U.S. Supreme Court Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983) Michigan v. Long No. 82-256 Argued February 23,
1983 Decided July 6, 1983 463
U.S. 1032 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MICHIGAN Syllabus Two police officers, patrolling in a rural area at night,
observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. When
the car swerved into a ditch, the officers stopped to investigate
and were met by respondent, the only occupant of the car, at the
rear of the car. Respondent, who "appeared to be under the
influence of something," did not respond to initial requests to
produce his license and registration, and when he began walking
toward the open door of the car, apparently to obtain the
registration, the officers followed him and saw a hunting knife on
the floorboard of the driver's side of the car. The officers then
stopped respondent and subjected him to a patdown search, which
revealed no weapons. One of the officers shined his flashlight into
the car, saw something protruding from under the armrest on the
front seat, and, upon lifting the armrest, saw an open pouch that
contained what appeared to be marihuana. Respondent was then
arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the car's
interior revealed no more contraband, but the officers decided to
impound the vehicle, and more marihuana was found in the trunk. The
Michigan state trial court denied respondent's motion to suppress
the marihuana taken from both the car's interior and its trunk, and
he was convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that the search of the passenger
compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , and
that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 . However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Terry did not justify the passenger
compartment search, and that the marihuana found in the trunk was
the "fruit" of the illegal search of the car's interior. Held: 1. This Court does not lack jurisdiction to decide the case on
the asserted ground that the decision below rests on an adequate
and independent state ground. Because of respect for the
independence of state courts and the need to avoid rendering
advisory opinions, this Court, in determining whether state court
references to state law constitute adequate and independent state
grounds, will no longer look beyond the opinion under review, or
require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of
their decisions. Accordingly, when a state court decision fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven Page 463 U. S. 1033 with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the
opinion, this Court will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so. If the state court
decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively
based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state
grounds, this Court will not undertake to review the decision. In
this case, apart from two citations to the State Constitution, the
court below relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases. Even if it is accepted that
the Michigan Constitution has been interpreted to provide
independent protection for certain rights also secured under the
Fourth Amendment, it fairly appears that the Michigan Supreme Court
rested its decision primarily on federal law. Pp. 463 U. S.
1037 -1044.

															2. The protective search of the passenger compartment of
respondent's car was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. Although Terry involved the stop and subsequent patdown search for
weapons of a person suspected of criminal activity, it did not restrict the preventive search to the person of the
detained suspect. Protection of police and others can justify
protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the
suspect poses a danger. Roadside encounters between police and
suspects are especially hazardous, and danger may arise from the
possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.
Thus, the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden,
is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons. If, while conducting a
legitimate Terry search of an automobile's interior, the
officer discovers contraband other than weapons, he cannot be
required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does
not require its suppression in such circumstances. The
circumstances of this case justified the officers in their
reasonable belief that respondent posed a danger if he were
permitted to reenter his vehicle. Nor did they act unreasonably in
taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other
weapons within respondent's immediate grasp before permitting him
to reenter his automobile. The fact that respondent was under the
officers' control during the investigative stop does not render
unreasonable their belief that he could injure them. Pp. 463 U. S.
1045 -1052.

															3. Because the Michigan Supreme Court suppressed the marihuana
taken from the trunk as a fruit of what it erroneously held was an
illegal Page 463 U. S. 1034 search of the car's interior, the case is remanded to enable it
to determine whether the trunk search was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions of this Court. P. 463 U. S.
1053 .

															413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d
866 , reversed and remanded.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in
Parts I, III, IV, and V of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BLACKMUN,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 463 U. S.
1054 . BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 463 U. S.
1054 . STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 463 U. S.
1065 .

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the
absence of probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to
deny a police officer the right "to neutralize the threat of
physical harm," id. at 392 U. S. 24 ,
when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an individual is
armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether
such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond
the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. In the
present case, respondent David Long was convicted for possession of
marihuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of
the Page 463 U. S. 1035 automobile that he was driving. The police searched the
passenger compartment because they had reason to believe that the
vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. We
hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was
reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and
other decisions of this Court. We also examine Long's argument that
the decision below rests upon an adequate and independent state
ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction. I Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one
evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling
erratically and at excessive speed. [ Footnote 1 ] The officers observed the car turning down a
side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers
stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile,
met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding Page 463 U. S. 1036 from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver's side of
the vehicle was left open.

															Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator's license,
but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long
produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell
requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another
repeated request, Long, who Howell thought "appeared to be under
the influence of something," 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N.W.2d
866 , 868 (1982), turned from the officers and began walking
toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long,
and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the
driver's side of the car. The officers then stopped Long's progress
and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which
revealed no weapons.

															Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle
while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the
vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell's
action was "to search for other weapons." 413 Mich., at 469, 320
N.W.2d at 868. The officer noticed that something was protruding
from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle
and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and
upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained
what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch
and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession
of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle,
including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the
vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle.
Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and
discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana.

															The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long's motion to suppress
the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its
trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long's conviction, holding
that the search of the passenger Page 463 U. S. 1037 compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry,
supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an
inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). See 94 Mich.App. 338, 288 N.W.2d 629 (1979). The
Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that "the sole
justification of the Terry search, protection of the
police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in
this case." 413 Mich. at 472, 320 N.W.2d at 869. The marihuana
found in Long's trunk was considered by the court below to be the
"fruit" of the illegal search of the interior, and was also
suppressed. [ Footnote 2 ]

															We granted certiorari in this case to consider the important
question of the authority of a police officer to protect himself by
conducting a Terry -type search of the passenger
compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop
of the occupant of the vehicle. 459 U.S. 904 (1982). II Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long's argument
that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case because the
decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
The court below referred twice to the State Constitution in its
opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law. [ Footnote 3 ] Long argues that the
Michigan Page 463 U. S. 1038 courts have provided greater protection from searches and
seizures under the State Constitution than is afforded under the
Fourth Amendment, and the references to the State Constitution
therefore establish an adequate and independent ground for the
decision below.

															It is, of course,

															"incumbent upon this Court . . . to ascertain for itself . . .
whether the asserted nonfederal ground independently and adequately
supports the judgment." Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.
S. 765 , 282 U. S. 773 (1931). Although we have announced a number of principles in order
to help us determine whether various forms of references to state
law constitute adequate and independent state grounds, [ Footnote 4 ] we openly admit that we
have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach
for resolving this vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken
the strict view that, if the ground of decision was at all unclear,
we would dismiss the case. See, e.g., Lynch v. New York ex rel.
Pierson, 293 U. S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated, Page 463 U. S. 1039 see, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.
S. 551 (1940), or continued a case, see, e.g., Herb
v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a
state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409 U. S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves examined state law
to determine whether state courts have used federal law to guide
their application of state law or to provide the actual basis for
the decision that was reached. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 460 U. S.
732 -733, n. 1 (1983) (plurality opinion). Cf. South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553 , 459 U. S. 569 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667 , 456 U. S.
670 -671 (1982), we rejected an invitation to remand to
the state court for clarification even when the decision rested in
part on a case from the state court, because we determined that the
state case itself rested upon federal grounds. We added that,

															"[e]ven if the case admitted of more doubt as to whether federal
and state grounds for decision were intermixed, the fact that the
state court relied to the extent it did on federal grounds requires
us to reach the merits." Id. at 456 U. S.
671 .

															This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve
possible adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical to
the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of
federal-state relations are involved. Moreover, none of the various
methods of disposition that we have employed thus far recommends
itself as the preferred method that we should apply to the
exclusion of others, and we therefore determine that it is
appropriate to reexamine our treatment of this jurisdictional issue
in order to achieve the consistency that is necessary.

															The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it
requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally
unfamiliar, and which often, as in this case, have not been
discussed at length by the parties. Vacation and continuance for
clarification have also been unsatisfactory, both because of the
delay and decrease in efficiency of judicial Page 463 U. S. 1040 administration, see Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.
S. 143 (1952), [ Footnote
5 ] and, more important, because these methods of disposition
place significant burdens on state courts to demonstrate the
presence or absence of our jurisdiction. See Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U. S. 241 , 434 U. S. 244 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Department of Motor
Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U. S. 425 , 410 U. S. 427 (973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Finally, outright dismissal of
cases is clearly not a panacea, because it cannot be doubted that
there is an important need for uniformity in federal law, and that
this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that
rests primarily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state ground is not apparent
from the four corners of the opinion. We have long recognized that
dismissal is inappropriate "where there is strong indication . . .
that the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled
the decision below." National Tea Co., supra, at 309 U. S.
556 .

															Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as
avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the
cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where there is
an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely because
of this respect for state courts, and this desire to avoid advisory
opinions, that we do not wish to continue to decide issues of state
law that go beyond the opinion that we review, or to require state
courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their
decisions. Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court
decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible Page 463 U. S. 1041 state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we
will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court
decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal
law required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely
on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other
jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in
its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the
result that the court has reached. In this way, both justice and
judicial administration will be greatly improved. If the state
court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review
the decision.

															This approach obviates in most instances the need to examine
state law in order to decide the nature of the state court
decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our
rendering advisory opinions. [ Footnote 6 ] It also avoids the unsatisfactory and
intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their
decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that such
an approach will provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to
develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and
yet will preserve the integrity of federal law.

															"It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered
by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally
important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts
do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the
validity under the federal constitution of state action." National Tea Co., supra, at 309 U. S.
557 .

															The principle that we will not review judgments of state courts
that rest on adequate and independent state grounds Page 463 U. S. 1042 is based, in part, on "the limitations of our own jurisdiction." Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 , 324 U. S. 125 (1945). [ Footnote 7 ] The
jurisdictional concern is that we not

															"render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal
laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion." Id. at 324 U. S. 126 .
Our requirement of a "plain statement" that a decision rests upon
adequate and independent state grounds does not in any way
authorize the rendering of advisory opinions. Rather, in
determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a
case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent state
grounds, see Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. at 282 U. S. 773 ,
we merely assume that there are no such grounds when it is not
clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an
adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears
that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law.
[ Footnote 8 ] Page 463 U. S. 1043 Our review of the decision below under this framework leaves us
unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state ground. Apart
from its two citations to the State Constitution, the court below
relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was cited to
support the state court's holding that the search of the passenger
compartment was unconstitutional. [ Footnote 9 ] Indeed, Page 463 U. S. 1044 the court declared that the search in this case was
unconstitutional because "[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously
applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio . . . to the
search of the interior of the vehicle in this case." 413 Mich. at
471, 320 N.W.2d at 869. The references to the State Constitution in
no way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any
way independent from the state court's interpretation of
federal law. Even if we accept that the Michigan Constitution has
been interpreted to provide independent protection for certain
rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it fairly appears
in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court rested its decision
primarily on federal law.

															Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the state
court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a
mere possibility that an adequate and independent ground supports
the judgment, we find that we have jurisdiction in the absence of a
plain statement that the decision below rested on an adequate and
independent state ground. It appears to us that the state court
"felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional
considerations to construe . . . its own law in the manner it did." Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.
S. 562 , 433 U. S. 568 (1977). [ Footnote 10 ] Page 463 U. S. 1045 III The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that Deputy
Howell's entry into the vehicle cannot be justified under the
principles set forth in Terry, because " Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of criminal activity," rather than a search of an area.
413 Page 463 U. S. 1046 Mich. at 472, 320 N.W.2d at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for
Respondent 10. Although Terry did involve the protective
frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this case
is justified by the principles that we have already established in Terry and other cases.

															In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a "stop
and frisk" in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The
police officer in Terry detained several suspects to
ascertain their identities after the officer had observed the
suspects for a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that
they were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the officer
feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the outside of
the suspects' clothing and discovered two revolvers.

															Examining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct in Terry, [ Footnote
11 ] we held that there is

															"'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails.'"

															392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S.
536 -537 (1967)). Although the conduct of the officer in Terry involved a "severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security," 392 U.S. at 392 U. S.
24 -25, Page 463 U. S. 1047 we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed the
interest of the individual against the legitimate interest in
"crime prevention and detection," id. at 392 U. S. 22 , and
the

															"need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and
other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest." Id. at 392 U. S. 24 .
When the officer has a reasonable belief

															"that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to
the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm." Ibid. Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent
patdown search of a person, we were careful to note that

															"[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective
search and seizure for weapons. These limitations will have to be
developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual
cases." Id. at 392 U. S. 29 .
Contrary to Long's view, Terry need not be read as
restricting the preventative search to the person of the detained
suspect. [ Footnote 12 ]

															In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific
factual situations, we recognized that investigative detentions
involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger
to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.
S. 106 (1977), we held that police may order persons out
of Page 463 U. S. 1048 an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may
frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief
that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in part on
the "inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a
person seated in an automobile." Id. at 434 U. S. 110 .
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), we held that the police, acting on an informant's tip, may
reach into the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a
gun from a driver's waistband even where the gun was not apparent
to police from outside the car and the police knew of its existence
only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in part on our
view of the danger presented to police officers in "traffic stop"
and automobile situations. [ Footnote 13 ]

															Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects may
injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to
weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. In the Term
following Terry, we decided Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations imposed on police authority
to conduct a search incident to a valid arrest. Relying explicitly
on Terry, we held that, when an arrest is made, it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search

															"the arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control' -- construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 763 .
We reasoned that

															"[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested." Ibid. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.
S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower courts

															"have found no workable definition of 'the area within the
immediate control of the arrestee' when Page 463 U. S. 1049 that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and
the arrestee is its recent occupant." Id. at 453 U. S. 460 .
In order to provide a "workable rule," ibid., we held
that

															"articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger
compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon.' . . ." Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, at 395 U. S.
763 ). We also held that the police may examine the
contents of any open or closed container found within the passenger
compartment, "for if the passenger compartment is within the reach
of the arrestee, so will containers in it be within his reach." 453
U.S. at 453 U. S. 460 (footnote omitted). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 , 452 U. S. 702 (1981).

															Our past cases indicate, then, that protection of police and
others can justify protective searches when police have a
reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous,
and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in
the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our
conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an
automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed
or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
[ Footnote 14 ] See
Terry, 392 Page 463 U. S. 1050 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21 .

															"[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger." Id. at 392 U. S. 27 . If
a suspect is "dangerous," he is no less dangerous simply because he
is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as
here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be
required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does
not require its suppression in such circumstances. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.
S. 499 , 436 U. S. 509 (1978); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 739 (plurality opinion by REHNQUIST, J.); id. at 460 U. S. 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).

															The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies Howell
and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed a danger if he
were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The hour was late, and the
area rural. Long was driving his automobile at excessive speed, and
his car swerved into a ditch. The officers had to repeat their
questions to Long, who appeared to be "under the influence" of some
intoxicant. Long was not frisked until the officers observed that
there was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long
was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was
restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have
immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial court
determined that the leather pouch containing Page 463 U. S. 1051 marihuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. [ Footnote 15 ] It is clear that the
intrusion was "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justifi[ed] its initiation." Terry, supra, at 392 U. S. 26 .

															In evaluating the validity of an officer's investigative or
protective conduct under Terry, the

															"[t]ouchstone of our analysis . . . is always 'the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 434 U. S.
108 -109 (quoting Terry, supra, at 392 U. S. 19 ). In
this case, the officers did not act unreasonably in taking
preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons
within Long's immediate grasp before permitting him to reenter his
automobile. Therefore, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area
search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as
they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that
the suspect is potentially dangerous.

															The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it was not
reasonable for the officers to fear that Long could injure them,
because he was effectively under their control during the
investigative stop and could not get access to any weapons that
might have been located in the automobile. See 413 Mich.
at 472, 320 N.W.2d at 869. This reasoning is mistaken in several
respects. During any investigative detention, the suspect is "in
the control" of the officers in the sense that he "may be briefly
detained against his will. . . ." Terry, supra, at 392 U. S. 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just as a Terry suspect on the
street may, despite being under the brief control of a police
officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position break away from police
control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile. See United
State v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132 1134 (CA7 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). In addition, Page 463 U. S. 1052 if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted
to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any
weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792,
795-796 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977). Or, as
here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before
the Terry investigation is over, and again, may have
access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a
police investigation "at close range," Terry, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 24 ,
when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a
full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must
make a "quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from
possible danger. . . ." Id. at 392 U. S. 28 . In
such circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt
alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the
intrusion involved in a Terry encounter. [ Footnote 16 ] Page 463 U. S. 1053 IV The trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the search of
the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court's decision
in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 (1976). The Michigan Supreme Court did not
address this holding, and instead suppressed the marihuana taken
from the trunk as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of
the automobile. Our holding that the initial search was justified
under Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the
trunk search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. However,
we decline to address this question, because it was not passed upon
by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose decision we review in this
case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.
S. 437 , 394 U. S. 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court below, to enable it to
determine whether the trunk search was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions of this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982). [ Footnote 17 ]

															The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. Page 463 U. S. 1054 [ Footnote 1 ]

															It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers
had arrested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated,
they could have searched the passenger compartment under New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk
contained contraband. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. However, at
oral argument, the State informed us that, while Long could have
been arrested for a speeding violation under Michigan law, he was not arrested, because, "[a]s a matter of practice," police
in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless "more" is
involved. See is. at 6. The officers did issue Long an
appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers
could have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated, but they
"would have to go through a process to make a determination as to
whether the party is intoxicated, and then go from that point." Ibid. The court below treated this case as involving a protective
search, and not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for
speeding, driving while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further,
the petitioner does not argue that, if probable cause to arrest
exists, but the officers do not actually effect the arrest, the
police may nevertheless conduct a search as broad as those
authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do
not address that issue.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
authorized the area search, and that the trunk search was a valid
inventory search. See 413 Mich. at 473-480, 320 N.W.2d at
870-873. Justice Moody concurred in the result on the ground that
the trunk search was improper. He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman
that the interior search was proper under Terry. See 413 Mich. at 480-486, 320 N.W.2d at 873-875.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both
the State and Federal Constitutions. See id. at 471, n. 4,
320 N.W.2d at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion
of the opinion, the court stated:

															"We hold, therefore, that the deputies' search of the vehicle
was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and art. 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution." Id. at 472-473, 320 N.W.2d at 870.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															For example, we have long recognized that,

															"where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one
of which is federal and the other nonfederal in character, our
jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the
federal ground and adequate to support the judgment." Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.
S. 207 , 296 U. S. 210 (1935). We may review a state case decided on a federal ground even
if it is clear that there was an available state ground for
decision on which the state court could properly have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U. S. 35 , 389 U. S. 37 , n.
3 (1967). Also, if, in our view, the state court

															"'felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the
manner it did,'"

															then we will not treat a normally adequate state ground as
independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 440 U. S. 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U. S. 562 , 433 U. S. 568 (1977)). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.
S. 553 , 459 U. S.
556 -557, n. 3 (1983). Finally,

															"where the nonfederal ground is so interwoven with the [federal
ground] as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient
breadth to sustain the judgment without any decision of the other,
our jurisdiction is plain." Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal
Co., 243 U. S. 157 , 243 U. S. 164 (1917).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Indeed, Dixon v. Duffy is also illustrative of another
difficulty involved in our requiring state courts to reconsider
their decisions for purposes of clarification. In Dixon, we continued the case on two occasions in order to obtain
clarification, but none was forthcoming: "[T]he California court
advised petitioner's counsel informally that it doubted its
jurisdiction to render such a determination." 344 U.S. at 344 U. S. 145 .
We then vacated the judgment of the state court, and remanded.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															There may be certain circumstances in which clarification is
necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking
the appropriate action.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. at 324 U. S. 128 ,
the Court also wrote that it was desirable that state courts "be
asked, rather than told, what they have intended." It is clear that
we have already departed from that view in those cases in which we
have examined state law to determine whether a particular result
was guided or compelled by federal law. Our decision today departs
further from Herb insofar as we disfavor further requests
to state courts for clarification, and we require a clear and
express statement that a decision rests on adequate and independent
state grounds. However, the "plain statement" rule protects the
integrity of state courts for the reasons discussed above. The
preference for clarification expressed in Herb has failed
to be a completely satisfactory means of protecting the state and
federal interests that are involved.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															It is not unusual for us to employ certain presumptions in
deciding jurisdictional issues. For instance, although the
petitioner bears the burden of establishing our jurisdiction, Durley v. Mayo, 351 U. S. 277 , 351 U. S. 285 (1956), we have held that the party who alleges that a controversy
before us has become moot has the "heavy burden" of establishing
that we lack jurisdiction. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 625 , 440 U. S. 631 (1979). That is, we presume in those circumstances that we have
jurisdiction until some party establishes that we do not for
reasons of mootness.

															We also note that the rule that we announce today was
foreshadowed by our opinions in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (1979), and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562 (1977). In these cases, the state courts relied on both state and
federal law. We determined that we had jurisdiction to decide the
cases because our reading of the opinions led us to conclude that
each court

															"felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in
the manner it did." Zacchini, supra, at 433 U. S. 568 ; Delaware, supra, at 440 U. S. 653 .
In Delaware, we referred to prior state decisions that
confirmed our understanding of the opinion in that case, but our
primary focus was on the face of the opinion. In Zacchini, we relied entirely on the syllabus and opinion of the state
court.

															In dissent, JUSTICE STEVENS proposes the novel view that this
Court should never review a state court decision unless the Court
wishes to vindicate a federal right that has been endangered. The
rationale of the dissent is not restricted to cases where the
decision is arguably supported by adequate and independent state
grounds. Rather, JUSTICE STEVENS appears to believe that even if
the decision below rests exclusively on federal grounds, this Court
should not review the decision as long as there is no federal right
that is endangered.

															The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation
in this country. In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions
(excluding juvenile and traffic charges) were filed in the 50 state
court systems and the District of Columbia. See 7 State
Court Journal, No. 1, p. 18 (1983). By comparison, approximately
32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts during that same
year. See Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts 6 (1982). The
state courts are required to apply federal constitutional
standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of
"federal law" in the process. It is not surprising that this Court
has become more interested in the application and development of
federal law by state courts in the light of the recent significant
expansion of federally created standards that we have imposed on
the States.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its
decision in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N.W.2d
867 , cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. However, the court cited that case only in the
context of a statement that the State did not seek to justify the
search in this case "by reference to other exceptions to the
warrant requirement." 413 Mich. at 472, 320 N.W.2d at 869-870
(footnote omitted). The court then noted that Reed held
that

															"'[a] warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per
se, and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the state constitution unless
shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule.'"

															413 Mich. at 472-473, n. 8, 320 N.W.2d at 870, n. 8.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an
independent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our
decision on an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long's
claim, as we have sometimes done in the past, our understanding of
Michigan law would also result in our finding that we have
jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state search and seizure
law, a "higher standard" is imposed under Art. 1, § 11, of the 1963
Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrest, 413 Mich.
521, 525, 321 N.W.2d
368 , 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter
alia, a "narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside
the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state," Art. 1, § 11,
of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, then the seizure is governed by
a standard identical to that imposed by the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N.W.2d
770 , 775 (1974).

															Long argues that, under the current Michigan Comp.Laws §
333.7107 (1979), the definition of a "narcotic" does not include
marihuana. The difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to
cite any authority for the proposition that the term "narcotic," as
used in the Michigan Constitution, is dependent on current
statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it appears that just
the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that
constitutional provisions are presumed "to be interpreted in
accordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time" of the
passage of the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92 N.W.2d
492 , 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change
the interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then
the legislature would have "the power of outright repeal of a duly
voted constitutional provision." Ibid. Applying these
principles, the Michigan courts have held that a statute passed
subsequent to the applicable state constitutional provision is not
relevant for interpreting its Constitution, and that a definition
in a legislative Act pertains only to that Act. Jones v. City
of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich.App. 574, 182 N.W.2d 795 (1970). See
also Walber v. Piggins, 2 Mich.App. 145, 138 N.W.2d 772
(1966), aff'd, 381 Mich. 138, 160
N.W.2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan
Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marihuana was considered
a narcotic drug. See 1961 Mich.Pub.Acts, No. 206, § 1(f).
Indeed, it appears that marihuana was considered a narcotic drug in
Michigan until 1978, when it was removed from the narcotic
classification. We would conclude that the seizure of marihuana in
Michigan is not subject to analysis under any "higher standard"
than may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In the light of
our holding in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.
S. 648 (1979), that an interpretation of state law in
our view compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not
an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to decide
the case.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement,
we acknowledged that the typical "stop and frisk" situation
involves

															"an entire rubric of police conduct -- necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat -- which historically has not been, and as a practical matter
could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the
conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizure." Terry, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 20 (footnote omitted). We have emphasized that the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether
the officer acted as a "reasonably prudent man" in deciding that
the intrusion was justified. Id. at 392 U. S. 27 .

															"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light
of the facts known to the officer at the time." Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 407 U. S. 146 (1972).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the
present case:

															"The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an
overcoat worn by defendant because that was the issue presented by
the facts. One could reasonably conclude that a different result
would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had
been carried, folded over the forearm, rather than worn. The
constitutional principles stated in Terry would still
control."

															413 Mich. at 475-476, 320 N.W.2d at 871 (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															According to one study,

															"approximately 30% of police shooting occurred when a police
officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Britow,
Police Officer Shooting -- A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J.Crim.L.C.
& P.S. 93 (1963)." Adams v. Williams, supra, at 407 U. S. 148 ,
n. 3.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may
conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an
investigative stop, although the "bright line" that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search whenever officers
effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists in the
arrest context, i.e., preservation of evidence, and this
justifies an "automatic" search. However, that additional interest
does not exist in the Terry context. A Terry search,

															"unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest,
is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or
destruction of evidence of crime. . . . The sole justification of
the search . . . is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby. . . ."

															392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 29 .
What we borrow now from Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969), and Belton is merely the
recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident
to an arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed,
may be able to gain access to weapons to injure officers or others
nearby, or otherwise to hinder legitimate police activity. This
recognition applies as well in the Terry context. However,
because the interest in collecting and preserving evidence is not
present in the Terry context, we require that officers who
conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so
only when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry. [ Footnote 15 ]

															Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of
Long's person that was conducted by the officers after the
discovery of the knife.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of
the search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these
arguments is that Terry searches are limited in scope, and
that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with this limited
scope. We have recognized that Terry searches are limited
insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an
articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see,
e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 392 U. S. 65 (1968), and that they are protective in nature and limited to
weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S.
85 , 444 U. S. 93 -94
(1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our
decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking
weapons, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the
suspect is potentially dangerous.

															Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on the discovery of the hunting knife
because Long possessed that weapon legally. See Brief for
Respondent 17. Assuming, arguendo, that Long possessed the
knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the
validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon
is possessed in accordance with state law. See Adam v.
Williams, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 146 .

															Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN's suggestion in dissent, the
reasoning of Terry, Chimel, and Belton points
clearly to the direction that we have taken today. Although Chimel involved a full custodial arrest, the rationale for Chimel rested on the recognition in Terry that it
is unreasonable to prevent the police from taking reasonable steps
to protect their safety.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that we are expanding the scope of a Terry -type search to include a search incident to a valid
arrest. However, our opinion clearly indicates that the area search
that we approve is limited to a search for weapons in circumstances
where the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect is
potentially dangerous to them. JUSTICE BRENNAN quotes at length
from Sibron, but fails to recognize that the search in
that case was a search for narcotics, and not a search for
weapons.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN concedes that "police should not be exposed to
unnecessary danger in the performance of their duties," post at 463 U. S.
1064 , but then would require that police officers, faced
with having to make quick determinations about self-protection and
the defense of innocent citizens in the area, must also decide
instantaneously what "less intrusive" alternative exists to ensure
that any threat presented by the suspect will be neutralized. Post at 463 U. S.
1065 . For the practical reasons explained in Terry, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 24 , 28,
we have never required police to adopt alternative measures to
avoid a legitimate Terry -type intrusion.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 43-44. The Michigan Supreme Court
is, of course, free to determine the validity of that search under
state law.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															I join Parts I, III, IV, and V of the Court's opinion. While I
am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction in this particular
case, I do not join the Court, in 463 U. S. in
fashioning a new presumption of jurisdiction over cases coming here
from state courts. Although I agree with the Court that uniformity
in federal criminal law is desirable, I see little efficiency and
an increased danger of advisory opinions in the Court's new
approach.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															The Court today holds that "the protective search of the
passenger compartment" of the automobile involved in this case "was
reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and
other decisions of this Court." Ante at 463 U. S.
1035 . I disagree. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968), does not support the Court's conclusion, and
the reliance on "other decisions" is patently misplaced. Plainly,
the Court is simply continuing the process of distorting Terry beyond recognition and forcing it into service as an
unlikely weapon against the Fourth Amendment's fundamental
requirement that searches and seizures be based on probable cause. See United State v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 , 462 U. S.
714 -717 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). I,
therefore, dissent. [ Footnote
2/1 ] Page 463 U. S. 1055 On three occasions this Term, I have discussed the limited scope
of the exception to the probable cause requirement created by Terry and its progeny. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 , 460 U. S.
509 -511 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 , 461 U. S.
364 -365 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); United
States v. Place, supra, at 462 U. S.
711 -717 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). I will not
repeat those discussions here, and note only that " Terry, and the cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative
stops and extremely limited searches based on reasonable
suspicion." 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 714 .
However, the Court's opinion compels a detailed review of Terry itself.

															In Terry, the Court confronted the "quite narrow
question" of

															"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a
person and subject him to a limited search for weapons
unless there is probable cause for an arrest."

															392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 15 (emphasis supplied). Because the Court was dealing

															"with an entire rubric of police conduct . . . which
historically [had] not been, and as a practical matter could not
be, subjected to the warrant procedure," id. at 392 U. S. 20 , the
Court tested the conduct at issue "by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Ibid. (footnote omitted). In considering the
"reasonableness" of the conduct, the Court balanced " the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.'" Id. at 392 U. S. 21 ,
quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S.
534 -535, 387 U. S.
536 -537 (1967). It deserves emphasis that, in discussing
the "invasion" at issue, the Court stated that "[e]ven a
limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a
severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security. .
. ." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 24 -25
(emphasis supplied). Ultimately, the Court concluded that "there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a
reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police
officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable Page 463 U. S. 1056 cause to arrest the individual for a crime." Id. at 392 U. S. 27 (emphasis supplied). The Court expressed its holding as
follows:

															"We merely hold today that, where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this behavior, he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him." Id. at 392 U. S. 30 (emphasis supplied).

															It is clear that Terry authorized only limited searches
of the person for weapons. In light of what Terry said,
relevant portions of which the Court neglects to quote, the Court's
suggestion that " Terry need not be read as restricting the
preventive search to the person of the detained suspect," ante at 463 U. S.
1047 (footnote omitted), can only be described as
disingenuous. Nothing in Terry authorized police officers
to search a suspect's car based on reasonable suspicion. The Court
confirmed this this very Term in United States v. Place,
supra, where it described the search authorized by Terry as a "limited search for weapons, or frisk'. . .
." 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 702 .
The search at issue in this case is a far cry from a "frisk" and
certainly was not "limited." [ Footnote
2/2 ] Page 463 U. S.
1057 The Court's reliance on Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.
S. 454 (1981), as support for its new "area search" rule
within the context of a Terry stop is misplaced. In Chimel, the Court addressed the scope of a search incident
to a lawful arrest, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 753 ,
and held invalid the search at issue there because it

															"went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area from
within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him." Id. at 395 U. S. 768 . Chimel stressed the need to limit the scope of searches
incident to arrest and overruled two prior decisions of this Court
validating overly broad searches. Ibid. In Belton, the Court considered the scope of a search
incident to the lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an
automobile. 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 455 .
In this "particular and problematic context," id. at 453 U. S. 460 ,
n. 3, the Court held that

															"when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile." Id. at 453 U. S. 460 (footnote omitted). [ Footnote
2/3 ]

															The critical distinction between this case and Terry on
the one hand, and Chimel and Belton, on the
other, is that the latter two cases arose within the context of
lawful custodial arrests supported by probable cause. [ Footnote 2/4 ] The Court in Terry expressly recognized the difference between a search incident to
arrest and the "limited search for weapons," 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 25 ,
involved in that case. The Court stated: Page 463 U. S. 1058 "A search [incident to arrest], although justified in part by
the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from
assault with a concealed weapon, . . . is also justified on other
grounds, . . . and can therefore involve a relatively extensive
exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation. . . . Thus, it must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be
characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though
it remains a serious intrusion."

															". . . An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon
individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the
interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different.
An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed,
and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the
individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons,
on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person." Id. at 392 U. S. 25 -26
(footnote omitted).

															In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 (1973), the Court relied on the differences
between searches incident to lawful custodial arrests and Terry "stop-and-frisk" searches to reject an argument that
the limitations established in Terry should be applied to
a search incident to arrest. 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 228 .
The Court noted that " Terry clearly recognized the
distinction between the two types of searches, and that a different
rule governed one than governed the other," id. at 414 U. S. 233 ,
and described Terry as involving "stricter . . .
standards," 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 234 ,
than those governing searches incident to arrest. The Court went on
to state: Page 463 U. S. 1059 "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search, and we hold that, in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that
Amendment." Id. at 414 U. S. 235 . See also id. at 414 U. S.
237 -238 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("The search incident
to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the
privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is
legitimately abated by the fact of arrest" (footnote omitted)); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U. S. 260 , 414 U. S. 264 (1973).

															As these cases recognize, there is a vital difference between
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests and Terry protective searches. The Court deliberately ignores that difference
in relying on principles developed within the context of intrusions
supported by probable cause to arrest to construct an "area search"
rule within the context of a Terry stop.

															The Court denies that an "area search" is fundamentally
inconsistent with Terry, see ante at 463 U. S.
1052 , n. 16, stating:

															"We have recognized that Terry searches are limited
insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an
articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see
e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 392 U. S.
65 (1968), and that they are protective in nature and
limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S.
85 , 444 U. S. 93 -94 (1979).
However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To
engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, the
officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is
potentially dangerous." Ibid. Page 463 U. S. 1060 This patently is no answer: respondent's argument relates to the scope of the search, not to the standard that justifies
it. The Court flouts Terry 's holding that Terry searches must be carefully limited in scope. See supra at 463 U. S.
1056 . Indeed, the page in Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968), cited by the Court states:

															"Even assuming arguendo that there were adequate
grounds to search Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of the
search conducted by Patrolman Martin were so clearly unrelated to
that justification as to render the heroin inadmissible. The search
for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a
limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for
concealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault.
Only when he discovered such objects did the officer in Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men he
searched. In this case, with no attempt at an initial limited
exploration for arms, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into
Sibron's pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin. His
testimony shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found
them. The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the
accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have
justified its inception -- the protection of the officer by
disarming a potentially dangerous man." Id. at 392 U. S. 65 (emphasis supplied). [ Footnote
2/5 ]

															As this passage makes clear, the scope of a search is determined
not only by reference to its purpose, but also by reference to its
intrusiveness. Yet the Court today holds that a search of a car
(and the containers within it) that is not even occupied by the
suspect is only as intrusive as, or perhaps less intrusive than,
thrusting a hand into a pocket after an Page 463 U. S. 1061 initial patdown has suggested the presence of concealed objects
that might be used as weapons.

															The Court suggests no limit on the "area search" it now
authorizes. The Court states that a

															"search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited
to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is
permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the
officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons." Ante at 463 U. S.
1049 (footnote omitted). Presumably a weapon "may be
placed or hidden" anywhere in a car. A weapon also might be hidden
in a container in the car. In this case, the Court upholds the
officer's search of a leather pouch because it "could have
contained a weapon." Ante at 463 U. S.
1050 -1051 (footnote omitted). In addition, the Court's
requirement that an officer have a reasonable suspicion that a
suspect is armed and dangerous does little to check the initiation
of an area search. In this case, the officers saw a hunting knife
in the car, see ante at 463 U. S.
1036 , 463 U. S.
1050 , but the Court does not base its holding that the
subsequent search was permissible on the ground that possession of
the knife may have been illegal under state law. See ante at 463 U. S.
1052 -1053, n. 16. An individual can lawfully possess
many things that can be used as weapons. A hammer, or a baseball
bat, can be used as a very effective weapon. Finally, the Court
relies on the following facts to conclude that the officers had a
reasonable suspicion that respondent was presently dangerous: the
hour was late; the area was rural; respondent had been driving at
an excessive speed; he had been involved in an accident; he was not
immediately responsive to the officers' questions; and he appeared
to be under the influence of some intoxicant. Ante at 463 U. S.
1050 . Based on these facts, one might reasonably
conclude that respondent was drunk. A drunken driver is indeed
dangerous while driving, but not while stopped on the roadside
by Page 463 U. S. 1062 the police. Even when an intoxicated person lawfully has in his
car an object that could be used as a weapon, it requires
imagination to conclude that he is presently dangerous. Even
assuming that the facts in this case justified the officers'
initial "frisk" of respondent, see ante at 463 U. S.
1035 -1036, 463 U. S.
1050 -1051, and n. 15, they hardly provide adequate
justification for a search of a suspect's car and the containers
within it. This represents an intrusion not just different in
degree, but in kind, from the intrusion sanctioned by Terry. In short, the implications of the Court's decision
are frightening.

															The Court also rejects the Michigan Supreme Court's view that
it

															"was not reasonable for the officers to fear that [respondent]
could injure them, because he was effectively under their control
during the investigative stop and could not get access to any
weapons that might have been located in the automobile." Ante at 463 U. S.
1051 . In this regard, the Court states:

															"[W]e stress that a Terry investigation, such as the
one that occurred here, involves a police investigation 'at close
range,' . . . when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in
part because a full custodial arrest has not been
effected, and the officer must make a 'quick decision as to how to
protect himself and others from possible danger.' . . . In such
circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt alternative
means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion
involved in a Terry encounter." Ante at 463 U. S.
1052 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). Putting
aside the fact that the search at issue here involved a far more
serious intrusion than that "involved in a Terry encounter," see ibid., and as such might suggest the need
for resort to "alternative means," the Court's reasoning is
perverse. The Court's argument in essence is that the absence of probable cause to arrest compels the conclusion
that a broad search, traditionally associated in scope with a
search incident to arrest, must be permitted based on reasonable
suspicion. But United State v. Robinson stated:

															"It is Page 463 U. S. 1063 scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police
station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact
resulting from the typical Terry -type stop."

															414 U.S. at 414 U. S.
234 -235. In light of Robinson's observation,
today's holding leaves in grave doubt the question of whether the
Court's assessment of the relative dangers posed by given
confrontations is based on any principled standard.

															Moreover, the Court's reliance on a "balancing" of the relevant
interests to justify its decision, see ante at 463 U. S.
1051 , is certainly inappropriate. In Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), the Court stated that

															"[t]he narrow intrusions involved in [ Terry y and its
progeny] were judged by a balancing test, rather than by the
general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported
by the 'long-prevailing standards' of probable cause, . . . only
because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion
associated with an arrest." Id. at 442 U. S. 212 .
The intrusion involved in this case is precisely "the kind of
intrusion associated with an arrest." There is no justification,
therefore, for "balancing" the relevant interests.

															In sum, today's decision reflects once again the threat to
Fourth Amendment values posed by "balancing." See United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 717 -719 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result).
As Justice Frankfurter stated in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950):

															"To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some
criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for
district judges or the police to say that an 'unreasonable search'
is forbidden -- that the search must be reasonable. What is the
test of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the
reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the
history and the experience which it embodies and the safeguards
afforded by it against the evils to which it was a response." Id. at 339 U. S. 83 (dissenting opinion). Page 463 U. S. 1064 Hornbook law has been that "the police may not conduct a search
unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is
probable cause to do so." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 457 .
While, under some circumstances, the police may search a car
without a warrant, see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), "the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll . . . applies only to searches of vehicles that
are supported by probable cause." United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , 456 U. S. 809 (1982) (footnote omitted).

															"[T]he Court in Carroll emphasized the importance of the
requirement that officers have probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband." Id. at 456 U. S.
807 -808. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266 , 413 U. S. 269 (1973) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause
for the search" (footnote omitted)). Today the Court discards these
basic principles and employs the very narrow exception established
by Terry "to swallow the general rule that Fourth
Amendment [searches of cars] are reasonable' only if based on
probable cause." [ Footnote 2/6 ] Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 442 U. S. 213 . See also United States v. Place, supra, at 462 U. S.
718 -719 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). Today's decision disregards the Court's warning in Almeida-Sanchez: "The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain
exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of
these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional
safeguards."

															413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 273 .
Of course, police should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in
the performance of their duties. But a search of a car and the
containers within it based on nothing more than reasonable
suspicion, even under the circumstances present Page 463 U. S. 1065 here, cannot be sustained without doing violence to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason in this
case why the officers could not have pursued less intrusive, but
equally effective, means of insuring their safety. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Cf. United States v. Place,
supra, at 462 U. S.
715 -716; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 511 ,
n. (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). The Court takes a long step
today toward "balancing" into oblivion the protections the Fourth
Amendment affords. I dissent, for as Justice Jackson said in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 (1949):

															"[Fourth Amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights, but
belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing
the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government." Id. at 338 U. S. 180 (dissenting opinion).

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															I agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. See ante at 463 U. S.
1044 -1045, n. 10.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Neither Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.
S. 106 (1977), nor Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), provides any support for the Court's conclusion in this
case. The Terry searches in Mimms and Adams were both limited, and involved only searches of the
person. See 434 U.S. at 434 U. S.
111 -112; 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 146 , 407 U. S.
148 .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The court went on to state that

															"the police may also examine the contents of any containers
found within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will
containers in it be within his reach."

															453 U.S. 453 U. S. 460 (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															There was no arrest before the search in this case, see
ante at 463 U. S.
1035 , n. 1, and the Court does not address whether the
police may conduct a search as broad as those authorized by Belton and United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982), if they have probable cause to arrest,
but do not actually effect the arrest. See ante at 463 U. S.
1035 , n. 1.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S.
85 , 444 U. S. 93 (1979) ("Under [Terry], a law enforcement officer, for his
own protection and safety, may conduct a patdown to find
weapons that he reasonably believes or suspects are then in the
possession of the person he has accosted" (emphasis supplied)).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Of course, the Court's decision also swallows the general rule
that searches of containers must be based on probable cause.
Without probable cause to search the car, United States v.
Ross does not apply. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 825 .
Moreover, in the absence of a lawful custodial arrest, see 463
U.S. 1032 fn2/4|>n. 4, supra, New York v. Belton does not apply. See 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 460 ; supra at 463 U. S.
1057 -1058.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															The police, for example, could have continued to detain
respondent outside the car and asked him to tell them where his
registration was. The police then could have retrieved the
registration themselves. This would have resulted in an intrusion
substantially less severe than the one at issue here.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															The jurisprudential questions presented in this case are far
more important than the question whether the Michigan police
officer's search of respondent's car violated the Fourth Amendment.
The case raises profoundly significant questions concerning the
relationship between two sovereigns -- the State of Michigan and
the United States of America.

															The Supreme Court of the State of Michigan expressly held

															"that the deputies' search of the vehicle was proscribed by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 1, §
11 of the Michigan Constitution. "

															413 Mich. 461, 472-473, 320 N.W.2d
866 , 870 (1982) (emphasis added). Page 463 U. S. 1066 The state law ground is clearly adequate to support the
judgment, but the question whether it is independent of the
Michigan Supreme Court's understanding of federal law is more
difficult. Four possible ways of resolving that question present
themselves: (1) asking the Michigan Supreme Court directly, (2)
attempting to infer from all possible sources of state law what the
Michigan Supreme Court meant, (3) presuming that adequate state
grounds are independent unless it clearly appears otherwise, or (4)
presuming that adequate state grounds are not independent unless it
clearly appears otherwise. This Court has, on different occasions,
employed each of the first three approaches; never until today has
it even hinted at the fourth. In order to "achieve the consistency
that is necessary," the Court today undertakes a reexamination of
all the possibilities. Ante at 463 U. S.
1039 . It rejects the first approach as inefficient and
unduly burdensome for state courts, and rejects the second approach
as an inappropriate expenditure of our resources. Ante at 463 U. S.
1039 -1040. Although I find both of those decisions
defensible in themselves, I cannot accept the Court's decision to
choose the fourth approach over the third -- to presume that
adequate state grounds are intended to be dependent on federal law
unless the record plainly shows otherwise. I must therefore
dissent.

															If we reject the intermediate approaches, we are left with a
choice between two presumptions: one in favor of our taking
jurisdiction, and one against it. Historically, the latter
presumption has always prevailed. See, e.g., Durley v.
Mayo, 351 U. S. 277 , 351 U. S. 285 (1956); Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.
S. 541 , 343 U. S. 547 (1952); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U. S.
52 (1934). The rule, as succinctly stated in Lynch, was as follows:

															"Where the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one
involving a federal question and the other not, or if it does not
appear upon which of two grounds the judgment was based, and the
ground independent of a federal question is sufficient in itself to
sustain it, this Page 463 U. S. 1067 Court will not take jurisdiction. Allen v. Arguimbau, 198 U. S.
149 , 198 U. S. 154 , 198 U. S.
155 ; Johnson v. Rusk , [ 137 U.S.
300 , 137 U. S. 306 , 137 U. S.
307 ]; Wood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co. v.
Skinner , [ 139 U.S.
293 , 139 U. S. 295 , 139 U. S.
297 ]; Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk &
Ocean View Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 596 , 228 U. S.
599 ; Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty
Co., 244 U. S. 300 , 244 U. S.
302 , 244 U. S. 304 ." Id. at 293 U. S. 54 -55.
The Court today points out that, in several cases, we have weakened
the traditional presumption by using the other two intermediate
approaches identified above. Since those two approaches are now to
be rejected, however, I would think that stare decisis would call for a return to historical principle. Instead, the Court
seems to conclude that, because some precedents are to be rejected,
we must overrule them all. [ Footnote
3/1 ]

															Even if I agreed with the Court that we are free to consider as
a fresh proposition whether we may take presumptive jurisdiction
over the decisions of sovereign States, I could not agree that an
expansive attitude makes good sense. It appears to be common ground
that any rule we adopt should show "respect for state courts, and
[a] desire to avoid advisory opinions." Ante at 463 U. S.
1040 . And I am confident that all Members of this Court
agree that there is a vital interest in the sound management of
scarce federal judicial resources. All of those policies counsel
against the exercise of federal jurisdiction. They are fortified by
my belief that a policy of judicial restraint -- one that allows
other decisional bodies to have the last word in legal
interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to
intervene -- enables this Court to make its most effective
contribution to our federal system of government.

															The nature of the case before us hardly compels a departure from
tradition. These are not cases in which an American citizen has
been deprived of a right secured by the United Page 463 U. S. 1068 States Constitution or a federal statute. Rather, they are cases
in which a state court has upheld a citizen's assertion of a right,
finding the citizen to be protected under both federal and state
law. The attorney for the complaining party is an officer of the
State itself, who asks us to rule that the state court interpreted
federal rights too broadly and "overprotected" the citizen.

															Such cases should not be of inherent concern to this Court. The
reason may be illuminated by assuming that the events underlying
this case had arisen in another country, perhaps the Republic of
Finland. If the Finnish police had arrested a Finnish citizen for
possession of marihuana, and the Finnish courts had turned him
loose, no American would have standing to object. If instead they
had arrested an American citizen and acquitted him, we might have
been concerned about the arrest, but we surely could not have
complained about the acquittal, even if the Finnish court had based
its decision on its understanding of the United States
Constitution. That would be true even if we had a treaty with
Finland requiring it to respect the rights of American citizens
under the United States Constitution. We would only be motivated to
intervene if an American citizen were unfairly arrested, tried, and
convicted by the foreign tribunal.

															In this case, the State of Michigan has arrested one of its
citizens and the Michigan Supreme Court has decided to turn him
loose. The respondent is a United States citizen as well as a
Michigan citizen, but since there is no claim that he has been
mistreated by the State of Michigan, the final outcome of the state
processes offended no federal interest whatever. Michigan simply
provided greater protection to one of its citizens than some other
State might provide or, indeed, than this Court might require
throughout the country.

															I believe that, in reviewing the decisions of state courts, the
primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard. That
belief resonates with statements in many of our prior cases. Page 463 U. S. 1069 In Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.
S. 765 (1931), the Supreme Court of Nebraska had
rejected a federal constitutional claim, relying in part on the
state law doctrine of laches. Writing for the Court in response to
the Nebraska Governor's argument that the Court should not accept
jurisdiction because laches provided an independent ground for
decision, Chief Justice Hughes concluded that this Court must
ascertain for itself whether the asserted nonfederal ground
independently and adequately supported the judgment "in order that
constitutional guaranties may appropriately be enforced." Id. at 282 U. S. 773 .
He relied on our earlier opinion in Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n of Missouri, 248 U. S.
67 (1918), in which Justice Holmes had made it clear
that the Court engaged in such an inquiry so that it would not "be
possible for a State to impose an unconstitutional burden" on a
private party. Id. at 248 U. S. 70 .
And both Abie and Union Pacific rely on Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.
S. 246 , 225 U. S. 261 (1912), in which the Court explained its duty to review the
findings of fact of a state court "where a Federal right has been
denied."

															Until recently, we had virtually no interest in cases of this
type. Thirty years ago, this Court reviewed only one. Nevada v.
Stacher, 346 U.S. 906 (1953). Indeed, that appears to have
been the only case during the entire 1953 Term in which a State
even sought review of a decision by its own judiciary. Fifteen
years ago, we did not review any such cases, although the total
number of requests had mounted to three. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Sometime during the past decade, perhaps
about Page 463 U. S. 1070 the time of the 5-to-4 decision in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.
S. 562 (1977), our priorities shifted. The result is a
docket swollen with requests by States to reverse judgments that
their courts have rendered in favor of their citizens. [ Footnote 3/3 ] I am confident that a future
Court will recognize the error of this allocation of resources.
When that day comes, I think it likely that the Court will also
reconsider the propriety of today's expansion of our
jurisdiction.

															The Court offers only one reason for asserting authority over
cases such as the one presented today:

															"an important need for uniformity in federal law [that] goes
unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily
upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state
ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion." Ante at 463 U. S.
1040 (emphasis omitted). Of course, the supposed need to
"review an opinion" clashes directly with our oft-repeated reminder
that "our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions." Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.
S. 117 , 324 U. S. 126 (1945). The clash is not merely one of form: the "need for
uniformity in federal law" is truly an ungovernable engine. That
same need is no less present when Page 463 U. S. 1071 it is perfectly clear that a state ground is both independent
and adequate. In fact, it is equally present if a state prosecutor
announces that he believes a certain policy of nonenforcement is
commanded by federal law. Yet we have never claimed jurisdiction to
correct such errors, no matter how egregious they may be, and no
matter how much they may thwart the desires of the state
electorate. We do not sit to expound our understanding of the
Constitution to interested listeners in the legal community; we sit
to resolve disputes. If it is not apparent that our views would
affect the outcome of a particular case, we cannot presume to
interfere. [ Footnote 3/4 ] Page 463 U. S. 1072 Finally, I am thoroughly baffled by the Court's suggestion that
it must stretch its jurisdiction and reverse the judgment of the
Michigan Supreme Court in order to show "[r]espect for the
independence of state courts." Ante at 463 U. S.
1040 . Would we show respect for the Republic of Finland
by convening a special sitting for the sole purpose of declaring
that its decision to release an American citizen was based upon a
misunderstanding of American law?

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															A sampling of the cases may be found in the footnotes to my
dissenting opinion in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553 , 459 U. S. 566 (1983). See also 463
U.S. 1032 fn3/4|>n. 4, infra. [ Footnote 3/2 ]

															In Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa.
189, 233 A.2d 840 (1967), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected the defendant's
right to publish and distribute the book "Candy." The Commonwealth
petitioned to this Court, and we denied certiorari. 390 U.S. 948
(1968). In People v. Noroff, 67 Cal. 2d
791 , 433 P.2d 479 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected the defendant's
right to distribute a magazine called "International Nudist Sun."
The State petitioned to this Court, and we denied certiorari. 390
U.S. 1012 (1968). In State v. Franc, 165 Colo. 69, 437 P.2d 48 (1968), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that, under Colorado
law, title in a certain piece of property should be quieted in a
citizen. The State petitioned to this Court, and we denied
certiorari. 392 U.S. 928 (1968).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															This Term, we devoted argument time to Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 (1983) (argued twice); Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (1983); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.
S. 359 (1983); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 73 0
(1983); California v. Ramos, ante p. 463 U. S. 992 ; Florida v. Casal, 462 U. S. 637 (1983); City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital,
ante p. 463 U. S. 239 ; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, ante p. 463 U. S. 765 ; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983), as well as this case. And a cursory survey of the United
States Law Week index reveal that, so far this Term, at least 80
petitions for certiorari to state courts were filed by the States
themselves.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															In this regard, one of the cases overruled today deserves
comment. In Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.
S. 551 (1940), the Court considered a case much like
this one -- the Minnesota Supreme Court had concluded that both the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 9,
§ 1, of the Minnesota Constitution prohibited a graduated income
tax on chainstore income. The state court stated that

															"th[e] provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions impose
identical restrictions upon the legislative power of the state in
respect to classification for purposes of taxation,"

															and "then adverted briefly to three of its former decisions
which had interpreted" the state provision. 309 U.S. at 309 U. S.
552 -553. It then proceeded to conduct a careful analysis
of the Federal Constitution. It could justly be said that the
decision rested primarily on federal law. Cf. ante at 463 U. S.
1042 . The majority of the Court reasoned as follows:

															"Enough has been said to demonstrate that there is considerable
uncertainty as to the precise grounds for the decision. That is
sufficient reason for us to decline at this time to review the
federal question asserted to be present, Honeyman v.
Hanan, 300 U. S. 14 , consistently with
the policy of not passing upon questions of a constitutional nature
which are not clearly necessary to a decision of the case."

															309 U.S. at 309 U. S. 556 .
The Court therefore remanded to the state court for
clarification.

															Today's Court rejects that approach as intruding unduly on the
state judicial process. One might therefore expect it to turn to
Chief Justice Hughes' dissenting opinion in National Tea. In a careful statement of the applicable principles, he made an
observation that I find unanswerable:

															"The fact that provisions of the state and federal constitutions
may be similar or even identical does not justify us in disturbing
a judgment of a state court which adequately rests upon its
application of the provisions of its own constitution. That the
state court may be influenced by the reasoning of our opinions
makes no difference. The state court may be persuaded by majority
opinions in this Court or it may prefer the reasoning of dissenting
judges, but the judgment of the state court upon the application of
its own constitution remains a judgment which we are without
jurisdiction to review. Whether in this case we thought that the
state tax was repugnant to the federal constitution or consistent
with it, the judgment of the state court that the tax violated the
state constitution would still stand. It cannot be supposed that
the Supreme Court of Minnesota is not fully conscious of its
independent authority to construe the constitution of the State,
whatever reasons it may adduce in so doing." Id. at 309 U. S.
558 -559.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The United States Supreme Court decided whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case, Michigan v. Long, which involved a state court's decision that appeared to rest on federal law but also referenced state law. The Court held that it had jurisdiction and clarified the approach for determining whether state court decisions based on federal law are reviewable. The Court concluded that when a state court decision primarily discusses federal law or is interwoven with federal law, and the role of state law is unclear, the assumption is that the state court based its decision on federal law. This approach respects state court independence and avoids advisory opinions. The Court overruled previous cases that required reconsideration by state courts for clarification of their decisions.