U.S. Supreme Court Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) Cooper v. Aaron No. 1 Argued September 11,
1958 Decided September 12, 1958 358 U.S.
1 ast|>* Opinion announced September 29,
1958 358 U.S.
1 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Under a plan of gradual desegregation of the races in the public
schools of Little Rock, Arkansas, adopted by petitioners and
approved by the courts below, respondents, Negro children, were
ordered admitted to a previously all-white high school at the
beginning of the 1957-1958 school year. Due to actions by the
Legislature and Governor of the State opposing desegregation, and
to threats of mob violence resulting therefrom, respondents were
unable to attend the school until troops were sent and maintained
there by the Federal Government for their protection; but they Page 358 U. S. 2 attended the school for the remainder of that school year.
Finding that these events had resulted in tensions, bedlam, chaos
and turmoil in the school, which disrupted the educational process,
the District Court, in June, 1958, granted petitioners' request
that operation of their plan of desegregation be suspended for two
and one-half years, and that respondents be sent back to segregated
schools. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed,
and the orders of the District Court enforcing petitioners' plan of
desegregation are reinstated, effective immediately. Pp. 358 U. S.
4 -20.

															1. This Court cannot countenance a claim by the Governor and
Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state officials to
obey federal court orders resting on this Court's considered
interpretation of the United States Constitution in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 . P. 358 U. S. 4 .

															2. This Court rejects the contention that it should uphold a
suspension of the Little Rock School Board's plan to do away with
segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and
efforts to upset and nullify its holding in the Brown case
have been further challenged and tested in the courts. P. 358 U. S. 4 .

															3. In many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation
will require the immediate general admission of Negro children,
otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes at
particular schools. P. 358 U. S. 7 .

															4. If, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course,
excludes hostility to racial desegregation), a District Court
concludes that justification exists for not requiring the present
nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children to public
schools, it should scrutinize the program of the school authorities
to make sure that they have developed arrangements pointed toward
the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and have
taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective
operation. P. 358 U. S. 7 .

															5. The petitioners stand in this litigation as the agents of the
State, and they cannot assert their good faith as an excuse for
delay in implementing the respondents' constitutional rights when
vindication of those rights has been rendered difficult or
impossible by the actions of other state officials. Pp. 358 U. S.
15 -16.

															6. The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be
sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have
followed Page 358 U. S. 3 upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature, and law and
order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children
of their constitutional rights. P. 358 U. S. 16 .

															7. The constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by
this Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified
openly and directly by state legislators or state executives or
judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive
schemes for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or
ingenuously." Pp. 358 U. S.
16 -17.

															8. The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by
this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the
land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on
the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding." P. 358 U. S. 18 .

															9. No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war
against the Constitution without violating his solemn oath to
support it. P. 358 U. S. 18 .

															10. State support of segregated schools through any arrangement,
management, funds or property cannot be squared with the command of
the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. P. 358 U. S. 19 .

															257 F.2d 33, affirmed. Page 358 U. S. 4 Opinion of the Court by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK,
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BURTON,
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, and MR.
JUSTICE WHITTAKER.

															As this case reaches us, it raises questions of the highest
importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government.
It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of
a State that there is no duty on state officials to obey federal
court orders resting on this Court's considered interpretation of
the United States Constitution. Specifically, it involves actions
by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that
they are not bound by our holding in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 .
That holding was that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to
use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds
from attending schools where there is state participation through
any arrangement, management, funds or property. We are urged to
uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School Board's plan to do
away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws
and efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board
of Education have been further challenged and tested in the
courts. We reject these contentions.

															The case was argued before us on September 11, 1958. On the
following day, we unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 257 F.2d 33, which had reversed a
judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, 163 F. Supp.
13 . The District Court had granted the application of the
petitioners, the Little Rock School Board and School
Superintendent, to suspend for two and one-half years the operation
of the School Board's court-approved desegregation program. In
order that the School Board Page 358 U. S. 5 might know, without doubt, its duty in this regard before the
opening of school, which had been set for the following Monday,
September 15, 1958, we immediately issued the judgment, reserving
the expression of our supporting views to a later date.** This
opinion of all of the members of the Court embodies those
views.

															The following are the facts and circumstances so far as
necessary to show how the legal questions are presented.

															On May 17, 1954, this Court decided that enforced racial
segregation in the public schools of a State is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown v. Board of
Education , Page 358 U. S. 6 347 U. S. 483 . The
Court postponed, pending further argument, formulation of a decree
to effectuate this decision. That decree was rendered May 31, 1955. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.
S. 294 . In the formulation of that decree, the Court
recognized that good faith compliance with the principles declared
in Brown might, in some situations,

															"call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the
transition to school systems operated in accordance with the
constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954,
decision." Id. at 349 U. S. 300 .
The Court went on to state:

															"Courts of equity may properly take into account the public
interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and
effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality
of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement with them."

															"While giving weight to these public and private considerations,
the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954,
ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that
additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an
effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish
that such time is necessary in the public interest and is
consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of the school
plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of
school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which
may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems."

															349 U.S. at 349 U. S.
300 -301. Page 358 U. S. 7 Under such circumstances, the District Courts were directed to
require "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance," and
to take such action as was necessary to bring about the end of
racial segregation in the public schools "with all deliberate
speed." Ibid. Of course, in many locations, obedience to
the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general
admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for
their appropriate classes at particular schools. On the other hand,
a District Court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of
course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude
that justification existed for not requiring the present
nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children. In such
circumstances, however, the Court should scrutinize the program of
the school authorities to make sure that they had developed
arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of
desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program
into effective operation. It was made plain that delay in any guise
in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children could
not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and
earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public
schools could constitute good faith compliance. State authorities
were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating
desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial
discrimination in the public school system.

															On May 20, 1954, three days after the first Brown opinion, the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on May
23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled "Supreme
Court Decision -- Segregation in Public Schools." In this
statement, the Board recognized that

															"It is our responsibility to comply with Federal Constitutional
Requirements, and we intend to do so when the Supreme Court of the
United States outlines the method to be followed. " Page 358 U. S. 8 Thereafter, the Board undertook studies of the administrative
problems confronting the transition to a desegregated public school
system at Little Rock. It instructed the Superintendent of Schools
to prepare a plan for desegregation, and approved such a plan on
May 24, 1955, seven days before the second Brown opinion.
The plan provided for desegregation at the senior high school level
(grades 10 through 12) as the first stage. Desegregation at the
junior high and elementary levels was to follow. It was
contemplated that desegregation at the high school level would
commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete
desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963.
Following the adoption of this plan, the Superintendent of Schools
discussed it with a large number of citizen groups in the city. As
a result of these discussions, the Board reached the conclusion
that "a large majority of the residents" of Little Rock were of
"the belief . . . that the Plan, although objectionable in
principle" from the point of view of those supporting segregated
schools, "was still the best for the interests of all pupils in the
District."

															Upon challenge by a group of Negro plaintiffs desiring more
rapid completion of the desegregation process, the District Court
upheld the School Board's plan, Aaron v.
Cooper, 143 F.
Supp. 855 . The Court of Appeals affirmed, 243 F.2d 361. Review
of that judgment was not sought here.

															While the School Board was thus going forward with its
preparation for desegregating the Little Rock school system, other
state authorities, in contrast, were actively pursuing a program
designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation
which this Court had held violated the Fourteenth Amendment. First
came, in November, 1956, an amendment to the State Constitution
flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose

															"in every Constitutional manner the Unconstitutional Page 358 U. S. 9 desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954, and May 31, 1955, of
the United States Supreme Court,"

															Ark.Const.Amend. 44, and, through the initiative, a pupil
assignment law, Ark.Stats. §§ 80-1519 to 80-1524. Pursuant to this
state constitutional command, a law relieving school children from
compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools, Ark.Stats. §
80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty Commission,
Ark.Stats. §§ 6-801 to 6-824, were enacted by the General Assembly
in February, 1957.

															The School Board and the Superintendent of Schools nevertheless
continued with preparations to carry out the first stage of the
desegregation program. Nine Negro children were scheduled for
admission in September, 1957, to Central High School, which has
more than two thousand students. Various administrative measures,
designed to assure the smooth transition of this first stage of
desegregation, were undertaken.

															On September 2, 1957, the day before these Negro students were
to enter Central High, the school authorities were met with drastic
opposing action on the part of the Governor of Arkansas, who
dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High
School grounds and placed the school "off limits" to colored
students. As found by the District Court in subsequent proceedings,
the Governor's action had not been requested by the school
authorities, and was entirely unheralded. The findings were
these:

															"Up to this time [September 2], no crowds had gathered about
Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence
in connection with the carrying out of the plan had occurred.
Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, the school
authorities had frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of
Police of Little Rock about taking appropriate Page 358 U. S. 10 steps by the Little Rock police to prevent any possible
disturbances or acts of violence in connection with the attendance
of the 9 colored students at Central High School. The Mayor
considered that the Little Rock police force could adequately cope
with any incidents which might arise at the opening of school. The
Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school authorities made no
request to the Governor or any representative of his for State
assistance in maintaining peace and order at Central High School.
Neither the Governor nor any other official of the State government
consulted with the Little Rock authorities about whether the Little
Rock police were prepared to cope with any incidents which might
arise at the school, about any need for State assistance in
maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the Arkansas
National Guard at Central High School." Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F.
Supp. 220 , 225.

															The Board's petition for postponement in this proceeding
states:

															"The effect of that action [of the Governor] was to harden the
core of opposition to the Plan and cause many persons who
theretofore had reluctantly accepted the Plan to believe there was
some power in the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could
nullify the Federal law and permit disobedience of the decree of
this [District] Court, and, from that date, hostility to the Plan
was increased, and criticism of the officials of the [School]
District has become more bitter and unrestrained."

															The Governor's action caused the School Board to request the
Negro students on September 2 not to attend the high school "until
the legal dilemma was solved." The next day, September 3, 1957, the
Board petitioned the District Court for instructions, and the
court, after a hearing, found that the Board's Page 358 U. S. 11 request of the Negro students to stay away from the high school
had been made because of the stationing of the military guards by
the state authorities. The court determined that this was not a
reason for departing from the approved plan, and ordered the School
Board and Superintendent to proceed with it.

															On the morning of the next day, September 4, 1957, the Negro
children attempted to enter the high school, but, as the District
Court later found, units of the Arkansas National Guard,

															"acting pursuant to the Governor's order, stood shoulder to
shoulder at the school grounds and thereby forcibly prevented the 9
Negro students . . . from entering,"

															as they continued to do every school day during the following
three weeks. 156 F. Supp. at 225.

															That same day, September 4, 1957, the United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of Arkansas was requested by the District
Court to begin an immediate investigation in order to fix
responsibility for the interference with the orderly implementation
of the District Court's direction to carry out the desegregation
program. Three days later, September 7, the District Court denied a
petition of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools for
an order temporarily suspending continuance of the program.

															Upon completion of the United States Attorney's investigation,
he and the Attorney General of the United States at the District
Court's request, entered the proceedings and filed a petition on
behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, to enjoin
the Governor of Arkansas and officers of the Arkansas National
Guard from further attempts to prevent obedience to the court's
order. After hearings on the petition, the District Court found
that the School Board's plan had been obstructed by the Governor
through the use of National Guard troops, and granted a preliminary
injunction on September Page 358 U. S. 12 20, 1957, enjoining the Governor and the officers of the Guard
from preventing the attendance of Negro children at Central High
School, and from otherwise obstructing or interfering with the
orders of the court in connection with the plan. 156 F.
Supp. 220 , affirmed, Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d
797. The National Guard was then withdrawn from the school.

															The next school day was Monday, September 23, 1957. The Negro
children entered the high school that morning under the protection
of the Little Rock Police Department and members of the Arkansas
State Police. But the officers caused the children to be removed
from the school during the morning because they had difficulty
controlling a large and demonstrating crowd which had gathered at
the high school. 163 F. Supp. at 16. On September 25, however, the
President of the United States dispatched federal troops to Central
High School, and admission of the Negro students to the school was
thereby effected. Regular army troops continued at the high school
until November 27, 1957. They were then replaced by federalized
National Guardsmen who remained throughout the balance of the
school year. Eight of the Negro students remained in attendance at
the school throughout the school year.

															We come now to the aspect of the proceedings presently before
us. On February 20, 1958, the School Board and the Superintendent
of Schools filed a petition in the District Court seeking a
postponement of their program for desegregation. Their position, in
essence, was that, because of extreme public hostility, which they
stated had been engendered largely by the official attitudes and
actions of the Governor and the Legislature, the maintenance of a
sound educational program at Central High School, with the Negro
students in attendance, would be impossible. The Board therefore
proposed that the Negro students already admitted to the school be
withdrawn Page 358 U. S. 13 and sent to segregated schools, and that all further steps to
carry out the Board's desegregation program be postponed for a
period later suggested by the Board to be two and one-half
years.

															After a hearing, the District Court granted the relief requested
by the Board. Among other things, the court found that the past
year at Central High School had been attended by conditions of
"chaos, bedlam and turmoil"; that there were "repeated incidents of
more or less serious violence directed against the Negro students
and their property"; that there was "tension and unrest among the
school administrators, the classroom teachers, the pupils, and the
latters' parents, which inevitably had an adverse effect upon the
educational program"; that a school official was threatened with
violence; that a "serious financial burden" had been cast on the
School District; that the education of the students had suffered
"and under existing conditions will continue to suffer"; that the
Board would continue to need "military assistance or its
equivalent"; that the local police department would not be able "to
detail enough men to afford the necessary protection"; and that the
situation was "intolerable." 163 F. Supp. at 20-26.

															The District Court's judgment was dated June 20, 1958. The Negro
respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
and also sought there a stay of the District Court's judgment. At
the same time, they filed a petition for certiorari in this Court
asking us to review the District Court's judgment without awaiting
the disposition of their appeal to the Court of Appeals, or of
their petition to that court for a stay. That we declined to do. 357 U. S. 566 . The
Court of Appeals did not act on the petition for a stay, but, on
August 18, 1958, after convening in special session on August 4 and
hearing the appeal, reversed the District Court, 257 F.2d 33. On
August 21, 1958, the Court of Appeals stayed its mandate Page 358 U. S. 14 to permit the School Board to petition this Court for
certiorari. Pending the filing of the School Board's petition for
certiorari, the Negro respondents, on August 23, 1958, applied to
MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, as Circuit Justice for the Eighth Circuit,
to stay the order of the Court of Appeals withholding its own
mandate, and also to stay the District Court's judgment. In view of
the nature of the motions, he referred them to the entire Court.
Recognizing the vital importance of a decision of the issues in
time to permit arrangements to be made for the 1958-1959 school
year, see Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.
S. 566 , 357 U. S. 567 ,
we convened in Special Term on August 28, 1958, and heard oral
argument on the respondents' motions, and also argument of the
Solicitor General who, by invitation, appeared for the United
States as amicus curiae, and asserted that the Court of
Appeals' judgment was clearly correct on the merits, and urged that
we vacate its stay forthwith. Finding that respondents' application
necessarily involved consideration of the merits of the litigation,
we entered an order which deferred decision upon the motions
pending the disposition of the School Board's petition for
certiorari, and fixed September 8, 1958, as the day on or before
which such petition might be filed, and September 11, 1958, for
oral argument upon the petition. The petition for certiorari, duly
filed, was granted in open Court on September 11, 1958, 358 U. S. 29 , and
further arguments were had, the Solicitor General again urging the
correctness of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On September
12, 1958, as already mentioned, we unanimously affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the per curiam opinion set
forth in the margin at the outset of this opinion.

															In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed
the District Court, we have accepted without reservation the
position of the School Board, the Page 358 U. S. 15 Superintendent of Schools, and their counsel that they displayed
entire good faith in the conduct of these proceedings and in
dealing with the unfortunate and distressing sequence of events
which has been outlined. We likewise have accepted the findings of
the District Court as to the conditions at Central High School
during the 1957-1958 school year, and also the findings that the
educational progress of all the students, white and colored, of
that school has suffered, and will continue to suffer if the
conditions which prevailed last year are permitted to continue.

															The significance of these findings, however, is to be considered
in light of the fact, indisputably revealed by the record before
us, that the conditions they depict are directly traceable to the
actions of legislators and executive officials of the State of
Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, which reflect their
own determination to resist this Court's decision in the Brown case and which have brought about violent resistance
to that decision in Arkansas. In its petition for certiorari filed
in this Court, the School Board itself describes the situation in
this language:

															"The legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the
state government opposed the desegregation of Little Rock schools
by enacting laws, calling out troops, making statements villifying
federal law and federal courts, and failing to utilize state law
enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public
peace."

															One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the
face of the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but,
regardless of the Board's good faith, the actions of the other
state agencies responsible for those conditions compel us to reject
the Board's legal position. Had Central High School been under the
direct management of the State itself, it could hardly be
suggested Page 358 U. S. 16 that those immediately in charge of the school should be heard
to assert their own good faith as a legal excuse for delay in
implementing the constitutional rights of these respondents, when
vindication of those rights was rendered difficult of impossible by
the actions of other state officials. The situation here is in no
different posture because the members of the School Board and the
Superintendent of Schools are local officials; from the point of
view of the Fourteenth Amendment, they stand in this litigation as
the agents of the State.

															The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be
sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have
followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature. As this
Court said some 41 years ago in a unanimous opinion in a case
involving another aspect of racial segregation:

															"It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the
public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is,
and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim
cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the federal Constitution." Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 , 245 U. S. 81 .
Thus, law and order are not here to be preserved by depriving the
Negro children of their constitutional rights. The record before us
clearly establishes that the growth of the Board's difficulties to
a magnitude beyond its unaided power to control is the product of
state action. Those difficulties, as counsel for the Board
forthrightly conceded on the oral argument in this Court, can also
be brought under control by state action.

															The controlling legal principles are plain. The command of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that no "State" shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

															"A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities. It can act in no Page 358 U. S. 17 other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean
that no agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom
its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue
of public position under a State government, . . . denies or takes
away the equal protection of the laws violates the constitutional
inhibition; and, as he acts in the name and for the State, and is
clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State. This
must be so, or the constitutional prohibition has no meaning." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , 100 U. S. 347 .
Thus, the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all
action of the State denying equal protection of the laws; whatever
the agency of the State taking the action, see Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U. S. 313 ; Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of
Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230 ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 ; or
whatever the guise in which it is taken, see Derrington v.
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922; Department of Conservation and
Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615. In short, the
constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against
in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this
Court in the Brown case can neither be nullified openly
and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial
officers nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes
for segregation whether attempted "ingeniously or ingenuously." Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 , 311 U. S. 132 .

															What has been said, in the light of the facts developed, is
enough to dispose of the case. However, we should answer the
premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that they
are not bound by our holding in the Brown case. It is
necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions
which are settled doctrine. Page 358 U. S. 18 Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as
"the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the
notable case of Marbury v.
Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177 ,
that "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." This decision declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the
exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has
ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.
It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme
law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Every state
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed
by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 "to support this
Constitution." Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court
in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers'

															"anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all
its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its
authority, on the part of a State. . . ." Ableman v.
Booth , 21 How. 506, 62 U. S.
524 .

															No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war
against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to
support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in
saying that:

															"If the legislatures of the several states may at will, annul
the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the
rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself
becomes a solemn mockery. . . ." United States v.
Peters , 5 Cranch 115, 9 U. S. 136 . A
Governor who asserts a Page 358 U. S. 19 power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained.
If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for
a unanimous Court,

															"it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the
Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the
land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the
exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases. . . ." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.
S. 378 , 287 U. S.
397 -398.

															It is, of course, quite true that the responsibility for public
education is primarily the concern of the States, but it is equally
true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity,
must be exercised consistently with federal constitutional
requirements as they apply to state action. The Constitution
created a government dedicated to equal justice under law. The
Fourteenth Amendment embodied and emphasized that ideal. State
support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management,
funds, or property cannot be squared with the Amendment's command
that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. The right of a student not to be
segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained is indeed so
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due
process of law. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 . The basic decision in Brown was
unanimously reached by this Court only after the case had been
briefed and twice argued and the issues had been given the most
serious consideration. Since the first Brown opinion,
three new Justices have come to the Court. They are at one with the
Justices still on the Court who participated in that basic decision
as to its correctness, and that decision is now unanimously
reaffirmed. The principles announced in that decision and the
obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the
Constitution, Page 358 U. S. 20 are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms guaranteed
by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional ideal
of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.

															* NOTE: The per curiam opinion announced on September 12, 1958,
and printed in a footnote, post, p. 358 U. S. 5 ,
applies not only to this case but also to No. 1, Misc., August
Special Term, 1958, Aaron et al. v. Cooper et al., on
application for vacation of order of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit staying issuance of its mandate, for
stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, and for such other orders as petitioners may
be entitled to, argued August 28, 1958.

															** The following was the Court's per curiam opinion:

															"PER CURIAM."

															"The Court, having fully deliberated upon the oral arguments had
on August 28, 1958, as supplemented by the arguments presented on
September 11, 1958, and all the briefs on file, is unanimously of
the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit of August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33, must be affirmed.
In view of the imminent commencement of the new school year at the
Central High School of Little Rock, Arkansas, we deem it important
to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of
Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will
be prepared and announced in due course."

															"It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, dated August 18, 1958, 257 F.2d 33,
reversing the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, dated June 20, 1958, 163 F.
Supp. 13 , be affirmed, and that the judgments of the District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated August 28, 1956, 143 F.
Supp. 855 , and September 3, 1957, enforcing the School Board's
plan for desegregation in compliance with the decision of this
Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 , be reinstated. It follows that the order of the
Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1958, staying its own mandate is
of no further effect."

															"The judgment of this Court shall be effective immediately, and
shall be communicated forthwith to the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas."

															Concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER.

															While unreservedly participating with my brethren in our joint
opinion, I deem it appropriate also to deal individually with the
great issue here at stake.

															By working together, by sharing in a common effort, men of
different minds and tempers, even if they do not reach agreement,
acquire understanding and thereby tolerance of their differences.
This process was under way in Little Rock. The detailed plan
formulated by the Little Rock School Board, in the light of local
circumstances, had been approved by the United States District
Court in Arkansas as satisfying the requirements of this Court's
decree in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.
S. 294 . The Little Rock School Board had embarked on an
educational effort "to obtain public acceptance" of its plan. Thus,
the process of the community's accommodation to new demands of law
upon it, the development of habits of acceptance of the right of
colored children to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Constitution, Amend. 14, had peacefully and promisingly begun.
The condition in Little Rock before this process was forcibly
impeded by those in control of the government of Arkansas was thus
described by the District Court, and these findings of fact have
not been controverted:

															"14. Up to this time, no crowds had gathered about Central High
School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection
with the carrying out of the plan had occurred. Nevertheless, out
of an abundance of caution, the school authorities had Page 358 U. S. 21 frequently conferred with the Mayor and Chief of Police of
Little Rock about taking appropriate steps by the Little Rock
police to prevent any possible disturbances or acts of violence in
connection with the attendance of the 9 colored students at Central
High School. The Mayor considered that the Little Rock police force
could adequately cope with any incidents which might arise at the
opening of school. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, and the school
authorities made no request to the Governor or any representative
of his for State assistance in maintaining peace and order at
Central High School. Neither the Governor nor any other official of
the State government consulted with the Little Rock authorities
about whether the Little Rock police were prepared to cope with any
incidents which might arise at the school, about any need for State
assistance in maintaining peace and order, or about stationing the
Arkansas National Guard at Central High School." 156 F.
Supp. 220 , 225.

															All this was disrupted by the introduction of the state militia
and by other obstructive measures taken by the State. The
illegality of these interferences with the constitutional right of
Negro children qualified to enter the Central High School is
unaffected by whatever action or nonaction the Federal Government
had seen fit to take. Nor is it neutralized by the undoubted good
faith of the Little Rock School Board in endeavoring to discharge
its constitutional duty.

															The use of force to further obedience to law is, in any event, a
last resort, and one not congenial to the spirit of our Nation. But
the tragic aspect of this disruptive tactic was that the power of
the State was used not to sustain law, but as an instrument for
thwarting law. The State of Arkansas is thus responsible for
disabling one Page 358 U. S. 22 of its subordinate agencies, the Little Rock School Board, from
peacefully carrying out the Board's and the State's constitutional
duty. Accordingly, while Arkansas is not a formal party in these
proceedings and a decree cannot go against the State, it is legally
and morally before the Court.

															We are now asked to hold that the illegal, forcible interference
by the State of Arkansas with the continuance of what the
Constitution commands, and the consequences in disorder that it
entrained, should be recognized as justification for undoing what
the School Board had formulated, what the District Court in 1955
had directed to be carried out, and what was in process of
obedience. No explanation that may be offered in support of such a
request can obscure the inescapable meaning that law should bow to
force. To yield to such a claim would be to enthrone official
lawlessness, and lawlessness, if not checked, is the precursor of
anarchy. On the few tragic occasions in the history of the Nation,
North and South, when law was forcibly resisted or systematically
evaded, it has signaled the breakdown of constitutional processes
of government on which ultimately rest the liberties of all.
Violent resistance to law cannot be made a legal reason for its
suspension without loosening the fabric of our society. What could
this mean but to acknowledge that disorder under the aegis of a
State has moral superiority over the law of the Constitution? For
those in authority thus to defy the law of the land is profoundly
subversive not only of our constitutional system, but of the
presuppositions of a democratic society. The State "must . . .
yield to an authority that is paramount to the State." This
language of command to a State is Mr. Justice Holmes', speaking for
the Court that comprised Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice
McReynolds, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland, Page 358 U. S. 23 Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Stone. Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 281 U. S. 179 , 281 U. S.
197 .

															When defiance of law, judicially pronounced, was last sought to
be justified before this Court, views were expressed which are now
especially relevant:

															"The historic phrase 'a government of laws, and not of men '
epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society.
When John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights, he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was
expressing the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration
of Independence and founded the Republic. 'A government of laws,
and not of men,' was the rejection in positive terms of rule by
fiat, whether by the fiat of governmental or private power. Every
act of government may be challenged by an appeal to law, as finally
pronounced by this Court. Even this Court has the last say only for
a time. Being composed of fallible men, it may err. But revision of
its errors must be by orderly process of law. The Court may be
asked to reconsider its decisions, and this has been done
successfully again and again throughout our history. Or what this
Court has deemed its duty to decide may be changed by legislation,
as it often has been, and, on occasion, by constitutional
amendment."

															"But, from their own experience and their deep reading in
history, the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from
being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power
however disguised. 'Civilization involves subjection of force to
reason, and the agency of this subjection is law.' (Pound, The
Future of Law (1937) 47 Yale L.J. 1, 13.) The conception of a
government by laws dominated the thoughts of those who founded
this Page 358 U. S. 24 Nation and designed its Constitution, although they knew as well
as the belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made,
interpreted and enforced by men. To that end, they set apart a body
of men who were to be the depositories of law, who, by their
disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual
temptations of private interest, may reasonably be expected to be
'as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will
admit.' So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on
securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with
extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how
exalted his public office or how righteous his private motive, can
be judge in his own case. That is what courts are for." United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.
S. 258 , 330 U. S.
307 -309 (concurring opinion).

															The duty to abstain from resistance to "the supreme Law of the
Land," U.S.Const., Art. VI, � 2, as declared by the organ of our
Government for ascertaining it, does not require immediate approval
of it, nor does it deny the right of dissent. Criticism need not be
stilled. Active obstruction or defiance is barred. Our kind of
society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as
derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially
charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is "the
supreme Law of the Land." See President Andrew Jackson's
Message to Congress of January 16, 1833, II Richardson, Messages
and Papers of the Presidents (1896 ed.) 610, 623. Particularly is
this so where the declaration of what "the supreme Law" commands on
an underlying moral issue is not the dubious pronouncement of a
gravely divided Court, but is the unanimous conclusion of a
long-matured deliberative process. The Constitution is not the
formulation of the Page 358 U. S. 25 merely personal views of the members of this Court, nor can its
authority be reduced to the claim that state officials are its
controlling interpreters. Local customs, however hardened by time,
are not decreed in heaven. Habits and feelings they engender may be
counteracted and moderated. Experience attests that such local
habits and feelings will yield, gradually though this be, to law
and education. And educational influences are exerted not only by
explicit teaching. They vigorously flow from the fruitful exercise
of the responsibility of those charged with political official
power, and from the almost unconsciously transforming actualities
of living under law.

															The process of ending unconstitutional exclusion of pupils from
the common school system -- "common" meaning shared alike -- solely
because of color is no doubt not an easy, overnight task in a few
States where a drastic alteration in the ways of communities is
involved. Deep emotions have, no doubt, been stirred. They will not
be calmed by letting violence loose -- violence and defiance
employed and encouraged by those upon whom the duty of law
observance should have the strongest claim -- nor by submitting to
it under whatever guise employed. Only the constructive use of time
will achieve what an advanced civilization demands and the
Constitution confirms.

															For carrying out the decision that color alone cannot bar a
child from a public school, this Court has recognized the diversity
of circumstances in local school situations. But is it a reasonable
hope that the necessary endeavors for such adjustment will be
furthered, that racial frictions will be ameliorated, by a reversal
of the process and interrupting effective measures toward the
necessary goal? The progress that has been made in respecting the
constitutional rights of the Negro children, according to the
graduated plan sanctioned by the two Page 358 U. S. 26 lower courts, would have to be retraced, perhaps with even
greater difficulty because of deference to forcible resistance. It
would have to be retraced against the seemingly vindicated feeling
of those who actively sought to block that progress. Is there not
the strongest reason for concluding that to accede to the Board's
request, on the basis of the circumstances that gave rise to it,
for a suspension of the Board's nonsegregation plan, would be but
the beginning of a series of delays calculated to nullify this
Court's adamant decisions in the Brown case that the
Constitution precludes compulsory segregation based on color in
state-supported schools?

															That the responsibility of those who exercise power in a
democratic government is not to reflect inflamed public feeling,
but to help form its understanding, is especially true when they
are confronted with a problem like a racially discriminating public
school system. This is the lesson to be drawn from the heartening
experience in ending enforced racial segregation in the public
schools in cities with Negro populations of large proportions.
Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the constitutional
organ of the supreme Law of the Land, has often, throughout our
history, depended on active support by state and local authorities.
It presupposes such support. To withhold it, and indeed to use
political power to try to paralyze the supreme Law, precludes the
maintenance of our federal system as we have known and cherished it
for one hundred and seventy years.

															Lincoln's appeal to "the better angels of our nature" failed to
avert a fratricidal war. But the compassionate wisdom of Lincoln's
First and Second Inaugurals bequeathed to the Union, cemented with
blood, a moral heritage which, when drawn upon in times of stress
and strife, is sure to find specific ways and means to surmount
difficulties that may appear to be insurmountable.

Summary: In Cooper v. Aaron, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the duty of state officials to obey federal court orders regarding desegregation in public schools, regardless of opposition from state governments or threats of violence. The Court rejected any suspension of desegregation plans and emphasized the immediate need for general admission of qualified Negro children to previously all-white schools. The Court highlighted the responsibility of those in power to form public understanding, rather than reflect inflamed emotions, especially in addressing racially discriminating systems. Compliance with the Constitution and the Court's previous Brown v. Board of Education decision was paramount, and any resistance or defiance would undermine the nation's federal system.