OCTOBER TERM, 1991

															Syllabus

															IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. ELIAS-ZACARIAS

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 90-1342. Argued November 4, 1991-Decided January 22,1992

															Respondent, a native of Guatemala, was apprehended for entering
the United States without inspection. In his deportation
proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that
he was ineligible for a discretionary grant of asylum. In reversing
that determination, the Court of Appeals ruled that a guerrilla
organization's acts of conscription constitute persecution on
account of political opinion and that respondent therefore had a
well-founded fear of such persecution. Held: A guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a
person into performing military service does not necessarily
constitute "persecution on account of ... political opinion" under
§ 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. §
1101(a)(42). Even one who supports the political aims of a
guerrilla movement might resist military combat and thus become the
object of such coercion. Moreover, persecution on ac count of
political opinion is not established by the fact that the coercing
guerrillas had "political" motives. In order to satisfy §
101(a)(42), the persecution must be on account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. Since
respondent did not produce evidence so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution on account of political opinion, the Court of Appeals
had no proper basis to set aside the BIA's determination. See 8 U.
S. C. § 1l05a(a)(4); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 ,300.
Pp.481-484. 921 F.2d
844 , reversed.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 484.

															Maureen E. Mahoney argued the cause for petitioner. On the
briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General
Gerson, Acting Deputy Solicitor General Wright, Stephen J. Marzen,
and Alice M. King. 479 James Robertson argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief were Carol F. Lee and Peter A. Von
Mehren.* JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The principal question presented by this case is whether a
guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce a person into performing
military service necessarily constitutes "persecution on
account of ... political opinion" under § 101(a)(42) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as added, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1l01(a)(42).

															I

															Respondent Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, was
apprehended in July 1987 for entering the United States without
inspection. In deportation proceedings brought by petitioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Elias-Zacarias
conceded his deportability but requested asylum and withholding of
deportation.

															The Immigration Judge summarized Elias-Zacarias' testi mony
as follows: "[A]round the end of January in 1987 [when EliasZacarias was
18], two armed, uniformed guerrillas with handkerchiefs covering
part of their faces came to his home. Only he and his parents were
there .... [T]he guerrillas asked his parents and himself to join
with them, but they all refused. The guerrillas asked them why and
told them that they would be back, and that they should think it
over about joining them. *Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Kevin R.
Johnson, Joshua R. Floum, and Robert Rubin; for the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights et al. by Arthur C. Helton, Q Thomas Johnson, Jr., and Andrew I.
Schoenholtz; and for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees by Arthur L. Bentley III and Julian
Fleet. 480 "[Elias-Zacarias] did not want to join the guerrillas because
the guerrillas are against the government and he was afraid that
the government would retaliate against him and his family if he did
join the guerrillas. [H]e left Guatemala at the end of March [1987]
... because he was afraid that the guerrillas would return." App.
to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a. The Immigration Judge understood from this testimony that
Elias-Zacarias' request for asylum and for withholding of
deportation was "based on this one attempted recruitment by the
guerrillas." Id., at 41a. She concluded that EliasZacarias
had failed to demonstrate persecution or a wellfounded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, and was not
eligible for asylum. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(a). She
further concluded that he did not qualify for withholding of
deportation.

															The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily dismissed
Elias-Zacarias' appeal on procedural grounds. EliasZacarias then
moved the BIA to reopen his deportation hearing so that he could
submit new evidence that, following his departure from Guatemala,
the guerrillas had twice returned to his family's home in continued
efforts to recruit him. The BIA denied reopening on the ground that
even with this new evidence Elias-Zacarias had failed to make a
prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum and had failed to
show that the results of his deportation hearing would be
changed.

															The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, treating the BIA's
denial of the motion to reopen as an affirmance on the merits of
the Immigration Judge's ruling, reversed. 921
F.2d 844 (1990). The court ruled that acts of conscription by a
nongovernmental group constitute persecution on account of
political opinion, and determined that Elias-Zacarias had a
"well-founded fear" of such conscription. Id., at 850852. We
granted certiorari. 500 U. S. 915 (1991). 481 II

															Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S.
C. § 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion,
to grant asylum to an alien who is a "refugee" as defined in the
Act, i. e., an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to
his home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." §
101(a)(42)(A), 8 U. S. C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 , 423, 428,
n. 5 (1987). The BIA's determination that Elias-Zacarias was not
eligible for asylum must be upheld if "supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole." 8 U. S. C. § 1l05a(a)(4). It can be reversed only if the
evidence presented by Elias-Zacarias was such that a reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of
persecution existed. NLRB v. Co lumbian Enameling
& Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 , 300
(1939).1

															The Court of Appeals found reversal warranted. In its view, a
guerrilla organization's attempt to conscript a person into its
military forces necessarily constitutes "persecution on account of
... political opinion," because "the person resisting forced
recruitment is expressing a political opinion hostile to the
persecutor and because the persecutors' motive in carrying out the
kidnapping is political." 921 F. 2d, at 850. The first half of this
seems to us untrue, and the second half irrelevant.

															1 Quite beside the point, therefore, is the dissent's assertion
that "the record in this case is more than adequate to support
the conclusion that this respondent's refusal [to join the
guerrillas] was a form of expressive conduct that constituted the
statement of a 'political opinion,'" post, at 488 (emphasis
added). To reverse the BrA finding we must find that the evidence
not only supports that conclusion, but compels it-and
also compels the further conclusion that Elias-Zacarias had a
well-founded fear that the guerrillas would persecute him because of that political opinion. 482 Even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might resist
recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to
remain with one's family and friends, a desire to earn a better
living in civilian life, to mention only a few. The record in the
present case not only failed to show a political motive on
Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the opposite. He testified that he
refused to join the guerrillas because he was afraid that the
government would retaliate against him and his family if he did so.
Nor is there any indication (assuming, arguendo, it would
suffice) that the guerrillas erroneously believed that
Elias-Zacarias' refusal was politically based.

															As for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the guerrillas'
"motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political": It apparently
meant by this that the guerrillas seek to fill their ranks in order
to carry on their war against the government and pursue their
political goals. See 921 F. 2d, at 850 (citing Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d
1227 , 1232, n. 8 (CA9 1988)); 921 F. 2d, at 852. But that does
not render the forced recruitment "persecution on account of ...
political opinion." In construing statutes, "we must, of course,
start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed
by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1 , 9 (1962); see Cardoza-Fonseca, supra, at 431; INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183 , 189
(1984). The ordinary meaning of the phrase "persecution on account
of ... political opinion" in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account
of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's. If
a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is not, within the ordinary
meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of
political opinion; and if a fundamentalist Moslem regime persecutes
democrats, it is not engaging in persecution on account of
religion. Thus, the mere existence of a generalized "political"
motive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate
to establish (and, indeed, goes far to refute) the proposition that
Elias-Zacarias fears persecution on account of political
opinion, as § 101(a)(42) requires. 483 Elias-Zacarias appears to argue that not taking sides with any
political faction is itself the affirmative expression of a
political opinion. That seems to us not ordinarily so, since we do
not agree with the dissent that only a "narrow, grudging
construction of the concept of 'political opinion,'" post, at 487, would distinguish it from such quite different concepts as
indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness. But we need not
decide whether the evidence compels the conclusion that
Elias-Zacarias held a political opinion. Even if it does,
Elias-Zacarias still has to establish that the record also compels
the conclusion that he has a "well-founded fear" that the
guerrillas will persecute him because of that political
opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them. He
has not done so with the degree of clarity necessary to permit
reversal of a BIA finding to the contrary; indeed, he has not done
so at alP

															Elias-Zacarias objects that he cannot be expected to provide
direct proof of his persecutors' motives. We do not require that.
But since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it, direct or circumstantial. And if he
seeks to obtain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination, he
must show that the evidence he presented was

															2 The dissent misdescribes the record on this point in several
respects.

															For example, it exaggerates the "well foundedness" of whatever
fear Elias-Zacarias possesses, by progressively transforming his
testimony that he was afraid the guerrillas would" 'take me or kill
me,'" post, at 484, into, first, "the guerrillas' implied
threat to 'take' him or to 'kill' him," post, at 489
(emphasis added), and, then, into the flat assertion that the
guerrillas "responded by threatening to 'take' or to 'kill'
him," post, at 490 (emphasis added). The dissent also
erroneously describes it as "undisputed" that the cause of the harm
Elias-Zacarias fears, if that harm should occur, will be "the
guerrilla organization's displeasure with his refusal to join them
in their armed insurrection against the government." Post, at 484 (emphasis added). The record shows no such concession by the
INS, and all Elias-Zacarias said on the point was that he feared
being taken or killed by the guerrillas. It is quite plausible,
indeed likely, that the taking would be engaged in by the
guerrillas in order to augment their troops rather than show their
displeasure; and the killing he feared might well be a killing in
the course of resisting being taken. 484 so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution. That he has not done.

															The BIA's determination should therefore have been upheld in all
respects, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment to the
contrary.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, dissenting.

															Respondent refused to join a guerrilla organization that engaged
in forced recruitment in Guatemala. He fled the country because he
was afraid the guerrillas would return and "take me and kill me." 1
After his departure, armed guerrillas visited his family on two
occasions searching for him. In testimony that the hearing officer
credited, he stated that he is still afraid to return to Guatemala
because "these people" can come back to "take me or kill me." 2

															It is undisputed that respondent has a well-founded fear that he
will be harmed, if not killed, if he returns to Guatemala. It is
also undisputed that the cause of that harm, if it should occur, is
the guerrilla organization's displeasure with his refusal to join
them in their armed insurrection against the government. The
question of law that the case presents is whether respondent's
well-founded fear is a "fear of persecution on account of ...
political opinion" within the meaning of § lOl(a)(42) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.3

															1 App. to Brief in Opposition 5a. 2Id., at 6a.

															3 Section 101(a)(42), as codified in 8 U. S. C. § llOl(a)(42),
provides:

															"(a) As used in this chapter-

															"(42) The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of perse- 485 If respondent were to prevail, as he did in the Court of
Appeals, 921 F.2d
844 (CA9 1990), he would be classified as a "refugee" and
therefore be eligible for a grant of asylum. He would not be
automatically entitled to that relief, however, because "the
Attorney General is not required to grant asylum to everyone
who meets the definition of refugee." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 , 428, n. 5
(1987) (emphasis in original). Instead, § 208 of the Act provides
that the Attorney General may, "in [his] discretion," grant asylum
to refugees.4

															cution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the
President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section
1157(e) of this title) may specify, any person who is within the
country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, within the country in which such person is
habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a wellfounded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The
term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion."

															4 Section 208(a) of the Act, as codified at 8 U. S. C. §
1158(a), provides:

															"The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien
physically present in the United States or at a land border or port
of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum,
and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the
Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien
is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this
title."

															As we recognized in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421 ,
444-445 (1987):

															"'The [House] Committee carefully considered arguments that the
new definition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to
come to the United States and force substantially greater refugee
admissions than the country could absorb. However, merely because
an individual or group comes within the definition will not
guarantee resettlement in the United States.' H. R. Rep. [96-608,
p. 10 (1979)].

															" ... Congress has assigned to the Attorney General and his
delegates the task of making these hard individualized decisions;
although Congress 486 Today the Court holds that respondent's fear of persecution is
not "on account of ... political opinion" for two reasons. First,
he failed to prove that his refusal to join the guerrillas was
politically motivated; indeed, he testified that he was at least in
part motivated by a fear that government forces would retaliate
against him or his family if he joined the guerrillas. See ante, at 482-483. Second, he failed to prove that his
persecutors' motives were political. In particular, the Court holds
that the persecutors' implicit threat to retaliate against
respondent "because of his refusal to fight with them," ante, at 483, is not persecution on account of political
opinion. I disagree with both parts of the Court's reasoning.

															I

															A political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as
affirmatively. A refusal to support a cause-by staying home on
election day, by refusing to take an oath of allegiance, or by
refusing to step forward at an induction center-can express a
political opinion as effectively as an affirmative statement or
affirmative conduct. Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing
more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with
one's family, it is the kind of political expression that the
asylum provisions of the statute were intended to protect.

															As the Court of Appeals explained in Bolanos-Hernandez "Choosing to remain neutral is no less a political decision than
is choosing to affiliate with a particular political faction. Just
as a nation's decision to remain neutral is a political one, see, e. g., Neutrality Act of 1939, 22 U. S. C. §§441-465
(1982), so is an individual's. When a person is aware of contending
political forces and af- could have crafted a narrower definition, it chose to authorize
the Attorney General to determine which, if any, eligible refugees
should be denied asylum." 487 firmatively chooses not to join any faction, that choice is a political one. A rule that one must identify with one
of two dominant warring political factions in order to possess a
political opinion, when many persons may, in fact, be opposed to
the views and policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic
objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980-to provide protection to all
victims of persecution regardless of ideology. Moreover, construing
'political opinion' in so short-sighted and grudging a manner could
result in limiting the benefits under the ameliorative provisions
of our immigration laws to those who join one political extreme or
another; moderates who choose to sit out a battle would not
qualify." Id., at 1286 (emphasis in original; footnote
omitted). The narrow, grudging construction of the concept of "political
opinion" that the Court adopts today is inconsistent with the basic
approach to this statute that the Court endorsed in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra. In that case, relying heavily on the
fact that an alien's status as a "refugee" merely makes him
eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum-as contrasted with the
entitlement to a withholding of deportation authorized by § 243(h)
of the Act-the Court held that the alien's burden of proving a
well-founded fear of persecution did not require proof that
persecution was more likely than not to occur. We explained: "Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry
with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, lead
inexorably to the conclusion that to show a 'well-founded fear of
persecution,' an alien need not prove that it is more likely than
not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country.
We find these ordinary canons of statutory construction compelling,
even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any
lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the
alien. See INS v. Errico, 385 488 u. S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U. S. 120 , 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6 , 10 (1948). "Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more
replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she
will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his
or her home country. In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress
sought to 'give the United States sufficient flexibility to respond
to situations involving political or religious dissidents and
detainees throughout the world.' H. R. Rep. [96-608, p. 9 (1979)].
Our holding today increases that flexibility by rejecting the
Government's contention that the Attorney General may not even
consider granting asylum to one who fails to satisfy the strict §
243(h) standard. Whether or not a 'refugee' is eventually granted
asylum is a matter which Congress has left for the Attorney General
to decide. But it is clear that Congress did not intend to restrict
eligibility for that relief to those who could prove that it is
more likely than not that they will be persecuted if deported." 480
U. S., at 449-450. Similar reasoning should resolve any doubts concerning the
political character of an alien's refusal to take arms against a
legitimate government in favor of the alien. In my opinion, the
record in this case is more than adequate to support the conclusion
that this respondent's refusal was a form of expressive conduct
that constituted the statement of a "political opinion" within the
meaning of § 208(a).5

															5 Here, respondent not only engaged in expressive conduct by
refusing to join the guerrilla organization but also explained that
he did so "[b]ecause they see very well, that if you join the
guerrillas ... then you are against the government. You are against
the government and if you join them then it is to die there. And,
then the government is against you and against your family." App.
to Brief in Opposition 5a. Respondent thus expressed the political
view that he was for the government and against the guerrillas. The
statute speaks simply in terms of a political opinion and does not
require that the view be well developed or elegantly expressed. 489 II

															It follows as night follows day that the guerrillas' implied
threat to "take" him or to "kill" him if he did not change his
position constituted threatened persecution "on account of" that
political opinion. As the Court of Appeals explained in Bo
lanos- Hernandez: "It does not matter to the persecutors what the individual's
motivation is. The guerrillas in EI Salvador do not inquire into
the reasoning process of those who insist on remaining neutral and
refuse to join their cause. They are concerned only with an act
that constitutes an overt manifestation of a political opinion.
Persecution because of that overt manifestation is persecution
because of a political opinion." 767 F. 2d, at 1287.6 It is important to emphasize that the statute does not require
that an applicant for asylum prove exactly why his persecutors
would act against him; it only requires him to show that he has a
"well-founded fear of persecution on account of ... political
opinion." As we recognized in INS v. CardozaFonseca, the applicant meets this burden if he shows that there is a
"'reasonable possibility'" that he will be perse-

															6 The Government has argued that respondent's statement is
analogous to that of a person who leaves a country to avoid being
drafted into military service. The INS has long recognized,
however, that the normal enforcement of Selective Service laws is
not "persecution" within the meaning of the statute even if the
draftee's motive is political. Thus, while holding that an Mghan
soldier who refused to fight under Soviet command qualified as a
political refugee, Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311
(BrA 1982), the INS has adhered "to the long-accepted position that
it is not persecution for a country to require military service of
its citizens." Matter of A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 506
(BrA 1987); cf. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
, 167 (1979) ("Fear of prosecution and punishment for desertion or
draft-evasion does not in itself constitute wellfounded fear of
persecution under the [1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees]"). 490 cuted on account of his political opinion. 480 U. S., at 440
(quoting INS v. Stevie, 467 U. S. 407 , 425
(1984)). Because respondent expressed a political opinion by
refusing to join the guerrillas, and they responded by threatening
to "take" or to "kill" him if he did not change his mind, his fear
that the guerrillas will persecute him on account of his political
opinion is well founded.7

															Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

															7 In response to this dissent, the Court suggests that
respondent and I have exaggerated the "well foundedness" of his
fear. See ante, at 483, n. 2. The Court's legal analysis,
however, would produce precisely the same result no matter how
unambiguous the guerrillas' threatened retaliation might have been.
Moreover, any doubts concerning the sinister character of a
suggestion to "think it over" delivered by two uniformed masked men
carrying machine guns should be resolved in respondent's favor.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a guerrilla organization's attempt to coerce someone into performing military service does not necessarily count as "political opinion" and therefore does not make that person eligible for asylum. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals' original determination that the respondent was ineligible for a discretionary grant of asylum was upheld.