determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose, and therefore does not constitute an
invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. II The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty and
complexity of the constitutional questions posed by appellees'
challenge to Texas' system of school financing. In concluding that
strict judicial scrutiny was required, Page 411 U. S. 18 that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights of
indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and appellate
processes, [ Footnote 45 ] and
on cases disapproving wealth restrictions on the right to vote.
[ Footnote 46 ] Those cases,
the District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect
classification. Finding that the local property tax system
discriminated on the basis of wealth, it regarded those precedents
as controlling. It then reasoned, based on decisions of this Court
affirming the undeniable importance of education, [ Footnote 47 ] that there is a fundamental
right to education, and that, absent some compelling state
justification, the Texas system could not stand.

															We are unable to agree that this case, which in significant
aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the
conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause. Indeed, for the several reasons that follow, we
find neither the suspect classification nor the fundamental
interest analysis persuasive. A The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court in
this case, and by several other courts that have recently struck
down school financing laws in other States, [ Footnote 48 ] is quite unlike any of the forms of
wealth discrimination Page 411 U. S. 19 heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing on the
unique features of the alleged discrimination, the courts in these
cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect
classification through a simplistic process of analysis: since,
under the traditional systems of financing public schools, some
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other more
affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth.
This approach largely ignores the hard threshold questions,
including whether it makes a difference, for purposes of
consideration under the Constitution, that the class of
disadvantaged "poor" cannot be identified or defined in customary
equal protection terms, and whether the relative -- rather than
absolute -- nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant
consequence. Before a State's laws and the justifications for the
classifications they create are subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed
more closely than they were in the court below.

															The case comes to us with no definitive description of the
classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of appellees'
complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argument suggests,
however, at least three ways in which the discrimination claimed
here might be described. The Texas system of school financing might
be regarded as discriminating (1) against "poor" persons whose
incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might
be characterized as functionally "indigent," [ Footnote 49 ] or Page 411 U. S. 20 (2) against those who are relatively poorer than others
[ Footnote 50 ] or (3) against
all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to
reside in relatively poorer school districts. [ Footnote 51 ] Our task must be to ascertain
whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting
classification may be regarded as suspect.

															The precedents of this Court provide the proper starting point.
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the
class discriminated against in our prior cases shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity, they
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and, as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v.
Illinois , Page 411 U. S. 21 351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny, [ Footnote 52 ] the Court invalidated state laws that
prevented an indigent criminal defendant from acquiring a
transcript, or an adequate substitute for a transcript, for use at
several stages of the trial and appeal process. The payment
requirements in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimination against those who, because of their indigency, were
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And the Court in each case
emphasized that no constitutional violation would have been shown
if the State had provided some "adequate substitute" for a full
stenographic transcript. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 , 404 U. S. 228 (1971); Gardner v. California, 393 U.
S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.
S. 214 (1958).

															Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 (1963), a decision establishing an indigent
defendant's right to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay for counsel from
their own resources and who had no other way of gaining
representation. Douglas provides no relief for those on
whom the burdens of paying for a criminal defense are, relatively
speaking, great but not insurmountable. Nor does it deal with
relative differences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less
wealthy. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.
S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penalties that
subjected indigents to incarceration simply because Page 411 U. S. 22 of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the disadvantaged class
was composed only of persons who were totally unable to pay the
demanded sum. Those cases do not touch on the question whether
equal protection is denied to persons with relatively less money on
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The Court has not
held that fines must be structured to reflect each person's ability
to pay in order to avoid disproportionate burdens. Sentencing
judges may, and often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay,
but, in such circumstances, they are guided by sound judicial
discretion, rather than by constitutional mandate.

															Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972), the Court invalidated the Texas filing
fee requirement for primary elections. Both of the relevant
classifying facts found in the previous cases were present there.
The size of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars
and, in at least one case, as high as $8,900, effectively barred
all potential candidates who were unable to pay the required fee.
As the system provided "no reasonable alternative means of access
to the ballot" ( id. at 405 U. S.
149 ), inability to pay occasioned an absolute denial of
a position on the primary ballot.

															Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the class
disadvantaged by the Texas school financing system --
discrimination against a class of definably "poor" persons -- might
arguably meet the criteria established in these prior cases. Even a
cursory examination, however, demonstrates that neither of the two
distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be
found here. First, in support of their charge that the system
discriminates against the "poor," appellees have made no effort to
demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any
class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose
incomes are beneath any Page 411 U. S. 23 designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to believe
that the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the
poorest property districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school
districts in Connecticut concluded that

															"[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to contend that the 'poor' live
in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual assumption of Serrano -- that the educational financing system
discriminates against the 'poor' -- is simply false in Connecticut.
[ Footnote 53 ]"

															Defining "poor" families as those below the Bureau of the Census
"poverty level," [ Footnote
54 ] the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial areas -- those
same areas that provide the most attractive sources of property tax
income for school districts. [ Footnote 55 ] Whether a similar pattern would be
discovered in Texas is not known, but there is no basis on the
record in this case for assuming that the poorest people -- defined
by reference to any level of absolute impecunity -- are
concentrated in the poorest districts.

															Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the
fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal
resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired
benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts
having relatively low assessable property values are receiving no
public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts
having more assessable wealth. Apart from the unsettled and
disputed question whether the quality of education may be
determined by the amount of money Page 411 U. S. 24 expended for it, [ Footnote
56 ] a sufficient answer to appellees' argument is that, at
least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does
not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.
[ Footnote 57 ] Nor, indeed,
in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational
process, can any system assure equal quality of education except in
the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation
Program provides an "adequate" education for all children in the
State. By providing 12 years of free public school education, and
by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds,
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to

															"guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all
people shall have at least an adequate program of education. This
is what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education.'
[ Footnote 58 ]"

															The State repeatedly asserted in its briefs in this Court that
it has fulfilled this desire, and that it now assures "every child
in every school district an adequate education." [ Footnote 59 ] No proof was offered at trial
persuasively discrediting or refuting the State's assertion. Page 411 U. S. 25 For these two reasons -- the absence of any evidence that the
financing system discriminates against any definable category of
"poor" people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of
education -- the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of
identification in traditional terms. [ Footnote 60 ]

															As suggested above, appellees and the District Court may have
embraced a second or third approach, the second of which might be
characterized as a theory of relative or comparative discrimination
based on family income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct
correlation exists between the wealth of families within each
district and the expenditures therein for education. That is, along
a continuum, the poorer the family, the lower the dollar amount of
education received by the family's children.

															The principal evidence adduced in support of this comparative
discrimination claim is an affidavit submitted by Professor Joel S.
Berke of Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy
Institute. The District Court, relying in major part upon this
affidavit and apparently accepting the substance of appellees'
theory, Page 411 U. S. 26 noted, first, a positive correlation between the wealth of
school districts, measured in terms of assessable property per
pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. Second, the
court found a similar correlation between district wealth and the
personal wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median
family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282 n. 3.

															If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then it
might be argued that expenditures on education -- equated by
appellees to the quality of education -- are dependent on personal
wealth. Appellees' comparative discrimination theory would still
face serious unanswered questions, including whether a bare
positive correlation or some higher degree of correlation [ Footnote 61 ] is necessary to provide
a basis for concluding that the financing system is designed to
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor,
[ Footnote 62 ] and whether a
class of this size and diversity could ever claim the special
protection accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not be
addressed in this case, however, since appellees' proof fails to
support their allegations or the District Court's conclusions.

															Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His findings,
previously set out in the margin, [ Footnote 63 ] show only Page 411 U. S. 27 that the wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest
median family incomes and spend the most on education, and that the
several poorest districts have the lowest family incomes and devote
the least amount of money to education. For the remainder of the
districts -- 96 districts composing almost 90% of the sample -- the
correlation is inverted, i.e., the districts that spend
next to the most money on education are populated by families
having next to the lowest median family incomes, while the
districts spending the least have the highest median family
incomes. It is evident that, even if the conceptual questions were
answered favorably to appellees, no factual basis exists upon which
to found a claim of comparative wealth discrimination. [ Footnote 64 ]

															This brings us, then, to the third way in which the
classification scheme might be defined -- district wealth
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by the
evidence is between district property wealth and expenditures, it
may be argued that discrimination might be found without regard to
the individual income characteristics of district residents.
Assuming a perfect correlation between district property wealth and
expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might
be Page 411 U. S. 28 viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the
district that has the most assessable wealth and spends the most on
education. [ Footnote 65 ]
Alternatively, as suggested in MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting
opinion, post at 411 U. S. 96 , the
class might be defined more restrictively to include children in
districts with assessable property which falls below the state-wide
average, or median, or below some other artificially defined
level.

															However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks this
Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system that
allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous
class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts
that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.
[ Footnote 66 ] The system of
alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.

															We thus conclude that the Texas system does not operate to the
peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. Page 411 U. S. 29 But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never
heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an
adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have not
relied solely on this contention. [ Footnote 67 ] They also assert that the State's system
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a "fundamental"
right, and that, accordingly, the prior decisions of this Court
require the application of the strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 , 403 U. S.
375 -376 (1971); Kramer v. Union School
District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 (1969). It is this question -- whether education
is a fundamental right, in the sense that it is among the rights
and liberties protected by the Constitution -- which has so
consumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent years.
[ Footnote 68 ] B In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 (1954), a unanimous Court recognized that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments." Id. at 347 U. S. 493 .
What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time:

															"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our Page 411 U. S. 30 recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." Ibid. This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the
vital role of education in a free society, may be found in numerous
opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 , 406 U. S. 213 (BURGER, C.J.), 406 U. S. 237 , 406 U. S.
238 -239 (WHITE, J.), (1972); Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 230 (1963) (BRENNAN, J.); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 212
(1948) (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street R. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907).

															Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our
historic dedication to public education. We are in complete
agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel below that
"the grave significance of education both to the individual and to
our society" cannot be doubted. [ Footnote 69 ] But the importance of a service performed by
the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as
fundamental for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection
Clause. Mr. Justice Page 411 U. S. 31 Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate travel,
admonished that "[v]irtually every state statute affects important
rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 655 , 394 U. S. 661 .
In his view, if the degree of judicial scrutiny of state
legislation fluctuated, depending on a majority's view of the
importance of the interest affected, we would have gone "far toward
making this Court a super-legislature.'" Ibid. We
would, indeed, then be assuming a legislative role, and one for
which the Court lacks both authority and competence. But MR.
JUSTICE STEWART s response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice
Harlan's concern correctly articulates the limits of the
fundamental rights rationale employed in the Court's equal
protection decisions: "The Court today does not "pick out particular human
activities, characterize them as fundamental,' and give them
added protection. . . ." To the contrary, the Court simply
recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and
gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself
demands." Id. at 394 U. S. 642 .
(Emphasis in original.)

															MR. JUSTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline what the
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting
to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that
imposed a one-year durational residency requirement as a
precondition to receiving AFDC benefits, the Court explained:

															"[I]n moving from State to State . . . appellees were exercising
a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." Id. at 394 U. S. 634 .
(Emphasis in original.) Page 411 U. S. 32 The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a
right of constitutional significance, [ Footnote 70 ] and the Court's decision, therefore, did
not require an ad hoc determination as to the social or
economic importance of that right. [ Footnote 71 ] Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only last Term, firmly reiterates that social
importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state
legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case,
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on
tenants in suits brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry
and Wrongful Detainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation
of the statute under "a more stringent standard than mere
rationality." Id. at 405 U. S. 73 .
The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated
"fundamental interests which are particularly important to the
poor," such as the " need for decent shelter'" and the "`right
to retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid. MR.
JUSTICE WHITE's analysis, in his opinion for the Court, is
instructive: "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to
perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of
access Page 411 U. S. 33 to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the
right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord
beyond the term of his lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are
legislative, not judicial, functions." Id. at 74. (Emphasis supplied.)

															Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 (1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the
fact that the "administration of public welfare assistance . . .
involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," id. at 397 U. S. 485 ,
[ Footnote 72 ] provided no
basis for departing from the settled mode of constitutional
analysis of legislative classifications involving questions of
economic and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central
importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by showing
some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78 (1971).

															The lesson of these cases in addressing the question now before
the Court is plain. It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether
education is "fundamental" is not to be found in comparisons of the
relative societal significance of education, as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Page 411 U. S. 34 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); [ Footnote 73 ] Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); [ Footnote 74 ] Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (197); [ Footnote
75 ] Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.
S. 535 (1942). [ Footnote 76 ] Page 411 U. S. 35 Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis
for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the
undisputed importance of education will not, alone, cause this
Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's
social and economic legislation. It is appellees' contention,
however, that education is distinguishable from other services and
benefits provided by the State, because it bears a peculiarly close
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded protection
under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that education is
itself a fundamental personal right, because it is essential to the
effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent
utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between
speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is
meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas"
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools.
Likewise, they argue that the corollary right to receive
information [ Footnote 77 ]
becomes little more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has
not been taught to read, assimilate, and utilize available
knowledge.

															A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the right
to vote. [ Footnote 78 ]
Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be divorced from
the educational foundation Page 411 U. S. 36 of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is to conform to
the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate: a voter
cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and
thought processes have been adequately developed.

															We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has
long afforded zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental
interference with the individual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech
or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable
goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative
form of government is not to be doubted. [ Footnote 79 ] These are indeed goals to be pursued by a
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from governmental
interference. But they are not values to be implemented by judicial
intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities.

															Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of
education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the
present levels of educational expenditures Page 411 U. S. 37 in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any
of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an
interference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved and where -- as is true
in the present case -- no charge fairly could be made that the
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights
of speech and of full participation in the political process.

															Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory
are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is education to be
distinguished from the significant personal interests in the basics
of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might well
buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and
ill-housed are among the most ineffective participants in the
political process, and that they derive the least enjoyment from
the benefits of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 80 ] If so, appellees' thesis would cast serious
doubt on the authority of Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. Normet, supra. We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of
the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right
or liberty, and have found those arguments unpersuasive. In one
further respect, we find this a particularly inappropriate case in
which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly different
from any of the cases in which the Court has Page 411 U. S. 38 applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching
upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of our prior cases
involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or "interfered"
with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or
liberty. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 316 U. S. 536 ; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra at 394 U. S. 634 ; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 405 U. S.
338 -343. A critical distinction between those cases and
the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with
respect to education. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient point: [ Footnote 81 ]

															"This is not a complaint that Congress . . . has
unconstitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to vote, but
rather that Congress violated the Constitution by not extending the
relief effected [to others similarly situated]. . . ."

															"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or deny the
franchise, but, in effect, extends the franchise to persons who
otherwise would be denied it by state law. . . . We need only
decide whether the challenged limitation on the relief effected . .
. was permissible. In deciding that question, the principle that
calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is Page 411 U. S. 39 inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by appellees is
presented only as a limitation on a reform measure aimed at
eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise.
Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations
in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles
that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it
might have gone farther than it did,' . . . that a legislature need
not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' . . . and that 'reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . .'" Id. at 384 U. S.
656 -657. (Emphasis in original.) The Texas system of
school financing is not unlike the federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. Every step leading to the
establishment of the system Texas utilizes today -- including the
decisions permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and
creating and continuously expanding state aid -- was implemented in
an effort to extend public education and to improve its quality.
[ Footnote 82 ] Of course,
every reform that benefits some more than others may be criticized
for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in
substance, the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and
reformatory, and, therefore, should be scrutinized under judicial
principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts and to
the rights reserved to the States under the Constitution. [ Footnote 83 ] Page 411 U. S. 40 C It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in accord
with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not a case in
which the challenged state action must be subjected to the
searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws that create suspect
classifications or impinge upon constitutionally protected
rights.

															We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century of Supreme
Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively
supports the application of the traditional standard of review,
which requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas
provides for the education of its children. We have here nothing
less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas has chosen to
raise and disburse state and local tax revenues. We are asked to
condemn the State's judgment in conferring on political
subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues for
local interests. In so doing, appellees would have the Court
intrude in an area in which it has traditionally deferred to state
legislatures. [ Footnote 84 ]
This Court has often admonished against such interferences with the
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause:

															"The broad discretion as to classification possessed by a
legislature in the field of taxation has long been recognized. . .
. [T]he passage of time has only served to underscore the wisdom of
that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed by
a legislature in formulating sound tax policies. . . . Page 411 U. S. 41 It has . . . been pointed out that in taxation, even more than
in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
classification. Since the members of a legislature necessarily
enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot
have, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by
the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile
and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes. . . ." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83 , 309 U. S. 87 -88
(1940). See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.
S. 435 , 311 U. S. 445 (1940).

															Thus, we stand on familiar ground when we continue to
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise
and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making
of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of
public revenues. Yet we are urged to direct the States either to
alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property
tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme
of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or
purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free
of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no
perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too
rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes
become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.
[ Footnote 85 ] Page 411 U. S. 42 In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves
the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,
another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge
and experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education,
perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of
"intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 487 .
The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a
state-wide public school system suggests that "there will be more
than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them," and
that, within the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts
to tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S.
546 -547. On even the most basic questions in this area,
the scholars and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of
the major Page 411 U. S. 43 sources of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a
demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the
quality of education [ Footnote
86 ] -- an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal
conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case. Related to the
questioned relationship between cost and quality is the equally
unsettled controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education. [ Footnote 87 ] And
the question regarding the most effective relationship between
state boards of education and local school boards, in terms of
their respective responsibilities and degrees of control, is now
undergoing searching reexamination. The ultimate wisdom as to these
and related problems of education is not likely to be divined for
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the
issues. In such circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional
restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued
research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial
solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of
ever-changing conditions. Page 411 U. S. 44 It must be remembered, also, that every claim arising under the
Equal Protection Clause has implications for the relationship
between national and state power under our federal system.
Questions of federalism are always inherent in the process of
determining whether a State's laws are to be accorded the
traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be
subjected instead to rigorous judicial scrutiny. While

															"[t]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional
provisions under which this Court examines state action, [ Footnote 88 ]"

															it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater
potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us,
in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public
education presently in existence in virtually every State.

															The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas'
system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for
strict judicial scrutiny. These same considerations are relevant to
the determination whether that system, with its conceded
imperfections, nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose. It is to this question that we next turn
our attention. III The basic contours of the Texas school finance system have been
traced at the outset of this opinion. We will now describe in more
detail that system and how it operates, as these facts bear
directly upon the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.

															Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school receives its
funds from the State and from its local school Page 411 U. S. 45 district. On a state-wide average, a roughly comparable amount
of funds is derived from each source. [ Footnote 89 ] The State's contribution, under the
Minimum Foundation Program, was designed to provide an adequate
minimum educational offering in every school in the State. Funds
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher --
compensated at the state supported minimum salary -- for every 25
students. [ Footnote 90 ] Each
school district's other supportive personnel are provided for: one
principal for every 30 teachers; [ Footnote 91 ] one "special service" teacher -- librarian,
nurse, doctor, etc. -- for every 20 teachers; [ Footnote 92 ] superintendents, vocational
instructors, counselors, and educators for exceptional children are
also provided. [ Footnote 93 ]
Additional funds are earmarked for current operating expenses, for
student transportation, [ Footnote 94 ] and for free textbooks. [ Footnote 95 ]

															The program is administered by the State Board of Education and
by the Central Education Agency, which also have responsibility for
school accreditation [ Footnote
96 ] and for monitoring the statutory teacher-qualification
standards. [ Footnote 97 ] As
reflected by the 62 increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood
School District over the last three years, [ Footnote 98 ] the State's financial contribution
to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas' school
districts, however, Page 411 U. S. 46 has been content to rely alone on funds from the Foundation
Program.

															By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its Local Fund
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem tax
on property located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was
designed to remain sufficiently low to assure that each district
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational
program. [ Footnote 99 ] Every
district supplements its Foundation grant in this manner. In some
districts, the local property tax contribution is insubstantial, as
in Edgewood, where the supplement was only $26 per pupil in 1967.
In other districts, the local share may far exceed even the total
Foundation grant. In part, local differences are attributable to
differences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which the
market value for any category of property varies from its assessed
value. [ Footnote 100 ] The
greatest inter-district disparities, however, are attributable to
differences in the amount of assessable property available within
any district. Those districts that have more property, or more
valuable property, have a greater capability for supplementing
state funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues are
devoted to paying higher salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the
primary distinguishing attributes of schools in property-affluent
districts are lower pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary
schedules. [ Footnote
101 ] Page 411 U. S. 47 This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas school financing
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned
by disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that
children in less affluent districts have been made the subject of
invidious discrimination. The District Court found that the State
had failed even "to establish a reasonable basis" for a system that
results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp.
at 284. We disagree.

															In its reliance on state, as well as local, resources, the Texas
system is comparable to the systems employed Page 411 U. S. 48 in virtually every other State. [ Footnote 102 ] The power to tax local property for
educational purposes has been recognized in Texas at least since
1883. [ Footnote 103 ] When
the growth of commercial and industrial centers and accompanying
shifts in population began to create disparities in local
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a considerable
investment of state funds.

															The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas legislators and
educators based the Gilmer-Aikin bills was a product of the
pioneering work of two New York educational reformers in the
1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig. [ Footnote 104 ] Their efforts were devoted
to establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum state-wide
educational program without sacrificing the vital element of local
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis Page 411 U. S. 49 represented an accommodation between these two competing forces.
As articulated by Professor Coleman:

															"The history of education since the industrial revolution shows
a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of
society to have educational opportunity for all children and the
desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford
for its own children. [ Footnote 105 ]"

															The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these two
forces. While assuring a basic education for every child in the
State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation
in and control of each district's schools at the local level. In an
era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of
the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for
public education has survived. The merit of local control was
recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions
in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.
S. 451 (1972). MR. JUSTICE STEWART stated there that
"[d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of
one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society." Id. at 407 U. S. 469 .
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in his dissent, agreed that

															"[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support
of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an
educational standpoint as well." Id. at 407 U. S.
478 .

															The persistence of attachment to government at the lowest level
where education is concerned reflects the depth of commitment of
its supporters. In part, local control means, as Professor Coleman
suggests, the freedom to devote more money to the education of
one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity Page 411 U. S. 50 it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that
determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each locality
is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism also
affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely
appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar
strengths of our form of government each State's freedom to "serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments."
[ Footnote 106 ] No area of
social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity of
viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public
education.

															Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' dedication to
local control of education. To the contrary, they attack the school
financing system precisely because, in their view, it does not
provide the same level of local control and fiscal flexibility in
all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be
preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted
in more equality in educational expenditures. While it is no doubt
true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues
provides less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for
some districts than for others, [ Footnote 107 ] Page 411 U. S. 51 the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in which the
State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for
striking down the entire system. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S.
425 -426 (1961). It may not be condemned simply because
it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 485 . Nor must the financing system fail
because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfying the
State's interest, which occasion "less drastic" disparities in
expenditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges
on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties
must it be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 343 ; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 , 364 U. S. 488 (1960). It is also well to remember that even those districts that
have reduced ability to make free decisions with respect to how
much they spend on education still retain, under the present
system, a large measure of authority as to how available funds will
be allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous other
decisions with respect to the operation of the schools. [ Footnote 108 ] The people of Texas
may be Page 411 U. S. 52 justified in believing that other systems of school financing,
which place more of the financial responsibility in the hands of
the State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired local
autonomy. That is, they may believe Page 411 U. S. 53 that along with increased control of the purse strings at the
state level will go increased control over local policies.
[ Footnote 109 ]

															Appellees further urge that the Texas system is
unconstitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability of
local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." They see no
justification for a system that allows, as they contend, the
quality of education to fluctuate on the basis of the fortuitous
positioning of the boundary lines of political subdivisions and the
location of valuable commercial and industrial property. But any
scheme of Page 411 U. S. 54 local taxation -- indeed the very existence of identifiable
local governmental units -- requires the establishment of
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. It is
equally inevitable that some localities are going to be blessed
with more taxable assets than others. [ Footnote 110 ] Nor is local wealth a static quantity.
Changes in the level of taxable wealth within any district may
result from any number of events, some of which local residents can
and do influence. For instance, commercial and industrial
enterprises may be encouraged to locate within a district by
various actions -- public and private.

															Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditures were an
unconstitutional method of providing for education, then it might
be an equally impermissible means of providing other necessary
services customarily financed largely from local property taxes,
including local police and fire protection, public health and
hospitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We
perceive no justification for such a severe denigration of local
property taxation and control as would follow from appellees'
contentions. It has simply never been within the constitutional
prerogative of this Court to nullify state-wide measures for
financing public services merely because the burdens or benefits
thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the
political subdivisions in which citizens live.

															In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school financing
results in unequal expenditures between children Page 411 U. S. 55 who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say that
such disparities are the product of a system that is so irrational
as to be invidiously discriminatory. Texas has acknowledged its
shortcomings, and has persistently endeavored -- not without some
success -- to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditures
without sacrificing the benefits of local participation. The Texas
plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived legislation. It
certainly is not the product of purposeful discrimination against
any group or class. On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of
experience in Texas and elsewhere, and, in major part, is the
product of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving
substance to the presumption of validity to which the Texas system
is entitled, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 (1911), it is important to remember that, at every stage of its
development, it has constituted a "rough accommodation" of
interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable
solutions. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61 , 228 U. S. 69 -70
(1913). One also must remember that the system here challenged is
not peculiar to Texas or to any other State. In its essential
characteristics, the Texas plan for financing public education
reflects what many educators for a half century have thought was an
enlightened approach to a problem for which there is no perfect
solution. We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and educational
authorities in 50 States, especially where the alternatives
proposed are only recently conceived and nowhere yet tested. The
constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is
whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a
legitimate state purpose or interest. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263 , 410 U. S. 270 (1973). We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this
standard. Page 411 U. S. 56 IV In light of the considerable attention that has focused on the
District Court opinion in this case and on its California
predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 ,
487 P.2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It
cannot be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by
the District Court and approved by our dissenting Brothers today
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval in
public education. Some commentators have concluded that, whatever
the contours of the alternative financing programs that might be
devised and approved, the result could not avoid being a beneficial
one. But, just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional
issues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or certain
about predicting the consequences of massive change in the
financing and control of public education. Those who have devoted
the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of
these cases have found no clear or dependable answers, and their
scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the
desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.

															The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by the lack of
consensus with respect to whether it may be said with any assurance
that the poor, the racial minorities, or the children in
overburdened core-city school districts would be benefited by
abrogation of traditional modes of financing education. Unless
there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures on
education across the board -- an event the likelihood of which is
open to considerable question [ Footnote 111 ] -- these groups stand to Page 411 U. S. 57 realize gains in terms of increased per-pupil expenditures only
if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively low
levels, i.e., in those districts that would benefit from
the redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered in
the most impecunious school districts. [ Footnote 112 ] Nor does it now appear that there is
any more than a random chance that racial minorities are
concentrated in property-poor districts. [ Footnote 113 ] Additionally, Page 411 U. S. 58 several research projects have concluded that any financing
alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of expenditures
is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educational
expenditures in the major urban centers, [ Footnote 114 ] a result that would exacerbate,
rather than ameliorate, existing conditions in those areas.

															These practical considerations, of course, play no role in the
adjudication of the constitutional issues presented here. But they
serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional limitations on
this Court's function. The consideration and initiation of
fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation and education
are matters reserved for the legislative processes of the various
States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and
separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly need add that
this Court's action today is not to be viewed as placing its
judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is
apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too
long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly
innovative thinking as to public education, its methods, and its
funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and
greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the
continued attention of the scholars who already Page 411 U. S. 59 have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate
solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic
pressures of those who elect them. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Not all of the children of these complainants attend public
school. One family's children are enrolled in private school
"because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood
Independent School District." Third Amended Complaint, App. 14.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San
Antonio metropolitan area that were originally named as defendants.
After a pretrial conference, the District Court issued an order
dismissing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the
San Antonio Independent School District joined in the plaintiffs'
challenge to the State's school finance system and filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this
Court.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															A three-judge court was properly convened, and there are no
questions as to the District Court's jurisdiction or the direct
appealability of its judgment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 2281.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The trial was delayed for two years to permit extensive pretrial
discovery and to allow completion of a pending Texas legislative
investigation concerning the need for reform of its public school
finance system. 337 F.
Supp. 280 , 285 n. 11 (WD Tex.1971).

															[ Footnote 5 ] 337 F.
Supp. 280 . The District Court stayed its mandate for two years
to provide Texas an opportunity to remedy the inequities found in
its financing program. The court, however, retained jurisdiction to
fashion its own remedial order if the State failed to offer an
acceptable plan. Id. at 286.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Tex.Const., Art. X, § 1 (1845):

															"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, it shall be
the duty of the Legislature of this State to make suitable
provision for the support and maintenance of public schools." Id. § 2:

															"The Legislature shall as early as practicable establish free
schools throughout the State, and shall furnish means for their
support, by taxation on property. . . ."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Tex.Const. of 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1883.

															[ Footnote 8 ] Id. Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															3 Gammel's Laws of Texas 1847-1854, p. 1461. See Tex.Const. Art. 7, §§ 1, 2, 5 (interpretive commentaries); 1 Report
of Governor's Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge
and the Chance 27 (1969) (hereinafter Governor's Committee
Report).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 ( see also the interpretive
commentary); 5 Governor's Committee Report 11-12.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The various sources of revenue for the Available School Fund are
cataloged in A Report of the Adequacy of Texas Schools, prepared by
Texas State Board of Education, 7-15 (1938) (hereinafter Texas
State Bd. of Educ.).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Nov. 5, 1918 ( see interpretive commentary).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															l Governor's Committee Report 35; Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at
5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and
Public Education 48-49 (1970); E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their
Apportionment 21-27 (1905).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															By 1940, one-half of the State's population was clustered in its
metropolitan centers. 1 Governor's Committee Report 35.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Gilmer-Aikin Committee, To Have What We Must 13 (1948).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															R. Still, The Gilmer-Aikin Bills 11-13 (1950); Texas State Bd.
of Educ., supra, n 11.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Still, supra, n. 16 at 12. It should be noted that, during this period,
the median per-pupil expenditure for all schools with an enrollment
of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year. During this same
period, a survey conducted by the State Board of Education
concluded that,

															"in Texas, the best educational advantages offered by the State
at present may be had for the median cost of $52.67 per year per
pupil in average daily attendance."

															Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 56.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg.Sess.1939, c. 7, pp.
274-275 ($22.50 per student); General & Spec.Laws of Texas,
48th Legis., Reg.Sess.1943, c. 161, pp. 262-263 ($25 per
student).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															General & Spec.Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg.Sess.1945, c.
52, pp. 74-75; Still, supra, n 16, at 12.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of a foundation
program, see Still, supra, n 16. See also 5 Governor's Committee
Report 14; Texas Research League, Public School Finance Problems in
Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															For the 1970-1971 school year, this state aid program accounted
for 48% of all public school funds. Local taxation contributed
41.1%, and 10.9% was provided in federal funds. Texas Research
League, supra, n 20, at 9.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															5 Governor's Committee Report 44-48.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															At present, there are 1,161 school districts in Texas. Texas
Research League, supra, n 20, at 12.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															In 1948, the Gilmer-Aikin Committee found that some school
districts were not levying any local tax to support education.
Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 16. The Texas State Board of Education Survey
found that over 400 common and independent school districts were
levying no local property tax in 1935-1936. Texas State Bd. of
Educ., supra, n 11,
at 392.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 15.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															1 Governor's Committee Report 51-53.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 2.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															In the years between 1949 and 1967, the average per-pupil
expenditure for all current operating expenses increased from $206
to $493. In that same period, capital expenditures increased from
$44 to $102 per pupil. 1 Governor's Committee Report 53-54.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															Acts 1949, 51st Legis., p. 625, c. 334, Art. 4, Tex.Educ.Code
Ann. § 16.302 (1972); see generally 3 Governor's Committee
Report 113-146; Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, The Texas
School Finance Case: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L.Educ.
659, 681-682 (1972).

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															The family income figures are based on 1960 census
statistics.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															The Available School Fund, technically, provides a second source
of state money. That Fund has continued as in years past (see text
accompanying nn 16-19, supra ) to distribute uniform per-pupil grants to every
district in the State. In 1968, this Fund allotted $98 per pupil.
However, because the Available School Fund contribution is always
subtracted from a district's entitlement under the Foundation
Program, it plays no significant role in educational finance
today.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															While federal assistance has an ameliorating effect on the
difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor districts,
the District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that
court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant in
assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp. at 284. The State
has not renewed that contention here.

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															A map of Bexar County included in the record shows that Edgewood
and Alamo Heights are among the smallest districts in the county,
and are of approximately equal size. Yet, as the figures above
indicate, Edgewood's student population is more than four times
that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously accounts for a
significant percentage of the differences between the two districts
in per-pupil property values and expenditures. If Alamo Heights had
as many students to educate as Edgewood does (22,000) its per pupil
assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 rather than
$49,000, and its per-pupil expenditures would therefore have been
considerably lower.

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															The figures quoted above vary slightly from those utilized in
the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp. at 282. These trivial
differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance on
slightly different statistical data than we have relied upon.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater
contributions to both school districts over the last several years,
it is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants is
due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries are
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and
possessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced
degrees, receives more state support. In this regard, the Texas
Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of
other States. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 63-125. Because more
dollars have been given to districts that already spend more per
pupil, such Foundation formulas have been described as
"anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage
disparity between the two Texas districts is diminished
substantially by state aid. Alamo Heights derived in 1967-1968
almost 13 times as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The
state aid grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to
approximately two to one, i.e., Alamo Heights had a little
more than twice as much money to spend per pupil from its combined
state and local resources.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 13.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															The Economic Index, which determines each county's share of the
total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was instituted. See text, supra at 411 U. S. 9 -10. It
has frequently been suggested by Texas researchers that the formula
be altered in several respects to provide a more accurate
reflection of local taxpaying ability, especially of urban school
districts. 5 Governor's Committee Report 48; Texas Research League,
Texas Public School Finance: A Majority of Exceptions 31-32 (2d
Interim Report 1972); Berke, Carnevale, Morgan White, supra, n 29, at
680-681.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															The District Court relied on the findings presented in an
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse University. His
sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct
correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and
it level of per-pupil expenditures. But his study found only a
partial correlation between a district's median family income and
per-pupil expenditures. The study also shows, in the relatively few
districts at the extremes, an inverse correlation between
percentage of minorities and expenditures.

															Categorized by Equalized Property Values,

															Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue

															Market Value Median State &

															of Taxable Family Per Cent Local

															Property Income Minority Revenues

															Per Pupil From 1960 Pupils Per Pupil

															Above $100,000 $5,900 8% $815

															(10 districts)

															$100,000-$50,000 $4,425 32% $544

															(26 districts)

															$50,00$30,000 $4,900 23% $483

															(30 districts)

															$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462

															(40 districts)

															Below $10,000 $3,325 79% $305

															(4 districts)

															Although the correlations with respect to family income and race
appear only to exist at the extremes, and although the affiant's
methodology has been questioned ( see Goldstein,
Inter-district Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical
Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120
U.Pa.L.Rev. 504, 523-525, nn. 67, 71 (1972)), insofar as any of
these correlations is relevant to the constitutional thesis
presented in this case, we may accept its basic thrust. But see
infra at 411 U. S. 25 -27.
For a defense of the reliability of the affidavit, see Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29.

															[ Footnote 39 ] E.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

															[ Footnote 40 ] E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.
S. 184 (1964).

															[ Footnote 41 ] See Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 405 U. S. 343 ,
and the cases collected therein.

															[ Footnote 42 ]

															Brief for Appellants 11.

															[ Footnote 43 ] Ibid. [ Footnote 44 ]

															Tr. of Oral Arg. 3; Reply Brief for Appellants 2.

															[ Footnote 45 ] E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S.
12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 (1963).

															[ Footnote 46 ] Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663 (1966); McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.
S. 512 (1973).

															[ Footnote 47 ] See cases cited in text, infra at 411 U. S.
29 -30.

															[ Footnote 48 ] Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 ,
487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870 (Minn.1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118
N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d
457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan., 1973.

															[ Footnote 49 ]

															In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a class
composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school
districts having a "low value of . . . property." Third Amended
Complaint, App. 15. Yet appellees have not defined the term "poor"
with reference to any absolute or functional level of impecunity. See text, infra at 411 U. S. 22 -23. See also Brief for Appellees 1, 3; Tr. of Oral Arg.
221.

															[ Footnote 50 ]

															Appellees' proof at trial focused on comparative differences in
family incomes between residents of wealthy and poor districts.
They endeavored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct
correlation between personal family income and educational
expenditures. See text, infra at 411 U. S. 25 -27.
The District Court may have been relying on this notion of relative
discrimination based on family wealth. Citing appellees'
statistical proof, the court emphasized that "those districts most
rich in property also have the highest median family income .
.while the poor property districts are poor in income. . . ." 337
F. Supp. at 282.

															[ Footnote 51 ]

															At oral argument, and in their brief, appellees suggest that
description of the personal status of the residents in districts
that spend less on education is not critical to their case. In
their view, the Texas system is impermissibly discriminatory even
if relatively poor districts do not contain poor people. Brief for
Appellees 43-44; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20-21. There are indications in
the District Court opinion that it adopted this theory of district
discrimination. The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative
financial status of districts, and, early in the opinion, it
describes appellees' class as being composed of "all . . . children
throughout Texas who live in school districts with low property
valuations." 337 F. Supp. at 281.

															[ Footnote 52 ] Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.
S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 U.
S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.
S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.
S. 214 (1958).

															[ Footnote 53 ]

															Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L.J. 1303, 1328-1329
(1972).

															[ Footnote 54 ] Id. at 1324 and n. 102

															[ Footnote 55 ] Id. at 1328

															[ Footnote 56 ]

															Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discrimination is
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies
directly with the amount of funds expended on it, and that,
therefore, the difference in quality between two schools can be
determined simplistically by looking at the difference in per-pupil
expenditures. This is a matter of considerable dispute among
educators and commentators. See nn. 86 and | 86
and S. 1fn101|>101, infra. [ Footnote 57 ] E.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 137 ,
149; Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 194 ; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S.
495 -496; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S.
367 .

															[ Footnote 58 ]

															Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 13. Indeed, even though local funding
has long been a significant aspect of educational funding, the
State has always viewed providing an acceptable education as one of
its primary functions. See Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n 11, at 1,
7.

															[ Footnote 59 ]

															Brief for Appellants 35; Reply Brief for Appellants 1.

															[ Footnote 60 ]

															An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however,
in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were
made available by the State only to those able to pay a tuition
assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class
of "poor" people -- definable in terms of their inability to pay
the prescribed sum -- who would be absolutely precluded from
receiving an education. That case would present a far more
compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the
case before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good
deal more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It
has provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for
all children, and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate
by state funding and by the local assessment program the
disparities in local tax resources.

															[ Footnote 61 ]

															Also it should be recognized that median income statistics may
not define with any precision the status of individual families
within any given district. A more dependable showing of comparative
wealth discrimination would also examine factors such as the
average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in
any district.

															[ Footnote 62 ] Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.
S. 535 , 406 U. S.
547 -549 (1972); Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1258-1259
(1970); Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining
and Future Finance Systems, 82 Yale L.J. 409, 439-440 (1973).

															[ Footnote 63 ] Supra at 411 U. S. 15 n.
38.

															[ Footnote 64 ]

															Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured in
terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families
residing in the district measured in terms of median family income.
Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan.L.Rev. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation:
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per
pupil, and districts with high assessed value per pupil have low
income per pupil"); Davis, Taxpaying Ability: A Study of the
Relationship Between Wealth and Income in California Counties, in
The Challenge of Change in School Finance, 10th Nat. Educational
Assn. Conf. on School Finance 199 (1967). Note, 81 Yale L.J., supra, n 53. See also Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 522-527.

															[ Footnote 65 ]

															Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v.
Priest defined the class they purported to represent:

															"Plaintiff children claim to represent a class consisting of all
public school pupils in California, 'except children in that school
district . . . which . . . affords the greatest educational
opportunity of all school districts within California.'"

															5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244. See also Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. at 873.

															[ Footnote 66 ]

															Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas system as
one resulting merely in discrimination between districts per
se, since this Court has never questioned the State's power to
draw reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within
its borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U. S. 218 , 377 U. S.
230 -231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 427 (1961); Salsbury v. Maryland, 346 U.
S. 545 , 346 U. S. 552 (1954).

															[ Footnote 67 ] E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 (1973). See MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion, post at 411 U. S.
121 .

															[ Footnote 68 ] See Serrano v. Priest, supra; Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
supra; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at
339-393; Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational
Expenditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37
Mo.L.Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Comment, Educational Financing,
Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich.L.Rev.
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases:
Inter-district Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14
Ariz.L.Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972).

															[ Footnote 69 ]

															337 F. Supp. at 283.

															[ Footnote 70 ] E.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.
S. 745 , 383 U. S.
757 -759 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 , 400 U. S. 229 , 400 U. S.
237 -238 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL,
JJ.).

															[ Footnote 71 ]

															After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 (1970), there could be no lingering question
about the constitutional foundation for the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge, the Court applied the
rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family grant
provision under its AFDC program. A federal district court held the
provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter standard of review.
In the course of reversing the lower court, the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that, in that case, "the
Court found state interference with the constitutionally protected
freedom of interstate travel." Id. at 397 U. S. 484 n. 16.

															[ Footnote 72 ]

															The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 , 397 U. S. 264 (1970) that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care."

															[ Footnote 73 ]

															In Eisenstadt, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptive devices,
finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal
protection standard." 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court recited the
correct form of equal protection analysis:

															"[I]f we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute
impinges upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965)], the
statutory classification would have to be not merely rationally
related to a valid public purpose, but necessary to
the achievement of a compelling state interest." Ibid. (emphasis in original).

															[ Footnote 74 ] Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights cases,
and explains that

															"this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction."

															405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 336 (emphasis supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right
to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted,
even though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 665 ,
"the right to vote in state elections is nowhere expressly
mentioned." See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 135 , 400 U. S.
138 -44 (DOUGLAS, J.), 400 U. S. 229 , 400 U. S.
241 -242 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S.
140 -144; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 , 395 U. S.
625 -630 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 , 393 U. S. 29 , 393 U. S. 30 -31
(1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 , 377 U. S.
554 -562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.
S. 368 , 372 U. S.
379 -381 (1963).

															[ Footnote 75 ]

															In Mosley, the Court struck down a Chicago
anti-picketing ordinance that exempted labor picketing from its
prohibitions. The ordinance was held invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and
finding that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn. The stricter
standard of review was appropriately applied, since the ordinance
was one "affecting First Amendment interests." 408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
101 .

															[ Footnote 76 ] Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a
state law permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals."
Implicit in the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right
of procreation is among the rights of personal privacy protected
under the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.
S. 113 , 410 U. S. 152 (1973).

															[ Footnote 77 ] See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 , 395 U. S.
389 -390 (1969); Stanley v.Georgia, 394 U.
S. 557 , 394 U. S. 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.
S. 301 , 381 U. S.
306 -307 (1965).

															[ Footnote 78 ]

															Since the right to vote, per se, is not a
constitutionally protected right, we assume that appellees'
references to that right are simply shorthand references to the
protected right, implicit in our constitutional system, to
participate in state elections on an equal basis with other
qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process
for determining who will represent any segment of the State's
population. See n 74, supra.

															[ Footnote 79 ]

															The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate interest
in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 384 U. S. 655 (1966), through such devices as literacy tests and age restrictions
on the right to vote. See ibid.; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). And, where those restrictions have been found to promote
intelligent use of the ballot without discriminating against those
racial and ethnic minorities previously deprived of an equal
educational opportunity, this Court has upheld their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 400 U. S. 133 (Black, J.), 400 U. S. 135 , 400 U. S.
144 -147 (DOUGLAS, J.), 400 U. S. 152 , 400 U. S.
216 -217 (Harlan, J.), 400 U. S. 229 , 400 U. S.
231 -236 (BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 400 U. S. 281 , 400 U. S.
282 -284 (STEWART, J.), and Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969).

															[ Footnote 80 ] See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public
Education, 71 Col.L.Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, 411 U. S. 68,
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a
National Tenants' Association, 47 Tex.L.Rev. 1160, 1172-1173, n. 61
(1969).

															[ Footnote 81 ] Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered
voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of education
at an "American-flag" school in that country even though the
language of instruction was other than English. This Court upheld
the questioned provision of the 1965 Act over the claim that it
discriminated against those with a sixth-grade education obtained
in non-English-speaking schools other than the ones designated by
the federal legislation.

															[ Footnote 82 ] Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F.
Supp. 944 (MD Fla.1970), vacated, 401 U.
S. 476 (1971).

															[ Footnote 83 ] See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U. S. 802 (1969).

															[ Footnote 84 ] See, e.g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495 , 301 U. S.
508 -509 (1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v.
Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959).

															[ Footnote 85 ]

															Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace
it. The most likely result of rejection of the existing system
would be state-wide financing of all public education with funds
derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or expansion
of sale and income taxes. See Simon, supra, n 62. The authors of Private
Wealth and Public Education, supra, n 13, at 201-242, suggest an alternative scheme,
known as "district power equalizing." In simplest terms, the State
would guarantee that, at any particular rate of property taxation
the district would receive a stated number of dollars regardless of
the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies to "poorer"
districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" districts
that, because of their higher property values, collect more than
the stated amount at any given rate. This is not the place to weigh
the arguments for and against "district power equalizing," beyond
noting that commentators are in disagreement as to whether it is
feasible, how it would work, and indeed whether it would violate
the equal protection theory underlying appellees' case. President's
Commission on School Finance, Schools, People & Money 32-33
(1972); Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v.
Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 (1972); Brest, Book
Review, 23 Stan.L.Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971); Goldstein, supra, n 38, at
542-543; Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model
Legislative Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc.Action 123, 125
(1971); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public
Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 1970 Wis.L.Rev. 7, 29-30.

															[ Footnote 86 ]

															The quality-cost controversy has received considerable
attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the
following: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis in
the Classroom (1970); U.S. Office of Education, Equality of
Educational Opportunity (1966) (the Coleman Report); On Equality of
Educational Opportunity (F. Mosteller 8 D. Moynihan eds.1972); J.
Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin R. Stout, Schools and Inequality
(1971); President's Commission on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swanson, The Cost-Quality Relationship, in The Challenge of
Change in School Finance, 10th Nat. Educational Assn. Conf. on
School Finance 151 (1967).

															[ Footnote 87 ] See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's
state-wide survey on the goals of education in that State. 1
Governor's Committee Report 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra, n 38, at
519-522; Schoettle, supra, n 80, authorities cited in n 86, supra. [ Footnote 88 ] Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.
S. 522 , 358 U. S. 530 , 358 U. S. 532 (1959) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 659 , 384 U. S. 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 89 ]

															In 1970 Texas expended approximately $2.1 billion for education
and a little over $1 billion came from the Minimum Foundation
Program. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 2

															[ Footnote 90 ]

															Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.13 (1972).

															[ Footnote 91 ] Id. § 16.18.

															[ Footnote 92 ] Id., § 16.15.

															[ Footnote 93 ] Id. §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19.

															[ Footnote 94 ] Id., §§ 16.45, 16.51-16.63.

															[ Footnote 95 ] Id. §§ 12.01-12.04.

															[ Footnote 96 ] Id. § 11.26(5).

															[ Footnote 97 ] Id. § 16.301 et seq. [ Footnote 98 ] See supra at 411 U. S.
13 -14.

															[ Footnote 99 ]

															Gilmer-Aikin Committee, supra, n 15, at 15.

															[ Footnote 100 ]

															There is no uniform state-wide assessment practice in Texas.
Commercial property, for example, might be assessed at 30% of
market value in one county and at 50% in another. 5 Governor'
Committee Report 25-26; Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29, at
666-667, n. 16.

															[ Footnote 101 ]

															Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 18. Texas, in this regard, is not unlike most
other States. One commentator has observed that "disparities in
expenditures appear to be largely explained by variations in
teacher salaries." Simon, supra, n 62, at 413.

															As previously noted, see text accompanying n 86, supra, the extent to
which the quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is
debated inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public
education. While all would agree that there is a correlation up to
the point of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and
academic opportunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include
the effect on the quality of education of pupil-teacher ratios and
of higher teacher salary schedules. E.g., Office of
Education, supra, n 86, at 316-319. The state funding in Texas is designed to assure,
on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, which is
considered to be a favorable ratio by most standards. Whether the
minimum salary of $6,000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract
qualified teachers may be more debatable, depending in major part
upon the location of the school district. But there appear to be
few empirical data that support the advantage of any particular
pupil-teacher ratio or that document the existence of a dependable
correlation between the level of public school teachers' salaries
and the quality of their classroom instruction. An intractable
problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the absence, up to
this time, of satisfactory techniques for judging their ability or
performance. Relatively few school systems have merit plans of any
kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are usually increased
across the board in a way which tends to reward the least deserving
on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries are usually
raised automatically on the basis of length of service and
according to predetermined "steps," extending over 10- to 12-year
periods.

															[ Footnote 102 ]

															President's Commission on School Finance, supra, n 85, at 9. Until recently,
Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely state-funded
educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended its
educational finance statute to permit counties to collect
additional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools.
The rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on
the question before the Court today:

															"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow
counties to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide
educational facilities as good as the people of the counties want
and are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above
and beyond established minimums to provide for their people
encourages the best features of democratic government."

															Haw.Sess.Laws 1968, Act 38, § 1.

															[ Footnote 103 ] See text accompanying n 7, supra. [ Footnote 104 ]

															G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Education in the
State of New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the
contribution of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent
history of educational finance, see Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 39-95.

															[ Footnote 105 ]

															J. Coleman, Foreword to Strayer & Haig, supra, at
vii.

															[ Footnote 106 ] New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.
S. 262 , 285 U. S. 280 , 285 U. S. 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 107 ]

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas system
violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to
guarantee complete freedom of choice to every district. He places
special emphasis on the statutory provision that establishes a
maximum rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local school
district may tax for school maintenance. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §
20.04(d) (1972). The maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case
was litigated in the District Court was $.55 per $100, barely
one-third of the allowable rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, see supra at 411 U. S. 12 , is
the equalized rate for maintenance and for the retirement of
bonds.) Appellees do not claim that the ceiling presently bars
desired tax increases in Edgewood or in any other Texas district.
Therefore, the constitutionality of that statutory provision is not
before us, and must await litigation in a case in which it is
properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F.
Supp. 944 (MD Fla.1970), vacated, 401 U.
S. 476 (1971).

															[ Footnote 108 ]

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL states in his dissenting opinion that the
State's asserted interest in local control is a "mere
sham," post, at 411 U. S. 130 ,
and that it has been offered not as a legitimate justification, but
"as an excuse . . . for inter-district inequality." Id. at 411 U. S. 126 .
In addition to asserting that local control would be preserved and
possibly better served under other systems -- a consideration that
we find irrelevant for the purpose of deciding whether the system
may be said to be supported by a legitimate and reasonable basis --
the dissent suggests that Texas' lack of good faith may be
demonstrated by examining the extent to which the State already
maintains considerable control. The State, we are told, regulates
"the most minute details of local public education," ibid., including textbook selection, teacher
qualifications, and the length of the school day. This assertion,
that genuine local control does not exist in Texas, simply cannot
be supported. It is abundantly refuted by the elaborate statutory
division of responsibilities set out in the Texas Education Code.
Although policy decisionmaking and supervision in certain areas are
reserved to the State, the day-to-day authority over the
"management and control" of all public elementary and secondary
schools is squarely placed on the local school boards.
Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 17.01, 23.26 (1972). Among the innumerable
specific powers of the local school authorities are the following:
the power of eminent domain to acquire land for the construction of
school facilities, id. §§ 17.26, 23.26; the power to hire
and terminate teachers and other personnel, id. §§
13.101-13.103; the power to designate conditions of teacher
employment and to establish certain standards of educational
policy, id. § 13.901; the power to maintain order and
discipline, id. § 21.305, including the prerogative to
suspend students for disciplinary reasons, id. § 21.301;
the power to decide whether to offer a kindergarten program, id. §§ 21.131-21.135, or a vocational training program, id. § 21.111, or a program of special education for the
handicapped, id. § 11.16; the power to control the
assignment and transfer of students, id. §§ 21.074-21.080;
and the power to operate and maintain a school bus program, id. § 16.52. See also Pervis v. LaMarque Ind. School
Dist., 328 F.
Supp. 638 , 642-643 (SD Tex.1971), reversed, 466 F.2d
1054 (CA5 1972); Nichols v. Aldine Ind. School Dist., 356
S.W.2d 182 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962). Local school boards also determine
attendance zones, location of new schools, closing of old ones,
school attendance hours (within limits), grading and promotion
policies subject to general guidelines, recreational and athletic
policies, and a myriad of other matters in the routine of school
administration. It cannot be seriously doubted that, in Texas,
education remains largely a local function, and that the
preponderating bulk of all decisions affecting the schools is made
and executed at the local level, guaranteeing the greatest
participation by those most directly concerned.

															[ Footnote 109 ]

															This theme -- that greater state control over funding will lead
to greater state power with respect to local educational programs
and policies -- is a recurrent one in the literature on financing
public education. Professor Simon, in his thoughtful analysis of
the political ramifications of this case, states that one of the
most likely consequences of the District Court's decision would be
an increase in the centralization of school finance and an increase
in the extent of collective bargaining by teacher unions at the
state level. He suggests that the subjects for bargaining may
include many "non-salary" items, such as teaching loads, class
size, curricular and program choices, questions of student
discipline, and selection of administrative personnel -- matters
traditionally decided heretofore at the local level. Simon, supra, n 62, at
434-436. See, e.g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of
Education, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of
Education 64, 77-79 (C. Bowers, I. Housego & D. Dyke eds.1970);
J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and The State 27 (1959) ("Unless
a local community, through its school board, has some control over
the purse, there can be little real feeling in the community that
the schools are in fact, local schools. . . ."); Howe, Anatomy of a
Revolution, in Saturday Review 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) ("It is an
axiom of American politics that control and power follow money. . .
."); R. Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally Shared Taxes 21
(1931) ("[S]tate administration of taxation is the first step
toward state control of the functions supported by these taxes. . .
."). Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as
detrimental or whether he agrees that the consequence is
inevitable, it certainly cannot be doubted that there is a rational
basis for this concern on the part of parents, educators, and
legislators.

															[ Footnote 110 ]

															This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial
uniformity." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 427 . See also Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S.
230 -231; Salsbury v. Maryland, 346 U.
S. 545 (1954). Cf. Board of Education of Muskogee v.
Oklahoma, 409 F.2d 665, 668 (CA10 1969).

															[ Footnote 111 ]

															Any alternative that calls for significant increases in
expenditures for education, whether financed through increases in
property taxation or through other sources of tax dollars, such as
income and sales taxes, is certain to encounter political barriers.
At a time when nearly every State and locality is suffering from
fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for services of all kinds
burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting tax
increases, there is considerable reason to question whether a
decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems
would result in a marked increase in the financial commitment to
education. See Senate Select Committee on Equal
Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Toward Equal
Educational Opportunity 339-345 (Comm.Print 1972); Berke &
Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone for
School Finance, 21 J.Pub.L. 23, 25-26 (1972); Simon, supra, n. 62 at
420-421. In Texas, it has been calculated that $2.4 billion of
additional school funds would be required to bring all schools in
that State up to the present level of expenditure of all but the
wealthiest districts -- an amount more than double that currently
being spent on education. Texas Research League, supra, n 20, at 16-18. An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 States,
focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some
justification that "each of the undersigned states . . . would
suffer severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants 2 (filed by Montgomery County, Md. et
al.).

															[ Footnote 112 ] See Note, supra, n 53. See also authorities cited n 114, infra. [ Footnote 113 ] See Goldstein, supra, n 38, at 526; Jencks, supra, n 86, at 27; U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law 37
(1972). Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra, n 13, at 356-357, n. 47, have noted that,
in California, for example, "[f]ifty-nine percent . . . of minority
students live in districts above the median [average valuation per
pupil.]" In Bexar County, the largest district by far -- the San
Antonio Independent School District -- is above the local average
in both the amount of taxable wealth per pupil and in median family
income. Yet 72% of its students are Mexican-Americans. And, in
1967-1968, it spent only a very few dollars less per pupil than the
North East and North Side Independent School Districts, which have
only 7% and 18% Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke,
Carnevale, Morgan & White, supra, n 29, at 673.

															[ Footnote 114 ] See Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Issues in School Finance 129
(Comm.Print 1972) (monograph entitled Inequities in School Finance
prepared by Professors Berke and Callahan); U.S. Office of
Education, Finances of Large-City School Systems: A Comparative
Analysis (1972) (HEW publication); U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra, n 113 at
33-36; Simon, supra, n 62, at 410-411, 418.

															MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.

															The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost
every other State, has resulted in a system of public education
that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust. [ Footnote 2/1 ] It does not follow, however,
and I cannot find, that this system violates the Constitution of
the United States. I join the opinion and judgment of the Court
because I am convinced that any other course would mark an
extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The uncharted
directions of such a departure are suggested, I think, by the
imaginative dissenting opinion my Brother MARSHALL has filed
today.

															Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause confers no substantive rights and creates no
substantive liberties. [ Footnote
2/2 ] The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather, is
simply to measure the validity of classifications created
by state laws. Page 411 U. S. 60 There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some
people differently from others. But the basic concern of the Equal
Protection Clause is with state legislation whose purpose or effect
is to create discrete and objectively identifiable classes.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] And, with respect to
such legislation, it has long been settled that the Equal
Protection Clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously
discriminatory -- only by classifications that are wholly arbitrary
or capricious. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.
S. 305 . This settled principle of constitutional law was
compendiously stated in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S.
425 -426, in the following words:

															"Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has
held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite
the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."

															This doctrine is no more than a specific application of one of
the first principles of constitutional adjudication -- the basic
presumption of the constitutional validity of a duly enacted state
or federal law. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv.L.Rev. 129
(1893). Page 411 U. S. 61 Under the Equal Protection Clause, this presumption of
constitutional validity disappears when a State has enacted
legislation whose purpose or effect is to create classes based upon
criteria that, in a constitutional sense, are inherently "suspect."
Because of the historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
prime example of such a "suspect" classification is one that is
based upon race. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 . But
there are other classifications that, at least in some settings,
are also "suspect" -- for example, those based upon national
origin, [ Footnote 2/4 ] alienage,
[ Footnote 2/5 ] indigency, [ Footnote 2/6 ] or illegitimacy. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Moreover, quite apart from the Equal Protection Clause, a state
law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty created or
conferred by the Constitution is, of course, presumptively invalid,
whether or not the law's purpose or effect is to create any
classifications. For example, a law that provided that newspapers
could be published only by people who had resided in the State for
five years could be superficially viewed as invidiously
discriminating against an identifiable class in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. But, more basically, such a law would be
invalid simply because it abridged the freedom of the press.
Numerous cases in this Court illustrate this principle. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Page 411 U. S. 62 In refusing to invalidate the Texas system of financing its
public schools, the Court today applies with thoughtfulness and
understanding the basic principles I have so sketchily summarized.
First, as the Court points out, the Texas system has hardly created
the kind of objectively identifiable classes that are cognizable
under the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Second, even assuming the existence of
such discernible categories, the classifications are in no sense
based upon constitutionally "suspect" criteria. Third, the Texas
system does not rest "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective." Finally, the Texas system
impinges upon no substantive constitutional rights or liberties. It
follows, therefore, under the established principle reaffirmed in
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in McGowan v.
Maryland, supra, that the judgment of the District Court must
be reversed.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ] See New York Times, Mar. 11, 1973, p. 1, col. 1.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															There is one notable exception to the above statement: it has
been established in recent years that the Equal Protection Clause
confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with
other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral
process for determining who will represent any segment of the
State's population. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.
S. 621 ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 , 405 U. S. 336 .
But there is no constitutional right to vote, as such. Minor v.
Happersett , 21 Wall. 162. If there were such a
right, both the Fifteenth Amendment and the Nineteenth Amendment
would have been wholly unnecessary.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] But see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633 , 332 U. S.
644 -646.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 , 403 U. S.
372 .

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S.
12 . "Indigency" means actual or functional indigency; it
does not mean comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative
affluence. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.
S. 137 .

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 ; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 .

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (free
speech); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 (freedom of interstate travel); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (freedom of association); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 ("liberty" conditionally protected by Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.
S. 641 , 384 U. S. 660 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

															Although I agree with my Brother WHITE that the Texas statutory
scheme is devoid of any rational basis, and, for that reason, is
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, I also record my
disagreement with the Court's rather distressing assertion that a
right may be deemed "fundamental" for the purposes of equal
protection analysis only if it is "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." Ante at 411 U. S. 33 -34.
As my Brother MARSHALL convincingly demonstrates, our prior cases
stand for the proposition that "fundamentality" is, in large
measure, a function of the right's importance in terms of the
effectuation of those rights which are in fact, constitutionally
guaranteed. Thus,

															"[a]s the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee
and the nonconstitutional Page 411 U. S. 63 interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when
the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be
adjusted accordingly." Post at 411 U. S.
102 -103.

															Here, there can be no doubt that education is inextricably
linked to the right to participate in the electoral process and to
the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First
Amendment. See post at 411 U. S.
111 -115. This being so, any classification affecting
education must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, and since
even the State concedes that the statutory scheme now before us
cannot pass constitutional muster under this stricter standard of
review, I can only conclude that the Texas school-financing scheme
is constitutionally invalid.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN join, dissenting.

															The Texas public schools are financed through a combination of
state funding, local property tax revenue, and some federal funds.
[ Footnote 3/1 ] Concededly, the
system yields wide disparity in per-pupil revenue among the various
districts. In a typical year, for example, the Alamo Heights
district had total revenues of $594 per pupil, while the Edgewood
district had only $356 per pupil. [ Footnote 3/2 ] The majority and the State concede, as
they must, the existence Page 411 U. S. 64 of major disparities in spendable funds. But the State contends
that the disparities do not invidiously discriminate against
children and families in districts such as Edgewood, because the
Texas scheme is designed

															"to provide an adequate education for all, with local autonomy
to go beyond that as individual school districts desire and are
able. . . . It leaves to the people of each district the choice
whether to go beyond the minimum and, if so, by how much. [ Footnote 3/3 ]"

															The majority advances this rationalization:

															"While assuring a basic education for every child in the State,
it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and
control of each district's schools at the local level."

															I cannot disagree with the proposition that local control and
local decisionmaking play an important part in our democratic
system of government. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.
S. 137 (1971). Much may be left to local option, and
this case would be quite different if it were true that the Texas
system, while insuring minimum educational expenditures in every
district through state funding, extended a meaningful option to all
local districts to increase their per-pupil expenditures, and so to
improve their children's education to the extent that increased
funding would achieve that goal. The system would then arguably
provide a rational and sensible method of achieving the stated aim
of preserving an area for local initiative and decision.

															The difficulty with the Texas system, however, is that it
provides a meaningful option to Alamo Heights and like school
districts, but almost none to Edgewood and those other districts
with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter
districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their
schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through
the use of the Page 411 U. S. 65 real estate property tax. In these districts, the Texas system
utterly fails to extend a realistic choice to parents because the
property tax, which is the only revenue-raising mechanism extended
to school districts, is practically and legally unavailable. That
this is the situation may be readily demonstrated.

															Local school districts in Texas raise their portion of the
Foundation School Program -- the Local Fund Assignment -- by
levying ad valorem taxes on the property located within
their boundaries. In addition, the districts are authorized, by the
state constitution and by statute, to levy ad valorem property taxes in order to raise revenues to support educational
spending over and above the expenditure of Foundation School
Program funds.

															Both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights districts are located in
Bexar County, Texas. Student enrollment in Alamo Heights is 5,432,
in Edgewood 22,862. The per-pupil market value of the taxable
property in Alamo Heights is $49,078, in Edgewood $5,960. In a
typical, relevant year, Alamo Heights had a maintenance tax rate of
$1.20 and a debt service (bond) tax rate of 20� per $100 assessed
evaluation, while Edgewood had a maintenance rate of 52� and a bond
rate of 67�. These rates, when applied to the respective tax bases,
yielded Alamo Heights $1,433,473 in maintenance dollars and
$236,074 in bond dollars, and Edgewood $223,034 in maintenance
dollars and $279,023 in bond dollars. As is readily apparent,
because of the variance in tax bases between the districts,
results, in terms of revenues, do not correlate with effort, in
terms of tax rate. Thus, Alamo Heights, with a tax base
approximately twice the size of Edgewood's base, realized
approximately six times as many maintenance dollars as Edgewood by
using a tax rate only approximately two and one-half times larger.
Similarly, Alamo Heights realized slightly fewer bond Page 411 U. S. 66 dollars by using a bond tax rate less than one-third of that
used by Edgewood.

															Nor is Edgewood's revenue-raising potential only deficient when
compared with Alamo Heights. North East District has taxable
property with a per-pupil market value of approximately $31,000,
but total taxable property approximately four and one-half times
that of Edgewood. Applying a maintenance rate of $1, North East
yielded $2,818,148. Thus, because of its superior tax base, North
East was able to apply a tax rate slightly less than twice that
applied by Edgewood and yield more than 10 times the maintenance
dollars. Similarly, North East, with a bond rate of 45�, yielded
$1,249,159 -- more than four times Edgewood's yield with two-thirds
the rate.

															Plainly, were Alamo Heights or North East to apply the Edgewood
tax rate to its tax base, it would yield far greater revenues than
Edgewood is able to yield applying those same rates to its base.
Conversely, were Edgewood to apply the Alamo Heights or North East
rates to its base, the yield would be far smaller than the Alamo
Heights or North East yields. The disparity is, therefore,
currently operative, and its impact on Edgewood is undeniably
serious. It is evident from statistics in the record that show
that, applying an equalized tax rate of 85� per $100 assessed
valuation, Alamo Heights was able to provide approximately $330 per
pupil in local revenues over and above the Local Fund Assignment.
In Edgewood, on the other hand, with an equalized tax rate of $1.05
per $100 of assessed valuation, $26 per pupil was raised beyond the
Local Fund Assignment. [ Footnote
3/4 ] As previously noted, in Alamo Heights, Page 411 U. S. 67 total per-pupil revenues from local, state, and federal funds
was $594 per pupil, in Edgewood $356. [ Footnote 3/5 ]

															In order to equal the highest yield in any other Bexar County
district, Alamo Heights would be required to tax at the rate of 68�
per $100 of assessed valuation. Edgewood would be required to tax
at the prohibitive rate of $5.76 per $100. But state law places a
$1.50 per $100 ceiling on the maintenance tax rate, a limit that
would surely be reached long before Edgewood attained an equal
yield. Edgewood is thus precluded in law, as well a in fact, from
achieving a yield even close to that of some other district.

															The Equal Protection Clause permits discriminations between
classes, but requires that the classification bear some rational
relationship to a permissible object sought to be attained by the
statute. It is not enough that the Texas system before us seeks to
achieve the valid, rational purpose of maximizing local initiative;
the means chosen by the State must also be rationally related to
the end sought to be achieved. As the Court stated just last Term
in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 , 406 U. S. 172 (1972):

															"The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the
Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this
Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Morey
v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483 (1955); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). " Page 411 U. S. 68 Neither Texas nor the majority heeds this rule. If the State
aims at maximizing local initiative and local choice, by permitting
school districts to resort to the real property tax if they choose
to do so, it utterly fails in achieving its purpose in districts
with property tax bases so low that there is little if any
opportunity for interested parents, rich or poor, to augment school
district revenues. Requiring the State to establish only that
unequal treatment is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without
also requiring the State to show that the means chosen to
effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement,
makes equal protection analysis no more than an empty gesture.
[ Footnote 3/6 ] In my view, the
parents and children in Edgewood, and in like districts, suffer
from an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection
Clause. This does not, of course, mean that local control may not
be a legitimate goal of a school financing system. Nor does it mean
that the State must guarantee each district an equal per-pupil
revenue from the state school financing system. Nor does it mean,
as the majority appears to believe, that, by affirming the decision
below, Page 411 U. S. 69 this Court would be

															"imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints
that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and
experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to
educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing
conditions."

															On the contrary, it would merely mean that the State must
fashion a financing scheme which provides a rational basis for the
maximization of local control, if local control is to remain a goal
of the system, and not a scheme with

															"different treatment be[ing] accorded to persons placed by a
statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute." Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 , 404 U. S. 75 -76
(1971).

															Perhaps the majority believes that the major disparity in
revenues provided and permitted by the Texas system is
inconsequential. I cannot agree, however, that the difference of
the magnitude appearing in this case can sensibly be ignored,
particularly since the State itself considers it so important to
provide opportunities to exceed the minimum state educational
expenditures.

															There is no difficulty in identifying the class that is subject
to the alleged discrimination and that is entitled to the benefits
of the Equal Protection Clause. I need go no farther than the
parents and children in the Edgewood district, who are plaintiffs
here and who assert that they are entitled to the same choice as
Alamo Heights to augment local expenditures for schools but are
denied that choice by state law. This group constitutes a class
sufficiently definite to invoke the protection of the Constitution.
They are as entitled to the protection of the Equal Protection
Clause as were the voters in allegedly underrepresented counties in
the reapportionment case. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S.
204 -208 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.
S. 368 , 372 U. S. 375 (1963); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 , 377 U. S.
654 -556 (1964). And in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), where a challenge to the Page 411 U. S. 70 Texas candidate filing fee on equal protection grounds was
upheld, we noted that the victims of alleged discrimination wrought
by the filing fee

															"cannot be described by reference to discrete and precisely
defined segments of the community as is typical of inequities
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause,"

															but concluded that

															"we would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this
system falls with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates,
according to their economic status." Id. at 405 U. S. 144 .
Similarly, in the present case, we would blink reality to ignore
the fact that school districts, and students in the end, are
differentially affected by the Texas school financing scheme with
respect to their capability to supplement the Minimum Foundation
School Program. At the very least, the law discriminates against
those children and their parents who live in districts where the
per-pupil tax base is sufficiently low to make impossible the
provision of comparable school revenues by resort to the real
property tax which is the only device the State extends for this
purpose.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The heart of the Texas system is embodied in an intricate series
of statutory provisions which make up Chapter 16 of the Texas
Education Code, Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.01 et seq. See
also Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01 et seq., and § 20.10 et seq. [ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The figures discussed are from Plaintiffs' Exhibits 7, 8, and
12. The figures are from the 1967-1968 school year. Because the
various exhibits relied upon different attendance totals, the
per-pupil results do not precisely correspond to the gross figures
quoted. The disparity between districts, rather than the actual
figures, is the important factor.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Brief for Appellants 11-13, 35.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Variable assessment practices are also revealed in this record.
Appellants do not, however, contend that this factor accounts, even
to a small extent, for the inter-district disparities.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The per-pupil funds received from state, federal, and other
sources, while not precisely equal, do not account for the large
differential and are not directly attacked in the present case.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The State of Texas appears to concede that the choice of whether
or not to go beyond the state-provided minimum

															"is easier for some districts than for others. Those districts
with large amounts of taxable property can produce more revenue at
a lower tax rate and will provide their children with a more
expensive education."

															Brief for Appellants 35. The State nevertheless insists that
districts have a choice and that the people in each district have
exercised that choice by providing some real property tax money
over and above the minimum funds guaranteed by the State. Like the
majority, however, the State fails to explain why the Equal
Protection Clause is not violated, or how its goal of providing
local government with realistic choices as to how much money should
be expended on education is implemented, where the system makes it
much more difficult for some than for others to provide additional
educational funds and where, as a practical and legal matter, it is
impossible for some districts to provide the educational budgets
that other districts can make available from real property tax
revenues.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs,
dissenting.

															The Court today decides, in effect, that a State may
constitutionally vary the quality of education which it offers its
children in accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in
the school districts within which they reside. The majority's
decision represents an abrupt departure from the mainstream of
recent state and federal court decisions concerning the
unconstitutionality of state educational financing schemes
dependent upon taxable local wealth. [ Footnote 4/1 ] More unfortunately, though, the Page 411 U. S. 71 majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from our
historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and as
unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in
their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as
citizens. The Court does this despite the absence of any
substantial justification for a scheme which arbitrarily channels
educational resources in accordance with the fortuity of the amount
of taxable wealth within each district.

															In my judgment, the right of every American to an equal start in
life, so far as the provision of a state service as important as
education is concerned, is far too vital to permit state
discrimination on grounds as tenuous as those presented by this
record. Nor can I accept the notion that it is sufficient to remit
these appellees to the vagaries of the political process which,
contrary to the majority's suggestion, has proved singularly
unsuited to the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination.
[ Footnote 4/2 ] I, for one, am
unsatisfied with the hope of an ultimate "political" solution
sometime in the indefinite future while, in the meantime, countless
children unjustifiably receive inferior educations that "may affect
their hearts Page 411 U. S. 72 and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 , 347 U. S. 494 (1954). I must therefore respectfully dissent. I The Court acknowledges that "substantial inter-district
disparities in school expenditures" exist in Texas, ante at 411 U. S. 15 , and
that these disparities are "largely attributable to differences in
the amounts of money collected through local property taxation," ante at 411 U. S. 16 . But
instead of closely examining the seriousness of these disparities
and the invidiousness of the Texas financing scheme, the Court
undertakes an elaborate exploration of the efforts Texas has
purportedly made to close the gaps between its districts in terms
of levels of district wealth and resulting educational funding. Yet
however praiseworthy Texas' equalizing efforts, the issue in this
case is not whether Texas is doing its best to ameliorate the worst
features of a discriminatory scheme, but rather whether the scheme
itself is, in fact, unconstitutionally discriminatory in the face
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. When the Texas financing scheme is taken as a whole, I do not
think it can be doubted that it produces a discriminatory impact on
substantial numbers of the school-age children of the State of
Texas. A Funds to support public education in Texas are derived from
three sources: local ad valorem property taxes; the
Federal Government; and the state government. [ Footnote 4/3 ] It is enlightening to consider these
in order. Page 411 U. S. 73 Under Texas law, the only mechanism provided the local school
district for raising new, unencumbered revenues is the power to tax
property located within its boundaries. [ Footnote 4/4 ] At the same time, the Texas financing
scheme effectively restricts the use of monies raised by local
property taxation to the support of public education within the
boundaries of the district in which they are raised, since any such
taxes must be approved by a majority of the property-taxpaying
voters of the district. [ Footnote
4/5 ]

															The significance of the local property tax element of the Texas
financing scheme is apparent from the fact that it provides the
funds to meet some 40% of the cost of public education for Texas as
a whole. [ Footnote 4/6 ] Yet the
amount of revenue that any particular Texas district can raise is
dependent on two factors -- its tax rate and its amount of taxable
property. The first factor is determined by the property-taxpaying
voters of the district. [ Footnote
4/7 ] But, regardless of the enthusiasm of the local voters for
public Page 411 U. S. 74 education, the second factor -- the taxable property wealth of
the district -- necessarily restricts the district's ability to
raise funds to support public education. [ Footnote 4/8 ] Thus, even though the voters of two Texas
districts may be willing to make the same tax effort, the results
for the districts will be substantially different if one is
property rich, while the other is property poor. The necessary
effect of the Texas local property tax is, in short, to favor
property-rich districts and to disfavor property-poor ones.

															The seriously disparate consequences of the Texas local property
tax, when that tax is considered alone, are amply illustrated by
data presented to the District Court by appellees. These data
included a detailed study of a sample of 110 Texas school districts
[ Footnote 4/9 ] for the 1967-1968
school year conducted by Professor Joel S. Berke of Syracuse
University's Educational Finance Policy Institute. Among other
things, this study revealed that the 10 richest districts examined,
each of which had more than $100,000 in taxable property per pupil,
raised through local effort an average of $610 per pupil, whereas
the four poorest districts studied, each of which had less than
$10,000 in taxable property per pupil, were able Page 411 U. S. 75 to raise only an average of $63 per pupil. [ Footnote 4/10 ] And, as the Court effectively
recognizes, ante at 411 U. S. 27 ,
this correlation between the amount of taxable property per pupil
and the amount of local revenues per pupil holds true for the 96
districts in between the richest and poorest districts. [ Footnote 4/11 ]

															It is clear, moreover, that the disparity of per-pupil revenues
cannot be dismissed as the result of lack of local effort -- that
is, lower tax rates by property-poor districts. To the contrary,
the data presented below indicate that the poorest districts tend
to have the highest tax rates and the richest districts tend to
have the lowest tax rates. [ Footnote
4/12 ] Yet, despite the apparent extra effort being made by the
poorest districts, they are unable even to begin to match the
richest districts in terms of the production of local revenues. For
example, the 10 richest districts studied by Professor Berke were
able to produce $585 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of
31� Page 411 U. S. 76 on $100 of equalized valuation, but the four poorest districts
studied, with an equalized rate of 70� on $100 of equalized
valuation, were able to produce only $60 per pupil. [ Footnote 4/13 ] Without more, this
state-imposed system of educational funding presents a serious
picture of widely varying treatment of Texas school districts, and
thereby of Texas school children, in terms of the amount of funds
available for public education.

															Nor are these funding variations corrected by the other aspects
of the Texas financing scheme. The Federal Government provides
funds sufficient to cover only some 10% of the total cost of public
education in Texas. [ Footnote
4/14 ] Furthermore, while these federal funds are not
distributed in Texas solely on a per-pupil basis, appellants do not
here contend that they are used in such a way as to ameliorate
significantly the widely varying consequences for Texas school
districts and school children of the local property tax element of
the state financing scheme. [ Footnote
4/15 ]

															State funds provide the remaining some 50% of the monies spent
on public education in Texas. [ Footnote 4/16 ] Technically, they are distributed under
two programs. The first is the Available School Fund, for which
provision is made in the Texas Constitution. [ Footnote 4/17 ] The Available Page 411 U. S. 77 School Fund is composed of revenues obtained from a number of
sources, including receipts from the state ad valorem property tax, one-fourth of all monies collected by the occupation
tax, annual contributions by the legislature from general revenues,
and the revenues derived from the Permanent School Fund. [ Footnote 4/18 ] For the 1970-1971 school
year, the Available School Fund contained $296,000,000. The Texas
Constitution requires that this money be distributed annually on a
per capita basis [ Footnote 4/19 ]
to the local school districts. Obviously, such a flat grant could
not alone eradicate the funding differentials attributable to the
local property tax. Moreover, today the Available School Fund is in
reality simply one facet of the second state financing program, the
Minimum Foundation School Program, [ Footnote 4/20 ] since each district's annual share of
the Fund is deducted from the sum to which the district is entitled
under the Foundation Program. [ Footnote 4/21 ]

															The Minimum Foundation School Program provides funds for three
specific purposes: professional salaries, current operating
expenses, and transportation expenses. [ Footnote 4/22 ] The State pays, on an overall basis, for
approximately 80% of the cost of the Program; the remaining 20% is
distributed among the local school districts under the Page 411 U. S. 78 Local Fund Assignment. [ Footnote
4/23 ] Each district's share of the Local Fund Assignment is
determined by a complex "economic index" which is designed to
allocate a larger share of the costs to property-rich districts
than to property-poor districts. [ Footnote 4/24 ] Each district pays its share with
revenues derived from local property taxation.

															The stated purpose of the Minimum Foundation School Program is
to provide certain basic funding for each local Texas school
district. [ Footnote 4/25 ] At the
same time, the Program was apparently intended to improve, to some
degree, the financial position of property-poor districts relative
to property-rich districts, since -- through the use of the
economic index -- an effort is made to charge a disproportionate
share of the costs of the Program to rich districts. [ Footnote 4/26 ] It bears noting, however,
that substantial criticism has been leveled at the practical
effectiveness of the economic index system of local cost
allocation. [ Footnote 4/27 ] In
theory, the index is designed to ascertain the relative ability of
each district to contribute to the Local Fund Assignment from local
property taxes. Yet the index is not developed simply on the basis
of each district's taxable wealth. It also takes into account the
district's relative income from manufacturing, mining, and
agriculture, its payrolls, and its scholastic population. [ Footnote 4/28 ] Page 411 U. S. 79 It is difficult to discern precisely how these latter factors
are predictive of a district's relative ability to raise revenues
through local property taxes. Thus, in 1966, one of the consultants
who originally participated in the development of the Texas
economic index adopted in 1949 told the Governor's Committee on
Public School Education: "The Economic Index approach to evaluating
local ability offers a little better measure than sheer chance, but
not much." [ Footnote 4/29 ]

															Moreover, even putting aside these criticisms of the economic
index as a device for achieving meaningful district wealth
equalization through cost allocation, poor districts still do not
necessarily receive more state aid than property-rich districts.
For the standards which currently determine the amount received
from the Foundation School Program by any particular district
[ Footnote 4/30 ] favor
property-rich districts. [ Footnote
4/31 ] Thus, focusing on the same Page 411 U. S. 80 Edgewood Independent and Alamo Heights School Districts which
the majority uses for purposes of illustration, we find that, in
1967-1968, property-rich Alamo Heights, [ Footnote 4/32 ] which raised $333 per pupil on an
equalized tax rate of 85� per $100 valuation, received $225 per
pupil from the Foundation School Program, while property-poor
Edgewood, [ Footnote 4/33 ] which
raised only $26 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per
$100 valuation, received only $222 per pupil from the Foundation
School Program. [ Footnote 4/34 ]
And, more recent data, which indicate that, for the 1970-1971
school year, Alamo Heights received $491 per pupil from Page 411 U. S. 81 the Program while Edgewood received only $356 per pupil, hardly
suggest that the wealth gap between the districts is being narrowed
by the State Program. To the contrary, whereas, in 1967-1968, Alamo
Heights received only $3 per pupil, or about 1%, more than Edgewood
in state aid, by 1970-1971, the gap had widened to a difference of
$135 per pupil, or about 38%. [ Footnote 4/35 ] It was data of this character that
prompted the District Court to observe that "the current [state
aid] system tends to subsidize the rich at the expense of the poor,
rather than the other way around." [ Footnote 4/36 ] 337 F.
Supp. 280 , 282. And even the appellants go no further here than
to venture that the Minimum Foundation School Program has "a mildly
equalizing effect." [ Footnote
4/37 ]

															Despite these facts, the majority continually emphasizes how
much state aid has, in recent years, been given Page 411 U. S. 82 to property-poor Texas school districts. What the Court fails to
emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more state aid is being
given to property-rich Texas school districts on top of their
already substantial local property tax revenues. [ Footnote 4/38 ] Under any view, then, it is
apparent that the state aid provided by the Foundation School
Program fails to compensate for the large funding variations
attributable to the local property tax element of the Texas
financing scheme. And it is these stark differences in the
treatment of Texas school districts and school children inherent in
the Texas financing scheme, not the absolute amount of state aid
provided to any particular school district, that are the crux of
this case. There can, moreover, be no escaping the conclusion that
the local property tax which is dependent upon taxable district
property wealth is an essential feature of the Texas scheme for
financing public education. [ Footnote
4/39 ] B The appellants do not deny the disparities in educational
funding caused by variations in taxable district property wealth.
They do contend, however, that whatever the differences in
per-pupil spending among Texas districts, there are no
discriminatory consequences for the children of the disadvantaged
districts. They recognize that what is at stake in this case is the
quality of the Page 411 U. S. 83 public education provided Texas children in the districts in
which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion that the
quality of education in any particular district is determined by
money -- beyond some minimal level of funding which they believe to
be assured every Texas district by the Minimum Foundation School
Program. In their view, there is simply no denial of equal
educational opportunity to any Texas school children as a result of
the widely varying per-pupil spending power provided districts
under the current financing scheme.

															In my view, though, even an unadorned restatement of this
contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity. Authorities
concerned with educational quality no doubt disagree as to the
significance of variations in per-pupil spending. [ Footnote 4/40 ] Indeed, conflicting expert
testimony was presented to the District Court in this case
concerning the effect of spending variations on educational
achievement. [ Footnote 4/41 ] We
sit, however, not to resolve disputes over educational theory, but
to enforce our Constitution. It is an inescapable fact that, if one
district has more funds available per pupil than another district,
the Page 411 U. S. 84 former will have greater choice in educational planning than
will the latter. In this regard, I believe the question of
discrimination in educational quality must be deemed to be an
objective one that looks to what the State provides its children,
not to what the children are able to do with what they receive.
That a child forced to attend an underfunded school with poorer
physical facilities, less experienced teachers, larger classes, and
a narrower range of courses than a school with substantially more
funds -- and thus with greater choice in educational planning --
may nevertheless excel is to the credit of the child, not the
State, cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.
S. 337 , 305 U. S. 349 (1938). Indeed, who can ever measure for such a child the
opportunities lost and the talents wasted for want of a broader,
more enriched education? Discrimination in the opportunity to learn
that is afforded a child must be our standard.

															Hence, even before this Court recognized its duty to tear down
the barriers of state-enforced racial segregation in public
education, it acknowledged that inequality in the educational
facilities provided to students may be discriminatory state action
as contemplated by the Equal Protection Clause. As a basis for
striking down state-enforced segregation of a law school, the Court
in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 , 339 U. S.
633 -634 (1950), stated:

															"[W]e cannot find substantial equality in the educational
opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In
terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity
for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library,
availability of law review and similar activities, the
[whites-only] Law School is superior. . . . It is difficult to
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools
would consider the question close. " Page 411 U. S. 85 See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education, 339 U. S. 637 (1950). Likewise, it is difficult to believe that, if the children
of Texas had a free choice, they would choose to be educated in
districts with fewer resources, and hence with more antiquated
plants, less experienced teachers, and a less diversified
curriculum. In fact, if financing variations are so insignificant
to educational quality, it is difficult to understand why a number
of our country's wealthiest school districts, which have no legal
obligation to argue in support of the constitutionality of the
Texas legislation, have nevertheless zealously pursued its cause
before this Court. [ Footnote
4/42 ]

															The consequences, in terms of objective educational input, of
the variations in district funding caused by the Texas financing
scheme are apparent from the data introduced before the District
Court. For example, in 1968-1969, 100% of the teachers in the
property-rich Alamo Heights School District had college degrees.
[ Footnote 4/43 ] By contrast,
during the same school year, only 80.02% of the teachers had
college degrees in the property poor Edgewood Independent school
District. [ Footnote 4/44 ] Also,
in 1968-1969, approximately 47% of the teachers in the Edgewood
District were on emergency teaching permits, whereas only 11% of
the teachers in Alamo Heights were on such permits. [ Footnote 4/45 ] This is undoubtedly a
reflection of the fact that the top of Edgewood's teacher salary
scale was Page 411 U. S. 86 approximately 80% of Alamo Heights'. [ Footnote 4/46 ] And, not surprisingly, the
teacher-student ratio varies significantly between the two
districts. [ Footnote 4/47 ] In
other wards, as might be expected, a difference in the funds
available to districts results in a difference in educational
inputs available for a child's public education in Texas. For
constitutional purposes, I believe this situation, which is
directly attributable to the Texas financing scheme, raises a grave
question of state-created discrimination in the provision of public
education. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 , 395 U. S.
293 -294 (1969).

															At the very least, in view of the substantial inter-district
disparities in funding and in resulting educational inputs shown by
appellees to exist under the Texas financing scheme, the burden of
proving that these disparities do not, in fact, affect the quality
of children's education must fall upon the appellants. Cf.
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F.
Supp. 844 , 860-861 (DC 1971). Yet appellants made no effort in
the District Court to demonstrate that educational quality is not
affected by variations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in
this Court, they have argued no more than that the relationship is
ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome appellees' prima facie showing of state-created discrimination
between the school children of Texas with respect to objective
educational opportunity.

															Nor can I accept the appellants' apparent suggestion that the
Texas Minimum Foundation School Program effectively eradicates any
discriminatory effects otherwise resulting from the local property
tax element of the Page 411 U. S. 87 Texas financing scheme. Appellants assert that, despite its
imperfections, the Program "does guarantee an adequate education to
every child." [ Footnote 4/48 ] The
majority, in considering the constitutionality of the Texas
financing scheme, seems to find substantial merit in this
contention, for it tells us that the Foundation Program "was
designed to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in
every school in the State," ante at 411 U. S. 45 , and
that the Program "assur[es] a basic education for every child," ante at 411 U. S. 49 . But
I fail to understand how the constitutional problems inherent in
the financing scheme are eased by the Foundation Program. Indeed,
the precise thrust of the appellants' and the Court's remarks are
not altogether clear to me.

															The suggestion may be that the state aid received via the
Foundation Program sufficiently improves the position of
property-poor districts vis-a-vis property-rich districts
-- in terms of educational funds -- to eliminate any claim of
inter-district discrimination in available educational resources
which might otherwise exist if educational funding were dependent
solely upon local property taxation. Certainly the Court has
recognized that to demand precise equality of treatment is normally
unrealistic, and thus minor differences inherent in any practical
context usually will not make out a substantial equal protection
claim. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.
S. 189 , 404 U. S.
194 -195 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 , 372 U. S.
495 -496 (1963); Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499 , 282 U. S. 501 (1931). But, as has already been seen, we are hardly presented here
with some de minimis claim of discrimination resulting
from the play necessary in any functioning system; to the contrary,
it is clear that the Foundation Program utterly fails to Page 411 U. S. 88 ameliorate the seriously discriminatory effects of the local
property tax. [ Footnote 4/49 ]

															Alternatively, the appellants and the majority may believe that
the Equal Protection Clause cannot be offended by substantially
unequal state treatment of persons who are similarly situated so
long as the State provides everyone with some unspecified amount of
education which evidently is "enough." [ Footnote 4/50 ] The basis for such a novel view is far
from clear. It is, of course, true that the Constitution does not
require precise equality in the treatment of all persons. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter explained:

															"The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause aims is not
a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal
protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. .
. . The Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 , 310 U. S. 147 (1940). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 , 372 U. S. 357 (1963); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.
S. 464 , 335 U. S. 466 (1948). Page 411 U. S. 89 But this Court has never suggested that, because some "adequate"
level of benefits is provided to all, discrimination in the
provision of services is therefore constitutionally excusable. The
Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to the minimal
sufficiency, but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state
action. It mandates nothing less than that "all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 , 253 U. S. 415 (1920).

															Even if the Equal Protection Clause encompassed some theory of
constitutional adequacy, discrimination in the provision of
educational opportunity would certainly seem to be a poor candidate
for its application. Neither the majority nor appellants inform us
how judicially manageable standards are to be derived for
determining how much education is "enough" to excuse constitutional
discrimination. One would think that the majority would heed its
own fervent affirmation of judicial self-restraint before
undertaking the complex task of determining at large what level of
education is constitutionally sufficient. Indeed, the majority's
apparent reliance upon the adequacy of the educational opportunity
assured by the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program seems
fundamentally inconsistent with its own recognition that
educational authorities are unable to agree upon what makes for
educational quality, see ante at 411 U. S. 42 -43
and n. 86 and at 411 U. S. 47 n.
101. If, as the majority stresses, such authorities are uncertain
as to the impact of various levels of funding on educational
quality, I fail to see where it finds the expertise to divine that
the particular levels of funding provided by the Program assure an
adequate educational opportunity -- much less an education
substantially equivalent in quality to that which a higher level of
funding might provide. Certainly appellants' mere assertion before
this Court of the adequacy of the education guaranteed by the
Minimum Page 411 U. S. 90 Foundation School Program cannot obscure the constitutional
implications of the discrimination in educational funding and
objective educational inputs resulting from the local property tax
-- particularly since the appellees offered substantial
uncontroverted evidence before the District Court impugning the now
much-touted "adequacy" of the education guaranteed by the
Foundation Program. [ Footnote
4/51 ]

															In my view, then, it is inequality -- not some notion of gross
inadequacy -- of educational opportunity that raises a question of
denial of equal protection of the laws. I find any other approach
to the issue unintelligible, and without directing principle. Here,
appellees have made a substantial showing of wide variations in
educational funding and the resulting educational opportunity
afforded to the school children of Texas. This discrimination is,
in large measure, attributable to significant disparities in the
taxable wealth of local Texas school districts. This is a
sufficient showing to raise a substantial question of
discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. [ Footnote 4/52 ] Page 411 U. S. 91 C Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas financing
scheme, both the appellants and the majority raise substantial
questions concerning the precise character of the disadvantaged
class in this case. The District Court concluded that the Texas
financing scheme draws "distinction between groups of citizens
depending upon the wealth of the district in which they live," and
thus creates a disadvantaged class composed of persons living in
property-poor districts. See 337 F. Supp. at 282. See
also id. at 281. In light of the data introduced before the
District Court, the conclusion that the school children of
property-poor districts constitute a sufficient class for our
purposes seems indisputable to me.

															Appellants contend, however, that, in constitutional terms, this
case involves nothing more than discrimination against local school
districts, not against individuals, since, on its face, the state
scheme is concerned only with the provision of funds to local
districts. The result of the Texas financing scheme, appellants
suggest, is merely that some local districts have more available
revenues for education; others have less. In that respect, Page 411 U. S. 92 they point out, the States have broad discretion in drawing
reasonable distinctions between their political subdivisions. See Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U. S. 218 , 377 U. S. 231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 427 (1961); Salsbury v. Maryland, 346 U.
S. 545 , 346 U. S.
550 -554 (1954).

															But this Court has consistently recognized that, where there is,
in fact, discrimination against individual interests, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not
inapplicable simply because the discrimination is based upon some
group characteristic such as geographic location. See Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U. S. 1 , 403 U. S. 4 (1971); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 , 377 U.S.
565 -566 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.
S. 368 , 372 U. S. 379 (1963). Texas has chosen to provide free public education for all
its citizens, and it has embodied that decision in its
constitution. [ Footnote 4/53 ]
Yet, having established public education for its citizens, the
State, as a direct consequence of the variations in local property
wealth endemic to Texas' financing scheme, has provided some Texas
school children with substantially less resources for their
education than others. Thus, while, on its face, the Texas scheme
may merely discriminate between local districts, the impact of that
discrimination falls directly upon the children whose educational
opportunity is dependent upon where they happen to live.
Consequently, the District Court correctly concluded that the Texas
financing scheme discriminates, from a constitutional perspective,
between school children on the basis of the amount of taxable
property located within their local districts.

															In my Brother STEWART's view, however, such a description of the
discrimination inherent in this case is apparently not sufficient,
for it fails to define the "kind of objectively identifiable
classes" that he evidently perceives Page 411 U. S. 93 to be necessary for a claim to be "cognizable under the Equal
Protection Clause," ante at 411 U. S. 62 . He
asserts that this is also the view of the majority, but he is
unable to cite, nor have I been able to find, any portion of the
Court's opinion which remotely suggests that there is no
objectively identifiable or definable class in this case. In any
event, if he means to suggest that an essential predicate to equal
protection analysis is the precise identification of the particular
individuals who compose the disadvantaged class, I fail to find the
source from which he derives such a requirement. Certainly such
precision is not analytically necessary. So long as the basis of
the discrimination is clearly identified, it is possible to test it
against the State's purpose for such discrimination -- whatever the
standard of equal protection analysis employed. [ Footnote 4/54 ] This is clear from our decision
only last Term in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972), where the Court, in striking down Texas'
primary filing fees as violative of equal protection, found no
impediment to equal protection analysis in the fact that the
members of the disadvantaged class could not be readily identified.
The Court recognized that the filing fee system tended

															"to deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of
their choosing; at the same time it gives the affluent the power to
place on the ballot their own names or the names of persons they
favor." Id. at 405 U. S. 144 .
The Page 411 U. S. 94 Court also recognized that

															"[t]his disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot be
described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments
of the community as is typical of inequities challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause. . . ." Ibid. Nevertheless it concluded that

															"we would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this
system falls with unequal weight on voters . . . according to their
economic status." Ibid. The nature of the classification in Bullock was clear, although the precise membership of the
disadvantaged class was not. This was enough in Bullock for purposes of equal protection analysis. It is enough here.

															It may be, though, that my Brother STEWART is not in fact,
demanding precise identification of the membership of the
disadvantaged class for purposes of equal protection analysis, but
is merely unable to discern with sufficient clarity the nature of
the discrimination charged in this case. Indeed, the Court itself
displays some uncertainty as to the exact nature of the
discrimination and the resulting disadvantaged class alleged to
exist in this case. See ante at 411 U. S. 120 .
It is, of course, essential to equal protection analysis to have a
firm grasp upon the nature of the discrimination at issue. In fact,
the absence of such a clear, articulable understanding of the
nature of alleged discrimination in a particular instance may well
suggest the absence of any real discrimination. But such is hardly
the case here.

															A number of theories of discrimination have, to be sure, been
considered in the course of this litigation. Thus, the District
Court found that, in Texas, the poor and minority group members
tend to live in property-poor districts, suggesting discrimination
on the basis of both personal wealth and race. See 337 F.
Supp. at 282 and n. 3. The Court goes to great lengths to discredit
the data upon which the District Court relied, and thereby its
conclusion that poor people live in property-poor districts.
[ Footnote 4/55 ] Page 411 U. S. 95 Although I have serious doubts as to the correctness of the
Court's analysis in rejecting the data submitted below, [ Footnote 4/56 ] I have no need to join
issue on these factual disputes. Page 411 U. S. 96 I believe it is sufficient that the overarching form of
discrimination in this case is between the school children of Texas
on the basis of the taxable property wealth of the districts in
which they happen to live. To understand both the precise nature of
this discrimination and the parameters of the disadvantaged class,
it is sufficient to consider the constitutional principle which
appellees contend is controlling in the context of educational
financing. In their complaint, appellees asserted that the
Constitution does not permit local district wealth to be
determinative of educational opportunity. [ Footnote 4/57 ] This is simply another way of saying, as
the District Court concluded, that, consistent with the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws, "the quality of public education
may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state
as a whole." 337 F. Supp. at 284. Under such a principle, the
children of a district are excessively advantaged if that district
has more taxable property per pupil than the average amount of
taxable property per pupil considering the State as a whole. By
contrast, the children of a district are disadvantaged if that
district has less taxable property per pupil than the state
average. The majority attempts to disparage such a definition of
the disadvantaged class as the product of an "artificially defined
level" of district wealth. Ante at 411 U. S. 28 . But
such is clearly not the case, for this is the Page 411 U. S. 97 definition unmistakably dictated by the constitutional principle
for which appellees have argued throughout the course of this
litigation. And I do not believe that a clearer definition of
either the disadvantaged class of Texas school children or the
allegedly unconstitutional discrimination suffered by the members
of that class under the present Texas financing scheme could be
asked for, much less needed. [ Footnote 4/58 ] Whether this discrimination, against the
school children of property-poor districts, inherent in the Texas
financing scheme, is violative of the Equal Protection Clause is
the question to which we must now turn. II To avoid having the Texas financing scheme struck down because
of the inter-district variations in taxable property wealth, the
District Court determined that it was insufficient for appellants
to show merely that the State's scheme was rationally related to
some legitimate state purpose; rather, the discrimination inherent
in the scheme had to be shown necessary to promote a "compelling
state interest" in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The
basis for this determination was twofold: first, the financing
scheme divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which
the District Court viewed as highly suspect; and second, the
discriminatory scheme directly affects what it considered to be a
"fundamental interest," namely, education.

															This Court has repeatedly held that state discrimination which
either adversely affects a "fundamental interest," see, e.g.,
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 405 U. S.
336 -342 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S.
629 -631 (1969), or is based on a distinction of a
suspect character, see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 , 403 U. S.
372 Page 411 U. S. 98 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.
S. 184 , 379 U. S.
191 -192 (1964), must be carefully scrutinized to ensure
that the scheme is necessary to promote a substantial, legitimate
state interest. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 405 U. S.
342 -343; Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 394 U. S. 634 .
The majority today concludes, however, that the Texas scheme is not
subject to such a strict standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause. Instead, in its view, the Texas scheme must be
tested by nothing more than that lenient standard of rationality
which we have traditionally applied to discriminatory state action
in the context of economic and commercial matters. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S.
425 -426; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.
S. 457 , 354 U. S.
465 -466 (1957); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. at 253 U. S. 415 ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 -79
(1911). By so doing, the Court avoids the telling task of searching
for a substantial state interest which the Texas financing scheme,
with its variations in taxable district property wealth, is
necessary to further. I cannot accept such an emasculation of the
Equal Protection Clause in the context of this case. A To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement with the
Court's rigidified approach to equal protection analysis. See
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S.
519 -521 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 , 404 U. S. 90 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The Court apparently seeks to
establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review --
strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in
the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Page 411 U. S. 99 Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular
classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and
societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn. I find, in fact, that many of the Court's
recent decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to equal
protection analysis for which I previously argued -- that is, an
approach in which

															"concentration [is] placed upon the character of the
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals
in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits
that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in
support of the classification." Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 397 U. S.
520 -521 (dissenting opinion).

															I therefore cannot accept the majority's labored efforts to
demonstrate that fundamental interests, which call for strict
scrutiny of the challenged classification, encompass only
established rights which we are somehow bound to recognize from the
text of the Constitution itself. To be sure, some interests which
the Court has deemed to be fundamental for purposes of equal
protection analysis are themselves constitutionally protected
rights. Thus, discrimination against the guaranteed right of
freedom of speech has called for strict judicial scrutiny. See
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972). Further, every citizen's right to travel
interstate, although nowhere expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, has long been recognized as implicit in the premises
underlying that document: the right "was conceived from the
beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the
Constitution created." United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 , 383 U. S. 758 (1966). See also Crandall v.
Nevada , 6 Wall. 35, 73 U. S. 48 (1868). Consequently, the Court has required that a state
classification affecting the constitutionally Page 411 U. S. 100 protected right to travel must be "shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest." Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 634 . But it will not do to suggest that the
"answer" to whether an interest is fundamental for purposes of
equal protection analysis is always determined by whether that
interest "is a right . . . explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution," ante at 411 U. S. 33 -34.
[ Footnote 4/59 ]

															I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right
to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.
S. 535 541 (1942) or the right to vote in state
elections, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 (1964) or the right to an appeal from a criminal
conviction, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S.
12 (1956). These are instances in which, due to the
importance of the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a
strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state
treatment. But the Court has never said or indicated that these are
interests which independently enjoy full-blown constitutional
protection.

															Thus, in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.
S. 200 (1927), the Court refused to recognize a
substantive constitutional guarantee of the right to procreate.
Nevertheless, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 316 U. S. 541 the Court, without impugning the continuing validity of Buck v.
Bell, held that "strict scrutiny" of state discrimination
affecting procreation "is essential," for "[m]arriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race." Recently, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.
S. 113 , 410 U. S.
152 -154 (1973), Page 411 U. S. 101 the importance of procreation has, indeed, been explained on the
basis of its intimate relationship with the constitutional right of
privacy which we have recognized. Yet the limited stature thereby
accorded any "right" to procreate is evident from the fact that, at
the same time, the Court reaffirmed its initial decision in Buck v. Bell. See Roe v. Wade, supra, at 410 U. S.
154 .

															Similarly, the right to vote in state elections has been
recognized as a "fundamental political right," because the Court
concluded very early that it is "preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , 118 U. S. 370 (1886); see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 377 U. S.
561 -562. For this reason,

															"this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. " Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 336 (emphasis added). The final source of such protection from
inequality in the provision of the state franchise is, of course,
the Equal Protection Clause. Yet it is clear that whatever degree
of importance has been attached to the state electoral process when
unequally distributed, the right to vote in state elections has
itself never been accorded the stature of an independent
constitutional guarantee. [ Footnote
4/60 ] See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.
S. 112 (1970); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621 , 395 U. S.
626 -629 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 383 U. S. 665 (1966). Page 411 U. S. 102 Finally, it is likewise "true that a State is not required by
the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to
appellate review at all." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 351 U. S. 18 .
Nevertheless, discrimination adversely affecting access to an
appellate process which a State has chosen to provide has been
considered to require close judicial scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Illinois, supra; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). [ Footnote 4/61 ]

															The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests that the
process of determining which interests are fundamental is a
difficult one. But I do not think the problem is insurmountable.
And I certainly do not accept the view that the process need
necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective
"picking-and-choosing" between various interests, or that it must
involve this Court in creating "substantive constitutional rights
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws," ante at 411 U. S. 33 .
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally
guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental
should be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. The task
in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes Page 411 U. S. 103 more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied
when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be
adjusted accordingly. Thus, it cannot be denied that interests such
as procreation, the exercise of the state franchise, and access to
criminal appellate processes are not fully guaranteed to the
citizen by our Constitution. But these interests have nonetheless
been afforded special judicial consideration in the face of
discrimination because they are, to some extent, interrelated with
constitutional guarantees. Procreation is now understood to be
important because of its interaction with the established
constitutional right of privacy. The exercise of the state
franchise is closely tied to basic civil and political rights
inherent in the First Amendment. And access to criminal appellate
processes enhances the integrity of the range of rights [ Footnote 4/62 ] implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of due process of law. Only if we closely
protect the related interests from state discrimination do we
ultimately ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee
itself. This is the real lesson that must be taken from our
previous decisions involving interests deemed to be
fundamental.

															The effect of the interaction of individual interests with
established constitutional guarantees upon the degree of care
exercised by this Court in reviewing state discrimination affecting
such interests is amply illustrated by our decision last Term in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). In Baird, the Court struck down as violative of
the Equal Protection Clause a state statute which denied unmarried
persons access to contraceptive devices on the same basis as
married persons. The Court Page 411 U. S. 104 purported to test the statute under its traditional standard
whether there is some rational basis for the discrimination
effected. Id. at 405 U. S.
446 -447. In the context of commercial regulation, the
Court has indicated that the Equal Protection Clause "is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to
the achievement of the State's objective." See, e.g., McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 425 ; Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.
S. 552 , 330 U. S. 557 (1947). And this lenient standard is further weighted in the
State's favor by the fact that "[a] statutory discrimination will
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
[by the Court] to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 366 U. S. 426 .
But, in Baird, the Court clearly did not adhere to these
highly tolerant standards of traditional rational review. For
although there were conceivable state interests intended to be
advanced by the statute -- e.g., deterrence of premarital
sexual activity and regulation of the dissemination of potentially
dangerous articles -- the Court was not prepared to accept these
interests on their face, but instead proceeded to test their
substantiality by independent analysis. See 405 U.S. at 405 U. S.
449 -454. Such close scrutiny of the State's interests
was hardly characteristic of the deference shown state
classifications in the context of economic interests. See,
e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, supra. Yet I think the Court's action was entirely appropriate, for access
to and use of contraceptives bears a close relationship to the
individual's constitutional right of privacy. See 405 U.S.
at 405 U. S.
453 -454; id. at 405 U. S.
463 -464 (WHITE, J., concurring in result). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S.
152 -153.

															A similar process of analysis with respect to the invidiousness
of the basis on which a particular classification is drawn has also
influenced the Court as to the Page 411 U. S. 105 appropriate degree of scrutiny to be accorded any particular
case. The highly suspect character of classifications based on
race, [ Footnote 4/63 ]
nationality, [ Footnote 4/64 ] or
alienage [ Footnote 4/65 ] is well
established. The reasons why such classifications call for close
judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups
have frequently been recognized as "discrete and insular
minorities" who are relatively powerless to protect their interests
in the political process. See Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. at 403 U. S. 372 ; cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.
S. 144 , 304 U. S.
152 -153, n. 4 (1938). Moreover, race, nationality, or
alienage is,

															"'in most circumstances, irrelevant' to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose, Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81 , 320 U. S.
100 ." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 192 .
Instead, lines drawn on such bases are frequently the reflection of
historic prejudices, rather than legislative rationality. It may be
that all of these considerations, which make for particular
judicial solicitude in the face of discrimination on the basis of
race, nationality, or alienage, do not coalesce -- or at least not
to the same degree -- in other forms of discrimination.
Nevertheless, these considerations have undoubtedly influenced the
care with which the Court has scrutinized other forms of
discrimination.

															In James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972), the Court held unconstitutional a state statute which
provided for recoupment from indigent convicts of legal defense
fees paid by the State. The Court found that the statute
impermissibly differentiated between indigent criminals in debt to
the State and civil judgment debtors, since criminal debtors were
denied various protective exemptions Page 411 U. S. 106 afforded civil judgment debtors. [ Footnote 4/66 ] The Court suggested that, in reviewing
the statute under the Equal Protection Clause, it was merely
applying the traditional requirement that there be " some
rationality'" in the line drawn between the different types of
debtors. I.d. at 407 U. S. 140 .
Yet it then proceeded to scrutinize the statute with less than
traditional deference and restraint. Thus, the Court recognized
"that state recoupment statutes may betoken legitimate state
interests" in recovering expenses and discouraging fraud.
Nevertheless, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court, concluded
that "these interests are not thwarted by requiring more even
treatment of indigent criminal defendants with other classes of
debtors to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference.
State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may
serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of
indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect." Id. at 407 U. S.
141 -142. The Court, in short, clearly did not consider
the problems of fraud and collection that the state legislature
might have concluded were peculiar to indigent criminal defendants
to be either sufficiently important or at least sufficiently
substantiated to justify denial of the protective exemptions
afforded to all civil judgment debtors, to a class composed
exclusively of indigent criminal debtors.

															Similarly, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S.
71 (1971), the Court, in striking down a state statute
which gave men Page 411 U. S. 107 preference over women when persons of equal entitlement apply
for assignment as an administrator of a particular estate, resorted
to a more stringent standard of equal protection review than that
employed in cases involving commercial matters. The Court indicated
that it was testing the claim of sex discrimination by nothing more
than whether the line drawn bore "a rational relationship to a
state objective," which it recognized as a legitimate effort to
reduce the work of probate courts in choosing between competing
applications for letters of administration. Id. at 404 U. S. 76 .
Accepting such a purpose, the Idaho Supreme Court had thought the
classification to be sustainable on the basis that the legislature
might have reasonably concluded that, as a rule, men have more
experience than women in business matters relevant to the
administration of an estate. 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638
(1970). This Court, however, concluded that

															"[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members of the other merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."

															404 U.S. at 404 U. S. 76 .
This Court, in other words, was unwilling to consider a theoretical
and unsubstantiated basis for distinction -- however reasonable it
might appear -- sufficient to sustain a statute discriminating on
the basis of sex. James and Reed can only be understood as
instances in which the particularly invidious character of the
classification caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with more
than traditional care the rationality of state discrimination.
Discrimination on the basis of past criminality and on the basis of
sex posed for the Court the specter of forms of discrimination
which it implicitly recognized to have deep social and legal roots
without necessarily having any basis in actual differences.
Still, Page 411 U. S. 108 the Court's sensitivity to the invidiousness of the basis for
discrimination is perhaps most apparent in its decisions protecting
the interests of children born out of wedlock from discriminatory
state action. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 (1968).

															In Weber, the Court struck down a portion of a state
workmen's compensation statute that relegated unacknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased to a lesser status with
respect to benefits than that occupied by legitimate children of
the deceased. The Court acknowledged the true nature of its inquiry
in cases such as these: "What legitimate state interest does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the
classification endanger?" Id. at 406 U. S. 173 .
Embarking upon a determination of the relative substantiality of
the State's justifications for the classification, the Court
rejected the contention that the classifications reflected what
might be presumed to have been the deceased's preference of
beneficiaries as "not compelling . . . where dependency on the
deceased is a prerequisite to anyone's recovery. . . ." Ibid. Likewise, it deemed the relationship between the
State's interest in encouraging legitimate family relationships and
the burden placed on the illegitimates too tenuous to permit the
classification to stand. Ibid. A clear insight into the
basis of the Court's action is provided by its conclusion:

															"[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way
of deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social
opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal
Protection Page 411 U. S. 109 Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws
relating to status of birth. . . ." Id. at 406 U. S.
175 -176. Status of birth, like the color of one's skin,
is something which the individual cannot control, and should
generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet
illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence,
discrimination on the basis of birth -- particularly when it
affects innocent children -- warrants special judicial
consideration.

															In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has
consistently adjusted the care with which it will review state
discrimination in light of the constitutional significance of the
interests affected and the invidiousness of the particular
classification. In the context of economic interests, we find that
discriminatory state action is almost always sustained, for such
interests are generally far removed from constitutional guarantees.
Moreover,

															"[t]he extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up
rational bases for state regulation in that area may in many
instances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion from the Court's
earlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect interests
that have more than enough power to protect themselves in the
legislative halls." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 520 (dissenting opinion). But the situation differs markedly when
discrimination against important individual interests with
constitutional implications and against particularly disadvantaged
or powerless classes is involved. The majority suggests, however,
that a variable standard of review would give this Court the
appearance of a "super-legislature." Ante at 411 U. S. 31 . I
cannot agree. Such an approach seems to me a part of the guarantees
of our Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppression
of and discrimination against discrete, powerless minorities which
underlie that document. In truth, Page 411 U. S. 110 the Court itself will be open to the criticism raised by the
majority so long as it continues on its present course of
effectively selecting in private which cases will be afforded
special consideration without acknowledging the true basis of its
action. [ Footnote 4/67 ] Opinions
such as those in Reed and James seem drawn more
as efforts to shield, rather than to reveal, the true basis of the
Court's decisions. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to a
political body such as a legislature, but it is not appropriate to
this Court. Open debate of the bases for the Court's action is
essential to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking
process. Only in this way can we avoid the label of legislature and
ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

															Nevertheless, the majority today attempts to force this case
into the same category for purposes of equal protection analysis as
decisions involving discrimination affecting commercial interests.
By so doing, the majority ingles this case out for analytic
treatment at odds with what seems to me to be the clear trend of
recent decisions in this Court, and thereby ignores the
constitutional importance of the interest at stake and the
invidiousness of the particular classification, factors that call
for far more than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing
scheme which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination
inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care demanded
by the interest and classification present in this case, the
unconstitutionality of that scheme is unmistakable. B Since the Court now suggests that only interests guaranteed by
the Constitution are fundamental for purposes of equal protection
analysis, and since it rejects Page 411 U. S. 111 the contention that public education is fundamental, it follows
that the Court concludes that public education is not
constitutionally guaranteed. It is true that this Court has never
deemed the provision of free public education to be required by the
Constitution. Indeed, it has on occasion suggested that
state-supported education is a privilege bestowed by a State on its
citizens. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
at 305 U. S. 349 .
Nevertheless, the fundamental importance of education is amply
indicated by the prior decisions of this Court, by the unique
status accorded public education by our society, and by the close
relationship between education and some of our most basic
constitutional values.

															The special concern of this Court with the educational process
of our country is a matter of common knowledge. Undoubtedly, this
Court's most famous statement on the subject is that contained in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. at 347 U. S.
493 :

															"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. . . ."

															Only last Term, the Court recognized that "[p]roviding public
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 , 406 U. S. 213 (1972). This is clearly borne out by the fact that, in 48 Page 411 U. S. 112 of our 50 States, the provision of public education is mandated
by the state constitution. [ Footnote
4/68 ] No other state function is so uniformly recognized
[ Footnote 4/69 ] as an essential
element of our society's wellbeing. In large measure, the
explanation for the special importance attached to education must
rest, as the Court recognized in Yoder, id. at 406 U. S. 221 ,
on the facts that "some degree of education is necessary to prepare
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open
political system . . . ," and that "education prepares individuals
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."
Both facets of this observation are suggestive of the substantial
relationship which education bears to guarantees of our
Constitution.

															Education directly affects the ability of a child to exercise
his First Amendment rights, both as a source and as a receiver of
information and ideas, whatever interests he may pursue in life.
This Court's decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 , 354 U. S. 250 (1957), speaks of the right of students "to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding. . . ." Thus,
we have not casually described the classroom as the
" marketplace of ideas.'" Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U. S. 589 , 385 U. S. 603 (1967). The opportunity for formal education may not necessarily be
the essential determinant of an individual's ability to enjoy
throughout his life the rights of free speech and
association Page 411 U. S. 113 guaranteed to him by the First Amendment. But such an
opportunity may enhance the individual's enjoyment of those rights
not only during, but also following, school attendance. Thus, in
the final analysis,

															"the pivotal position of education to success in American
society and its essential role in opening up to the individual the
central experiences of our culture lend it an importance that is
undeniable. [ Footnote 4/70 ]"

															Of particular importance is the relationship between education
and the political process. "Americans regard the public schools as
a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 230 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Education serves the essential
function of instilling in our young an understanding of and
appreciation for the principles and operation of our governmental
processes. [ Footnote 4/71 ]
Education may instill the interest and provide the tools necessary
for political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has frequently been
suggested that education is the dominant factor affecting political
consciousness and participation. [ Footnote 4/72 ] A system of

															"[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental Page 411 U. S. 114 policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 , 393 U. S. 32 (1968). But of most immediate and direct concern must be the
demonstrated effect of education on the exercise of the franchise
by the electorate. The right to vote in federal elections is
conferred by Art. I, § 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment of the
Constitution, and access to the state franchise has been afforded
special protection because it is "preservative of other basic civil
and political rights," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 562 .
Data from the Presidential Election of 1968 clearly demonstrate a
direct relationship between participation in the electoral process
and level of educational attainment, [ Footnote 4/73 ] and, as this Court recognized in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.
S. 285 , 395 U. S. 296 (1969), the quality of education offered may Page 411 U. S. 115 influence a child's decision to "enter or remain in school." It
is this very sort of intimate relationship between a particular
personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees that has
heretofore caused the Court to attach special significance, for
purposes of equal protection analysis, to individual interests such
as procreation and the exercise of the state franchise. [ Footnote 4/74 ]

															While ultimately disputing little of this, the majority seeks
refuge in the fact that the Court has

															"never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or
the most informed electoral choice." Ante at 411 U. S. 36 .
This serves only to blur what is in fact, at stake. With due
respect, the issue is neither provision of the most effective
speech nor of the most informed vote. Appellees Page 411 U. S. 116 do not now seek the best education Texas might provide. They do
seek, however, an end to state discrimination resulting from the
unequal distribution of taxable district property wealth that
directly impairs the ability of some districts to provide the same
educational opportunity that other districts can provide with the
same or even substantially less tax effort. The issue is, in other
words, one of discrimination that affects the quality of the
education which Texas has chosen to provide its children; and, the
precise question here is what importance should attach to education
for purposes of equal protection analysis of that discrimination.
As this Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. at 347 U. S. 493 ,
the opportunity of education, "where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." The factors just considered, including the relationship
between education and the social and political interests enshrined
within the Constitution, compel us to recognize the fundamentality
of education and to scrutinize with appropriate care the bases for
state discrimination affecting equality of educational opportunity
in Texas' school districts [ Footnote
4/75 ] -- a conclusion Page 411 U. S. 117 which is only strengthened when we consider the character of the
classification in this case. C The District Court found that, in discriminating between Texas
school children on the basis of the amount of taxable property
wealth located in the district in which they live, the Texas
financing scheme created a form of wealth discrimination. This
Court has frequently recognized that discrimination on the basis of
wealth may create a classification of a suspect character, and
thereby call for exacting judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.
S. 353 (1963); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs
of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802 , 394 U. S. 807 (1969). The majority, however, considers any wealth classification
in this case to lack certain essential characteristics which it
contends are common to the instances of wealth discrimination that
this Court has heretofore recognized. We are told that, in every
prior case involving a wealth classification, the members of the
disadvantaged class have

															"shared two distinguishing characteristics: because Page 411 U. S. 118 of their impecunity, they were completely unable to pay for some
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute
deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Ante at 411 U. S. 20 . I
cannot agree. The Court's distinctions may be sufficient to explain
the decisions in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.
S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.
S. 395 (1971); and even Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972). But they are not, in fact, consistent with the decisions in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663 (1966), or Griffin v. Illinois, supra, or Douglas v. California, supra. In Harper, the Court struck down, as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause, an annual Virginia poll tax of $1.50,
payment of which by persons over the age of 21 was a prerequisite
to voting in Virginia elections. In part, the Court relied on the
fact that the poll tax interfered with a fundamental interest --
the exercise of the state franchise. In addition, though, the Court
emphasized that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property .
. . are traditionally disfavored." 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 668 .
Under the first part of the theory announced by the majority, the
disadvantaged class in Harper, in terms of a wealth
analysis, should have consisted only of those too poor to afford
the $1.50 necessary to vote. But the Harper Court did not
see it that way. In its view, the Equal Protection Clause "bars a
system which excludes [from the franchise] those unable to pay a
fee to vote or who fail to pay. " Ibid. (Emphasis
added.) So far as the Court was concerned, the "degree of the
discrimination [was] irrelevant." Ibid. Thus, the Court
struck down the poll tax in toto; it did not order merely
that those too poor to pay the tax be exempted; complete impecunity
clearly was not determinative of the limits of the disadvantaged
class, nor was it essential to make an equal protection claim. Page 411 U. S. 119 Similarly, Griffin and Douglas refute the
majority's contention that we have in the past required an absolute
deprivation before subjecting wealth classifications to strict
scrutiny. The Court characterizes Griffin as a case
concerned simply with the denial of a transcript or an adequate
substitute therefor, and Douglas as involving the denial
of counsel. But, in both cases, the question was, in fact, whether
"a State that [grants] appellate review can do so in a way
that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of
their poverty." Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 351 U. S. 18 (emphasis added). In that regard, the Court concluded that
inability to purchase a transcript denies "the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to
pay the costs in advance," ibid. (emphasis added), and
that "the type of an appeal a person is afforded . . .
hinges upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of
counsel," Douglas v. California, supra, at 372 U. S.
355 -356 (emphasis added). The right of appeal itself was
not absolutely denied to those too poor to pay, but, because of the
cost of a transcript and of counsel, the appeal was a substantially
less meaningful right for the poor than for the rich. [ Footnote 4/76 ] It was on these terms that
the Court found a denial of equal protection, and those terms
clearly encompassed degrees of discrimination on the Page 411 U. S. 120 basis of wealth which do not amount to outright denial of the
affected right or interest. [ Footnote
4/77 ]

															This is not to say that the form of wealth classification in
this case does not differ significantly from those recognized in
the previous decisions of this Court. Our prior eases have dealt
essentially with discrimination on the basis of personal wealth.
[ Footnote 4/78 ] Here, by
contrast, the Page 411 U. S. 121 children of the disadvantaged Texas school districts are being
discriminated against not necessarily because of their personal
wealth or the wealth of their families, but because of the taxable
property wealth of the residents of the district in which they
happen to live. The appropriate question, then, is whether the same
degree of judicial solicitude and scrutiny that has previously been
afforded wealth classifications is warranted here.

															As the Court points out, ante at 411 U. S. 28 -29,
no previous decision has deemed the presence of just a wealth
classification to be sufficient basis to call forth rigorous
judicial scrutiny of allegedly discriminatory state action. Compare, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra,
with, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.
S. 137 (1971). That wealth classifications alone have
not necessarily been considered to bear the same high degree of
suspectness as have classifications based on, for instance, race or
alienage may be explainable on a number of grounds. The "poor" may
not be seen as politically powerless as certain discrete and
insular minority groups. [ Footnote
4/79 ] Personal poverty may entail much the same social stigma
as historically attached to certain racial or ethnic groups.
[ Footnote 4/80 ] But personal
poverty is not a permanent disability; its shackles may be escaped.
Perhaps most importantly, though, personal wealth may not
necessarily share the general irrelevance as a basis for
legislative action that race or nationality is recognized to have.
While the "poor" have frequently been a Page 411 U. S. 122 legally disadvantaged group, [ Footnote 4/81 ] it cannot be ignored that social
legislation must frequently take cognizance of the economic status
of our citizens. Thus, we have generally gauged the invidiousness
of wealth classifications with an awareness of the importance of
the interests being affected and the relevance of personal wealth
to those interests. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
supra. When evaluated with these considerations in mind, it seems to me
that discrimination on the basis of group wealth in this case
likewise calls for careful judicial scrutiny. First, it must be
recognized that, while local district wealth may serve other
interests, [ Footnote 4/82 ] it
bears no relationship whatsoever to the interest of Texas school
children in the educational opportunity afforded them by the State
of Texas. Given the importance of that interest, we must be
particularly sensitive to the invidious characteristics of any form
of discrimination that is not clearly intended to serve it, as
opposed to some other distinct state interest. Discrimination on
the basis of group wealth may not, to be sure, reflect the social
stigma frequently attached to personal poverty. Nevertheless,
insofar as group wealth discrimination involves wealth over which
the disadvantaged individual has no significant control, [ Footnote 4/83 ] it represents in fact, a
more serious basis of discrimination than does personal wealth. For
such discrimination Page 411 U. S. 123 is no reflection of the individual's characteristics or his
abilities. And thus -- particularly in the context of a
disadvantaged class composed of children -- we have previously
treated discrimination on a basis which the individual cannot
control as constitutionally disfavored. Cf. Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 (1968).

															The disability of the disadvantaged class in this case extends
as well into the political processes upon which we ordinarily rely
a adequate for the protection and promotion of all interests. Here
legislative reallocation of the State's property wealth must be
sought in the face of inevitable opposition from significantly
advantaged districts that have a strong vested interest in the
preservation of the status quo, a problem not completely
dissimilar to that faced by underrepresented districts prior to the
Court's intervention in the process of reapportionment, [ Footnote 4/84 ] see Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S.
191 -192 (1962).

															Nor can we ignore the extent to which, in contrast to our prior
decisions, the State is responsible for the wealth discrimination
in this instance. Griffin, Douglas, Williams, Tate, and
our other prior cases have dealt with discrimination on the basis
of indigency which was attributable to the operation of the private
sector. But we have no such simple de facto wealth
discrimination here. The means for financing public education in
Texas are selected and specified by the State. It is the State that
has created local school districts, and tied educational funding to
the local property tax, and thereby to local district wealth. At
the same time, governmentally Page 411 U. S. 124 imposed land use controls have undoubtedly encouraged and
rigidified natural trends in the allocation of particular areas for
residential or commercial use, [ Footnote 4/85 ] and thus determined each district's
amount of taxable property wealth. In short, this case, in contrast
to the Court's previous wealth discrimination decisions, can only
be seen as "unusual in the extent to which governmental action is
the cause of the wealth classifications." [ Footnote 4/86 ]

															In the final analysis, then, the invidious characteristics of
the group wealth classification present in this case merely serve
to emphasize the need for careful judicial scrutiny of the State's
justifications for the resulting inter-district discrimination in
the educational opportunity afforded to the school children of
Texas. D The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for state
discrimination is essentially the same in all equal protection
cases: we must consider the substantiality of the state interests
sought to be served, and we must scrutinize the reasonableness of
the means by which the State has sought to advance its interests. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 95 .
Differences in the application of this test are, in my view, a
function of the constitutional importance of the interests at stake
and the invidiousness of the particular classification. In terms of
the asserted state interests, the Court has indicated that it will
require, for instance, a "compelling," Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 634 , or a "substantial" Page 411 U. S. 125 or "important," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 343 ,
state interest to justify discrimination affecting individual
interests of constitutional significance. Whatever the differences,
if any, in these descriptions of the character of the state
interest necessary to sustain such discrimination, basic to each
is, I believe, a concern with the legitimacy and the reality of the
asserted state interests. Thus, when interests of constitutional
importance are at stake, the Court does not stand ready to credit
the State's classification with any conceivable legitimate purpose,
[ Footnote 4/87 ] but demands a
clear showing that there are legitimate state interests which the
classification was in fact, intended to serve. Beyond the question
of the adequacy of the State's purpose for the classification, the
Court traditionally has become increasingly sensitive to the means
by which a State chooses to act as its action affects more directly
interests of constitutional significance. See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 , 389 U. S. 265 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 , 364 U. S. 488 (1960). Thus, by now, "less restrictive alternatives" analysis is
firmly established in equal protection jurisprudence. See Dunn
v. Blumstein, supra, at 405 U. S. 343 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 627 .
It seems to me that the range of choice we are willing to accord
the State in selecting the means by which it will act, and the care
with which we scrutinize the effectiveness of the means which the
State selects, also must reflect the constitutional importance of
the interest affected and the invidiousness of the particular
classification. Here, both the nature of the interest and the
classification dictate close judicial scrutiny of the purposes
which Texas seeks to serve with its present educational
financing Page 411 U. S. 126 scheme and of the means it has selected to serve that
purpose.

															The only justification offered by appellants to sustain the
discrimination in educational opportunity caused by the Texas
financing scheme is local educational control. Presented with this
justification, the District Court concluded that

															"[n]ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling
state interests for their classifications based upon wealth, they
fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these
classifications."

															337 F. Supp. at 284. I must agree with this conclusion.

															At the outset, I do not question that local control of public
education, as an abstract matter, constitutes a very substantial
state interest. We observed only last Term that "[d]irect control
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is
a need that is strongly felt in our society." Wright v. Council
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 , 407 U. S. 469 (1972). See also id. at 407 U. S.
477 -478 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). The State's interest
in local educational control -- which certainly includes questions
of educational funding -- has deep roots in the inherent benefits
of community support for public education. Consequently, true state
dedication to local control would present, I think, a substantial
justification to weigh against simply inter-district variations in
the treatment of a State's school children. But I need not now
decide how I might ultimately strike the balance were we confronted
with a situation where the State's sincere concern for local
control inevitably produced educational inequality. For, on this
record, it is apparent that the State's purported concern with
local control is offered primarily as an excuse, rather than as a
justification for inter-district inequality.

															In Texas, state-wide laws regulate in fact, the most minute
details of local public education. For example, Page 411 U. S. 127 the State prescribes required courses. [ Footnote 4/88 ] All textbooks must be submitted for
state approval, [ Footnote 4/89 ]
and only approved textbooks may be used. [ Footnote 4/90 ] The State has established the
qualifications necessary for teaching in Texas public schools and
the procedures for obtaining certification. [ Footnote 4/91 ] The State has even legislated on the
length of the school day. [ Footnote
4/92 ] Texas' own courts have said:

															"As a result of the acts of the Legislature, our school system
is not of mere local concern, but it is state-wide. While a school
district is local in territorial limits, it is an integral part of
the vast school system which is coextensive with the confines of
the State of Texas." Treadaway v. Whitney Independent School District, 205
S.W.2d 97, 99 Tex.Ct. Civ.App. (1947). See also El Dorado
Independent School District v. Tisdale, 3 S.W.2d 420, 422
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).

															Moreover, even if we accept Texas' general dedication to local
control in educational matters, it is difficult to find any
evidence of such dedication with respect to fiscal matters. It
ignores reality to suggest -- as the Court does, ante at 411 U. S. 49 -50
-- that the local property tax element of the Texas financing
scheme reflects a conscious legislative effort to provide school
districts with local fiscal control. If Texas had a system truly
dedicated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality of
the educational opportunity provided in each district to vary with
the decision of the voters in that district as Page 411 U. S. 128 to the level of sacrifice they wish to make for public
education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the
opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the
best education in the State by imposing the highest tax rate.
Instead, the quality of the educational opportunity offered by any
particular district is largely determined by the amount of taxable
property located in the district -- a factor over which local
voters can exercise no control.

															The study introduced in the District Court showed a direct
inverse relationship between equalized taxable district property
wealth and district tax effort with the result that the
property-poor districts making the highest tax effort obtained the
lowest per-pupil yield. [ Footnote
4/93 ] The implications of this situation for local choice are
illustrated by again comparing the Edgewood and Alamo Heights
School Districts. In 1967-1968, Edgewood, after contributing its
share to the Local Fund Assignment, raised only $26 per pupil
through its local property tax, whereas Alamo Heights was able to
raise $333 per pupil. Since the funds received through the Minimum
Foundation School Program are to be used only for minimum
professional salaries, transportation costs, and operating
expenses, it is not hard to see the lack of local choice with
respect to higher teacher salaries to attract more and better
teachers, physical facilities, library books, and facilities,
special courses, or participation in special state and federal
matching funds programs -- under which a property-poor district
such as Edgewood is forced to labor. [ Footnote 4/94 ] In fact, because of the difference in
taxable local property wealth, Edgewood would have to tax itself
almost nine times as heavily to obtain the same Page 411 U. S. 129 yield as Alamo Heights. [ Footnote
4/95 ] At present, then, local control is a myth for many of the
local school districts in Texas. As one district court has
observed,

															"rather than reposing in each school district the economic power
to fix its own level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so
arranged the structure as to guarantee that some districts will
spend low (with high taxes) while others will spend high (with low
taxes)." Van Dusatz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870 , 876 (Minn.1971).

															In my judgment, any substantial degree of scrutiny of the
operation of the Texas financing scheme reveals that the State has
selected means wholly inappropriate to secure its purported
interest in assuring its school districts local fiscal control.
[ Footnote 4/96 ] At the same time,
appellees have pointed out a variety of alternative financing
schemes which may serve the State's purported interest in local
control as well as, if not better than, the present scheme without
the current impairment of the educational opportunity of vast
numbers of Texas school children. [ Footnote 4/97 ] I see no need, however, to explore the
practical or constitutional merits of those suggested alternatives
at this time, for, whatever their positive or negative features,
experience Page 411 U. S. 130 with the present financing scheme impugns any suggestion that it
constitutes a serious effort to provide local fiscal control. If,
for the sake of local education control, this Court is to sustain
inter-district discrimination in the educational opportunity
afforded Texas school children, it should require that the State
present something more than the mere sham now before us. III In conclusion, it is essential to recognize that an end to the
wide variations in taxable district property wealth inherent in the
Texas financing scheme would entail none of the untoward
consequences suggested by the Court or by the appellants.

															First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would hardly
sound the death knell for local control of education. It would mean
neither centralized decisionmaking nor federal court intervention
in the operation of public schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing
to do with local decisionmaking with respect to educational policy
or even educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect of
local control -- namely, local control over the raising of
educational funds. In fact, in striking down inter-district
disparities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took the
course which is most likely to make true local control over
educational decisionmaking a reality for all Texas school
districts.

															Nor does the District Court's decision even necessarily
eliminate local control of educational funding. The District Court
struck down nothing more than the continued inter-district wealth
discrimination inherent in the present property tax. Both
centralized and decentralized plans for educational funding not
involving such inter-district discrimination have been put forward.
[ Footnote 4/98 ] The choice Page 411 U. S. 131 among these or other alternatives would remain with the State,
not with the federal courts. In this regard, it should be evident
that the degree of federal intervention Page 411 U. S. 132 in matters of local concern would be substantially less in this
context than in previous decisions in which we have been asked
effectively to impose a particular scheme upon the States under the
guise of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78 (1971).

															Still, we are told that this case requires us "to condemn the
State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the power
to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests." Ante at 411 U. S. 40 . Yet
no one in the course of this entire litigation has ever questioned
the constitutionality of the local property tax as a device for
raising educational funds. The District Court's decision, at most,
restricts the power of the State to make educational funding
dependent exclusively upon local property taxation so long as there
exists inter-district disparities in taxable property wealth. But
it hardly eliminates the local property tax as a source of
educational funding or as a means of providing local fiscal
control. [ Footnote 4/99 ]

															The Court seeks solace for its action today in the possibility
of legislative reform. The Court's suggestions of legislative
redress and experimentation will doubtless be of great comfort to
the school children of Texas' disadvantaged districts, but,
considering the vested interests of wealthy school districts in the
preservation of the status quo, they are worth little
more. The possibility of legislative action is, in all events, no
answer to this Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate
unjustified state discrimination. In this case, we have been
presented with an instance of such discrimination, in a
particularly invidious form, against an individual interest of
large constitutional and practical importance. To support the
demonstrated discrimination in the provision Page 411 U. S. 133 of educational opportunity the State has offered a justification
which, on analysis, takes on, at best, an ephemeral character.
Thus, I believe that the wide disparities in taxable district
property wealth inherent in the local property tax element of the
Texas financing scheme render that scheme violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. [ Footnote
4/100 ]

															I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court. Page 411 U. S. 134 | 411 U.S.
1 app1|

															bwm:

															APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

															REVENUES OF TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED

															BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES AND SOURCE OF FUNDS

															CATEGORIES Total Revenues

															State and Local Per Pupil

															Market Value of Revenues Per Federal (State-Local-

															Taxable Property Local Revenues State Revenues Pupil (Columns
Revenues Federal, Columns

															Per Pupil Per Pupil Per Pupil 1 and 2) Per Pupil 1, 2 and 4)

															Above $100,000 $610 $205 $815 $ 41 $856

															(10 districts)

															$100,000-$50,000 287 257 544 66 610

															(26 districts)

															$50,000-$30,000 224 260 484 45 529

															(30 districts)

															$30,000-$10,000 166 295 461 85 546

															(40 districts)

															Below $10,000 63 243 306 135 441

															(4 districts)

															ewm:

															Based on Table V to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 208, which
was prepared on the basis of a sample of 110 selected Texas school
districts from data for the 1967-1968 school year. Page 411 U. S. 135 | 411 U.S.
1 app2|

															APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

															TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY

															EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUALIZED

															TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES

															CATEGORIES EQUALIZED YIELD PER PUPIL

															Market Value of TAX (Equalized Rate

															Taxable Property RATES Applied to District

															Per Pupil ON $100 Market Value)

															Above $100,000 $.31 $585

															(10 districts)

															$100,000-$50,000 .38 262

															(26 districts)

															$50,000-$30,000 .55 213

															(30 districts)

															$30,000-$10,000 .72 162

															(40 districts)

															Below $10,000 .70 60

															(4 districts)

															Based on Table II to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 205, which
was prepared on the basis of a sample of 110 selected Texas school
districts from data for the 1967-1968 school year. Page 411 U. S. 136 | 411 U.S.
1 app3|

															bwm:

															APPENDIX III TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

															SELECTED BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS

															CATEGORIZED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATION AND

															SELECTED INDICATORS OF EDUCATIONAL QUALITY

															Selected Districts Per Cent of Per Cent of

															From High to Low by Professional Teachers With Total Staff
Student- Professional

															Market Valuation Salaries Per College Masters With Emergen-
Counselor Personnel

															Per Pupil Pupil Degrees Degrees cy Permits Ratios Per 100
Pupils

															ALAMO HEIGHTS $372 100% 40% 11% 645 4.80

															NORTH EAST 288 99 24 7 1,516 4.50

															SAN ANTONIO 251 98 29 17 2,320 4.00

															NORTH SIDE 258 99 20 17 1,493 4.30

															HARLANDALE 243 94 21 22 1,800 4.00

															EDGEWOOD 209 96 15 47 3,098 4.06

															ewm:

															Based on Table XI to affidavit of Joel S. Berke,App. 220, which
was prepared on the basis of a sample of six selected school
districts located in Bexar County, Texas, from data for the
1967-1968 school year. Page 411 U. S. 137 | 411 U.S.
1 app4|

															APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., DISSENTING

															BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS RANKED BY

															EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO

															GENERATE HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS

															Districts Ranked from Tax Rate Per $100

															High to Low Market Needed to Equal

															Valuation Per Pupil Highest Yield

															ALAMO HEIGHTS $0.68

															JUDSON 1.04

															EAST CENTRAL 1.17

															NORTH EAST 1.21

															SOMERSET 1.32

															SAN ANTONIO 1.56

															NORTH SIDE 1.65

															SOUTH WEST 2.10

															SOUTH SIDE 3.03

															HARLANDALE 3.20

															SOUTH SAN ANTONIO 5.77

															EDGEWOOD 5.76

															Based on Table IX to affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App. 218, which
was prepared on the basis of the 12 school districts located in
Bexar County, Texas, from data from the 1967-1968 school year.

															[ Footnote 4/1 ] See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870 (Minn.1971); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d
457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan.1973; Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 ,
487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187 , 119 N.J.Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972); Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No.
C-253652 (Super.Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz. July 7, 1972). See
also Sweetwater County Planning Com. for the Organization of School
Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.1971), juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo.1972).

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															The District Court in this case postponed decision for some two
years in the hope that the Texas Legislature would remedy the gross
disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas financing scheme. It
was only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular
Session that the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of
hope for self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision. See Texas Research League, Public School Finance Problems
in Texas 13 (Interim Report 1972). The strong vested interest of
property-rich districts in the existing property tax scheme poses a
substantial barrier to self-initiated legislative reform in
educational financing. See N.Y. Times, Dec.19, 1972, p. 1,
col. 1.

															[ Footnote 4/3 ]

															Texas provides its school districts with extensive bonding
authority to obtain capital both for the acquisition of school
sites and "the construction and equipment of school buildings,"
Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.01 (1972), and for the acquisition,
construction, and maintenance of "gymnasia, stadia, or other
recreational facilities," id. §§ 20.21-20.22. While such
private capital provides a fourth source of revenue, it is, of
course, only temporary in nature, since the principal and interest
of all bonds must ultimately be paid out of the receipts of the
local ad valorem property tax, see id. §§ 20.01,
20.04, except to the extent that outside revenues derived from the
operation of certain facilities, such as gymnasia, are employed to
repay the bonds issued thereon, see id. §§ 20.22,
20.25.

															[ Footnote 4/4 ] See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 3; Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§
20.01-20.02. As a part of the property tax scheme, bonding
authority is conferred upon the local school districts, see 411 U.S.
1 fn4/3|>n. 3, supra. [ Footnote 4/5 ] See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.04.

															[ Footnote 4/6 ]

															For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 41.1%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S.
1 fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

															[ Footnote 4/7 ] See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.04.

															Theoretically, Texas law limits the tax rate for public school
maintenance, see id. § 20.02, to $1.50 per $100 valuation, see id. § 20.04(d). However, it does not appear that any
Texas district presently taxes itself at the highest rate
allowable, although some poor districts are approaching it, see App. 174.

															[ Footnote 4/8 ]

															Under Texas law, local districts are allowed to employ differing
bases of assessment -- a fact that introduces a third variable into
the local funding. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 20.03. But
neither party has suggested that this factor is responsible for the
disparities in revenues available to the various districts.
Consequently, I believe we must deal with this case on the
assumption that differences in local methods of assessment do not
meaningfully affect the revenue-raising power of local districts
relative to one another. The Court apparently admits as much. See ante at 411 U. S. 46 . It
should be noted, moreover, that the main set of data introduced
before the District Court to establish the disparities at issue
here was based upon "equalized taxable property" values which had
been adjusted to correct for differing methods of assessment. See App. C to Affidavit of Professor Joel S. Berke.

															[ Footnote 4/9 ]

															Texas has approximately 1,200 school districts.

															[ Footnote 4/10 ] See Appendix I, post, p. 411 U. S.
134 .

															[ Footnote 4/11 ] See ibid. Indeed, appellants acknowledge that the
relevant data from Professor Berke's affidavit show "a very
positive correlation, 0.973, between market value of taxable
property per pupil and state and local revenues per pupil." Reply
Brief for Appellants 6 n. 9.

															While the Court takes issue with much of Professor Berke's data
and conclusions, ante at 411 U. S. 15 -16,
n. 38, and 411 U. S. 25 -27,
I do not understand its criticism to run to the basic finding of a
correlation between taxable district property per pupil and local
revenues per pupil. The critique of Professor Berke's methodology
upon which the Court relies, see Goldstein, Inter-district
Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 504,
523-525, nn. 67, 71 (1972), is directed only at the suggested
correlations between family income and taxable district wealth and
between race and taxable district wealth. Obviously, the appellants
do not question the relationship in Texas between taxable district
wealth and per-pupil expenditures; and there is no basis for the
Court to do so, whatever the criticisms that may be leveled at
other aspects of Professor Berke's study, see infra, 411 U.S.
1 fn4/56|>n. 56.

															[ Footnote 4/12 ] See Appendix II, post, p. 411 U. S.
135 .

															[ Footnote 4/13 ] See ibid. [ Footnote 4/14 ]

															For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 10.9%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S.
1 fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

															[ Footnote 4/15 ]

															Appellants made such a contention before the District Court but
apparently have abandoned it in this Court. Indeed, data introduced
in the District Court simply belie the argument that federal funds
have a significant equalizing effect. See Appendix I, post, p. 411 U. S. 134 .
And, as the District Court observed, it does not follow that
remedial action by the Federal Government would excuse any
unconstitutional discrimination effected by the state financing
scheme. 337 F.
Supp. 280 , 284.

															[ Footnote 4/16 ]

															For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 48%. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S.
1 fn4/2|>n. 2, at 9.

															[ Footnote 4/17 ] See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). See
also Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(b).

															[ Footnote 4/18 ] See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(b).

															The Permanent School Fund is, in essence, a public trust
initially endowed with vast quantities of public land, the sale of
which has provided an enormous corpus that, in turn, produces
substantial annual revenues which are devoted exclusively to public
education. See Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). See also 5 Report of Governor's Committee on Public School
Education, The Challenge and the Chance 11 (1969) (hereinafter
Governor's Committee Report).

															[ Footnote 4/19 ]

															This is determined from the average daily attendance within each
district for the preceding year. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 15.01(c).

															[ Footnote 4/20 ] See id. §§ 16.01-16.975.

															[ Footnote 4/21 ] See id. §§ 16.71(2), 16.79.

															[ Footnote 4/22 ] See id. §§ 16.301-16.316, 16.45, 16.51-16.63.

															[ Footnote 4/23 ] See id., §§ 16.72-16.73, 16.76-16.77.

															[ Footnote 4/24 ] See id. §§ 16.74-16.76. The formula for calculating
each district's share is described in 5 Governor's Committee Report
448.

															[ Footnote 4/25 ] See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 16.01.

															[ Footnote 4/26 ] See 5 Governor's Committee Report 401.

															[ Footnote 4/27 ] See id. at 45 67; Texas Research League, Texas Public
Schools Under the Minimum Foundation Program -- An Evaluation:
1949-1954, pp.67-68 (1954).

															[ Footnote 4/28 ]

															Technically, the economic index involves a two-step calculation.
First, on the basis of the factors mentioned above, each Texas
county's share of the Local Fund Assignment is determined. Then
each county's share is divided among its school districts on the
basis of their relative shares of the county's assessable wealth. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 16.74-16.76; 5 Governor's
Committee Report 43-44; Texas Research League, Texas Public School
Finance: A Majority of Exceptions 6-8 (2d Interim Report 1972).

															[ Footnote 4/29 ]

															5 Governor's Committee Report 48, quoting statement of Dr. Edgar
Morphet.

															[ Footnote 4/30 ]

															The extraordinarily complex standards are summarized in 5
Governor's Committee Report 41-43.

															[ Footnote 4/31 ]

															The key element of the Minimum Foundation School Program is the
provision of funds for professional salaries -- more particularly,
for teacher salaries. The Program provides each district with funds
to pay its professional payroll as determined by certain state
standards. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 16.301-16.316. If the
district fails to pay its teachers at the levels determined by the
state standards, it receives nothing from the Program. See
id. § 16.301(c). At the same time, districts are free to pay
their teachers salaries in excess of the level set by the state
standards, using local revenues -- that is, property tax revenue --
to make up the difference, see id. § 16.301(a).

															The state salary standards focus upon two factors: the
educational level and the experience of the district's teachers. See id. §§ 16.30116.316. The higher these two factors are,
the more funds the district will receive from the Foundation
Program for professional salaries.

															It should be apparent that the net effect of this scheme is to
provide more assistance to property-rich districts than to
property-poor ones. For rich districts are able to pay their
teachers, out of local funds, salary increments above the state
minimum levels. Thus, the rich districts are able to attract the
teachers with the best education and the most experience. To
complete the circle, this then means, given the state standards,
that the rich districts receive more from the Foundation Program
for professional salaries than do poor districts. A portion of
Professor Berke's study vividly illustrates the impact of the
State's standards on districts of varying wealth. See Appendix III, post, p. 411 U. S.
136 .

															[ Footnote 4/32 ]

															In 1967-1968, Alamo Heights School District had $49,478 in
taxable property per pupil. See Berke Affidavit, Table
VII, App. 216.

															[ Footnote 4/33 ]

															In 1967-1968, Edgewood Independent School District had $5,960 in
taxable property per pupil. Ibid. [ Footnote 4/34 ]

															I fail to understand the relevance for this case of the Court's
suggestion that, if Alamo Heights School District, which is
approximately the same physical size as Edgewood Independent School
District but which has only one-fourth as many students, had the
same number of students as Edgewood, the former's per-pupil
expenditure would be considerably closer to the latter's. Ante at 411 U. S. 13 n.
33. Obviously this is true, but it does not alter the simple fact
that Edgewood does have four times as many students but
not four times as much taxable property wealth. From the
perspective of Edgewood's school children then -- the perspective
that ultimately counts here -- Edgewood is clearly a much poorer
district than Alamo Heights. The question here is not whether
districts have equal taxable property wealth in absolute terms, but
whether districts have differing taxable wealth given their
respective school-age populations.

															[ Footnote 4/35 ]

															In the face of these gross disparities in treatment which
experience with the Texas financing scheme has revealed, I cannot
accept the Court's suggestion that we are dealing here with a
remedial scheme to which we should accord substantial deference
because of its accomplishments, rather than criticize it for its
failures. Ante at 411 U. S. 38 -39. Moreover, Texas' financing scheme is
hardly remedial legislation of the type for which we have
previously shown substantial tolerance. Such legislation may in
fact, extend the vote to "persons who otherwise would be denied it
by state law," Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.
S. 641 , 384 U. S. 657 (1966), or it may eliminate the evils of the private bail bondsman, Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971). But those are instances in which a legislative body has
sought to remedy problems for which it cannot be said to have been
directly responsible. By contrast, public education is the function
of the State in Texas, and the responsibility for any defect in the
financing scheme must ultimately rest with the State. It is the
State's own scheme which has caused the funding problem, and, thus
viewed, that scheme can hardly be deemed remedial.

															[ Footnote 4/36 ] Cf. Appendix I, post, p. 411 U. S.
134 .

															[ Footnote 4/37 ]

															Brief for Appellants 3.

															[ Footnote 4/38 ]

															Thus, in 1967-1968, Edgewood had a total of $248 per pupil in
state and local funds, compared with a total of $558 per pupil for
Alamo Heights. See Berke Affidavit, Table X, App. 219. For
1970-1971, the respective totals were $418 and $913. See Texas Research League, supra, 411 U.S.
1 fn4/2|>n. 2, at 14.

															[ Footnote 4/39 ]

															Not only does the local property tax provide approximately 40%
of the funds expended on public education, but it is the only source of funds for such essential aspects of
educational financing as the payment of school bonds, see 411 U.S.
1 fn4/3|>n. 3, supra, and the payment of the
district's share of the Local Fund Assignment, as well as for
nearly all expenditures above the minimums established by the
Foundation School Program.

															[ Footnote 4/40 ] Compare, e.g., J. Coleman et al., Equality of
Educational Opportunity 290-330 (1966); Jencks, The Coleman Report
and the Conventional Wisdom, in On Equality of Educational
Opportunity 69, 91-104 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds.1972), with, e.g., J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin, & R.
Stout, Schools and Inequality 79-90 (1971); Kiesling, Measuring a
Local Government Service: A Study of School Districts in New York
State, 49 Rev.Econ. & Statistics 356 (1967).

															[ Footnote 4/41 ] Compare Berke Answers to Interrogatories 10 ("Dollar
expenditures are probably the best way of measuring the quality of
education afforded students . . ."), with Graham
Deposition 39 ("[I]t is not just necessarily the money, no. It is
how wisely you spend it"). It warrants noting that even appellants'
witness, Mr. Graham, qualified the importance of money only by the
requirement of wise expenditure. Quite obviously, a district which
is property poor is powerless to match the education provided by a
property-rich district, assuming each district allocates its funds
with equal wisdom.

															[ Footnote 4/42 ] See Brief of amici curiae, inter alia, San
Marino Unified School District; Beverly Hills Unified School
District; Brief of amici curiae, inter alia, Bloomfield
Hills, Michigan, School District; Dearborn City, Michigan, School
District; Grosse Pointe, Michigan, Public School System.

															[ Footnote 4/43 ]

															Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, App. 115.

															[ Footnote 4/44 ] Ibid. Moreover, during the same period, 37.17% of the
teachers in Alamo Heights had advanced degrees, while only 14.98%
of Edgewood's faculty had such degrees. See id. at
116.

															[ Footnote 4/45 ] Id. at 117.

															[ Footnote 4/46 ] Id. at 118.

															[ Footnote 4/47 ]

															In the 1967-1968 school year, Edgewood had 22,862 students and
864 teachers, a ratio of 26.5 to 1. See id. at 110, 114.
In Alamo Heights, for the same school year, there were 5,432
students and 265 teachers, for a ratio of 20.5 to 1. Ibid. [ Footnote 4/48 ]

															Reply Brief for Appellant 17. See also id. at 5,
15-16.

															[ Footnote 4/49 ]

															Indeed, even apart from the differential treatment inherent in
the local property tax, the significant inter-district disparities
in state aid received under the Minimum Foundation School Program
would seem to raise substantial equal protection questions.

															[ Footnote 4/50 ]

															I find particularly strong intimations of such a view in the
majority's efforts to denigrate the constitutional significance of
children in property-poor districts "receiving a poorer quality
education than that available to children in districts having more
assessable wealth" with the assertion "that, at least where wealth
is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages." Ante at 411 U. S. 23 , 411 U. S. 24 . The
Court, to be sure, restricts its remark to "wealth" discrimination.
But the logical basis for such a restriction is not explained by
the Court, nor is it otherwise apparent, see infra at 411 U. S.
117 -120 and n. 77.

															[ Footnote 4/51 ] See Answers to Interrogatories by Dr. Joel S. Berke,
Ans. 17, p. 9; Ans. 48-51, pp. 22-24; Ans. 88-89, pp. 41-42;
Deposition of Dr. Daniel C. Morgan, Jr., at 52-55; Affidavit of Dr.
Daniel C. Morgan, Jr., App. 242-243.

															[ Footnote 4/52 ]

															It is true that, in two previous cases, this Court has summarily
affirmed district court dismissals of constitutional attacks upon
other state educational financing schemes. See McInnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F.
Supp. 327 (ND Ill.1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom. McInnis
v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F.
Supp. 572 (WD Va.1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U. S.
44 (1970). But those decisions cannot be considered
dispositive of this action, for the thrust of those suits differed
materially from that of the present case. In McInnis, the
plaintiffs asserted that

															"only a financing system which apportions public funds according
to the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth
Amendment."

															293 F. Supp. at 331. The District Court concluded that

															"(1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public
school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils'
educational needs, and (2) the lack of judicially manageable
standards makes this controversy nonjusticiable." Id. at 329. The Burruss District Court
dismissed that suit essentially in reliance on McInnis, which it found to be "scarcely distinguishable." 310 F. Supp. at
574. This suit involves no effort to obtain an allocation of school
funds that considers only educational need. The District Court
ruled only that the State must remedy the discrimination resulting
from the distribution of taxable local district wealth which has
heretofore prevented many districts from truly exercising local
fiscal control. Furthermore, the limited holding of the District
Court presents none of the problems of judicial management which
would exist if the federal courts were to attempt to ensure the
distribution of educational funds solely on the basis of
educational need, see infra at 411 U. S.
130 -132.

															[ Footnote 4/53 ]

															Tex.Const., Art. 7, § 1.

															[ Footnote 4/54 ]

															Problems of remedy may be another matter. If provision of the
relief sought in a particular case required identification of each
member of the affected class, as in the case of monetary relief,
the need for clarity in defining the class is apparent. But this
involves the procedural problems inherent in class action
litigation, not the character of the elements essential to equal
protection analysis. We are concerned here only with the latter.
Moreover, it is evident that, in cases such as this, provision of
appropriate relief, which takes the injunctive form, is not a
serious problem, since it is enough to direct the action of
appropriate officials. Cf. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284,
288-290 (CA5 1963).

															[ Footnote 4/55 ]

															I assume the Court would lodge the same criticism against the
validity of the finding of a correlation between poor districts and
racial minorities.

															[ Footnote 4/56 ]

															The Court rejects the District Court's finding of a correlation
between poor people and poor districts with the assertion that
"there is reason to believe that the poorest families are not
necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts" in Texas. Ante at 411 U. S. 23 . In
support of its conclusion, the Court offers absolutely no data --
which it cannot on this record -- concerning the distribution of
poor people in Texas to refute the data introduced below by
appellees; it relies instead on a recent law review note concerned
solely with the State of Connecticut, Note, A Statistical Analysis
of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing
Wars, 81 Yale L.J. 1303 (1972). Common sense suggests that the
basis for drawing a demographic conclusion with respect to a
geographically large, urban-rural, industrial-agricultural State
such as Texas from a geographically small, densely populated,
highly industrialized State such as Connecticut is doubtful, at
best.

															Furthermore, the article upon which the Court relies to
discredit the statistical procedures employed by Professor Berke to
establish the correlation between poor people and poor districts, see 411 U.S.
1 fn4/11|>n. 11, supra, based its criticism
primarily on the fact that only four of the 110 districts studied
were in the lowest of the five categories, which were determined by
relative taxable property per pupil, and most districts clustered
in the middle three groups. See Goldstein, Inter-district
Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 504,
524 n. 67 (1972). See also ante at 411 U. S. 26 -27.
But the Court fails to note that the four poorest districts in the
sample had over 50,000 students, which constituted 10% of the
students in the entire sample. It appears, moreover, that even when
the richest and the poorest categories are enlarged to include in
each category 20% of the students in the sample, the correlation
between district and individual wealth holds true. See Brief for the Governors of Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, and Michigan as amici curiae 17 n. 21.

															Finally, it cannot be ignored that the data introduced by
appellees went unchallenged in the District Court. The majority's
willingness to permit appellants to litigate the correctness of
those data for the first time before this tribunal -- where
effective response by appellees is impossible -- is both unfair and
judicially unsound.

															[ Footnote 4/57 ]

															Third Amended Complaint App. 23. Consistent with this theory,
appellees purported to represent, among others, a class composed
of

															"all . . . school children in independent school districts . . .
who . . . have been deprived of the equal protection of the law
under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to public school
education because of the low value of the property lying within the
independent school districts in which they reside." Id. at 15.

															[ Footnote 4/58 ]

															The degree of judicial scrutiny that this particular
classification demands is a distinct issue which I consider in 411 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 4/59 ]

															Indeed, the Court's theory would render the established concept
of fundamental interests in the context of equal protection
analysis superfluous, for the substantive constitutional right
itself requires that this Court strictly scrutinize any asserted
state interest for restricting or denying access to any particular
guaranteed right, see, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 391 U. S. 377 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.
S. 536 , 379 U. S.
545 -551 (1965).

															[ Footnote 4/60 ]

															It is interesting that, in its effort to reconcile the state
voting rights cases with its theory of fundamentality, the majority
can muster nothing more than the contention that "[t]he
constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal treatment in
the voting process can no longer be doubted. . . ." Ante at 411 U. S. 34 n.
74 (emphasis added). If, by this, the Court intends to recognize a
substantive constitutional "right to equal treatment in the voting
process" independent of the Equal Protection Clause, the source of
such a right is certainly a mystery to me.

															[ Footnote 4/61 ]

															It is true that Griffin and Douglas also
involved discrimination against indigents, that is, wealth
discrimination. But, as the majority points out, ante at 411 U. S. 28 -29,
the Court has never deemed wealth discrimination alone to be
sufficient to require strict judicial scrutiny; rather, such review
of wealth classifications has been applied only where the
discrimination affects an important individual interest, see,
e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.
S. 663 (1966). Thus, I believe Griffin and Douglas can only be understood as premised on a
recognition of the fundamental importance of the criminal appellate
process.

															[ Footnote 4/62 ] See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967)
(right to compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confront one's accusers).

															[ Footnote 4/63 ] See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.
S. 184 , 379 U. S.
191 -192 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 , 388 U. S. 9 (1967).

															[ Footnote 4/64 ] See Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633 , 332 U. S.
644 -646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 , 323 U. S. 216 (1944).

															[ Footnote 4/65 ] See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 , 403 U. S. 372 (1971).

															[ Footnote 4/66 ]

															The Court noted that the challenged

															"provision strips from indigent defendants the array of
protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil judgment
debtors, including restrictions on the amount of disposable
earnings subject to garnishment, protection of the debtor from wage
garnishment at times of severe personal or family sickness, and
exemption from attachment and execution on a debtor's personal
clothing, books, and tools of trade."

															407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
135 .

															[ Footnote 4/67 ] See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972).

															[ Footnote 4/68 ] See Brief of the National Education Association et
al. as Amici Curiae App. A. All 48 of the 50 States
which mandate public education also have compulsory attendance laws
which require school attendance for eight years or more. Id. at 20-21.

															[ Footnote 4/69 ]

															Prior to this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), every State had a constitutional provision directing the
establishment of a system of public schools. But after Brown, South Carolina repealed its constitutional
provision, and Mississippi made its constitutional provision
discretionary with the state legislature.

															[ Footnote 4/70 ]

															Developments in the Law -- Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev.
1065, 1129 (1969).

															[ Footnote 4/71 ]

															The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, People,
& Money: The Need for Educational Reform 11 (1972), concluded
that "[l]iterally, we cannot survive as a nation or as individuals
without [education]." It further observed that:

															"[I]n a democratic society, public understanding of public
issues is necessary for public support. Schools generally include
in their courses of instruction a wide variety of subjects related
to the history, structure and principles of American government at
all levels. In so doing, schools provide students with a background
of knowledge which is deemed an absolute necessity for responsible
citizenship." Id. at 13-14.

															[ Footnote 4/72 ] See J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorfer, H. Levin, & R.
Stout, Schools and Inequality 103-105 (1971); R. Hess & J.
Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children 217-218
(1967); Campbell, The Passive Citizen, in 6 Acta Sociologica, Nos.
1-2, p. 9, at 20-21 (1962).

															That education is the dominant factor in influencing political
participation and awareness is sufficient, I believe, to dispose of
the Court's suggestion that, in all events, there is no indication
that Texas is not providing all of its children with a sufficient
education to enjoy the right of free speech and to participate
fully in the political process. Ante at 411 U. S. 36 -37.
There is, in short, no limit on the amount of free speech or
political participation that the Constitution guarantees. Moreover,
it should be obvious that the political process, like most other
aspects of social intercourse, is to some degree competitive. It is
thus of little benefit to an individual from a property-poor
district to have "enough" education if those around him have more
than "enough." Cf. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.
S. 629 , 339 U. S.
633 -634 (1950).

															[ Footnote 4/73 ] See United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1968,
Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No.192, Table 4, p. 17. See also Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Levin, The Costs to the Nation of
Inadequate Education 46-47 (Comm.Print 1972).

															[ Footnote 4/74 ]

															I believe that the close nexus between education and our
established constitutional values with respect to freedom of speech
and participation in the political process makes this a different
case from our prior decisions concerning discrimination affecting
public welfare, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), or housing, see, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972). There can be no question that, as the majority suggests,
constitutional rights may be less meaningful for someone without
enough to eat or without decent housing. Ante at 411 U. S. 37 . But
the crucial difference lies in the closeness of the relationship.
Whatever the severity of the impact of insufficient food or
inadequate housing on a person's life, they have never been
considered to bear the same direct and immediate relationship to
constitutional concerns for free speech and for our political
processes as education has long been recognized to bear. Perhaps
the best evidence of this fact is the unique status which has been
accorded public education as the single public service nearly
unanimously guaranteed in the constitutions of our States, see
supra at 411 U. S.
111 -112 and n. 68. Education, in terms of constitutional
values, is much more analogous, in my judgment, to the right to
vote in state elections than to public welfare or public housing.
Indeed, it is not without significance that we have long recognized
education as an essential step in providing the disadvantaged with
the tools necessary to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

															[ Footnote 4/75 ]

															The majority's reliance on this Court's traditional deference to
legislative bodies in matters of taxation falls wide of the mark in
the context of this particular case. See ante at 411 U. S. 40 -41.
The decisions on which the Court relies were simply taxpayer suits
challenging the constitutionality of a tax burden in the face of
exemptions or differential taxation afforded to others. See,
e.g., Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.
S. 522 (1959), Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83 (1940); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.
S. 232 (1890). There is no question that, from the
perspective of the taxpayer, the Equal Protection Clause

															"imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility
and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state
taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon
different trades and professions, and may vary the rate of excise
upon various products." Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, at 358 U. S.
526 -527. But, in this case, we are presented with a
claim of discrimination of an entirely different nature -- a claim
that the revenue-producing mechanism directly discriminates against
the interests of some of the intended beneficiaries; and, in
contrast to the taxpayer suits, the interest adversely affected is
of substantial constitutional and societal importance. Hence, a
different standard of equal protection review than has been
employed in the taxpayer suits is appropriate here. It is true that
affirmance of the District Court decision would to some extent
intrude upon the State's taxing power insofar as it would be
necessary for the State to at least equalize taxable district
wealth. But, contrary to the suggestions of the majority,
affirmance would not impose a strait-jacket upon the
revenue-raising powers of the State, and would certainly not spell
the end of the local property tax. See infra at 411 U. S.
132 .

															[ Footnote 4/76 ]

															This does not mean that the Court has demanded precise equality
in the treatment of the indigent and the person of means in the
criminal process. We have never suggested, for instance, that the
Equal Protection Clause requires the best lawyer money can buy for
the indigent. We are hardly equipped with the objective standards
which such a judgment would require. But we have pursued the goal
of substantial equality of treatment in the face of clear
disparities in the nature of the appellate process afforded rich
versus poor. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.
S. 487 , 372 U. S.
495 -496 (1963); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U. S. 438 , 369 U. S. 447 (1962).

															[ Footnote 4/77 ]

															Even if I put aside the Court's misreading of Griffin and Douglas, the Court fails to offer any reasoned
constitutional basis for restricting cases involving wealth
discrimination to instances in which there is an absolute
deprivation of the interest affected. As I have already discussed, see supra at 411 U. S. 88 -89,
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees equality of treatment of
those persons who are similarly situated; it does not merely bar
some form of excessive discrimination between such persons. Outside
the context of wealth discrimination, the Court's reapportionment
decisions clearly indicate that relative discrimination is within
the purview of the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , 377 U. S.
562 -563 (1964), the Court recognized:

															"It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be
constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of
the State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could
vote only once. . . . Of course, the effect of state legislative
districting schemes which give the same number of representatives
to unequal numbers of constituents is identical. Overweighting and
over-valuation of the votes of those living here has the certain
effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those living
there. . . . Their right to vote is simply not the same right to
vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. . . .
One must be ever aware that the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated
as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.'" See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.
S. 368 , 372 U. S.
380 -381 (1963). The Court gives no explanation why a
case involving wealth discrimination should be treated any
differently.

															[ Footnote 4/78 ] But cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 , 405 U. S. 144 (1972), where prospective candidates' threatened exclusion from a
primary ballot because of their inability to pay a filing fee was
seen as discrimination against both the impecunious candidates and
the "less affluent segment of the community" that supported such
candidates but was also too poor as a group to contribute enough
for the filing fees.

															[ Footnote 4/79 ] But cf. M. Harrington, The Other America 13-17 (Penguin
ed.1963).

															[ Footnote 4/80 ] See E. Banfield, The Unheavenly City 63, 75-76 (1970); cf. R. Lynd & H. Lynd, Middletown in Transition 450
(1937).

															[ Footnote 4/81 ] Cf. New York v.
Miln , 11 Pet. 102, 36 U. S. 142 (1837).

															[ Footnote 4/82 ]

															Theoretically, at least, it may provide a mechanism for
implementing Texas' asserted interest in local educational control, see infra at 411 U. S.
126 .

															[ Footnote 4/83 ]

															True, a family may move to escape a property-poor school
district, assuming it has the means to do so. But such a view would
itself raise a serious constitutional question concerning an
impermissible burdening of the right to travel, or, more precisely,
the concomitant right to remain where one is. Cf. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S.
629 -631 (1969).

															[ Footnote 4/84 ]

															Indeed, the political difficulties that seriously disadvantaged
districts face in securing legislative redress are augmented by the
fact that little support is likely to be secured from only mildly
disadvantaged districts. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.
S. 368 (1963). See also 411 U.S.
1 fn4/2|>n. 2, supra. [ Footnote 4/85 ] See Tex.Cities, Towns and Villages Code, Civ.Stat.Ann.
§§ 1011a-1011j (1963 and Supp. 1972-1973). See also, e.g.,
Skinner v. Reed, 265 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App. 1954); Corpus Christi v. Jones, 144 S.W.2d 388 (Tex.Ct. Civ.App.
1940).

															[ Footnote 4/86 ] Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. at
875-876.

															[ Footnote 4/87 ] Cf., e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v.
McGinley, 366 U. S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.
S. 464 (1948).

															[ Footnote 4/88 ]

															Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 21.101-21.117. Criminal penalties are
provided for failure to teach certain required courses. Id. §§ 4.15-4.16.

															[ Footnote 4/89 ] Id., §§ 12.11-12.35.

															[ Footnote 4/90 ] Id., § 12.62.

															[ Footnote 4/91 ] Id., §§ 13 031-13.046

															[ Footnote 4/92 ] Id., § 21.004.

															[ Footnote 4/93 ] See 411 U.S.
1 app1|>Appendix II, infra. [ Footnote 4/94 ] See Affidavit of Dr. Joe Cardenas, Superintendent of
School, Edgewood Independent School District, App. 234-238.

															[ Footnote 4/95 ] See 411 U.S.
1 app4|>Appendix IV, infra. [ Footnote 4/96 ]

															My Brother WHITE, in concluding that the Texas financing scheme
runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, likewise finds on
analysis that the means chosen by Texas -- local property taxation
dependent upon local taxable wealth -- is completely unsuited in
its present form to the achievement of the asserted goal of
providing local fiscal control. Although my Brother WHITE purports
to reach this result by application of that lenient standard of
mere rationality traditionally applied in the context of commercial
interests, it seems to me that the care with which he scrutinizes
the practical effectiveness of the present local property tax as a
device for affording local fiscal control reflects the application
of a more stringent standard of review, a standard which at the
least is influenced by the constitutional significance of the
process of public education.

															[ Footnote 4/97 ] See 411 U.S.
1 fn4/98|>n. 98, infra. [ Footnote 4/98 ]

															Centralized educational financing is, to be sure, one
alternative. On analysis, though, it is clear that even centralized
financing would not deprive local school districts of what has been
considered to be the essence of local educational control. See
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.
S. 451 , 407 U. S.
477 -478 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). Central financing
would leave in local hands the entire gamut of local educational
policymaking -- teachers, curriculum, school sites, the whole
process of allocating resources among alternative educational
objectives.

															A second possibility is the much-discussed theory of district
power equalization put forth by Professors Coons, Clune, and
Sugarman in their seminal work, Private Wealth and Public Education
201-242 (1970). Such a scheme would truly reflect a dedication to
local fiscal control. Under their system, each school district
would receive a fixed amount of revenue per pupil for any
particular level of tax effort regardless of the level of local
property tax base. Appellants criticize this scheme on the rather
extraordinary ground that it would encourage poorer districts to
overtax themselves in order to obtain substantial revenues for
education. But, under the present discriminatory scheme, it is the
poor districts that are already taxing themselves at the highest
rates, yet are receiving the lowest returns.

															District wealth reapportionment is yet another alternative which
would accomplish directly essentially what district power
equalization would seek to do artificially. Appellants claim that
the calculations concerning state property required by such a
scheme would be impossible, as a practical matter. Yet Texas is
already making far more complex annual calculations -- involving
not only local property values, but also local income and other
economic factors -- in conjunction with the Local Fund Assignment
portion of the Minimum Foundation School Program. See 5
Governor's Committee Report 43-44.

															A fourth possibility would be to remove commercial, industrial,
and mineral property from local tax rolls, to tax this property on
a state-wide basis, and to return the resulting revenues to the
local districts in a fashion that would compensate for remaining
variations in the local tax bases.

															None of these particular alternatives is necessarily
constitutionally compelled; rather, they indicate the breadth of
choice which would remain to the State if the present
inter-district disparities were eliminated.

															[ Footnote 4/99 ] See 411 U. S. 98, supra. [ Footnote 4/100 ]

															Of course, nothing in the Court's decision today should inhibit
further review of state educational funding schemes under state
constitutional provisions. See Milliken v. Green, 389
Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d
457 (1972), rehearing granted, Jan.1973; Robinson
v. Cahill, 118 N.J.Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 , 119 N.J.Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972); cf. Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 ,
487 P.2d 1241 (1971).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the U.S. Supreme Court case San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973):

Issue:
The case examined whether the Texas system of financing public schools, which relied on local property taxation, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to disparities in per-pupil expenditures among school districts.

Holding:
The Supreme Court held that the Texas school financing system did not violate equal protection requirements. The Court found that the system did not disadvantage any suspect class or interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right. While education is important, it is not a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. The Court also noted that the state has a broad choice of options to address inter-district disparities in school funding.

Key Points:
- The Texas system of school financing was a combination of state and local funding, with local funding derived from property taxes.
- Appellees argued that this system favored affluent districts and disadvantaged poor families in districts with a low property tax base.
- The Court rejected the argument that wealth is a suspect classification and that education is a fundamental right.
- The Court emphasized that local control over educational policymaking, including resource allocation, curriculum, and teachers, would remain intact even with centralized financing.
- Several alternatives to the current system were suggested, including district power equalization, district wealth reapportionment, and state-wide taxation of commercial and industrial property.
- The Court encouraged further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.