U.S. Supreme Court Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985) Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill No. 83-1362 Argued December 3,
1984 Decided March 19, 1985 470
U.S. 532 ast|>* 470
U.S. 532 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In No. 83-1362, petitioner Board of Education hired respondent
Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application, Loudermill
stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Subsequently,
upon discovering that he had in fact been convicted of grand
larceny, the Board dismissed him for dishonesty in filling out the
job application. He was not afforded an opportunity to respond to
the dishonesty charge or to challenge the dismissal. Under Ohio
law, Loudermill was a "classified civil servant," and by statute,
as such an employee, could be terminated only for cause, and was
entitled to administrative review of the dismissal. He filed an
appeal with the Civil Service Commission, which, after hearings
before a referee and the Commission, upheld the dismissal some nine
months after the appeal had been filed. Although the Commission's
decision was subject to review in the state courts, Loudermill
instead filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the
Ohio statute providing for administrative review was
unconstitutional on its face because it provided no opportunity for
a discharged employee to respond to charges against him prior to
removal, thus depriving him of liberty and property without due
process. It was also alleged that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied, because discharged employees were not given
sufficiently prompt postremoval hearings. The District Court
dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim on which relief
could be granted, holding that, because the very statute that
created the property right in continued employment also specified
the procedures for discharge, and because those procedures were
followed, Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process
due; that the post-termination hearings also adequately protected
Loudermill's property interest; and that, in light of the
Commission's crowded docket, the delay in processing his appeal was
constitutionally acceptable. In No. 83-1363, petitioner Board of
Education fired respondent Donnelly from his job as a bus mechanic
because he had Page 470 U. S. 533 failed an eye examination. He appealed to the Civil Service
Commission, which ordered him reinstated, but without backpay. He
then filed a complaint in Federal District Court essentially
identical to Loudermill's, and the court dismissed for failure to
state a claim. On a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed in part and remanded, holding that both respondents had
been deprived of due process and that the compelling private
interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of
presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added
administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. But with regard
to the alleged deprivation of liberty and Loudermill's 9-month wait
for an administrative decision, the court affirmed the District
Court, finding no constitutional violation. Held: All the process that is due is provided by a
pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with
post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio
statute; since respondents alleged that they had no chance to
respond, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaints
for failure to state a claim. Pp. 470 U. S.
538 -548.

															(a) The Ohio statute plainly supports the conclusion that
respondents possess property rights in continued employment. The
Due Process Clause provides that the substantive rights of life,
liberty, and property cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance
and procedure are distinct. "Property" cannot be defined by the
procedures provided for its deprivation. Pp. 470 U. S.
538 -541.

															(b) The principle that, under the Due Process Clause, an
individual must be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest
requires "some kind of hearing" prior to the discharge of an
employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in
his employment. The need for some form of pretermination hearing is
evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake: the
private interest in retaining employment, the governmental
interests in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and
the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an
erroneous termination. Pp. 470 U. S. 542 -545.

															(c) The pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the
propriety of the discharge, but should be an initial check against
mistaken decisions essentially a determination of whether there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee
are true and support the proposed action. The essential
requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to
respond. Pp. 470 U. S.
545 -546.

															(d) The delay in Loudermill's administrative proceedings did not
constitute a separate constitutional violation. The Due Process
Clause Page 470 U. S. 534 requires provision of a hearing "at a meaningful time," and here
the delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the procedures.
Pp. 470 U. S.
546 -547.

															721 F.2d 550, affirmed and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, in
Parts I, II, III, and IV of which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in Part
II of which MARSHALL, J., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 470 U. S. 548 .
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, post p. 470 U. S. 551 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 470 U. S.
559 . Page 470 U. S. 535 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In these cases, we consider what pretermination process must be
accorded a public employee who can be discharged only for
cause. I In 1979, the Cleveland Board of Education, petitioner in No.
83-1362, hired respondent James Loudermill as a security guard. On
his job application, Loudermill stated that he had never been
convicted of a felony. Eleven months later, as part of a routine
examination of his employment records, the Board discovered that,
in fact, Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. By
letter dated November 3, 1980, the Board's Business Manager
informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed because of his
dishonesty in filling out the employment application. Loudermill
was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge of
dishonesty or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board
adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge.

															Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a "classified civil servant."
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984). Such employees can be
terminated only for cause, and may obtain administrative review if
discharged. § 124.34. Pursuant to this provision, Loudermill filed
an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November
12. The Commission appointed a referee, who held a hearing on
January 29, 1981. Loudermill argued that he had thought that his
1968 larceny conviction was for a misdemeanor, rather than a
felony. The referee recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981,
the Page 470 U. S. 536 full Commission heard argument and orally announced that it
would uphold the dismissal. Proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law followed on August 10, and Loudermill's
attorneys were advised of the result by mail on August 21.

															Although the Commission's decision was subject to judicial
review in the state courts, Loudermill instead brought the present
suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio. The complaint alleged that § 124.34 was unconstitutional on
its face because it did not provide the employee an opportunity to
respond to the charges against him prior to removal. As a result,
discharged employees were deprived of liberty and property without
due process. The complaint also alleged that the provision was
unconstitutional as applied because discharged employees were not
given sufficiently prompt postremoval hearings.

															Before a responsive pleading was filed, the District Court
dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). It held that,
because the very statute that created the property right in
continued employment also specified the procedures for discharge,
and because those procedures were followed, Loudermill was, by
definition, afforded all the process due. The post-termination
hearing also adequately protected Loudermill's liberty interests.
Finally, the District Court concluded that, in light of the
Commission's crowded docket, the delay in processing Loudermill's
administrative appeal was constitutionally acceptable. App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 83-1362, pp. A36-A42.

															The other case before us arises on similar facts, and followed a
similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a bus mechanic for
the Parma Board of Education. In August, 1977, Donnelly was fired
because he had failed an eye examination. He was offered a chance
to retake the examination, but did not do so. Like Loudermill,
Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission. After a year of
wrangling about the timeliness of his appeal, the Commission
heard Page 470 U. S. 537 the case. It ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without
backpay. [ Footnote 1 ] In a
complaint essentially identical to Loudermill's, Donnelly
challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures. The
District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, relying on
its opinion in Loudermill. The District Court denied a joint motion to alter or amend its
judgment, [ Footnote 2 ] and the
cases were consolidated for appeal. A divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. 721
F.2d 550 (983). After rejecting arguments that the actions were
barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies and by res
judicata -- arguments that are not renewed here -- the Court
of Appeals found that both respondents had been deprived of due
process. It disagreed with the District Court's original rationale.
Instead, it concluded that the compelling private interest in
retaining employment, combined with the value of presenting
evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added administrative
burden of a pretermination hearing. Id. at 561-562. With
regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty, and Loudermill's
9-month wait for an administrative decision, the court affirmed the
District Court, finding no constitutional violation. Id. at 563-564. Page 470 U. S. 538 The dissenting judge argued that respondents' property interests
were conditioned by the procedural limitations accompanying the
grant thereof. He considered constitutional requirements satisfied
because there was a reliable pretermination finding of "cause,"
coupled with a due process hearing at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner. Id. at 566.

															Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 and
83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review of the
rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all three
petitions, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984), and now affirm in all
respects. II Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their
having had a property right in continued employment. [ Footnote 3 ] Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U. S. 564 , 408 U. S.
576 -578 (1972); Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419 , 182 U. S. 425 (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this
property without due process. See Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1 , 436 U. S. 11 -12
(1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 , 419 U. S.
573 -574 (1975).

															Property interests are not created by the Constitution,

															"they are created, and their dimensions are defined, by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, such
as state law. . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 408 U. S. 577 . See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 , 424 U. S. 709 (1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest.
Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio
Rev.Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984), entitled to retain their positions
"during good behavior and efficient service," who could not be
dismissed "except . . . for . . . misfeasance, Page 470 U. S. 539 malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office," § 124.34. [ Footnote 4 ] The statute plainly supports the
conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents
possessed property rights in continued employment. Indeed, this
question does not seem to have been disputed below. [ Footnote 5 ]

															The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right is
defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of
procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No.
83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that, in addition to
specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out
procedures by which termination may take place. [ Footnote 6 ] The Page 470 U. S. 540 procedures were adhered to in these cases. According to
petitioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would, in effect,
expand the scope of the property interest itself." Id. at
27. See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10.

															This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, has its
genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a former federal
employee to the procedures by which he was dismissed. The plurality
reasoned that, where the legislation conferring the substantive
right also sets out the procedural mechanism for enforcing that
right, the two cannot be separated:

															"The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee
as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated for the
determination of cause."

															" * * * *" "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably
intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of
appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 416 U. S.
152 -154.

															This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was
specifically rejected by the other six Justices. See id. at 416 U. S.
166 -167 (POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id. at 416 U. S.
177 -178, 185 (WHITE, J.,); id. at 416 U. S. 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then,
this theory has at times seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 , 426 U. S.
355 -361 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S.
586 -587 (POWELL, J., joined Page 470 U. S. 541 by BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting).
More recently, however, the Court has clearly rejected it. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 , 445 U. S. 491 (1980), we pointed out that

															"minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal
law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have
specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for
determining the preconditions to adverse official action."

															This conclusion was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U. S. 422 , 455 U. S. 432 (1982), where we reversed the lower court's holding that, because
the entitlement arose from a state statute, the legislature had the
prerogative to define the procedures to be followed to protect that
entitlement.

															In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with
the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee. If a
clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. The point is
straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain
substantive rights -- life, liberty, and property -- cannot be
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.
The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the
rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "
Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due
process

															"is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional
guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property
interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred,
without appropriate procedural safeguards." Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 416 U. S. 167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part); see id. at 416 U. S. 185 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

															In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause
applies, "the question remains what process is due." Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 , 408 U. S. 481 (1972). The answer to that question is not to be found in the Ohio
statute. Page 470 U. S. 542 III An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of
life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.
S. 306 , 339 U. S. 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process
Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest." [ Footnote 7 ] Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 , 401 U. S. 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 , 402 U. S. 542 (1971). This principle requires "some kind of a hearing" prior to
the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected
property interest in his employment. Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
569 -570; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.
S. 593 , 408 U. S. 599 (1972). As we pointed out last Term, this rule has been settled for
some time now. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.
S. 183 , 468 U. S. 192 ,
n. 10 (1984); id. at 468 U. S.
200 -203 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Even decisions finding no constitutional violation in
termination procedures have relied on the existence of some
pretermination opportunity to respond. For example, in Arnett, six Justices found constitutional minima satisfied
where the employee had access to the material upon which the charge
was based, and could respond orally and in writing and present
rebuttal affidavits. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55 , 443 U. S. 65 (1979) (no due process violation where horse trainer whose license
was suspended "was given more than one opportunity to present his
side of the story").

															The need for some form of pretermination hearing, recognized in
these cases, is evident from a balancing of the competing interests
at stake. These are the private interest in Page 470 U. S. 543 retaining employment, the governmental interest in the
expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance
of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous
termination. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.
S. 319 , 424 U. S. 335 (1976).

															First, the significance of the private interest in retaining
employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the
severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. See
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 , 419 U. S. 389 (1975); Bell v. Burson, supra, at 402 U. S. 539 ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 , 397 U. S. 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.
S. 337 , 395 U. S. 340 (1969). While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing
so will take some time, and is likely to be burdened by the
questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70 , 414 U. S. 83 -84
(1973).

															Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his side of
the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate
decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.
S. 682 , 442 U. S. 686 (1979). Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or
necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the
decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S.
583 -584; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.
S. 778 , 411 U. S.
784 -786 (1973). [ Footnote 8 ] Page 470 U. S. 544 The cases before us illustrate these considerations. Both
respondents had plausible arguments to make that might have
prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commission saw fit to
reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error might have been avoided
had he been provided an opportunity to make his case to the Board.
As for Loudermill, given the Commission's ruling, we cannot say
that the discharge was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the
referee's recommendation, neither can we say that a fully informed
decisionmaker might not have exercised its discretion and decided
not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to do so. In any
event, the termination involved arguable issues, [ Footnote 9 ] and the right to a hearing does
not depend on a demonstration of certain success. Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U. S. 247 , 435 U. S. 266 (1978). The governmental interest in immediate termination does not
outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording the
employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would
impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable
delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee's interest in
avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter
is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit of
the employee's labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified
employee on than to train a new one. A governmental employer also
has an interest in keeping citizens usefully employed, rather than
taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive step of forcing
its employees onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in those situations
where the employer perceives a significant hazard in Page 470 U. S. 545 keeping the employee on the job, [ Footnote 10 ] it can avoid the problem by suspending with
pay. IV The foregoing considerations indicate that the pretermination
"hearing," though necessary, need not be elaborate. We have pointed
out that

															"[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can
vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and
the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 378 . See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.
S. 886 , 367 U. S.
894 -895 (1961). In general, "something less" than a full
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 343 .
Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full
administrative hearing and judicial review. The only question is
what steps were required before the termination took effect.

															In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254 (1970), has the Court required a full adversarial
evidentiary hearing prior to adverse governmental action. However,
as the Goldberg Court itself pointed out, see id. at 397 U. S. 264 ,
that case presented significantly different considerations than are
present in the context of public employment. Here, the
pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety
of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken
decisions -- essentially, a determination of whether Page 470 U. S. 546 there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against
the employee are true and support the proposed action. See Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 402 U. S.
540 .

															The essential requirements of due process, and all that
respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and
an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons,
either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1281
(1975). The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 416 U. S.
170 -171 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id. at 416 U. S.
195 -196 (opinion of WHITE, J.); see also Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 581 .
To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an
unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing
an unsatisfactory employee.

															Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a
full post-termination hearing. In his cross-petition, Loudermill
asserts, as a separate constitutional violation, that his
administrative proceedings took too long. [ Footnote 11 ] The Court of Page 470 U. S. 547 Appeals held otherwise, and we agree. [ Footnote 12 ] The Due Process Clause requires provision
of a hearing "at a meaningful time." E.g., Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 , 380 U. S. 552 (1965). At some point, a delay in the post-termination hearing
would become a constitutional violation. See Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 66 . In
the present case, however, the complaint merely recites the course
of proceedings and concludes that the denial of a "speedy
resolution" violated due process. App. 10. This reveals nothing
about the delay except that it stemmed in part from the
thoroughness of the procedures. A 9-month adjudication is not, of
course, unconstitutionally lengthy per se. Yet Loudermill
offers no indication that his wait was unreasonably prolonged,
other than the fact that it took nine months. The chronology of the
proceedings set out in the complaint, coupled with the assertion
that nine months is too long to wait, does not state a claim of a
constitutional deprivation. [ Footnote 13 ] VI We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by a
pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with
post-termination Page 470 U. S. 548 administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute.
Because respondents allege in their complaints that they had no
chance to respond, the District Court erred in dismissing for
failure to state a claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. So ordered. * Together with No. 83-1363, Parma Board of Education v.
Donnelly et al., and No. 83-6392, Loudermill v. Cleveland
Board of Education et al., also on certiorari to the same
court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The statute authorizes the Commission to "affirm, disaffirm, or
modify the judgment of the appointing authority." Ohio Rev.Code
Ann. § 124.34 (1984). Petitioner Parma Board of Education
interprets this as authority to reinstate with or without backpay,
and views the Commission's decision as a compromise. Brief for
Petitioner in No. 83-1363, p. 6, n. 3; Tr. of Oral. Arg. 14. The
Court of Appeals, however, stated that the Commission lacked the
power to award backpay. 721 F.2d 550, 554, n. 3 (1983). As the
decision of the Commission is not in the record, we are unable to
determine the reasoning behind it.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															In denying the motion, the District Court no longer relied on
the principle that the state legislature could define the necessary
procedures in the course of creating the property right. Instead,
it reached the same result under a balancing test based on JUSTICE
POWELL's concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 , 416 U. S.
168 -169 (1974), and the Court's opinion in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1362, pp. A54-A57.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of
life and liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional
violation was based solely on the deprivation of a property
interest. We address below Loudermill's contention that he has been
unconstitutionally deprived of liberty. See n 13, infra. [ Footnote 4 ]

															The relevant portion of § 124.34 provides that no classified
civil servant may be removed except

															"for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness,
immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the
public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of
the director of administrative services or the commission, or any
other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had
no property right under state law because he obtained his
employment by lying on the application. It argues that, had
Loudermill answered truthfully, he would not have been hired. He
therefore lacked a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the
position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1362, pp. 14-15.

															For several reasons, we must reject this submission. First, it
was not raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions -- that
Loudermill lied and that he would not have been hired had he not
done so -- that are inconsistent with the allegations of the
complaint and inappropriate at this stage of the litigation, which
has not proceeded past the initial pleadings stage. Finally, the
argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent with the
undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired, and did hold the
security guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional
obligations by rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why
Loudermill should not have been hired in the first place.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n 4, supra, § 124.34
states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of
the order of removal giving the reasons therefor. Within 10 days of
the filing of the order with the Director of Administrative
Services, the employee may file a written appeal with the State
Personnel Board of Review or the Commission.

															"In the event such an appeal is filed, the board or commission
shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or
appoint a trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from
and after its filing with the board or commission, and it may
affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing
authority."

															Either side may obtain review of the Commission's decision in
the State Court of Common Pleas.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															There are, of course, some situations in which a postdeprivation
hearing will satisfy due process requirements. See Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.
S. 594 (1950); North American Cold Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															This is not to say that, where state conduct is entirely
discretionary, the Due Process Clause is brought into play. See
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 , 427 U. S. 228 (1976). Nor is it to say that a person can insist on a hearing in
order to argue that the decisionmaker should be lenient and depart
from legal requirements. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.
S. 105 , 431 U. S. 114 (1977). The point is that, where there is an entitlement, a prior
hearing facilitates the consideration of whether a permissible
course of action is also an appropriate one. This is one way in
which providing

															"effective notice and informal hearing permitting the [employee]
to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge
against erroneous action. At least the [employer] will be alerted
to the existence of disputes about facts and arguments about cause
and effect. . . . [H]is discretion will be more informed, and we
think the risk of error substantially reduced." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S.
583 -584.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Loudermill's dismissal turned not on the objective fact that he
was an ex-felon or the inaccuracy of his statement to the contrary,
but on the subjective question whether he had lied on his
application form. His explanation for the false statement is
plausible in light of the fact that he received only a suspended
6-month sentence and a fine on the grand larceny conviction. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 35.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															In the cases before us, no such danger seems to have existed.
The examination Donnelly failed was related to driving school
buses, not repairing them. Id. at 39-40. As the Court of
Appeals stated, "[n]o emergency was even conceivable with respect
to Donnelly." 721 F.2d at 562. As for Loudermill, petitioner states
that "to find that we have a person who is an ex-felon as our
security guard is very distressful to us." Tr. of Oral Arg.19. But
the termination was based on the presumed misrepresentation on the
employment form, not on the felony conviction. In fact, Ohio law
provides that an employee "shall not be disciplined for acts,"
including criminal convictions, occurring more than two years
previously. See Ohio Admin.Code § 124-3-04 (1979).
Petitioner concedes that Loudermill's job performance was fully
satisfactory.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Loudermill's hearing before the referee occurred two and
one-half months after he filed his appeal. The Commission issued
its written decision six and one-half months after that.
Administrative proceedings in Donnelly's case, once it was
determined that they could proceed at all, were swifter. A writ of
mandamus requiring the Commission to hold a hearing was issued on
May 9, 1978; the hearing took place on May 30; the order of
reinstatement was issued on July 6.

															Section 124.34 provides that a hearing is to be held within 30
days of the appeal, though the Ohio courts have ruled that the time
limit is not mandatory. E.g., In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc.
13, 17, 372 N.E.2d 1345, 1347 (Com.Pl.1977). The statute does not
provide a time limit for the actual decision.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															It might be argued that, once we find a due process violation in
the denial of a pretermination hearing, we need not and should not
consider whether the post-termination procedures were adequate. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55 , 443 U. S. 72 -74
(1979) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). We conclude that it is
appropriate to consider this issue, however, for three reasons.
First, the allegation of a distinct due process violation in the
administrative delay is not an alternative theory supporting the
same relief, but a separate claim altogether. Second, it was
decided by the court below, and is raised in the cross-petition.
Finally, the existence of post-termination procedures is relevant
to the necessary scope of pretermination procedures.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The cross-petition also argues that Loudermill was
unconstitutionally deprived of liberty because of the accusation of
dishonesty that hung over his head during the administrative
proceedings. As the Court of Appeals found, 721 F.2d at 563, n. 18,
the failure to allege that the reasons for the dismissal were
published dooms this claim. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341 , 426 U. S. 348 (1976).

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															I agree wholeheartedly with the Court's express rejection of the
theory of due process, urged upon us by the petitioner Boards of
Education, that a public employee who may be discharged only for
cause may be discharged by whatever procedures the legislature
chooses. I therefore join 470 U. S. I
also agree that, before discharge, the respondent employees were
entitled to the opportunity to respond to the charges against them
(which is all they requested), and that the failure to accord them
that opportunity was a violation of their constitutional rights.
Because the Court holds that the respondents were due all the
process they requested, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

															I write separately, however, to reaffirm my belief that public
employees who may be discharged only for cause are entitled, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to more than
respondents sought in this case. I continue to believe that, before the decision is made to terminate an employee's
wages, the employee is entitled to an opportunity to test the
strength of the evidence

															"by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by
presenting witnesses on his own behalf, whenever there are
substantial disputes in testimonial evidence," Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 , 416 U. S. 214 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Because the Court suggests that,
even in this situation, due process requires no more than notice
and an opportunity to be heard before wages are cut off, I am not
able to join the Court's opinion in its entirety. Page 470 U. S. 549 To my mind, the disruption caused by a loss of wages may be so
devastating to an employee that, whenever there are substantial
disputes about the evidence, additional predeprivation procedures
are necessary to minimize the risk of an erroneous termination.
That is, I place significantly greater weight than does the Court
on the public employee's substantial interest in the accuracy of
the pretermination proceeding. After wage termination, the employee
often must wait months before his case is finally resolved, during
which time he is without wages from his public employment. By
limiting the procedures due prior to termination of wages, the
Court accepts an impermissibly high risk that a wrongfully
discharged employee will be subjected to this often lengthy wait
for vindication, and to the attendant and often traumatic
disruptions to his personal and economic life.

															Considerable amounts of time may pass between the termination of
wages and the decision in a post-termination evidentiary hearing --
indeed, in this case, nine months passed before Loudermill received
a decision from his postdeprivation hearing. During this period,
the employee is left in limbo, deprived of his livelihood and of
wages on which he may well depend for basic sustenance. In that
time, his ability to secure another job might be hindered, either
because of the nature of the charges against him or because of the
prospect that he will return to his prior public employment if
permitted. Similarly, his access to unemployment benefits might
seriously be constrained, because many States deny unemployment
compensation to workers discharged for cause.* Absent an interim
source of wages, the employee might be unable to meet his basic,
fixed costs, such as food, rent or mortgage payments. He would be
forced to spend his savings, if he had any, and to convert his
possessions to Page 470 U. S. 550 cash before becoming eligible for public assistance. Even in
that instance

															"[t]he substitution of a meager welfare grant for a regular
paycheck may bring with it painful and irremediable personal as
well as financial dislocations. A child's education may be
interrupted, a family's home lost, a person's relationship with his
friends and even his family may be irrevocably affected. The costs
of being forced, even temporarily, onto the welfare rolls because
of a wrongful discharge from tenured Government employment cannot
be so easily discounted. . . ." id. at 221.

															Moreover, it is in no respect certain that a prompt
postdeprivation hearing will make the employee economically whole
again, and the wrongfully discharged employee will almost
inevitably suffer irreparable injury. Even if reinstatement is
forthcoming, the same might not be true of backpay -- as it was not
to respondent Donnelly in this case -- and the delay in receipt of
wages would thereby be transformed into a permanent deprivation. Of
perhaps equal concern, the personal trauma experienced during the
long months in which the employee awaits decision, during which he
suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an opportunity to
perform work, will never be recompensed, and indeed probably could
not be with dollars alone.

															That these disruptions might fall upon a justifiably discharged
employee is unfortunate; that they might fall upon a wrongfully
discharged employee is simply unacceptable. Yet, in requiring only
that the employee have an opportunity to respond before his wages
are cut off, without affording him any meaningful chance to present
a defense, the Court is willing to accept an impermissibly high
risk of error with respect to a deprivation that is
substantial.

															Were there any guarantee that the postdeprivation hearing and
ruling would occur promptly, such as within a few days of the
termination of wages, then this minimal predeprivation Page 470 U. S. 551 process might suffice. But there is no such guarantee. On a
practical level, if the employer had to pay the employee until the
end of the proceeding, the employer obviously would have an
incentive to resolve the issue expeditiously. The employer loses
this incentive if the only suffering as a result of the delay is
borne by the wage earner, who eagerly awaits the decision on his
livelihood. Nor has this Court grounded any guarantee of this kind
in the Constitution. Indeed, this Court has in the past approved,
at least implicitly, an average 10- or 11-month delay in the
receipt of a decision on Social Security benefits, Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 , 424 U. S.
341 -342 (1976), and, in the case of respondent
Loudermill, the Court gives a stamp of approval to a process that
took nine months. The hardship inevitably increases as the days go
by, but nevertheless the Court countenances such delay. The
adequacy of the predeprivation and postdeprivation procedures are
inevitably intertwined, and only a constitutional guarantee that
the latter will be immediate and complete might alleviate my
concern about the possibility of a wrongful termination of
wages.

															The opinion for the Court does not confront this reality. I
cannot and will not close my eyes today -- as I could not 10 years
ago -- to the economic situation of great numbers of public
employees, and to the potentially traumatic effect of a wrongful
discharge on a working person. Given that so very much is at stake,
I am unable to accept the Court's narrow view of the process due to
a public employee before his wages are terminated, and before he
begins the long wait for a public agency to issue a final decision
in his case.

															* See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Comparison of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws §§ 425, 435 (1984); see also
id. at 4-33 to 4-36 (table of state rules governing
disqualification from benefits for discharge for misconduct).

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															Today the Court puts to rest any remaining debate over whether
public employers must provide meaningful notice and hearing
procedures before discharging an employee for Page 470 U. S. 552 cause. As the Court convincingly demonstrates, the employee's
right to fair notice and an opportunity to "present his side of the
story" before discharge is not a matter of legislative grace, but
of "constitutional guarantee." Ante at 470 U. S. 541 , 470 U. S. 546 .
This principle, reaffirmed by the Court today, has been clearly
discernible in our "repeated pronouncements" for many years. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 , 468 U. S. 203 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

															Accordingly, I concur in Parts I-IV of the Court's opinion. I
write separately to comment on two issues the Court does not
resolve today, and to explain my dissent from the result in 470 U. S. First, the Court today does not prescribe the precise form of
required pretermination procedures in cases where an employee
disputes the facts proffered to support his discharge. The cases at
hand involve, as the Court recognizes, employees who did not
dispute the facts, but had "plausible arguments to make that might
have prevented their discharge." Ante at 470 U. S. 544 .
In such cases, notice and an "opportunity to present reasons," ante at 470 U. S. 546 ,
are sufficient to protect the important interests at stake.

															As the Court also correctly notes, other cases "will often
involve factual disputes," ante at 470 U. S. 543 ,
such as allegedly erroneous records or false accusations. As
JUSTICE MARSHALL has previously noted and stresses again today, ante at 470 U. S. 548 ,
where there exist not just plausible arguments to be made, but also
"substantial disputes in testimonial evidence," due process may
well require more than a simple opportunity to argue or deny. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 , 416 U. S. 214 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The Court acknowledges that what
the Constitution requires prior to discharge, in general terms, is
pretermination procedures sufficient to provide

															"an initial check against mistaken decisions -- essentially, a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe Page 470 U. S. 553 that the charges against the employee are true, and
support the proposed action." Ante at 470 U. S.
545 -546 (emphasis added). When factual disputes are
involved, therefore, an employee may deserve a fair opportunity
before discharge to produce contrary records or testimony, or even
to confront an accuser in front of the decisionmaker. Such an
opportunity might not necessitate "elaborate" procedures, see
ante at 470 U. S. 545 ,
but the fact remains that, in some cases, only such an opportunity
to challenge the source or produce contrary evidence will suffice
to support a finding that there are "reasonable grounds" to believe
accusations are "true."

															Factual disputes are not involved in these cases, however, and
the

															"very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.
S. 886 , 367 U. S. 895 (1961). I do not understand 470 U. S. ante p. 470 U. S. 548 ,
with respect to discharges based on disputed evidence or testimony.
I therefore join Parts I-IV of the Court's opinion. II The second issue not resolved today is that of administrative
delay. In holding that Loudermill's administrative proceedings did
not take too long, the Court plainly does not state a flat rule
that 9-month delays in deciding discharge appeals will pass
constitutional scrutiny as a matter of course. To the contrary, the
Court notes that a full post-termination hearing and decision must
be provided at "a meaningful time" and that "[a]t some point, a
delay in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional
violation." Ante at 470 U. S. 547 .
For example, in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S.
55 (1979), we disapproved as "constitutionally infirm"
the shorter administrative delays that resulted under a statute
that required "prompt" postsuspension hearings for suspended
racehorse trainers with decision to follow within 30 days of the
hearing. Id. at 443 U. S. 61 , 443 U. S. 66 . AS
JUSTICE MARSHALL demonstrates, when an employee's wages are
terminated pending Page 470 U. S. 554 administrative decision, "hardship inevitably increases as the
days go by." Ante at 470 U. S. 551 ; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 416 U. S. 194 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The impact
on the employee of being without a job pending a full hearing is
likely to be considerable because [m]ore than 75 percent of
actions contested within employing agencies require longer to
decide than the 60 days required by . . . regulations'") (citation
omitted). In such cases, the Constitution itself draws a line, as
the Court declares, "at some point" beyond which the State may not
continue a deprivation absent decision. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The holding in 470 U.
S. in this particular case, Loudermill failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a cause of action, and not that nine
months can never exceed constitutional limits. III Recognizing the limited scope of the holding in 470 U.
S. I must still dissent from its result, because the
record in this case is insufficiently developed to permit an
informed judgment on the issue of overlong delay. Loudermill's
complaint was dismissed without answer from the respondent
Cleveland Civil Service Commission. Allegations at this early stage
are to be liberally construed, and

															"[i]t is axiomatic that a complaint should not be dismissed
unless 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.'" McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U. S. 232 , 444 U. S. 246 (1980) (citation omitted). Loudermill alleged that it took the
Commission over two and one-half months simply to hold Page 470 U. S. 555 a hearing in his case, over two months more to issue a
nonbinding interim decision, and more than three and one-half
months after that to deliver a final decision. Complaint �� 20, 21,
App. 10. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The
Commission provided no explanation for these significant gaps in
the administrative process; we do not know if they were due to an
overabundance of appeals, Loudermill's own foot-dragging, bad faith
on the part of the Commission, or any other of a variety of reasons
that might affect our analysis. We do know, however, that, under
Ohio law, the Commission is obligated to hear appeals like
Loudermill's "within thirty days." Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.34
(1984). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Although
this statutory limit has been Page 470 U. S. 556 viewed only as "directory" by Ohio courts, those courts have
also made it clear that, when the limit is exceeded,

															"[t]he burden of proof [is] placed on the [Commission] to
illustrate to the court that the failure to comply with the 30-day
requirement . . . was reasonable." In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17, 372 N.E.2d 1345,
1347 (Com.Pl.1977). I cannot conclude on this record that
Loudermill could prove "no set of facts" that might have entitled
him to relief after nine months of waiting. Page 470 U. S. 557 The Court previously has recognized that constitutional
restraints on the timing, no less than the form, of a hearing and
decision "will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing
interests involved." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 , 419 U. S. 579 (1975). The relevant interests have generally been recognized as
threefold:

															"the importance of the private interest and the length or
finality of the deprivation, the likelihood of governmental error,
and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.
S. 422 , 455 U. S. 434 (1982) (citations omitted); accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 , 424 U. S.
334 -335 (1976); cf. United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 , 461 U. S. 564 (1983) (four-factor test for evaluating constitutionality of delay
between time of property seizure and initiation of forfeiture
action).

															"Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively
improper, for the determination necessarily depends on the facts of
the particular case." Id. at 461 U. S.
565 .

															Thus, the constitutional analysis of delay requires some
development of the relevant factual context when a plaintiff
alleges, as Loudermill has, that the administrative process has
taken longer than some minimal amount of time. Indeed, all of our
precedents that have considered administrative delays under the Due
Process Clause, either explicitly or sub silentio, have
been decided only after more complete proceedings in the District
Courts. See, e.g., $8,850, supra; Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55 (1979); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.
S. 134 (1974); Mathews v. Eldridge, supra. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Yet in 470 U.
S. the Court summarily holds Loudermill's
allegations Page 470 U. S. 558 insufficient, without adverting to any considered balancing of
interests. Disposal of Loudermill's complaint without examining the
competing interests involved marks an unexplained departure from
the careful multifaceted analysis of the facts we consistently have
employed in the past.

															I previously have stated my view that

															"[t]o be meaningful, an opportunity for a full hearing and
determination must be afforded at least at a time when the
potentially irreparable and substantial harm caused by a suspension
can still be avoided -- i.e., either before or immediately
after suspension." Barry v. Barchi, supra, at 443 U. S. 74 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). Loudermill's allegations of
months-long administrative delay, taken together with the facially
divergent results regarding length of administrative delay found in Barchi as compared to Arnett, see 470
U.S. 532 fn2/4|>n. 4, supra, are sufficient in my
mind to require further factual development. In no other way can
the third Mathews factor --

															"the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement [in this case, a speedier hearing
and decision] would entail,"

															424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 335 -- sensibly be evaluated in this case. [ Footnote 2/5 ] I therefore would remand the delay issue
to the District Court for further evidentiary proceedings
consistent with the Mathews approach. I respectfully
dissent from the Court's contrary decision in 470 U.
S. Page 470 U. S. 559 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Post-termination administrative procedures designed to determine
fully and accurately the correctness of discharge actions are to be
encouraged. Multiple layers of administrative procedure, however,
may not be created merely to smother a discharged employee with
"thoroughness," effectively destroying his constitutionally
protected interests by overextension. Cf. ante at 470 U. S. 547 ("thoroughness" of procedures partially explains delay in this
case).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The interim decision, issued by a hearing examiner, was in
Loudermill's favor, and recommended his reinstatement. But
Loudermill was not reinstated, nor were his wages even temporarily
restored; in fact, there apparently exists no provision for such
interim relief or restoration of backpay under Ohio's statutory
scheme. See ante at 470 U. S. 537 ,
n. 1; cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.
S. 134 , 416 U. S. 196 (1974) (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(under federal civil service law, discharged employee's wages are
only "provisionally cut off" pending appeal); id. at 416 U. S. 146 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.) (under federal system, backpay is
automatically refunded "if the [discharged] employee is reinstated
on appeal"). See also N.Y.Civ.Serv.Law § 75(3) (McKinney
1983) (suspension without pay pending determination of removal
charges may not exceed 30 days). Moreover, the final decision of
the Commission to reverse the hearing examiner apparently was
arrived at without any additional evidentiary development; only
further argument was had before the Commission. 721 F.2d 550, 553
(CA6 1983). These undisputed facts lead me at least to question the
administrative value of, and justification for, the 9-month period
it took to decide Loudermill's case.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															A number of other States similarly have specified time limits
for hearings and decisions on discharge appeals taken by tenured
public employees, indicating legislative consensus that a month or
two normally is sufficient time to resolve such actions. No state
statutes permit administrative delays of the length alleged by
Loudermill. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 41-785(A), (C)
(Supp.1984-1985) (hearing within 30 days, decision within 30 days
of hearing); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 24-50-125(4) (Supp.1984) (hearing
within 45 days, decision within 45 days of hearing);
Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 5-202(b) (Supp.1984) (decision within 60 days
of hearing); Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 24 1/2, � 38b14 (1983) (hearing
within 45 days); Ind.Code § 4-15-2-35 (1982) (decision within 30
days of hearing); Iowa Code § 19 A. 14 (1983) (hearing within 30
days); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 75-2949(f) (Supp.1983) (hearing within 45
days); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 18A.095(3) (1984) (hearing within 60 days of
filing, decision within 90 days of filing); Maine Rev.Stat.Ann.,
Tit. 5, § 753(5) (1979) (decision within 30 days of hearing);
Md.Ann.Code, Art. 64A, §§ 33(b)(2), (e) (Supp.1984) (salary
suspension hearing within 5 days and decision within 5 more days;
discharge hearing within 90 days and decision within 45 days of
hearing); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 31, § 43 (Supp.1984-1985)
(hearing within 10 days, findings "forthwith," decision within 30
days of findings); Minn.Stat. § 44.08 (1970) (hearing within 10
days, decision within 3 days of hearing); Nev.Rev.Stat. §
284.390(2) (1983) (hearing within 20 days); N.J.Stat.Ann. §§
11:15-4, 11:15-6 (West 1976) (hearing within 30 days, decision
within 15 days of hearing); Okla.Stat., Tit. 74, §§ 841.13, 841.13A
(Supp.1984) (hearing within 35 days, decision within 15 days of
hearing); R.I.Gen.Laws §§ 36-4-40, 36-4-40.2, 36-4-41 (1984)
(initial hearing within 14 days, interim decision within 20 days of
hearing, appeal decision within 30 more days, final decision of
Governor within 15 more days); S.C.Code §§ 8-17-330, 8-17-340
(Supp.1984) (interim decision within 45 days of filing, final
decision within 20 days of hearing); Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-25
(Supp.1983) (interim decision within 5-20 days, final hearing
within 30 days of filing final appeal, final decision within 40
days of hearing); Wash.Rev.Code § 41.64.100 (1983) (final decision
within 90 days of filing); Wis.Stat. § 230.44(4)(f)
(Supp.1984-1985) (decision within 90 days of hearing); see
also Ala.Code § 36-26-27(b) (Supp.1984) (hearings on citizen
removal petitions within 20 days of service); D.C.Code §
1-617.3(a)(1)(D) (1981) ("Career and Educational Services"
employees "entitled" to decision within 45 days); Ga.Code Ann. §
45-20-9(e)(1) (1982) (hearing officer's decision required within 30
days of hearing); Miss.Code Ann. § 21-31-23 (Supp.1984) (hearing
required within 20 days of termination for "extraordinary
circumstances").

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															After giving careful consideration to well-developed factual
contexts, the Court has reached results that might be viewed as
inconsistent in the abstract. Compare Barchi, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 66 (disapproving statute requiring decision within 30 days of
hearing), with Arnett, 416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 194 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (approving
statutory scheme under which over 50 percent of discharge appeals
"take more than three months"). Rather than inconsistency, however,
these differing results demonstrate the impossibility of drawing
firm lines and the importance of factual development in such
cases.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In light of the complete absence of record evidence, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Court of Appeals below was forced to
speculate that "[t]he delays in the instant cases, in all
likelihood, were inadvertent." 721 F.2d at 564, n.19. Similarly,
the Cleveland Board of Education and Civil Service Commission
assert only that "[n]o authority is necessary to support the
proposition" that administrative resolution of a case like
Loudermill's in less than nine months is "almost impossible." Brief
for Respondents in No. 83-6392, p. 8, n. 4. To the contrary,
however, I believe our precedents clearly require demonstration of
some "authority" in these circumstances.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.

															In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974), six Members of this Court agreed that a public employee
could be dismissed for misconduct without a full hearing prior to
termination. A plurality of Justices agreed that the employee was
entitled to exactly what Congress gave him, and no more. THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, Justice Stewart, and I said:

															"Here, appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be
removed other than for 'such cause as will promote the efficiency
of [the] service.' But the very section of the statute which
granted him that right, a right which had previously existed only
by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for
the procedure by which 'cause' was to be determined, and expressly
omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are
mandated by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the very sentence
of the Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not
to be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an
expectancy of that substantive right without the procedural
limitations which Congress attached to it. In the area of federal
regulation of government employees, where, in the absence of
statutory limitation, the governmental employer has had virtually
uncontrolled latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S.
886 , 367 U. S. 896 -897 (1961), we
do not believe that a statutory enactment such as the Lloyd-La
Follette Act may be parsed as discretely as appellee urges.
Congress was obviously intent on according a measure of statutory
job security to governmental employees which they had not
previously enjoyed, but was likewise intent on excluding more
elaborate procedural requirements which it felt would make the
operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in practice.
Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural
mechanism for enforcing the substantive Page 470 U. S. 560 right which was simultaneously conferred, we decline to conclude
that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from the
procedure provided for its enforcement. The employee's statutorily
defined right is not a guarantee against removal without cause in
the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures
which Congress has designated for the determination of cause." Id. at 416 U. S.
151 -152. In these cases, the relevant Ohio statute
provides in its first paragraph that

															"[t]he tenure of every officer or employee in the classified
service of the state and the counties, civil service townships,
cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city
school districts thereof, holding a position under this chapter of
the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient
service and no such officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or
position, suspended, or removed, except . . . for incompetency,
inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct,
insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of
duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of
administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of
good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office."

															Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.34 (1984).

															The very next paragraph of this section of the Ohio Revised Code
provides that, in the event of suspension of more than three days
or removal, the appointing authority shall furnish the employee
with the stated reasons for his removal. The next paragraph
provides that, within 10 days following the receipt of such a
statement, the employee may appeal in writing to the State
Personnel Board of Review or the Commission, such appeal shall be
heard within 30 days from the time of its filing, and the Board may
affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing
authority. Page 470 U. S. 561 Thus, in one legislative breath, Ohio has conferred upon civil
service employees such as respondents in these cases a limited form
of tenure during good behavior, and prescribed the procedures by
which that tenure may be terminated. Here, as in Arnett, "[t]he employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee
against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee
as enforced by the procedures which [the Ohio Legislature] has
designated for the determination of cause."

															416 U.S. at 416 U. S. 152 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). We stated in Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U. S. 564 , 408 U. S. 577 (1972):

															"Property interests, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law -- rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement
to those benefits."

															We ought to recognize the totality of the State's definition of
the property right in question, and not merely seize upon one of
several paragraphs in a unitary statute to proclaim that, in that
paragraph, the State has inexorably conferred upon a civil service
employee something which it is powerless under the United States
Constitution to qualify in the next paragraph of the statute. This
practice ignores our duty under Roth to rely on state law
as the source of property interests for purposes of applying the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it does not
impose a federal definition of property, the Court departs from the
full breadth of the holding in Roth by its selective
choice from among the sentences the Ohio Legislature chooses to use
in establishing and qualifying a right.

															Having concluded by this somewhat tortured reasoning that Ohio
has created a property right in the respondents in these cases, the
Court naturally proceeds to inquire what process is "due" before
the respondents may be divested of Page 470 U. S. 562 that right. This customary "balancing" inquiry conducted by the
Court in these cases reaches a result that is quite
unobjectionable, but it seems to me that it is devoid of any
principles which will either instruct or endure. The balance is
simply an ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent
upon how the Court subjectively views the underlying interests at
stake. The results in previous cases and in these cases have been
quite unpredictable. To paraphrase Justice Black, today's balancing
act requires a "pretermination opportunity to respond," but there
is nothing that indicates what tomorrow's will be. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 , 397 U. S. 276 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). The results from today's balance
certainly do not jibe with the result in Goldberg or Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976).* The lack of Page 470 U. S. 563 any principled standards in this area means that these
procedural due process cases will recur time and again. Every
different set of facts will present a new issue on what process was
due and when. One way to avoid this subjective and varying
interpretation of the Due Process Clause in cases such as these is
to hold that one who avails himself of government entitlements
accepts the grant of tenure along with its inherent
limitations.

															Because I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution does not support the conclusion that Ohio's
effort to confer a limited form of tenure upon respondents resulted
in the creation of a "property right" in their employment, I
dissent.

															* Today, the balancing test requires a pretermination
opportunity to respond. In Goldberg, we required a
full-fledged trial-type hearing, and in Mathews, we
declined to require any pretermination process other than those
required by the statute. At times, this balancing process may look
as if it were undertaken with a thumb on the scale, depending upon
the result the Court desired. For example, in Mathews, we
minimized the importance of the benefit to the recipient, stating
that, after termination, he could always go on welfare to survive.
424 U.S. at 424 U. S.
340 -343; see also id. at 424 U. S. 350 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Today, however, the Court exalts the
recipient's interest in retaining employment; not a word is said
about going on welfare. Conversely, in Mathews, we
stressed the interests of the State, while today, in a footnote,
the Court goes so far as to denigrate the State's interest in
firing a school security guard who had lied about a prior felony
conviction. Ante at 470 U. S. 545 ,
n. 10.

															Today, the Court purports to describe the State's interest, ante at 470 U. S.
544 -545, but does so in a way that is contrary to what
petitioner Boards of Education have asserted in their briefs. The
description of the State's interests looks more like a makeweight
to support the Court's result. The decision whom to train and
employ is strictly a decision for the State. The Court attempts to
ameliorate its ruling by stating that a State may always suspend an
employee with pay, in lieu of a predischarge hearing, if it
determines that he poses a threat. Ibid. This does less
than justice to the State's interest in its financial integrity and
its interest in promptly terminating an employee who has violated
the conditions of his tenure, and ignores Ohio's current practice
of paying back wages to wrongfully discharged employees.

Summary: In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the US Supreme Court held that a public employee with a property right to their job is entitled to a pre-termination hearing as part of their due process rights. The Court found that the Ohio statute, which provided no opportunity for employees to respond to charges before dismissal, was unconstitutional. The Court also held that discharged employees were entitled to prompt post-removal hearings. Justice Black dissented, arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not support the creation of a "property right" in employment and that the majority's decision lacked principled standards, leading to varying interpretations of due process in similar cases.