NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–405

															_________________

															BNSF RAILWAY CO., PETITIONER v. KELLI
TYRRELL, special administrator for the ESTATE OF BRENT T. TYRRELL,
DECEASED, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
montana

															[May 30, 2017]

															Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The two cases we decide today arise under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 35Stat. 65, as amended, 45
U. S. C. §51 et seq. , which makes railroads
liable in money damages to their employees for on-the-job injuries.
Both suits were pursued in Montana state courts although the
injured workers did not reside in Montana, nor were they injured
there. The defendant railroad, BNSF Railway Company (BNSF),
although “doing business” in Montana when the litigation commenced,
was not incorporated in Montana, nor did it maintain its principal
place of business in that State. To justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over BNSF, the Montana Supreme Court relied
on §56, which provides in relevant part:

															“Under this chapter an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States, in the district
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action
arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the
time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that
of the courts of the several States.”

															We hold that §56 does not address personal
jurisdiction over railroads. Its first relevant sentence is a venue
prescription governing proper locations for FELA suits filed in
federal court. The provision’s second relevant sentence, using the
term “concurrent” jurisdiction, refers to subject-matter
jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. It simply clarifies that
the federal courts do not have exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction over FELA suits; state courts can hear them, too.

															Montana’s Supreme Court, in the alternative,
relied on state law, under which personal jurisdiction could be
asserted over “persons found within . . . Montana.” Mont.
Rule Civ. Proc. 4(b)(1) (2015). BNSF fit that bill, the court
stated, because it has over 2,000 miles of railroad track and
employs more than 2,000 workers in Montana. Our precedent, however,
explains that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does
not permit a State to hale an out-of-state corporation before its
courts when the corporation is not “at home” in the State and
theepisode-in-suit occurred elsewhere. Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Montana Supreme Court.

															I

															In March 2011, respondent Robert Nelson, a
North Dakota resident, brought a FELA suit against BNSF in a
Montana state court to recover damages for knee injuries Nelson
allegedly sustained while working for BNSF as a fuel-truck driver.
383 Mont. 417, 419, 373 P. 3d 1, 3 (2016). In May 2014,
respondent Kelli Tyrrell, appointed in South Dakota as the
administrator of her husband Brent Tyrrell’s estate, similarly sued
BNSF under FELA in a Montana state court. Id. , at 419–420,
373 P. 3d, at 3 . Brent Tyrrell, his widow alleged, had
developed a fatal kidney cancer from his exposure to carcinogenic
chemicals while working for BNSF. Id. , at 420, 373
P. 3d, at 3. Neither plaintiff alleged injuries arising from
or related to work performed in Montana; indeed, neither Nelson nor
Brent Tyrrell appears ever to have worked for BNSF in Montana. Id. , at 419–420, 373 P. 3d, at 3.

															BNSF is incorporated in Delaware and has its
principal place of business in Texas. Id. , at 419, 373
P. 3d, at 3. It operates railroad lines in 28 States. No. DV
14–699 (13th Jud. Dist., Yellowstone Cty., Mont., Oct. 7, 2014),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. BNSF has 2,061 miles of railroad track
in Montana (about 6% of its total track mileage of 32,500), employs
some 2,100 workers there (less than 5% of its total work force of
43,000), generates less than 10% of its total revenue in the State,
and maintains only one of its 24 automotive facilities in Montana
(4%). Ibid. Contending that it is not “at home” in Montana,
as required for the exercise of general personal jurisdiction under Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted), BNSF moved to
dismiss both suits for lack of personal jurisdiction. Its motion
was granted in Nelson’s case and denied in Tyrrell’s. 383 Mont., at
419, 373 P. 3d, at 2.

															After consolidating the two cases, the Montana
Supreme Court held that Montana courts could exercise general
personal jurisdiction over BNSF. Id. , at 429, 373
P. 3d, at 9. Section 56, the court determined, authorizes
state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads
“doing business” in the State. Id. , at 426, 373 P. 3d,
at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court
observed, Montana law provides for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over “[a]ll persons found within” the State. Id. , at 427, 373 P. 3d, at 8 (quoting Mont. Rule Civ.
Proc. 4(b)(1) (2015)). In view of the railroad’s many employees and
miles of track in Montana, the court concluded, BNSF is both “doing
business” and “found within” the State, such that both FELA and
Montana law authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 383
Mont., at 426, 428, 373 P. 3d, at 7–8 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The due process limits articulated in Daimler , the court added, did not control, because Daimler did not involve a FELA claim or a railroad
defendant. 383 Mont., at 424, 373 P. 3d, at 6.

															Justice McKinnon dissented. Section 56, she
wrote, is a federal-court venue prescription, and also confers
subject-matter jurisdiction on state courts in FELA cases,
concurrent with federal courts. Id. , at 435–437, 373
P. 3d, at 13. But §56, she maintained, does not touch or
concern personal jurisdiction. Ibid. Furthermore, she
concluded, Daimler controls, rendering the Montana courts’
exercise of personal jurisdiction impermissible because BNSF is not
“at home” in Montana. 383 Mont., at 433–434, 373 P. 3d, at
11–12.

															We granted certiorari, 580 U. S. ___
(2017), to resolve whether §56 authorizes state courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over railroads doing business in their States
but not incorporated or headquartered there, and whether the
Montana courts’ exercise of personal jurisdiction in these cases
comports with due process.

															II

															Nelson and Tyrrell contend that §56’s first
relevant sentence confers personal jurisdiction on federal courts,
and that the section’s second relevant sentence extends that grant
of jurisdiction to state courts. Neither contention is tenable.
Section 56’s first relevant sentence concerns venue; its next
sentence speaks to subject-matter jurisdiction.[ 1 ]

															A

															The first sentence of §56 states that “an
action may be brought in a district court of the United States,”
in, among other places, the district “in which the defendant shall
be doing business at the time of commencing such action.” In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner , 314 U. S.
44 (1941) , we comprehended this clause as “establish[ing] venue”
for a federal-court action. Id., at 52. Congress, we
explained, designed §56 to expand venue beyond the limits of the
1888 Judiciary Act’s general venue provision, which allowed suit
only “in districts of which the defendant was an inhabitant.” Id. , at 49; see Act of Aug. 13, 1888, §1, 25Stat. 434.
Nowhere in Kepner or in any other decision did we intimate
that §56 might affect personal jurisdiction.

															Congress generally uses the expression, where
suit “may be brought,” to indicate the federal districts in which
venue is proper. See, e.g. , 28 U. S. C. §1391(b)
(general venue statute specifying where “[a] civil action may be
brought”); J. Oakley, ALI, Fed. Judicial Code Rev. Project 253–290
(2004) (listing special venue statutes, many with similar
language). See also Kepner , 314 U. S., at 56
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The phrasing of [§56] follows the
familiar pattern generally employed by Congress in framing venue
provisions.”).

															In contrast, Congress’ typical mode of providing
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been to authorize
service of process. See, e.g. , 15 U. S. C. §22
(Clayton Act provision stating that “all process in [cases against
a corporation arising under federal antitrust laws] may be served
in the district of which [the defendant] is an inhabitant, or
wherever [the defendant] may be found”); §53(a) (under Federal
Trade Commission Act, “process may be served on any person,
partnership, or corporation wherever it may be found”). See also Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. ,
484 U. S. 97 –107 (1987) (discussing statutes that authorize
(or fail to authorize) nationwide service of process). But cf. Schlanger v. Seamans , 401 U. S. 487 , n. 4
(1971) (though “Congress has provided for nationwide service of
process” in 28 U. S. C. §1391(e) (1964 ed., Supp. V),
that statute was meant to expand venue, not personal jurisdiction).
Congress uses this terminology because, absent consent, a basis for
service of a summons on the defendant is prerequisite to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Omni Capital , 484
U. S., at 104.

															Nelson and Tyrrell, however, argue that §56
relates to personal jurisdiction. In their view, the 1888 Judiciary
Act provision that prompted §56’s enactment, 25Stat. 434, concerned both personal jurisdiction and venue. According to House and
Senate Reports, they contend, two cases had brought to Congress’
attention the problem with the prior provision—namely, that in
federal-question cases it authorized suit only in the district of
the defendant’s residence. Brief for Respondents 16–18. See
H. R. Rep. No. 513, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1910) (citing Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. , 215
U. S. 501 (1910) ; Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
R. Co. , 173 F. 527 (WD Tex. 1909)); S. Rep. No. 432, 61st
Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1910) (same). In both cases, the courts
had dismissed FELA suits for “want of jurisdiction.” Macon
Grocery , 215 U. S., at 510; Cound , 173 F., at 534.
To avert such jurisdictional dismissals, they urge, Congress
enacted §56.

															Legislative history “throws little light” here. Kepner , 314 U. S., at 50.[ 2 ] Driving today’s decision, we have long read the 1888
Judiciary Act provision to concern venue only. See Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. , 205 U. S. 530 –533 (1907)
(analyzing personal jurisdiction separately, after concluding that
venue was proper under 1888 Judiciary Act provision). See also Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. , 260 U. S.
653, 655 (1923) (noting that materially identical successor to 1888
Judiciary Act provision, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, §51, 36Stat. 1101,
“relates to the venue of suits”). Indeed, reading the 1888
Judiciary Act provision to authorize the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would have yielded an anomalous result: In diversity
cases, the provision allowed for suit “in the district of the
residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.” 25Stat. 434.
Interpreting that clause to provide for jurisdiction would have
allowed a plaintiff to hale a defendant into court in the
plaintiff’s home district, even if the district was one with which
the defendant had no affiliation, and the episode-in-suit, no
connection.

															B

															The second §56 sentence in point provides that
“[t]he jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this
chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
States.” Nelson and Tyrrell argue that this sentence extends to
state courts the first sentence’s alleged conferral of personal
jurisdiction on federal courts. But, as just discussed, the first
sentence concerns federal-court venue and confers no personal
jurisdiction on any court.

															We have understood §56’s second sentence to
provide for the concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction of
state and federal courts over actions under FELA. See Second
Employers’ Liability Cases , 223 U. S. 1 –56 (1912). As
Nelson and Tyrrell acknowledge, Congress added the provision to
confirm concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction after the
Connecticut Supreme Court held that Congress intended to confine
FELA litigation to federal courts, and that state courts had no
obligation to entertain FELA claims. See Brief for Respondents 23
(citing Hoxie v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co. , 82 Conn. 352, 73 A. 754 (1909)). As Justice McKinnon
recognized in her dissent from the Montana Supreme Court’s decision
in Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s cases, “[t]he phrase ‘concurrent
jurisdiction’ is a well-known term of art long employed by Congress
and courts to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal
jurisdiction.” 383 Mont., at 436, 373 P. 3d, at 13. See, e.g. , Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC ,
565 U. S. 368, 372 (2012) (“federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over private suits arising under the
[Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U. S. C.
§227]”); Claflin v. Houseman , 93 U. S. 130 –134
(1876) (State courts retain “concurrent jurisdiction” over “suits
in which a bankrupt” party is involved, notwithstanding exclusive
federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters).

															C

															Pointing to a quartet of cases, the Montana
Supreme Court observed that this Court “consistently has
interpreted [§]56 to allow state courts to hear cases brought under
FELA even where the only basis for jurisdiction is the railroad
doing business in the forum [S]tate.” 383 Mont., at 421–423,
425–426, 373 P. 3d, at 4–7 (citing Pope v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. , 345 U. S. 379 (1953) ; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co. , 315 U. S. 698 (1942) ; Kepner , 314 U. S. 44 ; Denver & Rio Grande
Western R. Co. v. Terte , 284 U. S. 284 (1932)
).

															None of the decisions featured by the Montana
Supreme Court resolved a question of personal jurisdiction. Terte held that a FELA plaintiff, injured in Colorado, could
bring suit in Missouri state court against a railroad incorporated
elsewhere. 284 U. S., at 286–287. The dispute, however, was
over the Dormant Commerce Clause, not personal jurisdiction; the
railroad defendants argued that the suit would unduly burden
interstate commerce, and the decision rested on two Commerce Clause
decisions, Michigan Central R. Co. v. Mix , 278
U. S. 492 (1929) , and Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel.
Foraker , 274 U. S. 21 (1927) , not on an interpretation of
§56. See Terte , 284 U. S., at 285, 287. In Kepner and Miles , this Court held that a state court
may not, based on inconvenience to a railroad defendant, enjoin its
residents from bringing a FELA suit in another State’s federal
( Kepner ) or state ( Miles ) courts. Kepner , 314
U. S., at 54; Miles , 315 U. S., at 699–700, 704. Pope held that 28 U. S. C. §1404(a)’s provision
for transfer from one federal court to another did not bear on the
question decided in Miles : A state court still could not
enjoin a FELA action brought in another State’s courts. 345
U. S., at 383–384.

															Moreover, all these cases, save Pope ,
were decided before this Court’s transformative decision on
personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 (1945) . See Daimler ,
571 U. S., at ___, n. 18 (slip op., at 20, n. 18)
(cautioning against reliance on cases “decided in the era dominated
by” the “territorial thinking” of Pennoyer v. Neff ,
95 U. S. 714 (1878) ).

															III

															Because FELA does not authorize state courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad solely on the
ground that the railroad does some business in their States, the
Montana courts’ assertion of personal jurisdiction over BNSF here
must rest on Mont. Rule Civ. Proc. 4(b)(1), the State’s provision
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “persons found” in
Montana. See supra , at 2–3. BNSF does not contest that it is
“found within” Montana as the State’s courts comprehend that rule.
We therefore inquire whether the Montana courts’ exercise of
personal jurisdiction under Montana law comports with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															In International Shoe , this Court
explained that a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant who has “certain minimum contacts
with [the State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’ ” 326 U. S., at 316. Elaborating on this guide,
we have distinguished between specific or case-linked jurisdiction
and general or all-purpose jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Daimler , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , 564 U. S. 915, 919 (2011) ; Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall , 466
U. S. 408 , nn. 8, 9 (1984). Because neither Nelson nor
Tyrrell alleges any injury from work in or related to Montana, only
the propriety of general jurisdiction is at issue here. Goodyear and Daimler clarified
that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home
in the forum State.” Daimler , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 8) (quoting Goodyear , 564 U. S., at 919). The
“paradigm” forums in which a corporate defendant is “at home,” we
explained, are the corporation’s place of incorporation and its
principal place of business. Daimler , 571 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 18–19); Goodyear , 564 U. S., at 924. The
exercise of general jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in
an “exceptional case,” a corporate defendant’s operations in
another forum “may be so substantial and of such a nature as to
render the corporation at home in that State.” Daimler , 571
U. S., at ___, n. 19 (slip op., at 20, n. 19). We
suggested that Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. ,
342 U. S. 437 (1952) , exemplified such a case. Daimler , 571 U. S., at ___, n. 19 (slip op., at
20, n. 19). In Perkins , war had forced the defendant
corporation’s owner to temporarily relocate the enterprise from the
Philippines to Ohio. 342 U. S., at 447–448. Because Ohio then
became “the center of the corporation’s wartime activities,” Daimler , 571 U. S., at ___, n. 8 (slip op., at 12,
n. 8), suit was proper there, Perkins , 342 U. S.,
at 448.

															The Montana Supreme Court distinguished Daimler on the ground that we did not there confront “a FELA
claim or a railroad defendant.” 383 Mont., at 424, 373 P. 3d,
at 6. The Fourteenth Amendment due process constraint described in Daimler , however, applies to all state-court assertions of
general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants; the constraint
does not vary with the type of claim asserted or business
enterprise sued.[ 3 ]

															BNSF, we repeat, is not incorporated in Montana
and does not maintain its principal place of business there. Nor is
BNSF so heavily engaged in activity in Montana “as to render [it]
essentially at home” in that State. See Daimler , 571
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As earlier noted, BNSF has over 2,000 miles of railroad
track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana. But, as we observed
in Daimler , “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus
solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Id. , at ___, n. 20 (slip op., at 21, n. 20)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Rather, the
inquiry “calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in
their entirety”; “[a] corporation that operates in many places can
scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Ibid . In short,
the business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to subject the
railroad to specific personal jurisdiction in that State on claims
related to the business it does in Montana. But in-state business,
we clarified in Daimler and Goodyear , does not
suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims
like Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s that are unrelated to any activity
occurring in Montana.[ 4 ]

															IV

															Nelson and Tyrrell present a further
argument—that BNSF has consented to personal jurisdiction in
Montana. See Brief for Respondents 50–51. The Montana Supreme Court
did not address this contention, see 383 Mont., at 429, n. 3,
373 P. 3d, at 9, n. 3, so we do not reach it. See Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U. S. 709 , n. 7
(2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”).

															*  *  *

															For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Montana Supreme Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Section 56’s first
sentence, which provides a time bar for FELA claims, is not
relevant to the issue at hand. For ease of reference, we
hereinafter refer to the first relevant sentence, describing where
suit “may be brought,” as the provision’s “first” sentence, and the
sentence that immediately follows, referring to “concurrent”
jurisdiction, as the “second.” 2 We note, moreover, that
Nelson and Tyrrell overlooked the Senate Report’s explicit
reference to the first sentence of §56 as a venue provision, with
no mention of personal jurisdiction. S. Rep. No. 432, 61st
Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1910). 3 The Montana Supreme Court
also erred in asserting that “Congress drafted the FELA to make a
railroad ‘at home’ for jurisdictional purposes wherever it is
‘doing business.’ ” 383 Mont. 417, 425, 373 P. 3d 1, 6
(2016). As discussed, supra , at 5–7, in §56’s first
sentence, Congress dealt with venue only, not personal
jurisdiction. 4 Justice Sotomayor,
dissenting in part, renews a debate comprehensively aired in Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U. S. ___ (2014).
There, as again here, Justice Sotomayor treats the assertion of
jurisdiction by the State of Washington courts in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 (1945) , as
an exercise of general, dispute-blind, jurisdiction, post ,
at 3, thereby overlooking the fundamental difference between International Shoe and these cases. In International
Shoe , the defendant corporation’s in-state activities had “not
only been continuous and systematic, but also g[a]ve rise to the
liabilities sued on.” 326 U. S., at 317. The state courts
there asserted jurisdiction not over claims that had nothing to do
with the State; instead, they exercised adjudicatory authority to
hold the defendant corporation accountable for activity pursued
within the State of Washington. Daimler , 571 U. S., at
___, ___, n. 10 (slip op., at 7, 14, n. 10). This Court,
therefore, had no occasion in International Shoe to “engage
in a comparison between International Shoe’s contacts within the
State of Washington and the other States in which it operated.” Post , at 3. In marked contrast to International Shoe ,
Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s claims have no relationship to anything that
occurred or had its principal impact in Montana. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–405

															_________________

															BNSF RAILWAY CO., PETITIONER v. KELLI
TYRRELL, special administrator for the ESTATE OF BRENT T. TYRRELL,
DECEASED, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
montana

															[May 30, 2017]

															Justice Sotomayor, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

															I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U. S. C. §51 et seq. , does not confer personal jurisdiction over
railroads on state courts. I also agree that the Montana Supreme
Court erred when it concluded that the nature of the claim here—a
FELA claim against a railroad—answers the question whether the Due
Process Clause allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
BNSF. But my agreement with the majority ends there. I continue to
disagree with the path the Court struck in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), which limits general
jurisdiction over a corporate defendant only to those States where
it is “ ‘essentially at home,’ ” id., at ___ (slip
op., at 8). And even if the Court insists on adhering to that
standard, I dissent from its decision to apply it here in the first
instance rather than remanding to the Montana Supreme Court for it
to conduct what should be a fact-intensive analysis under the
proper legal framework. Accordingly, I join Parts I and II of the
Court’s opinion, but dissent from Part III and the judgment.

															The Court would do well to adhere more
faithfully to the direction from International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 (1945), which instructed that
general jurisdiction is proper when a corporation’s “continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Id ., at 318. Under International Shoe , in other
words, courts were to ask whether the benefits a defendant attained
in the forum State warranted the burdens associated with general
personal jurisdiction. See id. , at 317–318. The majority
itself acknowledges that International Shoe should govern,
describing the question as whether a defendant’s affiliations with
a State are sufficiently “ ‘continuous and systematic’ ”
to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction there. Ante, at 10. If only its analysis today reflected that directive.
Instead, the majority opinion goes on to reaffirm the restrictive
“at home” test set out in Daimler— a test that, as I have
explained, has no home in our precedents and creates serious
inequities. See 571 U. S., at ___–___ (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 8–19).

															The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional
windfall to large multistate or multinational corporations that
operate across many jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is
virtually inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject
to general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal
places of business or of incorporation. Foreign businesses with
principal places of business outside the United States may never be
subject to general jurisdiction in this country even though they
have continuous and systematic contacts within the United States.
See id. , at ___–___ (slip op., at 17–18). What was once a
holistic, nuanced contacts analysis backed by considerations of
fairness and reasonableness has now effectively been replaced by
the rote identification of a corporation’s principal place of
business or place of incorporation.[ 1 ] The result? It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the
actionsof a farflung foreign corporation, who will bear the brunt
of the majority’s approach and be forced to sue in dis-tant
jurisdictions with which they have no contacts or connection.

															Moreover, the comparative contacts analysis
invented in Daimler resurfaces here and proves all but
dispositive. The majority makes much of the fact that BNSF’s
contacts in Montana are only a percentage of its contacts with
other jurisdictions. Ante , at 3, 11. But International
Shoe , which the majority agrees is the springboard for our
modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, ante, at 9,
applied no comparative contacts test. There the Court analyzed
whether the Delaware corporation had “by its activities in the
State of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings” in the
State. 326 U. S. , at 311. The Court evaluated whether
the corporation had offices in the forum State, made contracts
there, delivered goods there, or employed salesmen there. See id. , at 313. Despite acknowledging that the corporation
maintained places of business in several States, ibid. , the
Court did not engage in a comparison between International Shoe’s
contacts within the State of Washington and the other States in
which it operated.[ 2 ] The Court
noted that the corporation employed 11 to 13 salesmen in Washington
but did not query how that number compared to the number of
salesmen in other States. Ibid. As well it should not have;
the relative percentage of contacts is irrelevant. The focus should
be on the quality and quantity of the defendant’s contacts in the
forum State.[ 3 ]

															The majority does even Daimler itself a
disservice, paying only lipservice to the question the Court
purported to reserve there—the possibility of an “exceptional case”
in which general jurisdiction would be proper in a forum State that
is neither a corporate defendant’s place of incorporation nor its
principal place of business. See 571 U. S., at ___, n. 19
(slip op., at 20, n. 19). Its opinion here could be understood
to limit that exception to the exact facts of Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. , 342 U. S. 437 (1952) . See ante , at 10–11. That reading is so narrow as to read the
exception out of existence entirely; certainly a defendant with
significant contacts with more than one State falls outside its
ambit. And so it is inevitable under its own reasoning that the
majority would conclude that BNSF’s contacts with Montana are
insufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction here.
This result is perverse. Despite having reserved the possibility of
an “exceptional case” in Daimler , the majority here has
re-jected that possibility out of hand.

															Worse, the majority reaches its conclusion only
by departing from the Court’s normal practice.[ 4 ] Had it remanded to the Montana Supreme Court to
reevaluate the due process question under the correct legal
standard, that court could have examined whether this is such an
“exceptional case.” Instead, with its ruling today, the Court
unnecessarily sends a signal to the lower courtsthat the
exceptional-circumstances inquiry is all form, no substance.

															I respectfully concur in part and dissent in
part. Notes 1 As many commentators have
observed, lower courts adhered to the continuous-and-systematic
standard for decades before Daimler , and its predecessor Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , 564 U. S. 915 (2011) , wrought the present sea
change. See, e.g., Cornett & Hoffheimer, Good-Bye
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman , 76 Ohio St. L. J. 101
(2015); Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after Bauman and Walden , 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 607 (2015);
Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe , 2 Tex. A&M
L. Rev. 247 (2014); Feder, Goodyear , “Home,” and the
Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S. C. L. Rev.
671 (2012). 2 The majority responds
that the language from International Shoe informs only a
specific jurisdiction case. Ante , at 12, n. 4. But the
majority’s view of International Shoe is overly restrictive.
The terms “specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” are
nowhere to be found in that opinion. And I continue to believe, as
I noted in Daimler , that there is no material difference
between the “continuous and systematic” terminology International Shoe used for what we now call specific
jurisdiction and the “continuous” and “substantial” terminology it
used for what we now call general jurisdiction. See Daimler, 571 U. S., at ___, n. 6 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
judgment) (slip op., at 8, n. 6). 3 Indeed, in neither Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. , 342 U. S.
437 (1952) , nor Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S. A. v. Hall , 466 U. S. 408 (1984) , did the
Court engage in a comparative-contacts analysis. 4 The Montana Supreme Court
reached this question only by wrongly assuming that 45
U. S. C. §56 is a jurisdictional statute and that a
defendant’s unique status as a railroad company is dispositive of
the jurisdictional question. A remand rather than an outright
reversal is this Court’s traditional practice where a lower court
applies the incorrect legal standard; we have done it repeatedly
just this Term. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections , 580 U. S. ___ (2017); Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l
Drilling Co. , ante, p. ___; McLane Co. v. EEOC , ante, p. ___; Moore v. Texas , ante , p. ___.

Summary: The Supreme Court held that a provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) governing venue in federal court does not address personal jurisdiction over railroads, and that a Montana rule allowing for personal jurisdiction over companies doing business in the state was unconstitutional as applied to an out-of-state company with only attenuated connections to the forum.


Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown

OPINION OF THE COURT GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S.&NBSP;A.V. BROWN 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 10-76 GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S. A.,
et al., PETITIONERS v. EDGAR D. BROWN, et ux.,
co-administrators of the ESTATE OF JULIAN DAVID BROWN,
et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of
north carolina

															[June 27, 2011]

															   Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   This case concerns the
jurisdiction of state courts over corporations organized and
operating abroad. We address, in particular, this question: Are
foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable
to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the
subsidiaries in the forum State?

															   A bus accident outside Paris that took the
lives of two 13-year-old boys from North Carolina gave rise to the
liti-gation we here consider. Attributing the accident to a
defective tire manufactured in Turkey at the plant of a foreign
subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear USA),
the boys’ parents commenced an action for damages in a North
Carolina state court; they named as defendants Goodyear USA, an
Ohio corporation, and three of its subsidiaries, organized and
operating, respectively, in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg.
Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina and regularly
engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest the North
Carolina court’s jurisdiction over it; Goodyear USA’s foreign
subsidiaries, however, maintained that North Carolina lacked
adjudicatory authority over them.

															   A state court’s assertion of jurisdiction
exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power, and is therefore
subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 , 316 (1945) (assertion
of jurisdiction over out-of-state corporation must comply with
“ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice’ ” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U. S. 457 ,
463 (1940))). Opinions in the wake of the pathmarking International Shoe decision have differentiated between
general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or case-linked
jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall , 466 U. S. 408 , 414, nn. 8, 9
(1984).

															   A court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so “continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at
home in the forum State. See International Shoe , 326 U.
S., at 317. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on an
“affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,”
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the
forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation. von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter von
Mehren & Trautman); see Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
General Jurisdiction, 66 Texas L. Rev. 721, 782 (1988)
(hereinafter Brilmayer). In contrast to general, all-purpose
jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of
“issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes jurisdiction.” von Mehren & Trautman 1136.

															   Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident,
occurred in France, and the tire alleged to have caused the
accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts
lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged. Brown v. Meter , 199 N. C. App. 50, 57–58, 681 S. E. 2d
382, 388 (2009). Were the foreign subsidiaries nonetheless amenable
to general jurisdiction in North Carolina courts? Confusing or
blending general and specific jurisdictional inquiries, the North
Carolina courts answered yes. Some of the tires made abroad by
Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals stressed, had reached North Carolina through “the stream of
commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed, gave
North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. Id. , at 67–68,
681 S. E. 2d, at 394–395.

															   A connection so limited between the forum and
the for-eign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction. Such a connection does not
establish the “continuous and systematic” affiliation necessary to
empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the
foreign corporation’s contacts with the State.

															I

															   On April 18, 2004, a bus destined
for Charles de Gaulle Airport overturned on a road outside Paris,
France. Passengers on the bus were young soccer players from North
Carolina beginning their journey home. Two 13-year-olds, Julian
Brown and Matthew Helms, sustained fatal injuries. The boys’
parents, respondents in this Court, filed a suit for wrongful-death
damages in the Superior Court of Onslow County, North Carolina, in
their capacity as administrators of the boys’ estates. Attributing
the accident to a tire that failed when its plies separated, the
parents alleged negligence in the “design, construction, testing,
and inspection” of the tire. 199 N. C. App., at 51, 681
S. E. 2d, at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															   Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA
(Goodyear Luxembourg), Goodyear Lastikleri T. A. S.
(Goodyear Turkey), and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA (Goodyear
France), petitioners here, were named as defendants. Incorporated
in Luxembourg, Turkey, and France, respectively, petitioners are
indirect subsidiaries of Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation also
named as a defendant in the suit. Petitioners manufacture tires
primarily for sale in European and Asian markets. Their tires
differ in size and construction from tires ordinarily sold in the
United States. They are designed to carry significantly heavier
loads, and to serve under road conditions and speed limits in the
manufacturers’ primary markets.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   In contrast to the parent company, Goodyear
USA, which does not contest the North Carolina courts’ personal
jurisdiction over it, petitioners are not registered to do business
in North Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or
bank accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture,
or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not
solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires
to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage of
petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions
manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed within North
Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. These tires were
typically custom ordered to equip specialized vehicles such as
cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse trailers.
Petitioners state, and respondents do not here deny, that the type
of tire involved in the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire
manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed in North
Carolina.

															   Petitioners moved to dismiss the claims
against them for want of personal jurisdiction. The trial court
denied the motion, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
af-firmed. Acknowledging that the claims neither “related to, nor …
ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with North Carolina,” the
Court of Appeals confined its analysis to “general rather than
specific jurisdiction,” which the court recognized required a
“higher threshold” showing: A defendant must have “continuous and
systematic contacts” with the forum. Id. , at 58, 681
S. E. 2d, at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
threshold was crossed, the court determined, when petitioners
placed their tires “in the stream of interstate commerce without
any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in
North Carolina.” Id. , at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at
394.

															   Nothing in the record, the court observed,
indicated that petitioners “took any affirmative action to cause
tires which they had manufactured to be shipped into North
Carolina.” Id. , at 64, 681 S. E. 2d, at 392. The
court found, however, that tires made by petitioners reached North
Carolina as a consequence of a “highly-organized distribution
process” involving other Goodyear USA subsidiaries. Id. ,
at 67, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. Petitioners, the court noted,
made “no attempt to keep these tires from reaching the North
Carolina market.” Id. , at 66, 681 S. E. 2d, at 393.
Indeed, the very tire involved in the accident, the court observed,
conformed to tire standards established by the U. S. Department of
Transportation and bore markings required for sale in the United
States. Ibid .[ Footnote
2 ] As further support, the court invoked North Carolina’s
“interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to
seek redress for [their] injuries,” and noted the hardship North
Carolina plaintiffs would experience “[were they] required to
litigate their claims in France,” a country to which they have no
ties. Id. , at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394. The North
Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review. Brown v. Meter, 364 N. C. 128, 695 S. E. 2d 756
(2010).

															   We granted certiorari to decide whether the
general jurisdiction the North Carolina courts asserted over
petitioners is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 561 U. S. ___ (2010).

															II

															A

															   The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state
tribunal’s authority to proceed against a defendant. Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U. S. 186 , 207
(1977). The canonical opinion in this area remains International Shoe, 326 U. S. 310 , in which we held that a
State may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant if the defendant has “certain
minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’ ” Id. , at 316 (quoting Meyer , 311 U. S., at 463).

															   Endeavoring to give specific
content to the “fair play and substantial justice” concept, the
Court in International Shoe classified cases involving
out-of-state corporate defendants. First, as in International
Shoe itself, jurisdiction unquestionably could be asserted
where the corporation’s in-state activity is “continuous and
systematic” and that activity gave rise to the
episode-in-suit . 326 U. S., at 317. Further, the Court
observed, the commission of certain “single or occasional acts” in
a State may be sufficient to render a corporation answerable in
that State with respect to those acts, though not with respect to
matters unrelated to the forum connections. Id. , at 318.
The heading courts today use to encompass these two International Shoe categories is “specific jurisdiction.”
See von Mehren & Trautman 1144–1163. Adjudicatory authority is
“specific” when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros , 466 U.
S., at 414, n. 8. International Shoe distinguished from
cases that fit within the “specific jurisdiction” categories,
“instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.” 326 U. S., at 318. Adjudicatory
authority so grounded is today called “general jurisdiction.” Helicopteros , 466 U. S., at 414, n. 9. For an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is
an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home. See Brilmayer 728 (identifying domicile, place
of incorporation, and principal place of business as “paradig[m]”
bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction).

															   Since International Shoe , this
Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that
warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction, particularly in
cases involving “single or occasional acts” occurring or having
their impact within the forum State. As a rule in these cases, this
Court has inquired whether there was “some act by which the
defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U. S. 235 , 253
(1958). See, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 , 287, 297
(1980) (Oklahoma court may not exercise personal jurisdiction “over
a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in
a products-liability action, when the defendants’ only connection
with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to
New York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U. S. 462 , 474–475
(1985) (franchisor headquartered in Florida may maintain
breach-of-contract action in Florida against Michigan franchisees,
where agreement contemplated on-going interactions between
franchisees and franchisor’s headquarters); Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. , 480 U. S. 102 ,
105 (1987) (Taiwanese tire manufacturer settled product liability
action brought in California and sought indemnification there from
Japanese valve assembly manufacturer; Japanese company’s “mere
awareness … that the components it manufactured, sold, and
delivered outside the United States would reach the forum State in
the stream of commerce” held insufficient to permit California
court’s adjudication of Taiwanese company’s cross-complaint); id. , at 109 (opinion of O’Connor, J.); id. , at
116–117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). See also Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction,
101 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 628 (1988) (in the wake of International Shoe , “specific jurisdiction has become the
centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general
jurisdiction plays a reduced role”).

															   In only two decisions postdating International Shoe , discussed infra , at 11–13,
has this Court considered whether an out-of-state corporate
defendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently “continuous and
systematic” to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over
claims unrelated to those contacts: Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co. , 342 U. S. 437 (1952)
(general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over Philippine
corporation sued in Ohio, where the company’s affairs were overseen
during World War II); and Helicopteros , 466 U. S. 408 (helicopter owned by
Colombian corporation crashed in Peru; survivors of U. S. citizens
who died in the crash, the Court held, could not maintain
wrongful-death actions against the Colombian corporation in Texas,
for the corporation’s helicopter purchases and purchase-linked
activity in Texas were insufficient to subject it to Texas court’s
general jurisdiction).

															B

															   To justify the exercise of
general jurisdiction over petitioners, the North Carolina courts
relied on the petitioners’ placement of their tires in the “stream
of commerce.” See supra , at 5. The stream-of-commerce
metaphor has been invoked frequently in lower court decisions
permitting “jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the
product has traveled through an extensive chain of distribution
before reaching the ultimate consumer.” 18 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of the Law of Corporations §8640.40, p. 133 (rev. ed. 2007).
Typically, in such cases, a nonresident defendant, acting outside the forum, places in the stream of commerce a
product that ultimately causes harm inside the forum. See
generally Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce,
7 Rev. Litigation 239, 262–268 (1988) (discussing origins and
evolution of the stream-of-commerce doctrine).

															   Many States have enacted long-arm
statutes authorizing courts to exercise specific jurisdiction over
manufacturers when the events in suit, or some of them, occurred
within the forum state. For example, the “Local Injury; Foreign
Act” subsection of North Carolina’s long-arm statute authorizes
North Carolina courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in “any
action claiming injury to person or property within this State
arising out of [the defendant’s] act or omission outside this
State,” if, “in addition[,] at or about the time of the injury,”
”[p]roducts … manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed,
within this State in the ordinary course of trade.” N. C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(4)(b) (Lexis 2009).[ Footnote 3 ] As the North Carolina Court of Appeals
recognized, this provision of the State’s long-arm statute “does
not apply to this case,” for both the act alleged to have caused
injury (the fabrication of the allegedly defective tire) and its
impact (the accident) occurred outside the forum. See 199
N. C. App., at 61, n. 6, 681 S. E. 2d, at 390,
n. 6.[ Footnote 4 ]

															   The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce
analysis elided the essential difference between case-specific and
all-purpose (general) jurisdiction. Flow of a manufacturer’s
products into the forum, we have explained, may bolster an
affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. See, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U. S., at 297
(where “the sale of a product … is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve … the market for its product in [several]
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there
been the source of injury to its owner or to others ”
(em-phasis added)). But ties serving to bolster the exercise of
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on
those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a
defendant. See, e.g. , Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd. , 647
F. 2d 200, 203, n. 5 (CADC 1981) (defendants’ marketing
arrangements, although “adequate to permit litigation of claims
relating to [their] introduction of … wine into the United States
stream of commerce, … would not be adequate to support general,
‘all purpose’ adjudicatory authority”). A corporation’s “continuous activity
of some sorts within a state,” International Shoe instructed, “is not enough to support the demand that the
corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.” 326
U. S., at 318. Our 1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co . remains “[t]he textbook case of general
jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation
that has not consented to suit in the forum.” Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transport Corp. , 652 F. 2d 1032, 1037
(CADC 1981).

															   Sued in Ohio, the defendant in Perkins was a Philippine mining corporation that had
ceased activities in the Philippines during World War II. To the
extent that the company was conducting any business during and
immediately after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it
was doing so in Ohio: the corporation’s president maintained his
office there, kept the company files in that office, and supervised
from the Ohio office “the necessarily limited wartime activities of
the company.” Perkins , 342 U. S., at 447–448. Although the
claim-in-suit did not arise in Ohio, this Court ruled that it would
not violate due process for Ohio to adjudicate the controversy. Ibid. ; see Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. , 465 U. S.
770 , 779–780, n. 11 (1984) (Ohio’s exercise of general
jurisdiction was permissible in Perkins because “Ohio was
the corporation’s principal, if temporary, place of business”).

															   We next addressed the exercise of general
jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation over three decades
later, in Helicopteros. In that case, survivors of United
States citizens who died in a helicopter crash in Peru instituted
wrongful-death actions in a Texas state court against the owner and
operator of the helicopter, a Colombian corporation. The Colombian
corporation had no place of business in Texas and was not licensed
to do business there. “Basically, [the company’s] contacts with
Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston
for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York
bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing
helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Texas
enterprise] for substantial sums; and sending personnel to [Texas]
for training.” 466 U. S., at 416. These links to Texas, we
determined, did not “constitute the kind of continuous and
systematic general business contacts … found to exist in Perkins, ” and were insufficient to support the exercise of
jurisdiction over a claim that neither “ar[o]se out of … no[r]
related to” the defendant’s activities in Texas. Id. , at
415–416 (internal quotation marks omitted). Helicopteros concluded that “mere
purchases [made in the forum State], even if occurring at regular
intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of
[general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of
action not related to those purchase transactions.” Id. ,
at 418. We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas
held insufficient in Helicopteros , the sales of
petitioners’ tires sporadically made in North Carolina through
intermediaries. Under the sprawling view of general jurisdiction
urged by respondents and embraced by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, any substantial manufacturer or seller of goods would be
amenable to suit, on any claim for relief, wherever its products
are distributed. But cf. World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U. S.,
at 296 (every seller of chattels does not, by virtue of the sale,
“appoint the chattel his agent for service of process”).

															   Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins , North Caro-lina is not a forum in which it would
be permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.
Unlike the defendant in Perkins , whose sole wartime
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no
sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated connections to
the State, see supra , at 4–5, fall far short of the “the
continuous and systematic general business contacts” necessary to
empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims
unrelated to anything that connects them to the State. Helicopteros , 466 U. S., at 416.[ Footnote 5 ]

															C

															   Respondents belatedly assert a
“single enterprise” theory, asking us to consolidate petitioners’
ties to North Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other
Goodyear entities. See Brief for Respondents 44–50. In effect,
respondents would have us pierce Goodyear corporate veils, at least
for jurisdictional purposes. See Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal
Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations,
Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 14, 29–30 (1986)
(merging parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional purposes requires
an inquiry “comparable to the corporate law question of piercing
the corporate veil”). But see 199 N. C. App., at 64, 681
S. E. 2d, at 392 (North Carolina Court of Appeals understood
that petitioners are “separate corporate entities … not directly
re-sponsible for the presence in North Carolina of tires that they
had manufactured”). Neither below nor in their brief in opposition
to the petition for certiorari did respondents urge disregard of
petitioners’ discrete status as subsidiaries and treatment of all
Goodyear entities as a “unitary business,” so that jurisdiction
over the parent would draw in the subsidiaries as well.[ Footnote 6 ] Brief for Respondents 44.
Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention, and we do not
address it. This Court’s Rule 15.2; Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters , 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at
16).

															*  *  *

															   For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the North Carolina Court of Appeals is

															Reversed. Footnote 1 Respondents portray Goodyear USA’s structure
as a reprehensible effort to “outsource” all manufacturing, and
correspondingly, tort litigation, to foreign jurisdictions. See
Brief for Respondents 51–53. Yet Turkey, where the tire alleged to
have caused the accident-in-suit was made, is hardly a strange
location for a facility that primarily supplies markets in Europe
and Asia. Footnote 2 Such markings do not necessarily show that
any of the tires were destined for sale in the United States. To
facilitate trade, the Solicitor General explained, the United
States encourages other countries to “treat compliance with
[Department of Transportation] standards, in-cluding through use of
DOT markings, as evidence that the products are safely
manufactured.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 32. Footnote 3 Cf. D. C. Code §13–423(a)(4) (2001)
(providing for specific jurisdiction over defendant who “caus[es]
tortious injury in the [forum] by an act or omission outside the
[forum]” when, in addition, the defendant “derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed … in the [forum]”). Footnote 4 The court instead relied on N. C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §1–75.4(1)(d), see 199 N. C. App., at 57, 681
S. E. 2d, at 388, which provides for jurisdiction, “whether
the claim arises within or without [the] State,” when the defendant
“[i]s engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether
such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.” This
provision, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held, was
“in-tended to make available to the North Carolina courts the full
juris-dictional powers permissible under federal due process.” Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp. , 291
N. C. 674, 676, 231 S. E. 2d 629, 630 (1977). Footnote 5 As earlier noted, see supra , at 6,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals invoked the State’s
“well-recognized interest in providing a forum in which its
citizens are able to seek redress for injuries that they have
sustained.” 199 N. C. App., at 68, 681 S. E. 2d, at 394.
But “[g]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States]
practice never been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the
forum. There is nothing in [our] law comparable to … article 14 of
the Civil Code of France (1804) under which the French nationality
of the plaintiff is a sufficient ground for jurisdiction.” von
Mehren & Trautman 1137; see Clermont & Palmer, Exorbitant
Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 474, 492–495 (2006) (French law
permitting plaintiff-based jurisdiction is rarely invoked in the
absence of other supporting factors). When a defendant’s act
outside the forum causes injury in the forum, by contrast, a
plaintiff’s residence in the forum may strengthen the case for the
exercise of specific jurisdiction . See Calder v. Jones , 465
U. S. 783 , 788 (1984); von Mehren & Trautman 1167–1173. Footnote 6 In the brief they filed in the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, respondents stated that petitioners were part of
an “integrated world-wide efforts to design, manufacture, market
and sell their tires in the United States, including in
North Carolina.” App. 485 (emphasis added). See also Brief in
Opposition 18. Read in context, that assertion was offered in
support of a narrower proposition: The distribution of petitioners’
tires in North Carolina, respondents maintained, demonstrated
petitioners’ own “calculated and deliberate efforts to take
advantage of the North Carolina market.” App. 485. As already
explained, see supra , at 12–13, even regularly occurring
sales of a product in a State do not justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those sales.

Summary: The Supreme Court held that a state court cannot exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary of a US company, unless the subsidiary has significant and continuous contacts with the state that make it essentially at home there. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on the relationship between the forum and the specific claims in the case.