OCTOBER TERM, 1993

															Syllabus

															FOGERTY v. FANTASY, INC.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 92-1750. Argued December 8, 1993-Decided March 1, 1994

															After petitioner Fogerty's successful defense of a copyright
infringement action filed against him by respondent Fantasy, Inc.,
the District Court denied his motion for attorney's fees pursuant
to 17 U. S. C. § 505, which provides in relevant part that in such
an action "the court may ... award a reasonable attorney's fee to
the prevailing party as part of the costs." The Court of Appeals
affirmed, declining to abandon its "dual" standard for awarding §
505 fees-under which prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded
attorney's fees as a matter of course, while defendants must show
that the original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith-in
favor of the so-called "evenhanded" approach, in which no
distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants. Held: Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants
must be treated alike under § 505; attorney's fees are to be
awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's
discretion. Pp. 522-535.

															(a) Fantasy's arguments in favor of a dual standard are
rejected. Section 505's language gives no hint that successful
plaintiffs are to be treated differently than successful
defendants. Nor does this Court's decision in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 , which
construed virtually identical language from Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, support different treatment. The normal
indication that fee-shifting statutes with similar language should
be interpreted alike is overborne by factors relied upon in Christiansburg and the Civil Rights Act which are noticeably
absent in the context of the Copyright Act. The legislative history
of § 505 provides no support for different treatment. In addition,
the two Acts' goals and objectives are not completely similar. The
Civil Rights Act provides incentives for the bringing of
meritorious lawsuits by impecunious "private attorney general"
plaintiffs who can ill afford to litigate their claims against
defendants with more resources. However, the Copyright Act's
primary objective is to encourage the production of original
literary, artistic, and musical expression for the public good; and
plaintiffs, as well as defendants, can run the gamut from corporate
behemoths to starving artists. Fantasy's argument that the dual
approach to § 505 best serves the Copyright Act's policy of
encouraging litigation of meritorious infringement claims expresses
a one-sided view of the Copyright Act's purposes. Because copyright
law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general 518 Syllabus

															public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly
important that the law's boundaries be demarcated as clearly as
possible. Thus, a defendant seeking to advance meritorious
copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the
same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious
infringement claims. Fantasy also errs in urging that the
legislative history supports the dual standard based on the
principle of ratification. Neither the two studies submitted to
Congress while it considered revisions to the Act, nor the cases
referred to in those studies, support the view that there was a
settled construction in favor of the dual standard under the
virtually identical provision in the 1909 Copyright Act. Pp.
522-533.

															(b) Also rejected is Fogerty's argument that § 505 enacted the
"British Rule," which allows for automatic recovery of attorney's
fees by prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, absent exceptional
circumstances. The word "may" in § 505 clearly connotes discretion
in awarding such fees, and an automatic award would pretermit the
exercise of that discretion. In addition, since Congress legislates
against the strong background of the American Rule-which requires
parties to bear their own attorney's fees unless Congress provides
otherwise-it would have surely drawn more explicit statutory
language and legislative comment had it intended to adopt the
British Rule in § 505. While there is no precise rule or formula
for making fee determinations under § 505, equitable discretion
should be exercised "in light of the considerations [this Court]
has identified." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 , 436-437.
Pp. 533-535. 984 F.2d
1524 , reversed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG,
JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 535. Kenneth 1. Sidle argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Vincent H. Chieffo and Julia
L. Ross. Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for
respondent.

															With him on the brief were Carlos T. Angulo, Malcolm Burnstein,
and Norman G. Rudman. * *Jonathan A. Marshall, William G. Pecau, Jon R. Stark, Stephen
P. Fox, and Roland I. Griffin filed a brieffor
Hewlett-Packard Co. as amicus curiae urging reversal.

															Jack E. Brown, Chris R. Ottenweller, and Charles A. Blanchard
filed a brief for Apple Computer, Inc., as amicus curiae urging
affirmance. 519 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. s. C. § 505, provides in
relevant part that in any copyright infringement action "the court
may ... award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party
as part of the costs." 1 The question presented in this case is
what standards should inform a court's decision to award attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant in a copyright infringement action-a
question that has produced conflicting views in the Courts of
Appeals.

															Petitioner John Fogerty is a successful musician, who, in the
late 1960's, was the lead singer and songwriter of a popular music
group known as "Creedence Clearwater Revival." 2 In 1970, he wrote
a song entitled "Run Through the Jungle" and sold the exclusive
publishing rights to predecessors-ininterest of respondent Fantasy,
Inc., who later obtained the copyright by assignment. The music
group disbanded in 1972 and Fogerty subsequently published under
another recording label. In 1985, he published and registered a
copyright to a song entitled "The Old Man Down the Road," which was
released on an album distributed by Warner Brothers Records, Inc.
Respondent Fantasy, Inc.,

															1 The section provides in full: "In any civil action under this
title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full
costs by or against any party other than the United States or an
officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the
court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing
party as part of the costs." 17 U. S. C. §505.

															2 Creedence Clearwater Revival (CCR), recently inducted into the
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, has been recognized as one of the
greatest American rock and roll groups of all time. With Fogerty as
its leader, CCR developed a distinctive style of music, dubbed
"swamp rock" by the media due to its southern country and blues
feel. Brief for Petitioner 4-5; see also Questions and Answers with
John Fogerty, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 12, 1993, section F, p. 1,
col. 2. 520 sued Fogerty, Warner Brothers, and affiliated companies 3 in
District Court, alleging that "The Old Man Down the Road" was
merely "Run Through the Jungle" with new words.4 The copyright
infringement claim went to trial and a jury returned a verdict in
favor of Fogerty.

															After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for
reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U. s. C. § 505. The
District Court denied the motion, finding that Fantasy's
infringement suit was not brought frivolously or in bad faith as
required by Circuit precedent for an award of attorney's fees to a
successful defendant.5 The Court of Appeals affirmed, 984 F.2d
1524 (CA9 1993), and declined to abandon the existing Ninth
Circuit standard for awarding attorney's fees which treats
successful plaintiffs and successful defendants differently. Under
that standard, commonly termed the "dual" standard, prevailing
plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney's fees as a matter of
course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original
suit was frivolous

															3 Pursuant to an agreement between Fogerty and the Warner
defendants, Fogerty indemnified and reimbursed the Warner
defendants for their attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending the copyright infringement action. Brief for Petitioner
4, n. 3.

															4 In addition to the copyright infringement claim, Fantasy
asserted state law and Lanham Act claims. These claims were
voluntarily dismissed before trial. Petitioner also asserted
various counterclaims against Fantasy, which were ultimately
dismissed on Fantasy's motion for summary judgment. These related
claims and counterclaims are not before this Court.

															5 In making its findings, the District Court stated: "Although
the facts of this case did not present the textbook scenario of
copyright infringement, the Court has held that Fogerty could
indeed be held liable for copyright infringement even where he also
wrote the song allegedly infringed .... Nor does Fantasy's
'knowledge of Fogerty's creativity' mean that this suit was brought
in bad faith, where a finding of subconscious copying would have
supported Fantasy's infringement claim." App. to Pet. for Cert.
A-31 (citation omitted). 521 or brought in bad faith.6 In contrast, some Courts of Appeals
follow the so-called "evenhanded" approach in which no distinction
is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.7
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled
that "we do not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance
of fees as a concomitant of prevailing in every case, but we do
favor an evenhanded approach." Lieb v. Topstone
Industries, Inc., 788 We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 903 (1993), to address an
important area of federal law and to resolve the conflict between
the Ninth Circuit's "dual" standard for awarding attorney's fees
under § 505, and the so-called "evenhanded" approach exemplified by
the Third Circuit.8 We reverse.

															6 By predicating an award of attorney's fees to prevailing
defendants on a showing of bad faith or frivolousness on the part
of plaintiffs, the "dual" standard makes it more difficult for
prevailing defendants to secure awards of attorney's fees than
prevailing plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit has explained that
prevailing plaintiffs, on the other hand, should generally receive
such awards absent special circumstances such as "the presence of a
complex or novel issue of law that the defendant litigates
vigorously and in good faith .... " McCulloch v. Albert
E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316, 323 (1987). In the instant case,
the Court of Appeals explained:

															"The purpose of [the dual standard] rule is to avoid chilling a
copyright holder's incentive to sue on colorable claims, and
thereby to give full effect to the broad protection for copyrights
intended by the Copyright Act." 984 F. 2d, at 1532.

															7 At oral argument, counsel for respondent voiced his
dissatisfaction with the terms "dual" and "evenhanded" used to
describe the differing rules in the Circuits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31.
Counsel objected to the implication from the terms-that the Ninth
Circuit's dual standard was somehow not evenhanded or fair. While
this point may be well taken in a rhetorical sense, we will
continue to use the terms as commonly used by the lower courts for
the sake of convenience.

															S In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Second, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits have adopted a "dual" standard of
awarding attorney's fees whereby a greater burden is placed upon
prevailing defendants than prevailing plaintiffs. See, e. g.,
Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 522 Respondent advances three arguments in support of the dual
standard followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
this case. First, it contends that the language of § 505, when read
in the light of our decisions construing similar fee-shifting
language, supports the rule. Second, it asserts that treating
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants differently comports with the
"objectives" and "equitable considerations" underlying the
Copyright Act as a whole. Finally, respondent contends that the
legislative history of § 505 indicates that Congress ratified the
dual standard which it claims was "uniformly" followed by the lower
courts under identical language in the 1909 Copyright Act. We
address each of these arguments in turn.

															The statutory language-"the court may also award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs"-gives
no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently
from successful defendants. But respondent contends that our
decision in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412 (1978), in which we construed virtually identical language,
supports a differentiation in treatment between plaintiffs and
defendants. Christiansburg construed the language of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which in relevant part provided that the
court, "in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... " 42 U. S. C. §
2000e-5(k). We had earlier held, interpreting the cognate provision
of Title II of that Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3(b), that a
prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily 745 F.2d
142 , 148-149 (CA2 1984); Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d
1010 , 1022 (CA7), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 861 (1991); Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. v. Conservative Digest,
Inc., 821 F.2d
800 , 809 (CADC 1987). On the other hand, the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits have been identified as following an "evenhanded"
approach similar to that of the Third Circuit. See, e. g.,
Sherry Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 822 F.2d
1031 , 1034-1035, n. 3 (CAll 1987); Cohen v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 620-623 (ED
Va. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d
247 (CA4 1986). 523 recover an attorney's fee unless some special circumstances
would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400 , 402
(1968). This decision was based on what we found to be the
important policy objectives of the Civil Rights statutes, and the
intent of Congress to achieve such objectives through the use of
plaintiffs as "'private attorney[s] generaL'" Ibid. In Christiansburg, supra, we determined that the same policy
considerations were not at work in the case of a prevailing civil
rights defendant. We noted that a Title VII plaintiff, like a Title
II plaintiff in Piggie Park, is "the chosen instrument of
Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority.'" 434 U. S., at 418. We also relied on the
admittedly sparse legislative history to indicate that different
standards were to be applied to successful plaintiffs than to
successful defendants.

															Respondent points to our language in Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.
S. 754 , 758, n. 2 (1989), that "fee-shifting statutes' similar
language is a 'strong indication' that they are to be interpreted
alike." But here we think this normal indication is overborne by
the factors relied upon in our Christiansburg opinion that
are absent in the case of the Copyright Act.9 The legislative
history of § 505 provides no support for treating prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recovery
of attorney's fees. The attorney's fees provision of § 505 of the
1976 Act was carried forward verbatim from the 1909 Act with
very little discussion.10 The relevant House Report provides
simply: "Under section 505 the awarding of costs and attorney's fees are
left to the court's discretion, and the section also makes clear
that neither costs nor attorney's fees 9 Additionally, we note that Congress, in enacting § 505 of the
1976 Copyright Act, could not have been aware of the Christiansburg dual standard as Christiansburg was
not decided until 1978.

															10 For the former provision under the Copyright Act of 1909, see
17 524 can be awarded to or against 'the United States or an officer
thereof.'" H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 163 (1976).11 See also S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 145 (1975) (same). Other courts
and commentators have noted the paucity of legislative history of §
505. See, e. g., Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 621 (ED Va. 1985),
aff'd on other grounds, 788 F.2d
247 (CA4 1986). See also Jaszi, 505 And All That-The
Defendant's Dilemma, 55 Law & Contemp. Prob. 107, 107-108, and
nn. 1,2 (1992).

															The goals and objectives of the two Acts are likewise not
completely similar. Oftentimes, in the civil rights context,
impecunious "private attorney general" plaintiffs can ill afford to
litigate their claims against defendants with more resources.
Congress sought to redress this balance in part, and to provide
incentives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by treating
successful plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in
terms of the award of attorney's fees. The primary objective of the
Copyright Act is to encourage the production of original literary,
artistic, and musical expression for the good of the public. See infra, at 527. In the copyright context, it has been noted
that "[e]ntities which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs
can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists; the
same is true of prospective copyright infringement defendants." Cohen, supra, at 622-623.

															11 The 1976 Copyright Act did change, however, the standard for
awarding costs to the prevailing party. The 1909 Act provided a
mandatory rule that "full costs shall be allowed." 17 U. S.
C. § 116 (1976 ed.) (emphasis added). The 1976 Act changed the rule
from a mandatory one to one of discretion. As the 1909 Act
indicates, Congress clearly knows how to use mandatory language
when it so desires. That Congress did not amend the neutral
language of the 1909 rule respecting attorney's fees lends further
support to the plain language of § 505-district courts are to use
their discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs to the
prevailing party. 525 We thus conclude that respondent's argument based on our
fee-shifting decisions under the Civil Rights Act must fail.12

															Respondent next argues that the policies and objectives of § 505
and of the Copyright Act in general are best served by the "dual
approach" to the award of attorney's fees.13 The most common reason
advanced in support of the dual approach is that, by awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, it
encourages litigation of meritorious claims of copyright
infringement. See, e. g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d
316 , 323 (CA9 1987) ("Because section 505 is intended in part
to encourage the assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter
infringement, and to make the plaintiff whole, fees are generally
awarded to a prevailing plaintiff") (citations omitted); Dia mond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d
142 , 148 (CA2

															12 We note that the federal fee-shifting statutes in the patent
and trademark fields, which are more closely related to that of
copyright, support a party-neutral approach. Those statutes contain
language similar to that of § 505, with the added proviso that fees
are only to be awarded in "exceptional cases." 35 U. S. C. § 285
(patent) ("The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party"); 15 U. S. C. § 1117
(trademark) (same). Consistent with the party-neutral language,
courts have generally awarded attorney's fees in an evenhanded
manner based on the same criteria. For patent, see, e. g.,
Eltech Systems Corp. v. PPG Industries, Inc., 903 F.2d
805 , 811 (CA Fed. 1990) ("[T]here is and should be no
difference in the standards applicable to patentees and infringers
who engage in bad faith litigation"). For trademark, see, e. g., Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 849 F.2d
781 , 786 (CA2 1988) (exceptional circumstances include
cases in which losing party prosecuted or defended action in bad
faith); but see Scotch Whisky Assn. v. Majestic
Distilling Co., 958 F.2d
594 , 599 (CA4) (finding in the legislative history that
prevailing defendants are to be treated more favorably than
prevailing plaintiffs), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 862 (1992).

															13 Respondent points to four important interests allegedly
advanced by the dual standard: (1) it promotes the vigorous
enforcement of the Copyright Act; (2) it distinguishes between the
wrongdoers and the blameless; (3) it enhances the predictability
and certainty in copyrights by providing a relatively certain
benchmark for the award of attorney's fees; and (4) it affords
copyright defendants sufficient incentives to litigate their
defenses. 526 1984) (same). Indeed, respondent relies heavily on this
argument. We think the argument is flawed because it expresses a
one-sided view of the purposes of the Copyright Act. While it is
true that one of the goals of the Copyright Act is to
discourage infringement, it is by no means the only goal of
that Act. In the first place, it is by no means always the case
that the plaintiff in an infringement action is the only holder of
a copyright; often times, defendants hold copyrights too, as
exemplified in the case at hand. See Lieb v. Topstone
Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d, at 155 (noting that "in many cases
the defendants are the [copyright] holders").

															More importantly, the policies served by the Copyright Act are
more complex, more measured, than simply maximizing the number of
meritorious suits for copyright infringement. The Constitution
grants to Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8. We have often
recognized the monopoly privileges that Congress has authorized,
while "intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward," are limited in
nature and must ultimately serve the public good. Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417 , 429
(1984). For example, in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.
S. 151 , 156 (1975), we discussed the policies underlying the
1909 Copyright Act as follows: "The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly
... reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is,
by 527 this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good." (Footnotes omitted.) We reiterated this theme in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340 , 349-350
(1991), where we said: "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor
of authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work." (Citations omitted.) Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching
the general public through access to creative works, it is
peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be
demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek
to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be
encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement. In the
case before us, the successful defense of "The Old Man Down the
Road" increased public exposure to a musical work that could, as a
result, lead to further creative pieces. Thus a successful defense
of a copyright infringement action may further the policies of the
Copyright Act every bit as much as a successful prosecution of an
infringement claim by the holder of a copyright.

															Respondent finally urges that the legislative history supports
the dual standard, relying on the principle of ratification. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575 , 580 (1978)
("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when
it re-enacts a statute without change ... "). Respondent surveys
the great number of lower court cases interpreting the identical
provision in the 1909 Act, 17 528 u. S. C. § 116 (1976 ed.), and asserts that "it was firmly
established" that prevailing defendants should be awarded
attorney's fees only where the plaintiff's claim was frivolous or
brought with a vexatious purpose. Brief for Respondent 40-45.
Furthermore, respondent claims that Congress was aware of this
construction of former § 116 because of two copyright studies
submitted to Congress when it was studying revisions to the Act. W.
Strauss, Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law, Study No. 22
(hereinafter Strauss Study), and R. Brown, Operation of the Damage
Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Study No. 23
(hereinafter Brown Study), Studies Prepared for Subcommittee on
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (H.
Judiciary Comm. Print 1960).

															Before turning to the import of the two studies and the cases
decided under the 1909 Act, we summarize briefly the factual
background of Lorillard, whence comes the statement upon
which respondent relies. There the question was whether there was a
right to jury trial in an action for lost wages under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In enacting that
statute, Congress provided, inter alia, that the provisions
of the ADEA were to be "enforced in accordance with the 'powers,
remedies and procedures' " of specified sections of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 81 Stat. 604, 29 U. S. C. § 626(b). Lorillard, 434 U. S., at 580. In the three decided cases
which had treated the right to jury trial under the FLSA, each
court had decided that there was such a right. In enacting the
ADEA, "Congress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA
provisions and their judicial interpretation and a willingness to
depart from those provisions regarded as undesirable or
inappropriate for incorporation." Id., at 581.

															Here, by contrast, the Strauss and Brown Studies deal only
briefly with the provision for the award of attorney's fees. In the
Strauss Study, the limited discussion begins with a quote to A.
Weil, American Copyright Law 530-531 529 (1917), for an explanation of the "discretionary awarding of
attorney's fees": "'The amount of money frequently involved in copyright
letigation [sic], especially on the part of the defendant is
trifling. The expense of any letigation [sic] is
considerable. Unless, therefore, some provision is made for
financial protection to a litigant, if successful, it may not pay a
party to defend rights, even if valid, a situation opposed to
justice .... It is increasingly recognized that the person who
forces another to engage counsel to vindicate, or defend, a right
should bear the expense of such engagement and not his successful
opponent .... '" Strauss Study 31. The study then notes that the pending bills contemplate no
change in the attorney's fees provision and concludes with the
simple statement "[t]he cases indicate that this discretion has
been judiciously exercised by the courts." Ibid. 14 This

															14 In a footnote, the Strauss Study lists several cases
exemplifying the courts' use of discretion. None of these cases
explicitly require a dual standard of awarding attorney's fees, but
instead offer various reasons for awarding or not awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party. Cases cited by the study
involving prevailing defendants: Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d
521 , 524 (CA9 1953) (denying counsel fees because there
was "no indication that the appeal was pursued in bad faith" and
"the principal question [was] a complex question of law"); Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation
Associates, 162 F.2d 541, 543 (CA7 1947) (denying
attorney's fee where "[t]he instant case was hard fought and
prosecuted in good faith, and ... presented a complex problem in
law"); Rosen v. Lowe's Inc., 162 F.2d 785 (CA2 1947) (defendant prevailed; no discussion of attorney's fees); Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Anderson, 144 F.2d 907 (CA8 1944) (denying attorney's fee without comment in case
involving defective copyright notice); Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 618 (SDNY 1931) (awarding fees where
plaintiff's case was "wholly synthetic"); Metro Associated
Services, Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 224 (ND Iowa 1953) (denying attorney's fee without
explanation where plaintiff filed defective copyright); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73, 80 (SDNY 1932)
(awarding fees where "[t]he most earnest advocate of the
plaintiff's side ... could not ... possibly find" any plagiarism by
the defendant); 530 limited discussion of attorney's fees surely does not constitute
an endorsement of a dual standard.

															The Brown Study was intended as a supplement to the Strauss
Study and, inter alia, provides information from a survey
distributed to practitioners about the practical work- Jerome v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 914,915 (SDNY 1946) (denying fee where court "[could] very
well understand how plaintiff was driven to some litigation,
although the theory of [the] action ... was not supported by the
proof"), 7 F. R. D. 190 (SDNY 1947), aff'd, 165 F. 2d 784 (CA2
1948). Cases cited by the study involving prevailing plaintiffs: Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Hinkley, 199 F.2d
313 , 316 (CA8 1952) (denying an attorney's fee where
plaintiff's counsel attempted to inflate and exaggerate plaintiff's
claim), cert. denied, 344 U. S. 921 (1953); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (EDNY 1954) (court denied
attorney's fee "since it appears to have ... been a fairly common
practice for publishers of [prayer books] to copy rather freely
from each other, and since much of plaintiff's book was in the
public domain, and defendant honestly, but mistakenly, believed
that plaintiff was illegally attempting to copyright and monopolize
the printing of ancient prayers"); Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Borst Music Pub. Co., 110 F. Supp. 913 (NJ
1953) (court noted only that it would not award attorney's fee
because such award is discretionary); Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227, 232 (SD Cal. 1952) (awarding
attorney's fees of $3,500 as an amount "reasonably necessary to
redress the infringement of plaintiffs' copyright"); Northern
Music Corp. v. King Record Distributing Co., 105 F.
Supp. 393, 401 (SDNY 1952) (noting that prevailing plaintiff
entitled to receive a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by
the court); White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502, 511
(SD Cal. 1950) (copyright holder, who was a successful defendant in
a declaratory judgment action, was awarded costs but denied
attorney's fee award without elaboration); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298
F.4d 0 , 482483 (EDSC 1924) (court awarded a moderate attorney's
fee after noting that full allowance "would bear too heavily upon
the defendant, in view of the character of the infringement and the
circumstances surrounding it; but, if no fee should be allowed at
all in such cases, it would probably result in many cases in a
practical denial of the rights of copyright owners").

															The study also cited to Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U.
S. 202 (1931), a case that did not involve attorney's fees, but
instead addressed the damages provision of § 25 of the 1909 Act, 35
Stat. 1081. 531 ings of the 1909 Copyright Act.15 It also does not endorse a
standard of treating prevailing plaintiffs and defendants
differently. At one point, the study notes that "courts do not
usually make an allowance at all if an unsuccessful plaintiff's
claim was not 'synthetic, capricious or otherwise unreasonable,' or
if the losing defendant raised real issues of fact or law." Brown
Study 85.16

															Our review of the prior case law itself leads us to conclude
that there was no settled "dual standard" interpretation of former
§ 116 about which Congress could have been aware. We note initially
that at least one reported case stated no reason in awarding
attorney's fees to successful defendants. See, e. g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925)
(noting that the Copyright Act gave courts "absolute discretion,"
the court awarded attorney's fees to prevailing defendant after
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed suit). More importantly, while it
appears that the majority of lower courts exercised their
discretion in awarding attorney's fees

															15 To this extent, the Brown Study focuses more on the effect
that the prospect of an award of attorney's fees has on decisions
to litigate or to settle cases. Based on its interview sources, the
study concluded that the likelihood of getting a fee award is so
problematic that "it is not a factor" that goes into the decision
to settle or litigate. Brown Study 85. The report also noted that
its observations about attorney's fees "are not intended as an
exhaustive treatment of the subject" and that "[attorney's fees']
deterrent effect on ill-founded litigation, whether by plaintiffs
or defendants, is outside the scope of this inquiry." Id., at 85-86.

															16 Citing to Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 193
(SDNY 1956) (it is proper to award fees to prevailing defendant
when copyright action is brought in bad faith, with a motive to
"vex and harass the defendant," or where plaintiff's claim utterly
lacks merit). The Brown Study also included cites to Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d
598 , 604 (CA7) (reversing attorney's fee award to
prevailing defendant as an abuse of discretion where plaintiff's
claim was not entirely without merit and involved a close question
of law), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 907 (1957); Marks v. Leo
Feist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460, 461 (CA2 1925) (awarding
attorney's fees to prevailing defendant after plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed suit). 532 to prevailing defendants based on a finding of frivolousness or
bad faith, not all courts expressly described the test in those
terms.17 In fact, only one pre-1976 case expressly endorsed a dual
standard. Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp.
623 (SDNY 1967).18 This is hardly the sort of uniform construction
that Congress might have endorsed.

															17See, e. g., Shroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 421 F. Supp. 372, 378 (ND Ill. 1976) (refusing to award
prevailing defendant an attorney's fee because plaintiff's action
was "prosecuted in good faith and with a reasonable likelihood of
success"), rev'd on other grounds, 566 F.2d
3 (CA7 1977); Kinelow Publishing Co. v. Photography
In Business, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 851, 855 (SDNY 1967) (denying
fee award to prevailing defendant because plaintiff's claims, while
"lacking in merit," were not "unreasonable or capricious"); Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517, 518-519 (SDNY
1962) (granting fee award to prevailing defendant where "asserted
claim of infringement was so demonstrably lacking in merit that
bringing it was clearly unreasonable"); Cloth v. Hyman,
supra, at 193 (noting that it is proper to award fees when a
copyright action is brought in bad faith, with a motive to "vex and
harass the defendant," or where plaintiff's claim utterly lacks
merit); Loews, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 186 (SD Cal. 1955) (denying prevailing
defendant fee award where question presented in the case "was a
nice one," and there are "no authorities squarely in point to guide
the litigants or their counsel"), aff'd, 239
F.2d 532 (CA9 1956), aff'd, 356 U. S. 43 (1958); Krafft v. Cohen, 38 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (ED Pa. 1941)
(denying fee award to prevailing defendant where claim brought "in
good faith," and evidence demonstrated appropriation); Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F. 2d, at 618 (awarding fees to prevailing
defendant because plaintiff's case was "wholly synthetic").

															18 That court concluded that "the considerations prompting an
award of fees to a successful plaintiff must of necessity differ
from those determining whether a prevailing defendant is entitled
to such an award." Breffort, 271 F. Supp., at 627. As
support, the court stated: "The purpose of an award of counsel fees
to a plaintiff is to deter copyright infringement .... In the case
of a prevailing defendant, however, prevention of infringement is
obviously not a factor; and if an award is to be made at all, it
represents a penalty imposed upon the plaintiff for institution of
a baseless, frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one instituted in
bad faith." Ibid. As we have already explained, supra, at 527, such is too narrow a view of the purposes of
the Copyright Act because it fails to adequately consider the
important role played by copyright defendants. See also 533 In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress,
nor the cases referred to by the studies, support respondent's view
that there was a settled construction in favor of the "dual
standard" under § 116 of the 1909 Copyright Act.

															We thus reject each of respondent's three arguments in support
of the dual standard. We now turn to petitioner's argument that §
505 was intended to adopt the "British Rule." Petitioner argues
that, consistent with the neutral language of § 505, both
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney's
fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circumstances. For
two reasons we reject this argument for the British Rule.

															First, just as the plain language of § 505 supports petitioner's
claim for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in
arguing for the British Rule. The statute says that "the court may
also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs." The word "may" clearly connotes discretion. The
automatic awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party would
pretermit the exercise of that discretion.

															Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the
strong background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where
counsel fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is
the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides
otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 ,
247-262 (1975) (tracing the origins and development of the American
Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S., at 758.
While § 505 is one situation in which Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp., at 621-622 (tracing the evolution of the Second
Circuit's dual standard rule and concluding that earlier cases upon
which it supposedly rests do not require bad faith or
frivolousness-"[the dual standard rule] is the culmination of a
long line of bootstrapping from nothing to something"). 534 Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of
attorney's fees in the court's discretion, we find it impossible to
believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British
Rule. Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have
surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative
comment. Cf. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U. S. 779 , 783 (1952)
("Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a
presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident"). Not surprisingly, no court has held that § 505 (or its
predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule.

															Thus we reject both the "dual standard" adopted by several of
the Courts of Appeals and petitioner's claim that § 505 enacted the
British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the
prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants
are to be treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to
prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion.
"There is no precise rule or formula for making these
determinations," but instead equitable discretion should be
exercised "in light of the considerations we have identified." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 436-437
(1983).19 Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held petitioner,
the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than that
applicable to a prevailing

															19 Some courts following the evenhanded standard have suggested
several nonexclusive factors to guide courts' discretion. For
example, the Third Circuit has listed several nonexclusive factors
that courts should consider in making awards of attorney's fees to
any prevailing party. These factors include "frivolousness,
motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in
the legal components of the case) and the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence." Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d
151 , 156 (1986). We agree that such factors may be used to
guide courts' discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to
the purposes of the Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded manner. 535 plaintiff, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.

															In my view, the Court's opinion is flatly inconsistent with our
statutory analysis in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.
S. 412 (1978). Because I disagree with that analysis, however,
and because I believe the Court adopts the correct interpretation
of the statutory language at issue in this case, I concur in the
judgment.

															In Christiansburg, the Court interpreted the attorney's
fee provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
states that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party ... a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs ....
" 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III). In this case, the
Court construes the attorney's fee provision of the Copyright Act
of 1976, which states that "the court may ... award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." 17 U.
S. C. § 505. As the Court observes, the two provisions contain
"virtually identical language." Ante, at 522. After today's
decision, however, they will have vastly different meanings.

															Under the Title VII provision, a prevailing plaintiff
"ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special
circumstances," Christiansburg, 434 U. S., at 417, whereas a
prevailing defendant is to be awarded fees only "upon a finding
that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation," id., at 421. By contrast, under the Court's
decision today, prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the
copyright context "are to be treated alike," and "attorney's fees
are to be awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the
court's discretion." Ante, at 534.

															Interestingly, the Court does not mention, let alone discuss, Christiansburg's statutory analysis. We began that 536 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

															analysis by considering the Christiansburg petitioner's
argument: "Relying on what it terms 'the plain meaning of the statute,'
[petitioner] argues that the language of [the attorney's fee
provision] admits of only one interpretation: 'A prevailing
defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on the same
basis as a prevailing plaintiff.'" 434 U. S., at 418. We summarily rejected this contention, stating that "the
permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even
invite, let alone require, such a mechanical construction." Ibid. We opined that the language "provide[s] no indication
whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a
defendant should be entitled to attorney's fees." Ibid. (emphasis deleted). Turning to the "equitable considerations"
embodied in the statute's policy objectives and legislative
history, id., at 418-420, we stated that those
considerations counseled against petitioner's position-a position
we concluded was "untenable," id., at 419.

															Today, confronting a provision "virtually identical" to that at
issue in Christiansburg, the Court adopts precisely the
interpretation that Christiansburg rejected as "mechanical"
and "untenable." The Court states that "the plain language of § 505
supports petitioner's claim for disapproving the dual standard," ante, at 533, and that the language "gives no hint that
successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful
defendants," ante, at 522. Thus, the Court replaces the
"dual" standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit with an "evenhanded"
approach, under which district courts will apply the same standard
to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants when deciding whether to
award fees. Ante, at 534535, and n. 19.

															It is difficult to see how the Court, when faced with "virtually
identical" language in two provisions, can hold that a given
interpretation is required by the "plain language" in 537 one instance, but reject that same interpretation as
"mechanical" and "untenable" in the other. After today's decision,
Congress could employ the same terminology in two different
attorney's fee statutes, but be quite uncertain as to whether the
Court would adopt a "dual" standard (that is, reject the
"mechanical" construction) or apply an "evenhanded" rule (that is,
adopt the "plain meaning").

															Such an inconsistent approach to statutory interpretation robs
the law of "the clarity of its command and the certainty of its
application." Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 , 669 (1992)
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). Indeed, we repeatedly have sought to
avoid this sort of inconsistency in our fee award decisions. See, e. g., Burlington v. Dague, 505 U. S. 557 , 562 (1992)
("case law construing what is a 'reasonable' fee applies uniformly
to all" fee-shifting statutes using the term); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680 , 691 (1983)
("similar attorney's fee provisions should be interpreted pari
passu"); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 , 433, n. 7
(1983) (the standards "set forth in this opinion are generally
applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award
of fees to a 'prevailing party' "). See also Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U. S. 754 , 758, n. 2
(1989) ("fee-shifting statutes' similar language is 'a strong
indication' that they are to be interpreted alike"); Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U. S. 427 ,
428 (1973) (per curiam) ("[S]imilarity of language ... is,
of course, a strong indication that ... two [attorney's fee]
statutes should be interpreted pari passu"). The Court recognizes the general principle that similar fee
provisions are to be interpreted alike, ante, at 523, but
states that the principle does not govern this case because the
factors that guided our interpretation in Christiansburg-the policy objectives and legislative history of the statute-do not
support the adoption of a "dual" standard in this context. See ante, at 522-525. The Court's analysis, however, rests on
the mistaken premise-a premise implicit in Christians- 538 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment burg-that whether we construe a statute in accordance
with its plain meaning depends upon the statute's policy objectives
and legislative history. Although attorney's fee provisions may be
interpreted "in light of the competing equities that Congress
normally takes into account," Zipes, supra, at 761, those
"equities" cannot dictate a result that is contrary to the
statutory language. "Our task is to apply the text, not to improve
upon it." Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, Div. of Cadence Industries Corp., 493 U.
S. 120, 126 (1989). When the text of the statute is clear, our
interpretive inquiry ends. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503
U. S. 249 , 254 (1992). The Court goes astray, in my view, by
attempting to reconcile this case with Christiansburg. Rather, it should acknowledge that Christiansburg mistakenly
cast aside the statutory language to give effect to equitable
considerations.

															I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe the Court
adopts the correct interpretation of the statutory language in this
case. As the Court observes, the language of 17 U. S. C. § 505
gives no indication that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are
to be treated differently. See ante, at 522, 533. In
addition, as the Court states, the use of the word "may" suggests
that the determination of whether an attorney's fee award is
appropriate is to be left to the discretion of the district courts. Ante, at 533. This conclusion finds further support in the
full text of § 505, which provides that "the court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs .... [T]he
court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs." (Emphasis added.)

															Because considerations of stare decisis have "special
force" in the area of statutory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 , 172
(1989), I might be hesitant to overrule Christiansburg and
other cases in which we have construed similar attorney's fee
provisions to impose a "dual" standard of recovery. See, e. g.,
Hensley, supra, at 539 429, and n. 2 (42 U. s. C. § 1988 (1988 ed., Supp. III)); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 483 U.
S. 711 , 713, n. 1 (1987) (42 U. S. C. § 7604(d)). But while stare decisis may call for hesitation in overruling a
dubious precedent, "it does not demand that such a precedent be
expanded to its outer limits." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25 , 42
(1993) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). I would therefore decline to
extend Christiansburg's analysis to other contexts. Because
the Court-at least in result, if not in rationale-refuses to make
such an extension, I concur in the judgment.

Summary: In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be treated differently under the attorney's fee provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. The Court held that both parties must be treated alike and that attorney's fees should be awarded at the court's discretion. The Court rejected the respondent's argument for a dual standard, finding no support in the statute's language, legislative history, or objectives. The Court's decision emphasized the importance of clear boundaries in copyright law and the need to encourage original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the public good.