NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–502

															_________________

															CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 18, 2015]

															Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has
adopted a comprehensive code governing the manner in which people
may display outdoor signs. Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code
(Sign Code or Code), ch. 1, §4.402 (2005).[ 1 ] The Sign Code identifies various categories of signs
based on the type of information they convey, then subjects each
category to different restrictions. One of the categories is
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event,”
loosely defined as signs directing the public to a meeting of a
nonprofit group. §4.402(P). The Code imposes more stringent
restrictions on these signs than it doeson signs conveying other
messages. We hold that these provisions are content-based
regulations of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny.

															I

															A

															The Sign Code prohibits the display of outdoor
signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but it then
exempts 23 categories of signs from that requirement. These
exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to flying banners.
Three categories of exempt signs are particularly relevant
here.

															The first is “Ideological Sign[s].” This
category includes any “sign communicating a message or ideas for
noncommercial purposes that is not a Construction Sign, Directional
Sign, Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event,
Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign owned or required by a
governmental agency.” Sign Code, Glossary of General Terms
(Glossary), p. 23 (emphasis deleted). Of the three categories
discussed here, the Code treats ideological signs most favorably,
allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in area and to be placed
in all “zoning districts” without time limits. §4.402(J).

															The second category is “Political Sign[s].” This
includes any “temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of
an election called by a public body.” Glossary 23.[ 2 ] The Code treats these signs less favorably
than ideological signs. The Code allows the placement of political
signs up to 16 square feet on residential property and up to 32
square feet on nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal
property, and “rights-of-way.” §4.402(I).[ 3 ] These signs may be displayed up to 60 days before a
primary election and up to 15 days following a general election. Ibid. The third category is “Temporary Directional
Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.” This includes any “Temporary
Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other passersby
to a ‘qualifying event.’ ” Glossary 25 (emphasis deleted). A
“qualifying event” is defined as any “assembly, gathering,
activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a
religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other
similar non-profit organization.” Ibid. The Code treats
temporary directional signs even less favorably than political
signs.[ 4 ] Temporary directional
signs may be no larger than six square feet. §4.402(P). They may be
placed on private property or on a public right-of-way, but no more
than four signs may be placed on a single property at any time. Ibid . And, they may be displayed no more than 12 hours
before the “qualifying event” and no more than 1 hour afterward. Ibid. B

															Petitioners Good News Community Church
(Church) and its pastor, Clyde Reed, wish to advertise the time and
location of their Sunday church services. The Church is a small,
cash-strapped entity that owns no building, so it holds its
services at elementary schools or other locations in or near the
Town. In order to inform the public about its services, which are
held in a variety of different locations, the Church began placing
15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town, frequently in the public
right-of-way abutting the street. The signs typically displayed the
Church’s name, along with the time and location of the upcoming
service. Church members would post the signs early in the day on
Saturday and then remove them around midday on Sunday. The display
of these signs requires little money and manpower, and thus has
proved to be an economical and effective way for the Church to let
the community know where its services are being held each week.

															This practice caught the attention of the Town’s
Sign Code compliance manager, who twice cited the Church for
violating the Code. The first citation noted that the Church
exceeded the time limits for displaying its temporary directional
signs. The second citation referred to the same problem, along with
the Church’s failure to include the date of the event on the signs.
Town officials even confiscated one of the Church’s signs, which
Reed had to retrieve from the municipal offices.

															Reed contacted the Sign Code Compliance
Department in an attempt to reach an accommodation. His efforts
proved unsuccessful. The Town’s Code compliance manager informed
the Church that there would be “no leni-ency under the Code” and
promised to punish any futureviolations.

															Shortly thereafter, petitioners filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of
speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
District Court denied the petitioners’ motion for a preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the Sign Code’s provision regulating temporary
directional signs did not regulate speech on the basis of content.
587 F. 3d 966, 979 (2009). It reasoned that, even though an
enforcement officer would have to read the sign to determine what
provisions of the Sign Code applied to it, the “ ‘kind of
cursory examination’ ” that would be necessary for an officer
to classify it as a temporary directional sign was “not akin to an
officer synthesizing the expressive content of the sign.” Id. , at 978. It then remanded for the District Court to
determine in the first instance whether the Sign Code’s
distinctions among temporary directional signs, political signs,
and ideological signs nevertheless constituted a content-based
regulation of speech.

															On remand, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Town. The Court of Appeals again affirmed,
holding that the Code’s sign categories were content neutral. The
court concluded that “the distinctions between Temporary
Directional Signs, Ideological Signs, and Political Signs
. . . are based on objective factors relevant to
Gilbert’s creation of the specific exemption from the permit
requirement and do not otherwise consider the substance of the
sign.” 707 F. 3d 1057, 1069 (CA9 2013). Relying on this
Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado , 530 U. S.
703 (2000) , the Court of Appeals concluded that the Sign Code is
content neutral. 707 F. 3d, at 1071–1072. As the court
explained, “Gilbert did not adopt its regulation of speech because
it disagreed with the message conveyed” and its “interests in
regulat[ing] temporary signs are unrelated to the content of the
sign.” Ibid. Accord-ingly, the court believed that the Code
was “content-neutral as that term [has been] defined by the Supreme
Court.” Id., at 1071. In light of that determination, it
applied a lower level of scrutiny to the Sign Code and concluded
that the law did not violate the First Amendment. Id. , at
1073–1076.

															We granted certiorari, 573 U. S. ___
(2014), and now reverse.

															II

															A

															The First Amendment, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws
“abridging the freedom of speech.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 1.
Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government
vested with state authority, “has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.” Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley , 408
U. S. 92, 95 (1972) . Content-based laws—those that target
speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves
that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests. R. A. V. v. St. Paul , 505
U. S. 377, 395 (1992) ; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd. , 502
U. S. 105, 115, 118 (1991) .

															Government regulation of speech is content based
if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. , 564 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2011) (slip
op., at 8–9); Carey v. Brown , 447 U. S. 455, 462
(1980) ; Mosley , supra, at 95. This commonsense
meaning of the phrase “content based” requires a court to consider
whether a regulation of speech “on its face” draws distinctions
based on the message a speaker conveys. Sorrell , supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8). Some facial distinctions
based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by
particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining
regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions
drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are
subject to strict scrutiny.

															Our precedents have also recognized a separate
and additional category of laws that, though facially content
neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech:
laws that cannot be “ ‘justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech,’ ” or that were adopted by
the government “because of disagreement with the message [the
speech] conveys,” Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491
U. S. 781, 791 (1989) . Those laws, like those that are
content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.

															B

															The Town’s Sign Code is content based on its
face. It defines “Temporary Directional Signs” on the basis of
whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to
church or some other “qualifying event.” Glossary 25. It defines
“Political Signs” on the basis of whether a sign’s message is
“designed to influence the outcome of an election.” Id., at
24. And it defines “Ideological Signs” on the basis of whether a
sign “communicat[es] a message or ideas” that do not fit within the
Code’s other categories. Id., at 23. It then subjects each
of these categories to different restrictions.

															The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to
any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of
the sign. If a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book
club will discuss John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, that
sign will be treated differently from a sign expressing the view
that one should vote for one of Locke’s followers in an upcoming
election, and both signs will be treated differently from a sign
expressing an ideological view rooted in Locke’s theory of
government. More to the point, the Church’s signs inviting people
to attend its worship services are treated differently from signs
conveying other types of ideas. On its face, the Sign Code is a
content-based regulation of speech. We thus have no need to
consider the government’s justifications or purposes for enacting
the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.

															C

															In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals offered several theories to explain why the Town’s Sign
Code should be deemed content neutral. None is persuasive.

															1

															The Court of Appeals first determined that the
Sign Code was content neutral because the Town “did not adopt its
regulation of speech [based on] disagree[ment] with the message
conveyed,” and its justifications for regulating temporary
directional signs were “unrelated to the content of the sign.” 707
F. 3d, at 1071–1072. In its brief to this Court, the United
States similarly contends that a sign regulation is content
neutral—even if it expressly draws distinctions based on the sign’s
communicative content—if those distinctions can be
“ ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.’ ” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20,
24 (quoting Ward, supra , at 791; emphasis
deleted).

															But this analysis skips the crucial first step
in thecontent-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is
content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its
face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s
benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of “animus
toward the ideas contained” in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network , Inc., 507
U. S. 410, 429 (1993) . We have thus made clear that
“ ‘[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment,’ ” and a party opposing
the government “need adduce ‘no evidence of an improper censorial
motive.’ ” Simon & Schuster, supra, at 117.
Although “a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain
circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not
necessary.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC ,
512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994) . In other words, an innocuous
justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into
one that is content neutral.

															That is why we have repeatedly considered
whether a law is content neutral on its face before turning
to the law’s justification or purpose. See, e.g., Sorrell , supra, at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9)
(statute was content based “on its face,” and there was also
evidence of an impermissible legislative motive); United
States v. Eichman , 496 U. S. 310, 315 (1990)
(“Although the [statute] contains no ex-plicit content-based
limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless
clear that the Government’s asserted interest is related to
the suppression of free expression” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent , 466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984) (“The
text of the ordinance is neutral,” and “there is not even a hint of
bias or censorship in the City’s enactment or enforcement of this
ordinance”); Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence , 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984) (requiring that a
facially content-neutral ban on camping must be “justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech”); United
States v. O’Brien , 391 U. S. 367, 375, 377 (1968)
(noting that the statute “on its face deals with conduct having no
connection with speech,” but examining whether the “the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression”). Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law is
content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for
the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question
before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus
subject to a lower level of scrutiny.

															The Court of Appeals and the United States
misunderstand our decision in Ward as suggesting that a
government’s purpose is relevant even when a law is content based
on its face. That is incorrect. Ward had nothing to say
about facially content-based restrictions because it involved a
facially content- neutral ban on the use, in a city-owned
music venue, of sound amplification systems not provided by the
city. 491 U. S., at 787, and n. 2. In that context, we
looked to governmental motive, including whether the government had
regulated speech “because of disagreement” with its message, and
whether the regulation was “ ‘justified without reference to
the content of the speech.’ ” Id., at 791. But Ward ’s framework “applies only if a statute is content
neutral.” Hill , 530 U. S., at 766 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Its rules thus operate “to protect speech,” not “to
restrict it.” Id., at 765.

															The First Amendment requires no less. Innocent
motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may
one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is
why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the
laws— i.e., the “abridg[ement] of speech”—rather than merely
the motives of those who enacted them. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1.
“ ‘The vice of content-based legislation . . . is
not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes,
but that it lends itself to use for those purposes.’ ” Hill, supra, at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

															For instance, in NAACP v. Button ,
371 U. S. 415 (1963) , the Court encountered a State’s attempt
to use a statute prohibiting “ ‘improper solicitation’ ”
by attorneys to outlaw litigation-related speech of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Id., at
438. Although Button predated our more recent formulations
of strict scrutiny, the Court rightly rejected the State’s claim
that its interest in the “regulation of professional conduct”
rendered the statute consistent with the First Amendment, observing
that “it is no answer . . . to say . . . that
the purpose of these regulations was merely to insure high
professional standards and not to curtail free expression.” Id., at 438–439. Likewise, one could easily imagine a Sign
Code compliance manager who disliked the Church’s substantive
teachings deploying the Sign Code to make it more difficult for the
Church to inform the public of the location of its services.
Accordingly, we have repeatedly “rejected the argument that
‘discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under the
First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress
certain ideas.’ ” Discovery Network, 507 U. S., at
429. We do so again today.

															2

															The Court of Appeals next reasoned that the
Sign Code was content neutral because it “does not mention any idea
or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment.”
587 F. 3d, at 977. It reasoned that, for the purpose of the
Code provisions, “[i]t makes no difference which candidate is
supported, who sponsors the event, or what ideological perspective
is asserted.” 707 F. 3d, at 1069.

															The Town seizes on this reasoning, insisting
that “content based” is a term of art that “should be applied
flexibly” with the goal of protecting “viewpoints and ideas from
government censorship or favoritism.” Brief for Respondents 22. In
the Town’s view, a sign regulation that “does not censor or favor
particular viewpoints or ideas” cannot be content based. Ibid . The Sign Code allegedly passes this test because its
treatment of temporary directional signs does not raise any
concerns that the government is “endorsing or suppressing ‘ideas or
viewpoints,’ ” id. , at 27, and the provisions for
political signs and ideological signs “are neutral as to particular
ideas or viewpoints” within those categories. Id. , at
37.

															This analysis conflates two distinct but related
limitations that the First Amendment places on government
regulation of speech. Government discrimination among viewpoints—or
the regulation of speech based on “the specific motivating ideology
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker”—is a “more blatant”
and “egregious form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U. S. 819,
829 (1995) . But it is well established that “[t]he First
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only
to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition
of public discussion of an entire topic.” Consolidated Edison
Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y. ,
447 U. S. 530, 537 (1980) .

															Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific
subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate
among viewpoints within that subject matter. Ibid. For
example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for political
speech—and only political speech—would be a content-based
regulation, even if it imposed no limits on the political
viewpoints that could be expressed. See Discovery Network,
supra, at 428. The Town’s Sign Code likewise singles out
specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it does
not target viewpoints within that subject matter. Ideological
messages are given more favorable treatment than messages
concerning a political candidate, which are themselves given more
favorable treatment than messages announcing an assembly of
like-minded individuals. That is a paradigmatic example of
content-based discrimination.

															3

															Finally, the Court of Appeals characterized
the Sign Code’s distinctions as turning on “ ‘the
content-neutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and
whether and when an event is occurring.’ ” 707 F. 3d, at
1069. That analysis is mistaken on both factual and legal
grounds.

															To start, the Sign Code’s distinctions are not
speaker based. The restrictions for political, ideological, and
temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. If
a local business, for example, sought to put up signs advertising
the Church’s meetings, those signs would be subject to the same
limitations as such signs placed by the Church. And if Reed had
decided to dis-play signs in support of a particular candidate, he
could have made those signs far larger—and kept them up for far
longer—than signs inviting people to attend hischurch services. If
the Code’s distinctions were truly speaker based, both types of
signs would receive the same treatment.

															In any case, the fact that a distinction is
speaker based does not, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe,
automatically render the distinction content neutral. Because
“[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all
too often simply a means to control content,” Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm’n , 558 U. S. 310,
340 (2010) , we have insisted that “laws favoring some speakers
over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker
preference reflects a content preference,” Turner, 512
U. S., at 658. Thus, a law limiting the content of newspapers,
but only newspapers, could not evade strict scrutiny simply because
it could be characterized as speaker based. Likewise, a
content-based law that restricted the political speech of all
corporations would not become content neutral just because it
singled out corporations as a class of speakers. See Citizens
United, supra , at 340–341. Characterizing a distinction as
speaker based is only the beginning—not the end—of the inquiry.

															Nor do the Sign Code’s distinctions hinge on
“whether and when an event is occurring.” The Code does not permit
citizens to post signs on any topic whatsoever within a set period
leading up to an election, for example. Instead, come election
time, it requires Town officials to determine whether a sign is
“designed to influence the outcome of an election” (and thus
“political”) or merely “communicating a message or ideas for
noncommercial purposes” (and thus “ideological”). Glossary 24. That
obvious content-based inquiry does not evade strict scrutiny review
simply because an event ( i.e., an election) is involved.

															And, just as with speaker-based laws, the fact
that a distinction is event based does not render it content
neutral. The Court of Appeals cited no precedent from this Court
supporting its novel theory of an exception from the
content-neutrality requirement for event-based laws. As we have
explained, a speech regulation is content based if the law applies
to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed. Supra, at 6. A regulation that targets a
sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less
content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it
conveys some other idea. Here, the Code singles out signs bearing a
particular message: the time and location of a specific event. This
type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to
regulate signs, but a clear and firm rule governing content
neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of
speech, even if laws that might seem “entirely reasonable” will
sometimes be “struck down because of their content-based nature.” City of Ladue v. Gilleo , 512 U. S. 43, 60 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).

															III

															Because the Town’s Sign Code imposes
content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand
only if they survive strict scrutiny, “ ‘which requires the
Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,’ ” Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett , 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 8)
(quoting Citizens United , 558 U. S. , at 340).
Thus, it is the Town’s burden to demonstrate that the Code’s
differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types
of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that
end. See ibid .

															The Town cannot do so. It has offered only two
governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code
draws: preserving the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic safety.
Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling
governmental interests, the Code’s distinctions fail as hopelessly
underinclusive.

															Starting with the preservation of aesthetics,
temporary directional signs are “no greater an eyesore,” Discovery Network , 507 U. S. , at 425, than
ideological or political ones. Yet the Code allows unlimited
proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting
the number, size, and duration of smaller directional ones. The
Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary
directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the
same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of signs that
create the same problem.

															The Town similarly has not shown that limiting
temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate threats to
traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not. The
Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs pose a
greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs. If
anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby
church meeting.

															In light of this underinclusiveness, the Town
has not met its burden to prove that its Sign Code is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling government interest. Because a
“ ‘law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the
highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful
speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital
interest unprohibited,’ ” Republican Party of Minn. v. White , 536 U. S. 765, 780 (2002) , the Sign Code fails
strict scrutiny.

															IV

															Our decision today will not prevent
governments from enacting effective sign laws. The Town asserts
that an “ ‘absolutist’ ” content-neutrality rule would
render “virtually all distinctions in sign laws . . .
subject to strict scrutiny,” Brief for Respondents 34–35, but that
is not the case. Not “all distinctions” are subject to strict
scrutiny, only content-based ones are. Laws that are content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny. See Clark , 468 U. S., at 295.

															The Town has ample content-neutral options
available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics. For
example, its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have
nothing to do with a sign’s message: size, building materials,
lighting, moving parts, and portability. See, e.g., §4.402(R). And on public property, the Town may go a long way
toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does
so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Taxpayers for
Vincent , 466 U. S., at 817 (upholding content-neutral ban
against posting signs on public property). Indeed, some lower
courts have long held that similar content-based sign laws receive
strict scrutiny, but there is no evidence that towns in those
jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic effects. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. Neptune Beach , 410 F. 3d 1250,
1264–1269 (CA11 2005) (sign categories similar to the town of
Gilbert’s were content based and subject to strict scru-tiny); Matthews v. Needham , 764 F. 2d 58, 59–60 (CA1
1985) (law banning political signs but not commercial signs was
content based and subject to strict scrutiny).

															We acknowledge that a city might reasonably view
the general regulation of signs as necessary because signs “take up
space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace
alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that
legitimately call for regulation.” City of Ladue , 512
U. S., at 48. At the same time, the presence of certain signs
may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide
traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance
narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of
pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—such as warning signs marking
hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street
numbers associated with private houses—well might survive strict
scrutiny. The signs at issue in this case, including political and
ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those
purposes. As discussed above, they are facially content based and
are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly
tailored.

															*  *  *

															We reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 The Town’s Sign Code is
available online at
http://www.gilbertaz.gov/departments / development - service / planning - development / land -development-code
(as visited June 16, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court’s case
file). 2 A “Temporary Sign” is a
“sign not permanently attached to the ground, a wall or a building,
and not designed or intended for permanent display.” Glossary
25. 3 The Code defines
“Right-of-Way” as a “strip of publicly owned land occupied by or
planned for a street, utilities, landscaping, sidewalks, trails,
and similar facilities.” Id., at 18. 4 The Sign Code has been
amended twice during the pendency of this case. When litigation
began in 2007, the Code defined the signs at issue as “Religious
Assembly Temporary Direction Signs.” App. 75. The Code entirely
prohibited placement of those signs in the public right-of-way, and
it forbade posting them in any location for more than two hours
before the religious assembly or more than one hour afterward. Id., at 75–76. In 2008, the Town redefined the category as
“Temporary Directional Signs Related to a Qualifying Event,” and it
expanded the time limit to 12 hours before and 1 hour after the
“qualifying event.” Ibid. In 2011, the Town amended the Code
to authorize placement of temporary directional signs in the public
right-of-way. Id., at 89. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–502

															_________________

															CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 18, 2015]

															Justice Alito, with whom Justice Kennedy and
Justice Sotomayor join, concurring.

															I join the opinion of the Court but add a few
words of further explanation.

															As the Court holds, what we have termed
“content-based” laws must satisfy strict scrutiny. Content-based
laws merit this protection because they present, albeit sometimes
in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech
based on viewpoint. Limiting speech based on its “topic” or
“subject” favors those who do not want to disturb the status quo.
Such regulations may interfere with democratic self-government and
the search for truth. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y. , 447 U. S. 530, 537 (1980)
.

															As the Court shows, the regulations at issue in
this case are replete with content-based distinctions, and as a
result they must satisfy strict scrutiny. This does not mean,
however, that municipalities are powerless to enact and enforce
reasonable sign regulations. I will not attempt to provide anything
like a comprehensive list, but here are some rules that would not
be content based:

															Rules regulating the size of signs. These rules
may distinguish among signs based on any content-neutral criteria,
including any relevant criteria listed below.

															Rules regulating the locations in which signs
may be placed. These rules may distinguish between free-standing
signs and those attached to buildings.

															Rules distinguishing between lighted and
unlighted signs.

															Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed
messages and electronic signs with messages that change.

															Rules that distinguish between the placement of
signs on private and public property.

															Rules distinguishing between the placement of
signs on commercial and residential property.

															Rules distinguishing between on-premises and
off-premises signs.

															Rules restricting the total number of signs
allowed per mile of roadway.

															Rules imposing time restrictions on signs
advertising a one-time event. Rules of this nature do not
discriminate based on topic or subject and are akin to rules
restricting the times within which oral speech or music is
allowed.[ 1 ]*

															In addition to regulating signs put up by
private actors, government entities may also erect their own signs
consistent with the principles that allow governmental speech. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U. S. 460 –469
(2009). They may put up all manner of signs to promote safety, as
well as directional signs and signs pointing out historic sites and
scenic spots.

															Properly understood, today’s decision will not
prevent cities from regulating signs in a way that fully protects
public safety and serves legitimate esthetic objectives. Notes 1 * Of course,
content-neutral restrictions on speech are not necessarily
consistent with the First Amendment. Time, place, and manner
restrictions “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s
legitimate, content-neutral interests.” Ward v. Rock
Against Racism , 491 U. S. 781, 798 (1989) . But they need not
meet the high standard imposed on viewpoint- and content-based
restrictions. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–502

															_________________

															CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 18, 2015]

															Justice Breyer, concurring in the
judgment.

															I join Justice Kagan’s separate opinion. Like
Justice Kagan I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily
resolve the legal problem before us. The First Amendment requires
greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive
objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than
a simple recitation of categories, such as “content discrimination”
and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my view, the category
“content discrimination” is better considered in many contexts,
including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic
“strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal
condemnation.

															To use content discrimination to trigger strict
scrutiny sometimes makes perfect sense. There are cases in which
the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional
method for suppressing a viewpoint. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U. S.
819 –829 (1995); see also Boos v. Barry , 485
U. S. 312 –319 (1988) (plurality opinion) (applying strict
scrutiny where the line between subject matter and viewpoint was
not obvious). And there are cases where the Court has found content
discrimination to reveal that rules governing a traditional public
forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of fairly managing the forum
in the interest of all speakers. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972) (“Once a forum is
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may
not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of
what they intend to say”). In these types of cases, strict
scru-tiny is often appropriate, and content discrimination has thus
served a useful purpose.

															But content discrimination, while helping courts
to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and
should not always trigger strict scrutiny. To say that it is
not an automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger is not to argue against
that concept’s use. I readily concede, for example, that content
discrimination, as a conceptual tool, can sometimes reveal
weaknesses in the government’s rationale for a rule that limits
speech. If, for example, a city looks to litter prevention as the
rationale for a prohibition against placing newsracks dispensing
free advertisements on public property, why does it exempt other
newsracks causing similar litter? Cf. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. , 507 U. S. 410 (1993) . I also
concede that, whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it
places that speech at a disadvantage, potentially interfering with
the free marketplace of ideas and with an individual’s ability to
express thoughts and ideas that can help that individual determine
the kind of society in which he wishes to live, help shape that
society, and help define his place within it.

															Nonetheless, in these latter instances to use
the presence of content discrimination automatically to trigger
strict scrutiny and thereby call into play a strong presumption
against constitutionality goes too far. That is because virtually
all government activities involve speech, many of which involve the
regulation of speech. Regula-tory programs almost always require
content discrimination. And to hold that such content
discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for
judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.

															Consider a few examples of speech regulated by
government that inevitably involve content discrimination, but
where a strong presumption against constitutionality has no place.
Consider governmental regulation of securities, e.g., 15
U. S. C. §78 l (requirements for content that must
be included in a registration statement); of energy conservation
labeling-practices, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §6294
(requirements for content that must be included on labels of
certain consumer electronics); of prescription drugs, e.g., 21 U. S. C. §353(b)(4)(A) (requiring a prescription drug
label to bear the symbol “Rx only”); of doctor-patient
confidentiality, e.g., 38 U. S. C. §7332
(requiring confidentiality of certain medical records, but allowing
a physician to disclose that the patient has HIV to the patient’s
spouse or sexual partner); of income tax statements, e.g., 26 U. S. C. §6039F (requiring taxpayers to furnish
information about foreign gifts received if the aggregate amount
exceeds $10,000); of commercial airplane briefings, e.g., 14
CFR §136.7 (2015) (requiring pilots to ensure that each passenger
has been briefed on flight procedures, such as seatbelt fastening);
of signs at petting zoos, e.g., N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law
Ann. §399–ff(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2015) (requiring petting zoos to
post a sign at every exit “ ‘strongly recommend[ing] that
persons wash their hands upon exiting the petting zoo
area’ ”); and so on.

															Nor can the majority avoid the application of
strict scrutiny to all sorts of justifiable governmental
regulations by relying on this Court’s many subcategories and
exceptions to the rule. The Court has said, for example, that we
should apply less strict standards to “commercial speech.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Comm’n of N.  Y. , 447 U. S. 557 –563 (1980). ButI
have great concern that many justifiable instancesof
“content-based” regulation are noncommercial. And, worse than that,
the Court has applied the heightened “strict scrutiny” standard
even in cases where the less stringent “commercial speech” standard
was appropriate. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. , 564
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
___ ) . The Court has also said that “government speech”
escapes First Amendment strictures. See Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U. S. 173 –194 (1991). But regulated
speech is typically private speech, not government speech. Further,
the Court has said that, “[w]hen the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of
idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul , 505 U. S. 377, 388 (1992) . But this
exception accounts for only a few of the instances in which content
discrimination is readily justifiable.

															I recognize that the Court could escape the
problem by watering down the force of the presumption against
constitutionality that “strict scrutiny” normally carries with it.
But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment’s
protection in instances where “strict scru-tiny” should apply in
full force.

															The better approach is to generally treat
content discrimination as a strong reason weighing against the
constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or
where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat
it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative
legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the strength of a
justification. I would use content discrimination as a supplement
to a more basic analysis, which, tracking most of our First
Amendment cases, asks whether the regulation at issue works harm to
First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the
relevant regulatory objectives. Answering this question requires
examining the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of
the countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will
achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less
restrictive ways of doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez , 567 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1–3); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 528 U. S. 377 –403
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). Admittedly, this approach does not
have the simplicity of a mechanical use of categories. But it does
permit the government to regulate speech in numerous instances
where the voters have authorized the government to regulate and
where courts should hesitate to substitute judicial judgment for
that of administrators.

															Here, regulation of signage along the roadside,
for purposes of safety and beautification is at issue. There is no
traditional public forum nor do I find any general effort to censor
a particular viewpoint. Consequently, the specific regulation at
issue does not warrant “strict scrutiny.” Nonetheless, for the
reasons that Justice Kagan sets forth, I believe that the Town of
Gilbert’s regulatory rules violate the First Amendment. I
consequently concur in the Court’s judgment only. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–502

															_________________

															CLYDE REED, et al., PETITIONERS v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 18, 2015]

															Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg and
Justice Breyer join, concurring in the judgment.

															Countless cities and towns across America have
adopted ordinances regulating the posting of signs, while exempting
certain categories of signs based on their subject matter. For
example, some municipalities generally prohibit illuminated signs
in residential neighborhoods, but lift that ban for signs that
identify the address of a home or the name of its owner or
occupant. See, e.g. , City of Truth or Consequences,
N. M., Code of Ordinances, ch. 16, Art. XIII, §§11–13–2.3,
11–13–2.9(H)(4) (2014). In other municipalities, safety signs such
as “Blind Pedestrian Crossing” and “Hidden Driveway” can be posted
without a permit, even as other permanent signs require one. See, e.g. , Code of Athens-Clarke County, Ga., Pt. III, §7–4–7(1)
(1993). Elsewhere, historic site markers—for example, “George
Washington Slept Here”—are also exempt from general regulations.
See, e.g. , Dover, Del., Code of Ordinances, Pt. II, App. B,
Art. 5, §4.5(F) (2012). And simi-larly, the federal Highway
Beautification Act limits signs along interstate highways unless,
for instance, they direct travelers to “scenic and historical
attractions” or advertise free coffee. See 23 U. S. C. §§131(b),
(c)(1), (c)(5).

															Given the Court’s analysis, many sign ordinances
of that kind are now in jeopardy. See ante , at 14
(acknowledging that “entirely reasonable” sign laws “will sometimes
be struck down” under its approach (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Says the majority: When laws “single[ ] out
specific subject matter,” they are “facially content based”; and
when they are facially content based, they are automatically
subject to strict scrutiny. Ante , at 12, 16–17. And although
the majority holds out hope that some sign laws with subject-matter
exemptions “might survive” that stringent review, ante , at
17, the likelihood is that most will be struck down. After all, it
is the “rare case[ ] in which a speech restriction withstands
strict scrutiny.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar , 575
U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 9). To clear that high bar, the
government must show that a content-based distinction “is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.” Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland , 481 U. S. 221, 231 (1987) . So on the
majority’s view, courts would have to determine that a town has a
compelling interest in informing passersby where George Washington
slept. And likewise, courts would have to find that a town has no
other way to prevent hidden-driveway mishaps than by specially
treating hidden-driveway signs. (Well-placed speed bumps? Lower
speed limits? Or how about just a ban on hidden driveways?) The
consequence—unless courts water down strict scrutiny to something
unrecognizable—is that our communities will find themselves in an
unenviable bind: They will have to either repeal the exemptions
that allow for helpful signs on streets and sidewalks, or else lift
their sign restrictions altogether and resign themselves to the
resulting clutter.[ 1 ]*

															Although the majority insists that applying
strict scrutiny to all such ordinances is “essential” to protecting
First Amendment freedoms, ante , at 14, I find it challenging
to understand why that is so. This Court’s decisions articulate two
important and related reasons for subjecting content-based speech
regulations to the most exacting standard of review. The first is
“to preserve an uninhib-ited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail.” McCullen v. Coakley , 573 U.
S. ___, ___–___ (2014) (slip op., at 8–9) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The second is to ensure that the government has not
regulated speech “based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the
underlying message expressed.” R. A. V. v. St. Paul ,
505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992) . Yet the subject-matter exemptions
included in many sign ordinances do not implicate those concerns.
Allowing residents, say, to install a light bulb over “name and
address” signs but no others does not distort the marketplace of
ideas. Nor does that different treatment give rise to an inference
of impermissible government motive.

															We apply strict scrutiny to facially
content-based regulations of speech, in keeping with the rationales
just described, when there is any “realistic possibility that
official suppression of ideas is afoot.” Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn. , 551 U. S. 177, 189 (2007)
(quoting R. A. V. , 505 U. S., at 390). That
is always the case when the regulation facially differentiates on
the basis of viewpoint. See Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U. S. 819, 829 (1995) . It
is also the case (except in non-public or limited public forums)
when a law restricts “discussion of an entire topic” in public
debate. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public
Serv. Comm’n of N. Y. , 447 U. S. 530 –540 (1980)
(invalidating a limitation on speech about nuclear power). We have
stated that “[i]f the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and
open, governments must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are
worth discussing or debating.’ ” Id. , at 537–538
(quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U. S.
92, 96 (1972) ). And we have recognized that such subject-matter
restrictions, even though viewpoint-neutral on their face, may
“suggest[ ] an attempt to give one side of a debatable public
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.” First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U. S.
765, 785 (1978) ; accord, ante , at 1 (Alito, J., concurring)
(limiting all speech on one topic “favors those who do not want to
disturb the status quo”). Subject-matter regulation, in other
words, may have the intent or effect of favoring some ideas over
others. When that is realistically possible—when the restriction
“raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace”—we insist that
the law pass the most demanding constitutional test. R. A. V. , 505 U. S., at 387 (quoting Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims
Bd. , 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991) ).

															But when that is not realistically possible, we
may do well to relax our guard so that “entirely reasonable” laws
imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive. Ante , at 14. This
point is by no means new. Our concern with content-based regulation
arises from the fear that the government will skew the public’s
debate of ideas—so when “that risk is inconsequential,
. . . strict scrutiny is unwarranted.” Davenport ,
551 U. S., at 188; see R. A. V. , 505 U. S.,
at 388 (approving certain content-based distinctions when there is
“no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination”). To do
its intended work, of course, the category of content-based
regulation triggering strict scrutiny must sweep more broadly than
the actual harm; that category exists to create a buffer zone
guaranteeing that the government cannot favor or disfavor certain
viewpoints. But that buffer zone need not extend forever. We can
administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common
sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its
intended function.

															And indeed we have done just that: Our cases
have been far less rigid than the majority admits in applying
strict scrutiny to facially content-based laws—including in cases
just like this one. See Davenport , 551 U. S., at 188
(noting that “we have identified numerous situations in which [the]
risk” attached to content-based laws is “attenuated”). In Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent , 466 U. S. 789 (1984) , the Court declined to
apply strict scrutiny to a municipal ordinance that exempted
address numbers and markers commemorating “historical, cultural, or
artistic event[s]” from a generally applicable limit on sidewalk
signs. Id. , at 792, n. 1 (listing exemptions); see id. , at 804–810 (upholding ordinance under intermediate
scrutiny). After all, we explained, the law’s enactment and
enforcement revealed “not even a hint of bias or censorship.” Id. , at 804; see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc. , 475 U. S. 41, 48 (1986) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a zoning law that facially distinguished among movie
theaters based on content because it was “designed to prevent
crime, protect the city’s retail trade, [and] maintain property
values . . . , not to suppress the expression of
unpopular views”). And another decision involving a similar law
provides an alternative model. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo , 512 U. S. 43 (1994) , the Court assumed arguendo that a sign ordinance’s exceptions for address
signs, safety signs, and for-sale signs in residential areas did
not trigger strict scrutiny. See id. , at 46–47, and
n. 6 (listing exemptions); id. , at 53 (noting this
assumption). We did not need to, and so did not, decide the
level-of-scrutiny question because the law’s breadth made it
unconstitutional under any standard.

															The majority could easily have taken Ladue ’s tack here. The Town of Gilbert’s defense of its sign
ordinance—most notably, the law’s distinctions between directional
signs and others—does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate
scrutiny, or even the laugh test. See ante , at 14–15
(discussing those distinctions). The Town, for example, provides no
reason at all for prohibiting more than four directional signs on a
property while placing no limits on the number of other types of
signs. See Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code, ch. I,
§§4.402(J), (P)(2) (2014). Similarly, the Town offers no coherent
justification for restricting the size of directional signs to 6
square feet while allowing other signs to reach 20 square feet. See
§§4.402(J), (P)(1). The best the Town could come up with at oral
argument was that directional signs “need to be smaller because
they need to guide travelers along a route.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.
Why exactly a smaller sign better helps travelers get to where they
are going is left a mystery. The absence of any sensible basis for
these and other distinctions dooms the Town’s ordinance under even
the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to
“time, place, or manner” speech regulations. Accordingly, there is
no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to
every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a
subject-matter exemption.

															I suspect this Court and others will regret the
majority’s insistence today on answering that question in the
affirmative. As the years go by, courts will discover that
thousands of towns have such ordinances, many of them “entirely
reasonable.” Ante , at 14. And as the challenges to them
mount, courts will have to invalidate one after the other. (This
Court may soon find itself a veritable Supreme Board of Sign
Review.) And courts will strike down those democratically enacted
local laws even though no one—certainly not the majority—has ever
explained why the vindication of First Amendment values requires
that result. Because I see no reason why such an easy case calls
for us to cast a constitutional pall on reasonable regulations
quite unlike the law before us, I concur only in the judgment. Notes 1 * Even in trying
(commendably) to limit today’s decision, Justice Alito’s
concurrence highlights its far-reaching effects. According to
Justice Alito, the majority does not subject to strict scrutiny
regulations of “signs advertising a one-time event.” Ante ,
at 2 (Alito, J., concurring). But of course it does. On the
majority’s view, a law with an exception for such signs “singles
out specific subject matter for differential treatment” and
“defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter.” Ante , at 6, 12 (majority opinion). Indeed, the precise
reason the majority applies strict scrutiny here is that “the Code
singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and
location of a specific event.” Ante , at 14.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that the town of Gilbert, Arizona's sign code, which imposed more restrictions on "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event" than on other types of signs, was a content-based regulation of speech that could not withstand strict scrutiny. The Court held that the code's distinctions between different types of signs based on the messages they conveyed were subject to strict scrutiny and that the town's defense of the ordinance did not pass strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny. The Court found that the town's sign code violated the First Amendment by unfairly restricting certain types of speech over others.