U.S. Supreme Court McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973) McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green No. 72-490 Argued March 28, 1973 Decided May 14, 1973 411
U.S. 792 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent, a black civil rights activist, engaged in disruptive
and illegal activity against petitioner as part of his protest that
his discharge as an employee of petitioner's and the firm's general
hiring practices were racially motivated. When petitioner, who
subsequently advertised for qualified personnel, rejected
respondent's reemployment application on the ground of the illegal
conduct, respondent filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charging violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC found that there was
reasonable cause to believe that petitioner's rejection of
respondent violated § 704(a) of the Act, which forbids
discrimination against applicants or employees for attempting to
protest or correct allegedly discriminatory employment conditions,
but made no finding on respondent's allegation that petitioner had
also violated § 703(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination in any
employment decision. Following unsuccessful EEOC conciliation
efforts, respondent brought suit in the District Court, which ruled
that respondent's illegal activity was not protected by § 704(a)
and dismissed the § 703(a)(1) claim because the EEOC had made no
finding with respect thereto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the §
704(a) ruling, but reversed with respect to § 703(a)(1), holding
that an EEOC determination of reasonable cause was not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to claiming a violation of that
provision in federal court. Held: 1. A complainant's right to bring suit under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is not confined to charges as to which the EEOC has
made a reasonable cause finding, and the District Court's error in
holding to the contrary was not harmless, since the issues raised
with respect to § 703(a)(1) were not identical to those with
respect to § 704(a), and the dismissal of the former charge may
have prejudiced respondent's efforts at trial. Pp. 411 U. S.
798 -800.

															2. In a private, non-class action complaint under Title VII
charging racial employment discrimination, the complainant has the
burden of establishing a prima facie case, which he can
satisfy by showing that (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
he Page 411 U. S. 793 applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to
fill; (iii) though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter
the employer continued to seek applicants with complainant's
qualifications. P. 411 U. S.
802 .

															3. Here, the Court of Appeals, though correctly holding that
respondent proved a prima facie case, erred in holding
that petitioner had not discharged its burden of proof in rebuttal
by showing that its stated reason for the rehiring refusal was
based on respondent's illegal activity. But on remand, respondent
must be afforded a fair opportunity of proving that petitioner's
stated reason was just a pretext for a racially discriminatory
decision, such as by showing that whites engaging in similar
illegal activity were retained or hired by petitioner. Other
evidence that may be relevant, depending on the circumstances,
could include facts that petitioner had discriminated against
respondent when he was an employee or followed a discriminatory
policy toward minority employees. Pp. 411 U. S.
802 -805.

															463 F.2d 337, vacated and remanded. POWELL, J., delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court.

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The case before us raises significant questions as to the proper
order and nature of proof in actions under Title Page 411 U. S. 794 VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. Petitioner, McDonnell Douglas Cop., is an aerospace and aircraft
manufacturer headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, where it employs
over 30,000 people. Respondent, a black citizen of St. Louis,
worked for petitioner as a mechanic and laboratory technician from
1956 until August 28, 1964, [ Footnote 1 ] when he was laid off in the course of a
general reduction in petitioner's workforce.

															Respondent, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement,
protested vigorously that his discharge and the general hiring
practices of petitioner were racially motivated. [ Footnote 2 ] As part of this protest,
respondent and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality
illegally stalled their cars on the main roads leading to
petitioner's plant for the purpose of blocking access to it at the
time of the morning shift change. The District Judge described the
plan for, and respondent's participation in, the "stall-in" as
follows:

															"[F]ive teams, each consisting of four cars would 'tie up' five
main access roads into McDonnell at the time of the morning rush
hour. The drivers of the cars were instructed to line up next to
each other completely blocking the intersections or roads. The
drivers were also instructed to stop their cars, turn off the
engines, pull the emergency brake, raise all windows, lock the
doors, and remain in their cars until the police arrived. The plan
was to have the cars remain in position for one hour. " Page 411 U. S. 795 "Acting under the 'stall-in' plan, plaintiff [respondent in the
present action] drove his car onto Brown Road, a McDonnell access
road, at approximately 7:00 a.m., at the start of the morning rush
hour. Plaintiff was aware of the traffic problems that would
result. He stopped his car with the intent to block traffic. The
police arrived shortly, and requested plaintiff to move his car. He
refused to move his car voluntarily. Plaintiff's car was towed away
by the police, and he was arrested for obstructing traffic.
Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic, and
was fined." 318 F.
Supp. 846 , 849.

															On July 2, 1965, a "lock-in" took place wherein a chain and
padlock were placed on the front door of a building to prevent the
occupants, certain of petitioner's employees, from leaving. Though
respondent apparently knew beforehand of the "lock-in," the full
extent of his involvement remains uncertain. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 411 U. S. 796 Some three weeks following the "lock-in," on July 25, 1965,
petitioner publicly advertised for qualified mechanics,
respondent's trade, and respondent promptly applied for
reemployment. Petitioner turned down respondent, basing its
rejection on respondent's participation in the "stall-in" and
"lock-in." Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a formal complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that
petitioner had refused to rehire him because of his race and
persistent involvement in the civil rights movement, in violation
of §§ 703(a)(1) and 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a). [ Footnote 4 ] The former section generally prohibits
racial discrimination in any employment decision, while the latter
forbids discrimination against applicants or employees for
attempting to protest or correct allegedly discriminatory
conditions of employment. Page 411 U. S. 797 The Commission made no finding on respondent's allegation of
racial bias under § 703(a)(1), but it did find reasonable cause to
believe petitioner had violated § 704(a) by refusing to rehire
respondent because of his civil rights activity. After the
Commission unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the dispute, it
advised respondent in March, 1968, of his right to institute a
civil action in federal court within 30 days.

															On April 15, 1968, respondent brought the present action,
claiming initially a violation of § 704(a) and, in an amended
complaint, a violation of § 703(a)(1) a well. [ Footnote 5 ] The District Court dismissed the
latter claim of racial discrimination in petitioner's hiring
procedures on the ground that the Commission had failed to make a
determination of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of
that section had been committed. The District Court also found that
petitioner's refusal to rehire respondent was based solely on his
participation in the illegal demonstrations, and not on his
legitimate civil rights activities. The court concluded that
nothing in Title VII or § 704 protected "such activity as employed
by the plaintiff in the "stall-in" and "lock-in" demonstrations."
318 F. Supp. at 850.

															On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed that unlawful protests
were not protected activities under § 704(a), [ Footnote 6 ] but reversed the dismissal of
respondent's § 703(a)(1) claim relating to racially discriminatory
hiring practices, holding that a prior Commission determination of
reasonable cause was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a
claim under that section in federal court. The court Page 411 U. S. 798 ordered the case remanded for trial of respondent's claim under
§ 703(a)(1).

															In remanding, the Court of Appeals attempted to set forth
standards to govern the consideration of respondent's claim. The
majority noted that respondent had established a prima
facie case of racial discrimination; that petitioner's refusal
to rehire respondent rested on "subjective" criteria which carried
little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination; that, though
respondent's participation in the unlawful demonstrations might
indicate a lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work
for that employer, respondent should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate that petitioner's reasons for refusing to rehire him
were mere pretext. [ Footnote 7 ]
In order to clarify the standards governing the disposition of an
action challenging employment discrimination, we granted
certiorari, 409 U.S. 1036 (1972). I We agree with the Court of Appeals that absence of a Commission
finding of reasonable cause cannot bar suit under an appropriate
section of Title VII, and that the District Judge erred in
dismissing respondent's claim of racial discrimination under §
703(a)(1). Respondent satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites to
a federal action (i) by filing timely charges of employment
discrimination with the Commission and (ii) by receiving and acting
upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a) and 2000e-5(e). The Act does not restrict a
complainant's right to sue to those charges as to which the
Commission has made findings of reasonable cause, and we will not
engraft on the statute a requirement which may inhibit the review
of Page 411 U. S. 799 claims of employment discrimination in the federal courts. The
Commission itself does not consider the absence of a "reasonable
cause" determination as providing employer immunity from similar
charges in a federal court, 29 CFR § 1601.30, and the courts of
appeal have held that, in view of the large volume of complaints
before the Commission and the nonadversary character of many of its
proceedings,

															"court actions under Title VII are de novo proceedings,
and . . . a Commission 'no reasonable cause' finding does not bar a
lawsuit in the case." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (CA4
1971); Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Construction Corp., 437
F.2d 1136 (CA5 1971); Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers
International Union of North America, 431 F.2d 205 (CA7 1970); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (CA3 1970).

															Petitioner argues, as it did below, that respondent sustained no
prejudice from the trial court's erroneous ruling, because, in
fact, the issue of racial discrimination in the refusal to reemploy
"was tried thoroughly" in a trial lasting four days, with "at least
80%" of the questions relating to the issue of "race." [ Footnote 8 ] Petitioner therefore
requests that the judgment below be vacated and the cause remanded
with instructions that the judgment of the District Court be
affirmed. [ Footnote 9 ] We
cannot agree that the dismissal of respondent's § 703(a)(1) claim
was harmless error. It is not clear that the District Court's
findings as to respondent's § 704(a) contentions involved the
identical issues raised by his claim under § 703(a)(1). The former
section relates solely to discrimination against an applicant or
employee on account of his participation in legitimate civil rights
activities or protests, while the latter section deals with the
broader and centrally Page 411 U. S. 800 important question under the Act of whether, for any reason, a
racially discriminatory employment decision has been made.
Moreover, respondent should have been accorded the right to prepare
his case and plan the strategy of trial with the knowledge that the
§ 703(a)(1) cause of action was properly before the District Court.
[ Footnote 10 ] Accordingly,
we remand the case for trial of respondent' claim of racial
discrimination consistent with the views set forth below. II The critical issue before us concerns the order and allocation
of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment
discrimination. The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose
of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have
fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage
of minority citizens. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 , 401 U. S. 429 (1971); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CA1 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2 1972); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (ED Va.1968). As noted in Griggs, supra: "Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a
job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act
does not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member
of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. Page 411 U. S. 801 What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." Id. at 401 U. S.
430 -431.

															There are societal, as well as personal, interests on both sides
of this equation. The broad, overriding interest, shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment
and personnel decisions. In the implementation of such decisions,
it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial
discrimination, subtle or otherwise.

															In this case, respondent, the complainant below, charges that he
was denied employment "because of his involvement in civil rights
activities" and "because of his race and color." [ Footnote 11 ] Petitioner denied
discrimination of any kind, asserting that its failure to reemploy
respondent was based upon and justified by his participation in the
unlawful conduct against it. Thus, the issue at the trial on remand
is framed by those opposing factual contentions. The two opinions
of the Court of Appeals and the several opinions of the three
judges of that court attempted, with a notable lack of harmony, to
state the applicable rules as to burden of proof and how this
shifts upon the making of a prima facie case. [ Footnote 12 ] We now address this
problem. Page 411 U. S. 802 The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial
burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. [ Footnote
13 ] In the instant case, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that respondent proved a prima facie case. 463 F.2d 337,
363. Petitioner sought mechanics, respondent's trade, and continued
to do so after respondent's rejection. Petitioner, moreover, does
not dispute respondent's qualifications, [ Footnote 14 ] and acknowledges that his past work
performance in petitioner's employ was "satisfactory." [ Footnote 15 ]

															The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
We need not attempt in the instant case to detail every matter
which fairly could be Page 411 U. S. 803 recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire. Here
petitioner has assigned respondent's participation in unlawful
conduct against it as the cause for his rejection. We think that
this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden of proof at this
stage, and to meet respondent's prima facie case of
discrimination.

															The Court of Appeals intimated, however, that petitioner's
stated reason for refusing to rehire respondent was a "subjective,"
rather than objective, criterion which "carr[ies] little weight in
rebutting charges of discrimination," 463 F.2d at 352. This was
among the statements which caused the dissenting judge to read the
opinion as taking "the position that such unlawful acts as Green
committed against McDonnell would not legally entitle McDonnell to
refuse to hire him, even though no racial motivation was involved.
. . ." Id. at 355. Regardless of whether this was the
intended import of the opinion, we think the court below seriously
underestimated the rebuttal weight to which petitioner's reasons
were entitled. Respondent admittedly had taken part in a carefully
planned "stall-in," designed to tie up access to and egress from
petitioner's plant at a peak traffic hour. [ Footnote 16 ] Nothing in Title VII compels an
employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such
deliberate, unlawful activity against it. [ Footnote 17 ] In upholding, under the National
Labor Relations Act, the discharge of employees who had seized and
forcibly retained Page 411 U. S. 804 an employer's factory buildings in an illegal sit-down strike,
the Court noted pertinently:

															"We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel
employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their
unlawful conduct, -- to invest those who go on strike with an
immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against
the employer's property. . . . Apart from the question of the
constitutional validity of an enactment of that sort, it is enough
to say that such a legislative intention should be found in some
definite and unmistakable expression." NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U.
S. 240 , 306 U. S. 255 (1939).

															Petitioner's reason for rejection thus suffices to meet the prima facie case, but the inquiry must not end here. While
Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of respondent,
neither does it permit petitioner to use respondent's conduct as a
pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by § 703(a)(1).
On remand, respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason
for respondent's rejection was in fact, pretext. Especially
relevant to such a showing would be evidence that white employees
involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to
the "stall-in" were nevertheless retained or rehired. Petitioner
may justifiably refuse to rehire one who was engaged in unlawful,
disruptive acts against it, but only if this criterion is applied
alike to members of all races.

															Other evidence that may be relevant to any showing of pretext
includes facts as to the petitioner's treatment of respondent
during his prior term of employment; petitioner's reaction, if any,
to respondent's legitimate civil rights activities; and
petitioner's general policy and Page 411 U. S. 805 practice with respect to minority employment. [ Footnote 18 ] On the latter point,
statistics as to petitioner's employment policy and practice may be
helpful to a determination of whether petitioner's refusal to
rehire respondent in this case conformed to a general pattern of
discrimination against blacks. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (CA10 1970); Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich.L.Rev. 59, 91-94 (1972).
[ Footnote 19 ] In short, on
the retrial, respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid
reasons for his rejection were, in fact, a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision.

															The court below appeared to rely upon Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., supra, in which the Court stated:

															"If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot Page 411 U. S. 806 be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."

															401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 431 .
[ Footnote 20 ] But Griggs differs from the instant case in important
respects. It dealt with standardized testing devices which, however
neutral on their face, operated to exclude many blacks who were
capable of performing effectively in the desired positions. Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies
in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting
from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a
cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder
of their lives. Id. at 401 U. S. 430 .
Respondent, however, appears in different clothing. He had engaged
in a seriously disruptive act against the very one from whom he now
seeks employment. And petitioner does not seek his exclusion on the
basis of a testing device which overstates what is necessary for
competent performance, or through some sweeping disqualification of
all those with any past record of unlawful behavior, however
remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant's personal
qualifications as an employee. Petitioner assertedly rejected
respondent for unlawful conduct against it, and, in the absence of
proof of pretext or discriminatory application of such a reason,
this cannot be thought the kind of "artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment" which the Court found to be the
intention of Congress to remove. Id. at 401 U. S. 431 .
[ Footnote 21 ] Page 411 U. S. 807 III In sum, respondent should have been allowed to pursue his claim
under § 703(a)(1). If the evidence on retrial is substantially in
accord with that before us in this case, we think that respondent
carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, and that petitioner successfully rebutted
that case. But this does not end the matter. On retrial, respondent
must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that
petitioner's assigned reason for refusing to reemploy was a pretext
or discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so
finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy. In the
absence of such a finding, petitioner's refusal to rehire must
stand.

															The judgment is vacated, and the cause is hereby remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. So ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															His employment during these years was continuous except for 21
months of service in the military.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Court of Appeals noted that respondent then

															"filed formal complaints of discrimination with the President's
Commission on Civil Rights, the Justice Department, the Department
of the Navy, the Defense Department, and the Missouri Commission on
Human Rights."

															463 F.2d 337, 339 (1972).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The "lock-in" occurred during a picketing demonstration by
ACTION, a civil rights organization, at the entrance to a downtown
office building which housed a part of petitioner's offices and in
which certain of petitioner's employees were working at the time. A
chain and padlock were placed on the front door of the building to
prevent ingress and egress. Although respondent acknowledges that
he was chairman of ACTION at the time, that the demonstration was
planned and staged by his group, that he participated in and indeed
was in charge of the picket line in front of the building, that he
was told in advance by a member of ACTION "that he was planning to
chain the front door," and that he "approved of" chaining the door,
there is no evidence that respondent personally took part in the
actual "lock-in," and he was not arrested. App. 132-133.

															The Court of Appeals majority, however, found that the record
did

															"not support the trial court's conclusion that Green 'actively
cooperated' in chaining the doors of the downtown St. Louis
building during the 'lock-in' demonstration."

															463 F.2d at 341. See also concurring opinion of Judge
Lay. Id. at 345. Judge Johnsen, in dissent, agreed with
the District Court that the "chaining and padlocking [were] carried
out as planned, [and that] Green had in fact, given it . . .
approval and authorization." Id. at 348.

															In view of respondent's admitted participation in the unlawful
"stall-in," we find it unnecessary to resolve the contradictory
contentions surrounding this "lock-in."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1), in pertinent part provides:

															"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . .
. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. . . ."

															Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a), in pertinent part provides:

															"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. . . ."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Respondent also contested the legality of his 1964 discharge by
petitioner, but both courts held this claim barred by the statute
of limitations. Respondent does not challenge those rulings
here.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Respondent has not sought review of this issue.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															All references here are to Part V of the revised opinion of the
Court of Appeals, 463 F.2d at 352, which superseded Part V of the
court's initial opinion with respect to the order and nature of
proof.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Brief for Petitioner 40.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The trial court did not discuss respondent's § 703(a)(1) claim
in its opinion, and denied requests for discovery of statistical
materials which may have been relevant to that claim.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The respondent initially charged petitioner in his complaint
filed April 15, 1968, with discrimination because of his
"involvement in civil rights activities." App. 8. In his amended
complaint, filed March 20, 1969, plaintiff broadened his charge to
include denial of employment because of race in violation of §
703(a)(1). App. 27.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See original opinion of the majority of the panel which
heard the case, 463 F.2d at 338; the concurring opinion of Judge
Lay, id. at 344; the first opinion of Judge Johnsen,
dissenting in part, id. at 346; the revised opinion of the
majority, id. at 352; and the supplemental dissent of
Judge Johnsen, id. at 353. A petition for rehearing en
banc was denied by an evenly divided Court of Appeals.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification above of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															We note that the issue of what may properly be used to test
qualifications for employment is not present in this case. Where
employers have instituted employment tests and qualifications with
an exclusionary effect on minority applicants, such requirements
must be "shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful
performance of the jobs" for which they were used, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 , 401 U. S. 431 (1971). Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (CA1 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (CA2
1972).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Tr. of Oral Arg. 3; 463 F.2d at 353.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															The trial judge noted that no personal injury or property damage
resulted from the "stall-in" due

															"solely to the fact that law enforcement officials had obtained
notice in advance of plaintiff's [here respondent's] demonstration,
and were at the scene to remove plaintiff's car from the
highway." 318 F.
Supp. 846 , 851.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The unlawful activity in this case was directed specifically
against petitioner. We need not consider or decide here whether, or
under what circumstances, unlawful activity not directed against
the particular employer may be a legitimate justification for
refusing to hire.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															We are aware that some of the above factors were, indeed,
considered by the District Judge in finding, under § 704(a),
that

															"defendant's [here petitioner's] reasons for refusing to rehire
the plaintiff were motivated solely and simply by the plaintiff's
participation in the 'stall-in' and 'lock-in' demonstrations."

															318 F. Supp. at 850. We do not intimate that this finding must
be overturned after consideration on remand of respondent's §
703(a)(1) claim. We do, however, insist that respondent, under §
703(a)(1), must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that, whatever the stated reasons for his
rejection, the decision was, in reality, racially premised.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The District Court may, for example, determine, after reasonable
discovery, that "the [racial] composition of defendant's labor
force is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary
practices." See Blumrosen, supra, at 92. We
caution that such general determinations, while helpful, may not
be, in and of themselves, controlling as to an individualized
hiring decision, particularly in the presence of an otherwise
justifiable reason for refusing to rehire. See generally United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 312 F.
Supp. 977 , 992 (WDNY 1970), order modified, 446 F.2d
652 (CA2 1971). Blumrosen, supra, n 19, at 93.

															[ Footnote 20 ] See 463 F.2d at 352.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															It is, of course, a predictive evaluation, resistant to
empirical proof, whether

															"an applicant's past participation in unlawful conduct directed
at his prospective employer might indicate the applicant's lack of
a responsible attitude toward performing work for that
employer."

															463 F.2d at 353. But in this case, given the seriousness and
harmful potential of respondent's participation in the "stall-in"
and the accompanying inconvenience to other employees, it cannot be
said that petitioner's refusal to employ lacked a rational and
neutral business justification. As the Court has noted elsewhere:
"Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may
have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust." Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.
S. 716 , 341 U. S. 720 (1951).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973):

Issue:
Whether a complainant can bring a lawsuit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for charges beyond those the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has found reasonable cause for, and who bears the burden of proof in a private, non-class action complaint under Title VII charging racial employment discrimination.

Rule:
1. A complainant's right to bring suit under the Civil Rights Act is not limited to charges for which the EEOC has found reasonable cause.
2. In a private, non-class action complaint under Title VII, the complainant must first establish a prima facie case by showing they are part of a racial minority, applied and were qualified for a job, were rejected despite qualifications, and the employer continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications.

Analysis:
The Court held that a complainant can bring suit under the Civil Rights Act for charges beyond those the EEOC has found reasonable cause for, and that the lower court's error in this regard was not harmless as the issues under § 703(a)(1) and § 704(a) were not identical. On the burden of proof, the Court agreed that the respondent had proven a prima facie case but disagreed with the lower court's holding that the petitioner had not sufficiently rebutted this case. The Court remanded the case for further consideration.

Conclusion:
The Court remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration, emphasizing the need to give the respondent a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate that the decision not to rehire was racially premised, despite the petitioner's stated reasons.


U.S. Supreme Court Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. No. 124 Argued December 14,
1970 Decided March 8, 1971 401
U.S. 424 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Negro employees at respondent's generating plant brought this
action, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
challenging respondent's requirement of a high school diploma or
passing of intelligence tests as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs at the plant. These requirements were not directed
at or intended to measure ability to learn to perform a particular
job or category of jobs. While § 703(a) of the Act makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, segregate,
or classify employees to deprive them of employment opportunities
or adversely to affect their status because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, § 703(h) authorizes the use of
any professionally developed ability test, provided that it is not
designed, intended, or used to discriminate. The District Court
found that respondent's former policy of racial discrimination had
ended, and that Title VII, being prospective only, did not reach
the prior inequities. The Court of Appeals reversed in part,
rejecting the holding that residual discrimination arising from
prior practices was insulated from remedial action, but agreed with
the lower court that there was no showing of discriminatory purpose
in the adoption of the diploma and test requirements. It held that,
absent such discriminatory purpose, use of the requirements was
permitted, and rejected the claim that, because a disproportionate
number of Negroes was rendered ineligible for promotion, transfer,
or employment, the requirements were unlawful unless shown to be
job-related. Held: 1. The Act requires the elimination of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race, and if, as here, an employment
practice that operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, it is prohibited, notwithstanding the
employer's lack of discriminatory intent. Pp. 401 U. S.
429 -433.

															2. The Act does not preclude the use of testing or measuring
procedures, but it does proscribe giving them controlling force
unless Page 401 U. S. 425 they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Pp. 401 U. S.
433 -436.

															420 F.2d 1225, reversed in part.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
members joined except BRENNAN, J., who took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether
an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, from requiring a high school education Page 401 U. S. 426 or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a
condition of employment in or transfer to jobs when (a) neither
standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance, (b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at
a substantially higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs
in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as
part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.
[ Footnote 1 ]

															Congress provided, in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
for class actions for enforcement of provisions of the Act, and
this proceeding was brought by a group of incumbent Negro employees
against Duke Power Company. All the petitioners are employed at the
Company's Dan River Steam Station, a power generating facility
located at Draper, North Carolina. At the time this action was
instituted, the Company had 95 employees at the Dan River Station,
14 of whom were Negroes; 13 of these are petitioners here.

															The District Court found that, prior to July 2, 1965, the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Page 401 U. S. 427 Company openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring
and assigning of employees at its Dan River plant. The plant was
organized into five operating departments: (1) Labor, (2) Coal
Handling, (3) Operations, (4) Maintenance, and (5) Laboratory and
Test. Negroes were employed only in the Labor Department, where the
highest paying jobs paid less than the lowest paying jobs in the
other four "operating" departments, in which only whites were
employed. [ Footnote 2 ]
Promotions were normally made within each department on the basis
of job seniority. Transferees into a department usually began in
the lowest position.

															In 1955, the Company instituted a policy of requiring a high
school education for initial assignment to any department except
Labor, and for transfer from the Coal Handling to any "inside"
department (Operations, Maintenance, or Laboratory). When the
Company abandoned its policy of restricting Negroes to the Labor
Department in 1965, completion of high school also was made a
prerequisite to transfer from Labor to any other department. From
the time the high school requirement was instituted to the time of
trial, however, white employees hired before the time of the high
school education requirement continued to perform satisfactorily
and achieve promotions in the "operating" departments. Findings on
this score are not challenged.

															The Company added a further requirement for new employees on
July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII became effective. To
qualify for placement in any but the Labor Department, it became
necessary to register satisfactory scores on two professionally
prepared aptitude Page 401 U. S. 428 tests, as well as to have a high school education. Completion of
high school alone continued to render employees eligible for
transfer to the four desirable departments from which Negroes had
been excluded if the incumbent had been employed prior to the time
of the new requirement. In September, 1965, the Company began to
permit incumbent employees who lacked a high school education to
qualify for transfer from Labor or Coal Handling to an "inside" job
by passing two tests -- the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which
purports to measure general intelligence, and the Bennett
Mechanical Comprehension Test. Neither was directed or intended to
measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or
category of jobs. The requisite scores used for both initial hiring
and transfer approximated the national median for high school
graduates. [ Footnote 3 ]

															The District Court had found that, while the Company previously
followed a policy of overt racial discrimination in a period prior
to the Act, such conduct had ceased. The District Court also
concluded that Title VII was intended to be prospective only, and,
consequently, the impact of prior inequities was beyond the reach
of corrective action authorized by the Act.

															The Court of Appeals was confronted with a question of first
impression, as are we, concerning the meaning of Title VII. After
careful analysis, a majority of that court concluded that a
subjective test of the employer's intent should govern,
particularly in a close case, and that, in this case, there was no
showing of a discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the diploma
and test requirements. On this basis, the Court of Appeals
concluded there was no violation of the Act. Page 401 U. S. 429 The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court in part,
rejecting the holding that residual discrimination arising from
prior employment practices was insulated from remedial action.
[ Footnote 4 ] The Court of
Appeals noted, however, that the District Court was correct in its
conclusion that there was no showing of a racial purpose or
invidious intent in the adoption of the high school diploma
requirement or general intelligence test, and that these standards
had been applied fairly to whites and Negroes alike. It held that,
in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, use of such
requirements was permitted by the Act. In so doing, the Court of
Appeals rejected the claim that, because these two requirements
operated to render ineligible a markedly disproportionate number of
Negroes, they were unlawful under Title VII unless shown to be
job-related. [ Footnote 5 ] We
granted the writ on these claims. 399 U.S. 926.

															The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove Page 401 U. S. 430 barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
"freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.

															The Court of Appeals' opinion, and the partial dissent, agreed
that, on the record in the present case, "whites register far
better on the Company's alternative requirements" than Negroes.
[ Footnote 6 ] 420 F.2d 1225,
1239 n. 6. This consequence would appear to be directly traceable
to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to
manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are
Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in
segregated schools, and this Court expressly recognized these
differences in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U. S. 285 (1969). There, because of the inferior education received by
Negroes in North Carolina, this Court barred the institution of a
literacy test for voter registration on the ground that the test
would abridge the right to vote indirectly on account of race.
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job
to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act
does not command that any Page 401 U. S. 431 person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group.
Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required
by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification.

															Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment
or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the
sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the
contrary, Congress has now required that the posture and condition
of the job seeker be taken into account. It has -- to resort again
to the fable -- provided that the vessel in which the milk is
proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited.

															On the record before us, neither the high school completion
requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of Appeals
noted, without meaningful study of their relationship to job
performance ability. Rather, a vice-president of the Company
testified, the requirements were instituted on the Company's
judgment that they generally would improve the overall quality of
the workforce.

															The evidence, however, shows that employees who have not
completed high school or taken the tests have continued to perform
satisfactorily, and make progress in departments for which the high
school and test criteria Page 401 U. S. 432 are now used. [ Footnote 7 ]
The promotion record of present employees who would not be able to
meet the new criteria thus suggests the possibility that the
requirements may not be needed even for the limited purpose of
preserving the avowed policy of advancement within the Company. In
the context of this case, it is unnecessary to reach the question
whether testing requirements that take into account capability for
the next succeeding position or related future promotion might be
utilized upon a showing that such long-range requirements fulfill a
genuine business need. In the present case, the Company has made no
such showing.

															The Court of Appeals held that the Company had adopted the
diploma and test requirements without any "intention to
discriminate against Negro employees." 420 F.2d at 1232. We do not
suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals
erred in examining the employer's intent; but good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in
headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability.

															The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by
special efforts to help the undereducated employees through Company
financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school
training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question. Page 401 U. S. 433 The facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and
general testing devices, as well as the infirmity of using diplomas
or degrees as fixed measures of capability. History is filled with
examples of men and women who rendered highly effective performance
without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms of
certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful
servants, but Congress has mandated the common sense proposition
that they are not to become masters of reality.

															The Company contends that its general intelligence tests are
specifically permitted by § 703(h) of the Act. [ Footnote 8 ] That section authorizes the use of
"any professionally developed ability test" that is not "designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)

															The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement
responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to
permit only the use of job-related tests. [ Footnote 9 ] The administrative interpretation of
the Page 401 U. S. 434 Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 400 U. S.
8 (1970); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S.
1 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396 (1961). Since the Act and its legislative history support the
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.

															Section 703(h) was not contained in the House version of the
Civil Rights Act, but was added in the Senate during extended
debate. For a period, debate revolved around claims that the bill,
as proposed, would prohibit all testing and force employers to hire
unqualified persons simply because they were part of a group
formerly subject to job discrimination. [ Footnote 10 ] Proponents of Title VII sought throughout
the debate to assure the critics that the Act would have no effect
on job-related tests. Senators Case of New Jersey and Clark of
Pennsylvania, comanagers of the bill on the Senate floor, issued a
memorandum explaining that the proposed Title VII

															"expressly protects the employer's right to insist that any
prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable
job qualifications. Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is
to promote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than
on the basis of race or color."

															110 Cong.Rec. 7247. [ Footnote
11 ] (Emphasis added.) Despite Page 401 U. S. 435 these assurances, Senator Tower of Texas introduced an amendment
authorizing "professionally developed ability tests." Proponents of
Title VII opposed the amendment because, as written, it would
permit an employer to give any test

															"whether it was a good test or not, so long as it was
professionally designed. Discrimination could actually exist under
the guise of compliance with the statute."

															110 Cong.Rec. 13504 (remarks of Sen. Case).

															The amendment was defeated, and, two days later, Senator Tower
offered a substitute amendment which was adopted verbatim, and is
now the testing provision of § 703(h). Speaking for the supporters
of Title VII, Senator Humphrey, who had vigorously opposed the
first amendment, endorsed the substitute amendment, stating:

															"Senators on both sides of the aisle who were deeply interested
in title VII have examined the text of this Page 401 U. S. 436 amendment, and have found it to be in accord with the intent and
purpose of that title."

															110 Cong.Rec. 13724. The amendment was then adopted. [ Footnote 12 ] From the sum of the
legislative history relevant in this case, the conclusion is
inescapable that the EEOC's construction of § 703(h) to require
that employment tests be job-related comports with congressional
intent.

															Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring
procedures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden
is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless
they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred
over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far
from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion,
nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded
is that any tests used must measure the person for the job, and not
the person in the abstract.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, as to that portion of
the judgment appealed from, reversed.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Act provides:

															"Sec. 703. (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer -- "

															" * * * *" "(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."

															" * * * *" "(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . .
."

															78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															A Negro was first assigned to a job in an operating department
in August, 1966, five months after charges had been filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The employee, a high
school graduate who had begun in the Labor Department in 1953, was
promoted to a job in the Coal Handling Department.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The test standards are thus more stringent than the high school
requirement, since they would screen out approximately half of all
high school graduates.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The Court of Appeals ruled that Negroes employed in the Labor
Department at a time when there was no high school or test
requirement for entrance into the higher paying departments could
not now be made subject to those requirements, since whites hired
contemporaneously into those departments were never subject to
them. The Court of Appeals also required that the seniority rights
of those Negroes be measured on a plant-wide, rather than a
departmental, basis. However, the Court of Appeals denied relief to
the Negro employees without a high school education or its
equivalent who were hired into the Labor Department after
institution of the educational requirement.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															One member of that court disagreed with this aspect of the
decision, maintaining, as do the petitioners in this Court, that
Title VII prohibits the use of employment criteria that operate in
a racially exclusionary fashion and do not measure skills or
abilities necessary to performance of the jobs for which those
criteria are used.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, while 34%
of white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males
had done so. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population:
1960, Vol. 1, Characteristics of the Population, pt. 35, Table
47.

															Similarly, with respect to standardized tests, the EEOC in one
case found that use of a battery of tests, including the Wonderlic
and Bennett tests used by the Company in the instant case, resulted
in 58% of whites passing the tests, as compared with only 6% of the
blacks. Decision of EEOC, CCH Empl.Prac. Guide, � 17,304.53 (Dec.
2, 1966). See also Decision of EEOC 70-552, CCH Empl.Prac.
Guide, � 6139 (Feb.19, 1970).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															For example, between July 2, 1965, and November 14, 1966, the
percentage of white employees who were promoted but who were not
high school graduates was nearly identical to the percentage of
nongraduates in the entire white workforce.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Section 703(h) applies only to tests. It has no applicability to
the high school diploma requirement.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, issued August
24, 1966, provide:

															"The Commission accordingly interprets 'professionally developed
ability test' to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the
applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to
measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or
class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual
or organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not,
without more, justify its use within the meaning of Title VII."

															The EEOC position has been elaborated in the new Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 CFR § 1607, 35 Fed.Reg. 12333
(Aug. 1, 1970). These guidelines demand that employers using tests
have available

															"data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
candidates are being evaluated." Id. at § 1607.4(c).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The congressional discussion was prompted by the decision of a
hearing examiner for the Illinois Fair Employment Commission in Myart v. Motorola Co. (The decision is reprinted at 110
Cong.Rec. 5662.) That case suggested that standardized tests on
which whites performed better than Negroes could never be used. The
decision was taken to mean that such tests could never be justified
even if the needs of the business required them. A number of
Senators feared that Title VII might produce a similar result. See remarks of Senators Ervin, 110 Cong.Rec. 5614-5616;
Smathers, id. at 5999-6000; Holland, id. at
7012-7013; Hill, id. at 8447; Tower, id. at 9024;
Talmadge, id. at 9025-9026; Fulbright, id. at
9599-9600; and Ellender, id. at 9600.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The Court of Appeals majority, in finding no requirement in
Title VII that employment tests be job-related, relied in part on a
quotation from an earlier Clark-Case interpretative memorandum
addressed to the question of the constitutionality of Title VII.
The Senators said in that memorandum:

															"There is no requirement in title VII that employers abandon bona fide qualification tests where, because of
differences in background and education, members of some groups are
able to perform better on these tests than members of other groups.
An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may
test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and
he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test
performance."

															110 Cong.Rec. 7213. However, nothing there stated conflicts with
the later memorandum dealing specifically with the debate over
employer testing, 110 Cong.Rec. 7247 (quoted from in the text
above), in which Senators Clark and Case explained that tests which
measure "applicable job qualifications" are permissible under Title
VII. In the earlier memorandum, Clark and Case assured the Senate
that employers were not to be prohibited from using tests that
determine qualifications. Certainly a reasonable interpretation of
what the Senators meant, in light of the subsequent memorandum
directed specifically at employer testing, was that nothing in the
Act prevents employers from requiring that applicants be fit for
the job.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Senator Tower's original amendment provided in part that a test
would be permissible

															"if, . . . in the case of any individual who is seeking
employment with such employer, such test is designed to determine
or predict whether such individual is suitable or trainable with
respect to his employment in the particular business or enterprise
involved. . . ."

															110 Cong.Rec. 13492. This language indicates that Senator
Tower's aim was simply to make certain that job-related tests would
be permitted. The opposition to the amendment was based on its
loose wording which the proponents of Title VII feared would be
susceptible of misinterpretation. The final amendment, which was
acceptable to all sides, could hardly have required less of a job
relation than the first.

Summary: In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court held that an employer's use of employment practices that disproportionately exclude Black applicants and are not related to job performance is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regardless of the employer's intent. The case challenged Duke Power Co.'s requirement of a high school diploma or passing intelligence tests for employment, which disproportionately impacted Black employees. The Court found that while Title VII allows for professionally developed ability tests, they must be related to job performance and not be used to discriminate. The Court also clarified that Title VII requires the elimination of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that discriminate based on race.