U.S. Supreme Court Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984) Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff No. 83-141 Argued March 26, 1984 Decided May 30, 1984 467
U.S. 229 ast|>* 467
U.S. 229 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus To reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land
oligopoly traceable to the early high chiefs of the Hawaiian
Islands, the Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967
(Act), which created a land condemnation scheme whereby title in
real property is taken from lessors and transferred to lessees in
order to reduce the concentration of land ownership. Under the Act,
lessees living on single-family residential lots within tracts at
least five acres in size are entitled to ask appellant Hawaii
Housing Authority (HHA) to condemn the property on which they live.
When appropriate applications by lessees are filed, the Act
authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether the
State's acquisition of the tract will "effectuate the public
purposes" of the Act. If HHA determines that these public purposes
will be served, it is authorized to designate some or all of the
lots in the tract for acquisition. It then acquires, at prices set
by a condemnation trial or by negotiation between lessors and
lessees, the former fee owners' "right, title, and interest" in the
land, and may then sell the land titles to the applicant lessees.
After HHA had held a public hearing on the proposed acquisition of
appellees' lands and had found that such acquisition would
effectuate the Act's public purposes, it directed appellees to
negotiate with certain lessees concerning the sale of the
designated properties. When these negotiations failed, HHA ordered
appellees to submit to compulsory arbitration as provided by the
Act. Rather than comply with this order, appellees filed suit in
Federal District Court, asking that the Act be declared
unconstitutional and that its enforcement be enjoined. The court
temporarily restrained the State from proceeding against appellees'
estates, but subsequently, while holding the compulsory arbitration
and compensation formulae provisions of the Act unconstitutional,
refused to issue a preliminary injunction and ultimately granted
partial summary judgment to HHA and private appellants who had
intervened, holding Page 467 U. S. 230 the remainder of the Act constitutional under the Public Use
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States under
the Fourteenth Amendment. After deciding that the District Court
had properly not abstained from exercising its jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Act violates the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Held: 1. The District Court was not required to abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction. Pp. 467 U. S.
236 -239.

															(a) Abstention under Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 , is
unnecessary. Pullman abstention is limited to uncertain
questions of state law, and here there is no uncertain question of
state law, since the Act unambiguously provides that the power to
condemn is "for a public use and purpose." Thus, the question,
uncomplicated by ambiguous language, is whether the Act, on its
face, is unconstitutional. Pp. 467 U. S.
236 -237.

															(b) Nor is abstention required under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 . Younger abstention is required only when state court
proceedings are initiated before any proceedings of substance on
the merits have occurred in federal court. Here, state judicial
proceedings had not been initiated at the time proceedings of
substance took place in the District Court, the District Court
having issued a preliminary injunction before HHA filed its first
state eminent domain suit in state court. And the fact that HHA's
administrative proceedings occurred before the federal suit was
filed did not require abstention, since the Act clearly states that
those proceedings are not part of, or are not themselves, a
judicial proceeding. Pp. 467 U. S.
237 -239.

															2. The Act does not violate the "public use" requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. Pp. 467 U. S.
239 -244.

															(a) That requirement is coterminous with the scope of a
sovereign's police powers. This Court will not substitute its
judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes
"public use" unless the use is palpably without reasonable
foundation. Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a compensated
taking is not prohibited by the Public Use Clause. Here, regulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of
a State's police powers, and redistribution of fees simple to
reduce such evils is a rational exercise of the eminent domain
power. Pp. 467 U. S.
239 -243.

															(b) The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain
is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does
not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.
Government does not itself have to use property to legitimate the
taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics,
that must pass scrutiny under Page 467 U. S. 231 the Public Use Clause. And the fact that a state legislature,
and not Congress, made the public use determination does not mean
that judicial deference is less appropriate. Pp. 467 U. S.
243 -244.

															702 F.2d 788, reversed and remanded.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except MARSHALL, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the cases.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation." These cases present the
question whether the Public Use Clause of that Amendment, made
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensation,
title in real property from Page 467 U. S. 232 lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to reduce the
concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State. We conclude
that it does not. I A The Hawaiian Islands were originally settled by Polynesian
immigrants from the western Pacific. These settlers developed an
economy around a feudal land tenure system in which one island high
chief, the ali'i nui, controlled the land and assigned it for
development to certain subchiefs. The subchiefs would then reassign
the land to other lower ranking chiefs, who would administer the
land and govern the farmers and other tenants working it. All land
was held at the will of the ali'i nui and eventually had to be
returned to his trust. There was no private ownership of land. See generally Brief for Office of Hawaiian Affairs as Amicus Curiae 3-5.

															Beginning in the early 1800's, Hawaiian leaders and American
settlers repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom
among the crown, the chiefs, and the common people. These efforts
proved largely unsuccessful, however, and the land remained in the
hands of a few. In the mid-1960's, after extensive hearings, the
Hawaii Legislature discovered that, while the State and Federal
Governments owned almost 49% of the State's land, another 47% was
in the hands of only 72 private landowners. See Brief for
the Hou Hawaiians and Maui Loa, Chief of the Hou Hawaiians, as Amici Curiae 32. The legislature further found that 18
landholders, with tracts of 21,000 acres or more, owned more than
40% of this land and that on Oahu, the most urbanized of the
islands, 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles. Id. at 32-33. The legislature concluded that concentrated
land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential
fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare. Page 467 U. S. 233 To redress these problems, the legislature decided to compel the
large landowners to break up their estates. The legislature
considered requiring large landowners to sell lands which they were
leasing to homeowners. However, the landowners strongly resisted
this scheme, pointing out the significant federal tax liabilities
they would incur. Indeed, the landowners claimed that the federal
tax laws were the primary reason they previously had chosen to
lease, and not sell, their lands. Therefore, to accommodate the
needs of both lessors and lessees, the Hawaii Legislature enacted
the Land Reform Act of 1967 (Act), Haw.Rev.Stat., ch. 516, which
created a mechanism for condemning residential tracts and for
transferring ownership of the condemned fees simple to existing
lessees. By condemning the land in question, the Hawaii Legislature
intended to make the land sales involuntary, thereby making the
federal tax consequences less severe while still facilitating the
redistribution of fees simple. See Brief for Appellants in
Nos. 83-141 and 83-283, pp. 3-4, and nn. 6-8.

															Under the Act's condemnation scheme, tenants living on
single-family residential lots within developmental tracts at least
five acres in size are entitled to ask the Hawaii Housing Authority
(HHA) to condemn the property on which they live. Haw. Rev.Stat. §§
516-1(2), (11), 516-22 (1977). When 25 eligible tenants, [ Footnote 1 ] or tenants on half the lots
in the tract, whichever is less, file appropriate applications, the
Act authorizes HHA to hold a public hearing to determine whether
acquisition by the State of all or part of the tract will
"effectuate the public purposes" of the Act. § 516-22. If HHA finds
that these public purposes will be served, it is authorized Page 467 U. S. 234 to designate some or all of the lots in the tract for
acquisition. It then acquires, at prices set either by condemnation
trial or by negotiation between lessors and lessees, [ Footnote 2 ] the former fee owners' full
"right, title, and interest" in the land. § 516-25.

															After compensation has been set, HHA may sell the land titles to
tenants who have applied for fee simple ownership. HHA is
authorized to lend these tenants up to 90% of the purchase price,
and it may condition final transfer on a right of first refusal for
the first 10 years following sale. §§ 516-30, 516-34, 516-35. If
HHA does not sell the lot to the tenant residing there, it may
lease the lot or sell it to someone else, provided that public
notice has been given. § 516-28. However, HHA may not sell to any
one purchaser, or lease to any one tenant, more than one lot, and
it may not operate for profit. §§ 516-28, 516-32. In practice,
funds to satisfy the condemnation awards have been supplied
entirely by lessees. See App. 164. While the Act
authorizes HHA to issue bonds and appropriate funds for
acquisition, no bonds have issued and HHA has not supplied any
funds for condemned lots. See ibid. B In April 1977, HHA held a public hearing concerning the proposed
acquisition of some of appellees' lands. HHA made the statutorily
required finding that acquisition of appellees' lands would
effectuate the public purposes of the Act. Then, in October, 1978,
it directed appellees to negotiate with certain lessees concerning
the sale of the designated properties. Those negotiations failed,
and HHA subsequently ordered appellees to submit to compulsory
arbitration.

															Rather than comply with the compulsory arbitration order,
appellees filed suit, in February, 1979, in United States
District Page 467 U. S. 235 Court, asking that the Act be declared unconstitutional and that
its enforcement be enjoined. The District Court temporarily
restrained the State from proceeding against appellees' estates.
Three months later, while declaring the compulsory arbitration and
compensation formulae provisions of the Act unconstitutional,
[ Footnote 3 ] the District Court
refused preliminarily to enjoin appellants from conducting the
statutory designation and condemnation proceedings. Finally, in
December, 1979, it granted partial summary judgment to appellants,
holding the remaining portion of the Act constitutional under the
Public Use Clause. See 483 F. Supp.
62 (Haw.1979). The District Court found that the Act's goals
were within the bounds of the State's police powers and that the
means the legislature had chosen to serve those goals were not
arbitrary, capricious, or selected in bad faith.

															The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 702 F.2d
788 (1983). First, the Court of Appeals decided that the District
Court had permissibly chosen not to abstain from the exercise of
its jurisdiction. Then, the Court of Appeals determined that the
Act could not pass the requisite judicial scrutiny of the Public
Use Clause. It found that the transfers contemplated by the Act
were unlike those of takings previously held to constitute "public
uses" by this Court. The court further determined that the public
purposes offered by the Hawaii Legislature were not deserving of
judicial deference. The court concluded that the Act was simply

															"a naked attempt on the part of the state of Hawaii to take the
private property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private
use and benefit." Id. at 798. One judge dissented. Page 467 U. S. 236 On applications of HHA and certain private appellants who had
intervened below, this Court noted probable jurisdiction. 464 U.S.
932 (1983). We now reverse. II We begin with the question whether the District Court abused its
discretion in not abstaining from the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The appellants have suggested as one alternative that perhaps
abstention was required under the standards announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.
S. 496 (1941), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). We do not believe that abstention was required. A In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., supra, this Court
held that federal courts should abstain from decision when
difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be resolved
before a substantial federal constitutional question can be
decided. By abstaining in such cases, federal courts will avoid
both unnecessary adjudication of federal questions and "needless
friction with state policies. . . ." Id. at 312 U. S. 500 .
However, federal courts need not abstain on Pullman grounds when a state statute is not "fairly subject to an
interpretation which will render unnecessary" adjudication of the
federal constitutional question. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528 , 380 U. S. 535 (1965). Pullman abstention is limited to uncertain
questions of state law because "[a]bstention from the exercise of
federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule." Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.
S. 800 , 424 U. S. 813 (1976).

															In these cases, there is no uncertain question of state law. The
Act unambiguously provides that "[t]he use of the power . . . to
condemn . . . is for a public use and purpose." Haw. Rev.Stat. §
516-83(a)(12) (1977); see also §§ 516-83(a)(10), (11),
(13). There is no other provision of the Act -- or, for that
matter, of Hawaii law -- which would suggest that Page 467 U. S. 237 § 516-83(a)(12) does not mean exactly what it says. Since "the
naked question, uncomplicated by [ambiguous language], is whether
the Act, on its face, is unconstitutional," Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 , 400 U.S. 439 (1971),
abstention from federal jurisdiction is not required.

															The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals suggested that,
perhaps, the state courts could make resolution of the federal
constitutional questions unnecessary by their construction of the
Act. See 702 F.2d at 811-812. In the abstract, of course,
such possibilities always exist. But the relevant inquiry is not
whether there is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that state
courts might render adjudication of the federal question
unnecessary. Rather,

															"[w]e have frequently emphasized that abstention is not to be
ordered unless the statute is of an uncertain nature, and is
obviously susceptible of a limiting construction." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 , 389 U. S. 251 ,
and n. 14 (1967). These statutes are not of an uncertain nature and
have no reasonable limiting construction. Therefore, Pullman abstention is unnecessary. [ Footnote 4 ] B The dissenting judge also suggested that abstention was required
under the standards articulated in Younger v. Harris,
supra. Under Younger abstention doctrine, interests
of comity and federalism counsel federal courts to abstain from
jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or could be
presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern Page 467 U. S. 238 important state interests. See Middlesex Ethics Committee v.
Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U. S. 423 , 457 U. S.
432 -437 (1982). Younger abstention is required,
however, only when state court proceedings are initiated "before
any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the
federal court." Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.
S. 332 , 422 U. S. 349 (1975). In other cases, federal courts must normally fulfill their
duty to adjudicate federal questions properly brought before
them.

															In these cases, state judicial proceedings had not been
initiated at the time proceedings of substance took place in
federal court. Appellees filed their federal court complaint in
February, 1979, asking for temporary and permanent relief. The
District Court temporarily restrained HHA from proceeding against
appellees' estates. At that time, no state judicial proceedings
were in process. Indeed, in June, 1979, when the District Court
granted, in part, appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction,
state court proceedings still had not been initiated. Rather, HHA
filed its first eminent domain lawsuit after the parties had begun
filing motions for summary judgment in the District Court -- in
September, 1979. Whether issuance of the February temporary
restraining order was a substantial federal court action or not,
issuance of the June preliminary injunction certainly was. See
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 , 422 U. S.
929 -931 (1975). A federal court action in which a
preliminary injunction is granted has proceeded well beyond the
"embryonic stage," id. at 422 U. S. 929 ,
and considerations of economy, equity, and federalism counsel
against Younger abstention at that point.

															The only extant proceedings at the state level prior to the
September, 1979, eminent domain lawsuit in state court were HHA's
administrative hearings. But the Act clearly states that these
administrative proceedings are not part of, and are not themselves,
a judicial proceeding, for "mandatory arbitration shall be in
advance of and shall not constitute any part of any action in
condemnation or eminent domain." Haw. Rev.Stat. § 516-51(b) (1976).
Since Younger is not a Page 467 U. S. 239 bar to federal court action when state judicial proceedings have
not themselves commenced, see Middlesex County Ethics Committee
v. Garden State Bar Assn., supra, at 457 U. S. 433 ; Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100 , 454 U. S.
112 -113 (1981), abstention for HHA's administrative
proceedings was not required. III The majority of the Court of Appeals next determined that the
Act violates the "public use" requirement of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. On this argument, however, we find ourselves
in agreement with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals. A The starting point for our analysis of the Act's
constitutionality is the Court's decision in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the Court held constitutional the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945. That Act provided
both for the comprehensive use of the eminent domain power to
redevelop slum areas and for the possible sale or lease of the
condemned lands to private interests. In discussing whether the
takings authorized by that Act were for a "public use," id. at 348 U. S. 31 ,
the Court stated:

															"We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own
facts. The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government, purposes
neither abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation, whether it Page 467 U. S. 240 be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia . .
. or the States legislating concerning local affairs. . . . This
principle admits of no exception merely because the power of
eminent domain is involved. . . ." Id. at 348 U. S. 32 (citations omitted). The Court explicitly recognized the breadth of
the principle it was announcing, noting:

															"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right
to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For
the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. . . .
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the means by
which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine. Here
one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for
redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the
project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another
businessman. But the means of executing the project are for
Congress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose
has been established." Id. at 348 U. S. 33 .
The "public use" requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of
a sovereign's police powers.

															There is, of course, a role for courts to play in reviewing a
legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use, even when
the eminent domain power is equated with the police power. But the
Court in Berman made clear that it is "an extremely
narrow" one. Id. at 348 U. S. 32 .
The Court in Berman cited with approval the Court's
decision in Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55 , 269 U. S. 66 (1925), which held that deference to the legislature's "public use"
determination is required "until it is shown to involve an
impossibility." The Berman Court also cited to United
States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546 , 327 U. S. 552 (1946), which emphasized that

															"[a]ny departure from this judicial restraint would result in
courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and
in their invalidating legislation on the basis of their view Page 467 U. S. 241 on that question at the moment of decision, a practice which has
proved impracticable in other fields."

															In short, the Court has made clear that it will not substitute
its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what constitutes a
public use "unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation." United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 , 160 U. S. 680 (1896).

															To be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that

															"one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even
though compensation be paid." Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U. S.
55 , 300 U. S. 80 (1937). See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.
S. 439 , 281 U. S. 447 (1930); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining
Co., 196 U. S. 239 , 196 U. S.
251 -252 (1905); Fallbrook Irrigation District v.
Bradley, 164 U. S. 112 , 164 U. S. 159 (1896). Thus, in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 (1896), where the

															"order in question was not, and was not claimed to be, . . . a taking of private property for a public use under the right
of eminent domain," id. at 164 U. S. 416 (emphasis added), the Court invalidated a compensated taking of
property for lack of a justifying public purpose. But where the
exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. See Berman v.
Parker, supra; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.
S. 700 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.
S. 135 (1921); cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Corp., supra, (invalidating an uncompensated taking).

															On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the Hawaii Act
is constitutional. The people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the
settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, [ Footnote 5 ] to reduce the perceived social and economic
evils of a Page 467 U. S. 242 land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs. The land oligopoly
has, according to the Hawaii Legislature, created artificial
deterrents to the normal functioning of the State's residential
land market and forced thousands of individual homeowners to lease,
rather than buy, the land underneath their homes. Regulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of
a State's police powers. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 (1978); Block v. Hirsh, supra; see also People of Puerto Rico
v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (CA1), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946). We cannot disapprove of Hawaii's
exercise of this power.

															Nor can we condemn as irrational the Act's approach to
correcting the land oligopoly problem. The Act presumes that, when
a sufficiently large number of persons declare that they are
willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices, the land market is
malfunctioning. When such a malfunction is signaled, the Act
authorizes HHA to condemn lots in the relevant tract. The Act
limits the number of lots any one tenant can purchase, and
authorizes HHA to use public funds to ensure that the market
dilution goals will be achieved. This is a comprehensive and
rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure.

															Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in
achieving its intended goals. But

															"whether in fact the provision will accomplish its
objectives is not the question: the [constitutional requirement] is
satisfied if . . . the . . . [state] Legislature rationally
could have believed that the [Act] would promote its
objective." Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 , 451 U. S.
671 -672 (1981); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 , 449 U. S. 466 (1981); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S.
93 , 440 U. S. 112 (1979). When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its Page 467 U. S. 243 means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings -- no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation -- are not to be
carried out in the federal courts. Redistribution of fees simple to
correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state
legislature to be attributable to land oligopoly is a rational
exercise of the eminent domain power. Therefore, the Hawaii statute
must pass the scrutiny of the Public Use Clause. [ Footnote 6 ] B The Court of Appeals read our cases to stand for a much narrower
proposition. First, it read our "public use" cases, especially Berman , as requiring that government possess and use
property at some point during a taking. Since Hawaiian lessees
retain possession of the property for private use throughout the
condemnation process, the court found that the Act exacted takings
for private use. 702 F.2d at 796-797. Second, it determined that
these cases involved only

															"the review of . . . congressional determination[s]
that there was a public use, not the review of . . . state
legislative determination[s]." Id. at 798 (emphasis in original). Because state
legislative determinations are involved in the instant cases, the
Court of Appeals decided that more rigorous judicial scrutiny of
the public use determinations was appropriate. The court concluded
that the Hawaii Legislature's professed purposes were mere
"statutory rationalizations." Ibid. We disagree with the
Court of Appeals' analysis.

															The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not
condemn that taking as having only a private Page 467 U. S. 244 purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement
that condemned property be put into use for the general public.

															"It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any
considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or participate in any
improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use." Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. at 262 U. S. 707 .
"[W]hat in its immediate aspect [is] only a private transaction may
. . . be raised by its class or character to a public affair." Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 256 U. S. 155 .
As the unique way titles were held in Hawaii skewed the land
market, exercise of the power of eminent domain was justified. The
Act advances its purposes without the State's taking actual
possession of the land. In such cases, government does not itself
have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the
taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny
under the Public Use Clause.

															Similarly, the fact that a state legislature, and not the
Congress, made the public use determination does not mean that
judicial deference is less appropriate. [ Footnote 7 ] Judicial deference is required because, in
our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess
what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the
taking power. State legislatures are as capable as Congress of
making such determinations within their respective spheres of
authority. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 32 .
Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines there are
substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts
must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a public
use. Page 467 U. S. 245 IV The State of Hawaii has never denied that the Constitution
forbids even a compensated taking of property when executed for no
reason other than to confer a private benefit on a particular
private party. A purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no
legitimate purpose of government, and would thus be void. But no
purely private taking is involved in these cases. The Hawaii
Legislature enacted its Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular
class of identifiable individuals, but to attack certain perceived
evils of concentrated property ownership in Hawaii -- a legitimate
public purpose. Use of the condemnation power to achieve this
purpose is not irrational. Since we assume for purposes of these
appeals that the weighty demand of just compensation has been met,
the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been
satisfied. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, and remand these cases for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision
of these cases.

															* Together with No. 83-236, Portlock Community Association
(Maunalua Beach) et al. v. Midkiff et al.; and No. 83-283, Kahala Community Association, Inc., et al. v. Midkiff et
al., also on appeal from the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															An eligible tenant is one who, among other things, owns a house
on the lot, has a bona fide intent to live on the lot or be a
resident of the State, shows proof of ability to pay for a fee
interest in it, and does not own residential land elsewhere nearby.
Haw. Rev.Stat. §§ 516-33(3), (4), (7) (1977)

															[ Footnote 2 ] See § 516-56 (Supp.1983). In either case, compensation
must equal the fair market value of the owner's leased fee
interest. § 516-1(14). The adequacy of compensation is not before
us.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															As originally enacted, lessor and lessee had to commence
compulsory arbitration if they could not agree on a price for the
fee simple title. Statutory formulae were provided for the
determination of compensation. The District Court declared both the
compulsory arbitration provision and the compensation formulae
unconstitutional. No appeal was taken from these rulings, and the
Hawaii Legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide only
for mandatory negotiation and for advisory compensation formulae.
These issues are not before us.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The dissenting judge's suggestion that Pullman abstention was required because interpretation of the State
Constitution may have obviated resolution of the federal
constitutional question is equally faulty. Hawaii's Constitution
has only a parallel requirement that a taking be for a public use. See Haw. Const., Art. I, § 20. The Court has previously
determined that abstention is not required for interpretation of
parallel state constitutional provisions. See Examining Board
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 , 426 U. S. 598 (1976); see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.
S. 433 (1971).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															After the American Revolution, the colonists in several States
took steps to eradicate the feudal incidents with which large
proprietors had encumbered land in the Colonies. See,
e.g., Act of May 1779, 10 Henning's Statutes At Large 64, ch.
13, § 6 (1822) (Virginia statute); Divesting Act of 1779, 1775-1781
Pa. Acts 258, ch. 139 (1782) (Pennsylvania statute). Courts have
never doubted that such statutes served a public purpose. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55 , 185 U. S. 60 -61
(1902); Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md. 242, 244-245, 16 A. 644,
645 (1889).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															We similarly find no merit in appellees' Due Process and
Contract Clause arguments. The argument that due process prohibits
allowing lessees to initiate the taking process was essentially
rejected by this Court in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Fox
Co., 439 U. S. 96 , 439 U. S.
108 -109 (1978). Similarly, the Contract Clause has never
been thought to protect against the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1 , 431 U. S. 19 , and
n. 16 (1977).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															It is worth noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not itself
contain an independent "public use" requirement. Rather, that
requirement is made binding on the States only by incorporation of
the Fifth Amendment's Eminent Domain Clause through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 (1897). It would be ironic to find that state legislation is
subject to greater scrutiny under the incorporated "public use"
requirement than is congressional legislation under the express
mandate of the Fifth Amendment.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the key points from the provided text:

- The Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) sought to reduce land ownership concentration and the social and economic issues caused by a land oligopoly, a problem traceable to the early high chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands.
- The Land Reform Act of 1967 authorized HHA to condemn property and transfer titles from lessors to lessees through a public hearing process.
- The case Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff involved a dispute between HHA and landowners (appellees) who refused to comply with the Act and sought to declare it unconstitutional.
- The District Court ruled against the landowners, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Act violated the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
- The Supreme Court rejected the need for abstention, finding that the case did not meet the requirements for Pullman abstention and that the state constitutional issue was not relevant to the federal constitutional question.
- The Supreme Court also rejected the landowners' due process and contract clause arguments, and noted that the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.