U.S. Supreme Court Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954) Hernandez v. Texas No. 406 Argued January 11,
1954 Decided May 3, 1954 347
U.S. 475 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF TEXAS Syllabus The systematic exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from
service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors in
the Texas county in which petitioner was indicted and tried for
murder, although there were a substantial number of such persons in
the county fully qualified to serve, deprived petitioner, a person
of Mexican descent, of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and his conviction in a state court is
reversed. Pp. 347 U. S.
476 -482.

															(a) The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is not directed solely against discrimination between whites and
Negroes. Pp. 347 U. S.
477 -478.

															(b) When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and
it is shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out
that class for different treatment not based on some reasonable
classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been
violated. P. 347 U. S.
478 .

															(c) The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury
service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is
discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 347 U. S.
478 -479.

															(d) The evidence in this case was sufficient to prove that, in
the county in question, persons of Mexican descent constitute a
separate class, distinct from "whites." Pp. 347 U. S.
479 -480.

															(e) A prima facie case of denial of the equal
protection of the laws was established in this case by evidence
that there were in the county a substantial number of persons of
Mexican descent with the qualifications required for jury service,
but that none of them had served on a jury commission, grand jury
or petit jury for 25 years. Pp. 347 U. S.
480 -481.

															(f) The testimony of five jury commissioners that they had not
discriminated against persons of Mexican descent in selecting
jurors, and that their only objective had been to select those whom
they thought best qualified, was not enough to overcome
petitioner's prima facie case of denial of the equal
protection of the laws. Pp. 347 U. S.
481 -482.

															(g) Petitioner had the constitutional right to be indicted and
tried by juries from which all members of his class were not
systematically excluded. P. 347 U. S.
482 .

															___ Tex.Cr.R. ___, 251
S.W.2d 531 , reversed. Page 347 U. S. 476 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The petitioner, Pete Hernandez, was indicted for the murder of
one Joe Espinosa by a grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. He was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 251
S.W.2d 531 . Prior to the trial, the petitioner, by his counsel,
offered timely motions to quash the indictment and the jury panel.
He alleged that persons of Mexican descent were systematically
excluded from service as jury commissioners, [ Footnote 1 ] grand jurors, and petit jurors,
although there were such persons fully Page 347 U. S. 477 qualified to serve residing in Jackson County. The petitioner
asserted that exclusion of this class deprived him, as a member of
the class, of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motions. At the trial, the motions were
renewed, further evidence taken, and the motions again denied. An
allegation that the trial court erred in denying the motions was
the sole basis of petitioner's appeal. In affirming the judgment of
the trial court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considered and
passed upon the substantial federal question raised by the
petitioner. We granted a writ of certiorari to review that
decision. 346 U.S. 811.

															In numerous decisions, this Court has held that it is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a
particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand
jury, or before a petit jury, from which all persons of his race or
color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded by
the State, whether acting through its legislature, its courts, or
its executive or administrative officers. [ Footnote 2 ] Although the Court has had little occasion
to rule on the question directly, it has been recognized since Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.
S. 303 , that the exclusion of a class of persons from
jury service on grounds other than race or color may also deprive a
defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. [ Footnote 3 ] The State of Texas would have us hold that
there are only two classes -- white and Negro -- within the
contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decisions of this
Court Page 347 U. S. 478 do not support that view. [ Footnote 4 ] And, except where the question presented
involves the exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from juries,
[ Footnote 5 ] Texas courts have
taken a broader view of the scope of the equal protection clause.
[ Footnote 6 ]

															Throughout our history, differences in race and color have
defined easily identifiable groups which have at times required the
aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But
community prejudices are not static, and, from time to time, other
differences from the community norm may define other groups which
need the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a
community is a question of fact. When the existence of a distinct
class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the laws, as
written or as applied, single out that class for different
treatment not based on some reasonable classification, the
guarantees of the Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a
"two-class theory" -- that is, based upon differences between
"white" and Negro.

															As the petitioner acknowledges, the Texas system of selecting
grand and petit jurors by the use of jury commissions is fair on
its face and capable of being utilized Page 347 U. S. 479 without discrimination. [ Footnote 7 ] But, as this Court has held, the system is
susceptible to abuse, and can be employed in a discriminatory
manner. [ Footnote 8 ] The
exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely
because of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas statute makes no
such discrimination, but the petitioner alleges that those
administering the law do.

															The petitioner's initial burden in substantiating his charge of
group discrimination was to prove that persons of Mexican descent
constitute a separate class in Jackson County, distinct from
"whites." [ Footnote 9 ] One
method by which this may be demonstrated is by showing the attitude
of the community. Here, the testimony of responsible officials and
citizens contained the admission that residents of the community
distinguished between "white" and "Mexican." The participation of
persons of Mexican descent in business and community groups was
shown to be slight. Until very recent times, children of Mexican
descent were required to attend a segregated school for the first
four grades. [ Footnote 10 ]
At least one restaurant in town prominently displayed a sign
announcing "No Mexicans Served." On the courthouse grounds at the
time of the Page 347 U. S. 480 hearing, there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the
other marked "Colored Men" and "Hombres Aqui" ("Men Here"). No
substantial evidence was offered to rebut the logical inference to
be drawn from these facts, and it must be concluded that petitioner
succeeded in his proof.

															Having established the existence of a class, petitioner was then
charged with the burden of proving discrimination. To do so, he
relied on the pattern of proof established by Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 . In
that case, proof that Negroes constituted a substantial segment of
the population of the jurisdiction, that some Negroes were
qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called for
jury service over an extended period of time, was held to
constitute prima facie proof of the systematic exclusion
of Negroes from jury service. This holding, sometimes called the
"rule of exclusion," has been applied in other cases, [ Footnote 11 ] and it is available in
supplying proof of discrimination against any delineated class.

															The petitioner established that 14% of the population of Jackson
County were persons with Mexican or Latin American surnames, and
that 11% of the males over 21 bore such names. [ Footnote 12 ] The County Tax Assessor
testified Page 347 U. S. 481 that 6 or 7 percent of the freeholders on the tax rolls of the
County were persons of Mexican descent. The State of Texas
stipulated that,

															"for the last twenty-five years, there is no record of any
person with a Mexican or Latin American name having served on a
jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County.
[ Footnote 13 ]"

															The parties also stipulated that

															"there are some male persons of Mexican or Latin American
descent in Jackson County who, by virtue of being citizens,
freeholders, and having all other legal prerequisites to jury
service, are eligible to serve as members of a jury commission,
grand jury and/or petit jury. [ Footnote 14 ]"

															The petitioner met the burden of proof imposed in Norris v.
Alabama, supra. To rebut the strong prima facie case
of the denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Constitution thus established, the State offered the testimony of
five jury commissioners that they had no discriminated against
persons of Mexican or Latin American descent in selecting jurors.
They stated that their only objective had been to select those whom
they thought were best qualified. This testimony is not enough to
overcome the petitioner's case. As the Court said in Norris v.
Alabama: "That showing as to the long-continued exclusion of negroes from
jury service, and as to the many negroes qualified for that
service, could not be met by mere generalities. If, in the presence
of such testimony as defendant adduced, the mere general assertions
by officials of their performance of duty were to be accepted as an
adequate justification for Page 347 U. S. 482 the complete exclusion of negroes from jury service, the
constitutional provision . . . would be but a vain and illusory
requirement. [ Footnote
15 ]"

															The same reasoning is applicable to these facts.

															Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a
certain class will serve on a particular jury or during some
particular period. But it taxes our credulity to say that mere
chance resulted in their being no members of this class among the
over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years. The result
bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision
on the part of any individual jury commissioner. The judgment of
conviction must be reversed.

															To say that this decision revives the rejected contention that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation of
all the component ethnic groups of the community on every jury
[ Footnote 16 ] ignores the
facts. The petitioner did not seek proportional representation, nor
did he claim a right to have persons of Mexican descent sit on the
particular juries which he faced. [ Footnote 17 ] His only claim is the right to be indicted
and tried by juries from which all members of his class are not
systematically excluded -- juries selected from among all qualified
persons regardless of national origin or descent. To this much he
is entitled by the Constitution. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Texas law provides that, at each term of court, the judge shall
appoint three to five jury commissioners. The judge instructs these
commissioners as to their duties. After taking an oath that they
will not knowingly select a grand juror they believe unfit or
unqualified, the commissioners retire to a room in the courthouse
where they select from the county assessment roll the names of 16
grand jurors from different parts of the county. These names are
placed in a sealed envelope and delivered to the clerk. Thirty days
before court meets, the clerk delivers a copy of the list to the
sheriff who summons the jurors. Vernon's Tex.Code Crim.Proc. arts.
333-350.

															The general jury panel is also selected by the jury commission.
Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stat. art. 2107. In capital cases, a special
venire may be selected from the list furnished by the
commissioners. Vernon's Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 592.

															[ Footnote 2 ] See Carter v. State of Texas, 177 U.
S. 442 , 177 U. S.
447 .

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"Nor, if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic
Irishmen [from jury service], would there be any doubt of its
inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment."

															100 U.S. at 100 U. S. 308 . Cf. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S.
89 , 179 U. S.
92 .

															[ Footnote 4 ] See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 ; Takahaski v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.
S. 410 ; cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 , 320 U. S.
100 :

															"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."

															[ Footnote 5 ] Sanchez v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 436, 181 S.W.2d 87; Salazar v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 260, 193 S.W.2d 211; Sanchez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 243
S.W.2d 700 .

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In Juarez v. State, 102 Tex.Cr.R. 297, 277 S.W. 1091,
the Texas court held that the systematic exclusion of Roman
Catholics from juries was barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Clifton v. Puente, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 272, the Texas
court ruled that restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of land
to persons of Mexican descent were unenforceable.

															[ Footnote 7 ] Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 , 311 U. S.
130 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															We do not have before us the question whether or not the Court
might take judicial notice that persons of Mexican descent are
there considered as a separate class. See Marden,
Minorities in American Society; McDonagh & Richards, Ethnic
Relations in the United States.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The reason given by the school superintendent for this
segregation was that these children needed special help in learning
English. In this special school, however, each teacher taught two
grades, while, in the regular school, each taught only one in most
instances. Most of the children of Mexican descent left school by
the fifth or sixth grade.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See note 8 supra. [ Footnote 12 ]

															The 1950 census report shows that, of the 12,916 residents of
Jackson County, 1,865, or about 14% had Mexican or Latin American
surnames. U.S. Census of Population, 1950, Vol. II, pt. 43, p. 180;
id., Vol. IV, pt. 3, c. C, p. 45. Of these 1,865, 1,738 were native
born American citizens and 65 were naturalized citizens. Id., Vol. IV, pt. 3, c. C, p. 45. Of the 3,754 males over
21 years of age in the County, 408, or about 11%, had Spanish
surnames. Id., Vol. II, pt. 43, p. 180; id., Vol. IV, pt.
3, c. C, p. 67. The State challenges any reliance on names as
showing the descent of persons in the County. However, just as
persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these
Spanish names provide ready identification of the members of this
class. In selecting jurors, the jury commissioners work from a list
of names.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															R. 34.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															R. 55. The parties also stipulated that there were no persons of
Mexican or Latin American descent on the list of talesmen. R. 83.
Each item of each stipulation was amply supported by the testimony
adduced at the hearing.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															294 U.S. at 294 U. S.
598 .

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S. 403 ; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 , 339 U. S.
286 -287.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See Akins v. Texas, supra, note 16, at 325 U. S.
403 .

Summary:
In Hernandez v. Texas (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the systematic exclusion of individuals of Mexican descent from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. The Court held that the constitutional right to equal protection applies to all racial groups, not just whites and African Americans.

The Court found that in Jackson County, Texas, individuals of Mexican descent constituted a distinct class and were treated differently due to their ancestry or national origin. Despite comprising a substantial portion of the county's population, no person of Mexican descent had served on a jury commission, grand jury, or petit jury for 25 years.

The Court concluded that the petitioner, Pete Hernandez, had been denied his constitutional right to be indicted and tried by juries from which members of his class were not systematically excluded. The Court reversed Hernandez's murder conviction, stating that the exclusion of individuals from jury service based solely on their ancestry or national origin was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.


U.S. Supreme Court Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) Sweatt v. Painter No. 44 Argued April 4, 1950 Decided June 5, 1950 339
U.S. 629 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
TEXAS Syllabus Petitioner was denied admission to the state supported
University of Texas Law School, solely because he is a Negro and
state law forbids the admission of Negroes to that Law School. He
was offered, but he refused, enrollment in a separate law school
newly established by the State for Negroes. The University of Texas
Law School has 16 full-time and three part-time professors, 850
students, a library of 65,000 volumes, a law review, moot court
facilities, scholarship funds, an Order of the Coif affiliation,
many distinguished alumni, and much tradition and prestige. The
separate law school for Negroes has five full-time professors, 23
students, a library of 16,500 volumes, a practice court, a legal
aid association, and one alumnus admitted to the Texas Bar, but it
excludes from its student body members of racial groups which
number 85% of the population of the State and which include most of
the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges, and other officials with
whom petitioner would deal as a member of the Texas Bar. Held: The legal education offered petitioner is not
substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to
the University of Texas Law School, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that he be admitted to the
University of Texas Law School. Pp. 343 U. S.
631 -636. Reversed. A Texas trial court found that a newly established state law
school for Negroes offered petitioner "privileges, advantages, and
opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to
those offered by the State to white students at the University of
Texas," and denied mandamus to compel his admission to the
University of Texas Law School. The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. 210 S.W.2d 442. The Texas Supreme Court denied writ of
error. This Court granted certiorari. 338 U.S. 865. Reversed, p. 339 U. S.
636 . Page 339 U. S. 631 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, post, p. 339 U. S. 637 ,
present different aspects of this general question: to what extent
does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit
the power of a state to distinguish between students of different
races in professional and graduate education in a state university?
Broader issues have been urged for our consideration, but we adhere
to the principle of deciding constitutional questions only in the
context of the particular case before the Court. We have frequently
reiterated that this Court will decide constitutional questions
only when necessary to the disposition of the case at hand, and
that such decisions will be drawn as narrowly as possible. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.
S. 549 (1947), and cases cited therein. Because of this
traditional reluctance to extend constitutional interpretations to
situations or facts which are not before the Court, much of the
excellent research and detailed argument presented in these cases
is unnecessary to their disposition.

															In the instant case, petitioner filed an application for
admission to the University of Texas Law School for the February,
1946, term. His application was rejected solely because he is a
Negro. [ Footnote 1 ] Petitioner
thereupon brought this suit for mandamus against the appropriate
school officials, respondents here, to compel his admission. At
that time, there was no law school in Texas which admitted
Negroes.

															The state trial court recognized that the action of the State in
denying petitioner the opportunity to gain Page 339 U. S. 632 a legal education while granting it to others deprived him of
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court did not grant the relief requested, however,
but continued the case for six months to allow the State to supply
substantially equal facilities. At the expiration of the six
months, in December, 1946, the court denied the writ on the showing
that the authorized university officials had adopted an order
calling for the opening of a law school for Negroes the following
February. While petitioner's appeal was pending, such a school was
made available, but petitioner refused to register therein. The
Texas Court of Civil Appeals set aside the trial court's judgment
and ordered the cause "remanded generally to the trial court for
further proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to
this suit."

															On remand, a hearing was held on the issue of the equality of
the educational facilities at the newly established school as
compared with the University of Texas Law School. Finding that the
new school offered petitioner

															"privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law
substantially equivalent to those offered by the State to white
students at the University of Texas,"

															the trial court denied mandamus. The Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed. 210 S.W.2d 442 (1948). Petitioner's application for a
writ of error was denied by the Texas Supreme Court. We granted
certiorari, 338 U.S. 865 (1949), because of the manifest importance
of the constitutional issues involved.

															The University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was
excluded, was staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three
part-time professors, some of whom are nationally recognized
authorities in their field. Its student body numbered 850. The
library contained over 65,000 volumes. Among the other facilities
available to the students were a law review, moot court
facilities, Page 339 U. S. 633 scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. The
school's alumni occupy the most distinguished positions in the
private practice of the law and in the public life of the State. It
may properly be considered one of the nation's ranking law
schools.

															The law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February,
1947, would have had no independent faculty or library. The
teaching was to be carried on by four members of the University of
Texas Law School faculty, who were to maintain their offices at the
University of Texas while teaching at both institutions. Few of the
10,000 volumes ordered for the library had arrived, [ Footnote 2 ] nor was there any full-time
librarian. The school lacked accreditation.

															Since the trial of this case, respondents report the opening of
a law school at the Texas State University for Negroes. It is
apparently on the road to full accreditation. It has a faculty of
five full-time professors; a student body of 23; a library of some
16,500 volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court and
legal aid association, and one alumnus who has become a member of
the Texas Bar.

															Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the
original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find
substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white
and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the
faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization,
size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of
law Page 339 U. S. 634 review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law
School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas
Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which
are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness
in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration,
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community,
traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who
had a free choice between these law schools would consider the
question close.

															Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we
are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law
school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot
be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions
with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed
from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which
the law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to
admit petitioner excludes from its student body members of the
racial groups which number 85% of the population of the State and
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other
officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he
becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and
significant segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that
the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that
which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law
School.

															It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is
no different from excluding white students from the new law school.
This contention overlooks realities. It is unlikely that a member
of a group so decisively in the majority, attending a school with
rich traditions and Page 339 U. S. 635 prestige which only a history of consistently maintained
excellence could command, would claim that the opportunities
afforded him for legal education were unequal to those held open to
petitioner. That such a claim, if made, would be dishonored by the
State is no answer. "Equal protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities." Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 , 334 U. S. 22 (1948).

															It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which are
personal and present. This Court has stated unanimously that

															"The State must provide [legal education] for [petitioner] in
conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any
other group." Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.
S. 631 , 332 U. S. 633 (1948). That case

															"did not present the issue whether a state might not satisfy the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing
a separate law school for Negroes." Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U. S. 147 , 333 U. S. 150 (1948). In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.
S. 337 , 305 U. S. 351 (1938), the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared
that

															"petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual
that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the
State was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for
legal education substantially equal to those which the State there
afforded for persons of the white race, whether or not other
negroes sought the same opportunity."

															These are the only cases in this Court which present the issue
of the constitutional validity of race distinctions in state
supported graduate and professional education.

															In accordance with these cases, petitioner may claim his full
constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by
the State to students of other races. Such education is not
available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State.
We cannot, therefore, Page 339 U. S. 636 agree with respondents that the doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), requires affirmance of the judgment below. Nor need we
reach petitioner's contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary knowledge
respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the effects
of racial segregation. See supra, p. 339 U. S.
631 .

															We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that petitioner be admitted to the University of
Texas Law School. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															It appears that the University has been restricted to white
students, in accordance with the State law. See Tex.Const., Art. VII, §§ 7, 14; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon, 1925),
Arts. 2643b (Supp. 1949), 2719, 2900.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"Students of the interim School of Law of the Texas State
University for Negroes [located in Austin, whereas the permanent
School was to be located at Houston] shall have use of the State
Law Library in the Capitol Building. . . ."

															Tex.Laws 1947, c. 29, § 11, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon, 1949
Supp.), note to Art. 2643b. It is not clear that this privilege was
anything more than was extended to all citizens of the State.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, must be admitted to the University of Texas Law School, as the separate law school established for black students did not offer substantially equal educational opportunities. The Court found that the educational benefits of the University of Texas Law School, including its faculty, student body, library, and other resources, were significantly superior to those of the separate law school for black students. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide equal educational opportunities for students of all races and that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. This ruling contributed to the dismantling of racial segregation in education and set a precedent for future civil rights cases.


U.S. Supreme Court Brown v. Board of Education, 344
U.S. 141 (1952) Brown v. Board of
Education No. 8 November 24, 1952 344
U.S. 141 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
KANSAS Syllabus This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court
sustaining the constitutionality of a state statute which
authorized racial segregation in the public schools of Kansas. In
the District Court, the State intervened and defended the
constitutionality of the statute, but neither the State nor any of
the other appellees has entered an appearance or filed a brief
here. Because of the importance of the issue, this Court requests
that the State present its views at the oral argument. If the State
does not desire to appear, the Attorney General of the State is
requested to advise this Court whether the State's default shall be
construed as a concession of the invalidity of the statute. Pp. 344 U. S.
141 -142.

															The decision below is reported in 98 F. Supp.
797 .

															PER CURIAM.

															This action was instituted by the appellants attacking a Kansas
statute which authorized segregation in the schools of that State.
It was urged that the Kansas was without power to enact such
legislation, claimed by appellants to be in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

															In the District Court, the State, by its Governor and Attorney
General, intervened and defended the constitutionality of the
statute. The court upheld its validity, 98 F.
Supp. 797 .

															In this Court, the appellants continue their constitutional
attack. No appearance has been entered here by Page 344 U. S. 142 the State of Kansas, the Board of Education of Topeka, and the
other appellees; nor have they presented any brief in support of
the statute's validity. The Court has been advised by counsel for
the Board of Education that it does not propose to appear in oral
argument or present a brief.

															Because of the national importance of the issue presented and
because of its importance to the Kansas, we request that the State
present its views at oral argument. If the State does not desire to
appear, we request the Attorney General to advise whether the
State's default shall be construed as a concession of
invalidity.

															Order accordingly.

Summary: In Brown v. Board of Education (1952), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools, inviting the state of Kansas to present its views during oral arguments. The case challenged a Kansas statute authorizing school segregation, with the state defending its validity in the District Court. However, neither the state nor other appellees entered an appearance or filed briefs in the Supreme Court, leading the Court to request the state's participation in oral arguments and guidance on the implications of its absence.


U.S. Supreme Court Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) Loving v. Virginia No. 395 Argued April 10, 1967 Decided June 12, 1967 388 U.S.
1 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF
VIRGINIA Syllabus Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons
solely on the basis of racial classifications held to violate the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pp. 388 U. S.
4 -12.

															206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78, reversed. Page 388 U. S. 2 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by
this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of
Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis
of racial classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 1 ] For reasons which seem to us to reflect the
central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that
these statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment.

															In June, 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro
woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the
District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their
marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia and established their
marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the
Circuit Court Page 388 U. S. 3 of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging
the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriages.
On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge, and
were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge
suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition
that the Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia
together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:

															"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And, but for the
interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such
marriage. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix."

															After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the
District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in
the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the
sentence on the ground that the statutes which they had violated
were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having
been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia requesting that a three-judge court be convened to
declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional
and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions. On
January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the motion to vacate
the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge
District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present
their constitutional claims to the highest state court.

															The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
anti-miscegenation statutes and, after Page 388 U. S. 4 modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions. [ Footnote 2 ] The Lovings appealed this decision, and we
noted probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.

															The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and
sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at
prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The Lovings were
convicted of violating § 258 of the Virginia Code:

															" Leaving State to evade law. -- If any white person and
colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being
married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of
it, and afterwards return to and reside in it, cohabiting as man
and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the
marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been
solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as
man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage."

															Section 259, which defines the penalty for miscegenation,
provides:

															" Punishment for marriage. -- If any white person
intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry
with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one
nor more than five years."

															Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are §
20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between "a white
person and a colored person" without any judicial proceeding,
[ Footnote 3 ] and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which, Page 388 U. S. 5 respectively, define "white persons" and "colored persons and
Indians" for purposes of the statutory prohibitions. [ Footnote 4 ] The Lovings have never disputed in the course
of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a "colored person" or that
Mr. Loving is a "white person" within the meanings given those
terms by the Virginia statutes. Page 388 U. S. 6 Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish
marriages on the basis of racial classifications. [ Footnote 5 ] Penalties for miscegenation arose as an
incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the
colonial period. [ Footnote 6 ] The present
statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity
Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme nativism which
followed the end of the First World War. The central features of
this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of
a "white person" marrying other than another "white person,"
[ Footnote 7 ] a prohibition against issuing
marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that Page 388 U. S. 7 the applicants' statements as to their race are correct,
[ Footnote 8 ] certificates of "racial composition"
to be kept by both local and state registrars, [ Footnote 9 ] and the carrying forward of earlier
prohibitions against racial intermarriage. [ Footnote
10 ] I In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the
decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred
to its 1965 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87
S.E.2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity of these
laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the State's
legitimate purposes were "to preserve the racial integrity of its
citizens," and to prevent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel
breed of citizens," and "the obliteration of racial pride,"
obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Id. at 90, 87 S.E.2d at 756. The court also reasoned that
marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without
federal intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage
should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth
Amendment.

															While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that
marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this
Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could
it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). Instead, the State argues that the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers,
is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element Page 388 U. S. 8 as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to
whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are
punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because
its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the
Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes,
despite their reliance on racial classifications, do not constitute
an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument
advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal application
theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does
not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on
racial classifications, the question of constitutionality would
thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to
treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages. On
this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is
substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court should defer
to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of
discouraging interracial marriages.

															Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application"
of a statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove
the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of
all invidious racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's
contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any
possible basis for concluding that they serve a rational purpose.
The mere fact of equal application does not mean that our analysis
of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in cases
involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection
Clause has been arrayed against a statute discriminating between
the kinds of advertising which may be displayed on trucks in New
York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949), or an exemption in Ohio's ad valorem tax for
merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of
Ohio , Page 388 U. S. 9 Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according
to race, the Court has merely asked whether there is any rational
foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom
of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal
with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of
equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy
burden of justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has
traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to
race.

															The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress
about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate
that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make
unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. Many of the statements
alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, which President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these
statements have some relevance to the intention of Congress in
submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood that
they pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the
broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As for the
various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we
have said in connection with a related problem that, although these
historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to
resolve the problem;

															"[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of
the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all
legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the
United States.' Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments,
and wished them to have the most limited effect." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 , 347 U. S. 489 (1954). See also Strauder Page 388 U. S. 10 v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 , 100 U. S. 310 (1880). We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the
Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the
State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is
satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on racial
classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the
offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964).

															The State finds support for its "equal application" theory in
the decision of the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.
S. 583 (1883). In that case, the Court upheld a
conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or
fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a
greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct
by members of the same race. The Court reasoned that the statute
could not be said to discriminate against Negroes because the
punishment for each participant in the offense was the same.
However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the reasoning
of that case, we stated " Pace represents a limited view of
the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the
subsequent decisions of this Court." McLaughlin v. Florida,
supra, at 379 U. S. 188 .
As we there demonstrated, the Equal Protection Clause requires the
consideration of whether the classifications drawn by any statute
constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and
central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States. Slaughter-House
Cases , 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 71 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.
S. 303 , 100 U. S.
307 -308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.
S. 339 , 100 U. S.
334 -335 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.
S. 715 (1961). Page 388 U. S. 11 There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The
statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by
members of different races. Over the years, this Court has
consistently repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81 , 320 U. S. 100 (1943). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that
racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be
subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U. S. 214 , 323 U. S. 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state
objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was
the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two
members of this Court have already stated that they

															"cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which
makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct
is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 379 U. S. 198 (STEWART, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J., concurring).

															There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy. [ Footnote
11 ] We have consistently denied Page 388 U. S. 12 the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of
citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. II These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.

															Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 , 316 U. S. 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.
S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in
these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom
of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial
discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual,
and cannot be infringed by the State.

															These convictions must be reversed. It is so ordered. Page 388 U. S. 13 [ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

															"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78 (1966).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Section 257 of the Virginia Code provides:

															" Marriages void without decree. -- All marriages
between a white person and a colored person shall be absolutely
void without any decree of divorce or other legal process."

															Va.Code Ann. § 20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code provides:

															" Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white
persons.' -- It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white
person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person
with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian.
For the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall
apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood
other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of
the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic
blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore
passed and now in effect regarding the intermarriage of white and
colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this
chapter."

															Va.Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															The exception for persons with less than one-sixteenth "of the
blood of the American Indian" is apparently accounted for, in the
words of a tract issued by the Registrar of the State Bureau of
Vital Statistics, by "the desire of all to recognize as an integral
and honored part of the white race the descendants of John Rolfe
and Pocathontas. . . ." Plecker, The New Family and Race
Improvement, 17 Va.Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at 25-26 (New Family
Series No. 5, 1925), cited in Wadlington, The Loving Case:
Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical Perspective, 52
Va.L.Rev. 1189, 1202, n. 93 (1966).

															Section 1-14 of the Virginia Code provides:

															" Colored persons and Indians defined. -- Every person
in whom there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and
taken to be a colored person, and every person not a colored person
having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed
an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing
in this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of Indian blood and
less than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal
Indians."

															Va.Code Ann. § 1-14 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															After the initiation of this litigation, Maryland repealed its
prohibitions against interracial marriage, Md.Laws 1967, c. 6,
leaving Virginia and 15 other States with statutes outlawing
interracial marriage: Alabama, Ala.Const., Art. 4, § 102, Ala.Code,
Tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark.Stat.Ann. § 55-104 (1947);
Delaware, Del.Code Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Florida,
Fla.Const., Art. 16, § 24, Fla.Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia,
Ga.Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Kentucky, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 402.020
(Supp. 1966); Louisiana, La.Rev.Stat. § 14:79 (1950); Mississippi,
Miss.Const., Art. 14, § 263, Miss.Code Ann. § 459 (1956); Missouri,
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North Carolina, N.C.Const.,
Art. XIV, § 8, N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-181 (1953); Oklahoma, Okla.Stat.,
Tit. 43, § 12 (Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S.C.Const., Art. 3, §
33, S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn.Const., Art. 11, §
14, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Texas, Tex.Pen.Code, Art. 492
(1952); West Virginia, W.Va.Code Ann. § 4697 (1961).

															Over the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws outlawing
interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.

															The first state court to recognize that miscegenation statutes
violate the Equal Protection Clause was the Supreme Court of
California. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d
711 , 198 P.2d 17 (1948).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															For a historical discussion of Virginia's miscegenation
statutes, see Wadlington, supra, n 4.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Va.Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Va.Code Ann. § 20-53 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Va.Code Ann. § 20-50 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Va.Code Ann. § 254 (1960 Repl. Vol.).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes,
as expressed in the words of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to
Preserve Racial Integrity," extends only to the integrity of the
white race. While Virginia prohibits whites from marrying any
nonwhite (subject to the exception for the descendants of
Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may
intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend that
this distinction renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes
arbitrary and unreasonable even assuming the constitutional
validity of an official purpose to preserve "racial integrity." We
need not reach this contention, because we find the racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect
the "integrity" of all races.

															MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.

															I have previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not
possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which
makes the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 , 379 U. S. 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that belief, I concur in
the judgment of the Court.

Summary: In the case of Loving v. Virginia (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that laws prohibiting interracial marriage violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws, which had prevented interracial couples from marrying solely based on racial classifications. The ruling ended the enforcement of such laws across the United States, affirming the right of individuals to marry regardless of race.