U.S. Supreme Court Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964) Van Dusen v. Barrack Nos. 56 and 80 Argued January 8-9,
1964 Decided March 30,
1964 376
U.S. 612 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondents, personal representatives of Pennsylvania decedents,
instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania 40 wrongful death actions arising from an
airplane crash in Massachusetts. Acting on petitioners' motion
under § 1404(a) of the Judicial Code of 1948, which provides for
transfer of civil actions for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, to any district where such
action "might have been brought," the District Court ordered that
the actions be transferred to the District of Massachusetts, where
over 100 other actions arising out of the same disaster are
pending. The Court of Appeals, interpreting § 1404(a) and relying
on Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, vacated the
transfer order, holding that it could be granted only if, at the
time the actions were filed, respondents were personal
representatives qualified to sue in Massachusetts courts. Held: 1. In § 1404(a), the phrase "where it might have been brought"
must be construed with reference to federal venue laws setting
forth the districts where such actions "may be brought," and not
with reference to the laws, such as those relating to damages and
the capacity of personal representatives to sue, of the State where
the transferee district court is located. Pp. 376 U. S.
616 -626.

															2. In a case such as this, where the actions were properly
brought in the transferor district court and where defendants seek
transfer under § 1404(a), the change of venue should not be
accompanied by a change in the governing state laws. Pp. 376 U. S.
626 -640.

															3. Where a § 1404(a) transfer is held not to effect a change of
state law, but essentially only to authorize a change of federal
courtrooms, the provision in Rule 17(b) that the capacity of
personal representatives to sue or be sued shall be determined by
the law of the State "in which the district court is held" should
similarly be interpreted to refer to the law of the State in which
the transferor District Court is located. Pp. 376 U. S.
640 -643. Page 376 U. S. 613 4. The general criteria of convenience and fairness of § 1404(a)
include what witnesses may be heard, the evidence which will be
relevant and important under the applicable state laws, and also
consideration of the judicial familiarity with the governing state
laws and the relative ease and practicality of trying the action in
the proposed transferee District Court. Pp. 376 U. S.
643 -646.

															309 F.2d 953, reversed and remanded.

															MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case involves the construction and application of § 1404(a)
of the Judicial Code of 1948. Section 1404(a), which allows a
"change of venue" within the federal judicial system, provides
that:

															"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."

															28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

															The facts, which need but brief statement here, reveal that the
disputed change of venue is set against the background of an
alleged mass tort. On October 4, 1960, shortly after departing from
a Boston airport, a commercial airliner, scheduled to fly from
Boston to Philadelphia, plunged into Boston Harbor. As a result of
the crash, over 150 actions for personal injury and wrongful
death Page 376 U. S. 614 have been instituted against the airline, various manufacturers,
the United States, and, in some cases, the Massachusetts Port
Authority. In most of these actions, the plaintiffs have alleged
that the crash resulted from the defendants' negligence in
permitting the aircraft's engines to ingest some birds. More than
100 actions were brought in the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts, and more than 45 actions in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

															The present case concerns 40 of the wrongful death actions
brought in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by personal
representatives of victims of the crash. [ Footnote 1 ] The defendants, petitioners in this Court,
moved under § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the District of
Massachusetts, where it was alleged that most of the witnesses
resided and where over 100 other actions are pending. The District
Court granted the motion, holding that the transfer was justified
regardless of whether the transferred actions would be governed by
the laws and choice-of-law rules of Pennsylvania or of
Massachusetts. 204 F.
Supp. 426 . The District Court also specifically held that
transfer was not precluded by the fact that the plaintiffs had not
qualified under Massachusetts law to sue as representatives of the
decedents. The plaintiffs, respondents in this Court, sought a writ
of mandamus from the Court of Appeals and successfully contended
that the District Court erred, and should vacate its order of
transfer. 309 F.2d 953. The Court of Appeals held that a § 1404(a)
transfer could be granted only if, at the time the suits were
brought, the plaintiffs had qualified to sue in Massachusetts, the
State of the transferee District Court. The Court of Appeals relied
in part upon Page 376 U. S. 615 its interpretation of Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. [ Footnote 2 ]

															We granted certiorari to review important questions concerning
the construction and operation of § 1404(a). 372 U.S. 964. For
reasons to be stated below, we hold that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals must be reversed, that both the Court of Appeals and the
District Court erred in their fundamental assumptions regarding the
state law to be applied to an action transferred under § 1404(a),
and that, accordingly, the case must be remanded to the District
Court. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 376 U. S. 616 I . WHERE THE ACTION "MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT"

															Section 1404(a) reflects an increased desire to have federal
civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called for in
the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice.
[ Footnote 4 ] Thus, as the Court
recognized in Continental Grain Co. v. Barge F.B.L.-585, 364 U. S. 19 , 364 U. S. 26 -27,
the purpose of the section is to prevent the waste "of time, energy
and money" and "to protect litigants, witnesses and the public
against unnecessary inconvenience and expense. . . ." To this end,
it empowers a district court to transfer "any civil action"
[ Footnote 5 ] to another
district court if the transfer is warranted by the convenience of
parties and witnesses and promotes the interest of justice. This
transfer power is, however, expressly limited by the final clause
of § 1404(a) restricting transfer to those federal districts in
which the action "might have been brought." Although, in the
present case, the plaintiffs were qualified to bring suit as
personal representatives under Pennsylvania law (the law of the
State of the transferor federal court), the Court of Appeals ruled
that the defendants' transfer motion must be denied because, at the
time the suits were brought in Pennsylvania (the transferor forum),
the complainants had not obtained the appointments requisite to
initiate such actions in Massachusetts (the transferee forum). Page 376 U. S. 617 At the outset, therefore, we must consider whether the
incapacity of the plaintiffs at the time they commenced their
actions in the transferor forum to sue under the state law of the
transferee forum renders the latter forum impermissible under the
"might have been brought" limitation.

															There is no question concerning the propriety either of venue or
of jurisdiction in the District of Massachusetts, the proposed
transferee forum. [ Footnote 6 ]
The Court of Appeals conceded that it was "quite likely" that the
plaintiffs could have obtained ancillary appointment in
Massachusetts, but held this legally irrelevant. 309 F.2d at
957-958. In concluding that the transfer could not be granted, the
Court of Appeals relied upon Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U. S. 335 , as
establishing that,

															"unless the plaintiff had an unqualified right to bring
suit in the transferee forum at the time he filed his original
complaint, transfer to that district is not authorized by §
1404(a)."

															309 F.2d at 957. (Emphasis in original.) The court found the
analogy to Hoffman particularly persuasive because it
could

															"perceive no basis in either logic or policy for making any
distinction between the absence of venue in the transferee forum
and prospective plaintiff's lack of capacity to sue there." Ibid. In addition, the court held that the transfer
must be denied because in actions by personal representatives Page 376 U. S. 618 "Rule 17(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., requires the district court to refer
to the law of the state in which it sits to determine capacity to
sue." [ Footnote 7 ] Id., 309 F.2d at 958.

															The defendants contend that the concluding phrase of § 1404(a)
-- "where it might have been brought" -- refers to those districts
in which Congress has provided by its venue statutes that the
action "may be brought." Applying this criterion, the defendants
argue that the posture of the case under state law is irrelevant.
They contend that Hoffman v. Blaski, supra, did not rule
that the limitations of state law were relevant to determining
where the action "might have been brought," but ruled only that the
requirement prohibited transfer where the proposed transferee forum
lacked both venue of the action and power to command jurisdiction
over the defendants when the suits were originally instituted. The
defendants contend further that the decision below is contrary to
the policy underlying Hoffman, since this decision
effectively enables a plaintiff, simply by failing to proceed in
other potential forums and qualify as a personal representative, to
restrict and frustrate efforts to have the action transferred to a
federal forum which would be far more convenient and appropriate.
Finally, with regard to the conclusion that Rule 17(b) precludes
transfer, the defendants argue that, under § 1404(a), the effect of
the Rule, like the existence of different state laws in the
transferee forum, is not relevant to a determination of where, as
indicated by federal venue laws, the action "might have been
brought." The defendants conclude that the effect of transfer upon
potential state law defenses and upon the state law applied under
Rule 17(b) should instead be considered and assessed with reference
to the criterion that the transfer be "in the interest of justice." See infra, pp. 376 U. S.
624 -626, 376 U. S.
640 -643. Page 376 U. S. 619 The plaintiffs respond emphasizing that they are "Pennsylvania
fiduciaries representing the estates of Pennsylvania decedents."
They were not and are not qualified to bring these or related
actions in Massachusetts, and their lack of capacity would, under
Massachusetts law, constitute "an absolute defense." The plaintiffs
contend that Hoffman v. Blaski established that transfer
must be denied unless, at the time the action was brought, the
complaint had an independent right to institute that action in the
transferee forum, regardless of the fact that the defendant, in
seeking transfer, might expressly or implicitly agree to venue and
jurisdiction in the transferee forum and waive defenses that would
have been available only under the law of the transferee State. In
addition, the plaintiffs argue, even if the limiting phrase "where
it might have been brought" relates only to federal venue laws,
Rule 17(b) expressly provides that the capacity of a fiduciary to
sue in a United States district court shall be determined "by the
law of the state in which the district court is held." The
plaintiffs understand the language of the Rule to refer to the law
of the State in which the transferee court is held, rather than to
the law of the State of the transferor court. They conclude that,
since they

															"were not qualified to sue in Massachusetts [the State in which
the transferee court would be held], they were not qualified to sue
in the United States district court in Massachusetts, and the
District of Massachusetts was not a district in which these actions
'might have been brought.'"

															A. In Hoffman v. Blaski, this Court first considered
the nature of the limitation imposed by the words "where it might
have been brought." The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion to
transfer on the ground that the proposed transferee forum lacked
both "venue over the action and ability to command jurisdiction
over the . . ." Page 376 U. S. 620 defendant. [ Footnote 8 ] 363
U.S. at 363 U. S. 337 .
The question, as stated by the Court, was

															"whether a District Court in which a civil action has been
properly brought is empowered by § 1404(a) to transfer the action,
on the motion of the defendant, to a district in which the
plaintiff did not have a right to bring it." Id. at 363 U. S. 336 .
(Emphasis in original.) The defendant emphasized that "venue, like
jurisdiction over the person, may be waived." Id. at 363 U. S. 343 .
This Court held that, despite the defendant's waivers or consent, a
forum which had been improper for both venue and service of process
was not a forum where the action "might have been brought."
[ Footnote 9 ]

															In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that
transfer could not be granted because here, as in Hoffman v.
Blaski, the plaintiffs did not have an "independent" or
"unqualified" right to bring the actions in the transferee Page 376 U. S. 621 forum. [ Footnote 10 ] The
propriety of this analogy to Hoffman turns, however, on
the validity of the assumption that the "where it might have been
brought" clause refers not only to federal venue statutes, but also
to the laws applied in the State of the transferee forum. It must
be noted that the instant case, unlike Hoffman, involves a
motion to transfer to a district in which both venue and
jurisdiction are proper. This difference plainly demonstrates that
the Court of Appeals extended the Hoffman decision and
increased the restrictions on transfers to convenient federal
forums. The issue here is not that presented in Hoffman, but instead is whether the limiting words of § 1404(a) prevent a
change of venue within the federal system because, under the law of
the State of the transferee forum, the plaintiff was not qualified
to sue or might otherwise be frustrated or prejudiced in pursuing
his action.

															We cannot agree that the final clause of § 1404(a) was intended
to restrict the availability of convenient federal forums by
referring to state law rules, such as those concerning capacity to
sue, which would have applied if the action had originally been
instituted in the transferee federal court. Several considerations
compel this conclusion. First, if the concluding clause is
considered as an independent entity and perused for its plain
meaning, it seems clear that the most obvious referents of the
words are found in their immediate statutory context. [ Footnote 11 ] Section Page 376 U. S. 622 1404(a) was enacted as part of Chapter 87 of Part IV of the
Judicial Code of 1948. That Chapter is designated "District Courts;
Venue." The Chapter itself is in that Part of the Code dealing
generally with "Jurisdiction and Venue." In the immediate Chapter,
which includes §§ 1391-1406, the phrase "may be brought" recurs at
least 10 times, [ Footnote
12 ] and the phrase "may be prosecuted" at least 8 times.
[ Footnote 13 ] The statutory
context is thus persuasive evidence that the "might have been
brought" language of § 1404(a) plainly refers to the similar
wording in the related federal statutes, and not directly to the
laws of the State of the transferee forum.

															Secondly, it should be asked whether the purposes of § 1404(a)
warrant a broad or generous construction of the limiting clause.
The answer, we think, is quite evident. As MR. JUSTICE BLACK said,
speaking for the Court in Continental Grain Co. v. Barge
F.B.L.-585, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S.
26 :

															"The idea behind § 1404(a) is that where a 'civil action' to
vindicate a wrong -- however brought in a court -- presents issues
and requires witnesses that make one District Court more convenient
than another, the trial judge can, after findings, transfer the
whole action to the more convenient court."

															This remedial purpose -- the individualized, case-by-case
consideration of convenience and fairness -- militates against
restricting the number of permissible forums within the federal
system. [ Footnote 14 ] Page 376 U. S. 623 There is no valid reason for reading the words "where it might
have been brought" to narrow the range of permissible federal
forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes which,
after all, are generalized attempts to promote the same goals of
convenience and fairness.

															Finally, in construing § 1404(a), we should consider whether a
suggested interpretation would discriminatorily enable parties
opposed to transfer, by means of their own acts or omissions, to
prevent a transfer otherwise proper and warranted by convenience
and justice. In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge F.B.L.-585,
supra, the plaintiff, having joined in a single complaint both in rem and in personam damage claims, opposed
transfer to a convenient forum on the ground that the in
rem claim could not have been brought in the transferee forum.
[ Footnote 15 ] In approving
the transfer order, this Court observed that failure to adopt a

															"common sense approach . . . would practically scuttle the forum non conveniens statute so far as admiralty actions
are concerned. All a plaintiff would need to do to escape from it
entirely would be to bring his action against both the owner and
the ship, as was done here." Id., 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 24 -25.
The case at bar presents a similar situation. The Court of Appeals'
decision would grant personal representatives bringing wrongful
death actions the power unilaterally to reduce the number of
permissible federal forums simply by refraining from qualifying as
representatives in States other than the one in which they wished
to litigate. The extent of that power is graphically illustrated by
the laws of the American jurisdictions, the vast majority of which
require that, as a condition of qualifying to bring suit, a foreign
executor or representative must obtain ancillary appointment Page 376 U. S. 624 or perform some preliminary act. [ Footnote 16 ] The possibilities thus suggested by the
facts of the present case amply demonstrate that the limiting
phrase of § 1404(a) should be construed to prevent parties who are
opposed to a change of venue from defeating a transfer which, but
for their own deliberate acts or omissions, would be proper,
convenient and just. The power to defeat a transfer to the
convenient federal forum should derive from rights and privileges
conferred by federal law, and not from the deliberate conduct of a
party favoring trial in an inconvenient forum.

															In summary, then, we hold that the words "where it might have
been brought" must be construed with reference to the federal laws
delimiting the districts in which such an action "may be brought,"
and not with reference to laws of the transferee State concerning
the capacity of fiduciaries to bring suit.

															B. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court, relied
in part upon Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The relevant portion of the Rule provides that the capacity of
personal representatives "to sue or be sued shall be determined by
the law of the state in which the district court is held."
[ Footnote 17 ] In our view,
the "where it might have been brought" clause does not refer to
this Rule, and the effect of the Rule, therefore, raises a separate
question. This conclusion does not, however, establish that Rule
17(b), if applied as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, would not
preclude the requested transfer. The reliance placed on Rule 17(b)
necessarily assumes that its language -- which is Page 376 U. S. 625 not free from ambiguity -- requires the application of the law
of the State of the transferee district court, rather than that of
the transferor district court. [ Footnote 18 ] On this assumption, the defendants in the
present case, after a transfer to Massachusetts, would be entitled
to raise the defense of incapacity under Massachusetts law, and
thereby defeat the actions. Thus, a § 1404(a) transfer might result
in a prejudicial change in the applicable state law. This
possibility makes it apparent, that, although Rule 17(b) may be
irrelevant to a determination of where an action "might have been
brought," the effect of the Rule may necessarily render a change of
venue against the "interest of justice."

															Although the Court of Appeals specifically relied on Rule 17(b),
in our opinion, the underlying and fundamental question is whether,
in a case such as the present, a change of venue within the federal
system is to be accompanied by a change in the applicable state
law. [ Footnote 19 ] Whenever
the law of the transferee State significantly differs from that of
the transferor State -- whether that difference relates to capacity
to sue, statutes of limitations, or "substantive" rules of
liability -- it becomes necessary Page 376 U. S. 626 to consider what bearing a change of venue, if accompanied by a
change in state law, would have on "the interest of justice." This
fundamental question underlies the problem of the interpretation of
the words of Rule 17(b), and requires a determination of whether
the existence of differing state laws would necessarily render a
transfer against "the interest of justice." In view of the facts of
this case and their bearing on this basic question, we must
consider first, insofar as is relevant, the relationship between a
change of venue under § 1404(a) and the applicable state law. II . "THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE": EFFECT OF A CHANGE OF VENUE UPON APPLICABLE STATE LAW A. The plaintiffs contend that the change of venue ordered by
the District Court was necessarily precluded by the likelihood that
it would be accompanied by a highly prejudicial change in the
applicable state law. The prejudice alleged is not limited to that
which might flow from the Massachusetts laws governing capacity to
sue. Indeed, the plaintiffs emphasize the likelihood that the
defendants'

															"ultimate reason for seeking transfer is to move to a forum
where recoveries for wrongful death are restricted to sharply
limited punitive damages, rather than compensation for the loss
suffered. [ Footnote 20 ]"

															It is argued that Pennsylvania choice of law rules would result
in the application of laws substantially different from those that
would be applied by courts sitting in Massachusetts. The District
Court held, however, that transfer could be ordered regardless of
the state laws and choice of law rules to be applied in the
transferee forum and regardless Page 376 U. S. 627 of the possibility that the laws applicable in the transferor
State would significantly differ from those applicable in the
transferee State. This ruling assumed that transfer to a more
convenient forum may be granted on a defendant's motion even though
that transfer would seriously prejudice the plaintiff's legal
claim. If this assumption is valid, the plaintiffs argue, transfer
is necessarily precluded -- regardless of convenience and other
considerations -- as against the "interest of justice" in dealing
with plaintiffs who have either exercised the venue privilege
conferred by federal statutes or had their cases removed from state
into federal court.

															If conflict of laws rules are laid aside, it is clear that
Massachusetts (the State of the transferee court) and Pennsylvania
(the State of the transferor court) have significantly different
laws concerning recovery for wrongful death. The Massachusetts
Death Act provides that one who negligently causes the death of
another

															"shall be liable in damages in the sum of not less than two
thousand nor more than twenty thousand dollars, to be assessed with
reference to the degree of his culpability. . . ."

															Mass.Ann. Laws, c. 229, § 2 (Supp.1961). By contrast, under
Pennsylvania law, the recovery of damages (1) is based upon the
more common principle of compensation for losses, rather than upon
the degree of the tortfeasor's culpability, and (2) is not limited
to $20,000. [ Footnote 21 ]
Some of the defendants urge, however, that Page 376 U. S. 628 these differences are irrelevant to the present case because
Pennsylvania state courts, applying their own choice of law rules,
would require that the Massachusetts Death Act be applied in its
entirety, including its culpability principle and damage
limitation. [ Footnote 22 ] It
follows that a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania, and
referring, as is required by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., Inc., 313 U. S. 487 , to
Pennsylvania choice of law rules, would therefore be applying the
same substantive rules as would a state or federal court in
Massachusetts if the actions had been commenced there. This
argument highlights the fact that the most convenient forum is
frequently the place where the cause of action arose, and that the
conflict of laws rules of other States may often refer to the
substantive rules of the more convenient forum. [ Footnote 23 ] The plaintiffs, however, point
to the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172
N.E.2d 526, and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d
553, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912, as indicating that
Pennsylvania, in light of its laws and policies, Page 376 U. S. 629 might not apply the culpability and damage limitation aspects of
the Massachusetts statute. The District Court, in ordering that the
actions be transferred, found it both undesirable and unnecessary
to rule on the question of whether Pennsylvania courts would accept
the right of action provided by the Massachusetts statute while at
the same time denying enforcement of the Massachusetts measure of
recovery. [ Footnote 24 ] 204
F. Supp. at 433-436. The District Court found it undesirable to
resolve this question because the Pennsylvania courts had not yet
considered it and because they would, in view of similar pending
cases, soon have an opportunity to do so. The District Court, being
of the opinion that the District of Massachusetts was, in any
event, a more convenient place for trial, reasoned that the
transfer should be granted forthwith, and that the transferee court
could proceed to the trial of the actions and postpone
consideration of the Pennsylvania choice of law rule as to damages
until a later time at which the Pennsylvania decisions might well
have supplied useful guidance. Fundamentally, however, the
transferring District Court assumed that the Pennsylvania choice of
law rule was irrelevant, because the transfer would be permissible
and justified even if accompanied by a significant change of
law.

															The possibilities suggested by the plaintiffs' argument
illustrate the difficulties that would arise if a change of venue,
granted at the motion of a defendant, were to result in a change of
law. Although in the present case the contentions concern rules
relating to capacity to sue and damages, in other cases the
transferee forum might have a shorter statute of limitations or
might refuse to Page 376 U. S. 630 adjudicate a claim which would have been actionable in the
transferor State. In such cases, a defendant's motion to transfer
could be tantamount to a motion to dismiss. [ Footnote 25 ] In light, therefore, of this
background and the facts of the present case, we need not and do
not consider the merits of the contentions concerning the meaning
and proper application of Pennsylvania's laws and choice of law
rules. For present purposes, it is enough that the potential
prejudice to the plaintiffs is so substantial as to require review
of the assumption that a change of state law would be a permissible
result of transfer under § 1404(a).

															The decisions of the lower federal courts, taken as a whole,
reveal that courts construing § 1404(a) have been strongly inclined
to protect plaintiffs against the risk that transfer might be
accompanied by a prejudicial change in applicable state laws.
[ Footnote 26 ] Although the
federal courts have Page 376 U. S. 631 utilized a variety of doctrines in order to approve a desirable
transfer and, at the same time, protect the plaintiffs, [ Footnote 27 ] the prevailing view in
the lower federal court is that adopted by the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1950, only two years after the enactment of §
1404(a), in Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 182 F.2d 305, and further developed in the recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in H. L. Green Co.,
Inc. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650. These cases have adopted and
applied a general interpretative principle which we believe
faithfully reflects the purposes underlying § 1404(a).

															In Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., supra, the plaintiff, a Missouri citizen, had been injured in an accident
in California. He contended that responsibility lay with the
defendant railroad, a Kansas corporation doing business in a number
of States. The plaintiff's Missouri attorney entered into
settlement negotiations with the defendant, but

															"these negotiations continued until after an action was barred
by the statute of limitations of California, [and] thereafter the
attorney was advised that the defendant would rely upon such
statute as a bar to the plaintiff's claim. . . ." Id., 182 F.2d at 307. The plaintiff thereupon filed his
action in a state court in New Mexico, where the defendant was
amenable to process and where, by virtue of a longer statute of
limitations, suit was not barred. The defendant then removed the
case to the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico on the ground of diversity. In the District Court, the Page 376 U. S. 632 defendant moved for dismissal "or, in the alternative, to
transfer the cause to the United States District Court of
California, Northern Division, pursuant to . . . § 1404(a)." Ibid. The court denied the transfer, indicating

															"that it would have transferred the action to California had the
statute of limitations of that state not run, but, since it had, a
transfer would be futile and unavailing." Id., 182 F.2d at 308. The Court of Appeals reversed,
observing first that the plaintiff:

															"had a legal right to select any forum where the defendant was
amenable to process, and no contention is made here that the case
was not properly brought in the New Mexico state court. It is
conceded that the action is not barred by the New Mexico statute.
Had the case been tried in the New Mexico state court, the
procedural laws of New Mexico including the statutes of limitations
would be applicable. . . . [I]n removal cases, the Federal Court
must apply the state law and the state policy." Id., 182 F.2d at 309. From this it followed, the court
concluded, that:

															"Upon removal to the Federal Court in New Mexico, the case would
remain a New Mexico case controlled by the law and policy of that
state, and if § 1404(a) is applicable and a transfer to the
California court is ordered for the convenience of the parties, the
witnesses, and in the interests of justice, there is no logical
reason why it should not remain a New Mexico case still controlled
by the law and policy of that state." Id., 182 F.2d at 309-310.

															Although the cases following the Headrick principle
have usually involved a similar problem concerning statutes of
limitations, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit plainly
indicated in H. L. Green Co., Inc. v. MacMahon, Page 376 U. S. 633 supra, that the Headrick rule was equally
applicable to other laws of the transferor State, including choice
of law rules, which might affect the outcome of the litigation. The
plaintiff in that case brought an action under the Securities
Exchange Act in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, and there moved to amend his complaint to add a common law
claim arising under New York law. Without ruling on the motion to
add to the complaint, the District Court granted a motion by the
defendant to transfer to the Southern District of Alabama pursuant
to § 1404(a). The plaintiff objected to transfer not only because
the Alabama statute of limitations would be unfavorable, but also
because prejudice would result from applying Alabama law "to the
common law claim [which the plaintiff] has moved to join with the
statutory claim." 312 F.2d at 652. The Court of Appeals rejected
these contentions:

															"Although, as a matter of federal policy, a case may be
transferred to a more convenient part of the system, whatever
rights the parties have acquired under state law should be
unaffected. The case should remain as it was in all respects but
location. Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 182
F.2d 305. . . ." Id., 312 F.2d at 652-653. The Court made the import of
this rule plain by expressly declaring first that the transferee
court sitting in Alabama should apply New York law in ruling on the
motion to add to the complaint and, secondly, that if the complaint
were thus amended, the transferee court "will apply New York law
(including any relevant New York choice of law rules)." Id., 312 F.2d at 654.

															Of course, these cases allow plaintiffs to retain whatever
advantages may flow from the state laws of the forum they have
initially selected. There is nothing, however, in the language or
policy of § 1404(a) to justify Page 376 U. S. 634 its use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to
plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which, although it was
inconvenient, was a proper venue. In this regard, the transfer
provisions of § 1404(a) may be compared with those of § 1406(a).
[ Footnote 28 ] Although both
sections were broadly designed to allow transfer instead of
dismissal, § 1406(a) provides for transfer from forums in which
venue is wrongly or improperly laid, whereas, in contrast, §
1404(a) operates on the premises that the plaintiff has properly
exercised his venue privilege. [ Footnote 29 ] This distinction underlines the fact that
Congress, in passing § 1404(a), was primarily concerned with the
problems arising where, despite the propriety of the plaintiff's
venue selection, the chosen forum was an inconvenient one.
[ Footnote 30 ] Page 376 U. S. 635 In considering the Judicial Code, Congress was particularly
aware of the need for provisions to mitigate abuses stemming from
broad federal venue provisions. The venue provision of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act was the subject of special concern.
[ Footnote 31 ] However, while
the Judicial Code was pending, Congress considered and rejected the
Jennings bill, which, as the Court stated in Ex parte
Collett, 337 U. S. 55 , 337 U. S. 64 ,
"was far more drastic than § 1404(a)," and which "would in large
part have repealed [the venue section] of the Liability Act" by
severely delimiting the permissible forums. [ Footnote 32 ] This legislative background
supports the view that § 1404(a) was not designed to narrow the
plaintiff's venue privilege or to defeat the state law advantages
that might accrue from the exercise of this venue privilege, but
rather the provision was simply to counteract the inconveniences
that flowed from the venue statutes by permitting transfer to a
convenient federal court. The legislative Page 376 U. S. 636 history of § 1404(a) certainly does not justify the rather
startling conclusion that one might "get a change of law as a bonus
for a change of venue." [ Footnote 33 ] Indeed, an interpretation accepting such a
rule would go far to frustrate the remedial purposes of § 1404(a).
If a change of law were in the offing, the parties might well
regard the section primarily as a forum-shopping instrument.
[ Footnote 34 ] And, more
importantly, courts would at least be reluctant to grant transfers,
despite considerations of convenience, if to do so might
conceivably prejudice the claim of a plaintiff who had initially
selected a permissible forum. [ Footnote 35 ] We believe, therefore, that both the history
and purposes of § 1404(a) indicate that it should be regarded as a
federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement
of litigation in the federal courts and generally Page 376 U. S. 637 intended, on the basis of convenience and fairness, simply to
authorize a change of courtrooms. [ Footnote 36 ]

															Although we deal here with a congressional statute apportioning
the business of the federal courts, our interpretation of that
statute fully accords with and is supported by the policy
underlying Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64 . This Court has often formulated the Erie doctrine by stating that it establishes "the principle of
uniformity within a state," Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., Inc., 313 U. S. 487 , 313 U. S. 496 ,
and declaring that federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases
are to apply the laws "of the states in which they sit," Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 , 313 U. S. 503 .
[ Footnote 37 ] A superficial
reading of these formulations might suggest that a transferee
federal court should apply the law of the State in which it Page 376 U. S. 638 sits, rather than the law of the transferor State. Such a
reading, however, directly contradicts the fundamental Erie doctrine which the quoted formulations were designed
to express. As this Court said in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U. S. 99 , 326 U. S.
109 :

															" Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to
formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that
touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between
State and federal courts. . . . The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that, for the same
transaction, the accident of a suit by a nonresident litigant in a
federal court, instead of in a State court a block away, should not
lead to a substantially different result."

															Applying this analysis to § 1404(a), we should ensure that the
"accident" of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a
party to utilize a transfer to achieve a result in federal court
which could not have been achieved in the courts of the State where
the action was filed. This purpose would be defeated in cases such
as the present if nonresident defendants, properly subjected to
suit in the transferor State (Pennsylvania), could invoke § 1404(a)
to gain the benefits of the laws of another jurisdiction
(Massachusetts). What Erie and the cases following it have
sought was an identity or uniformity between federal and state
courts; [ Footnote 38 ] and
the fact that, in most instances, this could be achieved by
directing federal courts to apply the laws of the States "in which
they Page 376 U. S. 639 sit" should not obscure that, in applying the same reasoning to
§ 1404(a), the critical identity to be maintained is between the
federal district court which decides the case and the courts of the
State in which the action was filed. [ Footnote 39 ]

															We conclude, therefore, that, in cases such as the present,
where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court
must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been
applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue
under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but
a change of courtrooms. [ Footnote 40 ]

															We therefore reject the plaintiffs' contention that the transfer
was necessarily precluded by the likelihood that a prejudicial
change of law would result. In so ruling, however, we do not and
need not consider whether, in all cases, § 1404(a) would require
the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the
transferee, State. [ Footnote
41 ] Page 376 U. S. 640 We do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same
considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under §
1404(a), [ Footnote 42 ] or if
it was contended that the transferor State would simply have
dismissed the action on the ground of forum non
conveniens. [ Footnote
43 ]

															B. It is in light of the foregoing analysis that we must
consider the interpretation of Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the relationship between that Rule and the laws
applicable following a § 1404(a) transfer. As indicated supra at 376 U. S. 619 ,
the plaintiffs contend that transfer cannot be granted because,
although they are fully qualified as personal representatives to
sue in courts in Pennsylvania, they lack the qualifications
necessary to sue in Massachusetts. Rule 17(b) provides that, for
such personal representatives, "capacity to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law of the state in which the district court is
held." [ Footnote 44 ] The
question arising here is whether the Court of Appeals was correct
in assuming that, in the context of a § 1404(a) transfer between
district courts, the language of the Rule referred to the law of
the State in which the transferee district court is held, rather
than to the law of the State of the transferor district court.

															The plaintiffs, arguing that Rule 17(b) refers only to the
transferee district court, suggests that their interpretation Page 376 U. S. 641 is necessary to protect the interest of States in controlling
the qualifications of foreign fiduciaries. The plaintiffs state
that the vast majority of American jurisdictions permit only
locally qualified foreign representatives, because safeguards are
needed

															"to protect local citizens who are potential defendants from
suits by more than one fiduciary purporting to represent the same
decedent and protect all persons from losses caused by the actions
of irresponsible out-of-state fiduciaries."

															These considerations do not, however, support the plaintiffs'
interpretation of Rule 17(b). [ Footnote 45 ] In the present case, for example, it is
conceded that the plaintiffs are qualified as personal
representatives under the laws of the transferor State
(Pennsylvania). It seems clear that the defendants, who are seeking
transfer to another jurisdiction, will be equitably protected if
Rule 17(b) is interpreted to refer to the laws of the transferor
State (Pennsylvania). It would be ironic if Rule 17(b) were
construed so that these plaintiffs could defeat transfer by arguing
that the defendants would receive inadequate protection against
"foreign" fiduciaries. Page 376 U. S. 642 We think it is clear that the Rule's reference to the State "in
which the district court is held" was intended to achieve the same
basic uniformity between state and federal courts as was intended
by the decisions which have formulated the Erie policy in
terms of requiring federal courts to apply the laws of the States
"in which they sit." [ Footnote
46 ] See supra at 376 U. S.
637 -639. The plaintiffs' argument assumes, [ Footnote 47 ] incorrectly we think,
that the critical phrase "in which the district court is held"
carries a plain meaning which governs even in the case of a §
1404(a) transfer involving two district courts sitting in different
States. It should be remembered, however, that this phrase, like
those which were formulated to express the Erie doctrine,
was employed long before the enactment of a § 1404(a) provision for
transfer within the federal system. [ Footnote 48 ] We believe that Rule 17(b) was intended to
work an accommodation of interests within our federal system, and
that, in interpreting it in new contexts, we should look to its
guiding policy, and keep it "free from entanglements with
analytical or terminological niceties." Cf. Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. at 326 U. S.
110 .

															Since, in this case, the transferee district court must, under §
1404(a), apply the laws of the State of the transferor district
court, it follows, in our view, that Rule 17(b) must be interpreted
similarly, so that the capacity to sue will also be governed by the
laws of the transferor State. Where a § 1404(a) transfer is thus
held not to effect a change of law, but essentially only to
authorize a change of courtrooms, the reference in Rule 17(b)to
the Page 376 U. S. 643 law of the State "in which the district court is held" should be
applied in a corresponding manner so that it will refer to the
district court which sits in the State that will generally be the
source of applicable laws. We conclude, therefore, that the Court
of Appeals misconceived the meaning and application of Rule 17(b),
and erred in holding that it required the denial of the § 1404(a)
transfer. III . APPLICABLE LAW: EFFECT ON THE CONVENIENCE OF PARTIES AND WITNESSES The holding that a § 1404(a) transfer would not alter the state
law to be applied does not dispose of the question of whether the
proposed transfer can be justified when measured against the
relevant criteria of convenience and fairness. Though the answer to
this question does not follow automatically from the determination
that the transferred actions will carry with them the transferor's
laws, that determination nevertheless may make the transfer more or
less practical and desirable. The matters to be weighed in
assessing convenience and fairness are pervasively shaped by the
contours of the applicable laws. The legal rules obviously govern
what facts will be relevant and irrelevant, what witnesses may be
heard, what evidence will be most vital, and so on. Not only do the
rules thus affect the convenience of a given place of trial, but
they also bear on considerations such as judicial familiarity with
the governing laws and the relative ease and practicality of trying
the cases in the alternative forums.

															In the present case, the District Court held that the requested
transfer could and should be granted regardless of whether the laws
of the transferor State or of the transferee State were to be
applied. 204 F. Supp. at 433-436. The court based its ruling on a
general finding that transfer to Massachusetts would be
sufficiently convenient and Page 376 U. S. 644 fair under the laws of either Pennsylvania or Massachusetts. We
do not attempt to review this general conclusion or to reassess the
discretion that was exercised. We do conclude, however, that the
District Court in assuming that the transferee court would be free
to determine which State's laws were to be applied, overlooked or
did not adequately consider several criteria or factors the
relevance of which is made more apparent when it is recognized
that, even after transfer, the laws of the transferor State will
continue to apply.

															It is apparent that the desirability of transfer might be
significantly affected if Pennsylvania courts decided that, in
actions such as the present, they would recognize the cause of
action based on the Massachusetts Death Act, but would not apply
that statute's culpability principle and damage limitation. In
regard to this possibility, it is relevant to note that the
District Court, in transferring these actions, generally assumed
that transfer to Massachusetts would facilitate the consolidation
of these cases with those now pending in the Massachusetts District
Court, and that, as a result, transfer would be accompanied by the
full benefits of consolidation and uniformity of result. 204 F.
Supp. at 431-432. Since, however, Pennsylvania laws would govern
the trial of the transferred cases, insofar as those laws may be
significantly different from the laws governing the cases already
pending in Massachusetts, the feasibility of consolidation and the
benefits therefrom may be substantially altered. Moreover, if the
transferred actions would not be subject to the Massachusetts
culpability and damage limitation provisions, then the plaintiffs
might find a relatively greater need for compensatory damage
witnesses to testify with regard to the economic losses suffered by
individuals. It is possible that such a difference in damage rules
could make the plaintiffs relatively more dependent upon witnesses
more conveniently located for a trial in Pennsylvania. Page 376 U. S. 645 In addition, it has long been recognized that:

															"There is an appropriateness . . . in having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that
must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other
forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.
S. 501 , 330 U. S. 509 .
Thus, to the extent that Pennsylvania laws are difficult or
unclear, and might not defer to Massachusetts laws, it may be
advantageous to retain the actions in Pennsylvania where the judges
possess a more ready familiarity with the local laws.

															If, on the other hand, Pennsylvania courts would apply the
Massachusetts Death Act in its entirety, these same factors might
well weigh quite differently. Consolidation of the transferred
cases with those now pending in Massachusetts might be freed from
any potential difficulties, and rendered more desirable. The
plaintiffs' need for witnesses residing in Pennsylvania might be
significantly reduced. And, of course, the trial would be held in
the State in which the causes of action arose, and in which the
federal judges are more familiar with the governing laws.

															In pointing to these considerations, we are fully aware that the
District Court concluded that the relevant Pennsylvania law was
unsettled, that its determination involved difficult questions, and
that, in the near future, Pennsylvania courts might provide
guidance. [ Footnote 49 ] We
think that this uncertainty, however, should itself have been
considered as a factor bearing on the desirability of transfer.
Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more Page 376 U. S. 646 convenient forum, not to a forum likely to prove equally
convenient or inconvenient. We do not suggest that elements of
uncertainty in transferor state law would alone justify a denial of
transfer; but we do think that the uncertainty is one factor, among
others, to be considered in assessing the desirability of
transfer.

															We have not singled out the above criteria for the purpose of
suggesting either that they are of controlling importance or that
the criteria actually relied upon by the District Court were
improper. We have concluded, however, that the District Court
ignored certain considerations which might well have been more
clearly appraised and might have been considered controlling had
not that court assumed that, even after transfer to Massachusetts,
the transferee District Court would be free to decide that the law
of its State might apply. It is appropriate, therefore, to reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and to remand to the District
Court to reconsider the motion to transfer.

															Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is reversed, and the cause remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the reversal substantially for the
reasons set forth in the opinion of the Court, but he believes
that, under the circumstances shown in the opinion, this Court
should now hold it was error to order these actions transferred to
the District of Massachusetts.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The plaintiffs are "Pennsylvania fiduciaries representing the
estates of Pennsylvania decedents."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Rule 17(b), Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., 28 U.S.C.:

															"Capacity to Sue or Be Sued. The capacity of an individual,
other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be
sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity
of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
under which it was organized. In all other cases, capacity to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the
district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other
unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law
of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the
purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United
States to sue or be sued in a court of the United States is
governed by Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 754 and 959(a)."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Although it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction to review
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Government, a defendant
in this case, urges that the judgment below be reversed because
mandamus was an improper remedy. However, in Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U. S. 335 , as
the Government concedes, this Court reviewed decisions in § 1404(a)
transfer cases which the Court of Appeals reviewed through exercise
of the mandamus power. See also Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29 ; Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 .
Since, in our opinion, the courts below erred in interpreting the
legal limitations upon and criteria for a § 1404(a) transfer, we
find it unnecessary to consider the mandamus contentions advanced
by the Government. Cf. Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., ante, at 376 U. S. 240 .

															[ Footnote 4 ] See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, supra, at 349 U. S.
32 :

															"When Congress adopted § 1404(a), it intended to do more than
just codify the existing law on forum non conveniens. . .
. Congress, in writing § 1404(a), which was an entirely new
section, was revising as well as codifying."

															1 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed., 1961), pp. 1751-1758.

															[ Footnote 5 ] See Ex parte Collett, supra, and United States v.
National City Lines, Inc., 337 U. S. 78 (interpreting "any civil action" to include actions governed by
special, as well as general, venue provisions).

															[ Footnote 6 ] See 204 F.
Supp. 426 , 437. Nor is there any question concerning the
propriety either of venue or of jurisdiction in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, the transferor forum. The District Court
indicated that one of the cases arising from the Boston Harbor
crash had "already been transferred due to improper venue. . . ." Id., 204 F. Supp. at 427, n. 1. The Court of Appeals noted
that counsel suggested that two other cases "must eventually be
transferred to the district court in Massachusetts, since venue in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is improper." 309 F.2d 953 at
958. The transfers ordered in these cases were not contested in the
Court of Appeals, ibid., and are not involved in the
present case. See notes 11 29 infra. [ Footnote 7 ]

															The text of Rule 17(b) is set forth in note 2 supra. [ Footnote 8 ]

															In the two cases decided sub nom. Hoffman v. Blaski,
supra, the petitioners conceded

															"that statutory venue did not exist over either of these actions
in the respective transferee districts, and that the respective
defendants were not within the reach of the process of the
respective transferee courts." Id. 363 U.S. at 363 U. S.
341 .

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Two weeks after Hoffman, the Court decided Continental Grain Co. v. Barge F.B.L.-585, 364 U. S.
19 . See infra at 376 U. S. 622 .
In that case, a cargo owner, seeking damages from a barge owner,
had joined in a single complaint an in personam claim
against the barge owner and an in rem claim against the
barge. The complaint was filed in the Federal District Court in New
Orleans. At that time, the barge, or the res, was in New
Orleans. The plaintiff cargo owner opposed a motion to transfer to
the District Court in Memphis on the ground that the in
rem claim could not have been brought in that forum, which had
only personal jurisdiction over the barge owner at the time the New
Orleans suit was brought. The Court, rejecting this argument, held
that, for purposes of assessing where the litigation "might have
been brought," the in personam and in rem claims
should be practically viewed as a single "civil action" in which
the complainant had chosen "an alternative way of bringing the
owner into court." Id., at 364 U. S. 26 . See Comment, 31 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 373 (1964).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															A similar rule had been applied in Felchlin v. American
Smelting & Refining Co., 136 F.
Supp. 577 (D.C.S.D.Cal.1955).

															[ Footnote 11 ] See Note, 60 Yale L.J. 183 (1951). The analogous
provisions of § 1406(a), which shares the same statutory context,
contain a similar phrase:

															"The district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or,
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been
brought. "

															28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (Emphasis added.) See Goldlawr, Inc.,
v. Heiman, 369 U. S. 463 ;
Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
(1953), p. 979; Comment, 30 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 735 (1963).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(b), 1392(a)(b), 1393(b), 1395(d), 1396,
1397, 1399, 1400(b).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															28 U.S.C. §§ 1394, 1395(a)(b)(c)(e), 1401, 1402(a)(b). Other
venue provisions in the same chapter of the Judicial Code use
language such as: "may be sued," § 1391(d); "must be brought," §
1393(a); "shall be brought," §§ 1398, 1403; and "may be
instituted," § 1400(a).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Note, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 1679, 1680 (1963).

															[ Footnote 15 ] See note 9 supra. [ Footnote 16 ] See Note, 17 Rutgers L.Rev. 664, 668 (1963); 52
A.L.R.2d 1048. The implications of the Court of Appeals' decision
are plainly indicated by two subsequent decisions, Goranson v.
Capital Airlines, Inc., 221 F.
Supp. 820 (D.C.E.D.Va.), and Thompson v. Capital Airlines,
Inc., 220 F.
Supp. 140 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The text of Rule 17(b) is set forth in note 2 supra. [ Footnote 18 ] See the rationale adopted in Felchlin v. American
Smelting & Refining Co., 136 F.
Supp. 577 (relied upon by the Court of Appeals in the present
case, 309 F.2d at 957).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															It has been observed that, in the present case,

															"the [Court of Appeals'] foray into Massachusetts substantive
law need never have been undertaken had the court been confident
that the transferee forum would treat the question of qualification
as governed by the doctrine . . . that the transferee court should
apply the law of the transferor forum."

															Note, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 1679, 1681 (1963). Similarly, it has been
noted that if, under the Court of Appeals decision,

															"there is no significant difference between venue-jurisdiction
and capacity, there may be no adequate difference between capacity
and a host of other defensive bars that may foreseeably subject a
plaintiff to dismissal."

															Note, 17 Rutgers L.Rev. 664, 666 (1963); cf. Comment,
51 Col.L.Rev. 762, 771 (1951).

															[ Footnote 20 ] See Cavers, Change in Choice of Law Thinking and Its
Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in A.L.I., Study of the
Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1963), pp. 154, 193.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															In Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U. S. 128 ,
this Court reviewed the relationship between the provisions of the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the principles of the Massachusetts
Death Act. Only two States, Alabama and Massachusetts, "award only
punitive damages for wrongful deaths." Id. at 352 U. S.
130 -131. The Court stated:

															"The assessment of damages with reference to the degree of
culpability of the tortfeasor, rather than with reference to the
amount of pecuniary loss suffered by the next of kin, makes those
damages punitive in nature. That has been the holding of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. . . . The standard of
liability under the Massachusetts Death Act is punitive -- i.e., 'with reference to the degree' of culpability -- not
compensatory. . . . There is nothing in the Massachusetts law which
measures the damages by 'pecuniary injuries.'" Id. at 352 U. S. 129 , 352 U. S.
132 -133. E.g., Beatty v. Fox, 328 Mass. 216, 102
N.E.2d 781 ; Macchiaroli v. Howell, 294 Mass. 144, 200
N.E. 905; Boott Mills v. Boston & M. R.R., 218 Mass.
582, 106 N.E. 680; Bagley v. Small, 92 N.H. 107, 26 A.2d
23. Compare 12 Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann. §§ 1601-1604; Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396
Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490; cf. Thirteenth & Fifteenth Street
Passenger R. Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475, 481-482.

															[ Footnote 22 ] Cf. Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655.

															[ Footnote 23 ] See Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48
Mich.L.Rev. 1, 37 (1949).

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The defendants, rejecting the view adopted by the Second Circuit
in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553,
contend that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Pennsylvania
courts to follow all the terms of the Massachusetts Death Act. We
intimate no view concerning this contention.

															[ Footnote 25 ] See, e.g., Note, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1347, 1354-1355 (1951),
which assumes that changes of venue might be accompanied by changes
of law and concludes that:

															"To make the transfer purely for reasons of convenience, without
considering the difference in law, would amount to directing a
verdict on the merits without examining them."

															[ Footnote 26 ] See H. L. Green Co., Inc., v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650; Benton v. Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Searls, 255 F.2d
299; Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., 182 F.2d
305. See also, e.g., King Bros. Productions, Inc. v. RKO
Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 271; Gomez v. The
SS Dorothy, 183 F.
Supp. 499 ; Hargrove v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., 153 F.
Supp. 681 ; Heaton v. Southern R. Co., 119 F.
Supp. 658 ; Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 118
F. Supp. 234; Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises,
Inc., 85 F. Supp.
410 ; cf. Curry v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 118
F. Supp. 234. But cf. Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655
(transfer granted because, even assuming transferee law applied,
the substantive rules would be identical); Felchlin v. American
Smelting & Refining Co., 136 F.
Supp. 577 ( see note
18 supra ); Curry v. States Marine Corp. of
Delaware, supra (transfer denied upon failure of parties to
stipulate that transferor statute of limitations would apply). See also authorities cited, note 39 infra. [ Footnote 27 ]

															Frequently, courts dealing with a defendant's motion to transfer
have relied at least in part upon a "transfer on condition" or
estoppel approach to grant transfer and protect the plaintiff. E.g., Frechoux v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., supra; Greve v.
Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., supra; Crawford v. The SS Shirley
Lykes, 148 F.
Supp. 958 ; May v. The Steel Navigator, 152 F.
Supp. 254 ; Hokanson v. Helene Curtis Industries,
Inc., 177 F.
Supp. 701 .

															[ Footnote 28 ] See note 11 supra. [ Footnote 29 ]

															In Viaggio v. Field, 177 F.
Supp. 643 , 648 ,
the District Court suggested that cases where defendants sought
transfer under § 1404(a) were the

															"converse of the situation . . . in the instant case [under §
1406(a)], where it is the plaintiff who brought the suit
incorrectly in this court and is now asking to have it transferred
to another court and hopes thereby to obtain an advantage with
respect to [the transferee state's statute of] limitations." See Skilling v. Funk Aircraft Co., 173 F.
Supp. 939 ; Comment, 61 Col.L.Rev. 902, 914 (1961); Comment, 30
U. of Chi.L.Rev. 735, 745, n. 68 (1963); Comment, 1962 Wis.L.Rev.
342, 35. Cf. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S.
466 -467. See note 6 supra. [ Footnote 30 ] See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.
S. 501 , 330 U. S.
507 :

															"The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a
court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality, and
usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy."

															The Revisor's Note to § 1404(a) states that it

															"was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum,
even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of such
a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S.
44 (1941), which was prosecuted under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act in New York, although the accident
occurred and the employee resided in Ohio. The new subsection
requires the court to determine that the transfer is necessary for
convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further, that it is
in the interest of justice to do so."

															Revision of Title 28, United States Code, Report of the House
Committee on Revision of the Laws on H.R. 7124, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess., p. A127.

															[ Footnote 31 ] See Ex parte Collett, supra, at 337 U. S. 68 -69;
Revisor's Note following § 1404(a) ( note 30 supra ); Moore, Commentary on the U.S.
Judicial Code (1949), p. 206.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															In Ex parte Collett, supra, at 337 U. S. 60 ,
the Court observed:

															"Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; §
1404(a) of the Code deals with the right to transfer an action
properly brought. The two sections deal with two separate and
distinct problems. Section 1404(a) does not limit or otherwise
modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere
to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be
brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been
brought previously."

															(Emphasis added.)

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive
Co., 345 U. S. 514 , 345 U. S. 522 ,
expressed dismay at what he viewed as such a suggestion:

															"Are we then to understand that parties may get a change of law
as a bonus for a change of venue? If the law of the forum in which
the case is tried is to be the sole test of substantive law, burden
of proof, contributory negligence, measure of damages, limitations,
admission of evidence, conflict of laws and other doctrines, . . .
then shopping for a favorable law via the [transfer] route opens up
possibilities of conflict, confusion and injustice greater than
anything Swift v. Tyson , 16 Pet. 1,
ever held."

															[ Footnote 34 ] See Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 405, 441 (1955):

															"If it should be established as a rule of thumb that the
transferee court is to apply the law of the state in which it sits,
every case in which there is a difference of law between the
original and the transferee state would become a game of chess,
with Section 1404(a) authorizing a knight's move; and nothing would
be certain except that the parties would land on a square of a
different color."

															[ Footnote 35 ] See, e.g., Note, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1347, 1355 (1951):

															"It would seem best, therefore, not to transfer at all where the
law which would be applied in the transferee forum would be
materially different from that applied by the transferring
court."

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															For recent proposals, see A.L.I., Study of the Division
of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1963), §§ 1306, 1307, 1308. The commentary on the proposed §
1306 notes that, where the defendant seeks transfer, the section
would provide

															"that the transferee court shall apply the rules which the
transferor court would have been bound to apply. . . . The effect
is to give the plaintiff the benefit which traditionally he has had
in the selection of a forum with favorable choice of law rules. . .
. It may be thought undesirable to let the plaintiff reap a choice
of law benefit from the deliberate selection of an inconvenient
forum. In a sense, this is so, but the alternatives seem even more
undesirable. If the rules of the State where the transferee
district is located were to control, the judge exercising his
discretion upon a motion for transfer might well make a ruling
decisive of the merits of the case. Whether he should simply decide
the appropriate place for trial, letting the choice of law bonus
fall as it may, or include in his consideration of 'the interest of
justice' the 'just' choice of law rule, the result is unfortunate.
. . ." Id. at 65-66.

															[ Footnote 37 ] See also, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 , 326 U. S. 108 ("a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose,
in effect, only another court of the State. . . .").

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U. S. 487 , 313 U. S. 496 ,
the Court observed that:

															"Whatever lack of uniformity [the Erie doctrine] may
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable
to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies
diverging from those of its neighbors." See note 36 supra. [ Footnote 39 ] See cases cited notes 26-27 supra. See 1 Moore, supra, at 1772-1777; Currie, Change of Venue and the
Conflict of Laws, 22 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 405, 410-413, 438-439 (1955);
Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27
U. of Chi.L.Rev. 341 (1960); Note, 60 Yale L.J. 537 (1951). But
see Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under § 1404(a) of the
New Judicial Code, 10 F.R.D. 595, 601 (1951); Note, 64 Harv.L.Rev.
1347, 1354-1355 (1951); cf. Note, 35 Cornell L.Q. 459,
462, 464 (1950).

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															Of course, the transferee District Court may apply its own rules
governing the conduct and dispatch of cases in its court. We are
only concerned here with those state laws of the transferor State
which would significantly affect the outcome of the case.

															[ Footnote 41 ]

															We do not suggest that the application of transferor state law
is free from constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Watson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U. S.
66 ; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.
S. 609 ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 ; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 .

															[ Footnote 42 ] Cf. note 29 supra. [ Footnote 43 ] Compare Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of
Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. of Chi.L.Rev. at 348 (1960) with Note, 60 Yale L.J. 537, 539-541 (1951). In Parsons v.
Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 375 U. S. 71 ,
involving a suit arising under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, the Court ruled in a per curiam opinion that:

															"a prior state court dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens can never serve to divest a federal district judge
of the discretionary power vested in him by Congress to rule upon a
motion to transfer under § 1404(a)." Id. at 375 U. S.
73 -74.

															[ Footnote 44 ]

															The text of Rule 17(b) is set forth in note 2 supra. [ Footnote 45 ]

															The Court of Appeals, referring to Rule 17(b), observed:

															"That most jurisdictions do not permit foreign personal
representatives to bring suit in their courts as a matter of right
is a well known rule of law, and we cannot presume that Congress
intended to alter state policy to the extent of permitting transfer
of such suits to the federal courts sitting in those states."

															309 F.2d at 958. This assumes that it is consistent with the
purposes of Rule 17(b) that the governing or prevailing "state
policy" be the policy of the transferee State, rather than that of
the transferor State. Since, however, the actions, when originally
instituted, were subject to the transferor State's laws, it is
misleading to suggest that the continued application of those laws
would "alter" state policy. To the contrary, if the plaintiffs have
selected a proper state forum and have qualified therein as
personal representatives, the policy of that State would be
"altered" if, as a result of the defendants' motion to transfer
under § 1404(a), the plaintiffs lost their status as qualified
representatives.

															[ Footnote 46 ] Cf. Note, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 1030, 1037-1041 (1949).

															[ Footnote 47 ] See Felchlin v. American Smelting & Refining
Co., 136 F.
Supp. 577 , 581-582 ( note
18 supra ).

															[ Footnote 48 ]

															The relevant provisions of Rule 17(b) were adopted by this Court
and transmitted to Congress on December 20, 1937. See 308
U.S. 649, 685. Section 1404(a) was first enacted in the Judicial
Code of 1948.

															[ Footnote 49 ]

															204 F. Supp. at 435 and n. 20. The District Court opinion was
filed in April, 1962. The defendants allege that a subsequent
Pennsylvania decision, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (Pa.C.P., Phila.Cty., June Term, 1962, No. 2013), indicates that
Pennsylvania courts would accept and apply the Massachusetts Death
Act in its entirety. Of course, we intimate no view with respect to
this contention.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Van Dusen v. Barrack:

Issue: Whether a transfer of a case from one federal district court to another under § 1404(a) of the Judicial Code of 1948 results in a change of the applicable state law.

Holding: No. The Supreme Court held that the phrase "where it might have been brought" in § 1404(a) refers to federal venue laws and not the laws of the state where the transferee district court is located. Therefore, a transfer under § 1404(a) should not change the governing state laws. The Court also interpreted Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which relates to the capacity of personal representatives to sue, to refer to the law of the state in which the transferor district court is located.

Facts: Respondents, personal representatives of Pennsylvania decedents, filed wrongful death actions in a Pennsylvania district court arising from an airplane crash in Massachusetts. The district court granted petitioners' motion to transfer the cases to a Massachusetts district court under § 1404(a) for the convenience of parties and witnesses. The Court of Appeals vacated the transfer order, holding that it could only be granted if respondents were qualified to sue in Massachusetts courts.

Reasoning: The Supreme Court interpreted § 1404(a) as referring to federal venue laws, not state laws, when determining where an action "might have been brought." The Court also emphasized that a § 1404(a) transfer should not change the governing state laws, especially when the actions were properly brought in the transferor district court. Regarding Rule 17(b), the Court interpreted "the district court" to refer to the transferor district court, ensuring that plaintiffs' status as qualified representatives would not be lost due to a transfer.

The Court outlined the criteria for convenience and fairness under § 1404(a), including witnesses, relevant evidence, judicial familiarity with governing state laws, and the practicality of trying the case in the transferee district court.