Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal

OPINION OF THE COURT GONZALES V. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTEUNIAO DO VEGETAL 546 U. S. ____ (2006) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 04-1084 ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,
PETITIONERS v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE UNIAO DO
VEGETAL et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 21, 2006]

															   Chief Justice Roberts delivered
the opinion of the Court.

															   A religious sect with origins in
the Amazon Rainforest receives communion by drinking a sacramental
tea, brewed from plants unique to the region, that contains a
hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the
Federal Government. The Government concedes that this practice is a
sincere exercise of religion, but nonetheless sought to prohibit
the small American branch of the sect from engaging in the
practice, on the ground that the Controlled Substances Act bars all
use of the hallucinogen. The sect sued to block enforcement against
it of the ban on the sacramental tea, and moved for a preliminary
injunction.

															   It relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, which prohibits the Federal Government from
substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless the
Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person” represents the least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling interest. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(b). The District
Court granted the preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari.
Before this Court, the Government’s central submission is that it
has a compelling interest in the uniform application of
the Controlled Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban on
use of the hallucinogen can be made to accommodate the sect’s
sincere religious practice. We conclude that the Government has not
carried the burden expressly placed on it by Congress in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and affirm the grant of the
preliminary injunction.

															I

															   In Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990),
this Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment does not prohibit governments from burdening religious
practices through generally applicable laws. In Smith , we
rejected a challenge to an Oregon statute that denied unemployment
benefits to drug users, including Native Americans engaged in the
sacramental use of peyote. Id., at 890. In so doing, we
rejected the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause announced
in Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and, in accord
with earlier cases, see Smith , 494 U. S., at 879–880,
884–885, held that the Constitution does not require judges to
engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens
imposed by facially constitutional laws. Id., at
883–890.

															   Congress responded by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat.
1488, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. , which
adopts a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule
rejected in Smith . Under RFRA, the Federal Government may
not, as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability.” §2000bb–1(a). The only exception recognized
by the statute requires the Government to satisfy the compelling
interest test—to “demonstrat[e] that application of the burden to
the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” §2000bb–1(b). A person whose
religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA “may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief.” §2000bb–1(c).[ Footnote 1 ]

															   The Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242,
as amended, 21 U. S. C. §801 et seq . (2000 ed. and
Supp. I), regulates the importation, manufacture, distribution, and
use of psychotropic substances. The Act classifies substances into
five schedules based on their potential for abuse, the extent to
which they have an accepted medical use, and their safety. See
§812(b) (2000 ed.). Substances listed in Schedule I of the Act are
subject to the most comprehensive restrictions, including an
outright ban on all importation and use, except pursuant to
strictly regulated research projects. See §§823, 960(a)(1). The Act
authorizes the imposition of a criminal sentence for simple
possession of Schedule I substances, see §844(a), and mandates the
imposition of a criminal sentence for possession “with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense” such substances, see
§§841(a), (b).

															   O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniăo
do Vegetal (UDV) is a Christian Spiritist sect based in Brazil,
with an American branch of approximately 130 individuals. Central
to the UDV’s faith is receiving communion through hoasca (pronounced “wass-ca”), a sacramental tea made from two plants
unique to the Amazon region. One of the plants, psychotria
viridis , contains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogen
whose effects are enhanced by alkaloids from the other plant, banisteriopsis caapi . DMT, as well as “any material,
compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of
[DMT],” is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.
§812(c), Schedule I(c).

															   In 1999, United States Customs inspectors
intercepted a shipment to the American UDV containing three drums
of hoasca . A subsequent investigation revealed that the
UDV had received 14 prior shipments of hoasca . The
inspectors seized the intercepted shipment and threatened the UDV
with prosecution.

															   The UDV filed suit against the Attorney
General and other federal law enforcement officials, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged, inter
alia, that applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV’s
sacramental use of hoasca violates RFRA. Prior to trial,
the UDV moved for a preliminary injunction, so that it could
continue to practice its faith pending trial on the merits.

															   At a hearing on the preliminary injunction,
the Government conceded that the challenged application of the
Controlled Substances Act would substantially burden a sincere
exercise of religion by the UDV. See O Centro Espirita
Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft , 282
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1252 (NM 2002). The Government argued,
however, that this burden did not violate RFRA, because applying
the Controlled Substances Act in this case was the least
restrictive means of advancing three compelling governmental
interests: protecting the health and safety of UDV members,
preventing the diversion of hoasca from the church to
recreational users, and complying with the 1971 United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty signed by the
United States and implemented by the Act. Feb. 21, 1971,
[1979–1980], 32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S. No.
9725. See 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1252–1253.

															   The District Court heard evidence from both
parties on the health risks of hoasca and the potential
for diversion from the church. The Government presented evidence to
the effect that use of hoasca , or DMT more generally, can
cause psychotic reactions, cardiac irregularities, and adverse drug
interactions. The UDV countered by citing studies documenting the
safety of its sacramental use of hoasca and presenting
evidence that minimized the likelihood of the health risks raised
by the Government. With respect to diversion, the Government
pointed to a general rise in the illicit use of hallucinogens, and
cited interest in the illegal use of DMT and hoasca in
particular; the UDV emphasized the thinness of any market for hoasca , the relatively small amounts of the substance
imported by the church, and the absence of any diversion problem in
the past.

															   The District Court concluded that the evidence
on health risks was “in equipoise,” and similarly that the evidence
on diversion was “virtually balanced.” Id., at 1262, 1266.
In the face of such an even showing, the court reasoned that the
Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest
justifying what it acknowledged was a substantial burden on the
UDV’s sincere religious exercise. Id., at 1255. The court
also rejected the asserted interest in complying with the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, holding that the Convention
does not apply to hoasca . Id., at 1266–1269.

															   The court entered a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances
Act with respect to the UDV’s importation and use of hoasca . The injunction requires the church to import the
tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control over the tea
to persons of church authority, and to warn particularly
susceptible UDV members of the dangers of hoasca . See
Preliminary Injunction ¶¶2, 5–12, 32–33, App. F to App. to Pet. for
Cert. 249a, 250a–252a, 258a–259a. The injunction also provides that
“if [the Government] believe[s] that evidence exists that hoasca has negatively affected the health of UDV members,”
or “that a shipment of hoasca contain[s] particularly
dangerous levels of DMT, [the Government] may apply to the Court
for an expedited determination of whether the evidence warrants
suspension or revocation of [the UDV’s authority to use hoasca ].” Id. , at 257a, ¶29.

															   The Government appealed the preliminary
injunction and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F. 3d 1170 (2003), as
did a majority of the Circuit sitting en banc, 389 F. 3d 973
(2004). We granted certiorari. 544 U. S. 973 (2005).

															II

															   Although its briefs contain some
discussion of the potential for harm and diversion from the UDV’s
use of hoasca , the Government does not challenge the
District Court’s factual findings or its conclusion that the
evidence submitted on these issues was evenly balanced. Instead,
the Government maintains that such evidentiary equipoise is an
insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act. We review the
District Court’s legal rulings de novo and its ultimate
decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion. See McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union , 545 U. S. ___ , ___ (2005) (slip op., at
19).

															   The Government begins by invoking
the well-established principle that the party seeking pretrial
relief bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on
the merits. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968 , 972
(1997) (per curiam); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 ,
931 (1975). The Government argues that the District Court lost
sight of this principle in issuing the injunction based on a mere
tie in the evidentiary record.

															   A majority of the en banc Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, and so do we. Before the District Court,
the Government conceded the UDV’s prima facie case under RFRA. See
282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1252 (application of the Controlled
Substances Act would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3)
religious exercise). The evidence the District Court found to be in
equipoise related to two of the compelling interests asserted by
the Government, which formed part of the Government’s affirmative
defense. See 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(b) (“Government may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1)
is in furtherance of a compelling government interest …” (emphasis
added)); §2000bb–2(3) (“[T]he term ‘demonstrates’ means meets the
burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion”).
Accordingly, the UDV effectively demonstrated that its sincere
exercise of religion was substantially burdened, and the Government
failed to demonstrate that the application of the burden to the UDV
would, more likely than not, be justified by the asserted
compelling interests. See 389 F. 3d, at 1009 (Seymour, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he balance is
between actual irreparable harm to [the] plaintiff and potential
harm to the government which does not even rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence”).

															   The Government argues that, although it would
bear the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest as part of
its affirmative defense at trial on the merits, the UDV should have
borne the burden of disproving the asserted compelling interests at
the hearing on the preliminary injunction. This argument is
foreclosed by our recent decision in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656 (2004). In Ashcroft , we affirmed the grant of a preliminary
injunction in a case where the Government had failed to show a
likelihood of success under the compelling interest test. We
reasoned that “[a]s the Government bears the burden of proof on the
ultimate question of [the challenged Act’s] constitutionality,
respondents [the movants] must be deemed likely to prevail unless
the Government has shown that respondents’ proposed less
restrictive alternatives are less effective than [enforcing the
Act].” Id., at 666. That logic extends to this case; here
the Government failed on the first prong of the compelling interest
test, and did not reach the least restrictive means prong, but that
can make no difference. The point remains that the burdens at the
preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial.

															   The Government attempts to limit the rule
announced in Ashcroft to content-based restrictions on
speech, but the distinction is unavailing. The fact that Ashcroft involved such a restriction was the reason the
Government had the burden of proof at trial under the First
Amendment, see id., at 665, but in no way affected the
Court’s assessment of the consequences of having that burden for
purposes of the preliminary injunction. Here the burden is placed
squarely on the Government by RFRA rather than the First Amendment,
see 42 U. S. C. §§2000bb–1(b), 2000bb–2(3), but the
consequences are the same. Congress’ express decision to legislate
the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should
be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated
applications of the test, including at the preliminary injunction
stage.

															III

															   The Government’s second line of
argument rests on the Controlled Substances Act itself. The
Government contends that the Act’s description of Schedule I
substances as having “a high potential for abuse,” “no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and “a
lack of accepted safety for use … under medical supervision,” 21 U.
S. C. §812(b)(1), by itself precludes any consideration of
individualized exceptions such as that sought by the UDV. The
Government goes on to argue that the regulatory regime established
by the Act—a “closed” system that prohibits all use of controlled
substances except as authorized by the Act itself, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005)
(slip op., at 10)—“cannot function with its necessary rigor and
comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial exemptions.” Brief for
Petitioners 18. According to the Government, there would be no way
to cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and “the public will
misread” such exceptions as signaling that the substance at issue
is not harmful after all. Id., at 23. Under the
Government’s view, there is no need to assess the particulars of
the UDV’s use or weigh the impact of an exemption for that specific
use, because the Controlled Substances Act serves a compelling
purpose and simply admits of no exceptions.

															A

															   RFRA, and the strict scrutiny
test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the
Government’s categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the challenged law “to the person”—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened. 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(b). RFRA expressly adopted the
compelling interest test “as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U. S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972).”
42 U. S. C. §2000bb(b)(1). In each of those cases, this Court
looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general
applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the asserted
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants. In Yoder, for example, we permitted an
exemption for Amish children from a compulsory school attendance
law. We recognized that the State had a “paramount” interest in
education, but held that “despite its admitted validity in the
generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that
the State seeks to promote … and the impediment to those objectives
that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish
exemption .” 406 U. S., at 213, 221 (emphasis added). The Court
explained that the State needed “to show with more particularity
how its admittedly strong interest … would be adversely affected by
granting an exemption to the Amish .” Id., at 236
(emphasis added).

															   In Sherbert, the Court
upheld a particular claim to a religious exemption from a state law
denying unemployment benefits to those who would not work on
Saturdays, but explained that it was not announcing a
constitutional right to unemployment benefits for “ all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their
unemployment.” 374 U. S., at 410 (emphasis added). The Court
distinguished the case “in which an employee’s religious
convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society.” Ibid.; see also Smith, 494 U. S., at 899
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (strict scrutiny “at least
requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to
the facts of each particular claim”). Outside the Free Exercise
area as well, the Court has noted that “[c]ontext matters” in
applying the compelling interest test, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 , 327
(2003), and has emphasized that “strict scrutiny does take
‘relevant differences’ into account—indeed, that is its fundamental
purpose,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200 , 228
(1995).

															B

															   Under the more focused inquiry
required by RFRA and the compelling interest test, the Government’s
mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I
substances, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot
carry the day. It is true, of course, that Schedule I substances
such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160 , 162
(1991). Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress, in
classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use
at issue here—the circumscribed, sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV. The question of the harms from the sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV was litigated below. Before the
District Court found that the Government had not carried its burden
of showing a compelling interest in preventing such harms, the
court noted that it could not “ignore that the legislative branch
of the government elected to place materials containing DMT on
Schedule I of the [Act], reflecting findings that substances
containing DMT have ‘a high potential for abuse,’ and ‘no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,’ and that
‘[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [DMT] under
medical supervision.’ ” 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1254. But
Congress’ determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I
simply does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the
Government of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.

															   This conclusion is reinforced by
the Controlled Substances Act itself. The Act contains a provision
authorizing the Attorney General to “waive the requirement for
registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers
if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety.” 21 U.
S. C. §822(d). The fact that the Act itself contemplates that
exempting certain people from its requirements would be “consistent
with the public health and safety” indicates that congressional
findings with respect to Schedule I substances should not carry the
determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would
ascribe to them.

															   And in fact an exception has been made to the
Schedule I ban for religious use. For the past 35 years, there has
been a regulatory exemption for use of peyote—a Schedule I
substance—by the Native American Church. See 21 CFR §1307.31
(2005). In 1994, Congress extended that exemption to all members of
every recognized Indian Tribe. See 42 U. S. C. §1996a(b)(1).
Everything the Government says about the DMT in hoasca —that, as a Schedule I substance, Congress has
determined that it “has a high potential for abuse,” “has no
currently accepted medical use,” and has “a lack of accepted safety
for use … under medical supervision,” 21 U. S. C.
§812(b)(1)—applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, yet
both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception
from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious
use of peyote. If such use is permitted in the face of the
congressional findings in §812(b)(1) for hundreds of thousands of
Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how
those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a
similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who
want to practice theirs. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 , 547
(1993) (“It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence
that ‘a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the
highest order’ … when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited’ ” (quoting Florida
Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524 , 541–542
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment))).

															   The Government responds that there is a
“unique relationship” between the United States and the Tribes,
Brief for Petitioners 27; see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974), but never explains what about that “unique” relationship
justifies overriding the same congressional findings on which the
Government relies in resisting any exception for the UDV’s
religious use of hoasca. In other words, if any Schedule I
substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount
no matter how used, what about the unique relationship with the
Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote? Nothing about the
unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune
from the health risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a
Schedule I substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the
Tribes use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of
diversion.

															   The Government argues that the existence of a congressional exemption for peyote does not indicate that
the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially
crafted exceptions. RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts would recognize exceptions—that is how the law
works. See 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(c) (“A person whose religious
exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain appropriate relief against a government”). Congress’ role in
the peyote exemption—and the Executive’s, see 21 CFR §1307.31
(2005)—confirms that the findings in the Controlled Substances Act
do not preclude exceptions altogether; RFRA makes clear that it is
the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are
required under the test set forth by Congress.

															C

															   The well-established peyote
exception also fatally undermines the Government’s broader
contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed
regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA. The
Government argues that the effectiveness of the Controlled
Substances Act will be “necessarily … undercut” if the Act is not
uniformly applied, without regard to burdens on religious exercise.
Brief for Petitioners 18. The peyote exception, however, has been
in place since the outset of the Controlled Substances Act, and
there is no evidence that it has “undercut” the Government’s
ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by non-Indians.

															   The Government points to some
pre- Smith cases relying on a need for uniformity in
rejecting claims for religious exemptions under the Free Exercise
Clause, see Brief for Petitioners 16, but those cases strike us as
quite different from the present one. Those cases did not embrace
the notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a
substantial burden on religious exercise; they instead scrutinized
the asserted need and explained why the denied exemptions could not
be accommodated. In United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982), for example, the Court rejected a claimed exception to the
obligation to pay Social Security taxes, noting that “mandatory
participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social
security system” and that the “tax system could not function if
denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax
payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious
belief.” Id., at 258, 260. See also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680 , 700
(1989) (same). In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961)
(plurality opinion), the Court denied a claimed exception to Sunday
closing laws, in part because allowing such exceptions “might well
provide [the claimants] with an economic advantage over their
competitors who must remain closed on that day.” Id., at
608–609. The whole point of a “uniform day of rest for all workers”
would have been defeated by exceptions. See Sherbert , 374
U. S., at 408 (discussing Braunfeld ). These cases show
that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in
uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence
that granting the requested religious accommodations would
seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.

															   Here the Government’s argument for uniformity
is different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory
program at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be
invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a
generally applicable law. The Government’s argument echoes the
classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an
exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no
exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the
compelling interest test, of exceptions to “rule[s] of general
applicability.” 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a). Congress determined
that the legislated test “is a workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests.” §200bb(a)(5). This determination finds support in our
cases; in Sherbert , for example, we rejected a
slippery-slope argument similar to the one offered in this case,
dismissing as “no more than a possibility” the State’s speculation
“that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants
feigning religious objections to Saturday work” would drain the
unemployment benefits fund. 374 U. S., at 407.

															   We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility
of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally
applicable rules. In Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.
S. ___ (2005), we held that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which allows federal and
state prisoners to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the
same standard as set forth in RFRA, does not violate the
Establishment Clause. We had “no cause to believe” that the
compelling interest test “would not be applied in an appropriately
balanced way” to specific claims for exemptions as they arose. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). Nothing in our opinion
suggested that courts were not up to the task.

															   We do not doubt that there may be instances in
which a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions
to generally applicable laws under RFRA. But it would have been
surprising to find that this was such a case, given the
longstanding exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for
religious use of peyote, and the fact that the very reason Congress
enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying a claimed right
to sacramental use of a controlled substance. See 42 U. S. C.
§2000bb(a)(4). And in fact the Government has not offered evidence
demonstrating that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the
kind of administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in Lee , Hernandez , and Braunfeld . The
Government failed to convince the District Court at the preliminary
injunction hearing that health or diversion concerns provide a
compelling interest in banning the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca . It cannot compensate for that failure now with the
bold argument that there can be no RFRA exceptions at all to the
Controlled Substances Act. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17 (Deputy
Solicitor General statement that exception could not be made even
for “rigorously policed” use of “one drop” of substance “once a
year”).

															IV

															   Before the District Court, the
Government also asserted an interest in compliance with the 1971
United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21,
1971, [1979–1980], 32 U. S. T. 543, T. I. A. S.
No. 9725. The Convention, signed by the United States and
implemented by the Controlled Substances Act, calls on signatories
to prohibit the use of hallucinogens, including DMT. The Government
argues that it has a compelling interest in meeting its
international obligations by complying with the Convention.

															   The District Court rejected this
interest because it found that the Convention does not cover hoasca . The court relied on the official commentary to the
Convention, which notes that “Schedule I [of the Convention] does
not list … natural hallucinogenic materials,” and that “[p]lants as
such are not, and it is submitted are also not likely to be, listed
in Schedule I, but only some products obtained from plants.”
U. N. Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic Substances
387, 385 (1976). The court reasoned that hoasca , like the
plants from which the tea is made, is sufficiently distinct from
DMT itself to fall outside the treaty. See 282 F. Supp. 2d, at
1266–1269.

															   We do not agree. The Convention provides that
“a preparation is subject to the same measures of control as the
psychotropic substance which it contains,” and defines
“preparation” as “any solution or mixture, in whatever physical
state, containing one or more psychotropic substances.” See 32 U.
S. T., at 546, Art. 1(f)(i); id., at 551, Art. 3. Hoasca is a “solution or mixture” containing DMT; the fact
that it is made by the simple process of brewing plants in water,
as opposed to some more advanced method, does not change that. To
the extent the commentary suggests plants themselves are not
covered by the Convention, that is of no moment—the UDV seeks to
import and use a tea brewed from plants, not the plants themselves,
and the tea plainly qualifies as a “preparation” under the
Convention.

															   The fact that hoasca is covered by
the Convention, however, does not automatically mean that the
Government has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the
Controlled Substances Act, which implements the Convention, to the
UDV’s sacramental use of the tea. At the present stage, it suffices
to observe that the Government did not even submit evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an
exemption for the UDV. The Government simply submitted two
affidavits by State Department officials attesting to the general
importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining
the leadership position of the United States in the international
war on drugs. See Declaration of Gary T. Sheridan (Jan. 24, 2001),
App. G to App. to Pet. for Cert. 261a; Declaration of Robert E.
Dalton (Jan. 24, 2001), App. H, id., at 265a. We do not
doubt the validity of these interests, any more than we doubt the
general interest in promoting public health and safety by enforcing
the Controlled Substances Act, but under RFRA invocation of such
general interests, standing alone, is not enough.[ Footnote 2 ]

															*  *  *

															   The Government repeatedly invokes
Congress’ findings and purposes underlying the Controlled
Substances Act, but Congress had a reason for enacting RFRA, too.
Congress recognized that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise,” and legislated “the compelling interest test”
as the means for the courts to “strik[e] sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” 42
U. S. C. §§2000bb(a)(2), (5).

															   We have no cause to pretend that
the task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy
one. Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the
Government here were cited by this Court in deciding that the
approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not required as
a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause. See Smith, 494 U. S., at 885–890. But Congress has determined
that courts should strike sensible balances, pursuant to a
compelling interest test that requires the Government to address
the particular practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude
that the courts below did not err in determining that the
Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction
stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use
of hoasca .

															   The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															   Justice Alito took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case. Footnote 1 As originally enacted, RFRA applied to States
as well as the Federal Government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U. S. 507 (1997), we held the application to States to be
beyond Congress’ legislative authority under §5 of the 14th
Amendment. Footnote 2 In light of the foregoing, we do not reach
the UDV’s argument that Art. 22, ¶5, of the Convention should be
read to accommodate exceptions under domestic laws such as
RFRA.

Summary: In *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, the Supreme Court ruled that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in prohibiting a religious sect from using a hallucinogenic tea as a sacrament, as protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction, allowing the sect to continue its religious practice.