NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 17–586 and 17–626

															_________________

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–586 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–626 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															on appeals from the united states district
court for the western district of texas

															[June 25, 2018]

															Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Before us for review are orders of a three-judge
court in the Western District of Texas effectively directing the
State not to conduct this year’s elections using districting plans
that the court itself adopted some years earlier. The court
developed those plans for use in the 2012 elections pursuant to our
directions in Perry v. Perez , 565 U. S. 388
(2012) ( per curiam ). We instructed the three-judge court to
start with the plans adopted by the Texas Legislature in 2011 but
to make adjustments as required by the Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act. Id. , at 392–396. After those plans were used in
2012, the Texas Legislature enacted them (with only minor
modifications) in 2013, and the plans were used again in both 2014
and 2016.

															Last year, however, the three-judge court
reversed its prior analysis and held that some of the districts in
those plans are unlawful. After reviewing the repealed 2011 plans,
which had never been used, the court found that they were tainted
by discriminatory intent and that the 2013 Legislature had not
“cured” that “taint.”

															We now hold that the three-judge court committed
a fundamental legal error. It was the challengers’ burden to show
that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent when it
enacted plans that the court itself had produced. The 2013
Legislature was not obligated to show that it had “cured” the
unlawful intent that the court attributed to the 2011 Legislature.
Thus, the essential pillar of the three-judge court’s reasoning was
critically flawed.

															When the congressional and state legislative
districts are reviewed under the proper legal standards, all but
one of them, we conclude, are lawful.

															I

															A

															The 2010 decennial census revealed that the
population of Texas had grown by more than 20% and the State was
therefore apportioned four additional seats in the United States
House of Representatives. C. J. S. 369a.[ 1 ] To accommodate this new allocation and the
population changes shown by the census, the Legislature adopted a
new congressional districting plan, as well as new districting maps
for the two houses of the State Legislature.

															Redistricting is never easy, and the task was
especially complicated in Texas in 2011. Not only was the
Legislature required to draw districts that were substantially
equal in population, see Perry , supra , at 391–392; Rey- nolds v. Sims , 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders , 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and to
comply with special state-law districting rules,[ 2 ] but federal law imposed complex and
delicately balanced requirements regarding the consideration of
race.

															Then, as now, federal law restricted the use of
race in making districting decisions. The Equal Protection Clause
forbids “racial gerrymandering,” that is, intentionally assigning
citizens to a district on the basis of race without sufficient
justification. Shaw v. Reno , 509 U. S. 630, 641
(1993). It also prohibits intentional “vote dilution”—“invidiously
. . . minimiz[ing] or cancel[ing] out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U. S. 55, 66–67 (1980) (plurality
opinion).

															While the Equal Protection Clause imposes these
important restrictions, its application in the field of districting
is complicated. For one thing, because a voter’s race sometimes
correlates closely with political party preference, see Cooper v. Harris , 581 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017)
(slip op., at 19–20); Easley v. Cromartie , 532
U. S. 234, 243 (2001), it may be very difficult for a court to
determine whether a districting decision was based on race or party
preference. Here, the three-judge court found that the two factors
were virtually indistinguishable.[ 3 ]

															At the same time that the Equal Protection
Clause restricts the consideration of race in the districting
process, compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79Stat.
437, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq. (VRA), pulls in the opposite direction: It often insists that
districts be created precisely because of race. Two provisions of
the VRA exert such demands, and in 2011, Texas was subject to both.
At that time, Texas was covered by §5 of the VRA[ 4 ] and was thus barred from making any
districting changes unless it could prove that they did not result
in “retrogression” with respect to the ability of racial minorities
to elect the candidates of their choice. Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama , 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)
(slip op., at 3). That showing obviously demanded consideration of
race.

															On top of this, Texas was (and still is)
required to comply with §2 of the VRA. A State violates §2 if its
districting plan provides “ ‘less opportunity’ ” for
racial minorities “ ‘to elect representatives of their
choice.’ ” League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry , 548 U. S. 399, 425 (2006) ( LULAC ). In a
series of cases tracing back to Thornburg v. Gingles ,
478 U. S. 30 (1986), we have interpreted this standard to mean
that, under certain circumstance, States must draw “opportunity”
districts in which minority groups form “effective majorit[ies],” LULAC , supra , at 426.

															Since the Equal Protection Clause restricts
consideration of race and the VRA demands consideration of race, a
legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is
vulnerable to “ ‘competing hazards of liability.’ ” Bush v. Vera , 517 U. S. 952, 977 (1996)
(plurality opinion). In an effort to harmonize these conflicting
demands, we have assumed that compliance with the VRA may justify
the consideration of race in a way that would not otherwise be
allowed. In technical terms, we have assumed that complying with
the VRA is a compelling state interest, see, e.g. , Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections , 580
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 13); Shaw v. Hunt , 517 U. S. 899, 915 (1996), and that a State’s
consideration of race in making a districting decision is narrowly
tailored and thus satisfies strict scrutiny if the State has
“ ‘good reasons’ ” for believing that its decision is
necessary in order to comply with the VRA. Cooper , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 3).

															B

															Facing this legal obstacle course, the Texas
Legislature in 2011 adopted new districting plans, but those plans
were immediately tied up in litigation and were never used. Several
plaintiff groups quickly filed challenges in the District Court for
the Western District of Texas, arguing that some of the districts
in the new plans were racial gerrymanders, some were based on
intentional vote dilution, and some had the effect of depriving
minorities of the equal opportunity to elect the candidates of
their choice. This case was assigned to a three-judge court, as
required by 28 U. S. C. §2284(a). (We will call this
court “the Texas court” or simply “the District Court.”)

															The situation was further complicated by the
requirement that Texas obtain preclearance of its new plans. To do
this, Texas filed for a declaratory judgment in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. See Texas v. United
States , 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (2012). (We will call
this court “the D. C. court.”) By early 2012, the D. C. court had
not yet issued a decision, and Texas needed usable plans for its
rapidly approaching primaries. Accordingly, the Texas court drew up
interim plans for that purpose. Perez v. Perry , 835
F. Supp. 2d 209 (2011). In creating those plans, the
majority of the Texas court thought that it was not “required to
give any deference to the Legislature’s enacted plan.” Id. ,
at 213. Instead, it based its plans on what it called “neutral
principles that advance the interest of the collective public
good.” Id. , at 212.[ 5 ]

															Texas challenged those court-ordered plans in
this Court, and we reversed. Perry v. Perez , 565
U. S. 388 (2012) ( per curiam ). Noting that
“[r]edistricting is ‘primarily the duty and responsibility of the
State,’ ” we held that the Texas court should have respected the
legislative judgments embodied in the 2011 plans to the extent
allowed by the Constitution and the VRA. Id. , at
392–399.

															We remanded the case with very specific
instructions. The Texas court was told to start with the plans
adopted by the Legislature but to modify those plans as needed so
as “not to incorporate . . . any legal defects.” Id. , at 394. With respect to claims under the Constitution
or §2 of the VRA, the District Court was told to change a district
if the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of
their challenge. Ibid. And with respect to §5 claims, the
court was instructed to make whatever changes were needed to
obviate any legal claim that was “not insubstantial.”[ 6 ] Id. , at 395. Thus, our
instructions, in an abundance of caution, demanded changes in the
challenged 2011 plans without proof that those changes were
actually required by either the Constitution or the VRA.

															On remand, the Texas court ordered additional
briefing and heard two more days of argument. App. 29a, 35a–50a;
Order in Civ. No. 11–cv–00360, Doc. No. 616. It issued two
opinions, totaling more than 70 pages, and analyzed disputed
districts in detail. C. J. S. 367a–423a;
H. J. S. 300a–315a. While stressing the preliminary
nature of its determinations, see C. J. S. 368a;
H. J. S. 314a–315a, the court found that some districts
required change and that others were lawful, C. J. S.
367a–423a; H. J. S. 300a–315a. The court then adopted
plans for the State’s congressional districts and for both houses
of the State Legislature. (The plan for the State Senate is not at
issue.)

															Both the congressional plan and the plan for the
Texas House departed significantly from the State’s 2011 plans. At
least 8 of the 36 congressional districts were markedly altered,
and 21 districts in the plan for the Texas House were
“substantially” changed. H. J. S. 314a;
C. J. S. 397a–408a.

															In August 2012, the D. C. court denied
preclearance of the plans adopted by the Legislature in 2011, see Texas v. United States , supra , so the
State conducted the 2012 elections under the interim plans devised
by the Texas court. At the same time, Texas filed an appeal in this
Court contesting the decision of the D. C. court,[ 7 ] but that appeal ultimately died for two
reasons.

															First, the 2011 plans were repealed. The Texas
attorney general urged the Legislature to pass new redistricting
plans, C. J. S. 429a, and in his view, the “best way to
remedy the violations found by the D. C. court” was to “adopt the
[Texas court’s] interim plans as the State’s permanent
redistricting maps.” Id. , at 432a. Doing so, he said, would
“confirm the legislature’s intent” to adopt “a redistricting plan
that fully comports with the law.” Id. , at 429a.

															The Governor called a special session to do just
that, and the Legislature complied. One of the legislative
sponsors, Senator Seliger, explained that, although “ ‘the
Texas Legislature remains confident that the legislatively-drawn
maps adopted in 2011 are fair and legal . . . , there
remain several outstanding legal questions regarding these maps
that undermine the stability and predictability of the electoral
process in Texas.’ ” 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 649, n. 40
(2017). Counsel for one of the plaintiff groups, the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), testified in
favor of the plans. C. J. S. 436a–439a. The 2013
Legislature then repealed the 2011 plans and enacted the Texas
court’s interim plans with just a few minor changes. The federal
congressional plan was not altered at all, and only small
modifications were made to the plan for the Texas House.
C. J. S. Findings 231a–232a.

															On the day after the Legislature passed the new
plans and the day before the Governor signed them, this Court
issued its decision in Shelby County v. Holder , 570
U. S. 529 (2013), which invalidated the coverage formula in §4
of the Voting Rights Act. Now no longer subject to §5, Texas
obtained a vacatur of the D. C. court’s order on preclearance. 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 634–635, and n. 11.

															With the never-effective 2011 plans now repealed
and any preclearance issues overcome by events, the State argued in
the Texas court that the plaintiffs’ case against the 2011 plans
was moot. In September 2013, the Texas court allowed the plaintiffs
to amend their complaints to challenge the 2013 plans, but the
court held that their challenges to the 2011 plans were still
alive, reasoning that the repeal of the 2011 plans represented the
“voluntary cessation” of allegedly unconstitutional
conduct.[ 8 ]

															Texas conducted its 2014 and 2016 elections
under the plans that had been preliminarily approved by the Texas
court and subsequently adopted (with only minor changes) by the
Legislature in 2013. But in March and April 2017, after multiple
trials, the Texas court issued a pair of rulings on the defunct
2011 plans. The court reaffirmed the conclusions it had reached in
2012 about defects in the 2011 plans, and it went further. Contrary
to its earlier decision, it held that Congressional District (CD)
35 is an impermissible racial gerrymander and that CD27 violates §2
of the Voting Rights Act because it has the effect of diluting the
electoral opportunities of Latino voters. C. J. S. 181a,
193a–194a. Previously, the court had provided detailed reasons for
rejecting the very arguments that it now accepted. Id. , at
409a–423a. Similarly, the court held that multiple districts in the
plan for the Texas House were the result of intentional vote
dilution. These included districts in the counties of Nueces (House
District (HD) 32, HD34), Bell (HD54, HD55), and Dallas (HD103,
HD104, HD105). H. J. S. 275a–276a.[ 9 ]

															In August 2017, having ruled on the repealed
2011 plans, the Texas court finally turned its attention to the
plans then in effect— i.e. , the plans that had been developed
by the court, adopted by the Legislature in 2013, and used in both
the 2014 and 2016 elections. The court invalidated the districts in
those plans that correspond to districts in the 2011 plan that it
had just held to be unlawful, i.e. , CD27, CD35, HD32, HD34,
HD54, HD55, HD103, HD104, and HD105. See 274 F. Supp. 3d
624 (2017) (No. 17–586) and 267 F. Supp. 3d 750 (2017)
(No. 17–626).

															In reaching these conclusions, the court pointed
to the discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011
Legislature, and it attributed this same intent to the 2013
Legislature because it had failed to “engage in a deliberative
process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011
plans.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 645–652; 267 F. Supp. 3d, at
757. The court saw “no indication that the Legislature looked to
see whether any discriminatory taint remained in the plans.” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 649. And it faulted the State because it “did
not accept [findings of the D. C. court] and instead appealed
to the Supreme Court.” Ibid. Seeing no evidence that the
State had undergone “a change of heart,” the court concluded that
the Legislature’s “decision to adopt the [District Court’s] plans”
was a “litigation strategy designed to insulate the 2011 or 2013
plans from further challenge, regardless of their legal
infirmities.” Id. , at 649–650. Finally, summarizing its
analysis, the court reiterated that the 2011 Legislature’s
“discriminatory taint was not removed by the [2013] Legislature’s
enactment of the Court’s interim plans, because the Legislature
engaged in no deliberative process to remove any such taint, and in
fact intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from
remedy.” Id. , at 686.

															The Texas court’s decisions about CD35 and all
but three of the Texas House districts were based entirely on its
finding that the 2013 Legislature had not purged its predecessor’s
discriminatory intent. However, the court also held that three
districts—CD27, HD32, and HD34—were invalid under §2 of the Voting
Rights Act because they had the effect of depriving Latinos of the
equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. Id. ,
at 682–686; 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 775–783. And the court found
independent proof that HD90 was a racial gerrymander. Id. ,
at 788–794.

															The court held that violations in all these
districts “must be remedied.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686; see
also 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 795 (describing State House district
violations that “must be remedied”). Mindful that October 1 was the
deadline for the Texas Secretary of State to provide voter
registration templates to the State’s counties, App. 380a–381a, the
court took steps to bring about prompt remedial action. In two
orders issued on August 15 and 24, the Texas attorney general was
instructed to advise the court, within three days, “whether the
Legislature intends to take up redistricting in an effort to cure
these violations.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686; 267 F. Supp.
3d, at 795. If the Legislature chose not to do so, the court
warned, it would “hold a hearing to consider remedial plans.” Ibid. After the Governor made clear that the State would not
act, the court ordered the parties to proceed with a hearing on the
congressional plan on September 5, as well as a hearing on the plan
for the Texas House on September 6. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686;
267 F. Supp. 3d, at 795; App. 134a–136a; Defendants’ Opposed
Motion To Stay Order on Plan C235 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment
in Civ. No. 11–cv–00360, Doc. 1538, pp. 3–4; Defendants’ Opposed
Motion To Stay Order on Plan H358 Pending Appeal or Final Judgment,
Doc. No. 1550, pp. 4–5.

															Texas applied for stays of both orders, but the
District Court denied the applications. App. 134a–136a. Texas then
asked this Court to stay the orders, and we granted that relief.
After receiving jurisdictional statements, we postponed
consideration of jurisdiction and set the cases for consolidated
argument. 583 U. S. ___ (2018).

															II

															Before reaching the merits of these appeals,
we must assure ourselves that we have jurisdiction to review the
orders at issue. Appellants claim that the orders amount to
injunctions and are therefore appealable to this Court under 28
U. S. C. §1253. Appellees disagree, contending that the
orders do not qualify as injunctions. We hold that we have
jurisdiction because the orders were effectively injunctions in
that they barred Texas from using the districting plans now in
effect to conduct this year’s elections.

															A

															The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1Stat. 73,
“established the general principle that only final decisions of the
federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc. , 450 U. S. 79,
83 (1981) (emphasis deleted). But because “rigid application of
this principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases,”
Congress created exceptions. Ibid. Two are relevant here. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1253 to hear an
appeal from an order of a three-judge district court “granting or
denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction.”
Similarly, §1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction
over “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts” “granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,” “except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”

															The orders in these cases fall within §1253. To
be sure, the District Court did not call its orders
“injunctions”—in fact, it disclaimed the term, App. 134a–136a—but
the label attached to an order is not dispositive. We have
previously made clear that where an order has the “practical
effect” of granting or denying an injunction, it should be treated
as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Carson , supra , at 83; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp. , 485 U. S. 271, 287–288 (1988). We
applied this test in Carson , holding that an order that
declined to enter a consent decree prohibiting certain conduct
could be appealed under §1292(a)(1) because it was the practical
equivalent of an order denying an injunction and threatened serious
and perhaps irreparable harm if not immediately reviewed. 450
U. S., at 83–84, 86–90.

															This “practical effect” rule serves a valuable
purpose. If an interlocutory injunction is improperly granted or
denied, much harm can occur before the final decision in the
district court. Lawful and important conduct may be barred, and
unlawful and harmful conduct may be allowed to continue.
Recognizing this, Congress authorized interlocutory appellate
review of such orders. But if the availability of interlocutory
review depended on the district court’s use of the term
“injunction” or some other particular language, Congress’s scheme
could be frustrated. The harms that Congress wanted to avoid could
occur so long as the district court was careful about its
terminology. The “practical effect” inquiry prevents such
manipulation.

															In analogous contexts, we have not allowed
district courts to “shield [their] orders from appellate review” by
avoiding the label “injunction.” Sampson v. Murray ,
415 U. S. 61, 87 (1974). For instance, in Sampson , we
held that an order labeled a temporary restraining order (which is
not appealable under §1292(a)(1)) should be treated as a
“preliminary injunction” (which is appealable) since the order had
the same practical effect as a preliminary injunction. Id. ,
at 86–88.

															Appellees and the dissent contend that the
“practical effect” approach should be confined to §1292(a)(1), but
we see no good reason why it should not apply to §1253 as well.
Appellees note that we “narrowly constru[e]” §1253, Goldstein v. Cox , 396 U. S. 471, 478 (1970), but
we also construe §1292(a)(1) “narrowly,” Carson , supra , at 84. In addition, the relevant language in the two
provisions is nearly identical;[ 10 ] both provisions serve the same purpose; and we have
previously called them “analogous.” Goldstein , supra ,
at 475.

															The provisions are also textually interlocked.
Section 1292(a)(1) does not apply where “direct review may be had
in the Supreme Court,” i.e. , where §1253 applies. If the
“practical effects” test applied under §1292(a)(1) but not §1253,
the consequences would be unfortunate and strange. We would have to
identify the magic language needed for an order to qualify as an
order granting or denying an injunction, and that standard would
hardly constitute the sort of “[s]imple” rule that the dissent
prizes. See post , at 14 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). Then,
having developed that standard, we would have to apply it in any
case in which a party took an appeal to us from an order of a
three-judge court that clearly had the practical effect of an
injunction. If we concluded that the magic-words test was not met,
the order would appear to be appealable to one of the courts of
appeals under §1292(a)(1). In the language of that provision, the
order would be an “orde[r] of [a] district cour[t] of the United
States . . . granting [an] injunctio[n].” And because
this Court would lack jurisdiction under §1253, the appeal would
not fall within §1292(1)’s exception for cases “where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court.” Having taken pains to
provide for review in this Court, and not in the courts of appeals,
of three-judge court orders granting injunctions Congress surely
did not intend to produce that result.[ 11 ]

															Appellees argue that an order denying an
injunction (the situation in Carson ) and an order granting
an injunction (the situation here) should be treated differently,
Brief for Appellees in No. 17–586, p. 27, but they offer no
convincing reason for doing so. No authority supports their
argument. The language of §§1253 and 1292(a)(1) makes no such
distinction, and we have stated that the “practical effect”
analysis applies to the “granting or denying” of injunctions. Gulfstream , supra , at 287–288.

															In addition, appellees’ suggested distinction
would put appellate courts in an awkward position. Suppose that a
district court granted an injunction that was narrower than the one
requested by the moving party. Would an appellate court (whether
this Court or a court of appeals) have jurisdiction to rule on only
part of that decision? Suppose the appellate court concluded that
the district court was correct in refusing to give the movant all
the injunctive relief it sought because the movant’s entire claim
was doomed to fail. Would the appellate court be limited to holding
only that the lower court properly denied the relief that was
withheld? The rule advocated by the appellees would needlessly
complicate appellate review.[ 12 ]

															Finally, appellees point in passing to Rule
65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
an injunction “state its terms specifically” and “describe in
reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or
required.” Rules 65(d)(1)(B), (C); see Brief for Appellees in No.
17–586, at 27. But as explained in Gunn v. University
Comm. to End War in Viet Nam , 399 U. S. 383, 389,
n. 4 (1970), we have never suggested that a failure to meet
the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) would “deprive the Court
of jurisdiction under §1253.”

															A contrary holding would be perverse. Rule 65(b)
protects the party against which an injunction is issued by
requiring clear notice as to what that party must do or refrain
from doing. Where a vague injunction does not comply with Rule
65(b), the aggrieved party has a particularly strong need for
appellate review. It would be odd to hold that there can be no
appeal in such a circumstance.

															For these reasons, we hold that we have
jurisdiction under §1253 to hear an appeal from an order that has
the same practical effect as one granting or denying an
injunction.

															B

															With these principles settled, we conclude
that the orders in these cases qualify as interlocutory injunctions
under §1253. The text of the orders and the context in which they
were issued make this clear.

															The orders are unequivocal that the current
legislative plans “violate §2 and the Fourteenth Amendment” and
that these violations “must be remedied.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
686; see also, e.g. , 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 795
(“[V]iolations found by this Court in its Order on [the State House
plan] now require a remedy”); ibid. (“In Bell County, the
intentional discrimination previously found by the Court must be
remedied”); ibid. (“In Dallas County, the intentional
discrimination previously found by the Court must be
remedied”).

															We do not suggest that this language alone is
sufficient to show that the orders had the practical effect of
enjoining use of the current plans in this year’s elections, but
the court did not stop with these pronouncements. As we have noted,
the orders required the Texas attorney general to inform the court
within three days whether the Legislature would remedy the
violations, and the orders stated that if the Legislature did not
intend to adopt new plans, the court would hold remedial
hearings.

															The short time given the Legislature to respond
is strong evidence that the three-judge court did not intend to
allow the elections to go ahead under the plans it had just
condemned. The Legislature was not in session, so in order to take
up the task of redistricting, the Governor would have been required
to convene a special session—which is no small matter. And, when
the Governor declined to call a special session, the court moved
ahead with its scheduled hearings and invited the parties to
continue preparing for them even after this Court administratively
stayed the August 15 order.

															The import of these actions is unmistakable: The
court intended to have new plans ready for use in this year’s
elections. Nothing in the record even hints that the court
contemplated the possibility of allowing the elections to proceed
under the 2013 plans.

															What is more, Texas had reason to believe that
it would risk deleterious consequences if it defied the court and
attempted to conduct the elections under the plans that the court
had found to be based on intentional racial discrimination. In the
very orders at issue, the court inferred discriminatory intent from
Texas’s choice to appeal the D. C. court’s preclearance decision
rather than immediately taking steps to bring its plans into
compliance with that decision. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649; see
Part III, infra . Reading such an order, Texas had reason to
fear that if it tried to conduct elections under plans that the
court had found to be racially discriminatory, the court would
infer an evil motive and perhaps subject the State once again to
the strictures of preclearance under §3(c) of the Voting Rights
Act.[ 13 ] This is a remedy
that the plaintiffs hoped to obtain, see, e.g. , App. 177a,
and that the District Court seemed inclined to consider, see
C. J. S. 122a–123a (declining to declare moot the
challenges to the long-since-repealed 2011 plans because “there
remains the possibility of declaratory and equitable relief under
§3(c)”).

															Contending that the orders here do not qualify
under §1253, appellees analogize this case to Gunn , 399
U. S. 383, but there is no relevant similarity. In Gunn , anti-war protesters were charged with violating a
Texas “disturbing-the-peace statute,” id. , at 384, and they
challenged the constitutionality of the statute in federal court.
After the state charges were dismissed, the District Court issued a
“discursive” opinion “expressing the view that [the statute was]
constitutionally invalid.” Id. , at 386–387. But the court
then refrained from going any further, “pending the next session,
special or general, of the Texas legislature, at which time the
State of Texas may, if it so desires, enact such
disturbing-the-peace statute as will meet constitutional
requirements.” University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam v. Gunn , 289 F. Supp. 469, 475 (WD Tex. 1968).
The defendants appealed to this Court, and at the time of our
decision two years later, neither the Legislature nor the District
Court had taken any further action. We therefore held that we
lacked jurisdiction under §1253. The District Court order in that
case did not have the same practical effect as an injunction.
Indeed, it had no practical effect whatsoever and is thus entirely
different from the orders now before us.[ 14 ]

															Appellees suggest that appellate jurisdiction is
lacking in this case because we do not know at this point “what a
remedy would entail, who it would affect, and when it would be
implemented.” Brief for Appellees in No. 17–586, at 27. The dissent
makes a similar argument with respect to two of the Texas House
districts. Post , at 13–14.[ 15 ] But the issue here is whether this year’s elections
can be held under the plans enacted by the Legislature, not whether
any particular remedies would have ulti- mately been ordered by the
District Court.

															Appellees and the dissent also fret that this
Court will be inundated with redistricting appeals if we accept
jurisdiction here, Brief for Appellees in No. 17–626, p. 34; post , at 15–16, and n. 8, but there is no reason to
fear such a flood. Because §1253 expressly authorizes
“interlocutory” appeals, there is no question that there can be
more than one appeal in a case challenging a redistricting plan.
District courts sometimes expressly enjoin the use of districting
plans before moving on to the remedial phase. See, e.g. , Whitford v. Gill , No. 3:15–cv–421, Doc. No. 190 (WD
Wis., Feb. 22, 2017); Harris v. McCrory , No.
1:13–cv–949, Doc. No. 143 (MDNC, Feb. 5, 2016). But appeals from
such orders have not overwhelmed our docket. Our holding here will
affect only a small category of additional cases.[ 16 ]

															It should go without saying that our decision
does not mean that a State can always appeal a district court order
holding a redistricting plan unlawful. A finding on liability
cannot be appealed unless an injunction is granted or denied, and
in some cases a district court may see no need for interlocutory
relief. If a plan is found to be unlawful long before the next
scheduled election, a court may defer any injunctive relief until
the case is completed. And if a plan is found to be unlawful very
close to the election date, the only reasonable option may be to
use the plan one last time.

															We appreciate our obligation to heed the limits
of our jurisdiction, and we reiterate that §1253 must be strictly
construed. But it also must be sensibly construed, and here the
District Court’s orders, for all intents and purposes, constituted
injunctions barring the State from conducting this year’s elections
pursuant to a statute enacted by the Legislature. Unless that
statute is unconstitutional, this would seriously and irreparably
harm[ 17 ] the State, and only
an interlocutory appeal can protect that State interest. See Carson , supra , at 89–90. As a result, §1253 provides
jurisdiction.

															III

															We now turn to the merits of the appeal. The
primary question is whether the Texas court erred when it required
the State to show that the 2013 Legislature somehow purged the
“taint” that the court attributed to the defunct and never-used
plans enacted by a prior legislature in 2011.

															A

															Whenever a challenger claims that a state law
was enacted with discriminatory intent, the burden of proof lies
with the challenger, not the State. Reno v. Bossier
Parish School Bd. , 520 U. S. 471, 481 (1997). This rule
takes on special significance in districting cases.

															Redistricting “is primarily the duty and
responsibility of the State,” and “[f]ederal-court review of
districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most
vital of local functions.” Miller v. Johnson , 515
U. S. 900, 915 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[I]n assessing the sufficiency of a challenge to a districting
plan,” a court “must be sensitive to the complex interplay of
forces that enter a legislature’s redistricting calculus.” Id. , at 915–916. And the “good faith of [the] state
legislature must be presumed.” Id. , at 915.

															The allocation of the burden of proof and the
presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding
of past discrimination. “[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the
manner of original sin, condemn governmental action that is not
itself unlawful.” Mobile , 446 U. S., at 74 (plurality
opinion). The “ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory
intent has been proved in a given case.” Ibid. The
“historical background” of a legislative enactment is “one
evidentiary source” relevant to the question of intent. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. , 429 U. S. 252, 267 (1977). But we have never
suggested that past discrimination flips the evidentiary burden on
its head.

															Neither the District Court nor appellees have
pointed to any authority that would justify shifting the burden.
The appellees rely primarily on Hunter v. Underwood ,
471 U. S. 222 (1985), but that case addressed a very different
situation. Hunter involved an equal protection challenge to
an article of the Alabama Constitution adopted in 1901 at a
constitutional convention avowedly dedicated to the establishment
of white supremacy. Id. , at 228–230. The article
disenfranchised anyone convicted of any crime on a long list that
included many minor offenses. Id. , at 226–227. The court
below found that the article had been adopted with discriminatory
intent, and this Court accepted that conclusion. Id. , at
229. The article was never repealed, but over the years, the list
of disqualifying offenses had been pruned, and the State argued
that what remained was facially constitutional. Id. , at
232–233. This Court rejected that argument because the amendments
did not alter the intent with which the article, including the
parts that remained, had been adopted. Id. , at 233. But the
Court specifically declined to address the question whether the
then-existing version would have been valid if “[re]enacted today.” Ibid. In these cases, we do not confront a situation
like the one in Hunter . Nor is this a case in which a law
originally enacted with discriminatory intent is later reenacted by
a different legislature. The 2013 Texas Legislature did not reenact
the plan previously passed by its 2011 predecessor. Nor did it use
criteria that arguably carried forward the effects of any
discriminatory intent on the part of the 2011 Legislature. Instead,
it enacted, with only very small changes, plans that had been
developed by the Texas court pursuant to instructions from this
Court “not to incorporate . . . any legal defects.” Perry , 565 U. S., at 394.

															Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt
about what matters: It is the intent of the 2013 Legislature. And
it was the plaintiffs’ burden to overcome the presumption of
legislative good faith and show that the 2013 Legislature acted
with invidious intent.

															The Texas court contravened these basic
principles. Instead of holding the plaintiffs to their burden of
overcoming the presumption of good faith and proving discriminatory
intent, it reversed the burden of proof. It imposed on the State
the obligation of proving that the 2013 Legislature had experienced
a true “change of heart” and had “engage[d] in a deliberative
process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011
plans.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649.

															The Texas court’s references to the need to
“cure” the earlier Legislature’s “taint” cannot be dismissed as
stray comments. On the contrary, they were central to the court’s
analysis. The court referred repeatedly to the 2013 Legislature’s
duty to expiate its predecessor’s bad intent, and when the court
summarized its analysis, it drove the point home. It stated: “The
discriminatory taint [from the 2011 plans] was not removed by the
Legislature’s enactment of the Court’s interim plans, because the
Legislature engaged in no deliberative process to remove any such
taint, and in fact intended any such taint to be maintained but be
safe from remedy.” Id. , at 686.[ 18 ]

															The dissent labors to explain away all these
references to the 2013’s Legislature’s supposed duty to purge its
predecessor’s allegedly discriminatory intent, but the dissent
loses track of its own argument and characterizes the District
Court’s reasoning exactly as we have. Indeed, the dissent
criticizes us on page 33 of its opinion for saying precisely the
same thing that it said 11 pages earlier. On page 33, the dissent
states:

															“[T]he majority quotes the orders as
requiring proof that the Legislature “ ‘engage[d] in a
deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint
from the 2011 plans.’ ” But the District Court did not put the
burden on Texas to make that affirmative showing.” Post , at
33–34 (quoting supra , at 23, in turn quoting 274 F. Supp.
3d, at 649; citations omitted).

															But earlier, the dissent itself describes the
District Court’s analysis as follows:

															“Despite knowing of the discrimination in
its 2011 maps, ‘the Legislature did not engage in a deliberative
process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint from the 2011
plans.’ ” Post , at 22 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
649).

															And this is not just a single slip of the pen.
The dissent writes that the District Court was required “to assess
how the 2013 Legislature addressed the known discrimination that
motivated” the districts approved by that Court in 2012. Post , at 31. The dissent quotes the District Court’s
statement that “ ‘there is no indication that the Legislature
looked to see whether any discriminatory taint remained in the
plans.’ ” Post , at 24 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
649). And there is also this: “Texas was just ‘not truly interested
in fixing any remaining discrimination in [its 2011 maps].’ ” Post , at 22 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 651,
n. 45). The District Court’s true mode of analysis is so
obvious that the dissent cannot help but repeat it. And that
approach was fundamentally flawed and demands reversal.

															While a district court’s finding of fact on the
question of discriminatory intent is reviewed for clear error, see Cromartie , 532 U. S., at 242, whether the court applied
the correct burden of proof is a question of law subject to plenary
review, U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at
Lakeridge, LLC , 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at
5); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System,
Inc. , 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 4). And when
a finding of fact is based on the application of an incorrect
burden of proof, the finding cannot stand. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. , 466 U. S. 485,
501 (1984) (“An appellate cour[t has] power to correct errors of
law, including those that . . . infect . . . a
finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the
governing rule of law”).

															B

															In holding that the District Court disregarded
the presumption of legislative good faith and improperly reversed
the burden of proof, we do not suggest either that the intent of
the 2011 Legislature is irrelevant or that the plans enacted in
2013 are unassailable because they were previously adopted on an
interim basis by the Texas court. Rather, both the intent of the
2011 Legislature and the court’s adoption of the interim plans are
relevant to the extent that they naturally give rise to—or tend to
refute—inferences regarding the intent of the 2013 Legislature.
They must be weighed together with any other direct and
circumstantial evidence of that Legislature’s intent. But when all
the relevant evidence in the record is taken into account, it is
plainly insufficient to prove that the 2013 Legislature acted in
bad faith and engaged in intentional discrimination.[ 19 ] See, e.g. , Ricci v. DeStefano , 557 U. S. 557, 585 (2009); McCleskey v. Zant , 499 U. S. 467, 497 (1991). There is thus no
need for any further prolongation of this already protracted
litigation.

															The only direct evidence brought to our
attention suggests that the 2013 Legislature’s intent was
legitimate. It wanted to bring the litigation about the State’s
districting plans to an end as expeditiously as possible. The
attorney general advised the Legislature that the best way to do
this was to adopt the interim, court-issued plans. The sponsor of
the 2013 plans voiced the same objective, and the Legislature then
adopted the court-approved plans.

															On its face, this explanation of the
Legislature’s intent is entirely reasonable and certainly
legitimate. The Legislature had reason to know that any new plans
it devised were likely to be attacked by one group of plaintiffs or
another. (The plaintiffs’ conflicting positions with regard to some
of the districts in the plans now before us bear this out.)
Litigating districting cases is expensive and time consuming, and
until the districts to be used in the next election are firmly
established, a degree of uncertainty clouds the electoral process.
Wishing to minimize these effects is understandable and proper.

															The court below discounted this direct evidence,
but its reasons for doing so are not sound. The court stated that
the “strategy” of the 2013 Legislature was to “insulate [the plans]
from further challenge, regardless of [the plans’] legal
infirmities.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 650; see also id. , at
651, n. 45. But there is no evidence that the Legislature’s
aim was to gain acceptance of plans that it knew were
unlawful.[ 20 ] Indeed, there
is no evidence that the Legislature thought that the plans were
invalid—and as we will explain, the Legislature had sound reasons
to believe just the opposite.[ 21 ]

															The District Court found it significant that the
Legislature must have realized that enacting the interim plans
would not “end the litigation,” because it knew that at least some
plaintiffs would pursue their challenges anyway. Id. , at
651, n. 45. But even if, as seems likely, the Legislature did not
think that all the plaintiffs would immediately abandon all their
claims, it does not follow that the Legislature was insincere in
stating that it adopted the court-approved plan with the aim of
bringing the litigation to a close. It was reasonable for the
Legislature to think that approving the court-approved plans might
at least reduce objections and thus simplify and expedite the
conclusion of the litigation.[ 22 ] That MALDEF, counsel for one of the plaintiff groups,
testified in favor of the plans is evidence that the Legislature’s
objective was reasonable. C. J. S. 436a–439a.

															Not only does the direct evidence suggest that
the 2013 Legislature lacked discriminatory intent, but the
circumstantial evidence points overwhelmingly to the same
conclusion. Consider the situation when the Legislature adopted the
court-approved interim plans. First, the Texas court had adopted
those plans, and no one would claim that the court acted with
invidious intent when it did so. Second, the Texas court approved
those plans only after reviewing them and modifying them as
required to comply with our instructions. Not one of the judges on
that court expressed the view that the plans were unlawful. Third,
we had directed the Texas court to make changes in response to any
claims under the Equal Protection Clause and §2 of the Voting
Rights Act if those claims were merely likely to prevail. Perry , 565 U. S., at 394. And the Texas court was told
to accommodate any claim under §5 of the VRA unless it was
“insubstantial.” Id. , at 395. Fourth, the Texas court had
made a careful analysis of all the claims, had provided a detailed
examination of individual districts, and had modified many
districts. Its work was anything but slapdash. All these facts gave
the Legislature good reason to believe that the court-approved
interim plans were legally sound.

															Is there any evidence from which a contrary
inference can reasonably be drawn? Appellees stress the preliminary
nature of the Texas court’s approval of the interim plans, and as
we have said, that fact is relevant. But in light of our
instructions to the Texas court and the care with which the interim
plans were developed, the court’s approval still gave the
Legislature a sound basis for thinking that the interim plans
satisfied all legal requirements.

															The court below and the dissent infer bad faith
because the Legislature “pushed the redistricting bills through
quickly in a special session.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649. But we
do not see how the brevity of the legislative process can give rise
to an inference of bad faith—and certainly not an inference that is
strong enough to overcome the presumption of legislative good faith
(a concept to which the dissent pays only the briefest lip service, post , at 21). The “special session” was necessary because
the regular session had ended. As explained, the Legislature had
good reason to believe that the interim plans were sound, and the
adoption of those already-completed plans did not require a
prolonged process. After all, part of the reason for adopting those
plans was to avoid the time and expense of starting from scratch
and leaving the electoral process in limbo while that
occurred.[ 23 ]

															The District Court and the dissent also err when
they charge that Representative Darby, the chair of the Texas House
Redistricting Committee at the time in question, “ ‘willfully
ignored those who pointed out deficiencies’ ” in the plans. Post , at 23 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 651,
n. 45). This accusation is not only misleading, it misses the
point. The Legislature adopted the interim plans in large part
because they had the preliminary approval of the District Court,
and Darby was open about the fact that he wanted to minimize
amendments to the plans for that reason. See, e.g. , Joint
Exh. 17.3, pp. S1–S2. That Darby generally hoped to minimize
amendments—so that the plans would remain legally compliant—hardly
shows that he, or the Legislature, acted with discriminatory
intent. In any event, it is misleading to characterize this
attitude as “willfu[l] ignor[ance].” The record shows that, al-
though Darby hoped to minimize amendments, he did not categorically
refuse to consider changes. This is illustrated by his support for
an amendment to HD90, which was offered by the then-incumbent,
Democrat Lon Burnam, precisely because it fixed an objection raised
by the Mexican-American Legal Caucus (MALC) that the district’s
Latino population was too low. 267 F. Supp. 3d, at
790.[ 24 ]

															The Texas court faulted the 2013 Legislature for
failing to take into account the problems with the 2011 plans that
the D. C. court identified in denying preclearance, ibid. ,
but the basis for that criticism is hard to understand. One of the
2013 Legislature’s principal reasons for adopting the
court-approved plans was to fix the problems identified by the D.
C. court. The attorney general advised the Legislature to adopt the
interim plans because he thought that was the “best way to remedy
the violations found by the D. C. court.” C. J. S. 432a. Chairman
Darby similarly stated that the 2013 plans fixed the errors found
by the D. C. court, Tr. 1498, 1584–1585 (July 14, 2017), as did
Senator Seliger, Joint Exh. 26.2, p. A–5.

															There is nothing to suggest that the Legislature
proceeded in bad faith—or even that it acted unreasonably—in
pursuing this strategy. Recall that we instructed the Texas court,
in developing the interim plans, to remedy any §5 claim that was
“not insubstantial.” Perry , 565 U. S., at 395. And that
is just what the interim plans, which the Legislature later
enacted, attempted to do. For instance, the D. C. court held that
the congressional plan had one too few “ability to elect” districts
for Latinos, largely because of changes to CD23, Texas , 887
F. Supp. 2d, at 156–159; the interim plan (and, by
extension, the 2013 plan) amended CD23, C. J. S.
397a–399a. Similarly, in the plan for the Texas House, the D. C.
court found §5 retrogression with respect to HD35, HD117, and
HD149, Texas , supra , at 167–175, and all of those
districts were changed in the 2013 plans, H. J. S.
305a–307a, 312a.

															Although the D. C. court found that the 2011
Legislature acted with discriminatory intent in framing the
congressional plan, that finding was based on evidence about
districts that the interim plan later changed. The D. C. court was
concerned about the intent reflected in the drawing of CDs 9, 18,
and 30, but all those districts were amended by the Texas court. Texas , supra , at 159–160; C. J. S.
406a–408a. With respect to the plan for the Texas House, the D. C.
court made no intent findings, but its areas of concern were
generally addressed by the Texas court and the 2013 plans. Compare Texas , supra , at 178 (noting evidence of unlawful
intent in HD117), with H. J. S. 307a (amending HD117).[ 25 ]

															It is indicative of the District Court’s
mistaken approach that it inferred bad faith from Texas’s decision
to take an appeal to this Court from the D. C. court’s decision
denying preclearance. See 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649 (“Defendants
did not accept [these findings] and instead appealed to the Supreme
Court”). Congress gave the State the right to appeal, and no bad
motive can be inferred from its decision to make use of this
right—unless of course the State had no reasonable grounds for
appeal. Before our decision in Shelby County mooted Texas’s
appeal to this Court from the D. C. court’s preclearance decision,
Texas filed a jurisdictional statement claiming that the D. C.
court made numerous errors, but the Texas court made no attempt to
show that Texas’s arguments were frivolous.

															As a final note, appellees assert that the 2013
Legislature should have either defended the 2011 plans in
litigation or gone back to the drawing board and devised en- tirely
new plans, Brief for Appellees in No. 17–626, at 45, but there is
no reason why the Legislature’s options should be limited in this
way. It was entirely permissible for the Legislature to favor a
legitimate option that promised to simplify and reduce the burden
of litigation. That the Legislature chose this course is not proof
of discriminatory intent.

															IV

															Once the Texas court’s intent finding is
reversed, there remain only four districts that were invalidated on
alternative grounds. For three of these districts, the District
Court relied on the “effects” test of §2. We reverse as to each of
these, but we affirm the District Court’s final holding that HD90
is a racial gerrymander.

															A

															To make out a §2 “effects” claim, a plaintiff
must establish the three so-called “ Gingles factors.” These
are (1) a geographically compact minority population sufficient to
constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) political
cohesion among the members of the minority group, and (3) bloc
voting by the majority to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate. Gingles , 478 U. S., at 48–51; LULAC ,
548 U. S., at 425. If a plaintiff makes that showing, it must
then go on to prove that, under the totality of the circumstances,
the district lines dilute the votes of the members of the minority
group. Id. , at 425–426.

															1

															The Texas court held that CD27 violates §2 of
the VRA because it has the effect of diluting the votes of Latino
voters in Nueces County. C. J. S. 191a. CD27 is anchored
in Nueces County (home to Corpus Christi) and follows the Gulf of
Mexico to the northeast before taking a turn inland to the
northwest in the direction of Austin. Nueces County contains a
Latino population of roughly 200,000 (a little less than one-third
the size of an ideal Texas congressional district), and the court
held that the Nueces County Latinos should have been included in a
Latino opportunity district, rather than CD27, which is not such a
district. The court found that an area centered on Nueces County
satisfies the Gingles factors and that, under the totality
of the circumstances, the placement of the Nueces County Latinos in
CD27 deprives them of the equal opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice. C. J. S. 181a–195a.

															The problem with this holding is that plaintiffs
could not establish a violation of §2 of the VRA without showing
that there is a “ ‘possibility of creating more than the
existing number of reasonably compact’ ” opportunity
districts. LULAC , supra , at 430. And as the Texas
court itself found, the geography and demographics of south and
west Texas do not permit the creation of any more than the seven
Latino opportunity districts that exist under the current plan. 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 684, and n. 85.

															Attempting to get around this problem, the Texas
court relied on our decision in LULAC , but it misapplied our
holding. In LULAC , we held that the State should have
created six proper Latino opportunity districts but instead drew
only five. 548 U. S., at 435. Although the State claimed that
the plan actually included a sixth opportunity district, that
district failed to satisfy the Gingles factors. 548
U. S., at 430. We held that a “State’s creation of an
opportunity district for those without a §2 right offers no excuse
for its failure to provide an opportunity district for those with a
§2 right.” Ibid. Here, the Texas court concluded that Texas
committed the same violation as in LULAC : It created “an
opportu-nity district for those without a §2 right” (the Latinos in
CD35), while failing to create such a district “for those with a §2
right” (the Latinos of Nueces County). Ibid. This holding is
based on a flawed analysis of CD35.

															CD35 lies to the north of CD27 and runs along
I–35 from San Antonio up to Austin, the center of Travis County. In
the District Court’s view, the Latinos of CD35 do not have a §2
right because one of the Gingles factors, majority bloc
voting, is not present. The Court reached this conclusion because
the non-Latino voters of Travis County tend to favor the same
candidates as the great majority of Latinos. There are two serious
problems with the District Court’s analysis.

															First, the Court took the wrong approach in
evaluating the presence of majority bloc voting in CD35. The Court
looked at only one, small part of the district, the portion that
falls within Travis County. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 683;
C. J. S. 175a–176a. But Travis County makes up only 21%
of the district. We have made clear that redistricting analysis
must take place at the district level. Bethune-Hill , 580
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). In failing to perform that
district-level analysis, the District Court went astray.

															Second, here, unlike in LULAC , the 2013
Legislature had “good reasons” to believe that the district at
issue (here CD35) was a viable Latino opportunity district that
satisfied the Gingles factors. CD35 was based on a concept
proposed by MALDEF, C. J. S. Findings 315a–316a, and the
Latino Redistricting Task Force (a plaintiff group) argued that the
district is mandated by §2. C. J. S. 174a. The only Gingles factor disputed by the court was majority bloc voting, and there is
ample evidence that this factor is met. Indeed, the court found
that majority bloc voting exists throughout the State.
C. J. S. Findings 467a. In addition, the District Court
extensively analyzed CD35 in 2012 and determined that it was likely
not a racial gerrymander and that even if it was, it likely
satisfied strict scrutiny. C. J. S. 415a. In other words,
the 2013 Legislature justifiably thought that it had placed a
viable opportunity district along the I–35 corridor.

															2

															The District Court similarly erred in holding
that HD32 and HD34 violate §2. These districts make up the entirety
of Nueces County, which has a population that is almost exactly
equal to twice the population of an ideal Texas House district. (It
can fit 2.0295 ideal districts. H. J. S. Findings 91a.)
In 2010, Latinos made up approximately 56% of the voting age
population of the county. Ibid. The 2013 plan created two
districts that lie wholly within the county; one, HD34, is a Latino
opportunity district, but the other, HD32, is not. 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 767.

															Findings made by the court below show that these
two districts do not violate §2 of the Voting Rights Act. Under Gingles , the ultimate question is whether a districting
decision dilutes the votes of minority voters, see LULAC , supra , at 425–426, and it is hard to see how this standard
could be met if the alternative to the districting decision at
issue would not enhance the ability of minority voters to elect the
candidates of their choice.

															The only plaintiff that pressed a §2 claim with
respect to HD32 and HD34 was MALC, 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 767,
and as the District Court recognized, that group’s own expert
determined that it was not possible to divide Nueces County into
more than one performing Latino district. In his analysis,
the expert relied on Nueces County election returns for statewide
elections between 2010 and 2016. Id. , at 775–776. Based on
this data, he calculated that when both HD32 and HD34 were
maintained as Latino-majority districts, one performed for Latinos
in only 7 out of 35 relevant elections, and the other did so in none of the 35 elections. Ibid. In order to create
two performing districts in that area, it was necessary, he found,
to break county lines in multiple places, id. , at
778, but the District Court held that “breaking the County Line
Rule” in the Texas Constitution, see Art. III, §26, to “remove
Anglos and incorporate even more Hispanics to improve electoral
outcomes goes beyond what §2 requires.” 267 F. Supp. 3d, at
783. So if Texas could not create two performing districts
in Nueces County and did not have to break county lines, the
logical result is that Texas did not dilute the Latino vote.

															The court refused to accept this conclusion, but
its reasons for doing so cannot stand up. As an initial matter, the
court thought that the two districts would have to be redrawn based
on its finding regarding the intent of the 2013
Legislature,[ 26 ] and it
therefore deferred a final decision on the §2 issue and advised the
plaintiffs to consider at the remedial phase of the case whether
they preferred to have two districts that might not perform or just
one safe district. Id. , at 783. The court’s decision cannot
be sustained on this ground, since its finding of discriminatory
intent is erroneous.

															The only other reason provided by the court was
the observation that MALC “failed to show” that two majority-Latino
districts in Nueces County would not perform. Id. , at 782.
This observation twisted the burden of proof beyond recognition. It
suggested that a plaintiff might succeed on its §2 claim because
its expert failed to show that the necessary factual basis for the
claim could not be established.[ 27 ] Courts cannot find §2 effects violations on the basis
of uncertainty . In any event, if even the District Court
remains unsure how to draw these districts to comply with §2 (after
six years of litigation, almost a dozen trials, and numerous
opinions), the Legislature surely had the “ ‘broad discretion’ ” to
comply as it reasonably saw fit in 2013, LULAC , supra , at 429.

															The dissent charges us with ignoring the
District Court’s “ ‘intensely local appraisal” ’ of
Nueces County, post , at 44, but almost none of the
“findings” that the District Court made with respect to HD32 and
HD34 referred to present local conditions, and none cast any
significant light on the question whether another opportunity
district is possible at the present time. For instance, what the
dissent describes as Texas’s “long ‘history of voting-related
discrimination,’ ” ibid. , in no way undermines—or even has
any logical bearing on—the conclusions reached by MALC’s expert
about whether Latino voters would have a real opportunity to elect
the candidates of their choice if the county was divided into two
districts with narrow majorities of Latino citizens of voting age.
The same is true with respect to the District Court’s findings
regarding racially polarized voting in the county and Latinos’
“continuing pattern of disadvantage relative to” non-Latinos. 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 779 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Perhaps recognizing as much, both the District Court and the
dissent point to the anticipated future growth in the percentage of
eligible voters of Latino descent, but the districts now at issue
would not necessar-ily be used beyond 2020, after which time the
2020 census would likely require redistricting once again.

															B

															HD90 is a district in Tarrant County that,
unlike the other districts at issue in this appeal, was not copied
from the District Court’s interim plans. Instead, the 2013
Legislature substantially modified the district developed by the
District Court, and the District Court held that the 2013
Legislature’s creation is an invalid racial gerrymander. 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 794.

															In drawing HD90, the Legislature was pulled in
opposite directions by competing groups. In 2011, the Legislature,
responding to pressure from MALDEF, increased the Latino population
of the district in an effort to make it a Latino opportunity
district. H. J. S. Findings 258a–262a. In the process of
doing so, the Legislature moved the community of Como, which is
predominantly African-American, out of the district. But Como
residents and the member of the Texas House who represented the
district, Lon Burnam, objected, and in 2013, the Legislature moved
Como back into the district. 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 788–789. That
change was opposed by MALC because it decreased the Latino
population below 50%. App. 398a–399a. So the Legislature moved
Latinos into the district to bring the Latino population back above
50%. 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 789–790.

															In light of these maneuvers, Texas does not
dispute that race was the predominant factor in the design of HD90,
but it argues that this was permissible because it had
“ ‘ good reasons to believe’ ” that this was necessary
to satisfy §2 of the Voting Rights Act.” Bethune-Hill , 580
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

															Texas offers two pieces of evidence to support
its claim. The first—that one of the plaintiffs, MALC, demanded as
much—is insufficient. A group that wants a State to create a
district with a particular design may come to have an overly
expansive understanding of what §2 demands. So one group’s demands
alone cannot be enough.

															The other item of evidence consists of the
results of the Democratic primaries in 2012 and 2014. In 2012,
Representative Burnham, who was not the Latino candidate of choice,
narrowly defeated a Latino challenger by 159 votes. And in 2014,
the present representative, Ramon Romero, Jr., beat Burnam by 110
votes. See Brief for Appellants 70. These election returns may be
suggestive, but standing alone, they were not enough to give the
State good reason to conclude that it had to alter the district’s
lines solely on the basis of race. And putting these two
evidentiary items together helps, but it is simply too thin a reed
to support the drastic decision to draw lines in this way.

															We have previously rejected proffers of evidence
that were at least as strong as Texas’s here. For example, in Cooper , 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11), we
analyzed North Carolina’s justification for deliberately moving
“African-American voters” into a district to “ensure
. . . the district’s racial composition” in the face of
its expansion in size. North Carolina argued that its race-based
decisions were necessary to comply with §2, but the State could
point to “no meaningful legislative inquiry” into “whether a new,
enlarged” district, “created without a focus on race,
. . . could lead to §2 liability.” Id. , at ___
(slip op., at 15). North Carolina pointed to two expert reports on
“voting patterns throughout the State,” but we rejected that
evidence as insufficient. Id. , at ___, n. 5 (slip op.,
at 15, n. 5). Here, Texas has pointed to no actual
“legislative inquiry” that would establish the need for its
manipulation of the racial makeup of the district.

															By contrast, where we have accepted a State’s
“good reasons” for using race in drawing district lines, the State
made a strong showing of a pre-enactment analysis with justifiable
conclusions. In Bethune-Hill , the State established that the
primary mapdrawer “discussed the district with incumbents from
other majority-minority districts[,] . . . considered
turnout rates, the results of the recent contested primary and
general elections,” and the district’s large prison population. 580
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). The State established that it
had performed a “functional analysis,” and acted to achieve an
“informed bipartisan consensus.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at
14). Texas’s showing here is not equivalent.

															Perhaps Texas could have made a stronger
showing, but it is the State’s burden to prove narrow tailoring,
and it did not do so on the record before us. We hold that HD90 is
an impermissible racial gerrymander. On remand, the District Court
will have to consider what if any remedy is appropriate at this
time.

															*  *  *

															Except with respect to one Texas House
district, we hold that the court below erred in effectively
enjoining the use of the districting maps adopted by the
Legislature in 2013. We therefore reverse with respect to No.
17–586; reverse in part and affirm in part with respect to No.
17–626; and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 There are several
appendixes in these cases. We use “App.” to refer to the joint
appendix filed at the merits stage. We use “C. J. S.” and
“H. J. S.” to refer to the appendixes attached to Texas’s
jurisdictional statements in No. 17–586 and No. 17–626,
respectively. We use “C. J. S. Findings” and
“H. J. S. Findings” to refer to appellees’ supplemental
appendixes in No. 17–586 and No. 17–626. 2 See, e.g. , Tex.
Const., Art. III, §25 (Senate), §26 (House). 3 The court found: “[I]t is
difficult to differentiate an intent to affect Democrats from an
intent to affect minority voters. Making minorities worse off will
likely make Democrats worse off, and vice versa.”
C. J. S. Findings 467a (citation omitted). “This
correlation is so strong that [an expert] assessed whether
districts were minority opportunity districts by looking at
Democratic results/wins (noting that in Texas, minority candidates
of choice means Democrats).” Ibid. 4 See Shelby County v. Holder , 570 U. S. 529 (2013). 5 Judge Smith dissented,
arguing that the majority had produced a “runaway plan” that
“award[ed] judgment on the pleadings in favor of one side—a
slam-dunk victory for the plaintiffs.” Perez v. Perry , 835 F. Supp. 2d 209, 218 (WD Tex.
2011). 6 The Texas court was given
more leeway to make changes to districts challenged under §5
because it would have been inappropriate for that court to address
the “merits of §5 challenges,” a task committed by statute to the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Perez , 565
U. S., at 394. 7 Notice of Appeal in Texas v. United States , Civ. No. 11–cv–1303, Doc. No.
234 (D DC, Aug. 31, 2012). 8 We express no view on the
correctness of this holding. 9 Judge Smith again
dissented, on both mootness and the merits. On mootness, Judge
Smith explained that, “[s]ix years later, we are still enveloped in
litigation over plans that have never been used and will never be
implemented.” C. J. S. 349a. On the merits, Judge Smith
argued that the majority erroneously inferred a “complex,
widespread conspiracy of scheming and plotting, by various
legislators and staff, carefully designed to obscure the alleged
race-based motive,” when the intent was in fact partisan.
H. J. S. 294a; C. J. S. 351a. 10 In
relevant part, §1253 applies to “an order granting . . .
an interlocutory . . . injunction.” Section 1292(a)(1)
applies to “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting
. . . injunctions.” Although the similarity is obvious,
the dissent perceives some unspecified substantive
difference. 11 The
dissent sees nothing strange about such a result because we held in Mitchell v. Donovan , 398 U. S. 427 (1970)
( per curiam ), that we lacked jurisdiction under §1253 to
hear an appeal from a three-judge court order denying a declaratory
judgment. The decision in Donovan was based on the plain
language of §1253, which says nothing about orders granting or
denying declaratory judgments. By contrast, §1253 gives us
jurisdiction to hear appeals from orders granting or denying
injunctions. The same goes for Rockefeller v. Catholic
Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. , 397 U. S.
820 (1970) ( per curiam ), also cited by the dissent. In that
case, the District Court issued a declaratory judgment, not an
injunction. Again, the text of §1253 says nothing about declaratory
judgments. 12 The
inquiry required by the practical effects test is no more difficult
when the question is whether an injunction was effectively granted
than it is when the question is whether an injunction was
effectively denied. Lower courts have had “no problem concluding
that [certain orders have] the practical effect of granting an
injunction.” I. A. M. Nat. Pension Fund Benefit Plan
A v. Cooper Industries, Inc. , 789 F. 2d 21, 24
(CADC 1986); see also Andrew v. American Import
Center , 110 A. 3d 626, 634 (D. C. 2015) (“[G]ranting
a stay pending arbitration does have the ‘practical effect’ of
enjoining the party opposing arbitration”). 13 Section 3(c) provides that if “the
court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendment justifying equitable relief,” the court “shall retain
jurisdiction for such period as it may deem appropriate and during
such period no voting” practice shall go into effect unless first
precleared by the court or the United States Attorney General. 52
U. S. C. §10302(c). 14 The
other authority cited by the dissent is a footnote in Whitcomb v. Chavis , 403 U. S. 124 (1971), a case
that came to us in an exceedingly complicated procedural posture.
In Whitcomb , the District Court held in August 1969 that
Indiana’s legislative districting scheme was unconstitutional, but
the court made it clear that it would take no further action for
two months. See Chavis v. Whitcomb , 305 F. Supp.
1364, 1392 (SD Ind. 1969). The Governor nevertheless appealed to
this Court, but by the time we ruled, the Governor had taken
another appeal from a later order, entered in December 1969,
prohibiting the use of Indiana’s current plans and requiring the
use of court-created plans in the 1970 elections. See 403
U. S., at 139; Juris. Statement in Whitcomb v. Chavis , O. T. 1970, No. 92, pp. 1–3. And to further
complicate matters, by the time we reviewed the case, the Indiana
Legislature had enacted new plans. Whitcomb , 403 U. S.,
at 140 . This Court entertained the later appeal and
reversed, but the Court dismissed the earlier—and by then, entirely
superfluous—appeal, stating that, at the time when it was issued,
“no judgment had been entered and no injunction had been granted or
denied.” Id. , at 138, n. 19. But that cursory
conclusion has little relevance here, where the District Court’s
orders were far more specific, immediate, and likely to demand
compliance. 15 While
we think it clear that the District Court effectively enjoined the
use of these districts as currently configured for this year’s
elections, even if the Court had not done so, that would not affect
our jurisdiction to review the Court’s order with respect to all
otherdistricts. 16 The
dissent cites exactly two cases ( Gunn and Whitcomb )
decided during the past half-century in which a party attempted to
take an appeal to this Court from a three-judge court order holding
a state statute unconstitutional but declining to issue an
injunction. 17 The
dissent argues that we give “short shrift” to the irreparable harm
question, post , at 16, but the inability to enforce its duly
enacted plans clearly inflicts irreparable harm on the State, see, e.g. , Maryland v. King , 567 U. S. 1301
(2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers). 18 The
dissent attempts to rehabilitate this statement by focusing on the
last part of this sentence, in which the District Court stated that
the Legislature “intended [the] taint to be maintained but safe
from remedy.” Post , at 34–35. In making this argument, the
dissent, like the District Court, refuses to heed the presumption
of legislative good faith and the allocation of the burden of
proving intentional discrimination. We do not dispute that the
District Court purportedly found that the 2013 Legislature acted
with discriminatory intent. The problem is that, in making that
finding, it relied overwhelmingly on what it perceived to be the
2013 Legislature’s duty to show that it had purged the bad intent
of its predecessor. 19 The
dissent is simply wrong in claiming over and over that we have not
thoroughly examined the record. See post , at 19, 27, 28, 30,
31, 35, 39–40, 43, 47. The dissent seems to think that the
repetition of these charges somehow makes them true. It does not.
On the contrary, it betrays the substantive weakness of the
dissent’s argument. 20 The
dissent and the District Court attach much meaning to the attorney
general’s use of the term “insulate” when he advised the
Legislature to adopt the District Court’s plans to avoid further
legal challenge. Setting aside that the word “insulate” is a common
term used to describe minimizing legal concerns, the context of the
letter makes clear that the attorney general was trying to make the
point that adopting these plans was the best method of obtaining
legal compliance, not the start of a grand conspiracy to trick the
District Court. Indeed, if his plan was to dupe the District Court,
shouting it to the world in a public letter was an odd way to go
about it. 21 In
any event, the Texas court was simply wrong that Texas believed its
plans would be free from any legal challenge. 274 F. Supp. 3d
624, 651 (2017). Texas consistently acknowledged that effects
claims would continue to be available and responded in detail to
those arguments in both the District Court and this Court. See
Brief for Appellants 64; Defendants’ Post-Trial Brief, Doc. No.
1526, p. 53. Moreover, Texas has not argued that intentional
discrimination claims are unavailable; it has instead argued that
intent must be assessed with respect to the 2013
Legislature , the Legislature that actually enacted the plans at
issue. 22 The
2013 Legislature had no reason to believe that the District Court
would spend four years examining moot plans before reversing its
own previous decisions by imputing the intent of the 2011
Legislature to the 2013 Legislature. At the very least, the 2013
Legislature had good reason to believe that adopting the
court-approved plans would lessen the time, expense, and complexity
of further litigation (even if that belief turned out to be
wrong). 23 Moreover, in criticizing the
Legislature for moving too quickly, the dissent downplays the
significant time and effort that went into consideration of the
2013 plans. Legislative committees held multiple field hearings in
four cities, Tr. 1507 (July 14, 2017), and the legislative actors
spent significant time considering the legislation, as well as
accepting and rejecting amendments, see, e.g. , Joint Exh.
17.3, p. S29; Joint Exh. 24.4, p. 21. 24 The
dissent tries to minimize the relevance of this amendment by
arguing that it turned HD90 into a racial gerrymander. See post , at 23, n. 12. But again this is misleading. The
Legislature adopted changes to HD90 at the behest of minority
groups , not out of a desire to discriminate. See Part IV–B, infra . That is, Darby was too solicitous of changes
with respect to HD90. 25 In
assessing the significance of the D. C. court’s evaluation of
intent, it is important not to forget that the burden of proof in a
preclearance proceeding was on the State. Texas v. United
States , 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 151 (DC 2012). Particularly
where race and partisanship can so often be confused, see supra , at 3, and n. 3, the burden of proof may be
crucial. 26 The
District Court also purported to find a violation of the “one
person, one vote” principle in Nueces County, 267 F. Supp. 3d
750, 783 (2017); H. J. S. 254a–255a, but that finding was
in actuality a restatement of its racial discrimination finding.
The population deviations from the ideal are quite small (0.34% in
HD32 and 3.29% in HD34, id. , at 254a), and the District
Court relied solely on the “evidence of the use of race in drawing
the lines in Nueces County” to find a one person, one vote
violation. Id. , at 255a; see also id. , at 254a
(“[T]he State intentionally discriminated against minority voters
by overpopulating minority districts and underpopulating Anglo
districts”). Even assuming that a court could find a one person,
one vote violation on the basis of such a small deviation, cf. Brown v. Thomson , 462 U. S. 835, 842–843 (1983)
(noting that deviations under 10% are generally insufficient to
show invidious discrimination), the District Court erred in relying
on its unsound finding regarding racial discrimination. Moreover,
plaintiffs rejected any separate one person, one vote claims before
the District Court, Tr. 22 (July 10, 2017), and they have not
mentioned such a claim as a separate theory in their briefing in
this Court. 27 The
District Court’s belief that simple Latino majorities in Nueces
County might be sufficient to create opportunity districts—and that
Texas should have known as much—conflicts with other parts of its
decision. With respect to numerous other districts, the District
Court chided Texas for focusing on bare numbers and not
considering real opportunity to elect. See, e.g. ,
C. J. S. 134a (“[T]he court rejects [the] bright-line
rule that any HCVAP-majority district is by definition a Latino
opportunity district” because it “may still lack real electoral
opportunity” (internal quotation marks omitted));
H. J. S. 121a (Texas “increase[d the Latino population]
while simultaneously ensuring that election success rates remained
minimally improved”). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 17–586 and 17–626

															_________________

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–586 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–626 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															on appeals from the united states district
court for the western district of texas

															[June 25, 2018]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins, concurring.

															I adhere to my view that §2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 does not apply to redistricting. See Cooper v. Harris , 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (concurring opinion)
(slip op., at 1) (citing Holder v. Hall , 512
U. S. 874, 922–923 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment)). Thus, §2 cannot provide a basis for invalidating any
district, and it cannot provide a justification for the racial
gerrymander in House District 90. Because the Court correctly
applies our precedents and reaches the same conclusion, I join its
opinion in full. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 17–586 and 17–626

															_________________

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–586 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															GREG ABBOTT, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

															17–626 v. SHANNON PEREZ, ET AL.

															on appeals from the united states district
court for the western district of texas

															[June 25, 2018]

															Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.

															The Court today goes out of its way to permit
the State of Texas to use maps that the three-judge District Court
unanimously found were adopted for the purpose of preserving the
racial discrimination that tainted its previous maps. In reaching
its desired result, the majority commits three fundamental errors
along the way.

															First, the majority disregards the strict limits
of our appellate jurisdiction and reads into the District Court
orders a nonexistent injunction to justify its premature
intervention. Second, the majority indulges Texas’ distorted
reading of the District Court’s meticulous orders, mistakenly
faulting the court for supposedly shifting the burden of proof to
the State to show that it cured the taint of past discrimination,
all the while ignoring the clear language and unambiguous factual
findings of the orders below. Third, the majority elides the
standard of review that guides our resolution of the factual
disputes in these appeals—indeed, mentioning it only in passing—and
selectively parses through the facts. As a result of these errors,
Texas is guaranteed continued use of much of its discriminatory
maps.

															This disregard of both precedent and fact comes
at serious costs to our democracy. It means that, after years of
litigation and undeniable proof of intentional discrimination,
minority voters in Texas—despite constituting a majority of the
population within the State—will continue to be underrepresented in
the political process. Those voters must return to the polls in
2018 and 2020 with the knowledge that their ability to exercise
meaningfully their right to vote has been burdened by the
manipulation of district lines specifically designed to target
their communities and minimize their political will. The
fundamental right to vote is too precious to be disregarded in this
manner. I dissent.

															I

															A

															The first obstacle the majority faces in its
quest to intervene in these cases is jurisdictional. The statute
that governs our jurisdiction over these appeals is 28
U. S. C. §1253, which provides that “any party may appeal
to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying
. . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any
civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to
be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
Unlike the more typical certiorari process, for cases falling
within §1253, appellate review in this Court is mandatory. That is
why, until today, this Court has repeatedly recognized and adhered
to a “long-established rule” requiring “strict construction” of
this jurisdictional statute “to protect our appellate docket.” Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po , 336 U. S. 368,
375, 378 (1949); see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Automatic
Employees Credit Union , 419 U. S. 90, 98 (1974) (noting
that “only a narrow construction” of our jurisdiction under §1253
“is consonant with the overriding policy, historically encouraged
by Congress, of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court in
the interests of sound judicial administration”); Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam , 399 U. S. 383,
387 (1970) (similar); Goldstein v. Cox , 396
U. S. 471, 477–478 (1970) (rejecting a construction of §1253
that would “involve an expansion of [our] mandatory appellate
jurisdiction,” even where the statutory text “is subject to [that]
construction,” in light of “canon of construction” requiring that
§1253 be “narrowly construed”); Phillips v. United
States , 312 U. S. 246, 248–250 (1941) (explaining that
§1253 is an “exceptional procedure” and that “inasmuch as this
procedure . . . brings direct review of a district court
to this Court, any loose construction . . . would defeat
the purposes of Congress . . . to keep within narrow
confines our appellate docket”).

															In line with that command, this Court has held
that a ruling on the merits will not suffice to invoke our
mandatory appellate jurisdiction in the absence of an order
granting or denying an injunction. In fact, even if a three-judge
district court unequivocally indicates that a state law must be
enjoined as it stands, we have required more before accepting
mandatory review. For example, the Court in Gunn found no
jurisdiction where the three-judge District Court held that a Texas
disturbing-the-peace statute was “ ‘impermissibly and
unconstitutionally broad,’ ” concluded that the plaintiffs
were “ ‘entitled to their declaratory judgment to that effect,
and to injunctive relief against the enforcement of [the statute]
as now worded, insofar as it may affect the rights guaranteed under
the First Amendment,’ ” and stayed the mandate to allow the
State to, “ ‘if it so desires, enact such disturbing-the-peace
statute as will meet constitutional requirements.’ ” 399
U. S., at 386. Despite the District Court’s resolution of the
merits and its clear indication that, unless amended, the
disturbing-the-peace statute would be enjoined, this Court
dismissed an appeal from the State for want of jurisdiction,
concluding that the District Court merely wrote a “rather
discursive per curiam opinion” and “there was no order of
any kind either granting or denying an injunction—interlocutory or
permanent.” Id., at 387. The Court explained that, in
addition to the congressional command to “ ‘keep within narrow
confines our appellate docket,’ ” other “policy
considerations” counseled limiting “our power of review,” including
“that until a district court issues an injunction, or enters an
order denying one, it is simply not possible to know with any
certainty what the court has decided.” Id., at 387–388.
Those considerations, the Court thought, were “conspicuously
evident” in that case, where the opinion did not specify, for
instance, exactly what was to be enjoined or against whom the
injunction would run. Id., at 388.

															Similarly, Whitcomb v. Chavis , 403
U. S. 124 (1971), concerned a redistricting challenge in which
a three-judge District Court held that “a redistricting of [the
challenged county was] necessitated” and “that the evidence adduced
. . . and the additional apportionment requirements set
forth by the Supreme Court call[ed] for a redistricting of the
entire state as to both houses of the General Assembly,” Chavis v. Whitcomb , 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1391 (SD
Ind. 1969). Recognizing “that the federal judiciary functions
within a system of federalism which entrusts the responsibility of
legislative apportionment and districting primarily to the state
legislature,” the District Court afforded the Governor “a
reasonable opportunity to call a Special Session of the General
Assembly of the State of Indiana so that it may enact legislation
to redistrict the State and reapportion the legislative seats in
the General Assembly in accordance with federal constitutional
requirements and in compliance with [its] opinion.” Id., at
1392. The District Court gave the State a little over two months to
enact new statutes “to remedy the improper districting and
malapportionment.” Ibid. When the Governor appealed from
that order, this Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction because
“at [the] time no judgment had been entered and no injunction had
been granted or denied.” 403 U. S. , at 138, n. 19.
The findings of liability on the merits and the unequivocal
indication that the redistricting and malapportionment violations
had to be remedied were not enough.

															B

															Straightforward application of this precedent
compels the conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction over
these appeals. Here, Texas appeals from two orders entered by the
three-judge District Court on August 15 and 24, 2017. Those orders
concern the constitutional and statutory challenges to Texas’ State
House and federal congressional redistricting plans, enacted by the
Texas Legislature (hereinafter Legislature) in 2013 (hereinafter
the 2013 maps). As relevant here, the orders concerned Texas House
districts in Bell County (HD54 and HD55), Dallas County (HD103,
HD104, and HD105), Nueces County (HD32 and HD34), and Tarrant
County (HD90), as well federal congressional districts encompassing
Nueces County (CD27) and parts of Travis County (CD35). The
District Court concluded that plaintiffs had proved intentional
discrimination as to HD54, HD55, HD103, HD104, HD105, HD32, HD34,
and CD27.[ 1 ] It also concluded
that plaintiffs had proved a “results” violation under §2 of the
Voting Rights Act as to HD32, HD34, and CD27,[ 2 ] and had established a racial gerrymandering
claim as to HD90 and CD35.[ 3 ]

															Having ruled on the challengers’ statutory and
constitutional claims, the District Court stated that all but one
of the “violations must be remedied by either the Texas Legislature
or [the District] Court.” 274 F. Supp. 3d 624, 686 (WD Tex.
2017); see also 267 F. Supp. 3d 750, 795 (WD Tex.
2017).[ 4 ] With respect to the
§2 results violation concerning HD32 and HD34, however, the
District Court noted that it had yet to decide “whether §2 requires
a remedy for this results violation.” Id., at 783, 795. The
District Court then ordered “the [Texas] Office of the Attorney
General to file a written advisory within three business days
stating whether the Legislature intends to take up redistricting in
an effort to cure these violations and, if so, when the matter will
be considered.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686; see also 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 795. The court went on: “If the Legislature
does not intend to take up redistricting, the [District] Court will
hold a hearing to consider remedial plans” on September 5 and 6,
2017, respecting the congressional and Texas House districts. 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 686–687; see also 267 F. Supp. 3d, at
795. “In preparation for the hearing[s],” the District Court
ordered the parties to confer and to “take immediate steps to
consult with their experts and mapdrawers and prepare” maps to
present at those hearings. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 687; 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 795.

															The District Court went no further. Though there
had been a determination on the merits that Texas violated both the
Equal Protection Clause and §2 of the Voting Rights Act with
respect to a number of districts in the 2013 maps, the District
Court did not enjoin use of the 2013 maps for the upcoming 2018
elections. For instance, with respect to the congressional map, the
District Court explained that its order “only partially
addresse[d]” the challengers’ claims, as it had “bifurcated the
remedial phase” from the merits phase. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
687. Importantly, in denying Texas’ motions for a stay, the
District Court took care to make abundantly clear the scope of its
orders: “Although the [District] Court found violations [in the
congressional and Texas House maps], the [District] Court has not
enjoined [their] use for any upcoming elections.” App.
134a–136a.

															That is the end of the inquiry under our
precedent, as our past cases are directly on point. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb , the District Court issued a ruling
on the merits against the State. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb , the District Court was clear that those violations
required a remedy. Like in Gunn and Whitcomb , the
District Court stayed its hand and did not enter an injunction,
instead allowing the State an opportunity to remedy the violations.
Therefore, like in Gunn and Whitcomb , this Court
lacks jurisdiction under §1253 because there is “no order of any
kind either granting or denying an injunction—interlocutory or
permanent.” Gunn , 399 U. S., at 387.[ 5 ]

															C

															1

															Despite this precedent, the majority
nonetheless concludes that our intervention at this early stage is
not only authorized, but mandatory. None of the justifications that
the majority offers for deviating from our precedent is
persuasive.

															The majority justifies its jurisdictional
overreach by holding that §1253 mandates appellate review in this
Court if a three-judge district court order “has the ‘practical
effect’ of granting or denying an injunction.” Ante, at 12.
It reasons that the Court has “previously made clear that where an
order has the ‘practical effect’ of granting or denying an
injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes of appellate
jurisdiction.” Ibid. That reasoning, however, has no
application here. Whereas this Court has applied the “practical
effect” rule in the context of the courts of appeals’ appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1292(a)(1), it has never
applied it to questions of its own mandatory appellate docket under
§1253. That explains why the only cases the majority can round up
to support its position concern jurisdiction under §1292(a)(1). Ante, at 12 (citing Carson v. American Brands,
Inc. , 450 U. S. 79, 83–84 (1981), and Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp. , 485 U. S. 271,
287–288 (1988)).

															This distinction matters a great deal. Courts of
appeals generally have jurisdiction over direct appeals from the
district courts. See 15A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure §3901, p. 13 (3d ed. 2005)
(“Courts of appeals jurisdiction extends to nearly every action
that might be taken by a district court”). In contrast, exercising
mandatory review over direct appeals in this Court is a truly
“exceptional procedure,” Phillips , 312 U. S., at 248,
in no small part due to our “necessarily finite docket,” 16B
Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §4003, at 19. Reading §1253
broadly risks transforming that exceptional procedure into a
routine matter, when our precedent commands a strict construction
precisely so that we can “ ‘keep within narrow confines our
appellate docket.’ ” Goldstein , 396 U. S., at
478.

															Brushing that distinction aside, the majority
contends that “we also construe Section 1292(a)(1)
‘narrowly,’ ” and have referred to the statutes as
“ ‘analogous.’ ” Ante, at 13. True, but that is no
response to the jurisdictional obstacle of §1253. The command from
our precedent is not simply one to undertake the same narrow
interpretation as we do for §1292(a)(1). Rather, our
“long-established rule” requires “strict construction” of §1253, Stainback , 336 U. S., at 378, so that even where the
statutory text could be read to expand our mandatory appellate
docket, this Court will not adopt that reading if a narrower
construction is available, Goldstein , 396 U. S., at
477–478. That “strict construction” rule exists for a purpose
specific to this Court: to protect our “carefully limited appellate
jurisdiction.” Board of Regents of Univ. of Tex. System v. New Left Ed. Project , 404 U. S. 541, 543 (1972). Unlike
the courts of appeals, which hear cases on mandatory jurisdiction
regularly, this Court hears cases on mandatory jurisdiction only
rarely. The majority nowhere grapples with that vital contextual
distinction between §1253 and §1292(a)(1). Nor does the majority
acknowledge that, in interpreting §1253, this Court has itself
recognized that distinction, noting that “this Court above all
others must limit its review of interlocutory orders.” Goldstein , 396 U. S., at 478 (emphasis added).

															2

															Looking to escape that pitfall in its
reasoning, the majority turns to the text of the two jurisdictional
statutes. But the text provides no refuge for its position. The
majority first states that “the relevant language in the two
provisions is nearly identical.” Ante, at 13. But whereas
§1253 provides for appeal “from an order granting or denying
. . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction,”
§1292(a)(1) provides for appeal from “[i]nterlocutory orders
. . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions.” It is a stretch, to say the least, to characterize
these provisions as “nearly identical.” Ante, at 13.

															Next, the majority contends that §1253 and
§1292(a)(1) are “textually interlocked,” ante, at 14, in
that §1292(a)(1) provides for appeal to the courts of appeals,
“except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” In
its view, this demonstrates that the “practical effect” rule must
apply under §1253. The majority reasons that “the consequences
would be unfortunate and strange” otherwise, imagining that an
order from a three-judge district court that had the practical
effect of an injunction but did not invoke §1253 jurisdiction would
“appear to be appealable to one of the courts of appeals” in light
of the “except” clause, a result “Congress surely did not intend”
given that it took “pains to provide for review in this Court, and
not in the courts of appeals, of three-judge court orders granting
injunctions.” Ante, at 14.

															This reasoning rests on a mistaken premise.
Congress did not provide for review of every three-judge
court order in this Court. It provided for review of only certain
narrow categories of orders, i.e., those granting or denying
an injunction. There is nothing “unfortunate” or “strange” about
the proposition that orders from a three-judge court that do not
fall within these narrow categories of actions made directly
appealable to this Court can be appealed only to the courts of
appeals. In fact, this Court itself has recognized as much. See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn
& Queens, Inc. , 397 U. S. 820 (1970) ( per
curiam ) (“The judgment appealed from does not include an order
granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction and is
therefore not appealable to this Court under 28 U. S. C.
§1253.  The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the
case is remanded to that court so that it may enter a fresh decree
from which timely appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals”
(citation omitted)); see also Mitchell v. Donovan ,
398 U. S. 427, 431–432 (1970) ( per curiam ) (concluding
that “this Court lacks jurisdiction of the appeal” under §1253 and
directing “the District Court [to] enter a fresh order
. . . thus affording the appellants an opportunity to
take a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals”).[ 6 ] And to the extent a party prematurely appeals
to the court of appeals an order that would otherwise fall within
§1253, e.g., if Texas had appealed the August 15 and 24
orders to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, that court
surely will be more than capable of identifying as much and
instructing the party to wait for an actual injunction before
bringing an appeal to this Court.

															3

															The majority attempts to bolster its
jurisdictional conclusion with a passing reference to the “valuable
purpose” served by the “practical effect” rule, i.e., preventing district courts from manipulating proceedings by
avoiding labeling their orders as “injunctions.” Ante, at
12–13. Notably, the majority cites no evidence for the proposition
that district courts are engaging in any kind of manipulation. Nor
is there any indication that the District Court here attempted to
manipulate the proceedings by shielding its orders from appellate
review. Instead, the District Court carefully adhered to a common
practice in cases implicating important state interests, staying
its hand as to the remedy to allow the State an opportunity to act,
as happened in Gunn and Whitcomb .

															More important, the majority ignores the
“valuable purposes” served by the longstanding rule requiring
strict construction of §1253. Not only does it comply with the
congressional command to “ ‘keep within narrow confines our
appellate docket,’ ” but without strict enforcement of the
requirement that an order grant or deny an injunction, “it is
simply not possible to know with any certainty what the court has
decided.” Gunn , 399 U. S., at 387–388. Such clarity “is
absolutely vital in a case where a federal court is asked to
nullify a law duly enacted by a sovereign State.” Id., at
389. Orders coming to this Court on direct appeal under the
“practical effect” rule will more often than not lack that
clarity.

															In these cases, for instance, what does the
majority read the “practical effect” of the orders to have been
with respect to HD32 and HD34? The District Court held that the
challengers had “not proven that §2 requires breaking the County
Line Rule” in the Texas Constitution, Art. III, but that “§2
could require” drawing two majority-HCVAP[ 7 ] districts. 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 783, 795. Does
the majority read that to mean that the §2 results violation could
potentially go without a remedy? If so, there would have been no
obstacle to use of the 2013 maps for those districts even after a
remedial phase. Or does the majority read that to mean that the
challengers still had more to show before the District Court
“would” redraw the districts that §2 “could” require to be redrawn?
And what is the effect of the conclusion respecting the County Line
Rule on the potential remedy for the intentional vote dilution
holding as to HD32 and HD34? The majority conveniently avoids
confronting this lack of clarity by ignoring the relevant record,
instead stating without explanation that it believes “it clear that
the District Court effectively enjoined use of these districts as
currently configured.” Ante, at 19, n. 15. But it
cannot escape the reality that its rule will “needlessly complicate
appellate review,” ante, at 15, given that “it is simply not
possible [absent an injunction] to know with any certainty what the
court has decided,” Gunn , 399 U. S., at 388.

															I do not disagree that “lack of specificity in
an injunctive order would [not] alone deprive the Court of
jurisdiction under §1253.” Id., at 389, n. 4; see also ante, at 16 (quoting Gunn ). “But the absence of any
semblance of effort by the District Court to comply with [the
specificity required of injunctive orders under the Federal Rules]
makes clear that the court did not think its [orders] constituted
an order granting an injunction.” Gunn , 399 U. S., at
389. If any doubt remained as to the effect of the orders here,
moreover, the District Court explicitly assured the parties that,
even though it had found violations, it was not enjoining use of
the 2013 maps for the upcoming elections. App. 134a–136a.

															Finally, it is axiomatic that “administrative
simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute.” Hertz
Corp. v. Friend , 559 U. S. 77, 94 (2010).

															“Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a
case . . . . Complex tests produce appeals and
reversals, [and] encourage gamesmanship . . . .
Judicial resources too are at stake [as] courts benefit from
straightforward rules under which they can readily assure
themselves of their power to hear a case. Simple jurisdictional
rules also promote greater predictability.” Ibid. (citations
omitted).

															Simple is thus the name of the game when it
comes to jurisdictional rules. The rule in the majority opinion is
anything but. Although the majority claims that a mere “finding on
liability cannot be appealed unless an injunction is granted or
denied,” ante, at 20, the rule it embraces today makes it
hard to understand when a finding on liability would not be read,
as the majority does here, as having the “practical effect” of an
injunction. It is a worrisome prospect that, after today, whenever
a three-judge district court expresses that a statutory or
constitutional violation must be remedied, the party held liable
will straightaway file an appeal in this Court and assert
jurisdiction under §1253, even where the district court is clear
that no injunction has issued.[ 8 ]

															The majority opinion purports to add a limit by
distinguishing between unappealable orders that find a plan
“unlawful long before the next scheduled election” or “very close
to the election date,” and those (presumably) appealable orders
that are entered neither “long before” nor “very close” to the next
election. Ante, at 20.[ 9 ] What does that even mean? The orders at issue here were
entered about 15 months before the 2018 elections, and according to
the majority fall within the not “long before” but not “very close”
appealable range. Why this is so, however, the majority never says.
Without any definitions for its boundary posts, courts will be left
to wonder: What about orders entered 17 or 18 months before an
election? Are those considered “long before” so they would be
unappealable? And are orders entered 14, 13, or 12 months before
the election similarly unappealable because they were entered “very
close” to the election date? And what does the majority mean by
“the election date”? Does that include primaries? What about
registration deadlines, or ballot-printing deadlines? It is not
uncommon for there to be, at any given time, multiple impending
deadlines relating to an upcoming election. Thinking through the
many variations of jurisdictional disputes that will arise over the
years following this novel reading of §1253 should be enough to
stop the majority from rewriting our long established jurisprudence
in this area.

															After today, our mandatory appellate docket will
be flooded by unhappy litigants in three-judge district court
cases, demanding our review. Given the lack of predict- ability,
the rule will incentivize appeals and “encourage gamesmanship.” Hertz Corp. , 559 U. S., at 94. The Court will no doubt
regret the day it opened its courthouse doors to such
time-consuming and needless manipulation of its docket.

															D

															Even if the majority were correct to import
the “practical effect” rule into the §1253 context, moreover, that
would still not justify the Court’s premature intervention in these
appeals for at least two reasons. First, while taking from Carson the “practical effect” rule it likes, the majority
gives short shrift to the second half of that case, in which the
Court was explicit that “[u]nless a litigant can show that an
interlocutory order . . . might have a ‘serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence,’ and that the order can be ‘effectually
challenged’ only by immediate appeal, the general congressional
policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory
appeal.” 450 U. S., at 84. Texas has made no showing of a
“serious, perhaps irreparable consequence” requiring our immediate
intervention, nor has Texas shown that the orders could not be
“effectually challenged” after the remedial stage was completed. In
fact, when Texas sought a stay of those orders before this Court,
the 2018 elections were more than a year away. For the majority,
however, it is enough that the District Court found the Texas
redistricting maps to be in violation of federal law. Ante, at 20–21. That cursory application of Carson , in particular
whether the injunctions the majority reads into the August 15 and
24 orders could be “effectually challenged” absent immediate appeal
to this Court, deprives that limit to our jurisdiction of much of
its meaning when assessing Texas’ request for our intervention in
these cases. Nothing in our precedent supports that truncated
approach. And in any event, if Texas wanted review of the orders
after any injunction was entered by the District Court, it could
have asked this Court for an emergency stay.

															Second, the August 15 and 24 orders at issue
here sim- ply did not have the “practical effect” of enjoining
Texas’ use of the 2013 maps. The majority thinks otherwise in part
because the District Court noted that the violations “ ‘must
be remedied.’ ” Ante, at 16. In addition, the major-
ity believes that “Texas had reason to fear that if it tried to
conduct elections under plans that the court had found to be
‘racially discriminatory,’ the court would infer an evil motive and
perhaps subject the State once again to the strictures of
preclearance under §3(c) of the Voting Rights Act.” Ante, at
17–18. But the majority forgets that the District Court made
explicit that “[a]lthough [it] found violations [in the 2013 maps],
[it] ha[d] not enjoined [their] use for any upcoming elections.”
App. 134a–136a. That the District Court requested the Texas
attorney general to advise it, within “three business days,”
whether “the Legislature intends to take up redistricting in an
effort to cure [the] violations,” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686; 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 795, does not undermine that unequivocal
statement. Nothing in that language indicates that the District
Court required the Legislature to “redraw both maps immediately ” or else “the court would do so itself.” Brief
for Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). Instead, recognizing
“that the federal judiciary functions within a system of federalism
which entrusts the responsibility of legislative . . .
districting primarily to the state legislature,” Whitcomb ,
305 F. Supp., at 1392, the District Court gave Texas an
opportunity to involve its Legislature and asked for a simple
statement of intent so that the court could manage its docket
accordingly. This request for a statement of intent, which was
necessary for the District Court to manage its own docket, does not
transform the orders into injunctions.

															As to the second point, if Texas had any “fear”
regarding the use of its maps, despite having been explicitly told
that the maps were not enjoined, that would still not be enough.
This Court recognized in Gunn that the State in that case,
faced with the order declaring its statute unconstitutional, “would
no doubt hesitate long before disregarding it.” 399 U. S., at
390. That hesitation was not enough in Gunn to magically
transform an order into an injunction for purposes of §1253, and
nothing about these cases justifies the majority taking out its
wand today. Whatever “fear” Texas had does not transform the August
15 and 24 orders into injunctions. And absent an injunction, this
Court lacks jurisdiction over these appeals. The cases should thus
be dismissed.

															II

															Having rewritten the limits of §1253, the
majority moves to the merits. There again the Court goes astray. It
asserts that the District Court legally erred when it purportedly
shifted the burden of proof and “required the State to show that
the 2013 Legislature somehow purged the ‘taint’ that the court
attributed to the defunct and never-used plans enacted by a prior
legislature in 2011.” Ante, at 21. But that holding ignores
the substantial amount of evidence of Texas’ discriminatory intent,
and indulges Texas’ warped reading of the legal analysis and
factual record below.[ 10 ]

															A

															Before delving into the content of the August
15 and 24 orders, a quick recap of the rather convoluted history of
these cases is useful. In 2011, the Texas Legislature redrew its
electoral districts. Various plaintiff groups challenged the 2011
maps under §2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment, and those lawsuits were consolidated before the
three-judge District Court below pursuant to 28 U. S. C.
§2284(a). Because Texas then was subject to preclearance under §5
of the Voting Rights Act, the 2011 maps did not take effect
immediately, and Texas filed a declaratory action in the District
Court for the District of Columbia to obtain preclearance.

															“Faced with impending election deadlines and
un-precleared plans that could not be used in the [2012] election,
[the District] Court was faced with the ‘unwelcome obligation’ of
implementing interim plans so that the primaries could proceed.”
274 F. Supp. 3d, at 632. In January 2012, this Court vacated
the first iteration of those interim maps in Perry v. Perez , 565 U. S. 388, 394–395 (2012) ( per
curiam ), finding that the District Court failed to afford
sufficient deference to the Legislature. In February 2012, the
District Court issued more deferential interim plans, but noted
that its analysis had been expedited and curtailed, and that it had
only made preliminary conclusions that might be revised on full
consideration. C. J. S. 367a–424a; H. J. S.
300a–315a.

															In August 2012, the D. C. District Court
denied preclearance of the 2011 maps. Texas v. United
States , 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (2012). It concluded that the
federal congressional map had “retrogressive effect” and “was
enacted with discriminatory intent,” id., at 159, 161, and
that the State House map was retrogressive and that “the full
record strongly suggests that the retrogressive effect
. . . may not have been accidental,” id., at 178.
Texas appealed, and the case was eventually dismissed following Shelby County v. Holder , 570 U. S. 529 (2013)
(holding unconstitutional the formula used to subject States to the
preclearance requirement).

															In June 2013, the Texas Governor called a
special legislative session, and that same month the Legislature
adopted the 2012 interim maps as the permanent maps for the State.
The Legislature made small changes to the maps, including redrawing
the lines in HD90, but the districts at issue in these appeals all
remained materially unchanged from the 2011 maps.

															The District Court in these cases denied Texas’
motion to dismiss the challenges to the 2011 maps, and the
challengers amended their complaints to assert claims respecting
the 2013 maps. In April and May 2017, the District Court held that
districts in Texas’ 2011 maps violated §2 and the Fourteenth
Amendment. The August 15 and 24 orders respecting the 2013 maps
followed.

															B

															The majority believes that, in analyzing the
2013 maps, the District Court erroneously “attributed [the] same
[discriminatory] intent [harbored by the 2011 Legislature] to the
2013 Legislature” and required the 2013 Legislature to purge that
taint. Ante, at 9–10. The District Court did no such thing.
It engaged in a painstaking analysis of discriminatory intent under Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. , 429 U. S. 252 (1977), which is critical to
understanding why, as explained in Part II–D, infra , the
District Court did not improperly presume that the Legislature
acted with discriminatory intent.

															Under Arlington Heights , “in determining
whether racially discriminatory intent existed,” this Court
considers “circumstantial and direct evidence” of: (1) the
discriminatory “impact of the official action,” (2) the “historical
background,” (3) the “specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision,” (4) departures from procedures or substance,
and (5) the “legislative or administrative history,” including
any “contemporary statements” of the lawmakers. 429 U. S., at
266–268. Although this analysis must start from a strong
“presumption of good faith,” Miller v. Johnson , 515
U. S. 900, 916 (1995), a court must not overlook the relevant
facts. This Court reviews the “findings of fact” made by the
District Court, including those respecting legislative motivations,
“only for clear error.” Cooper v. Harris , 581
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 3–4); see also Anderson v. Bessemer City , 470 U. S. 564, 573
(1985). The Court therefore “may not reverse just because we ‘would
have decided the [matter] differently. . . . A
finding that is ‘plausible’ in light of the full record—even if
another is equally or more so—must govern.” Harris , 581
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).

															The District Court followed the guidance in Arlington Heights virtually to a tee, and its factual
findings are more than “plausible” in light of the record. To
start, there is no question as to the discriminatory impact of the
2013 plans, as the “specific portions of the 2011 plans that [the
District Court] found to be discriminatory or unconstitutional
racial gerrymanders continue unchanged in the 2013 plans, their
harmful effects ‘continu[ing] to this day.’ ” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 649 (alteration in original). Texas, more-
over, has a long “history of discrimination” against minority
voters. Id., at 648, n. 37. “In the last four decades,
Texas has found itself in court every redistricting cycle, and each
time it has lost.” Texas , 887 F. Supp. 2d, at 161.

															There is also ample evidence that the 2013
Legislature knew of the discrimination that tainted its 2011 maps.
“The 2013 plans were enacted by a substantially similar Legislature
with the same leadership only two years after the original
enactment.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 648, n. 37. The
Legislature was also well aware that “the D. C. court
concluded that [its 2011] maps were tainted by evidence of
discriminatory purpose,” H. J. S. 443a, and despite the
District Court having warned of the potential that the Voting
Rights Act may require further changes to the maps, “the
Legislature continued its steadfast refusal to consider [that]
possibility,” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649.

															Turning to deliberative process—on which the
majority is singularly focused, to the exclusion of the rest of the
factors analyzed in the orders below, see Part II–D, infra —the District Court concluded that Texas was just “not
truly interested in fixing any remaining discrimination in the
[maps].” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 651, n. 45. Despite knowing
of the discrimination in its 2011 maps, “the Legislature did not
engage in a deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans
cured any taint from the 2011 plans.”[ 11 ] Id., at 649. For instance, Representative
Darby, a member of the redistricting committee, “kept stating that
he wanted to be informed of legal deficiencies so he could fix
them,” but “he did not himself seek to have the plan evaluated for
deficiencies and he willfully ignored those who pointed out
deficiencies, continuing to emphasize that he had thought ‘from the
start’ that the interim plans were fully legal.” Id., at
651, n. 45.[ 12 ] The
Legislature made no substantive changes to the challenged districts
that were the subject of the 2011 complaints, and “there is no
indication that the Legislature looked to see whether any
discriminatory taint remained in the plans.” Id., at 649. In
fact, the only substantive change that the Legislature made to the
maps was to add more discrimination in the form of a new
racially gerrymandered HD90, as the majority concedes. Ante, at 39–41.

															The absence of a true deliberative process was
coupled with a troubling sequence of events leading to the
enactment of the 2013 maps. Specifically, “the Legislature pushed
the redistricting bills through quickly in a special session,” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 649, despite months earlier having been urged
by the Texas attorney general to take on redistricting during the
regular session, id., at 634; see also H. J. S.
440a. By pushing the bills through a special session, the
Legislature did not have to comply with “a two-thirds rule in the
Senate or a calendar rule in the House,” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
649, n. 38, and it avoided the “full public notice and
hearing” that would have allowed “ ‘meaningful input’ from all
Texans, including the minor- ity community,” H. J. S.
444a. In addition, “necessary resources were not allocated to
support a true deliberative process.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649.
For instance, the House committee “did not have counsel when the
session started.” Ibid., n. 39.

															Nor can Texas credibly claim to have understood
the 2012 interim orders as having endorsed the legality of its maps
so that adopting them would resolve the challengers’ complaints. In
its 2012 interim orders, “the [District] Court clearly warned that
its preliminary conclusions . . . were not based on a
full examination of the record or the governing law and were
subject to revision” “given the severe time constraints
. . . at the time” the orders were adopted. Id., at 650. The District Court also explained that the “claims
presented . . . involve difficult and unsettled legal
issues as well as numerous factual disputes.” C. J. S.
367a. During the redistricting hearings, chief legislative counsel
for the Texas Legislative Council in 2013, Jeff Archer, advised the
Legislature that the District Court “ ‘had not made full
determinations, . . . had not made fact findings on every
issue, had not thoroughly analyzed all the evidence’ ” and had
“ ‘made it explicitly clear that this was an interim plan to
address basically first impression of voting rights issues.’ ”
274 F. Supp. 3d, at 650 (alterations in original); see also
App. 441a–442a (testimony that interim plans were “impromptu” and
“preliminary” and that the District Court “disclaimed making final
determinations”). Archer explained that although the Legislature
had “ ‘put to bed’ ” challenges regarding “ ‘those
issues that the [District] Court identified so far,’ ” it had
not “ ‘put the rest to bed.’ ” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
651, n. 45; see also App. 446a–447a (advising that, “on a realistic
level,” the Legislature had not “removed legal challenges” and that
adopting the interim maps “in no way would inoculate the
plans”).

															There was substantial evidence that the 2013
Legislature instead adopted the interim plans as part of a
“strategy [that] involved adopting the interim maps, however
flawed,” to insulate (and thus continue to benefit from) the
discriminatory taint of its 2011 maps. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
651. Texas hoped that, by adopting the 2012 interim maps, the
challengers “would have no remedy, and [the Legislature] would
maintain the benefit of such discrimination or unconstitutional
effects.” Ibid. That strategy originated with the Texas
attorney general, who was responsible for defending the State in
the redistricting challenges. Id., at 650, and n. 41.
He advised the Legislature that adopting the interim plans was the
“ ‘best way to avoid further intervention from federal
judges’ ” and to “ ‘ insulate [Texas’]
redistricting plans from further legal challenge.’ ” Id., at 650 (emphasis added); see also H. J. S.
443a. The Texas attorney general also drafted the “legislative fact
findings accompanying the plans, before the Legislature had
engaged in any fact findings on the bills,” stating that the 2012
interim plans “complied ‘with all federal and state constitutional
provisions or laws applicable to redistricting plans.’ ” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 650, n. 41 (emphasis added). That the
legislative factfindings were predrafted by the attorney defending
Texas in these redistricting challenges—purporting to conclude that
the 2012 interim plans complied with the law, when in fact the
evidence showed that the Legislature did not engage in a true
deliberative process or meaningfully consider evidence of the
legality of the plans so that it could have endorsed such
factfindings—demonstrates that the adoption of the interim plans
was a mere pretext to insulate the discriminatory benefits of the
2011 plans. That explains why legislators thought that removal of
those fact findings would “ ‘gu[t] the bill.’ ” Ibid. In the end, having presided over years of
litigation and seeing firsthand all of the evidence, the District
Court thought it clear that Texas’ “strategy involved adopting the
interim maps, however flawed” so that the challengers “would have
no remedy, and [Texas] would maintain the benefit of such
discrimination and unconstitutional effects.” Id., at 651.
It is hard to imagine what a more thorough consideration of the Arlington Heights factors in these cases would have looked
like. Review of the District Court’s thorough inquiry leads to the
inescapable conclusion that it did not err—let alone clearly err—in
concluding that the “Legislature in 2013 intentionally furthered
and continued the existing discrimination in the plans.” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 652.

															C

															In contrast to that thorough Arlington
Heights inquiry, the majority engages in a cursory analysis of
the record to justify its conclusion that the evidence
“overwhelmingly” shows that Texas acted with legitimate intent. Ante, at 28. Two critical things are conspicuously missing
from its analysis: first, consideration of the actual factual
record (or most of it, anyway),[ 13 ] and second, meaningful consideration of the limits of
our review of facts on these appeals.[ 14 ]

															The majority first makes reference to the fact
that the Texas attorney general “advised the Legislature that the
best way to [end the redistricting litigation] was to adopt the
interim, court-issued plans,” a position repeated by the sponsor of
the plans. Ante, at 26. And in its view, it was reasonable
for the Legislature to believe that adopting the interim plans
“might at least reduce objections and thus simplify and expedite
the conclusion of the litigation.” Ante, at 28. The majority
also states that “there is no evidence that the Legislature thought
that the plans were invalid.” Ante, at 27. In reaching those
findings, however, the majority ignores all of the evidence in the
record that demonstrates that the Legislature was aware of (and
ignored) the infirmities in the maps, that it knew that adopting
the interim plans would not resolve the litigation concerning the
disputed districts, and that it nevertheless moved forward with the
bills as a strategy to “insulate” the discriminatory maps from
further judicial scrutiny and perpetuate the discrimination
embedded in the 2012 interim maps. See Part II–B, supra .

															Instead of engaging with the factual record, the
majority opinion sets out its own view of “the situation when the
Legislature adopted the court-approved interim plans.” Ante, at 28. Under that view, “the Legislature [had] good reason to
believe that the court-approved interim plans were legally sound,”
particularly in light of our remand instructions in Perry ,
565 U. S. 388. Ante, at 28–29. The majority nowhere
considers, however, the evidence regarding what the Legislature actually had before it concerning the effect of the interim
orders, including the explicit cautionary statements in the orders
and the repeated warnings of the chief legislative counsel that the
interim plans were preliminary, incomplete, and impromptu.[ 15 ] See Part II–B, supra .

															The majority finds little significance in the
fact that the Legislature “ ‘pushed the redistricting bills
through quickly in a special session,’ ” reasoning that a
special session was needed “because the regular session had ended.” Ante, at 29. That of course ignores the evidence that the
Legislature disregarded requests by the Texas attorney general,
months earlier, to take up redistricting during the regular
session, that proceeding through a special session permitted the
Legislature to circumvent procedures that would have ensured full
and adequate consideration, and that resources were not
sufficiently allocated to permit considered review of the plans.
See Part II–B, supra .

															Finally, the majority sees nothing wrong with
the fact that the Legislature failed “to take into account the
problems with the 2011 plans that the D. C. court identified
in denying preclearance.” Ante, at 30. It maintains that the
purpose of adopting the interim plans was to “fix the problems
identified by the D. C. court,” and reasons that the interim
maps did just that by modifying any problematic districts. Ibid. But of course the finding of discriminatory intent
rested not only on what happened with particular districts. Rather,
the evidence suggested that discriminatory motive permeated the
entire 2011 redistricting process, as the D. C. court
considered that “Texas has found itself in court every
redistricting cycle [in the last four decades], and each time it
has lost”; that “Black and Hispanic members of Congress testified
at trial that they were excluded completely from the process of
drafting new maps, while the preferences of Anglo members were
frequently solicited and honored”; that the redistricting
committees “released a joint congressional redistricting proposal
for the public to view only after the start of a special
legislative session, and each provided only seventy-two hours’
notice before the sole public hearing on the proposed plan in each
committee”; that minority members of the Texas Legislature “raised
concerns regarding their exclusion from the drafting process and
their inability to influence the plan”; and that the Legislature
departed from normal procedure in the “failure to release a
redistricting proposal during the regular session, the limited time
for review, and the failure to provide counsel with the necessary
election data to evaluate [Voting Rights Act] compliance.” 887
F. Supp. 2d, at 161. The majority also ignores the findings of
retrogression concerning the previous version of CD25, which of
course are relevant to the challengers’ claims about CD27 and CD35
in this litigation and were not addressed in the 2012 interim
plans. See Part III–A, infra . That the 2012 interim maps
addressed some of the deficiencies identified by the D. C.
court in the preclearance litigation does not mean that the
Legislature in 2013 was free to wholly disregard the significance
of other evidence of discrimination that tainted its 2011 maps and
were entrenched in the 2012 interim maps.

															Even had the majority not ignored the factual
record, it still would be wrong in concluding that the District
Court erred in finding that the 2013 Legislature acted with the
intent to further and benefit from the discrimination in the 2011
maps. In light of the record before this Court, the finding of
invidious intent is at least more than “ ‘plausible’ ”
and thus “must govern.” Harris, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 4). The majority might think that it has a “better view of
the facts” than the District Court did, but “the very premise of
clear error review is that there are often ‘two
permissible’—because two ‘plausible’—‘views of the
evidence.’ ” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 9–10).

															D

															The majority resists the weight of all this
evidence of invidious intent not only by disregarding most of it
and ignoring the clear-error posture, but also by endorsing Texas’
distorted characterizations of the intent analysis in the orders
below. Specifically, the majority accepts Texas’ argument that the
District Court “reversed the burden of proof” and “imposed on the
State the obligation of proving that the 2013 Legislature had
experienced a true ‘change of heart’ and had ‘engage[d] in a
deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint
from the 2011 plans.’ ” Ante, at 23 (alteration in
original). The District Court did no such thing, and only a
selective reading of the orders below could support Texas’
position.

															It is worth noting, as a preliminary matter,
that the majority does not question the relevance of historical
discrimination in assessing present discriminatory intent. Indeed,
the majority leaves undisturbed the longstanding principle
recognized in Arlington Heights that the “ ‘historical
background’ of a legislative enactment is ‘one evidentiary source’
relevant to the question of intent.” Ante, at 22 (quoting Arlington Heights , 429 U. S., at 267). With respect to
these cases, the majority explicitly acknowledges that, in
evaluating whether the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory
purpose, “the intent of the 2011 Legislature . . . [is]
relevant” and “must be weighed together with any other direct and
circumstantial evidence” bearing on intent. Ante, at 26.

															If consideration of this “ ‘historical
background’ ” factor means anything in the context of
assessing intent of the 2013 Legislature, it at a minimum required
the District Court to assess how the 2013 Legislature addressed the
known discrimination that motivated the drawing of the district
lines that the Legislature was adopting, unchanged, from the 2011
maps. Therefore, the findings as to whether the 2013 Legislature
engaged in a good-faith effort to address any known discrimination
that tainted its 2011 plans were entirely apposite, so long as the
District Court “weighed [this factor] together with any other
direct and circumstantial evidence” bearing on the intent question,
and so long as the burden remained on the challengers to establish
invidious intent. Ante, at 26.

															The majority faults the District Court for not
adequately engaging in that weighing and giving too “central” a
focus to the historical factor in its intent analysis. Ante, at 23; see also ante, at 23–24, n. 18. That alleged
“central” focus, the majority contends, led the District Court to
shift the burden of proof on the intent inquiry away from the
challengers, instead requiring Texas to show that the Legislature
cured its past transgressions. Ante, at 23. Those
conclusions can only be supported if, as Texas and the majority
have done, one engages in a highly selective reading of the
District Court orders.

															To begin, entirely absent from the majority
opinion is any reference to the portions of the District Court
orders that unequivocally confirm its understanding that the burden
remained on the challengers to show that the 2013 Legislature acted
with invidious intent. The District Court was explicit that the
challengers bore the burden to “establish their claim by showing
that the Legislature adopted the plans with a discriminatory
purpose, maintained the district lines with a discriminatory
purpose, or intentionally furthered preexisting intentional
discrimination.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 646; see also id., at 645 (discussing Circuit precedent regarding the showing needed
for “a plaintiff [to] meet the purpose standard”).[ 16 ]

															Even when it does look at the actual language of
the orders, the majority picks the few phrases that it believes
support its argument, choosing to disregard the rest. For instance,
the majority quotes the District Court order as having required
Texas to show that the 2013 Legislature had a “ ‘change of
heart.’ ” Ante, at 23 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at
649). When that sentence is read in full, however, it is evident
that the District Court was not imposing a “duty to expiate” the
bad intent of the previous Legislature, as the majority contends, ante, at 23, but instead was describing what the weighing of
the direct and circumstantial evidence revealed about the
motivations of the 2013 Legislature: “The decision to adopt the
interim plans was not a change of heart concerning the validity of
[the challengers’] claims . . . —it was a litigation
strategy designed to insulate the 2011 or 2013 plans from further
challenge, regardless of their legal infirmities.” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 649–650.

															Likewise, the majority quotes the orders as
requiring proof that the Legislature “ ‘engage[d] in a
deliberative process to ensure that the 2013 plans cured any taint
from the 2011 plans.’ ” Ante, at 23 (quoting 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 649). But the District Court did not put the
burden on Texas to make that affirmative showing. Instead, that
partial quote is lifted from a sentence in which the District
Court, having held a trial on these factual issues, concluded that
the challengers had met their burden to show that “the Legislature
did not engage in a deliberative process,” which it supported later
in that paragraph with findings that the Legislature “pushed the
redistricting bills through quickly in a special session” without
allocating the “necessary resources . . . to support a
true deliberative process.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 649.

															The majority finally asserts that the District
Court “drove the point home” when it “summarized its analysis” as
follows: “ ‘The discriminatory taint [from the 2011 plans] was
not removed by the Legislature’s enactment of the Court’s interim
plans, because the Legislature engaged in no deliberative process
to remove any such taint, and in fact intended any such taint to be
maintained but safe from remedy.’ ” Ante, at 23
(quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686). The majority no doubt hopes
that the reader will focus on the portion of the sentence in which
the District Court concludes that the discriminatory taint found in
the 2011 maps “ ‘was not removed’ ” by the enactment of
the interim maps “ ‘because the Legislature engaged in no
deliberative process to remove any such taint.’ ” Ante, at 23 (quoting 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 686).[ 17 ] But the majority ignores the import of the
remaining part of the sentence, in which the District Court held
that the Legislature “in fact intended any such taint to be
maintained but be safe from remedy.” 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 652;
see also id., at 686. The majority also conveniently leaves
out the sentence that immediately follows: “The Legislature in 2013
intentionally furthered and continued the existing discrimination
in the plans.” Id., at 652. When read in full and in
context, it is clear that the District Court remained focused on
the evidence proving the intent of the 2013 Legislature to shield
its plans from a remedy and thus further the discrimination, rather
than simply presuming invidious intent from the failure to remove
the taint, as the majority claims.

															In selectively reviewing the record below, the
majority attempts to shield itself from the otherwise unavoidable
conclusion that the District Court did not err. If forced to
acknowledge the true scope of the legal analysis in the orders
below, the majority would find itself without support for its
insistence that the District Court was singu- larly focused on
whether the Legislature “removed” past taint. And then the majority
would have to contend with the thorough analysis of the Arlington Heights factors, Part II–B, supra , that led
the District Court to conclude that the 2013 Legislature acted with
invidious intent.

															III

															The majority fares no better in its
district-by-district analysis. In line with the theme underlying
the rest of its analysis, the majority opinion overlooks the
factual record and mischaracterizes the bulk of the analysis in the
orders below in concluding that the District Court erred in finding
a §2 results violation as to CD27, HD32, and HD34. I first address
CD27, and then turn to HD32 and HD34.

															A

															1

															To put in context the objections to the
District Court’s conclusion regarding CD27, a brief review of the
District Court’s factual findings as to that district is necessary.
Before 2011, CD27 was a Latino opportunity district, i.e., a
majority-HCVAP district with an opportunity to elect a
Hispanic-preferred candidate. When the Legislature reconfigured the
district in 2013, it moved Nueces County, a majority-HCVAP county,
into a new Anglo-majority district to protect an incumbent “who was
not the candidate of choice of those Latino voters” and likely
would have been “ousted” by them absent the redistricting.
C. J. S. 181a, 191a. The District Court found that the
“placement of Nueces County Hispanics in an Anglo-majority district
ensures that the Anglo majority usually will defeat the
minority-preferred candidate, given the racially polarized voting
in the area.” Id., at 189a–190a. It also found that “the
political processes are not equally open to Hispanics” in Texas as
a result of its “history of official discrimination touching on the
right of Hispanics to register, vote, and otherwise to participate
in the democratic process [that] is well documented,” and that
“Latinos bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as
education and employment/income, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process.” Id., at
190a–191a. Given those findings, the District Court concluded that
the newly constituted CD27 “has the effect of diluting Nueces
County Hispanic voters’ electoral opportunity.” Id., at
191a.

															Texas nevertheless contended (and maintains
here) that no §2 results violation existed because only “seven
compact Latino opportunity districts could be drawn in South/West
Texas,” id., at 181a, and that all seven districts already
existed under its maps. To explain how it counted to seven, Texas
pointed to the creation of CD35 as a supposed new Latino
opportunity district that joined Travis County Hispanics with
Hispanics in San Antonio. The District Court agreed that only seven
such districts could be drawn in the area, but rejected Texas’
invocation of CD35 as a defense. The District Court concluded that
because Travis County “[did] not have Anglo bloc voting,” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 683, §2 did not require the placement of
Travis County Hispanics in an opportunity district,
C. J. S. 176a; see also Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U. S. 30, 51 (1986). The District Court
found that Texas had moved Travis County Hispanics from their
pre-2011 district, CD25, to the newly constituted CD35, not to
comply with §2, but “to use race as a tool for partisan goals
. . . to intentionally destroy an existing district with
significant minority population (both African American and
Hispanic) that consistently elected a Democrat (CD25).” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 683. Thus, it concluded that “CD35 was an
impermissible racial gerrymander because race predominated in its
creation without furthering a compelling state interest.” Ibid. Importantly, the District Court concluded that,
without CD35, Texas could have drawn one more Latino opportunity
district in South/West Texas that included Nueces County Hispanics.
C. J. S. 181a; see also id., at 190a (“Plaintiffs
have thus shown that a district could be drawn in which Hispanics,
including Nueces County Hispanics, are sufficiently numerous and
geographically compact to constitute a majority HCVAP”); id., at 192a (“Numerous maps also demonstrated that
accommodating the §2 rights of all or most Nueces County Hispanic
voters would not compromise the §2 rights of any other voters, and
in fact including it substantially accommodates the §2 rights of
Hispanic voters in South/West Texas”). Indeed, “[p]lans were
submitted during the legislative session and during this litigation
that showed that seven compact districts could be drawn that
included all or most Nueces County Hispanic voters but not Travis
County voters.” Id., at 181a, n. 47.

															2

															Nothing in the record or the parties’ briefs
suggests that the District Court clearly erred in these findings of
fact, which unambiguously support its conclusion that there is a §2
results violation with respect to CD27. Nevertheless, the majority
offers two reasons for reversing that conclusion. First, the
majority contends that the District Court erred because “in
evaluating the presence of majority bloc voting in CD35,” it
“looked at only one, small part of the district, the portion that
falls within Travis County.” Ante, at 34. It cites to Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections , 580
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 12), an equal protection
racial gerrymandering case, for the proposition “that redistricting
analysis must take place at the district level.” Ante, at
34. According to the majority, then, the District Court should have
looked at the existence of majority bloc voting in CD35 as a whole
after the 2011 redistricting.

															But the majority confuses the relevant inquiry,
as well as the relevant timeline. The particular §2 question here
does not concern the status of Travis County Latinos in the newly
constituted CD35 after the 2011 redistricting. Rather, it concerns
the status of Travis County Latinos in the old CD25, prior to the
2011 redistricting. That is because the challengers’ §2 claim
concerns the choices before the Legislature at the time of the
2011 redistricting , when it was deciding which Latinos in
South/West Texas to place in the new opportunity district to be
created in that area of the State. The Legislature chose to include
Travis County Latinos in an opportunity district at the expense of
the Nueces County Latinos, who were instead moved into a
majority-Anglo district. So the question is whether, knowing that
Nueces County Latinos indisputably had a §2 right, the
Legislature’s choice was nevertheless justified because the Travis
County Latinos also had a §2 right that needed to be accommodated.
In other words, did the Legislature actually create a new §2
opportunity district for persons with a §2 right, or did it simply
move people without a §2 right into a new district and just call it
an opportunity district? To answer that question, the status of
Travis County Latinos in 2011 is the only thing that matters, and
the District Court thus correctly focused its inquiry on whether
bloc voting existed in Travis County prior to the 2011
redistricting, such that Travis County Latinos could be found to
have a §2 right. Whether the newly constituted CD35 now qualifies as a §2 opportunity district—an inquiry that would, as
the majority suggests, call for district-wide consideration—is
beside the point.

															Second, the majority reasons that “the 2013
Legislature had ‘good reasons’ to believe that [CD35] was a viable
Latino opportunity district that satisfied the Gingles factors.” Ante, at 35. For this, the majority cites to the
fact that the district “was based on a concept proposed by MALDEF”
and that one group of plaintiffs “argued that the district [was]
mandated by §2,” and vaguely suggests that, contrary to the
District Court’s finding, “there is ample evidence” of majority
bloc voting in CD35. Ibid. [ 18 ]

															The majority forgets, yet again, that we review
factual findings for clear error. Harris , 581 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). Indeed, its analysis is too cursory
even for de novo review. The majority does not
meaningfully engage with the full factual record below. Instead, it
looks only to the handful of favorable facts cited in Texas’
briefs. Compare Brief for Appellants 46 with ante, at 35.
Had the majority considered the full record, it could only have
found that the District Court cited ample evidence in support of
its conclusion that the Legislature had no basis for believing that
§2 required its drawing of CD35. In fact, the District Court noted
that Texas in 2011 “actually asserted that CD35 is not required by
§2,” C. J. S. 174a, n. 40, that the main plan
architect testified that he was not sure whether §2 required
drawing the district, and that testimony at trial showed that the
district was drawn because, on paper, it would fulfill the
requirement of being majority-HCVAP while providing Democrats only
one new district, and “not because all of the Gingles factors were satisfied,” id., at 178a–179a, n. 45. The
District Court also concluded that “there is no evidence that any
member of the Legislature . . . had any basis in evidence
for believing that CD35 was required by §2 other than its
HCVAP-majority status.” Ibid. Had the majority properly framed the inquiry and
ap-plied the clear-error standard to the full factual record, it
could not convincingly dispute the existence of a §2 results
violation as to CD27. Texas diluted the voting strength of Nueces
County Latinos by transforming a minority-opportunity district into
a majority-Anglo district. The State cannot defend that result by
pointing to CD35, because its “creation of an opportunity district
for [Travis County Latinos] without a §2 right offers no excuse for
its failure to provide an opportunity district for [Nueces County
Latinos] with a §2 right.” League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry , 548 U. S. 399, 430 (2006)
( LULAC ).[ 19 ]

															B

															1

															I turn now to HD32 and HD34. Before the 2011
redistricting, Nueces County had within it two Latino opportunity
districts and part of one Anglo-represented district. 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 767. Due to slower population growth reflected
in the 2010 census, however, Nueces County was entitled to have
within it only two districts. Accordingly, during the 2011
redistricting, the Legislature opted to “eliminate one of the
Latino opportunity districts . . . and draw two districts
wholly within Nueces County—one strongly Latino (HD34) and one a
safe Anglo Republican seat (HD32) to protect [an] incumbent.” Ibid. “Based on an analysis of the Gingles requirements and the totality of the circumstances,” however, the
District Court found that the Legislature could have drawn two
compact minority districts in Nueces County. Id., at 780.
Namely, the evidence demonstrated that it was possible to draw a
map with “two districts with greater than 50% HCVAP,” that “Latinos
in Nueces County are highly cohesive, and that Anglos vote as a
block usually to defeat minority preferred candidates.” Id., at 777–778.

															The District Court then considered two proposed
configurations for those districts: one with two HCVAP-majority
districts located wholly within Nueces County, and another that
required breaking the County Line Rule. Id., at 777. The
challengers preferred the latter configuration because, according
to their expert, “an exogenous election index” revealed that the
two HCVAP-majority districts wholly within Nueces County did “not
perform suffi- ciently.” Id., at 778. The District Court did
not accept that expert’s assessment at face value. Instead, it
explained that “an exogenous election index alone will not
determine opportunity,” and so evaluated the expert testing and
ample other evidence and ultimately concluded that the challengers
had “not adequately demonstrated that they lack equal opportunity
in [an alternative] configuration . . . such that a
county line break is necessary.” Id., at 778, 781. Thus,
although it found that “two HCVAP-districts could have been drawn
that would provide Hispanics with equal electoral opportunity, and
that §2 could require those two districts,” because §2 did not
require the challengers’ requested remedy ( i.e., breaking
the County Line Rule), the District Court had to “consider whether
§2 requires a remedy” and directed the challengers to “consider
their preferred configuration for the remedy stage” that was to
follow (before Texas prematurely appealed). Id., at 783.

															2

															The majority purports to accept these factual
findings, and contends that they “show that [HD32 and HD34] do not
violate §2.” Ante, at 35. Specifically, the majority points
to the fact that the challengers’ “own expert determined that it
was not possible to divide Nueces County into more than one performing Latino district” without breaking the County Line
Rule, a remedy the District Court concluded was not required by §2. Ante, at 36 (emphasis in original). “So if Texas could not create two performing districts in Nueces County and did not have to break county lines,” the majority reasons, “the
logical result is that Texas did not dilute the Latino vote.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). In its view, a districting
decision cannot be said to dilute the votes of minority voters “if
the alternative to the districting decision at issue would not
enhance the ability of minority voters to elect the candidates of
their choice.” Ibid. At bottom, then, the majority rests its
conclusion on one aspect of the challengers’ expert evidence, i.e., that it was not possible to place within Nueces County
more than one performing Latino district without breaking county
lines. The majority acknowledges the District Court’s finding that
the challengers had “ ‘failed to show’  that two
majority-Latino districts in Nueces County would not perform,” but
waves away that finding by concluding that the District Court
“twisted the burden of proof beyond recognition” by “suggest[ing]
that a plaintiff might succeed on its §2 claim because its expert
failed to show that the necessary factual basis for the claim could
not be established.” Ante, at 37. That conclusion is only
possible because the majority closes its eyes to significant
evidence in the record and misrepresents the District Court’s
conclusion about the potential for creating two performing
Latino-majority districts in Nueces County.

															The majority, of course, is right on one thing:
The District Court recognized that the challengers’ expert opined
that the two HCVAP-majority districts would not perform based on
the results of an exogenous election index. See ante, at 36.
But the majority ignores that the District Court rejected that
expert’s conclusion because “the results of an exogenous election
index alone will not determine opportunity,” as “[s]uch indices
often do not mirror endogenous election performance.” 267
F. Supp. 3d, at 778. Instead of “just relying on an exogenous
election index to measure opportunity,” the District Court
“conduct[ed] an intensely local appraisal to determine whether real
electoral opportunity exists.” Ibid. That “intensely local appraisal” resulted in a
lengthy analysis that considered, among other facts: that Texas had
a long “history of voting-related discrimination”; that “racially
polarized voting exist[s] in Nueces County and its house district
elections, the level is high, and the high degree of Anglo bloc
voting plays a role in the defeat of Hispanic candidates”; “that
Hispanics, including in Nueces County, suffer a ‘continuing pattern
of disadvantage’ relative to non-Hispanics”; that population growth
in the county “was [driven by] Hispanic growth” and that the “HCVAP
continues to climb”; that the districts “include demographic
distributions strongly favoring Hispanic voters,” and that the
“numbers translate into a significant advantage in house district
elections”; and that data analysis showed that “performance for
Latinos increased significantly in presidential election years,”
which “indicates that the districts provide potential to elect.” Id., at 778–782.[ 20 ]

															The District Court’s focus on the history of the
county as well as its potential performance going forward was an
important point of departure from the challengers’ expert, who
considered only the former. See LULAC , 548 U. S., at
442 (noting “a significant distinction” in analysis of what
district performance “ ‘had been’ ” compared to “how it
would operate today . . . given the growing Latino
political power in the district”). The District Court also found
the expert’s analysis lacking in other key respects. Namely, the
District Court noted that one of the majority-HCVAP districts
“provides opportunity, at least in presidential election years”;
that “[m]ost of the elections in [the exogenous election] index did
not involve a Latino Democrat candidate”; and that the
expert “only looked at statewide races and no county races,” even
though it was “conceiv- able that, in competitive local races with
Latino candidates, Hispanic voters would mobilize in significantly
higher numbers.” 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 781 (emphasis in
original).

															Based on this review of the evidence, the
District Court concluded “that Hispanics have equal opportunity in
two districts drawn wholly within Nueces County (or at least [the
challengers] failed to show that they do not).” Id., at 782.
It further explained that, whereas the “evidence shows that two
HCVAP-districts could have been drawn that would provide Hispanics
with equal electoral opportunity, . . . the evidence does
not show that the Legislature was required to break the County Line
Rule to draw what [the challengers] consider to be ‘effective’
districts.” Id., at 783.

															When read in the context of the full analysis
just detailed, it is clear that the District Court was not
“twist[ing] the burden of proof,” ante, at 37, when it
observed that the challengers “failed to show that” the two
HCVAP-majority districts drawn wholly within Nueces County would
not perform. That statement plainly refers to the challengers’
failure to rebut the finding that the two districts wholly within
Nueces County provided equal electoral opportunity to Hispanics, as
they needed to do to show that §2 required breaking the County Line
Rule. If anything is “twisted . . . beyond recognition,” ibid. , it is the majority opinion’s description of the
District Court’s findings. For while relying on a reference to what
the challengers’ expert opined, the majority wholly ignores the
District Court’s lengthy discussion rejecting that opinion on the
basis of other evidence in the record.[ 21 ]

															This Court has been clear that “the ultimate
right of §2 is equality of opportunity.” Johnson v. De
Grandy , 512 U. S. 997, 1014, n. 11 (1994). The
District Court found that two HCVAP-majority districts drawn wholly
within Nueces County provided such “equality of opportunity,” and
its findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Only by selectively
reading the factual record and ignoring the relevant analysis of
those facts can the majority escape the §2 results violation that
flows from those findings.

															IV

															The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and §2 of the Voting Rights Act secure for all voters in
our country, regardless of race, the right to equal participation
in our political processes. Those guarantees mean little, however,
if courts do not remain vigilant in curbing States’ efforts to
undermine the ability of minority voters to meaningfully exercise
that right. For although we have made progress, “voting
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” Shelby
County , 570 U. S., at 536.

															The Court today does great damage to that right
of equal opportunity. Not because it denies the existence of that
right, but because it refuses its enforcement. The Court intervenes
when no intervention is authorized and blinds itself to the
overwhelming factual record below. It does all of this to allow
Texas to use electoral maps that, in design and effect, burden the
rights of minority voters to exercise that most precious right that
is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins ,
118 U. S. 356, 370 (1886); see Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Institute , 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5) (“Our democracy rests on the
ability of all individuals, regardless of race, income, or status,
to exercise their right to vote”). Because our duty is to safeguard
that fundamental right, I dissent. Notes 1 The Fourteenth Amendment
and §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibit intentional “vote
dilution,” i.e., purposefully enacting “a particular voting
scheme . . . ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities,’ an action disadvantaging
voters of a particular race.” Miller v. Johnson , 515
U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (citations omitted). 2 The §2 “results” test
focuses, as relevant here, on vote dilution accomplished through
cracking or packing, i.e., “the dispersal of [a protected
class of voters] into districts in which they constitute an
ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of [those
voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive
majority.” Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U. S. 30,
46, n. 11 (1986). 3 The Fourteenth Amendment
“limits racial gerrymanders” and “prevents a State, in the absence
of ‘sufficient justification,’ from ‘separating its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race.’ ” Cooper v. Harris , 581 U. S. ___, ____ (2017)
(slip op., at 1). 4 The various appendixes
are abbreviated herein consistent with the majority opinion. See ante, at 2, n. 1. 5 Contrary to what the
majority contends, whether Whitcomb involved an “exceedingly
complicated procedural posture” has no effect on whether, at the
time the State first appealed, the District Court had granted or
denied an injunction for purposes of §1253 jurisdiction. Ante, at 19, n. 14. Nor was the order at issue in Whitcomb less “spe-cific” or less “likely to demand
compliance” than the orders at issue inthese appeals. Ibid. The District Court in Whitcomb , like here, issued an order
on the merits finding the State liable and unambiguously holding
that a remedy was required. Chavis v. Whitcomb , 305
F. Supp. 1364, 1391–1392 (SD Ind. 1969). The District Court
discussed how the Indiana Legislature might go about redistricting. Ibid. Also, the orders here were no more “immediate” than
the order in Whitcomb . Ante, at 19, n. 14. As in Whitcomb , the District Court here first attempted to defer
to the State to redistrict, and nothing in the record suggests that
the court would not have allowed the Texas Legislature a reasonable
amount of time to redistrict had the State decided to take up the
task, as the District Court did in Whitcomb . To the extent
the majority relies on the 3-day deadline contained in the orders
below, that deadline was solely for the Texas attorney general to
inform the District Court whether the Legislature intended to take
up redistricting; it was not a deadline to enact new maps. See infra , at 17–18. Whitcomb is thus not distinguishable
in any relevant respect. 6 The majority opinion
attempts to distinguish Donovan and Rockefeller by
stating that the decisions there were “based on the plain language
of §1253, which says nothing about orders granting or denying
declaratory judgments.” Ante, at 14–15, n. 11. But of
course, “the plain language of §1253” also “says nothing about”
noninjunctive orders, like the ones issued by the District Court
below. Notably, the order at issue in Rockefeller looked
similar to the orders on appeal here: There, the three-judge
District Court declined to enter an injunction only because “the
state ha[d] shown a desire to comply with applicable federal
requirements,” but its order nevertheless clearly resolved the
merits against the State. See Catholic Medical Center of
Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. v. Rockefeller , 305
F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (EDNY 1969). 7 “HCVAP” stands for
Hispanic citizen voting age population. 8 The majority guarantees
that there is “no reason to fear such a flood” of appeals from
three-judge district court orders because “appeals from [orders
expressly enjoining redistricting plans] have not overwhelmed our
docket.” Ante, at 20. But of course, its jurisdictional
ruling applies to all §1253 cases, not just those involving
redistricting. The majority also makes much of the fact that only
“two cases ( Gunn and Whitcomb ) decided during the
past half-century” have involved the scenario at issue here, i.e., an effort to invoke our mandatory jurisdiction to
review “a three-judge court order holding a state statute
unconstitutional but declining to issue an injunction.” Ante, at 20, n. 16. The majority never stops to
consider, however, that one reason so few cases have come to the
Court in this posture may be that Gunn and Whitcomb drew clear jurisdictional lines that litigants easily
understood—the same clear lines the majority erases
today. 9 The majority believes
these “long before” and “very close” limits guide district courts’
determinations about whether to enter an injunction. Ante, at 20. Presumably the majority would resort to the same
indeterminate limits in determining whether, in its view, a
noninjunctive order had the “practical effect” of an injunction
such that it would be justified to accept an appeal under
§1253. 10 Because the Court reaches the merits
of these appeals despite lacking jurisdiction, this dissent
addresses that portion of the majority opinion as
well. 11 The
majority is correct that our reference to these findings in the
District Court orders below is “not just a single slip of the pen.” Ante, at 24. That is because these findings form part
(though not the whole) of the comprehensive analysis that led the
District Court to conclude that the 2013 Legislature acted with the
specific intent to further the discrimination in its 2011 maps.
Full consideration of that analysis, as I have endeavored to do
here, requires review of those findings, and when read in the
context of the full factual record and legal reasoning contained in
the orders below, it is clear that these statements do not come
close to suggesting what Texas and the majority read into them, i.e., that the District Court somehow shifted the burden of
proof to require Texas to show that it cured the taint from its
past maps. 12 The
majority again engages in its own factfinding, without reference to
the fact that our review is for clear error only, when it decides
that the District Court was wrong in concluding that Representative
Darby willfully ignored the deficiencies in the 2013 maps. The
legislative hearing that the District Court cited, see 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 651, n. 45, shows, inter alia, that Representative Darby: told certain members of the Legislature
that changes to district lines would not be considered; rejected
proposed amendments where there was disagreement among the impacted
members; rejected an amendment to the legislative findings that set
out the history underlying the 2011 maps and related court rulings;
acknowledged that the accepted amendments did not address concerns
of retrogression or minority opportunity to elect their preferred
candidates; and dismissed concerns regarding the packing and
cracking of minority voters in, inter alia , HD32, HD34,
HD54, and HD55, stating simply that the 2012 court had already
rejected the challengers’ claims respecting those districts but
without engaging in meaningful discussion of the other legislators’
concerns. See Joint Exh. 17.3, pp. S7–S9, S11, S30–S35, S39–S43,
S53. Instead of addressing what is evident from the 64-page hearing
transcript, the majority fixates on the single fact that
Representative Darby accepted an amendment for the redrawing of the
new (racially gerrymandered) HD90, believing that this fact somehow
erases or outweighs all the evidence in the record showing that
Representative Darby was not interested in addressing concerns
regarding the interim plans. Ante, at 29–30, and n. 24.
Even if Representative Darby was in fact responsive to minority
concerns regarding the composition of HD90—which the record
contradicts, see 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 791, 793—that does not
undermine the weight of all of the evidence in the record
regarding his intent with respect to the enactment of the 2013 maps
as a whole. 13 The
majority contends in passing that its analysis takes account of
“all the relevant evidence in the record,” ante, at 26, and
n. 19, apparently believing that stating it explicitly somehow
makes it true. It does not. The District Court orders in these
cases are part of the public record and readers can therefore judge
for themselves. 14 The
majority never explains why it believes it appropriate to engage in
what amounts to de novo review of the factual record.
Presumably, it justifies its de novo review with its
claim of legal error as to the finding of invidious intent. See
Part II–D, infra . But even if the majority were correct that
the District Court improperly shifted the burden to the State to
disprove invidious intent, the proper next step would have been to
remand to the District Court for reconsideration of the facts in
the first instance under the correct legal standard. 15 The
majority is also just flat wrong on its characterization of the
interim orders. With respect to all but two of the challenged State
House districts, the discussion in the interim orders states only
in general terms that the District Court “preliminarily [found]
that any [§2] and constitutional challenges do not have a
likelihood of success, and any [§5] challenges are insubstantial,”
emphasizing the “preliminarily nature of [its] order.”
H. J. S. 303a, 307a–309a. With respect to the
congressional districts, the District Court opined that the “claims
are not without merit” and were “a close call,” but ultimately
concluded that the challengers had not at that time demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. C. J. S. 409a, 419a.
The District Court nevertheless emphasized that there remained
“unsettled legal issues as well as numerous factual disputes” such
that the interim map was “not a final ruling on the merits of any
claims.” C. J. S. 367a. It is a stretch to characterize
these interim orders as providing “a careful analysis of all the
claims,” ante, at 28, and borderline disingenuous to state
that, despite repeated and explicit warnings that its rulings were
not final and subject to change, the District Court was somehow
“reversing its own previous decisions” when it finally did render a
final decision, ante, at 28, n. 22. 16 The
majority spends some time distinguishing Hunter v. Underwood , 471 U. S. 222 (1985), adamant that it does
not support “shifting the burden” as it purports the District Court
did below. Ante, at 22. But the District Court agreed that Hunter was distinguishable and did not rely on it to support
any sort of burden-shifting. As the majority explains, Hunter involved a state constitutional provision adopted
with discriminatory intent that, despite pruning over the years,
the State never repealed. Ante, at 22 (citing 471
U. S., at 229, 232–233). The District Court discussed the
differences between Hunter and these cases, namely, that Hunter “did not involve a later reenactment . . .
which is what [Texas] now claims cleanses the plans.” 274
F. Supp. 3d, at 647. It noted the important distinction that,
“ ‘when a plan is reenacted—as opposed to merely remaining on
the books like the provision in Hunter —the state of mind of
the reenacting body must also be considered.’ ” Id., at
648. That the majority ignores that the District Court did not, as
it suggests, rely on Hunter as controlling is another
example of how it conveniently overlooks the District Court’s
express legal analysis. 17 Notably, the majority takes no issue
with that first conclusion, i.e., that the enactment of the
interim plans does not, on its own, insulate the 2013 plans from
challenge. It explicitly notes that the opinion does not hold that
“the 2013 [plans] are unassailable because they were previously
adopted on an interim basis by the Texas court,” noting that such a
factor is relevant insofar as it informs the inquiry into the
intent of the 2013 Legislature. Ante, at 25–26. 18 The
majority also believes that the interim orders gave the Legislature
cover with respect to CD35, ante, at 35, forgetting that the
District Court explicitly and repeatedly warned the parties that
its interim orders did not resolve all factual and legal disputes
in the cases. 19 It is
worth noting that Texas’ efforts to suppress the voting strength of
minority voters in Nueces County eerily mirror the actions this
Court invalidated as a violation of §2 in LULAC , 548
U. S. 399. Like in LULAC , “a majority-Hispanic district
that would likely have elected the Hispanic-preferred candidate was
flipped into an Anglo-majority district to protect a candidate that
was not preferred by the Hispanic voters.” C. J. S. 182a;
see also LULAC , 548 U. S., at 427–429. And like in LULAC , Texas attempted to defend that curtailment of
minority voters’ rights by pointing to the creation of another
supposed opportunity district. 274 F. Supp. 3d, at 684–685; LULAC , 548 U. S., at 429. In finding a §2 results
violation, the Court concluded that the “vote dilution of a group
that was beginning to . . . overcome prior electoral
discrimination . . . cannot be sustained.” Id., at
442. The Court also rejected Texas’ defense, holding that its
“creation of an opportunity district for those without a §2 right
offers no excuse for its failure to provide an opportunity district
for those with a §2 right.” Id., at 430. In line with LULAC , the Court should hold that Texas has once again
contravened §2 in its drawing of CD27. 20 The
majority contends that the District Court did not engage in a
sufficiently local analysis because it cited to the statewide
history of discrimination against minority voters, the continuing
disadvantage of Latino voters, and racially polarized voting. Ante, at 38. The majority not only misapprehends the
importance of that statewide evidence to the local appraisal, but
again ignores the many other factual findings and analysis that are
specific to Nueces County and thus problematic for its conclusion.
See supra, at 44–45. 21 Contrary to what the majority
suggests, the District Court did not believe that “simple Latino
majorities in Nueces County might be sufficient to create
opportunity districts” based only on “bare numbers.” Ante, at 37, n. 27. Consistent with its rebuke of Texas elsewhere in
the opinion for advocating a “bright-line rule that any
HCVAP-majority district is by definition a Latino opportunity
district” because it “may still lack ‘real electoral
opportunity,’ ” C. J. S. 134a, the District Court in
its analysis of HD32 and HD34 was clear that the challengers “could
assert that [the] HCVAP-majority districts do not present real
electoral opportunity due to racially polarized voting and lower
registration and turnout caused by the lingering effects of
official discrimination.” 267 F. Supp. 3d, at 781. Based on
its review of that evidence, it concluded that the two
majority-HCVAP districts drawn within Nueces County provided
minority voters equal electoral opportunity. Id., at
783.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that the three-judge court made a critical legal error by shifting the burden of proof to the Texas Legislature to prove it did not act with discriminatory intent when enacting districting plans the court had previously approved. The court also found that all but one of the challenged districts were lawful.