U.S. Supreme Court Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988) Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier No. 86-836 Argued October 13,
1987 Decided January 13,
1988 484
U.S. 260 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondents, former high school students who were staff members
of the school's newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court
against petitioners, the school district and school officials,
alleging that respondents' First Amendment rights were violated by
the deletion from a certain issue of the paper of two pages that
included an article describing school students' experiences with
pregnancy and another article discussing the impact of divorce on
students at the school. The newspaper was written and edited by a
journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to
the school's practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted
page proofs to the school's principal, who objected to the
pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named,
might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the
article's references to sexual activity and birth control were
inappropriate for some of the younger students. The principal
objected to the divorce article because the page proofs he was
furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final
version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the
principal believed that the student's parents should have been
given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to
their publication. Believing that there was no time to make
necessary changes in the articles if the paper was to be issued
before the end of the school year, the principal directed that the
pages on which they appeared be withheld from publication even
though other, unobjectionable articles were included on such pages.
The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had
occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: Respondents' First Amendment rights were not
violated.

															(a) First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings, and must be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment. A school need not
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic
educational mission, even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school.

															(b) The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum
for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public
forums Page 484 U. S. 261 only if school authorities have, by policy or by practice,
opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public,
or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If
the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been
created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on
the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school
community. The school officials in this case did not deviate from
their policy that the newspaper's production was to be part of the
educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity under the
journalism teacher's control as to almost every aspect of
publication. The officials did not evince any intent to open the
paper's pages to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and
editors, or by the student body generally. Accordingly, school
officials were entitled to regulate the paper's contents in any
reasonable manner.

															(c) The standard for determining when a school may punish
student expression that happens to occur on school premises is not
the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its
name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 ,
distinguished. Educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities, so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.

															(d) The school principal acted reasonably in this case in
requiring the deletion of the pregnancy article, the divorce
article, and the other articles that were to appear on the same
pages of the newspaper.

															795 F.2d 1368, reversed.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 484 U. S.
277 . Page 484 U. S. 262 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise
editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper
produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum. I Petitioners are the Hazelwood School District in St. Louis
County, Missouri; various school officials; Robert Eugene Reynolds,
the principal of Hazelwood East High School; and Howard Emerson, a
teacher in the school district. Respondents are three former
Hazelwood East students who were staff members of Spectrum, the
school newspaper. They contend that school officials violated their
First Amendment rights by deleting two pages of articles from the
May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum.

															Spectrum was written and edited by the Journalism II class at
Hazelwood East. The newspaper was published every three weeks or so
during the 1982-1983 school year. More than 4,500 copies of the
newspaper were distributed during that year to students, school
personnel, and members of the community.

															The Board of Education allocated funds from its annual budget
for the printing of Spectrum. These funds were supplemented by
proceeds from sales of the newspaper. The printing expenses during
the 1982-1983 school year totaled $4,668.50; revenue from sales was
$1,166.84. The other costs associated with the newspaper -- such as
supplies, textbooks, Page 484 U. S. 263 and a portion of the journalism teacher's salary -- were borne
entirely by the Board.

															The Journalism II course was taught by Robert Stergos for most
of the 1982-1983 academic year. Stergos left Hazelwood East to take
a job in private industry on April 29, 1983, when the May 13
edition of Spectrum was nearing completion, and petitioner Emerson
took his place as newspaper adviser for the remaining weeks of the
term.

															The practice at Hazelwood East during the spring 1983 semester
was for the journalism teacher to submit page proofs of each
Spectrum issue to Principal Reynolds for his review prior to
publication. On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13
edition to Reynolds, who objected to two of the articles scheduled
to appear in that edition. One of the stories described three
Hazelwood East students' experiences with pregnancy; the other
discussed the impact of divorce on students at the school.

															Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used
false names "to keep the identity of these girls a secret," the
pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text. He
also believed that the article's references to sexual activity and
birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students
at the school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student
identified by name in the divorce story had complained that her
father "wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister and I"
prior to the divorce, "was always out of town on business or out
late playing cards with the guys," and "always argued about
everything" with her mother. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38. Reynolds
believed that the student's parents should have been given an
opportunity to respond to these remarks, or to consent to their
publication. He was unaware that Emerson had deleted the student's
name from the final version of the article.

															Reynolds believed that there was no time to make the necessary
changes in the stories before the scheduled press run, Page 484 U. S. 264 and that the newspaper would not appear before the end of the
school year if printing were delayed to any significant extent. He
concluded that his only options under the circumstances were to
publish a four-page newspaper instead of the planned six-page
newspaper, eliminating the two pages on which the offending stories
appeared, or to publish no newspaper at all. Accordingly, he
directed Emerson to withhold from publication the two pages
containing the stories on pregnancy and divorce. [ Footnote 1 ] He informed his superiors of the
decision, and they concurred.

															Respondents subsequently commenced this action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking
a declaration that their First Amendment rights had been violated,
injunctive relief, and monetary damages. After a bench trial, the
District Court denied an injunction, holding that no First
Amendment violation had occurred. 607 F.
Supp. 1450 (1985).

															The District Court concluded that school officials may impose
restraints on students' speech in activities that are " an
integral part of the school's educational function'" -- including
the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism
class -- so long as their decision has "`a substantial and
reasonable basis.'" Id. at 1466 (quoting Frasca v.
Andrews, 463
F. Supp. 1043 , 1052 (EDNY 1979)). The court found that
Principal Reynolds' concern that the pregnant students' anonymity
would be lost and their privacy invaded was "legitimate and
reasonable," given "the small number of pregnant students at
Hazelwood East and several identifying characteristics that were
disclosed in the article." 607 F. Supp. at 1466. The court held
that Reynolds' action was also justified "to avoid the impression
that [the school] endorses Page 484 U. S. 265 the sexual norms of the subjects" and to shield younger students
from exposure to unsuitable material. Ibid. The deletion
of the article on divorce was seen by the court as a reasonable
response to the invasion of privacy concerns raised by the named
student's remarks. Because the article did not indicate that the
student's parents had been offered an opportunity to respond to her
allegations, said the court, there was cause for

															"serious doubt that the article complied with the rules of
fairness which are standard in the field of journalism and which
were covered in the textbook used in the Journalism II class." Id. at 1467. Furthermore, the court concluded that
Reynolds was justified in deleting two full pages of the newspaper,
instead of deleting only the pregnancy and divorce stories or
requiring that those stories be modified to address his concerns,
based on his

															"reasonable belief that he had to make an immediate decision and
that there was no time to make modifications to the articles in
question." Id. at 1466.

															The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 795 F.2d
1368 (1986). The court held at the outset that Spectrum was not
only "a part of the school adopted curriculum," id. at
1373, but also a public forum, because the newspaper was "intended
to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." Id. at 1372. The court then concluded that Spectrum's
status as a public forum precluded school officials from censoring
its contents except when " necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with school work or discipline . . . or
the rights of others.'" Id. at 1374 (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.
S. 503 , 393 U. S. 511 (1969)). The Court of Appeals found

															"no evidence in the record that the principal could have
reasonably forecast that the censored articles or any materials in
the censored articles would have materially disrupted classwork or
given rise to substantial disorder in the school."

															795 F.2d at 1375. School officials were entitled to censor the
articles on the ground that Page 484 U. S. 266 they invaded the rights of others, according to the court, only
if publication of the articles could have resulted in tort
liability to the school. The court concluded that no tort action
for libel or invasion of privacy could have been maintained against
the school by the subjects of the two articles or by their
families. Accordingly, the court held that school officials had
violated respondents' First Amendment rights by deleting the two
pages of the newspaper.

															We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), and we now
reverse. II Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, supra, at 393 U. S. 506 . They cannot be punished merely for
expressing their personal views on the school premises -- whether
"in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours," 393 U.S. at 393 U. S.
512 -513 -- unless school authorities have reason to
believe that such expression will "substantially interfere with the
work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. at 393 U. S.
509 .

															We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights
of students in the public schools "are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings," Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.
S. 675 , 403 U. S. 682 (1986), and must be "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker, supra, at 393 U. S. 506 ; cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.
S. 325 , 469 U. S.
341 -343 (1985). A school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its "basic educational mission," Fraser, supra, at 478 U. S. 685 , even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school. Accordingly, we held in Fraser that a student could be disciplined for having
delivered a speech that was "sexually explicit" but not legally
obscene at an official school assembly, because the school was
entitled to "disassociate itself " from the speech in a manner Page 484 U. S. 267 that would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is "wholly
inconsistent with the fundamental values' of public school
education." 478 U.S. at 478 U. S.
685 -686. We thus recognized that "[t]he determination of
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board," id. at 478 U. S. 683 ,
rather than with the federal courts. It is in this context that
respondents' First Amendment claims must be considered. A We deal first with the question whether Spectrum may
appropriately be characterized as a forum for public expression.
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets,
parks, and other traditional public forums that "time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496 , 307 U. S. 515 (1939). Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 , 454 U. S.
267 -268, n. 5 (1981). Hence, school facilities may be
deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have "by
policy or by practice" opened those facilities "for indiscriminate
use by the general public," Perry Education Assn. v. Perry
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 47 (1983), or by some segment of the public, such as student
organizations. Id. at 460 U. S. 46 , n.
7 (citing Widmar v. Vincent ). If the facilities have
instead been reserved for other intended purposes, "communicative
or otherwise," then no public forum has been created, and school
officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of
students, teachers, and other members of the school community. 460
U.S. at 460 U. S. 46 , n.
7.

															"The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788 , 473 U. S. 802 (1985). Page 484 U. S. 268 The policy of school officials toward Spectrum was reflected in
Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 and the Hazelwood East
Curriculum Guide. Board Policy 348.51 provided that

															"[s]chool sponsored publications are developed within the
adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular
classroom activities."

															App. 22. The Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide described the
Journalism II course as a "laboratory situation in which the
students publish the school newspaper applying skills they have
learned in Journalism I." Id. at 11. The lessons that were
to be learned from the Journalism II course, according to the
Curriculum Guide, included development of journalistic skills under
deadline pressure, "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions
imposed upon journalists within the school community," and
"responsibility and acceptance of criticism for articles of
opinion." Ibid. Journalism II was taught by a faculty
member during regular class hours. Students received grades and
academic credit for their performance in the course.

															School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy
that production of Spectrum was to be part of the educational
curriculum, and a "regular classroom activit[y]." The District
Court found that Robert Stergos, the journalism teacher during most
of the 1982-1983 school year, "both had the authority to exercise,
and in fact exercised, a great deal of control over Spectrum." 607
F. Supp. at 1453. For example, Stergos selected the editors of the
newspaper, scheduled publication dates, decided the number of pages
for each issue, assigned story ideas to class members, advised
students on the development of their stories, reviewed the use of
quotations, edited stories, selected and edited the letters to the
editor, and dealt with the printing company. Many of these
decisions were made without consultation with the Journalism II
students. The District Court thus found it

															"clear that Mr. Stergos was the final authority with respect to
almost every aspect of the production and publication of Spectrum,
including its content." Ibid. Moreover, after Page 484 U. S. 269 each Spectrum issue had been finally approved by Stergos or his
successor, the issue still had to be reviewed by Principal Reynolds
prior to publication. Respondents' assertion that they had believed
that they could publish "practically anything" in Spectrum was
therefore dismissed by the District Court as simply "not credible." Id. at 1456. These factual findings are amply supported by
the record, and were not rejected as clearly erroneous by the Court
of Appeals.

															The evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding
Spectrum to be a public forum, see 795 F.2d at 1372-1373,
is equivocal, at best. For example, Board Policy 348.51, which
stated in part that "[s]chool sponsored student publications will
not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules
of responsible journalism," also stated that such publications were
"developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational
implications." App. 22. One might reasonably infer from the full
text of Policy 348.51 that school officials retained ultimate
control over what constituted "responsible journalism" in a
school-sponsored newspaper. Although the Statement of Policy
published in the September 14, 1982, issue of Spectrum declared
that "Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all rights
implied by the First Amendment," this statement, understood in the
context of the paper's role in the school's curriculum, suggests,
at most, that the administration will not interfere with the
students' exercise of those First Amendment rights that attend the
publication of a school-sponsored newspaper. It does not reflect an
intent to expand those rights by converting a curricular newspaper
into a public forum. [ Footnote
2 ] Finally, Page 484 U. S. 270 that students were permitted to exercise some authority over the
contents of Spectrum was fully consistent with the Curriculum Guide
objective of teaching the Journalism II students "leadership
responsibilities as issue and page editors." App. 11. A decision to
teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity
hardly implies a decision to relinquish school control over that
activity. In sum, the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals
fails to demonstrate the "clear intent to create a public forum," Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 802 ,
that existed in cases in which we found public forums to have been
created. See id. at 473 U. S.
802 -803 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 267 ; Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167 , 429 U. S. 174 ,
n. 6 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 , 420 U. S. 555 (1975)). School officials did not evince either "by policy or by
practice," Perry Education Assn., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 47 ,
any intent to open the pages of Spectrum to "indiscriminate use," ibid., by its student reporters and editors, or by the
student body generally. Instead, they "reserve[d] the forum for its
intended purpos[e]," id. at 460 U. S. 46 , as
a supervised learning experience for journalism students.
Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the
contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner. Ibid. It is
this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that
governs this case. B The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech -- the question that we
addressed in Tinker -- is different from the question
whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively Page 484 U. S. 271 to promote particular student speech. The former question
addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter
question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These
activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school
curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences. [ Footnote 3 ]

															Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this
second form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a
school may, in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or
producer of a school play, "disassociate itself," Fraser, 478 U.S. at 478 U. S. 685 ,
not only from speech that would "substantially interfere with [its]
work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other students," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 509 ,
but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly
written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or
profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences. [ Footnote 4 ] A school must be able to set high
standards for Page 484 U. S. 272 the student speech that is disseminated under its auspices --
standards that may be higher than those demanded by some newspaper
publishers or theatrical producers in the "real" world -- and may
refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those
standards. In addition, a school must be able to take into account
the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining
whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an
elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual
activity in a high school setting. A school must also retain the
authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably
be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or
conduct otherwise inconsistent with "the shared values of a
civilized social order," Fraser, supra, at 478 U. S. 683 ,
or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality
on matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the schools would
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as

															"a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 , 347 U. S. 493 (1954).

															Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student
expression need not also be the standard for determining when a
school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the
dissemination Page 484 U. S. 273 of student expression. [ Footnote
5 ] Instead, we hold that educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities, so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns. [ Footnote 6 ]

															This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of
federal judges. See, e.g., Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.
S. 176 , 458 U. S. 208 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.
S. 308 , 420 U. S. 326 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S. 104 (1968). It is only when the decision to censor a school-sponsored
publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student
expression has no valid educational purpose that the First
Amendment is so "directly and sharply implicate[d]," ibid., as to require judicial intervention to protect
students' constitutional rights. [ Footnote 7 ] Page 484 U. S. 274 III We also conclude that Principal Reynolds acted reasonably in
requiring the deletion from the May 13 issue of Spectrum of the
pregnancy article, the divorce article, and the remaining articles
that were to appear on the same pages of the newspaper.

															The initial paragraph of the pregnancy article declared that
"[a]ll names have been changed to keep the identity of these girls
a secret." The principal concluded that the students' anonymity was
not adequately protected, however, given the other identifying
information in the article and the small number of pregnant
students at the school. Indeed, a teacher at the school credibly
testified that she could positively identify at least one of the
girls, and possibly all three. It is likely that many students at
Hazelwood East would have been at least as successful in
identifying the girls. Reynolds therefore could reasonably have
feared that the article violated whatever pledge of anonymity had
been given to the pregnant students. In addition, he could
reasonably have been concerned that the article was not
sufficiently sensitive to the privacy interests of the students'
boyfriends and parents, who were discussed in the article but who
were given no opportunity to consent to its publication or to offer
a response. The article did not contain graphic accounts of sexual
activity. The girls did comment in the article, however, concerning
their sexual histories and their use or nonuse of birth control. It
was not unreasonable for the principal to have concluded that such
frank talk was inappropriate in a school-sponsored publication
distributed to 14-year-old freshmen Page 484 U. S. 275 and presumably taken home to be read by students' even younger
brothers and sisters.

															The student who was quoted by name in the version of the divorce
article seen by Principal Reynolds made comments sharply critical
of her father. The principal could reasonably have concluded that
an individual publicly identified as an inattentive parent --
indeed, as one who chose "playing cards with the guys" over home
and family -- was entitled to an opportunity to defend himself as a
matter of journalistic fairness. These concerns were shared by both
of Spectrum's faculty advisers for the 1982-1983 school year, who
testified that they would not have allowed the article to be
printed without deletion of the student's name. [ Footnote 8 ]

															Principal Reynolds testified credibly at trial that, at the time
that he reviewed the proofs of the May 13 issue during an extended
telephone conversation with Emerson, he believed that there was no
time to make any changes in the articles, and that the newspaper
had to be printed immediately or not at all. It is true that
Reynolds did not verify whether the necessary modifications could
still have been made in the articles, and that Emerson did not
volunteer the information that printing could be delayed until the
changes were made. We nonetheless agree with the District Court
that the decision to excise the two pages containing the
problematic articles was reasonable, given the particular
circumstances of this case. These circumstances included the very
recent Page 484 U. S. 276 replacement of Stergos by Emerson, who may not have been
entirely familiar with Spectrum editorial and production
procedures, and the pressure felt by Reynolds to make an immediate
decision so that students would not be deprived of the newspaper
altogether.

															In sum, we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds'
conclusion that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce
article was suitable for publication in Spectrum. Reynolds could
reasonably have concluded that the students who had written and
edited these articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions
of the Journalism II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of
controversial issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the
privacy of individuals whose most intimate concerns are to be
revealed in the newspaper, and "the legal, moral, and ethical
restrictions imposed upon journalists within [a] school community"
that includes adolescent subjects and readers. Finally, we conclude
that the principal's decision to delete two pages of Spectrum,
rather than to delete only the offending articles or to require
that they be modified, was reasonable under the circumstances as he
understood them. Accordingly, no violation of First Amendment
rights occurred. [ Footnote
9 ]

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is
therefore Reversed. Page 484 U. S. 277 [ Footnote 1 ]

															The two pages deleted from the newspaper also contained articles
on teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile delinquents, as well as
a general article on teenage pregnancy. Reynolds testified that he
had no objection to these articles, and that they were deleted only
because they appeared on the same pages as the two objectionable
articles.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Statement also cited Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969), for the proposition that

															"[o]nly speech that 'materially and substantially interferes
with the requirements of appropriate discipline' can be found
unacceptable and therefore be prohibited."

															App. 26. This portion of the Statement does not, of course, even
accurately reflect our holding in Tinker. Furthermore, the
Statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker standard
to the news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored
newspaper. The dissent apparently finds as a fact that the
Statement was published annually in Spectrum; however, the District
Court was unable to conclude that the Statement appeared on more
than one occasion. In any event, even if the Statement says what
the dissent believes that it says, the evidence that school
officials never intended to designate Spectrum as a public forum
remains overwhelming.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The distinction that we draw between speech that is sponsored by
the school and speech that is not is fully consistent with Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators, 410 U. S. 667 (1973) (per curiam), which involved an off-campus "underground"
newspaper that school officials merely had allowed to be sold on a
state university campus.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The dissent perceives no difference between the First Amendment
analysis applied in Tinker and that applied in Fraser. We disagree. The decision in Fraser rested on the "vulgar," "lewd," and "plainly offensive" character
of a speech delivered at an official school assembly, rather than
on any propensity of the speech to "materially disrup[t] classwork
or involv[e] substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
others." 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 513 .
Indeed, the Fraser Court cited as "especially relevant" a
portion of Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Tinker "'disclaim[ing] any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal
Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school
officials to surrender control of the American public school system
to public school students.'"

															478 U.S. at 478 U. S. 686 (quoting 393 U.S. at 393 U. S.
526 ). Of course, Justice Black's observations are
equally relevant to the instant case.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															We therefore need not decide whether the Court of Appeals
correctly construed Tinker as precluding school officials
from censoring student speech to avoid "invasion of the rights of
others," 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 513 ,
except where that speech could result in tort liability to the
school.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															We reject respondents' suggestion that school officials be
permitted to exercise prepublication control over school-sponsored
publications only pursuant to specific written regulations. To
require such regulations in the context of a curricular activity
could unduly constrain the ability of educators to educate. We need
not now decide whether such regulations are required before school
officials may censor publications not sponsored by the school that
students seek to distribute on school grounds. See Baughman v.
Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (CA4 1973); Shanley v. Northeast
Independent School Dist., Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960 (CA5
1972); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F.2d 803
(CA2 1971).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															A number of lower federal courts have similarly recognized that
educators' decisions with regard to the content of school-sponsored
newspapers, dramatic productions, and other expressive activities
are entitled to substantial deference. See, e.g., Nicholson v.
Board of Education, Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d
858 (CA9 1982); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (CA3
1981); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v.
Andrews, 463 F.
Supp. 1043 (EDNY 1979). We need not now decide whether the same
degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The reasonableness of Principal Reynolds' concerns about the two
articles was further substantiated by the trial testimony of Martin
Duggan, a former editorial page editor of the St. Louis Globe
Democrat and a former college journalism instructor and newspaper
adviser. Duggan testified that the divorce story did not meet
journalistic standards of fairness and balance because the father
was not given an opportunity to respond, and that the pregnancy
story was not appropriate for publication in a high school
newspaper because it was unduly intrusive into the privacy of the
girls, their parents, and their boyfriends. The District Court
found Duggan to be "an objective and independent witness" whose
testimony was entitled to significant weight. 607 F.
Supp. 1450 , 1461 (ED Mo.1985).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															It is likely that the approach urged by the dissent would, as a
practical matter, have far more deleterious consequences for the
student press than does the approach that we adopt today. The
dissent correctly acknowledges "[t]he State's prerogative to
dissolve the student newspaper entirely." Post at 484 U. S. 287 .
It is likely that many public schools would do just that rather
than open their newspapers to all student expression that does not
threaten "materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork" or violation of
"rights that are protected by law," post at 484 U. S. 289 ,
regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate, or
personally insulting that expression otherwise might be.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, dissenting.

															When the young men and women of Hazelwood East High School
registered for Journalism II, they expected a civics lesson.
Spectrum, the newspaper they were to publish,

															"was not just a class exercise in which students learned to
prepare papers and hone writing skills, it was a . . . forum
established to give students an opportunity to express their views
while gaining an appreciation of their rights and responsibilities
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. . .
."

															795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (CA8 1986). "[A]t the beginning of each
school year," id. at 1372, the student journalists
published a Statement of Policy -- tacitly approved each year by
school authorities -- announcing their expectation that

															" Spectrum, as a student-press publication, accepts all
rights implied by the First Amendment. . . . Only speech that
'materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of
appropriate discipline' can be found unacceptable and therefore
prohibited."

															App. 26 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 , 393 U. S. 513 (1969)). [ Footnote 2/1 ] The school
board itself affirmatively guaranteed the students of Journalism II
an atmosphere conducive to fostering such an appreciation and
exercising the full panoply of rights associated with a free
student press. "School-sponsored student publications," it vowed,
"will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints within the
rules of responsible journalism." App. 22 (Board Policy
348.51). Page 484 U. S. 278 This case arose when the Hazelwood East administration breached
its own promise, dashing its students' expectations. The school
principal, without prior consultation or explanation, excised six
articles -- comprising two full pages -- of the May 13, 1983, issue
of Spectrum. He did so not because any of the articles would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline," but simply because he considered two of
the six "inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable" for
student consumption. 795 F.2d at 1371.

															In my view, the principal broke more than just a promise. He
violated the First Amendment's prohibitions against censorship of
any student expression that neither disrupts classwork nor invades
the rights of others, and against any censorship that is not
narrowly tailored to serve its purpose. I Public education serves vital national interests in preparing
the Nation's youth for life in our increasingly complex society and
for the duties of citizenship in our democratic Republic. See
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 , 347 U. S. 493 (1954). The public school conveys to our young the information and
tools required not merely to survive in, but to contribute to,
civilized society. It also inculcates in tomorrow's leaders the
"fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system. . . ." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S.
68 , 441 U. S. 77 (1979). All the while, the public educator nurtures students'
social and moral development by transmitting to them an official
dogma of " community values.'" Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U. S. 853 , 457 U. S. 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). The public educator's task is weighty and delicate indeed. It
demands particularized and supremely subjective choices among
diverse curricula, moral values, and political stances to teach or
inculcate in students, and among various methodologies for doing
so. Accordingly, we have traditionally reserved Page 484 U. S. 279 the "daily operation of school systems" to the States and their
local school boards. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S. 104 (1968); see Board of Education v. Pico, supra, at 457 U. S.
863 -864. We have not, however, hesitated to intervene
where their decisions run afoul of the Constitution. See e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987) (striking state statute that forbade teaching of evolution
in public school unless accompanied by instruction on theory of
"creation science"); Board of Education v. Pico, supra, (school board may not remove books from library shelves merely
because it disapproves of ideas they express); Epperson v.
Arkansas, supra, (striking state law prohibition against
teaching Darwinian theory of evolution in public school); West
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.
S. 624 (1943) (public school may not compel student to
salute flag); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages in public or private schools is
unconstitutional).

															Free student expression undoubtedly sometimes interferes with
the effectiveness of the school's pedagogical functions. Some
brands of student expression do so by directly preventing the
school from pursuing its pedagogical mission: the young polemic who
stands on a soapbox during calculus class to deliver an eloquent
political diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of
calculus. And the student who delivers a lewd endorsement of a
student government candidate might so extremely distract an
impressionable high school audience as to interfere with the
orderly operation of the school. See Bethel School Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986). Other student speech, however, frustrates the school's
legitimate pedagogical purposes merely by expressing a message that
conflicts with the school's, without directly interfering with the
school's expression of its message: a student who responds to a
political science teacher's question with the retort, "socialism is
good," subverts the school's inculcation of the message that
capitalism is better. Page 484 U. S. 280 Even the maverick who sits in class passively sporting a symbol
of protest against a government policy, cf. Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.
S. 503 (1969), or the gossip who sits in the student
commons swapping stories of sexual escapade could readily muddle a
clear official message condoning the government policy or
condemning teenage sex. Likewise, the student newspaper that, like
Spectrum, conveys a moral position at odds with the school's
official stance might subvert the administration's legitimate
inculcation of its own perception of community values.

															If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message
were a constitutionally sufficient justification for the
suppression of student speech, school officials could censor each
of the students or student organizations in the foregoing
hypotheticals, converting our public schools into "enclaves of
totalitarianism," id. at 393 U. S. 511 ,
that "strangle the free mind at its source," West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, at 319 U. S. 637 .
The First Amendment permits no such blanket censorship authority.
While the "constitutional rights of students in public school are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings," Fraser, supra, at 478 U. S. 682 ,
students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker, supra, at 393 U. S. 506 . Just as the public on the street corner
must, in the interest of fostering "enlightened opinion," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 310 (1940), tolerate speech that "tempt[s] [the listener] to throw [the
speaker] off the street," id. at 310 U. S. 309 ,
public educators must accommodate some student expression even if
it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the
school wishes to inculcate.

															In Tinker, this Court struck the balance. We held that
official censorship of student expression -- there the suspension
of several students until they removed their armbands protesting
the Vietnam war -- is unconstitutional unless the Page 484 U. S. 281 speech "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . . " 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 513 .
School officials may not suppress "silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part
of" the speaker. Id. at 393 U. S. 508 .
The "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint," id. at 393 U. S. 509 ,
or an unsavory subject, Fraser, supra, at 478 U. S.
688 -689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment), does not
justify official suppression of student speech in the high
school.

															This Court applied the Tinker test just a Term ago in Fraser, supra, upholding an official decision to
discipline a student for delivering a lewd speech in support of a
student government candidate. The Court today casts no doubt on Tinker's vitality. Instead, it erects a taxonomy of school
censorship, concluding that Tinker applies to one
category, and not another. On the one hand is censorship "to
silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on
the school premises." Ante at 484 U. S. 271 .
On the other hand is censorship of expression that arises in the
context of "school-sponsored . . . expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." Ibid. The Court does not, for it cannot, purport to discern from our
precedents the distinction it creates. One could, I suppose,
readily characterize the students' symbolic speech in Tinker as "personal expression that happens to [have]
occur[red] on school premises," although Tinker did not
even hint that the personal nature of the speech was of any (much
less dispositive) relevance. But that same description could not,
by any stretch of the imagination, fit Fraser's speech. He did not
just "happen" to deliver his lewd speech to an ad hoc gathering on the playground. As the second paragraph of Fraser evinces, if ever a forum for student expression was
"school-sponsored," Fraser's was: Page 484 U. S. 282 "Fraser . . . delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for
student elective office. Approximately 600 high school students . .
. attended the assembly. Students were required to attend the
assembly or to report to the study hall. The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in
self-government." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 478 U. S. 677 (emphasis added). Yet, from the first sentence of its analysis, see id. at 478 U. S. 680 ,
Fraser faithfully applied Tinker. Nor has this Court ever intimated a distinction between personal
and school-sponsored speech in any other context. Particularly
telling is this Court's heavy reliance on Tinker in two
cases of First Amendment infringement on state college campuses. See Papish v. University of Missouri Board of Curators, 410 U. S. 667 , 410 U. S. 671 ,
n. 6 (1973) (per curiam); Healy v. James, 408 U.
S. 169 , 408 U. S. 180 , 408 U. S. 189 ,
and n. 18, 408 U. S. 191 (1972). One involved the expulsion of a student for lewd expression
in a newspaper that she sold on campus pursuant to university
authorization, see Papish, supra, at 410 U. S. 667 -668,
and the other involved the denial of university recognition and
concomitant benefits to a political student organization, see
Healy, supra, at 408 U. S. 174 , 408 U. S. 176 , 408 U. S.
181 -182. Tracking Tinker's analysis, the Court
found each act of suppression unconstitutional. In neither case did
this Court suggest the distinction, which the Court today finds
dispositive, between school-sponsored and incidental student
expression. II Even if we were writing on a clean slate, I would reject the
Court's rationale for abandoning Tinker in this case. The
Court offers no more than an obscure tangle of three excuses to
afford educators "greater control" over school-sponsored speech
than the Tinker test would permit: the public educator's
prerogative to control curriculum; the pedagogical interest in
shielding the high school audience from objectionable viewpoints
and sensitive topics; and the school's need Page 484 U. S. 283 to dissociate itself from student expression. Ante at 484 U. S. 271 .
None of the excuses, once disentangled, supports the distinction
that the Court draws. Tinker fully addresses the first
concern; the second is illegitimate; and the third is readily
achievable through less oppressive means. A The Court is certainly correct that the First Amendment permits
educators "to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach. . . ." Ante at 484 U. S. 271 .
That is, however, the essence of the Tinker test, not an
excuse to abandon it. Under Tinker, school officials may
censor only such student speech as would "materially disrup[t]" a
legitimate curricular function. Manifestly, student speech is more
likely to disrupt a curricular function when it arises in the
context of a curricular activity -- one that "is designed to teach"
something -- than when it arises in the context of a noncurricular
activity. Thus, under Tinker, the school may
constitutionally punish the budding political orator if he disrupts
calculus class, but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of New
York, 447 U. S. 530 , 447 U. S.
544 -545 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
That is not because some more stringent standard applies in the
curricular context. (After all, this Court applied the same
standard whether the students in Tinker wore their
armbands to the "classroom" or the "cafeteria." 393 U.S. at 393 U. S.
512 .) It is because student speech in the noncurricular
context is less likely to disrupt materially any legitimate
pedagogical purpose.

															I fully agree with the Court that the First Amendment should
afford an educator the prerogative not to sponsor the publication
of a newspaper article that is "ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced," or that falls short
of the "high standards for . . . student speech that is
disseminated under [the school's] auspices. . . ." Ante at 484 U. S.
271 -272. But we need not abandon Tinker Page 484 U. S. 284 to reach that conclusion; we need only apply it. The enumerated
criteria reflect the skills that the curricular newspaper "is
designed to teach." The educator may, under Tinker, constitutionally "censor" poor grammar, writing, or research,
because to reward such expression would "materially disrup[t]" the
newspaper's curricular purpose.

															The same cannot be said of official censorship designed to
shield the audience or dissociate the sponsor from the expression. Censorship so motivated might well serve
(although, as I demonstrate infra at 484 U. S.
285 -289, cannot legitimately serve) some other school
purpose. But it in no way furthers the curricular purposes of a
student newspaper unless one believes that the purpose of
the school newspaper is to teach students that the press ought
never report bad news, express unpopular views, or print a thought
that might upset its sponsors. Unsurprisingly, Hazelwood East
claims no such pedagogical purpose.

															The Court relies on bits of testimony to portray the principal's
conduct as a pedagogical lesson to Journalism II students who

															"had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the . . .
curriculum that pertained to the treatment of controversial issues
and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of
individuals . . . and 'the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions
imposed upon journalists. . . .'" Ante at 484 U. S. 276 .
In that regard, the Court attempts to justify censorship of the
article on teenage pregnancy on the basis of the principal's
judgment that (1) "the [pregnant] students' anonymity was not
adequately protected," despite the article's use of aliases; and
(2) the judgment that "the article was not sufficiently sensitive
to the privacy interests of the students' boyfriends and parents. .
. ." Ante at 484 U. S. 274 .
Similarly, the Court finds in the principal's decision to censor
the divorce article a journalistic lesson that the author should
have given the father of one student an "opportunity to defend
himself" against her charge that (in the Court's words) he
"chose Page 484 U. S. 285 playing cards with the guys' over home and family. . . ." Ante at 484 U. S.
275 . But the principal never consulted the students before censoring
their work. "[T]hey learned of the deletions when the paper was
released. . . ." 795 F.2d at 1371. Further, he explained the
deletions only in the broadest of generalities. In one meeting
called at the behest of seven protesting Spectrum staff members
(presumably a fraction of the full class), he characterized the
articles as " too sensitive' for `our immature audience of
readers,'" 607 F.
Supp. 1450 , 1459 (ED Mo.1985), and in a later meeting he deemed
them simply "inappropriate, personal, sensitive and unsuitable for
the newspaper," ibid. The Court's supposition that the
principal intended (or the protesters understood) those
generalities as a lesson on the nuances of journalistic
responsibility is utterly incredible. If he did, a fact that
neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, the
lesson was lost on all but the psychic Spectrum staffer. B The Court's second excuse for deviating from precedent is the
school's interest in shielding an impressionable high school
audience from material whose substance is "unsuitable for immature
audiences." Ante at 484 U. S. 271 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the majority decrees that we must
afford educators authority to shield high school students from
exposure to "potentially sensitive topics" (like "the particulars
of teenage sexual activity") or unacceptable social viewpoints
(like the advocacy of "irresponsible se[x] or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social
order'") through school-sponsored student activities. Ante at 484 U. S. 272 (citation omitted). Tinker teaches us that the state educator's undeniable,
and undeniably vital, mandate to inculcate moral and political
values is not a general warrant to act as "thought police" stifling
discussion of all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all Page 484 U. S. 286 but the official position. See also Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923). Otherwise, educators could transform
students into "closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 511 ,
and cast a perverse and impermissible "pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom," Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.
S. 589 , 385 U. S. 603 (1967). Thus, the State cannot constitutionally prohibit its high
school students from recounting in the locker room "the particulars
of [their] teen-age sexual activity," nor even from advocating
"irresponsible se[x]" or other presumed abominations of "the shared
values of a civilized social order." Even in its capacity as
educator, the State may not assume an Orwellian "guardianship of
the public mind," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 , 323 U. S. 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).

															The mere fact of school sponsorship does not, as the Court
suggests, license such thought control in the high school, whether
through school suppression of disfavored viewpoints or through
official assessment of topic sensitivity. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The former would constitute unabashed and
unconstitutional viewpoint Page 484 U. S. 287 discrimination, see Board of Education v. Pico, 457
U.S. at 457 U. S.
878 -879 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment), as well as an impermissible infringement of the
students' " right to receive information and ideas,'" id. at 457 U. S. 867 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); see First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 , 435 U. S. 783 (1978). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Just as a
school board may not purge its state-funded library of all books
that "`offen[d] [its] social, political and moral tastes,'" 457
U.S. at 457 U. S.
858 -859 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted), school
officials may not, out of like motivation, discriminatorily excise
objectionable ideas from a student publication. The State's
prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely (or to limit
its subject matter) no more entitles it to dictate which viewpoints
students may express on its pages than the State's prerogative to
close down the schoolhouse entitles it to prohibit the
nondisruptive expression of antiwar sentiment within its
gates. Official censorship of student speech on the ground that it
addresses "potentially sensitive topics" is, for related reasons,
equally impermissible. I would not begrudge an educator the
authority to limit the substantive scope of a school-sponsored
publication to a certain, objectively definable topic, such as
literary criticism, school sports, or an overview of the school
year. Unlike those determinate limitations, "potential topic
sensitivity" is a vaporous nonstandard -- like " public welfare,
peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or
convenience,'" Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.
S. 147 , 394 U. S. 150 (1969), or "`general welfare of citizens,'" Staub v.
Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 , 355 U. S. 322 (1958) -- that invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot
permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint discrimination
and chills student speech to which school officials might
not Page 484 U. S. 288 object. In part because of those dangers, this Court has
consistently condemned any scheme allowing a state official
boundless discretion in licensing speech from a particular forum. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, supra, at 394 U. S.
150 -151, and n. 2; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 , 379 U. S.
557 -558 (1965); Staub v. Baxley, supra, at 355 U. S.
322 -324.

															The case before us aptly illustrates how readily school
officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as
the "mere" protection of students from sensitive topics. Among the
grounds that the Court advances to uphold the principal's
censorship of one of the articles was the potential sensitivity of
"teenage sexual activity." Ante at 484 U. S. 272 .
Yet the District Court specifically found that the principal "did
not, as a matter of principle, oppose discussion of said topi[c] in
Spectrum." 607 F.
Supp. at 1467 . That much is also clear from the same
principal's approval of the "squeal law" article on the same page,
dealing forthrightly with "teenage sexuality," "the use of
contraceptives by teenagers," and "teenage pregnancy," App. 4-5. If
topic sensitivity were the true basis of the principal's decision,
the two articles should have been equally objectionable. It is much
more likely that the objectionable article was objectionable
because of the viewpoint it expressed: it might have been read (as
the majority apparently does) to advocate "irresponsible sex." See ante at 484 U. S.
272 . C The sole concomitant of school sponsorship that might
conceivably justify the distinction that the Court draws between
sponsored and nonsponsored student expression is the risk "that the
views of the individual speaker [might be] erroneously attributed
to the school." Ante at 484 U. S. 271 .
Of course, the risk of erroneous attribution inheres in any student
expression, including "personal expression" that, like the armbands
in Tinker, "happens to occur on the school premises," ante at 484 U. S. 271 .
Nevertheless, the majority is certainly correct that indicia of
school sponsorship increase the likelihood Page 484 U. S. 289 of such attribution, and that state educators may therefore have
a legitimate interest in dissociating themselves from student
speech.

															But

															"'[e]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.'" Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 602 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 , 364 U. S. 488 (1960)). Dissociative means short of censorship are available to
the school. It could, for example, require the student activity to
publish a disclaimer, such as the "Statement of Policy" that
Spectrum published each school year announcing that

															"[a]ll . . . editorials appearing in this newspaper reflect the
opinions of the Spectrum staff, which are not necessarily shared by
the administrators or faculty of Hazelwood East,"

															App. 26; or it could simply issue its own response clarifying
the official position on the matter and explaining why the student
position is wrong. Yet, without so much as acknowledging the less
oppressive alternatives, the Court approves of brutal
censorship. III Since the censorship served no legitimate pedagogical purpose,
it cannot by any stretch of the imagination have been designed to
prevent "materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork," Tinker, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 513 .
Nor did the censorship fall within the category that Tinker described as necessary to prevent student
expression from "inva[ding] the rights of others," ibid. If that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights
that are protected by law. "Any yardstick less exacting than [that]
could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest
fear of disturbance," 795 F.2d at 1376, a prospect that would be
completely at odds with this Court's pronouncement that the

															"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough [even in the public school context] to overcome the right to
freedom of expression. " Page 484 U. S. 290 Tinker, supra, at 393 U. S. 508 .
And, as the Court of Appeals correctly reasoned, whatever
journalistic impropriety these articles may have contained, they
could not conceivably be tortious, much less criminal. See 795 F.2d at 1375-1376

															Finally, even if the majority were correct that the principal
could constitutionally have censored the objectionable material, I
would emphatically object to the brutal manner in which he did so.
Where "[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech
calls for more sensitive tools," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 , 357 U. S. 525 (1958); see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, at 385 U. S. 602 ,
the principal used a paper shredder. He objected to some material
in two articles, but excised six entire articles. He did not so
much as inquire into obvious alternatives, such as precise
deletions or additions (one of which had already been made),
rearranging the layout, or delaying publication. Such unthinking
contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state
official. It is particularly insidious from one to whom the public
entrusts the task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for
the cherished democratic liberties that our Constitution
guarantees. IV The Court opens its analysis in this case by purporting to
reaffirm Tinker's time-tested proposition that public
school students "do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'" Ante at 484 U. S. 266 (quoting Tinker, supra, at 393 U. S.
506 ). That is an ironic introduction to an opinion that
denudes high school students of much of the First Amendment
protection that Tinker itself prescribed. Instead of
"teach[ing] children to respect the diversity of ideas that is
fundamental to the American system," Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 457 U. S. 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and
"that our Constitution is a living reality, not parchment preserved
under glass," Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist.,
Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (CA5 Page 484 U. S. 291 1972), the Court today "teach[es] youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 637 .
The young men and women of Hazelwood East expected a civics lesson,
but not the one the Court teaches them today.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court suggests that the passage quoted in the text did not
"exten[d] the Tinker standard to the news and feature
articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper" because the
passage did not expressly mention them. Ante at 484 U. S. 269 , n 2. It is hard to imaging why
the Court (or anyone else) might expect a passage that applies
categorically to "a student-press publication," composed almost
exclusively of "news and feature articles," to mention those
categories expressly. Understandably, neither court below so
limited the passage.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court quotes language in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 (1986), for the proposition that

															"'[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom
or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the
school board.'" Ante at 484 U. S. 267 (quoting 478 U.S. at 478 U. S.
683 ). As the discussion immediately preceding that
quotation makes clear, however, the Court was referring only to the
appropriateness of the manner in which the message is conveyed, not
of the message's content. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 478 U. S. 683 ("[T]he fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system' disfavor the use of terms of debate
highly offensive or highly threatening to others"). In fact, the Fraser Court coupled its first mention of "society's . . .
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior," with an acknowledgment of "[t]he undoubted
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools
and classrooms," id. at 478 U. S. 681 (emphasis added). See also id. at 478 U. S. 689 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment) ("Nor does this case involve
an attempt by school officials to ban written materials they
consider `inappropriate' for high school students" (citation
omitted)). [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Petitioners themselves concede that " [c]ontrol over access'"
to Spectrum is permissible only if "`the distinctions drawn . . .
are viewpoint-neutral.'" Brief for Petitioners 32 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc., 473 U. S. 788 , 473 U. S. 806 (1985)).

Summary: In *Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier*, the US Supreme Court ruled that a school district did not violate the First Amendment rights of student journalists by censoring articles in the school newspaper. The Court held that student speech rights in public schools are not absolute and must be balanced against the school's educational mission. As the newspaper was part of the school curriculum and not a public forum, the school could censor articles deemed inappropriate for younger students or that identified students without their consent. This decision emphasized the school's role in teaching appropriate behavior and respecting student privacy.