U.S. Supreme Court Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson No. 782 Argued May 6, 1942 Decided June 1, 1942 316
U.S. 535 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
OKLAHOMA Syllabus 1. A statute of Oklahoma provides for the sterilization, by
vasectomy or salpingectomy, of "habitual criminals" -- an habitual
criminal being defined therein as any person who, having been
convicted two or more times, in Oklahoma or in any other State, of
"felonies involving moral turpitude," is thereafter convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment in Oklahoma for such a crime. Expressly
excepted from the terms of the statute are certain offenses,
including embezzlement. As applied to one who was convicted once of
stealing chickens and twice of robbery, held that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 316 U. S.
537 .

															2. The State Supreme Court having sustained the Act, as applied
to the petitioner here, without reference to a severability clause,
the question whether that clause would be so applied as to remove
the particular constitutional objection is one which may
appropriately be left for adjudication by the state court. P. 316 U. S.
542 . 189 Okla. 235 , 115 P.2d 123 ,
reversed. Page 316 U. S. 536 CERTIORARI, 315 U.S. 789, to review the affirmance of a judgment
in a proceeding under the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act, wherein it was ordered that the defendant (petitioner here) be
made sterile.

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case touches a sensitive and important area of human
rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right which is
basic to the perpetuation of a race the right to have offspring.
Oklahoma has decreed the enforcement of its law against petitioner,
overruling his claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because that decision raised grave and substantial constitutional
questions, we granted the petition for certiorari.

															The statute involved is Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal
Sterilization Act. Okla.Stat.Ann. Tit. 57, §§ 171, et
seq.; L.1935, pp. 94 et seq. That Act defines an
"habitual criminal" as a person who, having been convicted two or
more times for crimes "amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude," either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other
State, is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal
institution. § 173. Machinery is provided for the institution by
the Attorney General of a proceeding against such a person in the
Oklahoma courts for a judgment that such person shall be rendered
sexually sterile. §§ 176, 177. Notice, an opportunity to be heard,
and the right to a jury trial are provided. §§ 177-181. The issues
triable in such a proceeding are narrow and confined. Page 316 U. S. 537 If the court or jury finds that the defendant is an "habitual
criminal" and that he "may be rendered sexually sterile without
detriment to his or her general health," then the court "shall
render judgment to the effect that said defendant be rendered
sexually sterile" (§ 182) by the operation of vasectomy in case of
a male, and of salpingectomy in case of a female. § 174. Only one
other provision of the Act is material here, and that is § 195,
which provides that

															"offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws,
revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall not come
or be considered within the terms of this Act."

															Petitioner was convicted in 1926 of the crime of stealing
chickens, and was sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory. In
1929 he was convicted of the crime of robbery with firearms, and
was sentenced to the reformatory. In 1934, he was convicted again
of robbery with firearms, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. He
was confined there in 1935 when the Act was passed. In 1936, the
Attorney General instituted proceedings against him. Petitioner, in
his answer, challenged the Act as unconstitutional by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment. A jury trial was had. The court instructed
the jury that the crimes of which petitioner had been convicted
were felonies involving moral turpitude, and that the only question
for the jury was whether the operation of vasectomy could be
performed on petitioner without detriment to his general health.
The jury found that it could be. A judgment directing that the
operation of vasectomy be performed on petitioner was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma by a five-to-four decision. 189 Okla. 235 , 115 P.2d
123 .

															Several objections to the constitutionality of the Act have been
pressed upon us. It is urged that the Act cannot be sustained as an
exercise of the police power, in view Page 316 U. S. 538 of the state of scientific authorities respecting inheritability
of criminal traits. [ Footnote
1 ] It is argued that due process is lacking because, under this
Act, unlike the Act [ Footnote
2 ] upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.
S. 200 , the defendant is given no opportunity to be
heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential
parent of socially undesirable offspring. See Davis v.
Berry, 216 F. 413; Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526,
131 N.E. 2. It is also suggested that the Act is penal in
character, and that the sterilization provided for is cruel and
unusual punishment and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davis v. Berry, supra. Cf. State v. Felen, 70
Wash. 65, 126 P. 75; Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687. We
pass those points without intimating an opinion on them, for there
is a feature of the Act which clearly condemns it. That is its
failure to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

															We do not stop to point out all of the inequalities in this Act.
A few examples will suffice. In Oklahoma, grand larceny is a
felony. Okla.Stats.Ann. Tit. 21, §§ 1705, 5. Larceny is grand
larceny when the property taken exceeds $20 in value. Id., § 1704. Embezzlement is punishable "in the manner prescribed for
feloniously stealing property of the value of that embezzled." Id., § 1462. Hence, he who embezzles property worth more
than $20 is guilty of a felony. A clerk who appropriates over $20
from his employer's till ( id. § 1456) and a stranger who
steals the same Page 316 U. S. 539 amount are thus both guilty of felonies. If the latter repeats
his act and is convicted three times, he may be sterilized. But the
clerk is not subject to the pains and penalties of the Act no
matter how large his embezzlements nor how frequent his
convictions. A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens
commits a felony ( id., § 1719), and he may be sterilized
if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of the
property and fraudulently appropriates it, he is an embezzler. Id., § 1455. Hence, no matter how habitual his
proclivities for embezzlement are, and no matter how often his
conviction, he may not be sterilized. Thus, the nature of the two
crimes is intrinsically the same, and they are punishable in the
same manner. Furthermore, the line between them follows close
distinctions -- distinctions comparable to those highly technical
ones which shaped the common law as to "trespass" or "taking."
Bishop, Criminal Law (9th ed.) Vol. 2, §§ 760, 799, et
seq. There may be larceny by fraud, rather than embezzlement
even where the owner of the personal property delivers it to the
defendant, if the latter has, at that time, "a fraudulent intention
to make use of the possession as a means of converting such
property to his own use, and does so convert it." Bivens v.
State, 6 Okla.Cr. 521, 529, 120 P. 1033, 1036. If the
fraudulent intent occurs later, and the defendant converts the
property, he is guilty of embezzlement. Bivens v. State, supra;
Flohr v. Territory, 14 Okla. 477 ,
78 P. 565. Whether a particular act is larceny by fraud or
embezzlement thus turns not on the intrinsic quality of the act,
but on when the felonious intent arose -- a question for the jury
under appropriate instructions. Bivens v. State, supra; Riley
v. State, 64 Okla.Cr. 183, 78 P.2d
712 .

															It was stated in Buck v. Bell, supra, that the claim
that state legislation violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is "the usual last resort of constitutional
arguments." 274 U.S. p. 274 U. S. 208 .
Under our constitutional Page 316 U. S. 540 system, the States, in determining the reach and scope of
particular legislation, need not provide "abstract symmetry." Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 , 232 U. S. 144 .
They may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems
according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience. See Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 , and
cases cited. It was in that connection that Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499 , 282 U. S. 501 ,
stated, "We must remember that the machinery of government would
not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Only
recently, we reaffirmed the view that the equal protection clause
does not prevent the legislature from recognizing "degrees of evil"
( Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 , 239 U. S. 43 ) by
our ruling in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.
S. 141 , 310 U. S. 147 ,
that "the Constitution does not require things which are different,
in fact, or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same." And see Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362 .
Thus, if we had here only a question as to a State's classification
of crimes, such as embezzlement or larceny, no substantial federal
question would be raised. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 ; Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 ; Finley v. California, 222 U. S. 28 ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, supra. For a State is not
constrained in the exercise of its police power to ignore
experience which marks a class of offenders or a family of offenses
for special treatment. Nor is it prevented by the equal protection
clause from confining "its restrictions to those classes of cases
where the need is deemed to be clearest." Miller v.
Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 , 236 U. S. 384 . And see McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.
S. 539 . As stated in Buck v. Bell, supra, p. 274 U. S. 208 ,

															". . . the law does all that is needed when it does all that it
can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and
seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and
so fast as its means allow. " Page 316 U. S. 541 But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule
of the foregoing cases requires. We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or
reckless hands, it can cause races or types which are inimical to
the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption
for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the
State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived
of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not to reexamine the
scope of the police power of the States. We advert to them merely
in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
against groups or types of individuals in violation of the
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. The guaranty of
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 , 118 U. S. 369 .
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and
not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it
had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra; Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 .
Sterilization of those who have thrice committed grand larceny,
with immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed,
unmistakable discrimination. Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that
he who commits larceny by trespass or trick or fraud has
biologically inheritable traits which he who commits embezzlement
lacks. Oklahoma's line between larceny by fraud and embezzlement is
determined, as we have noted, "with reference to the time when
the Page 316 U. S. 542 fraudulent intent to convert the property to the taker's own
use" arises. Riley v. State, supra, 64 Okla.Cr. at p. 189,
78 P.2d p. 715. We have not the slightest basis for inferring that
that line has any significance in eugenics, nor that the
inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal
distinctions which the law has marked between those two offenses.
In terms of fines and imprisonment, the crimes of larceny and
embezzlement rate the same under the Oklahoma code. Only when it
comes to sterilization are the pains and penalties of the law
different. The equal protection clause would indeed be a formula of
empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn. See Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 420-421,
204 N.W. 40. In Buck v. Bell, supra, the Virginia statute
was upheld though it applied only to feeble-minded persons in
institutions of the State. But it was pointed out that,

															"so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be
kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum
to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached."

															274 U.S. p. 274 U. S. 208 .
Here there is no such saving feature. Embezzlers are forever free.
Those who steal or take in other ways are not. If such a
classification were permitted, the technical common law concept of
a "trespass" (Bishop, Criminal Law, 9th ed., vol. 1, §§ 566, 567)
based on distinctions which are "very largely dependent upon
history for explanation" (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 73) could
readily become a rule of human genetics.

															It is true that the Act has a broad severability clause.
[ Footnote 3 ] But we will not
endeavor to determine whether its application Page 316 U. S. 543 would solve the equal protection difficulty. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma sustained the Act without reference to the severability
clause. We have therefore a situation where the Act, as construed
and applied to petitioner, is allowed to perpetuate the
discrimination which we have found to be fatal. Whether the
severability clause would be so applied as to remove this
particular constitutional objection is a question which may be more
appropriately left for adjudication by the Oklahoma court. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 .
That is reemphasized here by our uncertainty as to what excision,
if any, would be made as a matter of Oklahoma law. Cf. Smith v.
Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 . It
is by no means clear whether, if an excision were made, this
particular constitutional difficulty might be solved by enlarging,
on the one hand, or contracting, on the other ( cf. Mr.
Justice Brandeis dissenting, National Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 277 U. S. 508 , 277 U. S.
534 -535) the class of criminals who might be
sterilized. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Healy, The Individual Delinquent (1915), pp. 188-200;
Sutherland, Criminology (1924), pp. 112-118, 621-622; Gillin,
Criminology and Penology (1926), c. IX; Popenoe, Sterilization and
Criminality, 53 Rep.Am.Bar Assoc. 575; Myerson et al., Eugenical Sterilization (1936), c. VIII; Landman, Human
Sterilization (1932), c. IX; Summary of the Report of the American
Neurological Association Committee for the Investigation of
Sterilization, 1 Am.Journ.Med.Jur. 253 (1938).

															[ Footnote 2 ] And see State v. Troutman, 50 Ida. 673, 299 P. 668;
Chamberlain, Eugenics in Legislatures and Courts, 15 Am.Bar
Assn.Journ. 165; Castle, The Law and Human Sterilization, 53
Rep.Am.Bar Assoc., 556, 572; 2 Bill of Rights Review 54.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Sec.194 provides:

															"If any section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, clause or
phrase of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional, or void for
any other reason by any court of final jurisdiction, such fact
shall not in any manner invalidate or affect any other or the
remaining portions of this Act, but the same shall continue in full
force and effect. The Legislature hereby declares that it would
have passed this Act, and each section, subsection, paragraph,
sentence, clause or phrase thereof, irrespective of the fact that
any one or more other sections, sub-sections, paragraphs,
sentences, clauses or phrases be declared unconstitutional."

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, concurring:

															I concur in the result, but I am not persuaded that we are aided
in reaching it by recourse to the equal protection clause.

															If Oklahoma may resort generally to the sterilization of
criminals on the assumption that their propensities are
transmissible to future generations by inheritance, I seriously
doubt that the equal protection clause requires it to apply the
measure to all criminals in the first instance, or to none. See
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260 , 226 U. S.
271 ; Page 316 U. S. 544 Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.
S. 224 , 234 U. S. 227 ; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 , 232 U. S.
144 .

															Moreover, if we must presume that the legislature knows -- what
science has been unable to ascertain -- that the criminal
tendencies of any class of habitual offenders are transmissible
regardless of the varying mental characteristics of its
individuals, I should suppose that we must likewise presume that
the legislature, in its wisdom, knows that the criminal tendencies
of some classes of offenders are more likely to be transmitted than
those of others. And so I think the real question we have to
consider is not one of equal protection, but whether the wholesale
condemnation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty,
without opportunity to any individual to show that his is not the
type of case which would justify resort to it, satisfies the
demands of due process.

															There are limits to the extent to which the presumption of
constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of
the person is concerned ( see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 304 U. S. 152 ,
n. 4) and where the presumption is resorted to only to dispense
with a procedure which the ordinary dictates of prudence would seem
to demand for the protection of the individual from arbitrary
action. Although petitioner here was given a hearing to ascertain
whether sterilization would be detrimental to his health, he was
given none to discover whether his criminal tendencies are of an
inheritable type. Undoubtedly, a state may, after appropriate
inquiry, constitutionally interfere with the personal liberty of
the individual to prevent the transmission by inheritance of his
socially injurious tendencies. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.
S. 200 . But, until now, we have not been called upon to
say that it may do so without giving him a hearing and opportunity
to challenge the existence as to him of the only facts which could
justify so drastic a measure. Page 316 U. S. 545 Science has found, and the law has recognized, that there are
certain types of mental deficiency associated with delinquency
which are inheritable. But the State does not contend -- nor can
there be any pretense -- that either common knowledge or
experience, or scientific investigation, * has given
assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual
offenders are universally, or even generally, inheritable. In such
circumstances, inquiry whether such is the fact in the case of any
particular individual cannot rightly be dispensed with. Whether the
procedure by which a statute carries its mandate into execution
satisfies due process is a matter of judicial cognizance. A law
which condemns, without hearing, all the individuals of a class to
so harsh a measure as the present because some or even many merit
condemnation is lacking in the first principles of due process. Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 , 291 U. S. 90 ,
and cases cited; Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U. S.
25 . And so, while the state may protect itself from the
demonstrably inheritable tendencies of the individual which are
injurious to society, the most elementary notions of due process
would seem to require it to take appropriate steps to safeguard the
liberty of the individual by affording him, before he is condemned
to an irreparable injury in his person, some opportunity to show
that he is without such inheritable tendencies. The state is called
on to sacrifice no permissible end when it is required to reach its
objective by a reasonable and just procedure adequate to safeguard
rights of the individual which concededly the Constitution
protects. Page 316 U. S. 546 * See Eugenical Sterilization, A Report of the
Committee of the American Neurological Association (1936),
pp.150-52; Myerson, Summary of the Report, 1 American Journal of
Medical Jurisprudence 253; Popenoe, Sterilization and Criminality,
53 American Bar Assn. Reports 575; Jennings, Eugenics, 5
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 617, 6221; Montagu, The
Biologist Looks at Crime, 217 Annals of American Academy of
Political and Social Science 46.

															MR JUSTICE JACKSON concurring:

															I join the CHIEF JUSTICE in holding that the hearings provided
are too limited in the context of the present Act to afford due
process of law. I also agree with the opinion of MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS that the scheme of classification set forth in the Act
denies equal protection of the law. I disagree with the opinion of
each insofar as it rejects or minimizes the grounds taken by the
other.

															Perhaps to employ a broad and loose scheme of classification
would be permissible if accompanied by the individual hearings
indicated by the CHIEF JUSTICE. On the other hand, narrow
classification with reference to the end to be accomplished by the
Act might justify limiting individual hearings to the issue whether
the individual belonged to a class so defined. Since this Act does
not present these questions, I reserve judgment on them.

															I also think the present plan to sterilize the individual in
pursuit of a eugenic plan to eliminate from the race
characteristics that are only vaguely identified and which, in our
present state of knowledge, are uncertain as to transmissibility
presents other constitutional questions of gravity. This Court has
sustained such an experiment with respect to an imbecile, a person
with definite and observable characteristics, where the condition
had persisted through three generations and afforded grounds for
the belief that it was transmissible, and would continue to
manifest itself in generations to come. Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 .

															There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively
represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority -- even those who have been guilty of what the majority
define as crimes. But this Act falls down before reaching this
problem, which I mention only to Page 316 U. S. 547 avoid the implication that such a question may not exist because
not discussed. On it, I would also reserve judgment.

Summary: In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an Oklahoma law allowing for the sterilization of "habitual criminals" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the right to have offspring is fundamental, and the law's classification scheme was not sufficiently narrow to justify such an infringement on individual liberty. The Court also raised concerns about the due process protections afforded by the law's hearing procedures.


U.S. Supreme Court McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950) McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Education No. 34 Argued April 3-4,
1950 Decided June 5, 1950 339
U.S. 637 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
OKLAHOMA Syllabus Appellant, a Negro citizen of Oklahoma possessing a master's
degree, was admitted to the Graduate School of the state supported
University of Oklahoma as a candidate for a doctorate in education
and was permitted to use the same classroom, library and cafeteria
as white students. Pursuant to a requirement of state law that the
instruction of Negroes in institutions of higher education be "upon
a segregated basis," however, he was assigned to a seat in the
classroom in a row specified for Negro students, was assigned to a
special table in the library, and, although permitted to eat in the
cafeteria at the same time as other students, was assigned to a
special table there. Held: the conditions under which appellant is required
to receive his education deprive him of his personal and present
right to the equal protection of the laws, and the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes such differences in treatment by the State
based upon race. Pp. 339 U. S.
638 -642.

															(a) The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit
his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views
with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession. Pp. 339 U. S.
640 -641.

															(b) That appellant may still be set apart by his fellow students
and may be in no better position when these restrictions are
removed is irrelevant, for there is a constitutional difference
between restrictions imposed by the State which prohibit the
intellectual commingling of students and the refusal of students to
commingle where the State presents no such bar. P. 339 U. S.
641 .

															(c) Having been admitted to a state supported graduate school,
appellant must receive the same treatment at the hands of the State
as students of other races. P. 339 U. S.
642 . 87 F.
Supp. 528 reversed.

															The proceedings below are stated in the opinion. The judgment
below is reversed, p. 339 U. S.
642 . Page 339 U. S. 638 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In this case, we are faced with the question whether a state
may, after admitting a student to graduate instruction in its state
university, afford him different treatment from other students
solely because of his race. We decide only this issue; see
Sweatt v. Painter, ante, p. 339 U. S. 629 .

															Appellant is a Negro citizen of Oklahoma. Possessing a Master's
degree, he applied for admission to the University of Oklahoma in
order to pursue studies and courses leading to a Doctorate in
Education. At that time, his application was denied, solely because
of his race. The school authorities were required to exclude him by
the Oklahoma statutes, 70 Okl.Stat. (1941) §§ 455, 456, 457, which
made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a
school at which both whites and Negroes are enrolled or taught.
Appellant filed a complaint requesting injunctive relief, alleging
that the action of the school authorities and the statutes upon
which their action was based were unconstitutional and deprived
him Page 339 U. S. 639 of the equal protection of the laws. Citing our decisions in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.
S. 337 (1938), and Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948), a statutory three-judge District Court held, 87 F. Supp.
526 , that the State had a constitutional duty to provide him
with the education he sought as soon as it provided that education
for applicants of any other group. It further held that, to the
extent the Oklahoma statutes denied him admission, they were
unconstitutional and void. On the assumption, however, that the
State would follow the constitutional mandate, the court refused to
grant the injunction, retaining jurisdiction of the cause with full
power to issue any necessary and proper orders to secure McLaurin
the equal protection of the laws.

															Following this decision, the Oklahoma legislature amended these
statutes to permit the admission of Negroes to institutions of
higher learning attended by white students, in cases where such
institutions offered courses not available in the Negro schools.
The amendment provided, however, that, in such cases the program of
instruction "shall be given at such colleges or institutions of
higher education upon a segregated basis." * Appellant Page 339 U. S. 640 was thereupon admitted to the University of Oklahoma Graduate
School. In apparent conformity with the amendment, his admission
was made subject to

															"such rules and regulations as to segregation as the President
of the University shall consider to afford Mr. G. W. McLaurin
substantially equal educational opportunities as are afforded to
other persons seeking the same education in the Graduate
College,"

															a condition which does not appear to have been withdrawn. Thus,
he was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the
mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the
regular reading room, and to sit at a designated table and to eat
at a different time from the other students in the school
cafeteria.

															To remove these conditions, appellant filed a motion to modify
the order and judgment of the District Court. That court held that
such treatment did not violate the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and denied the motion. 87 F.
Supp. 528 . This appeal followed.

															In the interval between the decision of the court below and the
hearing in this Court, the treatment afforded appellant was
altered. For some time, the section of the classroom in which
appellant sat was surrounded by a rail on which there was a sign
stating, "Reserved For Colored," but these have been removed. He is
now assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row specified for
colored students; he is assigned to a table in the library on the
main floor, and he is permitted to eat at the same time in the
cafeteria as other students, although here again he is assigned to
a special table.

															It is said that the separations imposed by the State in this
case are in form merely nominal. McLaurin uses the same classroom,
library, and cafeteria as students of other races; there is no
indication that the seats to which he is assigned in these rooms
have any disadvantage Page 339 U. S. 641 of location. He may wait in line in the cafeteria and there
stand and talk with his fellow students, but, while he eats, he
must remain apart.

															These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to comply, as
nearly as could be, with the statutory requirements of Oklahoma.
But they signify that the State, in administering the facilities it
affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart
from the other students. The result is that appellant is
handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such
restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession.

															Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained
leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case represents
perhaps the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an
advanced degree in education, to become, by definition, a leader
and trainer of others. Those who will come under his guidance and
influence must be directly affected by the education he receives.
Their own education and development will necessarily suffer to the
extent that his training is unequal to that of his classmates.
State-imposed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot
be sustained.

															It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position
when these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart
by his fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast
difference -- a Constitutional difference -- between restrictions
imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of
students and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the
state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 , 334 U. S. 13 -14
(1948). The removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily
abate individual and group predilections, prejudices, and choices.
But, at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant
of the opportunity Page 339 U. S. 642 to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits.

															We conclude that the conditions under which this appellant is
required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and
present right to the equal protection of the laws. See Sweatt
v. Painter, ante, p. 339 U. S. 629 . We
hold that, under these circumstances, the Fourteenth Amendment
precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race.
Appellant, having been admitted to a state-supported graduate
school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state
as students of other races. The judgment is Reversed. * The amendment adds the following proviso to each of the
sections relating to mixed schools:

															"Provided, that the provisions of this Section shall not apply
to programs of instruction leading to a particular degree given at
State owned or operated colleges or institutions of higher
education of this State established for and/or used by the white
race where such programs of instruction leading to a particular
degree are not given at colleges or institutions of higher
education of this State established for and/or used by the colored
race; provided further, that said programs of instruction leading
to a particular degree shall be given at such colleges or
institutions of higher education upon a segregated basis."

															70 Okla.Stat.Ann. (1950) §§ 455, 456, 457. Segregated basis is
defined as "classroom instruction given in separate classrooms, or
at separate times." Id., § 455.

Summary: In *McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents* (1950), the Supreme Court ruled that a state-supported university could not impose racial segregation on a black student, as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. The Court held that the conditions, such as separate seating in classrooms and libraries, impaired the student's ability to learn and engage with peers. The state must provide equal treatment regardless of individual or group prejudices.


U.S. Supreme Court Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948) Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma No. 369 Argued January 7-8,
1948 Decided January 12,
1948 332
U.S. 631 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
OKLAHOMA Syllabus A Negro, concededly qualified to receive professional legal
education offered by a State, cannot be denied such education
because of her color. The State must provide such education for her
in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any
other group. Pp. 332 U. S.
632 -633. 199 Okla. 36 , 180 P.2d 135 ,
reversed.

															The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed a denial by an inferior
state court of a writ of mandamus to require Page 332 U. S. 632 admission of a qualified Negro applicant to a state law school. 199 Okla. 36 , 180 P.2d 135 .
This Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 814. Reversed, p. 332 U. S. 633 .

															PER CURIAM.

															On January 14, 1946, the petitioner, a Negro, concededly
qualified to receive the professional legal education offered by
the State, applied for admission to the School of Law of the
University of Oklahoma, the only institution for legal education
supported and maintained by the taxpayers of the Oklahoma.
Petitioner's application for admission was denied solely because of
her color.

															Petitioner then made application for a writ of mandamus in the
District Court of Cleveland County, Oklahoma. The writ of mandamus
was refused, and the Supreme Court of the Oklahoma affirmed the
judgment of the District Court. 180 P.2d 135 .
We brought the case here for review.

															The petitioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by
a state institution. To this time, it has been denied her although,
during the same period, many Page 332 U. S. 633 white applicants have been afforded legal education by the
State. The State must provide it for her in conformity with the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and provide it
as soon as it does for applicants of any other group. Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 .

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed, and
the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

															The mandate shall issue forthwith. Reversed.

Summary: In *Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma* (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a qualified applicant cannot be denied admission to a state law school solely based on their race, as per the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court ordered the state to provide legal education to the applicant, a Negro, as soon as it would for applicants of any other race, reversing the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision.


U.S. Supreme Court Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954) Bolling v. Sharpe No. 8 Argued December 10-11,
1952 Reargued December 9,
1953 Decided May 17, 1954 347
U.S. 497 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus Racial segregation in the public schools of the District of
Columbia is a denial to Negro children of the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 347 U. S.
498 -500.

															(a) Though the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal
protection clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies
only to the States, the concepts of equal protection and due
process are not mutually exclusive. P. 347 U. S.
499 .

															(b) Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of
due process. P. 347 U. S.
499 .

															(c) Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to
any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro
children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due
Process Clause. Pp. 347 U. S.
499 -500.

															(d) In view of this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, ante, p. 347 U. S. 483 ,
that the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that
the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government. P. 347 U. S.
500 .

															(e) The case is restored to the docket for further argument on
specified questions relating to the form of the decree. P. 347 U. S.
500 . Page 347 U. S. 498 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia. The petitioners, minors of the
Negro race, allege that such segregation deprives them of due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused
admission to a public school attended by white children solely
because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court
for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court
dismissed their complaint. The Court granted a writ of certiorari
before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance
of the constitutional question presented. 344 U.S. 873.

															We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools. [ Footnote 1 ] The legal problem in the District of Columbia
is somewhat Page 347 U. S. 499 different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in
the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection
clause, as does the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the
states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually
exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit
safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and
therefore we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable
phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. [ Footnote 2 ]

															Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions, and
hence constitutionally suspect. [ Footnote 3 ] As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the
principle

															"that the constitution of the United States, in its present
form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned,
discrimination by the general government, or by the states, against
any citizen because of his race. [ Footnote 4 ]"

															And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60 , the Court held that a statute which limited the
right of a property owner to convey his property to a person of
another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of
due process of law.

															Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any
great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from
bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be
restricted except for a Page 347 U. S. 500 proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education
is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and
thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a
burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty
in violation of the Due Process Clause.

															In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government. [ Footnote 5 ] We hold that racial segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process
of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

															For the reasons set out in Brown v. Board of Education, this case will be restored to the docket for reargument on
Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court. 345 U.S.
972. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ] Brown v. Board of Education, ante, p. 347 U. S. 483 .

															[ Footnote 2 ] Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.
S. 329 ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S.
1 , 306 U. S. 13 -14; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 548 , 301 U. S.
585 .

															[ Footnote 3 ] Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.
S. 214 , 323 U. S. 216 ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81 , 320 U. S.
100 .

															[ Footnote 4 ] Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.
S. 565 , 162 U. S. 591 . Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 , 323 U. S.
198 -199.

															[ Footnote 5 ] Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 .

Summary: In Bolling v. Sharpe, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that racial segregation in public schools within the District of Columbia violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause like the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court argued that the concepts of equal protection and due process are linked and that discrimination can violate due process. The Court emphasized that classifications based solely on race are constitutionally suspect and that segregation in public education is not justifiable by any proper governmental objective. This decision extended the principles established in Brown v. Board of Education, which prohibited racial segregation in state schools, to the federal level.


U.S. Supreme Court Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949) Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York No. 51 Argued December 6,
1948 Decided January 31,
1949 336
U.S. 106 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
NEW YORK Syllabus A New York City traffic regulation forbids the operation of any
advertising vehicle on the streets, but excepts vehicles which have
upon them business notices or advertisements of the products of the
owner and which are not used merely or mainly for advertising. An
express company, which sold space on the exterior sides of its
trucks for advertising and which operated such trucks on the
streets, was convicted and fined for violating the ordinance. Upon
review here of the state court judgment, held: 1. The regulation does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 336 U. S.
108 -109.

															(a) The function of this Court upon such review is not to weigh
evidence on the due process issue in order to determine whether the
regulation is sound or appropriate, nor to pass judgment on the
wisdom of the regulation. P. 336 U. S.
109 .

															(b) This Court can not say that the regulation has no relation
to the trnffic problem of the City. P. 109.

															2. The exemption of vehicles having upon them advertisements of
products sold by the owner does not render the regulation a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Pp. 336 U. S.
109 -110. Page 336 U. S. 107 (a) This Court can not say that the advertising which is
forbidden has less incidence on traffic than that which is
exempted. P. 336 U. S.
110 .

															(b) The regulation is not rendered invalid by the fact that it
does not extend to what may be even greater distractions affecting
traffic safety, such as the spectacular displays at Times Square.
P. 336 U. S.
110 .

															3. The regulation does not burden interstate commerce in
violation of Art. I, § 8 of the Federal Constitution. P. 336 U. S.
111 .

															(a) Where traffic control and the use of highways are involved,
and where there is no conflicting federal regulation, great leeway
is allowed local authorities, even though the local regulation
materially interferes with interstate commerce. P. 336 U. S.
111 .

															297 N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13, affirmed.

															Appellant was convicted and fined for violation of a traffic
regulation of the City of New York. The conviction was sustained by
the Court of Special Sessions. 188 Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. 297 N Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13. On appeal to
this Court, affirmed, p. 336 U. S.
111 .

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Section 124 of the Traffic Regulations of the City of New York
[ Footnote 1 ] promulgated by the
Police Commissioner provides:

															"No person shall operate, or cause to be operated, in or upon
any street an advertising vehicle; provided Page 336 U. S. 108 that nothing herein contained shall prevent the putting of
business notices upon business delivery vehicles, so long as such
vehicles are engaged in the usual business or regular work of the
owner, and not used merely or mainly for advertising."

															Appellant is engaged in a nationwide express business. It
operates about 1,900 trucks in New York City, and sells the space
on the exterior sides of these trucks for advertising. That
advertising is, for the most part, unconnected with its own
business. [ Footnote 2 ] It was
convicted in the magistrates court and fined. The judgment of
conviction was sustained in the Court of Special Sessions. 188
Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732. The Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion by a divided vote. 297 N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13. The case is
here on appeal. Judicial Code § 237(a), 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), as
amended, now 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

															The Court, in Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467 ,
sustained the predecessor ordinance to the present regulation over
the objection that it violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that that was a
municipal Page 336 U. S. 109 ordinance resting on the broad base of the police power, while
the present regulation stands or falls merely as a traffic
regulation. But we do not believe that distinction warrants a
different result in the two cases.

															The Court of Special Sessions concluded that advertising on
vehicles using the streets of New York City constitutes a
distraction to vehicle drivers and to pedestrians alike, and
therefore affects the safety of the public in the use of the
streets. [ Footnote 3 ] We do not
sit to weigh evidence on the due process issue in order to
determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor is it
our function to pass judgment on its wisdom. See Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 . We
would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and
specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this
regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City.
It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such
a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be
palpably false.

															The question of equal protection of the laws is pressed more
strenuously on us. It is pointed out that the regulation draws the
line between advertisements of products sold by the owner of the
truck and general advertisements. It is argued that unequal
treatment on the basis of such a distinction is not justified by
the aim and purpose of the regulation. It is said, for example,
that one of appellant's trucks carrying the advertisement of a
commercial house would not cause any greater distraction of
pedestrians and vehicle drivers than if the Page 336 U. S. 110 commercial house carried the same advertisement on its own
truck. Yet the regulation allows the latter to do what the former
is forbidden from doing. It is therefore contended that the
classification which the regulation makes has no relation to the
traffic problem, since a violation turns not on what kind of
advertisements are carried on trucks, but on whose trucks they are
carried.

															That, however, is a superficial way of analyzing the problem,
even if we assume that it is premised on the correct construction
of the regulation. The local authorities may well have concluded
that those who advertised their own wares on their trucks do not
present the same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of
the advertising which they use. It would take a degree of
omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case. If that
judgment is correct, the advertising displays that are exempt have
less incidence on traffic than those of appellants.

															We cannot say that that judgment is not an allowable one. Yet,
if it is, the classification has relation to the purpose for which
it is made, and does not contain the kind of discrimination against
which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection. It is by such
practical considerations based on experience, rather than by
theoretical inconsistencies, that the question of equal protection
is to be answered. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 138 , 232 U. S. 144 ; Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.
S. 170 , 256 U. S.
198 -199; Metropolitan Casualty Co. of New York v.
Brownell, 294 U. S. 580 , 294 U. S.
585 -586. And the fact that New York City sees fit to
eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction, but does not touch
what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the
vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no requirement
of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated
or none at all. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 , 226 U. S.
160 . Page 336 U. S. 111 It is finally contended that the regulation is a burden on
interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution. Many of these trucks are engaged in delivering goods
in interstate commerce from New Jersey to New York. Where traffic
control and the use of highways are involved, and where there is no
conflicting federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local
authorities, even though the local regulation materially interferes
with interstate commerce. The case in that posture is controlled by South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.
S. 177 , 303 U. S. 187 et seq. . And see Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.
S. 598 . Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE acquiesces in the Court's opinion and
judgment, dubitante on the question of equal protection of
the laws.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															This regulation was promulgated by the Police Commissioner
pursuant to the power granted the police department under § 435 of
the New York City Charter, which provides as follows:

															"The police department and force shall have the power and it
shall be their duty to . . . regulate, direct, control and restrict
the movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the
facilitation of traffic, and the convenience of the public as well
as the proper protection of human life and health; . . . The
commissioner shall make such rules and regulations for the conduct
of pedestrian and vehicular traffic in the use of the public
streets, squares and avenues as he may deem necessary. . . ."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The advertisements for which appellant was convicted consisted
of posters from three by seven feet to four by ten feet portraying
Camel Cigarettes, Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus,
and radio station WOR. Drivers of appellant's trucks carrying
advertisements of Prince Albert Smoking Tobacco and U.S. Navy were
also convicted.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The element of safety was held to be one of the standards by
which the regulations of the Police Commissioner were to be judged.
We accept that construction of the authority of the Police
Commissioner under § 435 of the Charter, note 1 supra. See Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 , 238 U. S. 451 ; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. N. O. Nelson Co., 291 U. S. 352 , 291 U. S. 358 ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly, 319 U. S. 94 , 310 U. S.
97 .

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

															There are two clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which this
Court may invoke to invalidate ordinances by which municipal
governments seek to solve their local problems. One says that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." The other declares that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."

															My philosophy as to the relative readiness with which we should
resort to these two clauses is almost diametrically opposed to the
philosophy which prevails on this Court. While claims of denial of
equal protection are frequently asserted, they are rarely
sustained. But the Court frequently uses the due process clause to
strike down measures taken by municipalities to deal with
activities in their streets and public places which the local Page 336 U. S. 112 authorities consider to create hazards, annoyances or
discomforts to their inhabitants. And I have frequently dissented
when I thought local power was improperly denied. See, for
example, opinion in Douglas v. Jeannette and
companion cases, 319 U. S. 157 , 319 U. S.
166 ,; and dissents in Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 , 334 U. S. 566 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 , 321 U. S.
176 .

															The burden should rest heavily upon one who would persuade us to
use the due process clause to strike down a substantive law or
ordinance. Even its provident use against municipal regulations
frequently disables all government -- state, municipal and federal
-- from dealing with the conduct in question because the
requirement of due process is also applicable to State and Federal
Governments. Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due
process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which
many people find objectionable.

															Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand,
does not disable any governmental body from dealing with the
subject at hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation
must have a broader impact. I regard it as a salutary doctrine that
cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise their
powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except
upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object
of regulation. This equality is not merely abstract justice. The
framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation, and thus
to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them
if larger numbers were affected. Page 336 U. S. 113 Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be
just than to require that laws be equal in operation.

															This case affords an illustration. Even casual observations from
the sidewalks of New York will show that an ordinance which would
forbid all advertising on vehicles would run into conflict with
many interests, including some, if not all, of the great
metropolitan newspapers, which use that advertising extensively.
Their blandishment of the latest sensations is not less a cause of
diverted attention and traffic hazard than the commonplace
cigarette advertisement which this truck owner is forbidden to
display. But any regulation applicable to all such advertising
would require much clearer justification in local conditions to
enable its enactment than does some regulation applicable to a few.
I do not mention this to criticize the motives of those who enacted
this ordinance, but it dramatizes the point that we are much more
likely to find arbitrariness in the regulation of the few than of
the many. Hence, for my part, I am more receptive to attack on
local ordinances for denial of equal protection than for denial of
due process, while the Court has more often used the latter
clause.

															In this case, if the City of New York should assume that display
of any advertising on vehicles tends and intends to distract the
attention of persons using the highways and to increase the dangers
of its traffic, I should think it fully within its constitutional
powers to forbid it all. The same would be true if the City should
undertake to eliminate or minimize the hazard by any generally
applicable restraint, such as limiting the size, color, shape or
perhaps to some extent the contents of vehicular advertising.
Instead of such general regulation of advertising, however, the
City seeks to reduce the hazard only by saying that while some may,
others may not exhibit such appeals. The same display, for
example, Page 336 U. S. 114 advertising cigarettes, which this appellant is forbidden to
carry on its trucks, may be carried on the trucks of a cigarette
dealer and might on the trucks of this appellant if it dealt in
cigarettes. And almost an identical advertisement, certainly one of
equal size, shape, color, and appearance, may be carried by this
appellant if it proclaims its own offer to transport cigarettes.
But it may not be carried so long as the message is not its own,
but a cigarette dealer's offer to sell the same cigarettes.

															The City urges that this applies equally to all persons of a
permissible classification, because all that it does is (1) forbid
all inhabitants of New York City from engaging in the business of
selling advertising space on trucks which move as part of the city
traffic; (2) forbid all truck owners from incidentally employing
their vehicles for such purpose, with the exception that all truck
owners can advertise their own business on their own trucks. It is
argued that, while this does not eliminate vehicular advertising,
it does eliminate such advertising for hire, and, to this extent,
cuts down the hazard sought to be controlled.

															That the difference between carrying on any business for hire
and engaging in the same activity on one's own is a sufficient one
to sustain some types of regulations of the one that is not applied
to the other is almost elementary. But it is usual to find such
regulations applied to the very incidents wherein the two classes
present different problems, such as in charges, liability and
quality of service.

															The difference, however, is invoked here to sustain a
discrimination in a problem in which the two classes present
identical dangers. The courts of New York have declared that the
sole nature and purpose of the regulation before us is to reduce
traffic hazards. There is not even a pretense here that the traffic
hazard created Page 336 U. S. 115 by the advertising which is forbidden is in any manner or degree
more hazardous than that which is permitted. It is urged with
considerable force that this local regulation does not comply with
the equal protection clause, because it applies unequally upon
classes whose differentiation is in no way relevant to the objects
of the regulation.

															As a matter of principle, and in view of my attitude toward the
equal protection clause, I do not think differences of treatment
under law should be approved on classification because of
differences unrelated to the legislative purpose. The equal
protection clause ceases to assure either equality or protection if
it is avoided by any conceivable difference that can be pointed out
between those bound and those left free. This Court has often
announced the principle that the differentiation must have an
appropriate relation to the object of the legislation or ordinance. See, for example, Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266 ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 . In
the latter case, a motor vehicle regulation was struck down upon
citation of many authorities because "such a classification is not
based on anything having relation to the purpose for which it is
made." 283 U. S. 283 U.S.
553, 283 U. S. 567 .
If that were the situation here, I should think we should reach a
similar conclusion.

															The question in my mind comes to this. Where individuals
contribute to an evil or danger in the same way and to the same
degree, may those who do so for hire be prohibited, while those who
do so for their own commercial ends but not for hire be allowed to
continue? I think the answer has to be that the hireling may be put
in a class by himself, and may be dealt with differently than those
who act on their own. But this is not merely because such a
discrimination will enable the lawmaker to diminish the evil. That
might be done by many classifications, which I should think wholly
unsustainable. Page 336 U. S. 116 It is, rather, because there is a real difference between doing
in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to
tolerate action from those who act on their own, and it is another
thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a price.

															Certainly the presence of absence of hire has been the hook by
which much highway regulations has been supported. Rights usual to
passengers may be denied to the nonpaying guest in an automobile to
limit vexatious litigation. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.
S. 117 . A state may require security against injuries
from one using the highways for hire that it does not exact from
others because, as Mr. Justice Sutherland put it,

															"The streets belong to the public, and are primarily for the use
of the public in the ordinary way. Their use for the purposes of
gain is special and extraordinary, and, generally at least, may be
prohibited or conditioned as the Legislature deems proper." Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 , 264 U. S. 144 .
In the case of those who let out automobiles to those who drive
them, the Court, through Mr. Justice Butler, said of the State, "It
may prohibit or condition as it deems proper the use of city
streets as a place for the carrying on of private business." Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335 , 284 U. S. 337 . See also Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.
S. 374 , 286 U. S. 393 ; Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251 , 287 U. S. 278 ; Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169 ; Stanley v. Public Utilities Commission, 295 U. S.
76 ; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia
Commission, 295 U. S. 285 ; Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Commission, 306 U. S. 72 . The
rule was flatly stated for the Court by Mr. Justice Brandeis:

															"In dealing with the problem of safety of the highways, as in
other problems of motor transportation, the state may adopt
measures which favor vehicles used solely in the business of their
owners, as distinguished from those which are operated for hire by
carriers who use the highways as their place of business." Bradley v. Public Utilities
Commission , 289 Page 336 U. S. 117 U.S. 92, 289 U. S. 97 .
However, it is otherwise if the discriminations within the
regulates class are based on arbitrary differences as to
commodities carried having no relation to the object of the
regulation. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.
S. 553 . See also Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389 .

															Of course, this appellant did not hold itself out to carry or
display everybody's advertising, and its rental of space on the
sides of its trucks was only incidental to the main business which
brought its trucks into the streets. But it is not difficult to see
that, in a day of extravagant advertising more or less subsidized
by tax deduction, the rental of truck space could become an
obnoxious enterprise. While I do not think highly of this type of
regulation, that is not my business, and in view of the control I
would concede to cities to protect citizens in quiet and orderly
use for their proper purposes of the highways and public places, see dissent in Saia v. New York, 334 U.
S. 558 , I think the judgment below must be affirmed.

Summary: The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York City traffic regulation prohibiting the operation of advertising vehicles on streets, with an exemption for vehicles displaying advertisements for the owner's products. The Court found that the regulation did not violate due process, equal protection, or burden interstate commerce. It allowed local authorities significant discretion in traffic control and highway use, recognizing the unique challenges of urban transportation.


U.S. Supreme Court Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Argued December 9, 1952 Reargued December 8, 1953 Decided May 17, 1954* APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different
facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question
justifies their consideration together in this consolidated
opinion. [ Footnote 1 ] [487 ]

															In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their
legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining
admission to the public schools of their community on a
nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [488 ]

															they had been denied admission to schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according
to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge
federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the
so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Fergson, 163 U. S. 537 .
Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the
races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though
these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme
Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the
plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their
superiority to the Negro schools.

															The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not
"equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the
obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took
jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2 ]
Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this
Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. [ Footnote 3 ] [489 ]

															Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress,
ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial
segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the
Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us
that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among
"all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their
opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter
and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most
limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures
had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

															An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the
Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the
status of public education at that time. [ Footnote 4 ] In the South, the movement toward free
common schools, supported [490 ]

															by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white
children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of
Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race
were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by
law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the
business and professional world. It is true that public school
education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the
North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was
generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North,
the conditions of public education did not approximate those
existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded
schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three
months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was
virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that
there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.

															In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth
Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court
interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations
against the Negro race. [ Footnote
5 ] The doctrine of [491 ]

															"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court
until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. [ Footnote 6 ] American courts have since labored with
the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have
been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the
field of public education. [ Footnote 7 ] In Cumming v. County Board of
Education, 175 U. S. 528 , and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78 , the
validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. [ Footnote 8 ] In more recent cases, all on
the graduate school [492 ]

															level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by
white students were denied to Negro students of the same
educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U. S. 631 ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.
S. 637 . In none of these cases was it necessary to
reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And
in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved
decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should
be held inapplicable to public education.

															In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here,
unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that
the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are
being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula,
qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible"
factors. [ Footnote 9 ] Our
decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these
tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of
the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself
on public education.

															In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout [493 ]

															the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation
in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection
of the laws.

															Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.

															We come then to the question presented: does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though
the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.

															In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal
educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on
"those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a
Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other
students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." [494 ]

															Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade
and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The
effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was
well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which
nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro
plaintiffs:

															"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system. [ Footnote 10 ]"

															Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply
supported by modern authority. [ Footnote 11 ] Any language [495 ]

															in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is
rejected.

															We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have
been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of,
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 12 ]

															Because these are class actions, because of the wide
applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of
local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases
presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to
the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in
public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may
have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested
to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously
propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. [ Footnote 13 ] The Attorney General [496 ]

															of the United States is again invited to participate. The
Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation
in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici
curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and
submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. [ Footnote 14 ] It is so ordered. * Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued
December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board
of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,
argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953, and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued
December 9, 1953.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in
Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas
statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than
15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro
and white students. Kan.Gen.Stat. § 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to
that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish
segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the
community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and
2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental
effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that
the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect
to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational
qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp.
797 . The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1253.

															In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school
age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of South
Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of
Negroes and whites in public schools. S.C.Const., Art. XI, § 7;
S.C.Code § 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The
court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white
schools, and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to
equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of
the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the
white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp.
529 . This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and
remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on
a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in
the equalization program. 342 U. S. 350 . On
remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been
achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were
proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F.
Supp. 920 . The case is again here on direct appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1253.

															In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the
plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince
Edward County. They brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin
enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory
code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public
schools. Va.Const., § 140; Va.Code § 22-221 (1950). The three-judge
District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284, denied
the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in
physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the
defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and
transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and
dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in
the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the
contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the
white schools during the equalization program. 103 F.
Supp. 337 . The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1253.

															In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs
are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing
in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware
Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state
constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of
Negroes and whites in public schools. Del.Const., Art. X, § 2;
Del.Rev.Code § 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for the
plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools
previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the
Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher training,
pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant,
and time and distance involved in travel. 87
A.2d 862 . The Chancellor also found that segregation itself
results in an inferior education for Negro children ( see note 10 infra ), but
did not rest his decision on that ground. Id. at 865. The
Chancellor's decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware,
which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to
obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro
and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A.2d
137 , 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware
courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro
plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for
certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891. The plaintiffs, who
were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.

															[ Footnote 2 ] 344 U. S. 1 , 141,
891.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															345 U.S. 972. The Attorney General of the United States
participated both Terms as amicus curiae. [ Footnote 4 ]

															For a general study of the development of public education prior
to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of
Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public
Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School
practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment are described in Butts and Cremin, supra, at
269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight,
Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See
also H. Ex.Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although
the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same
pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the
South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty
years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower
development in the South ( e.g., the rural character of the
South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance)
are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the
country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War
virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id. at
427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the
country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in
Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941),
112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not
generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force
in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.

															[ Footnote 5 ] Slaughter-House
Cases , 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ,
307-308 (1880):

															"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the
same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether
colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States,
and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by law because of their color? The words of the
amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most
valuable to the colored race -- the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored --
exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race." See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.
S. 313 , 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 ,
344-345 (1880).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of
Boston, 59 Mass.198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation
against attack as being violative of a state constitutional
guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was
eliminated in 1855. Mass.Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the
North, segregation in public education has persisted in some
communities until recent years. It is apparent that such
segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of
sectional concern.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S.
45 (1908).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															In the Cummin case, Negro taxpayers sought an
injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the
operation of a high school for white children until the board
resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly,
in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese
descent, contended only that state authorities had misapplied the
doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him
to attend a Negro school.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality
as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp.
797 , 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found
that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to
comply with the court's decree." 103 F.
Supp. 920 , 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted
that the equalization program was already "afoot and progressing"
( 103 F.
Supp. 337 , 341); since then, we have been advised, in the
Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program
has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below
similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well
under way. 91 A.2d 137 ,
149.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															A similar finding was made in the Delaware case:

															"I conclude from the testimony that, in our Delaware society,
State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro
children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are
substantially inferior to those available to white children
otherwise similarly situated." 87 A.2d
862 , 865.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															K.B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on
Personality Development (Mid-century White House Conference on
Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the
Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological
Effects of Enforced Segregation A Survey of Social Science Opinion,
26 J.Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects
of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3
Int.J.Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational
Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., 1949),
44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools
violates the Fourteenth Amendment"

															"( a ) would a decree necessarily follow providing that,
within the limits set by normal geographic school districting,
Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their
choice, or"

															"( b ) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity
powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about
from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color
distinctions?"

															"5. On the assumption on which questions 4( a ) and
( b ) are based, and assuming further that this Court will
exercise its equity powers to the end described in question
4( b ),"

															"( a ) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in
these cases;"

															"( b ) if so, what specific issues should the decrees
reach;"

															"( c ) should this Court appoint a special master to hear
evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such
decrees;"

															"( d ) should this Court remand to the courts of first
instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases and, if
so, what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first instance
follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed
decrees?"

															[ Footnote 14 ] See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective
July 1, 1954).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the key points from the case:

- The case, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, was a consolidation of several cases from different states, all involving racial segregation in public schools.
- The plaintiffs, minors of the Negro race, sought admission to white schools, arguing that segregated schools were inherently unequal and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The lower courts in all but one case upheld segregation under the "separate but equal" doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson. The Delaware court ordered admission to white schools due to their superiority over Negro schools.
- The Supreme Court took jurisdiction due to the importance of the question presented and heard rearguments focused on the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Court concluded that racial segregation in public education violated the Equal Protection Clause, overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and ending legal segregation in US public schools.
- The Court recognized the negative psychological impact of segregation and the inherent inequality of separate educational facilities.
- The Court considered the implementation of desegregation, including the potential for gradual adjustment and the formulation of detailed decrees.

This case was a landmark decision that played a crucial role in the civil rights movement, ending legal segregation in public schools and setting a precedent for further challenges to racial segregation in other areas of American life.