U.S. Supreme Court Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959) Draper v. United
States No. 136 Argued December 11,
1958 Decided January 26,
1959 358
U.S. 307 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus An experienced federal narcotics agent was told by an informer,
whose information the agent had always found to be accurate and
reliable, that petitioner, whom the agent did not know but who was
described by the informer, was peddling narcotics, had gone to
Chicago to obtain a supply, and would return on a certain train on
a certain day or the day after. The agent met the train, easily
recognized petitioner from the informer's description, and, without
a warrant, arrested him, searched him, and seized narcotics and a
hypodermic syringe found in his possession. These were later
admitted in evidence over petitioner's objection at the trial at
which he was convicted of violating a federal narcotics law. Held: The arrest, search and seizure were lawful, and
the articles seized were properly admitted in evidence at
petitioner's trial. Pp. 358 U. S.
308 -314.

															(a) Even if the information received by the agent from the
informer was "hearsay," the agent was legally entitled to consider
it in determining whether he had "probable cause," within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and "reasonable grounds," within
the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7607, to believe that petitioner had
committed or was committing a violation of the narcotics laws. Pp. 358 U. S.
310 -312.

															(b) The information in the possession of the narcotics agent was
sufficient to show probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioner had violated or was violating the narcotics laws
and to justify his arrest without a warrant. Pp. 358 U. S.
312 -313.

															(c) The arrest was lawful, and the subsequent search and
seizure, having been made incident to a lawful arrest, were
likewise valid. Pp. 358 U. S.
310 -311, 358 U. S.
314 .

															248 F.2d 295, affirmed. Page 358 U. S. 308 MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Petitioner was convicted of knowingly concealing and
transporting narcotic drugs in Denver, Colorado, in violation of 35
Stat. 614, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174. His conviction was based in
part on the use in evidence against him of two "envelopes
containing [865 grams of] heroin" and a hypodermic syringe that had
been taken from his person, following his arrest, by the arresting
officer. Before the trial, he moved to suppress that evidence as
having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. After
hearing, the District Court found that the arresting officer had
probable cause to arrest petitioner without a warrant, and that the
subsequent search and seizure were therefore incident to a lawful
arrest, and overruled the motion to suppress. 146 F. Supp. 689. At
the subsequent trial, that evidence was offered and, over
petitioner's renewed objection, was received in evidence, and the
trial resulted, as we have said, in petitioner's conviction. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 248 F.2d 295, and
certiorari was sought on the sole ground that the search and
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, [ Footnote 1 ] and therefore the use of the heroin in
evidence vitiated the conviction. We granted the writ to determine
that question. 357 U.S. 935. Page 358 U. S. 309 The evidence offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress
was not substantially disputed. It established that one Marsh, a
federal narcotic agent with 29 years' experience, was stationed at
Denver; that one Hereford had been engaged as a "special employee"
of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and from
time to time gave information to Marsh regarding violations of the
narcotic laws, for which Hereford was paid small sums of money, and
that Marsh had always found the information given by Hereford to be
accurate and reliable. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh
that James Draper (petitioner) recently had taken up abode at a
stated address in Denver and "was peddling narcotics to several
addicts" in that city. Four days later, on September 7, Hereford
told Marsh

															"that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before [September 6] by
train [and] that he was going to bring back three ounces of heroin
[and] that he would return to Denver either on the morning of the
8th of September or the morning of the 9th of September also by
train."

															Hereford also gave Marsh a detailed physical description of
Draper and of the clothing he was wearing, [ Footnote 2 ] and said that he would be carrying "a tan
zipper bag," and that he habitually "walked real fast."

															On the morning of September 8, Marsh and a Denver police officer
went to the Denver Union Station and kept watch over all incoming
trains from Chicago, but they did not see anyone fitting the
description that Hereford had given. Repeating the process on the
morning of September 9, they saw a person, having the exact
physical attributes and wearing the precise clothing described by
Hereford, alight from an incoming Chicago train and Page 358 U. S. 310 start walking "fast" toward the exit. He was carrying a tan
zipper bag in his right hand, and the left was thrust in his
raincoat pocket. Marsh, accompanied by the police officer,
overtook, stopped and arrested him. They then searched him and
found the two "envelopes containing heroin" clutched in his left
hand in his raincoat pocket, and found the syringe in the tan
zipper bag. Marsh then took him (petitioner) into custody. Hereford
died four days after the arrest, and therefore did not testify at
the hearing on the motion.

															26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 7606, added by § 104(a) of the Narcotic
Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 570, provides, in pertinent part:

															"The Commissioner . . . and agents, of the Bureau of Narcotics .
. . may --"

															" * * * *" "(2) make arrests without warrant for violations of any law of
the United States relating to narcotic drugs . . . where the
violation is committed in the presence of the person making the
arrest or where such person has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such
violation."

															The crucial question for us, then, is whether knowledge of the
related facts and circumstances gave Marsh "probable cause" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and "reasonable grounds"
within the meaning of § 104(a), supra, [ Footnote 3 ] to believe that petitioner had
committed or was committing a violation of the narcotic laws. If it
did, the arrest, though without a warrant was lawful, Page 358 U. S. 311 and the subsequent search of petitioner's person and the seizure
of the found heroin were validly made incident to a lawful arrest,
and therefore the motion to suppress was properly overruled and the
heroin was competently received in evidence at the trial. Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S. 392 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 158 ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 , 269 U. S. 30 ; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.
S. 480 , 357 U. S.
483 .

															Petitioner does not dispute this analysis of the question for
decision. Rather, he contends (1) that the information given by
Hereford to Marsh was "hearsay" and, because hearsay is not legally
competent evidence in a criminal trial, could not legally have been
considered, but should have been put out of mind, by Marsh in
assessing whether he had "probable cause" and "reasonable grounds"
to arrest petitioner without a warrant, and (2) that, even if
hearsay could lawfully have been considered, Marsh's information
should be held insufficient to show "probable cause" and
"reasonable grounds" to believe that petitioner had violated or was
violating the narcotic laws and to justify his arrest without a
warrant.

															Considering the first contention, we find petitioner entirely in
error. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 , 338 U. S.
172 -173, has settled the question the other way. There,
in a similar situation, the convict contended

															"that the factors relating to inadmissibility of the evidence
[for] purposes of proving guilt at the trial, deprive[d]
the evidence as a whole of sufficiency to show probable cause for
the search. . . ." Id. at 338 U. S. 172 .
(Emphasis added.) But this Court, rejecting that contention,
said:

															"[T]he so-called distinction places a wholly unwarranted
emphasis upon the criterion of admissibility in evidence, to prove
the accused's guilt, of the facts relied upon to show probable
cause. That emphasis, we think, goes much too far in confusing and
disregarding the difference between what is required to prove guilt
in a criminal case and what is Page 358 U. S. 312 required to show probable cause for arrest or search. It
approaches requiring (if it does not in practical effect require)
proof sufficient to establish guilt in order to substantiate the
existence of probable cause. There is a large difference between
the two things to be proved [guilt and probable cause], as well as
between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish
them. [ Footnote 4 ]"

															338 U.S. at 338 U. S.
172 -173.

															Nor can we agree with petitioner's second contention that
Marsh's information was insufficient to show probable cause and
reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had violated or was
violating the narcotic laws and to justify his arrest without a
warrant. The information given to narcotic agent Marsh by "special
employee" Page 358 U. S. 313 Hereford may have been hearsay to Marsh, but coming from one
employed for that purpose and whose information had always been
found accurate and reliable, it is clear that Marsh would have been
derelict in his duties had he not pursued it. And when, in pursuing
that information, he saw a man, having the exact physical
attributes and wearing the precise clothing and carrying the tan
zipper bag that Hereford had described, alight from one of the very
trains from the very place stated by Hereford and start to walk at
a "fast" pace toward the station exit, Marsh had personally
verified every facet of the information given him by Hereford
except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the
three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And surely,
with every other bit of Hereford's information being thus
personally verified, Marsh had "reasonable grounds" to believe that
the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's information -- that
Draper would have the heroin with him -- was likewise true.

															"In dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, supra, at 338 U. S. 175 .
Probable cause exists where

															"the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that"

															an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 .
[ Footnote 5 ] Page 358 U. S. 314 We believe that, under the facts and circumstances here, Marsh
had probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioner was committing a violation of the laws of the United
States relating to narcotic drugs at the time he arrested him. The
arrest was therefore lawful, and the subsequent search and seizure,
having been made incident to that lawful arrest, were likewise
valid. [ Footnote 6 ] It follows
that petitioner's motion to suppress was properly denied, and that
the seized heroin was competent evidence lawfully received at the
trial. Affirmed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in
the consideration or decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides:

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Hereford told Marsh that Draper was a Negro of light brown
complexion, 27 years of age, 5 feet 8 inches tall, weighed about
160 pounds, and that he was wearing a light colored raincoat, brown
slacks and black shoes.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The terms "probable cause" as used in the Fourth Amendment and
"reasonable grounds" as used in § 104(a) of the Narcotic Control
Act, 70 Stat. 570, are substantial equivalents of the same meaning. United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519, 526; cf. United
States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716, 720.

															[ Footnote 4 ] In the United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106,
Judge Learned Hand said:

															"It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay
evidence; and indeed, the 'reasonable cause' necessary to support
an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the
accused's guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers
are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their
duties." Grau v. United States, 287 U.
S. 124 , 287 U. S. 128 ,
contains a dictum that

															"[a] search warrant may issue only upon evidence which would be
competent in the trial of the offense before a jury ( Giles v.
United States, 284 F. 208; Wagner v. United States, 8
F.(2d) 581). . . ."

															But the principles underlying that proposition were thoroughly
discredited and rejected in Brinegar v. United States,
supra, 338 U.S. at 338 U. S.
172 -174. There are several cases in the federal courts
that followed the now discredited dictum in the Grau case, Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85, 88; Worthington
v. United States, 166 F.2d 557, 564-565; cf. Reeve v.
Howe, 33 F. Supp.
619 , 622; United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp.
275 , 279, but the great weight of authority is the other way. See, e.g., Wrightson v. United States, 98 U.S.App.D.C.
377, 236 F.2d 672; United States v. Heitner, supra; United
States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716; Wisniewski v. United
States, 47 F.2d 825; United States v. Walker, 246
F.2d 519; Mueller v. Powell, 203 F.2d 797. And
see Note, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 1307, 1310-1311, criticizing the Grau dictum.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															To the same effect are: Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 , 282 U. S.
700 -701; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.
S. 435 , 268 U. S. 441 ; Steele v. United States, No. 1, 267 U.
S. 498 , 267 U. S.
504 -505; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S.
642 , 97 U. S. 645 ; Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U. S.
175 -176.

															[ Footnote 6 ] Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 , 232 U. S. 392 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 158 ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 , 269 U. S. 30 ; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.
S. 480 , 357 U. S.
483 .

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

															Decisions under the Fourth Amendment, [ Footnote 2/1 ] taken in the long view, have not given the
protection to the citizen which the letter and spirit of the
Amendment would seem to require. One reason, I think, is that
wherever a culprit is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth
Amendment cases, it is difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that
would turn him loose. A rule protective of law-abiding citizens is
not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually criminals. Yet
the rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike. If the
word of the informer Page 358 U. S. 315 on which the present arrest was made is sufficient to make the
arrest legal, his word would also protect the police who, acting on
it, hauled the innocent citizen off to jail.

															Of course, the education we receive from mystery stories and
television shows teaches that what happened in this case is
efficient police work. The police are tipped off that a man
carrying narcotics will step off the morning train. A man meeting
the precise description does alight from the train. No warrant for
his arrest has been -- or, as I see it, could then be -- obtained.
Yet he is arrested, and narcotics are found in his pocket and a
syringe in the bag he carried. This is the familiar pattern of
crime detection which has been dinned into public consciousness as
the correct and efficient one. It is, however, a distorted
reflection of the constitutional system under which we are supposed
to live.

															With all due deference, the arrest made here on the mere word of
an informer violated the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the
requirement of the law, 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 7607, governing
arrests in narcotics cases. If an arrest is made without a warrant,
the offense must be committed in the presence of the officer or the
officer must have "reasonable grounds to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed or is committing" a violation of the
narcotics law. The arresting officers did not have a bit of
evidence, known to them and as to which they could take an oath had
they gone to a magistrate for a warrant, that petitioner had
committed any crime. The arresting officers did not know the
grounds on which the informer based his conclusion; nor did they
seek to find out what they were. They acted solely on the
informer's word. In my view, that was not enough.

															The rule which permits arrest for felonies, as distinguished
from misdemeanors, if there are reasonable grounds for believing a
crime has been or is being committed ( Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S.
157 ), Page 358 U. S. 316 grew out of the need to protect the public safety by making
prompt arrests. Id. Yet, apart from those cases where the
crime is committed in the presence of the officer, arrests without
warrants, like searched without warrants, are the exception, not
the rule, in our society. Lord Chief Justice Pratt, in Wilkes
v. Wood, 19 How.St.Tr. 1153, condemned not only the odious
general warrant, [ Footnote 2/2 ] in
which the name of the citizen to be arrested was left blank, but
the whole scheme of seizures and searches [ Footnote 2/3 ] under "a discretionary power" of law
officers to act "wherever their suspicions may chance to fall" -- a
practice which he denounced as "totally subversive of the liberty
of the subject." Id. at 1167. See III May,
Constitutional History of England, c. XI. Wilkes had written in
1762,

															"To take any man into custody, and deprive him of his liberty,
without having some seeming foundation at least, on which to
justify such a step, is inconsistent with wisdom and sound
policy."

															The Life and Political Writings of John Wilkes, p. 372.

															George III, in 1777, pressed for a bill which would allow
arrests on suspicion of treason committed in America. The words
were "suspected of" treason and it was to these words that Wilkes
addressed himself in Parliament.

															"There is not a syllable in the Bill of the degree of
probability attending the suspicion. . . . Is it possible,
Sir, to give more despotic powers to a bashaw of the Turkish Page 358 U. S. 317 empire? What security is left for the devoted objects of this
Bill against the malice of a prejudiced individual, a wicked
magistrate . . .?"

															The Speeches of Mr. Wilkes, p. 102.

															These words and the complaints against which they were directed
were well known on this side of the water. Hamilton wrote about
"the practice of arbitrary imprisonments" which he denounced as
"the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny." The
writs of assistance, against which James Otis proclaimed, [ Footnote 2/4 ] were vicious in the same way
as the general warrants, since they required no showing of
"probable cause" before a magistrate, and since they allowed the
police to search on suspicion and without "reasonable grounds" for
believing that a crime had been or was being committed. Otis'
protest was eloquent; but he lost the case. His speech, however,
rallied public opinion. "Then and there," wrote John Adams, "the
child Independence was born." 10 Life and Works of John Adams
(1856), p. 248.

															The attitude of Americans to arrests and searches on suspicion
was also greatly influenced by the lettres de cachet extensively used in France. [ Footnote
2/5 ] This was an order emanating from the King and
countersigned by a minister directing the seizure of a person for
purposes of immediate imprisonment or exile. The ministers issued
the lettres in an arbitrary manner, often at the request
of the head of a noble family to punish a deviant son or relative. See Mirabeau, A Victim of the Lettres de Cachet, 3
Am.Hist.Rev. 19. One who was so arrested Page 358 U. S. 318 might remain incarcerated indefinitely, as no legal process was
available by which he could seek release.

															"Since the action of the government was secret, his friends
might not know whither he had vanished, and he might even be
ignorant of the cause of his arrest."

															8 The Camb.Mod.Hist. 50. In the Eighteenth Century, the practice
arose of issuing the lettres in blank, the name to be
filled in by the local mandatory. Thus, the King could be told in
1770

															"that no citizen of your realm is guaranteed against having his
liberty sacrificed to revenge. For no one is great enough to be
beyond the hate of some minister, nor small enough to be beyond the
hate of some clerk."

															III Encyc.Soc.Sci. 138. As Blackstone wrote,

															". . . if once it were left in the power of any, the highest,
magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers
thought proper (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown),
there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities."

															I Commentaries (4th ed. Colley) *135.

															The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted June 12, 1776,
included the forerunner of the Fourth Amendment: [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted."

															Section 10. (Italics added.)

															The requirement that a warrant of arrest be "supported by
evidence" was by then deeply rooted in history. And it is
inconceivable that, in those days, when the right of Page 358 U. S. 319 privacy was so greatly cherished, the mere word of an informer
-- such as we have in the present case -- would be enough. For
whispered charges and accusations, used in lieu of evidence of
unlawful acts, were the main complaint of the age. Frisbie v.
Butler, Kirby's Rep. (Conn.) 1785-1788, p. 213, decided in
1787, illustrates, I think, the mood of the day in the matter of
arrests on suspicion. A warrant of arrest and search was issued by
a justice of the peace on the oath of a citizen who had lost some
pork from a cellar, the warrant stating, "said Butler suspects one
Benjamin Frisbie, of Harwinton, to be the person that hath taken
said pork." The court on appeal reversed the judgment of
conviction, holding, inter alia, that the complaint
"contained no direct charge of the theft, but only an averment that
the defendant was suspected to be guilty." Id. at 215.
Nothing but suspicion is shown in the instant case -- suspicion of
an informer, not that of the arresting officers. Nor did they seek
to obtain from the informer any information on which he based his
belief. The arresting officers did not have a bit of evidence that
the petitioner had committed or was committing a crime before the
arrest. The only evidence of guilt was provided by the arrest
itself.

															When the Constitution was up for adoption, objections were made
that it contained no Bill of Rights. And Patrick Henry was one who
complained in particular that it contained no provision against
arbitrary searches and seizures:

															". . . general warrants, by which an officer may search
suspected places without evidence of the commission of a fact, or
seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be
prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized, any
property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any
evidence or reason. Everything the most sacred Page 358 U. S. 320 may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We
have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here than
they have in England, because there, if a person be confined,
liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But
here a man living many hundred miles from the judges may get in
prison before he can get that writ."

															I Elliot's Debates, 588.

															The determination that arrests and searches on mere suspicion
would find no place in American law enforcement did not abate
following the adoption of a Bill of Rights applicable to the
Federal Government. In Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn.
(Pa.) 38, an arrest warrant issued by a magistrate stating his
"strong reason to suspect" that the accused had committed a crime
because of "common rumor and report" was held illegal under a
constitutional provision identical in relevant part to the Fourth
Amendment.

															"It is true that, by insisting on an oath, felons may sometimes
escape. This must have been very well well known to the framers of
our constitution; but they thought it better that the guilty should
sometimes escape than that every individual should be subject to
vexation and oppression." Id. at 43-44. In Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn.
40, the warrant stated that "several persons are suspected" of
stealing some flour which is concealed in Hyatt's house or other
places and arrest the suspected persons if found with the flour.
The court held the warrant void, stating it knew of "no such
process as one to arrest all suspected persons, and bring them
before a court for trial. It is an idea not to be endured for a
moment." Id. at 44. See also Fisher v. McGirr, 1
Gray (Mass.) 1; Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51 N.E.
872; Somerville v. Richards, 37 Mich. 299; Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc., Mass., 329, 335-336. Page 358 U. S. 321 It was against this long background that Professors Hogan and
Snee of Georgetown University recently wrote:

															". . . it must be borne in mind that any arrest based on
suspicion alone is illegal. This indisputable rule of law has grave
implications for a number of traditional police investigative
practices. The round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on suspicion,
for questioning, for investigation or on an open charge all are
prohibited by the law. It is undeniable that if those arrests were
sanctioned by law, the police would be in a position to investigate
a crime and to detect the real culprit much more easily, much more
efficiently, much more economically, and with much more dispatch.
It is equally true, however, that society cannot confer such power
on the police without ripping away much of the fabric of a way of
life which seeks to give the maximum of liberty to the individual
citizen. The finger of suspicion is a long one. In an individual
case, it may point to all of a certain race, age group or locale.
Commonly it extends to any who have committed similar crimes in the
past. Arrest on mere suspicion collides violently with the basic
human right of liberty. It can be tolerated only in a society which
is willing to concede to its government powers which history and
experience teach are the inevitable accoutrements of tyranny."

															47 Geo.L.J. 1, 22.

															Down to this day, our decisions have closely heeded that
warning. So far as I can ascertain, the mere word of an informer,
not bolstered by some evidence [ Footnote 2/7 ] that a Page 358 U. S. 322 crime had been or was being committed, has never been approved
by this Court as "reasonable grounds" for making an arrest without
a warrant. Whether the act complained of be seizure of goods,
search of premises, or the arrest of the citizen, the judicial
inquiry has been directed toward the reasonableness of inferences
to be drawn from suspicious circumstances attending the action
thought to be unlawful. Evidence required to prove guilt is not
necessary. But the attendant circumstances must be sufficient to
give rise in the mind of the arresting officer at least to
inferences of guilt. Locke v. United
States , 7 Cranch 339; The
Thompson , 3 Wall. 155; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 ; Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U. S.
25 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S.
159 -162; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.
S. 581 , 332 U. S.
591 -592; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S.
165 -171.

															The requirement that the arresting officer know some facts
suggestive of guilt has been variously stated:

															"If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offense has been committed, it is sufficient." Stacey v. Emery, supra, at 97 U. S.
645 .

															". . . good faith is not enough to constitute probable cause.
That faith must be grounded on facts within knowledge of the . . .
agent, which in the judgment of the court would make his faith
reasonable." Director General v. Kastenbaum, supra, at 263 U. S.
28 . Page 358 U. S. 323 Even when officers had information far more suggestive of guilt
than the word of the informer used here, we have not sustained
arrests without a warrant. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 16 ,
the arresting officer not only had an informer's tip, but he
actually smelled opium coming out of a room and, on breaking in,
found the accused. That arrest was held unlawful. Yet the smell of
opium is far more tangible direct evidence than an unverified
report that someone is going to commit a crime. And in United
States v. Di Re, supra, an arrest without a warrant of a man
sitting in a car, where counterfeit coupons had been found passing
between two men, was not justified in absence of any shred of
evidence implicating the defendant, a third person. And see Giacona v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 325, 298
S.W.2d 587 . Yet the evidence before those officers was more
potent than the mere word of the informer involved in the present
case.

															The Court is quite correct in saying that proof of "reasonable
grounds" for believing a crime was being committed need not be
proof admissible at the trial. It could be inferences from
suspicious acts, e.g., consort with known peddlers, the
surreptitious passing of a package, an intercepted message
suggesting criminal activities, or any number of such events coming
to the knowledge of the officer. See People v.
Rios, 46 Cal. 2d
297 , 294 P.2d 39. But, if he takes the law into his own hands
and does not seek the protection of a warrant, he must act on some
evidence known to him. [ Footnote
2/8 ] The law goes far to protect Page 358 U. S. 324 the citizen. Even suspicious acts observed by the officers may
be as consistent with innocence as with guilt. That is not enough,
for even the guilty may not be implicated on suspicion alone. Baumboy v. United States, 24 F.2d 512. The reason it is,
as I have said, that the standard set by the Constitution and by
the statutes is one that will protect both the officer and the
citizen. For if the officer acts with "probable cause" or
"reasonable grounds," he is protected even though the citizen is
innocent. [ Footnote 2/9 ] This
important requirement should be strictly enforced, lest the whole
process of arrest revert once more to whispered accusations by
people. When we lower the guards as we do today, we risk making the
role of the informer -- odious in our history -- once more supreme.
I think the correct rule was stated in Poldo v. United
States, 55 F.2d 866, 869.

															"Mere suspicion is not enough; there must be circumstances
represented to the officers through the testimony of their senses
sufficient to justify them in a good faith belief that the
defendant had violated the law."

															Here, the officers had no evidence -- apart from the mere word
of an informer -- that petitioner was committing a crime. The fact
that petitioner walked fast and carried a tan zipper bag was not
evidence of any crime. The officers knew nothing except what they
had been told by the informer. If they went to a magistrate to get
a warrant of arrest and relied solely on the report of the
informer, it is not conceivable to me that one would be granted. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.
S. 480 , 357 U. S. 486 .
For they could not present to the magistrate any of the facts which
the informer may have had. They could swear only to the fact that
the informer had made the accusation. They could swear to no
evidence that lay in their own knowledge. They could Page 358 U. S. 325 present, on information and belief, no facts which the informer
disclosed. No magistrate could issue a warrant on the mere word of
an officer, without more. [ Footnote
2/10 ] See Giordenello v. United State, supra. We are
not justified in lowering the standard when an arrest is made
without a warrant and allowing the officers more leeway than we
grant the magistrate.

															With all deference, I think we break with tradition when we
sustain this arrest. We said in United States v. Di Re,
supra, at 332 U. S. 595 ,
" . . . a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In
law, it is good or bad when it starts and does not change character
from its success." In this case, it was only after the arrest and
search were made that there was a shred of evidence known to the
officers that a crime was in the process of being committed.
[ Footnote 2/11 ] Page 358 U. S. 326 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Fourth Amendment provides:

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized."

															(Italics added.)

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The general warrant was declared illegal by the House of Commons
in 1766. See 16 Hansard, Parl.Hist.Eng., 207.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The nameless general warrant was not the only vehicle for
intruding on the privacy of the subjects without a valid basis for
believing them guilty of offenses. In declaring illegal a warrant
to search a plaintiff's house for evidence of libel, issued by the
Secretary of State without any proof that the named accused was the
author of the alleged libels, Lord Camden said,

															"we can safely say there is no law in this country to justify
the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would
destroy all the comforts of society." Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.K.B. 275, 291.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See Quincy's Mass.Rep., 1761-1882, Appendix I, p.
469.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															"Experience . . . has taught us that the power [to make arrests,
searches and seizures] is one open to abuse. The most notable
historical instance of it is that of lettres de cachet. Our Constitution was framed during the seethings of the French
Revolution. The thought was to make lettres de cachet impossible with us." United States v. Innelli, 286 F. 731.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See also Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), Art.
XXIII; Massachusetts Constitution (1780), Part First, Art. XIV; New
Hampshire Constitution (1784), Part I, Art. XIX; North Carolina
Declaration of Rights (1776), Art. XI; Pennsylvania Constitution
(1776), Art. X.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Hale, who traced the evolution of arrests without warrants in
The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. ed. 1847), states
that, while officers need at time to act on information from
others, they must make that information, so far as they can, their
own. He puts a case where A, suspecting B "on reasonable grounds"
of being a felon, asks an officer to arrest B. The duty of the
officer was stated as follows:

															"He ought to inquire and examine the circumstances and causes of
the suspicion of A, which, tho he cannot do it upon oath, yet such
an information may carry over the suspicion even to the constable,
whereby it may become his suspicion as well as the suspicion of
A." Id. at 91.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106, that says
an arrest may be made "upon hearsay evidence" was a case where the
arrest was made after the defendant on seeing the officers tried to
get away. Our cases cited by that court in support of the use of
hearsay were Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 ; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.
S. 435 ; and Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 . But
each of them was a case where the information on which the arrest
was made, though perhaps not competent at the trial, was known to
the arresting officer.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] Maghan v. Jerome, 67 App.D.C. 9, 88 F.2d 1001; Pritchett v. Sullivan, 182 F. 480. See Ravenscroft v.
Casey, 139 F.2d 776.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245, 4 P. 363; State
v. Smith, Mo.App., 262 S.W. 65, arising under state
constitutions having provisions comparable to our Fourth
Amendment.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The Supreme Court of South Carolina has said:

															"Some things are to be more deplored than the unlawful
transportation of whiskey; one is the loss of liberty. Common as
the event may be, it is a serious thing to arrest a citizen, and it
is a more serious thing to search his person; and he who
accomplishes it must do so in conformity to the laws of the land.
There are two reasons for this -- one to avoid bloodshed and the
other to preserve the liberty of the citizen. Obedience to law is
the bond of society, and the officers set to enforce the law are
not exempt from its mandates."

															"In the instant case, the possession of the liquor was the body
of the offense; that fact was proven by a forcible and unlawful
search of the defendant's person to secure the veritable key to the
offense. It is fundamental that a citizen may not be arrested and
have his person searched by force and without process in order to
secure testimony against him. . . . It is better that the guilty
shall escape, rather than another offense shall be committed in the
proof of guilt." Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 148, 88 S.E.
441.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Draper v. United States:

The case centered around the arrest and search of the petitioner, who was suspected of violating federal narcotics laws. The arresting officer, a federal narcotics agent, received information from an informant that the petitioner was involved in illegal narcotics activities and would be returning from Chicago on a specific train with a supply of drugs.

The key issue was whether the agent had "probable cause" and "reasonable grounds" to believe that the petitioner had committed or was committing a crime, which would justify the arrest, search, and seizure without a warrant.

The Court held that:

1. The agent was legally entitled to consider the information received from the informant, even if it was "hearsay," when determining whether there was probable cause for the arrest.

2. The information provided by the informant, which the agent had found to be reliable in the past, was sufficient to establish probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner was violating narcotics laws.

3. As a result, the arrest was lawful, and the subsequent search and seizure of the narcotics and syringe were also valid as they were incident to a lawful arrest.

The Court affirmed the lower court's decision and upheld the petitioner's conviction, allowing the seized evidence to be admitted at the trial.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the preliminary print of the United States
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–896

															_________________

															COMMIL USA, LLC, PETITIONER v. CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the federal circuit

															[May 26, 2015]

															Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.[ 1 ]*

															A patent holder, and the holder’s lawful licensees, can recover
for monetary injury when their exclusive rights are violated by
others’ wrongful conduct. One form of patent injury occurs if
unauthorized persons or entities copy, use, or otherwise infringe
upon the patented invention. Another form of injury to the patent
holder or his licensees can occur when the actor induces others to
infringe the patent. In the instant case, both forms of
in-jury—direct infringement and wrongful inducement of others to
commit infringement—were alleged. After two trials, the defendant
was found liable for both types of injury. The dispute now before
the Court concerns the inducement aspect of the case.

															I

															The patent holder who commenced this action is the petitioner
here, Commil USA, LLC. The technical details of Commil’s patent are
not at issue. So it suffices to say, with much oversimplification,
that the patent is for a method of implementing short-range
wireless networks. Suppose an extensive business headquarters or a
resort or a college campus wants a single, central wireless system
(sometimes called a Wi-Fi network). In order to cover the large
space, the system needs multiple base stations so a user can move
around the area and still stay connected. Commil’s patent relates
to a method of providing faster and more reliable communications
between devices and base stations. The particular claims of
Commil’s patent are discussed in the opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 720 F. 3d 1361,
1364–1365, 1372 (2013).

															Commil brought this action against Cisco Systems, Inc., which
makes and sells wireless networking equipment. In 2007, Commil sued
Cisco in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas. Cisco is the respondent here. Commil alleged that Cisco
had infringed Commil’s patent by making and using networking
equipment. In addition Commil alleged that Cisco had induced others
to infringe the patent by selling the infringing equipment for them
to use, in contravention of Commil’s exclusive patent rights.

															At the first trial, the jury concluded that Commil’s patent was
valid and that Cisco had directly infringed. The jury awarded
Commil $3.7 million in damages. As to induced infringement, the
jury found Cisco not liable. Commil filed a motion for a new trial
on induced infringement and damages, which the District Court
grantedbecause of certain inappropriate comments Cisco’s counsel
had made during the first trial.

															A month before the second trial Cisco went to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office and asked it to re-examine the validity
of Commil’s patent. The Office granted the request; but,
undoubtedly to Cisco’s disappointment, it confirmed the validity of
Commil’s patent. App. 159, 162.

															Back in the District Court, the second trial proceeded, limited
to the issues of inducement and damages on that issue and direct
infringement. As a defense to the claim of inducement, Cisco argued
it had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was invalid. It
sought to introduce evidence to support that assertion. The
District Court, however, ruled that Cisco’s proffered evidence of
its good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity was inadmissible.
While the District Court’s order does not provide the reason for
the ruling, it seems the court excluded this evidence on the
assumption that belief in invalidity is not a defense to a
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant induced others to
infringe.

															At the close of trial, and over Cisco’s objection, the District
Court instructed the jury that it could find inducement if “Cisco
actually intended to cause the acts that constitute . . .
direct infringement and that Cisco knew or should have known that
its actions would induce actual infringement.” Id., at 21.
The jury returned a verdict for Commil on induced infringement and
awarded $63.7 million in damages.

															After the verdict, but before judgment, this Court issued its
decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S. A. , 563 U. S. ___ (2011). That case, as will be
discussed in more detail, held that, in an action for induced
infringement, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the
alleged inducer knew of the patent in question and knew the induced
acts were infringing. Id. , at ___ (slip op.,at 10). Relying
on that case, Cisco again urged that the jury instruction was
incorrect because it did not state knowledge as the governing
standard for inducement liability. The District Court denied
Cisco’s motion and entered judgment in Commil’s favor.

															Cisco appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded it
was error for the District Court to have instructed the jury that
Cisco could be liable for induced infringement if it “ ‘knew
or should have known’ ” that its customers infringed. 720
F. 3d, at 1366. The panel held that “induced infringement
‘requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Global-Tech , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10)). By stating that Cisco
could be found liable if it “ ‘knew or should have known that
its actions would induce actual infringement,’ ” the Court of
Appeals explained, the District Court had allowed “the jury to find
[Cisco] liable based on mere negligence where knowledge is
required.” 720 F. 3d, at 1366. That ruling, which requires a
new trial on the inducement claim with a corrected instruction on
knowledge, is not in question here.

															What is at issue is the second holding of the Court of Appeals,
addressing Cisco’s contention that the trial court committed
further error in excluding Cisco’s evidence that it had a
good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was in-valid. Beginning with
the observation that it is “axiomatic that one cannot infringe an
invalid patent,” the Court of Appeals reasoned that “evidence of an
accused inducer’s good-faith belief of invalidity may negate the
requisite intent for induced infringement.” Id., at 1368.
The court saw “no principled distinction between a good-faith
belief of invalidity and a good-faith belief of non-infringement
for the purpose of whether a defendant possessed the specific
intent to induce infringement of a patent.” Ibid. Judge Newman dissented on that point. In Judge Newman’s view a
defendant’s good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is not a
defense to induced infringement. She reasoned that “whether there
is infringement in fact does not depend on the belief of the
accused infringer that it might succeed in invalidating the
patent.” Id., at 1374 (opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Both parties filed petitions for rehearing en
banc, which were denied. 737 F. 3d 699, 700 (2013). Five
judges, however, would have granted rehearing en banc to consider
the question whether a good-faith belief in invalidity is a defense
to induced infringement. Id., at 700 (Reyna, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).

															This Court granted certiorari to decide that question. 574
U. S. ___ (2014).

															II

															Although the precise issue to be addressed concerns a claim of
improper inducement to infringe, the discussion to follow refers as
well to direct infringement and contributory infringement, so it is
instructive at the outset to set forth the statutory provisions
pertaining to these three forms of liability. These three relevant
provisions are found in §271 of the Patent Act.35
U. S. C. §271.

															Subsection (a) governs direct infringement and provides:

															“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United
States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”

															Under this form of liability, a defendant’s mental state is
irrelevant. Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense. Global-Tech , 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5,
n. 2).

															Subsection (b) governs induced infringement:

															“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.”

															In contrast to direct infringement, liability for inducing
infringement attaches only if the defendant knew of the patent and
that “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Id. ,
at ___ (slip op., at 10). In Commil and the Government’s view, not
only is knowledge or belief in the patent’s validity irrelevant,
they further argue the party charged with inducing infringement
need not know that the acts it induced would infringe. On this
latter point, they are incorrect, as will be explained below.

															Subsection (c) deals with contributory infringement:

															“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and
not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributoryinfringer.”

															Like induced infringement, contributory infringement requires
knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent
infringement. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co. ,377 U. S. 476,488 (1964) ( Aro II ).

															This case asks a question of first impression: whether knowledge
of, or belief in, a patent’s validity is required for induced
infringement under §271(b).

															A

															Before turning to the question presented, it is necessary to
reaffirm what the Court held in Global-Tech . Commil and the
Government (which supports Commil in this case) argue that Global-Tech should be read as holding that only knowledge of
the patent is required for induced infringement. That, as will be
explained, would contravene Global-Tech ’s explicit holding
that liability for induced infringement can only attach if the
defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that “the induced
acts constitute patent infringement.” 563 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 10).

															In Global-Tech , the plaintiff, SEB, had invented and
patented a deep fryer. A few years later, Sunbeam asked Pentalpha
to supply deep fryers for Sunbeam to sell. To make the deep fryer,
Pentalpha bought an SEB fryer and copied all but the cosmetic
features. Pentalpha then sold the fryers to Sunbeam, which in turn
sold them to customers. SEB sued Pentalpha for induced
infringement, arguing Pentalpha had induced Sunbeam and others to
sell the infringing fryers in violation of SEB’s patent rights. In
defense, Pentalpha argued it did not know the deep fryer it copied
was patented and therefore could not be liable for inducing anyone
to infringe SEB’s patent. The question presented to this Court was
“whether a party who ‘actively induces infringement of a patent’
under35 U. S. C. §271(b) must know that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at
1).

															After noting the language of §271(b) and the case law prior to
passage of the Patent Act did not resolve the question, the Global-Tech Court turned to Aro II , a case about
contributory infringement . The Global-Tech Court
deemed that rules concerning contributory infringement were
relevant to induced infringement, because the mental state imposed
in each instance is similar. Before the Patent Act, inducing
infringement was not a separate theory of indirect liability but
was evidence of contributory infringement. 563 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 5). Thus, in many respects, it is proper to find
common ground in the two theories of liability. Aro II concluded that to be liable for contributory
infringement, a defendant must know the acts were infringing. 377
U. S. , at 488. In Global-Tech , the Court said
this reasoning was applicable, explaining as follows:

															“Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is
needed for induced infringement under §271(b). As noted, the two
provisions have a common origin in the pre-1952 understanding of
contributory infringement, and the language of the two provisions
creates the same difficult interpretive choice. It would thus be
strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent is needed
under §271(c) but not under §271(b). “Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under
§271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute
patent infringement.” 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). In support of Commil, the Government argues against the clear
language of Global-Tech . According to the Government, all Global-Tech requires is knowledge of the patent: “The Court
did not definitively resolve whether Section 271(b) additionally
requires knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9. See also Brief
for Petitioner 17. Together, Commil and the Government claim the
“factual circumstances” of Global-Tech “did not require” the
Court to decide whether knowledge of infringement is required for
inducement liability. Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 12. See also Brief for Petitioner 23–24. But in the
Court’s Global-Tech decision, its description of the factual
circumstances suggests otherwise. The Court concluded there was
enough evidence to support a finding that Pentalpha knew “the
infringing nature of the sales it encouraged Sunbeam to make.” 563
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). It was not only knowledge of
the existence of SEB’s patent that led the Court to affirm the
liability finding but also it was the fact that Pentalpha copied
“all but the cosmetic features of SEB’s fryer,” demonstrating
Pentalpha knew it would be causing customers to infringe SEB’s
patent. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15). Accepting the Government and Commil’s argument would require
this Court to depart from its prior holding. See id., at ___
(slip op., at 10). See also id., at ___ (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 1) (“The Court is correct, in my view, to
conclude that . . . to induce infringement a defendant
must know the acts constitute patent infringement” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). And the Global-Tech rationale is
sound. Qualifying or limiting its holding, as the Government and
Commil seek to do, would lead to the conclusion, both in inducement
and contributory infringement cases, that a person, or entity,
could be liable even though he did not know the acts were
infringing. In other words, even if the defendant reads the
patent’s claims differently from the plaintiff, and that reading is
reasonable, he would still be liable because he knew the acts might
infringe. Global-Tech requires more. It requires proof the
defendant knew the acts were infringing. And the Court’s opinion
was clear in rejecting any lesser mental state as the standard. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13–14). B The question the Court confronts today concerns whether a
defendant’s belief regarding patent validity is a defense to a
claim of induced infringement. It is not. The scienter element for
induced infringement concerns infringement; that is a different
issue than validity. Section 271(b) requires that the defendant
“actively induce[d] infringement.” That language requires intent to
“bring about the desired result,” which is infringement. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). And because infringement and
validity are separate issues under the Act, belief regarding
validity cannot negate the scienter required under §271(b). When infringement is the issue, the validity of the patent is
not the question to be confronted. In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc. ,508 U. S. 83 (1993), the Court
explained, “A party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity
presents a claim independent of the patentee’s charge of
infringement.” Id., at 96. It further held noninfringement
and invalidity were “alternative grounds” for dismissing the suit. Id., at 98. And in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper ,445 U. S. 326 (1980), the Courtexplained that an
accused infringer “may prevail either by successfully attacking the
validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge of
infringement.” Id., at 334. These explanations are in accord
with the long-accepted truth—perhaps the axiom—that infringement
and invalidity are separate matters under patent law. See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss R. Prods., Inc. , 320
F. 3d 1354, 1365 (CA Fed. 2003). Indeed, the issues of infringement and validity appear in
separate parts of the Patent Act. Part III of the Act deals with
“Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” including the right to
be free from infringement. §§251–329. Part II, entitled
“Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,” defines what
constitutes a valid patent. §§100–212. Further, noninfringement and
invalidity are listed as two separate defenses, see §§282(b)(1),
(2), and defendants are free to raise either or both of them. See Cardinal , supra, at 98. Were this Court to interpret
§271(b) as permitting a defense of belief in invalidity, it would
conflate the issues of infringement and validity. Allowing this new defense would also undermine a presumption
that is a “common core of thought and truth” reflected in this
Court’s precedents for a century. Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc. ,293 U. S. 1,8
(1934). Under the Patent Act, and the case law before its passage,
a patent is “presumed valid.” §282(a); id., at 8. That
presumption takes away any need for a plaintiff to prove his patent
is valid to bring a claim. But if belief in invalidity were a
defense to induced infringement, the force of that presumption
would be lessened to a drastic degree, for a defendant could
prevail if he proved he reasonably believed the patent was invalid.
That would circumvent the high bar Congress is presumed to have
chosen: the clear and convincing standard. See Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership , 564 U. S. ___,
___–___ (2011) (slip op., at 8–10). Defendants must meet that
standard to rebut the presumption of validity. Ibid. To say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that
someone cannot be induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one
sense a simple truth, both as a matter of logic and semantics. See M. Swift & Sons, Inc. v. W. H. Coe Mfg. Co. , 102
F. 2d 391, 396 (CA1 1939). But the questions courts must
address when interpreting and implementing the statutory framework
require a determination of the procedures and sequences that the
parties must follow to prove the act of wrongful inducement and any
related issues of patent validity. “Validity and infringement are
distinct issues, bearing different burdens, different presumptions,
and different evidence.” 720 F. 3d, at 1374 (opinion of
Newman, J.). To be sure, if at the end of the day, an act that
would have been an infringement or an inducement to infringe
pertains to a patent that is shown to be invalid, there is no
patent to be infringed. But the allocation of the burden to
persuade on these questions, and the timing for the presentations
of the relevant arguments, are concerns of central relevance to the
orderly administration of the patent system. Invalidity is an affirmative defense that “can preclude
enforcement of a patent against otherwise infringing conduct.” 6A
Chisum on Patents §19.01, p. 19–5 (2015). An accused infringer can,
of course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit is invalid; if
the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper
procedures, there is no liability. See i4i , supra , at
___–___ (slip op., at 11–12). That is because invalidity is not a
defense to infringement, it is a defense to liability. And because
of that fact, a belief as to invalidity cannot negate the scienter
required for induced infringement. There are also practical reasons not to create a defense
based on a good-faith belief in invalidity. First and foremost,
accused inducers who believe a patent is invalid have various
proper ways to obtain a ruling to that effect. They can file a
declaratory judgment action asking a federal court to declare the
patent invalid. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc. ,549 U. S. 118,137 (2007). They can seek inter
partes review at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and receive
a decision as to validity within 12 to 18 months. See §316. Or they
can, as Cisco didhere, seek ex parte reexamination of
the patent by the Patent and Trademark Office. §302. And, of
course, any accused infringer who believes the patent in suit is
invalid may raise the affirmative defense of invalidity.
§282(b)(2). If the defendant is successful, he will be immune from
liability. Creating a defense of belief in invalidity, furthermore,
would have negative consequences. It can render litigation more
burdensome for everyone involved. Every accused inducer would have
an incentive to put forth a theory of invalidity and could likely
come up with myriad arguments. See Sloan, Think it is Invalid? A
New Defense to Negate Intent for Induced Infringement, 23 Fed. Cir.
B. J. 613, 618 (2013). And since “it is often more difficult
to determine whether a patent is valid than whether it has been
infringed,” Cardinal , 508 U. S., at 99, accused
inducers would likely find it easier to prevail on a defense
regarding the belief of invalidity than noninfringement. In
addition the need to respond to the defense will increase discovery
costs and multiply the issues the jury must resolve. Indeed, the
jury would be put to the difficult task of separating the
defendant’s belief regarding validity from the actual issue of
validity. As a final note, “[o]ur law is . . . no stranger to
the possibility that an act may be ‘intentional’ for purposes of
civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her
conduct violated the law.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie,
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A. ,559 U. S.
573–583 (2010). Tortious interference with a contract provides an
apt example. While the invalidity of a contract is a defense to
tortious interference, belief in validity is irrelevant.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §766, Comment i (1979). See
also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on Law of Torts 110 (5th ed. 1984). In a similar way, a
trespass “can be committed despite the actor’s mistaken belief that
she has a legal right to enter the property.” Jerman , supra, at 583 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §164,
and Comment e (1963–1964)). And of course, “[t]he general
rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal
system.” Cheek v. United States ,498 U. S.
192,199 (1991). In the usual case, “I thought it was legal” is no
defense. That concept mirrors this Court’s holding that belief in
invalidity will not negate the scienter required under
§271(b). III The Court is well aware that an “industry has developed in
which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C. ,547
U. S. 388,396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Some companies
may use patents as a sword to go after defendants for money, even
when their claims are frivolous. This tactic is often pursued
through demand letters, which “may be sent very broadly and without
prior investigation, may assert vague claims of infringement, and
may be designed to obtain payments that are based more on the costs
of defending litigation than on the merit of the patent claims.” L.
Greisman, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on
Discussion Draft of Patent Demand Letter Legislation before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce 2 (2014). This behavior can impose
a “harmful tax on innovation.” Ibid. No issue of frivolity has been raised by the parties in this
case, nor does it arise on the facts presented to this Court.
Nonetheless, it is still necessary and proper to stress that
district courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure
frivolous cases are dissuaded. If frivolous cases are filed in
federal court, it is within the power of the court to sanction
attorneys for bringing such suits. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. It
is also within the district court’s discretion to award attorney’s
fees to prevailing parties in “exceptional cases.”35
U. S. C. §285; see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. , 572 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2014) (slip op., at 7–8). These safeguards, combined with the
avenues that accused inducers have to obtain rulings on the
validity of patents, militate in favor of maintaining the
separation expressed throughout the Patent Act between infringement
and validity. This dichotomy means that belief in invalidity is no
defense to a claim of induced infringement. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case. Notes 1 * Justice Thomas joins Parts II–B and
III of this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–896

															_________________

															COMMIL USA, LLC, PETITIONER v. CISCO
SYSTEMS, INC.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit

															[May 26, 2015]

															Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice
joins, dissenting.

															I agree with the Court’s rejection of the main
argument advanced by Commil and the United States, that induced
infringement under 35 U. S. C. §271(b) does not
“requir[e] knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9; see also Brief
for Petitioner 15–44.I disagree, however, with the Court’s holding
that good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is not a defense to
induced infringement.

															Infringing a patent means invading a patentee’s
exclusive right to practice his claimed invention. Crown Die
& Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works , 261
U. S. 24, 40 (1923) (quoting 3 W. Robinson, Law of Patents
§937, pp. 122–123 (1890)). Only valid patents confer this right to
exclusivity—invalid patents do not. FTC v. Actavis,
Inc. , 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 8). It
follows, as night the day, that only valid patents can be
infringed. To talk of infringing an invalid patent is to talk
nonsense.

															Induced infringement, we have said, “requires
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A. , 563
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 10). Because only valid
patents can be infringed, anyone with a good-faith belief in a
patent’s in validity necessarily believes the patent cannot be infringed. And it is impossible for anyone who
believes that a patent cannot be infringed to induce actions that
he knows will infringe it. A good-faith belief that a patent
is invalid is therefore a defense to induced infringement of that
patent.

															The Court makes four arguments in support of the
contrary position. None seems to me persuasive. First, it notes
that the Patent Act treats infringement and validity as distinct
issues. Ante, at 9–10. That is true. It is also irrelevant.
Saying that infringement cannot exist without a valid patent does
not “conflate the issues of infringement and validity,” ante, at 10, any more than saying that water cannot exist
without oxygen “conflates” water and oxygen. Recognizing that
infringement requires validity is entirely consistent with the
“long-accepted truth . . . that infringement and
invalidity are separate matters under patent law.” Ibid .

															The Court next insists that permitting the
defense at issue would undermine the statutory presumption of
validity. Ante , at 10–11. It would do no such thing. By
reason of the statutory presumption of validity, §282(a), patents
can be held invalid only by “clear and convincing evidence.” Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership , 564
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 1). This presumption is
not weakened by treating a good-faith belief in invalidity as a
defense to induced infringement. An alleged inducer who succeeds in
this defense does not thereby call a patent’s validity into
question. He merely avoids liability for a third party’s
infringement of a valid patent, in no way undermining that
patent’s presumed validity.

															Next, the Court says that “invalidity is not a
defense to infringement, it is a defense to liability.” Ante , at 11. That is an assertion, not an argument. Again,
to infringe a patent is to invade the patentee’s right of
exclusivity. An invalid patent confers no such right. How is it
possible to interfere with rights that do not exist? The Court has
no answer.

															That brings me to the Court’s weakest argument:
that there are “practical reasons not to create a defense
based on a good-faith belief in invalidity.” Ante , at 12
(emphasis added); see also ibid. (“ Creating a defense
of belief in invalidity, furthermore, would have negative
consequences” (emphasis added)). Ours is not a common-law
court. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U. S. 64, 78
(1938) . We do not, or at least should not, create defenses
to statutory liability—and that is not what this dissent purports
to do. Our task is to interpret the Patent Act, and to decide
whether it makes a good-faith belief in a patent’s
invalid-ity a defense to induced infringement. Since, as we said in Global-Tech , supra, the Act makes knowledge of
infringement a requirement for induced-infringement liability; and
since there can be no infringement (and hence no knowledge of
infringement) of an invalid patent; good-faith belief in invalidity
is a defense. I may add, however, that if the desirability of the
rule we adopt were a proper consideration, it is by no means clear
that the Court’s holding, which increases the in terrorem power of patent trolls, is preferable. The Court seemingly
acknowledges that consequence in Part III of its opinion.

															For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully
dissent.

Summary: Commil USA, LLC sued Cisco Systems, Inc. for patent infringement, alleging that Cisco had infringed Commil's patent for a method of implementing short-range wireless networks and induced others to infringe the patent. The jury found Cisco liable for both direct infringement and inducement of infringement. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict, finding that a defendant's good-faith belief in the invalidity of a patent is not a defense to induced infringement.