OPINION OF THE COURT INDIANA V. EDWARDS 554 U. S. ____ (2008) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-208 INDIANA, PETITIONER v. AHMAD EDWARDS

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
indiana

															[June 19, 2008]

															   Justice Breyer delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   This case focuses upon a criminal
defendant whom a state court found mentally competent to stand
trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to
conduct that trial himself. We must decide whether in these
circumstances the Constitution forbids a State from insisting that
the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, the State thereby
denying the defendant the right to represent himself. See U. S.
Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta v. California , 422 U. S. 806 (1975). We conclude that
the Constitution does not forbid a State so to insist.

															I

															   In July 1999 Ahmad Edwards, the
respondent, tried to steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana
department store. After he was discovered, he drew a gun, fired at
a store security officer, and wounded a bystander. He was caught
and then charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly
weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. His mental condition
subsequently became the subject of three competency proceedings and
two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial
judge: 1. First Competency
Hearing: August 2000 . Five months after Edwards’ arrest, his
court-appointed counsel asked for a psychiatric evaluation. After
hearing psychiatrist and neuropsychologist witnesses (in February
2000 and again in August 2000), the court found Edwards incompetent
to stand trial, App. 365a, and committed him to Logansport State
Hospital for evaluation and treatment, see id ., at
48a–53a. 2. Second Competency Hearing:
March 2002. Seven months after his commitment, doctors found
that Edwards’ condition had improved to the point where he could
stand trial. Id ., at 63a–64a. Several months later,
however, but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel asked for another
psychiatric evaluation. In March 2002, the judge held a competency
hearing, considered additional psychiatric evidence, and (in April)
found that Edwards, while “suffer[ing] from mental illness,” was
“competent to assist his attorneys in his defense and stand trial
for the charged crimes.” Id ., at 114a. 3. Third Competency Hearing:
April 2003. Seven months later but still before trial,
Edwards’ counsel sought yet another psychiatric evaluation of his
client. And, in April 2003, the court held yet another competency
hearing. Edwards’ counsel presented further psychiatric and
neuropsychological evidence showing that Edwards was suffering from
serious thinking difficulties and delusions. A testifying
psychiatrist reported that Edwards could understand the charges
against him, but he was “unable to cooperate with his attorney in
his defense because of his schizophrenic illness”; “[h]is delusions
and his marked difficulties in thinking make it impossible for him
to cooperate with his attorney.” Id ., at 164a. In November
2003, the court concluded that Edwards was not then competent to
stand trial and ordered his recommitment to the state hospital. Id ., at 206a–211a. 4. First Self-Representation
Request and First Trial: June 2005. About eight months after
his commitment, the hospital reported that Edwards’ condition had
again improved to the point that he had again become competent to
stand trial. Id ., at 228a–236a. And almost one year after
that Edwards’ trial began. Just before trial, Edwards asked to
represent himself. Id ., at 509a, 520a. He also asked for a
continuance, which, he said, he needed in order to proceed pro
se . Id ., at 519a–520a. The court refused the
continuance. Id ., at 520a. Edwards then proceeded to trial
represented by counsel. The jury convicted him of criminal
recklessness and theft but failed to reach a verdict on the charges
of attempted murder and battery. 5. Second Self-Representation
Request and Second Trial: December 2005 . The State decided to
retry Edwards on the attempted murder and battery charges. Just
before the retrial, Edwards again asked the court to permit him to
represent himself. Id ., at 279a–282a. Referring to the
lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted that
Edwards still suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that
“[w]ith these findings, he’s competent to stand trial but I’m not
going to find he’s competent to defend himself.” Id ., at
527a. The court denied Edwards’ self-representation request.
Edwards was represented by appointed counsel at his retrial. The
jury convicted Edwards on both of the remaining counts.

															   Edwards subsequently appealed to Indiana’s
intermediate appellate court. He argued that the trial court’s
refusal to permit him to represent himself at his retrial deprived
him of his constitutional right of self-representation. U. S.
Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta , supra . The court agreed
and ordered a new trial. The matter then went to the Indiana
Supreme Court. That court found that “[t]he record in this case
presents a substantial basis to agree with the trial court,” 866
N. E. 2d 252, 260 (2007), but it nonetheless affirmed the
intermediate appellate court on the belief that this Court’s
precedents, namely, Faretta , 422 U. S. 806 , and Godinez v. Moran , 509
U. S. 389 (1993), required the State to allow Edwards to
represent himself. At Indiana’s request, we agreed to consider
whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow Edwards
to represent himself at trial.

															II

															   Our examination of this Court’s
precedents convinces us that those precedents frame the question
presented, but they do not answer it. The two cases that set forth
the Constitution’s “mental competence” standard, Dusky v. United States , 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) , and Drope v. Missouri , 420 U. S. 162 (1975), specify that the Constitution does not permit trial of an
individual who lacks “mental competency.” Dusky defines
the competency standard as including both (1) “whether” the
defendant has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him” and (2) whether the defendant “has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 362 U. S., at 402
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). Drope repeats that standard, stating that it “has long been accepted that
a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity
to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense may not be subjected to a trial.” 420 U. S., at 171
(emphasis added). Neither case considered the mental competency
issue presented here, namely, the relation of the mental competence
standard to the right of self-representation.

															   The Court’s foundational
“self-representation” case, Faretta , held that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments include a “constitutional right to
proceed without counsel when” a criminal defendant
“voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” 422 U. S., at 807
(emphasis in original). The Court implied that right from: (1) a
“nearly universal conviction,” made manifest in state law, that
“forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his
basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so,” id ., at 817–818; (2) Sixth Amendment language granting
rights to the “accused;” (3) Sixth Amendment structure indicating
that the rights it sets forth, related to the “fair administration
of American justice,” are “persona[l]” to the accused, id ., at 818–821; (4) the absence of historical examples of forced representation, id ., at 821–832; and (5)
“ ‘respect for the individual,’ ” id ., at 834
(quoting Illinois v. Allen , 397 U. S. 337 , 350–351
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel “must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the law’ ”)). Faretta does not answer the question
before us both because it did not consider the problem of mental
competency (cf. 422 U. S., at 835 (Faretta was “literate,
competent, and understanding”)), and because Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of
self-representation is not absolute. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. , 528 U. S. 152 , 163
(2000) (no right of self-representation on direct appeal in a
criminal case); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U. S. 168 , 178–179
(1984) (appointment of standby counsel over self-represented
defendant’s objection is permissible); Faretta , 422 U. S.,
at 835, n. 46 (no right “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”); ibid . (no right to avoid compliance with “relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law”); id., at 834, n. 46
(no right to “engag[e] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,”
referring to Illinois v. Allen , supra ).
The question here concerns a mental-illness-related limitation on
the scope of the self-representation right.

															   The sole case in which this Court considered
mental competence and self-representation together, Godinez,
supra, presents a question closer to that at issue here. The
case focused upon a borderline-competent criminal defendant who had
asked a state trial court to permit him to represent himself and to
change his pleas from not guilty to guilty. The state trial court
had found that the defendant met Dusky’ s mental competence
standard, that he “knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to
assistance of counsel, and that he “freely and voluntarily” chose
to plead guilty. 509 U. S., at 393 (internal quotation marks
omitted). And the state trial court had consequently granted the
defendant’s self-representation and change-of-plea requests. See id ., at 392–393. A federal appeals court, however, had
vacated the defendant’s guilty pleas on the ground that the
Constitution required the trial court to ask a further question,
namely, whether the defendant was competent to waive his
constitutional right to counsel. See id ., at 393–394.
Competence to make that latter decision, the appeals court said,
required the defendant to satisfy a higher mental competency
standard than the standard set forth in Dusky . See 509 U.
S., at 393–394. Dusky ’s more general standard sought only
to determine whether a defendant represented by counsel was
competent to stand trial, not whether he was competent to waive his
right to counsel. 509 U. S., at 394–395.

															   This Court, reversing the Court of Appeals,
“reject[ed] the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive
the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher
than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.” Id ., at 398. The decision to plead guilty, we said, “is no
more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a
[represented] defendant may be called upon to make during the
course of a trial.” Ibid . Hence “there is no reason to
believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably
higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other
constitutional rights.” Id ., at 399. And even assuming
that self-representation might pose special trial-related
difficulties, “the competence that is required of a defendant
seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” Ibid . (emphasis in original). For this reason, we
concluded, “the defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not
relevant’ to the determination.” Id ., at 400 (quoting Faretta , supra , at 836).

															   We concede that Godinez bears certain
similarities with the present case. Both involve mental competence
and self-representation. Both involve a defendant who wants to
represent himself. Both involve a mental condition that falls in a
gray area between Dusky’ s minimal constitutional
requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to stand trial and
a somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for another
legal purpose.

															   We nonetheless conclude that Godinez does not answer the question before us now. In part that is because
the Court of Appeals higher standard at issue in Godinez differs in a critical way from the higher standard at issue here.
In Godinez, the higher standard sought to measure the
defendant’s ability to proceed on his own to enter a guilty plea;
here the higher standard seeks to measure the defendant’s ability
to conduct trial proceedings. To put the matter more specifically,
the Godinez defendant sought only to change his pleas to
guilty, he did not seek to conduct trial proceedings, and his
ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not at issue.
Thus we emphasized in Godinez that we needed to consider
only the defendant’s “competence to waive the right .” 509
U. S., at 399 (emphasis in original). And we further emphasized
that we need not consider the defendant’s “technical legal
knowledge” about how to proceed at trial. Id ., at 400
(internal quotation marks omitted). We found our holding consistent
with this Court’s earlier statement in Massey v. Moore , 348
U. S. 105 , 108 (1954), that “[o]ne might not be insane in the
sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the
capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel.” See Godinez , supra , at 399–400, n. 10 (quoting Massey and noting that it dealt with “a question that is
quite different from the question presented” in Godinez ).
In this case, the very matters that we did not consider in Godinez are directly before us.

															   For another thing, Godinez involved a
State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to
represent himself. Godinez ’s constitutional holding is
that a State may do so. But that holding simply does not tell a
State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right
to represent himself—the matter at issue here. One might argue that Godinez ’s grant (to a State) of permission to allow a
gray-area defendant self-representation must implicitly include
permission to deny self-representation. Cf. 509 U. S., at 402
(“States are free to adopt competency standards that are more
elaborate than the Dusky formulation”). Yet one could more
forcefully argue that Godinez simply did not consider
whether the Constitution requires self-representation by
gray-area defendants even in circumstances where the State seeks to
disallow it (the question here). The upshot is that, in our view,
the question before us is an open one.

															III

															   We now turn to the question
presented. We assume that a criminal defendant has sufficient
mental competence to stand trial ( i.e ., the defendant
meets Dusky’ s standard) and that the defendant insists on
representing himself during that trial. We ask whether the
Constitution permits a State to limit that defendant’s
self-representation right by insisting upon representation by
counsel at trial—on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented.

															   Several considerations taken
together lead us to conclude that the answer to this question is
yes. First, the Court’s precedent, while not answering the
question, points slightly in the direction of our affirmative
answer. Godinez, as we have just said, simply leaves the
question open. But the Court’s “mental competency” cases set forth
a standard that focuses directly upon a defendant’s “present
ability to consult with his lawyer,” Dusky , 362 U. S., at
402 (internal quotation marks omitted); a “capacity … to consult
with counsel,” and an ability “to assist [counsel] in preparing his
defense,” Drope , 420 U. S., at 171. See ibid .
(“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a
trial” (emphasis added)). These standards assume representation by
counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel. They thus suggest
(though do not hold) that an instance in which a defendant who
would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different
set of circumstances, which in our view, calls for a different
standard.

															   At the same time Faretta , the
foundational self-representation case, rested its conclusion in
part upon pre-existing state law set forth in cases all of which
are consistent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a
competency limitation on the self-representation right. See 422 U.
S., at 813, and n. 9 (citing 16 state-court decisions and two
secondary sources). See, e.g ., Cappetta v. State , 204 So. 2d 913, 917–918 (Fla. App. 1967),
rev’d on other grounds, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cited in Faretta , supra , at 813, n. 9 (assuring a
“mentally competent” defendant the right “to conduct his own
defense” provided that “no unusual circumstances exist”
such as, e.g ., “mental derangement” that “would …
depriv[e]” the defendant “of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his
own defense,” 204 So. 2d, at 917–918); id. , at 918
(noting that “whether unusual circumstances are evident is a matter
resting in the sound discretion granted to the trial judge”); Allen v. Commonwealth , 324 Mass. 558, 562–563, 87
N. E. 2d 192, 195 (1949) (noting “the assignment of counsel”
was “necessary” where there was some “special circumstance” such as
when the criminal defendant was “mentally defective”).

															   Second, the nature of the problem before us
cautions against the use of a single mental competency standard for
deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by counsel
can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial
must be permitted to represent himself. Mental illness itself is
not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time.
It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times
in different ways. The history of this case (set forth in Part I, supra) illustrates the complexity of the problem. In
certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’ s mental competence standard, for he will be able to
work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable
to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense
without the help of counsel. See, e.g. , N. Poythress, R.
Bonnie, J. Monahan, R. Otto, & S. Hoge, Adjudicative
Competence: The MacArthur Studies 103 (2002) (“Within each domain
of adjudicative competence (competence to assist counsel;
decisional competence) the data indicate that understanding,
reasoning, and appreciation [of the charges against a defendant]
are separable and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal
ability”). See also McKaskle , 465 U. S., at 174
(describing trial tasks as including organization of defense,
making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir
dire , questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and
jury).

															   The American Psychiatric Association (APA)
tells us (without dispute) in its amicus brief filed in
support of neither party that “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in
sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive
abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental
illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to play the
significantly expanded role required for self-representation even
if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.” Brief for
APA et al. as Amici Curiae 26. Motions and other
documents that the defendant prepared in this case (one of which we
include in the Appendix, infra ) suggest to a layperson the
common sense of this general conclusion.

															   Third, in our view, a right of
self-representation at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a
defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense
without the assistance of counsel. McKaskle , supra , at 176–177 (“Dignity” and “autonomy” of individual
underlie self-representation right) . To the contrary,
given that defendant’s uncertain mental state, the spectacle that
could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least
as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a
defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or
sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts
the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives,
providing a fair trial. As Justice Brennan put it, “[t]he
Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts
from acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution
itself prescribes.” Allen , 397 U. S., at 350 (concurring
opinion). See Martinez , 528 U. S., at 162 (“Even at the
trial level … the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity
and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s
interest in acting as his own lawyer”). See also Sell v. United States , 539 U. S. 166 , 180
(2003) (“[T]he Government has a concomitant, constitutionally
essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair
one”).

															   Further, proceedings must not only be fair,
they must “appear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat v. United States , 486 U. S. 153 , 160
(1988). An amicus brief reports one psychiatrist’s
reaction to having observed a patient (a patient who had satisfied Dusky ) try to conduct his own defense: “[H]ow in the world
can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?” Brief
for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (internal
quotation marks omitted). See Massey , 348 U. S., at 108
(“No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is
insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental
condition stands helpless and alone before the court”). The
application of Dusky’ s basic mental competence standard
can help in part to avoid this result. But given the different
capacities needed to proceed to trial without counsel, there is
little reason to believe that Dusky alone is sufficient.
At the same time, the trial judge, particularly one such as the
trial judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards’
competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able
to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the
individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.

															   We consequently conclude that the Constitution
permits judges to take realistic account of the particular
defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who
seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to
do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist
upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand
trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial
proceedings by themselves.

															IV

															   Indiana has also asked us to
adopt, as a measure of a defendant’s ability to conduct a trial, a
more specific standard that would “deny a criminal defendant the
right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot
communicate coherently with the court or a jury.” Brief for
Petitioner 20 (emphasis deleted). We are sufficiently uncertain,
however, as to how that particular standard would work in practice
to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard
here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.

															   Indiana has also asked us to
overrule Faretta . We decline to do so. We recognize that
judges have sometimes expressed concern that Faretta, contrary to its intent, has led to trials that are unfair. See Martinez , supra , at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(noting practical concerns of trial judges). But recent empirical
research suggests that such instances are not common. See, e.g ., Hashimoto, Defending the Right of
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony
Defendant, 85 N. C. L. Rev. 423, 427, 447, 428 (2007)
(noting that of the small number of defendants who chose to proceed pro se —“roughly 0.3% to 0.5%” of the total, state felony
defendants in particular “appear to have achieved higher felony
acquittal rates than their represented counterparts in that they
were less likely to have been convicted of felonies”). At the same
time, instances in which the trial’s fairness is in doubt may well
be concentrated in the 20 percent or so of self-representation
cases where the mental competence of the defendant is also at
issue. See id ., at 428 (about 20 percent of federal pro se felony defendants ordered to undergo competency
evaluations). If so, today’s opinion, assuring trial judges the
authority to deal appropriately with cases in the latter category,
may well alleviate those fair trial concerns.

															   For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Indiana is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

															So ordered.

															APPENDIX

															   Excerpt from respondent’s filing
entitled “ ‘Defendant’s Version of the Instant
Offense,’ ” which he had attached to his presentence
investigation report:

															“ ‘The appointed motion of permissive
intervention filed therein the court superior on, 6–26–01 caused a
stay of action and apon it’s expiration or thereafter three years
the plan to establish a youth program to and for the coordination
of aspects of law enforcement to prevent and reduce crime amoung
young people in Indiana became a diplomatic act as under the Safe
Streets Act of 1967, “A omnibuc considerate agent: I membered
clients within the public and others that at/production of the
courts actions showcased causes. The costs of the stay (Trial Rule
60) has a derivative property that is: my knowledged events as not
unexpended to contract the membered clients is the commission of
finding a facilitie for this plan or project to become organization
of administrative recommendations conditioned by governors.’ ”
866 N. E. 2d, at 258, n. 4 (alterations omitted). SCALIA, J., DISSENTING INDIANA V. EDWARDS 554 U. S. ____ (2008) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-208 INDIANA, PETITIONER v. AHMAD EDWARDS

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
indiana

															[June 19, 2008]

															   Justice Scalia, with whom Justice
Thomas joins, dissenting.

															   The Constitution guarantees a
defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to counsel
the right to proceed pro se at his trial. Faretta v. California , 422 U. S. 806 (1975). A
mentally ill defendant who knowingly and voluntarily elects to
proceed pro se instead of through counsel receives a fair
trial that comports with the Fourteenth Amendment. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389 (1993). The Court today
concludes that a State may nonetheless strip a mentally ill
defendant of the right to represent himself when that would be
fairer. In my view the Constitution does not permit a State to
substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant’s right
to make his own case before the jury—a specific right long
understood as essential to a fair trial.

															I

															   Ahmad Edwards suffers from
schizophrenia, an illness that has manifested itself in different
ways over time, depending on how and whether Edwards was treated as
well as on other factors that appear harder to identify. In the
years between 2000 and 2003—years in which Edwards was apparently
not treated with the antipsychotic medications and other drugs that
are commonly prescribed for his illness—Edwards was repeatedly
declared incompetent to stand trial. Even during this period,
however, his mental state seems to have fluctuated. For instance,
one psychiatrist in March 2001 described Edwards in a competency
report as “free of psychosis, depression, mania, and confusion,”
“alert, oriented, [and] appropriate,” apparently “able to think
clearly” and apparently “psychiatrically normal.” App. 61a.

															   Edwards seems to have been
treated with antipsychotic medication for the first time in 2004.
He was found competent to stand trial the same year. The
psychiatrist making the recommendation described Edwards’ thought
processes as “coherent” and wrote that he “communicate[d] very
well,” that his speech was “easy to understand,” that he displayed
“good communications skills, cooperative attitude, average
intelligence, and good cognitive functioning,” that he could
“appraise the roles of the participants in the courtroom
proceedings,” and that he had the capacity to challenge prosecution
witnesses realistically and to testify relevantly. Id. , at
232a–235a (report of Dr. Robert Sena).

															   Over the course of what became two separate
criminal trials, Edwards sought to act as his own lawyer. He filed
a number of incoherent written pleadings with the judge on which
the Court places emphasis, but he also filed several intelligible
pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss counsel, a motion to dismiss
charges under the Indiana speedy trial provision, and a motion
seeking a trial transcript.

															   Edwards made arguments in the courtroom that
were more coherent than his written pleadings. In seeking to
represent himself at his first trial, Edwards complained in detail
that the attorney representing him had not spent adequate time
preparing and was not sharing legal materials for use in his
defense. The trial judge concluded that Edwards had knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel and proceeded to quiz
Edwards about matters of state law. Edwards correctly answered
questions about the meaning of voir dire and how it
operated, and described the basic framework for admitting videotape
evidence to trial, though he was unable to answer other questions,
including questions about the topics covered by state evidentiary
rules that the judge identified only by number. He persisted in his
request to represent himself, but the judge denied the request
because Edwards acknowledged he would need a continuance.
Represented by counsel, he was convicted of criminal recklessness
and theft, but the jury deadlocked on charges of attempted murder
and battery.

															   At his second trial, Edwards again asked the
judge to be allowed to proceed pro se . He explained that
he and his attorney disagreed about which defense to present to the
attempted murder charge. Edwards’ counsel favored lack of intent to
kill; Edwards, self-defense. As the defendant put it: “My objection
is me and my attorney actually had discussed a defense, I think
prosecution had mentioned that, and we are in disagreement with it.
He has a defense and I have a defense that I would like to
represent or present to the Judge.” Id., at 523a.

															   The court again rejected Edwards’ request to
proceed pro se , and this time it did not have the
justification that Edwards had sought a continuance. The court did
not dispute that Edwards knowingly and intelligently waived his
right to counsel, but stated it was “going to carve out a third
exception” to the right of self-representation, and—without
explaining precisely what abilities Edwards lacked—stated Edwards
was “competent to stand trial but I’m not going to find he’s
competent to defend himself.” Id., at 527a. Edwards
sought—by a request through counsel and by raising an objection in
open court—to address the judge on the matter, but the judge
refused, stating that the issue had already been decided. Edwards’
court-appointed attorney pursued the defense the attorney judged
best—lack of intent, not self-defense—and Edwards was convicted of
both attempted murder and battery. The Supreme Court of Indiana
held that he was entitled to a new trial because he had been denied
the right to represent himself. The State of Indiana sought
certiorari, which we granted. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).

															II

															A

															   The Constitution guarantees to
every criminal defendant the “right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta , 422 U. S., at 807. The right reflects “a nearly
universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our
courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is
contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to
do so.” Id. , at 817. Faretta ’s discussion of the
history of the right, id. , at 821–833, includes the
observation that “[i]n the long history of British criminal
jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a
practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a
criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber,” id. , at 821. Faretta described the right to
proceed pro se as a premise of the Sixth Amendment, which
confers the tools for a defense on the “accused,” and describes the
role of the attorney as one of “assistance.” The right of
self-representation could also be seen as a part of the traditional
meaning of the Due Process Clause. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. , 528 U. S. 152 , 165
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Whichever provision
provides its source, it means that a State simply may not force a
lawyer upon a criminal defendant who wishes to conduct his own
defense. Faretta , 422 U. S., at 807.

															   Exercising the right of
self-representation requires waiving the right to counsel. A
defendant may represent himself only when he “ ‘knowingly and
intelligently’ ” waives the lawyer’s assistance that is
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id., at 835. He must
“be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation,” and the record must “establish that ‘he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann , 317 U. S. 269 , 279
(1942)). This limitation may be relevant to many
mentally ill defendants, but there is no dispute that Edwards was
not one of them. Edwards was warned extensively of the risks of
proceeding pro se . The trial judge found that Edwards had
“knowingly and voluntarily” waived his right to counsel at his
first trial, App. 512a, and at his second trial the judge denied
him the right to represent himself only by “carv[ing] out” a new
“exception” to the right beyond the standard of knowing and
voluntary waiver, id., at 527a. When a defendant appreciates the
risks of forgoing counsel and chooses to do so voluntarily, the
Constitution protects his ability to present his own defense even
when that harms his case. In fact waiving counsel “usually” does
so. McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U. S. 168 , 177,
n. 8 (1984); see also Faretta , 422 U. S., at 834. We
have nonetheless said that the defendant’s “choice must be honored
out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of
the law.’ ” Ibid. What the Constitution requires is
not that a State’s case be subject to the most rigorous adversarial
testing possible—after all, it permits a defendant to eliminate all adversarial testing by pleading guilty. What the
Constitution requires is that a defendant be given the right to
challenge the State’s case against him using the arguments he sees fit. In Godinez, 509 U. S. 389 , we held that the Due
Process Clause posed no barrier to permitting a defendant who
suffered from mental illness both to waive his right to counsel and
to plead guilty, so long as he was competent to stand trial and
knowingly and voluntarily waived trial and the counsel right. Id. , at 391, 400. It was “never the rule at common law”
that a defendant could be competent to stand trial and yet
incompetent to either exercise or give up some of the rights
provided for his defense. Id. , at 404 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). We rejected the
invitation to craft a higher competency standard for waiving
counsel than for standing trial. That proposal, we said, was built
on the “flawed premise” that a defendant’s “competence to represent
himself” was the relevant measure: “[T]he competence that is
required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is
the competence to waive the right , not the competence to
represent himself.” Id. , at 399. We grounded this on Faretta ’s candid acknowledgment that the Sixth Amendment
protected the defendant’s right to conduct a defense to his
disadvantage. 509 U. S. at 399–400. B The Court is correct
that this case presents a variation on Godinez: It
presents the question not whether another constitutional
requirement (in Godinez , the proposed higher degree of
competence required for a waiver) limits a defendant’s
constitutional right to elect self-representation, but whether a
State’s view of fairness (or of other values) permits it to strip
the defendant of this right. But that makes the question before us
an easier one. While one constitutional requirement must yield to
another in case of conflict, nothing permits a State, because of its view of what is fair, to deny a constitutional
protection. Although “the purpose of the rights set forth in [the
Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial,” it “does not follow
that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the
whole, fair.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140 ,
145 (2006). Thus, although the Confrontation Clause aims to produce
fairness by ensuring the reliability of testimony, States may not
provide for unconfronted testimony to be used at trial so long as
it is reliable. Crawford v. Washington , 541 U. S. 36 , 61 (2004).
We have rejected an approach to individual liberties that
“ ‘abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then
eliminates the right.’ ” Gonzalez-Lopez , supra , at 145 (quoting Maryland v. Craig , 497
U. S. 836 , 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Until today, the
right of self-representation has been accorded the same respect as
other constitutional guarantees. The only circumstance in which we
have permitted the State to deprive a defendant of this trial right
is the one under which we have allowed the State to deny other such rights: when it is necessary to enable the
trial to proceed in an orderly fashion. That overriding necessity,
we have said, justifies forfeiture of even the Sixth Amendment
right to be present at trial—if, after being threatened with
removal, a defendant “insists on conducting himself in a manner so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his
trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 , 343
(1970). A pro se defendant may not “abuse the dignity of
the courtroom,” nor may he fail to “comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law,” and a court may “terminate” the
self-representation of a defendant who “deliberately engages in
serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Faretta, supra, at
834–835, n. 46. This ground for terminating
self-representation is unavailable here, however, because Edwards
was not even allowed to begin to represent himself, and because he
was respectful and compliant and did not provide a basis to
conclude a trial could not have gone forward had he been allowed to
press his own claims. Beyond this circumstance, we have
never constrained the ability of a defendant to retain “actual
control over the case he chooses to present to the jury”—what we
have termed “the core of the Faretta right.” Wiggins,
supra , at 178. Thus, while Faretta recognized that
the right of self-representation does not bar the court from
appointing standby counsel, we explained in Wiggins that
“[t]he pro se defendant must be allowed to control the
organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to
argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to
question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at
appropriate points in the trial.” 465 U. S., at 174. Furthermore,
because “multiple voices ‘for the defense’ ” could “confuse
the message the defendant wishes to convey,” id. , at 177,
a standby attorney’s participation would be barred when it would
“destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing
himself,” id. , at 178. As I have explained, I would not
adopt an approach to the right of self-representation that we have
squarely rejected for other rights—allowing courts to disregard the
right when doing so serves the purposes for which the right was
intended. But if I were to adopt such an approach, I would remain
in dissent, because I believe the Court’s assessment of the
purposes of the right of self-representation is inaccurate to boot.
While there is little doubt that preserving individual
“ ‘dignity’ ” (to which the Court refers), ante, at 11, is paramount among those purposes, there is equally little
doubt that the loss of “dignity” the right is designed to prevent
is not the defendant’s making a fool of himself by
presenting an amateurish or even incoherent defense. Rather, the
dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of
one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the dignity of
individual choice. Faretta explained that the Sixth
Amendment’s counsel clause should not be invoked to impair
“ ‘the exercise of [the defendant’s] free choice’ ” to
dispense with the right, 422 U. S., at 815 (quoting Adams ,
317 U. S., at 280); for “whatever else may be said of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they
understood the inestimable worth of free choice,” 422 U. S., at
833–834. Nine years later, when we wrote in Wiggins that
the self-representation right served the “dignity and autonomy of
the accused,” 465 U. S., at 177, we explained in no uncertain terms
that this meant according every defendant the right to his say in
court. In particular, we said that individual dignity and autonomy
barred standby counsel from participating in a manner that would to
“destroy the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing
himself,” and meant that “the pro se defendant is entitled
to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to
the jury.” Id. , at 178. In sum, if the Court is to honor
the particular conception of “dignity” that underlies the
self-representation right, it should respect the autonomy of the
individual by honoring his choices knowingly and voluntarily
made. A further purpose that the Court
finds is advanced by denial of the right of self-representation is
the purpose of assuring that trials “appear fair to all who observe
them.” Ante , at 11. To my knowledge we have never denied a
defendant a right simply on the ground that it would make his trial
appear less “fair” to outside observers, and I would not inaugurate
that principle here. But were I to do so, I would not apply it to
deny a defendant the right to represent himself when he knowingly
and voluntarily waives counsel. When Edwards stood to say that “I
have a defense that I would like to represent or present to the
Judge,” App. 523a, it seems to me the epitome of both actual and
apparent unfairness for the judge to say, I have heard “your desire
to proceed by yourself and I’ve denied your request, so your
attorney will speak for you from now on,” id. , at
530a. III It may be that the
Court permits a State to deprive mentally ill defendants of a
historic component of a fair trial because it is suspicious of the
constitutional footing of the right of self-representation itself.
The right is not explicitly set forth in the text of the Sixth
Amendment, and some Members of this Court have expressed skepticism
about Faretta’ s holding. See Martinez, supra , at
156–158 (questioning relevance of historical evidence underlying Faretta’ s holding); 528 U. S., at 164 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting “judges closer to the firing line have
sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences” of the
right of self-representation). While the Sixth
Amendment makes no mention of the right to forgo counsel, it
provides the defendant, and not his lawyer, the right to call
witnesses in his defense and to confront witnesses against him, and
counsel is permitted to assist in “ his defence” (emphasis
added). Our trial system, however, allows the attorney representing
a defendant “full authority to manage the conduct of the trial”—an
authority without which “[t]he adversary process could not function
effectively.” Taylor v. Illinois , 484 U. S. 400 , 418
(1988); see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175 , 187
(2004). We have held that “the client must accept the consequences
of the lawyer’s decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not
to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose
the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial.” Taylor , supra , at 418. Thus, in order for the
defendant’s right to call his own witnesses, to cross-examine
witnesses, and to put on a defense to be anything more than “a
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction,” a defendant must have
consented to the representation of counsel. Faretta,
supra, at 821. Otherwise, “the defense presented is not the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for in a very real
sense, it is not his defense.” Ibid. The facts of this case illustrate
this point with the utmost clarity. Edwards wished to take a
self-defense case to the jury. His counsel preferred a defense that
focused on lack of intent. Having been denied the right to conduct
his own defense, Edwards was convicted without having had the
opportunity to present to the jury the grounds he believed
supported his innocence. I do not doubt that he likely would have
been convicted anyway. But to hold that a defendant may be deprived
of the right to make legal arguments for acquittal simply because a
state-selected agent has made different arguments on his behalf is,
as Justice Frankfurter wrote in Adams, supra , at 280, to
“imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.” In
singling out mentally ill defendants for this treatment, the
Court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue of being
politically correct. At a time when all society is trying to
mainstream the mentally impaired, the Court permits them to be
deprived of a basic constitutional right—for their own
good. Today’s holding is extraordinarily
vague. The Court does not accept Indiana’s position that
self-representation can be denied “ ‘where the defendant
cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury,’ ” ante , at 12. It does not even hold that Edwards was
properly denied his right to represent himself. It holds only that
lack of mental competence can under some circumstances form a basis
for denying the right to proceed pro se , ante, at
1. We will presumably give some meaning to this holding in the
future, but the indeterminacy makes a bad holding worse. Once the
right of self-representation for the mentally ill is a sometime
thing, trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives
easier—to avoid the painful necessity of deciphering occasional
pleadings of the sort contained in the Appendix to today’s
opinion—by appointing knowledgeable and literate
counsel. Because I think a defendant who is
competent to stand trial, and who is capable of knowing and
voluntary waiver of assistance of counsel, has a constitutional
right to conduct his own defense, I respectfully
dissent.

Summary: In *Indiana v. Edwards*, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who is mentally competent to stand trial with legal representation may still be denied the right to represent themselves due to mental incompetence. The Court concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from insisting that a defendant with mental health issues proceed to trial with legal counsel, even if they wish to represent themselves. This ruling considered the defendant's right to self-representation and the state's interest in ensuring a fair trial and protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings.