U.S. Supreme Court Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986) Bowen v. Roy No. 84-780 Argued January 14,
1986 Decided June 11, 1986 476
U.S. 693 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA Syllabus Appellees applied for and received benefits under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the Food Stamp
program. They refused, however, to comply with the federal
statutory requirements that participants in those programs furnish
the state welfare agencies who administer the programs with their
Social Security numbers and those of each member of their household
as a condition of receiving benefits, and that each state agency
utilize those numbers in administering the programs. Appellees
contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their
2-year-old daughter would violate their Native American religious
beliefs. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
terminated AFDC benefits payable to appellees on the child's behalf
and instituted proceedings to reduce the level of food stamps that
appellees' household was receiving. Appellees then filed an action
in Federal District Court, claiming that the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment entitled them to an exemption from the
Social Security number requirements, and requesting injunctive and
other relief. Following a trial in which it was disclosed that the
child had in fact been assigned a Social Security number, the court
held that the public interest in maintaining an efficient and
fraud-resistant system could be met without requiring a Social
Security number for the child. The court then enjoined the
Secretary of Health and Human Services from using and disseminating
the Social Security number issued in the child's name, and also
enjoined the federal and state defendants from denying appellees
benefits, until the child's 16th birthday, because of their refusal
to provide a Social Security number for her. Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is
remanded. 590 F.
Supp. 600 , vacated and remanded.

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I and II, concluding that the statutory
requirement that a state agency utilize Social Security numbers in
administering the programs in question does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. That Clause affords an individual protection from
certain forms of governmental compulsion, but does not afford an
individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's
internal procedures. The Government's Page 476 U. S. 694 use of a Social Security number for appellees' child does not
itself impair appellees' freedom to exercise their religion. Pp. 476 U. S.
699 -701.

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, joined by JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, concluded in Part III that the statutory requirement
that applicants provide a Social Security number as a condition of
eligibility for the benefits in question does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. That requirement is facially neutral in religious
terms, applies to all applicants for the benefits involved, and
clearly promotes a legitimate and important public interest.
Preventing fraud in these benefit programs is an important goal,
and the Social Security number requirement is a reasonable means of
promoting that goal. Government regulation that indirectly and
incidentally calls for a choice between securing a governmental
benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from
governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously
inspired activity or compels conduct that some find objectionable
for religious reasons. Pp. 476 U. S. 701 -712.

															BURGER, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in
which POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part, post, p. 476 U. S. 712 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the result, post, p. 476 U. S. 716 .
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 476 U. S. 724 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 476 U. S.
733 . Page 476 U. S. 695 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II,
and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which JUSTICE POWELL
and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join.

															The question presented is whether the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment compels the Government to accommodate a
religiously based objection to the statutory requirements that a
Social Security number be provided by an applicant seeking to
receive certain welfare benefits, and that the States use these
numbers in administering the benefit programs. I Appellees Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller applied for and
received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program and the Food Stamp program. They refused to comply,
however, with the requirement, contained in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25)
[ Footnote 1 ] and 7 U.S.C. §
2025(e), that participants in these programs furnish their state
welfare agencies with the Social Security numbers of the members of
their household as a condition of receiving benefits. Appellees
contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their
2-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, would violate their
Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare thereafter terminated AFDC and medical benefits
payable to appellees on the child's behalf and instituted
proceedings to reduce the level of food stamps that appellees'
household was receiving. Appellees then filed this action against
the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of
Agriculture, arguing that the Free Exercise Clause entitled them to
an exemption from the Social Security number requirement. In their
complaint, Page 476 U. S. 696 appellees stated that "[t]he sole basis" for the denial of
welfare benefits was "Mr. Roy's refusal to obtain a Social Security
Number for Little Bird of the Snow," and thus requested injunctive
relief, damages, and benefits. In the statement of "undisputed
facts," the parties agreed that Little Bird of the Snow did not
have a Social Security number.

															At trial, Roy testified that he had recently developed a
religious objection to obtaining a Social Security number for
Little Bird of the Snow. [ Footnote
2 ] Roy is a Native American descended from the Abenaki Tribe,
and he asserts a religious belief that control over one's life is
essential to spiritual purity, and indispensable to "becoming a
holy person." Based on recent conversations with an Abenaki chief,
Roy believes that technology is "robbing the spirit of man." In
order to prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power,
therefore, Roy testified to his belief that he must keep her person
and spirit unique, and that the uniqueness of the Social Security
number as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of the number
over which she has no control, will serve to "rob the spirit" of
his daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual
power.

															For purposes of determining the breadth of Roy's religious
concerns, the trial judge raised the possibility of using the
phonetics of his daughter's name to derive a Social Security
number. Although Roy saw "a lot of good" in this suggestion, he
stated it would violate his religious beliefs because the special
number still would apply uniquely and identify her. Roy also
testified that his religious objection would not be satisfied even
if the Social Security Administration appended the daughter's full
tribal name to her Social Security number. Page 476 U. S. 697 In Roy's own testimony, he emphasized the evil that would flow
simply from obtaining a number. [ Footnote 3 ] On the last day of trial, however, a
federal officer inquired whether Little Bird of the Snow already
had a Social Security number; he learned that a number had been
assigned -- under first name "Little," middle name "Bird of the
Snow," and last name "Roy."

															The Government at this point suggested that the case had become
moot, because, under Roy's beliefs, Little Bird of the Snow's
spirit had already been "robbed." Roy, however, was recalled to the
stand and testified that her spirit would be robbed only by "use"
of the number. Since no known use of the number had yet been made,
Roy expressed his belief that her spirit had not been damaged. The
District Court concluded that the case was not moot because of
Roy's beliefs regarding "use" of the number. See Roy v.
Cohen, 590 F.
Supp. 600 , 605 (MD Pa.1984) (finding of fact 33) ("Roy believes
that the establishment of a social security number for Little Bird
of the Snow, without more, has not robbed her spirit,' but
widespread use of the social security number by the federal or
state governments in their computer systems would have that
effect"). After hearing all of the testimony, the District Court denied
appellees' request for damages and benefits, but granted injunctive
relief. Based on the testimony of the Government's experts and the
obvious fact that many people share certain names, the District
Court found that

															"[u]tilization in Page 476 U. S. 698 the computer system of the name of a benefit recipient alone
frequently is not sufficient to ensure the proper payment of
benefits."

															The court nevertheless concluded that the public

															"interest in maintaining an efficient and fraud resistant system
can be met without requiring use of a social security number for
Little Bird of the Snow,"

															elaborating:

															"It appears to the Court that the harm that the Government might
suffer if [appellees] prevailed in this case would be, at worst,
that one or perhaps a few individuals could fraudulently obtain
welfare benefits. Such a result would obtain only if (1) Little
Bird of the Snow attempted fraudulently to obtain welfare benefits
or someone else attempted fraudulently to obtain such benefits
using Little Bird of the Snow's name and (2)
identification procedures available to the Defendants that do not
require utilization of a social security number failed to expose
the fraud. This possibility appears to the Court to be remote." Id. at 612-613. Citing our decision in United
States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982), the court entered an injunction containing two basic
components. First, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services was

															"permanently restrained from making any use of the social
security number which was issued in the name of Little Bird of the
Snow Roy and from disseminating the number to any agency,
individual, business entity, or any other third party." Second, the federal and state defendants were enjoined
until Little Bird of the Snow's 16th birthday from denying Roy cash
assistance, medical assistance, and food stamps "because of the
[appellees'] refusal to provide a social security number for
her."

															We noted probable jurisdiction, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), and we
vacate and remand. Page 476 U. S. 699 II Appellees raise a constitutional challenge to two features of
the statutory scheme here. [ Footnote 4 ] They object to Congress' requirement that a
state AFDC plan

															" must . . . provide (A) that, as a condition of
eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or
recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his
social security account number."

															42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (emphasis added). They also object to
Congress' requirement that "such State agency shall
utilize such account numbers . . . in the administration of
such plan." Ibid. (emphasis added). [ Footnote 5 ] We analyze each of these contentions,
turning to the latter contention first.

															Our cases have long recognized a distinction between the freedom
of individual belief, which is absolute, and the freedom of
individual conduct, which is not absolute. This case implicates
only the latter concern. Roy objects to the statutory requirement
that state agencies "shall utilize" Social Security numbers not
because it places any restriction on what he may believe or what he
may do, but because he believes the use of the number may harm his
daughter's spirit.

															Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First
Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in
ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause
simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct
its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not
insist that appellees engage in Page 476 U. S. 700 any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not
demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices
by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter.

															"[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the
individual can extract from the government." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , 374 U. S. 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).

															As a result, Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection
to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his
daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size
or color of the Government's filing cabinets. The Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of
governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right
to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.

															As Roy points out, eight years ago, Congress passed a Joint
Resolution concerning American Indian religious freedom that
provides guidance with respect to this case. As currently codified,
the Resolution provides:

															"On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the
United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their
inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and
Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials and traditional rites."

															42 U.S.C. § 1996. That Resolution -- with its emphasis on
protecting the freedom to believe, express, and exercise a religion
-- accurately identifies the mission of the Free Exercise Clause
itself. The Federal Government's use of a Social Security number
for Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any degree impair
Roy's "freedom to believe, express, and exercise" his religion.
[ Footnote 6 ] Page 476 U. S. 701 Consequently, appellees' objection to the statutory requirement
that each state agency "shall utilize" a Social Security number in
the administration of its plan is without merit. It follows that
their request for an injunction against use of the Social Security
number in processing benefit applications should have been
rejected. We therefore hold that the portion of the District
Court's injunction that permanently restrained the Secretary from
making any use of the Social Security number that had been issued
in the name of Little Bird of the Snow Roy must be vacated. III Roy also challenges Congress' requirement that a state AFDC
plan

															" must . . . provide (A) that, as a condition of
eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or
recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his
social security account number."

															42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (emphasis added). [ Footnote 7 ] The Page 476 U. S. 702 First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall make no law . .
. prohibiting the free exercise" of religion holds an important
place in our scheme of ordered liberty, but the Court has
steadfastly maintained that claims of religious conviction do not
automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the conditions
and terms of dealings with the Government. Not all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional. See Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). This was treated recently in United States v.
Lee: "To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious
freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious
practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be
accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would
'radically restrict the operating latitude of the
legislature.'"

															455 U.S. at 455 U. S.
259 . Page 476 U. S. 703 The statutory requirement that applicants provide a Social
Security number is wholly neutral in religious terms, and uniformly
applicable. There is no claim that there is any attempt by Congress
to discriminate invidiously, or any covert suppression of
particular religious beliefs. The administrative requirement does
not create any danger of censorship, [ Footnote 8 ] or place a direct condition or burden on the
dissemination of religious views. [ Footnote 9 ] It does not intrude on the organization of a
religious institution [ Footnote
10 ] or school. [ Footnote
11 ] It may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with
choices, but in no sense does it affirmatively compel appellees, by
threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct
[ Footnote 12 ] or to engage
in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons.
[ Footnote 13 ] Rather, it is
appellees who seek benefits from the Government and who assert
that, because of certain religious beliefs, they should be excused
from compliance with a condition that is binding on all other
persons who seek the same benefits from the Government.

															This is far removed from the historical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See
generally M. Malbin, Religion and Politics: The Intentions of
the Authors of the First Amendment (1978). We are not unmindful of
the importance of many government benefits today or of the value of
sincerely held religious beliefs. Page 476 U. S. 704 However, while we do not believe that no government compulsion
is involved, we cannot ignore the reality that denial of such
benefits by a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is
of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative
compulsion or prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions, for
conduct that has religious implications.

															This distinction is clearly revealed in the Court's opinions.
Decisions rejecting religiously based challenges have often recited
the fact that a mere denial of a governmental benefit by a
uniformly applicable statute does not constitute infringement of
religious liberty. In Hamilton v. Regents of University of
California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934), for example, the Court rejected a religious challenge by
students to military courses required as part of their curriculum,
explaining:

															"The fact that they are able to pay their way in this
university, but not in any other institution in California, is
without significance upon any constitutional or other question here
involved. California has not drafted or called them to attend the
university. They are seeking education offered by the State, and at
the same time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed
course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and
conscientious objections to war. . . ." Id. at 293 U. S. 262 .
[ Footnote 14 ] In cases
upholding First Amendment challenges, on the other hand, the Court
has often relied on the showing that compulsion of certain activity
with religious significance was involved. Page 476 U. S. 705 In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.
S. 624 (1943), for example, the Court distinguished the
earlier Hamilton holding and upheld a challenge to a flag
salute requirement:

															"Here . . . we are dealing with a compulsion of students to
declare a belief. . . . This issue is not prejudiced by the Court's
previous holding that, where a State, without compelling
attendance, extends college facilities to pupils who voluntarily
enroll, it may prescribe military training as part of the course
without offense to the Constitution. It was held that those who
take advantage of its opportunities may not, on ground of
conscience, refuse compliance with such conditions. Hamilton v.
Regents, 293 U. S. 245 . In the present
case, attendance is not optional."

															319 U.S. at 319 U. S.
631 -632. [ Footnote
15 ] The distinction between governmental compulsion and
conditions relating to governmental benefits contained in these two
cases was emphasized by JUSTICE BRENNAN in his concurring opinion
in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 (1963):

															"The different results of [ Hamilton and Barnette ] are attributable only in part to a difference in
the strength of the particular state interests which the respective
statutes were designed to serve. Far more significant is the fact
that Hamilton dealt with the voluntary attendance at
college of young adults, while Barnette involved the
compelled attendance of young children at elementary and secondary
schools. This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional
results." Id. at 374 U. S.
252 -253 (footnote omitted). Page 476 U. S. 706 We have repeatedly emphasized this distinction: in rejecting a
Free Exercise challenge in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U. S. 574 , 461 U. S.
603 -604 (1983), for example, we observed that the

															"[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial
impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not
prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.
[ Footnote 16 ]"

															We conclude then that government regulation that indirectly and
incidentally calls for a choice between securing a governmental
benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from
governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously
inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find
objectionable for religious reasons. Although the denial of
government benefits over religious objection can raise serious Free
Exercise problems, these two very different forms of government
action are not governed by the same constitutional standard. A
governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from
review simply because it is indirect, Thomas v. Review Board of
Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.
S. 707 , 450 U. S.
717 -718 (1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. at 374 U. S.
404 ); Page 476 U. S. 707 but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the
government must meet to justify the burden.

															The general governmental interests involved here buttress this
conclusion. Governments today grant a broad range of benefits;
inescapably, at the same time, the administration of complex
programs requires certain conditions and restrictions. Although, in
some situations, a mechanism for individual consideration will be
created, a policy decision by a government that it wishes to treat
all applicants alike, and that it does not wish to become involved
in case-by-case inquiries into the genuineness of each religious
objection to such condition or restrictions is entitled to
substantial deference. Moreover, legitimate interests are
implicated in the need to avoid any appearance of favoring
religious over nonreligious applicants.

															The test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972), is not appropriate in this setting. In the enforcement of a
facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for the
administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of
people, the Government is entitled to wide latitude. The Government
should not be put to the strict test applied by the District Court;
that standard required the Government to justify enforcement of the
use of Social Security number requirement as the least restrictive
means of accomplishing a compelling state interest. [ Footnote 17 ] Absent proof of an intent to
discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against
religion in general, the Government Page 476 U. S. 708 meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged
requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its
application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public
interest.

															We reject appellees' contention that Sherbert and Thomas compel affirmance. The statutory conditions at
issue in those cases provided that a person was not eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits if, "without good cause," he had
quit work or refused available work. The "good cause" standard
created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state
creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an
instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent.
Thus, as was urged in Thomas, to consider a religiously
motivated resignation to be "without good cause" tends to exhibit
hostility, not neutrality, towards religion. See Brief for
Petitioner 15, and Brief for American Jewish Congress as Amicus
Curiae 11, in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Div., O.T. 1979, No. 79-952. See also Sherbert,
supra, at 374 U. S.
401 -402, n. 4; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
at 455 U. S. 264 ,
n. 3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ( Thomas and Sherbert may be viewed "as a protection against unequal
treatment, rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members
of the religious sect"). In those cases, therefore, it was
appropriate to require the State to demonstrate a compelling reason
for denying the requested exemption.

															Here there is nothing whatever suggesting antagonism by Congress
towards religion generally, or towards any particular religious
beliefs. The requirement that applicants provide a Social Security
number is facially neutral, and applies to all applicants for the
benefits involved. Congress has made no provision for individual
exemptions to the requirement in the two statutes in question.
Indeed, to the contrary, Congress has specified that a state AFDC
plan

															" must . . . provide (A) that, as a condition of
eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or
recipient of aid shall furnish to the Page 476 U. S. 709 State agency his social security account number,"

															42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (emphasis added), and that

															"[s]tate agencies shall (1) require, as a condition
of eligibility for participation in the food stamp program,
that each household member furnish to the State agency their social
security account number,"

															7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (emphasis added). Nor are these requirements
relics from the past; Congress made the requirement mandatory for
the Food Stamp program in 1981. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 2025(f)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) (State agencies "may" require that each
household member furnish their Social Security number), with 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (States "shall" require that such
numbers be furnished). Congress also recently extended to several
other aid programs the mandatory requirement that the States use
Social Security numbers in verifying eligibility for benefits. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-369, §
2651(a), 98 Stat. 1147.

															The Social Security number requirement clearly promotes a
legitimate and important public interest. No one can doubt that
preventing fraud in these benefits programs is an important goal.
As Representative Richmond explained in support of the bill that
made the Social Security number requirement mandatory for the Food
Stamp program:

															"We know that, however generously motivated Americans may be to
furnish resources to the poor to enable them to survive, . . . they
understandably object if they believe that those resources are
being abused or wasted. . . ."

															"We want to be certain that the food stamp program is run as
efficiently and as error-free as possible."

															"We want applicants and recipients alike constantly to be aware
that the Congress does not and will not tolerate any refusal to
disclose earnings accurately, and underreporting of welfare or
other assistance program benefits, any efforts to evade the work
requirement, or any other attempts to take advantage of the program
and dollars intended only for those who completely satisfy the
stringent Page 476 U. S. 710 eligibility requirements set forth in sections 5 and 7 of the
Food Stamp Act of 1977 and further tightened this year and in this
bill."

															127 Cong.Rec. 24783 (1981). We also think it plain that the
Social Security number requirement is a reasonable means of
promoting that goal. The programs at issue are of truly staggering
magnitude. Each year, roughly 3.8 million families receive $7.8
billion through federally funded AFDC programs, and 20 million
persons receive $11 billion in food stamps. The Social Security
program itself is the largest domestic governmental program in the
United States today, distributing approximately $51 billion monthly
to 36 million recipients. Because of the tremendous administrative
problems associated with managing programs of this size, the
District Court found:

															"Social security numbers are used in making the determination
that benefits in the programs are properly paid and that there is
no duplication of benefits or failure of payment. . . . Utilization
in the computer system of the name of a benefit recipient alone
frequently is not sufficient to ensure the proper payment of
benefits."

															Social Security numbers are unique numerical identifiers, and
are used pervasively in these programs. The numbers are used, for
example, to keep track of persons no longer entitled to receive
food stamps because of past fraud or abuses of the program.
Moreover, the existence of this unique numerical identifier creates
opportunities for ferreting out fraudulent applications through
computer "matching" techniques. One investigation, "Project Match,"
compared federal employee files against AFDC and Medicaid files to
determine instances of Government employees receiving welfare
benefits improperly. Data from 26 States were examined, and 9,000
individuals were identified as receiving duplicate welfare
payments. While undoubtedly some fraud escapes detection in spite
of such investigations, the President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control, known more popularly as the "Grace Commission," Page 476 U. S. 711 recently reported that matching

															"is the Federal Government's most cost-effective tool for
verification or investigation in the prevention and detection of
fraud, waste and abuse."

															7 The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,
Management Office Selected Issues -- Information Gap in the Federal
Government 90 (1984).

															The importance of the Social Security number to these matching
techniques is illustrated by the facts of this case. The District
Court found that

															"efficient operation of these [matching] programs requires the
use of computer systems that utilize unique numerical identifiers
such as the social security number."

															590 F. Supp. at 606. It further found that exempting even
appellees alone from this requirement could result in "one or
perhaps a few individuals . . . fraudulently obtain[ing] welfare
benefits," id. at 612, a prospect the court termed
"remote." Id. at 613. The District Court's assessment of
this probability seems quite dubious. [ Footnote 18 ] But in any event, we know of no case
obligating the Government to tolerate a slight risk of "one or
perhaps a few individuals" fraudulently obtaining benefits in order
to satisfy a religious objection to a requirement designed to
combat that very risk. Appellees may not use the Free Exercise
Clause to demand Page 476 U. S. 712 Government benefits, but only on their own terms, particularly
where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage to the
Government in the administration of the programs.

															As the Court has recognized before, given the diversity of
beliefs in our pluralistic society and the necessity of providing
governments with sufficient operating latitude, some incidental
neutral restraints on the free exercise of religion are
inescapable. As a matter of legislative policy, a legislature might
decide to make religious accommodations to a general and neutral
system of awarding benefits, [ Footnote 19 ] "[b]ut our concern is not with the wisdom of
legislation, but with its constitutional limitation." Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S. 608 (1961) (plurality opinion). We conclude that the Congress' refusal
to grant appellees a special exemption does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.

															The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is
remanded. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															We refer to the statutory scheme as it existed at the time
appellees filed suit. The scheme has since been amended, although
the Social Security number requirement has been retained in
virtually identical form. See Deficit Reduction Act of
1984, Pub.L. 98-369, § 2651(a), 98 Stat. 1147.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Roy and Miller both have Social Security numbers. They also
obtained a Social Security number for their 5-year-old daughter
Renee at some time prior to the present dispute.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"[Q.] Mr. Roy, could you explain why obtaining a Social Security
Number for Little Bird of the Snow would be contrary to your
religious beliefs as a native Abenaki?"

															"A. Yes. Because we felt that this number would be used to rob
her of her ability to have greater power in that this number is a
unique number. It serves unique purposes. It's applied to her and
only her; and being applied to her, that's what offends us, and we
try to keep her person unique, and we try to keep her spirit
unique, and we're scared that, if we were to use this number, she
would lose control of that, and she would have no ability to
protect herself from any evil that that number might be used
against her."

															App. 85.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															They also raise a statutory argument -- that the Government's
denial of benefits to them constitutes illegal discrimination on
the basis of religion or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000d; 7 U.S.C. §2011. We find these claims to be without
merit.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Food Stamp program restrictions that appellees challenge
contain restrictions virtually identical to those in the AFDC
program quoted in the text. See 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Roy's religious views may not accept this distinction between
individual and governmental conduct. See, e.g., n 3, supra. It is clear,
however, that the Free Exercise Clause, and the Constitution
generally, recognize such a distinction; for the adjudication of a
constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather than an individual's
religion, must supply the frame of reference.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															This issue is clearly not moot in light of our discussion in 476 U. S. contrary to the suggestion of the two concurrences. JUSTICE STEVENS
asserts that

															"there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Government
will not pay the benefits in dispute as soon as the District
Court's injunction against the use of the number has been
vacated." Post at 476 U. S. 723 .
To my mind, this statement, while true, fundamentally misperceives
the nature of appellees' suit. Appellees do not seek to have the
Government "pay the benefits in dispute as soon as the District
Court's injunction against use of the number has been vacated."
Such payment would entail use of Little Bird of the Snow's Social
Security number, use that appellees filed suit to prevent.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN similarly believes that, on remand,

															"it is possible that the Government, in a welcome display of
reasonableness, will decide that, since it already has a Social
Security number for Little Bird of the Snow, it will not insist
that appellees resupply it." Post at 476 U.S.
714 -715. My reading of the record is that such an occurrence
is not a mere "possibility." JUSTICE STEVENS cites federal
regulations that provide that the Government will assist households
that, for some reason or other, are unable to furnish a Social
Security number. See post at 476 U. S.
721 -722. Moreover, the Government's brief in this Court
reports that

															"we are advised by the Social Security Administration that the agency itself assigns [Social Security numbers] to persons
who are required by federal law to have one, but decline to
complete an application. If, for religious reasons, the
individual requiring [a Social Security number] does not wish to
receive a social security card, the agency will accommodate that
request. Similarly, when an applicant refuses to sign an
application for [a Social Security number] on religious grounds,
[Social Security Administration personnel] may sign in lieu of the
applicant."

															Brief for Appellants 46, n.19 (emphasis added; citations
omitted). Thus, the Government undoubtedly would be happy to
"supply" the number for appellees -- i.e., fill the number
in on their applications -- if this is what they wanted. But
appellees do not desire any such assistance from the Government;
instead they filed suit seeking a ruling excluding them from the
operation of any portion of the statutory scheme involving Social
Security numbers. They continue to press this claim in this Court.
For the reasons advanced here, this claim ultimately lacks merit,
but it certainly is not moot.

															Also, in view of our analysis of the case, because all relevant
facts are before the Court and further proceedings in the District
Court could not produce information that would change the result,
the case is ripe for decision.

															[ Footnote 8 ] Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 305 (1940).

															[ Footnote 9 ] Cf. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.
S. 573 , 577-578 (1944); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 , 112
(1943).

															[ Footnote 10 ] Cf. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S.
94 (1952).

															[ Footnote 11 ] Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.
S. 490 (1979).

															[ Footnote 12 ] Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.
S. 158 (1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 , 312 U. S. 574 (1941); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510 (1925); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 , 98 U. S. 167 (1879).

															[ Footnote 13 ] United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 , 455 U. S. 259 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 (1972); Gilette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.
S. 624 (1943); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Concurring in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 521 (1961), Justice Frankfurter viewed it as important that the
challenged statutes

															"do not make criminal, do not place under the onus of civil or
criminal disability, any act which is itself prescribed by the
duties of the Jewish or other religions."

															In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.
S. 599 , 366 U. S.
605 -606 (1961), the plurality opinion emphasized:

															"Fully recognizing that the alternatives open to appellants and
others similarly situated . . . may result in some financial
sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs; still the
option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to
make a religious practice itself unlawful."

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															In Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, at 406 U. S. 218 ,
we similarly relied on the fact that

															"[t]he impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents'
practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable,
for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs."

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR's partial dissent asserts that the Court's
holding "has no basis in precedent," post at 476 U. S. 727 .
To the contrary, it is the history advanced by the dissenting
opinions that is revisionist. The dissent characterizes our prior
cases as holding that the denial of a benefit is the same, for
constitutional purposes, as the imposition of a criminal sanction.
In Bob Jones University, however, the Court upheld the
denial of tax benefits to a school that prohibited interracial
dating, observing that the school remained wholly free to
"observ[e] [its] religious tenets." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 604 .
If denying governmental benefits is the same as imposing criminal
sanctions, then the Free Exercise Clause could not prevent the
Government from ordering Bob Jones University, under pain of
criminal penalty, to violate its religious beliefs and permit
interracial dating on its campus. But that difficult question is
still an open one, since "the Constitution may compel toleration of
private discrimination in some circumstances." Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 , 413 U. S. 463 (1973).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															It is readily apparent that virtually every action that
the Government takes, no matter how innocuous it might appear, is
potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection. For example,
someone might raise a religious objection, based on Norse
mythology, to filing a tax return on a Wednesday (Woden's day).
Accordingly, if the dissent's interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause is to be taken seriously, then the Government will be unable
to enforce any generally applicable rule unless it can satisfy a
federal court that it has a "compelling government interest." While
libertarians and anarchists will no doubt applaud this result, it
is hard to imagine that this is what the Framers intended.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The District Court's assessment appears to have turned in part
on its belief that it was unlikely that Little Bird of the Snow or
her parents would attempt fraudulently to obtain welfare benefits.
Without in any way questioning the conclusion that appellees are
law-abiding citizens, we believe that the District Court
misperceived the nature of the Government's interest. The
Government's interest is ensuring a fraud-resistent system in the
event that a fraudulent application is made by
appellees.

															This misunderstanding of the Government's interest probably
accounts for the District Court's conclusion that the Government's
interest in preventing fraud "can be satisfied without requiring a
social security number for Little Bird of the Snow." 590 F. Supp.
at 607. In any event, this conclusionary statement is certainly at
odds with the District Court's more specific statement quoted in
text regarding the prospects for "one or perhaps a few individuals
. . . fraudulently obtain[ing] welfare benefits." Indeed, the
partial dissent appears to concede that its position might result
in one or perhaps a few individuals fraudulently receiving
benefits.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															An exemption adopted by Congress to accommodate religious
beliefs such as appellees' would not violate the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 , 374 U. S.
409 -410 (1963).

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part.

															I join only Parts I and II of the opinion written by THE CHIEF
JUSTICE.

															In August, 1983, appellees Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller sued
to prevent the Government from requiring them to provide a social
security number for their 2-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the
Snow, as a condition for obtaining food stamps and welfare benefits
for the child. They object to the social security number
requirement because of their sincere religious conviction that the
Government's widespread use of a unique numerical identifier for
their daughter will deprive her of spiritual power. After it
developed at trial that the Government already had a social
security Page 476 U. S. 713 number for Little Bird of the Snow, the District Court enjoined
the Government not only from denying benefits to her based on her
parents' failure to provide a social security number, but also from
using or disseminating the number already in the Government's
possession until the child's 16th birthday. App. to Juris.
Statement 25a.

															I agree with the Court that the District Court erred in
enjoining the Government's internal use of Little Bird of the
Snow's social security number. It is easy to understand the
rationale for that part of the District Court's injunction:
appellees argue plausibly that the Government's threat to put the
social security number into active use if they apply for benefits
for their daughter requires them to choose between the child's
physical sustenance and the dictates of their faith, the same
dilemma created by the Government's initial requirement that
appellees themselves supply a social security number for Little
Bird of the Snow. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 , 374 U. S. 404 (1963). They claim that, absent some compelling state interest, the
Government should refrain from acting in ways that appellees
believe on religious grounds will harm their daughter's spiritual
development.

															Although this argument has some facial appeal, I conclude, for
the reasons stated in 476 U. S. that
it stretches the Free Exercise Clause too far. Consequently, I
agree that the portion of the District Court's judgment that
enjoins the Government from using or disseminating the social
security number already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow must be
vacated. I would also vacate the remainder of the judgment and
remand the case for further proceedings, because, once the
injunction against use or dissemination is set aside, it is unclear
on the record presently before us whether a justiciable controversy
remains with respect to the rest of the relief ordered by the
District Court. Roy and Miller evidently objected to the social
security number requirement primarily because they did not want the Government Page 476 U. S. 714 to be able to use a unique numerical identifier for Little Bird
of the Snow, and that injury cannot be redressed if, as the Court
today holds, the Government cannot be enjoined from using the
preexisting number. It is possible, however, that appellees still
would have an independent religious objection to their being forced
to cooperate actively with the Government by themselves providing
their daughter's social security number on benefit applications. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.
S. 252 , 455 U. S. 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Div., 450 U. S. 707 , 450 U. S. 711 (1981).

															In my view, the record is ambiguous on this score. In rejecting
the Government's argument that the existence of the number rendered
the case moot, the District Court found that Roy

															"feels compelled by his religious belief to avoid any use of
that number and, to that end, has refused to provide the number to
the Defendants in order to receive welfare benefits for Little Bird
of the Snow." Roy v. Cohen, 590 F.
Supp. 600 , 608 (MD Pa.1984). It is unclear whether the "use" to
which the District Court referred included use by Roy and Miller,
or just the more extensive use of the number by the Government. And
even if the court meant to refer only to use by the Government, it
is not clear that appellees do not also have an independent
religious objection to the requirement that they provide a
social security number for their daughter.

															On the other hand, even if appellees do have such an objection,
vacating the District Court's injunction against governmental use
or dissemination of the number may moot this case in other ways.
Regardless of whether Roy and Miller are required to provide their
daughter's social security number on applications for benefits,
they may simply be unwilling to apply for benefits without an
assurance that the application will not trigger the use of the
number. Conversely, it is possible that the Government, in a
welcome display of reasonableness, Page 476 U. S. 715 will decide that, since it already has a social security number
for Little Bird of the Snow, it will not insist that appellees
resupply it. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Since the proceedings on remand might well render unnecessary
any discussion of whether appellees constitutionally may be
required to provide a social security number for Little Bird of the
Snow in order to obtain Government assistance on her behalf, that
question could be said not to be properly before us. I nonetheless
address it, partly because the rest of the Court has seen fit to do
so and partly because I think it is not the kind of difficult
constitutional question that we should refrain from deciding except
when absolutely necessary. Indeed, for the reasons expressed by
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, see post at 476 U. S.
726 -732, I think the question requires nothing more than
a straightforward application of Page 476 U. S. 716 Sherbert, Thomas, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972). [ Footnote 2/2 ] If it proves
necessary to reach the issue on remand, I agree with JUSTICE
O'CONNOR that, on the facts as determined by the District Court,
the Government may not deny assistance to Little Bird of the Snow
solely because her parents' religious convictions prevent them from
supplying the Government with a social security number for their
daughter.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Unfortunately, I cannot agree that such flexibility on the
Government's part is assured either by the Government's earlier
argument to the District Court that the case should be dismissed as
moot, or by regulations providing special assistance to handicapped
applicants and applicants who cannot read and write English. Cf. ante at 476 U. S.
701 -702, n. 7 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.); post at 476 U. S. 720 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). Before
this Court, the Government concedes only that

															" it would not be an unreasonable construction of the
statutes [at issue in this case] to conclude that they are
satisfied by the government's ability to use [social security
numbers] already in its possession, as is the case with Little Bird
of the Snow, or by the government's ability to assign (and then
use) [a number] for a person who refuses to apply for one."

															Brief for Appellants 46, n.19 (emphasis added). What the
Government does not say is that it, in fact ,will adopt this
construction, which it does not appear to have followed in the
past. It is worth recalling that the Government's response to
appellees' refusal to supply a social security number for their
daughter was not to assign her a number unilaterally, or to offer
to do so, but rather to cut off benefits for the child.

															Given THE CHIEF JUSTICE's contrary view that the Government
"undoubtedly" will not insist that appellees themselves provide a
social security number for Little Bird of the Snow, see
ante at 476 U. S. 702 ,
n. 7, I am at a loss to understand why THE CHIEF JUSTICE believes
there is still a live controversy.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															I do not share JUSTICE STEVENS' narrow view of Sherbert and Thomas. Compare post at 476 U. S. 722 ,
n. 17, with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.
S. 503 , 475 U. S. 524 (1986) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Consequently, I have no occasion
to consider separately, as he does, the "hypothetical questions," post at 476 U. S. 723 ,
that would arise if the Government refused to grant religious
objectors an exemption from the social security number requirement
while simultaneously offering comparable exemptions and special
assistance to applicants who are prevented in other ways from
completing the required application forms. See post at 476 U. S.
720 -722.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in the
result.

															Members of the Abenaki Indian Tribe are unquestionably entitled
to the same constitutional protection against governmental action
"prohibiting the free exercise" of their religion as are the
adherents of other faiths. [ Footnote
3/1 ] Our respect for the sincerity of their religious beliefs
does not, however, relieve us from the duty to identify the precise
character of the two quite different claims that the parents of
Little Bird of the Snow have advanced. They claim, first, that they
are entitled to an injunction preventing the Government from making
any use of a Social Security number assigned to Little Bird of the
Snow, and second, that they are entitled to receive a full
allowance of food stamps and cash assistance for Little Bird of the
Snow without providing a Social Security number for her.

															As the Court holds in Part 476 U. S. which I join, the first claim must fail because the Free Exercise
Clause Page 476 U. S. 717 does not give an individual the right to dictate the
Government's method of recordkeeping. The second claim, I submit,
is either moot or not ripe for decision. I In order to understand the precise nature and current posture of
appellees' claims, it is necessary to emphasize an extremely
unusual feature of this case. At the outset of the litigation, the
parties assumed -- indeed, they stipulated to -- a critical fact
that was discovered to be inaccurate on the last day of the trial.
Although the parties believed that Little Bird of the Snow did not
have a Social Security number, the District Court found, and the
parties now agree, that she has had a Social Security number since
birth. The contrary belief had been central to the parties'
perception of the litigation, and to the requested relief. It is
thus also central to the state of the record as we find it.

															At the state agency administrative hearing on the threatened
withdrawal of certain benefits, the issue had been framed as
whether to affirm a decision

															"determining the appellant's daughter, Little Bird of the Snow,
ineligible for public assistance and Medical Assistance because the
appellant would not apply for a Social Security Number for her.
[ Footnote 3/2 ]"

															In their complaint, Little Bird's parents alleged that "[t]he
sole basis" for the denial of welfare benefits was "Mr. Roy's
refusal to obtain a Social Security Number for Little Bird of the
Snow," [ Footnote 3/3 ] and thus
requested injunctive relief, damages, and benefits. In the
statement of "undisputed facts," the parties stipulated that Little
Bird of the Snow did not have a Social Security number. [ Footnote 3/4 ] In the District Court's
opinion Page 476 U. S. 718 denying summary judgment, the court began its opinion by
observing that Roy and Miller

															"have refused to obtain a Social Security number for their
two-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, on the ground that
doing so would be contrary to their Native Abenaki Indian religious
beliefs. [ Footnote 3/5 ]"

															At trial, Roy's counsel introduced his case by emphasizing that
Little Bird of the Snow, unlike the other members of the family,
did not have a Social Security number, and thus had not been
exposed to the evil that the number represents. [ Footnote 3/6 ] In Roy's own testimony, he emphasized
the evil that would flow from obtaining a number.
[ Footnote 3/7 ] On the last day of
trial, however, in response to questions, a federal official
inquired, during a court recess, whether Little Bird of the Snow
already had a Social Security number, and discovered that she had
been assigned a Social Security number at birth. [ Footnote 3/8 ]

															This discovery had a dramatic impact on the litigation, and on
the judgment under review. Because there was no longer any apparent
basis for the dispute, the Government Page 476 U. S. 719 suggested that the case had become moot. [ Footnote 3/9 ] Roy, however, responded to the discovery
by changing his request for relief and asking for a cancellation of
the existing number. [ Footnote
3/10 ]

															Concluding that the discovery did not moot the case, [ Footnote 3/11 ] the District Court denied
the request for damages and benefits, but granted injunctive
relief. The injunction -- the judgment that we are considering --
contains two basic components. First, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services is

															"permanently restrained from making any use of the social
security number which was issued in the name of Little Bird of the
Snow Roy and from disseminating the number to any agency,
individual, business entity, or any other third party. [ Footnote 3/12 ]"

															Second, the federal and state defendants are enjoined until
Little Bird of the Snow's 16th birthday from denying Roy cash
assistance, medical assistance, and food stamps "because of the
Plaintiffs' refusal to provide a social security number for her."
[ Footnote 3/13 ] Of course, if the
injunction preventing the Secretary from making use of the already
existing number had not been granted, there would have been no
apparent impediment to providing the benefits that had previously
been denied.

															As the case comes to us, the first question to be decided is
whether the District Court erred in effectively canceling the
number that had already been issued for Little Bird of the Snow,
and that established the appellees' eligibility for the benefits in
dispute. The Court correctly holds that the District Page 476 U. S. 720 Court did err, and that

															"the portion of the District Court's injunction that permanently
restrained the Secretary from making any use of the Social Security
number that had been issued in the name of Little Bird of the Snow
Roy must be vacated." Ante at 476 U. S. 701 .
Having so held, however, the Court should pause to consider whether
any other constitutional issue need be addressed. For, as the Court
demonstrates, an objection to the Government's use of a Social
Security number, and a possible objection to "providing" the number
when the Government already has it, pose very different
constitutional problems. II Once we vacate the injunction preventing the Government from
making routine use of the number that has already been assigned to
Little Bird of the Snow, there is nothing disclosed by the record
to prevent the appellees from receiving the payments that are in
dispute. Indeed, since the Government itself suggested to the
District Court that the case had become moot as soon as it was
learned that a Social Security number already existed, it is
obvious that the Government perceives no difficulty in making the
requested payments in the future. The only issue that prevented the
case from becoming moot was the claim asserted by Roy that he was
entitled to an injunction that effectively canceled the existing
number. Since that issue has now been resolved, nothing remains of
the case.

															Neither Roy nor the Government has pointed to anything in the
record suggesting that Roy will be under any further obligation to
"provide" a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow.
Even if one makes the unsupported assumption that Roy may object to
filing certain forms in the future, there is a conspicuous lack of
evidence and findings concerning the extent to which such
requirements might impose a burden either on Roy or on any other
person who finds difficulty in providing information on pertinent
forms. Page 476 U. S. 721 The absence of this information in the record is significant.
Current regulations suggest that assistance for such difficulties
may well be available in the programs at issue, [ Footnote 3/14 ] particularly for those with mental,
physical, and linguistic handicaps that prevent completion of the
required forms, [ Footnote 3/15 ]
or other required steps in the application process. [ Footnote 3/16 ] To the extent that Page 476 U. S. 722 other food stamp and welfare applicants are, in fact, offered
exceptions and special assistance in response to their inability to
"provide" required information, it would seem that a religious
inability should be given no less deference. For our recent free
exercise cases suggest that religious claims should not be
disadvantaged in relation to other claims. [ Footnote 3/17 ]

															These considerations highlight the fact that, if this case is
not moot, it surely is not ripe. The case, as litigated, simply
bears no resemblance to the currently abstract question about what
the Government may require if it seeks a Social Security number
that it already has.

															Consistent with our longstanding principles of constitutional
adjudication, we should decide nothing more than is actually
necessary to dispose of the precise dispute before the Court,
[ Footnote 3/18 ] and nothing more
than is fairly presented by the Page 476 U. S. 723 record and the factual findings. [ Footnote 3/19 ] Because the District Court has not made
findings about the extent to which other exceptions and assistance
are available for those who cannot, or do not, "provide" required
information, and because there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the Government will not pay the benefits in dispute as soon as
the District Court's injunction against the use of the number has
been vacated, I concur in the judgment vacating the remainder of
the injunction. No matter how interesting, or how clear their
answers may appear to be, however, I would not address the
hypothetical questions debated by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
O'CONNOR, because they are not properly presented by the record in
this case. [ Footnote 3/20 ] Page 476 U. S. 724 [ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The First Amendment provides:

															"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Department of Public Welfare Adjudication, Complaint, Ex. A, p.
2.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Complaint � 11.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Statement of Undisputed Facts � 6, App. 13 ("With the exception
of Little Bird of the Snow, [the members of the Roy family] all
have Social Security Numbers"); � 20, App. 14 ("The sole basis for
these actions [the reduction of AFDC and medical assistance] was
Mr. Roy's refusal to obtain a Social Security Number for Little
Bird of the Snow").

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															App. to Juris. Statement 27a.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ] See App. 52-53 ("Mr. Roy has a Social Security number,
as does his eldest daughter, Renee; but, as Mr. Roy will explain,
the number was obtained before he became aware of what he perceives
as a potential for evil of these numbers; and he will tell you
that, once that number is provided, the evil is done, and
continuing to do so has no further effect; but with respect to
Little Bird of the Snow, he simply cannot do so").

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															"[Q.] Mr. Roy, could you explain why obtaining a Social Security
Number for Little Bird of the Snow would be contrary to your
religious beliefs as a native Abenaki?"

															"A. Yes. Because we felt that this number would be used to rob
her of her ability to have greater power in that this number is a
unique number. It serves unique purposes. It's applied to her and
only her; and being applied to her, that's what offends us, and we
try to keep her person unique, and we try to keep her spirit
unique, and we're scared that, if we were to use this number, she
would lose control of that, and she would have no ability to
protect herself from any evil that that number might be used
against her." Id. at 85.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ] Id. at 442-443.

															[ Footnote 3/9 ] See id. at 514-515 (argument of Deputy Attorney General
of Pennsylvania); id. at 521 (argument of Attorney for
United States Dept. of Justice); Record, Doc. No. 68, p. 2 (federal
defendants' motion to dismiss).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															Record, Doc. No. 65, pp. 2-3.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ] See Roy v. Cohen, 590 F.
Supp. 600 , 605 (MD Pa.1984) (finding of fact 33) ("Roy believes
that the establishment of a social security number for Little Bird
of the Snow, without more, has not robbed her spirit,' but
widespread use of the social security number by the federal or
state governments in their computer systems would have that
effect"). [ Footnote 3/12 ]

															App. to Juris. Statement 24a.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ] Id. at 25a.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ] See, e.g., 7 CFR §273.2(c)(1) (1986) ("The household
shall be advised that it . . . may file an incomplete application
form as long as the form contains the applicant's name and address
and is signed by a responsible member of the household or the
household's authorized representative").

															[ Footnote 3/15 ] See 7 CFR § 282.17(c)(3)(v) (1985) ("Households which
require special assistance in order to apply for food stamps if
that special assistance will not be available for completing the
monthly reports. Special assistance shall include authorized
representatives to complete monthly reports, home visits or
telephone reporting in lieu of the report form. Such households may
be comprised of blind, mentally or physically disabled persons,
persons whose reading and writing skills are so limited that they
cannot complete monthly reports on their own, or non-English
speaking persons residing in project areas where the bilingual
requirement of § 272.4(c) do not apply").

															[ Footnote 3/16 ] See 7 CFR § 273.2(e)(2) (1985) ("The office interview
shall be waived if requested by any household which is unable to
appoint an authorized representative and which has no household
members able to come to the food stamp office because they are 65
years of age or older, or are mentally or physically handicapped"); ibid; ("The State agency shall waive the office interview
on a case-by-case basis for any household which is unable to
appoint an authorized representative and which has no household
members able to come to the food stamp office because of
transportation difficulties or similar hardships which the State
agency determines warrants a waiver of the office interview. These
hardship conditions include, but are not limited to: illness, care
of a household member, prolonged severe weather, or work hours
which preclude in-office interview").

															Indeed, the regulations suggest that there may be a limited
exception to the Social Security number requirement itself. See 7 CFR § 273.6 (b)(2) (1985) ("For those individuals
required to provide an SSN who do not have one, the State agency
shall act as follows. . . . If an individual applies through the
State agency, the State agency shall complete the application for
an SSN, Form SS-5"); 50 Fed.Reg. 10469 (1985) (proposed 7 CFR §
273.6(d)) ("In determining if good cause exists for failure to
comply with the requirement to apply for or provide the State
agency with an SSN, the State agency shall consider information
from the household member, the Social Security Administration, and
the State agency. . . . Good cause does not include delays due to
illness, lack of transportation or temporary absences, because SSA
makes provisions for mail-in applications in lieu of applying in
person. . . . If the household member(s) applying for an SSN has
been unable to obtain the documents required by SSA, the State
agency caseworker should make every effort to assist the
individual(s) in obtaining these documents").

															[ Footnote 3/17 ]

															In Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security
Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 (1963), the granting of a religious exemption was
necessary to prevent the treatment of religious claims less
favorably than other claims. See United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 , 455 U. S. 264 ,
n. 3 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (In Thomas and Sherbert, "the treatment of the
religious objection to the new job requirements as though it were
tantamount to a physical impairment that made it impossible for the
employee to continue to work under changed circumstances could be
viewed as a protection against unequal treatment, rather than a
grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious
sect").

															[ Footnote 3/18 ] See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.
S. 549 , 331 U. S. 569 (1947) ("[C]onstitutional issues affecting legislation will not be
determined . . . in broader terms than are required by the precise
facts to which the ruling is to be applied"); Coffman v. Breeze
Corp., 323 U. S. 316 , 323 U. S.
324 -325 (1945) ("[T]he Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation . . . until it is necessary to do
so to preserve the rights of the parties"); Liverpool, New York
and Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33 , 113 U. S. 39 (1885) (This Court "is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly
adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other, never to
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is applied").

															[ Footnote 3/19 ] See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534 , 475 U. S. 542 ,
n. 5 (1986) ("We have frequently recognized the importance of the
facts and the fact-finding process in constitutional
adjudication"); Minnick v. California Dept. of
Corrections, 452 U. S. 105 , 452 U. S. 123 (1981) ("In this case, our analysis of the question whether the
federal constitutional issues may be affected by additional
proceedings in the state courts . . . is . . . affected by
ambiguities in the record"); England v. Louisiana Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 , 375 U. S. 416 (1964) ("How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of
federal claims"); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.
S. 293 , 372 U. S. 312 (1963) ("It is the typical, not the rare, case in which
constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested factual
issues"); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.
S. 349 , 357 U. S. 352 (1958) ("The versatility of circumstances often mocks a natural
desire for definitiveness"); Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164 , 275 U. S.
171 -172 (1927) ("Before any of the questions suggested,
which are both novel and of far-reaching importance, are passed
upon by this Court, the facts essential to their decision should be
definitely found by the lower courts upon adequate evidence").

															[ Footnote 3/20 ]

															Curiously, in explaining why they discourse at length on
constitutional questions, THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
appear to rely on different factual assumptions. Compare
ante at 476 U. S. 702 ,
n. 7 (BURGER, C.J.) (The "Government undoubtedly would be happy to supply' the number for appellees -- i.e., fill the
number in on their applications -- if this is what they wanted"),
with post at 476 U. S. 725 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The
Government still refuses to concede that it should now provide
welfare benefits to Little Bird of the Snow, even though it now
claims to possess Little Bird of the Snow's Social Security
number"). It is, of course, an elementary principle of judicial
restraint that uncertainty about the facts should prevent
unnecessary constitutional disquisitions. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I join Parts 476 U. S. S.
699|>II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion, and I would vacate only
a portion of the injunction issued by the District Court. I I believe that appellees cannot pursue their free exercise claim
based solely on the actions of the Government with respect to the
use of a Social Security number already in its possession, or with
respect to any other identification number the Government may wish
to assign and use in connection with its administration of its
welfare assistance program. Accordingly, I join Parts 476 U.
S. S. 699|>II of THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion, and I
would vacate that portion of the District Court's judgment that
enjoins the Government from using or disseminating the Social
Security number already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow.

															In all, eight Members of the Court believe that the District
Court's injunction was overbroad in preventing the Government from
using information already in its possession. See ante at 476 U. S.
699 -701 (opinion of BURGER, C.J., joined by POWELL and
REHNQUIST, JJ.); ante at 476 U. S.
716 -717 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the result); ante at 476 U. S. 713 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); supra, this page.

															A logical next step on the facts of this case is to consider
whether the case is moot. Only two Members of the Court Page 476 U. S. 725 believe that the case is, or may be, moot. See ante at 476 U. S.
720 -723 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring
in result) (stating that the case is moot or not ripe); ante at 476 U.S.
714 -716 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part) (District Court
should consider whether the case is moot). I agree with THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, ante at 476 U. S.
701 -702, n. 7, that the case is not moot.

															The District Court enjoined the Government not only from
disseminating or using the Social Security number already in its
possession, but "from denying Plaintiff Roy cash assistance and
medical assistance benefits for Little Bird of the Snow for the
Plaintiffs' failure to provide a social security number for her."
App. to Juris. Statement 24a. Because of this portion of the
District Court's injunction, we continue to have before us a live
case or controversy. Mr. Roy sought in part an injunction that

															"restrai[ns the Government] from denying cash assistance and
medical assistance to Little Bird of the Snow for failure to
provide a Social Security Number."

															Record, Doc. No. 65, Proposed Orders Submitted by Plaintiff 1-2.
The District Court granted that relief. App. to Juris. Statement
24a. The Government still refuses to concede that it should now
provide welfare benefits to Little Bird of the Snow, even though it
now claims to possess Little Bird of the Snow's Social Security
number, and even though the Solicitor General has been

															"advised by the Social Security Administration that the agency
itself assigns [Social Security numbers] to persons who are
required by federal law to have one, but decline to complete an
application."

															Brief for Appellants 46, n.19. Because the Government contests
the District Court's decision that the Government may not deny
welfare benefits to Little Bird of the Snow despite its
acknowledgment of appellees' sincere religious objections, Mr. Roy
may properly press his suit. Although the Government properly
challenges part of the District Court's injunction as overbroad, it
seeks to overturn the rest of the injunction only on the grounds
that the District Court improperly applied the substantive
standards of the First Amendment. Page 476 U. S. 726 II Given that a majority of the Court believes that the Government
may use and disseminate information already in its possession, and
given that the case is not moot, there is probably less remaining
in this case than meets the eye. The interest asserted by the
Government before the District Court could be wholly served after
accommodating appellees' sincere religious beliefs, and the
interests remaining after vacating the overbroad portion of the
injunction are certainly no more difficult to pursue.

															The Government has identified its goal as preventing fraud and
abuse in the welfare system, a goal that is both laudable and
compelling. The District Court, however, soundly rejected the
Government's assertion that provision of the Social Security number
was necessary to prevent such fraud and abuse. Among the means for
which the Social Security number is used to reduce such fraud is
"cross-matching," in which various computerized lists are compared
with the welfare rolls to detect unreported income, individuals
claimed as part of more than one household, and other fraudulent
practices. Roy v. Cohen, 590 F.
Supp. 600 , 606-607 (MD Pa.1984). As now appears, the Government
not only has the Social Security number it wants for Little Bird of
the Snow, but it can also use it. But even under the erroneous
assumption of the District Court that no such number was available
for use, that court found as a fact that, while cross-matching is
"more difficult" without Social Security numbers,

															"[t]he file on a particular benefit recipient can be identified
and cross-matching performed, if the recipient's full name, date of
birth, and parents' names are entered into the computerized
systems." Id. at 607. The District Court's generalized evaluation
of the asserted indispensability of the Social Security number
similarly undermines the Government's claim here:

															" The government's interest in preventing Little Bird of
the Snow from fraudulently receiving welfare benefits can be
satisfied without requiring a social security number Page 476 U. S. 727 for Little Bird of the Snow." Ibid. (emphasis added).

															Faced with these facts, however, THE CHIEF JUSTICE not only
believes appellees themselves must provide a Social Security number
to the Government before receiving benefits, but he also finds it
necessary to invoke a new standard to be applied to test the
validity of Government regulations under the Free Exercise Clause. Ante at 476 U. S.
707 -708. He would uphold any facially neutral and
uniformly applicable governmental requirement if the Government
shows its rule to be "a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate
public interest." Ante at 476 U. S. 708 .
Such a test has no basis in precedent, and relegates a serious
First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that
the Equal Protection Clause already provides. I would apply our
long line of precedents to hold that the Government must
accommodate a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an
especially important interest by narrowly tailored means.

															This Court has stated:

															"Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior
and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security
Div., 450 U. S. 707 , 450 U. S.
717 -718 (1981). Indeed, THE CHIEF JUSTICE appears to
acknowledge at least that the law at issue here involves
governmental compulsion. See ante at 476 U. S. 704 ("[W]e do not believe that no government compulsion is involved").
The Free Exercise Clause is therefore clearly implicated in this
case. See Thomas v. Review Bd., supra, at 450 U. S.
717 -718; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 , 374 U. S.
403 -406 (1963). Page 476 U. S. 728 Once it has been shown that a governmental regulation burdens
the free exercise of religion,

															"only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 , 406 U. S. 215 (1972). This Court has consistently asked the Government to
demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the
religious objector "is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest," United States v. Lee, 455 U.
S. 252 , 455 U. S.
257 -258 (1982), or represents "the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest," Thomas v.
Review Bd., supra, at 450 U. S. 718 . See also Braunfeld v. Brawn, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S. 607 (1961); Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 374 U. S. 406 .
Only an especially important governmental interest pursued by
narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a sacrifice of First
Amendment freedoms a§ the price for an equal share of the rights,
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.

															Granting an exemption to Little Bird of the Snow, and to the
handful of others who can be expected to make a similar religious
objection to providing the Social Security number in conjunction
with the receipt of welfare benefits, will not demonstrably
diminish the Government's ability to combat welfare fraud. The
District Court found that the governmental appellants had hardly
shown that a significant number of other individuals were likely to
make a claim similar to that at issue here:

															"There have been four reported cases involving challenges to the
social security number requirement for welfare benefits based upon
the contention that the number violates sincerely held religious
beliefs of the welfare recipient."

															590 F. Supp. at 607. Cf. United States v. Lee, supra, (refusing request for exemption from mandatory taxation); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 (1971) (refusing request for exemption from
involuntary military service). The danger that a religious
exemption would invite or encourage fraudulent applications
seeking Page 476 U. S. 729 to avoid cross-matching performed with the use of Social
Security numbers is remote on the facts as found by the District
Court: few would-be lawbreakers would risk arousing suspicion by
requesting an exemption granted only to a very few. And the
sincerity of appellees' religious beliefs is here undisputed. There
is therefore no reason to believe that our previous standard for
determining whether the Government must accommodate a free exercise
claim does not apply. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.
S. 574 (1983), does not support THE CHIEF JUSTICE's
analysis. The Court stated in that case:

															"The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. . . .
[T]he Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education -- discrimination
that prevailed, with official approval, for the first 165 years of
this Nation's constitutional history. That governmental interest
substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits
places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. The
interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that
compelling governmental interest, see United States v. Lee,
supra, at 455 U. S. 259 -260; and no
'less restrictive means,' see Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana
Employment Security Div., supra, at 450 U. S.
718 , are available to achieve the governmental
interest." Id. at 461 U. S. 604 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 461 U. S. 603 ("'The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by
showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest'") (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Lee, supra, at 455 U. S.
257 -258). It is clear that the Court in Bob Jones
University did not adopt anything like the legitimate
interest/rational means test propounded by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, but
rather continued to require the Government to show pursuit of an
especially important interest by narrowly tailored means. In
addition, Page 476 U. S. 730 the interest that the Court in Bob Jones University balanced against asserted religious interests was not merely a
compelling governmental interest, but a constitutional interest.
Here, although prevention of welfare fraud is concededly a
compelling interest, the Government asserts only administrative
efficiency as its reason for refusing to exempt appellees from
furnishing the Social Security number. The District Court found
that assertion sorely wanting, and our conclusion that part of the
resulting injunction was overbroad only makes the Government's
assertion less plausible. Surely the fact that the Court was
willing in Bob Jones University to give overriding weight
to the Government's interest in eradicating the scourge of racial
discrimination does not mean that the Court must also give
overriding weight to the unanchored anxieties of the welfare
bureaucracy. Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934), also fails to support THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S construction of a
new test. When the Court decided Hamilton, it had not yet
applied, and did not in Hamilton apply, the Free Exercise
Clause to actions of the States. Cf. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). The Court's discussion in Hamilton of the state
university's decision to require military training is therefore
limited to a generalized analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment of
whether the State's policy deprived the would-be students of "life,
liberty, or property." See 293 U.S. at 293 U. S.
261 -262. The Court concluded that no such deprivation
was involved when the State "ha[d] not drafted or called [the
individuals] to [war]." Id. at 293 U. S.
262 .

															This Court's opinions have never turned on so slender a reed as
whether the challenged requirement is merely a "reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest." Ante at 476 U. S. 708 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). THE CHIEF JUSTICE appears to believe
that the added inconvenience to the State of administering a
selective exemption overbalances any burden on individual religious
exercise. But this Court Page 476 U. S. 731 has held that administrative inconvenience is not alone
sufficient to justify a burden on free exercise unless it creates
problems of substantial magnitude. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
408 -409. And as 476 U. S. there is essentially no administrative burden imposed on the
Government in this case.

															Appellants have rested their case on vague allegations of
administrative inconvenience and harm to the public fisc that are
wholly unsubstantiated by the record and the findings of the
District Court. The Court simply cannot, consistent with its
precedents, distinguish this case from the wide variety of factual
situations in which the Free Exercise Clause indisputably imposes
significant constraints upon government. Indeed, five Members of
the Court agree that Sherbert and Thomas, in
which the government was required to accommodate sincere religious
beliefs, control the outcome of this case to the extent it is not
moot. See ante at 476 U. S. 716 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); post at 476 U. S. 733 (WHITE, J., dissenting); supra at 476 U. S.
728 -730.

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE's distinction between this case and the
Court's previous decisions on free exercise claims -- that here

															"it is appellees who seek benefits from the Government and who
assert that . . . they should be excused from compliance with a
condition that is binding on all other persons who seek the same
benefits from the Government," ante at 476 U. S. 703 -- has been directly rejected. The fact that the underlying dispute
involves an award of benefits, rather than an exaction of
penalties, does not grant the Government license to apply a
different version of the Constitution:

															"[Welfare] benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for
persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves state
action that adjudicates important rights. The constitutional
challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance
benefits are "a privilege,' and not a `right.'" Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 627 n. 6 (1969). Relevant constitutional Page 476 U. S. 732 restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance
benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). . . ." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 , 397 U. S. 262 (1970) (footnote omitted). See also Sherbert v. Verner,
supra, at 374 U. S. 404 ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege"). The fact that appellees
seek exemption from a precondition that the Government attaches to
an award of benefits does not, therefore, generate a meaningful
distinction between this case and one where appellees seek an
exemption from the Government's imposition of penalties upon them.
Even if the Founding Fathers did not live in a society with the
"broad range of benefits" and "complex programs" that the Federal
Government administers today, ante at 476 U. S. 707 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.), they constructed a society in which the
Constitution placed express limits upon governmental actions
limiting the freedoms of that society's members. The rise of the
welfare state was not the fall of the Free Exercise Clause.

															Our precedents have long required the Government to show that a
compelling state interest is served by its refusal to grant a
religious exemption. The Government here has clearly and easily met
its burden of showing that the prevention of welfare fraud is a
compelling governmental goal. If the Government could meet its
compelling needs only by refusing to grant a religious exemption,
and chose a narrowly tailored means to do so, then the Government
would prevail. But the Government has failed to show that granting
a religious exemption to those who legitimately object to providing
a Social Security number will do any harm to its compelling
interest in preventing welfare fraud.

															I would merely vacate that portion of the injunction issued by
the District Court that enjoins the Government from Page 476 U. S. 733 using or disseminating the Social Security number already in its
possession.

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															Being of the view that Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana
Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 (1963), control this case, I cannot join the
Court's opinion and judgment.

Summary: In Bowen v. Roy, the Supreme Court considered whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment entitled Native American parents to an exemption from providing their child's Social Security number to receive government benefits. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals from specific forms of compulsion but does not allow individuals to dictate the government's internal procedures. While the government must show a compelling interest to refuse a religious exemption, it also has to prove that granting the exemption would harm that interest. In this case, the government failed to show how granting a religious exemption would harm its interest in preventing welfare fraud. The Court vacated the lower court's injunction and remanded the case.