U.S. Supreme Court Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781 (1989) Ward v. Rock Against
Racism No. 88-226 Argued February 27,
1989 Decided June 22, 1989 491
U.S. 781 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent Rock Against Racism (RAR), furnishing its own sound
equipment and technicians, has sponsored yearly programs of rock
music at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in New York City's Central
Park. The city received numerous complaints about excessive noise
at RAR's concerts from users of the nearby Sheep Meadow, an area
designated by the city for passive recreation, from other users of
the park, and from residents of areas adjacent to the park.
Moreover, when the city shut off the power after RAR ignored
repeated requests to lower the volume at one of its concerts, the
audience became abusive and disruptive. The city also experienced
problems at bandshell events put on by other sponsors, who, due to
their use of inadequate sound equipment or sound technicians
unskilled at mixing sound for the bandshell area, were unable to
provide sufficient amplification levels, resulting in disappointed
or unruly audiences. Rejecting various other solutions to the
excessive noise and inadequate amplification problems, the city
adopted a Use Guideline for the bandshell which specified that the
city would furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an
independent, experienced sound technician for all performances.
After the city implemented this guideline, RAR amended a
preexisting District Court complaint against the city to seek
damages and a declaratory judgment striking down the guideline as
facially invalid under the First Amendment. The court upheld the
guideline, finding, inter alia, that performers who had
used the city's sound system and technician had been uniformly
pleased; that, although the city's technician ultimately controlled
both sound volume and mix, the city's practice was to give the
sponsor autonomy as to mix and to confer with him before turning
the volume down; and that the city's amplification system was
sufficient for RAR's needs. Applying this Court's three-part test
for judging the constitutionality of governmental regulation of the
time, place, and manner of protected speech, the court found the
guideline valid. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
such regulations' method and extent must be the least intrusive
upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary to
achieve the regulations' purpose, finding that there were various
less restrictive means by which the city could control excessive
volume without also intruding on RAR's ability to control sound
mix. Page 491 U. S. 782 Held: The city's sound-amplification guideline is valid
under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the place
and manner of protected speech. Pp. 491 U. S.
790 -803.

															(a) The guideline is content-neutral, since it is justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech. The
city's principal justification -- the desire to control noise in
order to retain the sedate character of the Sheep Meadow and other
areas of the park and to avoid intrusion into residential areas --
has nothing to do with content. The city's other justification, its
interest in ensuring sound quality, does not render the guideline
content-based as an attempt to impose subjective standards of
acceptable sound mix on performers, since the city has expressly
disavowed any such intent, and requires its technician to defer to
the sponsor's wishes as to mix. On the record below, the city's
sound quality concern extends only to the clearly content-neutral
goals of ensuring adequate amplification and avoiding volume
problems associated with inadequate mix. There is no merit to RAR's
argument that the guideline is nonetheless invalid on its face
because it places unbridled discretion in the hands of city
enforcement officials. Even granting the doubtful proposition that
this claim falls within the narrow class of permissible facial
challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory
authority, the claim nevertheless fails, since the guideline's own
terms in effect forbid officials purposely to select an inadequate
system or to vary sound quality or volume based on the performer's
message. Moreover, the city has applied a narrowing construction to
the guideline by requiring officials to defer to sponsors on sound
quality and confer with them as to volume problems, and by
mandating that amplification be sufficient for the sound to reach
all concert-ground listeners. Pp. 491 U. S.
791 -796.

															(b) The guideline is narrowly tailored to serve significant
governmental interests. That the city has a substantial interest in
protecting citizens from unwelcome and excessive noise, even in a
traditional public forum such as the park, cannot be doubted.
Moreover, it has a substantial interest in ensuring the sufficiency
of sound amplification at bandshell events in order to allow
citizens to enjoy the benefits of the park, in light of the
evidence that inadequate amplification had resulted in the
inability of some audiences to hear performances. The Court of
Appeals erred in requiring the city to prove that the guideline was
the least intrusive means of furthering these legitimate interests,
since a "less-restrictive-alternative analysis" has never been --
and is here, again, specifically rejected as -- a part of the
inquiry into the validity of a time, place, or manner regulation. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 , 468 U. S. 293 ; Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641 . The
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the
regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would
be Page 491 U. S. 783 achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and the means
chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve that
interest. If these standards are met, courts should defer to the
government's reasonable determination. Here, the city's substantial
interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and
effective way by the requirement that its technician control the
mixing board. Absent this requirement, the city's interest would
have been served less well, as is evidenced by the excessive noise
complaints generated by RAR's past concerts. The city also could
reasonably have determined that, overall, its interest in ensuring
that sound amplification was sufficient to reach all concert-ground
listeners would be served less effectively without the guideline
than with it, since, by providing competent technicians and
adequate equipment, the city eliminated inadequate amplification
problems that plagued some performers in the past. Furthermore, in
the absence of evidence that the guideline had a substantial
deleterious effect on the ability of performers to achieve the
quality of sound they desired, there is no merit to RAR's
contention that the guideline is substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the city's legitimate ends. Pp. 491 U. S.
796 -802.

															(c) The guideline leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication, since it does not attempt to ban any particular
manner or type of expression at a given place and time. Rather, it
continues to permit expressive activity in the bandshell, and has
no effect on the quantity or content of that expression beyond
regulating the extent of amplification. That the city's volume
limitations may reduce to some degree the potential audience for
RAR's speech is of no consequence, since there has been no showing
that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate. Pp. 491 U. S.
802 -803.

															848 F.2d 367, reversed.

															KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. MARSHALL, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 491 U. S.
803 . Page 491 U. S. 784 JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In the southeast portion of New York City's Central Park, about
10 blocks upward from the park's beginning point at 59th Street,
there is an amphitheater and stage structure known as the Naumberg
Acoustic Bandshell. The bandshell faces west across the remaining
width of the park. In close proximity to the bandshell, and lying
within the directional path of its sound, is a grassy open area
called the Sheep Meadow. The city has designated the Sheep Meadow
as a quiet area for passive recreations like reclining, walking,
and reading. Just beyond the park, and also within the potential
sound range of the bandshell, are the apartments and residences of
Central Park West.

															This case arises from the city's attempt to regulate the volume
of amplified music at the bandshell so the performances are
satisfactory to the audience without intruding upon those who use
the Sheep Meadow or live on Central Park West and in its
vicinity.

															The city's regulation requires bandshell performers to use sound
amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the
city. The challenge to this volume control technique comes from the
sponsor of a rock concert. The trial court sustained the noise
control measures, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed. We granted certiorari to resolve the important First
Amendment issues presented by the case. I Rock Against Racism, respondent in this case, is an
unincorporated association which, in its own words, is "dedicated
to the espousal and promotion of antiracist views." App. to Pet.
for Cert. 3. Each year from 1979 through 1986, RAR has sponsored a
program of speeches and rock music at the Page 491 U. S. 785 bandshell. RAR has furnished the sound equipment and sound
technician used by the various performing groups at these annual
events.

															Over the years, the city received numerous complaints about
excessive sound amplification at respondent's concerts from park
users and residents of areas adjacent to the park. On some
occasions, RAR was less than cooperative when city officials asked
that the volume be reduced; at one concert, police felt compelled
to cut off the power to the sound system, an action that caused the
audience to become unruly and hostile. App. 127-131, 140-141,
212-214, 345-347.

															Before the 1984 concert, city officials met with RAR
representatives to discuss the problem of excessive noise. It was
decided that the city would monitor sound levels at the edge of the
concert-ground, and would revoke respondent's event permit if
specific volume limits were exceeded. Sound levels at the concert
did exceed acceptable levels for sustained periods of time, despite
repeated warnings and requests that the volume be lowered. Two
citations for excessive volume were issued to respondent during the
concert. When the power was eventually shut off, the audience
became abusive and disruptive.

															The following year, when respondent sought permission to hold
its upcoming concert at the bandshell, the city declined to grant
an event permit, citing its problems with noise and crowd control
at RAR's previous concerts. The city suggested some other
city-owned facilities as alternative sites for the concert. RAR
declined the invitation, and filed suit in United States District
Court against the city, its mayor, and various police and parks
department officials, seeking an injunction directing issuance of
an event permit. After respondent agreed to abide by all applicable
regulations, the parties reached agreement and a permit was
issued.

															The city then undertook to develop comprehensive New York City
Parks Department Use Guidelines for the Naumberg Bandshell. A
principal problem to be addressed by Page 491 U. S. 786 the guidelines was controlling the volume of amplified sound at
bandshell events. A major concern was that, at some bandshell
performances, the event sponsors had been unable to "provide the
amplification levels required and crowds unhappy with the sound
became disappointed or unruly.'" Brief for Petitioners 9. The city
found that this problem had several causes, including inadequate
sound equipment, sound technicians who were either unskilled at
mixing sound outdoors or unfamiliar with the acoustics of the
bandshell and its surroundings, and the like. Because some
performers compensated for poor sound mix by raising volume, these
factors tended to exacerbate the problem of excess noise. [ Footnote 1 ] App. 30, 189,
218-219. The city considered various solutions to the sound amplification
problem. The idea of a fixed decibel limit for all performers using
the bandshell was rejected because the impact on listeners of a
single decibel level is not constant, but varies in response to
changes in air temperature, foliage, audience size, and like
factors. Id. at 31, 220, 285-286. The city also rejected
the possibility of employing a sound technician to operate the
equipment provided by the various sponsors of bandshell events
because the city's technician might have had difficulty satisfying
the needs of sponsors while operating unfamiliar, and perhaps
inadequate, sound equipment. Id. Page 491 U. S. 787 at 220. Instead, the city concluded that the most effective way
to achieve adequate but not excessive sound amplification would be
for the city to furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an
independent, experienced sound technician for all performances at
the bandshell. After an extensive search, the city hired a private
sound company capable of meeting the needs of all the varied users
of the bandshell.

															The Use Guidelines were promulgated on March 21, 1986. [ Footnote 2 ] After learning that it
would be expected to comply with the guidelines at its upcoming
annual concert in May, 1986, respondent returned to the District
Court and filed a motion for an injunction against the enforcement
of certain aspects of the guidelines. The District Court
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the sound amplification rule
on May 1, 1986. See 636 F.
Supp. 178 (SDNY 1986). Under the protection of the injunction,
and alone among users of the bandshell in the 1986 season, RAR was
permitted to use its own sound equipment Page 491 U. S. 788 and technician, just as it had done in prior years. RAR's 1986
concert again generated complaints about excessive noise from park
users and nearby residents. App. 127, 138.

															After the concert, respondent amended its complaint to seek
damages and a declaratory judgment striking down the guidelines as
facially invalid. After hearing five days of testimony about
various aspects of the guidelines, the District Court issued its
decision upholding the sound amplification guideline. [ Footnote 3 ] The court found that the
city had been "motivated by a desire to obtain top-flight sound
equipment and experienced operators" in selecting an independent
contractor to provide the equipment and technician for bandshell
events, and that the performers who did use the city's sound system
in the 1986 season, in performances "which ran the full cultural
gamut from grand opera to salsa to reggae," were uniformly pleased
with the quality of the sound provided. 658
F. Supp. 1346 , 1352 (SDNY 1987).

															Although the city's sound technician controlled both sound
volume and sound mix by virtue of his position at the mixing board,
the court found that

															"[t]he City's practice for events at the Bandshell is to give
the sponsor autonomy with respect to the sound mix: balancing
treble with bass, highlighting a particular instrument or voice,
and the like,"

															and that the city's sound technician "does all he can to
accommodate the sponsor's desires in those regards." Ibid. Even with respect to volume control, the city's practice was to
confer with the sponsor before making any decision to turn the
volume down. Ibid. In some instances, as with a New York
Grand Opera performance, the sound technician accommodated the
performers' unique needs by integrating special microphones with
the city's equipment. The Court specifically found that

															"[t]he City's implementation of the Bandshell guidelines
provides for a sound amplification system capable of meeting Page 491 U. S. 789 RAR's technical needs and leaves control of the sound 'mix' in
the hands of RAR." Id. at 1353. Applying this Court's three-part test for
judging the constitutionality of government regulation of the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, the court found the city's
regulation valid.

															The Court of Appeals reversed. 848 F.2d 367 (CA2 1988). After
recognizing that

															"[c]ontent-neutral time, place and manner regulations are
permissible so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit
alternative avenues of expression,"

															the court added the proviso that

															"the method and extent of such regulation must be reasonable,
that is, it must be the least intrusive upon the freedom of
expression as is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate
purpose of the regulation." Id. at 370 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 377
(1968)). Applying this test, the court determined that the city's
guideline was valid only to the extent necessary to achieve the
city's legitimate interest in controlling excessive volume, but
found there were various alternative means of controlling volume
without also intruding on respondent's ability to control the sound
mix. For example, the city could have directed respondent's sound
technician to keep the volume below specified levels.
Alternatively, a volume-limiting device could have been installed;
and as a "last resort," the court suggested, "the plug can be
pulled on the sound to enforce the volume limit." 848 F.2d at 372,
n. 6. In view of the potential availability of these seemingly less
restrictive alternatives, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
sound amplification guideline was invalid because the city had
failed to prove that its regulation "was the least intrusive means
of regulating the volume." Id. at 371.

															We granted certiorari, 488 U, S. 816 (1988), to clarify the
legal standard applicable to governmental regulation of the time,
place, or manner of protected speech. Because the Court of Appeals
erred in requiring the city to prove that its regulation was the
least intrusive means of furthering its legitimate Page 491 U. S. 790 governmental interests, and because the ordinance is valid on
its face, we now reverse. II Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From
Plato's discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our
own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the
intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical
compositions to serve the needs of the state. See 2
Dialogues of Plato, Republic, bk. 3, pp. 231, 245-248 (B. Jowett
transl., 4th ed.1953) ("Our poets must sing in another and a nobler
strain"); Musical Freedom and Why Dictators Fear It, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 1981, section 2, p. 1, col. 5; Soviet Schizophrenia toward
Stravinsky, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1982, section 1, p. 25, col. 2;
Symphonic Voice from China Is Heard Again, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1987, section 2, p. 27, col. 1. The Constitution prohibits any like
attempts in our own legal order. Music, as a form of expression and
communication, is protected under the First Amendment. In the case
before us, the performances apparently consisted of remarks by
speakers, as well as rock music, but the case has been presented as
one in which the constitutional challenge is to the city's
regulation of the musical aspects of the concert; and, based on the
principle we have stated, the city's guideline must meet the
demands of the First Amendment. The parties do not appear to
dispute that proposition.

															We need not here discuss whether a municipality which owns a
bandstand or stage facility may exercise, in some circumstances, a
proprietary right to select performances and control their quality. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.
S. 546 , 420 U. S.
570 -574 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). Though it
did demonstrate its own interest in the effort to insure high
quality performances by providing the equipment in question, the
city justifies its guideline as a regulatory measure to limit and
control noise. Here the bandshell was open, apparently, to all
performers; and we decide Page 491 U. S. 791 the case as one in which the bandshell is a public forum for
performances in which the government's right to regulate expression
is subject to the protections of the First Amendment. United
States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 , 461 U. S. 177 (1983); see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.
S. 474 , 487 U. S. 481 (1988); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'
Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 45 (1983). Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum,
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions

															"are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information." Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U. S. 288 , 468 U. S. 293 (1984); see Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 , 452 U. S. 648 (1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 , 425 U. S. 771 (1976)). We consider these requirements in turn. A The principal inquiry in determining content-neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S. 295 .
The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A
regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages, but not others. See Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 , 475 U. S. 47 -48
(1986). Government regulation of expressive activity is
content-neutral so long as it is " justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech." Community
for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S. 293 (emphasis added); Heffron, supra, at 462 U. S. 648 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd., supra, at Page 491 U. S. 792 425 U. S.
771 ); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.
S. 312 , 485 U. S.
320 -321 (1988) (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.).

															The principal justification for the sound amplification
guideline is the city's desire to control noise levels at bandshell
events, in order to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow and
its more sedate activities, and to avoid undue intrusion into
residential areas and other areas of the park. This justification
for the guideline "ha[s] nothing to do with content," Boos v.
Barry, supra, at 485 U. S. 320 ,
and it satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner
regulations be content-neutral.

															The only other justification offered below was the city's
interest in "ensur[ing] the quality of sound at Bandshell events."
658 F. Supp. at 1352; see 848 F.2d at 370, n. 3.
Respondent urges that this justification is not content-neutral,
because it is based upon the quality, and thus the content, of the
speech being regulated. In respondent's view, the city is seeking
to assert artistic control over performers at the bandshell by
enforcing a bureaucratically determined, value-laden conception of
good sound. That all performers who have used the city's sound
equipment have been completely satisfied is of no moment,
respondent argues, because

															"[t]he First Amendment does not permit and cannot tolerate state
control of artistic expression merely because the State claims that
[its] efforts will lead to 'top-quality' results."

															Brief for Respondent 19.

															While respondent's arguments that the government may not
interfere with artistic judgment may have much force in other
contexts, they are inapplicable to the facts of this case. The city
has disclaimed in express terms any interest in imposing its own
view of appropriate sound mix on performers. To the contrary, as
the District Court found, the city requires its sound technician to
defer to the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix. 658 F.
Supp. at 1352-1353. On this record, the city's concern with sound
quality extends only to the clearly content-neutral goals of
ensuring adequate Page 491 U. S. 793 sound amplification and avoiding the volume problems associated
with inadequate sound mix. [ Footnote 4 ] Any governmental attempt to serve purely
aesthetic goals by imposing subjective standards of acceptable
sound mix on performers would raise serious First Amendment
concerns, but this case provides us with no opportunity to address
those questions. As related above, the District Court found that
the city's equipment and its sound technician could meet all of the
standards requested by the performers, including RAR.

															Respondent argues further that the guideline, even if not
content-based in explicit terms, is nonetheless invalid on its face
because it places unbridled discretion in the hands of city
officials charged with enforcing it. See Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750 , 486 U. S.
769 -772 (1988) (4-to-3 decision); Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, at 452 U. S. 649 ; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 , 380 U. S. 56 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88 , 310 U. S. 97 (1940). According to respondent, there is nothing in the language
of the guideline to prevent city officials from selecting wholly
inadequate sound equipment or technicians, or even from varying the
volume and quality of sound based on the message being conveyed by
the performers.

															As a threshold matter, it is far from clear that respondent
should be permitted to bring a facial challenge to this aspect of
the regulation. Our cases permitting facial challenges to
regulations that allegedly grant officials unconstrained authority
to regulate speech have generally involved licensing schemes that
"ves[t] unbridled discretion in a government official over whether
to permit or deny expressive activity." Plain Dealer,
supra, at 486 U. S. 755 .
The grant of discretion that respondent Page 491 U. S. 794 seeks to challenge here is of an entirely different, and lesser,
order of magnitude, because respondent does not suggest that city
officials enjoy unfettered discretion to deny bandshell permits
altogether. Rather, respondent contends only that the city, by
exercising what is concededly its right to regulate amplified
sound, could choose to provide inadequate sound for performers
based on the content of their speech. Since respondent does not
claim that city officials enjoy unguided discretion to deny the
right to speak altogether, it is open to question whether
respondent's claim falls within the narrow class of permissible
facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory
authority. Cf. 486 U.S. at 486 U. S. 787 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (arguing that facial challenges of this
type are permissible only where "the local law at issue require[s]
licenses -- not for a narrow category of expressive conduct that
could be prohibited -- but for a sweeping range of First Amendment
protected activity").

															We need not decide, however, whether the "extraordinary
doctrine" that permits facial challenges to some regulations of
expression, see id. at 486 U. S. 772 (WHITE, J., dissenting), should be extended to the circumstances of
this case, for respondent's facial challenge fails on its merits.
The city's guideline states that its goals are to "provide the best
sound for all events" and to

															"insure appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for
nearby residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone
of [the] Sheep Meadow."

															App. 375. While these standards are undoubtedly flexible, and
the officials implementing them will exercise considerable
discretion, perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been
required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.
S. 104 , 408 U. S. 110 (1972) ("Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect
mathematical certainty in our language"); see also Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 , 336 U. S. 79 (1949) (rejecting vagueness challenge to city ordinance forbidding
"loud and raucous" sound amplification) (opinion of Reed, J.). By
its own terms, the Page 491 U. S. 795 city's sound amplification guideline must be interpreted to
forbid city officials purposely to select inadequate sound systems
or to vary the sound quality or volume based on the message being
delivered by performers. The guideline is not vulnerable to
respondent's facial challenge. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Even if the language of the guideline were not sufficient on its
face to withstand challenge, our ultimate conclusion would be the
same, for the city has interpreted the guideline in such a manner
as to provide additional guidance to the officials charged with its
enforcement. The District Court expressly found that the city's
policy is to defer to the sponsor's desires concerning sound
quality. 658 F. Supp. at 1352. With respect to sound volume, the
city retains ultimate control, but city officials "mak[e] it a
practice to confer with the sponsor if any questions of excessive
sound arise, before taking any corrective action." Ibid. The city's goal of ensuring that "the sound amplification [is]
sufficient to reach all listeners within the defined
concert-ground," ibid., serves to limit further the
discretion of the officials on the scene. Administrative
interpretation and implementation of a regulation is, of course,
highly relevant to our analysis, for,

															"[i]n evaluating a facial Page 491 U. S. 796 challenge to a state law, a federal court must . . . consider
any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency
has proffered." Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489 , 455 U. S. 494 ,
n. 5 (1982); see Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 486 U. S.
769 -770, and n. 11; United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. at 461 U. S. 181 ,
n. 10; Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 408 U. S. 110 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953). Any inadequacy on the face of the guideline would have been
more than remedied by the city's narrowing construction. B The city's regulation is also "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest." Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 293 .
Despite respondent's protestations to the contrary, it can no
longer be doubted that government "ha[s] a substantial interest in
protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise." City Council of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.
S. 789 , 466 U. S. 806 (1984) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, supra ); see Grayned,
supra, at 408 U. S. 116 .
This interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to
protect " the wellbeing, tranquility, and privacy of the home,'" Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 487 U. S. 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S. 471 (1980)), but it is by no means limited to that context, for the
government may act to protect even such traditional public forums
as city streets and parks from excessive noise. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 86 -87
(opinion of Reed, J.); id. at 336 U. S. 96 -97
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 336 U. S. 97 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Community for Creative
Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S. 296 (recognizing the government's "substantial interest in maintaining
the parks . . . in an attractive and intact condition, readily
available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy
them"). We think it also apparent that the city's interest in ensuring
the sufficiency of sound amplification at bandshell events is a
substantial one. The record indicates that inadequate Page 491 U. S. 797 sound amplification has had an adverse affect on the ability of
some audiences to hear and enjoy performances at the bandshell. The
city enjoys a substantial interest in ensuring the ability of its
citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have to offer,
from amplified music to silent meditation. See Community for
Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S.
296 .

															The Court of Appeals recognized the city's substantial interest
in limiting the sound emanating from the bandshell. See 848 F.2d at 370. The court concluded, however, that the city's
sound amplification guideline was not narrowly tailored to further
this interest, because "it has not [been] shown . . . that the
requirement of the use of the city's sound system and technician
was the least intrusive means of regulating the volume." Id. at 371 (emphasis added). In the court's judgment,
there were several alternative methods of achieving the desired end
that would have been less restrictive of respondent's First
Amendment rights.

															The Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available
or imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in order
to determine whether the city's solution was "the least intrusive
means" of achieving the desired end. This

															"less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a
part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner
regulation." Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641 , 468 U. S. 657 (1984) (opinion of WHITE, J.). Instead, our cases quite clearly
hold that restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech are not invalid "simply because there is some imaginable
alternative that might be less burdensome on speech." United
States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675 , 472 U. S. 689 (1985).

															The Court of Appeals apparently drew its least-intrusive-means
requirement from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 377 ,
the case in which we established the standard for judging the
validity of restrictions on expressive conduct. See 848
F.2d at 370. The court's reliance was misplaced, Page 491 U. S. 798 however, for we have held that the O'Brien test, "in
the last analysis, is little, if any, different from the standard
applied to time, place, or manner restrictions." Community for
Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S. 298 .
Indeed, in Community for Creative Non-Violence, we
squarely rejected reasoning identical to that of the court
below:

															"We are unmoved by the Court of Appeals' view that the
challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, because
there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have
satisfied the Government interest in preserving park lands. . . .
We do not believe . . . that either United States v.
O'Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the
judiciary the authority to replace the [parks department] as the
manager of the [city's] parks or endow the judiciary with the
competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and
how that level of conservation is to be attained."

															468 U.S. 468 U. S.
299 .

															Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must
be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate,
content-neutral interests, but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. [ Footnote 6 ] Page 491 U. S. 799 Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied

															"so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation." United States v. Albertini, supra, at 472 U. S. 689 ; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S. 297 .
To be sure, this standard does not mean that a time, place, or
manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.
Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to
advance its goals. [ Footnote 7 ] See Frisby Page 491 U. S. 800 v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 487 U. S. 485 ("A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each
activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately
targeted evil"). So long as the means chosen are not substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest,
however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court
concludes that the government's interest could be adequately served
by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.

															"The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not
turn on a judge's agreement with the responsible decisionmaker
concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant
government interests"

															or the degree to which those interests should be promoted. United States v. Albertini, supra, at 472 U. S. 689 ; see Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 468 U. S.
299 .

															It is undeniable that the city's substantial interest in
limiting sound volume is served in a direct and effective way by
the requirement that the city's sound technician control the mixing
board during performances. Absent this requirement, the city's
interest would have been served less well, as is evidenced by the
complaints about excessive volume generated by respondent's past
concerts. The alternative regulatory methods hypothesized by the
Court of Appeals reflect nothing more than a disagreement with the
city over how much control of volume is appropriate or how that
level of control is to be achieved. See Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 299 .
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city's
reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume
would be best served by requiring bandshell performers to utilize
the city's sound technician.

															The city's second content-neutral justification for the
guideline, that of ensuring "that the sound amplification [is]
sufficient to reach all listeners within the defined
concert-ground," Page 491 U. S. 801 658 F. Supp. at 1352, also supports the city's choice of
regulatory methods. By providing competent sound technicians and
adequate amplification equipment, the city eliminated the problems
of inexperienced technicians and insufficient sound volume that had
plagued some bandshell performers in the past. No doubt this
concern is not applicable to respondent's concerts, which
apparently were characterized by more-than-adequate sound
amplification. But that fact is beside the point, for the validity
of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall
problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which
it furthers the government's interests in an individual case. Here,
the regulation's effectiveness must be judged by considering all
the varied groups that use the bandshell, and it is valid so long
as the city could reasonably have determined that its interests
overall would be served less effectively without the sound
amplification guideline than with it. United States v.
Albertini, supra, at 472 U. S.
688 -689; Community for Creative Non-Violence,
supra, at 468 U. S.
296 -297. Considering these proffered justifications
together, therefore, it is apparent that the guideline directly
furthers the city's legitimate governmental interests, and that
those interests would have been less well served in the absence of
the sound amplification guideline.

															Respondent nonetheless argues that the sound amplification
guideline is not narrowly tailored because, by placing control of
sound mix in the hands of the city's technician, the guideline
sweeps far more broadly than is necessary to further the city's
legitimate concern with sound volume. According to respondent, the
guideline "targets . . . more than the exact source of the evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby v. Schultz, supra, at 487 U. S.
485 . If the city's regulatory scheme had a substantial deleterious
effect on the ability of bandshell performers to achieve the
quality of sound they desired, respondent's concerns would have
considerable force. The District Court found, Page 491 U. S. 802 however, that, pursuant to city policy, the city's sound
technician

															"give[s] the sponsor autonomy with respect to the sound mix . .
. [and] does all that he can to accommodate the sponsor's desires
in those regards."

															658 F. Supp. at 1352. The court squarely rejected respondent's
claim that the city's "technician is not able properly to implement
a sponsor's instructions as to sound quality or mix," finding that
"[n]o evidence to that effect was offered at trial; as noted, the
evidence is to the contrary." App. to Pet. for Cert. 89. In view of
these findings, which were not disturbed by the Court of Appeals,
we must conclude that the city's guideline has no material impact
on any performer's ability to exercise complete artistic control
over sound quality. Since the guideline allows the city to control
volume without interfering with the performer's desired sound mix,
it is not "substantially broader than necessary" to achieve the
city's legitimate ends, City Council of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers Page 491 U. S. 803 for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 808 ,
and thus it satisfies the requirement of narrow tailoring. C The final requirement, that the guideline leave open ample
alternative channels of communication, is easily met. Indeed, in
this respect the guideline is far less restrictive than regulations
we have upheld in other cases, for it does not attempt to ban any
particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time. Compare Frisby, supra, at 487 U. S.
482 -484; Community for Creative Non-Violence,
supra, at 468 U. S. 295 ; Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 53 -54.
Rather, the guideline continues to permit expressive activity in
the bandshell, and has no effect on the quantity or content of that
expression beyond regulating the extent of amplification. That the
city's limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the
potential audience for respondent's speech is of no consequence,
for there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of
communication are inadequate. See Taxpayers for Vincent,
supra, at 466 U. S. 803 ,
and n. 23, 466 U. S. 812 ,
and n. 30; Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 88 -89
(opinion of Reed, J.). III The city's sound amplification guideline is narrowly tailored to
serve the substantial and content-neutral governmental interests of
avoiding excessive sound volume and providing sufficient
amplification within the bandshell concert-ground, and the
guideline leaves open ample channels of communication. Accordingly,
it is valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of
the place and manner of expression. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is Reversed. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs in the result.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The amplified sound heard at a rock concert consists of two
components, volume and mix. Sound produced by the various
instruments and performers on stage is picked up by microphones and
fed into a central mixing board, where it is combined into one
signal and then amplified through speakers to the audience. A sound
technician is at the mixing board to select the appropriate mix, or
balance, of the various sounds produced on stage, and to add other
effects as desired by the performers. In addition to controlling
the sound mix, the sound technician also controls the overall
volume of sound reaching the audience. During the course of a
performance, the sound technician is continually manipulating
various controls on the mixing board to provide the desired sound
mix and volume. The sound technician thus plays an important role
in determining the quality of the amplified sound that reaches the
audience.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															In pertinent part, the Use Guidelines provide:

															"SOUND AMPLIFICATION"

															"To provide the best sound for all events, Department of Parks
and Recreation has leased a sound amplification system designed for
the specific demands of the Central Park Bandshell. To insure
appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for nearby
residential neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone of Sheep
Meadow, all sponsors may use only the Department of Parks and
Recreation sound system. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS TO
BE THE SOLE AND ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION, INCLUDING,
THOUGH NOT LIMITED TO, AMPLIFIERS, SPEAKERS, MONITORS, MICROPHONES,
AND PROCESSORS."

															"Clarity of sound results from a combination of amplification
equipment and a sound technician's familiarity and proficiency with
that system. Department of Parks and Recreation will employ a
professional sound technician [who] will be fully versed in sound
bounce patterns, daily air currents, and sound skipping within the
Park. The sound technician must also consider the Bandshell's
proximity to Sheep Meadow, activities at Bethesda Terrace, and the
New York City Department of Environmental Protection
recommendations."

															App. 375-376.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The court invalidated certain other aspects of the Use
Guidelines, but those provisions are not before us.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															As noted above, there is evidence to suggest that volume control
and sound mix are interrelated to a degree, in that performers
unfamiliar with the acoustics of the Bandshell sometimes attempt to
compensate for poor sound mix by increasing volume. App. 218,
290-291. By providing adequate sound equipment and professional
sound mixing, the city avoids this problem.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The dissent's suggestion that the guideline constitutes a prior
restraint is not consistent with our cases. See post at 491 U. S.
808 -809. As we said in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975), the regulations we have found invalid as prior restraints
have "had this in common: they gave public officials the power to
deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression." Id. at 420 U. S. 553 .
The sound amplification guideline, by contrast, grants no authority
to forbid speech, but merely permits the city to regulate volume to
the extent necessary to avoid excessive noise. It is true that the
city's sound technician theoretically possesses the power to shut
off the volume for any particular performer, but that hardly
distinguishes this regulatory scheme from any other; government
will always possess the raw power to suppress speech
through force, and indeed it was in part to avoid the necessity of
exercising its power to "pull the plug" on the volume that the city
adopted the sound amplification guideline. The relevant question is
whether the challenged regulation authorizes suppression
of speech in advance of its expression, and the sound amplification
guideline does not.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Respondent contends that our decision last Term in Boos v.
Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988), supports the conclusion that "a regulation is neither
precisely drawn nor narrowly tailored' if less intrusive means
than those employed are available." Brief for Respondent 27. In Boos, we concluded that the government regulation at issue
was "not narrowly tailored; a less restrictive alternative is
readily available." 485 U.S. at 485 U. S. 329 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.
S. 267 , 476 U. S. 280 ,
n. 6 (1986) (plurality opinion)). In placing reliance on Boos, however, respondent ignores a crucial difference
between that case and this. The regulation we invalidated in Boos was a content-based ban on displaying signs critical
of foreign governments; such content-based restrictions on
political speech "must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny."
485 U.S. at 485 U. S. 321 .
While time, place, or manner regulations must also be "narrowly
tailored" in order to survive First Amendment challenge, we have
never applied strict scrutiny in this context. As a result, the
same degree of tailoring is not required of these regulations, and
least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place. For
the same reason, the dissent's citation of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989), is beside the point. See post at 491 U. S. 806 ,
n. 4. Croson, like Boos, is a strict scrutiny
case; even the dissent does not argue that strict scrutiny is
applicable to time, place, or manner regulations. Our summary affirmance of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action
Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (CA7 1986), aff'd, 479 U.S.
1048 (1987), is not to the contrary. Although the Seventh Circuit
in that case did adopt the least-restrictive-alternative approach, see 796 F.2d at 1553-1554, its judgment was also supported
by the alternative grounds that the regulation at issue did not
serve to further the stated governmental interests, and did not
leave open alternative channels of communication. Id. at
1555-1558. As we have noted on more than one occasion:

															"A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court
below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential
to sustain that judgment." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.
S. 780 , 460 U. S. 785 ,
n. 5 (1983).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The dissent's attempt to analogize the sound amplification
guideline to a total ban on distribution of handbills is
imaginative, but misguided. See post at 491 U. S.
806 -807. The guideline does not ban all concerts, or
even all rock concerts, but instead focuses on the source of the
evils the city seeks to eliminate -- excessive and inadequate sound
amplification -- and eliminates them without, at the same time,
banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of
speech that does not create the same evils. This is the essence of
narrow tailoring. A ban on handbilling, of course, would suppress a
great quantity of speech that does not cause the evils that it
seeks to eliminate, whether they be fraud, crime, litter, traffic
congestion, or noise. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S.
145 -146 (1943). For that reason, a complete ban on
handbilling would be substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the interests justifying it.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, dissenting.

															No one can doubt that government has a substantial interest in
regulating the barrage of excessive sound that can plague urban
life. Unfortunately, the majority plays to our shared impatience
with loud noise to obscure the damage that it does to our First
Amendment rights. Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has
been government's obligation to adopt the least intrusive
restriction necessary to achieve its goals. By abandoning the
requirement that time, place, and manner regulations must be
narrowly tailored, the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny
with mandatory deference. The majority's willingness to give
government officials a free hand in achieving their policy ends
extends so far as to permit, in this case, government control of
speech in advance of its dissemination. Because New York City's Use
Guidelines (Guidelines) are not narrowly tailored to serve its
interest in regulating loud noise, and because they constitute an
impermissible prior restraint, I dissent. Page 491 U. S. 804 I The majority sets forth the appropriate standard for assessing
the constitutionality of the Guidelines. A time, place, and manner
regulation of expression must be content-neutral, serve a
significant government interest, be narrowly tailored to serve that
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.
S. 474 , 487 U. S.
481 -482 (1988); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 44 (1983). The Guidelines indisputably are content-neutral, as they
apply to all bandshell users irrespective of the message of their
music. App. 375; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1 , 475 U. S. 20 (1985). [ Footnote 2/1 ] They also
serve government's significant interest in limiting loud noise in
public places, see Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.
S. 104 , 408 U. S. 116 (1972), by giving the city exclusive control of all sound
equipment.

															My complaint is with the majority's serious distortion of the
narrow tailoring requirement. Our cases have not, as the majority
asserts, "clearly" rejected a less-restrictive-alternative test. Ante at 491 U. S. 797 .
On the contrary, just last Term, we held that a statute is narrowly
tailored only "if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact
source of the evil' it seeks to remedy." Frisby v. Schultz,
supra, at 487 U. S. 485 .
While there is language in a few opinions which, taken out
of Page 491 U. S. 805 context, supports the majority's position, [ Footnote 2/2 ] in practice, the Court has
interpreted the narrow tailoring requirement to mandate an
examination of alternative methods of serving the asserted
governmental interest and a determination whether the greater
efficacy of the challenged regulation outweighs the increased
burden it places on protected speech. See, e.g., Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S.
147 -148 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 , 308 U. S. 162 (1939). In Schneider, for example, the Court invalidated a
ban on handbill distribution on public streets, notwithstanding
that it was the most effective means of serving government's
legitimate interest in minimizing litter, noise, and traffic
congestion, and in preventing fraud. The Court concluded that
punishing those who actually litter or perpetrate frauds was a much
less intrusive, albeit not quite as effective, means to serve those
significant interests. Id. at 308 U. S. 162 , 308 U. S. 164 ; see also Martin, supra, at 148 (invalidating ban on
door-to-door distribution of handbills because directly punishing
fraudulent solicitation was a less intrusive, yet still effective,
means of serving government's interest in preventing fraud).
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 491 U. S. 806 The Court's past concern for the extent to which a regulation
burdens speech more than would a satisfactory alternative is
noticeably absent from today's decision. The majority requires only
that government show that its interest cannot be served as
effectively without the challenged restriction. Ante at 491 U. S. 799 .
It will be enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation
advances the government's interest only in the slightest, for any
differential burden on speech that results does not enter the
calculus. Despite its protestations to the contrary, the majority
thus has abandoned the requirement that restrictions on speech be
narrowly tailored in any ordinary use of the phrase. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Indeed, after today's
decision, a city could claim that bans on handbill distribution or
on door-to-door solicitation are the most effective means of
avoiding littering and fraud, or that a ban on loudspeakers and
radios in a public park is the most effective means of avoiding
loud noise. Logically extended, the majority's analysis would
permit such far reaching restrictions on speech.

															True, the majority states that

															"[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a manner that
a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to
advance its goals." Ibid. But this means that only those regulations that
"engage in the gratuitous inhibition of expression" will be
invalidated. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
Harv.L.Rev. 1482, 1485 (1975). Moreover, the majority has robbed
courts of the necessary analytic tools to make even this limited
inquiry. The Court of Appeals examined "how much control of volume
is appropriate [and] how that level of control is to be achieved," ante at 491 U. S. 800 ,
but the majority admonishes that court for doing so, stating that
it should Page 491 U. S. 807 have "defer[red] to the city's reasonable determination." Ibid. The majority thus instructs courts to refrain from
examining how much speech may be restricted to serve an asserted
interest, and how that level of restriction is to be achieved. If a
court cannot engage in such inquiries, I am at a loss to understand
how a court can ascertain whether the government has adopted a
regulation that burdens substantially more speech than is
necessary.

															Had the majority not abandoned the narrow tailoring requirement,
the Guidelines could not possibly survive constitutional scrutiny.
Government's interest in avoiding loud sounds cannot justify giving
government total control over sound equipment, any more than its
interest in avoiding litter could justify a ban on handbill
distribution. In both cases, government's legitimate goals can be
effectively and less intrusively served by directly punishing the
evil -- the persons responsible for excessive sounds and the
persons who litter. Indeed, the city concedes that it has an
ordinance generally limiting noise, but has chosen not to enforce
it. See Tr. of Oral. Arg. 5-6. [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															By holding that the Guidelines are valid time, place, and manner
restrictions, notwithstanding the availability of less intrusive
but effective means of controlling volume, the majority deprives
the narrow tailoring requirement of all meaning. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Today, the majority enshrines
efficacy, but sacrifices free speech. Page 491 U. S. 808 II The majority's conclusion that the city's exclusive control of
sound equipment is constitutional is deeply troubling for another
reason. It places the Court's imprimatur on a
quintessential prior restraint, incompatible with fundamental First
Amendment values. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Indeed, just as "[m]usic is one of the oldest forms of
human expression," ante at 491 U. S. 790 ,
the city's regulation is one of the oldest forms of speech
repression. In 16th- and 17th-century England, government
controlled speech through its monopoly on printing presses. See L. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 6 (1985). Here, the
city controls the volume and mix of sound through its monopoly on
sound equipment. In both situations, government's exclusive control
of the means of communication enables public officials to censor
speech in advance of its expression. See Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 , 420 U. S. 553 (1975). Under more familiar prior restraints, government officials
censor speech "by a simple stroke of the pen," Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648, 657
(1955). Here, it is done by a single turn of a knob.

															The majority's implication that government control of sound
equipment is not a prior restraint because city officials do not
"enjoy unguided discretion to deny the right to speak altogether," ante at 491 U. S. 794 ,
is startling. In the majority's view, this case involves a question
of "different and lesser" magnitude -- the discretion to provide
inadequate sound for performers. But whether the city denies a
performer a bandshell permit or grants the permit and then silences
or Page 491 U. S. 809 distorts the performer's music, the result is the same -- the
city censors speech. In the words of CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, the
First Amendment means little if it permits government to "allo[w] a
speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the
use of an amplifying system." FEC v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480 , 470 U. S. 493 (1985); see also Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 420 U. S. 556 ,
n. 8 ("A licensing system need not effect total suppression in
order to create a prior restraint").

															As a system of prior restraint, the Guidelines are presumptively
invalid. See Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 420 U. S. 558 ; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S.
58 , 372 U. S. 70 (1963). They may be constitutional only if accompanied by the
procedural safeguards necessary "to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S.
51 , 380 U. S. 58 (1965). The city must establish neutral criteria embodied in
"narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards," in order to
ensure that discretion is not exercised based on the content of
speech. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 , 340 U. S. 271 (1951); see also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750 , 486 U. S. 758 (1988); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.
S. 147 , 394 U. S.
150 -151 (1969). Moreover, there must be "an almost
immediate judicial determination" that the restricted material was
unprotected by the First Amendment. Bantam Books, supra, at 372 U. S. 70 ; see also Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 420 U. S.
560 .

															The Guidelines contain neither of these procedural safeguards.
First, there are no "narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite
standards" guiding the hands of the city's sound technician as he
mixes the sound. The Guidelines state that the goals are "to
provide the best sound for all events" and to "insure appropriate
sound quality balanced with respect for nearby residential
neighbors and the mayorally decreed quiet zone." App. 375; see
also ante at 491 U. S. 794 .
But the city never defines "best sound" or "appropriate sound
quality." The bandshell program director-manager testified that
quality of Page 491 U. S. 810 sound refers to tone and to sound mix. App. 229, 230. Yet
questions of tone and mix cannot be separated from musical
expression as a whole. See The New Grove Dictionary of
Music and Musicians 51-55 (S. Sadie ed.1980) (tonality involves
relationship between pitches and harmony); F. Everest, Successful
Sound System Operation 173 (1985) ("The mixing console . . . must
be considered as a creative tool"). Because judgments that sounds
are too loud, noise-like, or discordant can mask disapproval of the
music itself, [ Footnote 2/7 ]
government control of the sound mixing equipment necessitates
detailed and neutral standards.

															The majority concedes that the standards in the Guidelines are
"undoubtedly flexible," and that "the officials implementing them
will exercise considerable discretion." Ante at 491 U. S. 794 .
Nevertheless, it concludes that,

															"[b]y its own terms, the city's sound amplification guideline
must be interpreted to forbid city officials purposefully to select
inadequate sound systems or to vary the sound quality or volume
based on the message being delivered by performers." Ante at 491 U. S.
794 -795. Although the majority wishes it were so, the
language of the Guidelines simply does not support such a
limitation on the city's discretion. Alternatively, the majority
finds a limitation in the city's practice of deferring to the
sponsor with respect to sound mix, and of conferring "with the
sponsor if any questions of excessive sound arise before taking any
corrective action." 658 F.
Supp. 1346 , 1352 (SDNY 1987). A promise to consult, however,
does not provide the detailed Page 491 U. S. 811 "neutral criteria" necessary to prevent future abuses of
discretion any more than did the city's promise in Lakewood to deny permit applications only for reasons
related to the health, safety, or welfare of Lakewood citizens.
Indeed, a presumption that city officials will act in good faith
and adhere to standards absent from a regulation's face is "the
very presumption that the doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion
disallows." Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770. [ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Second, even if there were narrowly drawn guidelines limiting
the city's discretion, the Guidelines would be fundamentally
flawed. For the requirement that there be detailed standards is of
value only so far as there is a judicial mechanism to enforce them.
Here, that necessary safeguard is absent. The city's sound
technician consults with the performers for several minutes before
the performance, and then decides how to present each song or piece
of music. During the performance itself, the technician makes
hundreds of decisions affecting the mix and volume of sound. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 13. The music is played immediately after each decision.
There is, of course, no time for appeal in the middle of a song. As
a result, no court ever determines that a particular restraint on
speech is necessary. The city's admission that it does not impose
sanctions on violations of its general sound ordinance because the
necessary litigation is too costly and time-consuming only
underscores its contempt for the need for judicial review of
restrictions on speech. Id. at 5. With neither prompt
judicial review nor detailed and neutral standards fettering the
city's discretion to restrict protected Page 491 U. S. 812 speech, the Guidelines constitute a quintessential, and
unconstitutional, prior restraint. III Today's decision has significance far beyond the world of rock
music. Government no longer need balance the effectiveness of
regulation with the burdens on free speech. After today, government
need only assert that it is most effective to control speech in
advance of its expression. Because such a result eviscerates the
First Amendment, I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The majority's reliance on Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986)
is unnecessary and unwise. That decision dealt only with the unique
circumstances of "businesses that purvey sexually explicit
materials," id. at 475 U. S. 49 ,
and n. 2. Today, for the first time, a majority of the Court
applies Renton analysis to a category of speech far afield
from that decision's original limited focus. Given the serious
threat to free expression posed by Renton analysis, see Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 , 485 U. S.
335 -337 (1988) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Renton, supra, at 475 U. S. 55 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), I
fear that its broad application may encourage widespread official
censorship.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] United States v. Albertini, 472 U.
S. 675 (1985), for example, involved a person's right to
enter a military base, which, unlike a public park, is not a place
traditionally dedicated to free expression. Id. at 472 U. S. 687 (commanding officer's power to exclude civilians from a military
base cannot "be analyzed in the same manner as government
regulation of a traditional public forum"). Nor can isolated
language from JUSTICE WHITE's opinion in Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U. S. 641 , 468 U. S. 657 (1984), which commanded the votes of only three other Justices, be
construed as this Court's definitive explication of the narrow
tailoring requirement.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The majority relies heavily on Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984), but, in that case, the Court engaged in an inquiry similar
to the one the majority now rejects; it considered whether the
increased efficacy of the challenged regulation warranted the
increased burden on speech. Id. at 468 U. S. 299 ("[P]reventing overnight sleeping will avoid a measure of actual or
threatened damage"; however, "minimiz[ing] the possible injury by
reducing the size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations would
still curtail the total allowable expression in which demonstrators
could engage").

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															In marked contrast, the majority recently adopted a far more
stringent narrow tailoring requirement in the affirmative action
context. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.
S. 469 , 488 U. S.
507 -508 (1989) (plurality opinion).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Significantly, the National Park Service relies on the very
methods of volume control rejected by the city -- monitoring sound
levels on the perimeter of an event, communicating with event
sponsors, and, if necessary, turning off the power. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 21. In light of the Park
Service's "experienc[e] with thousands of events over the years," ibid., the city's claims that these methods of monitoring
excessive sound are ineffective and impracticable are hard to
accept.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Because I conclude that the Guidelines are not narrowly
tailored, there is no need to consider whether there are ample
alternative channels for communication. I note only that the
availability of alternative channels of communication outside a
public park does not magically validate a government restriction on
protected speech within it. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 , 420 U. S. 556 (1975) (" [O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place,'" quoting Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147 , 308 U. S. 163 (1939)). [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															"New music always sounds loud to old ears. Beethoven seemed to
make more noise than Mozart; Liszt was noisier than Beethoven;
Schoenberg and Stravinsky noisier than any of their
predecessors."

															N. Slonimsky, Lexicon of Musical Invective: Critical Assaults on
Composers Since Beethoven's Time 18 (1953). One music critic wrote
of Prokofiev:

															"Those who do not believe that genius is evident in
superabundance of noise looked in vain for a new musical message in
Mr. Prokofiev's work. Nor in the Classical Symphony, which the
composer conducted, was there any cessation from the orgy of
discordant sounds." Id. at 5 (internal quotations omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Of course, if the city always defers to a performer's wishes in
sound mixing, then it is difficult to understand the need for a
city technician to operate the mixing console. See Tr. of
Oral. Arg. 12 (city concedes that the possibilities for a
confrontation over volume are the same whether the city technician
directly controls the mixing console or sits next to a performer's
technician who operates the equipment). Conversely, if the city can
control sound only by using its own equipment and technician, then
it must not be heeding all the performer's wishes on sound
mixing.

Summary: The Supreme Court upheld a New York City guideline requiring the use of city-provided sound equipment and technicians for performances at the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell in Central Park, finding it to be a reasonable and content-neutral regulation of the place and manner of protected speech. The city implemented this guideline to address excessive noise complaints and inadequate amplification issues. The Court rejected arguments that there were less restrictive means to control volume, finding that the city's method was narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose without unnecessarily intruding on performers' expression.