U.S. Supreme Court Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981) Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno No. 8048 Argued October 14,
1981 Decided December 8, 1981 454
U.S. 235 ast|>* 454
U.S. 235 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent, as representative of the estates of several citizens
and residents of Scotland who were killed in an airplane crash in
Scotland during a charter flight, instituted wrongful death
litigation in a California state court against petitioners, which
are the company that manufactured the plane in Pennsylvania and the
company that manufactured the plane's propellers in Ohio. At the
time of the crash, the plane was registered in Great Britain and
was owned and operated by companies organized in the United
Kingdom. The pilot and all of the decedents' heirs and next of kin
were Scottish subjects and citizens, and the investigation of the
accident was conducted by British authorities. Respondent sought to
recover from petitioners on the basis of negligence or strict
liability (not recognized by Scottish law), and admitted that the
action was filed in the United States because its laws regarding
liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more favorable to
respondent's position than those of Scotland. On petitioners'
motion, the action was removed to a Federal District Court in
California and was then transferred to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). The District Court granted petitioners' motion to
dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Relying on the test set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501 , and
analyzing the "private interest factors" affecting the litigants'
convenience and the "public interest factors" affecting the forum's
convenience, as set forth in Gilbert, the District Court
concluded that Scotland was the appropriate forum. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had
abused its discretion in conducting the Gilbert analysis
and that, in any event, dismissal is automatically barred where Page 454 U. S. 236 the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the
plaintiff than the law of the forum chosen by the plaintiff. Held: 1. Plaintiffs may not defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground
of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the
substantive law that would be applied in the alternative forum is
less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the chosen forum. The
possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be
given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non
conveniens inquiry. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 . Pp. 454 U. S.
247 -255.

															(a) Under Gilbert, supra, dismissal will ordinarily be
appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a
heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff
is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting
his choice. If substantial weight were given to the possibility of
an unfavorable change in law, however, dismissal might be barred
even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly inconvenient, and
the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually
useless. Such an approach not only would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine, but also
would pose substantial practical problems, requiring that trial
courts determine complex problems in conflict of laws and
comparative law, and increasing the flow into American courts of
litigation by foreign plaintiffs against American manufacturers.
Pp. 454 U. S.
248 -252.

															(b) Nor may an analogy be drawn between forum non
conveniens dismissals and transfers between federal courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which was construed in Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U. S. 612 , as
precluding a transfer if it resulted in a change in the applicable
law. The statute was enacted to permit change of venue between
federal courts, and although it was drafted in accordance with the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, it was intended to be a
revision, rather than a codification of the common law. District
courts were given more discretion to transfer under § 1404(a) than
they had to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Van Dusen v. Barrack, supra, distinguished. Pp. 454 U. S.
253 -254.

															2. The District Court properly decided that the presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's forum choice applied with less than
maximum force when the plaintiff or (as here) the real parties in
interest are foreign. When the plaintiff has chosen the home forum,
it is reasonable to assume that the choice is convenient; but when
the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign, this
assumption is much less reasonable, and the plaintiff's choice
deserves less deference. Pp. 454 U. S.
255 -256. Page 454 U. S. 237 3. The forum non conveniens determination is committed
to the trial court's sound discretion, and may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Here, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the private and
public interests under the Gilbert analysis, and thereby
determining that the trial should be held in Scotland. Pp. 454 U. S.
257 -261.

															(a) In analyzing the private interest factors, the District
Court did not act unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary
problems would be posed if the trial were held in Scotland, a large
proportion of the relevant evidence being located there. The
District Court also correctly concluded that the problems posed by
the petitioners' inability to implead potential Scottish
third-party defendants -- the pilot's estate, the plane's owners,
and the charter company -- supported holding the trial in Scotland.
Pp. 454 U. S.
257 -259.

															(b) The District Court's review of the factors relating to the
public interest was also reasonable. Even aside from the question
whether Scottish law might be applicable in part, all other public
interest factors favor trial in Scotland, which has a very strong
interest in this litigation. The accident occurred there, all of
the decedents were Scottish, and apart from petitioners, all
potential parties are either Scottish or English. As to
respondent's argument that American citizens have an interest in
ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing
defective products and that additional deterrence might be obtained
by trial in the United States where they could be sued on the basis
of both negligence and strict liability, any incremental deterrence
from trial in an American court is likely to be insignificant and
is not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial
time and resources that would be required. Pp. 454 U. S.
259 -261.

															630 F.2d 149, reversed.

															MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in Parts
I and II of which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 454 U. S. 261 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 454 U. S. 261 .
POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. O'CONNOR,
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Page 454 U. S. 238 JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															These cases arise out of an air crash that took place in
Scotland. Respondent, acting as representative of the estates of
several Scottish citizens killed in the accident, brought wrongful
death actions against petitioners that were ultimately transferred
to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. After noting that an alternative
forum existed in Scotland, the District Court granted their
motions. 479 F.
Supp. 727 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed. 630 F.2d 149 (1980). The Court of Appeals
based its decision, at least in part, on the ground that dismissal
is automatically barred where the law of the alternative forum is
less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum chosen by
the plaintiff. Because we conclude that the possibility of an
unfavorable change in law should not, by itself, bar dismissal, and
because we conclude that the District Court did not otherwise abuse
its discretion, we reverse. I A In July, 1976, a small commercial aircraft crashed in the
Scottish highlands during the course of a charter flight from Page 454 U. S. 239 Blackpool to Perth. The pilot and five passengers were killed
instantly. The decedents were all Scottish subjects and residents,
as are their heirs and next of kin. There were no eyewitnesses to
the accident. At the time of the crash, the plane was subject to
Scottish air traffic control.

															The aircraft, a twin-engine Piper Aztec, was manufactured in
Pennsylvania by petitioner Piper Aircraft Co. (Piper). The
propellers were manufactured in Ohio by petitioner Hartzell
Propeller, Inc. (Hartzell). At the time of the crash, the aircraft
was registered in Great Britain and was owned and maintained by Air
Navigation and Trading Co., Ltd. (Air Navigation). It was operated
by McDonald Aviation, Ltd. (McDonald), a Scottish air taxi service.
Both Air Navigation and McDonald were organized in the United
Kingdom. The wreckage of the plane is now in a hangar in
Farnsborough, England.

															The British Department of Trade investigated the accident
shortly after it occurred. A preliminary report found that the
plane crashed after developing a spin, and suggested that
mechanical failure in the plane or the propeller was responsible.
At Hartzell's request, this report was reviewed by a three-member
Review Board, which held a 9-day adversary hearing attended by all
interested parties. The Review Board found no evidence of defective
equipment and indicated that pilot error may have contributed to
the accident. The pilot, who had obtained his commercial pilot's
license only three months earlier, was flying over high ground at
an altitude considerably lower than the minimum height required by
his company's operations manual.

															In July, 1977, a California probate court appointed respondent
Gaynell Reyno administratrix of the estates of the five passengers.
Reyno is not related to and does not know any of the decedents or
their survivors; she was a legal secretary to the attorney who
filed this lawsuit. Several days after her appointment, Reyno
commenced separate wrongful Page 454 U. S. 240 death actions against Piper and Hartzell in the Superior Court
of California, claiming negligence and strict liability. [ Footnote 1 ] Air Navigation, McDonald,
and the estate of the pilot are not parties to this litigation. The
survivors of the five passengers whose estates are represented by
Reyno filed a separate action in the United Kingdom against Air
Navigation, McDonald, and the pilot's estate. [ Footnote 2 ] Reyno candidly admits that the action
against Piper and Hartzell was filed in the United States because
its laws regarding liability, capacity to sue, and damages are more
favorable to her position than are those of Scotland. Scottish law
does not recognize strict liability in tort. Moreover, it permits
wrongful death actions only when brought by a decedent's relatives.
The relatives may sue only for "loss of support and society."
[ Footnote 3 ]

															On petitioners' motion, the suit was removed to the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. Piper
then moved for transfer to the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
[ Footnote 4 ] Hartzell moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative,
to transfer. [ Footnote 5 ] In
December, 1977, the District Court quashed service on Page 454 U. S. 241 Hartzell and transferred the case to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Respondent then properly served process on
Hartzell. B In May, 1978, after the suit had been transferred, both Hartzell
and Piper moved to dismiss the action on the ground of forum
non conveniens. The District Court granted these motions in
October, 1979. It relied on the balancing test set forth by this
Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.
S. 501 (1947), and its companion case, Koster v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947). In those decisions, the Court stated that a plaintiff's
choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. However, when an
alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial
in the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and
vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff's
convenience," or when the "chosen forum [is] inappropriate because
of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and
legal problems," the court may, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, dismiss the case. Koster, supra, at 330 U. S. 524 .
To guide trial court discretion, the Court provided a list of
"private interest factors" affecting the convenience of the
litigants, and a list of "public interest factors" affecting the
convenience of the forum. Gilbert, supra, at 330 U. S.
508 -509. [ Footnote
6 ] Page 454 U. S. 242 After describing our decisions in Gilbert. and Koster, the District Court analyzed the facts of these
cases. It began by observing that an alternative forum existed in
Scotland; Piper and Hartzell had agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of the Scottish courts and to waive any statute of
limitations defense that might be available. It then stated that
plaintiffs choice of forum was entitled to little weight. The court
recognized that a plaintiff's choice ordinarily deserves
substantial deference. It noted, however, that Reyno

															"is a representative of foreign citizens and residents seeking a
forum in the United States because of the more liberal rules
concerning products liability law,"

															and that

															"the courts have been less solicitous when the plaintiff is not
an American citizen or resident, and particularly when the foreign
citizens seek to benefit from the more liberal tort rules provided
for the protection of citizens and residents of the United
States."

															479 F. Supp. at 731.

															The District Court next examined several factors relating to the
private interests of the litigants, and determined that these
factors strongly pointed towards Scotland as the appropriate forum.
Although evidence concerning the design, manufacture, and testing
of the plane and propeller is located in the United States, the
connections with Scotland are otherwise "overwhelming." Id. at 732. The real parties in interest are citizens of
Scotland, as were all the decedents. Witnesses who could testify
regarding the maintenance of the aircraft, the training of the
pilot, and the investigation of the accident -- all essential to
the defense -- are in Great Britain. Moreover, all witnesses to
damages are located in Scotland. Trial would be aided by
familiarity with Scottish topography, and by easy access to the
wreckage.

															The District Court reasoned that, because crucial witnesses and
evidence were beyond the reach of compulsory process, and because
the defendants would not be able to implead potential Scottish
third-party defendants, it would be "unfair to make Piper and
Hartzell proceed to trial in this forum." Id. Page 454 U. S. 243 at 733. The survivors had brought separate actions in Scotland
against the pilot, McDonald, and Air Navigation. "[I]t would be
fairer to all parties and less costly if the entire case was
presented to one jury with available testimony from all relevant
witnesses." Ibid. Although the court recognized that, if
trial were held in the United States, Piper and Hartzell could file
indemnity or contribution actions against the Scottish defendants,
it believed that there was a significant risk of inconsistent
verdicts. [ Footnote 7 ]

															The District Court concluded that the relevant public interests
also pointed strongly towards dismissal. The court determined that
Pennsylvania law would apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell
if the case were tried in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
[ Footnote 8 ] As a result,
"trial in this forum would be hopelessly complex and confusing for
a jury." Id. at 734. In addition, the court noted that it
was unfamiliar with Scottish law and thus would have to rely upon
experts from that country. The court also found that the trial
would be enormously costly and time-consuming; that it would be
unfair to burden citizens with jury duty when the Middle
District Page 454 U. S. 244 of Pennsylvania has little connection with the controversy; and
that Scotland has a substantial interest in the outcome of the
litigation.

															In opposing the motions to dismiss, respondent contended that
dismissal would be unfair because Scottish law was less favorable.
The District Court explicitly rejected this claim. It reasoned that
the possibility that dismissal might lead to an unfavorable change
in the law did not deserve significant weight; any deficiency in
the foreign law was a "matter to be dealt with in the foreign
forum." Id. at 738. C On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. The decision to reverse
appears to be based on two alternative grounds. First, the Court
held that the District Court abused its discretion in conducting
the Gilbert analysis. Second, the Court held that
dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff.

															The Court of Appeals began its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis by noting that the plaintiff's choice of
forum deserved substantial weight, even though the real parties in
interest are nonresidents. It then rejected the District Court's
balancing of the private interests. It found that Piper and
Hartzell had failed adequately to support their claim that key
witnesses would be unavailable if trial were held in the United
States: they had never specified the witnesses they would call and
the testimony these witnesses would provide. The Court of Appeals
gave little weight to the fact that Piper and Hartzell would not be
able to implead potential Scottish third-party defendants,
reasoning that this difficulty would be "burdensome" but not
"unfair," 630 F.2d at 162. [ Footnote 9 ] Finally, the court stated that resolution of
the suit Page 454 U. S. 245 would not be significantly aided by familiarity with Scottish
topography, or by viewing the wreckage.

															The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court's analysis
of the public interest factors. It found that the District Court
gave undue emphasis to the application of Scottish law:

															"'the mere fact that the court is called upon to determine and
apply foreign law does not present a legal problem of the sort
which would justify the dismissal of a case otherwise properly
before the court.'" Id. at 163 (quoting Hoffman v. Goberman, 420
F.2d 423, 427 (CA3 1970)). In any event, it believed that Scottish
law need not be applied. After conducting its own choice of law
analysis, the Court of Appeals determined that American law would
govern the actions against both Piper and Hartzell. [ Footnote 10 ] The same choice of law
analysis apparently led it to conclude that Pennsylvania and Ohio,
rather than Scotland, are the jurisdictions with the greatest
policy interests in the dispute, and that all other public interest
factors favored trial in the United States. [ Footnote 11 ] Page 454 U. S. 246 In any event, it appears that the Court of Appeals would have
reversed even if the District Court had properly balanced the
public and private interests. The court stated:

															"[I]t is apparent that the dismissal would work a change in the
applicable law so that the plaintiff's strict liability claim would
be eliminated from the case. But . . . a dismissal for forum
non conveniens, like a statutory transfer, 'should not,
despite its convenience, result in a change in the applicable law.'
Only when American law is not applicable, or when the foreign
jurisdiction would, as a matter of its own choice of law, give the
plaintiff the benefit of the claim to which she is entitled here,
would dismissal be justified."

															630 F.2d at 163-164 (footnote omitted) (quoting DeMateos v.
Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (CA3 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978)). In other words, the court
decided that dismissal is automatically barred if it would lead to
a change in the applicable law unfavorable to the plaintiff.

															We granted certiorari in these cases to consider the questions
they raise concerning the proper application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 450 U.S. 909 (1981). [ Footnote 12 ] Page 454 U. S. 247 II The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat
a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be applied in
the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that
of the present forum. The possibility of a change in substantive
law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.

															We expressly rejected the position adopted by the Court of
Appeals in our decision in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 (1932). That case arose out of a collision between two vessels in
American waters. The Canadian owners of cargo lost in the accident
sued the Canadian owners of one of the vessels in Federal District
Court. The cargo owners chose an American court in large part
because the relevant American liability rules were more favorable
than the Canadian rules. The District Court dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs argued that dismissal
was inappropriate because Canadian laws were less favorable to
them. This Court nonetheless affirmed:

															"We have no occasion to enquire by what law the rights of the
parties are governed, as we are of the opinion Page 454 U. S. 248 that, under any view of that question, it lay within the
discretion of the District Court to decline to assume jurisdiction
over the controversy. . . . '[T]he court will not take cognizance
of the case if justice would be as well done by remitting the
parties to their home forum.'" Id. at 285 U. S.
419 -420 (quoting Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring,
Jones & Tidy, Ltd., 281 U. S. 515 , 281 U. S. 517 (1930)). The Court further stated that "[t]here as no basis for the
contention that the District Court abused its discretion." 285 U.S.
at 285 U. S.
423 .

															It is true that Canada Malting was decided before Gilbert, and that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was not fully crystallized until our decision in
that case. [ Footnote 13 ]
However, Gilbert in no way affects the validity of Canada Malting. Indeed, Page 454 U. S. 249 by holding that the central focus of the forum non
conveniens inquiry is convenience, Gilbert implicitly
recognized that dismissal may not be barred solely because of the
possibility of an unfavorable change in law. [ Footnote 14 ] Under Gilbert, dismissal
will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's
chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court,
and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of
convenience supporting his choice. [ Footnote 15 ] If substantial weight were given to the
possibility of an unfavorable change in law, however, dismissal
might be barred even where trial in the chosen forum was plainly
inconvenient.

															The Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with this Court's
earlier forum non conveniens decisions in another respect.
Those decisions have repeatedly emphasized the need to retain
flexibility. In Gilbert, the Court refused to identify
specific circumstances "which will justify or require either grant
or denial of remedy." 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 508 .
Similarly, in Koster, the Court rejected the contention
that, where a trial would involve inquiry into the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation, dismissal was always appropriate. "That
is one, but only one, factor which may show convenience." 330 U.S.
at 330 U. S. 527 .
And in Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549 , 326 U. S. 557 (1946), we stated that we would not lay down a rigid rule to govern
discretion, and that "[e]ach case turns on its facts." If central
emphasis were Page 454 U. S. 250 placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so
valuable.

															In fact, if conclusive or substantial weight were given to the
possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless. Jurisdiction and venue
requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many
plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums.
Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choice of
law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of an
unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial weight
in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would
rarely be proper.

															Except for the court below, every Federal Court of Appeals that
has considered this question after Gilbert has held that
dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be
granted even though the law applicable in the alternative forum is
less favorable to the plaintiff's chance of recovery. See,
e.g., Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U.S.App.D.C. 229,
248-249, 637 F.2d 775, 794-795 (1980); Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 453 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346
F.2d 281, 283 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920
(1966). [ Footnote 16 ]
Several courts have relied expressly on Canada Malting to
hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change of law should
not, by itself, bar dismissal. See Fitzgerald Page 454 U. S. 251 v. Texaco, Inc., supra; Anglo-American Grain Co. v. The SIT
Mina D'Amico, 169 F.
Supp. 908 (ED Va.1959).

															The Court of Appeals' approach is not only inconsistent with the
purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine, but also
poses substantial practical problems. If the possibility of a
change in law were given substantial weight, deciding motions to
dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens would become
quite difficult. Choice of law analysis would become extremely
important, and the courts would frequently be required to interpret
the law of foreign jurisdictions. First, the trial court would have
to determine what law would apply if the case were tried in the
chosen forum, and what law would apply if the case were tried in
the alternative forum. It would then have to compare the rights,
remedies, and procedures available under the law that would be
applied in each forum. Dismissal would be appropriate only if the
court concluded that the Law applied by the alternative forum is as
favorable to the plaintiff as that of the chosen forum. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, is designed in
part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in
comparative law. As we stated in Gilbert, the public
interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be
required to "untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself." 330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
509 .

															Upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals would result in
other practical problems. At least where the foreign plaintiff
named an American manufacturer as defendant, [ Footnote 17 ] a court could not dismiss the case
on grounds of forum non Page 454 U. S. 252 conveniens where dismissal might lead to an unfavorable
change in law. The American courts, which are already extremely
attractive to foreign plaintiffs, [ Footnote 18 ] would become even more attractive. The flow
of litigation into the United States would increase and further
congest already crowded courts. [ Footnote 19 ] Page 454 U. S. 253 The Court of Appeals based its decision, at least in part, on an
analogy between dismissals on grounds of forum non
conveniens and transfers between federal courts pursuant to §
1404(a). In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.
S. 612 (1964), this Court ruled that a § 1404(a)
transfer should not result in a change in the applicable law.
Relying on dictum in an earlier Third Circuit opinion interpreting Van Dusen, the court below held that that principle is
also applicable to a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. 630 F.2d at 164, and n. 51 (citing DeMateos v. Texaco,
Inc., 562 F.2d at 899). However, § 1404(a) transfers are
different than dismissals on the ground of forum non
conveniens. Congress enacted § 1404(a) to permit change of venue between
federal courts. Although the statute was drafted in accordance with
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see Revisor's Note,
H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A132 (1947); H.R.Rep. No.
2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., A127 (1946), it was intended to be a
revision, rather than a codification of the common law. Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U. S. 29 (1955). District courts were given more discretion to transfer
under § 1404(a) than they had to dismiss on grounds of forum
non conveniens. Id. at 349 U. S.
31 -32.

															The reasoning employed in Van Dusen v. Barrack is
simply inapplicable to dismissals on grounds of forum non
conveniens. That case did not discuss the common law doctrine.
Rather, it focused on "the construction and application" of §
1404(a). 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 613 .
[ Footnote 20 ] Emphasizing
the remedial Page 454 U. S. 254 purpose of the statute, Barrack concluded that Congress
could not have intended a transfer to be accompanied by a change in
law. Id. at 376 U. S. 622 .
The statute was designed as a "federal housekeeping measure,"
allowing easy change of venue within a unified federal system. Id. at 376 U. S. 613 .
The Court feared that, if a change in venue were accompanied by a
change in law, forum-shopping parties would take unfair advantage
of the relaxed standards for transfer. The rule was necessary to
ensure the just and efficient operation of the statute. [ Footnote 21 ]

															We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in
law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of course, if the remedy
provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change
in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may
conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of justice.
[ Footnote 22 ] In these
cases, however, the remedies that Page 454 U. S. 255 would be provided by the Scottish courts do not fall within this
category. Although the relatives of the decedents may not be able
to rely on a strict liability theory, and although their potential
damages award may be smaller, there is no danger that they will be
deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly. III The Court of Appeals also erred in rejecting the District
Court's Gilbert analysis. The Court of Appeals stated that
more weight should have been given to the plaintiff's choice of
forum, and criticized the District Court's analysis of the private
and public interests. However, the District Court's decision
regarding the deference due plaintiff's choice of forum was
appropriate. Furthermore, we do not believe that the District Court
abused its discretion in weighing the private and public
interests. A The District Court acknowledged that there is ordinarily a
strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum,
which may be overcome only when the private and public interest
factors clearly point towards trial in the alternative forum. It
held, however, that the presumption applies with less force when
the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.

															The District Court's distinction between resident or citizen
plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully justified. In Koster, the Court indicated that a plaintiff's choice of
forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has
chosen the home forum. 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 524 .
[ Footnote 23 ] When the home
forum has Page 454 U. S. 256 been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is
convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption
is much less reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial
is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deserves less
deference. [ Footnote 24 ] Page 454 U. S. 257 The forum non conveniens determination is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court
has considered all relevant public and private interest factors,
and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its
decision deserves substantial deference. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
at 330 U. S.
511 -512; Koster, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 531 .
Here, the Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that the standard
of review was one of abuse of discretion. In examining the District
Court's analysis of the public and private interests, however, the
Court of Appeals seems to have lost sight of this rule, and
substituted its own judgment for that of the District Court. (1) In analyzing the private interest factors, the District Court
stated that the connections with Scotland are "overwhelming." 479
F. Supp. at 732. This characterization may be somewhat exaggerated.
Particularly with respect to the question of relative ease of
access to sources of proof, the private interests point in both
directions. As respondent emphasizes, records concerning the
design, manufacture, and testing of the propeller and plane are
located in the United States. She would have greater access to
sources of proof relevant to her strict liability and negligence
theories if trial were held here. [ Footnote 25 ] However, the District Court did not act Page 454 U. S. 258 unreasonably in concluding that fewer evidentiary problems would
be posed if the trial were held in Scotland. A large proportion of
the relevant evidence is located in Great Britain.

															The Court of Appeals found that the problems of proof could not
be given any weight because Piper and Hartzell failed to describe
with specificity the evidence they would not be able to obtain if
trial were held in the United States. It suggested that defendants
seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must submit
affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the
testimony these witnesses would provide if the trial were held in
the alternative forum. Such detail is not necessary. [ Footnote 26 ] Piper and Hartzell have
moved for dismissal precisely because many crucial witnesses are
located beyond the reach of compulsory process, and thus are
difficult to identify or interview. Requiring extensive
investigation would defeat the purpose of their motion. Of course,
defendants must provide enough information to enable the District
Court to balance the parties' interests. Our examination of the
record convinces us that sufficient information Page 454 U. S. 259 was provided here. Both Piper and Hartzell submitted affidavits
describing the evidentiary problems they would face if the trial
were held in the United States. [ Footnote 27 ]

															The District Court correctly concluded that the problems posed
by the inability to implead potential third-party defendants
clearly supported holding the trial in Scotland. Joinder of the
pilot's estate, Air Navigation, and McDonald is crucial to the
presentation of petitioners' defense. If Piper and Hartzell can
show that the accident was caused not by a design defect, but
rather by the negligence of the pilot, the plane's owners, or the
charter company, they will be relieved of all liability. It is
true, of course, that, if Hartzell and Piper were found liable
after a trial in the United States, they could institute an action
for indemnity or contribution against these parties in Scotland. It
would be far more convenient, however, to resolve all claims in one
trial. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Forcing
petitioners to rely on actions for indemnity or contributions would
be "burdensome," but not "unfair." 630 F.2d at 162. Finding that
trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum would be burdensome, however,
is sufficient to support dismissal on grounds of forum non
conveniens. [ Footnote
28 ] (2) The District Court's review of the factors relating to the
public interest was also reasonable. On the basis of its Page 454 U. S. 260 choice of law analysis, it concluded that, if the case were
tried in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law
would apply to Piper and Scottish law to Hartzell. It stated that a
trial involving two sets of laws would be confusing to the jury. It
also noted its own lack of familiarity with Scottish law.
Consideration of these problems was clearly appropriate under Gilbert; in that case, we explicitly held that the need to
apply foreign law pointed towards dismissal. [ Footnote 29 ]

															The Court of Appeals found that the District Court's choice of
law analysis was incorrect, and that American law would apply to
both Hartzell and Piper. Thus, lack of familiarity with foreign law
would not be a problem. Even if the Court of Appeals' conclusion is
correct, however, all other public interest factors favored trial
in Scotland.

															Scotland has a very strong interest in this litigation. The
accident occurred in its airspace. All of the decedents were
Scottish. Apart from Piper and Hartzell, all potential plaintiffs
and defendants are either Scottish or English. As we stated in Gilbert, there is "a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home." 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 509 .
Respondent argues that American citizens have an interest in
ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing
defective products, and that additional deterrence might be
obtained if Piper and Hartzell were tried in the United States,
where they could be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict
liability. However, the incremental deterrence that would be gained
if this trial were held in an Page 454 U. S. 261 American court is likely to be insignificant. The American
interest in this accident is simply not sufficient to justify the
enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would
inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here. IV The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the possibility of an
unfavorable change in law bars dismissal on the ground of forum
non conveniens. It also erred in rejecting the District
Court's Gilbert analysis. The District Court properly
decided that the presumption in favor of the respondent's forum
choice applied with less than maximum force because the real
parties in interest are foreign. It did not act unreasonably in
deciding that the private interests pointed towards trial in
Scotland. Nor did it act unreasonably in deciding that the public
interests favored trial in Scotland. Thus, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is Reversed. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of these cases.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision
of these cases.

															* Together with No. 80-883, Hartzell Propeller, Inc. v.
Reyno, Personal Representative of the Estates of Fehilly et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Avco-Lycoming, Inc., the manufacturer of the plane's engines,
was also named as a defendant. It was subsequently dismissed from
the suit by stipulation.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The pilot's estate has also filed suit in the United Kingdom
against Air Navigation, McDonald, Piper, and Hartzell.

															[ Footnote 3 ] See Affidavit of Donald Ian Kerr MacLeod, App. A19
(affidavit submitted to District Court by petitioners describing
Scottish law). Suits for damages are governed by The Damages
(Scotland) Act 1976.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Section 1404(a) provides:

															"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The District Court concluded that it could not assert personal
jurisdiction over Hartzell consistent with due process. However, it
decided not to dismiss Hartzell because the corporation would be
amenable to process in Pennsylvania.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants
included the

															"relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive." Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 508 .
The public factors bearing on the question included the
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the
"local interest in having localized controversies decided at home";
the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum
that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the
application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening
citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. Id. at 330 U. S.
509 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The District Court explained that inconsistent verdicts might
result if petitioners were held liable on the basis of strict
liability here, and then required to prove negligence in an
indemnity action in Scotland. Moreover, even if the same standard
of liability applied, there was a danger that different juries
would find different facts and produce inconsistent results.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Under Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.
S. 487 (1941), a court ordinarily must apply the choice
of law rules of the State in which it sits. However, where a case
is transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it must apply the
choice of law rules of the State from which the case was
transferred. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.
S. 612 (1946). Relying on these two cases, the District
Court concluded that California choice of law rules would apply to
Piper, and Pennsylvania choice of law rules would apply to
Hartzell. It further concluded that California applied a
"governmental interests" analysis in resolving choice of law
problems, and that Pennsylvania employed a "significant contacts"
analysis. The court used the "governmental interests" analysis to
determine that Pennsylvania liability rules would apply to Piper,
and the "significant contacts" analysis to determine that Scottish
liability rules would apply to Hartzell.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The court claimed that the risk of inconsistent verdicts was
slight because Pennsylvania and Scotland both adhere to principles
of res judicata. [ Footnote 10 ]

															The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that
California choice of law rules applied to Piper, and that
Pennsylvania choice of law rules applied to Hartzell, see n 8, supra. It did not
agree, however, that California used a "governmental interests"
analysis and that Pennsylvania used a "significant contacts"
analysis. Rather, it believed that both jurisdictions employed the
"false conflicts" test. Applying this test, it concluded that Ohio
and Pennsylvania had a greater policy interest in the dispute than
Scotland, and that American law would apply to both Piper and
Hartzell.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The court's reasoning on this point is somewhat unclear. It
states:

															"We have held that, under the applicable choice of law rules,
Pennsylvania and Ohio are the jurisdictions with the greatest
policy interest in this dispute. It follows that the other public
interest factors that should be considered under the Supreme Court
cases of Gilbert and Koster favor trial in this
country, rather than Scotland."

															630 F.2d at 171. The Court of Appeals concluded as part of its
choice of law analysis that the United States had the greatest
policy interest in the dispute. See n 10, supra. It apparently believed
that this conclusion necessarily implied that the forum non
conveniens public interest factors pointed toward trial in the
United States.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															We granted certiorari in No. 80 848 to consider the question

															"[w]hether, in an action in federal district court brought by
foreign plaintiffs against American defendants, the plaintiffs may
defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that
would be applied if the case were litigated in the district court
is more favorable to them than the law that would be applied by the
courts of their own nation."

															We granted certiorari in No. 80-883 to consider the question
whether

															"a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens [should] be denied whenever the law of the alternate forum is less
favorable to recovery than that which would be applied by the
district court."

															In this opinion, we begin by considering whether the Court of
Appeals properly held that the possibility of an unfavorable change
in law automatically bars dismissal. 454 U.
S. infra. Since we conclude that the Court of
Appeals erred, we then consider its review of the District Court's Gilbert analysis to determine whether dismissal was
otherwise appropriate. 454 U. S. infra. We believe that it is necessary to discuss the Gilbert analysis in order to properly dispose of the
cases.

															The questions on which certiorari was granted are sufficiently
broad to justify our discussion of the District Court's Gilbert analysis. However, even if the issues we discuss
in 454 U. S. our
consideration of these issues is not inappropriate. An order
limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a
jurisdictional bar. We may consider questions outside the scope of
the limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary
for the proper disposition of the case. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928); McCandless v. Furlaud, 293 U. S.
67 (1934); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.
S. 767 (1967).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The doctrine of forum non conveniens has a long
history. It originated in Scotland, see Braucher, The
Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 908, 909-911 (1947), and
became part of the common law of many States, see id. at
911-912; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1929). The doctrine was also
frequently applied in federal admiralty actions. See, e.g.,
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.; see also Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the
Federal Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L.Q. 12 (1949).
In Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549 (1946), the Court first indicated that motions to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens could be made in federal
diversity actions. The doctrine became firmly established when Gilbert and Koster were decided one year
later.

															In previous forum non conveniens decisions, the Court
has left unresolved the question whether, under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in a diversity case. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 509 ; Koster, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 529 ; Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., supra, at 326 U. S. 551 , 326 U. S.
558 -559. The Court did not decide this issue, because
the same result would have been reached in each case under federal
or state law. The lower courts in these cases reached the same
conclusion: Pennsylvania and California law on forum non
conveniens dismissals are virtually identical to federal law. See 630 F.2d at 158. Thus, here also, we need not resolve
the Erie question.

															[ Footnote 14 ] See also Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co. at 326 U. S. 555 ,
n. 4 (citing with approval a Scottish case that dismissed an action
on the ground of forum non conveniens despite the
possibility of an unfavorable change in law).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															In other words, Gilbert held that dismissal may be
warranted where a plaintiff choose a particular forum not because
it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or
take advantage of favorable law. This is precisely the situation in
which the Court of Appeals' rule would bar dismissal.

															[ Footnote 16 ] Cf. Dahl v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027,
1032 (CA3 1980) (dismissal affirmed where "Norwegian substantive
law will predominate the trial of this case and the mere presence
of a count pleaded under Connecticut law, but which may have little
chance of success, does not warrant a different conclusion"). But see DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (CA3
1977) (dictum) (principle that § 1404(a) transfer should not result
in change in law is no less applicable to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904
(1978). The court below relied on the dictum in DeMateos in reaching its decision. See infra at 454 U. S.
253 -254.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															In fact, the defendant might not even have to be American. A
foreign plaintiff seeking damages for an accident that occurred
abroad might be able to obtain service of process on a foreign
defendant who does business in the United States. Under the Court
of Appeals' holding, dismissal would be barred if the law in the
alternative forum were less favorable to the plaintiff -- even
though none of the parties are American, and even though there is
absolutely no nexus between the subject matter of the litigation
and the United States.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															First, all but 6 of the 50 American States -- Delaware,
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming --
offer strict liability. 1 CCH Prod.Liability Rep. § 4016 (1981).
Rules roughly equivalent to American strict liability are effective
in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. West Germany and Japan have a
strict liability statute for pharmaceuticals. However, strict
liability remains primarily an American innovation. Second, the
tort plaintiff may choose, at least potentially, from among 50
jurisdictions if he decides to file suit in the United States. Each
of these jurisdictions applies its own set of malleable choice of
law rules. Third, jury trials are almost always available in the
United States, while they are never provided in civil law
jurisdictions. G. Gloss, Comparative Law 12 (1979); J. Merryman,
The Civil Law Tradition 121 (1969). Even in the United Kingdom,
most civil actions are not tried before a jury. 1 G. Keeton, The
United Kingdom: The Development of its Laws and Constitutions 309
(1955). Fourth, unlike most foreign jurisdictions, American courts
allow contingent attorney's fees, and do not tax losing parties
with their opponents' attorney's fees. R. Schlesinger, Comparative
Law: Cases, Text, Materials 275-277 (3d ed.1970); Orban, Product
Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement -- Foreign National Law
and the EEC Directive, 8 Ga.J.Int'l & Comp.L. 342, 393 (1978).
Fifth, discovery is more extensive in American than in foreign
courts. R. Schlesinger, supra, at 307, 310, and n. 33.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															In holding that the possibility of a change in law unfavorable
to the plaintiff should not be given substantial weight, we also
necessarily hold that the possibility of a change in law favorable
to defendant should not be considered. Respondent suggests that
Piper and Hartzell filed the motion to dismiss not simply because
trial in the United States would be inconvenient, but also because
they believe the laws of Scotland are more favorable. She argues
that this should be taken into account in the analysis of the
private interests. We recognize, of course, that Piper and Hartzell
may be engaged in reverse forum-shopping. However, this possibility
ordinarily should not enter into a trial court's analysis of the
private interests. If the defendant is able to overcome the
presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial in the
chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is
appropriate -- regardless of the fact that defendant may also be
motivated by a desire to obtain a more favorable forum. Cf.
Kloeckner Reederei und Kohlenhandel v. A/S Hakedal, 210 F.2d
754, 757 (CA2) (defendant not entitled to dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens solely because the law of the
original forum is less favorable to him than the law of the
alternative forum), cert. dism'd by stipulation, 348 U.S.
801 (1954).

															[ Footnote 20 ] Barrack at least implicitly recognized that the rule it
announced for transfer under § 1404(a) was not the common law rule.
It cited several decisions under § 1404(a) in which lower courts
had been "strongly inclined to protect plaintiffs against the risk
that transfer might be accompanied by a prejudicial change in
applicable state laws." 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 630 ,
n. 26. These decisions frequently rested on the assumption that a
change in law would have been unavoidable under common law forum non conveniens, but could be avoided under §
1404(a). See, e.g., Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises,
Inc., 85 F. Supp.
410 , 414 (NM 1949).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
expressly rejected the contention that rules governing transfers
pursuant to § 1404(a) also govern forum non conveniens dismissals. Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156
(1978).

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the
court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.
Ordinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant
is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
506 -507. In rare circumstances, however, where the
remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the
other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial
requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal
would not be appropriate where the alternative forum does not
permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute. Cf.
Phoenix Canada Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445
(Del.1978) (court refuses to dismiss, where alternative forum is
Ecuador, it is unclear whether Ecuadorean tribunal will hear the
case, and there is no generally codified Ecuadorean legal remedy
for the unjust enrichment and tort claims asserted).

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															In Koster, we stated that,

															"[i]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of
convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will
normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have
shown."

															330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 524 . See also Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana del
Caribe, 339 U. S. 684 , 339 U. S. 697 (1950) ("suit by a United States citizen against a foreign
respondent brings into force considerations very different from
those in suits between foreigners"); Canada Malting Co. v.
Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. at 285 U. S. 421 ("[t]he rule recognizing an unqualified discretion to decline
jurisdiction in suits in admiralty between foreigners appears to be
supported by an unbroken line of decisions in the lower federal
courts").

															As the District Court correctly noted in its opinion, 479 F.
Supp. at 731; see also n 10, supra, the lower federal courts have
routinely given less weight to a foreign plaintiff's choice of
forum. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v.
Verlag, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 408, 536 F.2d 429, 435 (1976); Paper Operations Consultants Int'l, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong
Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (CA9 1975); Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 451 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976); Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil
Co., 363 F.2d 611, 614 (CA3), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
945 (1966); Ionescu v. E. F. Hutton & Co.
(France), 465 F.
Supp. 139 (SDNY 1979); Michell v. General Motors
Corp., 439 F. Supp.
24 , 27 (ND Ohio 1977).

															A citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive weight,
however. See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205
U.S.App.D.C. 229, 252-253, 637 F.2d 775, 796-797 (1980); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d
975 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than foreign
plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred when a
plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum. As always, if the
balance of conveniences suggests that trial in the chosen forum
would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court,
dismissal is proper.

															[ Footnote 24 ] See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., supra, at 253,
637 F.2d at 797 (citizenship and residence are proxies for
convenience); see also Note, Forum Non Conveniens and
American Plaintiffs in the Federal Courts, 47 U. Chi.L.Rev. 373,
382 383 (1980).

															Respondent argues that since plaintiffs will ordinarily file
suit in the jurisdiction that offers the most favorable law,
establishing a strong presumption in favor of both home and foreign
plaintiffs will ensure that defendants will always be held to the
highest possible standard of accountability for their purported
wrongdoing. However, the deference accorded a plaintiff's choice of
forum has never been intended to guarantee that the plaintiff will
be able to select the law that will govern the case. See
supra at 454 U. S.
247 -250.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															In the future, where similar problems are presented, district
courts might dismiss subject to the condition that defendant
corporations agree to provide the records relevant to the
plaintiff's claims.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
expressly rejected such a requirement. Fitzgerald v. Texaco,
Inc., supra, at 451, n. 3. In other cases, dismissals have
been affirmed despite the failure to provide detailed affidavits. See Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F.
Supp. 910 , 924 (SDNY 1977), aff'd., 588 F.2d 880 (CA2
1978). And in a decision handed down two weeks after the decision
in this case, another Third Circuit panel affirmed a dismissal
without mentioning such a requirement. See Dahl v. United
Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027 (1980).

															The Court of Appeals apparently relied on an analogy to motions
to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 630 F.2d at 160-161. It
cited Marbury-Pattillo Construction Co. v. Bayside Warehouse
Co., 490 F.2d 155, 158 (CA5 1974), and Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 148 (CA10 1967), which suggest an
affidavit requirement in the § 1404(a) context. As we have
explained, however, dismissals on grounds of forum non
conveniens and § 1404(a) transfers are not directly
comparable. See supra at 454 U. S.
253 -254.

															[ Footnote 27 ] See Affidavit of Ronald C. Scott, App. to Pet. for
Cert. of Hartzell Propeller, Inc., A75; Affidavit of Charles J.
McKelvey, App. to Pet. for Cert. of Piper Aircraft Co. 1f. The
affidavit provided to the District Court by Piper states that it
would call the following witnesses: the relatives of the decedents;
the owners and employees of McDonald; the persons responsible for
the training and licensing of the pilot; the persons responsible
for servicing and maintaining the aircraft; and two or three of its
own employees involved in the design and manufacture of the
aircraft.

															[ Footnote 28 ] See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 205 U.S.App.D.C.
at 244, 637 F.2d at 790 (relying on similar argument in approving
dismissal of action arising out of helicopter crash that took place
in Norway).

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															Many forum non conveniens decisions have held that the
need to apply foreign law favors dismissal. See, e.g., Calavo
Growers of California v. Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 967 (CA2
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d at 1165. Of course, this
factor alone is not sufficient to warrant dismissal when a
balancing of all relevant factors shows that the plaintiff's chosen
forum is appropriate. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology
v. Verlag, 175 U.S.App.D.C. at 409, 536 F.2d at 436; Burt
v. Isthmus Development Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (CA5), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955).

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. However, like
JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS, I would not proceed to deal
with the issues addressed in 454 U. S. To
that extent, I am in dissent.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.

															In No. 80 848, only one question is presented for review to this
Court:

															"Whether, in an action in federal district court brought by
foreign plaintiffs against American defendants, the plaintiffs may
defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of Page 454 U. S. 262 forum non conveniens merely by showing that the
substantive law that would be applied if the case were litigated in
the district court is more favorable to them than the law that
would be applied by the courts of their own nation."

															Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-848, p. i. In No. 8083, the Court
limited its grant of certiorari, see 450 U.S. 909, to the
same question:

															"Must a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non
conveniens be denied whenever the law of the alternate forum
is less favorable to recovery than that which would be applied by
the district court?"

															Pet. for Cert. in No. 80-883, p. i. I agree that this question
should be answered in the negative. Having decided that question, I
would simply remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further
consideration of the question whether the District Court correctly
decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in which to
litigate a claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was
defectively designed and manufactured in Pennsylvania.

Summary: In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, the US Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs cannot prevent a case dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens just because the substantive law in the alternative forum is less favorable to them. The Court held that a change in substantive law should not be a decisive factor in the forum non conveniens analysis and that other private and public interest factors should be considered. The case involved a plane crash in Scotland, and the plaintiffs, representatives of the estates of Scottish citizens, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in a California state court against the plane and propeller manufacturers based in the US. The Court considered the convenience of the litigants and the forum, with the District Court concluding that Scotland was the appropriate forum, while the Court of Appeals disagreed, leading to the Supreme Court's review.