U.S. Supreme Court Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950) Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. No. 378 Argued February &,
1950 Decided April 24,
1950 339
U.S. 306 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
NEW YORK Syllabus A trust company in New York which had exclusive management and
control of a common trust fund established by it under §100-c of
the New York Banking Law petitioned under that section for a
judicial settlement of accounts which would be binding and
conclusive as to any matter set forth therein upon everyone having
any interest in the common fund or in any participating trust. In
this common fund, the trust company had invested assets of numerous
small trusts of which it was trustee and of which some of the
beneficiaries were residents, and some nonresidents, of the State.
The only notice of this petition given beneficiaries was by
publication in a local newspaper pursuant to §100-c(12). Held: 1. Whether such a proceeding for settlement of accounts be
technically in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the
supervision of its courts is such as to establish beyond doubt the
right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full
opportunity to appear and be heard. Pp. 339 U. S.
311 -313.

															2. The statutory notice by publication is sufficient as to any
beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the
trustee, since there are no other means of giving them notice which
are both practicable and more effective. Pp. 339 U. S.
313 -318.

															3. Such notice by publication is not sufficient under the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for adjudication depriving of
substantial property rights known persons whose whereabouts are
also known, since it is not impracticable to make serious efforts
to notify them at least by ordinary mail to their addresses on
record with the trust company. Pp. 339 U. S.
318 -320.

															299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d 73, reversed.

															Overruling objections to the statutory notice to beneficiaries
by publication authorized by §100-c of the New York Banking Law, a
New York Surrogate's Court entered a final decree accepting an
accounting of the trustee of Page 339 U. S. 307 a common trust fund established pursuant to that section. 75
N.Y.S.2d 397. This decree was affirmed by the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York ( see 274 App.Div. 772, 80
N.Y.S.2d 127), and the Court of Appeals of New York (229 N.Y. 697,
87 N.E.2d 73). On appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 339 U. S.
320 .

															Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This controversy questions the constitutional sufficiency of
notice to beneficiaries on judicial settlement of accounts by the
trustee of a common trust fund established under the New York
Banking Law, Consol.Laws, c. 2. The New York Court of Appeals
considered and overruled objections that the statutory notice
contravenes requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that, by
allowance of the account, beneficiaries were deprived of property
without due process of law. 299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d 73. The case is
here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

															Common trust fund legislation is addressed to a problem
appropriate for state action. Mounting overheads have made
administration of small trusts undesirable to corporate trustees.
In order that donors and testators of moderately sized trusts may
not be denied the service of corporate fiduciaries, the District of
Columbia and some Page 339 U. S. 308 thirty states other than New York have permitted pooling small
trust estates into one fund for investment administration. * The income,
capital gains, losses and expenses of the collective trust are
shared by the constituent trusts in proportion to their
contribution. By this plan, diversification of risk and economy of
management can be extended to those whose capital standing alone
would not obtain such advantage.

															Statutory authorization for the establishment of such common
trust funds is provided in the New York Banking Law, § 100-c, c.
687, L.1937, as amended by c. 602, L.1943 and c. 158, L.1944. Under
this Act, a trust company may, with approval of the State Banking
Board, establish a common fund and, within prescribed limits, Page 339 U. S. 309 invest therein the assets of an unlimited number of estates,
trusts or other funds of which it is trustee. Each participating
trust shares ratably in the common fund, but exclusive management
and control is in the trust company as trustee, and neither a
fiduciary nor any beneficiary of a participating trust is deemed to
have ownership in any particular asset or investment of this common
fund. The trust company must keep fund assets separate from its
own, and, in its fiduciary capacity, may not deal with itself or
any affiliate. Provisions are made for accountings twelve to
fifteen months after the establishment of a fund, and triennially
thereafter. The decree, in each such judicial settlement of
accounts, is made binding and conclusive as to any matter set forth
in the account upon everyone having any interest in the common fund
or in any participating estate, trust or fund.

															In January, 1946, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company
established a common trust fund in accordance with these
provisions, and, in March, 1947, it petitioned the Surrogate's
Court for settlement of its first account as common trustee. During
the accounting period, a total of 113 trusts, approximately half inter vivos and half testamentary, participated in the
common trust fund, the gross capital of which was nearly three
million dollars. The record does not show the number or residence
of the beneficiaries, but they were many, and it is clear that some
of them were not residents of the State of New York.

															The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application
was by publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with
the minimum requirements of N.Y.Banking Law § 100-c(12):

															"After filing such petition [for judicial settlement of its
account], the petitioner shall cause to be issued by the court in
which the petition is filed and shall publish not less than once in
each week Page 339 U. S. 310 for four successive weeks in a newspaper to be designated by the
court, a notice or citation addressed generally, without naming
them, to all parties interested in such common trust fund and in
such estates, trusts or funds mentioned in the petition, all of
which may be described in the notice or citation only in the manner
set forth in said petition and without setting forth the residence
of any such decedent or donor of any such estate, trust or
fund."

															Thus, the only notice required, and the only one given, was by
newspaper publication setting forth merely the name and address of
the trust company, the name and the date of establishment of the
common trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts
or funds.

															At the time the first investment in the common fund was made on
behalf of each participating estate; however, the trust company,
pursuant to the requirements of § 100-c(9), had notified by mail
each person of full age and sound mind whose name and address was
then known to it and who was

															"entitled to share in the income therefrom . . . (or) . . . who
would be entitled to share in the principal if the event upon which
such estate, trust or fund will become distributable should have
occurred at the time of sending such notice."

															Included in the notice was a copy of those provisions of the Act
relating to the sending of the notice itself and to the judicial
settlement of common trust fund accounts.

															Upon the filing of the petition for the settlement of accounts,
appellant was, by order of the court pursuant to § 100-c(12),
appointed special guardian and attorney for all persons known or
unknown not otherwise appearing who had or might thereafter have
any interest in the income of the common trust fund, and appellee
Vaughan was appointed to represent those similarly interested in
the principal. There were no other appearances on behalf of anyone
interested in either interest or principal. Page 339 U. S. 311 Appellant appeared specially, objecting that notice and the
statutory provisions for notice to beneficiaries were inadequate to
afford due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
that the court was without jurisdiction to render a final and
binding decree. Appellant's objections were entertained and
overruled, the Surrogate holding that the notice required and given
was sufficient. 75 N.Y.S.2d 397. A final decree accepting the
accounts has been entered, affirmed by the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court, In re Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 275 App.Div. 769, 88 N.Y.S.2d 907, and by the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, 299 N.Y. 697, 87 N.E.2d 73.

															The effect of this decree, as held below, is to settle "all
questions respecting the management of the common fund." We
understand that every right which beneficiaries would otherwise
have against the trust company, either as trustee of the common
fund or as trustee of any individual trust, for improper management
of the common trust fund during the period covered by the
accounting is sealed and wholly terminated by the decree. See
Matter of Hoaglund's Estate, 194 Misc. 803, 811-812, 74
N.Y.S.2d 156, 164, affirmed, 272 App.Div. 1040, 74
N.Y.S.2d 911, affirmed, 297 N.Y. 920, 79 N.E.2d 746; Matter of Bank of New York, 189 Misc. 459, 470, 67
N.Y.S.2d 444, 453; Matter of Security Trust Co. of
Rochester, 189 Misc. 748, 760, 70 N.Y.S.2d 260, 271; Matter of Continental Bank & Trust Co., 189 Misc. 795,
797, 67 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807-808.

															We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the
State -- the right of its courts to adjudicate at all as against
those beneficiaries who reside without the State of New York. It is
contended that the proceeding is one in personam, in that
the decree affects neither title to nor possession of any res, but adjudges only personal rights of the
beneficiaries to surcharge their trustee for negligence or breach
of trust. Accordingly, it is said, under the strict doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , the
Surrogate Page 339 U. S. 312 is without jurisdiction as to nonresidents upon whom personal
service of process was not made.

															Distinctions between actions in rem and those in
personam are ancient, and originally expressed in procedural
terms what seems really to have been a distinction in the
substantive law of property under a system quite unlike our own.
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, 66; Burdick,
Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law, 298. The
legal recognition and rise in economic importance of incorporeal or
intangible forms of property have upset the ancient simplicity of
property law and the clarity of its distinctions, while new forms
of proceedings have confused the old procedural classification.
American courts have sometimes classed certain actions as in
rem because personal service of process was not required, and,
at other times, have held personal service of process not required
because the action was in rem. See cases
collected in Freeman on Judgments, §§ 1517 et seq. (5th ed.).

															Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been
sometimes termed in rem, or, more indefinitely, quasi
in rem, or more vaguely still, "in the nature of a proceeding in rem. " It is not readily apparent how the courts of New
York did or would classify the present proceeding, which has some
characteristics, and is wanting in some features of, proceedings
both in rem and in personam. But, in any event,
we think that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which
the standards are so elusive and confused generally, and which,
being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from
state to state. Without disparaging the usefulness of distinctions
between actions in rem and those in personam in
many branches of law, or on other issues, or the reasoning which
underlies them, we do not rest the power of the State to resort to
constructive service in this proceeding Page 339 U. S. 313 upon how its courts or this Court may regard this historic
antithesis. It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the
technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of each
state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of
its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts
is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt
the right of its courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords
full opportunity to appear and be heard.

															Quite different from the question of a state's power to
discharge trustees is that of the opportunity it must give
beneficiaries to contest. Many controversies have raged about the
cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause, but there can
be no doubt that, at a minimum, they require that deprivation of
life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.

															In two ways, this proceeding does or may deprive beneficiaries
of property. It may cut off their rights to have the trustee answer
for negligent or illegal impairments of their interests. Also,
their interests are presumably subject to diminution in the
proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their
names but without their knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or
uncompensatory contest. Certainly the proceeding is one in which
they may be deprived of property rights and hence notice and
hearing must measure up to the standards of due process.

															Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of
proceeding. But the vital interest of the State in bringing any
issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement can be served
only if interests or claims of individuals who are outside of the
State can somehow be determined. A construction of the Due Process
Clause which Page 339 U. S. 314 would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could
not be justified.

															Against this interest of the State, we must balance the
individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is defined by our holding that "[t]he fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 , 234 U. S. 394 .
This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.

															The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a
balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or
determining when constructive notice may be utilized, or what test
it must meet. Personal service has not, in all circumstances, been
regarded as indispensable to the process due to residents, and it
has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents. We disturb
none of the established rules on these subjects. No decision
constitutes a controlling, or even a very illuminating, precedent
for the case before us. But a few general principles stand out in
the books.

															An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections. Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 ; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385 ; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604 ; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 . The
notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information, Grannis v. Ordean, supra, and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance, Roller v. Holly, supra, and cf. Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U. S. 71 . But
if, with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the
case, these conditions Page 339 U. S. 315 are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are
satisfied.

															"The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury, but
the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having
reference to the subject with which the statute deals." American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S.
47 , 219 U. S. 67 , and see Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S. 1 , 222 U. S. 7 .

															But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it. The reasonableness, and hence the constitutional
validity of, any chosen method may be defended on the ground that
it is, in itself, reasonably certain to inform those affected, compare Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.
S. 352 , with Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S.
13 , or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to
bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary
substitutes.

															It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as
prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested
parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is
not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this
Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned
with actions founded on process constructively served through local
newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local
resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages
of a newspaper, and, if he makes his home outside the area of the
newspaper's normal circulation, the odds that the information will
never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is
further reduced when, as here, the notice required does not even
name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and does not
inform acquaintances who might call it to attention. In weighing
its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we
are unable to regard this as more than a feint. Page 339 U. S. 316 Nor is publication here reinforced by steps likely to attract
the parties' attention to the proceeding. It is true that
publication traditionally has been acceptable as notification
supplemental to other action which, in itself, may reasonably be
expected to convey a warning. The ways of an owner with tangible
property are such that he usually arranges means to learn of any
direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights. Hence,
libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel or entry upon real estate
in the name of law may reasonably be expected to come promptly to
the owner's attention. When the state within which the owner has
located such property seizes it for some reason, publication or
posting affords an additional measure of notification. A state may
indulge the assumption that one who has left tangible property in
the state either has abandoned it, in which case proceedings
against it deprive him of nothing, cf. Anderson National Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 ; Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.
S. 282 , or that he has left some caretaker under a duty
to let him know that it is being jeopardized. Ballard v.
Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 ; Huling v. Kaw Valley R. Co., 130 U.
S. 559 ,. As phrased long ago by Chief Justice Marshall
in The Mary , 9
Cranch 126, 13 U. S.
144 ,

															"It is the part of common prudence for all those who have any
interest in [a thing] to guard that interest by persons who are in
a situation to protect it."

															In the case before us, there is, of course, no abandonment. On
the other hand, these beneficiaries do have a resident fiduciary as
caretaker of their interest in this property. But it is their
caretaker who, in the accounting, becomes their adversary. Their
trustee is released from giving notice of jeopardy, and no one else
is expected to do so. Not even the special guardian is required or
apparently expected to communicate with his ward and client, and,
of course, if such a duty were merely transferred Page 339 U. S. 317 from the trustee to the guardian, economy would not be served
and more likely the cost would be increased.

															This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication
as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not
reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning.
Thus, it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing
or unknown, employment of an indirect, and even a probably futile,
means of notification is all that the situation permits, and
creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their
rights. Cunnius v. Reading School District, 198 U.
S. 458 ; Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U. S.
1 ; and see Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.
S. 261 .

															Those beneficiaries represented by appellant whose interests or
whereabouts could not, with due diligence, be ascertained come
clearly within this category. As to them, the statutory notice is
sufficient. However great the odds that publication will never
reach the eyes of such unknown parties, it is not in the typical
case, much more likely to fail than any of the choices open to
legislators endeavoring to prescribe the best notice
practicable.

															Nor do we consider it unreasonable for the State to dispense
with more certain notice to those beneficiaries whose interests are
either conjectural or future or, although they could be discovered
upon investigation, do not, in due course of business, come to
knowledge of the common trustee. Whatever searches might be
required in another situation under ordinary standards of
diligence, in view of the character of the proceedings and the
nature of the interests here involved, we think them unnecessary.
We recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would be
attendant on frequent investigations into the status of great
numbers of beneficiaries, many of whose interests in the common
fund are so remote as to be ephemeral, and we have no doubt that
such impracticable and extended searches are not required in
the Page 339 U. S. 318 name of due process. The expense of keeping informed from day to
day of substitutions among even current income beneficiaries and
presumptive remaindermen, to say nothing of the far greater number
of contingent beneficiaries, would impose a severe burden on the
plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages. These are
practical matters in which we should be reluctant to disturb the
judgment of the state authorities.

															Accordingly we overrule appellant's constitutional objections to
published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any
beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the
trustee.

															As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence,
however, notice by publication stands on a different footing.
Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule
that, within the limits of practicability, notice must be such as
is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the
names and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding
are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely
than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.

															The trustee has on its books the names and addresses of the
income beneficiaries represented by appellant, and we find no
tenable ground for dispensing with a serious effort to inform them
personally of the accounting, at least by ordinary mail to the
record addresses. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra. Certainly sending them a copy of the statute months, and perhaps
years, in advance does not answer this purpose. The trustee
periodically remits their income to them, and we think that they
might reasonably expect that, with or apart from their remittances,
word might come to them personally that steps were being taken
affecting their interests.

															We need not weigh contentions that a requirement of personal
service of citation on even the large number of known resident or
nonresident beneficiaries would, by Page 339 U. S. 319 reasons of delay, if not of expense, seriously interfere with
the proper administration of the fund. Of course, personal service,
even without the jurisdiction of the issuing authority, serves the
end of actual and personal notice, whatever power of compulsion it
might lack. However, no such service is required under the
circumstances. This type of trust presupposes a large number of
small interests. The individual interest does not stand alone, but
is identical with that of a class. The rights of each in the
integrity of the fund, and the fidelity of the trustee, are shared
by many other beneficiaries. Therefore, notice reasonably certain
to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to
safeguard the interests of all, since any objections sustained
would inure to the benefit of all. We think that, under such
circumstances, reasonable risks that notice might not actually
reach every beneficiary are justifiable.

															"Now and then, an extraordinary case may turn up, but
constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take
some chances, and, in the great majority of instances, no doubt,
justice will be done." Blinn v. Nelson, at 222 U. S. 7 .

															The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate not
because, in fact, it fails to reach everyone, but because, under
the circumstances, it is not reasonably calculated to reach those
who could easily be informed by other means at hand. However it may
have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an
efficient and inexpensive means of communication. Moreover, the
fact that the trust company has been able to give mailed notice to
known beneficiaries at the time the common trust fund was
established is persuasive that postal notification at the time of
accounting would not seriously burden the plan.

															In some situations, the law requires greater precautions in its
proceedings than the business world accepts for its own purposes.
In few, if any, will it be satisfied with Page 339 U. S. 320 less. Certainly it is instructive, in determining the
reasonableness of the impersonal broadcast notification here used,
to ask whether it would satisfy a prudent man of business, counting
his pennies but finding it in his interest to convey information to
many persons whose names and addresses are in his files. We are not
satisfied that it would. Publication may theoretically be available
for all the world to see, but it is too much, in our day, to
suppose that each or any individual beneficiary does or could
examine all that is published to see if something may be tucked
away in it that affects his property interests. We have before
indicated, in reference to notice by publication, that "Great
caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that
can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 , 243 U. S.
91 .

															We hold the notice of judicial settlement of accounts required
by the New York Banking Law § 100-c(12) is incompatible with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for
adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are also
known of substantial property rights. Accordingly, the judgment is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															* Ala.Code Ann., 1940, Cum.Supp.1947, tit. 58, §§ 88 to 103, as
amended, Laws 1949, Act 262; Ariz.Code Ann., 1939, Cum.Supp.1949,
§§ 51-1101 to 51-1104; Ark.Stat.Ann.1947, §§ 58-110 to 58-112;
Cal.Bank.Code Ann., Deering 1949, § 1564; Colo.Stat.Ann., 1935,
Cum.Supp.1947, c. 18, §§ 173 to 178; Conn.Gen.Stat.1949 Rev., §
5805; Del.Rev.Code, 1935, § 4401, as amended, Laws 1943, c. 171,
Laws 1947, c. 268; (D.C.) Pub.Law No. 416, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
c. 767, Oct. 27, 1949, 63 Stat. 938; Fla.Stat., 1941, §§ 655.29 to
655.34, F.S.A.; Ga.Code Ann., 1937, Cum.Supp.1947, §§ 109-601 to
109-622; Idaho Code Ann., 1949, Cum.Supp.1949, §§ 68-701 to 68-703;
Ill.Rev.Stat., 1949, c. 16 1/2, §§ 57 to 63; Ind.Stat.Ann., Burns
1950, §§ 18-2009 to 18-2014; Ky.Rev.Stat., 1948, § 287.230;
La.Gen.Stat.Ann., 1939, § 9850.64, Act No. 81 of 1938, § 64;
Md.Ann.Code Gen.Laws, 1939, Cum.Supp.1947, art. 11, § 62A;
Mass.Ann.Laws, 1933, Cum.Supp.1949, c. 203A; Mich.Stat.Ann., 1943,
Cum.Supp.1949, §§ 23.1141 to 23.1153, Comp.Laws 1948, §§
555.101-555.113; Minn.Stat., 1945, § 48.84, as amended, Laws 1947,
c. 234, M.S.A.; N.J.S.A., 1939, Cum.Supp.1949, §§ 17:9A-36 to
17:9A-46; N.C.Gen.Stat., 1943, §§ 36-47 to 36-52; Ohio Gen.Code
Ann. (Page's 1946), Cum.Supp.1949, §§ 715 to 720, 722;
Okla.Stat.1941, Cum.Supp.1949, tit. 60, § 162; Pa.Stat.Ann., 1939,
Cum.Supp.1949, tit. 7, §§ 819-1109 to 819-1109d; So.Dak.Laws 1941,
c. 20; Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann., 1939, Cum.Supp.1949, art.
7425b-48; Vt. Stat., 1947 Rev., § 8873; Va.Code Ann., 1950, §§
6-569 to 6-576; Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann., Supp.1943, §§ 3388 to 3388-6;
W.Va.Code Ann., 1949, § 4219 (1) et seq.; Wisc.Stat., 1947, §
223.055.

															MR. JUSTICE BURTON, dissenting.

															These common trusts are available only when the instruments
creating the participating trusts permit participation in the
common fund. Whether or not further notice to beneficiaries should
supplement the notice and representation here provided is properly
within the discretion of the State. The Federal Constitution does
not require it here.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case verdict:

The Supreme Court ruled that while a state court has the right to determine the interests of all claimants in a trust, regardless of their residency, adequate notice must be provided to known beneficiaries whose whereabouts are also known. The Court held that notice by publication was insufficient and impractical for those with known addresses, as more effective means of notification, such as ordinary mail, were available. The case was remanded for further proceedings.