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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–536

															_________________

															SHAUN McCUTCHEON, et al., APPELLANTS v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the district of columbia

															[April 2, 2014]

															     Chief Justice Roberts
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in
which Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito join.

															     There is no right more
basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing
our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a
variety of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote, urge
others to vote for a particular candidate, volunteer to work on a
campaign, and contribute to a candidate’s campaign. This case
is about the last of those options.

															     The right to
participate in democracy through political contributions is
protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute.
Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign
contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of
corruption. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 –27
(1976) (per curiam). At the same time, we have made clear that
Congress may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount
of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of
some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See,
e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
24–25).

															     Many people might find
those latter objectives attractive: They would be delighted to see
fewer television commercials touting a candidate’s
accomplishments or disparaging an opponent’s character. Money
in politics may at times seem repugnant to some, but so too does
much of what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the First
Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi
parades—despite the profound offense such spectacles
cause—it surely protects political campaign speech despite
popular opposition. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989)
; Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. ___ (2011); National Socialist
Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43 (1977) (per curiam).
Indeed, as we have emphasized, the First Amendment “has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,
401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971) .

															     In a series of cases
over the past 40 years, we have spelled out how to draw the
constitutional line between the permissible goal of avoiding
corruption in the political process and the impermissible desire
simply to limit political speech. We have said that government
regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate may
feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political
access such support may afford. “Ingratiation and access
. . . are not corruption.” Citizens United v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 360 (2010) .
They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and
candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to
those concerns.

															     Any regulation must
instead target what we have called “quid pro quo”
corruption or its appearance. See id., at 359. That Latin phrase
captures the notion of a direct exchange of an official act for
money. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257, 266
(1991) . “The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid
pro quo: dollars for po- litical favors.” Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U. S. 480, 497 (1985) . Campaign finance restrictions that
pursue other objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject
the Government “into the debate over who should
govern.” Bennett, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 25). And those
who govern should be the last people to help decide who should
govern.

															     The statute at issue in
this case imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions.
The first, called base limits, restricts how much money a donor may
contribute to a particular candidate or committee. 2
U. S. C. §441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate
limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute in total to
all candidates or committees. §441a(a)(3).

															     This case does not
involve any challenge to the base limits, which we have previously
upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting
corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also
serve that objective, by preventing circumvention of the base
limits. We conclude, however, that the aggregate limits do little,
if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting
participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are
therefore invalid under the First Amendment.

															I

															A

															     For the
2013–2014 election cycle, the base limits in the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), permit an individual to
contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate ($5,200 total
for the primary and general elections); $32,400 per year to a
national party committee; [ 1 ]
$10,000 per year to a state or local party committee; and $5,000
per year to a political action committee, or “PAC.” 2
U. S. C. §441a(a)(1); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 (2013). [ 2 ] A national committee, state
or local party committee, or multicandidate PAC may in turn
contribute up to $5,000 per election to a candidate.
§441a(a)(2). [ 3 ]

															     The base limits apply
with equal force to contributions that are “in any way
earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or
conduit” to a candidate. §441a(a)(8). If, for example, a
donor gives money to a party committee but directs the party
committee to pass the contribution along to a particular candidate,
then the transaction is treated as a contribution from the original
donor to the specified candidate.

															     For the 2013–2014
election cycle, the aggregate limits in BCRA permit an individual
to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total
of $74,600 to other political committees. Of that $74,600, only
$48,600 may be contributed to state or local party committees and
PACs, as opposed to national party committees. §441a(a)(3); 78
Fed. Reg. 8532. All told, an individual may contribute up to
$123,200 to candidate and noncandidate committees during each
two-year election cycle.

															     The base limits thus
restrict how much money a donor may contribute to any particular
candidate or committee; the aggregate limits have the effect of
restricting how many candidates or committees the donor may
support, to the extent permitted by the base limits.

															B

															     In the
2011–2012 election cycle, appellant Shaun McCutcheon
contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 different federal candidates,
in compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges
that he wished to contribute $1,776 to each of 12 additional
candidates but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit
on contributions to candidates. McCutcheon also contributed a total
of $27,328 to several noncandidate political committees, in
compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that
he wished to contribute to various other political committees,
including $25,000 to each of the three Republican national party
committees, but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit
on contributions to political committees. McCutcheon further
alleges that he plans to make similar contributions in the future.
In the 2013–2014 election cycle, he again wishes to
contribute at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to
non-candidate political committees. Brief for Appellant McCutcheon
11–12.

															     Appellant Republican
National Committee is a national political party committee charged
with the general management of the Republican Party. The RNC wishes
to receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly situated
individuals would like to make—contributions otherwise
permissible under the base limits for national party committees but
foreclosed by the aggregate limit on contributions to political
committees.

															     In June 2012,
McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint before a three-judge panel
of the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See
BCRA §403(a), 116Stat. 113–114. McCutcheon and the RNC
asserted that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates
and to noncandidate political committees were unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. They moved for a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and the
Government moved to dismiss the case.

															     The three-judge
District Court denied appellants’ motion for a preliminary
injunction and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss.
Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the
Government’s anticorruption interest, the District Court
concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment
scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits. 893
F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (2012).

															     In particular, the
District Court imagined a hypothetical scenario that might occur in
a world without aggregate limits. A single donor might contribute
the maximum amount under the base limits to nearly 50 separate
committees, each of which might then transfer the money to the same
single committee. Ibid. That committee, in turn, might use all the
transferred money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a
particular candidate, allowing the single donor to circumvent the
base limit on the amount he may contribute to that candidate. Ibid.
The District Court acknowledged that “it may seem unlikely
that so many separate entities would willingly serve as
conduits” for the single donor’s interests, but it
concluded that such a scenario “is not hard to
imagine.” Ibid. It thus rejected a constitutional challenge
to the aggregate limits, characterizing the base limits and the
aggregate limits “as a coherent system rather than merely a
collection of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon
prophylaxis.” Ibid.

															     McCutcheon and the RNC
appealed directly to this Court, as authorized by law. 28
U. S. C. §1253. In such a case, “we ha[ve] no
discretion to refuse adjudication of the case on its merits,”
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975) , and accordingly
we noted probable jurisdiction. 568 U. S. ___ (2013).

															II

															A

															     Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1 , presented this Court with its first opportunity to
evaluate the constitutionality of the original contribution and
expenditure limits set forth in FECA. FECA imposed a $1,000 per
election base limit on contributions from an individual to a
federal candidate. It also imposed a $25,000 per year aggregate
limit on all contributions from an individual to candidates or
political committees. 18 U. S. C. §§608(b)(1),
608(b)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). On the expenditures side, FECA
imposed limits on both independent expenditures and
candidates’ overall campaign expenditures.
§§608(e)(1), 608(c).

															     Buckley recognized that
“contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area
of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” 424
U. S., at 14. But it distinguished expenditure limits from
contribution limits based on the degree to which each encroaches
upon protected First Amendment interests. Expenditure limits, the
Court explained, “necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”
Id., at 19. The Court thus subjected expenditure limits to
“the exacting scrutiny applicable to lim- itations on core
First Amendment rights of political expression.” Id., at
44–45. Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may regulate
protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling
interest and is the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989) .

															     By contrast, the Court
concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on
political speech because they “permit[ ] the symbolic
expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[ ] not in
any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss
candidates and issues.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. As a
result, the Court focused on the effect of the contribution limits
on the freedom of political association and applied a lesser but
still “rigorous standard of review.” Id., at 29. Under
that standard, “[e]ven a ‘ “significant
interference” with protected rights of political
association’ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.”
Id., at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 488
(1975) ).

															     The primary purpose of
FECA was to limit quid pro quo corruption and its appearance; that
purpose satisfied the requirement of a “sufficiently
important” governmental interest. 424 U. S., at
26–27. As for the “closely drawn” component,
Buckley concluded that the $1,000 base limit “focuses
precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions
. . . while leaving persons free to engage in independent
political expression, to associate actively through volunteering
their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless
substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with
financial resources.” Id., at 28. The Court therefore upheld
the $1,000 base limit under the “closely drawn” test.
Id., at 29.

															     The Court next
separately considered an overbreadth challenge to the base limit.
See id., at 29–30. The challengers argued that the base limit
was fatally overbroad because most large donors do not seek
improper influence over legislators’ actions. Although the
Court accepted that premise, it nevertheless rejected the
overbreadth challenge for two reasons: First, it was too
“difficult to isolate suspect contributions” based on a
contributor’s subjective intent. Id., at 30. Second,
“Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in
safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that
the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large
monetary contributions be eliminated.” Ibid.

															     Finally, in one
paragraph of its 139-page opinion, the Court turned to the $25,000
aggregate limit under FECA. As a preliminary matter, it noted that
the constitution- ality of the aggregate limit “ha[d] not
been separately addressed at length by the parties.” Id., at
38. Then, in three sentences, the Court disposed of any
constitutional objections to the aggregate limit that the
challengers might have had:

															“The overall $25,000 ceiling does
impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and
committees with which an individual may associate himself by means
of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon
protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the
$1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise
contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate
through the use of unearmarked contributions to political
committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge
contributions to the candidate’s political party. The
limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by
the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic
individual contribution limitation that we have found to be
constitutionally valid.” Ibid.

															B

															1

															     The parties and amici
curiae spend significant energy debating whether the line that
Buckley drew between contributions and expenditures should remain
the law. Notwithstanding the robust debate, we see no need in this
case to revisit Buckley’s distinction between contributions
and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the applicable
standards of review. Buckley held that the Government’s
interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance
was “sufficiently important,” id., at 26–27; we
have elsewhere stated that the same interest may properly be
labeled “compelling,” see National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 496–497, so that
the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny. Moreover,
regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley’s
“closely drawn” test, we must assess the fit between
the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve
that objective. See, e.g., National Conservative Political Action
Comm., supra, at 496–501; Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S.
230 –262 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.). Or to put it another
way, if a law that restricts political speech does not “avoid
unnecessary abridgement” of First Amendment rights, Buckley,
424 U. S., at 25, it cannot survive “rigorous”
review.

															     Because we find a
substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated
objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate
limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. We
therefore need not parse the differences between the two standards
in this case.

															2

															     Buckley treated the
constitutionality of the $25,000 aggregate limit as contingent upon
that limit’s ability to prevent circumvention of the $1,000
base limit, describing the aggregate limit as “no more than a
corollary” of the base limit. Id., at 38. The Court
determined that circumvention could occur when an individual
legally contributes “massive amounts of money to a particular
candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions” to
entities that are themselves likely to contribute to the candidate.
Ibid. For that reason, the Court upheld the $25,000 aggregate
limit.

															     Although Buckley
provides some guidance, we think that its ultimate conclusion about
the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA
does not control here. Buckley spent a total of three sentences
analyzing that limit; in fact, the opinion pointed out that the
constitutionality of the aggregate limit “ha[d] not been
separately addressed at length by the parties.” Ibid. We are
now asked to address appellants’ direct challenge to the
aggregate limits in place under BCRA. BCRA is a different statutory
regime, and the aggregate limits it imposes operate against a
distinct legal backdrop.

															     Most notably, statutory
safeguards against circumvention have been considerably
strengthened since Buckley was decided, through both statutory
additions and the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme. With more targeted anticircumvention measures in place
today, the indiscriminate aggregate limits under BCRA appear
particularly heavy-handed.

															     The 1976 FECA
Amendments, for example, added another layer of base contribution
limits. The 1974 version of FECA had already capped contributions
from political committees to candidates, but the 1976 version added
limits on contributions to political committees. This change was
enacted at least “in part to prevent circumvention of the
very limitations on contributions that this Court upheld in
Buckley.” California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182 –198 (1981) (plurality
opinion); see also id., at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). Because a donor’s contributions
to a political committee are now limited, a donor cannot flood the
committee with “huge” amounts of money so that each
contribution the committee makes is perceived as a contribution
from him. Buckley, supra, at 38. Rather, the donor may contribute
only $5,000 to the committee, which hardly raises the specter of
abuse that concerned the Court in Buckley. Limits on contributions
to political committees consequently create an additional hurdle
for a donor who seeks both to channel a large amount of money to a
particular candidate and to ensure that he gets the credit for
doing so.

															     The 1976 Amendments
also added an antiprolifera- tion rule prohibiting donors from
creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees.
See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(5); 11 CFR
§100.5(g)(4). The Government ac- knowledges that this
antiproliferation rule “forecloses what would otherwise be a
particularly easy and effective means of circumventing the limits
on contributions to any particular political committee.”
Brief for Appellee 46. In effect, the rule eliminates a
donor’s ability to create and use his own political
committees to direct funds in excess of the individual base limits.
It thus blocks a straightforward method of achieving the
circumvention that was the underlying concern in Buckley.

															     The intricate
regulatory scheme that the Federal Election Commission has enacted
since Buckley further limits the opportunities for circumvention of
the base limits via “unearmarked contributions to political
committees likely to contribute” to a particular candidate.
424 U. S., at 38. Although the earmarking provision, 2
U. S. C. §441a(a)(8), was in place when Buckley was
decided, the FEC has since added regulations that define earmarking
broadly. For example, the regulations construe earmarking to
include any designation, “whether direct or indirect, express
or implied, oral or written.” 11 CFR §110.6(b)(1). The
regulations specify that an individual who has contributed to a
particular candidate may not also contribute to a single-candidate
committee for that candidate. §110.1(h)(1). Nor may an
individual who has contributed to a candidate also contribute to a
political committee that has supported or anticipates supporting
the same candidate, if the individual knows that “a
substantial portion [of his contribution] will be contributed to,
or expended on behalf of,” that candidate.
§110.1(h)(2).

															     In addition to
accounting for statutory and regulatory changes in the campaign
finance arena, appellants’ challenge raises distinct legal
arguments that Buckley did not consider. For example, presumably
because of its cursory treatment of the $25,000 aggregate limit,
Buckley did not separately address an overbreadth challenge with
respect to that provision. The Court rejected such a challenge to
the base limits because of the difficulty of isolating suspect
contributions. The propriety of large contributions to in- dividual
candidates turned on the subjective intent of donors, and the Court
concluded that there was no way to tell which donors sought
improper influence over legislators’ actions. See 424
U. S., at 30. The aggregate limit, on the other hand, was
upheld as an anticircumvention measure, without considering whether
it was possible to discern which donations might be used to
circumvent the base limits. See id., at 38. The Court never
addressed overbreadth in the specific context of aggregate limits,
where such an argument has far more force.

															     Given the foregoing,
this case cannot be resolved merely by pointing to three sentences
in Buckley that were written without the benefit of full briefing
or argument on the issue. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314
U. S. 118 –140 (1941) (departing from “[l]oose language
and a sporadic, ill-considered decision” when asked to
resolve a question “with our eyes wide open and in the light
of full consideration”); Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S.
236, 251 (1998) (departing from a prior decision where it
“was rendered without full briefing or argument”). We
are confronted with a different statute and different legal
arguments, at a different point in the development of campaign
finance regulation. Appellants’ sub- stantial First Amendment
challenge to the system of aggregate limits currently in place thus
merits our plenary consideration. [ 4 ]

															III

															     The First Amendment
“is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints
from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to
what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us,
. . . in the belief that no other approach would comport
with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S.
15, 24 (1971) . As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an
individual’s right to participate in the public debate
through political expression and political association. See
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 15. When an individual contributes
money to a candidate, he exercises both of those rights: The
contribution “serves as a general expression of support for
the candidate and his views” and “serves to affiliate a
person with a candidate.” Id., at 21–22.

															     Those First Amendment
rights are important regardless whether the individual is, on the
one hand, a “lone pamphleteer[ ] or street corner orator[ ]
in the Tom Paine mold,” or is, on the other, someone who
spends “substan-tial amounts of money in order to communicate
[his] political ideas through sophisticated” means. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 493. Either
way, he is participating in an electoral debate that we have
recognized is “integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.” Buckley, supra,
at 14.

															     Buckley acknowledged
that aggregate limits at least diminish an individual’s right
of political association. As the Court explained, the
“overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction
upon the number of candidates and committees with which an
individual may associate himself by means of financial
support.” 424 U. S., at 38. But the Court characterized
that restriction as a “quite modest restraint upon protected
political activity.” Ibid. We cannot agree with that
characterization. An aggregate limit on how many candidates and
committees an individual may support through contributions is not a
“modest restraint” at all. The Government may no more
restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it
may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.

															     To put it in the
simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from
fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of
ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the
base limits Congress views as adequate to protect against
corruption. The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine
candidates, but the aggregate limits constitute an outright ban on
further contributions to any other candidate (beyond the additional
$1,800 that may be spent before reaching the $48,600 aggregate
limit). At that point, the limits deny the individual all ability
to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing
to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences. A donor
must limit the number of candidates he supports, and may have to
choose which of several policy concerns he will advance—clear
First Amendment harms that the dissent never acknowledges.

															     It is no answer to say
that the individual can simply contribute less money to more
people. To require one person to contribute at lower levels than
others because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to
impose a special burden on broader participation in the democratic
process. And as we have recently admonished, the Government may not
penalize an individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his
First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554
U. S. 724, 739 (2008) .

															     The First Amendment
burden is especially great for individuals who do not have ready
access to alternative avenues for supporting their preferred
politicians and policies. In the context of base contribution
limits, Buckley observed that a supporter could vindicate his
associational interests by personally volunteering his time and
energy on behalf of a candidate. See 424 U. S., at 22, 28.
Such personal volunteering is not a realistic alternative for those
who wish to support a wide variety of candidates or causes. Other
effective methods of supporting preferred candidates or causes
without contributing money are reserved for a select few, such as
entertainers capable of raising hundreds of thousands of dollars in
a single evening. Cf. Davis, supra, at 742. [ 5 ]

															     The dissent faults this
focus on “the individual’s right to engage in political
speech,” saying that it fails to take into account “the
public’s interest” in “collective speech.”
Post, at 6 (opinion of Breyer, J). This “collective”
interest is said to promote “a government where laws reflect
the very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of
which the First Amendment protects.” Post, at 7.

															     But there are
compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First
Amendment by reference to such a generalized conception of the
public good. First, the dissent’s “collective
speech” reflected in laws is of course the will of the
majority, and plainly can include laws that restrict free speech.
The whole point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals
protection against such infringements. The First Amendment does not
protect the government, even when the government purports to act
through legislation reflecting “collective speech.” Cf.
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. ___ (2012); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977) ; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) .

															     Second, the degree to
which speech is protected cannot turn on a legislative or judicial
determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic
process. The First Amendment does not contemplate such
“ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 470
(2010) ; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 818 (2000) (“What the Constitution
says is that” value judgments “are for the individual
to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or
approval of a majority”).

															     Third, our established
First Amendment analysis already takes account of any
“collective” interest that may justify restrictions on
individual speech. Under that accepted analysis, such restrictions
are measured against the asserted public interest (usually framed
as an important or compelling governmental interest). As explained
below, we do not doubt the compelling nature of the
“collective” interest in preventing corruption in the
electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that interest
only so long as it does not unnecessarily infringe an
individual’s right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate
this tailoring test at the outset.

															IV

															A

															     With the significant
First Amendment costs for individual citizens in mind, we turn to
the governmental interests asserted in this case. This Court has
identified only one legitimate governmental interest for
restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741; National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at
496–497. We have consistently rejected attempts to suppress
campaign speech based on other legislative objectives. No matter
how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental
objective to “level the playing field,” or to
“level electoral opportunities,” or to
“equaliz[e] the financial resources of candidates.”
Bennett, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22–23); Davis,
supra, at 741–742; Buckley, supra, at 56. The First Amendment
prohibits such legislative attempts to “fine-tun[e]”
the electoral process, no matter how well intentioned. Bennett,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 21).

															     As we framed the
relevant principle in Buckley, “the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.” 424 U. S., at 48–49. The
dissent’s suggestion that Buckley supports the opposite
proposition, see post, at 6, simply ignores what Buckley actually
said on the matter. See also Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
295 (1981) (“Buckley . . . made clear that
contributors cannot be protected from the possibility that others
will make larger contributions”).

															     Moreover, while
preventing corruption or its appearance is a legitimate objective,
Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption—“quid pro quo” corruption. As Buckley
explained, Congress may permissibly seek to rein in “large
contributions [that] are given to secure a political quid pro quo
from current and potential office holders.” 424 U. S.,
at 26. In addition to “actual quid pro quo
arrangements,” Congress may permissibly limit “the ap-
pearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions” to particular candidates. Id., at
27; see also Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 359 (“When
Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest
in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that
interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption”).

															     Spending large sums of
money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an
effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official
duties, does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor
does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may
garner “influence over or access to” elected officials
or political parties. Id., at 359; see McConnell v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And because
the Government’s interest in preventing the appearance of
corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption, the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of
mere influence or access. See Citizens United, 558 U. S., at
360.

															     The dissent advocates a
broader conception of corruption, and would apply the label to any
individual contributions above limits deemed necessary to protect
“collective speech.” Thus, under the dissent’s
view, it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates
but somehow corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth.

															     It is fair to say, as
Justice Stevens has, “that we have not always spoken about
corruption in a clear or consistent voice.” Id., at 447
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The definition
of corruption that we apply today, however, has firm roots in
Buckley itself. The Court in that case upheld base contribution
limits because they targeted “the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements” and “the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from public awareness” of such a system
of unchecked direct contributions. 424 U. S., at 27. Buckley
simultaneously rejected limits on spending that was less likely to
“be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.” Id., at 47. In any event, this case is not the
first in which the debate over the proper breadth of the
Government’s anticorruption interest has been engaged.
Compare Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 356–361 (majority
opinion), with id., at 447–460 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

															     The line between quid
pro quo corruption and general influence may seem vague at times,
but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard basic
First Amendment rights. In addition, “[i]n drawing that line,
the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting
political speech rather than suppressing it.” Federal
Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S.
449, 457 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.).

															     The dissent laments
that our opinion leaves only remnants of FECA and BCRA that are
inadequate to combat corruption. See post, at 2. Such rhetoric
ignores the fact that we leave the base limits undisturbed. [ 6 ] Those base limits remain
the primary means of regulating campaign contributions—the
obvious explanation for why the aggregate limits received a scant
few sentences of attention in Buckley. [ 7 ]

															B

															     “When the
Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of
proving the constitutionality of its actions.” United States
v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S., at 816. Here,
the Government seeks to carry that burden by arguing that the
aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing
quid pro quo corruption.

															     The difficulty is that
once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of
any amount. But Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit
indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do
not create a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no
corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it
is difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as
corruptible if given $1,801, and all others corruptible if given a
dime. And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be
corrupted by donations of up to $5,200, then the Government must
defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent
circumvention of the base limits.

															     The problem is that
they do not serve that function in any meaningful way. In light of
the various statutes and regulations currently in effect,
Buckley’s fear that an individual might “contribute
massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through the use
of unearmarked contributions” to entities likely to support
the candi- date, 424 U. S., at 38, is far too speculative.
And—importantly—we “have never accepted mere
conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.”
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 392
(2000) .

															     As an initial matter,
there is not the same risk of quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance when money flows through independent actors to a
candidate, as when a donor contributes to a candidate directly.
When an individual contributes to a candidate, a party committee,
or a PAC, the individual must by law cede control over the funds.
See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8); 11 CFR §110.6. The
Government admits that if the funds are subsequently re-routed to a
particular candidate, such action occurs at the initial
recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s. See Brief
for Appellee 37. As a consequence, the chain of attribution grows
longer, and any credit must be shared among the various actors
along the way. For those reasons, the risk of quid pro quo
corruption is generally applicable only to “the narrow
category of money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a
candidate or officeholder.” McConnell, 540 U. S., at 310
(opinion of Kennedy, J.).

															     Buckley nonetheless
focused on the possibility that “unearmarked
contributions” could eventually find their way to a
candidate’s coffers. 424 U. S., at 38. Even ac-cepting
the validity of Buckley’s circumvention theory, it is hard to
see how a candidate today could receive a “massive amount[ ]
of money” that could be traced back to a particular
contributor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. Ibid. The
Government offers a series of scenarios in support of that
possibility. But each is sufficiently implausible that the
Government has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the
aggregate limits further its anticircumvention interest.

															     The primary example of
circumvention, in one form or another, envisions an individual
donor who contributes the maximum amount under the base limits to a
particular candidate, say, Representative Smith. Then the donor
also channels “massive amounts of money” to Smith
through a series of contributions to PACs that have stated their
intention to support Smith. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee
35–37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 6.

															     Various earmarking and
antiproliferation rules disarm this example. Importantly, the donor
may not contribute to the most obvious PACs: those that support
only Smith. See 11 CFR §110.1(h)(1); see also §102.14(a).
Nor may the donor contribute to the slightly less obvious PACs that
he knows will route “a substantial portion” of his
contribution to Smith. §110.1(h)(2).

															     The donor must instead
turn to other PACs that are likely to give to Smith. When he does
so, however, he discovers that his contribution will be
significantly diluted by all the contributions from others to the
same PACs. After all, the donor cannot give more than $5,000 to a
PAC and so cannot dominate the PAC’s total receipts, as he
could when Buckley was decided. 2 U. S. C.
§441a(a)(1)(C). He cannot retain control over his
contribution, 11 CFR §110.1(h)(3), direct his money “in
any way” to Smith, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8), or
even imply that he would like his money to be recontributed to
Smith, 11 CFR §110.6(b)(1). His salience as a Smith supporter
has been diminished, and with it the potential for corruption.

															     It is not clear how
many candidates a PAC must support before our dedicated donor can
avoid being tagged with the impermissible knowledge that “a
substantial portion” of his contribution will go to Smith.
But imagine that the donor is one of ten equal donors to a PAC that
gives the highest possible contribution to Smith. [ 8 ] The PAC may give no more than $2,600 per
election to Smith. Of that sum, just $260 will be attributable to
the donor intent on circumventing the base limits. Thus far he has
hardly succeeded in funneling “massive amounts of
money” to Smith. Buckley, supra, at 38.

															     But what if this donor
does the same thing via, say, 100 different PACs? His $260
contribution will balloon to $26,000, ten times what he may
contribute directly to Smith in any given election.

															     This 100-PAC scenario
is highly implausible. In the first instance, it is not true that
the individual donor will necessarily have access to a sufficient
number of PACs to effectuate such a scheme. There are many PACs,
but they are not limitless. For the 2012 election cycle, the FEC
reported about 2,700 nonconnected PACs (excluding PACs that finance
independent expenditures only). And not every PAC that supports
Smith will work in this scheme: For our donor’s pro rata
share of a PAC’s contribution to Smith to remain meaningful,
the PAC must be funded by only a small handful of donors. The
antiproliferation rules, which were not in effect when Buckley was
decided, prohibit our donor from creating 100 pro-Smith PACs of his
own, or collaborating with the nine other donors to do so. See 2
U. S. C. §441a(a)(5) (“all contributions made
by political committees established or financed or maintained or
controlled by . . . any other person, or by any group of
such persons, shall be considered to have been made by a single
political committee”).

															     Moreover, if 100 PACs
were to contribute to Smith and few other candidates, and if
specific individuals like our ardent Smith supporter were to
contribute to each, the FEC could weigh those “circumstantial
factors” to determine whether to deem the PACs affiliated. 11
CFR §100.5(g)(4)(ii). The FEC’s analysis could take
account of a “common or overlapping membership” and
“similar patterns of contributions or contributors,”
among other considerations. §§100.5(g)(4)(ii)(D), (J).
The FEC has in the past initiated enforcement proceedings against
contributors with such suspicious patterns of PAC donations. See,
e.g., Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley, Matters Under
Review 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001).

															     On a more basic level,
it is hard to believe that a rational actor would engage in such
machinations. In the example described, a dedicated donor spent
$500,000—donating the full $5,000 to 100 different
PACs—to add just $26,000 to Smith’s campaign coffers.
That same donor, meanwhile, could have spent unlimited funds on
independent expenditures on behalf of Smith. See Buckley, 424
U. S., at 44–51. Indeed, he could have spent his entire
$500,000 advocating for Smith, without the risk that his selected
PACs would choose not to give to Smith, or that he would have to
share credit with other contributors to the PACs.

															     We have said in the
context of independent expenditures that “ ‘[t]he
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with
the candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate.’ ” Citizens
United, 558 U. S., at 357 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 47). But
probably not by 95 percent. And at least from the donor’s
point of view, it strikes us as far more likely that he will want
to see his full $500,000 spent on behalf of his favored
candidate—even if it must be spent independently—rather
than see it diluted to a small fraction so that it can be
contributed directly by someone else. [ 9 ]

															     Another circumvention
example is the one that apparently motivated the District Court. As
the District Court crafted the example, a donor gives a $500,000
check to a joint fundraising committee composed of a candidate, a
national party committee, and “most of the party’s
state party committees” (actually, 47 of the 50). 893
F. Supp. 2d, at 140. The committees divide up the money so
that each one receives the maximum contribution permissible under
the base limits, but then each transfers its allocated portion to
the same single committee. That committee uses the money for
coordinated expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate. If
that scenario “seem[s] unlikely,” the District Court
thought so, too. Ibid. But because the District Court could
“imagine” that chain of events, it held that the
example substantiated the Government’s circumvention
concerns. Ibid.

															     One problem, however,
is that the District Court’s speculation relies on illegal
earmarking. Lest there be any confusion, a joint fundraising
committee is simply a mechanism for individual committees to raise
funds collectively, not to circumvent base limits or earmarking
rules. See 11 CFR §102.17(c)(5). Under no circumstances may a
contribution to a joint fundraising committee result in an
allocation that exceeds the contribution limits applicable to its
constituent parts; the committee is in fact required to return any
excess funds to the contributor. See §102.17(c)(6)(i).

															     The District Court
assumed compliance with the specific allocation rules governing
joint fundraising committees, but it expressly based its example on
the premise that the donor would telegraph his desire to support
one candidate and that “many separate entities would
willingly serve as conduits for a single contributor’s
interests.” 893 F. Supp. 2d, at 140. Regardless whether
so many distinct entities would cooperate as a practical matter,
the earmarking provision prohibits an individual from directing
funds “through an intermediary or conduit” to a
particular candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441a(8). Even the
“implicit[ ]” agreement imagined by the District Court,
893 F. Supp. 2d, at 140, would trigger the earmarking
provision. See 11 CFR §110.6(b)(1). So this circumvention
scenario could not succeed without assuming that nearly 50 separate
party committees would engage in a transparent violation of the
earmarking rules (and that they would not be caught if they
did).

															     Moreover, the District
Court failed to acknowledge that its $500,000 example cannot apply
to most candidates. It crafted the example around a presidential
candidate, for whom donations in the thousands of dollars may not
seem remarkable—especially in comparison to the nearly $1.4
billion spent by the 2012 presidential candidates. The same example
cannot, however, be extrapolated to most House and Senate
candidates. Like contributions, coordinated expenditures are
limited by statute, with different limits based on the State and
the office. See 2 U. S. C. §441a(d)(3). The 2013
coordinated expenditure limit for most House races is $46,600, well
below the $500,000 in coordinated expenditures envisioned by the
District Court. The limit for Senate races varies significantly
based on state population. See 78 Fed. Reg. 8531 (2013). A scheme
of the magnitude imagined by the District Court would be possible
even in theory for no House candidates and the Senate candidates
from just the 12 most populous States. Ibid.

															     Further, to the extent
that the law does not foreclose the scenario described by the
District Court, experience and common sense do. The Government
provides no reason to believe that many state parties would
willingly participate in a scheme to funnel money to another
State’s candidates. A review of FEC data of Republican and
Democratic state party committees for the 2012 election cycle
reveals just 12 total instances in which a state party committee
contributed to a House or Senate candidate in another State. No
surprise there. The Iowa Democratic Party, for example, has little
reason to transfer money to the California Democratic Party,
especially when the Iowa Democratic Party would be barred for the
remainder of the election cycle from receiving another contribution
for its own activities from the particular donor.

															     These scenarios, along
with others that have been suggested, are either illegal under
current campaign finance laws or divorced from reality. The three
examples posed by the dissent are no exception. The dissent does
not explain how the large sums it postulates can be legally
rerouted to a particular candidate, why most state committees would
participate in a plan to redirect their donations to a candidate in
another State, or how a donor or group of donors can avoid
regulations prohibiting con- tributions to a committee “with
the knowledge that a substantial portion” of the contribution
will support a candidate to whom the donor has already contributed,
11 CFR §110.1(h)(2).

															     The dissent argues that
such knowledge may be difficult to prove, pointing to eight FEC
cases that did not proceed because of insufficient evidence of a
donor’s incriminating knowledge. See post, at 24–25. It
might be that such guilty knowledge could not be shown because the
donors were not guilty—a possibility that the dissent does
not entertain. In any event, the donors described in those eight
cases were typically alleged to have exceeded the base limits by
$5,000 or less. The FEC’s failure to find the requisite
knowledge in those cases hardly means that the agency will be
equally powerless to prevent a scheme in which a donor routes
millions of dollars in excess of the base limits to a particular
candidate, as in the dissent’s “Example Two.” And
if an FEC official cannot establish knowledge of circumvention (or
establish affiliation) when the same ten donors contribute $10,000
each to 200 newly created PACs, and each PAC writes a $10,000 check
to the same ten candidates—the dissent’s “Example
Three”—then that official has not a heart but a head of
stone. See post, at 19–20, 25.

															     The dissent concludes
by citing three briefs for the proposition that, even with the
aggregate limits in place, individuals “have transferred
large sums of money to specific candidates” in excess of the
base limits. Post, at 26. But the cited sources do not provide any
real-world examples of circumvention of the base limits along the
lines of the various hypotheticals. The dearth of FEC prosecutions,
according to the dissent, proves only that people are getting away
with it. And the violations that surely must be out there elude
detection “because in the real world, the methods of
achieving circumvention are more subtle and more complex”
than the hypothetical examples. Ibid. This sort of speculation,
however, cannot justify the substantial intrusion on First
Amendment rights at issue in this case.

															     Buckley upheld
aggregate limits only on the ground that they prevented channeling
money to candidates beyond the base limits. The absence of such a
prospect today belies the Government’s asserted objective of
preventing corruption or its appearance. The improbability of
circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits instead further
the impermissible objective of simply limiting the amount of money
in political campaigns.

															C

															     Quite apart from the
foregoing, the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment because
they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment
of associational freedoms.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25.
In the First Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is
not applying strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is
‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . .
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but
. . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.” Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox,
492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting In re R. M. J., 455
U. S. 191, 203 (1982) ). Here, because the statute is poorly
tailored to the Government’s interest in preventing
circumvention of the base limits, it impermissibly restricts
participation in the political process.

															1

															     The Government argues
that the aggregate limits are justified because they prevent an
individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might
subsequently recontribute a donation. After all, only recontributed
funds can conceivably give rise to circumvention of the base
limits. Yet all indications are that many types of recipients have
scant interest in regifting donations they receive.

															     Some figures might be
useful to put the risk of circumvention in perspective. We
recognize that no data can be marshaled to capture perfectly the
counterfactual world in which aggregate limits do not exist. But,
as we have noted elsewhere, we can nonetheless ask “whether
experience under the present law confirms a serious threat of
abuse.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 457 (2001) . It does
not. Experience suggests that the vast majority of contri- butions
made in excess of the aggregate limits are likely to be retained
and spent by their recipients rather than rerouted to
candidates.

															     In the 2012 election
cycle, federal candidates, political parties, and PACs spent a
total of $7 billion, according to the FEC. In particular, each
national political party’s spending ran in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. The National Republican Senatorial Committee
(NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC),
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), however, spent less than
$1 million each on direct candidate contributions and less than $10
million each on coordinated expenditures. Brief for NRSC
et al. as Amici Curiae 23, 25 (NRSC Brief). Including both
coordinated expenditures and direct candidate contributions, the
NRSC and DSCC spent just 7% of their total funds on contributions
to candidates and the NRCC and DCCC spent just 3%.

															     Likewise, as explained
previously, state parties rarely contribute to candidates in other
States. In the 2012 election cycle, the Republican and Democratic
state party committees in all 50 States (and the District of
Columbia) contributed a paltry $17,750 to House and Senate
candidates in other States. The state party committees spent over
half a billion dollars over the same time period, of which the
$17,750 in contributions to other States’ candidates
constituted just 0.003%.

															     As with national and
state party committees, candidates contribute only a small fraction
of their campaign funds to other candidates. Authorized candidate
committees may support other candidates up to a $2,000 base limit.
2 U. S. C. §432(e)(3)(B). In the 2012 election,
House candidates spent a total of $1.1 billion.
Candidate-to-candidate contributions among House candidates totaled
$3.65 million, making up just 0.3% of candidates’ overall
spending. NRSC Brief 29. The most that any one individual candidate
received from all other candidates was around $100,000. Brief for
Appellee 39. The fact is that candidates who receive campaign
contributions spend most of the money on themselves, rather than
passing along donations to other candidates. In this arena at
least, charity begins at home. [ 10 ]

															     Based on what we can
discern from experience, the indiscriminate ban on all
contributions above the aggregate limits is disproportionate to the
Government’s interest in preventing circumvention. The
Government has not given us any reason to believe that parties or
candidates would dramatically shift their priorities if the
aggregate limits were lifted. Absent such a showing, we cannot
conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropriately
tailored to guard against any contributions that might implicate
the Government’s anticircumvention interest.

															     A final point: It is
worth keeping in mind that the base limits themselves are a
prophylactic measure. As we have explained, “restrictions on
direct contributions are preventative, because few if any
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo
arrangements.” Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357. The
aggregate limits are then layered on top, ostensibly to prevent
circumvention of the base limits. This
“prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” requires that
we be particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law’s fit.
Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S., at 479 (opinion of
Roberts, C. J.); see McConnell, 540 U. S., at
268–269 (opinion of Thomas, J.).

															2

															     Importantly, there
are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve
the Government’s anticircumvention interest, while avoiding
“unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights.
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25.

															     The most obvious might
involve targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and
political committees. There are currently no such limits on
transfers among party committees and from candidates to party
committees. See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(4); 11 CFR
§113.2(c). Perhaps for that reason, a central concern of the
District Court, the Government, multiple amici curiae, and the
dissent has been the ability of party committees to transfer money
freely. If Congress agrees that this is problematic, it might
tighten its permissive transfer rules. Doing so would impose a
lesser burden on First Amendment rights, as compared to aggregate
limits that flatly ban contributions beyond certain levels. And
while the Government has not conceded that transfer restrictions
would be a perfect substitute for the aggregate limits, it has
recognized that they would mitigate the risk of circumvention. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.

															     One possible option for
restricting transfers would be to require contributions above the
current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated,
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients. Such a
solution would address the same circumvention possibilities as the
current aggregate limits, while not completely barring
contributions beyond the aggregate levels. In addition (or as an
alternative), if Congress believes that circumvention is especially
likely to occur through creation of a joint fundraising committee,
it could require that funds received through those committees be
spent by their recipients (or perhaps it could simply limit the
size of joint fundraising committees). Such alternatives to the
aggregate limits properly refocus the inquiry on the delinquent
actor: the recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who
then routes the money in a manner that undermines those limits. See
Citizens United, supra, at 360–361; cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U. S. 514 –530 (2001).

															     Indeed, Congress has
adopted transfer restrictions, and the Court has upheld them, in
the context of state party spending. See 2 U. S. C.
§441i(b). So-called “Levin funds” are donations
permissible under state law that may be spent on certain federal
election activity—namely, voter registration and
identification, get-out-the-vote efforts, or generic campaign
activities. Levin funds are raised directly by the state or local
party committee that ultimately spends them.
§441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). That means that other party committees may
not transfer Levin funds, solicit Levin funds on behalf of the
particular state or local committee, or engage in joint fundraising
of Levin funds. See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 171–173.
McConnell upheld those transfer restrictions as “justifiable
anticircumvention measures,” though it acknowledged that they
posed some associational burdens. Id., at 171. Here, a narrow
transfer restriction on contributions that could otherwise be
recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a similar
justification.

															     Other alternatives
might focus on earmarking. Many of the scenarios that the
Government and the dissent hy-pothesize involve at least implicit
agreements to circumvent the base limits—agreements that are
already prohibited by the earmarking rules. See 11 CFR §110.6.
The FEC might strengthen those rules further by, for exam- ple,
defining how many candidates a PAC must support in order to ensure
that “a substantial portion” of a do- nor’s
contribution is not rerouted to a certain candidate.
§110.1(h)(2). Congress might also consider a modified version
of the aggregate limits, such as one that prohibits donors who have
contributed the current maximum sums from further contributing to
political committees that have indicated they will support
candidates to whom the donor has already contributed. To be sure,
the existing earmarking provision does not define “the outer
limit of accept- able tailoring.” Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Comm., 533 U. S., at 462. But tighter rules could
have a significant effect, especially when adopted in concert with
other measures.

															     We do not mean to opine
on the validity of any particular proposal. The point is that there
are numerous al- ternative approaches available to Congress to
prevent circumvention of the base limits.

															D

															     Finally, disclosure
of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign
finance system. Disclosure requirements are in part
“justified based on a governmental interest in
‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the
sources of election-related spending.” Citizens United, 558
U. S., at 367 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 66). They may also
“deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the
light of publicity.” Id., at 67. Disclosure requirements
burden speech, but—unlike the aggregate limits—they do
not impose a ceiling on speech. Citizens United, supra, at 366; but
see McConnell, supra, at 275–277 (opinion of Thomas, J.). For
that reason, disclosure often represents a less restrictive
alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech.
See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 262 (1986) .

															     With modern technology,
disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the
voting public with information. In 1976, the Court observed that
Congress could regard disclosure as “only a partial
measure.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 28. That perception was
understandable in a world in which information about campaign
contributions was filed at FEC offices and was therefore virtually
inaccessible to the average member of the public. See Brief for
Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae 15–16. Today,
given the Internet, disclosure offers much more robust protections
against corruption. See Citizens United, supra, at 370–371.
Reports and databases are availa- ble on the FEC’s Web site
almost immediately after they are filed, supplemented by private
entities such as OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org. Because
massive quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a
mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible at the time
Buckley, or even McConnell, was decided.

															     The existing aggregate
limits may in fact encourage the movement of money away from
entities subject to dis-closure. Because individuals’ direct
contributions are limited, would-be donors may turn to other
avenues for political speech. See Citizens United, supra, at 364.
Individuals can, for example, contribute unlimited amounts to
501(c) organizations, which are not required to publicly disclose
their donors. See 26 U. S. C. §6104(d)(3). Such
organizations spent some $300 million on independent expenditures
in the 2012 election cycle.

															V

															     At oral argument, the
Government shifted its focus from Buckley’s anticircumvention
rationale to an argument that the aggregate limits deter corruption
regardless of their ability to prevent circumvention of the base
limits. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30, 50–52. The
Government argued that there is an opportunity for corruption
whenever a large check is given to a legislator, even if the check
consists of contributions within the base limits to be
appropriately divided among numerous candidates and committees. The
aggregate limits, the argument goes, ensure that the check amount
does not become too large. That new rationale for the aggregate
limits—embraced by the dissent, see post, at
15–17—does not wash. It dangerously broadens the
circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articu- lated
in our prior cases, and targets as corruption the general,
broad-based support of a political party.

															     In analyzing the base
limits, Buckley made clear that the risk of corruption arises when
an individual makes large contributions to the candidate or
officeholder himself. See 424 U. S., at 26–27.
Buckley’s analysis of the aggregate limit under FECA was
similarly confined. The Court noted that the aggregate limit
guarded against an individual’s funneling—through
circumvention—“massive amounts of money to a particular
candidate.” Id., at 38 (emphasis added). We have reiterated
that understanding several times. See, e.g., National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 497 (quid pro quo
corruption occurs when “[e]lected officials are influenced to
act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of
financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their
campaigns” (emphasis added)); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290,
297 (1981) (Buckley’s holding that contribution limits are
permissible “relates to the perception of undue influence of
large contributors to a candidate”); McConnell, 540
U. S., at 296 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (quid pro quo
corruption in Buckley involved “contributions that flowed to
a particular candidate’s benefit” (emphasis
added)).

															     Of course a candidate
would be pleased with a donor who contributed not only to the
candidate himself, but also to other candidates from the same
party, to party committees, and to PACs supporting the party. But
there is a clear, administrable line between money beyond the base
limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate—for
which the candidate feels obligated—and money within the base
limits given widely to a candidate’s party—for which
the candidate, like all other members of the party, feels
grateful.

															     When donors furnish
widely distributed support within all applicable base limits, all
members of the party or supporters of the cause may benefit, and
the leaders of the party or cause may feel particular gratitude.
That gratitude stems from the basic nature of the party system, in
which party members join together to further common political
beliefs, and citizens can choose to support a party because they
share some, most, or all of those beliefs. See Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208 –216 (1986). To
recast such shared interest, standing alone, as an opportunity for
quid pro quo corruption would dramatically expand government
regulation of the political process. Cf. California Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 –573 (2000) (recognizing
the Government’s “role to play in structuring and
monitoring the election process,” but rejecting “the
proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First
Amendment protections”).

															     The Government suggests
that it is the solicitation of large contributions that poses the
danger of corruption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30,
38–39, 50–51; see also post, at 15–16, 20, but
the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by
an officeholder or candidate. Cf. McConnell, supra, at
298–299, 308 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (rejecting a ban on
“soft money” contributions to national parties, but
approving a ban on the solicitation of such contributions as
“a direct and necessary regulation of federal
candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of
quids”). We have no occasion to consider a law that would
specifically ban candidates from soliciting donations—within
the base limits—that would go to many other candidates, and
would add up to a large sum. For our purposes here, it is enough
that the aggregate limits at issue are not directed specifically to
candidate behavior.

															*  *  *

															     For the past 40
years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need
to preserve authority for the Government to combat corruption,
without at the same time compromising the political responsiveness
at the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government
to favor some participants in that process over others. As Edmund
Burke explained in his famous speech to the electors of Bristol, a
representative owes constituents the exercise of his “mature
judgment,” but judgment informed by “the strictest
union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved
communication with his constituents.” The Speeches of the
Right Hon. Edmund Burke 129–130 (J. Burke ed. 1867).
Constituents have the right to support candidates who share their
views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent
orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to
those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the very concept of
self-governance through elected officials.

															     The Government has a
strong interest, no less critical to our democratic system, in
combatting corruption and its appearance. We have, however, held
that this interest must be limited to a specific kind of
corruption—quid pro quo corruption—in order to ensure
that the Government’s efforts do not have the effect of
restricting the First Amendment right of citizens to choose who
shall govern them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the
aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only
governmental interest this Court accepted as legitimate in Buckley.
They instead intrude without justification on a citizen’s
ability to exercise “the most fundamental First Amendment
activities.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14.

															     The judgment of the
District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 There are six authorized
national party committees: the Republican National Committee, the
Democratic National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial
Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the
National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee. See . 2 A PAC is a business,
labor, or interest group that raises or spends money in connection
with a federal election, in some cases by contributing to
candidates. A so-called “Super PAC” is a PAC that makes
only independent expenditures and cannot contribute to candidates.
The base and aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional
PACs, but not to independent expenditure PACs. See SpeechNow.org v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 599 F. 3d 686, 695–696 (CADC
2010) (en banc). 3 A multicandidate PAC is a
PAC with more than 50 contributors that has been registered for at
least six months and has made contributions to five or more
candidates for federal office. 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3) (2012).
PACs that do not qualify as multicandidate PACs must abide by the
base limit applicable to individual contributions. 4 The dissent contends that
we should remand for development of an evidentiary record before
answering the question with which we were presented. See post, at
28–30 (opinion of Breyer, J). But the parties have treated
the question as a purely legal one, and the Government has insisted
that the aggregate limits can be upheld under the existing record
alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 55–56. We take the case as it
comes to us. 5 See, e.g., Felsenthal,
Obama Attends Fundraiser Hosted by Jay-Z, Beyonce, Reuters, Sept.
18, 2012; Coleman, Kid Rock Supports Paul Ryan at Campaign
Fundraiser, Rolling Stone, Aug. 25, 2012; Mason, Robert Duvall to
Host Romney Fundraiser, L. A. Times, July 25, 2012; Piazza,
Hillary Lands 2.5M with Rocket Man, N. Y. Daily News, Apr. 10,
2008, p. 2. 6 The fact that this
opinion does not address the base limits also belies the
dissent’s concern that we have silently overruled the
Court’s holding in McConnell v. Federal Election
Comm’n, . See post, at 12–13. At issue in McConnell was
BCRA’s extension of the base limits to so-called “soft
money”—previously unregulated contributions to national
party committees. See 540 U. S., at 142; see also post, at
31–38 (appendix A to opinion of Breyer, J.) (excerpts from
McConnell record discussing unregulated “soft money”).
Our holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits
clearly does not overrule McConnell’s holding about
“soft money.” 7 It would be especially
odd to regard aggregate limits as essential to enforce base limits
when state campaign finance schemes typically include base limits
but not aggregate limits. Just eight of the 38 States that have
imposed base limits on contributions from individuals to candidates
have also imposed aggregate limits (excluding restrictions on a
specific subset of donors). See Conn. Gen. Stat.
§9–611(c) (2013); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A,
§1015(3) (Supp. 2013); Md. Elec. Law Code Ann.
§13–226(b) (Lexis Supp. 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55,
§7A(a)(5) (West 2012); N. Y. Elec. Law Ann.
§14–114(8) (West Supp. 2013); R. I. Gen. Laws
§17–25–10.1(a)(1) (Lexis 2013); Wis. Stat.
§11.26(4) (2007–2008); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§22–25–102(c)(ii) (2013). The Government presents
no evidence concerning the circumvention of base limits from the 30
States with base limits but no aggregate limits. 8 Even those premises are
generous because they assume that the donor contributes to
non-multicandidate PACs, which are relatively rare. Multicandidate
PACs, by contrast, must have more than 50 contributors. 11 CFR
§100.5(e)(3). The more contributors, of course, the more the
donor’s share in any eventual contribution to Smith is
diluted. 9 The Justice Department
agrees. As Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman recently
testified before Congress: “We anticipate seeing fewer cases
of conduit contributions directly to campaign committees or
parties, because individuals or corporations who wish to influence
elections or officials will no longer need to attempt to do so
through conduit contribution schemes that can be criminally
prosecuted. Instead, they are likely to simply make unlimited
contributions to Super PACs or 501(c)s.” Hearing on Current
Issues in Campaign Finance Law Enforcement before the Subcommittee
on Crime and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
113th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (2013). 10 In
addition, the percentage of contributions above the aggregate
limits that even could be used for circumvention is limited by the
fact that many of the modes of potential circumvention can be used
only once each election. For example, if one donor gives $2,600 to
100 candidates with safe House seats in the hopes that each
candidate will reroute $2,000 to Representative Smith, a candidate
in a contested district, no other donor can do the same, because
the candidates in the safe seats will have exhausted their
permissible contributions to Smith. So there is no risk that the
circumvention scheme will repeat itself with multiple other
would-be donors to Smith. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–536

															_________________

															SHAUN McCUTCHEON, et al., APPELLANTS v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the district of columbia

															[April 2, 2014]

															     Justice Thomas,
concurring in the judgment.

															     I adhere to the view
that this Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), denigrates core First Amendment
speech and should be overruled. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U. S. 230 –267 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment); Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539
U. S. 146 –165 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Federal
Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm., 533 U. S. 431 –466 (2001) (Colorado II) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528
U. S. 377 –420 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n,
518 U. S. 604 –640 (1996) (Colorado I ) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).

															     Political speech is
“ ‘the primary object of First Amendment
protection’ ” and “the lifeblood of a
self-governing people.” Colorado II, supra, at 465–466
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Contributions to political campaigns, no
less than direct expenditures, “generate essential political
speech” by fostering discussion of public issues and can-
didate qualifications. Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also id., at 410–411. Buckley itself
recognized that both contribution and expenditure limits
“operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities” and “implicate fundamental First Amendment
interests.” 424 U. S., at 14, 23. But instead of
treating political giving and political spending alike, Buckley
distinguished the two, embracing a bifurcated standard of review
under which contribution limits receive less rigorous scrutiny.
Id., at 25.

															     As I have explained
before, “[t]he analytic foundation of Buckley . . . was
tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in
the intervening years.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412
(Thomas, J., dissenting). To justify a lesser standard of review
for contribution limits, Buckley relied on the premise that
contributions are different in kind from direct expenditures. None
of the Court’s bases for that premise withstands careful
review. The linchpin of the Court’s analysis was its
assertion that “[w]hile contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present
views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.” 424 U. S., at 21. But that
“ ‘speech by proxy’ ” rationale
quickly breaks down, given that “[e]ven in the case of a
direct expenditure, there is usually some go-between that
facilitates the dissemination of the spender’s
message—for instance, an advertising agency or a television
station.” Colorado I, supra, at 638–639 (opinion of
Thomas, J.). Moreover, we have since rejected the
“ ‘proxy speech’ ” approach as
affording insufficient First Amendment protection to “the
voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently
wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own
resources.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 495 (1985)
; see Shrink Missouri, supra, at 413–414 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).

															     The remaining
justifications Buckley provided are also flawed. For example,
Buckley claimed that contribution limits entail only a
“marginal” speech restriction because “[a]
contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying
basis for the support.” 424 U. S., at 20, 21. But this
Court has never required a speaker to explain the reasons for his
position in order to obtain full First Amendment protection.
Instead, we have consistently held that speech is protected even
“when the underlying basis for a position is not
given.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415, n. 3 (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S.
43, 46 (1994) (sign reading “For Peace in the Gulf”);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 –416 (1989) (flag
burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U. S. 503 –511 (1969) (black armband signifying
opposition to Vietnam War); see also Colorado I, supra, at 640
(opinion of Thomas, J.) (“Even a pure message of support,
unadorned with reasons, is valuable to the democratic
process”)

															     Equally unpersuasive is
Buckley’s suggestion that contribution limits warrant less
stringent review because “[t]he quantity of communication by
the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution,” and “[a]t most, the size of the
contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the
contributor’s support for the candidate.” 424
U. S., at 21. Contributions do in- crease the quantity of
communication by “amplifying the voice of the
candidate” and “help[ing] to ensure the dissemination
of the messages that the contributor wishes to convey.”
Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415 (Thomas, J., dissenting). They also
serve as a quantifiable metric of the intensity of a particular
contributor’s support, as demonstrated by the frequent
practice of giving different amounts to different candidates.
Buckley simply failed to recognize that “we have accorded
full First Amendment protection to expressions of intensity.”
Id., at 415, n. 3; see also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15
–26 (1971) (protecting the use of an obscenity for
emphasis).

															     Although today’s
decision represents a faithful application of our precedents, the
plurality’s discussion of Buckley omits any reference to
these discarded rationales. Instead, the plurality alludes only to
Buckley’s last remaining reason for devaluing political
contributions relative to expenditures. See ante, at 8 (quoting
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21). The relevant sentence from Buckley
reads as follows:

															“A limitation on the amount of money
a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus
involves little direct restraint on his political commu- nication,
for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the
contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and
issues.” Ibid.

															That proposition, read in full, cannot be
squared with a key premise of today’s decision.

															     Among the
Government’s justifications for the aggregate limits set
forth in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) is that
“an individual can engage in the ‘symbolic act of
contributing’ to as many entities as he wishes.” Brief
for Appellee 20. That is, the Government contends that aggregate
limits are constitutional as long as an individual can still
contribute some token amount (a dime, for example) to each of his
preferred candidates. The plurality, quite correctly, rejects that
argument, noting that “[i]t is no answer to say that the
individual can simply contribute less money to more people.”
Ante, at 16. That is so because “[t]o require one person to
contribute at lower levels than others because he wants to support
more candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on broader
participation in the democratic process.” Ibid.

															     What the plurality does
not recognize is that the same logic also defeats the reasoning
from Buckley on which the plurality purports to rely. Under the
plurality’s analysis, limiting the amount of money a person
may give to a candidate does impose a direct restraint on his
political communication; if it did not, the aggregate limits at
issue here would not create “a special burden on broader
participation in the democratic process.” Ibid. I am wholly
in agreement with the plurality’s conclusion on this point:
“[T]he Government may not penalize an individual for
‘robustly exercis[ing]’ his First Amendment
rights.” Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 739 (2008) ). I regret only that
the plurality does not acknowledge that today’s decision,
although purporting not to overrule Buckley, continues to chip away
at its footings.

															     In sum, what remains of
Buckley is a rule without a rationale. Contributions and
expenditures are simply “two sides of the same First
Amendment coin,” and our ef- forts to distinguish the two
have produced mere “word games” rather than any
cognizable principle of constitutional law. Buckley, supra, at 241,
244 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For that reason, I would overrule Buckley and subject the
aggregate limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, which they would
surely fail. See Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 640–641
(opinion of Thomas, J.) (“I am convinced that under
traditional strict scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both
spending and giving in the political process . . . are
unconstitutional”).

															     This case represents
yet another missed opportunity to right the course of our campaign
finance jurisprudence by restoring a standard that is faithful to
the First Amendment. Until we undertake that reexamination, we
remain in a “halfway house” of our own design. Shrink
Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). For
these reasons, I concur only in the judgment. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–536

															_________________

															SHAUN McCUTCHEON, et al., APPELLANTS v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the district of columbia

															[April 2, 2014]

															     Justice Breyer, with
whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join,
dissenting.

															     Nearly 40 years ago in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), this Court
considered the constitutionality of laws that imposed limits upon
the overall amount a single person can contribute to all federal
candidates, political parties, and committees taken together. The
Court held that those limits did not violate the Constitution. Id.,
at 38; accord, McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540
U. S. 93 , n. 40, 152–153, n. 48 (2003)
(citing with approval Buckley’s aggregate limits
holding).

															     The Buckley Court
focused upon the same problem that concerns the Court today, and it
wrote:

															“The overall $25,000 ceiling does
impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and
committees with which an individual may associate himself by means
of financial support. But this quite modest restraint upon
protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the
$1,000 contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise
contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate
through the use of unearmarked contributions to political
committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge
contributions to the candidate’s political party. The
limited, additional restriction on associa-tional freedom imposed
by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the
basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be
constitutionally valid.” 424 U. S., at 38.

															     Today a majority of the
Court overrules this holding. It is wrong to do so. Its conclusion
rests upon its own, not a record-based, view of the facts. Its
legal analysis is faulty: It misconstrues the nature of the
competing constitutional interests at stake. It understates the
importance of protecting the political integrity of our
governmental insti- tutions. It creates a loophole that will allow
a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a
political party or to a candidate’s campaign. Taken together
with Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558
U. S. 310 (2010) , today’s decision eviscerates our
Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable
of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that
those laws were intended to resolve.

															I

															     The plurality
concludes that the aggregate contribution limits
“ ‘unnecessar[ily] abridg[e]’ ”
First Amendment rights. Ante, at 8, 30 (quoting Buckley, supra, at
25). It notes that some individuals will wish to “spen[d]
‘substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [their]
political ideas through sophisticated’ means.” Ante, at
14–15 (quoting Federal Election Comm’n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 493 (1985)
(NCPAC)). Aggregate contribution ceilings limit an
individual’s ability to engage in such “broader
participation in the democratic process,” while
insufficiently advancing any legitimate governmental objective.
Ante, at 16, 21–29. Hence, the plurality finds, they violate
the Constitution.

															     The plurality’s
conclusion rests upon three separate but related claims. Each is
fatally flawed. First, the plurality says that given the base
limits on contributions to candi-dates and political committees,
aggregate limits do not further any independent governmental
objective worthy of protection. And that is because, given the base
limits, “[s]pending large sums of money in connection with
elections” does not “give rise to . . .
corruption.” Ante, at 19. In making this argument, the
plurality relies heavily upon a narrow definition of
“corruption” that excludes efforts to obtain
“ ‘influence over or access to’ elected
officials or political parties. ” Ibid. (quoting
Citizens United, supra, at 359); accord, ante, at 18–20,
22–29.

															     Second, the plurality
assesses the instrumental objective of the aggregate limits,
namely, safeguarding the base limits. It finds that they “do
not serve that function in any meaningful way.” Ante, at
22.  That is because, even without the aggregate limits, the
possibilities for circumventing the base limits are
“implausible” and “divorced from reality.”
Ante, at 23, 24, 28.

															     Third, the plurality
says the aggregate limits are not a
“ ‘reasonable’ ” policy tool.
Rather, they are “poorly tailored to the Government’s
interest in preventing circumvention of the base limits.”
Ante, at 30 (quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v.
Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989) ). The plurality imagines
several alternative regulations that it says might just as
effectively thwart circumvention. Accordingly, it finds, the
aggregate caps are out of “ ‘proportion to the
[anticorruption] interest served.’ ” Ante, at 30
(quoting Fox, supra, at 480).

															II

															     The plurality’s
first claim—that large aggregate contributions do not
“give rise” to “corruption”—is
plausible only because the plurality defines
“corruption” too narrowly. The plurality describes the
constitutionally permissible objective of campaign finance
regulation as follows: “Congress may target only a specific
type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’
corruption.” Ante, at 19. It then defines quid pro quo
corruption to mean no more than “a direct exchange of an
official act for money”—an act akin to bribery. Ante,
at 2–3. It adds specifically that corruption does not include
efforts to “garner ‘influence over or access to’
elected officials or political parties.” Ante, at 19 (quoting
Citizens United, supra, at 359). Moreover, the Government’s
efforts to prevent the “appearance of corruption” are
“equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo
corruption,” as narrowly defined. Ante, at 19. In the
plurality’s view, a federal statute could not prevent an
individual from writing a million dollar check to a political party
(by donating to its various committees), because the rationale for
any limit would “dangerously broade[n] the circumscribed
definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior
cases.” Ante, at 37.

															     This critically
important definition of “corruption” is inconsistent
with the Court’s prior case law (with the possible exception
of Citizens United, as I will explain below). It is virtually
impossible to reconcile with this Court’s decision in
McConnell, upholding the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA). And it misun- derstands the constitutional importance of
the interests at stake. In fact, constitutional
interests—indeed, First Amendment interests—lie on both
sides of the legal equation.

															A

															     In reality, as the
history of campaign finance reform shows and as our earlier cases
on the subject have recognized, the anticorruption interest that
drives Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far
broader, more important interest than the plurality acknowledges.
It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public
governmental institutions. And it is an interest rooted in the
Constitution and in the First Amendment itself.

															     Consider at least one
reason why the First Amendment protects political speech. Speech
does not exist in a vac- uum. Rather, political communication seeks
to secure government action. A politically oriented
“marketplace of ideas” seeks to form a public opinion
that can and will influence elected representatives.

															     This is not a new idea.
Eighty-seven years ago, Justice Brandeis wrote that the First
Amendment’s protection of speech was “essential to
effective democracy.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S.
357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). Chief Justice Hughes
reiterated the same idea shortly thereafter: “A fundamental
principle of our constitutional system” is the
“maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion
to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369
(1931) (emphasis added). In Citizens United, the Court stated that
“[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is
the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” 558
U. S., at 339 (emphasis added).

															     The Framers had good
reason to emphasize this same connection between political speech
and governmental action. An influential 18th-century continental
philosopher had argued that in a representative democracy, the
people lose control of their representatives between elections,
during which interim periods they were “in chains.” J.
Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social Contract
265–266 (transl. 1791).

															     The Framers responded
to this criticism both by requiring frequent elections to federal
office, and by enacting a First Amendment that would facilitate a
“chain of communication between the people, and those, to
whom they have committed the exercise of the powers of
government.” J. Wilson, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States of America 30–31 (1792). This
“chain” would establish the necessary “communion
of interests and sympathy of sentiments” between the people
and their representatives, so that public opinion could be
channeled into effective governmental action. The Federalist No.
57, p. 386 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T.
Benton, 1 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to
1856, p. 141 (1857) (explaining that the First Amendment will
strengthen American democracy by giving “ ‘the
people’ ” a right to “ ‘publicly
address their representatives,’ ”
“ ‘privately advise them,’ ” or
“ ‘declare their sentiments by petition to the
whole body’ ” (quoting James Madison)).
Accordingly, the First Amendment advances not only the
individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also
the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in
which collective speech matters.

															     What has this to do
with corruption? It has everything to do with corruption.
Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary “chain of
communication” between the people and their representatives.
It derails the essential speech-to-government-action tie. Where
enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.
Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought and
political action, a free marketplace of political ideas loses its
point. That is one reason why the Court has stressed the
constitutional importance of Congress’ concern that a few
large donations not drown out the voices of the many. See, e.g.,
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26–27.

															     That is also why the
Court has used the phrase “subversion of the political
process” to describe circumstances in which “[e]lected
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of
office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions
of money into their campaigns.” NCPAC, 470 U. S., at
497. See also Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 208 (1982) (the Government’s
interests in preventing corruption “directly implicate the
integrity of our electoral process” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). See generally R. Post, Citizens Divided:
Campaign Fi-nance Reform and the Constitution 7–16,
80–94 (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the efficacy of
American democ- racy depends on “electoral integrity”
and the responsiveness of public officials to public opinion).

															     The “appearance
of corruption” can make matters worse. It can lead the public
to believe that its efforts to communicate with its representatives
or to help sway public opinion have little purpose. And a cynical
public can lose interest in political participation altogether. See
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 390
(2000) (“[T]he cynical assumption that large donors call the
tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance”). Democracy, the Court has often said,
cannot work unless “the people have faith in those who
govern.” United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co.,
364 U. S. 520, 562 (1961) .

															     The upshot is that the
interests the Court has long described as preventing
“corruption” or the “appearance of
corruption” are more than ordinary factors to be weighed
against the constitutional right to political speech. Rather, they
are interests rooted in the First Amendment it- self. They are
rooted in the constitutional effort to create a democracy
responsive to the people—a government where laws reflect the
very thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of
which the First Amendment protects. Given that end, we can and
should understand campaign finance laws as resting upon a broader
and more significant constitutional rationale than the plural-
ity’s limited definition of “corruption”
suggests. We should see these laws as seeking in significant part
to strengthen, rather than weaken, the First Amendment. To say this
is not to deny the potential for conflict between (1) the need to
permit contributions that pay for the diffusion of ideas, and (2)
the need to limit payments in order to help maintain the integrity
of the electoral process. But that conflict takes place within, not
outside, the First Amendment’s boundaries.

															B

															     Since the kinds of
corruption that can destroy the link between public opinion and
governmental action extend well beyond those the plurality
describes, the plurality’s notion of corruption is flatly
inconsistent with the basic constitutional rationale I have just
described. Thus, it should surprise no one that this Court’s
case law (Citizens United excepted) insists upon a considerably
broader definition.

															     In Buckley, for
instance, the Court said explicitly that aggregate limits were
constitutional because they helped “prevent evasion . . .
[through] huge contributions to the candidate’s political
party,” 424 U. S., at 26 (the contrary to what the
plurality today seems to believe, see ante, at 36–39).
Moreover, Buckley upheld the base limits in significant part
because they helped thwart “the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.” 424 U. S., at 27 (emphasis added). And it
said that Congress could reasonably conclude that criminal laws
forbidding “the giving and taking of bribes” did not
adequately “deal with the reality or appearance of
corruption.” Id., at 28. Bribery laws, the Court recognized,
address “only the most blatant and specific attempts of those
with money to influence governmental action.” Ibid. The
concern with corruption extends further.

															     Other cases put the
matter yet more strongly. In Beaumont, for example, the Court found
constitutional a ban on direct contributions by corporations
because of the need to prevent corruption, properly
“understood not only as quid pro quo agreements, but also as
undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment.” Federal
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146 –156
(2003). In Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 –460 (2001) (Colo-
rado II ), the Court upheld limits imposed upon coordinated
expenditures among parties and candidates because it found they
thwarted corruption and its appearance, again understood as
including “undue influence” by wealthy donors. In
Shrink Missouri, the Court upheld limitations imposed by the
Missouri Legislature upon contributions to state political
candidates, not only because of the need to prevent bribery, but
also because of “the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” 528
U. S., at 389.

															C

															     Most important, in
McConnell, this Court considered the constitutionality of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, an Act that set new limits
on “soft money” contributions to political parties.
“Soft money” referred to funds that, prior to BCRA,
were freely donated to parties for activities other than directly
helping elect a federal candidate—activities such as voter
registration, “get out the vote” drives, and
advertising that did not expressly advocate a federal
candidate’s election or defeat. 540 U. S., at
122–124. BCRA imposed a new ban on soft money contributions
to national party committees, and greatly curtailed them in respect
to state and local parties. Id., at 133–134,
161–164.

															     The Court in McConnell
upheld these new contribution restrictions under the First
Amendment for the very reason the plurality today discounts or
ignores. Namely, the Court found they thwarted a significant risk
of cor- ruption—understood not as quid pro quo bribery, but
as privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected
representatives.

															     In reaching its
conclusion in McConnell, the Court relied upon a vast record
compiled in the District Court. That record consisted of over
100,000 pages of material and included testimony from more than 200
witnesses. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (DC 2003) (per
curiam). What it showed, in detail, was the web of relationships
and un- derstandings among parties, candidates, and large donors
that underlies privileged access and influence. See McConnell, 540
U. S., at 146–152, 154–157, 167–171,
182–184. The District Judges in McConnell made clear that the
record did “not contain any evidence of bribery or vote
buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money.” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 481 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (emphasis
added). Indeed, no one had identified a “single discrete
instance of quid pro quo corruption” due to soft money. Id.,
at 395 (opinion of Henderson, J.). But what the record did
demonstrate was that enormous soft money contributions, ranging
between $1 million and $5 million among the largest donors, enabled
wealthy contributors to gain disproportionate “access to
federal lawmakers” and the ability to “influenc[e]
legislation.” Id., at 481 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
There was an indisputable link between generous political donations
and opportunity after opportunity to make one’s case directly
to a Member of Congress.

															     Testimony by elected
officials supported this conclusion. See, e.g., ibid.
(“ ‘Large donors of both hard and soft money
receive special treatment’ ” (Sen. Simpson)); id.,
at 482 (“ ‘Donations, including soft money
donations to political parties, do affect how Congress operates.
It’s only natural, and happens all too often, that a busy
Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning
the call of a large soft money donor’ ” (Sen.
Boren)); id., at 496 (“ ‘At a minimum, large soft
money donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make
their case to elected officials . . .’ ” (Sen.
McCain)). Furthermore, testimony from party operatives showed that
national political parties had created “major donor
programs,” through which they openly “offer[ed] greater
access to federal office holders as the donations gr[e]w
larger.” Id., at 502. I have placed in Appendix A more
examples of the kind of evidence that filled the District Court
record in McConnell.

															     This Court upheld
BCRA’s limitations on soft money contributions by relying on
just the kind of evidence I have described. We wrote:

															“The evidence in the record shows
that candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the
soft-money loophole, the former to increase their prospects of
election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders
. . . . Plaintiffs argue that without concrete evidence of an
instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a
vote [in exchange for soft money] . . . , Congress has not shown
that there exists real or apparent corruption. . . . [P]laintiffs
conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly
established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance
of such influence.’ ” 540 U. S., at 146,
149–150 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 441;
emphasis added; paragraphs and paragraph breaks omitted).

															We specifically rejected efforts to define
“corruption” in ways similar to those the plurality
today accepts. We added:

															“Just as troubling to a functioning
democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that
officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires
of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions valued by the
officeholder.” 540 U. S., at 153.

															Insofar as today’s decision sets forth a
significantly nar-rower definition of “corruption,” and
hence of the public’s interest in political integrity, it is
flatly inconsistent with McConnell.

															D

															     One case, however,
contains language that offers the plurality support. That case is
Citizens United. There, as the plurality points out, ante, at 19,
the Court said that “[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo
corruption.” 558 U. S., at 359. Further, the Court said that
quid pro quo corruption does not include “influence over or
access to elected officials,” because “ ‘generic
favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First
Amendment analyses.’ ” Ibid. (quoting McConnell, supra,
at 296 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part)).

															     How should we treat
these statements from Citizens United now? They are not essential
to the Court’s holding in the case—at least insofar as
it can be read to require federal law to treat corporations and
trade unions like individuals when they independently pay for,
e.g., television advertising during the last 60 days of a federal
election. Citizens United, supra, at 365. Taken literally, the
statements cited simply refer to and characterize still-earlier
Court cases. They do not require the more absolute reading that the
plurality here gives them.

															     More than that. Read as
the plurality reads them today, the statements from Citizens United
about the proper contours of the corruption rationale conflict not
just with language in the McConnell opinion, but with
McConnell’s very holding. See supra, at 9–11. Did the
Court in Citizens United intend to overrule McConnell? I doubt it,
for if it did, the Court or certainly the dissent would have said
something about it. The total silence of all opinions in Citizens
United with respect to this matter argues strongly in favor of
treating the language quoted above as dic- tum, as an
overstatement, or as limited to the context in which it appears.
Citizens United itself contains language that supports the last
mentioned reading, for it says that “[Buckley] did not extend
this rationale [about the reality or appearance of corruption] to
independent expenditures, and the Court does not do so here.”
558 U. S., at 357 (emphasis added). And it adds that, while
“[t]he BCRA record establishes that certain donations to
political parties, called ‘soft money,’ were made to
gain access to elected officials,” “[t]his case,
however, is about independent expenditures, not soft money.”
Id., at 360–361 (emphasis added).

															     The plurality’s
use of Citizens United’s narrow definition of corruption
here, however, is a different matter. That use does not come
accompanied with a limiting context (independent expenditures by
corporations and unions) or limiting language. It applies to the
whole of campaign finance regulation. And, as I have pointed out,
it is flatly inconsistent with the broader definition of corruption
upon which McConnell’s holding depends.

															     So: Does the Court
intend today to overrule McConnell? Or does it intend to leave
McConnell and BCRA in place? The plurality says the latter. Ante,
at 20–21, n. 6 (“Our holding about the
constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not overrule
McConnell’s holding about ‘soft
money’ ”). But how does the plurality explain its
rejection of the broader definition of corruption, upon which
McConnell’s holding depends? Compare ante, at 18–21,
with McConnell, 540 U. S., at 146, 149–153.

															III

															     The plurality
invalidates the aggregate contribution limits for a second reason.
It believes they are no longer needed to prevent contributors from
circumventing federal limits on direct contributions to
individuals, political parties, and political action committees.
Ante, at 22–29. Cf. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 (aggregate
limits “prevent evasion” of base contribution limits).
Other “campaign finance laws,” combined with
“experience” and “common sense,” foreclose
the various circumvention scenarios that the Government
hypothesizes. Ante, at 28. Accordingly, the plurality concludes,
the aggregate limits provide no added benefit.

															     The plurality is wrong.
Here, as in Buckley, in the absence of limits on aggregate
political contributions, donors can and likely will find ways to
channel millions of dollars to parties and to individual
candidates, producing precisely the kind of
“corruption” or “appearance of corruption”
that previously led the Court to hold aggregate limits
constitutional. Those opportunities for circumvention will also
produce the type of corruption that concerns the plurality today.
The methods for using today’s opinion to evade the
law’s individual contribution limits are complex, but they
are well known, or will become well known, to party fundraisers. I
shall describe three.

															A

															     Example One: Gifts
for the Benefit of the Party. Campaign finance law permits each
individual to give $64,800 over two years to a national party
committee. 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1)(B); 78 Fed. Reg.
8532 (2013). The two major political parties each have three
national committees. Ante, at 4, n. 1. Federal law also
entitles an individual to give $20,000 to a state party committee
over two years. §441a(a)(1)(D). Each major political party has
50 such committees. Those individual limits mean that, in the
absence of any aggregate limit, an individual could legally give to
the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party about $1.2 million
over two years. See Appendix B, Table 1, infra, at 39. To make it
easier for contributors to give gifts of this size, each party
could create a “Joint Party Committee,” comprising all
of its national and state party committees. The titular heads could
be the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority
Leader of the House. A contributor could then write a single check
to the Joint Party Committee—and its staff would divide the
funds so that each constituent unit receives no more than it could
obtain from the contributor directly ($64,800 for a national
committee over two years, $20,000 for a state committee over the
same). Before today’s decision, the total size of Rich
Donor’s check to the Joint Party Committee was capped at
$74,600—the aggregate limit for donations to political
parties over a 2-year election cycle. See §441a(a)(3)(B); 78
Fed. Reg. 8532. After today’s decision, Rich Donor can write
a single check to the Joint Party Committee in an amount of about
$1.2 million.

															     Will political parties
seek these large checks? Why not? The recipient national and state
committees can spend the money to buy generic party advertisements,
say television commercials or bumper stickers saying “Support
Republicans,” “Support Democrats,” or the like.
They also can transfer the money to party committees in
battleground States to increase the chances of winning hotly
contested seats. See §441a(a)(4) (permitting national or state
po- litical committees to make unlimited “transfers” to
other committees “of the same political party”).

															     Will party officials
and candidates solicit these large contributions from wealthy
donors? Absolutely. Such con- tributions will help increase the
party’s power, as well as the candidate’s standing
among his colleagues.

															     Will elected officials
be particularly grateful to the large donor, feeling obliged to
provide him special access and influence, and perhaps even a quid
pro quo legislative favor? That is what we have previously
believed. See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 182 (“Large soft-money
donations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest
give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by
contributions made directly to the candidate or
officeholder”); id., at 308 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(“The making of a solicited gift is a quid both to the
recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the
payment”); Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 460, n. 23
(explaining how a candidate can “become a player [in his
party] beyond his own race” by “directing donations to
the party and making sure that the party knows who raised the
money,” and that “the donor’s influence is
multiplied” in such instances). And, as the statements
collected in Appendix A, infra, make clear, we have believed this
with good reason.

															     Example Two: Donations
to Individual Candidates (The $3.6 Million Check). The first
example significantly understates the problem. That is because
federal election law also allows a single contributor to give
$5,200 to each party candidate over a 2-year election cycle
(assuming the candidate is running in both a primary and a general
election). §441a(a)(1)(A); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. There are 435
party candidates for House seats and 33 party candidates for Senate
seats in any given election year. That makes an additional $2.4
million in allowable contributions. Thus, without an aggregate
limit, the law will permit a wealthy individual to write a check,
over a 2-year election cycle, for $3.6 million—all to benefit
his political party and its candidates. See Appendix B, Table 2(a),
infra, at 39.

															     To make it easier for a
wealthy donor to make a contribution of this size, the parties can
simply enlarge the composition of the Joint Party Committee
described in Example One, so that it now includes party candidates.
And a party can proliferate such joint entities, perhaps calling
the first the “Smith Victory Committee,” the second the
“Jones Victory Committee,” and the like. See 11 CFR
§102.17(c)(5) (2012). (I say “perhaps” because too
transparent a name might call into play certain earmarking rules.
But the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) database of joint
fundraising committees in 2012 shows similarly named entities,
e.g., “Landrieu Wyden Victory Fund,” etc.).

															     As I have just said,
without any aggregate limit, the law will allow Rich Donor to write
a single check to, say, the Smith Victory Committee, for up to $3.6
million. This check represents “the total amount that the
contributor could contribute to all of the participants” in
the Committee over a 2-year cycle. §102.17(c)(5). The
Committee would operate under an agreement that provides a
“for- mula for the allocation of fundraising proceeds”
among its constituent units. §102.17(c)(1). And that
“formula” would divide the proceeds so that no
committee or can- didate receives more than it could have received
from Rich Donor directly—$64,800, $20,000, or $5,200. See
§102.17(c)(6).

															     So what is wrong with
that? The check is considerably larger than Example One’s
check. But is there anything else wrong? The answer is yes,
absolutely. The law will also permit a party and its candidates to
shift most of Rich Donor’s contributions to a single
candidate, say Smith. Here is how:

															     The law permits each
candidate and each party committee in the Smith Victory Committee
to write Candidate Smith a check directly. For his primary and
general elections combined, they can write checks of up to $4,000
(from each candidate’s authorized campaign committee) and
$10,000 (from each state and national committee). 2
U. S. C. §§432(e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR
§110.3(b). This yields a potential $1,872,000 (from
candidates) plus $530,000 (from party committees). Thus, the law
permits the candidates and party entities to redirect $2.37 million
of Rich Donor’s $3.6 million check to Candidate Smith. It
also permits state and national committees to contribute to
Smith’s general election campaign through making coordinated
expenditures—in amounts that range from $46,600 to $2.68
million for a general election (depending upon the size of
Smith’s State and whether he is running for a House or Senate
seat). 78 Fed. Reg. 8530–8532. See Appendix B, Table 2(b),
infra, at 40.

															     The upshot is that
Candidate Smith can receive at least $2.37 million and possibly the
full $3.6 million contributed by Rich Donor to the Smith Victory
Committee, even though the funds must first be divided up among the
constituent units before they can be rerouted to Smith. Nothing
requires the Smith Victory Committee to explain in advance to Rich
Donor all of the various transfers that will take place, and
nothing prevents the entities in the Committee from informing the
donor and the receiving candidate after the fact what has
transpired. Accordingly, the money can be donated and rerouted to
Candidate Smith without the donor having violated the base limits
or any other FEC regulation. And the evidence in the McConnell
record reprinted in Appendix A, infra—with respect to soft
money contributions—makes clear that Candidate Smith will
almost certainly come to learn from whom he has received this
money.

															     The parties can apply
the same procedure to other large donations, channeling money from
Rich Donor Two to Candidate Jones. If 10 or 20 candidates face
particularly tight races, party committees and party candidates may
work together to channel Rich Donor One’s multimillion dollar
contribution to the Most Embattled Candidate (e.g., Candidate
Smith), Rich Donor Two’s multimillion dollar contribution to
the Second Most Embattled Candidate (e.g., Candidate Jones), and so
on down the line. If this does not count as evasion of the base
limits, what does? Present aggregate limits confine the size of any
individual gift to $123,200. Today’s opinion creates a
loophole measured in the millions.

															     Example Three:
Proliferating Political Action Commit-tees (PACs). Campaign finance
law prohibits an individual from contributing (1) more than $5,200
to any candidate in a federal election cycle, and (2) more than
$5,000 to a PAC in a calendar year. 2 U. S. C.
§§441a(a)(1)(A), (C); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. It also
prohibits (3) any PAC from contributing more than $10,000 to any
candidate in an election cycle. §441(a)(2)(A). But the law
does not prohibit an individual from contributing (within the
current $123,200 biannual aggregate limit) $5,000 to each of an
unlimited total number of PACs. And there, so to speak, lies the
rub.

															     Here is how, without
any aggregate limits, a party will be able to channel $2 million
from each of ten Rich Do- nors to each of ten Embattled Candidates.
Groups of party supporters—individuals, corporations, or
trade unions—create 200 PACs. Each PAC claims it will use the
funds it raises to support several candidates from the party,
though it will favor those who are most endangered. (Each PAC
qualifies for “multicandidate” status because it has
received contributions from more than 50 persons and has made
contributions to five federal candidates at some point previously.
§441a(a)(4); 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3)). Over a 2-year election
cycle, Rich Donor One gives $10,000 to each PAC ($5,000 per
year)—yielding $2 million total. Rich Donor 2 does the same.
So, too, do the other eight Rich Donors. This brings their total
donations to $20 million, disbursed among the 200 PACs. Each PAC
will have collected $100,000, and each can use its money to write
ten checks of $10,000—to each of the ten most Embattled
Candidates in the party (over two years). See Appendix B, Table 3,
infra, at 41. Every Embattled Candidate, receiving a $10,000 check
from 200 PACs, will have collected $2 million.

															     The upshot is that ten
Rich Donors will have contrib- uted $2 million each, and ten
Embattled Candidates will have collected $2 million each. In this
example, unlike Example Two, the recipient candidates may not know
which of the ten Rich Donors is personally responsible for the $2
million he or she receives. But the recipient candidate is highly
likely to know who the ten Rich Donors are, and to feel
appropriately grateful. Moreover, the ability of a small group of
donors to contribute this kind of money to threatened candidates is
not insignificant. In the example above—with ten Rich Donors
giving $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates receiving $2
million each—the contributions would have been enough to
finance a considerable portion of, and perhaps all of, the
candidates’ races in the 2012 elections. See Appendix C,
Table 1, infra, at 42 (showing that in 2012, the average winning
House candidate spent $1.6 million and the average winning Senate
candidate spent $11.5 million).

															B

															     The plurality
believes that the three scenarios I have just depicted either pose
no threat, or cannot or will not take place. It does not believe
the scenario depicted in Example One is any cause for concern,
because it involves only “general, broad-based support of a
political party.” Ante, at 37. Not so. A candidate who
solicits a multimillion dollar check for his party will be deeply
grateful to the checkwriter, and surely could reward him with a
quid pro quo favor. The plurality discounts the scenarios depicted
in Example Two and Example Three because it finds such
circumvention tactics “illegal under current campaign finance
laws,” “implausible,” or “divorced from
reality.” Ante, at 23, 24, 28. But they are not.

															     The plurality’s
view depends in large part upon its claim that since this Court
decided Buckley in 1976, changes in either statutory law or in
applicable regulations have come to make it difficult, if not
impossible, for these circumvention scenarios to arise. Hence, it
concludes, there is no longer a need for aggregate contribution
limits. See ante, at 11–13, 22–29. But a closer
examination of the five legal changes to which the plurality points
makes clear that those changes cannot effectively stop the abuses
that I have depicted.

															     First, the plurality
points out that in 1976 (a few months after this Court decided
Buckley) Congress “added limits on contributions to political
committees,” i.e., to PACs. Ante, at 11; accord, 90Stat. 487
(codified at 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1)(C)). But Example
Three, the here-relevant example, takes account of those limits,
namely, $5,000 to a PAC in any given year. And it shows that the
per-PAC limit does not matter much when it comes to the potential
for circumvention, as long as party supporters can create dozens or
hundreds of PACs. Federal law places no upper limit on the number
of PACs supporting a party or a group of party candidates that can
be established. And creating a PAC is primarily a matter of
paperwork, a knowledgeable staff person, and a little time.

															     Second, the plurality
points out that in 1976, Congress “also added an
antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or
controlling multiple affiliated political committees.” Ante,
at 12. The rule provides that “all contributions made by
political committees established or financed or maintained or
controlled” by the same corporation, labor organization,
person, or group of persons, “shall be considered to have
been made by a single political committee.” §441a(a)(5).
But different supporters can create different PACs. Indeed, there
were roughly 2,700 “nonconnected” PACs (i.e., PACs not
connected to a spe- cific corporation or labor union) operating
during the 2012 elections. Ante, at 24. In a future without
aggregate contribution limits, far more nonconnected PACs will
likely appear. The plurality also notes that the FEC can examine
certain “ ‘circumstantial
factors,’ ” such as “ ‘common or
overlapping membership’ ” or
“ ‘similar patterns of
contributions,’ ” to determine whether a group of
PACs are affiliated. Ante, at 25 (quoting 11 CFR
§100.5(g)(4)(ii)). But the ultimate question in the
affiliation inquiry is whether “one committee or organization
[has] been established, financed, maintain or controlled by another
committee or sponsoring organization.” Ibid. Just because a
group of multicandidate PACs all support the same party and all
decide to donate funds to a group of endangered candidates in that
party does not mean they will qualify as “affiliated”
under the relevant definition. This rule appears inadequate to stop
the sort of circumvention depicted in Example Three.

															     Third, the plurality
says that a post-Buckley regulation has strengthened the
statute’s earmarking provision. Ante, at 12. Namely, the
plurality points to a rule pro- mulgated by the FEC in 1976,
specifying that earmarking includes any “designation
‘whether direct or indirect, express or implied, oral or
written.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 11 CFR §110.6(b));
accord, 41 Fed. Reg. 35950 (1976). This means that if Rich Donor
were to give $5,000 to a PAC while “designat[ing]” (in
any way) that the money go to Candidate Smith, those funds must
count towards Rich Donor’s total allowable contributions to
Smith—$5,200 per election cycle. But the virtually identical
earmarking provision in effect when this Court decided Buckley
would have required the same thing. That provision also counted,
when applying the base contribution limits, “all contri-
butions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf
of a particular candidate, including contributions which are in any
way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or
conduit to a candidate.” 88Stat. 1264; accord, 2 U. S. C.
§441a(a)(8) (same). What is the difference?

															     Fourth, the plurality
points out that the FEC’s regulations “specify that an
individual who has contributed to a particular candidate committee
may not also contribute to a single-candidate committee for that
candidate.” Ante, at 12–13 (citing 11 CFR
§110.1(h)(1); emphasis added). The regulations, however, do
not prevent a person who has contributed to a candidate from also
contributing to multicandidate committees that support the
candidate. Indeed, the rules specifically authorize such
contributions. See §110.1(h) (“A person may contribute
to a candidate . . . and also contribute to a political committee
which has sup- ported, or anticipates supporting, the same
candidate in the same election,” as long as the political
committee is “not the candidate’s principal campaign
committee” or a “single candidate committee”
(emphasis added)). Example Three illustrates the latter kind of
contribution. And briefs before us make clear that the possibility
for circumventing the base limits through making such contributions
is a realistic, not an illusory, one. See Brief for Appellee 36
(demonstrating that many PACs today explain in their public
materials just what fairly small group of candidates they intend to
support); Brief for Americans for Campaign Reform as Amicus Curiae
14–15 (similar).

															     Fifth, the plurality
points to another FEC regulation (also added in 1976), which says
that “an individual who has contributed to a candidate”
may not “also contribute to a political committee that has
supported or anticipates supporting the same candidate if the
individual knows that ‘a substantial portion [of his
contribution] will be contributed to, or expended on behalf
of,’ that candidate.” Ante, at 13 (quoting 11 CFR
§110.1(h)(2); brackets in original); accord, 41 Fed. Reg.
35948. This regulation is important, for in principle, the FEC
might use it to prevent the circumstances that Examples Two and
Three set forth from arising. And it is not surprising that the
plurality relies upon the existence of this rule when it describes
those circumstances as “implausible,”
“illegal,” or “divorced from reality.”
Ante, at 23, 24, 28.

															     In fact, however, this
regulation is not the strong anti-circumvention weapon that the
plurality imagines. Despite the plurality’s assurances, it
does not “disarm” the possibilities for circumvention.
Ante, at 23. That is because the regulation requires a showing that
donors have “knowledge that a substantial portion” of
their contributions will be used by a PAC to support a candidate to
whom they have already contributed. §110.1(h)(2) (emphasis
added). And “knowledge” is hard to prove.

															     I have found nine FEC
cases decided since the year 2000 that refer to this regulation. In
all but one, the FEC failed to find the requisite
“knowledge”—despite the presence of Example Two
or Example Three circumstances. See Factual and Legal Analysis, In
re: Transfund PAC, Matter Under Review (MUR) 6221, p. 11 (FEC,
June 7, 2010) (although the donor “might reasonably infer
that some portion of his contribution” to a candidate’s
Leadership PAC would be used to support the candidate, “such
an inference alone does not suggest that [he] had ‘actual
knowledge’ ” of such); Factual and Legal Analysis,
In re: John Shadegg’s Friends, MUR 5968, pp. 3, 6–7
(FEC, Nov. 10, 2008) (“[T]here is no basis on which to
conclude that [the donors] knew that the funds they contributed to
LEAD PAC would be used to support the Shadegg Committee” even
though Congressman Shadegg solicited the donations and LEAD PAC was
Congressman Shadegg’s Leadership PAC); Factual and Legal
Analysis, In re: Walberg for Congress, MUR 5881, pp. 6, 9–11
(FEC, Aug. 15, 2007) (finding seven contributors, who gave to a
candidate and to a PAC that provided 86% of the candidate’s
financing, had not shown “knowledge”); Factual and
Legal Analysis, In re: Matt Brown for Senate, MUR 5732, p. 11 (FEC,
Apr. 4, 2007) (“Though it may be reasonable to infer that the
individual donors solicited by Brown gave to the State Parties
under the assumption that some portion of their contribution might
then be donated to the Brown Committee, such an inference alone is
insufficient to find reason to believe 11 CFR §110.1(h) has
been violated”); First General Counsel’s Report, In re:
Liffrig for Senate, MUR 5678, pp. 8–9 (FEC, Nov. 27, 2006)
(similar); First General Counsel’s Report, In re: Nesbitt,
MUR 5445, pp. 11–12 (FEC, Feb. 2, 2005) (similar); First
General Counsel’s Report, In re: Keystone Corp., MUR
5019, pp. 23–29 (FEC, Feb. 5, 2001) (similar); General
Counsel’s Report #2, In re: Boston Capital Corp., MUR
4538, pp. 17–18 (FEC, Mar. 10, 2000) (recommending the FEC
take no action with respect to the §110.1(h) issue). Given
this record of FEC (in)activity, my reaction to the
plurality’s reliance upon agency enforcement of this rule (as
an adequate substitute for Congress’ aggregate limits) is
like Oscar Wilde’s after reading Dickens’ account of
the death of Little Nell: “One must have a heart of
stone,” said Wilde, “to read [it] without
laughing.” Oxford Dictionary of Humorous Quotations 86 (N.
Sherrin 2d ed. 2001).

															     I have found one
contrary example—the single example to which the plurality
refers. Ante, at 25 (citing Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley,
MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)). In that case,
the FEC found prob- able cause to believe that three individual
contributors to several PACs had the requisite
“knowledge” that the PACs would use a
“substantial portion” of their contributions to support
a candidate to whom they had already contributed—Sam
Brownback, a candidate for the Senate (for two of the
contributors), and Robert Riley, a candidate for the House (for the
third). The individuals had made donations to several PACs
operating as a network, under the direction of a single political
consulting firm. The two contributors to Sam Brownback were his
parents-in-law, and the FEC believed they might be using the PAC
network to channel extra support to him. The contributor to Robert
Riley was his son, and the FEC believed he might be doing the same.
The facts in this case are unusual, for individ- ual contributors
are not typically relatives of the candidates they are seeking to
support, and ordinary PACs do not tend to work in coordination
under the direction of a con-sulting firm. In any event, this
single swallow cannot make the plurality’s summer.

															     Thus, it is not
surprising that throughout the many years this FEC regulation has
been in effect, political parties and candidates have established
ever more joint fundraising committees (numbering over 500 in the
last federal elections); candidates have established ever more
“Leadership PACs” (numbering over 450 in the last
elections); and party supporters have established ever more
multicandidate PACs (numbering over 3,000 in the last elections).
See Appendix C, Tables 2–3, infra, at 42–43; FEC, 2014
Committee Summary (reporting the number of “qualified”
(or multicandidate) PACs in 2012), online at
http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do (all Internet materials
as visited Mar. 28, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file).

															     Using these entities,
candidates, parties, and party supporters can transfer and, we are
told, have transferred large sums of money to specific candidates,
thereby avoiding the base contribution limits in ways that Examples
Two and Three help demonstrate. See Brief for Appellee 38–39,
53–54; Brief for Campaign Legal Center, et al. as Amici
Curiae 12–15; Brief of Democratic Members of the United
States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae 28–29. They
have done so without drawing FEC prosecution—at least not
according to my (and apparently the plurality’s) search of
publicly available records. That is likely because in the real
world, the methods of achieving circumvention are more subtle and
more complex than our stylized Examples Two and Three depict. And
persons have used these entities to channel money to candidates
without any individual breaching the current aggregate $123,200
limit. The plurality now removes that limit, thereby permitting
wealthy donors to make aggregate contributions not of $123,200, but
of several millions of dollars. If the FEC regulation has failed to
plug a small hole, how can it possibly plug a large one?

															IV

															     The plurality
concludes that even if circumvention were a threat, the aggregate
limits are “poorly tailored” to ad- dress it. Ante, at
30. The First Amendment requires “ ‘a fit that is
. . . reasonable,’ ” and there is no
such “fit” here because there are several alternative
ways Congress could prevent evasion of the base limits. Ibid.
(quoting Fox, 492 U. S., at 480). For instance, the plurality
posits, Congress (or the FEC) could “tighten . . .
transfer rules”; it could require “contributions above
the current aggregate limits to be deposited into segregated,
nontransferable accounts and spent only by their recipients”;
it could define “how many candidates a PAC must support in
order to ensure that ‘a substantial portion’ of a
donor’s contribution is not rerouted to a certain
candidate”; or it could prohibit “donors who have
contributed the current maximum sums from further contributing to
political committees that have indicated they will support
candidates to whom the donor has already contributed.” Ante,
at 33–35 (quoting 11 CFR §110.1(h)(2)).

															     The plurality, however,
does not show, or try to show, that these hypothetical alternatives
could effectively replace aggregate contribution limits. Indeed, it
does not even “opine on the validity of any particular
proposal,” ante, at 35—presumably because these
proposals themselves could be subject to constitutional challenges.
For the most part, the alternatives the plurality mentions were
similarly available at the time of Buckley. Their hypothetical
presence did not prevent the Court from upholding aggregate limits
in 1976. How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the
plurality now to conclude that aggregate limits are “poorly
tailored?” See ante, at 30. How can their continued
hypothetical presence lead the Court to overrule Buckley now?

															     In sum, the explanation
of why aggregate limits are needed is complicated, as is the
explanation of why other methods will not work. But the conclusion
is simple: There is no “substantial mismatch” between
Congress’ legitimate objective and the “means selected
to achieve it.” Ante, at 10. The Court, as in Buckley, should
hold that aggregate contribution limits are constitutional.

															V

															     The District Court in
this case, holding that Buckley foreclosed McCutcheon’s
constitutional challenge to the aggregate limits, granted the
Government’s motion to dismiss the complaint prior to a full
evidentiary hearing. See 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140–141 (DC
2012). If the plurality now believes the District Court was wrong,
then why does it not return the case for the further evidentiary
development which has not yet taken place?

															     In the past, when
evaluating the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions,
we have typically relied upon an evidentiary record amassed below
to determine whether the law served a compelling governmental
objective. And, typically, that record contained testimony from
Members of Congress (or state legislators) explaining why Congress
(or the legislature) acted as it did. See, e.g., McConnell, 540
U. S., at 147–154 (upholding federal restrictions on
soft money by drawing on an extensive District Court record that
contained declarations from current and former Members of
Congress); Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 457–465 (upholding
federal limits on coordinated expenditures between parties and
candidates on the basis of a summary judgment record that contained
declarations from party operatives, fundraisers, and Members of
Congress); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 393 (upholding
Missouri’s contribution limits on the basis of the lower
court record, which contained similar declarations). If we are to
overturn an act of Congress here, we should do so on the basis of a
similar record.

															     For one thing, an
evidentiary record can help us determine whether or the extent to
which we should defer to Congress’ own judgments,
particularly those reflecting a balance of the countervailing First
Amendment interests I have described. Determining whether
anticorruption objectives justify a particular set of contribution
limits requires answering empirically based questions, and ap-
plying significant discretion and judgment. To what extent will
unrestricted giving lead to corruption or its appearance? What
forms will any such corruption take? To what extent will a lack of
regulation undermine public confidence in the democratic system? To
what extent can regulation restore it?

															     These kinds of
questions, while not easily answered, are questions that Congress
is far better suited to resolve than are judges. Thus, while court
review of contribution limits has been and should be
“rigorous,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 29, we have
also recognized that “deference to legislative choice is
warranted.” Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 155. And that
deference has taken account of facts and circumstances set forth in
an evidentiary record.

															     For another thing, a
comparison of the plurality’s opinion with this dissent
reveals important differences of opinion on fact-related matters.
We disagree, for example, on the possibilities for circumvention of
the base limits in the absence of aggregate limits. We disagree
about how effectively the plurality’s
“alternatives” could prevent evasion. An evidentiary
proceeding would permit the parties to explore these matters, and
it would permit the courts to reach a more accurate judgment. The
plurality rationalizes its haste to forgo an evidentiary record by
noting that “the parties have treated the question as a
purely legal one.” Ante, at 14, n.  4. But without a
doubt, the legal question—whether the aggregate limits are
closely drawn to further a compelling governmental
inter-est—turns on factual questions about whether
corruption, in the absence of such limits, is a realistic threat to
our democracy. The plurality itself spends pages citing figures
about campaign spending to defend its “legal”
conclusion. Ante, at 24–26, 27–28, 30–32. The
problem with such reasoning is that this Court’s expertise
does not lie in marshaling facts in the primary instance. That is
why in the past, when answering similar questions about the
constitutionality of restrictions on campaign contributions, we
have relied on an extensive evidentiary record produced below to
inform our decision.

															     Without further
development of the record, however, I fail to see how the plurality
can now find grounds for overturning Buckley. The justification for
aggregate contribution restrictions is strongly rooted in the need
to assure political integrity and ultimately in the First Amendment
itself. Part II, supra. The threat to that integrity posed by the
risk of special access and influence remains real. Part III, supra.
Even taking the plurality on its own terms and considering solely
the threat of quid pro quo corruption (i.e., money-for-votes
exchanges), the aggregate limits are a necessary tool to stop
circumvention. Ibid. And there is no basis for finding a lack of
“fit” between the threat and the means used to combat
it, namely the aggregate limits. Part IV, supra.

															     The plurality reaches
the opposite conclusion. The re- sult, as I said at the outset, is
a decision that substitutes judges’ understandings of how the
political process works for the understanding of Congress; that
fails to recognize the difference between influence resting upon
public opinion and influence bought by money alone; that overturns
key precedent; that creates huge loopholes in the law; and that
undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of campaign finance
reform.

															     With respect, I
dissent.

															APPENDIXES

															A

															Existence of Large Donations

															Expert Report: “During the 1996 election
cycle, the top 50 nonfederal money donors made contributions
ranging from $530,000 to $3,287,175. . . . Soft money financing of
party campaigning exploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft money
spending by the national parties reached $498 million, now 42% of
their total spending. Raising a half billion dollars in soft money
[in 2000] took a major effort by the national parties and elected
officials, but they had the advantage of focusing their efforts on
large donors. . . . The top 50 soft money donors . . . each
contributed between $955,695 and $5,949,000.” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 440 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing T.
Mann Expert Report, pp. 22, 24–25)

															Candidate Solicitation of Large Donations

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “It is a common
practice for Members of Congress to be involved in raising both
federal and non-federal dollars for the national party committees,
sometimes at the parties’ request. The personal involvement
of high-ranking Members of Congress is a major component of raising
federal and nonfederal funds.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
471.

															Senator Paul Simon: “ ‘While I
was in Congress, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
(DCCC) and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC)
would ask Members to make phone calls seeking contributions to the
party. They would assign me a list of names, people I had not known
previously, and I would just go down the list. I am certain they
did this because they found it more effective to have Members make
calls.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Simon Decl. ¶7).

															Senator John McCain: “ ‘[T]he
parties encourage Members of Congress to raise large amounts of
soft money to benefit their own and others’ re-election. At
one recent caucus meeting, a Member of Congress was praised for
raising $1.3 million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a
Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told the New
York Times that House leaders consider soft money fundraising
prowess in assigning chairmanships and other sought-after jobs. . .
. I share Mr. Greenwood’s concerns.’ ” Id., at
476 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶7).

															Representative Christopher Shays:
“ ‘Soft money is raised directly by federal
candidates, officeholders, and national political party leaders.
National party officials often raise these funds by promising
donors access to elected officials. The national parties and
national congressional campaign committees also request that
Members of Congress make the calls to soft money donors to solicit
more funds.’ ” Id., at 471 (quoting Shays Decl.
¶18).

															Representative Marty Meehan:
“ ‘Members of Congress raise money for the
national party committees, and I have been involved in such
fund-raising for the Democratic Party. At the request of the Party
Members of Congress go to the [DCCC] and call prospective donors
from lists provided by the Party to ask them to participate in
Party events, such as DCCC dinners or Democratic National Committee
(DNC) dinners. These lists typically consist of persons who have
contributed to the Democratic Party in the
past.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471 (quoting
Meehan Decl. in Republican National Committee v. FEC, No.
98–CV–1207 (DC), ¶6).

															Lobbyist: “ ‘Even though soft
money contributions often go to political parties, the money is
given so that the contributors can be close to, and recognized by,
Members, Presidents, and Administration officials who have power.
Mem- bers, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much of the
large soft money contributions.’ ” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (quoting Robert Rozen Decl. ¶15, a
partner in a lobbying firm).

															Senator Fred Thompson: “ ‘We
have gone from basically a small donor system . . . where
the average person believed they had a stake, believed they had a
voice, to one of extremely large amounts of money, where you are
not a player unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range [or
more] . . . .’ ” Id., at 433 (quoting 147 Cong.
Rec. 4622 (2001)).

															Former DNC official: “Former DNC and DSCC
official and current lobbyist Robert Hickmott testifies that even
incumbents with safe seats have incentives to raise money for the
parties. He explains: ‘Incumbents who were not raising money
for themselves because they were not up for reelection would
sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for challengers. They
would send $20,000 to the DSCC and ask that it be entered on
another candidate’s tally. They might do this, for example,
if they were planning to run for a leadership position and wanted
to obtain support from the Senators they assisted. This would
personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to help
retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would preserve the
legislative power of all Democratic senators.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 475–476 (quoting Hickmott Decl.,
Exh. A ¶18).

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “The DSCC
maintains a ‘credit’ program that credits nonfederal
money raised by a Senator or candidate to that Senator or
candidate’s state party. Amounts credited to a state party
can reflect that the Senator or candidate solicited the donation,
or can serve as a donor’s sign of tacit support for the state
party or the Senate candidate.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
477 (citation omitted).

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “Federal
candidates also raise nonfederal money through joint fundraising
committees formed with national committees. One common method of
joint fundraising is for a national congressional committee to form
a separate joint fundraising committee with a federal candidate
committee. . . . Two experts characterize the joint fundraising
system as one ‘in which Senate candidates in effect
raise[ ] soft money for use in their own
races.’ ” Id., at 478 (quoting J. Krasno and F.
Sorauf Expert Report, p. 13; citation omitted).

															Donor Access and Influence

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “The fact that
Members of Congress are intimately involved in the raising of money
for the political parties, particularly unlimited nonfederal money
donations, creates opportunities for corruption. The record does
not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in exchange for
donations of nonfederal money; however, the evidence presented in
this case convincingly demonstrates that large contributions,
particularly those nonfederal contributions surpassing the federal
limits, provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a
critical ingredient for influencing legislation, and which the
Supreme Court has determined constitutes corruption.” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 481.

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “Individual
donors testify that contributions provide access to influence
federal officeholders on issue of concern to them.” Id., at
498.

															Political donor: “ ‘I’ve
been involved in political fundraising long enough to remember when
soft money had little value to federal
candidates. . . . [I]n recent election cycles,
Members and national committees have asked soft money donors to
write soft money checks to state and national parties solely in
order to assist federal campaigns. Most soft money donors
don’t ask and don’t care why the money is going to a
particular state party, a party with which they may have no
connection. What matters is that the donor has done what the Member
asked.’ ” Id., at 472 (quoting Wade Randlett,
Chief Executive Officer, Dashboard Technology, Decl.
¶¶6–9).

															Political donor: “ ‘As a
result of my $500,000 soft money donation to the DNC, I was offered
the chance to at- tend events with the President, including events
at the White House, a number of times. I was offered special ac-
cess. . . .’ ” 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 499 (quoting Arnold Hiatt Decl. ¶9).

															Senator Alan Simpson: “ ‘Too
often, Members’ first thought is not what is right or wrong
or what they believe, but how will it affect fundraising. Who,
after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not
alter the way one thinks about—and quite possibly votes
on—an issue? . . . When you don’t pay the
piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more
money from that piper. Since money is the mother’s milk of
politics, you never want to be in that
situation.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481
(quoting Simpson Decl. ¶10).

															Senator Alan Simpson: “ ‘Large
donors of both hard and soft money receive special treatment. No
matter how busy a politician may be during the day, he or she will
always make time to see donors who gave large amounts of money.
Staffers who work for Members know who the big donors are, and
those people always get their phone calls returned first and are
allowed to see the Member when others are not.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481–482 (quoting Simpson Decl.
¶9).

															Senator David Boren:
“ ‘Donations, including soft money donations to
political parties, do affect how Congress operates. It’s only
natural, and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10
minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the call of a
large soft money donor rather than the call of any other
constituent. . . . I know from my first-hand experience and from my
interactions with other Senators that they did feel beholden to
large donors.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (quoting Boren
Decl. ¶¶7–8).

															Senator Dale Bumpers: “[Senator Bumpers]
had ‘heard that some Members even keep lists of big donors in
their offices,’ and [stated] that ‘you cannot be a good
Democratic or good Republican Member and not be aware of who gave
money to the party.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
487 (quoting Bumpers Decl. ¶¶18, 20).

															Representative Christopher Shays:
“ ‘The candidates know who makes these huge
contributions and what these donors expect. Candidates not only
solicit these funds themselves, they meet with big donors who have
important issues pending before the government; and sometimes, the
candidates’ or the party’s position appear to change
after such meetings.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
487 (quoting 148 Cong Rec. 1305 (2002)).

															Senator Warren Rudman:
“ ‘Large soft money contri-butions in fact distort
the legislative process. They affect what gets done and how it gets
done. They affect whom Senators and House members see, whom they
spend their time with, what input they get . . .
.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 496 (quoting Rudman
Decl. ¶¶7, 9).

															Senator Paul Simon: “ ‘While I
realize some argue donors don’t buy favors, they buy access.
That access is the abuse and it affects all of us. . . . You feel a
sense of gratitude for their support. . . . Because few people can
afford to give over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those
people who can will receive substantially better access to elected
federal leaders than people who can only afford smaller
contributions or can not afford to make any contributions. When you
increase the amount that people are allowed to give, or let people
give without limit to the parties, you increase the danger of
unfair access.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 496
(quoting Simon Decl. ¶16).

															Senator John McCain: “ ‘At a
minimum, large soft money donations purchase an opportunity for the
donors to make their case to elected officials . . . in a way
average citizens cannot.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 496 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶6).

															Senator Warren Rudman: “ ‘I
understand that those who opposed passage of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, and those who now challenge its
constitutionality in Court, dare elected officials to point to
specific [instances of vote buying]. I think this misses the point
altogether. [The access and influence accorded large donors] is
inherently, endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can’t
swim in the ocean without getting wet; you can’t be part of
this system without getting dirty.’ ” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 481 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶10).

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “Lobbyists
state that their clients make donations to political parties to
achieve access.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 489.

															Letter from Republican National Committee (RNC)
staffer: “ ‘As you know, [this executive] has been
very generous to the RNC. If there is any way you can assist [in
obtaining an appointment with an important Senator], it would be
greatly appreciated.’ ” Id., at 501 (quoting
Memorandum from Tim Barnes, RNC, to Royal Roth).

															Letter from RNC: “[The] letter from RNC
to Senator Hagel staffer [asks] Senator Hagel to meet with a donor
for four ‘key’ reasons including: . . . ‘[h]e
just contributed $100,000 to the RNC.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting a letter in the judicial record).

															Judicial Finding of Fact: “The political
parties have structured their donation programs so that donors are
encouraged to contribute larger amounts in order to get access to
more exclusive and intimate events at which Members or Congress are
present. The evidence also shows that the parties use the
enticement of access to secure larger donations. ” Id., at
502 (quoting a document in the judicial record).

															B

															Table 1: Donations to Support the Party

															Base Limit

															(per year)

															Number

															(committees)

															Years

															Total Contributions (per 2-year cycle)

															National Party Committees

															$32,400

															     3

															2

															     $194,400

															State Party Committees

															     $10,000

															50

															2

															     $1,000,000

															Total

															$1,194,400

															     Source: See 2
U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg.
8532.

															Table 2(a): The $3.6 Million Check

															Base Limit

															(per year/ election)

															Number

															(committees/ candidates)

															Years

															or Elections

															Total Contribu-tions

															(per 2-year cycle)

															National Party Committees

															$32,400

															     3

															2

															     $194,400

															State Party Committees

															     $10,000

															     50

															2

															     $1,000,000

															Candidates (Senate)

															     $2,600

															     33

															2

															     $171,600

															Candidates (House)

															     $2,600

															435

															2

															     $2,262,000

															Total

															$3,628,000

															     Source: See 2
U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (B), (D); 78 Fed.
Reg. 8532.

															Table 2(b): Circumvention of the $3.6 Million
Check

															Direct Contributions to Candidate (per
election)

															Number

															(committees/ candidates)

															Elec-tions

															Total Direct Contributions (per 2-year
cycle)

															National Party Committees

															$5,000

															     3

															2

															     $30,0001

															State Party Committees

															     $5,000

															     50

															2

															     $500,000

															Candidates (Senate)

															     $2,000

															     33

															2

															     $132,000

															Candidates (House)

															     $2,000

															     435

															2

															     $1,740,000

															Total Direct Contributions

															$2,372,000

															Independent Expenditures (IEs)

															(per general election)

															Elec-tions

															Total IEs (per general election)

															House Candidate

															Senate Candidate

															National Party Committees

															$46,600 (min)2

															$94,100 (min)3

															1

															$46,600–

															     $93,100

															(min)

															State Party Committees

															     $46,600

															(min)2

															$94,100 (min)3

															1

															$46,600–$93,100 (min)

															Total IEs

															     $46,600

															(min)2

															$94,100 (min)3

															$46,600–$93,100 (min)

															     1 $45,400 for a
Senate candidate. §441a(h); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532.

															     2 If the State
has more than one House seat, this figure is $46,600. If it has one
House seat, this figure is $93,100. Id., at 8531.

															     3 This figure
ranges from $93,100 (Del.) to $2,68 million (Cal.), depending on
the State’s population. Ibid.

															     Source: See 2
U. S. C. §§432(e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR
§110.3(b); 78 Fed. Reg. 8530–8532.

															Table 3: Proliferating PACs

															Base Limit (per year)

															Number (PACs)

															Years

															Total Contributions (per 2-year cycle)

															Rich Donor One

															$5,000

															200

															2

															$2,000,000

															Rich Donor Two

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Three

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Four

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Five

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Six

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Seven

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Eight

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Nine

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Rich Donor Ten

															     $5,000

															200

															2

															     $2,000,000

															Total Contributions to PACs (by 10 Donors)

															$20,000,000

															Total Contributions by Each Donor

															$2,000,000

															Base Limit (per election)

															Number (candi-dates)

															Elec-tions

															PAC One

															$5,000

															10

															2

															     $100,000

															PAC Two

															     $5,000

															10

															2

															     $100,000

															PAC Three

															     $5,000

															10

															2

															     $100,000

															. . .

															etc.

															etc.

															etc.

															etc.

															PAC 200

															     $5,000

															10

															2

															     $100,000

															Total Contributions by PACs (to 10
Candidates)

															$20,000,000

															Total Contributions to Each Candidate

															$2,000,000

															     Source: 2
U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(C), 441a(a)(2)(A).

															C

															Table 1: Costs of a Federal Seat

															2012 Elections

															House

															Average House Winner Spent

															     $1,567,293

															Average House Loser Spent

															     $496,637

															Average Winner's Receipts from PACs

															     $665,728

															Senate

															Average Senate Winner Spent

															     $11,474,077

															Average Senate Loser Spent

															$7,435,446

															Average Winner's Receipts from PACs

															     $2,185,650

															     Source: Center for
Responsive Politics, Election Stats, online at

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php.

															Table 2: Leadership PACs

															Number of Leadership PACs

															(contributing to federal candidates)

															Total Contributed (to federal candidates)

															2000 Elections

															175

															$17,000,000

															2002 Elections

															228

															     $25,000,000

															2004 Elections

															274

															     $30,700,000

															2006 Elections

															336

															     $44,700,000

															2008 Elections

															378

															     $40,600,000

															2010 Elections

															396

															     $44,000,000

															2012 Elections

															456

															     $46,400,000

															     Source: Center for
Responsive Politics, Leadership PACs, online at

															http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs.

															Table 3: Joint Fundraising Committees

															Number of Joint Fundraising Committees

															“Senate” Related

															“House”

															Related

															2008 Elections

															269

															31

															34

															2010 Elections

															367

															37

															60

															2012 Elections

															508

															67

															89

															     Source: Federal
Election Commission, online at

http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do.

Summary: In *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission*, the Supreme Court ruled that federal limits on the total amount of money an individual can contribute to political campaigns or candidates (aggregate contribution limits) are unconstitutional. The Court upheld the base limits on contributions to individual candidates or committees, but found that the aggregate limits restricted political participation without properly preventing corruption. This decision expanded on the Court's previous rulings in *Buckley v. Valeo* and *Citizens United v. FEC*, further increasing the role of money in political campaigns.