U.S. Supreme Court World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980) World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson No. 78-1078 Argued October 3,
1979 Decided January 21,
1980 444
U.S. 286 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
OKLAHOMA Syllabus A products liability action was instituted in an Oklahoma st,ate
court by respondents husband and wife to recover for personal
injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident involving an
automobile that had been purchased by them in New York while they
were New York residents and that was being driven through Oklahoma
at the time of the accident. The defendants included the automobile
retailer and its wholesaler (petitioners), New York corporations
that did no business in Oklahoma. Petitioners entered special
appearances, claiming that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over
them would offend limitations on the State's jurisdiction imposed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial
court rejected petitioners' claims, and they then sought, but were
denied, a writ of prohibition in the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
restrain respondent trial judge from exercising in
personam jurisdiction over them. Held: Consistently with the Due Process Clause, the
Oklahoma trial court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over petitioners. Pp. 444 U. S.
291 -299.

															(a) A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum
contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 . The defendant's contacts with the forum State
must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, id. at 326 U. S. 316 ,
and the relationship between the defendant and the forum must be
such that it is "reasonable . . . to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there," id. at 326 U. S. 317 .
The Due Process Clause

															"does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 326 U. S. 319 .
Pp. 444 U. S.
291 -294.

															(b) Here, there is a total absence in the record of those
affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any
exercise of state court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no
activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close no sales and perform no
services there, avail Page 444 U. S. 287 themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, and solicit
no business there either through salespersons or through
advertising reasonably calculated to reach that State. Nor does the
record show that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents, or
that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the
Oklahoma market. Although it is foreseeable that automobiles sold
by petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the automobile
here might cause injury in Oklahoma, "foreseeability" alone is not
a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause. The foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State, but rather is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Nor can
jurisdiction be supported on the theory that petitioners earn
substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. Pp. 444 U. S.
295 -299. 585 P.2d 351 ,
reversed.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 444 U. S. 299 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined, post, p. 444 U. S. 313 .
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 444 U. S.
317 .

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The issue before us is whether, consistently with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an Oklahoma court may
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products
liability action, when the defendants' only connection with
Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New
York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma. Page 444 U. S. 288 I Respondents Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi
automobile from petitioner Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway), in
Massena, N.Y. in 1976. The following year, the Robinson family, who
resided in New York, left that State for a new home in Arizona. As
they passed through the State of Oklahoma, another car struck their
Audi in the rear, causing a fire which severely burned Kay Robinson
and her two children. [ Footnote
1 ]

															The Robinsons [ Footnote 2 ]
subsequently brought a products liability action in the District
Court for Creek County, Okla., claiming that their injuries
resulted from defective design and placement of the Audi's gas tank
and fuel system. They joined as defendants the automobile's
manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); its
importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); its regional
distributor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide);
and its retail dealer, petitioner Seaway. Seaway and World-Wide
entered special appearances, [ Footnote 3 ] claiming that Oklahoma's exercise of
jurisdiction over them would offend the limitations on the State's
jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. [ Footnote 4 ]

															The facts presented to the District Court showed that World-Wide
is incorporated and has its business office in New Page 444 U. S. 289 York. It distributes vehicles, parts, and accessories, under
contract with Volkswagen, to retail dealers in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut. Seaway, one of these retail dealers, is
incorporated and has its place of business in New York. Insofar as
the record reveals, Seaway and World-Wide are fully independent
corporations whose relations with each other and with Volkswagen
and Audi are contractual only. Respondents adduced no evidence that
either World-Wide or Seaway does any business in Oklahoma, ships or
sells any products to or in that State, has an agent to receive
process there, or purchases advertisements in any media calculated
to reach Oklahoma. In fact, as respondents' counsel conceded at
oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg 32, there was no showing that any
automobile sold by World-Wide or Seaway has ever entered Oklahoma,
with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present
case.

															Despite the apparent paucity of contacts between petitioners and
Oklahoma, the District Court rejected their constitutional claim
and reaffirmed that ruling in denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. [ Footnote 5 ]
Petitioners then sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma to restrain the District Judge, respondent Charles S.
Woodson, from exercising in personam jurisdiction over
them. They renewed their contention that, because they had no
"minimal contacts," App. 32, with the State of Oklahoma, the
actions of the District Judge were in violation of their rights
under the Due Process Clause.

															The Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied the writ, 585 P.2d 351 (1978), [ Footnote 6 ] holding
that personal jurisdiction over petitioners was authorized by
Oklahoma's "long-arm" statute, Page 444 U. S. 290 Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1971). [ Footnote 7 ] Although the court noted that the
proper approach was to test jurisdiction against both statutory and
constitutional standards, its analysis did not distinguish these
questions, probably because § 1701.03(a)(4) has been interpreted as
conferring jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the United
States Constitution. [ Footnote
8 ] The court's rationale was contained in the following
paragraph, 585 P.2d at 354:

															"In the case before us, the product being sold and distributed
by the petitioners is, by its very design and purpose, so mobile
that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. This is
especially true of the distributor, who has the exclusive right to
distribute such automobile in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.
The evidence presented below demonstrated that goods sold and
distributed by the petitioners were used in the State of Oklahoma,
and, under the facts, we believe it reasonable to infer, given the
retail value of the automobile, that the petitioners derive
substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are
used in the State of Oklahoma. This being the case, we hold that,
under the facts presented, the trial court was justified in
concluding Page 444 U. S. 291 that the petitioners derive substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed in this State."

															We granted certiorari, 440 U.S. 907 (1979), to consider an
important constitutional question with respect to state court
jurisdiction and to resolve a conflict between the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma and the highest courts of at least four other States.
[ Footnote 9 ] We reverse. II The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against
a nonresident defendant. Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U. S. 84 , 436 U. S. 91 (1978). A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in
the rendering State and is not entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 , 95 U. S.
732 -733 (1878). Due process requires that the defendant
be given adequate notice of the suit, Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 , 339 U. S.
313 -314 (1950), and be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the court, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945). In the present case, it is not contended that notice was
inadequate; the only question is whether these particular
petitioners were subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma
courts.

															As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between
the defendant and the forum State. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra at 326 U. S. 316 .
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform
two related, but Page 444 U. S. 292 distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And
it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as
coequal sovereigns in a federal system.

															The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically
described in terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said
that the defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such
that maintenance of the suit "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra at 326 U. S. 316 ,
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940). The relationship between the defendant and the forum must
be such that it is "reasonable . . . to require the corporation to
defend the particular suit which is brought there." 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 317 .
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding
that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern,
will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other
relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U. S. 220 , 355 U. S. 223 (1957); the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court,
supra at 436 U. S. 92 , at
least when that interest is not adequately protected by the
plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 , 433 U. S. 211 ,
n. 37 (1977); the interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior
Court, supra at 436 U. S. 93 , 436 U. S.
98 . The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process
Clause, in its role as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation,
have been substantially relaxed over the years. As we noted in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra at 355 U. S.
222 -223, Page 444 U. S. 293 this trend is largely attributable to a fundamental
transformation in the American economy:

															"Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States,
and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in
the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the
same time, modern transportation and communication have made it
much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity."

															The historical developments noted in McGee, of course,
have only accelerated in the generation since that case was
decided.

															Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state
lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we and
remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied
in the Constitution. The economic interdependence of the States was
foreseen and desired by the Framers. In the Commerce Clause, they
provided that the Nation was to be a common market, a "free trade
unit" in which the States are debarred from acting as separable
economic entities. H. P. Hood Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 , 336 U. S. 538 (1949). But the Framers also intended that the States retain many
essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all
of its sister States -- a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment.

															Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth that "[t]he
authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established," Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 95 U. S. 720 ,
we emphasized that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction
over the defendant must be assessed "in the context of our federal
system of government," Page 444 U. S. 294 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 317 ,
and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness,
but also the "orderly administration of the laws," id. at 326 U. S. 319 .
As we noted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.
S. 235 , 357 U. S.
250 -251 (1958):

															"As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce
between the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has
undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in
communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in
a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes,
the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have
evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 , to the flexible standard of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 . But it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of
all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.
[Citation omitted.] Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States."

															Thus, the Due Process Clause

															"does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra at 326 U. S. 319 .
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law
to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment. Hanson v.
Denckla, supra at 357 U. S. 251 , 357 U. S.
254 . Page 444 U. S. 295 III Applying these principles to the case at hand, [ Footnote 10 ] we find in the record before
us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a
necessary predicate to any exercise of state court jurisdiction.
Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close
no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves of
none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit
no business there either through salespersons or through
advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the
record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to
Oklahoma customers or residents, or that they indirectly, through
others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In short,
respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence
and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous
circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New
York residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing
through Oklahoma.

															It is argued, however, that, because an automobile is mobile by
its very design and purpose, it was "foreseeable" that the
Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma. Yet
"foreseeability" alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. In Hanson
v. Denckla, supra, it was no doubt foreseeable that the
settlor of a Delaware trust would subsequently move to Florida and
seek to exercise a power of appointment there; yet we held that
Florida courts could not constitutionally Page 444 U. S. 296 exercise jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee that had no other
contacts with the forum State. In Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U. S. 84 (1978), it was surely "foreseeable" that a divorced wife would move
to California from New York, the domicile of the marriage, and that
a minor daughter would live with the mother. Yet we held that
California could not exercise jurisdiction in a child support
action over the former husband, who had remained in New York.

															If foreseeability were the criterion, a local California tire
retailer could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout
occurs there, see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills,
Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (CA4 1956); a Wisconsin seller of a
defective automobile jack could be haled before a distant court for
damage caused in New Jersey, Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac,
Inc., 372 F.
Supp. 1205 (NJ 1974); or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire
could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening
there, see Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services,
Inc., 304 F.
Supp. 165 , 170-171 (Minn.1969). Every seller of chattels would,
in effect, appoint the chattel his agent for service of process.
His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel. We recently
abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.
S. 215 (1905), that the interest of a creditor in a debt
could be extinguished or otherwise affected by any State having
transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (1977). Having interred the mechanical rule that a creditor's
amenability to a quasi in rem action travels with his
debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in the
present case. [ Footnote
11 ] Page 444 U. S. 297 This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See Kulko
v. California Superior Court, supra at 436 U. S. 97 -98; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 216 ;
and see id. at 433 U. S.
217 -219 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). The Due
Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly administration of the
laws," International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 319 ,
gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit.

															When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State," Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. at 357 U.S.
253 , it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there,
and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers,
or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State. Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its
product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to
suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise
has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The
forum State does not Page 444 U. S. 298 exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State. Cf. Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432 , 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).

															But there is no such or similar basis for Oklahoma jurisdiction
over World-Wide or Seaway in this case. Seaway's sales are made in
Massena, N. Y. World-Wide's market, although substantially larger,
is limited to dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
There is no evidence of record that any automobiles distributed by
World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside this tristate area.
It is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by
World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma. But the mere
"unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
with the forum State." Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 357 U.S. 253 .

															In a variant on the previous argument, it is contended that
jurisdiction can be supported by the fact that petitioners earn
substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court so found, 585 P.2d at 354-355, drawing the inference
that, because one automobile sold by petitioners had been used in
Oklahoma, others might have been used there also. While this
inference seems less than compelling on the facts of the instant
case, we need not question the court's factual findings in order to
reject its reasoning.

															This argument seems to make the point that the purchase of
automobiles in New York, from which the petitioners earn
substantial revenue, would not occur but for the fact that
the automobiles are capable of use in distant States like Oklahoma.
Respondents observe that the very purpose of an automobile is to
travel, and that travel of automobiles sold by petitioners is
facilitated by an extensive chain of Volkswagen service centers
throughout the country, including some in Oklahoma. [ Footnote 12 ] Page 444 U. S. 299 However, financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a
collateral relation to the forum State will not support
jurisdiction if they do not stem from a constitutionally cognizable
contact with that State. See Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 94 -95.
In our view, whatever marginal revenues petitioners may receive by
virtue of the fact that their products are capable of use in
Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to justify that State's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.

															Because we find that petitioners have no "contacts, ties, or
relations" with the State of Oklahoma, International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, supra, at 326 U. S. 319 ,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The driver of the other automobile does not figure in the
present litigation .

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Kay Robinson sued on her own behalf. The two children sued
through Harry Robinson as their father and next friend.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Volkswagen also entered a special appearance in the District
Court, but, unlike World-Wide and Seaway, did not seek review in
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, and is not a petitioner here. Both
Volkswagen and Audi remain as defendants in the litigation pending
before the District Court in Oklahoma.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The papers filed by the petitioners also claimed that the
District Court lacked "venue of the subject matter," App. 9, or
"venue over the subject matter," id. at 11.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The District Court's rulings are unreported, and appear at App.
13 and 20.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Five judges joined in the opinion. Two concurred in the result,
without opinion, and one concurred in part and dissented in part,
also without opinion.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															This subsection provides:

															"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or claim for
relief arising from the persons . . . causing tortious injury in
this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly
does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in this state. . . ."

															The State Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction based on §
1701.03(a)(3), which authorizes jurisdiction over any person
"causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission in
this state." Something in addition to the infliction of tortious
injury was required.

															[ Footnote 8 ] Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla.1976); Carmack v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 536 P.2d 897 (Okla.1975); Hines v. Clendennin, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla.1970).

															[ Footnote 9 ] Cf. Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200
Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968); Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974); Oliver v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Wash. 2d
875 , 425 P.2d
647 (1967).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Respondents argue, as a threshold matter, that petitioners
waived any objections to personal jurisdiction by (1) joining with
their special appearances a challenge to the District Court's
subject matter jurisdiction, see n 4, supra, and (2) taking depositions on the
merits of the case in Oklahoma. The trial court, however,
characterized the appearances as "special," and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, rather than finding jurisdiction waived, reached and
decided the statutory and constitutional questions. Cf. Kulko
v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S.
84 , 436 U. S. 91 , n.
5 (1978).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Respondents' counsel, at oral argument, see Tr. of Oral
Arg.19-22, 29, sought to limit the reach of the foreseeability
standard by suggesting that there is something unique about
automobiles. It is true that automobiles are uniquely mobile, see Tyson v. Whitaker & Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1 ,
6, and n. 11 (Me.1979) (McKusick, C.J.), that they did play a
crucial role in the expansion of personal jurisdiction through the
fiction of implied consent, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927), and that some of the cases have treated the automobile as a
"dangerous instrumentality." But today, under the regime of International Shoe, we see no difference for
jurisdictional purposes between an automobile and any other
chattel. The "dangerous instrumentality" concept apparently was
never used to support personal jurisdiction; and to the extent it
has relevance today, it bears not on jurisdiction, but on the
possible desirability of imposing substantive principles of tort
law such as strict liability.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															As we have noted, petitioners earn no direct revenues from these
service centers. See supra at 444 U. S.
289 .

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. * The Court holds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bars the States from asserting jurisdiction over the
defendants in these two cases. In each case, the Court so decides
because it fails to find the "minimum contacts" that have been
required since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 (1945). Because I believe that the Court reads International
Shoe and its progeny too narrowly, and because I believe that
the standards enunciated by those cases may already be obsolete as
constitutional boundaries, I dissent. I The Court's opinions focus tightly on the existence of contacts
between the forum and the defendant. In so doing, they accord too
little weight to the strength of the forum State's interest in the
case, and fail to explore whether there Page 444 U. S. 300 would be any actual inconvenience to the defendant. The
essential inquiry in locating the constitutional limits on state
court jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether the particular
exercise of jurisdiction offends " traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe, supra at 326 U. S. 316 ,
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940). The clear focus in International Shoe was on
fairness and reasonableness. Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U. S. 84 , 436 U. S. 92 (1978). The Court specifically declined to establish a mechanical
test based on the quantum of contacts between a State and the
defendant: "Whether due process is satisfied must depend, rather, upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations."

															326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 319 (emphasis added). The existence of contacts, so long as there were
some, was merely one way of giving content to the determination of
fairness and reasonableness.

															Surely International Shoe contemplated that the
significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction
would diminish if some other consideration helped establish that
jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable. The interests of the
State and other parties in proceeding with the case in a particular
forum are such considerations. McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U. S. 220 , 355 U. S. 223 (1957), for instance, accorded great importance to a State's
"manifest interest in providing effective means of redress" for its
citizens. See also Kulko v. California Superior Court,
supra at 436 U. S. 92 ; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 , 433 U. S. 208 (1977); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.
S. 306 , 339 U. S. 313 (1950).

															Another consideration is the actual burden a defendant Page 444 U. S. 301 must bear in defending the suit in the forum. McGee,
supra. Because lesser burdens reduce the unfairness to the
defendant, jurisdiction may be justified despite less significant
contacts. The burden, of course, must be of constitutional
dimension. Due process limits on jurisdiction do not protect a
defendant from all inconvenience of travel, McGee, supra at 355 U. S. 224 ,
and it would not be sensible to make the constitutional rule turn
solely on the number of miles the defendant must travel to the
courtroom. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Instead,
the constitutionally significant "burden" to be analyzed relates to
the mobility of the defendant's defense. For instance, if having to
travel to a foreign forum would hamper the defense because
witnesses or evidence or the defendant himself were immobile, or if
there were a disproportionately large number of witnesses or amount
of evidence that would have to be transported at the defendant's
expense, or if being away from home for the duration of the trial
would work some special hardship on the defendant, then the
Constitution would require special consideration for the
defendant's interests.

															That considerations other than contacts between the forum and
the defendant are relevant necessarily means that the Constitution
does not require that trial be held in the State which has the
"best contacts" with the defendant. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
supra at 433 U. S. 228 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The defendant has no constitutional
entitlement to the best forum or, for that matter, to any
particular forum. Under even the most restrictive view of International Shoe, several States could have jurisdiction
over a particular cause of action. We need only determine whether
the forum States in these cases satisfy the constitutional minimum.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] Page 444 U. S. 302 II In each of these cases, I would find that the forum State has an
interest in permitting the litigation to go forward, the litigation
is connected to the forum, the defendant is linked to the forum,
and the burden of defending is not unreasonable. Accordingly, I
would hold that it is neither unfair nor unreasonable to require
these defendants to defend in the forum State. A In No. 78-952, a number of considerations suggest that Minnesota
is an interested and convenient forum. The action was filed by a
bona fide resident of the forum. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Consequently, Minnesota's interests are
similar to, even if lesser than, the interests of California in McGee, supra, "in providing a forum for its residents and
in regulating the activities of insurance companies" doing business
in the State. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Post at 444 U. S. 332 .
Moreover, Minnesota has "attempted to assert [its] particularized
interest in trying such cases in its courts by . . . enacting a
special jurisdictional statute." Kulko, supra at 436 U. S. 98 ; McGee, supra at 355 U. S. 221 , 355 U. S. 224 .
As in McGee, a resident forced to travel to a distant
State to prosecute an action Page 444 U. S. 303 against someone who has injured him could, for lack of funds, be
entirely unable to bring the cause of action. The plaintiff's
residence in the State makes the State one of a very few convenient
fora for a personal injury case (the others usually being the
defendant's home State and the State where the accident occurred).
[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In addition, the burden on the defendant is slight. As Judge
Friendly has recognized, Shaffer emphasizes the importance
of identifying the real impact of the lawsuit. O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 00 (CA2 1978) (upholding
the constitutionality of jurisdiction in a very similar case under
New York's law after Shaffer ). Here the real impact is on
the defendant's insurer, which is concededly amenable to suit in
the forum State. The defendant is carefully protected from
financial liability because the action limits the prayer for
damages to the insurance policy's liability limit. [ Footnote 2/6 ] The insurer will handle the case for
the defendant. The defendant is only a nominal party who need be no
more active in the case than the cooperation clause of his policy
requires. Because of the ease of airline transportation, he need
not lose significantly more time than if the case were at home.
Consequently, if the suit went forward Page 444 U. S. 304 in Minnesota, the defendant would bear almost no burden or
expense beyond what he would face if the suit were in his home
State. The real impact on the named defendant is the same as it is
in a direct action against the insurer, which would be
constitutionally permissible. Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109-110
(CA2 1968). The only distinction is the formal, "analytica[l]
prerequisite," post at 444 U. S. 331 ,
of making the insured a named party. Surely the mere addition of
appellant's name to the complaint does not suffice to create a due
process violation. [ Footnote
2/7 ]

															Finally, even were the relevant inquiry whether there are
sufficient contacts between the forum and the named defendant, I
would find that such contacts exist. The insurer's presence in
Minnesota is an advantage to the defendant that may well have been
a consideration in his selecting the policy he did. An insurer with
offices in many States makes it easier for the insured to make
claims or conduct other business that may become necessary while
traveling. It is simply not true that "State Farm's decision to do
business in Minnesota was completely adventitious as far as Rush
was concerned." Post at 444 U. S.
328 -329. By buying a State Farm policy, the defendant
availed himself of the benefits he might derive from having an
insurance agent in Minnesota who could, among other things,
facilitate a suit for appellant against a Minnesota resident. It
seems unreasonable to read the Constitution as permitting one to
take advantage of his nationwide insurance network but not to be
burdened by it.

															In sum, I would hold that appellant is not deprived of due
process by being required to submit to trial in Minnesota, first
because Minnesota has a sufficient interest in and connection Page 444 U. S. 305 to this litigation and to the real and nominal defendants, and
second because the burden on the nominal defendant is sufficiently
slight. B In No. 78-1078, the interest of the forum State and its
connection to the litigation is strong. The automobile accident
underlying the litigation occurred in Oklahoma. The plaintiffs were
hospitalized in Oklahoma when they brought suit. Essential
witnesses and evidence were in Oklahoma. See Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 208 .
The State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its laws designed
to keep its highway system safe, and the trial can proceed at least
as efficiently in Oklahoma as anywhere else.

															The petitioners are not unconnected with the forum. Although
both sell automobiles within limited sales territories, each sold
the automobile which, in fact, was driven to Oklahoma, where it was
involved in an accident. [ Footnote
2/8 ] It may be true, as the Court suggests, that each sincerely
intended to limit its commercial impact to the limited territory,
and that each intended to accept the benefits and protection of the
laws only of those States within the territory. But obviously these
were unrealistic hopes that cannot be treated as an automatic
constitutional shield. [ Footnote
2/9 ] Page 444 U. S. 306 An automobile simply is not a stationary item or one designed to
be used in one place. An automobile is intended to be
moved around. Someone in the business of selling large numbers of
automobiles can hardly plead ignorance of their mobility, or
pretend that the automobiles stay put after they are sold. It is
not merely that a dealer in automobiles foresees that they will
move. Ante at 444 U. S. 295 .
The dealer actually intends that the purchasers will use the
automobiles to travel to distant States where the dealer does not
directly "do business." The sale of an automobile does purposefully inject the vehicle into the stream of
interstate commerce so that it can travel to distant States. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 94 ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U.S. 253 (1958).

															This case is similar to Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
Corp., 401 U. S. 493 (1971). There we indicated, in the course of denying leave to file
an original jurisdiction case, that corporations having no direct
contact with Ohio could constitutionally be brought to trial in
Ohio because they dumped pollutants into streams outside Ohio's
limits which ultimately, through the action of the water, reached
Lake Erie and affected Ohio. No corporate acts, only their
consequences, occurred in Ohio. The stream of commerce is just as
natural a force as a stream of water, and it was equally
predictable that the cars petitioners released would reach distant
states. [ Footnote 2/10 ]

															The Court accepts that a State may exercise jurisdiction over a
distributor which "serves" that State "indirectly" by "deliver[ing]
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State." Ante at 444 U. S.
297 -298. It is difficult to see why the Constitution
should distinguish between a case involving Page 444 U. S. 307 goods which reach a distant State through a chain of
distribution and a case involving goods which reach the same State
because a consumer, using them as the dealer knew the customer
would, took them there. [ Footnote
2/11 ] In each case, the seller purposefully injects the goods
into the stream of commerce, and those goods predictably are used
in the forum State. [ Footnote
2/12 ]

															Furthermore, an automobile seller derives substantial benefits
from States other than its own. A large part of the value of
automobiles is the extensive, nationwide network of highways.
Significant portions of that network have been constructed by, and
are maintained by, the individual States, including Oklahoma. The
States, through their highway programs, contribute in a very direct
and important way to the value of petitioners' businesses.
Additionally, a network of other related dealerships with their
service departments operates throughout the country under the
protection of the laws of the various States, including Oklahoma,
and enhances the value of petitioners' businesses by facilitating
their customers' traveling.

															Thus, the Court errs in its conclusion, ante at 444 U. S. 299 (emphasis added), that "petitioners have no contacts,
ties, or relations'" with Oklahoma. There obviously are contacts,
and, given Oklahoma's connection to the litigation, the contacts
are sufficiently significant to make it fair and reasonable for the
petitioners to submit to Oklahoma's jurisdiction. III It may be that affirmance of the judgments in these cases would
approach the outer limits of International Shoe's jurisdictional Page 444 U. S. 308 principle. But that principle, with its almost exclusive focus
on the rights of defendants, may be outdated. As MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL wrote in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
212 :

															"'[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures.
. . ." International Shoe inherited its defendant focus from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), and represented the last major step this Court has taken in
the long process of liberalizing the doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. Though its flexible approach represented a major
advance, the structure of our society has changed in many
significant ways since International Shoe was decided in
1945. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220 , 355 U. S. 222 (1957), recognized that "a trend is clearly discernible toward
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents." He explained the trend as
follows:

															"In part, this is attributable to the fundamental transformation
of our national economy over the years. Today, many commercial
transactions touch two or more States, and may involve parties
separated by the full continent. With this increasing
nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount
of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time,
modern transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity." Id. at 355 U. S.
222 -223. As the Court acknowledges, ante at 444 U. S.
292 -293, both the nationalization of commerce and the
ease of transportation and communication have accelerated in the
generation since 1957. [ Footnote
2/13 ] Page 444 U. S. 309 The model of society on which the International Shoe Court based its opinion is no longer accurate. Business people, no
matter how local their businesses, cannot assume that goods remain
in the business' locality. Customers and goods can be anywhere else
in the country, usually in a matter of hours and always in a matter
of a very few days.

															In answering the question whether or not it is fair and
reasonable to allow a particular forum to hold a trial binding on a
particular defendant, the interests of the forum State and other
parties loom large in today's world, and surely are entitled to as
much weight as are the interests of the defendant. The "orderly
administration of the laws" provides a firm basis for according
some protection to the interests of plaintiffs and States as well
as of defendants. [ Footnote 2/14 ]
Certainly, I cannot see how a defendant's right to due process is
violated if the defendant suffers no inconvenience. See
ante at 444 U. S.
294 .

															The conclusion I draw is that constitutional concepts of
fairness no longer require the extreme concern for defendants that
was once necessary. Rather, as I wrote in dissent from Shaffer
v. Heitner, supra, at 433 U. S. 220 (emphasis added), minimum Page 444 U. S. 310 contacts must exist "among the parties, the contested
transaction, and the forum State." [ Footnote 2/15 ] The contacts between any two of these
should not be determinative.

															"[W]hen a suitor seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a
substantial interest in seeing its own law applied to the
transaction in question, we could wisely act to minimize conflicts,
confusion, and uncertainty by adopting a liberal view of
jurisdiction, unless considerations of fairness or efficiency
strongly point in the opposite direction. [ Footnote 2/16 ]"

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
225 -226. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S.
258 -250, expressed similar concerns by suggesting that a
State should have jurisdiction over a case growing out of a
transaction significantly related to that State

															"unless litigation there would impose such a heavy and
disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant that it would
offend what this Court has referred to as 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' [ Footnote 2/17 ]"

															Assuming Page 444 U. S. 311 that a State gives a nonresident defendant adequate notice and
opportunity to defend, I do not think the Due Process Clause is
offended merely because the defendant has to board a plane to get
to the site of the trial.

															The Court's opinion in No. 78-1078 suggests that the defendant
ought to be subject to a State's jurisdiction only if he has
contacts with the State "such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there." [ Footnote 2/18 ] Ante at 444 U. S. 297 .
There is nothing unreasonable or unfair, however, about recognizing
commercial reality. Given the tremendous mobility of goods and
people, and the inability of businessmen to control where goods are
taken by customers (or retailers), I do not think that the
defendant should be in complete control of the geographical stretch
of his amenability to suit. Jurisdiction is no longer premised on
the notion that nonresident defendants have somehow impliedly
consented to suit. People should understand that they are held
responsible for the consequences of their actions, and that, in our
society, most actions have consequences affecting many States. When
an action in fact causes injury in another State, the actor should
be prepared to answer for it there unless defending in that State
would be unfair for some reason other than that a state boundary
must be crossed. [ Footnote
2/19 ]

															In effect, the Court is allowing defendants to assert the
sovereign Page 444 U. S. 312 rights of their home States. The expressed fear is that,
otherwise, all limits on personal jurisdiction would disappear. But
the argument's premise is wrong. I would not abolish limits on
jurisdiction or strip state boundaries of all significance, see
Hanson, supra at 357 U. S. 260 (Black, J., dissenting); I would still require the plaintiff to
demonstrate sufficient contacts among the parties, the forum, and
the litigation to make the forum a reasonable State in which to
hold the trial. [ Footnote
2/20 ]

															I would also, however, strip the defendant of an unjustified
veto power over certain very appropriate fora -- a power the
defendant justifiably enjoyed long ago when communication and
travel over long distances were slow and unpredictable and when
notions of state sovereignty were impractical and exaggerated. But
I repeat that that is not today's world. If a plaintiff can show
that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the
litigation (or sufficient contacts with the defendant), then the
defendant who cannot show some real injury to a constitutionally
protected interest, see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d at 201, should have no constitutional excuse not to
appear. [ Footnote 2/21 ]

															The plaintiffs in each of these cases brought suit in a forum
with which they had significant contacts and which had significant
contacts with the litigation. I am not convinced that the
defendants would suffer any "heavy and disproportionate burden" in
defending the suits. Accordingly, I would hold Page 444 U. S. 313 that the Constitution should not shield the defendants from
appearing and defending in the plaintiffs' chosen fora.

															* [This opinion applies also to No. 7952, Rush et al. v.
Savchuk, post, p. 444 U. S. 320 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															In fact, a courtroom just across the state line from a defendant
may often be far more convenient for the defendant than a courtroom
in a distant corner of his own State.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The States themselves, of course, remain free to choose whether
to extend their jurisdiction to embrace all defendants over whom
the Constitution would permit exercise of jurisdiction.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction pursuant to Minn.Stat. §
571.41, subd. 2 (1978), which allows garnishment of an insurer's
obligation to defend and indemnify its insured. See post at 444 U. S.
322 -323, n. 3, and accompanying text. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as allowing suit only to
the insurance policy's liability limit. The court has held that the
statute embodies the rule of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d
111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															To say that these considerations are relevant is a far cry from
saying that they are "substituted for . . . contacts with the
defendant and the cause of action." Post at 444 U. S. 332 .
The forum's interest in the litigation is an independent point of
inquiry even under traditional readings of International
Shoe's progeny. If there is a shift in focus, it is not away
from "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation." Post at 444 U. S. 332 (emphasis added). Instead, it is a shift within the same accepted
relationship from the connections between the defendant
and the forum to those between the forum and the litigation.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In every International Shoe inquiry, the defendant,
necessarily, is outside the forum State. Thus, it is inevitable
that either the defendant or the plaintiff will be inconvenienced.
The problem existing at the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), that a resident plaintiff could obtain a binding judgment
against an unsuspecting, distant defendant, has virtually
disappeared in this age of instant communication and virtually
instant travel.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															It is true that the insurance contract is not the subject of the
litigation. Post at 444 U. S. 329 .
But one of the undisputed clauses of the insurance policy is that
the insurer will defend this action and pay any damages assessed,
up to the policy limit. The very purpose of the contract is to
relieve the insured from having to defend himself, and, under the
state statute, there could be no suit absent the insurance
contract. Thus, in a real sense, the insurance contract is the
source of the suit. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 , 433 U. S. 207 (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Were the defendant a real party subject to actual liability, or
were there significant noneconomic consequences such as those
suggested by the Court's note 20, post at 444 U. S. 331 ,
a more substantial connection with the forum State might well be
constitutionally required.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															On the basis of this fact, the state court inferred that the
petitioners derived substantial revenue from goods used in
Oklahoma. The inference is not without support. Certainly, were use
of goods accepted as a relevant contact, a plaintiff would not need
to have an exact count of the number of petitioners' cars that are
used in Oklahoma.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Moreover, imposing liability in this case would not so undermine
certainty as to destroy an automobile dealer's ability to do
business. According jurisdiction does not expand liability except
in the marginal case where a plaintiff cannot afford to bring an
action except in the plaintiff's own State. In addition, these
petitioners are represented by insurance companies. They not only
could, but did, purchase insurance to protect them should they
stand trial and lose the case. The costs of the insurance no doubt
are passed on to customers.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															One might argue that it was more predictable that the pollutants
would reach Ohio than that one of petitioners' cars would reach
Oklahoma. The Court's analysis, however, excludes jurisdiction in a
contiguous State such as Pennsylvania as surely as in more distant
States such as Oklahoma.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															For example, I cannot understand the constitutional distinction
between selling an item in New Jersey and selling an item in New
York expecting it to be used in New Jersey.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The manufacturer in the case cited by the Court, Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432 , 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961), had no more control over which States its goods
would reach than did the petitioners in this case.

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															Statistics help illustrate the amazing expansion in mobility
since International Shoe. The number of revenue
passenger-miles flown on domestic and international flights
increased by nearly three orders of magnitude between 1945 (450
million) and 1976 (179 billion). U.S. Department of Commerce,
Historical Statistics of the United States, pt. 2, P. 770 (1975);
U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 670 (1978). Automobile vehicle-miles (including passenger
cars, buses, and trucks) driven in the United States increased by a
relatively modest 500% during the same period, growing from 250
billion in 1945 to 1,409 billion in 1976. Historical Statistics, supra at 718; Statistical Abstract, supra at
647.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															The Court has recognized that there are cases where the
interests of justice can turn the focus of the jurisdictional
inquiry away from the contacts between a defendant and the forum
State. For instance, the Court indicated that the requirement of
contacts may be greatly relaxed (if indeed any personal contacts
would be required) where a plaintiff is suing a nonresident
defendant to enforce a judgment procured in another State. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
210 -211, nn. 36, 37.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															In some cases, the inquiry will resemble the inquiry commonly
undertaken in determining which State's law to apply. That it is
fair to apply a State's law to a nonresident defendant is clearly
relevant in determining whether it is fair to subject the defendant
to jurisdiction in that State. Shaffer v. Heitner, supra at 433 U. S. 225 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.
S. 235 , 357 U. S. 258 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). See 444
U.S. 286 fn2/19|>n.19, infra. [ Footnote 2/16 ]

															Such a standard need be no more uncertain than the Court's
test

															"in which few answers will be written 'in black and white. The
greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.' Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 , 334 U. S.
545 (1948)." Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S.
84 , 436 U. S. 92 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															This strong emphasis on the State's interest is nothing new.
This Court, permitting the forum to exercise jurisdiction over
nonresident claimants to a trust largely on the basis of the
forum's interest in closing the trust, stated:

															"[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts
that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as
to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the
interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its
procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.
S. 306 , 339 U. S.
313 (1950).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															The Court suggests that this is the critical foreseeability
rather than the likelihood that the product will go to the forum
State. But the reasoning begs the question. A defendant cannot know
if his actions will subject him to jurisdiction in another State
until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction is.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															One consideration that might create some unfairness would be if
the choice of forum also imposed on the defendant an unfavorable
substantive law which the defendant could justly have assumed would
not apply. See 444
U.S. 286 fn2/15|>n. 15, supra. [ Footnote 2/20 ]

															For instance, in No. 78-952, if the plaintiff were not a bona
fide resident of Minnesota when the suit was filed or if the
defendant were subject to financial liability, I might well reach a
different result. In No. 78-1078, I might reach a different result
if the accident had not occurred in Oklahoma.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															Frequently, of course, the defendant will be able to influence
the choice of forum through traditional doctrines, such as venue or forum non conveniens, permitting the transfer of
litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 228 ,
n. 8 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.

															For over 30 years, the standard by which to measure the
constitutionally permissible reach of state court jurisdiction has
been well established:

															"[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940).

															The corollary, that the Due Process Clause forbids the assertion
of jurisdiction over a defendant "with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations," 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 319 ,
is equally clear. The concepts of fairness and substantial justice
as applied to an evaluation of "the quality and nature of the
[defendant's] activity," ibid., are not readily
susceptible of further definition, however, and it is not
surprising that the constitutional standard is easier to state than
to apply.

															This is a difficult case, and reasonable minds may differ as to
whether respondents have alleged a sufficient "relationship among
the defendant[s], the forum, and the litigation," Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 , 433 U. S. 204 (1977), to satisfy the requirements of International Shoe. I am concerned, however, that the majority has reached its result
by taking an unnecessarily narrow view of petitioners'
forum-related conduct. The majority asserts that

															"respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the
fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New
York to New York Page 444 U. S. 314 residents, happened to suffer an accident while passing through
Oklahoma." Ante at 444 U. S. 295 .
If that were the case, I would readily agree that the minimum
contacts necessary to sustain jurisdiction are not present. But the
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction is not the happenstance
that an individual over whom petitioners had no control made a
unilateral decision to take a chattel with him to a distant State.
Rather, jurisdiction is premised on the deliberate and purposeful
actions of the defendants themselves in choosing to become part of
a nationwide, indeed a global, network for marketing and servicing
automobiles.

															Petitioners are sellers of a product whose utility derives from
its mobility. The unique importance of the automobile in today's
society, which is discussed in MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting
opinion, post at 444 U. S. 318 ,
needs no further elaboration. Petitioners know that their customers
buy cars not only to make short trips, but also to travel long
distances. In fact, the nationwide service network with which they
are affiliated was designed to facilitate and encourage such
travel. Seaway would be unlikely to sell many cars if authorized
service were available only in Massena, N.Y. Moreover, local
dealers normally derive a substantial portion of their revenues
from their service operations, and thereby obtain a further
economic benefit from the opportunity to service cars which were
sold in other States. It is apparent that petitioners have not
attempted to minimize the chance that their activities will have
effects in other States; on the contrary, they have chosen to do
business in a way that increases that chance, because it is to
their economic advantage to do so.

															To be sure, petitioners could not know in advance that this
particular automobile would be driven to Oklahoma. They must have
anticipated, however, that a substantial portion of the cars they
sold would travel out of New York. Seaway, a local dealer in the
second most populous State, and World-Wide, Page 444 U. S. 315 one of only seven regional Audi distributors in the entire
country, see Brief for Respondents 2, would scarcely have
been surprised to learn that a car sold by then had been driven in
Oklahoma on Interstate 44, a heavily traveled transcontinental
highway. In the case of the distributor, in particular, the
probability that some of the cars it sells will be driven in every
one of the contiguous States must amount to a virtual certainty.
This knowledge should alert a reasonable businessman to the
likelihood that a defect in the product might manifest itself in
the forum State -- not because of some unpredictable, aberrant,
unilateral action by a single buyer, but in the normal course of
the operation of the vehicles for their intended purpose.

															It is misleading for the majority to characterize the argument
in favor of jurisdiction as one of " foreseeability' alone." Ante at 444 U. S. 295 .
As economic entities, petitioners reach out from New York,
knowingly causing effects in other States and receiving economic
advantage both from the ability to cause such effects themselves
and from the activities of dealers and distributors in other
States. While they did not receive revenue from making direct sales
in Oklahoma, they intentionally became part of an interstate
economic network, which included dealerships in Oklahoma, for
pecuniary gain. In light of this purposeful conduct, I do not
believe it can be said that petitioners "had no reason to expect to
be haled before a[n Oklahoma] court." Shaffer v. Heitner,
supra at 433 U. S. 216 ; see ante at 444 U. S. 297 ,
and Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S.
84 , 436 U. S. 97 -98
(1978). The majority apparently acknowledges that, if a product is
purchased in the forum State by a consumer, that State may assert
jurisdiction over everyone in the chain of distribution. See
ante at 444 U. S.
297 -298. With this I agree. But I cannot agree that
jurisdiction is necessarily lacking if the product enters the State
not through the channels of distribution but in the course of its
intended use by the consumer. We have recognized Page 444 U. S. 316 the role played by the automobile in the expansion of our
notions of personal jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
supra at 433 U. S. 204 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). Unlike most other chattels, which may find their way into
States far from where they were purchased because their owner takes
them there, the intended use of the automobile is precisely as a
means of traveling from one place to another. In such a case, it is
highly artificial to restrict the concept of the "stream of
commerce" to the chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the
ultimate consumer.

															I sympathize with the majority's concern that persons ought to
be able to structure their conduct so as not to be subject to suit
in distant forums. But that may not always be possible. Some
activities, by their very nature, may foreclose the option of
conducting them in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to
jurisdiction in multiple forums. This is by no means to say that
all sellers of automobiles should be subject to suit everywhere;
but a distributor of automobiles to a multistate market and a local
automobile dealer who makes himself part of a nationwide network of
dealerships can fairly expect that the cars they sell may cause
injury in distant States and that they may be called on to defend a
resulting lawsuit there.

															In light of the quality and nature of petitioners' activity, the
majority's reliance on Kulko v. California Superior Court,
supra, is misplaced. Kulko involved the assertion of
state court jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in
connection with an action to modify his child custody rights and
support obligations. His only contact with the forum State was that
he gave his minor child permission to live there with her mother.
In holding that the exercise of jurisdiction violated the Due
Process Clause, we emphasized that the cause of action, as well as
the defendant's actions in relation to the forum State, arose
" not from the defendant's commercial transactions in interstate
commerce, but rather from his personal, Page 444 U. S. 317 domestic relations," 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 97 (emphasis supplied), contrasting Kulko's actions with those of the
insurance company in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957), which were undertaken for commercial benefit.*

															Manifestly, the "quality and nature" of commercial activity is
different, for purposes of the International Shoe test,
from actions from which a defendant obtains no economic advantage.
Commercial activity is more likely to cause effects in a larger
sphere, and the actor derives an economic benefit from the activity
that makes it fair to require him to answer for his conduct where
its effects are felt. The profits may be used to pay the costs of
suit, and, knowing that the activity is likely to have effects in
other States, the defendant can readily insure against the costs of
those effects, thereby sparing himself much of the inconvenience of
defending in a distant forum.

															Of course, the Constitution forbids the exercise of jurisdiction
if the defendant had no judicially cognizable contacts with the
forum. But as the majority acknowledges, if such contacts are
present, the jurisdictional inquiry requires a balancing of various
interests and policies. See ante at 444 U. S. 292 ; Rush v. Savchuk, post at 444 U. S. 332 .
I believe such contacts are to be found here, and that, considering
all of the interests and policies at stake, requiring petitioners
to defend this action in Oklahoma is not beyond the bounds of the
Constitution. Accordingly, I dissent.

															* Similarly, I believe the Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 (1958), was influenced by the fact that trust administration has
traditionally been considered a peculiarly local activity.

															MR JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

															I confess that I am somewhat puzzled why the plaintiffs in this
litigation are so insistent that the regional distributor and the
retail dealer, the petitioners here, who handled the ill-fated Audi
automobile involved in this litigation, be named defendants. It
would appear that the manufacturer and the Page 444 U. S. 318 importer, whose subjectability to Oklahoma jurisdiction is not
challenged before this Court, ought not to be judgment-proof. It
may, of course, ultimately amount to a contest between insurance
companies that, once begun, is not easily brought to a termination.
Having made this much of an observation, I pursue it no
further.

															For me, a critical factor in the disposition of the litigation
is the nature of the instrumentality under consideration. It has
been said that we are a nation on wheels. What we are concerned
with here is the automobile and its peripatetic character. One need
only examine our national network of interstate highways, or make
an appearance on one of them, or observe the variety of license
plates present not only on those highways but in any metropolitan
area, to realize that any automobile is likely to wander far from
its place of licensure or from its place of distribution and retail
sale. Miles per gallon on the highway (as well as in the city) and
mileage per tankful are familiar allegations in manufacturers'
advertisements today. To expect that any new automobile will remain
in the vicinity of its retail sale -- like the 1914 electric car
driven by the proverbial "little old lady" -- is to blink at
reality. The automobile is intended for distance, as well as for
transportation within a limited area.

															It therefore seems to me not unreasonable -- and certainly not
unconstitutional and beyond the reach of the principles laid down
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 (1945), and its progeny -- to uphold Oklahoma
jurisdiction over this New York distributor and this New York
dealer when the accident happened in Oklahoma. I see nothing more
unfair for them than for the manufacturer and the importer. All are
in the business of providing vehicles that spread out over the
highways of our several States. It is not too much to anticipate,
at the time of distribution and at the time of retail sale, that
this Audi would be in Oklahoma. Moreover, in assessing "minimum
contacts," foreseeable use in another State seems to me to be
little different from foreseeable resale Page 444 U. S. 319 in another State: yet the Court declares this distinction
determinative. Ante at 444 U. S.
297 -299.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN points out in his dissent, ante at 444 U. S. 307 ,
that an automobile dealer derives substantial benefits from States
other than its own. The same is true of the regional distributor.
Oklahoma does its best to provide safe roads. Its police
investigate accidents. It regulates driving within the State. It
provides aid to the victim, and thereby, it is hoped, lessens
damages. Accident reports are prepared and made available. All this
contributes to and enhances the business of those engaged
professionally in the distribution and sale of automobiles. All
this also may benefit defendants in the very lawsuits over which
the State asserts jurisdiction.

															My position need not now take me beyond the automobile and the
professional who does business by way of distributing and retailing
automobiles. Cases concerning other instrumentalities will be dealt
with as they arise, and in their own contexts.

															I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Because the Court reverses that judgment, it will now be about
parsing every variant in the myriad of motor vehicle fact
situations that present themselves. Some will justify jurisdiction
and others will not. All will depend on the "contact" that the
Court sees fit to perceive in the individual case.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that an Oklahoma state court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a New York automobile retailer and wholesaler in a products liability case, as the defendants had no significant contacts with Oklahoma and did not purposefully avail themselves of the benefits and protections of Oklahoma law.