OPINION OF THE COURT SNYDER V. PHELPS 562 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-751 ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, SR., et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

															[March 2, 2011]

															   Chief Justice Roberts delivered
the opinion of the Court.

															   A jury held members of the
Westboro Baptist Church liable for millions of dollars in damages
for picketing near a soldier’s funeral service. The picket signs
reflected the church’s view that the United States is overly
tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment.
The question presented is whether the First Amendment shields the
church members from tort liability for their speech in this
case.

															I

															A

															   Fred Phelps founded the Westboro
Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The church’s
congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United States
for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s
military. The church frequently communicates its views by
picketing, often at military funerals. In the more than 20 years
that the members of Westboro Baptist have publicized their message,
they have picketed nearly 600 funerals. Brief for Rutherford
Institute as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 14.

															   Marine Lance Corporal Matthew
Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. Lance Corporal
Snyder’s father selected the Catholic church in the Snyders’
hometown of Westminster, Maryland, as the site for his son’s
funeral. Local newspapers provided notice of the time and location
of the service.

															   Phelps became aware of Matthew Snyder’s
funeral and decided to travel to Maryland with six other Westboro
Baptist parishioners (two of his daughters and four of his
grandchildren) to picket. On the day of the memorial service, the
Westboro congregation members picketed on public land adjacent to
public streets near the Maryland State House, the United States
Naval Academy, and Matthew Snyder’s funeral. The Westboro picketers
carried signs that were largely the same at all three locations.
They stated, for instance: “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,”
“America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for
IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape
Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates
You.”

															   The church had notified the authorities in
advance of its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the
picketers complied with police instructions in staging their
demonstration. The picketing took place within a 10- by 25-foot
plot of public land adjacent to a public street, behind a temporary
fence. App. to Brief for Appellants in No. 08–1026 (CA4),
pp. 2282–2285 (hereinafter App.). That plot was approximately
1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held. Several
buildings separated the picket site from the church. Id .,
at 3758. The Westboro picketers displayed their signs for about 30
minutes before the funeral began and sang hymns and recited Bible
verses. None of the picketers entered church property or went to
the cemetery. They did not yell or use profanity, and there was no
violence associated with the picketing. Id ., at 2168,
2371, 2286, 2293.

															   The funeral procession passed within 200 to
300 feet of the picket site. Although Snyder testified that he
could see the tops of the picket signs as he drove to the funeral,
he did not see what was written on the signs until later that
night, while watching a news broadcast covering the event. Id. , at 2084–2086.[ Footnote 1 ]

															B

															   Snyder filed suit against Phelps,
Phelps’s daughters, and the Westboro Baptist Church (collectively
Westboro or the church) in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland under that court’s diversity jurisdiction.
Snyder alleged five state tort law claims: defamation, publicity
given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy. Westboro
moved for summary judgment contending, in part, that the church’s
speech was insulated from liability by the First Amendment. See 533
F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (Md. 2008).

															   The District Court awarded
Westboro summary judgment on Snyder’s claims for defamation and
publicity given to private life, concluding that Snyder could not
prove the necessary elements of those torts. Id., at
572–573. A trial was held on the remaining claims. At trial, Snyder
described the severity of his emotional injuries. He testified that
he is unable to separate the thought of his dead son from his
thoughts of Westboro’s picketing, and that he often becomes
tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it. Id., at 588–589. Expert witnesses testified that Snyder’s
emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had
exacerbated pre-existing health conditions.

															   A jury found for Snyder on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and
civil conspiracy claims, and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million
in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages.
Westboro filed several post-trial motions, including a motion
contending that the jury verdict was grossly excessive and a motion
seeking judgment as a matter of law on all claims on First
Amendment grounds. The District Court remitted the punitive damages
award to $2.1 million, but left the jury verdict otherwise intact. Id., at 597.

															   In the Court of Appeals, Westboro’s primary
argument was that the church was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because the First Amendment fully protected Westboro’s
speech. The Court of Appeals agreed. 580 F. 3d 206, 221 (CA4
2009). The court reviewed the picket signs and concluded that
Westboro’s statements were entitled to First Amendment protection
because those statements were on matters of public concern, were
not provably false, and were expressed solely through hyperbolic
rhetoric. Id. , at 222–224.[ Footnote 2 ]

															   We granted certiorari. 559 U. S. ___
(2010).

															II

															   To succeed on a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused
the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. See Harris v. Jones , 281 Md. 560, 565–566, 380
A. 2d 611, 614 (1977). The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment—“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of
speech”—can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell , 485 U. S. 46 ,
50–51 (1988).[ Footnote 3 ]

															   Whether the First Amendment
prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns
largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as
determined by all the circumstances of the case. “[S]peech on
‘matters of public concern’ … is ‘at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection.’ ” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U. S. 749 , 758–759
(1985) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti , 435 U. S. 765 , 776
(1978)). The First Amendment reflects “a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U. S. 254 , 270
(1964). That is because “speech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U. S. 64 , 74–75
(1964). Accordingly, “speech on public issues occupies the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to
special protection.” Connick v. Myers , 461 U. S. 138 , 145
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															   “ ‘[N]ot all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance,’ ” however, and where matters of purely
private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are
often less rigorous. Hustler , supra, at 56
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet , supra, at 758);
see Connick , supra, at 145–147. That is because
restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the
same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of
public interest: “[T]here is no threat to the free and robust
debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a
meaningful dialogue of ideas”; and the “threat of liability” does
not pose the risk of “a reaction of self-censorship” on matters of
public import. Dun & Bradstreet , supra, at
760 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															   We noted a short time ago, in considering
whether public employee speech addressed a matter of public
concern, that “the boundaries of the public concern test are not
well defined.” San Diego v. Roe , 543 U. S. 77 , 83 (2004)
( per curiam ). Although that remains true today, we have
articulated some guiding principles, principles that accord broad
protection to speech to ensure that courts themselves do not become
inadvertent censors.

															   Speech deals with matters of public concern
when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
politi- cal, social, or other concern to the community,” Connick , supra, at 146, or when it “is a subject
of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest
and of value and concern to the public,” San Diego , supra, at 83–84. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn , 420
U. S. 469 , 492–494 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill , 385
U. S. 374 , 387– 388 (1967). The arguably “inappropriate or
controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the
question whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Rankin v. McPherson , 483 U. S. 378 , 387
(1987).

															   Our opinion in Dun & Bradstreet ,
on the other hand, provides an example of speech of only private
concern. In that case we held, as a general matter, that
information about a particular individual’s credit report “concerns
no public issue.” 472 U. S., at 762. The content of the report, we
explained, “was speech solely in the individual interest of the
speaker and its specific business audience.” Ibid. That
was confirmed by the fact that the particular report was sent to
only five subscribers to the reporting service, who were bound not
to disseminate it further. Ibid. To cite another example,
we concluded in San Diego v. Roe that, in the
context of a government employer regulating the speech of its
employees, videos of an employee engaging in sexually explicit acts
did not address a public concern; the videos “did nothing to inform
the public about any aspect of the [employing agency’s] functioning
or operation.” 543 U. S., at 84.

															   Deciding whether speech is of public or
private concern requires us to examine the “ ‘content, form,
and context’ ” of that speech, “ ‘as revealed by the
whole record.’ ” Dun & Bradstreet , supra, at 761 (quoting Connick , supra, at 147–148). As in other First Amendment cases, the court is
obligated “to ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’
in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. , 466 U. S.
485 , 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times , supra, at 284–286). In considering content, form, and
context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate
all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where
it was said, and how it was said.

															   The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly
relates to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather
than matters of “purely private concern.” Dun &
Bradstreet , supra, at 759. The placards read “God
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray
for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,”
“God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not
Blessed Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in
Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates
You.” App. 3781–3787. While these messages may fall short of
refined social or political commentary, the issues they
highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and
its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are matters of
public import. The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on
those issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet , to reach as broad a public audience
as possible. And even if a few of the signs—such as “You’re Going
to Hell” and “God Hates You”—were viewed as containing messages
related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically, that would
not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of
Westboro’s demonstration spoke to broader public issues.

															   Apart from the content of Westboro’s signs,
Snyder contends that the “context” of the speech—its connection
with his son’s funeral—makes the speech a matter of private rather
than public concern. The fact that Westboro spoke in connection
with a funeral, however, cannot by itself transform the nature of
Westboro’s speech. Westboro’s signs, displayed on public land next
to a public street, reflect the fact that the church finds much to
condemn in modern society. Its speech is “fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern,” Connick , 461 U. S., at 146, and the funeral setting does
not alter that conclusion.

															   Snyder argues that the church members in fact
mounted a personal attack on Snyder and his family, and then
attempted to “immunize their conduct by claiming that they were
actually protesting the United States’ tolerance of homosexuality
or the supposed evils of the Catholic Church.” Reply Brief for
Petitioner 10. We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s
speech on public matters was in any way contrived to insulate
speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been
actively engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its
picketing long before it became aware of Matthew Snyder, and there
can be no serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent
its “honestly believed” views on public issues. Garrison ,
379 U. S., at 73. There was no pre-existing relationship or
conflict between Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s
speech on public matters was intended to mask an attack on Snyder
over a private matter. Contrast Connick , supra, at 153 (finding public employee speech a matter of private concern
when it was “no coincidence that [the speech] followed upon the
heels of [a] transfer notice” affecting the employee).

															   Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro’s speech
should be afforded less than full First Amendment protection “not
only because of the words” but also because the church members
exploited the funeral “as a platform to bring their message to a
broader audience.” Brief for Petitioner 44, 40. There is no doubt
that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at the Naval Academy,
the Maryland State House, and Matthew Snyder’s funeral to increase
publicity for its views and because of the relation between those
sites and its views—in the case of the military funeral, because
Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as
punishment for the Nation’s sinful policies.

															   Westboro’s choice to convey its views in
conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the expression of
those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew’s
father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal
term—“emotional distress”—fails to capture fully the anguish
Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable grief.
But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of
public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street. Such
space occupies a “special position in terms of First Amendment
protection.” United States v. Grace , 461 U. S. 171 , 180
(1983). “[W]e have repeatedly referred to public streets as the
archetype of a traditional public forum,” noting that
“ ‘[t]ime out of mind’ public streets and sidewalks have been
used for public assembly and debate.” Frisby v. Schultz , 487 U. S. 474 , 480
(1988).[ Footnote 4 ]

															   That said, “[e]ven protected speech is not
equally permissible in all places and at all times.” Id., at 479 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Ed. Fund, Inc. , 473 U. S. 788 , 799
(1985)). Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its
picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory reach—it is
“subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions” that
are consistent with the standards announced in this Court’s
precedents. Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence , 468 U. S. 288 , 293
(1984). Maryland now has a law imposing restrictions on funeral
picketing, Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §10–205 (Lexis Supp. 2010), as
do 43 other States and the Federal Government. See Brief for
American Legion as Amicus Curiae 18–19, n. 2 (listing
statutes). To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise
very different questions from the tort verdict at issue in this
case. Maryland’s law, however, was not in effect at the time of the
events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it
might apply to facts such as those before us, or whether it or
other similar regulations are constitutional.[ Footnote 5 ]

															   We have identified a few limited situations
where the location of targeted picketing can be regulated under
provisions that the Court has determined to be content neutral. In Frisby , for example, we upheld a ban on such picketing
“before or about” a particular residence, 487 U. S., at 477. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. , we
approved an injunction requiring a buffer zone between protesters
and an abortion clinic entrance. 512 U. S. 753 , 768
(1994). The facts here are obviously quite different, both with
respect to the activity being regulated and the means of
restricting those activities.

															   Simply put, the church members had the right
to be where they were. Westboro alerted local authorities to its
funeral protest and fully complied with police guidance on where
the picketing could be staged. The picketing was conducted under
police supervision some 1,000 feet from the church, out of the
sight of those at the church. The protest was not unruly; there was
no shouting, profanity, or violence.

															   The record confirms that any distress
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and
viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference
with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the
very spot where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless
America” and “God Loves You,” would not have been subjected to
liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort
damages.

															   Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public
place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to
“special protection” under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot
be restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson , 491 U. S. 397 , 414
(1989). Indeed, “the point of all speech protection … is to shield
just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided,
or even hurtful.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. , 515 U. S. 557 , 574
(1995).

															   The jury here was instructed that it could
hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on a finding that Westboro’s picketing was
“outrageous.” “Outrageousness,” however, is a highly malleable
standard with “an inherent subjectiveness about it which would
allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes
or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression.” Hustler , 485 U. S., at 55 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In a case such as this, a jury is “unlikely to be
neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech,” posing “a
real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of …
‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasan[t]’ ” expression. Bose Corp. , 466 U. S., at 510 (quoting New York
Times , 376 U. S., at 270). Such a risk is unacceptable; “in
public debate [we] must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous,
speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” Boos v. Barry , 485
U. S. 312 , 322 (1988) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose
to say it, is entitled to “special protection” under the First
Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding
that the picketing was outrageous.

															   For all these reasons, the jury verdict
imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must be set aside.

															III

															   The jury also found Westboro
liable for the state law torts of intrusion upon seclusion and
civil conspiracy. The Court of Appeals did not examine these torts
independently of the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort. Instead, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court
wholesale, holding that the judgment wrongly “attache[d] tort
liability to constitutionally protected speech.” 580 F. 3d, at
226.

															   Snyder argues that even assuming
Westboro’s speech is entitled to First Amendment protection
generally, the church is not immunized from liability for intrusion
upon seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audience at
his son’s funeral. Brief for Petitioner 45–46. We do not agree. In
most circumstances, “the Constitution does not permit the
government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are
sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling
listener or viewer. Rather, … the burden normally falls upon the
viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply
by averting [his] eyes.” Erznoznik v. Jacksonville , 422 U. S. 205 , 210–211
(1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, “[t]he
ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is … dependent
upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner.” Cohen v. California , 403 U. S. 15 , 21
(1971).

															   As a general matter, we have applied the
captive audience doctrine only sparingly to protect unwilling
listeners from protected speech. For example, we have upheld a
statute allowing a homeowner to restrict the delivery of offensive
mail to his home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept. , 397 U. S. 728 ,
736–738 (1970), and an ordinance prohibiting picketing “before or
about” any individual’s residence, Frisby , 487 U. S., at
484–485.

															   Here, Westboro stayed well away from the
memorial service. Snyder could see no more than the tops of the
signs when driving to the funeral. And there is no indication that
the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service
itself. We decline to expand the captive audience doctrine to the
circumstances presented here.

															   Because we find that the First Amendment bars
Snyder from recovery for intentional infliction of emotional
distress or intrusion upon seclusion—the alleged unlawful activity
Westboro conspired to accomplish—we must likewise hold that Snyder
cannot recover for civil conspiracy based on those torts.

															IV

															   Our holding today is narrow. We
are required in First Amendment cases to carefully review the
record, and the reach of our opinion here is limited by the
particular facts before us. As we have noted, “the sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between First
Amendment and [state law] rights counsel relying on limited
principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context
of the instant case.” Florida Star v. B. J. F. , 491 U. S. 524 , 533
(1989).

															   Westboro believes that America is
morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about Westboro.
Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its
con-tribution to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro
addressed matters of public import on public property, in a
peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local
officials. The speech was indeed planned to coincide with Matthew
Snyder’s funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and
Westboro’s choice to conduct its picketing at that time and place
did not alter the nature of its speech.

															   Speech is powerful. It can stir people to
action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did
here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to
that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to
ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires
that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in
this case.

															   The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 A few weeks after the funeral, one of the
picketers posted a message on Westboro’s Web site discussing the
picketing and containing religiously oriented denunciations of the
Snyders, interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations. Snyder
discovered the posting, referred to by the parties as the “epic,”
during an Internet search for his son’s name. The epic is not
properly before us and does not factor in our analysis. Although
the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts
below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari.
See Pet. for Cert. i (“Snyder’s claim arose out of Phelps’
intentional acts at Snyder’s son’s funeral ” (emphasis
added)); this Court’s Rule 14.1(g) (petition must contain statement
“setting out the facts material to consideration of the question
presented”). Nor did Snyder respond to the statement in the
opposition to certiorari that “[t]hough the epic was asserted as a
basis for the claims at trial, the petition … appears to be
addressing only claims based on the picketing.” Brief in Opposition
9. Snyder devoted only one paragraph in the argument section of his
opening merits brief to the epic. Given the foregoing and the fact
that an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in this context,
we decline to consider the epic in deciding this case. See Ontario v. Quon , 560 U. S. ___,
___ – ___ (2010) (slip op., at 10–12). Footnote 2 One judge concurred in the judgment on the
ground that Snyder had failed to introduce sufficient evidence at
trial to support a jury verdict on any of his tort claims. 580
F. 3d, at 227 (opinion of Shedd, J.). The Court of Appeals
majority determined that the picketers had “voluntarily waived” any
such contention on appeal. Id., at 216. Like the court
below, we proceed on the unexamined premise that respondents’
speech was tortious. Footnote 3 The dissent attempts to draw parallels
between this case and hy-pothetical cases involving defamation or
fighting words. Post , at 10–11 (opinion of
Alito, J.). But, as the court below noted, there is “no
suggestion that the speech at issue falls within one of the
categorical exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as
those for obscenity or ‘fighting words.’ ” 580 F. 3d, at
218, n. 12; see United States v. Stevens ,
559 U. S. ___ , ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5). Footnote 4 The dissent is wrong to suggest that the
Court considers a public street “a free-fire zone in which
otherwise actionable verbal attacks are shielded from liability.” Post , at 10–11. The fact that Westboro conducted its
picketing adjacent to a public street does not insulate the speech
from liability, but instead heightens concerns that what is at
issue is an effort to communicate to the public the church’s views
on matters of public concern. That is why our precedents so clearly
recognize the special significance of this traditional public
forum. Footnote 5 The Maryland law prohibits picketing within
100 feet of a funeral service or funeral procession; Westboro’s
picketing would have complied with that restriction. BREYER, J., CONCURRING SNYDER V. PHELPS 562 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-751 ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, Sr., et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

															[March 2, 2011]

															   Justice Breyer, concurring.

															   I agree with the Court and join
its opinion. That opinion restricts its analysis here to the matter
raised in the petition for certiorari, namely, Westboro’s picketing
activity. The opinion does not examine in depth the effect of
television broadcasting. Nor does it say anything about Internet
postings. The Court holds that the First Amendment protects the
picketing that occurred here, primarily because the picketing
addressed matters of “public concern.”

															   While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that
the picketing addressed matters of public concern, I do not believe
that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point. A State
can sometimes regulate picketing, even picketing on matters of
public concern. See Frisby v. Schultz , 487 U. S. 474 (1988).
Moreover, suppose that A were physically to assault B, knowing that
the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an opportunity
to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern.
The constitutionally protected nature of the end would not shield
A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some circumstances
the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U. S. 568 (1942)
(“fighting words”).

															   The dissent recognizes that the means used
here consist of speech. But it points out that the speech, like an
assault, seriously harmed a private individual. Indeed, the state
tort of “intentional infliction of emotional distress” forbids only
conduct that produces distress “so severe that no reasonable man
could be expected to endure it,” and which itself is “so outrageous
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Post , at
2–3 (opinion of Alito, J.) (quoting Harris v. Jones , 281 Md. 560, 567, 571, 380 A. 2d 611, 614, 616
(1977); internal quotation marks omitted) . The dissent
requires us to ask whether our holding unreasonably limits
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress—to the
point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a public
matter) might launch a verbal assault upon B, a private person,
publicly revealing the most intimate details of B’s private life,
while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional
harm. Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the
individual against invasions of, e.g. , personal privacy,
even in the most horrendous of such circumstances?

															   As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does
not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide
private individuals with necessary protection. Rather, the Court
has reviewed the underlying facts in detail, as will sometimes
prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected
(say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict. Cf. Florida Star v. B. J. F. , 491 U. S. 524 , 533
(1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. , 466 U. S. 485 , 499
(1984). That review makes clear that Westboro’s means of
communicating its views consisted of picketing in a place where
picketing was lawful and in compliance with all police directions.
The picketing could not be seen or heard from the funeral ceremony
itself. And Snyder testified that he saw no more than the tops of
the picketers’ signs as he drove to the funeral. To uphold the
application of state law in these circumstances would punish
Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of public
concern without proportionately advancing the State’s interest in
protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.
Consequently, the First Amendment protects Westboro. As I read the
Court’s opinion, it holds no more. ALITO, J., DISSENTING SNYDER V. PHELPS 562 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-751 ALBERT SNYDER, PETITIONER v. FRED W.
PHELPS, Sr., et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the fourth circuit

															[March 2, 2011]

															   Justice Alito, dissenting.

															   Our profound national commitment
to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal
assault that occurred in this case.

															   Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public
figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal
Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is
surely the right of any parent who experiences such an incalculable
loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents, members of the
Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right.
They first issued a press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral
into a tumultuous media event. They then appeared at the church,
approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and
launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a
time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Albert Snyder
suffered severe and lasting emotional injury.[ Footnote 1 ] The Court now holds that the First
Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I
cannot agree.

															I

															   Respondents and other members of
their church have strong opinions on certain moral, religious, and
political issues, and the First Amendment ensures that they have
almost limitless opportunities to express their views. They may
write and distribute books, articles, and other texts; they may
create and disseminate video and audio recordings; they may
circulate petitions; they may speak to individuals and groups in
public forums and in any private venue that wishes to accommodate
them; they may picket peacefully in countless locations; they may
appear on television and speak on the radio; they may post messages
on the Internet and send out e-mails. And they may express their
views in terms that are “uninhibited,” “vehement,” and “caustic.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U. S. 254 , 270
(1964).

															   It does not follow, however, that
they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private
persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching
vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public debate.
To protect against such injury, “most if not all jurisdictions”
permit recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress (or IIED). Hustler Magazine , Inc. v. Falwell , 485 U. S. 46 , 53 (1988).

															   This is a very narrow tort with requirements
that “are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §12,
p. 61 (5th ed. 1984). To recover, a plaintiff must show that the
conduct at issue caused harm that was truly severe. See Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel , 321 Md. 642, 653,
584 A. 2d 69, 75 (1991) (“[R]ecovery will be meted out
sparingly, its balm reserved for those wounds that are truly severe
and incapable of healing themselves” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Harris v. Jones , 281 Md. 560, 571, 380
A. 2d 611, 616 (1977) (the distress must be “ ‘so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it’ ”
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment j (1963–1964))).

															   A plaintiff must also establish that the
defendant’s conduct was “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.’ ” Id. , at 567, 380 A. 2d,
at 614 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment d ).

															   Although the elements of the IIED tort are
difficult to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to
show that those tough standards were not satisfied here. On appeal,
they chose not to contest the sufficiency of the evidence. See 580
F. 3d 206, 216 (CA4 2009). They did not dispute that Mr.
Snyder suffered “ ‘wounds that are truly severe and incapable
of healing themselves.’ ” Figueiredo-Torres , supra , at 653, 584 A. 2d, at 75. Nor did they dispute
that their speech was “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.’ ” Harris , supra , at
567, 380 A. 2d, at 614. Instead, they maintained that the
First Amendment gave them a license to engage in such conduct. They
are wrong.

															II

															   It is well established that a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be
satisfied by speech. Indeed, what has been described as “[t]he
leading case” recognizing this tort involved speech. Prosser and
Keeton, supra, §12, at 60 (citing Wilkinson v. Downton , [1897] 2 Q. B. 57); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts §46, illustration 1. And although this Court has
not decided the question, I think it is clear that the First
Amendment does not entirely preclude liability for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress by means of speech.

															   This Court has recognized that
words may “by their very utterance inflict injury” and that the
First Amendment does not shield utterances that form “no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U. S. 568 , 572
(1942); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut , 310 U. S. 296 ,
310 (1940) (“[P]ersonal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution”). When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by
means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment
should not interfere with recovery.

															III

															   In this case, respondents
brutally attacked Matthew Snyder, and this attack, which was almost
certain to inflict injury, was central to respondents’
well-practiced strategy for attracting public attention.

															   On the morning of Matthew
Snyder’s funeral, respondents could have chosen to stage their
protest at countless locations. They could have picketed the United
States Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon,
or any of the more than 5,600 military recruiting stations in this
country. They could have returned to the Maryland State House or
the United States Naval Academy, where they had been the day
before. They could have selected any public road where pedestrians
are allowed. (There are more than 4,000,000 miles of public roads
in the United States.[ Footnote
2 ]) They could have staged their protest in a public park.
(There are more than 20,000 public parks in this country.[ Footnote 3 ]) They could have chosen any
Catholic church where no funeral was taking place. (There are
nearly 19,000 Catholic churches in the United States.[ Footnote 4 ]) But of course, a small group
picketing at any of these locations would have probably gone
unnoticed.

															   The Westboro Baptist Church, however, has
devised a strategy that remedies this problem. As the Court notes,
church members have protested at nearly 600 military funerals. Ante , at 1. They have also picketed the funerals of police
officers,[ Footnote 5 ]
firefighters,[ Footnote 6 ] and
the victims of natural disasters,[ Footnote 7 ] accidents,[ Footnote 8 ] and shocking crimes.[ Footnote 9 ] And in advance of these protests, they
issue press releases to ensure that their protests will attract
public attention.[ Footnote
10 ]

															   This strategy works because it is expected
that respondents’ verbal assaults will wound the family and friends
of the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the
sight of persons who are visibly in grief. The more outrageous the
funeral protest, the more publicity the Westboro Baptist Church is
able to obtain. Thus, when the church recently announced its
intention to picket the funeral of a 9-year-old girl killed in the
shooting spree in Tucson—proclaiming that she was “better off
dead”[ Footnote 11 ]—their
announcement was national news,[ Footnote 12 ] and the church was able to obtain free air
time on the radio in exchange for canceling its protest.[ Footnote 13 ] Similarly, in 2006, the
church got air time on a talk radio show in exchange for canceling
its threatened protest at the funeral of five Amish girls killed by
a crazed gunman.[ Footnote
14 ]

															   In this case, respondents implemented the
Westboro Baptist Church’s publicity-seeking strategy. Their press
release stated that they were going “to picket the funeral of Lance
Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder” because “God Almighty killed Lance Cpl.
Snyder. He died in shame, not honor—for a fag nation cursed by God
… . Now in Hell—sine die.” Supp. App. in No. 08–1026 (CA4),
p. 158a. This announcement guaranteed that Matthew’s funeral
would be transformed into a raucous media event and began the
wounding process. It is well known that anticipation may heighten
the effect of a painful event.

															   On the day of the funeral, respondents, true
to their word, displayed placards that conveyed the message
promised in their press release. Signs stating “God Hates You” and
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers” reiterated the message that God had
caused Matthew’s death in retribution for his sins. App. to Brief
for Appellants in No. 08–1026 (CA4), pp. 3787, 3788 (hereinafter
App.). Others, stating “You’re Going to Hell” and “Not Blessed Just
Cursed,” conveyed the message that Matthew was “in Hell—sine die.” Id., at 3783.

															   Even if those who attended the funeral were
not alerted in advance about respondents’ intentions, the meaning
of these signs would not have been missed. Since respondents chose
to stage their protest at Matthew Snyder’s funeral and not at any
of the other countless available venues, a reasonable person would
have assumed that there was a connection between the messages on
the placards and the deceased. Moreover, since a church funeral is
an event that naturally brings to mind thoughts about the
afterlife, some of respondents’ signs— e.g ., “God Hates
You,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “You’re Going to Hell”—would
have likely been interpreted as referring to God’s judgment of the
deceased.

															   Other signs would most naturally have been
understood as suggesting—falsely—that Matthew was gay.
Homosexuality was the theme of many of the signs. There were signs
reading “God Hates Fags,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Fags Doom Nations,”
and “Fag Troops.” Id. , at 3781–3787. Another placard
depicted two men engaging in anal intercourse. A reasonable
bystander seeing those signs would have likely concluded that they
were meant to suggest that the deceased was a homosexual.

															   After the funeral, the Westboro picketers
reaffirmed the meaning of their protest. They posted an online
account entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A.
Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help the
Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!” Id., at
3788.[ Footnote 15 ] Belying
any suggestion that they had simply made general comments about
homosexuality, the Catholic Church, and the United States military,
the “epic” addressed the Snyder family directly:

															   “God blessed you, Mr. and Mrs.
Snyder, with a resource and his name was Matthew. He was an arrow
in your quiver! In thanks to God for the comfort the child could
bring you, you had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD
his GOD—PERIOD! You did JUST THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the
devil.

															.     .     .     .     .

															   “Albert and Julie RIPPED that body apart and
taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit
adultery. They taught him how to support the largest pedophile
machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic
monstrosity. Every dime they gave the Roman Catholic monster they
condemned their own souls. They also, in supporting satanic
Catholicism, taught Matthew to be an idolater.

															.     .     .     .     .

															   “Then after all that they sent him to fight
for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock
step with his evil, wicked, and sinful manner of life, putting him
in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has smoke coming from
his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?” Id., at 3791.

															   In light of this evidence, it is
abundantly clear that respondents, going far beyond commentary on
matters of public concern, specifically attacked Matthew Snyder
because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of the United
States military. Both Matthew and petitioner were private
figures,[ Footnote 16 ] and
this attack was not speech on a matter of public concern. While
commentary on the Catholic Church or the United States military
constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding
Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct does not.

															   Justice Breyer provides an apt analogy to a
case in which the First Amendment would permit recovery in tort for
a verbal attack:

															“[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B,
knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with an
opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of
public concern. The constitutionally protected nature of the end
would not shield A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in
some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be
similarly unprotected.” Ante , at 1 (concurring
opinion).

															   This captures what respondents
did in this case. Indeed, this is the strategy that they have
routinely employed—and that they will now continue to
employ—inflicting severe and lasting emotional injury on an ever
growing list of innocent victims.

															IV

															   The Court concludes that
respondents’ speech was protected by the First Amendment for
essentially three reasons, but none is sound.

															   First—and most important—the
Court finds that “the overall thrust and dominant theme of [their]
demonstration spoke to” broad public issues. Ante, at 8.
As I have attempted to show, this portrayal is quite inaccurate;
respondents’ attack on Matthew was of central importance. But in
any event, I fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized
simply because it is interspersed with speech that is protected.
The First Amendment allows recovery for defamatory statements that
are interspersed with nondefamatory statements on matters of public
concern, and there is no good reason why respondents’ attack on
Matthew Snyder and his family should be treated differently. Second, the Court suggests that
respondents’ personal attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First
Amendment protection because it was not motivated by a private
grudge, see ante , at 9, but I see no basis for the strange
distinction that the Court appears to draw. Respondents’
motivation—“to increase publicity for its views,” ibid. —did not transform their statements attacking the
character of a private figure into statements that made a
contribution to debate on matters of public concern. Nor did their
publicity-seeking motivation soften the sting of their attack. And
as far as culpability is concerned, one might well think that
wounding statements uttered in the heat of a private feud are less,
not more, blameworthy than similar statements made as part of a
cold and calculated strategy to slash a stranger as a means of
attracting public attention.

															   Third, the Court finds it significant that
respondents’ protest occurred on a public street, but this fact
alone should not be enough to preclude IIED liability. To be sure,
statements made on a public street may be less likely to satisfy
the elements of the IIED tort than statements made on private
property, but there is no reason why a public street in close
proximity to the scene of a funeral should be regarded as a
free-fire zone in which otherwise actionable verbal attacks are
shielded from liability. If the First Amendment permits the States
to protect their residents from the harm inflicted by such
attacks—and the Court does not hold otherwise—then the location of
the tort should not be dispositive. A physical assault may occur
without trespassing; it is no defense that the perpetrator had “the
right to be where [he was].” See ante , at 11. And the same
should be true with respect to unprotected speech. Neither classic
“fighting words” nor defamatory statements are immunized when they
occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a
verbal assault based on the conduct or character of a private
figure like Matthew Snyder any differently.

															   One final comment about the opinion of the
Court is in order. The Court suggests that the wounds inflicted by
vicious verbal assaults at funerals will be prevented or at least
mitigated in the future by new laws that restrict picketing within
a specified distance of a funeral. See ante , at
10–11 . It is apparent, however, that the enactment of
these laws is no substitute for the protection provided by the
established IIED tort; according to the Court, the verbal attacks
that severely wounded petitioner in this case complied with the new
Maryland law regulating funeral picketing. See ante , at
11, n. 5. And there is absolutely nothing to suggest that Congress
and the state legislatures, in enacting these laws, intended them
to displace the protection provided by the well-established IIED
tort.

															   The real significance of these new laws is not
that they obviate the need for IIED protection. Rather, their
enactment dramatically illustrates the fundamental point that
funerals are unique events at which special protection against
emotional assaults is in order. At funerals, the emotional
well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable. See National Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish , 541 U. S. 157 ,
168 (2004). Exploitation of a funeral for the purpose of attracting
public attention “intrud[es] upon their … grief,” ibid. ,
and may permanently stain their memories of the final moments
before a loved one is laid to rest. Allowing family members to have
a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public
debate. I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First
Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of
private concern.

															V

															   In reversing the District Court
judgment in favor of petitioner, the Court of Appeals relied on
several grounds not discussed in the opinion of this Court or in
the separate opinion supporting affirmance. I now turn briefly to
those issues.

															   First, the Court of Appeals held
that the District Court erred by allowing the jury to decide
whether respondents’ speech was “ ‘directed specifically at
the Snyder family.’ ” 580 F. 3d, at 221. It is not clear
whether the Court of Appeals thought that this was a question for
the trial judge alone or a question on which the judge had to make
a preliminary ruling before sending it to the jury. In either
event, however, the submission of this question to the jury was not
reversible error because, as explained above, it is clear that
respondents’ statements targeted the Snyders.

															   Second, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge went astray in allowing the jury to decide whether
respondents’ speech was so “ ‘offensive and shocking as to not
be entitled to First Amendment protection.’ ” Ibid. This instruction also did respondents no harm. Because their speech
did not relate to a matter of public concern, it was not protected
from liability by the First Amendment, and the only question for
the jury was whether the elements of the IIED tort were met.

															   Third, the Court of Appeals appears to have
concluded that the First Amendment does not permit an IIED
plaintiff to recover for speech that cannot reasonably be
interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. See id., at 222. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of
Appeals relied on two of our cases— Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co ., 497
U. S. 1 (1990), and Hustler, 485 U. S. 46 —but neither supports the
broad proposition that the Court of Appeals adopted. Milkovich was a defamation case, and
falsity is an element of defamation. Nothing in Milkovich even hints that the First Amendment requires that this defamation
element be engrafted onto the IIED tort. Hustler did involve an IIED claim,
but the plaintiff there was a public figure, and the Court did not
suggest that its holding would also apply in a case involving a
private figure. Nor did the Court suggest that its holding applied
across the board to all types of IIED claims. Instead, the holding
was limited to “publications such as the one here at issue,”
namely, a caricature in a magazine. 485 U. S., at 56. Unless a
caricature of a public figure can reasonably be interpreted as
stating facts that may be proved to be wrong, the caricature does
not have the same potential to wound as a personal verbal assault
on a vulnerable private figure.

															   Because I cannot agree either with the holding
of this Court or the other grounds on which the Court of Appeals
relied, I would reverse the decision below and remand for further
proceedings.[ Footnote
17 ]

															VI

															   Respondents’ outrageous conduct
caused petitioner great injury, and the Court now compounds that
injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the
wrong he suffered.

															   In order to have a society in
which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not
necessary to allow the brutalization of innocent victims like
petitioner. I therefore respectfully dissent. Footnote 1 See 580 F. 3d 206, 213–214, 216 (CA4
2009). Footnote 2 See Dept. of Transp., Federal Highway
Administration, Highway Statistics 2008, Table HM–12M,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/
statistics/2008/hm12m.cfm (all Internet materials as visited Feb.
25, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Footnote 3 See Trust for Public Land, 2010 City Park
Facts, http://
www.tpl.org/content_documents/CityParkFacts_2010.pdf. Footnote 4 See United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, Catholic Information Project,
http://www.usccb.org/comm/cip.shtml#toc4. Footnote 5 See
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110124_St-Petersburg-FL-
Dead-Police.pdf. Footnote 6 See http: //www.godhatesfags.com / fliers/20110120_Dead-Volunteer-Firefighter-Connecting_the_Dots-Baltimore-MD.pdf. Footnote 7 See
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110104_Newburg-and-Rolla-MO-Tornado-Connecting-the-Dots.pdf. Footnote 8 See
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20101218_Wichita-KS-Two-Dead-Wichita-Bikers.pdf. Footnote 9 See
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110129_Tampa-FL-God-Sent-Military-Mom-Shooter-to-Kill-Kids.pdf. Footnote 10 See nn. 5–9, supra . Footnote 11 See
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110109_AZ-Shooter-Connecting-the-Dots-Day-2.pdf. Footnote 12 See, e.g., Stanglin, Anti-Gay Church
Group Plans to Picket Tucson Funerals, USA Today, Jan. 10, 2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
ondeadline / post / 2011/01/anti-gay-church-group-plans-to-picket-tucston-
funerals/1; Mohanani, Group to Picket 9-Year-Old Tucson Victim’s
Funeral, Palm Beach Post, Jan. 11, 2011,
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/
news/nation/group-to-picket-9-year-old-tucson-victims-1177921.html;
Mehta & Santa Cruz, Tucson Rallies to Protect Girl’s Family
from Protesters, Los Angeles Times, Jan. 11, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/jan/11/nation/la-na-funeral-protest-20110112; Medrano, Funeral
Protest: Arizona Rallies to Foil Westboro Baptist Church, Christian
Science Monitor, Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/
0111/Funeral-protest-Arizona-rallies-to-foil-Westboro-Baptist-Church. Footnote 13 See Santa Cruz & Mehta, Westboro Church
Agrees Not to Take Protest to Shooting Victims’ Funerals, Los
Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/13/nation/la-na-funeral-protest-20110113;
http://www.godhatesfags.com/fliers/20110112_AZ-Shooter-Mike-Gallagher-Radio-Exchange.pdf. Footnote 14 See Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral
Protest, N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2006, p. A14. Footnote 15 The Court refuses to consider the epic
because it was not discussed in Snyder’s petition for certiorari. Ante , at 3, n. 1. The epic, however, is not a
distinct claim but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in
imposing liability for the claims now before this Court. The
protest and the epic are parts of a single course of conduct that
the jury found to constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See 580 F. 3d, at 225 (“[T]he Epic cannot be
divorced from the general context of the funeral protest”). The
Court’s strange insistence that the epic “is not properly before
us,” ante , at 3, n. 1, means that the Court has not
actually made “an independent examination of the whole record,” ante , at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the
Court’s refusal to consider the epic contrasts sharply with its
willingness to take notice of Westboro’s protest activities at
other times and locations. See ante , at 9. Footnote 16 See 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (Md.
2008). Footnote 17 The Court affirms the decision of the Fourth
Circuit with respect to petitioner’s claim of intrusion upon
seclusion on a ground not addressed by the Fourth Circuit. I would
not reach out to decide that issue but would instead leave it for
the Fourth Circuit to decide on remand. I would likewise allow the
Fourth Circuit on remand to decide whether the judgment on the
claim of civil conspiracy can survive in light of the ultimate
disposition of the IIED and intrusion upon seclusion claims.

Summary: In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment protected a church's right to engage in hate speech near a soldier's funeral, despite the hurtful and offensive nature of their picket signs. The court affirmed that free speech, even hateful speech, is a fundamental right in the United States.