U.S. Supreme Court Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38 (1985) Wallace v. Jaffree No. 83-812 Argued December 4,
1984 Decided June 4, 1985 472 U.S.
38 ast|>* 472 U.S.
38 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE `ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In proceedings instituted in Federal District Court, appellees
challenged the constitutionality of, inter alia, a 1981
Alabama Statute (§ 16-1-20.1) authorizing a 1-minute period of
silence in all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer."
Although finding that § 16-1-20.1 was an effort to encourage a
religious activity, the District Court ultimately held that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not prohibit a
State from establishing a religion. The Court of Appeals
reversed. Held: Section 16-1-20.1 is a law respecting the
establishment of religion, and thus violates the First Amendment.
Pp. 472 U. S.
48 -61.

															(a) The proposition that the several States have no greater
power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First
Amendment than does Congress is firmly embedded in constitutional
jurisprudence. The First Amendment was adopted to curtail Congress'
power to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to
worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of
his own conscience, and the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the same
substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate. The
individual's freedom to choose his own creed is the counterpart of
his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority. Moreover, the individual freedom of conscience protected
by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious
faith or none at all. Pp. 472 U. S.
48 -55.

															(b) One of the well-established criteria for determining the
constitutionality of a statute under the Establishment Clause is
that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose. Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613. The First Amendment requires that a statute
must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion. Pp. 472 U. S.
55 -56.

															(c) The record here not only establishes that § 16-1-20.1's
purpose was to endorse religion, it also reveals that the enactment
of the statute was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose. In
particular, the statements of § 16-120.1's sponsor in the
legislative record and in his Page 472 U. S. 39 testimony before the District Court indicate that the
legislation was solely an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to
the public schools. Moreover, such unrebutted evidence of
legislative intent is confirmed by a consideration of the
relationship between § 16-1-20.1 and two other Alabama statutes --
one of which, enacted in 1982 as a sequel to § 16-1-20.1,
authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a prescribed
prayer, and the other of which, enacted in 1978 as § 16-1-20. l's
predecessor, authorized a period of silence "for meditation" only.
The State's endorsement, by enactment of § 16-1-20.1, of prayer
activities at the beginning of each schoolday is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion. Pp. 472 U. S.
56 -61.

															705 F.2d 1526 and 713 F.2d 614, affirmed.

															STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 472 U. S. 62 .
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 472 U. S. 67 .
BURGER, C.J., post, p. 472 U. S. 84 ,
WHITE, J., post, p. 472 U. S. 90 ,
and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 472 U. S. 91 ,
filed dissenting opinions. Page 472 U. S. 40 JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															At an early stage of this litigation, the constitutionality of
three Alabama statutes was questioned: (1) § 16-1-20, enacted in
1978, which authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all public
schools "for meditation"; [ Footnote
1 ] (2) § 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1981, which authorized a period
of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer"; [ Footnote 2 ] and (3) § 16-1-20.2, enacted in
1982, which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a
prescribed prayer to "Almighty God . . . the Creator and Supreme
Judge of the world." [ Footnote
3 ] Page 472 U. S. 41 At the preliminary injunction stage of this case, the District
Court distinguished § 16-1-20 from the other two statutes. It then
held that there was "nothing wrong" with § 16-1-20, [ Footnote 4 ] but that §§ 16-1-20.1 and
16-1-20.2 were both invalid because the sole purpose of both was
"an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a
religious activity." [ Footnote
5 ] After the trial on the merits, the District Court did not
change its interpretation of these two statutes, but held that they
were constitutional because, in its opinion, Alabama has the power
to establish a state religion if it chooses to do so. [ Footnote 6 ]

															The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's initial
interpretation of the purpose of both § 16-1-20.1 and § 16-1-20.2,
and held them both unconstitutional. [ Footnote 7 ] We have already affirmed the Court of Appeals'
holding with respect to § 16-1-20.2. [ Footnote 8 ] Moreover, appellees have not questioned the
holding that § 16-1-20 is valid. [ Footnote 9 ] Thus, the narrow question for decision is
whether § 16-1-20.1, which authorizes a period of silence for
"meditation or voluntary prayer," is a Page 472 U. S. 42 law respecting the establishment of religion within the meaning
of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 10 ] I Appellee Ishmael Jaffree is a resident of Mobile County,
Alabama. On May 28, 1982, he filed a complaint on behalf of three
of his minor children; two of them were second-grade students and
the third was then in kindergarten. The complaint named members of
the Mobile County School Board, various school officials, and the
minor plaintiffs' three teachers as defendants. [ Footnote 11 ] The complaint alleged that the
appellees brought the action

															"seeking principally a declaratory judgment and an injunction
restraining the Defendants and each of them from maintaining or
allowing the maintenance of regular religious prayer services or
other forms of religious observances in the Mobile County Public
Schools in violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to
states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. [ Footnote
12 ]"

															The complaint further alleged that two of the children had been
subjected to various acts of religious indoctrination "from the
beginning of the school year in September, 1981"; [ Footnote 13 ] that the defendant teachers
had "on a daily basis" led their classes in saying certain prayers
in unison; [ Footnote 14 ]
that the minor children were exposed to ostracism from their peer
group class members if they did not participate; [ Footnote 15 ] and that Ishmael Jaffree had
repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the devotional
services be stopped. The original complaint made no reference to
any Alabama statute. Page 472 U. S. 43 On June 4, 1982, appellees filed an amended complaint seeking
class certification, [ Footnote
16 ] and on June 30, 1982, they filed a second amended complaint
naming the Governor of Alabama and various state officials as
additional defendants. In that amendment, the appellees challenged
the constitutionality of three Alabama statutes: §§ 16-1-20,
16-1-20.1, and 16-l-20.2. [ Footnote 17 ]

															On August 2, 1982, the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing on appellees' motion for a preliminary injunction. At that
hearing, State Senator Donald G. Holmes testified that he was the
"prime sponsor" of the bill that was enacted in 1981 as §
16-l-20.1. [ Footnote 18 ] He
explained that the bill was an "effort to return voluntary prayer
to our public schools . . . it is a beginning and a step in the
right direction." [ Footnote
19 ] Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public
school, Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had "no
other purpose in mind." [ Footnote 20 ] A week after the hearing, the District Court
entered a preliminary injunction. [ Footnote 21 ] The court held that appellees were likely to
prevail on the merits because the enactment of §§ 16-1-20.1 and
16-1-20.2 did not reflect a clearly secular purpose. [ Footnote 22 ] Page 472 U. S. 44 In November 1982, the District Court held a 4-day trial on the
merits. The evidence related primarily to the 1981-1982 academic
year -- the year after the enactment of § 16-120.1 and prior to the
enactment of § 16-1-20.2. The District Court found that, during
that academic year, each of the minor plaintiffs' teachers had led
classes in prayer activities, even after being informed of
appellees' objections to these activities. [ Footnote 23 ]

															In its lengthy conclusions of law, the District Court reviewed a
number of opinions of this Court interpreting the Page 472 U. S. 45 Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and then embarked
on a fresh examination of the question whether the First Amendment
imposes any barrier to the establishment of an official religion by
the State of Alabama. After reviewing at length what it perceived
to be newly discovered historical evidence, the District Court
concluded that

															"the establishment clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution does not prohibit the state from establishing a
religion. [ Footnote 24 ]"

															In a separate opinion, the District Court dismissed appellees'
challenge to the three Alabama statutes because of a failure to
state any claim for which relief could be granted. The court's
dismissal of this challenge was also based on its conclusion that
the Establishment Clause did not bar the States from establishing a
religion. [ Footnote 25 ] Page 472 U. S. 46 The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases; not
surprisingly, it reversed. The Court of Appeals noted that this
Court had considered and had rejected the historical arguments Page 472 U. S. 47 that the District Court found persuasive, and that the District
Court had misapplied the doctrine of stare decisis. [ Footnote 26 ] The Court of
Appeals then held that the teachers' religious activities violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 27 ] With respect to § 16-1-20.1
and § 16-1-20.2, the Court of Appeals stated that "both statutes
advance and encourage religious activities." [ Footnote 28 ] The Court of Appeals then quoted
with approval the District Court's finding that § 161-20.1, and §
16-1-20.2, were efforts

															"'to encourage a religious activity. Even though these statutes
are permissive in form, it is nevertheless state involvement
respecting an establishment of religion.' [ Footnote 29 ]"

															Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that both statutes were
"specifically the type which the Supreme Court addressed in Engel [v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962)]." [ Footnote 30 ] Page 472 U. S. 48 A suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent
of four judges who expressed the opinion that the full court should
reconsider the panel decision insofar as it held § 16-1-20.1
unconstitutional. [ Footnote
31 ] When this Court noted probable jurisdiction, it limited
argument to the question that those four judges thought worthy of
reconsideration. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect
to the other issues presented by the appeals was affirmed. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U. S. 924 (1984). II Our unanimous affirmance of the Court of Appeals' judgment
concerning § 16-1-20.2 makes it unnecessary to comment at length on
the District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal
Constitution imposes no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a
state religion. Before analyzing the precise issue that is
presented to us, it is nevertheless appropriate to recall how
firmly embedded in our constitutional jurisprudence is the
proposition that the several States have no greater power to
restrain the individual freedoms Page 472 U. S. 49 protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the
United States.

															As is plain from its text, the First Amendment was adopted to
curtail the power of Congress to interfere with the individual's
freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in
accordance with the dictates of his own conscience. [ Footnote 32 ] Until the Fourteenth Amendment
was added to the Constitution, the First Amendment's restraints on
the exercise of federal power simply did not apply to the States.
[ Footnote 33 ] But when the
Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any
person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment
imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to
legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the
Congress' power. This Court has confirmed and endorsed this
elementary proposition of law time and time again. [ Footnote 34 ] Page 472 U. S. 50 Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 303
(1940), Justice Roberts explained:

															". . . We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the
appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of
law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The
constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion
has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion." Cantwell, of course, is but one case in which the Court
has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the
central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First
Amendment. [ Footnote 35 ]
Enlarging on this theme, THE CHIEF JUSTICE recently wrote: Page 472 U. S. 51 "We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S.
624 , 319 U. S. 633 -634 (1943); id. at 319 U. S. 645 (Murphy, J.,
concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize
religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' Id. at 319 U. S. 637 ."

															" * * * *" "The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state
statute which required public school students to participate in
daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words and
traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S.
586 (1940), the Court held that"

															"a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political
attitude may [not] be imposed upon the individual by official
authority under powers committed to any political organization
under our Constitution."

															"319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 636 . Compelling
the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious
infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of
carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is
essentially one of degree. Here, as in Barnette, we are
faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of
his daily life -- indeed constantly while his automobile is in
public view -- to be an Page 472 U. S. 52 instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological
point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State"

															"invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control."

															" Id. at 319 U. S. 642 ." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , 430 U. S.
714 -715 (1977).

															Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of a broader concept of
individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom to
choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to refrain
from accepting the creed established by the majority. At one time,
it was thought that this right merely proscribed the preference of
one Christian sect over another, but would not require equal
respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the
adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.
[ Footnote 36 ] But when the
underlying principle has been examined in the crucible of
litigation, the Page 472 U. S. 53 Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to
select any religious faith or none at all. [ Footnote 37 ] This conclusion derives support not
only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of
conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs
worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by
the faithful, [ Footnote
38 ] Page 472 U. S. 54 and from recognition of the fact that the political interest in
forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance among Christian
sects -- or even intolerance among "religions" -- to encompass
intolerance of the disbeliever and the uncertain. [ Footnote 39 ] Page 472 U. S. 55 As Justice Jackson eloquently stated in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S. 642 (1943):

															"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."

															The State of Alabama, no less than the Congress of the United
States, must respect that basic truth. III When the Court has been called upon to construe the breadth of
the Establishment Clause, it has examined the criteria developed
over a period of many years. Thus, in Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971), we wrote:

															"Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S.
236 , 396 U. S. 243 (1968);
finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive Page 472 U. S. 56 government entanglement with religion.' Walz [v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S.
674 (1970)]."

															It is the first of these three criteria that is most plainly
implicated by this case. As the District Court correctly
recognized, no consideration of the second or third criteria is
necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular purpose.
[ Footnote 40 ] For even
though a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose
may satisfy the first criterion, see, e.g., Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S.
296 -303 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), the First
Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion. [ Footnote 41 ]

															In applying the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask "whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion." [ Footnote 42 ] In
this case, the answer to that question is dispositive. For the
record not only provides us with an unambiguous affirmative answer,
but it also reveals that the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was not
motivated by any clearly secular purpose indeed, the statute had no secular purpose. IV The sponsor of the bill that became § 16-1-20.1, Senator Donald
Holmes, inserted into the legislative record -- apparently Page 472 U. S. 57 without dissent -- a statement indicating that the legislation
was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools.
[ Footnote 43 ] Later Senator
Holmes confirmed this purpose before the District Court. In
response to the question whether he had any purpose for the
legislation other than returning voluntary prayer to public
schools, he stated: "No, I did not have no other purpose in mind."
[ Footnote 44 ] The State did
not present evidence of any secular purpose. [ Footnote 45 ] Page 472 U. S. 58 The unrebutted evidence of legislative intent contained in the
legislative record and in the testimony of the sponsor of §
16-1-20.1 is confirmed by a consideration of the relationship
between this statute and the two other measures that were
considered in this case. The District Court found that the 1981
statute and its 1982 sequel had a common, nonsecular purpose. The
wholly religious character of the later enactment is plainly
evident from its text. When the differences between § 16-1-20.1 and
its 1978 predecessor, § 16-1-20, are examined, it is equally clear
that the 1981 statute has the same wholly religious character.

															There are only three textual differences between § 161-20.1 and
§ 16-1-20: (1) the earlier statute applies only to grades one
through six, whereas § 16-1-20.1 applies to all grades; (2) the
earlier statute uses the word "shall" whereas § 16-1-20.1 uses the
word "may"; (3) the earlier statute refers Page 472 U. S. 59 only to "meditation" whereas § 16-1-20.1 refers to "meditation
or voluntary prayer." The first difference is of no relevance in
this litigation, because the minor appellees were in kindergarten
or second grade during the 1981-1982 academic year. The second
difference would also have no impact on this litigation, because
the mandatory language of § 16-1-20 continued to apply to grades
one through six. [ Footnote
46 ] Thus, the only significant textual difference is the
addition of the words "or voluntary prayer."

															The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools
is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every
student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate
moment of silence during the schoolday. The 1978 statute already
protected that right, containing nothing that prevented any student
from engaging in voluntary prayer during a silent minute of
meditation. [ Footnote 47 ]
Appellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not
fully served by § 16-1-20 before the enactment of § 16-1-20.1.
Thus, only two conclusions are consistent with the text of §
16-1-20.1: (1) the statute was enacted to convey a message of state
endorsement and promotion of prayer; or (2) the statute was enacted
for no purpose. No one suggests that the statute was nothing but a
meaningless or irrational act. [ Footnote 48 ]

															We must, therefore, conclude that the Alabama Legislature
intended to change existing law, [ Footnote 49 ] and that it was motivated Page 472 U. S. 60 by the same purpose that the Governor's answer to the second
amended complaint expressly admitted; that the statement inserted
in the legislative history revealed; and that Senator Holmes'
testimony frankly described. The legislature enacted § 16-1-20.1,
despite the existence of § 161-20, for the sole purpose of
expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one
minute at the beginning of each schoolday. The addition of "or
voluntary prayer" indicates that the State intended to characterize
prayer as a favored practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent
with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion. [ Footnote 50 ]

															The importance of that principle does not permit us to treat
this as an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a few
words of symbolic speech on behalf of the political majority.
[ Footnote 51 ] For whenever
the State itself speaks on a religious Page 472 U. S. 61 subject, one of the questions that we must ask is "whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion." [ Footnote 52 ] The well-supported concurrent findings of
the District Court and the Court of Appeals -- that § 16-1-20.1 was
intended to convey a message of state approval of prayer activities
in the public schools -- make it unnecessary, and indeed
inappropriate, to evaluate the practical significance of the
addition of the words "or voluntary prayer" to the statute. Keeping
in mind, as we must,

															"both the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in
our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which
Establishment Clause values can be eroded, [ Footnote 53 ]"

															we conclude that § 16-1-20.1 violates the First Amendment.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Page 472 U. S. 62 * Together with No. 83-929, Smith et al. v. Jaffree et
al., also on appeal from the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Alabama Code § 16-1-20 (Supp.1984) reads as follows:

															"At the commencement of the first class each day in the first
through the sixth grades in all public schools, the teacher in
charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce
that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in duration,
shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period
silence shall be maintained and no activities engaged in."

															Appellees have abandoned any claim that § 16-120 is
unconstitutional. See Brief for Appellees 2.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Alabama Code § 16-120.1 (Supp.1984) provides:

															"At the commencement of the first class of each day in all
grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in
which each class is held may announce that a period of silence not
to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation
or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities
shall be engaged in."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Alabama Code § 16-120.2 (Supp.1984) provides:

															"From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public
educational institution within the state of Alabama, recognizing
that the Lord God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any
class, may pray, may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead
the willing students in the following prayer to God:"

															"Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the
Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your
truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our
countrymen, in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity of
our homes and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our
Lord. Amen."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The court stated that it did not find any potential infirmity in
§ 16-1-20 because

															"it is a statute which prescribes nothing more than a child in
school shall have the right to meditate in silence and there is
nothing wrong with a little meditation and quietness." Jaffree v. James, 544 F.
Supp. 727 , 732 (SD Ala. 1982).

															[ Footnote 5 ] Ibid. [ Footnote 6 ] Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 554
F. Supp. 1104 , 1128 (SD Ala. 1983).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															705 F.2d 1526, 1535-1536 (CA11 1983).

															[ Footnote 8 ] Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U. S. 924 (1984).

															[ Footnote 9 ] See n 1, supra. [ Footnote 10 ]

															The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, of course, has
long been held applicable to the State. Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 15 -16
(1947).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															App. 4-7.

															[ Footnote 12 ] Id. at 4.

															[ Footnote 13 ] Id. at 7.

															[ Footnote 14 ] Ibid. [ Footnote 15 ] Id. at 8-9.

															[ Footnote 16 ] Id. at 17.

															[ Footnote 17 ] Id. at 21. See nn. 1 2 and 3 supra. [ Footnote 18 ]

															App. 47-49.

															[ Footnote 19 ] Id. at 50.

															[ Footnote 20 ] Id. at 52

															[ Footnote 21 ] Jaffree v. James, 544 F.
Supp. 727 (SD Ala.1982).

															[ Footnote 22 ] See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971). Insofar as relevant to the issue now
before us, the District Court explained:

															"The injury to plaintiffs from the possible establishment of a
religion by the State of Alabama contrary to the proscription of
the establishment clause outweighs any indirect harm which may
occur to defendants as a result of an injunction. Granting an
injunction will merely maintain the status quo existing
prior to the enactment of the statutes."

															" * * * *" "The purpose of Senate Bill 8 [§ 16-1-20.2] as evidenced by its
preamble, is to provide for a prayer that may be given in public
schools. Senator Holmes testified that his purpose in sponsoring §
16-1-20.1 was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. He
intended to provide children the opportunity of sharing in their
spiritual heritage of Alabama and of this country. See Alabama Senate Journal 921 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has explained
that 'prayer is a primary religious activity in itself. . . .' Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.1981). The
state may not employ a religious means in its public schools. Abington School District v.
Schempp , [ 374 U.S.
203 , 374 U. S. 224 ] (1963). Since
these statutes do not reflect a clearly secular purpose, no
consideration of the remaining two parts of the Lemon test is
necessary."

															"The enactment of Senate Bill 8 [§ 16-1-20.2] and § 16-1-20.1 is
an effort on the part of the State of Alabama to encourage a
religious activity. Even though these statutes are permissive in
form, it is nevertheless state involvement respecting an
establishment of religion. Engel v. Vitale , [ 370 U.S.
421 , 370 U. S. 430 ] (1962). Thus,
binding precedent which this Court is under a duty to follow
indicates the substantial likelihood plaintiffs will prevail on the
merits."

															544 F. Supp. at 730-732.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															The District Court wrote:

															"Defendant Boyd, as early as September 16, 1981, led her class
at E. R. Dickson in singing the following phrase:"

															"God is great, God is good,"

															"Let us thank him for our food,"

															"bow our heads we all are fed,"

															"Give us Lord our daily bread."

															"Amen!"

															"The recitation of this phrase continued on a daily basis
throughout the 1981-82 school year."

															" * * * *" "Defendant Pixie Alexander has led her class at Craighead in
reciting the following phrase:"

															"God is great, God is good,"

															"Let us thank him for our food."

															"Further, defendant Pixie Alexander had her class recite the
following, which is known as the Lord's Prayer:"

															" Our Father, which are in heaven, hallowed be Thy name. Thy
kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. Give us
this day our daily bread and forgive us our debts as we forgive our
debtors. And lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil
for thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever.
Amen."

															"The recitation of these phrases continued on a daily basis
throughout the 1981-82 school year."

															" * * * *" "Ms. Green admitted that she frequently leads her class in
singing the following song:"

															" For health and strength and daily food, we praise Thy name, Oh
Lord."

															"This activity continued throughout the school year, despite the
fact that Ms. Green had knowledge that plaintiff did not want his
child exposed to the above-mentioned song." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. at 1107-1108.

															[ Footnote 24 ] Id. at 1128.

															[ Footnote 25 ] Jaffree v. James, 554 F.
Supp. 1130 , 1132 (SD Ala.1983). The District Court's opinion
was announced on January 14, 1983. On February 11, 1983, JUSTICE
POWELL, in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh
Circuit, entered a stay which in effect prevented the District
Court from dissolving the preliminary injunction that had been
entered in August, 1982. JUSTICE POWELL accurately summarized the
prior proceedings:

															"The situation, quite briefly, is as follows: beginning in the
fall of 1981, teachers in the minor applicants' schools conducted
prayers in their regular classes, including group recitations of
the Lord's Prayer. At the time, an Alabama statute provided for a
one-minute period of silence 'for meditation or voluntary prayer'
at the commencement of each day's classes in the public elementary
schools. Ala.Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1982). In 1982, Alabama enacted
a statute permitting public school teachers to lead their classes
in prayer. 1982 Ala. Acts 735."

															"Applicants, objecting to prayer in the public schools, filed
suit to enjoin the activities. They later amended their complaint
to challenge the applicable state statutes. After a hearing, the
District Court granted a preliminary injunction. Jaffree v.
James, 544 F.
Supp. 727 (1982). It recognized that it was bound by the
decisions of this Court, id. at 731, and that, under those
decisions, it was 'obligated to enjoin the enforcement' of the
statutes, id. at 733."

															"In its subsequent decision on the merits, however, the District
Court reached a different conclusion. Jaffree v. Board of
School Commissioners of Mobile County, 554 F.
Supp. 1104 (1983). It again recognized that the prayers at
issue, given in public school classes and led by teachers, were
violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as
that Clause had been construed by this Court. The District Court
nevertheless ruled 'that the United States Supreme Court has
erred.' Id. at 1128. It therefore dismissed the complaint
and dissolved the injunction."

															"There can be little doubt that the District Court was correct
in finding that conducting prayers as part of a school program is
unconstitutional under this Court's decisions. In Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the Court
held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits a
State from authorizing prayer in the public schools. The following
Term, in Murray v. Curlett, decided with Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), the Court
explicitly invalidated a school district's rule providing for the
reading of the Lord's Prayer as part of a school's opening
exercises, despite the fact that participation in those exercises
was voluntary."

															"Unless and until this Court reconsiders the foregoing
decisions, they appear to control this case. In my view, the
District Court was obligated to follow them." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 459 U. S. 1314 , 459 U. S.
1315 -1316 (1983).

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															The Court of Appeals wrote:

															"The stare decisis doctrine and its exceptions do not
apply where a lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of a
higher court. See 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 183 (1965)."

															"Federal district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere
to the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Hutto v.
Davis , [ 454 U.S.
370 , 454 U. S. 375 ] (1982). . . .
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of precedent when he
observed that,"

															"unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial
system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower
federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts
may think it to be."

															" Davis, [454 U.S. at 454 U. S.
375 ]. See also Thurston Motor Line, Inc. v. Jordan K.
Rand, Ltd. , [ 460 U.S.
533 , 460 U. S. 535 ] (1983) (the
Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, recently stated: 'Needless
to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents')."

															705 F.2d at 1532.

															[ Footnote 27 ] Id. at 1533-1534. This Court has denied a petition for
a writ of certiorari that presented the question whether the
Establishment Clause prohibited the teachers' religious prayer
activities. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County v.
Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926 (1984).

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															705 F.2d at 1535.

															[ Footnote 29 ] Ibid. [ Footnote 30 ] Ibid. After noting that the invalidity of § 16-1-20.2
was aggravated by "the existence of a government-composed prayer,"
and that the proponents of the legislation admitted that that
section "amounts to the establishment of a state religion," the
court added this comment on § 16-1-20.1:

															"The objective of the meditation or prayer statute (Ala.Code §
16-120.1) was also the advancement of religion. This fact was
recognized by the district court at the hearing for preliminary
relief where it was established that the intent of the statute was
to return prayer to the public schools. James, 544 F.
Supp. at 731. The existence of this fact and the inclusion of
prayer obviously involves the state in religious activities. Beck v. McElrath, 548 F.
Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn.1982). This demonstrates a lack of secular
legislative purpose on the part of the Alabama Legislature.
Additionally, the statute has the primary effect of advancing
religion. We do not imply that simple meditation or silence is
barred from the public schools; we hold that the state cannot
participate in the advancement of religious activities through any
guise, including teacher-led meditation. It is not the activity
itself that concerns us; it is the purpose of the activity that we
shall scrutinize. Thus, the existence of these elements require
that we also hold section 16-1-20.1 in violation of the
establishment clause." Id. at 1535-1536.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															713 F.2d 614 (CA11 1983) (per curiam).

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															The First Amendment provides:

															"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances."

															[ Footnote 33 ] See Permoli v. Municipality No. 1
of the City of New Orleans , 3 How. 589, 44 U. S. 609 (1845).

															[ Footnote 34 ] See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.
S. 705 , 430 U. S. 714 (1977) (right to refuse endorsement of an offensive state motto); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 , 337 U. S. 4 (1949)
(right to free speech); West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S.
637 -638 (1943) (right to refuse to participate in a
ceremony that offends one's conscience); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940) (right to proselytize one's religious faith); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496 , 307 U. S. 519 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (right to assemble peaceably); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.
S. 697 , 283 U. S. 707 (1931) (right to publish an unpopular newspaper); Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357 , 274 U. S. 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (right to advocate the cause of
Communism); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.
S. 652 , 268 U. S. 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (right to express an unpopular
opinion); cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 215 ,
n. 7 (1963), where the Court approvingly quoted Board of
Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211, 253 (1872) which
stated:

															"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests is left by
any free government to individual enterprise and individual action.
Religion is eminently one of these interests, lying outside the
true and legitimate province of government."

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.
S. 158 , 321 U. S. 164 (1944), the Court wrote:

															"If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a
broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted
that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be
given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in
our basic scheme. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S.
147 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296 . All are interwoven there together. Differences
there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise.
But they have unity in the charter's prime place because they have
unity in their human sources and functionings." See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 , 454 U. S. 269 (1981) (stating that religious worship and discussion "are forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment").

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															Thus Joseph Story wrote:

															"Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and
of the amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment],
the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was that
christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far
as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in
utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if
not universal indignation."

															2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 1874, p. 593 (1851) (footnote omitted). In the same
volume, Story continued:

															"The real object of the amendment was not to countenance, much
less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by
prostrating christianity, but to exclude all rivalry among
christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment, which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive
patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of
religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages) and of the
subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles
to the present age. . . ." Id. § 1877, at 594 (emphasis supplied).

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 15 , the
Court stated:

															"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Id. at 330 U. S. 18 (the
First Amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 347 U. S. 216 ("this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one
religion over another"); id. at 347 U. S. 226 ("The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved
through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and
the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have
come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within
the power of the government to invade that citadel, whether its
purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the
relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality"); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs"). [ Footnote 38 ]

															In his "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785," James Madison wrote, in part:

															"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable
truth"

															"that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the
[Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and]
conviction, not by force or violence."

															"The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to
exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right. It is unalienable because the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds,
cannot follow the dictates of other men. It is unalienable also,
because what is here a right towards men is a duty towards the
Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. . .
. We maintain therefore that, in matters of Religion, no man's
right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society, and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance."

															" * * * *" "3. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first
duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristics of the
late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped
power had strengthened itself by exercise and entangled the
question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the
principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who
does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion
of all other Sects?"

															The Complete Madison 299-301 (S. Padover ed.1953). See also
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 435 (1962) ("It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that
each separate government in this country should stay out of the
business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the
people choose to look for religious guidance").

															[ Footnote 39 ]

															As the Barnette opinion explained, it is the teaching
of history, rather than any appraisal of the quality of a State's
motive, that supports this duty to respect basic freedoms:

															"Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some
end thought essential to their time and country have been waged by
many good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively
recent phenomenon, but at other times and places, the ends have
been racial or territorial security, support of a dynasty or
regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As first and
moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its
accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As
governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no
deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation
than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose
program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in
embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence
is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp
out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the
Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the
Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast
failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who
begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."

															319 U.S. at 319 U. S.
640 -641. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 431 ("a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion").

															[ Footnote 40 ] See n 22, supra. [ Footnote 41 ] See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 , 465 U. S. 680 (1984); id. at 465 U. S. 690 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id. at 465 U. S. 697 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
dissenting); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 , 463 U. S. 394 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 271 ; Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 , 449 U. S. 40 -41
(1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S. 236 (1977).

															[ Footnote 42 ] Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 690 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks whether,
irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An
affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged
practice invalid").

															[ Footnote 43 ]

															The statement indicated, in pertinent part:

															"Gentlemen, by passage of this bill by the Alabama Legislature,
our children in this state will have the opportunity of sharing in
the spiritual heritage of this state and this country. The United
States as well as the State of Alabama was founded by people who
believe in God. I believe this effort to return voluntary
prayer to our public schools for its return to us to the
original position of the writers of the Constitution, this local
philosophies and beliefs hundreds of Alabamians have urged my
continuous support for permitting school prayer. Since coming to
the Alabama Senate, I have worked hard on this legislation to
accomplish the return of voluntary prayer in our public schools and
return to the basic moral fiber. "

															App. 50 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 44 ] Id. at 52. The District Court and the Court of Appeals
agreed that the purpose of § 16-1-20.1 was "an effort on the part
of the State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. at 732; 705 F.2d at 1535.
The evidence presented to the District Court elaborated on the
express admission of the Governor of Alabama (then Fob James) that
the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's]
intent to have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity," compare Second Amended Complaint � 32(d) (App. 24-25) with Governor's Answer to § 32(d) (App. 40); and that the
"expressed legislative purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 (1981)
was to return voluntary prayer to public schools,'" compare Second Amended Complaint �� 32(b) and (c) (App.
24) with Governor's Answer to �� 32(b) and (c) (App.
40). [ Footnote 45 ]

															Appellant Governor George C. Wallace now argues that § 16-1-20.1
"is best understood as a permissible accommodation of religion,"
and that, viewed even in terms of the Lemon test, the
"statute conforms to acceptable constitutional criteria." Brief for
Appellant Wallace 5; see also Brief for Appellants Smith et al. 39 (§ 16-1-20.1 "accommodates the free exercise of
the religious beliefs and free exercise of speech and belief of
those affected"); id. at 47. These arguments seem to be
based on the theory that the free exercise of religion of some of
the State's citizens was burdened before the statute was enacted.
The United States, appearing as amicus curiae in support
of the appellants, candidly acknowledges that

															"it is unlikely that, in most contexts, a strong Free Exercise
claim could be made that time for personal prayer must be set aside
during the school day."

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10. There is
no basis for the suggestion that § 16-1-20.1

															"is a means for accommodating the religious and meditative needs
of students without in any way diminishing the school's own
neutrality or secular atmosphere." Id. at 11. In this case, it is undisputed that, at the
time of the enactment of § 16-1-20.1, there was no governmental
practice impeding students from silently praying for one minute at
the beginning of each schoolday; thus, there was no need to
"accommodate" or to exempt individuals from any general
governmental requirement because of the dictates of our cases
interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.
S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 (1963); see also Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 226 ("While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state
action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it
has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the
State to practice its beliefs"). What was missing in the
appellants' eyes at the time of the enactment of § 16-1-20.1 -- and
therefore what is precisely the aspect that makes the statute
unconstitutional -- was the State's endorsement and promotion of
religion and a particular religious practice.

															[ Footnote 46 ] See n 1, supra. [ Footnote 47 ]

															Indeed, for some persons, meditation itself may be a form of
prayer. B. Larson, Larson's Book of Cults 62-65 (1982); C.
Whittier, Silent Prayer and Meditation in World Religions 1-7
(Congressional Research Service 1982).

															[ Footnote 48 ]

															If the conclusion that the statute had no purpose were tenable,
it would remain true that no purpose is not a secular
purpose. But such a conclusion is inconsistent with the
common-sense presumption that statutes are usually enacted to
change existing law. Appellants do not even suggest that the State
had no purpose in enacting § 16-1-20.1.

															[ Footnote 49 ] United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.
S. 290 , 341 U. S. 297 (1951) (a "statute cannot be divorced from the circumstances
existing at the time it was passed"); id. at 341 U. S. 298 (refusing to attribute pointless purpose to Congress in the absence
of facts to the contrary); United States v. National City
Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78 , 337 U. S. 80 -81
(1949) (rejecting Government's argument that Congress had no desire
to change law when enacting legislation).

															[ Footnote 50 ] See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 42 (per curiam); Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S.
792 -793 (1973) ("A proper respect for both the Free
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue
a course of neutrality' toward religion"); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 , 393 U. S. 109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
215 -222; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 430 ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral
nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is
voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause"); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U. S. 203 , 333 U. S.
211 -212 (1948); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
18 . [ Footnote 51 ]

															As this Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S.
430 :

															"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion, and
is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not."

															Moreover, this Court has noted that

															"[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Id. at 370 U. S. 431 .
This comment has special force in the public school context where
attendance is mandatory. Justice Frankfurter acknowledged this
reality in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 227 (concurring opinion):

															"That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the
constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the
school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's
domain. The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an
outstanding characteristic of children." See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 374 U. S. 290 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 , 463 U. S. 792 (1983) (distinguishing between adults not susceptible to "religious
indoctrination" and children subject to "peer pressure"). Further,
this Court has observed:

															"That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 319 U. S.
637 .

															[ Footnote 52 ] Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
690 -691 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("The purpose prong
of the Lemon test requires that a government activity have
a secular purpose. . . . The proper inquiry under the purpose prong
of Lemon . . . is whether the government intends to convey
a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion").

															[ Footnote 53 ] Id. at 465 U. S.
694 .

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

															I concur in the Court's opinion and judgment that Ala.Code §
16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984) violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's
persistence in attempting to institute state-sponsored prayer in
the public schools by enacting three successive statutes. [ Footnote 2/1 ] I agree fully with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR's assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes may be
constitutional, [ Footnote 2/2 ] a
suggestion set forth in the Court's opinion as well. Ante at 472 U. S.
59 . Page 472 U. S. 63 I write separately to express additional views and to respond to
criticism of the three-pronged Lemon test. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), identifies standards that have proved useful in analyzing
case after case both in our decisions and in those of other courts.
It is the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon, supra, have we addressed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to
its three-pronged test. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). [ Footnote 2/4 ] Lemon,
supra, has not been overruled or its test modified. Yet
continued criticism of it could encourage other courts to feel free
to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad hoc basis.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 472 U. S. 64 The first inquiry under Lemon is whether the challenged
statute has a "secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman,
supra, at 403 U. S. 612 .
AS JUSTICE O'CONNOR recognizes, this secular purpose must be
"sincere"; a law will not pass constitutional muster if the secular
purpose articulated by the legislature is merely a "sham." Post at 472 U. S. 75 (concurring in judgment). In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 (1980) (per curiam), for example, we held that a
statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools violated the Establishment Clause, even though the Kentucky
Legislature asserted that its goal was educational. We have not
interpreted the first prong of Lemon, supra, however, as
requiring that a statute have "exclusively secular" objectives.
[ Footnote 2/6 ] Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 6 (1984). If such a requirement existed, much conduct and
legislation approved by this Court in the past would have been
invalidated. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 (1970) (New York's property tax exemption for
religious organizations upheld); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947)
(holding that a township may reimburse parents for the cost of
transporting their children to parochial schools). Page 472 U. S. 65 The record before us, however, makes clear that Alabama's
purpose was solely religious in character. Senator Donald Holmes,
the sponsor of the bill that became Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1
(Supp.1984), freely acknowledged that the purpose of this statute
was "to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. See
ante at 472 U. S. 57 , n.
43. I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that a single legislator's
statement, particularly if made following enactment, is not
necessarily sufficient to establish purpose. See post at 472 U. S. 77 (concurring in judgment). But, as noted in the Court's opinion, the
religious purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is manifested in other evidence,
including the sequence and history of the three Alabama statutes. See ante at 472 U. S.
58 -60.

															I also consider it of critical importance that neither the
District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a secular purpose,
while both agreed that the purpose was to advance religion. In its
first opinion (enjoining the enforcement of § 16-1-20.1 pending a
hearing on the merits), the District Court said that the statute
did "not reflect a clearly secular purpose." Jaffree v.
James, 544 F.
Supp. 727 , 732 (SD Ala.1982). Instead, the District Court found
that the enactment of the statute was an "effort on the part of the
State of Alabama to encourage a religious activity." [ Footnote 2/7 ] Ibid. The Court of
Appeals likewise applied the Lemon test and found "a lack
of secular purpose on the part of the Alabama Legislature." Page 472 U. S. 66 705 F.2d 1526, 1535 (CA11 1983). It held that the objective of §
16-1-20.1 was the "advancement of religion." Ibid. When
both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular
purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.

															I would vote to uphold the Alabama statute if it also had a
clear secular purpose. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 , 463 U. S.
394 -395 (1983) (the Court is "reluctan[t] to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States, particularly when a
plausible secular purpose for the State's program may be discerned
from the face of the statute"). Nothing in the record before us,
however, identifies a clear secular purpose, and the State also has
failed to identify any nonreligious reason for the statute's
enactment. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Under
these circumstances, the Court is required by our precedents to
hold that the statute fails the first prong of the Lemon test, and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.

															Although we do not reach the other two prongs of the Lemon test, I note that the "effect" of a straightforward
moment-of-silence statute is unlikely to "advanc[e] or inhibi[t]
religion." [ Footnote 2/9 ] See
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 , 392 U. S. 243 (1968). Nor would such a statute "foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon Page 472 U. S.
67 v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
612 -613, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
at 397 U. S.
674 .

															I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The three statutes are Ala.Code § 16-1-20 (Supp.1984) (moment of
silent meditation); Ala.Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984) (moment of
silence for meditation or prayer); and Ala.Code § 16-1-20.2
(Supp.1984) (teachers authorized to lead students in vocal prayer).
These statutes were enacted over a span of four years. There is
some question whether § 16-1-20 was repealed by implication. The
Court already has summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding
that § 16-1-20.2 is invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U. S. 924 (1984). Thus, our opinions today address only the validity of §
16-1-20.1. See ante at 472 U. S.
41 -42.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR is correct in stating that moment-of-silence
statutes cannot be treated in the same manner as those providing
for vocal prayer:

															"A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is
different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence,
unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated with a
religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. During a moment of
silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute
does not stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to
how the Court regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and
at least one Member of this Court have recognized the distinction
and suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be
constitutional. See Abington, [374 U.S.] at 374 U. S. 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ( [T]he observance of a moment of
reverent silence at the opening of class' may serve `the solely
secular purposes of the devotional activities without jeopardizing
either the religious liberties of any members of the community or
the proper degree of separation between the spheres of religion and
government'); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6, P. 829
(1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue, in Religion and the Public
Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47 Minn.L.Rev. at 371; Kauper, Prayer,
Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 1031, 1041
(1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is difficult to discern a
serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent,
thoughtful schoolchildren." Post at 472 U. S. 72 -73
(concurring in judgment).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR asserts that the

															"standards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and
refined in order to make them more useful in achieving the
underlying purpose of the First Amendment." Post at 472 U. S. 68 (concurring in judgment). JUSTICE REHNQUIST would discard the Lemon test entirely. Post at 472 U. S. 112 (dissenting).

															As I state in the text, the Lemon test has been applied
consistently in Establishment Clause cases since it was adopted in
1971. In a word, it has been the law. Respect for stare
decisis should require us to follow Lemon. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 , 469 U. S. 559 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting) ("The stability of judicial
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple precedents . .
.").

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															In Marsh v. Chambers, we held that the Nebraska
Legislature's practice of opening each day's session with a prayer
by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. Our holding was based upon the
historical acceptance of the practice that had become "part of the
fabric of our society." 463 U.S. at 463 U. S.
792 .

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), was a carefully considered opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in
which he was joined by six other Justices. Lemon's three-pronged test has been repeatedly followed. In Committee
for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973), for example, the Court applied the "now well-defined
three-part test" of Lemon. 413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
772 .

															In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984), we said that the Court is not "confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. at 465 U. S. 679 .
The decision in Lynch, like that in Marsh v.
Chambers, was based primarily on the long historical practice
of including religious symbols in the celebration of Christmas.
Nevertheless, the Court, without any criticism of Lemon, applied its three-pronged test to the facts of that case. It
focused on the "question . . . whether there is a secular purpose
for [the] display of the creche." 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
681 .

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The Court's opinion recognizes that "a statute that is motivated
in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion." Ante at 472 U. S. 56 .
The Court simply holds that "a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." Ibid. (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In its subsequent decision on the merits, the District Court
held that prayer in the public schools -- even if led by the
teacher -- did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The District Court recognized that its decision was
inconsistent with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 (1962), and other decisions of this Court. The
District Court nevertheless ruled that its decision was justified
because "the United States Supreme Court has erred. . . ." Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 554
F. Supp. 1104 , 1128 (SD Ala.1983).

															In my capacity as Circuit Justice, I stayed the judgment of the
District Court pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 459 U. S. 1314 (1983) (in chambers).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Instead, the State criticizes the Lemon test and
asserts that "the principal problems [with the test] stem from the
purpose prong." See Brief for Appellant Wallace 9 et
seq. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															If it were necessary to reach the "effects" prong of Lemon, we would be concerned primarily with the effect on
the minds and feelings of immature pupils. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR
notes, during

															"a moment of silence, a student who objects to prayer [even
where prayer may be the purpose] is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others." Post at 472 U. S. 72 (concurring in judgment). Given the types of subjects youthful
minds are primarily concerned with, it is unlikely that many
children would use a simple "moment of silence" as a time for
religious prayer. There are too many other subjects on the mind of
the typical child. Yet there also is the likelihood that some
children, raised in strongly religious families, properly would use
the moment to reflect on the religion of his or her choice.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment.

															Nothing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this
Court or in the laws of the State of Alabama prohibits public
school students from voluntarily praying at any time before,
during, or after the schoolday. Alabama has facilitated voluntary
silent prayers of students who are so inclined by enacting Ala.Code
§ 16-1-20 (Supp.1984), which provides a moment of silence in
appellees' schools each day. The parties to these proceedings
concede the validity of this enactment. At issue in these appeals
is the constitutional validity of an additional and subsequent
Alabama statute, Ala.Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984), which both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded was enacted
solely to officially encourage prayer during the moment of silence.
I agree with the judgment of the Court that, in light of the
findings of the courts below and the history of its enactment, §
16-1-20.1 of the Alabama Code violates the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. In my view, there can be little doubt that the
purpose and likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to
endorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools. I write
separately to identify the peculiar features of the Alabama law
that render it invalid, and to explain why moment of silence laws
in other States do not necessarily manifest the same infirmity. I
also write to explain why neither history nor the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment validates the Alabama law struck down
by the Court today. I The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, coupled with the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of ordered liberty, preclude both
the Nation and the States from making any law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting Page 472 U. S. 68 the free exercise thereof. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940). Although a distinct jurisprudence has enveloped each of
these Clauses, their common purpose is to secure religious liberty. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 430 (1962). On these principles, the Court has been and remains
unanimous.

															As these cases once again demonstrate, however,

															"it is far easier to agree on the purpose that underlies the
First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses than to
obtain agreement on the standards that should govern their
application." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.). It once appeared that the Court had
developed a workable standard by which to identify impermissible
government establishments of religion. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). Under the now familiar Lemon test, statutes must
have both a secular legislative purpose and a principal or primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and in addition
they must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. Id. at 403 U. S.
612 -613. Despite its initial promise, the Lemon test has proved problematic. The required inquiry into
"entanglement" has been modified and questioned, see Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S. 403 ,
n. 11 (1983), and in one case we have upheld state action against
an Establishment Clause challenge without applying the Lemon test at all. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). The author of Lemon himself apparently questions
the test's general applicability. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 679 (1984). JUSTICE REHNQUIST today suggests that we abandon Lemon entirely, and in the process limit the reach of the
Establishment Clause to state discrimination between sects and
government designation of a particular church as a "state" or
"national" one. Post at 472 U. S.
108 -113.

															Perhaps because I am new to the struggle, I am not ready to
abandon all aspects of the Lemon test. I do believe,
however, that the standards announced in Lemon should
be Page 472 U. S. 69 reexamined and refined in order to make them more useful in
achieving the underlying purpose of the First Amendment. We must
strive to do more than erect a constitutional "signpost," Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 , 413 U. S. 741 (1973), to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our
predilections may dictate. Instead, our goal should be

															"to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that is
not only grounded in the history and language of the first
amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent application
to the relevant problems."

															Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 Minn.L.Rev. 329, 332-333 (1963)
(footnotes omitted). Last Term, I proposed a refinement of the Lemon test with this goal in mind. Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 687 -689 (concurring opinion).

															The Lynch concurrence suggested that the religious
liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is infringed when the
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community. Direct government action
endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid
under this approach because it

															"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community." Id. at 465 U. S. 688 .
Under this view, Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and
effect of a statute requires courts to examine whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually
conveys a message of endorsement.

															The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content
it gives to the Lemon -mandated inquiry into legislative
purpose and effect. In this country, church and state must
necessarily operate within the same community. Because of this
coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular interests of
government and the religious interests of various sects and their
adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A
statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest Page 472 U. S. 70 often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or
hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would ensue if every such
statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause. For example,
the State could not criminalize murder for fear that it would
thereby promote the Biblical command against killing. The task for
the Court is to sort out those statutes and government practices
whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious liberty
protected by the First Amendment.

															The endorsement test does not preclude government from
acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in
making law and policy. It does preclude government from conveying
or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred. Such an endorsement
infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for

															"[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 370 U. S. 431 .
At issue today is whether state moment of silence statutes in
general, and Alabama's moment of silence statute in particular,
embody an impermissible endorsement of prayer in public
schools. A Twenty-five states permit or require public school teachers to
have students observe a moment of silence in their classrooms.
[ Footnote 3/1 ] A few statutes
provide that the moment of silence Page 472 U. S. 71 is for the purpose of meditation alone. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15-22 (1984); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-16a (1983);
R.I.Gen.Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981). The typical statute, however,
calls for a moment of silence at the beginning of the schoolday
during which students may meditate, pray, or reflect on the
activities of the day. See, e.g., Ark.Stat.Ann. §
80-1607.1 (1980); Ga.Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982); Ill.Rev.Stat.,
ch. 122, � 771 (1983); Ind.Code § 20-10.1-7-11 (1982);
Kan.Stat.Ann. § 72-5308a (1980); Pa. Stat.Ann., Tit. 24, §
15-1516.1 (Purdon Supp.1984-1985). Federal trial courts have
divided on the constitutionality of these moment of silence laws. Compare Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.
Supp. 337 (Mass.1976) (upholding statute), with May v.
Cooperman, 572 F.
Supp. 1561 (NJ 1983) (striking down statute); Duffy v. Las
Cruces Public Schools, 557 F.
Supp. 1013 (NM 1983) (same); and Beck v.
McElrath, 548 F.
Supp. 1161 (MD Tenn.1982) (same). See also Walter v. West
Virginia Board of Education, Civ. Action No. 84-5366 (SD W.Va.
Mar. 14, 1985) (striking down state constitutional amendment).
Relying on this Court's decisions disapproving vocal prayer and
Bible reading in the public schools, see Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962), the courts that have struck down the moment of silence
statutes generally conclude that their purpose and effect are to
encourage prayer in public schools.

															The Engel and Abington decisions are not
dispositive on the constitutionality of moment of silence laws. In
those Page 472 U. S. 72 cases, public school teachers and students led their classes in
devotional exercises. In Engel, a New York statute
required teachers to lead their classes in a vocal prayer. The
Court concluded that

															"it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the American people to recite as part of a
religious program carried on by the government."

															370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 425 .
In Abington, the Court addressed Pennsylvania and Maryland
statutes that authorized morning Bible readings in public schools.
The Court reviewed the purpose and effect of the statutes,
concluded that they required religious exercises, and therefore
found them to violate the Establishment Clause. 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
223 -224. Under all of these statutes, a student who did
not share the religious beliefs expressed in the course of the
exercise was left with the choice of participating, thereby
compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby
calling attention to his or her nonconformity. The decisions
acknowledged the coercion implicit under the statutory schemes, see Engel, supra, at 370 U. S. 431 ,
but they expressly turned only on the fact that the government was
sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise.

															A state-sponsored moment of silence in the public schools is
different from state-sponsored vocal prayer or Bible reading.
First, a moment of silence is not inherently religious. Silence,
unlike prayer or Bible reading, need not be associated with a
religious exercise. Second, a pupil who participates in a moment of
silence need not compromise his or her beliefs. During a moment of
silence, a student who objects to prayer is left to his or her own
thoughts, and is not compelled to listen to the prayers or thoughts
of others. For these simple reasons, a moment of silence statute
does not stand or fall under the Establishment Clause according to
how the Court regards vocal prayer or Bible reading. Scholars and
at least one Member of this Court have recognized the distinction
and suggested that a moment of silence in public schools would be
constitutional. See Abington, supra, at 374 U. S. 281 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("[T]he observance of a moment Page 472 U. S. 73 of reverent silence at the opening of class" may serve "the
solely secular purposes of the devotional activities without
jeopardizing either the religious liberties of any members of the
community or the proper degree of separation between the spheres of
religion and government"); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §
14-6, p. 829 (1978); P. Freund, The Legal Issue, in Religion and
the Public Schools 23 (1965); Choper, 47 Minn.L.Rev. at 371;
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61
Mich.L.Rev. 1031, 1041 (1963). As a general matter, I agree. It is
difficult to discern a serious threat to religious liberty from a
room of silent, thoughtful schoolchildren.

															By mandating a moment of silence, a State does not necessarily
endorse any activity that might occur during the period. Cf.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 , 454 U. S. 272 ,
n. 11 (1981) ("[B]y creating a forum, the [State] does not thereby
endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired there"). Even
if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray silently
during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby encouraged prayer
over other specified alternatives. Nonetheless, it is also possible
that a moment of silence statute, either as drafted or as actually
implemented, could effectively favor the child who prays over the
child who does not. For example, the message of endorsement would
seem inescapable if the teacher exhorts children to use the
designated time to pray. Similarly, the face of the statute or its
legislative history may clearly establish that it seeks to
encourage or promote voluntary prayer over other alternatives,
rather than merely provide a quiet moment that may be dedicated to
prayer by those so inclined. The crucial question is whether the
State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that children
should use the moment of silence for prayer. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Page 472 U. S. 74 This question cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead
requires courts to examine the history, language, and
administration of a particular statute to determine whether it
operates as an endorsement of religion. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 694 (concurring opinion) ("Every government practice must be judged in
its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion"). Before reviewing
Alabama's moment of silence law to determine whether it endorses
prayer, some general observations on the proper scope of the
inquiry are in order. First, the inquiry into the purpose of the
legislature in enacting a moment of silence law should be
deferential and limited. See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 6 (1947)
(courts must exercise "the most extreme caution" in assessing
whether a state statute has a proper public purpose). In
determining whether the government intends a moment of silence
statute to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion, a court has no license to psychoanalyze the legislators. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 466 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). If a legislature expresses a
plausible secular purpose for a moment of silence statute in either
the text or the legislative history, [ Footnote 3/3 ] or if the statute disclaims an intent to
encourage prayer over alternatives during a moment of silence,
[ Footnote 3/4 ] then courts should
generally Page 472 U. S. 75 defer to that stated intent. See Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , 413 U. S. 773 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 , 403 U. S.
678 -679 (1971). It is particularly troublesome to
denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to postenactment
testimony by particular legislators or by interested persons who
witnessed the drafting of the statute. Even if the text and
official history of a statute express no secular purpose, the
statute should be held to have an improper purpose only if it is
beyond purview that endorsement of religion or a religious belief
"was and is the law's reason for existence." Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 , 393 U. S. 108 (1968). Since there is arguably a secular pedagogical value to a
moment of silence in public schools, courts should find an improper
purpose behind such a statute only if the statute on its face, in
its official legislative history, or in its interpretation by a
responsible administrative agency suggests it has the primary
purpose of endorsing prayer.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests that this sort of deferential inquiry
into legislative purpose "means little," because "it only requires
the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all
sectarian references." Post at 472 U. S. 108 .
It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the
legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian
endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored
to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that government
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice. It is
of course possible that a legislature will enunciate a sham secular
purpose for a statute. I have little doubt that our courts are
capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere
one, or that the Lemon inquiry into the effect of an
enactment would help decide those close cases where the validity of
an expressed secular purpose is in doubt. While the secular purpose
requirement alone may rarely be determinative in striking down a
statute, it nevertheless serves an important function. It reminds
government that, Page 472 U. S. 76 when it acts, it should do so without endorsing a particular
religious belief or practice that all citizens do not share. In
this sense, the secular purpose requirement is squarely based in
the text of the Establishment Clause it helps to enforce.

															Second, the Lynch concurrence suggested that the effect
of a moment of silence law is not entirely a question of fact:

															"[W]hether a government activity communicates endorsement of
religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Although
evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like
the question whether racial or sex-based classifications
communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to
be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social
facts."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
693 -694. The relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state
endorsement of prayer in public schools. Cf. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.
S. 485 , 466 U. S.
517 -518, n. 1 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (noting
that questions whether fighting words are "likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation," Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 , 394 U. S. 592 (1969), and whether allegedly obscene material appeals to "prurient
interests," Miller v. California, 413 U. S.
15 , 413 U. S. 24 (1973), are mixed questions of law and fact that are properly
subject to de novo appellate review). A moment of silence
law that is clearly drafted and implemented so as to permit prayer,
meditation, and reflection within the prescribed period, without
endorsing one alternative over the others, should pass this
test. B The analysis above suggests that moment of silence laws in many
States should pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, because they do
not favor the child who chooses to pray during a moment of silence
over the child who chooses to meditate Page 472 U. S. 77 or reflect. Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984) does not stand
on the same footing. However deferentially one examines its text
and legislative history, however objectively one views the message
attempted to be conveyed to the public, the conclusion is
unavoidable that the purpose of the statute is to endorse prayer in
public schools. I accordingly agree with the Court of Appeals, 705
F.2d 1526, 1535 (1983), that the Alabama statute has a purpose
which is in violation of the Establishment Clause, and cannot be
upheld.

															In finding that the purpose of § 16-1-20.1 is to endorse
voluntary prayer during a moment of silence, the Court relies on
testimony elicited from State Senator Donald G. Holmes during a
preliminary injunction hearing. Ante at 472 U. S. 56 -57.
Senator Holmes testified that the sole purpose of the statute was
to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. For the reasons
expressed above, I would give little, if any, weight to this sort
of evidence of legislative intent. Nevertheless, the text of the
statute in light of its official legislative history leaves little
doubt that the purpose of this statute corresponds to the purpose
expressed by Senator Holmes at the preliminary injunction
hearing.

															First, it is notable that Alabama already had a moment of
silence statute before it enacted § 16-1-20.1. See Ala.Code § 16-1-20 (Supp.1984), quoted ante at 472 U. S. 40 , n.
1. Appellees do not challenge this statute indeed, they concede its
validity. See Brief for Appellees 2. The only significant
addition made by § 16-1-20.1 is to specify expressly that voluntary
prayer is one of the authorized activities during a moment of
silence. Any doubt as to the legislative purpose of that addition
is removed by the official legislative history. The sole purpose
reflected in the official history is "to return voluntary prayer to
our public schools." App. 50. Nor does anything in the legislative
history contradict an intent to encourage children to choose prayer
over other alternatives during the moment of silence. Given this
legislative history, it is not surprising that the State of Alabama
conceded in the Page 472 U. S. 78 courts below that the purpose of the statute was to make prayer
part of daily classroom activity, and that both the District Court
and the Court of Appeals concluded that the law's purpose was to
encourage religious activity. See ante at 472 U. S. 57 , n.
44. In light of the legislative history and the findings of the
courts below, I agree with the Court that the State intended §
16-1-20.1 to convey a message that prayer was the endorsed activity
during the state-prescribed moment of silence. [ Footnote 3/5 ] While it is therefore unnecessary
also to determine the effect of the statute, Lynch, 465
U.S. at 465 U. S. 690 (concurring opinion), it also seems likely that the message
actually conveyed to objective observers by § 16-1-20.1 is approval
of the child who selects prayer over other alternatives during a
moment of silence.

															Given this evidence in the record, candor requires us to admit
that this Alabama statute was intended to convey a message of state
encouragement and endorsement of religion. In Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 669 ,
the Court stated that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
are flexible enough to "permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference." Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1
(Supp.1984) does more than permit prayer to occur during a moment
of silence "without interference." It Page 472 U. S. 79 endorses the decision to pray during a moment of silence, and
accordingly sponsors a religious exercise. For that reason, I
concur in the judgment of the Court. II In his dissenting opinion, post at 472 U. S.
91 -106, JUSTICE REHNQUIST reviews the text and history
of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. His opinion suggests that
a long line of this Court's decisions are inconsistent with the
intent of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. He urges the Court to
correct the historical inaccuracies in its past decisions by
embracing a far more restricted interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, an interpretation that presumably would permit vocal group
prayer in public schools. See generally R. Cord,
Separation of Church and State (1982).

															The United States, in an amicus brief, suggests a less
sweeping modification of Establishment Clause principles. In the
Federal Government's view, a state-sponsored moment of silence is
merely an "accommodation" of the desire of some public school
children to practice their religion by praying silently. Such an
accommodation is contemplated by the First Amendment's guarantee
that the Government will not prohibit the free exercise of
religion. Because the moment of silence implicates free exercise
values, the United States suggests that the Lemon -mandated
inquiry into purpose and effect should be modified. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 22.

															There is an element of truth and much helpful analysis in each
of these suggestions. Particularly when we are interpreting the
Constitution, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.
S. 345 , 256 U. S. 349 (1921). Whatever the provision of the Constitution that is at
issue, I continue to believe that

															"fidelity to the notion of constitutional -- as opposed
to purely judicial -- limits on governmental action requires us to
impose a heavy burden on those who claim that practices accepted
when [the provision] was Page 472 U. S. 80 adopted are now constitutionally impermissible." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 , 471 U. S. 26 (1985) (dissenting opinion). The Court properly looked to history
in upholding legislative prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), property tax exemptions for houses of worship, Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, supra, and Sunday closing laws, McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). As Justice Holmes once observed,

															"[i]f a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22 , 260 U. S. 31 (1922).

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST does not assert, however, that the drafters of
the First Amendment expressed a preference for prayer in public
schools, or that the practice of prayer in public schools enjoyed
uninterrupted government endorsement from the time of enactment of
the Bill of Rights to the present era. The simple truth is that
free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late 18th
century. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 238 ,
and n. 7 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Since there then existed few
government-run schools, it is unlikely that the persons who drafted
the First Amendment, or the state legislators who ratified it,
anticipated the problems of interaction of church and state in the
public schools. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress, and
the Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 Va.L.Rev. 1395,
1403-1404 (1966). Even at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, education in Southern States was still primarily in
private hands, and the movement toward free public schools
supported by general taxation had not taken hold. Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ,
489-490 (1954)

															This uncertainty as to the intent of the Framers of the Bill of
Rights does not mean we should ignore history for guidance on the
role of religion in public education. The Court has not done so. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U. S. 203 , 333 U. S. 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, Page 472 U. S. 81 J., concurring). When the intent of the Framers is unclear, I
believe we must employ both history and reason in our analysis. The
primary issue raised by JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent is whether the
historical fact that our Presidents have long called for public
prayers of Thanks should be dispositive on the constitutionality of
prayer in public schools. [ Footnote
3/6 ] I think not. At the very least, Presidential Proclamations
are distinguishable from school prayer in that they are received in
a noncoercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who
presumably are not readily susceptible to unwilling religious
indoctrination. This Court's decisions have recognized a
distinction when government-sponsored religious exercises are
directed at impressionable children who are required to attend
school, for then government endorsement is much more likely to
result in coerced religious beliefs. See, e.g., Marsh v.
Chambers, supra, at 463 U. S. 792 ; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 686 .
Although history provides a touchstone for constitutional problems,
the Establishment Clause concern for religious liberty is
dispositive here.

															The element of truth in the United States' arguments, I believe,
lies in the suggestion that Establishment Clause analysis must
comport with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that
government make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
Our cases have interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to compel the
government to exempt persons from some generally applicable
government requirements so as to permit those persons to freely
exercise their religion. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Board of
the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.
S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner , 374 U. S. 398 Page 472 U. S. 82 (1963). Even where the Free Exercise Clause does not compel the
government to grant an exemption, the Court has suggested that the
government in some circumstances may voluntarily choose to exempt
religious observers without violating the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 , 401 U. S. 453 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.
S. 599 (1961). The challenge posed by the United States'
argument is how to define the proper Establishment Clause limits on
voluntary government efforts to facilitate the free exercise of
religion. On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting
religious observers from generally applicable government
obligations. By definition, such legislation has a religious
purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On
the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports
to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely
vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to
religion can be viewed as an "accommodation" of free exercise
rights. Indeed, the statute at issue in Lemon, which
provided salary supplements, textbooks, and instructional materials
to Pennsylvania parochial schools, can be viewed as an
accommodation of the religious beliefs of parents who choose to
send their children to religious schools.

															It is obvious that either of the two Religion Clauses, "if
expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 668 -669. The Court has long exacerbated the
conflict by calling for government "neutrality" toward religion. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968). It is difficult to square any notion of
"complete neutrality," ante at 472 U. S. 60 ,
with the mandate of the Free Exercise Clause that government must
sometimes exempt a religious observer from an otherwise generally
applicable obligation. A government that confers a benefit on an
explicitly religious basis is not Page 472 U. S. 83 neutral toward religion. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333 , 398 U. S. 372 (1970) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

															The solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses lies
not in "neutrality," but rather in identifying workable limits to
the government's license to promote the free exercise of religion.
The text of the Free Exercise Clause speaks of laws that prohibit
the free exercise of religion. On its face, the Clause is directed
at government interference with free exercise. Given that concern,
one can plausibly assert that government pursues Free Exercise
Clause values when it lifts a government-imposed burden on the free
exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then
the standard Establishment Clause test should be modified
accordingly. It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular
purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate
the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed
burden. Instead, the Court should simply acknowledge that the
religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free
Exercise Clause. I would also go further. In assessing the effect
of such a statute -- that is, in determining whether the statute
conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a particular
religious belief -- courts should assume that the "objective
observer," supra at 472 U. S. 76 , is
acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it
promotes. Thus individual perceptions, or resentment that a
religious observer is exempted from a particular government
requirement, would be entitled to little weight if the Free
Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption.

															While this "accommodation" analysis would help reconcile our
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause standards, it would not save
Alabama's moment of silence law. If we assume that the religious
activity that Alabama seeks to protect is silent prayer, then it is
difficult to discern any state-imposed burden on that activity that
is lifted by Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984). No law prevents
a student who is so inclined from praying silently in public
schools. Page 472 U. S. 84 Moreover, state law already provided a moment of silence to
these appellees irrespective of § 16-1-20.1. See Ala.Code
§ 16-1-20 (Supp.1984). Of course, the State might argue that §
16-1-20.1 protects not silent prayer, but rather group silent
prayer under state sponsorship. Phrased in these terms, the burden
lifted by the statute is not one imposed by the State of Alabama,
but by the Establishment Clause as interpreted in Engel and Abington. In my view, it is beyond the authority of
the State of Alabama to remove burdens imposed by the Constitution
itself. I conclude that the Alabama statute at issue today lifts no
state-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion, and
accordingly cannot properly be viewed as an accommodation
statute. III The Court does not hold that the Establishment Clause is so
hostile to religion that it precludes the States from affording
schoolchildren an opportunity for voluntary silent prayer. To the
contrary, the moment of silence statutes of many States should
satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we have here applied. The
Court holds only that Alabama has intentionally crossed the line
between creating a quiet moment during which those so inclined may
pray and affirmatively endorsing the particular religious practice
of prayer. This line may be a fine one, but our precedents and the
principles of religious liberty require that we draw it. In my
view, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See Ala.Code §§ 16-1-20, 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984);
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15-522 (1984); Ark.Stat.Ann. 80-1607.1 (1980);
Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-16a (1983); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 14, § 4101
(1981) (as interpreted in Del.Op.Atty.Gen. 79-1011 (1979));
Fla.Stat. § 233.062 (1983); Ga.Code Ann. § 20-2-1050 (1982);
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 122, 11771 (1983); Ind.Code § 20-10.1-7-11
(1982); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 72.5308a (1980); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §
17:2115(A) (West 1982); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 20-A, § 4805 (1983);
Md.Educ.Code Ann. § 7-104 (1985); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 71, § 1A
(West 1982); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 380.1565 (Supp.1984-1985);
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 18A:36-4 (West Supp.1984-1985); N.M.Stat.Ann. §
22-5-4.1 (1981); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3029-a (McKinney 1981);
N.D.Cent.Code § 15-47-30.1 (1981); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3313.60.1
(1980); Pa. Stat.Ann., Tit. 24, § 15.1516.1 (Purdon
Supp.1984-1985); R.I.Gen.Laws § 16-12-3.1 (1981); Tenn.Code Ann. §
49-6-1004 (1983); Va.Code § 22.1203 (1980); W.Va. Const., Art. III,
§ 15-a. For a useful comparison of the provisions of many of these
statutes, see Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public
Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 4, 407-408
(1983).

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Appellants argue that Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 , 343 U. S.
313 -314 (1952), suggests there is no constitutional
infirmity in a State's encouraging a child to pray during a moment
of silence. The cited dicta from Zorach however, is
inapposite. There the Court stated that

															"[w]hen the state encourages religious instruction . . . by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it
follows the best of our traditions." Ibid. (emphasis added). When the State provides a
moment of silence during which prayer may occur at the election of
the student, it can be said to be adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs. But when the State also encourages the
student to pray during a moment of silence, it converts an
otherwise inoffensive moment of silence into an effort by the
majority to use the machinery of the State to encourage the
minority to participate in a religious exercise. See Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 226 (1963).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See, e.g., Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-6-1004 (1983).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] See, e.g., W.Va. Const., Art. III, § 15-a.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that one consequence of the Court's
emphasis on the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor
statute might be to render the Pledge of Allegiance
unconstitutional because Congress amended it in 1954 to add the
words "under God." Post at 472 U. S. 88 . I
disagree. In my view, the words "under God" in the Pledge, as
codified at 36 U.S.C. § 172, serve as an acknowledgment of religion
with "the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public
occasions, [and] expressing confidence in the future." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 693 (1984) (concurring opinion).

															I also disagree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE's suggestion that the
Court's opinion invalidates any moment of silence statute that
includes the word "prayer." Post at 472 U. S. 85 . As
noted supra at 472 U. S.
73 ,

															"[e]ven if a statute specifies that a student may choose to pray
silently during a quiet moment, the State has not thereby
encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives."

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															Even assuming a taxpayer could establish standing to challenge
such a practice, see Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464 (1982), these Presidential Proclamations would probably withstand
Establishment Clause scrutiny, given their long history. See
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983).

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

															Some who trouble to read the opinions in these cases will find
it ironic -- perhaps even bizarre -- that on the very day we heard
arguments in the cases, the Court's session opened with an
invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a few hundred
yards away, the House of Representatives and Page 472 U. S. 85 the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer. These
legislative prayers are not just one minute in duration, but are
extended, thoughtful invocations and prayers for Divine guidance.
They are given, as they have been since 1789, by clergy appointed
as official chaplains and paid from the Treasury of the United
States. Congress has also provided chapels in the Capitol, at
public expense, where Members and others may pause for prayer,
meditation -- or a moment of silence.

															Inevitably some wag is bound to say that the Court's holding
today reflects a belief that the historic practice of the Congress
and this Court is justified because members of the Judiciary and
Congress are more in need of Divine guidance than are
schoolchildren. Still others will say that all this controversy is
"much ado about nothing," since no power on earth -- including this
Court and Congress -- can stop any teacher from opening the
schoolday with a moment of silence for pupils to meditate, to plan
their day -- or to pray if they voluntarily elect to do so.

															I make several points about today's curious holding.

															(a) It makes no sense to say that Alabama has "endorsed prayer"
by merely enacting a new statute "to specify expressly that
voluntary prayer is one of the authorized activities
during a moment of silence," ante at 472 U. S. 77 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). To suggest
that a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word "prayer"
unconstitutionally endorses religion, while one that simply
provides for a moment of silence does not, manifests not
neutrality, but hostility, toward religion. For decades, our
opinions have stated that hostility toward any religion or toward
all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as is an
official establishment of religion. The Alabama Legislature has no
more "endorsed" religion than a state or the Congress does when it
provides for legislative chaplains, or than this Court does when it
opens each session with an invocation to Page 472 U. S. 86 God. Today's decision recalls the observations of Justice
Goldberg:

															"[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to
invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the
Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive dedication
to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the
religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the
Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S. 306 (1963) (concurring opinion).

															(b) The inexplicable aspect of the foregoing opinions, however,
is what they advance as support for the holding concerning the
purpose of the Alabama Legislature. Rather than determining
legislative purpose from the face of the statute as a whole,
[ Footnote 4/1 ] the opinions rely on
three factors in concluding that the Alabama Legislature had a
"wholly religious" purpose for enacting the statute under review,
Ala.Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984): (i) statements of the statute's
sponsor, (ii) admissions in Governor James' answer to the second
amended complaint, and (iii) the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and
its predecessor statute.

															Curiously, the opinions do not mention that all of the sponsor's
statements relied upon -- including the statement "inserted" into
the Senate Journal -- were made after the legislature had
passed the statute; indeed, the testimony that the Court finds
critical was given well over a year after the statute was enacted.
As even the appellees concede, see Brief for Appellees 18,
there is not a shred of evidence that Page 472 U. S. 87 the legislature as a whole shared the sponsor's motive or that a
majority in either house was even aware of the sponsor's view of
the bill when it was passed. The sole relevance of the sponsor's
statements, therefore, is that they reflect the personal,
subjective motives of a single legislator. No case in the 195-year
history of this Court supports the disconcerting idea that
postenactment statements by individual legislators are relevant in
determining the constitutionality of legislation.

															Even if an individual legislator's after-the-fact statements
could rationally be considered relevant, all of the opinions fail
to mention that the sponsor also testified that one of his purposes
in drafting and sponsoring the moment-of-silence bill was to clear
up a widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is legally
prohibited from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps
inside a public school building. See App. 53-54. That
testimony is at least as important as the statements the Court
relies upon, and surely that testimony manifests a permissible
purpose.

															The Court also relies on the admissions of Governor James'
answer to the second amended complaint. Strangely, however, the
Court neglects to mention that there was no trial bearing on the
constitutionality of the Alabama statutes; trial became unnecessary
when the District Court held that the Establishment Clause does not
apply to the states. [ Footnote 4/2 ]
The absence of a trial on the issue of the constitutionality of §
16-1-20.1 is significant because the answer filed by the State
Board and Superintendent of Education did not make the same
admissions that the Governor's answer made. See 1 Record
187. The Court cannot know whether, if these cases had been tried,
those state officials would have offered evidence to contravene
appellees' allegations concerning legislative purpose. Thus, it is
completely inappropriate to accord any relevance to the admissions
in the Governor's answer. Page 472 U. S. 88 The several preceding opinions conclude that the principal
difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor statute proves
that the sole purpose behind the inclusion of the phrase "or
voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 was to endorse and promote prayer.
This reasoning is simply a subtle way of focusing exclusively on
the religious component of the statute, rather than examining the
statute as a whole. Such logic -- if it can be called that -- would
lead the Court to hold, for example, that a state may enact a
statute that provides reimbursement for bus transportation to the
parents of all schoolchildren, but may not add parents of parochial
school students to an existing program providing reimbursement for
parents of public school students. Congress amended the statutory
Pledge of Allegiance 31 years ago to add the words "under God." Act
of June 14, 1954, Pub.L. 396, 68 Stat. 249. Do the several opinions
in support of the judgment today render the Pledge
unconstitutional? That would be the consequence of their method of
focusing on the difference between § 16-1-20.1 and its predecessor
statute, rather than examining § 16-1-20.1 as a whole. [ Footnote 4/3 ] Any such holding would of
course make a mockery of our decisionmaking in Establishment Clause
cases. And even were the Court's method correct, the inclusion of
the words "or voluntary prayer" in § 16-1-20.1 is wholly consistent
with the clearly permissible purpose of clarifying that silent,
voluntary prayer is not forbidden in the public school
building. [ Footnote 4/4 ] Page 472 U. S. 89 (c) The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), suggests a naive preoccupation with an easy, bright-line
approach for addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly
cautioned that Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper
capable of resolving every Establishment Clause issue, but that it
sought only to provide "signposts." "In each [Establishment Clause]
case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 , 465 U. S. 678 (1984). In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy
formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or
practice at issue is a step toward establishing a state religion.
Given today's decision, however, perhaps it is understandable that
the opinions in support of the judgment all but ignore the
Establishment Clause itself and the concerns that underlie it.

															(d) The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward
creating an established church borders on, if it does not trespass
into, the ridiculous. The statute does not remotely threaten
religious liberty; it affirmatively furthers the values of
religious freedom and tolerance that the Establishment Clause was
designed to protect. Without pressuring those who do not wish to
pray, the statute simply creates an opportunity to think, to plan,
or to pray if one wishes -- as Congress does by providing chaplains
and chapels. It accommodates the purely private, voluntary
religious choices of the individual pupils who wish to pray while
at the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for
those who do not choose to pray. The statute also provides a
meaningful opportunity for schoolchildren to appreciate the
absolute constitutional right of each individual to worship and
believe as the individual wishes. The statute "endorses" only the
view that the religious observances of others should be tolerated
and, Page 472 U. S. 90 where possible, accommodated. If the government may not
accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly neutral and
noncoercive manner, the "benevolent neutrality" that we have long
considered the correct constitutional standard will quickly
translate into the "callous indifference" that the Court has
consistently held the Establishment Clause does not require.

															The Court today has ignored the wise admonition of Justice
Goldberg that "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the
ability and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere
shadow." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 308 (concurring opinion). The innocuous statute that the Court strikes
down does not even rise to the level of "mere shadow." JUSTICE
O'CONNOR paradoxically acknowledges: "It is difficult to discern a
serious threat to religious liberty from a room of silent,
thoughtful schoolchildren." Ante at 472 U. S. 73 .
[ Footnote 4/5 ] I would add to that,
"even if they choose to pray."

															The mountains have labored and brought forth a mouse. [ Footnote 4/6 ]

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															The foregoing opinions likewise completely ignore the statement
of purpose that accompanied the moment-of-silence bill throughout
the legislative process:

															"To permit a period of silence to be observed for the
purpose of meditation or voluntary prayer at the
commencement of the first class of each day in all public
schools."

															1981 Ala. Senate J. 14 (emphasis added). See also id. at 150, 307, 410, 535, 938, 967.

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															The four days of trial to which the Court refers concerned only
the alleged practices of vocal, group prayer in the classroom.

															[ Footnote 4/3 ]

															The House Report on the legislation amending the Pledge states
that the purpose of the amendment was to affirm the principle that
"our people and our Government [are dependent] upon the moral
directions of the Creator." H.R.Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
2 (1954). If this is simply "acknowledgment," not "endorsement," of
religion, see ante at 472 U. S. 78 , n.
5 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment), the distinction is far
too infinitesimal for me to grasp.

															[ Footnote 4/4 ]

															The several opinions suggest that other similar statutes may
survive today's decision. See ante at 472 U. S. 59 ; ante at 472 U. S. 62 (POWELL, J., concurring); ante at 472 U. S. 78 , n.
5 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). If this is true, these
opinions become even less comprehensible, given that the Court
holds this statute invalid when there is no legitimate evidence of
"impermissible" purpose; there could hardly be less evidence of
"impermissible" purpose than was shown in these cases.

															[ Footnote 4/5 ]

															The principal plaintiff in this action has stated:

															"'I probably wouldn't have brought the suit just on the silent
meditation or prayer statute. . . . If that's all that existed,
that wouldn't have caused me much concern, unless it was
implemented in a way that suggested prayer was the preferred
activity.'"

															Malone, Prayers for Relief, 71 A.B.A.J. 61, 62, col. l
(Apr.1985) (quoting Ishmael Jaffree).

															[ Footnote 4/6 ]

															Horace, Epistles, bk. III (Ars Poetica), line 139.

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															For the most part agreeing with the opinion of THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, I dissent from the Court's judgment invalidating Ala.Code
§ 16-1-20.1 (Supp.1984). Because I do, it is apparent that in my
view the First Amendment does not proscribe either (1) statutes
authorizing or requiring in so many words a moment of silence
before classes begin or (2) a statute that provides, when it is
initially passed, for a moment of silence for meditation or prayer.
As I read the filed opinions, Page 472 U. S. 91 a majority of the Court would approve statutes that provided for
a moment of silence but did not mention prayer. But if a student
asked whether he could pray during that moment, it is difficult to
believe that the teacher could not answer in the affirmative. If
that is the case, I would not invalidate a statute that at the
outset provided the legislative answer to the question "May I
pray?" This is so even if the Alabama statute is infirm, which I do
not believe it is, because of its peculiar legislative history.

															I appreciate JUSTICE REHNQUIST's explication of the history of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Against that history,
it would be quite understandable if we undertook to reassess our
cases dealing with these Clauses, particularly those dealing with
the Establishment Clause. Of course, I have been out of step with
many of the Court's decisions dealing with this subject matter, and
it is thus not surprising that I would support a basic
reconsideration of our precedents.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.

															Thirty-eight years ago this Court, in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 16 (1947), summarized its exegesis of Establishment Clause doctrine
thus:

															"In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of
religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.' Reynolds v. United States , [ 98 U.S.
145 , 98 U. S. 164 (1879)]."

															This language from Reynolds, a case involving the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, rather than the
Establishment Clause, quoted from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the
Danbury Baptist Association the phrase

															"I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation Page 472 U. S. 92 between church and State."

															8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861).
[ Footnote 5/1 ]

															It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately
the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas
Jefferson was, of course, in France at the time the constitutional
Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and
ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after
the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any
detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary
history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.

															Jefferson's fellow Virginian, James Madison, with whom he was
joined in the battle for the enactment of the Virginia Statute of
Religious Liberty of 1786, did play as large a part as anyone in
the drafting of the Bill of Rights. He had two advantages over
Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and
he was a leading Member of the First Congress. But when we turn to
the record of the proceedings in the First Congress leading up to
the adoption of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution,
including Madison's significant contributions thereto, we see a far
different picture of its purpose than the highly simplified "wall
of separation between church and State."

															During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of
the Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents
of ratification was that, without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing
individual liberty, the new general Government Page 472 U. S. 93 carried with it a potential for tyranny. The typical response to
this argument on the part of those who favored ratification was
that the general Government established by the Constitution had
only delegated powers, and that these delegated powers were so
limited that the Government would have no occasion to violate
individual liberties. This response satisfied some, but not others,
and of the 11 Colonies which ratified the Constitution by early
1789, 5 proposed one or another amendments guaranteeing individual
liberty. Three -- New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia -- included
in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom. See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 659
(1891); 1 id. at 328. Rhode Island and North Carolina
flatly refused to ratify the Constitution in the absence of
amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights. 1 id. at
334; 4 id. at 244. Virginia and North Carolina proposed
identical guarantees of religious freedom:

															"[A]ll men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,
and . . . no particular religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established, by law, in preference to others."

															3 id. at 659; 4 id. at 244. [ Footnote 5/2 ]

															On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose in the House of
Representatives and "reminded the House that this was the day that
he had heretofore named for bringing forward amendments to the
Constitution." 1 Annals of Cong. 424. Madison's subsequent remarks
in urging the House to adopt his drafts of the proposed amendments
were less those of a dedicated advocate of the wisdom of such
measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of
measures Page 472 U. S. 94 sought by a number of his fellow citizens which could surely do
no harm, and might do a great deal of good. He said, inter
alia: "It appears to me that this House is bound by every motive of
prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing
to the State Legislatures, some things to be incorporated into the
Constitution, that will render it as acceptable to the whole people
of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority
of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done,
that those who had been friendly to the adoption of this
Constitution may have the opportunity of proving to those who were
opposed to it that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a
Republican Government, as those who charged them with wishing the
adoption of this Constitution in order to lay the foundation of an
aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to
extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community, any
apprehensions that there are those among his countrymen who wish to
deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and
honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired of such a
nature as will not injure the Constitution, and they can be
ingrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our
fellow-citizens, the friends of the Federal Government will evince
that spirit of deference and concession for which they have
hitherto been distinguished." Id. at 431-432.

															The language Madison proposed for what ultimately became the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment was this:

															"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id. at 434. Page 472 U. S. 95 On the same day that Madison proposed them, the amendments which
formed the basis for the Bill of Rights were referred by the House
to a Committee of the Whole, and after several weeks' delay, were
then referred to a Select Committee consisting of Madison and 10
others. The Committee revised Madison's proposal regarding the
establishment of religion to read:

															"[N]o religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 729.

															The Committee's proposed revisions were debated in the House on
August 15, 1789. The entire debate on the Religion Clauses is
contained in two full columns of the "Annals," and does not seem
particularly illuminating. See id. at 729-731.
Representative Peter Sylvester of New York expressed his dislike
for the revised version, because it might have a tendency "to
abolish religion altogether." Representative John Vining suggested
that the two parts of the sentence be transposed; Representative
Elbridge Gerry thought the language should be changed to read "that
no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id. at
729. Roger Sherman of Connecticut had the traditional reason for
opposing provisions of a Bill of Rights -- that Congress had no
delegated authority to "make religious establishments" -- and
therefore he opposed the adoption of the amendment. Representative
Daniel Carroll of Maryland thought it desirable to adopt the words
proposed, saying

															"[h]e would not contend with gentlemen about the phraseology,
his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to
satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community."

															Madison then spoke, and said that

															"he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation
of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary
to their conscience." Id. at 730. He said that some of the state conventions
had thought that Congress might rely on Page 472 U. S. 96 the Necessary and Proper Clause to infringe the rights of
conscience or to establish a national religion, and

															"to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was
intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the
language would admit." Ibid. Representative Benjamin Huntington then expressed the view that
the Committee's language might

															"be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the
cause of religion. He understood the amendment to mean what had
been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others might
find it convenient to put another construction upon it."

															Huntington, from Connecticut, was concerned that in the New
England States, where state-established religions were the rule,
rather than the exception, the federal courts might not be able to
entertain claims based upon an obligation under the bylaws of a
religious organization to contribute to the support of a minister
or the building of a place of worship. He hoped that

															"the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the
rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of
religion, but not to patronise those who professed no religion at
all." Id. at 730-731.

															Madison responded that the insertion of the word "national"
before the word "religion" in the Committee version should satisfy
the minds of those who had criticized the language.

															"He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a
preeminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to
which they would compel others to conform. He thought that, if the
word 'national' was introduced, it would point the amendment
directly to the object it was intended to prevent." Id. at 731. Representative Samuel Livermore expressed
himself as dissatisfied with Madison's proposed amendment, and
thought it would be better if the Committee language were altered
to read that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
infringing the rights of conscience." Ibid. Representative Gerry spoke in opposition to the use of the word
"national" because of strong feelings expressed during Page 472 U. S. 97 the ratification debates that a federal government, not a
national government, was created by the Constitution. Madison
thereby withdrew his proposal, but insisted that his reference to a
"national religion" only referred to a national establishment, and
did not mean that the Government was a national one. The question
was taken on Representative Livermore's motion, which passed by a
vote of 31 for and 20 against. Ibid. The following week, without any apparent debate, the House voted
to alter the language of the Religion Clauses to read

															"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent
the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of
conscience." Id. at 766. The floor debates in the Senate were
secret, and therefore not reported in the Annals. The Senate, on
September 3, 1789, considered several different forms of the
Religion Amendment, and reported this language back to the
House:

															"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a
mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion."

															C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal
Establishment 130 (1964).

															The House refused to accept the Senate's changes in the Bill of
Rights, and asked for a conference; the version which emerged from
the conference was that which ultimately found its way into the
Constitution as a part of the First Amendment.

															"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

															The House and the Senate both accepted this language on
successive days, and the Amendment was proposed in this form.

															On the basis of the record of these proceedings in the House of
Representatives, James Madison was undoubtedly the most important
architect among the Members of the Page 472 U. S. 98 House of the Amendments which became the Bill of Rights, but it
was James Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative
compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution.
During the ratification debate in the Virginia Convention, Madison
had actually opposed the idea of any Bill of Rights. His
sponsorship of the Amendments in the House was obviously not that
of a zealous believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses, but
of one who felt it might do some good, could do no harm, and would
satisfy those who had ratified the Constitution on the condition
that Congress propose a Bill of Rights. [ Footnote 5/3 ] His original language "nor shall any
national religion be established" obviously does not conform to the
"wall of separation" between church and State idea which latter-day
commentators have ascribed to him. His explanation on the floor of
the meaning of his language -- "that Congress should not establish
a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law" -- is
of the same ilk. When he replied to Huntington in the debate over
the proposal which came from the Select Committee of the House, he
urged that the language "no religion shall be established by law"
should be amended by inserting the word "national" in front of the
word "religion."

															It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking,
as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he
saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a
national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among
sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of
government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's
opinion in Everson -- while correct in bracketing Madison
and Jefferson together in their exertions in their home State
leading to the enactment of the Page 472 U. S. 99 Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty -- is totally incorrect in
suggesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of the
United States House of Representatives when he proposed the
language which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights.

															The repetition of this error in the Court's opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), and, inter alia, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 (1962), does not make it any sounder
historically. Finally, in Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 214 (1963), the Court made the truly remarkable statement that

															"the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams,
came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but
likewise in those of most of our States"

															(footnote omitted). On the basis of what evidence we have, this
statement is demonstrably incorrect as a matter of history.
[ Footnote 5/4 ] And its repetition
in varying forms in succeeding opinions of the Court can give it no
more authority than it possesses as a matter of fact; stare
decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot
bind them as to matters of history.

															None of the other Members of Congress who spoke during the
August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they
thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or the
evil to be aimed at, would require that the Government be
absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion. The evil to
be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned, appears to
have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the
preference of one religious sect over another; but it was
definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid all
religions evenhandedly. If one were to follow the advice of JUSTICE
BRENNAN, concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp,
supra, at 374 U. S. 236 ,
and construe the Amendment in the light of what particular Page 472 U. S. 100 "practices . . . challenged threaten those consequences which
the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote
that type of interdependence between religion and state which the
First Amendment was designed to prevent,"

															one would have to say that the First Amendment Establishment
Clause should be read no more broadly than to prevent the
establishment of a national religion or the governmental preference
of one religious sect over another.

															The actions of the First Congress, which reenacted the Northwest
Ordinance for the governance of the Northwest Territory in 1789,
confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the Government
should be neutral between religion and irreligion. The House of
Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the same day as
Madison introduced his proposed amendments which became the Bill of
Rights; while at that time the Federal Government was, of course,
not bound by draft amendments to the Constitution which had not yet
been proposed by Congress, say nothing of ratified by the States,
it seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would
simultaneously consider proposed amendments to the Constitution and
enact an important piece of territorial legislation which
conflicted with the intent of those proposals. The Northwest
Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, reenacted the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
and provided that

															"[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged." Id. at 52, n. (a). Land grants for schools in the
Northwest Territory were not limited to public schools. It was not
until 1845 that Congress limited land grants in the new States and
Territories to nonsectarian schools. 5 Stat. 788; C. Antieau, A.
Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 163
(1964).

															On the day after the House of Representatives voted to adopt the
form of the First Amendment Religion Clauses which was ultimately
proposed and ratified, Representative Page 472 U. S. 101 Elias Boudinot proposed a resolution asking President George
Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Boudinot said
he

															"could not think of letting the session pass over without
offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United States of
joining with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their sincere
thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon them."

															1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789). Representative Aedanas Burke
objected to the resolution because he did not like "this mimicking
of European customs"; Representative Thomas Tucker objected that
whether or not the people had reason to be satisfied with the
Constitution was something that the States knew better than the
Congress, and, in any event, "it is a religious matter, and, as
such, is proscribed to us." Id. at 915. Representative
Sherman supported the resolution "not only as a laudable one in
itself, but as warranted by a number of precedents in Holy Writ:
for instance, the solemn thanksgivings and rejoicings which took
place in the time of Solomon, after the building of the temple, was
a case in point. This example, he thought, worthy of Christian
imitation on the present occasion. . . ." Ibid. Boudinot's resolution was carried in the affirmative on
September 25, 1789. Boudinot and Sherman, who favored the
Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted in favor of the adoption of the
proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the Religion
Clauses; Tucker, who opposed the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted
against the adoption of the amendments which became the Bill of
Rights.

															Within two weeks of this action by the House, George Washington
responded to the Joint Resolution which by now had been changed to
include the language that the President

															"recommend to the people of the United States a day of public
thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with
grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God,
especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish
a form of government for their safety and happiness."

															1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of Page 472 U. S. 102 the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1897). The Presidential
Proclamation was couched in these words:

															"Now, therefore, I do recommend and assign Thursday, the 26th
day of November next, to be devoted by the people of these States
to the service of that great and glorious Being who is the
beneficent author of all the good that was, that is, or that will
be; that we may then all unite in rendering unto Him our sincere
and humble thanks for His kind care and protection of the people of
this country previous to their becoming a nation; for the signal
and manifold mercies and the favorable interpositions of His
providence in the course and conclusion of the late war; for the
great degree of tranquillity, union, and plenty which we have since
enjoyed; for the peaceable and rational manner in which we have
been enabled to establish constitutions of government for our
safety and happiness, and particularly the national one now lately
instituted; for the civil and religious liberty with which we are
blessed, and the means we have of acquiring and diffusing useful
knowledge; and, in general, for all the great and various favors
which He has been pleased to confer upon us."

															"And also that we may then unite in most humbly offering our
prayers and supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations,
and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions; to
enable us all, whether in public or private stations, to perform
our several and relative duties properly and punctually; to render
our National Government a blessing to all the people by constantly
being a Government of wise, just, and constitutional laws,
discreetly and faithfully executed and obeyed; to protect and guide
all sovereigns and nations (especially such as have shown kindness
to us), and to bless them with good governments, peace, and
concord; to promote the knowledge and practice of true religion and
virtue, and the increase of science among them and Page 472 U. S. 103 us; and, generally, to grant unto all mankind such a degree of
temporal prosperity as He alone knows to be best." Ibid. George Washington, John Adams, and James Madison all issued
Thanksgiving Proclamations; Thomas Jefferson did not, saying:

															"Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining them
an act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to
determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the objects
proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and this
right can never be safer than in their own hands, where the
Constitution has deposited it."

															11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 429 (A. Lipscomb ed.1904).

															As the United States moved from the 18th into the 19th century,
Congress appropriated time and again public moneys in support of
sectarian Indian education carried on by religious organizations.
Typical of these was Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians,
which provided annual cash support for the Tribe's Roman Catholic
priest and church. [ Footnote 5/5 ]
It was not until 1897, when aid to sectarian education Page 472 U. S. 104 for Indians had reached $500,000 annually, that Congress decided
thereafter to cease appropriating money for education in sectarian
schools. See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, 79; cf.
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 , 210 U. S. 77 -79
(1908); J. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution
118-119 (1949). See generally R. Cord, Separation of
Church and State 61-82 (1982). This history shows the fallacy of
the notion found in Everson that "no tax in any amount" may be
levied for religious activities in any form. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
15 -16.

															Joseph Story, a Member of this Court from 1811 to 1845, and
during much of that time a professor at the Harvard Law School,
published by far the most comprehensive treatise on the United
States Constitution that had then appeared. Volume 2 of Story's
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 630-632 (5th
ed. 1891) discussed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment this way:

															"Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and
of the amendment to it now under consideration [First Amendment],
the general if not the universal sentiment in America was that
Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State so far
as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all
religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in
utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if
not universal indignation."

															" * * * *" "The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not to
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or
infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry
among Christian sects, and to prevent Page 472 U. S. 105 any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It
thus cut off the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest
of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience
in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from
the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . ."

															(Footnotes omitted.)

															Thomas Cooley's eminence as a legal authority rivaled that of
Story. Cooley stated in his treatise entitled Constitutional
Limitations that aid to a particular religious sect was prohibited
by the United States Constitution, but he went on to say:

															"But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend
religious freedom and equality, the American constitutions contain
no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn
recognition of a superintending Providence in public transactions
and exercises as the general religious sentiment of mankind
inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite and dependent
beings. Whatever may be the shades of religious belief, all must
acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in important human affairs
the superintending care and control of the Great Governor of the
Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving his boundless
favors, or bowing in contrition when visited with the penalties of
his broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is violated
when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed; when chaplains are
designated for the army and navy; when legislative sessions are
opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, or when
religious teaching is encouraged by a general exemption of the
houses of religious worship from taxation for the support of State
government. Undoubtedly the spirit of the Constitution will
require, in all these cases, that care be taken to avoid
discrimination Page 472 U. S. 106 in favor of or against any one religious denomination or sect;
but the power to do any of these things does not become
unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse. . .
." Id. at *470-*471.

															Cooley added that

															"[t]his public recognition of religious worship, however, is not
based entirely, perhaps not even mainly, upon a sense of what is
due to the Supreme Being himself as the author of all good and of
all law; but the same reasons of state policy which induce the
government to aid institutions of charity and seminaries of
instruction will incline it also to foster religious worship and
religious institutions, as conservators of the public morals and
valuable, if not indispensable, assistants to the preservation of
the public order." Id. at *470.

															It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it
forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade
preference among religious sects or denominations. Indeed, the
first American dictionary defined the word "establishment" as "the
act of establishing, founding, ratifying or ordaining," such as in
"[t]he episcopal form of religion, so called, in England." 1 N.
Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed.
1828). The Establishment Clause did not require government
neutrality between religion and irreligion, nor did it prohibit the
Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to
religion. There is simply no historical foundation for the
proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of
separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson. Notwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this
theory of rigid separation, the wall idea might well have served as
a useful, albeit misguided, analytical concept, had it led this
Court to unified and principled results in Establishment Clause
cases. The opposite, unfortunately, has been Page 472 U. S. 107 true; in the 38 years since Everson, our Establishment
Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified. Our recent
opinions, many of them hopelessly divided pluralities, [ Footnote 5/6 ] have with embarrassing candor
conceded that the "wall of separation" is merely a "blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier," which "is not wholly accurate"
and can only be "dimly perceived." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 614 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 , 403 U. S.
677 -678, (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S. 236 (1977); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 , 465 U. S. 673 (1984).

															Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical
unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but
useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It
illustrates only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's
observation that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 244 N.Y. 84,
94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).

															But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous
diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of
the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of litigation," ante at 472 U. S. 52 , is
well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of
testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of
historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true.
The "wall of separation between church and State" is a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a
guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly
abandoned. Page 472 U. S. 108 The Court has more recently attempted to add some mortar to Everson's wall through the three-part test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S.
614 -615, which served at first to offer a more useful
test for purposes of the Establishment Clause than did the "wall"
metaphor. Generally stated, the Lemon test proscribes
state action that has a sectarian purpose or effect, or causes an
impermissible governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon cited Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 , 392 U. S. 243 (1968), as the source of the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the
three-part test. The Allen opinion explains, however, how
it inherited the purpose and effect elements from Schempp and Everson, both of which contain the historical errors
described above. See Allen, supra, at 392 U. S. 243 .
Thus the purpose and effect prongs have the same historical
deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based
on either the language or intent of the drafters.

															The secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application
because it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully
stated how the test is to operate. If the purpose prong is intended
to void those aids to sectarian institutions accompanied by a
stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will condemn
nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and
says nothing about aiding religion. Thus, the constitutionality of
a statute may depend upon what the legislators put into the
legislative history and, more importantly, what they leave out. The
purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to
express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references,
because legislators might do just that. Faced with a valid
legislative secular purpose, we could not properly ignore that
purpose without a factual basis for doing so. Larson v.
Valente, 456 U. S. 228 , 456 U. S.
262 -263 (1982) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

															However, if the purpose prong is aimed to void all statutes
enacted with the intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether
stated or not, then most statutes providing any aid, such as Page 472 U. S. 109 textbooks or bus rides for sectarian school children, will fail
because one of the purposes behind every statute, whether stated or
not, is to aid the target of its largesse. In other words, if the
purpose prong requires an absence of any intent to aid sectarian
institutions, whether or not expressed, few state laws in this area
could pass the test, and we would be required to void some state
aids to religion which we have already upheld. E.g., Allen,
supra. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test came from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 674 (1970). Walz involved a constitutional challenge to New
York's time-honored practice of providing state property tax
exemptions to church property used in worship. The Walz opinion refused to "undermine the ultimate constitutional objective
[of the Establishment Clause] as illuminated by history," id. at 397 U. S. 671 ,
and upheld the tax exemption. The Court examined the historical
relationship between the State and church when church property was
in issue, and determined that the challenged tax exemption did not
so entangle New York with the church as to cause an intrusion or
interference with religion. Interferences with religion should
arguably be dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause, but the
entanglement inquiry in Walz was consistent with that
case's broad survey of the relationship between state taxation and
religious property.

															We have not always followed Walz' reflective inquiry
into entanglement, however. E.g., Wolman, supra, at 433 U. S. 254 .
One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when
divorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an "insoluble
paradox" in school aid cases: we have required aid to parochial
schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet
this close supervision itself will create an entanglement. Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.
S. 736 , 426 U. S.
768 -769 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). For
example, in Wolman, supra, the Court in part struck the
State's nondiscriminatory provision of buses for parochial school
field trips, because the state supervision Page 472 U. S. 110 of sectarian officials in charge of field trips would be too
onerous. This type of self-defeating result is certainly not
required to ensure that States do not establish religions.

															The entanglement test as applied in cases like Wolman also ignores the myriad state administrative regulations properly
placed upon sectarian institutions such as curriculum, attendance,
and certification requirements for sectarian schools, or fire and
safety regulations for churches. Avoiding entanglement between
church and State may be an important consideration in a case like Walz, but if the entanglement prong were applied to all
state and church relations in the automatic manner in which it has
been applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly require
anything of church-related institutions as a condition for receipt
of financial assistance.

															These difficulties arise because the Lemon test has no
more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the
wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test represents a
determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically
faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound as the doctrine
it attempts to service. The three-part test has simply not provided
adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this
Court has slowly come to realize. Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality
opinions, see 472 U.S.
38 fn5/6|>n. 6, supra, depending upon how each of
the three factors applies to a certain state action. The results
from our school services cases show the difficulty we have
encountered in making the Lemon test yield principled
results.

															For example, a State may lend to parochial school children
geography textbooks [ Footnote 5/7 ]
that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. [ Footnote 5/8 ] A State may lend textbooks on
American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on Page 472 U. S. 111 George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history
class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend
workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus
rendering them nonreusable. [ Footnote
5/9 ] A State may pay for bus transportation to religious
schools, [ Footnote 5/10 ] but may
not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the
public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. [ Footnote 5/11 ] A State may pay for
diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school, but
therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech
and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian
school are forbidden, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 , 421 U. S. 367 , 421 U. S. 371 (1975), but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic
testing inside the sectarian school. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 241 .
Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but
it must take place outside of the parochial school, [ Footnote 5/12 ] such as in a trailer
parked down the street. Id. at 433 U. S. 245 .
A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the
administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting
services, [ Footnote 5/13 ] but it
may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular
subjects. [ Footnote 5/14 ]
Religious instruction may not be given in public school, [ Footnote 5/15 ] but the public school may
release students during the day for religion classes elsewhere, and
may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws.
[ Footnote 5/16 ]

															These results violate the historically sound principle

															"that the Establishment Clause does not forbid governments . . .
to [provide] general welfare under which benefits are distributed
to private individuals, even though many of those individuals Page 472 U. S. 112 may elect to use those benefits in ways that 'aid' religious
instruction or worship." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S. 799 (1973) (BURGER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
It is not surprising in the light of this record that our most
recent opinions have expressed doubt on the usefulness of the Lemon test.

															Although the test initially provided helpful assistance, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 (1971), we soon began describing the test as only
a "guideline," Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, and lately we have described it as
"no more than [a] useful signpos[t]." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S. 394 (1983), citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.
S. 734 , 413 U. S. 741 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.
S. 116 (1982). We have noted that the Lemon test is "not easily applied," Meek, supra, at 421 U. S. 358 ,
and as JUSTICE WHITE noted in Committee for Public Education
& Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.
S. 646 (1980), under the Lemon test we have
"sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility." 444 U.S.
at 444 U. S. 662 .
In Lynch, we reiterated that the Lemon test has
never been binding on the Court, and we cited two cases where we
had declined to apply it. 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 679 ,
citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.
S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.
S. 228 (1982).

															If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply, and yields
unprincipled results, I see little use in it. The "crucible of
litigation," ante at 472 U. S. 52 ,
has produced only consistent unpredictability, and today's effort
is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task of trying to patch
together the blurred, indistinct and variable barrier'
described in Lemon v. Kurtzman. " Regan, supra, at 444 U. S. 671 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). We have done much straining since 1947,
but still we admit that we can only "dimly perceive" the Everson wall. Tilton, supra. Our perception has
been clouded not by the Constitution, but by the mists of an
unnecessary metaphor. Page 472 U. S. 113 The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in
its history. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S.
671 -673; see also Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S.
673 -678. As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers
inscribed the principles that control today. Any deviation from
their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter, and
will only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has
plagued our Establishment Clause cases since Everson. The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the
designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also
designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference
for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the
"incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States
via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are
prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating
between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in
the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral
between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit
Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends
through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.

															The Court strikes down the Alabama statute because the State
wished to "characterize prayer as a favored practice." Ante at 472 U. S. 60 . It
would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of
Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today
to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority,
prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endorsing" prayer. George
Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which
passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving
and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts
the many and signal favors of Almighty God." History must judge
whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of
the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.

															The State surely has a secular interest in regulating the manner
in which public schools are conducted. Nothing in Page 472 U. S. 114 the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly
understood, prohibits any such generalized "endorsement" of prayer.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

															[ Footnote 5/1 ] Reynolds is the only authority cited as direct
precedent for the "wall of separation theory." 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 16 . Reynolds is truly inapt; it dealt with a Mormon's Free
Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy law.

															[ Footnote 5/2 ]

															The New York and Rhode Island proposals were quite similar. They
stated that no particular "religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established by law in preference to others." 1 Elliot's
Debates, at 328; id. at 334.

															[ Footnote 5/3 ]

															In a letter he sent to Jefferson in France, Madison stated that
he did not see much importance in a Bill of Rights, but he planned
to support it because it was "anxiously desired by others . . .
[and] it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of
disservice." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 (G. Hunt ed.1904).

															[ Footnote 5/4 ]

															State establishments were prevalent throughout the late 18th and
early 19th centuries. See Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1,
Art. III; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art. VI; Md. Declaration of Rights
of 1776, Art. XXXIII; R. I. Charter of 1633 (superseded 1842).

															[ Footnote 5/5 ]

															The treaty stated in part:

															" And whereas, the greater part of said Tribe have been
baptized and received into the Catholic church, to which they are
much attached, the United States will give annually for seven years
one hundred dollars towards the support of a priest of that
religion . . . [a]nd . . . three hundred dollars, to assist the
said Tribe in the erection of a church."

															7 Stat. 79.

															From 1789 to 1823 the United States Congress had provided a
trust endowment of up to 12,000 acres of land "for the Society of
the United Brethren, for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen." See, e.g., ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490. The Act creating this
endowment was renewed periodically and the renewals were signed
into law by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson.

															Congressional grants for the aid of religion were not limited to
Indians. In 1787, Congress provided land to the Ohio Company,
including acreage for the support of religion. This grant was
reauthorized in 1792. See 1 Stat. 257. In 1833, Congress
authorized the State of Ohio to sell the land set aside for
religion and use the proceeds "for the support of religion . . .
and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. . . ." 4 Stat.
618-619.

															[ Footnote 5/6 ] Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 , 403 U. S. 677 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 (1975) (partial); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of
Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 (1977).

															Many of our other Establishment Clause cases have been decided
by bare 5-4 majorities. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.
S. 228 (1982); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 (1983); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 (1984); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.
S. 472 (1973).

															[ Footnote 5/7 ] Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968).

															[ Footnote 5/8 ] Meek, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S.
362 -366. A science book is permissible, a science kit is
not. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
249 .

															[ Footnote 5/9 ] See Meek, supra, at 421 U. S.
354 -355, nn. 3, 4, 421 U. S.
362 -366.

															[ Footnote 5/10 ] Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 (1947).

															[ Footnote 5/11 ] Wolman, supra, at 433 U. S.
252 -255.

															[ Footnote 5/12 ] Wolman, supra, at 433 U. S.
241 -248; Meek, supra, at 421 U. S. 352 ,
n. 2, 421 U. S.
367 -373.

															[ Footnote 5/13 ] Regan, 444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 648 , 444 U. S.
657 -659.

															[ Footnote 5/14 ] Levitt, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
479 -482.

															[ Footnote 5/15 ] Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).

															[ Footnote 5/16 ] Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).

Summary: In Wallace v. Jaffree, the Supreme Court ruled that an Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court found that the statute lacked a secular legislative purpose and was solely motivated by a purpose to advance religion, as indicated by the sponsor's statements and the statute's relationship with other Alabama laws. The ruling affirmed the individual's freedom to choose their own creed or none at all, protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and prohibited states from establishing an official religion.