U.S. Supreme Court West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish No. 293 Argued December 16, 17,
1936 Decided March 29,
1937 300
U.S. 379 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON Syllabus 1. Deprivation of liberty to contract is forbidden by the
Constitution if without due process of law, but restraint or
regulation of this liberty, if reasonable in relation to its
subject and if adopted for the protection of the community against
evils menacing the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people, is due process. P. 300 U. S. 391 .

															2. In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the
legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order
that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and
that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from
oppression. P. 300 U. S.
393 .

															3. The State has a special interest in protecting women against
employment contracts which through poor working conditions, long
hours or scant wages may leave them inadequately supported and
undermine their health; because:

															(1) The health of women is peculiarly related to the vigor of
the race;

															(2) Women are especially liable to be overreached and exploited
by unscrupulous employers; and

															(3) This exploitation and denial of a living wage is not only
detrimental to the health and wellbeing of the women affected, but
casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. Pp. 300 U. S. 394 , 300 U. S. 398 , et seq. 4. Judicial notice is taken of the unparalleled demands for
relief which arose during the recent period of depression and still
continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic
recovery which has been achieved. P. 300 U. S.
399 .

															5. A state law for the setting of minimum wages for women is not
an arbitrary discrimination because it does not extend to men. P. 300 U. S.
400 .

															6. A statute of the State of Washington (Laws, 1913, c. 174;
Remington's Rev.Stats., 1932, § 7623 et seq. ) providing
for the establishment of minimum wages for women, held valid. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.
S. 525 , is overruled; Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 ,
distinguished. P. 300 U. S.
400 .

															185 Wash. 581; 55 P.2d 1083, affirmed. Page 300 U. S. 380 This was an appeal from a judgment for money directed by the
Supreme Court of Washington, reversing the trial court, in an
action by a chambermaid against a hotel company to recover the
difference between the amount of wages paid or tendered to her as
per contract and a larger amount computed on the minimum wage fixed
by a state board or commission. Page 300 U. S. 386 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the question of the constitutional validity
of the minimum wage law of the State of Washington.

															The Act, entitled "Minimum Wages for Women," authorizes the
fixing of minimum wages for women and minors. Laws of 1913
(Washington) chap. 174; Remington's Rev.Stat. (1932), § 7623 et
seq. It provides:

															"SECTION 1. The welfare of the State of Washington demands that
women and minors be protected from conditions of labor which have a
pernicious effect on their health and morals. The State of
Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign
power declares that inadequate wages and unsanitary conditions of
labor exert such pernicious effect."

															"SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to employ women or minors in any
industry or occupation within the State of Washington under
conditions of labor detrimental to their health or morals, and it
shall be unlawful to employ Page 300 U. S. 387 women workers in any industry within the State of Washington at
wages which are not adequate for their maintenance."

															"SEC. 3. There is hereby created a commission to be known as the
'Industrial Welfare Commission' for the State of Washington, to
establish such standards of wages and conditions of labor for women
and minors employed within the State of Washington as shall be held
hereunder to be reasonable and not detrimental to health and
morals, and which shall be sufficient for the decent maintenance of
women."

															Further provisions required the Commission to ascertain the
wages and conditions of labor of women and minors within the State.
Public hearings were to be held. If, after investigation, the
Commission found that, in any occupation, trade or industry, the
wages paid to women were "inadequate to supply them necessary cost
of living and to maintain the workers in health," the Commission
was empowered to call a conference of representatives of employers
and employees together with disinterested persons representing the
public. The conference was to recommend to the Commission, on its
request, an estimate of a minimum wage adequate for the purpose
above stated, and, on the approval of such a recommendation, it
became the duty of the Commission to issue an obligatory order
fixing minimum wages. Any such order might be reopened, and the
question reconsidered with the aid of the former conference or a
new one. Special licenses were authorized for the employment of
women who were "physically defective or crippled by age or
otherwise," and also for apprentices, at less than the prescribed
minimum wage.

															By a later Act, the Industrial Welfare Commission was abolished,
and its duties were assigned to the Industrial Welfare Committee,
consisting of the Director of Labor and Industries, the Supervisor
of Industrial Insurance, Page 300 U. S. 388 the Supervisor of Industrial Relations, the Industrial
Statistician, and the Supervisor of Women in Industry. Laws of 1921
(Washington) c. 7; Remington's Rev.Stat. (1932), §§ 10840,
10893.

															The appellant conducts a hotel. The appellee, Elsie Parrish, was
employed as a chambermaid and (with her husband) brought this suit
to recover the difference between the wages paid her and the
minimum wage fixed pursuant to the state law. The minimum wage was
$14.50 per week of 48 hours. The appellant challenged the act as
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court of the
State, reversing the trial court, sustained the statute and
directed judgment for the plaintiffs. Parrish v. West Coast
Hotel Co., 185 Wash. 581, 55 P.2d 1083. The case is here on
appeal.

															The appellant relies upon the decision of this Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.
S. 525 , which held invalid the District of Columbia
Minimum Wage Act, which was attacked under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. On the argument at bar, counsel for the
appellees attempted to distinguish the Adkins case upon
the ground that the appellee was employed in a hotel, and that the
business of an innkeeper was affected with a public interest. That
effort at distinction is obviously futile, as it appears that, in
one of the cases ruled by the Adkins opinion, the employee
was a woman employed as an elevator operator in a hotel. Adkins
v. Lyons, 261 U. S. 525 , at
p. 261 U. S.
542 .

															The recent case of Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 ,
came here on certiorari to the New York court, which had held the
New York minimum wage act for women to be invalid. A minority of
this Court thought that the New York statute was distinguishable in
a material feature from that involved in the Adkins case,
and, that for that and other reasons, the New Page 300 U. S. 389 York statute should be sustained. But the Court of Appeals of
New York had said that it found no material difference between the
two statutes, and this Court held that the "meaning of the statute"
as fixed by the decision of the state court "must be accepted here
as if the meaning had been specifically expressed in the
enactment." Id., p. 298 U. S. 609 .
That view led the affirmance by this Court of the judgment in the Morehead case, as the Court considered that the only
question before it was whether the Adkins case was
distinguishable, and that reconsideration of that decision had not
been sought. Upon that point, the Court said:

															"The petition for the writ sought review upon the ground that
this case [ Morehead ] is distinguishable from that one
[ Adkins ]. No application has been made for reconsideration
of the constitutional question there decided. The validity of the
principles upon which that decision rests is not challenged. This
court confines itself to the ground upon which the writ was asked
or granted. . . . Here, the review granted was no broader than that
sought by the petitioner. . . . He is not entitled, and does not
ask, to be heard upon the question whether the Adkins case
should be overruled. He maintains that it may be distinguished on
the ground that the statutes are vitally dissimilar." Id. pp. 298 U. S. 604 , 298 U. S.
605 .

															We think that the question which was not deemed to be open in
the Morehead case is open and is necessarily presented
here. The Supreme Court of Washington has upheld the minimum wage
statute of that State. It has decided that the statute is a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In reaching
that conclusion, the state court has invoked principles long
established by this Court in the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The state court has refused to regard the decision in
the Adkins case as determinative, and has pointed to our
decisions both before and since that case as justifying its
position. We are of the opinion that this ruling of Page 300 U. S. 390 the state court demands on our part a reexamination of the Adkins case. The importance of the question, in which many
States having similar laws are concerned, the close division by
which the decision in the Adkins case was reached, and the
economic conditions which have supervened, and in the light of
which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of
the State must be considered, make it not only appropriate, but we
think imperative, that, in deciding the present case, the subject
should receive fresh consideration.

															The history of the litigation of this question may be briefly
stated. The minimum wage statute of Washington was enacted over
twenty-three years ago. Prior to the decision in the instant case,
it had twice been held valid by the Supreme Court of the State. Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037; Spokane
Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 Pac. 595. The
Washington statute is essentially the same as that enacted in
Oregon in the same year. Laws of 1913 (Oregon) chap. 62. The
validity of the latter act was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Oregon in Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743,
and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Ore. 261, 141 Pac. 158. These
cases, after reargument, were affirmed here by an equally divided
court, in 1917. 243 U.S. 629. The law of Oregon thus continued in
effect. The District of Columbia Minimum Wage Law (40 Stat. 960)
was enacted in 1918. The statute was sustained by the Supreme Court
of the District in the Adkins case. Upon appeal, the Court
of Appeals of the District first affirmed that ruling, but, on
rehearing, reversed it, and the case came before this Court in
1923. The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding the Act invalid
was affirmed, but with Chief Justice Taft, Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Sanford dissenting, and Mr. Justice Brandeis taking no
part. The dissenting opinions took the ground that the decision was
at variance with the Page 300 U. S. 391 principles which this Court had frequently announced and
applied. In 1925 and 1927, the similar minimum wage statutes of
Arizona and Arkansas were held invalid upon the authority of the Adkins case. The Justices who had dissented in that case
bowed to the ruling, and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented. Murphy
v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530; Donham v. West-Nelson Co., 273 U.S. 657. The question did not come before us again until the
last term in the Morehead case, as already noted. In that
case, briefs supporting the New York statute were submitted by the
States of Ohio, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey and Rhode Island. 298 U.S. p. 604, note.
Throughout this entire period, the Washington statute now under
consideration has been in force.

															The principle which must control our decision is not in doubt.
The constitutional provision invoked is the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, governing the States, as the due process
clause invoked in the Adkins case governed Congress. In
each case, the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage
regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is
this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that
deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and
uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its
history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in
a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of
the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process. Page 300 U. S. 392 This essential limitation of liberty in general governs freedom
of contract in particular. More than twenty-five years ago, we set
forth the applicable principle in these words, after referring to
the cases where the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
had been broadly described: [ Footnote 1 ]

															"But it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others,
that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute,
right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to
contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw
from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which
consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the
power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
community." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.
S. 549 , 219 U. S.
567 .

															This power under the Constitution to restrict freedom of
contract has had many illustrations. [ Footnote 2 ] That it may be exercised in the public
interest with respect to contracts Page 300 U. S. 393 between employer and employee is undeniable. Thus, statutes have
been sustained limiting employment in underground mines and
smelters to eight hours a day ( Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 ); in
requiring redemption in cash of store orders or other evidences of
indebtedness issued in the payment of wages ( Knoxville Iron Co.
v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 ); in
forbidding the payment of seamen's wages in advance ( Patterson
v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169 ); in
making it unlawful to contract to pay miners employed at quantity
rates upon the basis of screened coal instead of the weight of the
coal as originally produced in the mine ( McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 ); in
prohibiting contracts limiting liability for injuries to employees
( Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, supra ); in
limiting hours of work of employees in manufacturing establishments
( Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 ),
and in maintaining workmen's compensation laws ( New York
Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.
S. 219 ). In dealing with the relation of employer and
employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of
discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health
and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through
regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and
freedom from oppression. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
McGuire, supra, p. 219 U. S.
570 .

															The point that has been strongly stressed that adult employees
should be deemed competent to make their own contracts was
decisively met nearly forty years ago in Holden v. Hardy,
supra, where we pointed out the inequality in the footing of
the parties. We said ( Id. 169 U. S.
397 ):

															"The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the
experience of legislators in many States has corroborated, that the
proprietors of these establishments and their operatives do not
stand upon an equality, and that Page 300 U. S. 394 their interests are, to a certain extent, conflicting. The
former naturally desire to obtain as much labor as possible from
their employes, while the latter are often induced by the fear of
discharge to conform to regulations which their judgment, fairly
exercised, would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or
strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules and
the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. In such
cases, self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature
may properly interpose its authority."

															And we added that the fact

															"that both parties are of full age and competent to contract
does not necessarily deprive the State of the power to interfere
where the parties do not stand upon an equality, or where the
public health demands that one party to the contract shall be
protected against himself."

															"The State still retains an interest in his welfare, however
reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the sum of all the
parts, and when the individual health, safety and welfare are
sacrificed or neglected, the State must suffer."

															It is manifest that this established principle is peculiarly
applicable in relation to the employment of women, in whose
protection the State has a special interest. That phase of the
subject received elaborate consideration in Muller v.
Oregon (1908), 208 U. S. 412 ,
where the constitutional authority of the State to limit the
working hours of women was sustained. We emphasized the
consideration that "woman's physical structure and the performance
of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence," and that her physical wellbeing "becomes an
object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race." We emphasized the need of
protecting women against oppression despite her possession of
contractual rights. We said that,

															"though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be
removed by legislation, there is that in her Page 300 U. S. 395 disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full
assertion of those rights. She will still be where some legislation
to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of
right."

															Hence, she was

															"properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed
for her protection may be sustained even when like legislation is
not necessary for men and could not be sustained."

															We concluded that the limitations which the statute there in
question "placed upon her contractual powers, upon her right to
agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor," were "not
imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of
all." Again, in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S.
59 , 223 U. S. 63 , in
referring to a differentiation with respect to the employment of
women, we said that the Fourteenth Amendment did not interfere with
state power by creating a "fictitious equality." We referred to
recognized classifications on the basis of sex with regard to hours
of work and in other matters, and we observed that the particular
points at which that difference shall be enforced by legislation
were largely in the power of the State. In later rulings, this
Court sustained the regulation of hours of work of women employees
in Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.
S. 671 (factories), Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 (hotels), and Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.
S. 385 (hospitals).

															This array of precedents and the principles they applied were
thought by the dissenting Justices in the Adkins case to
demand that the minimum wage statute be sustained. The validity of
the distinction made by the Court between a minimum wage and a
maximum of hours in limiting liberty of contract was especially
challenged. 261 U.S. p. 261 U. S. 564 .
That challenge persists, and is without any satisfactory answer. As
Chief Justice Taft observed:

															"In absolute freedom of contract, the one term is as important
as the other, for both enter equally into the consideration given
and received, a restriction as to Page 300 U. S. 396 the one is not greater, in essence, than the other, and is of
the same kind. One is the multiplier, and the other the
multiplicand."

															And Mr. Justice Holmes, while recognizing that "the distinctions
of the law are distinctions of degree," could

															"perceive no difference in the kind or degree of interference
with liberty, the only matter with which we have any concern,
between the one case and the other. The bargain is equally affected
whichever half you regulate." Id., p. 261 U. S.
569 .

															One of the points which was pressed by the Court in supporting
its ruling in the Adkins case was that the standard set up
by the District of Columbia Act did not take appropriate account of
the value of the services rendered. In the Morehead case,
the minority thought that the New York statute had met that point
in its definition of a "fair wage," and that it accordingly
presented a distinguishable feature which the Court could recognize
within the limits which the Morehead petition for
certiorari was deemed to present. The Court, however, did not take
that view, and the New York Act was held to be essentially the same
as that for the District of Columbia. The statute now before us is
like the latter, but we are unable to conclude that, in its minimum
wage requirement, the State has passed beyond the boundary of its
broad protective power.

															The minimum wage to be paid under the Washington statute is
fixed after full consideration by representatives of employers,
employees and the public. It may be assumed that the minimum wage
is fixed in consideration of the services that are performed in the
particular occupations under normal conditions. Provision is made
for special licenses at less wages in the case of women who are
incapable of full service. The statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in
the Adkins case is pertinent:

															"This statute does not compel anybody to pay anything. It simply
forbids employment at rates below those fixed as Page 300 U. S. 397 the minimum requirement of health and right living. It is safe
to assume that women will not be employed at even the lowest wages
allowed unless they earn them, or unless the employer's business
can sustain the burden. In short the law, in its character and
operation, is like hundreds of so-called police laws that have been
upheld."

															261 U.S. p. 261 U. S. 570 .
And Chief Justice Taft forcibly pointed out the consideration which
is basic in a statute of this character:

															"Legislatures which adopt a requirement of maximum hours or
minimum wages may be presumed to believe that, when sweating
employers are prevented from paying unduly low wages by positive
law, they will continue their business, abating that part of their
profits which were wrung from the necessities of their employees,
and will concede the better terms required by the law, and that,
while in individual cases hardship may result, the restriction will
enure to the benefit of the general class of employees in whose
interest the law is passed, and so to that of the community at
large." Id., p. 261 U. S.
563 .

															We think that the views thus expressed are sound, and that the
decision in the Adkins case was a departure from the true
application of the principles governing the regulation by the State
of the relation of employer and employed. Those principles have
been reenforced by our subsequent decisions. Thus, in Radice v.
New York, 264 U. S. 292 , we
sustained the New York statute which restricted the employment of
women in restaurants at night. In O'Gorman & Young v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 251 ,
which upheld an act regulating the commissions of insurance agents,
we pointed to the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute
dealing with a subject within the scope of the police power and to
the absence of any factual foundation of record for deciding that
the limits of power had been transcended. In Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U. S. 502 ,
dealing Page 300 U. S. 398 with the New York statute providing for minimum prices for milk,
the general subject of the regulation of the use of private
property and of the making of private contracts received an
exhaustive examination, and we again declared that, if such
laws

															"have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and
are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied;"

															that

															"with the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or
practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are
both incompetent and unauthorized to deal;"

															that

															"times without number, we have said that the legislature is
primarily the judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that
every possible presumption is in favor of its validity, and that,
though the court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of
legislative power." Id. pp. 291 U. S. 537 , 291 U. S.
538 .

															With full recognition of the earnestness and vigor which
characterize the prevailing opinion in the Adkins case, we
find it impossible to reconcile that ruling with these well
considered declarations. What can be closer to the public interest
than the health of women and their protection from unscrupulous and
overreaching employers? And if the protection of women is a
legitimate end of the exercise of state power, how can it be said
that the requirement of the payment of a minimum wage fairly fixed
in order to meet the very necessities of existence is not an
admissible means to that end? The legislature of the State was
clearly entitled to consider the situation of women in employment,
the fact that they are in the class receiving the least pay, that
their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are the
ready victims of those who would take advantage of their
necessitous circumstances. The legislature was entitled to adopt
measures to reduce the evils of the "sweating system," Page 300 U. S. 399 the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be insufficient
to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very
helplessness the occasion of a most injurious competition. The
legislature had the right to consider that its minimum wage
requirements would be an important aid in carrying out its policy
of protection. The adoption of similar requirements by many States
evidences a deep-seated conviction both as to the presence of the
evil and as to the means adapted to check it. Legislative response
to that conviction cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious,
and that is all we have to decide. Even if the wisdom of the policy
be regarded as debatable and its effects uncertain, still the
legislature is entitled to its judgment.

															There is an additional and compelling consideration which recent
economic experience has brought into a strong light. The
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power, and are thus relatively
defenceless against the denial of a living wage, is not only
detrimental to their health and wellbeing, but casts a direct
burden for their support upon the community. What these workers
lose in wages, the taxpayers are called upon to pay. The bare cost
of living must be met. We may take judicial notice of the
unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent
period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent
despite the degree of economic recovery which has been achieved. It
is unnecessary to cite official statistics to establish what is of
common knowledge through the length and breadth of the land. While,
in the instant case, no factual brief has been presented, there is
no reason to doubt that the State of Washington has encountered the
same social problem that is present elsewhere. The community is not
bound to provide what is, in effect, a subsidy for unconscionable
employers. The Page 300 U. S. 400 community may direct its lawmaking power to correct the abuse
which springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest.
The argument that the legislation in question constitutes an
arbitrary discrimination, because it does not extend to men, is
unavailing. This Court has frequently held that the legislative
authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend
its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The
legislature "is free to recognize degrees of harm and it may
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need
is deemed to be clearest." If

															"the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is
not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it
might have been applied."

															There is no "doctrinaire requirement" that the legislation
should be couched in all embracing terms. Carroll v. Greenwich
Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401 , 199 U. S. 411 ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 , 232 U. S. 144 ; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.
S. 224 , 234 U. S. 227 ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 , 286 U. S. 396 ; Semler v. Oregon Board, 294 U. S. 608 , 294 U. S. 610 , 294 U. S. 611 .
This familiar principle has repeatedly been applied to legislation
which singles out women, and particular classes of women, in the
exercise of the State's protective power. Miller v. Wilson,
supra, p. 236 U. S. 384 ; Bosley v. McLaughlin, supra, pp. 236 U. S. 394 , 236 U. S. 395 ; Radice v. New York, supra, pp. 264 U. S.
295 -298. Their relative need in the presence of the
evil, no less than the existence of the evil itself, is a matter
for the legislative judgment.

															Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, supra, should be, and it is, overruled. The judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ] Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.
S. 578 ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45 ; Adair v. United States, 208 U.
S. 161 .

															[ Footnote 2 ] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 ; Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.
S. 307 ; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 ; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 ; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 ; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183 ; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 ; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 ; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.
S. 510 ; National Fire Insurance Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71 ; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 ; Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U. S. 540 ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Assn., 276 U. S. 71 , 276 U. S. 97 ; Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U.
S. 253 , 279 U. S. 261 ; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Insurance Co., 282 U. S. 249 , 282 U. S. 251 ; Hardware Dealers Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151 , 281 U. S. 157 ; Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 95 , 285 U. S. 111 ; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 , 287 U. S. 274 ; Hartford Accident Co. v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 291 U.
S. 352 , 291 U. S. 360 ; Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.
S. 570 ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.
S. 502 , 291 U. S.
527 -529.

															MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, dissenting:

															MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER, MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS, MR. JUSTICE
BUTLER and I think the judgment of the court below should be
reversed. Page 300 U. S. 401 The principles and authorities relied upon to sustain the
judgment were considered in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 , and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.
S. 587 , and their lack of application to cases like the
one in hand was pointed out. A sufficient answer to all that is now
said will be found in the opinions of the court in those cases.
Nevertheless, in the circumstances, it seems well to restate our
reasons and conclusions.

															Under our form of government, where the written Constitution, by
its own terms, is the supreme law, some agency, of necessity, must
have the power to say the final word as to the validity of a
statute assailed as unconstitutional. The Constitution makes it
clear that the power has been intrusted to this court when the
question arises in a controversy within its jurisdiction, and, so
long as the power remains there, its exercise cannot be avoided
without betrayal of the trust.

															It has been pointed out many times, as in the Adkins case, that this judicial duty is one of gravity and delicacy, and
that rational doubts must be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute. But whose doubts, and by whom
resolved? Undoubtedly it is the duty of a member of the court, in
the process of reaching a right conclusion, to give due weight to
the opposing views of his associates; but, in the end, the question
which he must answer is not whether such views seem sound to those
who entertain them, but whether they convince him that the statute
is constitutional or engender in his mind a rational doubt upon
that issue. The oath which he takes as a judge is not a composite
oath, but an individual one. And, in passing upon the validity of a
statute, he discharges a duty imposed upon him, which
cannot be consummated justly by an automatic acceptance of the
views of others which have neither convinced, nor created a
reasonable doubt in, his mind. If upon a question so Page 300 U. S. 402 important he thus surrender his deliberate judgment, he stands
forsworn. He cannot subordinate his convictions to that extent and
keep faith with his oath or retain his judicial and moral
independence.

															The suggestion that the only check upon the exercise of the
judicial power, when properly invoked to declare a constitutional
right superior to an unconstitutional statute, is the judge's own
faculty of self-restraint is both ill-considered and mischievous.
Self-restraint belongs in the domain of will, and not of judgment.
The check upon the judge is that imposed by his oath of office, by
the Constitution, and by his own conscientious and informed
convictions, and since he has the duty to make up his own mind and
adjudge accordingly, it is hard to see how there could be any other
restraint. This court acts as a unit. It cannot act in any other
way, and the majority (whether a bare majority or a majority of all
but one of its members) therefore establishes the controlling rule
as the decision of the court, binding, so long as it remains
unchanged, equally upon those who disagree and upon those who
subscribe to it. Otherwise, orderly administration of justice would
cease. But it is the right of those in the minority to disagree,
and sometimes, in matters of grave importance, their imperative
duty to voice their disagreement at such length as the occasion
demands -- always, of course, in terms which, however forceful, do
not offend the proprieties or impugn the good faith of those who
think otherwise.

															It is urged that the question involved should now receive fresh
consideration, among other reasons, because of "the economic
conditions which have supervened"; but the meaning of the
Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events. We frequently are told in more general words that the
Constitution must be construed in the light of the present. If by
that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of Page 300 U. S. 403 living words that apply to every new condition which they
include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be
intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they
did not mean when written -- that is, that they do not apply to a
situation now to which they would have applied then -- is to rob
that instrument of the essential element which continues it in
force as the people have made it until they, and not their official
agents, have made it otherwise.

															The words of Judge Campbell in Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 127, 139-140, apply with peculiar force. "But it may
easily happen," he said,

															"that specific provisions may, in unforeseen emergencies, turn
out to have been inexpedient. This does not make these provisions
any less binding. Constitutions cannot be changed by events alone.
They remain binding as the acts of the people in their sovereign
capacity, as the framers of Government, until they are amended or
abrogated by the action prescribed by the authority which created
them. It is not competent for any department of the Government to
change a constitution, or declare it changed, simply because it
appears ill-adapted to a new state of things."

															". . . Restrictions have, it is true, been found more likely
than grants to be unsuited to unforeseen circumstances . . . But,
where evils arise from the application of such regulations, their
force cannot be denied or evaded, and the remedy consists in repeal
or amendment, and not in false construction."

															The principle is reflected in many decisions of this court. See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.
S. 437 , 199 U. S.
448 -449; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.
S. 662 , 130 U. S. 670 ; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 , 178 U. S. 95 ; Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts , 12 Pet. 657, 37 U. S. 723 ; Craig v.
Missouri , 4 Pet. 410, 431-432; Ex parte
Bain, 121 U. S. 1 , 121 U. S. 12 ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 , 176 U. S. 602 ; Jarrolt v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580 , 103 U. S.
586 . Page 300 U. S. 404 The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not
include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation.
To miss the point of difference between the two is to miss all that
the phrase "supreme law of the land" stands for, and to convert
what was intended as inescapable and enduring mandates into mere
moral reflections.

															If the Constitution, intelligently and reasonably construed in
the light of these principles, stands in the way of desirable
legislation, the blame must rest upon that instrument, and not upon
the court for enforcing it according to its terms. The remedy in
that situation -- and the only true remedy -- is to amend the
Constitution. Judge Cooley, in the first volume of his
Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), p. 124, very clearly pointed
out that much of the benefit expected from written constitutions
would be lost if their provisions were to be bent to circumstances
or modified by public opinion. He pointed out that the common law,
unlike a constitution, was subject to modification by public
sentiment and action which the courts might recognize, but that

															"a court or legislature which should allow a change in public
sentiment to influence it in giving to a written constitution a
construction not warranted by the intention of its founders would
be justly chargeable with reckless disregard of official oath and
public duty, and if its course could become a precedent, these
instruments would be of little avail. . . . What a court is to do,
therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to
the people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may
require. The meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is
adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent time when a
court has occasion to pass upon it."

															The Adkins case dealt with an act of Congress which had
passed the scrutiny both of the legislative and executive branches
of the government. We recognized that Page 300 U. S. 405 thereby these departments had affirmed the validity of the
statute, and properly declared that their determination must be
given great weight, but we then concluded, after thorough
consideration, that their view could not be sustained. We think it
not inappropriate now to add a word on that subject before coming
to the question immediately under review.

															The people, by their Constitution, created three separate,
distinct, independent and coequal departments of government. The
governmental structure rests, and was intended to rest, not upon
any one or upon any two, but upon all three of these fundamental
pillars. It seems unnecessary to repeat what so often has been
said, that the powers of these departments are different, and are
to be exercised independently. The differences clearly and
definitely appear in the Constitution. Each of the departments is
an agent of its creator, and one department is not and cannot be
the agent of another. Each is answerable to its creator for what it
does, and not to another agent. The view, therefore, of the
Executive and of Congress that an act is constitutional is
persuasive in a high degree; but it is not controlling.

															Coming, then, to a consideration of the Washington statute, it
first is to be observed that it is in every substantial respect
identical with the statute involved in the Adkins case.
Such vices as existed in the latter are present in the former. And
if the Adkins case was properly decided, as we who join in
this opinion think it was, it necessarily follows that the
Washington statute is invalid.

															In support of minimum wage legislation it has been urged, on the
one hand, that great benefits will result in favor of underpaid
labor, and, on the other hand, that the danger of such legislation
is that the minimum will tend to become the maximum, and thus bring
down the Page 300 U. S. 406 earnings of the more efficient toward the level of the less
efficient employees. But with these speculations we have nothing to
do. We are concerned only with the question of
constitutionality.

															That the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbids a
state to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law includes freedom of contract is so well settled
as to be no longer open to question. Nor reasonably can it be
disputed that contracts of employment of labor are included in the
rule. Adair v. United States, 208 U.
S. 161 , 208 U. S.
174 -175; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S.
1 , 236 U. S. 10 , 236 U. S. 14 . In
the first of these cases, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
court, said,

															"The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he
deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will
accept such labor from the person offering to sell. . . . In all
such particulars, the employer and employee have equality of right,
and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can
legally justify in a free land."

															In the Adkins case, we referred to this language, and
said that, while there was no such thing as absolute freedom of
contract, but that it was subject to a great variety of restraints,
nevertheless, freedom of contract was the general rule, and
restraint the exception, and that the power to abridge that freedom
could only be justified by the existence of exceptional
circumstances. This statement of the rule has been many times
affirmed, and we do not understand that it is questioned by the
present decision.

															We further pointed out four distinct classes of cases in which
this court from time to time had upheld statutory interferences
with the liberty of contract. They were, in brief, (1) statutes
fixing rates and charges to be Page 300 U. S. 407 exacted by businesses impressed with a public interest; (2)
statutes relating to contracts for the performance of public work;
(3) statutes prescribing the character, methods and time for
payment of wages, and (4) statutes fixing hours of labor. It is the
last class that has been most relied upon as affording support for
minimum wage legislation, and much of the opinion in the Adkins case (261 U.S. 261 U. S.
547 -553) is devoted to pointing out the essential
distinction between fixing hours of labor and fixing wages. What is
there said need not be repeated. It is enough for present purposes
to say that statutes of the former class deal with an incident of
the employment having no necessary effect upon wages. The parties
are left free to contract about wages, and thereby equalize such
additional burdens as may be imposed upon the employer as a result
of the restrictions as to hours by an adjustment in respect of the
amount of wages. This court, wherever the question is adverted to,
has been careful to disclaim any purpose to uphold such legislation
as fixing wages, and has recognized an essential difference between
the two. E.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.
S. 426 ; Wilson v. New, 243 U.
S. 332 , 243 U. S.
345 -346, 243 U. S.
353 -354, and see Freund, Police Power, §
318.

															We then pointed out that minimum wage legislation such as that
here involved does not deal with any business charged with a public
interest, or with public work, or with a temporary emergency, or
with the character, methods or periods of wage payments, or with
hours of labor, or with the protection of persons under legal
disability, or with the prevention of fraud. It is, simply and
exclusively, a law fixing wages for adult women who are legally as
capable of contracting for themselves as men, and cannot be
sustained unless upon principles apart from those involved in cases
already decided by the court.

															Two cases were involved in the Adkins decision. In one
of them, it appeared that a woman 21 years of age, Page 300 U. S. 408 who brought the suit, was employed as an elevator operator at a
fixed salary. Her services were satisfactory, and she was anxious
to retain her position, and her employer, while willing to retain
her, was obliged to dispense with her services on account of the
penalties prescribed by the act. The wages received by her were the
best she was able to obtain for any work she was capable of
performing, and the enforcement of the order deprived her, as she
alleged, not only of that employment, but left her unable to secure
any position at which she could make a living with as good physical
and moral surroundings and as good wages as she was receiving and
was willing to take. The Washington statute, of course, admits of
the same situation and result, and, for aught that appears to the
contrary, the situation in the present case may have been the same
as that just described. Certainly, to the extent that the statute
applies to such cases, it cannot be justified as a reasonable
restraint upon the freedom of contract. On the contrary, it is
essentially arbitrary.

															Neither the statute involved in the Adkins case nor the
Washington statute, so far as it is involved here, has the
slightest relation to the capacity or earning power of the
employee, to the number of hours which constitute the day's work,
the character of the place where the work is to be done, or the
circumstances or surroundings of ,he employment. The sole basis
upon which the question of validity rests is the assumption that
the employee is entitled to receive a sum of money sufficient to
provide a living for her, keep her in health, and preserve her
morals. And, as we pointed out at some length in that case (pp. 261 U. S.
555 -557), the question thus presented for the
determination of the board cannot be solved by any general formula
prescribed by a statutory bureau, since it is not a composite, but
an individual, question to be answered for each individual,
considered by herself. Page 300 U. S. 409 What we said further in that case (pp. 261 U. S.
557 -559), is equally applicable here:

															"The law takes account of the necessities of only one party to
the contract. It ignores the necessities of the employer by
compelling him to pay not less than a certain sum not only whether
the employee is capable of earning it, but irrespective of the
ability of his business to sustain the burden, generously leaving
him, of course, the privilege of abandoning his business as an
alternative for going on at a loss. Within the limits of the
minimum sum, he is precluded, under penalty of fine and
imprisonment, from adjusting compensation to the differing merits
of his employees. It compels him to pay at least the sum fixed in
any event, because the employee needs it, but requires no service
of equivalent value from the employee. It therefore undertakes to
solve but one-half of the problem. The other half is the
establishment of a corresponding standard of efficiency, and this
forms no part of the policy of the legislation, although in
practice the former half without the latter must lead to ultimate
failure, in accordance with the inexorable law that no one can
continue indefinitely to take out more than he puts in without
ultimately exhausting the supply. The law is not confined to the
great and powerful employers, but embraces those whose bargaining
power may be as weak as that of the employee. It takes no account
of periods of stress and business depression, of crippling losses
which may leave the employer himself without adequate means of
livelihood. To the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value
of the services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from
the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for
whose condition there rests upon him no peculiar responsibility,
and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoulders a
burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a
whole."

															"The feature of this statute which, perhaps more than any other,
puts upon it the stamp of invalidity is that it Page 300 U. S. 410 exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose and
upon a basis having no causal connection with his business, or the
contract, or the work the employee engages to do. The declared
basis, as already pointed out, is not the value of the service
rendered, but the extraneous circumstance that the employee needs
to get a prescribed sum of money to insure her subsistence, health
and morals. The ethical right of every worker, man or woman, to a
living wage may be conceded. One of the declared and important
purposes of trade organizations is to secure it. And with that
principle and with every legitimate effort to realize it, in fact,
no one can quarrel; but the fallacy of the proposed method of
attaining it is that it assumes that every employer is bound at all
events to furnish it. The moral requirement implicit in every
contract of employment, viz., that the amount to be paid
and the service to be rendered shall bear to each other some
relation of just equivalence, is completely ignored. The
necessities of the employee are alone considered, and these arise
outside of the employment, are the same when there is no
employment, and as great in one occupation as in another. Certainly
the employer, by paying a fair equivalent for the service rendered,
though not sufficient to support the employee, has neither caused
nor contributed to her poverty. On the contrary, to the extent of
what he pays, he has relieved it. In principle, there can be no
difference between the case of selling labor and the case of
selling goods. If one goes to the butcher, the baker or grocer to
buy food, he is morally entitled to obtain the worth of his money,
but he is not entitled to more. If what he gets is worth what he
pays, he is not justified in demanding more simply because he needs
more, and the shopkeeper, having dealt fairly and honestly in that
transaction, is not concerned in any peculiar sense with the
question of his customer's necessities. Should a statute undertake
to vest in a commission Page 300 U. S. 411 power to determine the quantity of food necessary for individual
support and require the shopkeeper, if he sell to the individual at
all, to furnish that quantity at not more than a fixed maximum, it
would undoubtedly fall before the constitutional test. The fallacy
of any argument in support of the validity of such a statute would
be quickly exposed. The argument in support of that now being
considered is equally fallacious, though the weakness of it may not
be so plain. A statute requiring an employer to pay in money, to
pay at prescribed and regular intervals, to pay the value of the
services rendered, even to pay with fair relation to the extent of
the benefit obtained from the service, would be understandable. But
a statute which prescribes payment without regard to any of these
things, and solely with relation to circumstances apart from the
contract of employment, the business affected by it and the work
done under it, is so clearly the product of a naked, arbitrary
exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand under the
Constitution of the United States."

															Whether this would be equally or at all true in respect of the
statutes of some of the states we are not called upon to say. They
are not now before us, and it is enough that it applies in every
particular to the Washington statute now under consideration.

															The Washington statute, like the one for the District of
Columbia, fixes minimum wages for adult women. Adult men and their
employers are left free to bargain as they please, and it is a
significant and an important fact that all state statutes to which
our attention has been called are of like character. The common law
rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have, under
our system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand
upon a legal and political equality with men. There is no longer
any reason why they should be put in different classes in respect
of their legal Page 300 U. S. 412 right to make contracts; nor should they be denied, in effect,
the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages which men
may be willing to accept. And it is an arbitrary exercise of the
legislative power to do so. In the Tipaldo case, 298 U. S. 587 , 298 U. S. 615 ,
it appeared that the New York legislature had passed two minimum
wage measures -- one dealing with women alone, the other with both
men and women. The act which included men was vetoed by the
governor. The other, applying to women alone, was approved. The
"factual background" in respect of both measures was substantially
the same. In pointing out the arbitrary discrimination which
resulted (pp. 298 U. S.
615 -617) we said:

															"These legislative declarations, in form of findings or recitals
of fact, serve well to illustrate why any measure that deprives
employers and adult women of freedom to agree upon wages, leaving
employers and men employees free so to do, is necessarily
arbitrary. Much, if not all, that in them is said in justification
of the regulations that the Act imposes in respect of women's wages
applies with equal force in support of the same regulation of men's
wages. While men are left free to fix their wages by agreement with
employers, it would be fanciful to suppose that the regulation of
women's wages would be useful to prevent or lessen the evils listed
in the first section of the Act. Men in need of work are as likely
as women to accept the low wages offered by unscrupulous employers.
Men in greater number than women support themselves and dependents,
and, because of need, will work for whatever wages they can get,
and that without regard to the value of the service, and even
though the pay is less than minima prescribed in accordance with
this Act. It is plain that, under circumstances such as those
portrayed in the 'Factual background,' prescribing of minimum wages
for women alone would unreasonably restrain them Page 300 U. S. 413 in competition with men and tend arbitrarily to deprive them of
employment and a fair chance to find work."

															An appeal to the principle that the legislature is free to
recognize degrees of harm, and confine its restrictions
accordingly, is but to beg the question, which is, since the
contractual rights of men and women are the same, does the
legislation here involved, by restricting only the rights of women
to make contracts as to wages, create an arbitrary discrimination?
We think it does. Difference of sex affords no reasonable ground
for making a restriction applicable to the wage contracts of all
working women from which like contracts of all working men are left
free. Certainly a suggestion that the bargaining ability of the
average woman is not equal to that of the average man would lack
substance. The ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows,
does not depend upon sex.

															If, in the light of the facts, the state legislation, without
reason or for reasons of mere expediency, excluded men from the
provisions of the legislation, the power was exercised arbitrarily.
On the other hand, if such legislation in respect of men was
properly omitted on the ground that it would be unconstitutional,
the same conclusion of unconstitutionality is inescapable in
respect of similar legislative restraint in the case of women, 261
U.S. 261 U. S.
553 .

															Finally, it may be said that a statute absolutely fixing wages
in the various industries at definite sums and forbidding employers
and employees from contracting for any other than those designated
would probably not be thought to be constitutional. It is hard to
see why the power to fix minimum wages does not connote a like
power in respect of maximum wages. And yet, if both powers be
exercised in such a way that the minimum and the maximum so nearly
approach each other as to Page 300 U. S. 414 become substantially the same, the right to make any contract in
respect of wages will have been completely abrogated.

															A more complete discussion may be found in the Adkins and Tipaldo cases cited supra.

Summary: In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Washington state law establishing minimum wages for women, overturning a previous decision (Adkins v. Children's Hospital) that deemed such laws unconstitutional. The Court recognized the state's interest in protecting women from poor working conditions and low wages, which could lead to inadequate support and health issues, impacting not just the women but also the community at large. The Court also noted the exceptional demands for relief during the Great Depression. The ruling validated state power to regulate wages for the well-being of society, setting a precedent for future labor laws and minimum wage legislation.


U.S. Supreme Court J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321
U.S. 332 (1944) J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board No. 67 Argued January 3,
1944 Decided February 28,
1944 321
U.S. 332 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. In view of the continuing character of the obligation imposed
on the employer by the order of the National Labor Relations Board,
the subsequent expiration of the contracts in question and the
employer's entry into a collective bargaining agreement did not
render the case moot. P. 321 U. S.
334 .

															2. That an employer has individual contracts of employment,
covering wages, hours and working conditions, with a majority of
his employees, which contracts were valid when made and are
unexpired, does not preclude exercise by the employees of their
right under the National Labor Relations Act to choose a
representative for collective bargaining, nor warrant refusal by
the employer to bargain with such representative in respect of
terms covered by the individual contracts. P. 321 U. S.
339 .

															The relation in general of individual contracts to collective
bargaining is discussed.

															3. The Board has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect
of the contracts here in question, except as to their effect on
matters within its jurisdiction. P. 321 U. S.
340 .

															4. Since the desist order literally goes beyond what the Board
intended, its language is modified accordingly. P. 321 U. S.
341 .

															134 F.2d 70 modified and affirmed.

															Certiorari, 320 U.S. 210, to review a decree which granted
enforcement of an order of the National Labor Relations Board, 42
N.L.R.B. 85. Page 321 U. S. 333 MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This cause was heard by the National Labor Relations Board on
stipulated facts which, so far as concern present issues, are as
follows:

															The petitioner, J. I. Case Company, at its Rock Island,
Illinois, plant, from 1937, offered each employee an individual
contract of employment. The contracts were uniform, and for a term
of one year. The Company agreed to furnish employment as steadily
as conditions permitted, to pay a specified rate, which the Company
might redetermine if the job changed, and to maintain certain
hospital facilities. The employee agreed to accept the provisions,
to serve faithfully and honestly for the term, to comply with
factory rules, and that defective work should not be paid for.
About 75% of the employees accepted and worked under these
agreements.

															According to the Board's stipulation and finding, the execution
of the contracts was not a condition of employment, nor was the
status of individual employees affected by reason of signing or
failing to sign the contracts. It is not found or contended that
the agreements were coerced, obtained by any unfair labor practice,
or that they were not valid under the circumstances in which they
were made.

															While the individual contracts executed August 1, 1941, were in
effect, a CIO union petitioned the Board for certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the production and
maintenance employees. On December 17, 1941, a hearing was held at
which the Company urged the individual contracts as a bar to
representation proceedings. The Board, however, directed an
election, which was won by the union. The union was thereupon
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in question in respect to wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment. Page 321 U. S. 334 The union then asked the Company to bargain. It refused,
declaring that it could not deal with the union in any manner
affecting rights and obligations under the individual contracts
while they remained in effect. It offered to negotiate on matters
which did not affect rights under the individual contracts, and
said that, upon the expiration of the contracts, it would bargain
as to all matters. Twice the Company sent circulars to its
employees asserting the validity of the individual contracts and
stating the position that it took before the Board in reference to
them.

															The Board held that the Company had refused to bargain
collectively, in violation of § 8(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, and that the contracts had been utilized, by means
of the circulars, to impede employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, with the result that the Company had
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(1) of
the Act. It ordered the Company to cease and desist from giving
effect to the contracts, from extending them or entering into new
ones, from refusing to bargain and from interfering with the
employees, and it required the Company to give notice accordingly
and to bargain upon request.

															The Circuit Court of Appeals, with modification not in issue
here, granted an order of enforcement. The issues are unsettled
ones important in the administration of the Act, and we granted
certiorari. In doing so, we asked counsel, in view of the
expiration of the individual contracts and the negotiation of a
collective contract, to discuss whether the case was moot. In view
of the continuing character of the obligation imposed by the order,
we think it is not, and will examine the merits.

															Contract, in labor law, is a term the implications of which must
be determined from the connection in which it appears. Collective
bargaining between employer and the representatives of a unit,
usually a union, results in an Page 321 U. S. 335 accord as to terms which will govern hiring and work and pay in
that unit. The result is not, however, a contract of employment
except in rare cases; no one has a job by reason of it, and no
obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from
it alone. The negotiations between union and management result in
what often has been called a trade agreement, rather than in a
contract of employment. Without pushing the analogy too far, the
agreement may be likened to the tariffs established by a carrier,
to standard provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for
insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates and rules for
service, which do not of themselves establish any relationships,
but which do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer or customer
relationship whenever and with whomever it may be established.
Indeed, in some European countries, contrary to American practice,
the terms of a collectively negotiated trade agreement are
submitted to a government department, and, if approved, become a
governmental regulation ruling employment in the unit. [ Footnote 1 ]

															After the collective trade agreement is made, the individuals
who shall benefit by it are identified by individual hirings. The
employer, except as restricted by the collective agreement itself
and except that he must engage in no unfair labor practice or
discrimination, is free to select those he will employ or
discharge. But the terms of the employment already have been traded
out. There is little left to individual agreement except the act of
hiring. This hiring may be by writing or by word of mouth or may be
implied from conduct. In the sense of contracts of hiring,
individual contracts between the employer and employee Page 321 U. S. 336 are not forbidden, but indeed are necessitated by the collective
bargaining procedure.

															But, however engaged, an employee becomes entitled by virtue of
the Labor Relations Act somewhat as a third party beneficiary to
all benefits of the collective trade agreement, even if on his own
he would yield to less favorable terms. The individual hiring
contract is subsidiary to the terms of the trade agreement, and may
not waive any of its benefits, any more than a shipper can contract
away the benefit of filed tariffs, the insurer the benefit of
standard provisions, or the utility customer the benefit of legally
established rates.

															Concurrent existence of these two types of agreement raises
problems as to which the National Labor Relations Act makes no
express provision. We have, however, held that individual contracts
obtained as the result of an unfair labor practice may not be the
basis of advantage to the violator of the Act nor of disadvantage
to employees. National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350 . But
it is urged that where, as here, the contracts were not unfairly or
unlawfully obtained, the court indicated a contrary rule in Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 , 301 U. S. 44 -45,
and Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.
S. 515 . Without reviewing those cases in detail, it may
be said that their decision called for nothing and their opinions
contain nothing which may be properly read to rule the case before
us. The Court in those cases recognized the existence of some scope
for individual contracts, but it did not undertake to define it or
to consider the relations between lawful individual and collective
agreements, which is the problem now before us.

															Care has been taken in the opinions of the Court to reserve a
field for the individual contract, even in industries covered by
the National Labor Relations Act, not merely as an act or evidence
of hiring, but also in the sense of a completely individually
bargained contract setting out Page 321 U. S. 337 terms of employment, because there are circumstances in which it
may legally be used -- in fact in which there is no alternative.
Without limiting the possibilities, instances such as the following
will occur: men may continue work after a collective agreement
expires and, despite negotiation in good faith, the negotiation may
be deadlocked or delayed; in the interim, express or implied
individual agreements may be held to govern. The conditions for
collective bargaining may not exist; thus, a majority of the
employees may refuse to join a union or to agree upon or designate
bargaining representatives, or the majority may not be demonstrable
by the means prescribed by the statute, or a previously existent
majority may have been lost without unlawful interference by the
employer and no new majority have been formed. As the employer in
these circumstances may be under no legal obligation to bargain
collectively, he may be free to enter into individual contracts.
[ Footnote 2 ]

															Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that
justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of
to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor
Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the
contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor
may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition
the terms of the collective agreement. "The Board asserts a public
right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest
with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices." National
Licorice Co. v. Labor Board, 309 U. S. 350 , 309 U. S. 364 .
Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they
obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. Page 321 U. S. 338 It is equally clear, since the collective trade agreement is to
serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract
cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the
employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The
very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement
is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with
terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the
welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every
employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his
preexisting contract of employment.

															But it is urged that some employees may lose by the collective
agreement, that an individual workman may sometimes have, or be
capable of getting, better terms than those obtainable by the
group, and that his freedom of contract must be respected on that
account. We are not called upon to say that under no circumstances
can an individual enforce an agreement more advantageous than a
collective agreement, but we find the mere possibility that such
agreements might be made no ground for holding generally that
individual contracts may survive or surmount collective ones. The
practice and philosophy of collective bargaining looks with
suspicion on such individual advantages. Of course, where there is
great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity of
employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe
only minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain
areas open to individual bargaining. But, except as so provided,
advantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial
peace as disadvantages. They are a fruitful way of interfering with
organization and choice of representatives; increased compensation,
if individually deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking
down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the
group, and always creates the suspicion of being Page 321 U. S. 339 paid at the long range expense of the group as a whole. Such
discriminations not infrequently amount to unfair labor practices.
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more
than that of the group, to vote against representation, but the
majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain,
individual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as
a contribution to the collective result. We cannot except
individual contracts generally from the operation of collective
ones because some may be more individually advantageous. Individual
contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether, under
some circumstances, they may add to them in matters covered by the
collective bargain we leave to be determined by appropriate forums
under the laws of contracts applicable, and to the Labor Board if
they constitute unfair labor practices.

															It also is urged that such individual contracts may embody
matters that are not necessarily included within the statutory
scope of collective bargaining, such as stock purchase, group
insurance, hospitalization, or medical attention. We know of
nothing to prevent the employee's, because he is an employee,
making any contract provided it is not inconsistent with a
collective agreement or does not amount to or result from or is not
part of an unfair labor practice. But, in so doing, the employer
may not incidentally exact or obtain any diminution of his own
obligation or any increase of those of employees in the matters
covered by collective agreement.

															Hence, we find that the contentions of the Company that the
individual contracts precluded a choice of representatives and
warranted refusal to bargain during their duration were properly
overruled. It follows that representation to the employees by
circular letter that they had such legal effect was improper, and
could properly be prohibited by the Board. Page 321 U. S. 340 One minor matter remains for consideration. The literal terms of
the Board's order require the Company to

															"cease and desist from (a) giving effect to the individual
contracts of employment or any modification, continuation,
extension or renewal thereof, or entering into any similar form of
contract with its employees for any period subsequent to the date
of this decision,"

															and to give written notice to each to that effect and that "such
contract will not in any manner be enforced or attempted to be
enforced," and that "such discontinuance of the contract is without
prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee may
have acquired under such contract."

															These provisions, it has been argued, go beyond the Board's
power, leave employees free to bring, but the Company powerless to
defend, actions on the contract, and prohibit making future
contracts even when not obnoxious to the law or to any collective
agreement.

															The Board, of course, has no power to adjudicate the validity or
effect of such contracts except as to their effect on matters
within its jurisdiction. National Licorice Co. v. Labor Board,
supra. The Board, however, would construe the order more
narrowly than its terms suggest. It says,

															"The provision in question, as we have seen, is based upon the
finding that the contracts were utilized as a means of interfering
with rights guaranteed by the Act, and constituted an obstacle to
collective bargaining. Read in the context of this finding, the
requirement of the cease and desist provisions enjoins petitioner
only from continuing to derive benefits from the contracts
heretofore utilized to forestall collective bargaining and deter
self-organization, and from entering into new contracts either for
the purpose of again thus utilizing them or under circumstances in
which similar infringement of the collective bargaining process
would be a probable consequence. The paragraph does not prevent
petitioner from contracting with individual employees under
circumstances which negative any Page 321 U. S. 341 intent to interfere with the employees' right under the Act. . .
. Thus, construed, the challenged requirement is but a reasonable
safeguard. . . ."

															We agree, but the literal language of the order may well be read
in quite different meaning, especially when separated from findings
and standing alone in the Court's enforcement order. It then
becomes the language of the Court, and the Court would not be bound
to look upon the Board's construction as its own. Questions of
construction had better be ironed out before enforcement orders
issue than upon contempt proceedings. A party is entitled to a
definition as exact as the circumstances permit of the acts which
he can perform only on pain of contempt of court. Nor should he be
ordered to desist from more on the theory that he may violate the
literal language and then defend by resort to the Board's
construction of it. Courts' orders are not to be trifled with, nor
should they invite litigation as to their meaning. It will occur
often enough when every reasonable effort is made to avoid it.
Where, as here, the literal language of the order goes beyond what
the Board admits was intended, correction should be made.
Paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) of the decree of the court below are
hereby modified, by adding the words in italics, to read as
follows:

															"1. Cease and desist from:"

															"(a) Giving effect to the individual contracts of employment or
any modification, continuation, extension, or renewal thereof to forestall collective bargaining or deter
self-organization, or entering into any similar form of
contract with its employees for any period subsequent to the date
of this Decree for such purpose or with such effect. "

															"2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act:"

															"(a) Give separate written notice to each of its employees who
signed an individual contract of employment or any modification,
continuation, extension, or renewal Page 321 U. S. 342 thereof, or any similar form of contract for any period
subsequent to the date of this Decree, that such contract will not
in any manner be enforced or attempted to be enforced to
forestall collective bargaining or deter self-organization, that the employee is not required or expected by virtue of such
contract to deal with respondent individually in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment, and that such discontinuance of the contract is
without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee
may have acquired under such contract or to any defenses
thereto by the employer. "

															As so modified the decree is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS is of opinion that the judgment should be
reversed.

															[ Footnote 1 ] See Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements
to Cover Entire Trade and Industries" (1939) 40 International Labor
Review 153; Methods of Collaboration between Public Authorities,
Workers' Organizations, and Employers' Organizations (International
Labour Conference, 1940) p. 112.

															[ Footnote 2 ] Cf. Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.
S. 332 ; Labor Board v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 , 306 U. S.
297 -298; Labor Board v. Brashear Freight Lines,
Inc., 119 F.2d 379; Hoeniger, "The Individual Employment
Contract and Individual Bargain," 10 Fordham L.Rev. 14, 22-25.

Summary:
The case of J. I. Case Co. v. Labor Board (1944) concerned an employer's attempt to avoid collective bargaining with its employees by implementing individual contracts of employment. The National Labor Relations Board and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled against the employer, and the Supreme Court affirmed this decision.

The Court held that the employer's individual contracts with employees, covering wages, hours, and working conditions, did not preclude the employees' right to choose a representative for collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. The Court also clarified the Board's power to adjudicate the validity of such contracts, stating that it extends only to matters within the Board's jurisdiction.

While the employer's subsequent entry into a collective bargaining agreement could have rendered the case moot, the Court emphasized the continuing nature of the obligation imposed by the Board's order. The Court modified the Board's order to more precisely define the acts the employer was required to refrain from, emphasizing the importance of clear and exact language in court orders.