OCTOBER TERM, 1994

															Syllabus

															QUALITEX CO. v. JACOBSON PRODUCTS CO., INC.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 93-1577. Argued January 9, 1995-Decided March 28,1995

															Petitioner Qualitex Company has for years colored the dry
cleaning press pads it manufactures with a special shade of green
gold. After respondent Jacobson Products (a Qualitex rival) began
to use a similar shade on its own press pads, Qualitex registered
its color as a trademark and added a trademark infringement count
to the suit it had previously filed challenging Jacobson's use of
the green-gold color. Qualitex won in the District Court, but the
Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment on the infringement claim
because, in its view, the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) does
not permit registration of color alone as a trademark. Held: The Lanham Act permits the registration of a
trademark that consists, purely and simply, of a color. Pp.
162-174.

															(a) That color alone can meet the basic legal requirements for
use as a trademark is demonstrated both by the language of the Act,
which describes the universe of things that can qualify as a
trademark in the broadest of terms, 15 U. S. C. § 1127, and by the
underlying principles of trademark law, including the requirements
that the mark "identify and distinguish [the seller's] goods ...
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate [their]
source," ibid., and that it not be "ftmctional," see, e. g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S. 844 , 850, n.
10. The District Court's findings (accepted by the Ninth Circuit
and here undisputed) show Qualitex's green-gold color has met these
requirements. It acts as a symbol. Because customers identify the
color as Qualitex's, it has developed secondary meaning, see, e. g., id., at 851, n. 11, and thereby identifies the
press pads' source. And, the color serves no other function.
(Although it is important to use some color on press pads to
avoid noticeable stains, the court found no competitive need in the
industry for the green-gold color, since other colors are equally
usable.) Accordingly, unless there is some special reason that
convincingly militates against the use of color alone as a
trademark, trademark law protects Qualitex's use of its green-gold
color. Pp. 162-166.

															(b) Jacobson's various special reasons why the law should forbid
the use of color alone as a trademark-that a contrary holding (1)
will produce uncertainty and unresolvable court disputes about what
shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use; (2) is unworkable
in light of 160 the limited supply of colors that will soon be depleted by
competitors; (3) is contradicted by many older cases, including
decisions of this Court interpreting pre-Lanham Act trademark law;
and (4) is unnecessary because firms already may use color as part
of a trademark and may rely on "trade dress" protection-are
unpersuasive. Pp. 166-174. 13 F.3d
1297 , reversed.

															BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

															Donald G. Mulack argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Christopher A. Bloom, Edward J. Chalfie,
Heather C. Steinmeyer, and Ava B. Campagna.

															Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were
Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorneys General Hunger and
Bingaman, Diane P. Wood, James A. Feldman, William Kanter, Marc
Richman, Nancy J. Linck, Albin F. Drost, Nancy C. Slutter,
and Linda Moneys Isacson. Laurence D. Strick argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *

															JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The question in this case is whether the Trademark Act of 1946
(Lanham Act), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 ed. and Supp. V),
permits the registration of a trademark that con-

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the Bar Association of the District of Columbia by Bruce T.
Wieder, Sheldon H. Klein, and Linda S. Paine-Powell; for B. F. Goodrich Co. by Lawrence S. Robbins and Mary Ann Tucker; for the Crosby Group,
Inc., by Robert D. Yeager; for Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Corp. by David C. Gryce; for the Hand Tools Institute et al.
by James E. Siegel, Witold A. Ziarno, and Rosemarie
Biondi-Tofano; for Intellectual Property Owners by George R.
Powers, Neil A. Smith, and Herbert C. Wamsley; for the International Trademark Association by Christopher C. Larkin, Joan L. Dillon, and Morton David Goldberg; and for Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. by Michael W Schwartz and Marc Wolinsky. Arthur M. Handler filed a brief for the Private Label
Manufacturers Association as amicus curiae urging
affirmance. 161 sists, purely and simply, of a color. We conclude that,
sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark requirements.
And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone
from serving as a trademark.

															I

															The case before us grows out of petitioner Qualitex Company's
use (since the 1950's) of a special shade of green-gold color on
the pads that it makes and sells to dry cleaning firms for use on
dry cleaning presses. In 1989, respondent J acobson Products (a
Qualitex rival) began to sell its own press pads to dry cleaning
firms; and it colored those pads a similar green gold. In 1991,
Qualitex registered the special greengold color on press pads with
the Patent and Trademark Office as a trademark. Registration No.
1,633,711 (Feb. 5, 1991). Qualitex subsequently added a trademark
infringement count, 15 U. s. C. § 1114(1), to an unfair competition
claim, § 1125(a), in a lawsuit it had already filed challenging
Jacobson's use of the green-gold color.

															Qualitex won the lawsuit in the District Court. 21 U. S. P. Q.
2d 1457 (CD Cal. 1991). But, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit set aside the judgment in Qualitex's favor on the trademark
infringement claim because, in that Circuit's view, the Lanham Act
does not permit Qualitex, or anyone else, to register "color alone"
as a trademark. 13 F.3d
1297 , 1300, 1302 (1994).

															The Courts of Appeals have differed as to whether or not the law
recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark. Compare NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917
F.2d 1024 , 1028 (CA7 1990) (absolute prohibition against
protection of color alone), with In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 774 F.2d
1116 , 1128 (CA Fed. 1985) (allowing registration of color pink
for fiberglass insulation), and Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d
219 , 224 (CA8 1993) (declining to establish per se prohibition against protecting color alone as a trademark).
Therefore, this Court granted certiorari. 512 162 u. S. 1287 (1994). We now hold that there is no rule absolutely
barring the use of color alone, and we reverse the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit.

															II

															The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to
"register" a trademark, 15 U. S. C. § 1052 (1988 ed. and Supp. V),
and to prevent his or her competitors from using that trademark, §
1114(1). Both the language of the Act and the basic underlying
principles of trademark law would seem to include color within the
universe of things that can qualify as a trademark. The language of
the Lanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of terms. It
says that trademarks "includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof." § 1127. Since human beings might use
as a "symbol" or "device" almost anything at all that is capable of
carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not
restrictive. The courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have
authorized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola
bottle), a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a
particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread). See, e. g., Registration No. 696,147 (Apr. 12, 1960);
Registration Nos. 523,616 (Apr. 4, 1950) and 916,522 (July 13,
1971); In re Clarke, 17 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1238, 1240 (TTAB
1990). If a shape, a sound, and a fragrance can act as symbols why,
one might ask, can a color not do the same?

															A color is also capable of satisfying the more important part of
the statutory definition of a trademark, which requires that a
person "us[e]" or "inten[d] to use" the mark "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
15 U. S. C. § 1127. True, a product's color is unlike "fanciful," "arbitrary," or
"suggestive" words or designs, which almost automatically 163 tell a customer that they refer to a brand. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4 , 9-10 (CA2 1976) (Friendly, J.); see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U. S. 763 , 768
(1992). The imaginary word "Suntost," or the words "Suntost
Marmalade," on a jar of orange jam immediately would signal a brand
or a product "source"; the jam's orange color does not do so. But,
over time, customers may come to treat a particular color on a
product or its packaging (say, a color that in context seems
unusual, such as pink on a firm's insulating material or red on the
head of a large industrial bolt) as signifying a brand. And, if so,
that color would have come to identify and distinguish the goods-i. e., "to indicate" their "source"-much in the way that
descriptive words on a product (say, "Trim" on nail clippers or
"Car- Freshner" on deodorizer) can come to indicate a product's
origin. See, e. g., J. Wiss & Sons
Co. v. W E. Bassett Co., 59 C. C. P. A. 1269, 1271
(Pat.), 462 F.2d
567 , 569 (1972); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Turtle Wax,
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 162, 164 (SDNY 1967). In this circumstance,
trademark law says that the word (e. g., "Trim"), although
not inherently distinctive, has developed "secondary meaning." See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
456 U. S. 844, 851, n. 11 (1982) ("[S]econdary meaning" is
acquired when "in the minds of the public, the primary significance
of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself"). Again, one might ask, if
trademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary meaning to
act as a mark, why would it not permit a color, under similar
circumstances, to do the same?

															We cannot find in the basic objectives of trademark law any
obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a
trademark, where that color has attained "secondary meaning" and
therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand (and thus
indicates its "source"). In principle, trademark law, by preventing
others from copying a sourceidentifying mark, "reduce[s] the
customer's costs of shopping 164 and making purchasing decisions," 1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2.01[2], p. 2-3 (3d ed. 1994)
(hereinafter McCarthy), for it quickly and easily assures a
potential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he
or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law
helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating competitor)
will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with
a desirable product. The law thereby "encourage[s] the production
of quality products," ibid., and simultaneously discourages
those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a
consumer's inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item
offered for sale. See, e. g., 3 L. Altman, Callmann
on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 17.03 (4th ed.
1983); Landes & Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 T.
M. Rep. 267, 271-272 (1988); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189 , 198
(1985); S. Rep. No. 100515, p. 4 (1988). It is the
source-distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological status
as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign-that permits it to serve
these basic purposes. See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J. Law & Econ. 265, 290 (1987). And,
for that reason, it is difficult to find, in basic trademark
objectives, a reason to disqualify absolutely the use of a color as
a mark.

															Neither can we find a principled objection to the use of color
as a mark in the important "functionality" doctrine of trademark
law. The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks
to promote competition by protecting a firm's reputation, from
instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature. It is the province of patent law,
not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a
monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time,
35 U. S. C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use
the innovation. If a product's functional features could be 165 used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could
be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as patents and
could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in
perpetuity). See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111 ,
119-120 (1938) (Brandeis, J.); Inwood Laboratories, Inc.,
supra, at 863 (White, J., concurring in result) ("A functional
characteristic is 'an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product,' and, after expiration of a patent, it is
no more the property of the originator than the product itself")
(citation omitted). Functionality doctrine therefore would require,
to take an imaginary example, that even if customers have come to
identify the special illumination-enhancing shape of a new patented
light bulb with a particular manufacturer, the manufacturer may not
use that shape as a trademark, for doing so, after the patent had
expired, would impede competition-not by protecting the reputation
of the original bulb maker, but by frustrating competitors'
legitimate efforts to produce an equivalent illumination-enhancing
bulb. See, e. g., Kellogg Co., supra, at 119-120 (trademark
law cannot be used to extend monopoly over "pillow" shape of
shredded wheat biscuit after the patent for that shape had
expired). This Court consequently has explained that, "[i]n general
terms, a product feature is functional," and cannot serve as a
trademark, "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article," that is, if
exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant
non-reputation-related disadvantage. Inwood Laboratories, Inc.,
supra, at 850, n. 10. Although sometimes color plays an
important role (unrelated to source identification) in making a
product more desirable, sometimes it does not. And, this latter
fact-the fact that sometimes color is not essential to a product's
use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality-indicates that
the doctrine of "functionality" does not create an absolute bar to
the use of color alone as a mark. See Owens-Corning, 774 F.
2d, at 1123 (pink color of insulation in wall "performs no
non-trademark function"). 166 It would seem, then, that color alone, at least sometimes, can
meet the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark. It can
act as a symbol that distinguishes a firm's goods and identifies
their source, without serving any other significant function. See
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure § 1202.04(e), p. 1202-13 (2d ed. May,
1993) (hereinafter PTO Manual) (approving trademark registration of
color alone where it "has become distinctive of the applicant's
goods in commerce," provided that "there is [no] competitive need
for colors to remain available in the industry" and the color is
not "functional"); see also 1 McCarthy §§ 3.01[1], 7.26, pp. 3-2,
7-113 ("requirements for qualification of a word or symbol as a
trademark" are that it be (1) a "symbol," (2) "use[d] ... as a
mark," (3) "to identify and distinguish the seller's goods from
goods made or sold by others," but that it not be "functional").
Indeed, the District Court, in this case, entered findings
(accepted by the Ninth Circuit) that show Qualitex's green-gold
press pad color has met these requirements. The green-gold color
acts as a symbol. Having developed secondary meaning (for customers
identified the green-gold color as Qualitex's), it identifies the
press pads' source. And, the green-gold color serves no other
function. (Although it is important to use some color on
press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the court found "no
competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold
color, since other colors are equally usable." 21 U. S. P. Q. 2d,
at 1460.) Accordingly, unless there is some special reason that
convincingly militates against the use of color alone as a
trademark, trademark law would protect Qualitex's use of the
green-gold color on its press pads.

															III

															Respondent Jacobson Products says that there are four special
reasons why the law should forbid the use of color 167 alone as a trademark. We shall explain, in turn, why we,
ultimately, find them unpersuasive. First, Jacobson says that, if the law permits the use of
color as a trademark, it will produce uncertainty and unresolvable
court disputes about what shades of a color a competitor may
lawfully use. Because lighting (morning sun, twilight mist) will
affect perceptions of protected color, competitors and courts will
suffer from "shade confusion" as they try to decide whether use of
a similar color on a similar product does, or does not, confuse
customers and thereby infringe a trademark. Jacobson adds that the
"shade confusion" problem is "more difficult" and "far different
from" the "determination of the similarity of words or symbols."
Brief for Respondent 22.

															We do not believe, however, that color, in this respect, is
special. Courts traditionally decide quite difficult questions
about whether two words or phrases or symbols are sufficiently
similar, in context, to confuse buyers. They have had to compare,
for example, such words as "Bonamine" and "Dramamine"
(motion-sickness remedies); "Huggies" and "Dougies" (diapers);
"Cheracol" and "Syrocol" (cough syrup); "Cyclone" and "Tornado"
(wire fences); and "Mattres" and "1-800-Mattres" (mattress
franchisor telephone numbers). See, e. g., G. D.
Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265 F.2d
385 , 389 (CA7 1959); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. H.
Douglas Enterprises, Ltd., 774 F.2d
1144 , 1146-1147 (CA Fed. 1985); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d
254 , 262 (CA2 1957); Hancock v. American Steel & Wire Co. of N. J., 40 C. C. P. A. (Pat.) 931,
935, 203 F.2d
737 , 740-741 (1953); Dial-AMattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d
675 , 678 (CA2 1989). Legal standards exist to guide courts in
making such comparisons. See, e. g., 2 McCarthy §
15.08; 1 McCarthy §§ 11.24-11.25 ("[S]trong" marks, with greater
secondary meaning, receive broader protection than "weak" marks).
We do not see why courts could not apply those standards to a
color, replicating, if necessary, lighting conditions under 168 which a colored product is normally sold. See Ebert, Trademark
Protection in Color: Do It By the Numbers!, 84 T. M. Rep. 379, 405
(1994). Indeed, courts already have done so in cases where a
trademark consists of a color plus a design, i. e., a
colored symbol such as a gold stripe (around a sewer pipe), a
yellow strand of wire rope, or a "brilliant yellow" band (on
ampules). See, e. g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Tallman Conduit Co., 149 U. S. P. Q. 656, 657 (TTAB
1966); Amstead Industries, Inc. v. West Coast Wire
Rope & Rigging Inc., 2 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1755, 1760
(TTAB 1987); In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167 U. S. P. Q. 255,
256 (TTAB 1970). Second, Jacobson argues, as have others, that colors are
in limited supply. See, e. g., NutraSweet Co., 917 F. 2d, at
1028; Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (CA3 1949). Jacobson claims that, if one of many
competitors can appropriate a particular color for use as a
trademark, and each competitor then tries to do the same, the
supply of colors will soon be depleted. Put in its strongest form,
this argument would concede that "[h]undreds of color pigments are
manufactured and thousands of colors can be obtained by mixing." L.
Cheskin, Colors: What They Can Do For You 47 (1947). But, it would
add that, in the context of a particular product, only some colors
are usable. By the time one discards colors that, say, for reasons
of customer appeal, are not usable, and adds the shades that
competitors cannot use lest they risk infringing a similar,
registered shade, then one is left with only a handful of possible
colors. And, under these circumstances, to permit one, or a few,
producers to use colors as trademarks will "deplete" the supply of
usable colors to the point where a competitor's inability to find a
suitable color will put that competitor at a significant
disadvantage.

															This argument is unpersuasive, however, largely because it
relies on an occasional problem to justify a blanket prohibition.
When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will
likely be available for similar use by others. See, e. g.,
Owens-Corning, 774 F. 2d, at 1121 (pink insulation). 169 Moreover, if that is not so-if a "color depletion" or "color
scarcity" problem does arise-the trademark doctrine of
"functionality" normally would seem available to prevent the
anticompetitive consequences that Jacobson's argument posits,
thereby minimizing that argument's practical force.

															The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use of
a product's feature as a trademark where doing so will put a
competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is
"essential to the use or purpose of the article" or "affects [its]
cost or quality." Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S., at
850, n. 10. The functionality doctrine thus protects competitors
against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation)
that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their
inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related
product features. For example, this Court has written that
competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where
that color serves to identify the kind of medication (e. g.,
a type of blood medicine) in addition to its source. See id., at 853, 858, n. 20 ("[S]ome patients commingle
medications in a container and rely on color to differentiate one
from another"); see also J. Ginsburg, D. Goldberg, & A.
Greenbaum, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 194-195 (1991)
(noting that drug color cases "have more to do with public health
policy" regarding generic drug substitution "than with trademark
law"). And, the federal courts have demonstrated that they can
apply this doctrine in a careful and reasoned manner, with
sensitivity to the effect on competition. Although we need not
comment on the merits of specific cases, we note that lower courts
have permitted competitors to copy the green color of farm
machinery (because customers wanted their farm equipment to match)
and have barred the use of black as a trademark on outboard boat
motors (because black has the special functional attributes of
decreasing the apparent size of the motor and ensuring
compatibility with many different boat colors). See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 170 F. Supp. 85, 98 (SD Iowa 1982), aff'd, 721
F.2d 253 (CA8 1983); Brunswick Corp. v. British
Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d
1527 , 1532 (CA Fed. 1994), cert. pending, No. 94-1075; see also Nor-Am Chemical v. O. M. Scott & Sons Co., 4 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1316, 1320 (ED Pa. 1987) (blue color of fertilizer
held functional because it indicated the presence of nitrogen). The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition adds that, if a design's
"aesthetic value" lies in its ability to "confe[r] a significant
benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of
alternative designs," then the design is "functional." Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 17, Comment c, pp. 175-176
(1993). The "ultimate test of aesthetic functionality," it
explains, "is whether the recognition of trademark rights would
significantly hinder competition." Id., at 176.

															The upshot is that, where a color serves a significant
nontrademark function-whether to distinguish a heart pill from a
digestive medicine or to satisfy the "noble instinct for giving the
right touch of beauty to common and necessary things," G.
Chesterton, Simplicity and Tolstoy 61 (1912)courts will examine
whether its use as a mark would permit one competitor (or a group)
to interfere with legitimate (nontrademark-related) competition
through actual or potential exclusive use of an important product
ingredient. That examination should not discourage firms from
creating esthetically pleasing mark designs, for it is open to
their competitors to do the same. See, e. g., W T. Rogers
Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d
334 , 343 (CA7 1985) (Posner, J.). But, ordinarily, it should
prevent the anticompetitive consequences of Jacobson's hypothetical
"color depletion" argument, when, and if, the circumstances of a
particular case threaten "color depletion." Third, Jacobson points to many older cases-including
Supreme Court cases-in support of its position. In 1878, this Court
described the common-law definition of trademark rather broadly to
"consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or 171 merchant in order to designate the goods he manufactures or
sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by
another." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 , 254. Yet, in
interpreting the Trademark Acts of 1881 and 1905, 21 Stat. 502, 33
Stat. 724, which retained that common-law definition, the Court
questioned "[w]hether mere color can constitute a valid
trade-mark," A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U. S. 166 , 171
(1906), and suggested that the "product including the coloring
matter is free to all who make it," Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke
Co. of America, 254 U. S. 143 , 147
(1920). Even though these statements amounted to dicta, lower
courts interpreted them as forbidding protection for color alone.
See, e. g., Campbell Soup Co., 175 F. 2d, at 798, and n. 9; Life Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d
4 ,9 (CA7 1950) (quoting Campbell Soup, supra, at
798).

															These Supreme Court cases, however, interpreted trademark law as
it existed before 1946, when Congress enacted the Lanham
Act. The Lanham Act significantly changed and liberalized the
common law to "dispense with mere technical prohibitions," S. Rep.
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946), most notably, by
permitting trademark registration of descriptive words (say,
"V-Build-It" model airplanes) where they had acquired "secondary
meaning." See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F. 2d,
at 9 (Friendly, J.). The Lanham Act extended protection to
descriptive marks by making clear that (with certain explicit
exceptions not relevant here) "nothing ... shall prevent the registration of a mark used by
the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce." 15 U. S. C. § 1052(f) (1988 ed., Supp. V). This language permits an ordinary word, normally used for a
nontrademark purpose (e. g., description), to act as a
trademark where it has gained "secondary meaning." Its logic 172 would appear to apply to color as well. Indeed, in 1985, the
Federal Circuit considered the significance of the Lanham Act's
changes as they related to color and held that trademark protection
for color was consistent with the "jurisprudence under the Lanham Act developed in accordance with
the statutory principle that if a mark is capable of being or
becoming distinctive of [the] applicant's goods in commerce, then
it is capable of serving as a trademark." Owens-Corning, 774
F. 2d, at 1120. In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act, revising portions of
the definitional language, but left unchanged the language here
relevant. § 134, 102 Stat. 3946, 15 U. S. C. § 1127. It enacted
these amendments against the following background: (1) the Federal
Circuit had decided Owens-Corning; (2) the Patent and
Trademark Office had adopted a clear policy (which it still
maintains) permitting registration of color as a trademark, see PTO
Manual § 1202.04(e) (at p. 1200-12 of the January 1986 edition and
p. 1202-13 of the May 1993 edition); and (3) the Trademark
Commission had written a report, which recommended that "the terms
'symbol, or device' ... not be deleted or narrowed to preclude
registration of such things as a color, shape, smell, sound, or
configuration which functions as a mark," The United States
Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 T. M.
Rep. 375, 421 (1987); see also 133 Congo Rec. 32812 (1987)
(statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("The bill I am introducing today is
based on the Commission's report and recommendations"). This
background strongly suggests that the language "any word, name,
symbol, or device," 15 U. S. C. § 1127, had come to include color.
And, when it amended the statute, Congress retained these terms.
Indeed, the Senate Report accompanying the Lanham Act revision
explicitly referred to this background understanding, in saying
that the "revised definition intentionally retains ... 173 the words 'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the
registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they
function as trademarks." S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 44. (In addition,
the statute retained language providing that "[n]o trademark by
which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration ... on account of its
nature" (except for certain specified reasons not relevant here).
15 U. S. C. § 1052 (1988 ed., Supp. V).)

															This history undercuts the authority of the precedent on which
Jacobson relies. Much of the pre-1985 case law rested on statements
in Supreme Court opinions that interpreted pre- Lanham Act
trademark law and were not directly related to the holdings in
those cases. Moreover, we believe the Federal Circuit was right in
1985 when it found that the 1946 Lanham Act embodied crucial legal
changes that liberalized the law to permit the use of color alone
as a trademark (under appropriate circumstances). At a minimum, the
Lanham Act's changes left the courts free to reevaluate the
preexisting legal precedent which had absolutely forbidden the use
of color alone as a trademark. Finally, when Congress reenacted the
terms "word, name, symbol, or device" in 1988, it did so against a
legal background in which those terms had come to include color,
and its statutory revision embraced that understanding. Fourth, Jacobson argues that there is no need to permit
color alone to function as a trademark because a firm already may
use color as part of a trademark, say, as a colored circle or
colored letter or colored word, and may rely upon "trade dress"
protection, under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, if a competitor copies
its color and thereby causes consumer confusion regarding the
overall appearance of the competing products or their packaging,
see 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The first part of
this argument begs the question. One can understand why a firm
might find it difficult to place a usable symbol or word on a
product (say, a large industrial 174 bolt that customers normally see from a distance); and, in such
instances, a firm might want to use color, pure and simple, instead
of color as part of a design. Neither is the second portion of the
argument convincing. Trademark law helps the holder of a mark in
many ways that "trade dress" protection does not. See 15 U. S. C. §
1124 (ability to prevent importation of confusingly similar goods);
§ 1072 (constructive notice of ownership); § 1065 (incontestible
status); § 1057(b) (prima facie evidence of validity and
ownership). Thus, one can easily find reasons why the law might
provide trademark protection in addition to trade dress
protection.

															IV

															Having determined that a color may sometimes meet the basic
legal requirements for use as a trademark and that respondent
Jacobson's arguments do not justify a special legal rule preventing
color alone from serving as a trademark (and, in light of the
District Court's here undisputed findings that Qualitex's use of
the green-gold color on its press pads meets the basic trademark
requirements), we conclude that the Ninth Circuit erred in barring
Qualitex's use of color as a trademark. For these reasons, the
judgment of the Ninth Circuit is

															Reversed.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a color can be trademarked if it meets the basic legal requirements for use as a trademark and there are no special reasons that convincingly argue against it. In this case, Qualitex's use of a specific shade of green-gold on its dry cleaning press pads was upheld as a valid trademark, as it served to identify and distinguish their products from competitors and had no other function. The Court rejected Jacobson's arguments against allowing color alone to be trademarked, including concerns over limited color availability and potential legal disputes. The Court's decision affirmed that colors could function as trademarks under the Lanham Act, provided they met the necessary conditions.