U.S. Supreme Court Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938) Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada No. 57 Argued November 9,
1938 Decided December 12,
1938 305
U.S. 337 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MISSOURI Syllabus 1. The State of Missouri provides separate schools and
universities for whites and negroes. At the state university,
attended by whites, there is a course in law; at the Lincoln
University, attended by negroes, there is as yet none, but it is
the duty of the curators of that institution to establish one there
whenever in their opinion this shall be necessary and practicable,
and pending such development, they are authorized to arrange for
legal education of Missouri negroes, and to pay the tuition charges
therefor, at law schools in adjacent States where negroes are
accepted and where the training is equal to that obtainable at the
Missouri State University. Pursuant to the State's policy of
separating the races in its educational institutions, the curators
of the state university refused to admit a negro as a student in
the law school there because of his race; whereupon he sought a
mandamus, in the state courts, which was denied. Held: (1) That inasmuch as the curators of the state university
represented the State, in carrying out its policy, their action in
denying the negro admission to the law school was state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 305 U. S.
343 .

															(2) The action of the State in furnishing legal education within
the State to whites while not furnishing legal education within the
State to negroes was a discrimination repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 305 U. S.
344 .

															If a State furnishes higher education to white residents, it is
bound to furnish substantially equal advantages to negro residents,
though not necessarily in the same schools.

															(3) The unconstitutional discrimination is not avoided by the
purpose of the State to establish a law school for negroes whenever
necessary and practicable in the opinion of the curators of the
University provided for negroes. P. 305 U. S.
346 .

															(4) Nor are the requirements of the equal protection clause
satisfied by the opportunities afforded by Missouri to its negro
citizens for legal education in other States. P. 305 U. S.
348 .

															The basic consideration here is not as to what sort of
opportunities other States provide, or whether they are as good as
those Page 305 U. S. 338 in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself
furnishes to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the
ground of color. The admissibility of laws separating the races in
the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon
the equality of the privileges which the laws give to the separated
groups within the State. By the operation of the laws of Missouri,
a privilege has been created for white law students which is denied
to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded
legal education within the State; the negro resident having the
same qualifications is refused it there, and must go outside the
State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right
to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and
the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does
not remove the discrimination. P. 305 U. S.
348 .

															(5) The obligation of the State to give the protection of equal
laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within
its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal right
must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the Constitution
upon the States severally as governmental entities each responsible
for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons
within its borders. P. 305 U. S.
350 .

															(6) The fact that there is but a limited demand in Missouri for
the legal education of negroes does not excuse the discrimination
in favor of whites. P. 305 U. S.
350 .

															(7) Inasmuch as the discrimination may last indefinitely -- so
long as the curators find it unnecessary and impracticable to
provide facilities for the legal education of negroes within the
State, the alternative of attendance at law schools in other States
being provided meanwhile -- it cannot be excused as a temporary
discrimination. P. 305 U. S.
351 .

															2. The state court decided this case upon the merits of the
federal question, and not upon the propriety of remedy by mandamus.
P. 305 U. S.
352 .

															342 Mo. 121; 113 S.W.2d 783, reversed.

															CERTIORARI, post, p. 580, to review a judgment
affirming denial of a writ of mandamus. Page 305 U. S. 342 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Petitioner Lloyd Gaines, a negro, was refused admission to the
School of Law at the State University of Missouri. Asserting that
this refusal constituted a denial by the State of the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution, petitioner brought this action for
mandamus to compel the curators of the University to admit him. On
final hearing, an alternative writ was quashed and a peremptory
writ was denied by the Circuit Court. The Supreme Court of the
State affirmed the judgment. 113 S.W.2d 783. We granted certiorari,
October 10, 1938.

															Petitioner is a citizen of Missouri. In August, 1935, he was
graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Arts at the Lincoln
University, an institution maintained by the State of Missouri for
the higher education of negroes. That University has no law school.
Upon the filing of his application for admission to the law school
of the University of Missouri, the registrar advised him to
communicate with the president of Lincoln University, and the
latter directed petitioner's attention to § 9622 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri (1929), providing as follows:

															"Sec. 9622. May arrange for attendance at university of any
adjacent state -- Tuition fees. -- Pending the full
development of the Lincoln university, the board of Page 305 U. S. 343 curators shall have the authority to arrange for the attendance
of negro residents of the state of Missouri at the university of
any adjacent state to take any course or to study any subjects
provided for at the state university of Missouri, and which are not
taught at the Lincoln university and to pay the reasonable tuition
fees for such attendance; provided that, whenever the
board of curators deem it advisable, they shall have the power to
open any necessary school or department. (Laws 1921, p. 86, §
7.)"

															Petitioner was advised to apply to the State Superintendent of
Schools for aid under that statute. It was admitted on the trial
that petitioner's

															"work and credits at the Lincoln University would qualify him
for admission to the School of Law of the University of Missouri if
he were found otherwise eligible."

															He was refused admission upon the ground that it was "contrary
to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to admit a
negro as a student in the University of Missouri." It appears that
there are schools of law in connection with the state universities
of four adjacent States, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and Illinois, where
nonresident negroes are admitted.

															The clear and definite conclusions of the state court in
construing the pertinent state legislation narrow the issue. The
action of the curators, who are representatives of the State in the
management of the state university (R.S.Mo. § 9625), must be
regarded as state action. [ Footnote
1 ] The state constitution provides that separate free public
schools shall be established for the education of children of
African descent (Art. XI, § 3), and, by statute, separate high
school facilities are supplied for colored students equal to those
provided for white students (R.S.Mo. Page 305 U. S. 344 §§ 9346-9349). While there is no express constitutional
provision requiring that the white and negro races be separated for
the purpose of higher education, the state court, on a
comprehensive review of the state statutes, held that it was
intended to separate the white and negro races for that purpose
also. Referring in particular to Lincoln University, the court
deemed it to be clear

															"that the Legislature intended to bring the Lincoln University
up to the standard of the University of Missouri, and give to the
whites and negroes an equal opportunity for higher education -- the
whites at the University of Missouri, and the negroes at Lincoln
University."

															Further, the court concluded that the provisions of § 9622
(above-quoted) to the effect that negro residents "may attend the
university of any adjacent State with their tuition paid, pending
the full development of Lincoln University," made it evident "that
the Legislature did not intend that negroes and whites should
attend the same university in this State." In that view, it
necessarily followed that the curators of the University of
Missouri acted in accordance with the policy of the State in
denying petitioner admission to its School of Law upon the sole
ground of his race.

															In answering petitioner's contention that this discrimination
constituted a denial of his constitutional right, the state court
has fully recognized the obligation of the State to provide negroes
with advantages for higher education substantially equal to the
advantages afforded to white students. The State has sought to
fulfill that obligation by furnishing equal facilities in separate
schools, a method the validity of which has been sustained by our
decisions. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.
S. 537 , 163 U. S. 544 ; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.
S. 151 , 235 U. S. 160 ; Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 , 275 U. S. 85 , 275 U. S. 86 . Compare Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.
S. 528 , 175 U. S. 544 , 175 U. S. 545 .
Respondents' counsel have appropriately emphasized the special Page 305 U. S. 345 solicitude of the State for the higher education of negroes as
shown in the establishment of Lincoln University, a state
institution well conducted on a plane with the University of
Missouri so far as the offered courses are concerned. It is said
that Missouri is a pioneer in that field and is the only State in
the Union which has established a separate university for negroes
on the same basis as the state university for white students. But,
commendable as is that action, the fact remains that instruction in
law for negroes is not now afforded by the State, either at Lincoln
University or elsewhere within the State, and that the State
excludes negroes from the advantages of the law school it has
established at the University of Missouri.

															It is manifest that this discrimination, if not relieved by the
provisions we shall presently discuss, would constitute a denial of
equal protection. That was the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
of Maryland in circumstances substantially similar in that aspect. University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590.
It there appeared that the State of Maryland had "undertaken the
function of education in the law," but had "omitted students of one
race from the only adequate provision made for it, and omitted them
solely because of their color"; that, if those students were to be
offered "equal treatment in the performance of the function, they
must, at present, be admitted to the one school provided." Id., p. 489. A provision for scholarships to enable
negroes to attend colleges outside the State, mainly for the
purpose of professional studies, was found to be inadequate
( Id. pp. 485, 486), and the question "whether with aid in
any amount it is sufficient to send the negroes outside the State
for legal education" the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to
discuss. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to admit the applicant was
issued to the officers and Page 305 U. S. 346 regents of the University of Maryland as the agents of the State
entrusted with the conduct of that institution.

															The Supreme Court of Missouri in the instant case has
distinguished the decision in Maryland upon the grounds -- (1)
that, in Missouri, but not in Maryland, there is "a legislative
declaration of a purpose to establish a law school for negroes at
Lincoln University whenever necessary or practical", and (2)
that,

															"pending the establishment of such a school, adequate provision
has been made for the legal education of negro students in
recognized schools outside of this State."

															113 S.W.2d p. 791.

															As to the first ground, it appears that the policy of
establishing a law school at Lincoln University has not yet ripened
into an actual establishment, and it cannot be said that a mere
declaration of purpose, still unfulfilled, is enough. The provision
for legal education at Lincoln is at present entirely lacking.
Respondents' counsel urge that, if, on the date when petitioner
applied for admission to the University of Missouri, he had instead
applied to the curators of Lincoln University, it would have been
their duty to establish a law school; that this "agency of the
State," to which he should have applied, was "specifically charged
with the mandatory duty to furnish him what he seeks." We do not
read the opinion of the Supreme Court as construing the state
statute to impose such a "mandatory duty" as the argument seems to
assert. The state court quoted the language of § 9618, R.S.Mo.1929,
set forth in the margin, [ Footnote
2 ] making it the mandatory Page 305 U. S. 347 duty of the board of curators to establish a law school in
Lincoln University "whenever necessary and practicable in their
opinion." This qualification of their duty, explicitly stated in
the statute, manifestly leaves it to the judgment of the curators
to decide when it will be necessary and practicable to establish a
law school, and the state court so construed the statute.
Emphasizing the discretion of the curators, the court said:

															"The statute was enacted in 1921. Since its enactment, no negro,
not even appellant, has applied to Lincoln University for a law
education. This fact demonstrates the wisdom of the legislature in
leaving it to the judgment of the board of curators to determine
when it would be necessary or practicable to establish a law school
for negroes at Lincoln University. Pending that time, adequate
provision is made for the legal education of negroes in the
university of some adjacent State, as heretofore pointed out."

															113 S.W.2d p. 791.

															The state court has not held that it would have been the duty of
the curators to establish a law school at Lincoln University for
the petitioner on his application. Their duty, as the court defined
it, would have been either to supply a law school at Lincoln
University as provided in § 9618 or to furnish him the opportunity
to obtain his legal training in another State, as provided in §
9622

															Thus, the law left the curators free to adopt the latter course.
The state court has not ruled or intimated that their failure or
refusal to establish a law school for a very few students, still
less for one student, would have been an abuse of the discretion
with which the curators were entrusted. And, apparently, it was
because of that discretion, Page 305 U. S. 348 and of the postponement which its exercise in accordance with
the terms of the statute would entail until necessity and
practicability appeared, that the state court considered and upheld
as adequate the provision for the legal education of negroes, who
were citizens of Missouri, in the universities of adjacent States.
We may put on one side respondent's contention that there were
funds available at Lincoln University for the creation of a law
department and the suggestions with respect to the number of
instructors who would be needed for that purpose and the cost of
supplying them. The president of Lincoln University did not advert
to the existence or prospective use of funds for that purpose when
he advised petitioner to apply to the State Superintendent of
Schools for aid under § 9622. At best, the evidence to which
argument as to available funds is addressed admits of conflicting
inferences, and the decision of the state court did not hinge on
any such matter. In the light of its ruling, we must regard the
question whether the provision for the legal education in other
States of negroes resident in Missouri is sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of equal protection as the pivot upon
which this case turns.

															The state court stresses the advantages that are afforded by the
law schools of the adjacent States -- Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa and
Illinois -- which admit nonresident negroes. The court considered
that these were schools of high standing where one desiring to
practice law in Missouri can get "as sound, comprehensive, valuable
legal education" as in the University of Missouri; that the system
of education in the former is the same as that in the latter, and
is designed to give the students a basis for the practice of law in
any State where the Anglo-American system of law obtains; that the
law school of the University of Missouri does not specialize in
Missouri law, and that the course of study and the case books
used Page 305 U. S. 349 in the five schools are substantially identical. Petitioner
insists that, for one intending to practice in Missouri, there are
special advantages in attending a law school there, both in
relation to the opportunities for the particular study of Missouri
law and for the observation of the local courts [ Footnote 3 ] and also in view of the prestige
of the Missouri law school among the citizens of the State, his
prospective clients. Proceeding with its examination of relative
advantages, the state court found that the difference in distances
to be traveled afforded no substantial ground of complaint, and
that there was an adequate appropriation to meet the full tuition
fees which petitioner would have to pay.

															We think that these matters are beside the point. The basic
consideration is not as to what sort of opportunities other States
provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as
to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students
and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color. The
admissibility of laws separating the races in the enjoyment of
privileges afforded by the State rests wholly upon the equality of
the privileges which the laws give to the separated groups within
the State. The question here is not of a duty of the State to
supply legal training, or of the quality of the training which it
does supply, but of its duty when it provides such training to
furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an
equality of right. By the operation of the laws of Missouri, a
privilege has been created for white law students which is denied
to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded
legal education within the State; the negro resident having the
same qualifications is refused it there, and must go outside the
State to obtain it. That is a denial of the equality of legal right
to the enjoyment of the privilege Page 305 U. S. 350 which the State has set up, and the provision for the payment of
tuition fees in another State does not remove the
discrimination.

															The equal protection of the laws is "a pledge of the protection
of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 , 118 U. S. 369 .
Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of
equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is,
within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of legal
right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the
Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities --
each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and
duties of persons within its borders. It is an obligation the
burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon another, and no
State can be excused from performance by what another State may do
or fail to do. That separate responsibility of each State within
its own sphere is of the essence of statehood maintained under our
dual system. It seems to be implicit in respondents' argument that,
if other States did not provide courses for legal education, it
would nevertheless be the constitutional duty of Missouri, when it
supplied such courses for white students, to make equivalent
provision for negroes. But that plain duty would exist because it
rested upon the State independently of the action of other States.
We find it impossible to conclude that what otherwise would be an
unconstitutional discrimination, with respect to the legal right to
the enjoyment of opportunities within the State, can be justified
by requiring resort to opportunities elsewhere. That resort may
mitigate the inconvenience of the discrimination, but cannot serve
to validate it.

															Nor can we regard the fact that there is but a limited demand in
Missouri for the legal education of negroes as excusing the
discrimination in favor of whites. We had occasion to consider a
cognate question in the case Page 305 U. S. 351 of McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., supra. There, the argument was advanced, in relation to the provision by a
carrier of sleeping cars, dining, and chair cars, that the limited
demand by negroes justified the State in permitting the furnishing
of such accommodations exclusively for white persons. We found that
argument to be without merit. It made, we said, the constitutional
right

															"depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated
against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it
is a personal one. Whether or not particular facilities shall be
provided may doubtless be conditioned upon there being a reasonable
demand therefor, but, if facilities are provided, substantial
equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions
cannot be refused. It is the individual who is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common
carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a
facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under
substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another
traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional
privilege has been invaded." Id. pp. 235 U. S. 161 , 235 U. S.
162 .

															Here, petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an
individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders
facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which
the State there afforded for persons of the white race, whether or
not other negroes sought the same opportunity.

															It is urged, however, that the provision for tuition outside the
State is a temporary one -- that it is intended to operate merely
pending the establishment of a law department for negroes at
Lincoln University. While, in that sense, the discrimination may be
termed temporary, it may nevertheless continue for an indefinite
period by reason of the discretion given to the curators of
Lincoln Page 305 U. S. 352 University and the alternative of arranging for tuition in other
States, as permitted by the state law as construed by the state
court, so long as the curators find it unnecessary and
impracticable to provide facilities for the legal instruction of
negroes within the State. In that view, we cannot regard the
discrimination as excused by what is called its temporary
character.

															We do not find that the decision of the state court turns on any
procedural question. The action was for mandamus, but it does not
appear that the remedy would have been deemed inappropriate if the
asserted federal right had been sustained. In that situation, the
remedy by mandamus was found to be a proper one in University
of Maryland v. Murray, supra. In the instant case, the state
court did note that petitioner had not applied to the management of
Lincoln University for legal training. But, as we have said, the
state court did not rule that it would have been the duty of the
curators to grant such an application, but, on the contrary, took
the view, as we understand it, that the curators were entitled
under the state law to refuse such an application and, in its
stead, to provide for petitioner's tuition in an adjacent State.
That conclusion presented the federal question as to the
constitutional adequacy of such a provision while equal opportunity
for legal training within the State was not furnished, and this
federal question the state court entertained and passed upon. We
must conclude that, in so doing, the court denied the federal right
which petitioner set up and the question as to the correctness of
that decision is before us. We are of the opinion that the ruling
was error, and that petitioner was entitled to be admitted to the
law school of the State University in the absence of other and
proper provision for his legal training within the State.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. Reversed. Page 305 U. S. 353 [ Footnote 1 ] Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , 100 U. S. 346 ,
347; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 , 103 U. S. 397 ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 , 177 U. S. 447 ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 , 294 U. S.
589 .

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Section 9618, R.S.Mo.1929, is as follows:

															"Sec. 9618. Board of curators authorized to reorganize. -- The board of curators of the Lincoln university shall be
authorized and required to reorganize said institution so that it
shall afford to the negro people of the state opportunity for
training up to the standard furnished at the state university of
Missouri whenever necessary and practicable in their opinion. To
this end the board of curators shall be authorized to purchase
necessary additional land, erect necessary additional buildings, to
provide necessary additional equipment, and to locate, in the
county of Cole the respective units of the university where, in
their opinion, the various schools will most effectively promote
the purposes of this article. (Laws of 1921, p. 86, § 3.)"

															[ Footnote 3 ] See University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478,
486.

															Separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.

															Considering the disclosures of the record, the Supreme Court of
Missouri arrived at a tenable conclusion, and its judgment should
be affirmed. That court well understood the grave difficulties of
the situation, and rightly refused to upset the settled legislative
policy of the State by directing a mandamus.

															In Cummming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 , 175 U. S. 545 ,
this Court, through Mr. Justice Harlan, declared:

															"The education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any
interference on the part of Federal authority with the management
of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear
and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of
the land." Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 , 275 U. S. 85 --
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft -- asserts: "The right and power
of the state to regulate the method of providing for the education
of its youth at public expense is clear."

															For a long time, Missouri has acted upon the view that the best
interest of her people demands separation of whites and negroes in
schools. Under the opinion just announced, I presume she may
abandon her law school, and thereby disadvantage her white citizens
without improving petitioner's opportunities for legal instruction;
or she may break down the settled practice concerning separate
schools and thereby, as indicated by experience, damnify both
races. Whether by some other course it may be possible for her to
avoid condemnation is matter for conjecture.

															The State has offered to provide the negro petitioner
opportunity for study of the law -- if perchance that is the thing
really desired -- by paying his tuition at some nearby school of
good standing. This is far from unmistakable disregard of his
rights, and, in the circumstances, Page 305 U. S. 354 is enough to satisfy any reasonable demand for specialized
training. It appears that never before has a negro applied for
admission to the Law School, and none has ever asked that Lincoln
University provide legal instruction.

															The problem presented obviously is a difficult and highly
practical one. A fair effort to solve it has been made by offering
adequate opportunity for study when sought in good faith. The State
should not be unduly hampered through theorization inadequately
restrained by experience.

															This proceeding commenced in April, 1936. Petitioner, then
twenty-four years old, asked mandamus to compel his admission to
the University in September, 1936, notwithstanding plain
legislative inhibition. Mandamus is not a writ of right, but is
granted only in the court's discretion upon consideration of all
the circumstances. Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308 , 245 U. S. 311 ; United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.
S. 367 , 249 U. S.
371 .

															The Supreme Court of Missouri did not consider the propriety of
granting the writ under the theory of the law now accepted here.
That, of course, will be matter open for its consideration upon
return of the cause.

Summary: In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Missouri's policy of providing separate schools for whites and negroes was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that if a state provides higher education to white residents, it must also provide substantially equal advantages to negro residents, even if they are not in the same schools. The Court found that Missouri's denial of admission to a negro student at the state university's law school solely based on race was state action and violated the equal protection clause. The Court also rejected the state's argument that its plans to establish a law school for negroes or its offer to pay tuition for negro students to study law in other states satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.


U.S. Supreme Court Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) Plessy v. Ferguson No. 210 Argued April 18, 1896 Decided May 18, 1896 163
U.S. 537 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA Syllabus The statute of Louisiana, acts of 1890, c. 111, requiring
railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in that
State, to provide equal, but separate, accommodations for the white
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for
each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a
partition so as to secure separate accommodations; and providing
that no person shall be permitted to occupy seats in coaches other
than the ones assigned to them, on account Page 163 U. S. 538 of the race they belong to; and requiring the officer of the
passenger train to assign each passenger to the coach or
compartment assigned for the race to which he or she belong; and
imposing fines or imprisonment upon passengers insisting on going
into a coach or compartment other than the one set aide for the
race to which he or she belongs; and conferring upon officers of
the train power to refuse to carry on the train passengers refusing
to occupy the coach or compartment assigned to them, and exempting
the railway company from liability for such refusal, are not in
conflict with the provisions either of the Thirteenth Amendment or
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.

															This was a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari,
originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State by Plessy, the
plaintiff in error, against the Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge of the
criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans, and setting
forth in substance the following facts:

															That petitioner was a citizen of the United States and a
resident of the State of Louisiana, of mixed descent, in the
proportion of seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood;
that the mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him, and
that he was entitled to every recognition, right, privilege and
immunity secured to the citizens of the United States of the white
race by its Constitution and laws; that, on June 7, 1892, he
engaged and paid for a first class passage on the East Louisiana
Railway from New Orleans to Covington, in the same State, and
thereupon entered a passenger train, and took possession of a
vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were
accommodated; that such railroad company was incorporated by the
laws of Louisiana as a common carrier, and was not authorized to
distinguish between citizens according to their race. But,
notwithstanding this, petitioner was required by the conductor,
under penalty of ejection from said train and imprisonment, to
vacate said coach and occupy another seat in a coach assigned by
said company for persons not of the white race, and for no other
reason than that petitioner was of the colored race; that, upon
petitioner's refusal to comply with such order, he was, with the
aid of a police officer, forcibly ejected from said coach and
hurried off to and imprisoned in the parish jail of Page 163 U. S. 539 New Orleans, and there held to answer a charge made by such
officer to the effect that he was guilty of having criminally
violated an act of the General Assembly of the State, approved July
10, 1890, in such case made and provided.

															That petitioner was subsequently brought before the recorder of
the city for preliminary examination and committed for trial to the
criminal District Court for the parish of Orleans, where an
information was filed against him in the matter above set forth,
for a violation of the above act, which act the petitioner affirmed
to be null and void, because in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States; that petitioner interposed a plea to such
information based upon the unconstitutionality of the act of the
General Assembly, to which the district attorney, on behalf of the
State, filed a demurrer; that, upon issue being joined upon such
demurrer and plea, the court sustained the demurrer, overruled the
plea, and ordered petitioner to plead over to the facts set forth
in the information, and that, unless the judge of the said court be
enjoined by a writ of prohibition from further proceeding in such
case, the court will proceed to fine and sentence petitioner to
imprisonment, and thus deprive him of his constitutional rights set
forth in his said plea, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of
the act under which he was being prosecuted; that no appeal lay
from such sentence, and petitioner was without relief or remedy
except by writs of prohibition and certiorari. Copies of the
information and other proceedings in the criminal District Court
were annexed to the petition as an exhibit.

															Upon the filing of this petition, an order was issued upon the
respondent to show cause why a writ of prohibition should not issue
and be made perpetual, and a further order that the record of the
proceedings had in the criminal cause be certified and transmitted
to the Supreme Court.

															To this order the respondent made answer, transmitting a
certified copy of the proceedings, asserting the constitutionality
of the law, and averring that, instead of pleading or admitting
that he belonged to the colored race, the said Plessy declined and
refused, either by pleading or otherwise, to admit Page 163 U. S. 540 that he was in any sense or in any proportion a colored man.

															The case coming on for a hearing before the Supreme Court, that
court was of opinion that the law under which the prosecution was
had was constitutional, and denied the relief prayed for by the
petitioner. Ex parte Plessy, 45 La.Ann. 80. Whereupon
petitioner prayed for a writ of error from this court, which was
allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

															MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the court.

															This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the
General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, passed in 1890,
providing for separate railway carriages for the white and colored
races. Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.

															The first section of the statute enacts

															"that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches
in this State shall provide equal but separate accommodations for
the white and colored races by providing two or more passenger
coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger
coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations: Provided, That this section shall not be construed to
apply to street railroads. No person or persons, shall be admitted
to occupy seats in coaches other than the ones assigned to them on
account of the race they belong to."

															By the second section, it was enacted

															"that the officers of such passenger trains shall have power and
are hereby required Page 163 U. S. 541 to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for
the race to which such passenger belongs; any passenger insisting
on going into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not
belong shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu
thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days
in the parish prison, and any officer of any railroad insisting on
assigning a passenger to a coach or compartment other than the one
set aside for the race to which said passenger belongs shall be
liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to
imprisonment for a period of not more than twenty days in the
parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach
or compartment to which he or she is assigned by the officer of
such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse to carry such
passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the
railway company which he represents shall be liable for damages in
any of the courts of this State."

															The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect
of the officers, directors, conductors, and employees of railway
companies to comply with the act, with a proviso that "nothing in
this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending
children of the other race." The fourth section is immaterial.

															The information filed in the criminal District Court charged in
substance that Plessy, being a passenger between two stations
within the State of Louisiana, was assigned by officers of the
company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he
insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did
not belong. Neither in the information nor plea was his particular
race or color averred. The petition for the writ of prohibition
averred that petitioner was seven-eighths Caucasian and one eighth
African blood; that the mixture of colored blood was not
discernible in him, and that he was entitled to every right,
privilege and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of
the white race; and that, upon such theory, he took possession of a
vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were
accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate Page 163 U. S. 542 said coach and take a seat in another assigned to persons of the
colored race, and, having refused to comply with such demand, he
was forcibly ejected with the aid of a police officer, and
imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated
the above act.

															The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the ground
that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution, abolishing slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the part of the
States.

															1. That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, is too clear for argument. Slavery implies
involuntary servitude -- a state of bondage; the ownership of
mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the labor and
services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of
a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property and
services. This amendment was said in the Slaughterhouse
Cases , 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended primarily
to abolish slavery as it had been previously known in this country,
and that it equally forbade Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie
trade when they amounted to slavery or involuntary servitude, and
that the use of the word "servitude" was intended to prohibit the
use of all forms of involuntary slavery, of whatever class or name.
It was intimated, however, in that case that this amendment was
regarded by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect
the colored race from certain laws which had been enacted in the
Southern States, imposing upon the colored race onerous
disabilities and burdens and curtailing their rights in the pursuit
of life, liberty and property to such an extent that their freedom
was of little value; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was devised
to meet this exigency.

															So, too, in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.
3 , 109 U. S. 24 , it
was said that the act of a mere individual, the owner of an inn, a
public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing accommodations to
colored people cannot be justly regarded as imposing any badge of
slavery or servitude upon the applicant, but Page 163 U. S. 543 only as involving an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable
by the laws of the State and presumably subject to redress by those
laws until the contrary appears. "It would be running the slavery
argument into the ground," said Mr. Justice Bradley,

															"to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to
his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of
intercourse or business."

															A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the
white and colored races -- a distinction which is founded in the
color of the two races and which must always exist so long as white
men are distinguished from the other race by color -- has no
tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do not
understand that the Thirteenth Amendment is strenuously relied upon
by the plaintiff in error in this connection.

															2. By the Fourteenth Amendment, all persons born or naturalized
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are
made citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside, and the States are forbidden from making or enforcing any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person within
their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

															The proper construction of this amendment was first called to
the attention of this court in the Slaughterhouse
Cases , 16 Wall. 36, which involved, however, not a
question of race, but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not
call for any expression of opinion as to the exact rights it was
intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally
that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the
negro, to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and
of the States, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the
States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the States. Page 163 U. S. 544 The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but, in the
nature of things, it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two
races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and
even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to
be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not
universally, recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common
instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate
schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States
where the political rights of the colored race have been longest
and most earnestly enforced.

															One of the earliest of these cases is that of Roberts v.
City of Boston, 5 Cush. 19, in which the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that the general school committee of
Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored
children in separate schools established exclusively for them, and
to prohibit their attendance upon the other schools. "The great
principle," said Chief Justice Shaw, p. 206, "advanced by the
learned and eloquent advocate for the plaintiff" (Mr. Charles
Sumner),

															"is that, by the constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all
persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin
or condition, are equal before the law. . . . But when this great
principle comes to be applied to the actual and various conditions
of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion that men
and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political
powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the same
functions and be subject to the same treatment, but only that the
rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are
equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of
the law for their maintenance and security."

															It was held that the powers of the committee extended to the
establishment Page 163 U. S. 545 of separate schools for children of different ages, sexes and
colors, and that they might also establish special schools for poor
and neglected children, who have become too old to attend the
primary school and yet have not acquired the rudiments of learning
to enable them to enter the ordinary schools. Similar laws have
been enacted by Congress under its general power of legislation
over the District of Columbia, Rev.Stat.D.C. §§ 281, 282, 283, 310,
319, as well as by the legislatures of many of the States, and have
been generally, if not uniformly, sustained by the courts. State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198; Lehew v.
Brummell, 15 S.W.Rep. 765; Ward v. Flood, 48
California 36; Bertonneau v. School Directors, 3 Woods
177; People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438; Cory v.
Carter, 48 Indiana 897; Dawson v. Lee, 3 Kentucky
49.

															Laws forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said
in a technical sense to interfere with the freedom of contract, and
yet have been universally recognized as within the police power of
the State. State v. Gibson, 36 Indiana 389.

															The distinction between laws interfering with the political
equality of the negro and those requiring the separation of the two
races in schools, theatres and railway carriages has been
frequently drawn by this court. Thus, in Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 , it
was held that a law of West Virginia limiting to white male
persons, 21 years of age and citizens of the State, the right to
sit upon juries was a discrimination which implied a legal
inferiority in civil society, which lessened the security of the
right of the colored race, and was a step toward reducing them to a
condition of servility. Indeed, the right of a colored man that, in
the selection of jurors to pass upon his life, liberty and
property, there shall be no exclusion of his race and no
discrimination against them because of color has been asserted in a
number of cases. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.
S. 313 ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.
S. 370 ; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.
S. 110 ; Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.
S. 565 . So, where the laws of a particular locality or
the charter of a particular railway corporation has provided that
no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of Page 163 U. S. 546 color, we have held that this meant that persons of color should
travel in the same car as white ones, and that the enactment was
not satisfied by the company's providing cars assigned exclusively
to people of color, though they were as good as those which they
assigned exclusively to white persons. Railroad
Company v. Brown , 17 Wall. 445.

															Upon the other hand, where a statute of Louisiana required those
engaged in the transportation of passengers among the States to
give to all persons traveling within that State, upon vessels
employed in that business, equal rights and privileges in all parts
of the vessel, without distinction on account of race or color, and
subjected to an action for damages the owner of such a vessel, who
excluded colored passengers on account of their color from the
cabin set aside by him for the use of whites, it was held to be, so
far as it applied to interstate commerce, unconstitutional and
void. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 48 . The
court in this case, however, expressly disclaimed that it had
anything whatever to do with the statute as a regulation of
internal commerce, or affecting anything else than commerce among
the States.

															In the Civil Rights Case, 109 U. S.
3 , it was held that an act of Congress entitling all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States to the full
and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges of inns, public conveyances, on land or water,
theatres and other places of public amusement, and made applicable
to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude, was unconstitutional and void upon the
ground that the Fourteenth Amendment was prohibitory upon the
States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by
Congress for enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters
respecting which the States were prohibited from making or
enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was corrective
legislation such as might be necessary or proper for counteracting
and redressing the effect of such laws or acts. In delivering the
opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Bradley observed that the
Fourteenth Amendment

															"does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects
that are within the Page 163 U. S. 547 domain of state legislation, but to provide modes of relief
against state legislation or state action of the kind referred to.
It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law
for the regulation of private rights, but to provide modes of
redress against the operation of state laws and the action of state
officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and
privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, but
they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws and state
proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power
given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such
prohibition into effect, and such legislation must necessarily be
predicated upon such supposed state laws or state proceedings, and
be directed to the correction of their operation and effect."

															Much nearer, and, indeed, almost directly in point is the case
of the Louisville, New Orleans &c. Railway v.
Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587 ,
wherein the railway company was indicted for a violation of a
statute of Mississippi enacting that all railroads carrying
passengers should provide equal but separate accommodations for the
white and colored races by providing two or more passenger cars for
each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger cars by a
partition so as to secure separate accommodations. The case was
presented in a different aspect from the one under consideration,
inasmuch as it was an indictment against the railway company for
failing to provide the separate accommodations, but the question
considered was the constitutionality of the law. In that case, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 66 Mississippi 662, had held that the
statute applied solely to commerce within the State, and that,
being the construction of the state statute by its highest court,
was accepted as conclusive. "If it be a matter," said the court, p.
591,

															"respecting commerce wholly within a State, and not interfering
with commerce between the States, then obviously there is no
violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. . . .
No question arises under this section as to the power of the State
to separate in different compartments interstate passengers Page 163 U. S. 548 or affect in any manner the privileges and rights of such
passengers. All that we can consider is whether the State has the
power to require that railroad trains within her limits shall have
separate accommodations for the two races; that affecting only
commerce within the State is no invasion of the power given to
Congress by the commerce clause."

															A like course of reasoning applies to the case under
consideration, since the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of
the State ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks, Judge, et al., 44
La.Ann. 770, held that the statute in question did not apply to
interstate passengers, but was confined in its application to
passengers traveling exclusively within the borders of the State.
The case was decided largely upon the authority of Railway Co.
v. State, 66 Mississippi 662, and affirmed by this court in 133 U. S. 587 . In
the present case, no question of interference with interstate
commerce can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana Railway
appears to have been purely a local line, with both its termini
within the State of Louisiana. Similar statutes for the separation
of the to races upon public conveyances were held to be
constitutional in West Chester &c. Railroad v. Miles, 55 Penn.St. 209; Day v. Owen, 5 Michigan 520; Chicago
&c. Railway v. Williams, 5 Illinois 185; Chesapeake
&c. Railroad v. Wells, 85 Tennessee 613; Memphis
&c. Railroad v. Benson, 85 Tennessee 627; The
Sue, 22 Fed.Rep. 83; Logwood v. Memphis &c.
Railroad, 23 Fed.Rep. 318; McGuinn v. Forbes, 37
Fed.Rep. 639; People v. King, 18 N.E.Rep. 245; Houck
v. South Pac. Railway, 38 Fed.Rep. 226; Heard v. Georgia
Railroad Co., 3 Int.Com.Com'n 111; S.C., 1 Ibid. 428.

															While we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied
to the internal commerce of the State, neither abridges the
privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his
property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal
protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we are not prepared to say that the conductor, in
assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does
not act at his peril, or that the provision of the second section
of the act that denies to the passenger compensation Page 163 U. S. 549 in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which
he properly belongs is a valid exercise of the legislative power.
Indeed, we understand it to be conceded by the State's Attorney
that such part of the act as exempts from liability the railway
company and its officers is unconstitutional. The power to assign
to a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to
which race the passenger belongs, as well as the power to determine
who, under the laws of the particular State, is to be deemed a
white and who a colored person. This question, though indicated in
the brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon
the record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the
unconstitutionality of the act so far as it requires the railway to
provide separate accommodations and the conductor to assign
passengers according to their race.

															It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed
community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in
this instance the white race, is property in the same sense that a
right of action or of inheritance is property. Conceding this to be
so for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this
statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to, such
property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he
may have his action for damages against the company for being
deprived of his so-called property. Upon the other hand, if he be a
colored man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no
property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of
being a white man.

															In this connection, it is also suggested by the learned counsel
for the plaintiff in error that the same argument that will justify
the state legislature in requiring railways to provide separate
accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to
require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a
certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain
nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk
upon one side of the street and white people upon the other, or
requiring white men's houses to be painted white and colored men's
black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of different
colors, upon the theory that one side Page 163 U. S. 550 of the street is as good as the other, or that a house or
vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color. The reply
to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be
reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good
faith for the promotion for the public good, and not for the
annoyance or oppression of a particular class. Thus, in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , it
was held by this court that a municipal ordinance of the city of
San Francisco to regulate the carrying on of public laundries
within the limits of the municipality violated the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States if it conferred upon the
municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will and
without regard to discretion, in the legal sense of the term, to
give or withhold consent as to persons or places without regard to
the competency of the persons applying or the propriety of the
places selected for the carrying on of the business. It was held to
be a covert attempt on the part of the municipality to make an
arbitrary and unjust discrimination against the Chinese race. While
this was the case of a municipal ordinance, a like principle has
been held to apply to acts of a state legislature passed in the
exercise of the police power. Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 ; Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677 , and
cases cited on p. 161 U. S. 700 ; Duggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548; Capen v.
Foster, 12 Pick. 48; State ex rel. Wood v. Baker, 38
Wisconsin 71; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 66; Hulseman v. Rems, 41 Penn. St. 396; Orman v.
Riley, 1 California 48.

															So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and, with respect
to this, there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part
of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness,
it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace
and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law
which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races
in public conveyances Page 163 U. S. 551 is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment
than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored
children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of
which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding
acts of state legislatures.

															We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument
to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it. The argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more
than once the case and is not unlikely to be so again, the colored
race should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and
should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby
relegate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that
the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption.
The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by
legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro
except by an enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot
accept this proposition. If the two races are to meet upon terms of
social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a
mutual appreciation of each other's merits, and a voluntary consent
of individuals. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448,

															"this end can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which
conflict with the general sentiment of the community upon whom they
are designed to operate. When the government, therefore, has
secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and
equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has
accomplished the end for which it was organized, and performed all
of the functions respecting social advantages with which it is
endowed."

															Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties
of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both
races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly Page 163 U. S. 552 or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane.

															It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood
necessary to constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a
white person, is one upon which there is a difference of opinion in
the different States, some holding that any visible admixture of
black blood stamps the person as belonging to the colored race
( State v. Chaver, 5 Jones [N.C.] 1, p. 11); others that it
depends upon the preponderance of blood ( Gray v. State, 4
Ohio 354; Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 665); and still
others that the predominance of white blood must only be in the
proportion of three-fourths. ( People v. Dean, 4 Michigan
406; Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Virginia 538). But these
are questions to be determined under the laws of each State, and
are not properly put in issue in this case. Under the allegations
of his petition, it may undoubtedly become a question of importance
whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the petitioner belongs to the
white or colored race.

															The judgment of the court below is, therefore, Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.

															By the Louisiana statute the validity of which is here involved,
all railway companies (other than street railroad companies)
carrying passengers in that State are required to have separate but
equal accommodations for white and colored persons

															"by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger
train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to
secure separate accommodations."

															Under this statute, no colored person is permitted to occupy a
seat in a coach assigned to white persons, nor any white person to
occupy a seat in a coach assigned to colored persons. The managers
of the railroad are not allowed to exercise any discretion in the
premises, but are required to assign each passenger to some coach
or compartment set apart for the exclusive use of his race. If a
passenger insists upon going into a coach or compartment not set
apart for persons of his race, Page 163 U. S. 553 he is subject to be fined or to be imprisoned in the parish
jail. Penalties are prescribed for the refusal or neglect of the
officers, directors, conductors and employees of railroad companies
to comply with the provisions of the act.

															Only "nurses attending children of the other race " are excepted
from the operation of the statute. No exception is made of colored
attendants traveling with adults. A white man is not permitted to
have his colored servant with him in the same coach, even if his
condition of health requires the constant, personal assistance of
such servant. If a colored maid insists upon riding in the same
coach with a white woman whom she has been employed to serve, and
who may need her personal attention while traveling, she is subject
to be fined or imprisoned for such an exhibition of zeal in the
discharge of duty.

															While there may be in Louisiana persons of different races who
are not citizens of the United States, the words in the act "white
and colored races" necessarily include all citizens of the United
States of both races residing in that State. So that we have before
us a state enactment that compels, under penalties, the separation
of the two races in railroad passenger coaches, and makes it a
crime for a citizen of either race to enter a coach that has been
assigned to citizens of the other race.

															Thus, the State regulates the use of a public highway by
citizens of the United States solely upon the basis of race.

															However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we
have only to consider whether it is consistent with the
Constitution of the United States.

															That a railroad is a public highway, and that the corporation
which owns or operates it is in the exercise of public functions,
is not, at this day, to be disputed. Mr. Justice Nelson, speaking
for this court in New Jersey Steam Navigation
Co. v. Merchants' Bank , 6 How. 344, 47 U. S. 382 ,
said that a common carrier was in the exercise

															"of a sort of public office, and has public duties to perform,
from which he should not be permitted to exonerate himself without
the assent of the parties concerned."

															Mr. Justice Strong, delivering the judgment of Page 163 U. S. 554 this court in Olcott v. The
Supervisors , 16 Wall. 678, 83 U. S. 694 ,
said:

															"That railroads, though constructed by private corporations and
owned by them, are public highways has been the doctrine of nearly
all the courts ever since such conveniences for passage and
transportation have had any existence. Very early the question
arose whether a State's right of eminent domain could be exercised
by a private corporation created for the purpose of constructing a
railroad. Clearly it could not unless taking land for such a
purpose by such an agency is taking land for public use. The right
of eminent domain nowhere justifies taking property for a private
use. Yet it is a doctrine universally accepted that a state
legislature may authorize a private corporation to take land for
the construction of such a road, making compensation to the owner.
What else does this doctrine mean if not that building a railroad,
though it be built by a private corporation, is an act done for a
public use."

															So, in Township of Pine Grove v.
Talcott , 19 Wall. 666, 86 U. S. 676 :
"Though the corporation [a railroad company] was private, its work
was public, as much so as if it were to be constructed by the
State." So, in Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western Railroad
Corporation, 4 Met. 564:

															"The establishment of that great thoroughfare is regarded as a
public work, established by public authority, intended for the
public use and benefit, the use of which is secured to the whole
community, and constitutes, therefore, like a canal, turnpike or
highway, a public easement. It is true that the real and personal
property necessary to the establishment and management of the
railroad is vested in the corporation, but it is in trust for the
public."

															In respect of civil rights common to all citizens, the
Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any
public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected
in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race,
and, under appropriate circumstances, when the rights of others,
his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his
privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon
it as to him seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or
judicial tribunal may have regard to the Page 163 U. S. 555 race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are
involved. Indeed, such legislation as that here in question is
inconsistent not only with that equality of rights which pertains
to citizenship, National and State, but with the personal liberty
enjoyed by everyone within the United States.

															The Thirteenth Amendment does not permit the withholding or the
deprivation of any right necessarily inhering in freedom. It not
only struck down the institution of slavery as previously existing
in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens
or disabilities that constitute badges of slavery or servitude. It
decreed universal civil freedom in this country. This court has so
adjudged. But that amendment having been found inadequate to the
protection of the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was
followed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which added greatly to the
dignity and glory of American citizenship and to the security of
personal liberty by declaring that

															"all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside,"

															and that

															"no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

															These two amendments, if enforced according to their true intent
and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to
freedom and citizenship. Finally, and to the end that no citizen
should be denied, on account of his race, the privilege of
participating in the political control of his country, it as
declared by the Fifteenth Amendment that

															"the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color or previous condition of servitude."

															These notable additions to the fundamental law were welcomed by
the friends of liberty throughout the world. They removed the race
line from our governmental systems. They had, as this court has
said, a common purpose, namely to secure

															"to a race recently emancipated, a race that through Page 163 U. S. 556 many generations have been held in slavery, all the civil rights
that the superior race enjoy."

															They declared, in legal effect, this court has further said,

															"that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as
for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the
colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily
designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law
because of their color."

															We also said:

															"The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but
they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or
right, most valuable to the colored race -- the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored
-- exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in
civil society, Lessening the security of their enjoyment of the
rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race."

															It was, consequently, adjudged that a state law that excluded
citizens of the colored race from juries, because of their race and
however well qualified in other respects to discharge the duties of
jurymen, was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 , 100 U. S. 306 , 100 U. S. 307 ; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 ; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 , 103 U. S. 386 ; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S. 110 , 107 U. S. 116 .
At the present term, referring to the previous adjudications, this
court declared that

															"underlying all of those decisions is the principle that the
Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so
far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by
the General Government or the States against any citizen because of
his race. All citizens are equal before the law." Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565 .

															The decisions referred to show the scope of the recent
amendments of the Constitution. They also show that it is not
within the power of a State to prohibit colored citizens, because
of their race, from participating as jurors in the administration
of justice.

															It as said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does Page 163 U. S. 557 not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a rule
applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this argument
does not meet the difficulty. Everyone knows that the statute in
question had its origin in the purpose not so much to exclude white
persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks as to exclude colored
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.
Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination
among whites in the matter of accommodation for travelers. The
thing to accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal
accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep
to themselves while traveling in railroad passenger coaches. No one
would be so wanting in candor a to assert the contrary. The
fundamental objection, therefore, to the statute is that it
interferes with the personal freedom of citizens. "Personal
liberty," it has been well said,

															"consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or
removing one's person to whatsoever places one's own inclination
may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due course
of law."

															1 Bl.Com. *134. If a white man and a black man choose to occupy
the same public conveyance on a public highway, it is their right
to do so, and no government, proceeding alone on grounds of race,
can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of each.

															It is one thing for railroad carriers to furnish, or to be
required by law to furnish, equal accommodations for all whom they
are under a legal duty to carry. It is quite another thing for
government to forbid citizens of the white and black races from
traveling in the same public conveyance, and to punish officers of
railroad companies for permitting persons of the two races to
occupy the same passenger coach. If a State can prescribe, as a
rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as
passengers in the same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate
the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to compel white
citizens to keep on one side of a street and black citizens to keep
on the other? Why may it not, upon like grounds, punish whites and
blacks who ride together in streetcars or in open vehicles on a
public road Page 163 U. S. 558 or street? Why may it not require sheriffs to assign whites to
one side of a courtroom and blacks to the other? And why may it not
also prohibit the commingling of the two races in the galleries of
legislative halls or in public assemblages convened for the
consideration of the political questions of the day? Further, if
this statute of Louisiana is consistent with the personal liberty
of citizens, why may not the State require the separation in
railroad coaches of native and naturalized citizens of the United
States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?

															The answer given at the argument to these questions was that
regulations of the kind they suggest would be unreasonable, and
could not, therefore, stand before the law. Is it meant that the
determination of questions of legislative power depends upon the
inquiry whether the statute whose validity is questioned is, in the
judgment of the courts, a reasonable one, taking all the
circumstances into consideration? A statute may be unreasonable
merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I
do not understand that the courts have anything to do with the
policy or expediency of legislation. A statute may be valid and
yet, upon grounds of public policy, may well be characterized as
unreasonable. Mr. Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says
that, the legislative intention being clearly ascertained,

															"the courts have no other duty to perform than to execute the
legislative will, without any regard to their views as to the
wisdom or justice of the particular enactment."

															Stat. & Const.Constr. 324. There is a dangerous tendency in
these latter days to enlarge the functions of the courts by means
of judicial interference with the will of the people as expressed
by the legislature. Our institutions have the distinguishing
characteristic that the three departments of government are
coordinate and separate. Each must keep within the limits defined
by the Constitution. And the courts best discharge their duty by
executing the will of the lawmaking power, constitutionally
expressed, leaving the results of legislation to be dealt with by
the people through their representatives. Statutes must always have
a reasonable construction. Sometimes they are to be construed
strictly; sometimes liberally, in order to carry out the
legislative Page 163 U. S. 559 will. But however construed, the intent of the legislature is to
be respected, if the particular statute in question is valid,
although the courts, looking at the public interests, may conceive
the statute to be both unreasonable and impolitic. If the power
exists to enact a statute, that ends the matter so far as the
courts are concerned. The adjudged cases in which statutes have
been held to be void because unreasonable are those in which the
means employed by the legislature were not at all germane to the
end to which the legislature was competent.

															The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for
all time if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all
citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the
most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of
his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It is
therefore to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final
expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the
conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the
enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis
of race.

															In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time,
prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this
tribunal in the Dred Scott Case. It was adjudged in that
case that the descendants of Africans who were imported into this
country and sold as slaves were not included nor intended to be
included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and could
not claim any of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provided for and secured to citizens of the United States; that, at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution, they were

															"considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant Page 163 U. S. 560 race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those
who held the power and the government might choose to grant
them."

															19 How. 60 U. S. 393 , 60 U. S. 404 .
The recent amendments of the Constitution, it was supposed, had
eradicated these principles from our institutions. But it seems
that we have yet, in some of the States, a dominant race -- a
superior class of citizens, which assumes to regulate the enjoyment
of civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the basis of race.
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only
stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the
admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief
that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the
beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in
view when they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution,
by one of which the blacks of this country were made citizens of
the United States and of the States in which they respectively
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the
States are forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of whites are in no
danger from the presence here of eight millions of blacks. The
destinies of the two races in this country are indissolubly linked
together, and the interests of both require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
planted under the sanction of law. What can more certainly arouse
race hate, what more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of
distrust between these races, than state enactments which, in fact,
proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and
degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens. That, as all will admit, is the real
meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

															The sure guarantee of the peace and security of each race is the
clear, distinct, unconditional recognition by our governments,
National and State, of every right that inheres in civil freedom,
and of the equality before the law of all citizens of the United
States, without regard to race. State enactments regulating the
enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race, and cunningly
devised to defeat legitimate results of the Page 163 U. S. 561 war under the pretence of recognizing equality of rights, can
have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible and
to keep alive a conflict of races the continuance of which must do
harm to all concerned. This question is not met by the suggestion
that social equality cannot exist between the white and black races
in this country. That argument, if it can be properly regarded as
one, is scarcely worthy of consideration, for social equality no
more exists between two races when traveling in a passenger coach
or a public highway than when members of the same races sit by each
other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with each
other in a political assembly, or when they use in common the
street of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the
purpose of having their names placed on the registry of voters, or
when they approach the ballot box in order to exercise the high
privilege of voting.

															There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States.
Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely
excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese race. But, by
the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in the same passenger
coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of
the black race in Louisiana, many of whom, perhaps, risked their
lives for the preservation of the Union, who are entitled, by law,
to participate in the political control of the State and nation,
who are not excluded, by law or by reason of their race, from
public stations of any kind, and who have all the legal rights that
belong to white citizens, are yet declared to be criminals, liable
to imprisonment, if they ride in a public coach occupied by
citizens of the white race. It is scarcely just to say that a
colored citizen should not object to occupying a public coach
assigned to his own race. He does not object, nor, perhaps, would
he object to separate coaches for his race if his rights under the
law were recognized. But he objecting, and ought never to cease
objecting, to the proposition that citizens of the white and black
race can be adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the right
to sit, in the same public coach on a public highway. Page 163 U. S. 562 The arbitrary separation of citizens on the basis of race while
they are on a public highway is a badge of servitude wholly
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law
established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any
legal grounds.

															If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon
public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be
infinitely less than those that will surely come from state
legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis
of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all
other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a
state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow citizens, our
equals before the law. The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations
for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor
atone for the wrong this day done.

															The result of the whole matter is that, while this court has
frequently adjudged, and at the present term has recognized the
doctrine, that a State cannot, consistently with the Constitution
of the United States, prevent white and black citizens, having the
required qualifications for jury service, from sitting in the same
jury box, it is now solemnly held that a State may prohibit white
and black citizens from sitting in the same passenger coach on a
public highway, or may require that they be separated by a
"partition," when in the same passenger coach. May it not now be
reasonably expected that astute men of the dominant race, who
affect to be disturbed at the possibility that the integrity of the
white race may be corrupted, or that its supremacy will be
imperiled, by contact on public highways with black people, will
endeavor to procure statutes requiring white and black jurors to be
separated in the jury box by a "partition," and that, upon retiring
from the courtroom to consult as to their verdict, such partition,
if it be a moveable one, shall be taken to their consultation room
and set up in such way as to prevent black jurors from coming too
close to their brother jurors of the white race. If the "partition"
used in the courtroom happens to be stationary, provision could be
made for screens with openings through Page 163 U. S. 563 which jurors of the two races could confer as to their verdict
without coming into personal contact with each other. I cannot see
but that, according to the principles this day announced, such
state legislation, although conceived in hostility to, and enacted
for the purpose of humiliating, citizens of the United States of a
particular race, would be held to be consistent with the
Constitution.

															I do not deem it necessary to review the decisions of state
courts to which reference was made in argument. Some, and the most
important, of them are wholly inapplicable because rendered prior
to the adoption of the last amendments of the Constitution, when
colored people had very few rights which the dominant race felt
obliged to respect. Others were made at a time when public opinion
in many localities was dominated by the institution of slavery,
when it would not have been safe to do justice to the black man,
and when, so far as the rights of blacks were concerned, race
prejudice was, practically, the supreme law of the land. Those
decisions cannot be guides in the era introduced by the recent
amendments of the supreme law, which established universal civil
freedom, gave citizenship to all born or naturalized in the United
States and residing here, obliterated the race line from our
systems of governments, National and State, and placed our free
institutions upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of
all men before the law.

															I am of opinion that the statute of Louisiana is inconsistent
with the personal liberty of citizens, white and black, in that
State, and hostile to both the spirit and letter of the
Constitution of the United States. If laws of like character should
be enacted in the several States of the Union, the effect would be
in the highest degree mischievous. Slavery, as an institution
tolerated by law would, it is true, have disappeared from our
country, but there would remain a power in the States, by sinister
legislation, to interfere with the full enjoyment of the blessings
of freedom to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon
the basis of race, and to place in a condition of legal inferiority
a large body of American citizens now constituting a part of the
political community called the Page 163 U. S. 564 People of the United States, for whom and by whom, through
representatives, our government is administered. Such a system is
inconsistent with the guarantee given by the Constitution to each
State of a republican form of government, and may be stricken down
by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their
solemn duty to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in
the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.

															For the reasons stated, I am constrained to withhold my assent
from the opinion and judgment of the majority.

															MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument or participate in
the decision of this case.

Summary: In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation laws for public facilities, establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine that would persist for decades. Homer Plessy, a person of mixed race, challenged a Louisiana law requiring separate accommodations for white and non-white passengers on trains. The Court, in an infamous decision, ruled that such segregation did not violate the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as long as the separate facilities were equal in quality. This ruling entrenched racial segregation and legitimized the notion that racial inequality could be legally sanctioned. Dissenting opinions highlighted the inherent injustice and conflict of such laws with the Constitution's guarantee of equal rights and freedoms.