U.S. Supreme Court Block v. Commun. Nutrition Inst., 467
U.S. 340 (1984) Block v. Community Nutrition
Institute No. 83-458 Argued April 24, 1984 Decided June 4, 1984 467
U.S. 340 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus To bring destabilizing competition among dairy farmers under
control, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (Act)
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) to issue milk
market orders setting the minimum prices that handlers (those who
process dairy products) must pay to producers (dairy farmers) for
their milk products. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary
issued market orders under which handlers are required to pay for
"reconstituted milk" (milk manufactured by mixing milk powder with
water) the minimum price for Class II milk (raw milk used to
produce such products as dry milk powder), rather than the higher
price covering Class I milk (raw milk processed and bottled for
fluid consumption). The orders assume that handlers will use the
reconstituted milk to manufacture surplus milk products, but for
any portion of reconstituted milk not so used, handlers must make a
"compensatory payment" equal to the difference between Class I and
Class II milk product prices. Respondents -- three individual
consumers of fluid dairy products, a handler regulated by the
market orders, and a nonprofit organization -- brought suit in
Federal District Court, contending that the compensatory payment
requirement makes reconstituted milk uneconomical for handlers to
process. The District Court held, inter alia, that the
consumers had no standing to challenge the orders. The Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that the consumers had suffered
injury-in-fact, their injuries were redressable, and they were
within the zone of interests protected by the Act, and that the
Act's structure and purposes did not reveal the type of "clear and
convincing evidence of congressional intent needed to overcome the
presumption in favor of judicial review." Held: The individual consumers may not obtain judicial
review of the milk market orders in question. Pp. 467 U. S.
345 -353.

															(a) It is clear from the structure of the Act that Congress
intended that judicial review of market orders ordinarily be
confined to suits by handlers in accordance with the provisions of
the Act expressly entitling them to such review in a federal
district court after exhausting their administrative remedies.
Allowing consumers to sue the Secretary would severely disrupt the
Act's complex and delicate administrative scheme. Pp. 467 U. S.
345 -348. Page 467 U. S. 341 (b) The presumption favoring judicial review of administrative
action does not control in cases such as this one, where the
congressional intent to preclude consumer suits is "fairly
discernible" in the detail of the legislative scheme. The Act
contemplates a cooperative venture among the Secretary, producers,
and handlers; consumer participation is not provided for or desired
under that scheme. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.
S. 288 , distinguished. Pp. 467 U. S.
348 -352.

															225 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 698 F.2d 1239, reversed.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the
decision of the case.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the question whether ultimate consumers of
dairy products may obtain judicial review of milk market orders
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) under the
authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(Act), ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et
seq. We conclude that consumers may not obtain judicial review
of such orders. I A In the early 1900's, dairy farmers engaged in intense
competition in the production of fluid milk products. See Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168 , 396 U. S.
172 -176 (1969). To bring this destabilizing competition
under control, the 1937 Act authorizes the Secretary to issue milk
market orders setting the minimum prices that handlers (those who
process dairy products) Page 467 U. S. 342 must pay to producers (dairy farmers) for their milk products. 7
U.S.C. § 608c. The "essential purpose [of this milk market order
scheme is] to raise producer prices," S.Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 (1935), and thereby to ensure that the benefits and
burdens of the milk market are fairly and proportionately shared by
all dairy farmers. See Nebba v. New York, 291 U.
S. 502 , 291 U. S.
517 -518 (1934).

															Under the scheme established by Congress, the Secretary must
conduct an appropriate rulemaking proceeding before issuing a milk
market order. The public must be notified of these proceedings and
provided an opportunity for public hearing and comment. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(3). An order may be issued only if the
evidence adduced at the hearing shows "that [it] will tend to
effectuate the declared policy of this chapter with respect to such
commodity." 7 U.S.C. § 608c(4). Moreover, before any market order
may become effective, it must be approved by the handlers of at
least 50% of the volume of milk covered by the proposed order and
at least two-thirds of the affected dairy producers in the region.
7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(8), 608c(5)(B)(i). If the handlers withhold their
consent, the Secretary may nevertheless impose the order. But the
Secretary's power to do so is conditioned upon at least two-thirds
of the producers consenting to its promulgation and upon his making
an administrative determination that the order is "the only
practical means of advancing the interests of the producers." 7
U.S.C. § 608c(9)(B).

															The Secretary currently has some 45 milk market orders in
effect. See 7 CFR pts. 1001-1139 (1984). Each order covers
a different region of the country, and collectively they cover
most, though not all, of the United States. The orders divide dairy
products into separately priced classes based on the uses to which
raw milk is put. See 44 Fed.Reg. 65990 (1979). Raw milk
that is processed and bottled for fluid consumption is termed
"Class I" milk. Raw milk that is used to Page 467 U. S. 343 produce milk products such as butter, cheese, or dry milk powder
is termed "Class II" milk. [ Footnote 1 ]

															For a variety of economic reasons, fluid milk products would
command a higher price than surplus milk products in a perfectly
functioning market. Accordingly, the Secretary's milk market orders
require handlers to pay a higher order price for Class I products
than for Class II products. To discourage destabilizing competition
among producers for the more desirable fluid milk sales, the orders
also require handlers to submit their payments for either class of
milk to a regional pool. Administrators of these regional pools are
then charged with distributing to dairy farmers a weighted average
price for each milk product they have produced, irrespective of its
use. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(B)(ii).

															In particular, the Secretary has regulated the price of
"reconstituted milk" -- that is, milk manufactured by mixing milk
powder with water -- since 1964. See 29 Fed.Reg. 9002,
9010 (1964); see also 34 Fed.Reg. 16548, 16551 (1969). The
Secretary's orders assume that handlers will use reconstituted milk
to manufacture surplus milk products. Handlers are therefore
required to pay only the lower Class II minimum price. See 44 Fed.Reg. 65989, 65990 (1979). However, handlers are required to
make a "compensatory payment" on any portion of the reconstituted
milk that their records show has not been used to manufacture
surplus milk products. 7 CFR §§ 1012.44(a)(5)(i), 1012.60(e)
(1984). The compensatory payment is equal to the difference between
the Class I and Class II milk product prices. Handlers make these
payments to the regional pool, from which moneys are then
distributed to producers of fresh fluid milk in the region where
the reconstituted milk was manufactured and sold. §
1012.71(a)(1). Page 467 U. S. 344 B In December, 1980, respondents brought suit in District Court,
contending that the compensatory payment requirement makes
reconstituted milk uneconomical for handlers to process. [ Footnote 2 ] Respondents, as plaintiffs
in the District Court, included three individual consumers of fluid
dairy products, a handler regulated by the market orders, and a
nonprofit organization. The District Court concluded that the
consumers and the nonprofit organization did not have standing to
challenge the market orders. In addition, it found that Congress
had intended by the Act to preclude such persons from obtaining
judicial review. The District Court dismissed the milk handler's
complaint because he had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies.

															The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, and
remanded the case for a decision on the merits. 225 U.S.App.D.C.
387, 698 F.2d 1239 (1983). The Court of Appeals agreed that the
milk handler and the nonprofit organization had been properly
dismissed by the District Court. But the court concluded that the
individual consumers had standing: they had suffered an
injury-in-fact, Page 467 U. S. 345 their injuries were redressable, and they were within the zone
of interests arguably protected by the Act. The Court also
concluded that the statutory structure and purposes of the Act did
not reveal

															"the type of clear and convincing evidence of congressional
intent needed to overcome the presumption in favor of judicial
review." Id. at 400, and n. 75, 698 F.2d at 1252, and n. 75. The
Court of Appeals expressly refused to follow the decision of the
Ninth Circuit in Rasmussen v. Hardin, 461 F.2d 595, cert. denied sub nom. Rasmussen v. Butz, 409 U.S. 933
(1972), which had held consumers precluded by statute from seeking
judicial review.

															We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits.
464 U.S. 991 (1983). We now reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals in this case. II Respondents filed this suit under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. The APA confers a
general cause of action upon persons "adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute," 5 U.S.C. § 702, but withdraws that cause of action to the
extent the relevant statute "preclude[s] judicial review," 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1). Whether and to what extent a particular statute
precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express
language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its
objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the
administrative action involved. See Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard
Allied Mining Corp., 442 U. S. 444 , 442 U. S.
454 -463 (1979); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491 , 432 U. S.
499 -507 (1977); see generally Note, Statutory
Preclusion of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 1976 Duke L.J. 431, 442-449. Therefore, we must examine this
statutory scheme

															"to determine whether Congress precluded all judicial review,
and, if not, whether Congress nevertheless foreclosed review to the
class to which the [respondents] Page 467 U. S. 346 belon[g]." Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 , 397 U. S. 173 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.,); see also Data Processing
Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 , 397 U. S. 156 (1970).

															It is clear that Congress did not intend to strip the judiciary
of all authority to review the Secretary's milk market orders. The
Act's predecessor, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 31, contained no provision relating to administrative or
judicial review. In 1935, however, Congress added a mechanism by
which dairy handlers could obtain review of the Secretary's market
orders. 49 Stat. 760. That mechanism was retained in the 1937
legislation, and remains in the Act as § 608c(15) today. Section
608c(15) requires handlers first to exhaust the administrative
remedies made available by the Secretary. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A); see 7 CFR §§ 900.50-900.71 (1984). After these formal
administrative remedies have been exhausted, handlers may obtain
judicial review of the Secretary's ruling in the federal district
court in any district "in which [they are] inhabitant[s], or ha[ve
their] principal place[s] of business." 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(B).
These provisions for handler-initiated review make evident
Congress' desire that some persons be able to obtain judicial
review of the Secretary's market orders.

															The remainder of the statutory scheme, however, makes equally
clear Congress' intention to limit the classes entitled to
participate in the development of market orders. The Act
contemplates a cooperative venture among the Secretary, handlers,
and producers the principal purposes of which are to raise the
price of agricultural products and to establish an orderly system
for marketing them. Handlers and producers -- but not consumers --
are entitled to participate in the adoption and retention of market
orders. 7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(8), (9), (16)(B). The Act provides for
agreements among the Secretary, producers, and handlers, 7 U.S.C. §
608(2), for hearings among them, §§ 608(5), 608c(3), and for votes
by producers and handlers, §§ 608c(8)(A), (9)(B), (12), Page 467 U. S. 347 608c(19). Nowhere in the Act, however, is there an express
provision for participation by consumers in any proceeding. In a
complex scheme of this type, the omission of such a provision is
sufficient reason to believe that Congress intended to foreclose
consumer participation in the regulatory process. See Switchmen
v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 305-306 (1943); cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 , 456 U. S. 208 (1982).

															To be sure, the general purpose sections of the Act allude to
general consumer interests. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 602(2), (4).
But the preclusion issue does not only turn on whether the
interests of a particular class like consumers are implicated.
Rather, the preclusion issue turns ultimately on whether Congress
intended for that class to be relied upon to challenge agency
disregard of the law. See Barlow v. Collins, supra, at 397 U. S. 167 .
The structure of this Act indicates that Congress intended only
producers and handlers, and not consumers, to ensure that the
statutory objectives would be realized.

															Respondents would have us believe that, while Congress
unequivocally directed handlers first to complain to the Secretary
that the prices set by milk market orders are too high, it was
nevertheless the legislative judgment that the same challenge, if
advanced by consumers, does not require initial administrative
scrutiny. There is no basis for attributing to Congress the intent
to draw such a distinction. The regulation of agricultural products
is a complex, technical undertaking. Congress channeled disputes
concerning marketing orders to the Secretary in the first instance,
because it believed that only he has the expertise necessary to
illuminate and resolve questions about them. Had Congress intended
to allow consumers to attack provisions of marketing orders, it
surely would have required them to pursue the administrative
remedies provided in § 608c(15)(A) as well. The restriction of the
administrative remedy to handlers strongly suggests that Congress
intended a similar restriction of judicial review of market
orders. Page 467 U. S. 348 Allowing consumers to sue the Secretary would severely disrupt
this complex and delicate administrative scheme. It would provide
handlers with a convenient device for evading the statutory
requirement that they first exhaust their administrative remedies.
A handler may also be a consumer and, as such, could sue in that
capacity. Alternatively, a handler would need only to find a
consumer who is willing to join in or initiate an action in the
district court. The consumer or consumer-handler could then raise
precisely the same exceptions that the handler must raise
administratively. Consumers or consumer-handlers could seek
injunctions against the operation of market orders that "impede,
hinder, or delay" enforcement actions, even though such injunctions
are expressly prohibited in proceedings properly instituted under 7
U.S.C. § 608c(15). Suits of this type would effectively nullify
Congress' intent to establish an

															"equitable and expeditious procedure for testing the validity of
orders, without hampering the Government's power to enforce
compliance with their terms."

															S.Rep. No. 1011, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1935); see also
United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U. S. 287 , 329 U. S.
293 -294, and n. 3 (1946). For these reasons, we think it
clear that Congress intended that judicial review of market orders
issued under the Act ordinarily be confined to suits brought by
handlers in accordance with 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15). III The Court of Appeals viewed the preclusion issue from a somewhat
different perspective. First, it recited the presumption in favor
of judicial review of administrative action that this Court usually
employs. It then noted that the Act has been interpreted to
authorize producer challenges to the administration of market order
settlement funds, see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.
S. 288 (1944), and that no legislative history or
statutory language directly and specifically supported the
preclusion of consumer suits. In these circumstances, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that the Act could not fairly be Page 467 U. S. 349 interpreted to overcome the presumption favoring judicial review
and to leave consumers without a judicial remedy. See 225
U.S.App.D.C. at 400, and n. 75, 698 F.2d at 1252, and n. 75. We
disagree with the Court of Appeals' analysis.

															The presumption favoring judicial review of administrative
action is just that -- a presumption. This presumption, like all
presumptions used in interpreting statutes, may be overcome by
specific language or specific legislative history that is a
reliable indicator of congressional intent. See, e.g., Southern
R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
454 -463; Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.
S. 666 , 363 U. S.
670 -677 (1960). The congressional intent necessary to
overcome the presumption may also be inferred from contemporaneous
judicial construction barring review and the congressional
acquiescence in it, see, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948), or from the collective import of legislative and judicial
history behind a particular statute, see, e.g., Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953). More important for purposes of this case, the presumption
favoring judicial review of administrative action may be overcome
by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole. See, e.g., Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.
S. 491 (1977); Switchmen v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943). In particular, at least when a statute provides a detailed
mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the
behest of particular persons, judicial review of those issues at
the behest of other persons may be found to be impliedly precluded. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 168 ,
and n. 2, 175, and n. 9 (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Switchmen v.
National Mediation Board, supra, at 320 U. S.
300 -301; cf. Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.
S. 519 , 459 U. S. 542 (1983).

															A case that best illustrates the relevance of a statute's
structure to the Court's preclusion analysis is Morris v.
Gressette, supra. In that case, the Court held that the
Attorney General's failure to object to a change in voting Page 467 U. S. 350 procedures was an unreviewable administrative determination
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Neither the Voting Rights Act
nor its legislative history said anything about judicial review.
Nevertheless, the Morris Court concluded that the

															"nature of the [statutory] remedy . . . strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend the Attorney General's actions under that
provision to be subject to judicial review." Id. at 432 U. S. 501 .
The Court reasoned that Congress had intended the approval
procedure to be expeditious, and that reviewability would
unnecessarily extend the period the State must wait for effecting
its change. Id. at 432 U. S.
504 -505. The Court also found relevant the existence of
other remedies to ensure the realization of the Voting Rights Act's
objectives. Id. at 432 U. S.
505 -507. In these circumstances, even though proof of
specific congressional intent was not "clear and convincing" in the
traditional evidentiary sense, the Court unremarkably found the
intent to preclude judicial review implicit in the statutory
scheme.

															In this case, the Court of Appeals did not take the balanced
approach to statutory construction reflected in the Morris opinion. Rather, it recited this Court's oft-quoted statement
that

															"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a
contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.
S. 136 , 387 U. S. 141 (1967). See also Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling
Corp., supra, at 442 U. S. 462 ; Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560 , 421 U. S. 568 (1975). According to the Court of Appeals, the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard required it to find unambiguous
proof, in the traditional evidentiary sense, of a congressional
intent to preclude judicial review at the consumers' behest. Since
direct statutory language or legislative history on this issue
could not be found, the Court of Appeals found the presumption
favoring judicial review to be controlling.

															This Court has, however, never applied the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in the strict evidentiary sense the Page 467 U. S. 351 Court of Appeals thought necessary in this case. Rather, the
Court has found the standard met, and the presumption favoring
judicial review overcome, whenever the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review is "fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme." Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 157 .
In the context of preclusion analysis, the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard is not a rigid evidentiary test, but a useful
reminder to courts that, where substantial doubt about the
congressional intent exists, the general presumption favoring
judicial review of administrative action is controlling. That
presumption does not control in cases such as this one, however,
since the congressional intent to preclude judicial review is
"fairly discernible" in the detail of the legislative scheme.
Congress simply did not intend for consumers to be relied upon to
challenge agency disregard of the law.

															It is true, as the Court of Appeals also noted, that this Court
determined, in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.
S. 288 (1944), that dairy producers could challenge
certain administrative actions even though the Act did not
expressly provide them a right to judicial review. The producers
challenged certain deductions the Secretary had made from the
"producer settlement fund" established in connection with the milk
market order in effect at the time. "[T]he challenged deduction[s]
reduce[d] pro tanto the amount actually received by the
producers for their milk." Id. at 321 U. S. 302 .
These deductions injured what the producers alleged were "definite
personal rights" that were "not possessed by the people generally," id. at 321 U. S. 304 , 321 U. S. 309 ,
and gave the producers standing to object to the administration of
the settlement fund. See id. at 321 U. S. 306 .
Though the producers' standing could not, by itself, ensure
judicial review of the Secretary's action at their behest, see
ibid., the statutory scheme as a whole, the Court concluded,
implicitly authorized producers' suits concerning settlement fund
administration. See id. at 321 U. S.
309 -310. "[H]andlers [could not] question the use of the
fund, because handlers had Page 467 U. S. 352 no financial interest in the fund or its use." Id. at 321 U. S. 308 .
Thus, there was "no forum" in which this aspect of the Secretary's
actions could or would be challenged. Judicial review of the
producers' complaint was therefore necessary to ensure achievement
of the Act's most fundamental objectives -- to-wit, the protection
of the producers of milk and milk products.

															By contrast, preclusion of consumer suits will not threaten
realization of the fundamental objectives of the statute. Handlers
have interests similar to those of consumers. Handlers, like
consumers, are interested in obtaining reliable supplies of milk at
the cheapest possible prices. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
at 396 U. S. 190 .
Handlers can therefore be expected to challenge unlawful agency
action, and to ensure that the statute's objectives will not be
frustrated. [ Footnote 3 ]
Indeed, as noted above, consumer suits might themselves frustrate
achievement of the statutory purposes. The Act contemplates a
cooperative venture among the Secretary, producers, and handlers;
consumer participation is not provided for or desired under the
complex scheme enacted by Congress. Consumer suits would undermine
the congressional preference for administrative remedies, and
provide a mechanism for disrupting administration of the
congressional scheme. Thus, preclusion of consumer suits is
perfectly consistent with the Court's contrary conclusion
concerning producer challenges in Stark v. Wickard and its
analogous conclusion concerning voter challenges in Morris v.
Gressette. IV The structure of this Act implies that Congress intended to
preclude consumer challenges to the Secretary's market orders.
Preclusion of such suits does not pose any threat to Page 467 U. S. 353 realization of the statutory objectives; it means only that
those objectives must be realized through the specific remedies
provided by Congress and at the behest of the parties directly
affected by the statutory scheme. [ Footnote 4 ] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Under many orders, milk is divided into three classes. For
purposes of this case, however, all milk other than milk used for
fluid purposes is referred to as Class II milk.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Prior to filing suit, respondents petitioned the Secretary to
hold a rulemaking hearing to amend the market orders so that
reconstituted milk would no longer be subject to the compensatory
payment rule. See 44 Fed.Reg. 65989 (1979). The Secretary
published a Notice of Request and asked for comments. Ibid. Subsequently, the Secretary published a preliminary
impact analysis of the proposal and invited comments. See 45 Fed.Reg. 75956 (1980). In April 1981, after respondents had
filed suit in the District Court, the Secretary determined not to
hold a rulemaking hearing, because respondents' proposal would not
further the purposes of the Act. See App. 57-63. The
portion of respondents' complaint challenging the Secretary's
inaction on their rulemaking request was held moot by the Court of
Appeals. 225 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 403, and n. 93, 698 F.2d 1239, 1255,
and n. 93 (1983). Respondents did not cross-petition for certiorari
review of this issue, and we therefore have no occasion to consider
it.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Whether handlers would pass on to consumers any savings they
might secure through a successful challenge to the market order
provisions is irrelevant. Consumers' interest in market orders is
limited to lowering the prices charged to handlers in the hope that
consumers will then reap some benefit at the retail level.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The conclusion that Congress intended to preclude consumers from
seeking judicial review of the Secretary's market orders avoids any
pronouncement on the merits of respondents' substantive claims.
Since congressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect
jurisdictional, we need not address the standing issues decided by
the Court of Appeals in this case. See National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 , 414 U. S. 456 (1974); see also id. at 414 U. S. 465 ,
and n. 13.

Summary: In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, the US Supreme Court ruled that individual consumers cannot legally challenge milk market orders, which set minimum prices for dairy products, and are meant to control competition among dairy farmers. The Court found that only handlers (processors) of dairy products could bring suit, as the law intends to create a cooperative system between the Secretary of Agriculture, producers, and handlers. Consumers are not a part of this system and are therefore precluded from challenging the orders.


U.S. Supreme Court Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984) Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. No. 82-1005 Argued February 29,
1984 Decided June 25, 1984 467
U.S. 837 ast|>* 467
U.S. 837 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 impose certain requirements
on States that have not achieved the national air quality standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant
to earlier legislation, including the requirement that such
"nonattainment" States establish a permit program regulating "new
or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution. Generally,
a permit may not be issued for such sources unless stringent
conditions are met. EPA regulations promulgated in 1981 to
implement the permit requirement allow a State to adopt a plantwide
definition of the term "stationary source," under which an existing
plant that contains several pollution-emitting devices may install
or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit
conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions
from the plant, thus allowing a State to treat all of the
pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as
though they were encased within a single "bubble." Respondents
filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the regulations embodying the "bubble concept" as contrary to
law. Although recognizing that the amended Clean Air Act does not
explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a "stationary source"
to which the permit program should apply, and that the issue was
not squarely addressed in the legislative history, the court
concluded that, in view of the purpose of the nonattainment program
to improve, rather than merely maintain, air quality, a plantwide
definition was "inappropriate," while stating it was mandatory in
programs designed to maintain existing air quality. Held: The EPA's plantwide definition is a permissible
construction of the statutory term "stationary source." Pp. 467 U. S.
842 -866.

															(a) With regard to judicial review of an agency's construction
of the statute which it administers, if Congress has not directly
spoken to the precise question at issue, the question for the court
is whether the Page 467 U. S. 838 agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. Pp. 467 U. S.
842 -845.

															(b) Examination of the legislation and its history supports the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that Congress did not have a specific
intention as to the applicability of the "bubble concept" in these
cases. Pp. 467 U. S.
845 -851.

															(c) The legislative history of the portion of the 1977
Amendments dealing with nonattainment areas plainly discloses that,
in the permit program, Congress sought to accommodate the conflict
between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements to
continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality.
Pp. 467 U. S.
851 -853.

															(d) Prior to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA had used a plantwide
definition of the term "source," but in 1980, the EPA ultimately
adopted a regulation that, in essence, applied the basic reasoning
of the Court of Appeals here, precluding use of the "bubble
concept" in nonattainment States' programs designed to enhance air
quality. However, when a new administration took office in 1981,
the EPA, in promulgating the regulations involved here, reevaluated
the various arguments that had been advanced in connection with the
proper definition of the term "source" and concluded that the term
should be given the plantwide definition in nonattainment areas.
Pp. 467 U. S.
853 -859.

															(e) Parsing the general terms in the text of the amended Clean
Air Act -- particularly the provisions of §§ 302(j) and 111(a)(3)
pertaining to the definition of "source" -- does not reveal any
actual intent of Congress as to the issue in these cases. To the
extent any congressional "intent" can be discerned from the
statutory language, it would appear that the listing of
overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather
than to confine, the scope of the EPA's power to regulate
particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Clean
Air Act. Similarly, the legislative history is consistent with the
view that the EPA should have broad discretion in implementing the
policies of the 1977 Amendments. The plantwide definition is fully
consistent with the policy of allowing reasonable economic growth,
and the EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its
conclusion that the regulations serve environmental objectives as
well. The fact that the EPA has from time to time changed its
interpretation of the term "source" does not lead to the conclusion
that no deference should be accorded the EPA's interpretation of
the statute. An agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a
continuing basis. Policy arguments concerning the "bubble concept"
should be addressed to legislators or administrators, not to
judges. The EPA's interpretation of the statute here represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests, and is
entitled to deference. Pp. 467 U. S. 859 -866.

															222 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 685 F.2d 718, reversed. Page 467 U. S. 839 STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except MARSHALL and REHNQUIST, JJ., who took
no part in the consideration or decision of the cases, and
O'CONNOR, J., who took no part in the decision of the cases.

															JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub.L. 95-95, 91 Stat.
685, Congress enacted certain requirements applicable Page 467 U. S. 840 to States that had not achieved the national air quality
standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
pursuant to earlier legislation. The amended Clean Air Act required
these "nonattainment" States to establish a permit program
regulating "new or modified major stationary sources" of air
pollution. Generally, a permit may not be issued for a new or
modified major stationary source unless several stringent
conditions are met. [ Footnote
1 ] The EPA regulation promulgated to implement this permit
requirement allows a State to adopt a plantwide definition of the
term "stationary source." [ Footnote
2 ] Under this definition, an existing plant that contains
several pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece
of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the
alteration will not increase the total emissions from the plant.
The question presented by these cases is whether EPA's decision to
allow States to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within
the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a
single "bubble" is based on a reasonable construction of the
statutory term "stationary source." I The EPA regulations containing the plantwide definition of the
term stationary source were promulgated on October Page 467 U. S. 841 14, 1981. 46 Fed.Reg. 50766. Respondents [ Footnote 3 ] filed a timely petition for review in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). [ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals set aside the
regulations. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Gorsuch, 222 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 685 F.2d 718 (1982).

															The court observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean
Air Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a stationary source, to which the permit program . . . should
apply," and further stated that the precise issue was not "squarely
addressed in the legislative history." Id. at 273, 685
F.2d at 723. In light of its conclusion that the legislative
history bearing on the question was "at best contradictory," it
reasoned that "the purposes of the nonattainment program should
guide our decision here." Id. at 276, n. 39, 685 F.2d at
726, n. 39. [ Footnote 5 ] Based
on two of its precedents concerning the applicability of the bubble
concept to certain Clean Air Act programs, [ Footnote 6 ] the court stated that the bubble concept
was "mandatory" in programs designed merely to maintain existing
air quality, but held that it was "inappropriate" in programs
enacted to improve air quality. Id. at 276, 685 F.2d at
726. Since the purpose of the permit Page 467 U. S. 842 program its " raison d'etre, " in the court's view -- was
to improve air quality, the court held that the bubble concept was
inapplicable in these cases under its prior precedents. Ibid. It therefore set aside the regulations embodying the
bubble concept as contrary to law. We granted certiorari to review
that judgment, 461 U.S. 956 (1983), and we now reverse.

															The basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a
static judicial definition of the term "stationary source" when it
had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that definition.
Respondents do not defend the legal reasoning of the Court of
Appeals. [ Footnote 7 ]
Nevertheless, since this Court reviews judgments, not opinions,
[ Footnote 8 ] we must determine
whether the Court of Appeals' legal error resulted in an erroneous
judgment on the validity of the regulations. II When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, Page 467 U. S. 843 as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. [ Footnote 9 ] If, however, the court determines Congress has
not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court
does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
[ Footnote 10 ] as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
[ Footnote 11 ]

															"The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 , 415 U. S. 231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill, there is an express delegation Page 467 U. S. 844 of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. [ Footnote 12 ] Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit, rather than explicit.
In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency. [ Footnote 13 ]

															We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, [ Footnote 14 ] and the principle of deference to
administrative interpretations

															"has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision
as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the
statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U. S. 190 ; Labor Board
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S.
111 ; Republic Aviation Corp.
v. Page
467 U. S. 845 Labor Board, 324 U. S.
793 ; Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194 ; Labor Board
v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344 ."

															". . . If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of
conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by
the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the
statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not
one that Congress would have sanctioned." United States v. Shimer, 367 U.
S. 374 , 367 U. S. 382 ,
383 (1961). Accord, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
ante at 467 U. S.
699 -700.

															In light of these well-settled principles, it is clear that the
Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing
the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own
examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have
an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the
permit program, the question before it was not whether, in its
view, the concept is "inappropriate" in the general context of a
program designed to improve air quality, but whether the
Administrator's view that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one. Based on the examination of
the legislation and its history which follows, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that Congress did not have a specific intention on
the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases, and
conclude that the EPA's use of that concept here is a reasonable
policy choice for the agency to make. III In the 1950's and the 1960's, Congress enacted a series of
statutes designed to encourage and to assist the States in
curtailing air pollution. See generally Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S.
60 , 421 U. S. 63 -64
(1975). The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.L. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676, "sharply increased federal authority and responsibility Page 467 U. S. 846 in the continuing effort to combat air pollution," 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 64 ,
but continued to assign "primary responsibility for assuring air
quality" to the several States, 84 Stat. 1678. Section 109 of the
1970 Amendments directed the EPA to promulgate National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS's) [ Footnote 15 ] and § 110 directed the States to develop
plans (SIP's) to implement the standards within specified
deadlines. In addition, § 111 provided that major new sources of
pollution would be required to conform to technology-based
performance standards; the EPA was directed to publish a list of
categories of sources of pollution and to establish new source
performance standards (NSPS) for each. Section 111(e) prohibited
the operation of any new source in violation of a performance
standard.

															Section 111(a) defined the terms that are to be used in setting
and enforcing standards of performance for new stationary sources.
It provided:

															"For purposes of this section:"

															" * * * *" "(3) The term 'stationary source' means any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant."

															84 Stat. 1683. In the 1970 Amendments, that definition was not
only applicable to the NSPS program required by § 111, but also was
made applicable to a requirement of § 110 that each state
implementation plan contain a procedure for reviewing the location
of any proposed new source and preventing its construction if it
would preclude the attainment or maintenance of national air
quality standards. [ Footnote
16 ]

															In due course, the EPA promulgated NAAQS's, approved SIP's, and
adopted detailed regulations governing NSPS's Page 467 U. S. 847 for various categories of equipment. In one of its programs, the
EPA used a plantwide definition of the term "stationary source." In
1974, it issued NSPS's for the nonferrous smelting industry that
provided that the standards would not apply to the modification of
major smelting units if their increased emissions were offset by
reductions in other portions of the same plant. [ Footnote 17 ] Nonattainment The 1970 legislation provided for the attainment of primary
NAAQS's by 1975. In many areas of the country, particularly the
most industrialized States, the statutory goals were not attained.
[ Footnote 18 ] In 1976, the
94th Congress was confronted with this fundamental problem, as well
as many others respecting pollution control. As always in this
area, the legislative struggle was basically between interests
seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its
social costs and interests advancing the economic concern that
strict schemes would retard industrial development with attendant
social costs. The 94th Congress, confronting these competing
interests, was unable to agree on what response was in the public
interest: legislative proposals to deal with nonattainment failed
to command the necessary consensus. [ Footnote 19 ]

															In light of this situation, the EPA published an Emissions
Offset Interpretative Ruling in December, 1976, see 41
Fed.Reg. 55524, to "fill the gap," as respondents put it, until
Congress acted. The Ruling stated that it was intended to Page 467 U. S. 848 address

															"the issue of whether and to what extent national air quality
standards established under the Clean Air Act may restrict or
prohibit growth of major new or expanded stationary air pollution
sources." Id. at 55524-55525. In general, the Ruling provided
that

															"a major new source may locate in an area with air quality worse
than a national standard only if stringent conditions can be
met." Id. at 55525. The Ruling gave primary emphasis to the
rapid attainment of the statute's environmental goals. [ Footnote 20 ] Consistent with that
emphasis, the construction of every new source in nonattainment
areas had to meet the "lowest achievable emission rate" under the
current state of the art for that type of facility. See
Ibid. The 1976 Ruling did not, however, explicitly adopt or
reject the "bubble concept." [ Footnote 21 ] IV The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 are a lengthy, detailed,
technical, complex, and comprehensive response to a major social
issue. A small portion of the statute -- 91 Stat. Page 467 U. S. 849 745-751 (Part D of Title I of the amended Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
7501-7508) -- expressly deals with nonattainment areas. The focal
point of this controversy is one phrase in that portion of the
Amendments. [ Footnote
22 ]

															Basically, the statute required each State in a nonattainment
area to prepare and obtain approval of a new SIP by July 1, 1979.
In the interim, those States were required to comply with the EPA's
interpretative Ruling of December 21, 1976. 91 Stat. 745. The
deadline for attainment of the primary NAAQS's was extended until
December 31, 1982, and in some cases until December 31, 1987, but
the SIP's were required to contain a number of provisions designed
to achieve the goals as expeditiously as possible. [ Footnote 23 ] Page 467 U. S. 850 Most significantly for our purposes, the statute provided that
each plan shall

															"(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new
or modified major stationary sources in accordance with section
173. . . ." Id. at 747. Before issuing a permit, § 173 requires (1)
the state agency to determine that there will be sufficient
emissions reductions in the region to offset the emissions from the
new source and also to allow for reasonable further progress toward
attainment, or that the increased emissions will not exceed an
allowance for growth established pursuant to § 172(b)(5); (2) the
applicant to certify that his other sources in the State are in
compliance with the SIP, (3) the agency to determine that the
applicable SIP is otherwise being implemented, and (4) the proposed
source to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER).
[ Footnote 24 ] Page 467 U. S. 851 The 1977 Amendments contain no specific reference to the "bubble
concept." Nor do they contain a specific definition of the term
"stationary source," though they did not disturb the definition of
"stationary source" contained in § 111(a)(3), applicable by the
terms of the Act to the NSPS program. Section 302(j), however,
defines the term "major stationary source" as follows:

															"(j) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the terms 'major
stationary source' and 'major emitting facility' mean any
stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly
emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or
more of any air pollutant (including any major emitting facility or
source of fugitive emissions of any such pollutant, as determined
by rule by the Administrator)."

															91 Stat. 770. V The legislative history of the portion of the 1977 Amendments
dealing with nonattainment areas does not contain any specific
comment on the "bubble concept" or the question whether a plantwide
definition of a stationary source is permissible under the permit
program. It does, however, plainly disclose that in the permit
program Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the
economic interest in permitting capital improvements to continue
and the environmental interest in improving air quality. Indeed,
the House Committee Report identified the economic interest as one
of the "two main purposes" of this section of the bill. It
stated:

															"Section 117 of the bill, adopted during full committee markup
establishes a new section 127 of the Clean Air Act. The section has
two main purposes: (1) to allow reasonable economic growth to
continue in an area while making reasonable further progress to
assure attainment of the standards by a fixed date; and (2) to
allow Page 467 U. S. 852 States greater flexibility for the former purpose than EPA's
present interpretative regulations afford."

															"The new provision allows States with nonattainment areas to
pursue one of two options. First, the State may proceed under EPA's
present 'tradeoff' or 'offset' ruling. The Administrator is
authorized, moreover, to modify or amend that ruling in accordance
with the intent and purposes of this section."

															"The State's second option would be to revise its implementation
plan in accordance with this new provision."

															H.R.Rep. No. 95-294, p. 211 (1977). [ Footnote 25 ]

															The portion of the Senate Committee Report dealing with
nonattainment areas states generally that it was intended to
"supersede the EPA administrative approach," and that expansion
should be permitted if a State could

															"demonstrate that these facilities can be accommodated within
its overall plan to provide for attainment of air quality
standards."

															S.Rep. No. 95-127, p. 55 (1977). The Senate Report notes the
value of

															"case-by-case review of each new or modified major source of
pollution that seeks to locate in a region exceeding an ambient
standard,"

															explaining that such a review

															"requires matching reductions from existing sources against Page 467 U. S. 853 emissions expected from the new source in order to assure that
introduction of the new source will not prevent attainment of the
applicable standard by the statutory deadline." Ibid. This description of a case-by-case approach to
plant additions, which emphasizes the net consequences of the
construction or modification of a new source as well as its impact
on the overall achievement of the national standards, was not,
however, addressed to the precise issue raised by these cases.

															Senator Muskie made the following remarks:

															"I should note that the test for determining whether a new or
modified source is subject to the EPA interpretative regulation
[the Offset Ruling] -- and to the permit requirements of the
revised implementation plans under the conference bill -- is
whether the source will emit a pollutant into an area which is
exceeding a national ambient air quality standard for that
pollutant -- or precursor. Thus, a new source is still subject to
such requirements as 'lowest achievable emission rate' even if it
is constructed as a replacement for an older facility resulting in
a net reduction from previous emission levels."

															"A source -- including an existing facility ordered to convert
to coal -- is subject to all the nonattainment requirements as a
modified source if it makes any physical change which increases the
amount of any air pollutant for which the standards in the area are
exceeded."

															123 Cong.Rec. 26847 (1977). VI As previously noted, prior to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA had
adhered to a plantwide definition of the term "source" under a NSPS
program. After adoption of the 1977 Amendments, proposals for a
plantwide definition were considered in at least three formal
proceedings.

															In January, 1979, the EPA considered the question whether the
same restriction on new construction in nonattainment areas that
had been included in its December, 1976, Ruling Page 467 U. S. 854 should be required in the revised SIP's that were scheduled to
go into effect in July, 1979. After noting that the 1976 Ruling was
ambiguous on the question "whether a plant with a number of
different processes and emission points would be considered a
single source," 44 Fed.Reg. 3276 (1979), the EPA, in effect,
provided a bifurcated answer to that question. In those areas that
did not have a revised SIP in effect by July, 1979, the EPA
rejected the plantwide definition; on the other hand, it expressly
concluded that the plantwide approach would be permissible in
certain circumstances if authorized by an approved SIP. It
stated:

															"Where a state implementation plan is revised and implemented to
satisfy the requirements of Part D, including the reasonable
further progress requirement, the plan requirements for major
modifications may exempt modifications of existing facilities that
are accompanied by intrasource offsets, so that there is no net
increase in emissions. The agency endorses such exemptions, which
would provide greater flexibility to sources to effectively manage
their air emissions at least cost." Ibid. [ Footnote
26 ] Page 467 U. S. 855 In April, and again in September, 1979, the EPA published
additional comments in which it indicated that revised SIP's could
adopt the plantwide definition of source in nonattainment areas in
certain circumstances. See id. at 20372, 20379, 51924,
51951, 51958. On the latter occasion, the EPA made a formal
rulemaking proposal that would have permitted the use of the
"bubble concept" for new installations within a plant as well as
for modifications of existing units. It explained:

															"'Bubble' Exemption: The use of offsets inside the same source
is called the 'bubble.' EPA proposes use of the definition of
'source' (see above) to limit the use of the bubble under
nonattainment requirements in the following respects:"

															"i. Part D SIPs that include all requirements needed to assure
reasonable further progress and attainment by the deadline under
section 172 and that are being carried out need not restrict the
use of a plantwide bubble, the same as under the PSD proposal."

															"ii. Part D SIPs that do not meet the requirements specified
must limit use of the bubble by including a definition of
'installation' as an identifiable piece of process equipment.
[ Footnote 27 ] " Page 467 U. S. 856 Significantly, the EPA expressly noted that the word "source"
might be given a plantwide definition for some purposes and a
narrower definition for other purposes. It wrote:

															"Source means any building structure, facility, or installation
which emits or may emit any regulated pollutant. 'Building,
structure, facility or installation' means plant in PSD areas and
in nonattainment areas except where the growth prohibitions would
apply or where no adequate SIP exists or is being carried out." Id. at 51925. [ Footnote 28 ] The EPA's summary of its proposed Ruling
discloses a flexible, rather than rigid, definition of the term
"source" to implement various policies and programs:

															"In summary, EPA is proposing two different ways to define
source for different kinds of NSR programs:"

															"(1) For PSD and complete Part D SIPs, review would apply only
to plants, with an unrestricted plantwide bubble."

															"(2) For the offset ruling, restrictions on construction, and
incomplete Part D SIPs, review would apply to both plants and
individual pieces of process equipment, causing the plant-wide
bubble not to apply for new and modified major pieces of
equipment."

															"In addition, for the restrictions on construction, EPA is
proposing to define 'major modification' so as to prohibit the
bubble entirely. Finally, an alternative discussed but not favored
is to have only pieces of process equipment reviewed, resulting in
no plant-wide bubble and allowing minor pieces of equipment to
escape NSR Page 467 U. S. 857 regardless of whether they are within a major plant." Id. at 51934.

															In August, 1980, however, the EPA adopted a regulation that, in
essence, applied the basic reasoning of the Court of Appeals in
these cases. The EPA took particular note of the two then-recent
Court of Appeals decisions, which had created the bright-line rule
that the "bubble concept" should be employed in a program designed
to maintain air quality, but not in one designed to enhance air
quality. Relying heavily on those cases, [ Footnote 29 ] EPA adopted a dual definition of "source"
for nonattainment areas that required a permit whenever a change in
either the entire plant, or one of its components, would result in
a significant increase in emissions even if the increase was
completely offset by reductions elsewhere in the plant. The EPA
expressed the opinion that this interpretation was "more consistent
with congressional intent" than the plantwide definition because it
"would bring in more sources or modifications for review," 45
Fed.Reg. 52697 (1980), but its primary legal analysis was
predicated on the two Court of Appeals decisions.

															In 1981, a new administration took office and initiated a
"Government-wide reexamination of regulatory burdens and
complexities." 46 Fed.Reg. 16281. In the context of that Page 467 U. S. 858 review, the EPA reevaluated the various arguments that had been
advanced in connection with the proper definition of the term
"source" and concluded that the term should be given the same
definition in both nonattainment areas and PSD areas.

															In explaining its conclusion, the EPA first noted that the
definitional issue was not squarely addressed in either the statute
or its legislative history, and therefore that the issue involved
an agency "judgment as how to best carry out the Act." Ibid. It then set forth several reasons for concluding
that the plantwide definition was more appropriate. It pointed out
that the dual definition "can act as a disincentive to new
investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to
existing facilities" and

															"can actually retard progress in air pollution control by
discouraging replacement of older, dirtier processes or pieces of
equipment with new, cleaner ones." Ibid. Moreover, the new definition

															"would simplify EPA's rules by using the same definition of
'source' for PSD, nonattainment new source review, and the
construction moratorium. This reduces confusion and
inconsistency." Ibid. Finally, the agency explained that additional
requirements that remained in place would accomplish the
fundamental purposes of achieving attainment with NAAQS's as
expeditiously as possible. [ Footnote 30 ] These conclusions were expressed Page 467 U. S. 859 in a proposed rulemaking in August, 1981, that was formally
promulgated in October. See id. at 50766. VII In this Court, respondents expressly reject the basic rationale
of the Court of Appeals' decision. That court viewed the statutory
definition of the term "source" as sufficiently flexible to cover
either a plantwide definition, a narrower definition covering each
unit within a plant, or a dual definition that could apply to both
the entire "bubble" and its components. It interpreted the policies
of the statute, however, to mandate the plantwide definition in
programs designed to maintain clean air and to forbid it in
programs designed to improve air quality. Respondents place a
fundamentally different construction on the statute. They contend
that the text of the Act requires the EPA to use a dual definition
-- if either a component of a plant, or the plant as a whole, emits
over 100 tons of pollutant, it is a major stationary source. They
thus contend that the EPA rules adopted in 1980, insofar as they
apply to the maintenance of the quality of clean air, as well as
the 1981 rules which apply to nonattainment areas, violate the
statute. [ Footnote 31 ] Statutory Language The definition of the term "stationary source" in § 111(a)(3)
refers to "any building, structure, facility, or installation"
which emits air pollution. See supra at 467 U. S. 846 .
This definition is applicable only to the NSPS program by the
express terms of the statute; the text of the statute does not make
this definition Page 467 U. S. 860 applicable to the permit program. Petitioners therefore maintain
that there is no statutory language even relevant to ascertaining
the meaning of stationary source in the permit program aside from §
302(j), which defines the term "major stationary source." See
supra at 467 U. S. 851 .
We disagree with petitioners on this point.

															The definition in § 302(j) tells us what the word "major" means
-- a source must emit at least 100 tons of pollution to qualify --
but it sheds virtually no light on the meaning of the term
"stationary source." It does equate a source with a facility -- a
"major emitting facility" and a "major stationary source" are
synonymous under § 302(j). The ordinary meaning of the term
"facility" is some collection of integrated elements which has been
designed and constructed to achieve some purpose. Moreover, it is
certainly no affront to common English usage to take a reference to
a major facility or a major source to connote an entire plant, as
opposed to its constituent parts. Basically, however, the language
of § 302(j) simply does not compel any given interpretation of the
term "source."

															Respondents recognize that, and hence point to § 111(a)(3).
Although the definition in that section is not literally applicable
to the permit program, it sheds as much light on the meaning of the
word "source" as anything in the statute. [ Footnote 32 ] As respondents point out, use of
the words "building, structure, facility, or installation," as the
definition of source, could be read to impose the permit conditions
on an individual building that is a part of a plant. [ Footnote 33 ] A "word may have a
character of its own not to be submerged by its association." Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.
S. 514 , 261 U. S.
519 Page 467 U. S. 861 (1923). On the other hand, the meaning of a word must be
ascertained in the context of achieving particular objectives, and
the words associated with it may indicate that the true meaning of
the series is to convey a common idea. The language may reasonably
be interpreted to impose the requirement on any discrete, but
integrated, operation which pollutes. This gives meaning to all of
the terms -- a single building, not part of a larger operation,
would be covered if it emits more than 100 tons of pollution, as
would any facility, structure, or installation. Indeed, the
language itself implies a "bubble concept" of sorts: each
enumerated item would seem to be treated as if it were encased in a
bubble. While respondents insist that each of these terms must be
given a discrete meaning, they also argue that § 111(a)(3) defines
"source" as that term is used in § 302(j). The latter section,
however, equates a source with a facility, whereas the former
defines "source" as a facility, among other items.

															We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text
of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress. [ Footnote 34 ] Page 467 U. S. 862 We know full well that this language is not dispositive; the
terms are overlapping, and the language is not precisely directed
to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context
of a larger operation. To the extent any congressional "intent" can
be discerned from this language, it would appear that the listing
of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather
than to confine, the scope of the agency's power to regulate
particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the
Act. Legislative History In addition, respondents argue that the legislative history and
policies of the Act foreclose the plantwide definition, and that
the EPA's interpretation is not entitled to deference, because it
represents a sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act.

															Based on our examination of the legislative history, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that it is unilluminating. The general
remarks pointed to by respondents "were obviously not made with
this narrow issue in mind, and they cannot be said to demonstrate a
Congressional desire. . . ." Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine
Workers, 325 U. S. 161 , 325 U. S.
168 -169 (1945). Respondents' argument based on the
legislative history relies heavily on Senator Muskie's observation
that a new source is subject to the LAER requirement. [ Footnote 35 ] But the full statement
is ambiguous, and, like the text of § 173 itself, this comment does
not tell us what a new source is, much less that it is to have an
inflexible definition. We find that the legislative history as a
whole is silent on the precise issue before us. It is, however,
consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion
in implementing the policies of the 1977 Amendments. Page 467 U. S. 863 More importantly, that history plainly identifies the policy
concerns that motivated the enactment; the plantwide definition is
fully consistent with one of those concerns -- the allowance of
reasonable economic growth -- and, whether or not we believe it
most effectively implements the other, we must recognize that the
EPA has advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion that
the regulations serve the environmental objectives as well. See
supra at 467 U. S.
857 -859, and n. 29; see also supra at 467 U. S. 855 ,
n. 27. Indeed, its reasoning is supported by the public record
developed in the rulemaking process, [ Footnote 36 ] as well as by certain private studies.
[ Footnote 37 ]

															Our review of the EPA's varying interpretations of the word
"source" -- both before and after the 1977 Amendments -- convinces
us that the agency primarily responsible for administering this
important legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly --
not in a sterile textual vacuum, but in the context of implementing
policy decisions in a technical and complex arena. The fact that
the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the
term "source" does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude
that no deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of
the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations Page 467 U. S. 864 and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. Moreover,
the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in
different contexts adds force to the argument that the definition
itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated
any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute.

															Significantly, it was not the agency in 1980, but rather the
Court of Appeals that read the statute inflexibly to command a
plantwide definition for programs designed to maintain clean air
and to forbid such a definition for programs designed to improve
air quality. The distinction the court drew may well be a sensible
one, but our labored review of the problem has surely disclosed
that it is not a distinction that Congress ever articulated itself,
or one that the EPA found in the statute before the courts began to
review the legislative work product. We conclude that it was the
Court of Appeals, rather than Congress or any of the decisionmakers
who are authorized by Congress to administer this legislation, that
was primarily responsible for the 1980 position taken by the
agency. Policy The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties'
briefs create the impression that respondents are now waging in a
judicial forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost
in the agency and in the 32 jurisdictions opting for the "bubble
concept," but one which was never waged in the Congress. Such
policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or
administrators, not to judges. [ Footnote 38 ] Page 467 U. S. 865 In these cases, the Administrator's interpretation represents a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests, and is
entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and
complex, [ Footnote 39 ] the
agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,
[ Footnote 40 ] and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies. [ Footnote 41 ] Congress intended to
accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level
of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this
level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question
at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition
on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to
take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.

															Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of
the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to
which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may,
within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices
-- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the Page 467 U. S. 866 agency charged with the administration of the statute in light
of everyday realities.

															When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In
such a case, federal judges -- who have no constituency -- have a
duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices
and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public
interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , 437 U. S. 195 (1978).

															We hold that the EPA's definition of the term "source" is a
permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate
progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth.

															"The Regulations which the Administrator has adopted provide
what the agency could allowably view as . . . [an] effective
reconciliation of these twofold ends. . . ." United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S.
383 .

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the decision of these
cases.

															* Together with No. 82-1247, American Iron & Steel
Institute et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et
al.; and No. 82-1591, Ruckelshaus, Administrator,
Environmental Protection. Agency v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same
court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 172(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6), provides:

															"The plan provisions required by subsection (a) shall -- "

															" * * * *" "(6) require permits for the construction and operation of new
or modified major stationary sources in accordance with section 173
(relating to permit requirements)."

															91 Stat. 747.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"(i) 'Stationary source' means any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant
subject to regulation under the Act."

															"(ii) 'Building, structure, facility, or installation' means all
of the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same
industrial grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or
adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person
(or persons under common control) except the activities of any
vessel."

															40 CFR §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i) and (ii) (1983).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															National Resources Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for a Better
Environment, Inc., and North Western Ohio Lung Association,
Inc.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Petitioners, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., American Iron and Steel
Institute, American Petroleum Institute, Chemical Manufacturers
Association, Inc., General Motors Corp., and Rubber Manufacturers
Association were granted leave to intervene and argue in support of
the regulation.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The court remarked in this regard:

															"We regret, of course, that Congress did not advert specifically
to the bubble concept's application to various Clean Air Act
programs, and note that a further clarifying statutory directive
would facilitate the work of the agency and of the court in their
endeavors to serve the legislators' will."

															222 U.S.App.D.C. at 276, n. 39, 685 F.2d at 726, n. 39.

															[ Footnote 6 ] Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 636
F.2d 323 (1979); ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 77,
578 F.2d 319 (1978).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Respondents argued below that EPA's plantwide definition of
"stationary source" is contrary to the terms, legislative history,
and purposes of the amended Clear Air Act. The court below rejected
respondents' arguments based on the language and legislative
history of the Act. It did agree with respondents contention that
the regulations were inconsistent with the purposes of the Act, but
did not adopt the construction of the statute advanced by
respondents here. Respondents rely on the arguments rejected by the
Court of Appeals in support of the judgment, and may rely on any
ground that finds support in the record. See Ryerson v. United
States, 312 U. S. 405 , 312 U. S. 408 (1941); LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.
S. 415 , 308 U. S. 421 (1940); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.
S. 531 , 282 U. S.
533 -539 (1931).

															[ Footnote 8 ] E.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.
S. 292 , 351 U. S. 297 (1956); J. E. Riley Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 311 U. S. 55 , 311 U. S. 59 (1940); Williams v.
Norris , 12 Wheat. 117, 25 U. S. 120 (1827); McClung v.
Silliman , 6 Wheat. 598, 19 U. S. 603 (1821).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction, and must reject administrative constructions which
are contrary to clear congressional intent. See, e.g., FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S.
27 , 454 U. S. 32 (1981); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103 , 436 U. S.
117 -118 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726 , 411 U. S.
745 -746 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261 , 390 U. S. 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278 , 380 U. S. 291 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.
S. 374 , 380 U. S. 385 (1965); Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.
S. 358 , 327 U. S. 369 (1946); Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S.
1 , 285 U. S. 16 (1932); Webster v. Luther, 163 U.
S. 331 , 163 U. S. 342 (1896). If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue, that intention is the law, and must be
given effect.

															[ Footnote 10 ] See generally R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law
174-175 (1921).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. FEC
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 39 ; Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.
S. 443 , 437 U. S. 450 (1978); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U. S. 60 , 421 U. S. 75 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 , 380 U. S. 16 (1965); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143 , 329 U. S. 153 (1946); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.
S. 477 , 256 U. S.
480 -481 (1921).

															[ Footnote 12 ] See, e.g., United States v. Morton, ante at 467 U. S. 834 ; Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S.
34 , 453 U. S. 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.
S. 416 , 432 U. S.
424 -426 (1977); American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. United States, 299 U. S. 232 , 299 U. S.
235 -237(1936).

															[ Footnote 13 ] E.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.
S. 139 , 450 U. S. 144 (1981); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. at 421 U. S.
87 .

															[ Footnote 14 ] Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util.
Dist., ante at 467 U. S. 389 ; Blum. v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132 , 457 U. S. 141 (1982); Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.
S. 246 , 427 U. S. 256 (1976); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.
S. 617 , 401 U. S.
626 -627 (1971); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v.
Aragon, 329 U.S. at 329 U. S.
153 -154; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 , 322 U. S. 131 (1944); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. at 256 U. S.
480 -481; Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. at 163 U. S. 342 ; Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568 , 113 U. S.
570 -571 (1885); United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760 , 95 U. S. 763 (1878); Edwards' Lessee v.
Darby , 12 Wheat. 206, 25 U. S. 210 (1827).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Primary standards were defined as those whose attainment and
maintenance were necessary to protect the public health, and
secondary standards were intended to specify a level of air quality
that would protect the public welfare.

															[ Footnote 16 ] See §§ 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(a)(4).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The Court of Appeals ultimately held that this plantwide
approach was prohibited by the 1970 Act, see ASARCO Inc., 188 U.S.App.D.C. at 83-84, 578 F.2d at 325-327. This decision was
rendered after enactment of the 1977 Amendments, and hence the
standard was in effect when Congress enacted the 1977
Amendments.

															[ Footnote 18 ] See Report of the National Commission on Air Quality,
To Breathe Clean Air, 3.3-20 through 3.3-33 (1981).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Comprehensive bills did pass both Chambers of Congress; the
Conference Report was rejected in the Senate. 122 Cong.Rec.
34375-34403, 34405-34418 (1976).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															For example, it stated:

															"Particularly with regard to the primary NAAQS's, Congress and
the Courts have made clear that economic considerations must be
subordinated to NAAQS achievement and maintenance. While the ruling
allows for some growth in areas violating a NAAQS if the net effect
is to insure further progress toward NAAQS achievement, the Act
does not allow economic growth to be accommodated at the expense of
the public health."

															41 Fed.Reg. 55527 (1976).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															In January, 1979, the EPA noted that the 1976 Ruling was
ambiguous concerning this issue:

															"A number of commenters indicated the need for a more explicit
definition of 'source.' Some readers found that it was unclear
under the 1976 Ruling whether a plant with a number of different
processes and emission points would be considered a single source.
The changes set forth below define a source as"

															"any structure, building, facility, equipment, installation, or
operation (or combination thereof) which is located on one or more
contiguous or adjacent properties and which is owned or operated by
the same person (or by persons under common control)."

															"This definition precludes a large plant from being separated
into individual production lines for purposes of determining
applicability of the offset requirements."

															44 Fed.Reg. 3276.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Specifically, the controversy in these cases involves the
meaning of the term "major stationary sources" in § 172(b)(6) of
the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 752(b)(6). The meaning of the term "proposed
source" in § 173(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2), is not at
issue.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Thus, among other requirements, § 172(b) provided that the SIP's
shall --

															"(3) require, in the interim, reasonable further progress (as
defined in section 171(1)) including such reduction in emissions
from existing sources in the area as may be obtained through the
adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably available control
technology;"

															"(4) include a comprehensive, accurate, current inventory of
actual emissions from all sources (as provided by rule of the
Administrator) of each such pollutant for each such area which is
revised and resubmitted as frequently as may be necessary to assure
that the requirements of paragraph (3) are met and to assess the
need for additional reductions to assure attainment of each
standard by the date required under paragraph (1);"

															"(5) expressly identify and quantify the emissions, if any, of
any such pollutant which will be allowed to result from the
construction and operation of major new or modified stationary
sources for each such area, . . ."

															" * * * *" "(8) contain emission limitations, schedules of compliance and
such other measures as may be necessary to meet the requirements of
this section."

															91 Stat. 747. Section 171(1) provided:

															"(1) The term 'reasonable further progress' means annual
incremental reductions in emissions of the applicable air pollutant
(including substantial reductions in the early years following
approval or promulgation of plan provisions under this part and
section 110(a)(2)(1) and regular reductions thereafter) which are
sufficient in the judgment of the Administrator, to provide for
attainment of the applicable national ambient air quality standard
by the date required in section 172(a)." Id. at 746.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															Section 171(3) provides:

															"(3) The term 'lowest achievable emission rate' means for any
source, that rate of emissions which reflects -- "

															"(A) the most stringent emission limitation which is contained
in the implementation plan of any State for such class or category
of source, unless the owner or operator of the proposed source
demonstrates that such limitations are not achievable, or"

															"(B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in
practice by such class or category of source, whichever is more
stringent."

															"In no event shall the application of this term permit a
proposed new or modified source to emit any pollutant in excess of
the amount allowable under applicable new source standards of
performance."

															The LAER requirement is defined in terms that make it even more
stringent than the applicable new source performance standard
developed under § 111 of the Act, as amended by the 1970
statute.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															During the floor debates, Congressman Waxman remarked that the
legislation struck

															"a proper balance between environmental controls and economic
growth in the dirty air areas of America. . . . There is no other
single issue which more clearly poses the conflict between
pollution control and new jobs. We have determined that neither
need be compromised. . . ."

															"This is a fair and balanced approach, which will not undermine
our economic vitality, or impede achievement of our ultimate
environmental objectives."

															123 Cong.Rec. 27076 (1977).

															The second "main purpose" of the provision -- allowing the
States "greater flexibility" than the EPA's interpretative Ruling
-- as well as the reference to the EPA's authority to amend its
Ruling in accordance with the intent of the section, is entirely
consistent with the view that Congress did not intend to freeze the
definition of "source" contained in the existing regulation into a
rigid statutory requirement.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															In the same Ruling, the EPA added:

															"The above exemption is permitted under the SIP because, to be
approved under Part D, plan revisions due by January, 1979, must
contain adopted measures assuring that reasonable further progress
will be made. Furthermore, in most circumstances, the measures
adopted by January, 1979, must be sufficient to actually provide
for attainment of the standards by the dates required under the
Act, and in all circumstances measures adopted by 1982 must provide
for attainment. See Section 172 of the Act and 43 F R
21673-21677 (May 19, 1978). Also, Congress intended under Section
173 of the Act that States would have some latitude to depart from
the strict requirements of this Ruling when the State plan is
revised and is being carried out in accordance with Part D. Under a
Part D plan, therefore, there is less need to subject a
modification of an existing facility to LAER and other stringent
requirements if the modification is accompanied by sufficient
intrasource offsets so that there is no net increase in
emissions."

															44 Fed.Reg. 3277 (1979).

															[ Footnote 27 ] Id. at 51926. Later in that Ruling, the EPA added:

															"However, EPA believes that complete Part D SIPs, which contain
adopted and enforceable requirements sufficient to assure
attainment, may apply the approach proposed above for PSD, with
plant-wide review but no review of individual pieces of equipment.
Use of only a plant-wide definition of source will permit
plant-wide offsets for avoiding NSR of new or modified pieces of
equipment. However, this is only appropriate once a SIP is adopted
that will assure the reductions in existing emissions necessary for
attainment. See 44 FR 3276 col. 3 (January 16, 1979). If
the level of emissions allowed in the SIP is low enough to assure
reasonable further progress and attainment, new construction or
modifications with enough offset credit to prevent an emission
increase should not jeopardize attainment." Id. at 51933.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															In its explanation of why the use of the "bubble concept" was
especially appropriate in preventing significant deterioration
(PSD) in clean air areas, the EPA stated:

															"In addition, application of the bubble on a plant-wide basis
encourages voluntary upgrading of equipment, and growth in
productive capacity." Id. at 51932.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															"The dual definition also is consistent with Alabama
Power and ASARCO. Alabama Power held that
EPA had broad discretion to define the constituent terms of
'source' so as best to effectuate the purposes of the statute.
Different definitions of 'source' can therefore be used for
different sections of the statute. . . ."

															"Moreover, Alabama Power and ASARCO, taken
together, suggest that there is a distinction between Clean Air Act
programs designed to enhance air quality and those designed only to
maintain air quality. . . ."

															" * * * *" "Promulgation of the dual definition follows the mandate of Alabama Power, which held that, while EPA could not define
'source' as a combination of sources, EPA had broad discretion to
define 'building,' 'structure,' 'facility,' and 'installation' so
as to best accomplish the purposes of the Act."

															45 Fed.Reg. 52697 (1980).

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															It stated:

															"5. States will remain subject to the requirement that for all
nonattainment areas they demonstrate attainment of NAAQS as
expeditiously as practicable and show reasonable further progress
toward such attainment. Thus, the proposed change in the mandatory
scope of nonattainment new source review should not interfere with
the fundamental purpose of Part D of the Act."

															"6. New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) will continue to
apply to many new or modified facilities and will assure use of the
most up-to-date pollution control techniques regardless of the
applicability of nonattainment area new source review."

															"7. In order to avoid nonattainment area new source review, a
major plant undergoing modification must show that it will not
experience a significant net increase in emissions. Where overall
emissions increase significantly, review will continue to be
required."

															46 Fed.Reg. 16281 (1981).

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															"What EPA may not do, however, is define all four terms to mean only plants. In the 1980 PSD rules, EPA did just that. EPA
compounded the mistake in the 1981 rules here under review, in
which it abandoned the dual definition."

															Brief for Respondents 29, n. 56.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															We note that the EPA in fact adopted the language of that
definition in its regulations under the permit program. 40 CFR §§
51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983).

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															Since the regulations give the States the option to define an
individual unit as a source, see 40 CFR § 51.18(j)(1)
(1983), petitioners do not dispute that the terms can be read as
respondents suggest.

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															The argument based on the text of § 173, which defines the
permit requirements for nonattainment areas, is a classic example
of circular reasoning. One of the permit requirements is that "the
proposed source is required to comply with the lowest achievable
emission rate" (LAER). Although a State may submit a revised SIP
that provides for the waiver of another requirement -- the "offset
condition" -- the SIP may not provide for a waiver of the LAER
condition for any proposed source. Respondents argue that the
plantwide definition of the term "source" makes it unnecessary for
newly constructed units within the plant to satisfy the LAER
requirement if their emissions are offset by the reductions
achieved by the retirement of older equipment. Thus, according to
respondents, the plantwide definition allows what the statute
explicitly prohibits -- the waiver of the LAER requirement for the
newly constructed units. But this argument proves nothing, because
the statute does not prohibit the waiver unless the proposed new
unit is indeed subject to the permit program. If it is not, the
statute does not impose the LAER requirement at all, and there is
no need to reach any waiver question. In other words, § 173 of the
statute merely deals with the consequences of the definition of the
term "source," and does not define the term.

															[ Footnote 35 ] See supra at 467 U. S. 853 .
We note that Senator Muskie as not critical of the EPA's use of the
"bubble concept" in one NSPS program prior to the 1977 amendments. See ibid. [ Footnote 36 ] See, for example, the statement of the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation, pointing out that denying
a source owner flexibility in selecting options made it "simpler
and cheaper to operate old, more polluting sources than to trade
up. . . ." App. 128-129.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															"Economists have proposed that economic incentives be
substituted for the cumbersome administrative-legal framework. The
objective is to make the profit and cost incentives that work so
well in the marketplace work for pollution control. . . . [The
'bubble' or 'netting' concept] is a first attempt in this
direction. By giving a plant manager flexibility to find the places
and processes within a plant that control emissions most cheaply,
pollution control can be achieved more quickly and cheaply."

															L. Lave & G. Omenn, Cleaning the Air: Reforming the Clean
Air Act 28 (1981) (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															Respondents point out if a brand new factory that will emit over
100 tons of pollutants is constructed in a nonattainment area, that
plant must obtain a permit pursuant to § 172(b)(6), and, in order
to do so, it must satisfy the § 173 conditions, including the LAER
requirement. Respondents argue if an old plant containing several
large emitting units is to be modernized by the replacement of one
or more units emitting over 100 tons of pollutant with a new unit
emitting less -- but still more than 100 tons -- the result should
be no different simply because "it happens to be built not at a new
site, but within a preexisting plant. " Brief for
Respondents 4.

															[ Footnote 39 ] See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln
Peoples' Util. Dist., ante at 467 U. S.
390 .

															[ Footnote 40 ] See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 117 ; Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.
S. 275 , 434 U. S. 287 ,
n. 5 (1978); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.
S. 134 , 323 U. S. 140 (1944).

															[ Footnote 41 ] See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, ante at 467 U. S.
699 -700; United States v. Shimer, 367 U.
S. 374 , 367 U. S. 382 (1961).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC (1984):

The case centers around the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) implementation of these amendments. The specific issue is the definition of the term "stationary source" in the context of air pollution permits for "new or modified major stationary sources" of air pollution in states that have not met national air quality standards ("nonattainment" states).

The Supreme Court upheld the EPA's plantwide definition of "stationary source," which allowed existing plants to modify or install one piece of equipment without meeting permit conditions as long as total emissions from the plant did not increase.

The Court's decision rested on the principle that when Congress has not directly addressed an issue in a statute, the responsibility falls to the administrative agency (in this case, the EPA) to fill in the statutory gap with a reasonable interpretation. The Court found that Congress had not specifically addressed the "bubble concept" (the idea of treating all pollution-emitting devices within an industrial grouping as a single source) in the Clean Air Act Amendments. Therefore, the EPA's plantwide definition was a permissible construction of the statute.

This case established the "Chevron deference," a two-step framework for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes, which gives significant discretion to administrative agencies in interpreting ambiguous statutes.