U.S. Supreme Court Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947) Hickman v. Taylor No. 47 Argued November 13,
1946 Decided January 13,
1947 329
U.S. 495 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT Syllabus Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff in a suit
in a federal district court against certain tug owners to recover
for the death of a seaman in the sinking of the tug filed numerous
interrogatories directed to the defendants, including one inquiring
whether any statements of members of the crew were taken in
connection with the accident and requesting that exact copies of
all such written statements be attached and that the defendant "set
forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or
reports." There was no showing of necessity or other justification
for these requests. A public hearing had been held before the
United States Steamboat Inspectors at which the survivors of the
accident had been examined and their testimony recorded and made
available to all interested parties. Defendants answered all other
interrogatories, stating objective facts and giving the names and
addresses of witnesses, but declined to summarize or set forth the
statements taken from witnesses, on the ground that they were
"privileged matter obtained in preparation for litigation." After a
hearing on objections to the interrogatories, the District Court
held that the requested matters were not privileged and decreed
that they be produced and that memoranda of defendants' counsel
containing statements of fact by witnesses either be produced or
submitted to the court for determination of those portions which
should be revealed to plaintiff. Defendants and their counsel
refused, and were adjudged guilty of contempt. Held: 1. In these circumstances, Rules 26, 33 and 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the production as of right
of oral and written statements of witnesses secured by an adverse
party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible
litigation after a claim has arisen. Pp. 329 U. S.
509 -514.

															2. Since plaintiff addressed simple interrogatories to adverse
parties, did not direct them to such parties or their counsel by
way of deposition under Rule 26, and it does not appear that he
filed a Page 329 U. S. 496 motion under Rule 34 for a court order directing the production
of the documents in question, he was proceeding primarily under
Rule 33, relating to interrogatories to parties. P. 329 U. S.
504 .

															3. Rules 33 and 34 are limited to parties, thereby excluding
their counsel or agents. P. 329 U. S.
504 .

															4. Rule 33 did not permit the plaintiff to obtain, as adjuncts
to interrogatories addressed to defendants, memoranda and
statements prepared by their counsel after a claim had arisen. P. 329 U. S.
504 .

															5. The District Court erred in holding defendants in contempt
for failure to produce that which was in the possession of their
counsel, and in holding their counsel in contempt for failure to
produce that which he could not be compelled to produce under
either Rule 33 or Rule 34. P. 329 U. S.
505 .

															6. Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions prepared or
obtained from interviews with witnesses by counsel in preparing for
litigation after a claim has arisen are not within the
attorney-client privilege, and are not protected from discovery on
that basis. P. 329 U. S.
508 .

															7. The general policy against invading the privacy of an
attorney's course of preparation is so essential to an orderly
working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the
one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to
justify production through a subpoena or court order. P. 329 U. S.
512 .

															8. Rule 30(b) gives the trial judge the requisite discretion to
make a judgment as to whether discovery should be allowed as to
written statements secured from witnesses; but, in this case, there
was no ground for the exercise of that discretion in favor of
plaintiff. P. 329 U. S.
512 .

															9. Under the circumstances of this case, no showing of necessity
could be made which would justify requiring the production of oral
statements made by witnesses to defendants' counsel, whether
presently in the form of his mental impressions or in the form of
memoranda. P. 329 U. S.
512 .

															153 F.2d 212 affirmed.

															A District Court adjudged respondents guilty of contempt for
failure to produce, in response to interrogatories, copies of
certain written statements and memoranda prepared by counsel in
connection with pending litigation. 4 F.R.D. 479. The Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed. 153 F.2d 212. This Court granted certiorari.
328 U.S. 876. Affirmed, p. 329 U. S.
514 . Page 329 U. S. 497 MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents an important problem under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as to the extent to which a party may inquire
into oral and written statements of witnesses, or other
information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of
preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen.
Examination into a person's files and records, including those
resulting from the professional activities of an attorney, must be
judged with care. It is not without reason that various safeguards
have been established to preclude unwarranted excursions into the
privacy of a man's work. At the same time, public policy supports
reasonable and necessary inquiries. Properly to balance these
competing interests is a delicate and difficult task. Page 329 U. S. 498 On February 7, 1943, the tug "J. M. Taylor" sank while engaged
in helping to tow a car float of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
across the Delaware River at Philadelphia. The accident was
apparently unusual in nature, the cause of it still being unknown.
Five of the nine crew members were drowned. Three days later, the
tug owners and the underwriters employed a law firm, of which
respondent Fortenbaugh is a member, to defend them against
potential suits by representatives of the deceased crew members and
to sue the railroad for damages to the tug.

															A public hearing was held on March 4, 1943, before the United
States Steamboat Inspectors at which the four survivors were
examined. This testimony was recorded and made available to all
interested parties. Shortly thereafter, Fortenbaugh privately
interviewed the survivors and took statements from them with an eye
toward the anticipated litigation; the survivors signed these
statements on March 29. Fortenbaugh also interviewed other persons
believed to have some information relating to the accident, and in
some cases he made memoranda of what they told him. At the time
when Fortenbaugh secured the statements of the survivors,
representatives of two of the deceased crew members had been in
communication with him. Ultimately claims were presented by
representatives of all five of the deceased; four of the claims,
however, were settled without litigation. The fifth claimant,
petitioner herein, brought suit in a federal court under the Jones
Act on November 26, 1943, naming as defendants the two tug owners,
individually and as partners, and the railroad.

															One year later, petitioner filed 39 interrogatories directed to
the tug owners. The 38th interrogatory read:

															"State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the
Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were
taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the
sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.' Page 329 U. S. 499 Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing,
and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such
oral statements or reports."

															Supplemental interrogatories asked whether any oral or written
statements, records, reports, or other memoranda had been made
concerning any matter relative to the towing operation, the sinking
of the tug, the salvaging and repair of the tug, and the death of
the deceased. If the answer was in the affirmative, the tug owners
were then requested to set forth the nature of all such records,
reports, statements, or other memoranda.

															The tug owners, through Fortenbaugh, answered all of the
interrogatories except No. 38 and the supplemental ones just
described. While admitting that statements of the survivors had
been taken, they declined to summarize or set forth the contents.
They did so on the ground that such requests called "for privileged
matter obtained in preparation for litigation," and constituted "an
attempt to obtain indirectly counsel's private files." It was
claimed that answering these requests "would involve practically
turning over not only the complete files, but also the telephone
records and, almost, the thoughts, of counsel."

															In connection with the hearing on these objections, Fortenbaugh
made a written statement and gave an informal oral deposition
explaining the circumstances under which he had taken the
statements. But he was not expressly asked in the deposition to
produce the statements. The District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, held that the requested matters
were not privileged. 4 F.R.D. 479. The court then decreed that the
tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for the tug owners
forthwith

															"answer Plaintiff's 38th interrogatory and supplemental
interrogatories; produce all written statements of witnesses
obtained by Mr. Fortenbaugh, as counsel and agent for
Defendants; Page 329 U. S. 500 state in substance any fact concerning this case which
Defendants learned through oral statements made by witnesses to Mr.
Fortenbaugh, whether or not included in his private memoranda, and
produce Mr. Fortenbaugh's memoranda containing statements of fact
by witnesses or to submit these memoranda to the Court for
determination of those portions which should be revealed to
Plaintiff."

															Upon their refusal, the court adjudged them in contempt and
ordered them imprisoned until they complied.

															The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, also sitting en banc,
reversed the judgment of the District Court. 153 F.2d 212. It held
that the information here sought was part of the "work product of
the lawyer," and hence privileged from discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The importance of the problem, which has
engendered a great divergence of views among district courts,
[ Footnote 1 ] led us to grant
certiorari. 328 U.S. 876.

															The pretrial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules
26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, the
pretrial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation, and
fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the
pleadings. [ Footnote 2 ] Inquiry
into the issues and the facts before trial was Page 329 U. S. 501 narrowly confined, and was often cumbersome in method. [ Footnote 3 ] The new rules, however,
restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving, and
invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the
preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now
serve (1) as a device, along with the pretrial hearing under Rule
16, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and
(2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to
the existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.
Thus, civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried
on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized
privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. [ Footnote 4 ]

															There is an initial question as to which of the
deposition-discovery rules is involved in this case. Petitioner, in
filing his interrogatories, thought that he was proceeding under
Rule 33. That rule provides that a party may serve upon any adverse
party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served.
[ Footnote 5 ] The District Court
proceeded Page 329 U. S. 502 on the same assumption in its opinion, although its order to
produce and its contempt order stated that both Rules 33 and 34
were involved. Rule 34 establishes a procedure whereby, upon motion
of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all
other parties, the court may order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated
documents, etc., not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody, or control. [ Footnote 6 ]

															The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, felt that Rule 26 was the
crucial one. Petitioner, it said, was proceeding by
interrogatories, and, in connection with those interrogatories,
wanted copies of memoranda and statements secured from witnesses.
While the court believed that Rule 33 was involved at least as to
the defending tug owners, it stated that this rule could not be
used as the basis for condemning Fortenbaugh's failure to disclose
or produce Page 329 U. S. 503 the memoranda and statements, since the rule applies only to
interrogatories addressed to adverse parties, not to their agents
or counsel. And Rule 34 was said to be inapplicable since
petitioner was not trying to see an original document and to copy
or photograph it, within the scope of that rule. The court then
concluded that Rule 26 must be the one really involved. That
provides that the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken by any party by deposition upon oral examination or
written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as
evidence, and that the deponent may be examined regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether relating to the claim or
defense of the examining party or of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of
any books, documents or other tangible things. [ Footnote 7 ] Page 329 U. S. 504 The matter is not without difficulty in light of the events that
transpired below. We believe, however, that petitioner was
proceeding primarily under Rule 33. He addressed simple
interrogatories solely to the individual tug owners, the adverse
parties, as contemplated by that rule. He did not, and could not
under Rule 33, address such interrogatories to their counsel,
Fortenbaugh. Nor did he direct these interrogatories either to the
tug owners or to Fortenbaugh by way of deposition; Rule 26 thus
could not come into operation. And it does not appear from the
record that petitioner filed a motion under Rule 34 for a court
order directing the production of the documents in question.
Indeed, such an order could not have been entered as to
Fortenbaugh, since Rule 34, like Rule 33, is limited to parties to
the proceeding, thereby excluding their counsel or agents.

															Thus, to the extent that petitioner was seeking the production
of the memoranda and statements gathered by Fortenbaugh in the
course of his activities as counsel, petitioner misconceived his
remedy. Rule 33 did not permit him to obtain such memoranda and
statements as adjuncts to the interrogatories addressed to the
individual tug owners. A party clearly cannot refuse to answer
interrogatories on the ground that the information sought is solely
within the knowledge of his attorney. But that is not this case.
Here, production was sought of documents prepared by a party's
attorney after the claim has arisen. Rule 33 does not make
provision for such production, even when sought in connection with
permissible interrogatories. Moreover, since petitioner was also
foreclosed from securing them through an order under Rule 34, his
only recourse was to take Fortenbaugh's deposition under Rule 26
and to attempt to force Fortenbaugh to produce the materials by use
of a subpoena duces tecum in accordance with Rule 45.
Holtzoff, "Instruments of Discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," 41 Page 329 U. S. 505 Mich.L.Rev. 205, 220. But, despite petitioner's faulty choice of
action, the District Court entered an order, apparently under Rule
34, commanding the tug owners and Fortenbaugh, as their agent and
counsel, to produce the materials in question. Their refusal led to
the anomalous result of holding the tug owners in contempt for
failure to produce that which was in the possession of their
counsel, and of holding Fortenbaugh in contempt for failure to
produce that which he could not be compelled to produce under
either Rule 33 or Rule 34.

															But, under the circumstances, we deem it unnecessary and unwise
to rest our decision upon this procedural irregularity, an
irregularity which is not strongly urged upon us and which was
disregarded in the two courts below. It matters little at this
later stage whether Fortenbaugh fails to answer interrogatories
filed under Rule 26 or under Rule 33 or whether he refuses to
produce the memoranda and statements pursuant to a subpoena under
Rule 45 or a court order under Rule 34. The deposition-discovery
rules create integrated procedural devices. And the basic question
at stake is whether any of those devices may be used to inquire
into materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the
course of preparation for possible litigation. The fact that the
petitioner may have used the wrong method does not destroy the main
thrust of his attempt. Nor does it relieve us of the responsibility
of dealing with the problem raised by that attempt. It would be
inconsistent with the liberal atmosphere surrounding these rules to
insist that petitioner now go through the empty formality of
pursuing the right procedural device only to reestablish precisely
the same basic problem now confronting us. We do not mean to say,
however, that there may not be situations in which the failure to
proceed in accordance with a specific rule would be important or
decisive. But, in the present circumstances, for the purposes of
this decision, the procedural Page 329 U. S. 506 irregularity is not material. Having noted the proper procedure,
we may accordingly turn our attention to the substance of the
underlying problem.

															In urging that he has a right to inquire into the materials
secured and prepared by Fortenbaugh, petitioner emphasizes that the
deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are designed to enable the parties to discover the true
facts, and to compel their disclosure wherever they may be found.
It is said that inquiry may be made under these rules, epitomized
by Rule 26, as to any relevant matter which is not privileged, and,
since the discovery provisions are to be applied as broadly and
liberally as possible, the privilege limitation must be restricted
to its narrowest bounds. On the premise that the attorney-client
privilege is the one involved in this case, petitioner argues that
it must be strictly confined to confidential communications made by
a client to his attorney. And, since the materials here in issue
were secured by Fortenbaugh from third persons, rather than from
his clients, the tug owners, the conclusion is reached that these
materials are proper subjects for discovery under Rule 26.

															As additional support for this result, petitioner claims that to
prohibit discovery under these circumstances would give a corporate
defendant a tremendous advantage in a suit by an individual
plaintiff. Thus, in a suit by an injured employee against a
railroad or in a suit by an insured person against an insurance
company, the corporate defendant could pull a dark veil of secrecy
over all the pertinent facts it can collect after the claim arises
merely on the assertion that such facts were gathered by its large
staff of attorneys and claim agents. At the same time, the
individual plaintiff, who often has direct knowledge of the matter
in issue and has no counsel until some time after his claim arises,
could be compelled to disclose all the intimate details of his
case. By endowing with Page 329 U. S. 507 immunity from disclosure all that a lawyer discovers in the
course of his duties, it is said, the rights of individual
litigants in such cases are drained of vitality, and the lawsuit
becomes more of a battle of deception than a search for truth.

															But framing the problem in terms of assisting individual
plaintiffs in their suits against corporate defendants is
unsatisfactory. Discovery concededly may work to the disadvantage
as well as to the advantage of individual plaintiffs. Discovery, in
other words, is not a one-way proposition. It is available in all
types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate,
plaintiff or defendant. The problem thus far transcends the
situation confronting this petitioner. And we must view that
problem in light of the limitless situations where the particular
kind of discovery sought by petitioner might be used.

															We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the
time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
[ Footnote 8 ] Mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The
deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which
the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. But
discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and
necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules 30(b) and (d) and
31(d), limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown Page 329 U. S. 508 that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such
a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to
the inquiry. And, as Rule 26(b) provides, further limitations come
into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.

															We also agree that the memoranda, statements, and mental
impressions in issue in this case fall outside the scope of the
attorney-client privilege, and hence are not protected from
discovery on that basis. It is unnecessary here to delineate the
content and scope of that privilege as recognized in the federal
courts. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the
protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his
client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege
concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other writings
prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's
case, and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an
attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories.

															But the impropriety of invoking that privilege does not provide
an answer to the problem before us. Petitioner has made more than
an ordinary request for relevant, nonprivileged facts in the
possession of his adversaries or their counsel. He has sought
discovery as of right of oral and written statements of witnesses
whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner
appears unimpaired. He has sought production of these matters after
making the most searching inquiries of his opponents as to the
circumstances surrounding the fatal accident, which inquiries were
sworn to have been answered to the best of their information and
belief. Interrogatories were directed toward all the events prior
to, during, and subsequent to the sinking of the tug. Full and
honest answers to such broad inquiries would necessarily have
included all Page 329 U. S. 509 pertinent information gleaned by Fortenbaugh through his
interviews with the witnesses. Petitioner makes no suggestion, and
we cannot assume, that the tug owners or Fortenbaugh were
incomplete or dishonest in the framing of their answers. In
addition, petitioner was free to examine the public testimony of
the witnesses taken before the United States Steamboat Inspectors.
We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the production of
written statements and mental impressions contained in the files
and the mind of the attorney Fortenbaugh without any showing of
necessity or any indication or claim that denial of such production
would unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case or
cause him any hardship or injustice. For aught that appears, the
essence of what petitioner seeks either has been revealed to him
already through the interrogatories or is readily available to him
direct from the witnesses for the asking.

															The District Court, after hearing objections to petitioner's
request, commanded Fortenbaugh to produce all written statements of
witnesses and to state in substance any facts learned through oral
statements of witnesses to him. Fortenbaugh was to submit any
memoranda he had made of the oral statements, so that the court
might determine what portions should be revealed to petitioner. All
of this was ordered without any showing by petitioner, or any
requirement that he make a proper showing, of the necessity for the
production of any of this material or any demonstration that denial
of production would cause hardship or injustice. The court simply
ordered production on the theory that the facts sought were
material and were not privileged as constituting attorney-client
communications.

															In our opinion, neither Rule 26 nor any other rule dealing with
discovery contemplates production under such circumstances. That is
not because the subject matter is privileged or irrelevant, as
those concepts are used in these Page 329 U. S. 510 rules. [ Footnote 9 ] Here is
simply an attempt, without purported necessity or justification, to
secure written statements, private memoranda, and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in
the course of his legal duties. As such, it falls outside the arena
of discovery and contravenes the public policy underlying the
orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims. Not even the most
liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries
into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.

															Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court, and is bound
to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting
the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various
duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing
parties and their counsel. Page 329 U. S. 511 Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories, and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and
the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our
system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their
clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in
interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways -- aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the lawyer." Were
such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of
what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An
attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of
cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.

															We do not mean to say that all written materials obtained or
prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation
are necessarily free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant
and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file, and
where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of
one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such written statements
and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in
evidence, or give clues as to the existence or location of relevant
facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of impeachment or
corroboration. And production might be justified where the
witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with
difficulty. Were production of written statements and documents to
be precluded under Page 329 U. S. 512 such circumstances, the liberal ideals of the
deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would be stripped of much of their meaning. But the
general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course
of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly
working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the
one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to
justify production through a subpoena or court order. That burden,
we believe, is necessarily implicit in the rules as now
constituted. [ Footnote
10 ]

															Rule 30(b), as presently written, gives the trial judge the
requisite discretion to make a judgment as to whether discovery
should be allowed as to written statements secured from witnesses.
But, in the instant case, there was no room for that discretion to
operate in favor of the petitioner. No attempt was made to
establish any reason why Fortenbaugh should be forced to produce
the written statements. There was only a naked, general demand for
these materials as of right, and a finding by the District Court
that no recognizable privilege was involved. That was insufficient
to justify discovery under these circumstances, and the court
should have sustained the refusal of the tug owners and Fortenbaugh
to produce.

															But, as to oral statements made by witnesses to Fortenbaugh,
whether presently in the form of his mental impressions or
memoranda, we do not believe that any showing of necessity can be
made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify
production. Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to
repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver
the account Page 329 U. S. 513 to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such
production. The practice forces the attorney to testify as to what
he remembers or what he saw fit to write down regarding witnesses'
remarks. Such testimony could not qualify as evidence, and to use
it for impeachment or corroborative purposes would make the
attorney much less an officer of the court and much more an
ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby
suffer.

															Denial of production of this nature does not mean that any
material, nonprivileged facts can be hidden from the petitioner in
this case. He need not be unduly hindered in the preparation of his
case, in the discovery of facts, or in his anticipation of his
opponents' position. Searching interrogatories directed to
Fortenbaugh and the tug owners, production of written documents and
statements upon a proper showing, and direct interviews with the
witnesses themselves all serve to reveal the facts in Fortenbaugh's
possession to the fullest possible extent consistent with public
policy. Petitioner's counsel frankly admits that he wants the oral
statements only to help prepare himself to examine witnesses and to
make sure that he has overlooked nothing. That is insufficient
under the circumstances to permit him an exception to the policy
underlying the privacy of Fortenbaugh's professional activities. If
there should be a rare situation justifying production of these
matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.

															We fully appreciate the widespread controversy among the members
of the legal profession over the problem raised by this case.
[ Footnote 11 ] It is a
problem that rests on what Page 329 U. S. 514 has been one of the most hazy frontiers of the discovery
process. But, until some rule or statute definitely prescribes
otherwise, we are not justified in permitting discovery in a
situation of this nature as a matter of unqualified right. When
Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and
the members of the bar in general certainly did not believe or
contemplate that all the files and mental processes of lawyers were
thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries. And we
refuse to interpret the rules at this time so as to reach so harsh
and unwarranted a result.

															We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ] See cases collected by Advisory Committee on Rules for
Civil Procedure in its Report of Proposed Amendments (June, 1946),
pp. 40-47; 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-460. See also 2 Moore's
Federal Practice (1945 Cum.Supp.), § 26.12, pp. 155-159; Holtzoff,
"Instruments of Discovery under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"
41 Mich.L.Rev. 205, 210-212; Pike and Willis, "Federal Discovery in
Operation," 7 Univ. of Chicago L.Rev. 297, 301-307.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"The great weakness of pleading as a means for developing and
presenting issues of fact for trial lay in its total lack of any
means for testing the factual basis for the pleader's allegations
and denials."

															Sunderland, "The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure," 36
Mich.L.Rev. 215, 216. See also Ragland, Discovery Before
Trial (1932), ch. I.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															2 Moore's Federal Practice (1938), § 26.02, pp. 2445, 2455.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Pike and Willis, "The New Federal Deposition-Discovery
Procedure," 38 Col.L.Rev. 1179, 1436; Pike, "The New Federal
Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules of Evidence," 34
Ill.L.Rev. 1.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Rule 33 reads:

															"Any party may serve upon any adverse party written
interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party
served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or
association, by any officer thereof competent to testify in its
behalf. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully
in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed by the person
making them, and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been
served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting
the interrogatories within 15 days after the delivery of the
interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice and for
good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Objections to any
interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after
service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion, and answers
shall be deferred until the objections are determined, which shall
be at as early a time as is practicable. No party may, without
leave of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be
answered by the same party."

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Rule 34 provides:

															"Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is
pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or
control; or (2) order any party to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose
of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property
or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection
and taking the copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The relevant portions of Rule 26 provide as follows:

															"(a) WHEN DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN. By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a
party or not, may be taken at the instance of any party by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the
purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken
only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person
confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such
terms as the court prescribes."

															"(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless otherwise ordered by the court
as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether relating to
the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts."

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															"One of the chief arguments against the 'fishing expedition'
objection is the idea that discovery is mutual -- that, while a
party may have to disclose his case, he can at the same time tie
his opponent down to a definite position."

															Pike and Willis, "Federal Discovery in Operation," 7 Univ. of
Chicago L.Rev. 297, 303.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The English courts have developed the concept of privilege to
include all documents prepared by or for counsel with a view to
litigation.

															"All documents which are called into existence for the purpose
-- but not necessarily the sole purpose -- of assisting the
deponent or his legal advisers in any actual or anticipated
litigation are privileged from production. . . . Thus, all proofs,
briefs, draft pleadings, etc., are privileged; but not counsel's
indorsement on the outside of his brief . . . nor any deposition or
notes of evidence given publicly in open Court. . . . So are all
papers prepared by any agent of the party bona fide for
the use of his solicitor for the purposes of the action, whether in
fact so used or not. . . . Reports by a company's servant, if made
in the ordinary course of routine, are not privileged, even though
it is desirable that the solicitor should have them and they are
subsequently sent to him; but if the solicitor has requested that
such documents shall always be prepared for his use and this was
one of the reasons why they were prepared, they need not by
disclosed."

															Odgers on Pleading and Practice (12th ed., 1939), p. 264. See Order 31, rule 1, of the Rules of the Supreme
Court, 1883, set forth in The Annual Practice, 1945, p. 519, and
the discussion following that rule. For a compilation of the
English cases on the matter, see 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3d
ed., 1940), § 2319, pp. 618-622, notes.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Rule 34 is explicit in its requirements that a party show good
cause before obtaining a court order directing another party to
produce documents. See Report of Proposed Amendments by
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (June, 1946); 5
F.R.D. 433.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See Report of Proposed Amendments by Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure (June, 1946), pp. 44-47; 5 F.R.D. 433,
459, 460; Discovery Procedure Symposium before the 1946 Conference
of the Third United States Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 F.R.D. 403;
Armstrong, "Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments," 5 F.R.D. 339,
353-357.

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

															The narrow question in this case concerns only one of
thirty-nine interrogatories which defendants and their counsel
refused to answer. As there was persistence in refusal after the
court ordered them to answer it, counsel and clients were committed
to jail by the district court until they should purge themselves of
contempt.

															The interrogatory asked whether statements were taken from the
crews of the tugs involved in the accident, or of any other vessel,
and demanded,

															"Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in
writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of
any such oral statements or reports."

															The question is simply whether such a demand is authorized by
the rules relating to various aspects of "discovery."

															The primary effect of the practice advocated here would be on
the legal profession itself. But it too often is overlooked Page 329 U. S. 515 that the lawyer and the law office are indispensable parts of
our administration of justice. Law-abiding people can go nowhere
else to learn the ever changing and constantly multiplying rules by
which they must behave and to obtain redress for their wrongs. The
welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime
consequence to society, which would feel the consequences of such a
practice as petitioner urges secondarily, but certainly.

															"Discovery" is one of the working tools of the legal profession.
It traces back to the equity bill of discovery in English Chancery
practice, and seems to have had a forerunner in Continental
practice. See Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932)
13-16. Since 1848, when the draftsmen of New York's Code of
Procedure recognized the importance of a better system of
discovery, the impetus to extend and expand discovery, as well as
the opposition to it, has come from within the Bar itself. It
happens in this case that it is the plaintiff's attorney who
demands such unprecedented latitude of discovery and, strangely
enough, amicus briefs in his support have been filed by
several labor unions representing plaintiffs as a class. It is the
history of the movement for broader discovery, however, that, in
actual experience, the chief opposition to its extension has come
from lawyers who specialize in representing plaintiffs, because
defendants have made liberal use of it to force plaintiffs to
disclose their cases in advance. See Report of the
Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State
(1934) 330, 331; Ragland, Discovery Before Trial (1932) 35, 36.
Discovery is a two-edged sword, and we cannot decide this problem
on any doctrine of extending help to one class of litigants.

															It seems clear, and long has been recognized, that discovery
should provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his
case. Cf. Report of Commission on the Administration of
Justice in New York State (1934) 41, 42. Page 329 U. S. 516 It seems equally clear that discovery should not nullify the
privilege of confidential communication between attorney and
client. But those principles give us no real assistance here,
because what is being sought is neither evidence nor is it a
privileged communication between attorney and client.

															To consider first the most extreme aspect of the requirement in
litigation here, we find it calls upon counsel, if he has had any
conversations with any of the crews of the vessels in question or
of any other, to "set forth in detail the exact provision of any
such oral statements or reports." Thus, the demand is not for the
production of a transcript in existence, but calls for the creation
of a written statement not in being. But the statement by counsel
of what a witness told him is not evidence when written plaintiff
could not introduce it to prove his case. What, then, is the
purpose sought to be served by demanding this of adverse
counsel?

															Counsel for the petitioner candidly said on argument that he
wanted this information to help prepare himself to examine
witnesses, to make sure he overlooked nothing. He bases his claim
to it in his brief on the view that the Rules were to do away with
the old situation where a law suit developed into "a battle of wits
between counsel." But a common law trial is and always should be an
adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or
on wits borrowed from the adversary.

															The real purpose and the probable effect of the practice ordered
by the district court would be to put trials on a level even lower
than a "battle of wits." I can conceive of no practice more
demoralizing to the Bar than to require a lawyer to write out and
deliver to his adversary an account of what witnesses have told
him. Even if his recollection were perfect, the statement would be
his language Page 329 U. S. 517 permeated with his inferences. Everyone who has tried it knows
that it is almost impossible so fairly to record the expressions
and emphasis of a witness that, when he testifies in the
environment of the court and under the influence of the leading
question, there will not be departures in some respects. Whenever
the testimony of the witness would differ from the "exact"
statement the lawyer had delivered, the lawyer's statement would be
whipped out to impeach the witness. Counsel producing his
adversary's "inexact" statement could lose nothing by saying, "Here
is a contradiction, gentlemen of the jury. I do not know whether it
is my adversary or his witness who is not telling the truth, but
one is not." Of course, if this practice were adopted, that scene
would be repeated over and over again. The lawyer who delivers such
statements often would find himself branded a deceiver afraid to
take the stand to support his own version of the witness'
conversation with him, or else he will have to go on the stand to
defend his own credibility -- perhaps against that of his chief
witness, or possibly even his client.

															Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand, and will do so
only for grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his role;
he is almost invariably a poor witness. But he steps out of
professional character to do it. He regrets it; the profession
discourages it. But the practice advocated here is one which would
force him to be a witness not as to what he has seen or done, but
as to other witnesses' stories, and not because he wants to do so,
but in self-defense.

															And what is the lawyer to do who has interviewed one whom he
believes to be a biased, lying, or hostile witness to get his
unfavorable statements and know what to meet? He must record and
deliver such statements even though he would not vouch for the
credibility of the witness by calling him. Perhaps the other side
would not want to Page 329 U. S. 518 call him either, but the attorney is open to the charge of
suppressing evidence at the trial if he fails to call such a
hostile witness even though he never regarded him as reliable or
truthful.

															Having been supplied the names of the witnesses, petitioner's
lawyer gives no reason why he cannot interview them himself. If an
employee-witness refuses to tell his story, he, too, may be
examined under the Rules. He may be compelled on discovery as fully
as on the trial to disclose his version of the facts. But that is
his own disclosure -- it can be used to impeach him if he
contradicts it, and such a deposition is not useful to promote an
unseemly disagreement between the witness and the counsel in the
case.

															It is true that the literal language of the Rules would admit of
an interpretation that would sustain the district court's order. So
the literal language of the Act of Congress which makes "any
writing or record . . . made as a memorandum or record of any . . .
occurrence, or event" admissible as evidence would have allowed the
railroad company to put its engineer's accident statements in
evidence. Cf. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.
S. 109 , 318 U. S. 111 .
But all such procedural measures have a background of custom and
practice which was assumed by those who wrote and should be by
those who apply them. We reviewed the background of the Act and the
consequences on the trial of negligence cases of allowing railroads
and others to put in their statements and thus to shield the crew
from cross-examination. We said, "Such a major change which opens
wide the door to avoidance of cross-examination should not be left
to implication." 318 U.S. at 318 U. S. 114 .
We pointed out that there, as here, the "several hundred years of
history behind the Act . . . indicate the nature of the reforms
which it was designed to effect." Page 329 U. S. 519 318 U.S. at 318 U. S. 115 .
We refused to apply it beyond that point. We should follow the same
course of reasoning here. Certainly nothing in the tradition or
practice of discovery up to the time of these Rules would have
suggested that they would authorize such a practice as here
proposed.

															The question remains as to signed statements or those written by
witnesses. Such statements are not evidence for the defendant. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 . Nor
should I think they ordinarily could be evidence for the plaintiff.
But such a statement might be useful for impeachment of the witness
who signed it, if he is called, and if he departs from the
statement. There might be circumstances, too, where impossibility
or difficulty of access to the witness or his refusal to respond to
requests for information or other facts would show that the
interests of justice require that such statements be made
available. Production of such statements are governed by Rule 34
and on "Showing good cause therefor" the court may order their
inspection, copying or photographing. No such application has here
been made; the demand is made on the basis of right, not on showing
of cause.

															I agree to the affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Appeals which reversed the district court.

															MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER joins in this opinion.

Summary: In Hickman v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is not entitled to obtain oral and written statements of witnesses secured by their adversary's counsel during the preparation for possible litigation. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting an attorney's work product and preserving the integrity of the adversarial system. While witness statements may be useful for impeachment purposes, the proper procedure to obtain them is through Rule 34, which requires a showing of good cause. The Court also clarified that Rules 33 and 34 are limited to parties and do not extend to their counsel or agents.


OCTOBER TERM, 1996

															Syllabus

															VACCO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK, ET AL. v. QUILL ET
AL.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT No. 95-1858. Argued January 8, 1997-Decided June 26,1997 In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to
commit or attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving
medical treatment. Respondent New York physicians assert that,
although it would be consistent with the standards of their medical
practices to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent,
terminally ill patients who are suffering great pain and desire a
doctor's help in taking their own lives, they are deterred from
doing so by New York's assisted-suicide ban. They, and three
gravely ill patients who have since died, sued the State's Attorney
General, claiming that the ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The Federal District Court disagreed, but
the Second Circuit reversed, holding (1) that New York accords
different treatment to those competent, terminally ill persons who
wish to hasten their deaths by self-administering prescribed drugs
than it does to those who wish to do so by directing the removal of
life-support systems, and (2) that this supposed unequal treatment
is not rationally related to any legitimate state interests. Held: New York's prohibition on assisting suicide does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 799-809.

															(a) The Equal Protection Clause embodies a general rule that
States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases
accordingly. E. g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 , 216. The
New York statutes outlawing assisted suicide neither infringe
fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications, e. g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at 719-728, and are
therefore entitled to a strong presumption of validity, Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319. On their faces,
neither the assisted-suicide ban nor the law permitting patients to
refuse medical treatment treats anyone differently from anyone else
or draws any distinctions between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to
refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is
permitted to assist a suicide. Generally, laws that apply
evenhandedly to all unquestionably comply with equal protection. E. g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 ,
587. This Court disagrees with the Second Circuit's submission that
ending or refusing lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more
nor less than assisted suicide." The distinc- 794 Syllabus

															tion between letting a patient die and making that patient die
is important, logical, rational, and well established: It comports
with fundamental legal principles of causation, see, e. g.,
People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-472, 527 N. W.
2d 714, 728, cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1083, and intent, see, e.
g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394 , 403-406;
has been recognized, at least implicitly, by this Court in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261 , 278-280; id., at 287-288 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); and has been
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession, the state
courts, and the overwhelming majority of state legislatures, which,
like New York's, have permitted the former while prohibiting the
latter. The Court therefore disagrees with respondents' claim that
the distinction is "arbitrary" and "irrational." The line between
the two acts may not always be clear, but certainty is not
required, even were it possible. Logic and contemporary practice
support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and
New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat
them differently. Pp. 799-808.

															(b) New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on the
distinction between refusing treatment and assisting a
suicide-including prohibiting intentional killing and preserving
life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their
patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference,
prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their
lives; and avoiding a possible slide toward euthanasia-are valid
and important public interests that easily satisfy the
constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a
rational relation to some legitimate end. See Glucksberg,
ante. Pp. 808-809. 80 F.3d
716 , reversed.

															REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ.,
joined in part, ante, p. 736. STEVENS, J., ante, p.
738, SOUTER, J., post, p. 809, GINSBURG, J., ante, p.
789, and BREYER, J., ante, p. 789, filed opinions concurring
in the judgment. Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of New York, pro se, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the
briefs were Barbara Gott Billet, Solicitor General, and Daniel Smirlock and Michael S. Popkin, Assistant Attorneys General.

															Acting Solicitor General Dellinger argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor
General Waxman, Deputy Assistant 795 Attorney General Preston, Barbara C. Biddle, and Ann
Hubbard. Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for respondents.

															With him on the brief were Peter J. Rubin, Kathryn L. Tucker,
David J. Burman, Kari Anne Smith, and Carla A. Kerr. *

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Robert L. Mukai, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Alvin J. Korobkin, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas S. Lazar, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of
Alabama, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A.
Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of
Georgia, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of
Nebraska, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma, Pedro R. Pierluisi of Puerto
Rico, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Mark W
Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W Burson of Tennessee, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, and Christine O. Gregoire of Washington; for Wayne
County, Michigan, by John D. O'Hair and Timothy A.
Baughman; for Agudath Israel of America by David Zwiebel and Morton M. Avigdor; for the American Association of Homes
and Services for the Aging et al. by Joel G. Chefitz and Robert K. Niewijk; for the American Center for Law and
Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, James M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M.
Weber, Keith A. Fournier, John G. Stepanovich, and Thomas P. Monaghan; for the American Geriatrics Society by John H. Pickering and Joseph E. Schmitz; for the
American Hospital Association by Michael K. Kellogg and Margaret J. Hardy; for the American Medical
Association et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Mark E. Haddad,
Paul E. Kalb, Katherine L. Adams, Newton N. Minow, Jack R. Bierig,
Kirk B. Johnson, and Michael L. Ile; for the Catholic
Health Association of the United States by James A. Serritella,
James C. Geoly, Kevin R. Gustafson, Thomas C. Shields, Peter M. Leibold, and Charles S. Gilham; for the Catholic Medical Association by Joseph J. Frank, Sergio Alvarez-Mena III, and Peter Buscemi; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Edward J. Larson, Kimberlee Wood Colby, and Steven
T. McFarland; for the Clarendon Foundation by Ronald D.
Maines; for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America by Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Susan D. Reece Martyn, Henry J. Bourguignon, and Phillip H. Harris; for the Family
Research Council by Cathleen A. Cleaver, Mark A. Rothe, and Edward R. Grant; for the Institute for Public Affairs of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish 796 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to
commit or attempt suicide,l but patients may refuse even

															Congregations of America et al. by Richard B. Stone; for
the Medical Society of New Jersey by Paul W Armstrong and R. Bruce Crelin; for the National Association of Prolife
Nurses et al. by Jacqulyn Kay Hall; for the National
Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities et al. by James
Bopp, Jr., Thomas J. Marzen, Daniel Avila, and Jane
E. T. Brockmann; for the National Hospice Organization by E.
Barrett Prettyman, Jr.; for the National Legal Center for the
Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., et al. by James Bopp,
Jr., Thomas J. Marzen, Daniel Avila, and Jane E. T.
Brockmann; for the Project on Death in America et al. by Robert A. Burt; for the United States Catholic Conference et
al. by Mark E. Chopko; for Senator Orrin Hatch et al. by Michael W McConnell; for Members of the New York and
Washington State Legislatures by Paul Benjamin Linton and Clarke D. Forsythe; for Bioethics Professors by George J. Annas; for Jerome J. De Cosse et al. by Michael P. Tierney; for Gary Lee, M. D., et al. by James
Bopp, Jr., Bary A. Bostrom, and Richard E. Coleson; and
for Richard Thompson by Mr. Thompson, pro se, and Richard
H. Browne. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Cameron Clark,
Karen E. Boxx, and Steven R. Shapiro; for Americans for
Death with Dignity et al. by John R. Reese and Page R.
Barnes; for the American Medical Student Association et al. by John H. Hall; for the Coalition of Hospice Professionals by Gerald A. Rosenberg and Frances Kulka Browne; for Gay
Men's Health Crisis et al. by Andrew I. Batavia; for the
National Women's Health Network et al. by Sylvia A. Law; for
36 Religious Organizations, Leaders, and Scholars by Barbara
McDowell and Gregory A. Castanias; for the Washington
State Psychological Association et al. by Edward C. DuMont; for Bioethicists by Martin R. Gold and Robert P. Mulvey; for Law Professors by Charles H. Baron,
David A. Hoffman, and Joshua M. Davis; for State
Legislators by Sherry F. Colb; and for Julian M.
Whitaker, M. D., by Jonathan W Emord. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American
College of Legal Medicine by Miles J. Zaremski, Bruce C. Nelson, and Ila S. Rothschild; for the
American Life League, Inc., by Charles E. Rice; for Choice
in Dying, Inc., by Henry Putzel III; for the International
Anti-Euthanasia Task Force by Wesley J. Smith; for
Not Dead Yet et al. by Stephen F. Gold; for Surviving
Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying by Katrin
E. Frank, Robert A. Free, and Kathleen Wareham; and
for

															[Footnote 1 is on p. 797J 797 lifesaving medical treatment.2 The question presented by this
case is whether New York's prohibition on assisting suicide
therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We hold that it does not.

															Petitioners are various New York public officials. Respondents
Timothy E. Quill, Samuel C. Klagsbrun, and Howard A. Grossman are
physicians who practice in New York. They assert that although it
would be "consistent with the standards of [their] medical
practice[s]" to prescribe lethal medication for "mentally
competent, terminally ill patients" who are suffering great pain
and desire a doctor's help in taking their own lives, they are
deterred from doing so by New York's ban on assisting suicide. App.
25-26.3 Respondents, and three gravely ill patients who have since
died,4 sued the State's Attorney General in the United States

															Ronald Dworkin et al. by Mr. Dworkin, pro se, Peter L. Zimroth,
Philip H. Curtis, Kent A. Yalowitz, Anand Agneshwar, and Abe
Krash.

															1 New York Penal Law § 125.15 (McKinney 1987) ("Manslaughter in
the second degree") provides: "A person is guilty of manslaughter
in the second degree when ... (3) He intentionally causes or aids
another person to commit suicide. Manslaughter in the second degree
is a class C felony." Section 120.30 ("Promoting a suicide
attempt") states: "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to
attempt suicide. Promoting a suicide attempt is a class E felony."
See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at
710-719.

															2"It is established under New York law that a competent person
may refuse medical treatment, even if the withdrawal of such
treatment will result in death." Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (SDNY 1994); see N. Y. Pub. Health Law, §§
2960-2979 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 1997) ("Orders Not to
Resuscitate") (regulating right of "adult with capacity" to direct
issuance of orders not to resuscitate); id., §§ 2980-2994 ("Health
Care Agents and Proxies") (allowing appointment of agents "to make
... health care decisions on the principal's behalf," including
decisions to refuse lifesaving treatment).

															3 Declaration of Timothy E. Quill, M. D., App. 42-49;
Declaration of Samuel C. Klagsbrun, M. D., id., at 68-74;
Declaration of Howard A. Grossman, M. D., id., at 84-89; 80 F.3d
716 , 719 (CA2 1996).

															4 These three patients stated that they had no chance of
recovery, faced the "prospect of progressive loss of bodily
function and integrity and increasing pain and suffering," and
desired medical assistance in ending 798 District Court. They urged that because New York permits a
competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and
because the refusal of such treatment is "essentially the same
thing" as physician-assisted suicide, New York's assisted-suicide
ban violates the Equal Protection Clause. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84-85 (SDNY 1994).

															The District Court disagreed: "[I]t is hardly unreasonable or
irrational for the State to recognize a difference between allowing
nature to take its course, even in the most severe situations, and
intentionally using an artificial deathproducing device." Id., at 84. The court noted New York's "obvious legitimate
interests in preserving life, and in protecting vulnerable
persons," and concluded that "[u]nder the United States
Constitution and the federal system it establishes, the resolution
of this issue is left to the normal democratic processes within the
State." Id., at 84-85.

															The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 80 F.3d
716 (1996). The court determined that, despite the
assisted-suicide ban's apparent general applicability, "New York
law does not treat equally all competent persons who are in the
final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths,"
because "those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on
life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by
directing the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining
equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering
prescribed drugs." Id., at 727, 729. In the court's view,
"[t]he ending of life by [the withdrawal of life-support systems]
is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide." Id., at 729
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals then examined whether this
supposed unequal treatment was rationally related to any legitimate
state

															their lives. App. 25-26; Declaration of William A. Barth, id.,
at 96-98; Declaration of George A. Kingsley, id., at 99-102;
Declaration of Jane Doe, id., at 105-109. 799 interests,5 and concluded that "to the extent that [New York's
statutes] prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be
self-administered by a mentally competent, terminally-ill person in
the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest." Id., at 731. We
granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1055 (1996), and now reverse.

															The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." This provision creates no substantive rights. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 33 (1973); id., at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, it embodies a
general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 , 216 (1982)
(" '[T]he Constitution does not require things which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same''') (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 , 147
(1940)). If a legislative classification or distinction "neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end." Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 , 631
(1996).

															New York's statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect and
address matters of profound significance to all New Yorkers alike.
They neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect
classifications. Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at
719-728; see 80 F. 3d, at 726; San Antonio School Dist., 411
U. S., at 28 ("The system of alleged discrimination and the class
it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness");
id., at 33-35 (courts must look to the Constitution, not the
"importance" of the asserted right, when deciding whether an
asserted right is "fundamental"). These laws

															5 The court acknowledged that because New York's
assisted-suicide statutes "do not impinge on any fundamental rights
[or] involve suspect classifications," they were subject only to
rational-basis judicial scrutiny. 80 F. 3d, at 726-727. 800 are therefore entitled to a "strong presumption of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312 , 319
(1993).

															On their faces, neither New York's ban on assisting suicide nor
its statutes permitting patients to refuse medical treatment treat
anyone differently from anyone else or draw any distinctions
between persons. Everyone, regardless of physical condition,
is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.
Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all
"unquestionably comply" with the Equal Protection Clause. New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 , 587
(1979); see Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.
S. 256 , 271-273 (1979) ("[M]any [laws] affect certain groups
unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no differently
from all other members of the class described by the law").

															The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that some terminally
ill people-those who are on life-support systemsare treated
differently from those who are not, in that the former may "hasten
death" by ending treatment, but the latter may not "hasten death"
through physician-assisted suicide. 80 F. 3d, at 729. This
conclusion depends on the submission that ending or refusing
lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than
assisted suicide." Ibid. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we
think the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and
endorsed in the medical profession 6 and in our legal traditions,
is both important and

															6 The American Medical Association emphasizes the "fundamental
difference between refusing life-sustaining treatment and demanding
a lifeending treatment." American Medical Association, Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 Issues
in Law & Medicine 91, 93 (1994); see also American Medical
Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions
Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229, 2230-2231,2233 (1992) ("The
withdrawing or withholding of life-sustaining treatment is not
inherently contrary to the principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence," but assisted suicide "is contrary to the
prohibition 801 logical; it is certainly rational. See Feeney, supra, at
272 ("When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven
effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no
constitutional concern").

															The distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of
causation and intent. First, when a patient refuses lifesustaining
medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or
pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication prescribed by
a physician, he is killed by that medication. See, e. g.,
People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-472, 527 N. W.
2d 714, 728 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1083 (1995); Matter
of Conroy, 98 N. J. 321, 355, 486 A. 2d 1209, 1226 (1985) (when
feeding tube is removed, death "result[s] ... from [the patient's]
underlying medical condition"); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 123, 660 P. 2d 738, 743 (1983) ("[D]eath which occurs after
the removal of life sustaining systems is from natural causes");
American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, PhysicianAssisted Suicide, 10 Issues in Law & Medicine
91, 93 (1994) ("When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the
patient dies primarily because of an underlying disease").

															Furthermore, a physician who withdraws, or honors a patient's
refusal to begin, life-sustaining medical treatment purposefully
intends, or may so intend, only to respect his patient's wishes and
"to cease doing useless and futile or degrading things to the
patient when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit from them."
Assisted Suicide in the

															against using the tools of medicine to cause a patient's
death"); New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death
is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context
108 (1994) ("[Professional organizations] consistently distinguish
assisted suicide and euthanasia from the withdrawing or withholding
of treatment, and from the provision of palliative treatments or
other medical care that risk fatal side effects"); Brief for
American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae 18-25.
Of course, as respondents' lawsuit demonstrates, there are
differences of opinion within the medical profession on this
question. See New York Task Force, supra, at 104-109. 802 United States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
2d Sess., 368 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass). The same is
true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in some
cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the
physician's purpose and intent is, or may be, only to ease his
patient's pain. A doctor who assists a suicide, however, "must,
necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be
made dead." Id., at 367. Similarly, a patient who commits
suicide with a doctor's aid necessarily has the specific intent to
end his or her own life, while a patient who refuses or
discontinues treatment might not. See, e. g., Matter of Conroy,
supra, at 351, 486 A. 2d, at 1224 (patients who refuse
life-sustaining treatment "may not harbor a specific intent to die"
and may instead "fervently wish to live, but to do so free of
unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs"); Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
743, n. 11,370 N. E. 2d 417, 426, n. 11 (1977) ("[I]n refusing
treatment the patient may not have the specific intent to
die").

															The law has long used actors' intent or purpose to distinguish
between two acts that may have the same result. See, e. g.,
United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394 , 403-406
(1980) ("[T]he ... common law of homicide often distinguishes ...
between a person who knows that another person will be killed as
the result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific
purpose of taking another's life"); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U. S.
246 , 250 (1952) (distinctions based on intent are "universal
and persistent in mature systems of law"); M. Hale, 1 Pleas of the
Crown 412 (1847) ("If A. with an intent to prevent a gangrene
beginning in his hand doth without any advice cut off his hand, by
which he dies, he is not thereby felo de se for tho it was a
voluntary act, yet it was not with an intent to kill himself"). Put
differently, the law distinguishes actions taken "because of" a
given end 803 from actions taken "in spite of" their unintended but foreseen
consequences. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279; Compassion in
Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790 , 858 (CA9 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("When General
Eisenhower ordered American soldiers onto the beaches of Normandy,
he knew that he was sending many American soldiers to certain
death

															His purpose, though, was to ... liberate Europe from the
Nazis").

															Given these general principles, it is not surprising that many
courts, including New York courts, have carefully distinguished
refusing life-sustaining treatment from suicide. See, e. g.,
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N. Y. 2d 218, 227, and n. 2, 551
N. E. 2d 77, 82, and n. 2 (1990) ("[M]erely declining medical care
... is not considered a suicidal act").7 In fact, the first
state-court decision explicitly to authorize withdrawing lifesaving
treatment noted the "real distinction between the self-infliction
of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life
support." In re Quinlan, 70 N. J. 10, 43,52, and n. 9, 355
A. 2d 647,665,670, and n. 9, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U. S. 922 (1976). And recently, the Michigan
Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the distinction
"between acts that artificially sustain life and acts that
artificially curtail life" is merely a "distinction without
constitutional significance-a meaning-

															7Thus, the Second Circuit erred in reading New York law as
creating a "right to hasten death"; instead, the authorities cited
by the court recognize a right to refuse treatment, and nowhere
equate the exercise of this right with suicide. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 129-130, 105
N. E. 92, 93 (1914), which contains Justice Cardozo's famous
statement that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body," was
simply an informed-consent case. See also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N. Y. 2d 485, 495,495 N. E. 2d 337, 343 (1986)
(right to refuse antipsychotic medication is not absolute, and may
be limited when "the patient presents a danger to himself"); Matter of Storar, 52 N. Y. 2d 363, 377, n. 6, 420 N. E. 2d
64, 71, n. 6, cert. denied, 454 U. S. 858 (1981). 804 less exercise in semantic gymnastics," insisting that "the Cruzan majority disagreed and so do we." Kevorkian, 447 Mich., at 471,527 N. W. 2d, at 728.8

															Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state legislatures have
drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and with-

															8 Many courts have recognized this distinction. See, e. g.,
Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1178, and nn. 20-21 (ED
Mich. 1997); In re Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 602, 673 A. 2d 905,
910 (1996); Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099,
1106 (Fla. App. 1996); Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A. 2d
806, 808-809 (R. I. 1995); State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N. W. 2d 358, 360 (N. D. 1995); Thor v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 4th 725, 741-742, 855 P. 2d 375,
385-386 (1993); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S. W. 2d 698,
707 (Ky. 1993); People v. Adams, 216 Cal. App. 3d
1431, 1440,265 Cal. Rptr. 568,573-574 (1990); Guardianship of
Jane Doe, 411 Mass. 512, 522-523, 583 N. E. 2d 1263, 1270,
cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 503 U. S. 950
(1992); In re L. W, 167 Wis. 2d 53, 83, 482 N. W. 2d 60, 71
(1992); In re Rosebush, 195 Mich. App. 675, 681, n. 2, 491
N. W. 2d 633, 636, n. 2 (1992); Donaldson v. Van de
Kamp, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614, 1619-1625, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59,
61-64 (1992); In re Lawrance, 579 N. E. 2d 32, 40, n. 4
(Ind. 1991); McKay v. Bergstedt, 106 Nev. 808,
822-823, 801 P. 2d 617, 626-627 (1990); In re Browning, 568
So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); McConnell v. Beverly
EnterprisesConnecticut, Inc., 209 Conn. 692, 710, 553 A. 2d
596, 605 (1989); State v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579, 581,
385 S. E. 2d 651, 652 (1989); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545,
563, 747 P. 2d 445, 454-455 (1987); In re Gardner, 534 A. 2d
947, 955-956 (Me. 1987); Matter of Farrell, 108 N. J. 335,
349-350, 529 A. 2d 404, 411 (1987); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 218, 741 P. 2d 674, 685 (1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,
11441145,225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 App. Div. 2d 66, 70, 450 N. Y. S. 2d 623, 627
(1982); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d
186, 196-197, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225-226 (1984); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 137,482 A.
2d 713, 720 (1984); In re P. V. W, 424 So. 2d 1015, 1022
(La. 1982); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68
Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 426 N. E. 2d 809, 815 (Ohio Comm. Pleas 1980); In re Severns, 425 A. 2d 156, 161 (Del. Ch. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-163 (Fla.
App. 1978); Application of the President and Directors of
Georgetown College, 331 F.2d
1000 , 1009 (CADC), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 978 (1964); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417,
439, 497 N. E. 2d 626, 638 (1986). The British House of Lords has
also recognized the distinction. Airedale N. H. S. Trust v. Bland, 2 W. L. R. 316, 368 (1993). 805 drawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment by prohibiting the former and permitting the latter. Glucksberg, ante, at 710-711, 716-719. And "nearly all
states expressly disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide either
in statutes dealing with durable powers of attorney in health-care
situations, or in 'living will' statutes." Kevorkian, supra, at 478-479, and nn. 53-54, 527 N. W. 2d, at 731-732, and nn.
53-54.9 Thus, even as the

															9See Ala. Code §22-8A-1O (1990); Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 18.
12.080(a), (f) (1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-3210 (Supp.
1996); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 2013-905(a), (f), 20-17-210(a), (g) (1991
and Supp. 1995); Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 7191.5(a),
(g) (West Supp. 1997); Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 4723 (West Supp.
1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-14-504(4),15-18-112(1),15-18.5101(3),
15-18.6-108 (1987 and Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-575
(Supp. 1996); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 16, § 2512 (Supp. 1996); D. C.
Code Ann. §§ 6-2430,21-2212 (1995 and Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. §§
765.309(1), (2) (Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. §§31-32-11(b),
31-36-2(b) (1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. §327D-13 (1996); Idaho Code
§39-152 (Supp. 1996); Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 755, §§35/9(f), 40/5,
40/50, 45/2-1 (1992); Ind. Code §§ 16-36-1-13, 16-364-19,30-5-5-17
(1994 and Supp. 1996); Iowa Code §§ 144A.11.1-144A.11.6, 144B.12.2
(1989 and Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-28,109 (1985); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §311.638 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
40: 1299.58.10(A), (B) (West 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18-A,
§§ 5813(b), (c) (Supp. 1996); Md. Health Code Ann. § 5-611(c)
(1994); Mass. Gen. Laws 20m, § 12 (Supp. 1997); Mich. Compo Laws
Ann. § 700.496(20) (West 1995); Minn. Stat. §§ 145B.14, 145C.14
(Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. §§4141-117(2),41-41-119(1) (Supp.
1992); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§459.015.3, 459.055(5) (1992); Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 50-9-205(1), (7), 50-10-104(1), (6) (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 20-412(1), (7), 30-3401(3) (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.670(2)
(1996); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 137-H:10, 137-H:13, 137-J:1
(1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §§26:2H-54(d), (e), 26:2H-77 (West 1996);
N. M. Stat. Ann. §§24-7A-13(B)(1), (C) (Supp. 1995); N. Y. Pub.
Health Law §2989(3) (McKinney 1993); N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-320(b),
90-321(f) (1993); N. D. Cent. Code §§ 23-06.4-01, 23-06.5-01
(1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2133.12(A), (D) (Supp. 1996); Okla.
Stat., Tit. 63, §§ 3101.2(C), 3101.12(A), (G) (1997); 20 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 5402(b) (Supp. 1996); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 23-4.10-9(a), (f),
23-4. l1-1O(a), (f) (1996); S. C. Code Ann. §§44-77-130,
44-78-50(A), (C), 62-5-504(0) (Supp. 1996); S. D. Codified Laws
§§34-12D-14, 34-12D-20 (1994); Tenn. Code Ann. §§32-11-110(a),
39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); Tex. 806 States move to protect and promote patients' dignity at the end
of life, they remain opposed to physician-assisted suicide.

															New York is a case in point. The State enacted its current
assisted-suicide statutes in 1965.10 Since then, New York has acted
several times to protect patients' commonlaw right to refuse
treatment. Act of Aug. 7, 1987, ch. 818, § 1, 1987 N. Y. Laws 3140
("Do Not Resuscitate Orders") (codified as amended at N. Y. Pub.
Health Law §§ 2960-2979 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 1997)); Act of
July 22, 1990, ch. 752, § 2, 1990 N. Y. Laws 3547 ("Health Care
Agents and Proxies") (codified as amended at N. Y. Pub. Health Law
§§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 1997)). In so doing, however,
the State has neither endorsed a general right to "hasten death"
nor approved physician-assisted suicide. Quite the opposite: The
State has reaffirmed the line between "killing" and "letting die."
See N. Y. Pub. Health Law § 2989(3) (McKinney 1993) ("This article
is not intended to permit or promote suicide, assisted suicide, or
euthanasia"); New York State Task Force on Life and the Law,
LifeSustaining Treatment: Making Decisions and Appointing a Health
Care Agent 36-42 (July 1987); Do Not Resuscitate Orders: The
Proposed Legislation and Report of the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law 15 (Apr. 1986). More recently, the New York State
Task Force on Life and

															Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 672.017, 672.020, 672.021
(1992); Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-2-1116,75-2-1118 (1993); Vt. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 18, § 5260 (1987); Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2990 (1994); V.
I. Code Ann., Tit. 19, §§ 198(a), (g) (1995); Wash. Rev. Code §§
70.122.070(1), 70.122.100 (Supp. 1997); W. Va. Code §§ 16-30-10,
16-30A-16(a), 16-30B-2(b), 16-30B-13, 16-30C-14 (1995); Wis.
Stat. §§ 154.11(1), (6), 154.25(7), 155.70(7) (Supp. 1996); Wyo.
Stat. §§3-5-211, 35-22-109, 35-22-208 (1994 and Supp. 1996). See
also 42 U. S. C. §§ 14402(b)(1), (2), (4) (1994 ed., Supp. III)
("Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997").

															10 It has always been a crime, either by statute or under the
common law, to assist a suicide in New York. See Marzen, O'Dowd,
Crone, & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne
L. Rev. 1, 205-210 (1985) (App.). 807 the Law studied assisted suicide and euthanasia and, in 1994,
unanimously recommended against legalization. When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context vii (1994).
In the Task Force's view, "allowing decisions to forgo
life-sustaining treatment and allowing assisted suicide or
euthanasia have radically different consequences and meanings for
public policy." Id., at 146.

															This Court has also recognized, at least implicitly, the
distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient
die. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261 ,
278 (1990), we concluded that "[t]he principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions," and we assumed the existence of such a right for
purposes of that case, id., at 279. But our assumption of a right
to refuse treatment was grounded not, as the Court of Appeals
supposed, on the proposition that patients have a general and
abstract "right to hasten death," 80 F. 3d, at 727-728, but on
well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and
freedom from unwanted touching, Cruzan, 497 U. S., at
278-279; id., at 287288 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). In fact,
we observed that "the majority of States in this country have laws
imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit
suicide." Id., at 280. Cruzan therefore provides no
support for the notion that refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment is "nothing more nor less than suicide."

															For all these reasons, we disagree with respondents' claim that
the distinction between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and
assisted suicide is "arbitrary" and "irrational." Brief for
Respondents 44.11 Granted, in some cases,

															11 Respondents also argue that the State irrationally
distinguishes between physician-assisted suicide and "terminal
sedation," a process respondents characterize as "induc[ing]
barbiturate coma and then starv[ing] the person to death." Brief
for Respondents 48-50; see 80 F. 3d, 808 the line between the two may not be clear, but certainty is not
required, even were it possible.12 Logic and contemporary practice
support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and
New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat
them differently. By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical
treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New
York law follows a longstanding and rational distinction.

															N ew York's reasons for recognizing and acting on this
distinction-including prohibiting intentional killing and
preserving life; preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role
as their patients' healers; protecting vulnerable people from

															at 729. Petitioners insist, however, that "'[a]lthough
proponents of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia contend
that terminal sedation is covert physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia, the concept of sedating pharmacotherapy is based on
informed consent and the principle of double effect.''' Reply Brief
for Petitioners 12 (quoting P. Rousseau, Terminal Sedation in the
Care of Dying Patients, 156 Archives Internal Med. 1785, 1785-1786
(1996)). Just as a State may prohibit assisting suicide while
permitting patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may
permit palliative care related to that refusal, which may have the
foreseen but unintended "double effect" of hastening the patient's
death. See New York Task Force, When Death is Sought, supra n. 6,
at 163 ("It is widely recognized that the provision of pain
medication is ethically and professionally acceptable even when the
treatment may hasten the patient's death, if the medication is
intended to alleviate pain and severe discomfort, not to cause
death").

															12We do not insist, as JUSTICE STEVENS suggests, ante, at
750 (opinion concurring in judgments), that "in all cases there
will in fact be a significant difference between the intent of the
physicians, the patients, or the families [in
withdrawal-of-treatment and physician-assisted-suicide cases]." See
supra, at 801-802 ("[A] physician who withdraws, or honors a
patient's refusal to begin, life-sustaining medical treatment
purposefully intends, or may so intend, only to respect his
patient's wishes ... The same is true when a doctor provides
aggressive palliative care; ... the physician's purpose and intent
is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain" (emphasis
added)). In the absence of omniscience, however, the State is
entitled to act on the reasonableness of the distinction. 809 indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial
pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards
euthanasia-are discussed in greater detail in our opinion in Glucksberg, ante. These valid and important public interests
easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative
classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate
end.13

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

															It is so ordered.

															[For concurring opinion of JUSTICE O'CONNOR, see ante, p.
736; for opinions concurring in the judgments of JUSTICE STEVENS,
see ante, p. 738, JUSTICE GINSBURG, see ante, p. 789,
and JUSTICE BREYER, see ante, p. 789.]

															JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.

															Even though I do not conclude that assisted suicide is a
fundamental right entitled to recognition at this time, I accord
the claims raised by the patients and physicians in this case and Washington v. Glucksberg a high degree of importance,
requiring a commensurate justification. See Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at 782 (SOUTER, J., concurring in
judgment). The reasons that lead me to conclude in Glucksberg that the prohibition on assisted suicide is not
arbitrary under the due process standard also support the
distinction between assistance to suicide, which is banned, and

															13JUSTICE STEVENS observes that our holding today "does not
foreclose the possibility that some applications of the New York
statute may impose an intolerable intrusion on the patient's
freedom." Ante, at 751-752 (opinion concurring in
judgments). This is true, but, as we observe in Glucks berg,
ante, at 735, n. 24, a particular plaintiff hoping to show that New
York's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional in his particular
case would need to present different and considerably stronger
arguments than those advanced by respondents here. 810 SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment

															practices such as termination of artificial life support and
death-hastening pain medication, which are permitted. I accordingly
concur in the judgment of the Court.

Summary: New York's ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ban treats all people equally, regardless of physical condition, and allows competent individuals to refuse life-saving medical treatment. The distinction between letting a patient die and actively causing their death is important, rational, and well-established, and the state has a legitimate interest in protecting vulnerable people, maintaining ethical standards, and preventing a slide towards euthanasia.