U.S. Supreme Court Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979) Scott v. Illinois No. 77-1177 Argued December 4,
1978 Decided March 5, 1979 440
U.S. 367 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS Syllabus Petitioner, an indigent, was convicted of shoplifting and was
fined $50 after a bench trial in an Illinois state court. The
applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such an
offense at a $500 fine, one year in jail, or both. Petitioner's
conviction was ultimately affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court,
over the petitioner's contention that a line of cases culminating
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 , requires state provision of counsel whenever
imprisonment is an authorized penalty. Held: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that
no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense, but do not require
a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant,
such as petitioner, who is charged with a statutory offense for
which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not imposed.
Pp. 440 U. S.
369 -374.

															(a) Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, limits the
constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal
proceedings to a case that actually leads to imprisonment. P. 440 U. S.
373 .

															(b) Even were the matter res nova, Argersinger's central premise -- that actual imprisonment is a penalty different
in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment -- is
eminently sound, and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as
the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel. P. 440 U. S.
373 . 68 Ill. 2d
269 , 369 N.E.2d
881 , affirmed.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and POWELL, JJ., joined. POWELL,
J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 440 U. S. 374 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and
STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 440 U. S. 375 .
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 440 U. S.
389 . Page 440 U. S. 368 MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. We
granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict among state
and lower federal courts regarding the proper application of our
decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 (1972). [ Footnote
1 ] 436 U.S. 925. Petitioner Scott was convicted of theft and
fined $50 after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Ill. His conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate
appellate court, and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois, over
Scott's contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution required that Illinois provide trial
counsel to him at its expense. Petitioner Scott was convicted of
shoplifting merchandise valued at less than $150. The applicable
Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such an offense at a
$500 fine or one year in jail, or both. [ Footnote 2 ] The petitioner argues that a line of this
Court's cases culminating in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, requires state provision of counsel whenever imprisonment is an
authorized penalty. Page 440 U. S. 369 The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this contention, quoting
the following language from Argersinger: "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."

															407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
37 .

															"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when
the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be
imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is
represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness
and gravity of the offense, and therefore know when to name a
lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts." Id. at 407 U. S.
40 .

															The Supreme Court of Illinois went on to state that it was "not
inclined to extend Argersinger " to the case where a
defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which
imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually imposed
upon the defendant. 68 Ill. 2d
269 , 272, 369 N.E.2d
881 , 882 (1977). We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois
that the Federal Constitution does not require a state trial court
to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant such as petitioner, and
we therefore affirm its judgment.

															In his petition for certiorari, petitioner referred to the issue
in this case as "the question left open in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972)." Pet. for Cert. 5. Whether this question was indeed "left
open" in Argersinger depends upon whether one considers
that opinion to be a point in a moving line or a holding that the
States are required to go only so far in furnishing counsel to
indigent defendants. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in quoting the
above language from Argersinger, clearly viewed the latter
as Argersinger's holding. Page 440 U. S. 370 Additional support for this proposition may be derived from the
concluding paragraph of the opinion in that case:

															"The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling.
But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's
liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand
of counsel' so necessary where one's liberty is in jeopardy."

															407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
40 .

															Petitioner, on the other hand, refers to language in the Court's
opinion, responding to the opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, which
states that the Court

															"need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved
. . . for here petitioner was, in fact, sentenced to jail." Id. at 407 U. S.
37 .

															There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as
originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights,
contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a
criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to
assist in his defense. W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American
Courts 27-30 (1955). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45 (1932), the Court held that Alabama was obligated to
appoint counsel for the Scottsboro defendants, phrasing the inquiry
as

															"whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of
counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 287 U. S. 52 . It
concluded its opinion with the following language:

															"The United States, by statute, and every state in the Union, by
express provision of law or by the determination of its courts,
make it the duty of the trial judge, where the accused is unable to
employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states, the
rule applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions; in others, it is
limited to the more serious crimes, and in a very limited number,
to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous Page 440 U. S. 371 accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to
have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the present, and
lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to
the fundamental nature of that right." Id. at 287 U. S.
73 . Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), held that not every indigent defendant accused in a state
criminal prosecution was entitled to appointment of counsel. A
determination had to be made in each individual case whether
failure to appoint counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness. Betts was, in turn, overruled in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, Betts was described as holding

															"that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant
charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."

															372 U.S. at 372 U. S.
339 .

															Several Terms later, the Court held, in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), that the right to jury trial in federal court guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held, however:

															"It is doubtless true that there is a category of petty crimes
or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
provision, and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
jury trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying
possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if
they otherwise qualify as petty offenses. . . ." Id. at 391 U. S. 159 (footnote omitted). In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S.
66 , 399 U. S. 69 (1970), the controlling opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE concluded that
"no offense can be deemed "petty" for purposes of the right to
trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is
authorized."

															In Argersinger, the State of Florida urged that a
similar dichotomy be employed in the right-to-counsel area: any
offense punishable by less than six months in jail should not Page 440 U. S. 372 require appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant.
[ Footnote 3 ] The Argersinger Court rejected this analogy, however,
observing that "the right to trial by jury has a different
genealogy, and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge
alone." 407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
29 .

															The number of separate opinions in Gideon, Duncan,
Baldwin, and Argersinger suggests that constitutional
line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the
Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to
transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to
another. The process of incorporation creates special difficulties,
for the state and federal contexts are often different, and
application of the same principle may have ramifications distinct
in degree and kind. The range of human conduct regulated by state
criminal laws is much broader than that of the federal criminal
laws, particularly on the "petty" offense part of the spectrum. As
a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less
willing to extrapolate an already extended line when, although the
general nature of the principle sought to be applied is clear, its
precise limits and their ramifications become less so. We have now,
in our decided cases, departed from the literal meaning of the
Sixth Amendment. And we cannot fall back on the common law as it
existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it
perversely gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused
felons than to those accused of misdemeanors. See Powell v.
Alabama, supra at 287 U. S.
60 .

															In Argersinger, the Court rejected arguments that
social cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its
holding, in some part because it thought these arguments were
factually incorrect. 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 37 n.
7. But they were rejected in much larger part because of the
Court's conclusion that incarceration was so severe a sanction that
it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an
indigent Page 440 U. S. 373 defendant had been offered appointed counsel to assist in his
defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a
rule. The Court, in its opinion, repeatedly referred to trials
"where an accused is deprived of his liberty," id. at 407 U. S. 32 ,
and to "a case that actually leads to imprisonment, even for a
brief period," id. at 407 U. S. 33 .
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, in his opinion concurring in the result, also
observed that "any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter." Id. at 407 U. S.
41 .

															Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are
not unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to
appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings. [ Footnote 4 ] Even were the matter res
nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger -- that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment --
is eminently sound, and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as
the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of
counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable,
whereas any extension would create confusion and impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite
diverse States. [ Footnote 5 ] We
therefore hold that the Sixth Page 440 U. S. 374 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. The judgment of the
Supreme Court of Illinois is accordingly Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ] Compare, e.g., Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (CA5
1976); State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d 547, 249 N.W.2d
791 (1977), with Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713
(CA10 1972); Rollins v. State, 299 So. 2d 586 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969). The penalty provision of
the statute, at the time in question, provided in relevant
part:

															"A person first convicted of theft of property not from the
person and not exceeding $150 in value shall be fined not to exceed
$500 or imprisoned in a penal institution other than the
penitentiary not to exceed one year, or both. A person convicted of
such theft a second or subsequent time, or after a prior conviction
of any type of theft, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary from
one to 5 years. . . ."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Brief for Respondent in Argersinger v. Hamlin, O.T.
1971, No. 70-5015, p. 12.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															We note that the line drawn in Argersinger was with
full awareness of the various options. Both the petitioner in that
case and the Legal Aid Society of New York, as amicus
curiae, argued that the right to appointed counsel should
pertain in any case in which imprisonment was an authorized penalty
for the underlying offense. Brief for Petitioner in Argersinger
v. Hamlin, O.T. 1971, No. 70-5015, p. 4; Brief for Legal Aid
Society of New York as Amicus Curiae in Argersinger v.
Hamlin 5-11. Respondent Florida and the amici States
urged that the line be drawn as it had been in Baldwin for
purposes of the jury trial guarantee. See, e.g., Brief for
Respondent in Argersinger v. Hamlin 12. The Solicitor
General argued for .the standard that was finally adopted -- that
of actual imprisonment. Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae in Argersinger v. Hamlin 22-24.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Unfortunately, extensive empirical work has not been done. That
which exists suggests that the requirements of Argersinger have not proved to be unduly burdensome. See, e.g., Ingraham, The Impact of Argersinger -- One Year Later, 8
Law & Soc. Rev. 615 (1974). That some Jurisdictions have had
difficulty implementing Argersinger is certainly not an
argument for extending it. S. Krantz, C Smith, D. Rossman, P. Froyd
& J. Hoffman, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases 1-18
(1976).

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

															For the reasons stated in my opinion in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 , 407 U. S. 44 (1972), I do not think the rule adopted by the Court in that case
is required by the Constitution. Moreover, the drawing of a line
based on whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can
have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in
other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious
consequences. The Argersinger rule also tends to impair
the proper functioning of the criminal justice system in that trial
judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing
anything about the case except the charge, all too often will be
compelled to forgo the legislatively granted option to impose a
sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. Preserving this option by
providing counsel often will be impossible or impracticable --
particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are
heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where
lawyers may not be available.

															Despite my continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule, it was approved by the Court in the 1972
opinion and four Justices have reaffirmed it today. It is important
that this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts
across the country that confront this problem daily. Accordingly,
and mindful of stare decisis, I join the opinion of
the Page 440 U. S. 375 Court. I do so, however, with the hope that, in due time, a
majority will recognize that a more flexible rule is, consistent
with due process and will better serve the cause of justice.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR.
JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (Emphasis supplied.) Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the right includes
the right of the indigent to have counsel provided. Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), held that the right recognized in Gideon extends
to the trial of any offense for which a convicted defendant is
likely to be incarcerated.

															This case presents the question whether the right to counsel
extends to a person accused of an offense that, although punishable
by incarceration, is actually punished only by a fine. Petitioner
Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.,
ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969), an offense punishable by imprisonment for up
to one year or by a fine of up to $500, or by both. About four
months before Argersinger was decided, Scott had a bench
trial, without counsel, and without notice of entitlement to retain
counsel or, if indigent, [ Footnote
2/1 ] to have counsel provided. He was found guilty as charged
and sentenced to pay a $50 fine.

															The Court, in an opinion that, at best, ignores the basic
principles of prior decisions, affirms Scott's conviction
without Page 440 U. S. 376 counsel because he was sentenced only to pay a fine. In my view,
the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment and the Court's precedents
compel the conclusion that Scott's uncounseled conviction violated
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and should be reversed. I The Court's opinion intimates that the Court's precedents
ordaining the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds in
state criminal proceedings fail to provide a principled basis for
deciding this case. That is demonstrably not so. The principles
developed in the relevant precedents are clear and sound. The Court
simply chooses to ignore them. Gideon v. Wainwright held that, because representation
by counsel in a criminal proceeding is "fundamental and essential
to a fair trial," 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 342 ,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment:

															"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that, in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society.
Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed,
who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed Page 440 U. S. 377 fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but
it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him." Id. at 372 U. S.
344 .

															Earlier precedents had recognized that the assistance of
appointed counsel was critical not only to equalize the sides in an
adversary criminal process, [ Footnote
2/2 ] but also to give substance to other constitutional and
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Gideon established
the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds as a
categorical Page 440 U. S. 378 requirement, making the Court's former case-by-case due process
analysis, cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455 (1942), unnecessary in cases covered by its
holding. Gideon involved a felony prosecution, but that
fact was not crucial to the decision; its reasoning extended, in
the words of the Sixth Amendment, to "all criminal prosecutions."
[ Footnote 2/4 ] Argersinger v. Hamlin took a cautious approach toward
implementing the logical consequences of Gideon's rationale. The petitioner in Argersinger had been
sentenced to jail for 90 days after conviction -- at a trial
without counsel -- of carrying a concealed weapon, a Florida
offense carrying an authorized penalty of imprisonment for up to
six months and a fine of up to $1,000. The State, relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S.
66 (1970), urged that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, like the right to jury trial, should not apply to accuseds
charged with "petty" offenses punishable by less than six months'
imprisonment. But Argersinger refused to extend the
"petty" offense limitation to the right to counsel. The Court
pointed out that the limitation was contrary to the express words
of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantee its enumerated rights "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions"; that the right to jury trial was the
only Sixth Amendment right applicable to the States that had been
held inapplicable to "petty offenses"; [ Footnote 2/5 ] that this Page 440 U. S. 379 limitation had been based on historical considerations peculiar
to the right to jury trial; [ Footnote
2/6 ] and that the right to counsel was more fundamentally
related to the fairness of criminal prosecutions than the right to
jury trial, and was, in fact, essential to the meaningful exercise
of other Sixth Amendment protections. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Although its analysis, like that in Gideon and other
earlier cases, suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
should apply to all state criminal prosecutions, Argersinger held only that an indigent defendant is
entitled to appointed counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by
six months of incarceration or less, if he is likely to be
sentenced to incarceration for any time if convicted. The question
of the right to counsel in cases in which incarceration was
authorized but would not be imposed was expressly reserved.
[ Footnote 2/8 ] II In my view, petitioner could prevail in this case without
extending the right to counsel beyond what was assumed to exist in Argersinger. Neither party in that case questioned Page 440 U. S. 380 the existence of the right to counsel in trials involving
"nonpetty" offenses punishable by more than six months in jail.
[ Footnote 2/9 ] The question the
Court addressed was whether the right applied to some "petty"
offenses to which the right to jury trial did not extend. The
Court's reasoning in applying the right to counsel in the case
before it -- that the right to counsel is more fundamental to a
fair proceeding than the right to jury trial and that the
historical limitations on the jury trial right are irrelevant to
the right to counsel -- certainly cannot support a standard for the
right to counsel that is more restrictive than the standard for
granting a right to jury trial. As my Brother POWELL commented in
his opinion concurring in the result in Argersinger, 407
U.S. at 407 U. S.
456 :

															"It is clear that, wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be
drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a right to
appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due process
right to a jury trial." Argersinger thus established a "two dimensional" test
for the right to counsel: the right attaches to any "nonpetty"
offense punishable by more than six months in jail and in addition
to any offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless of
the maximum authorized penalty. See Duke, The Right to
Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 601 (1975).

															The offense of "theft" with which Scott was charged is certainly
not a "petty" one. It is punishable by a sentence of up to one year
in jail. Unlike many traffic or other "regulatory" offenses, it
carries the moral stigma associated with common law crimes
traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravity.
[ Footnote 2/10 ] The State
indicated at oral argument that the Page 440 U. S. 381 services of a professional prosecutor were considered essential
to the prosecution of this offense. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; cf.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 49 (POWELL, J., concurring in result). Likewise, nonindigent
defendants charged with this offense would be well advised to hire
the "best lawyers they can get." [ Footnote 2/11 ] Scott's right to the assistance of
appointed counsel is thus plainly mandated by the logic of the
Court's prior cases, including Argersinger itself. [ Footnote 2/12 ] III But rather than decide consonant with the assumption in regard
to nonpetty offenses that was both implicit and explicit Page 440 U. S. 382 in Argersinger, the Court today retreats to the
indefensible position that the Argersinger "actual
imprisonment" standard is the only test for determining the
boundary of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in state
misdemeanor cases, thus necessarily deciding that, in many cases
(such as this one), a defendant will have no right to appointed
counsel even when he has a constitutional right to a jury trial.
This is simply an intolerable result. Not only is the "actual
imprisonment" standard unprecedented as the exclusive test, but
also the problems inherent in its application demonstrate the
superiority of an "authorized imprisonment" standard that would
require the appointment of counsel for indigents accused of any
offense for which imprisonment for any time is authorized.

															First, the "authorized imprisonment" standard more faithfully
implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment identified in Gideon. The procedural rules established by state statutes
are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for an offense,
not to the actual penalty imposed in particular cases. The
authorized penalty is also a better predictor of the stigma and
other collateral consequences that attach to conviction of an
offense. [ Footnote 2/13 ] With the
exception of Argersinger, authorized penalties have been
used consistently by this Court as the true measures of the
seriousness of offenses. See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 68 -70; Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147 , 395 U. S. 149 (1969); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.
S. 433 (1922). Imprisonment is a sanction particularly
associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses punishable by
imprisonment accordingly possess the characteristics Page 440 U. S. 383 found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel.
By contrast, the "actual imprisonment" standard, as the Court's
opinion in this case demonstrates, denies the right to counsel in
criminal prosecutions to accuseds who suffer the severe
consequences of prosecution other than imprisonment.

															Second, the "authorized imprisonment" test presents no problems
of administration. It avoids the necessity for time-consuming
consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case before
trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal
treatment, and apparent and actual bias. These problems with the
"actual imprisonment" standard were suggested in my Brother
POWELL's concurrence in Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 555 ,
which was echoed in scholarly criticism of that decision. [ Footnote 2/14 ] Petitioner emphasizes
these defects, arguing with considerable force that implementation
of the "actual imprisonment" standard must assuredly lead to
violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner 47-59.

															Finally, the "authorized imprisonment" test ensures that courts
will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the appropriate
range of penalties to be considered for each offense. Under the
"actual imprisonment" standard,

															"[t]he judge will . . . be forced to decide in advance of trial
-- and without hearing the evidence -- whether he will forgo
entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sentence of
imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to consider the full
range of punishments established by the legislature. His
alternatives, assuming the availability Page 440 U. S. 384 of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the discretion
vested in him by law, or to abandon this discretion in advance and
proceed without counsel." Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 407 U. S. 53 (POWELL, J., concurring in result). The "authorized imprisonment"
standard, on the other hand, respects the allocation of functions
between legislatures and courts in the administration of the
criminal justice system.

															The apparent reason for the Court's adoption of the "actual
imprisonment" standard for all misdemeanors is concern for the
economic burden that an "authorized imprisonment" standard might
place on the States. But, with all respect, that concern is both
irrelevant and speculative.

															This Court's role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary
decisions of state governments. A unanimous Court made that clear
in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 , 404 U. S.
196 -197 (1971), in rejecting a proposed fiscal
justification for providing free transcripts for appeals only when
the appellant was subject to imprisonment:

															"This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin [v.
Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956)]. . . . Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of
the accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat
prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective
an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own
way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when
criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is
not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed.
The State's fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant. [ Footnote 2/15 ]"

															In any event, the extent of the alleged burden on the States is,
as the Court admits, ante at 440 U. S.
373 -374, n. 5, speculative. Although Page 440 U. S. 385 more persons are charged with misdemeanors punishable by
incarceration than are charged with felonies, a smaller percentage
of persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as indigent, and
misdemeanor cases, as a rule, require far less attorney time.
[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economically
feasible, and the establishment of such systems to replace
appointment of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable
levels even when the number of cases requiring appointment of
counsel increases dramatically. [ Footnote 2/17 ] The public defender system alternative
also answers the argument that an "authorized imprisonment"
standard would clog the courts with inexperienced appointed
counsel.

															Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent's alarmist
prophecies that an "authorized imprisonment" standard would wreak
havoc on the States is that the standard has not produced that
result in the substantial number of States that already provide
counsel in all cases where imprisonment is Page 440 U. S. 386 authorized -- States that include a large majority of the
country's population and a great diversity of urban and rural
environments. [ Footnote 2/18 ]
Moreover, of those States that do not yet Page 440 U. S. 387 provide counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is
authorized, many provide counsel when periods of imprisonment
longer than 30 days, [ Footnote
2/19 ] 3 months, [ Footnote
2/20 ] or 6 months [ Footnote
2/21 ] are authorized. Page 440 U. S. 388 In fact, Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel under the
current laws of at least 33 States. [ Footnote 2/22 ]

															It may well be that adoption by this Court of an "authorized
imprisonment" standard would lead state and local governments to
reexamine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local
government might determine that it no longer desired to authorize
incarceration for certain minor offenses in light of the expense of
meeting the requirements of the Constitution. In my view, this
reexamination is long overdue. [ Footnote 2/23 ] In any Page 440 U. S. 389 event, the Court's "actual imprisonment" standard must
inevitably lead the courts to make this reexamination, which
plainly should more properly be a legislative responsibility. IV The Court's opinion turns the reasoning of Argersinger on its head. It restricts the right to counsel, perhaps the most
fundamental Sixth Amendment right, [ Footnote 2/24 ] more narrowly than the admittedly less
fundamental right to jury trial. [ Footnote 2/25 ] The abstract pretext that

															"constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach
of the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to
transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to
another," ante at 440 U. S. 372 ,
cannot camouflage the anomalous result the Court reaches. Today's
decision reminds one of Mr. Justice Black's description of Betts v. Brady: "an anachronism when handed down" that
"ma[kes] an abrupt break with its own well considered precedents." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 345 , 372 U. S.
344 .

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Scott was found to be indigent at the time of his initial
appeal, and an attorney was therefore appointed for him and he was
provided a free transcript of his trial for use on the appeal. The
Illinois courts and the parties have assumed his indigency at the
time of trial for purposes of this case. See 68 Ill. 2d
269 , 270-272, 369 N.E.2d
881 , 881-882 (1977); 36 Ill.App.3d 304, 307-308, 343 N.E.2d
517, 520 (1976).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															"[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That
which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the
untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 304 U. S.
462 -463 (1938) .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at eery step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 669
(1932).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S.
25 , 407 U. S. 31 (1972).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															"'It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that
the trial of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without
notice to the accused of the charges, or that, in such cases, the
defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf.'" Id. at 407 U. S. 28 ,
quoting Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43
Wash.L.Rev. 685, 705 (1968). Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967)
(right to compulsory process of witnesses); Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U. S. 505 (1971) (right to an impartial jury).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"While there is historical support for limiting the 'deep
commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal cases,' there is
no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance
of counsel. . . ."

															" * * * *" "The Sixth Amendment . . . extended the right to counsel beyond
its common law dimensions. But there is nothing in the language of
the Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of this Court to
indicate that it was intended to embody a retraction of the right
in petty offenses wherein the common law previously did require
that counsel be provided." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 30 (footnote and citations omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] Id. at 407 U. S. 31 ; see supra at 440 U. S. 377 ,
and n. 3.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															"MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that these problems [requiring the
presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial] are raised
even in situations where there is no prospect of imprisonment. . .
. We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved,
however, for here petitioner was, in fact, sentenced to jail."

															407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
37 .

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See, e.g., id. at 407 U. S. 27 , 407 U. S. 30 -31, 407 U. S. 36 ,
and n. 5; id. at 407 U. S. 45 ,
and n. 2, 407 U. S. 63 (POWELL, J., concurring in result).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															Because a theft conviction implies dishonesty, it may be a basis
for impeaching petitioner's testimony in a court proceeding. People v. Stufflebean, 24 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1068-1169, 322
N.E.2d 488, 491-492 (1974). Because jurors must be of "fair
character" and "approved integrity," Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 78, § 2
(1975), petitioner may be excluded from jury duty as a result of
his theft conviction. Twelve occupations licensed under Illinois
law and 23 occupations licensed under city of Chicago ordinances
require the license applicant to have "good moral character" or
some equivalent background qualification that could be found
unsatisfied because of a theft conviction. See Chicago
Council of Lawyers, Study of Licensing Restrictions on Ex-Offenders
in the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois 8, A-17 (1975).
Under federal law petitioner's theft conviction would bar him from
working in any capacity in a bank insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 12 U.S.C. § 1829, or possibly in any public
or private employment requiring a security clearance. 32 CFR §§
1555 (h) and (i), and 156.7(b)(1)(iii) (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ] Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 , 372 U. S. 344 (1963); see Junker, supra, 440
U.S. 367 fn2/5|>n. 5, at 713-714.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															My Brother POWELL's concurrence in Argersinger, 407
U.S. at 407 U. S. 44 ,
joined by my Brother REHNQUIST, also supports petitioner's right to
appointed counsel in this case. The concurrence explicitly stated
that the right to counsel should extend at least as far as the
right to jury trial, id. at 407 U. S. 45 -46,
and its preference for a case-by-case approach was repeatedly
limited to "petty" offenses. See, e.g., id. at 407 U. S. 45 ,
and n. 2, 407 U. S. 47 , 407 U. S. 63 .
Even in petty offenses, the Argersinger concurrence would
have mandated the following procedures:

															"The determination [whether counsel must be appointed] should be
made before the accused formally pleads; many petty cases are
resolved by guilty pleas in which the assistance of counsel may be
required. If the trial court should conclude that the assistance of
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its reasons so
that the issue could be preserved for review." Id. at 407 U. S.
63 .

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] See 440
U.S. 367 fn2/10|>n. 10, supra. The scope of
collateral consequences that would be constitutionally permissible
under the "actual imprisonment" standard remains unsettled, and
this uncertainty is another source of confusion generated by this
standard. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-37; United
States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390 (CA8 1976); Note, Argersinger v. Hamlin and the Collateral Use of Prior
Misdemeanor Convictions of Indigents Unrepresented by Counsel at
Trial, 35 Ohio St.L.J. 168 (1974).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ] See, e.g., S. Krantz, C. Smith, D. Rossman, P. Froyd
& J. Hoffman, Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Mandate
of Argersinger v. Hamlin 69-117 (1976); Duke, The Right to
Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 601 (1975).

															The case-by-case approach advocated by my Brother POWELL in Argersinger has also been criticized as unworkable because
of the administrative burden it would impose. See, e.g., Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 321(b), Comment, 10
U.L.A. 69 (1974).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ] See also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.
S. 817 , 430 U. S. 825 (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/16 ] See Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 321(b),
Comment, 10 U.L.A. 70 (1974) (estimates that only 10% of
misdemeanor defendants, as opposed to 60%-65% of felony defendants,
meet the necessary indigency standard); National Legal Aid and
Defender Assn., The Other Face of Justice, Note I, pp. 82-83 (1973)
(survey indicates national average is 65% indigency in felony cases
and only 47% in misdemeanor cases).

															The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals adopted a maximum caseload standard of 150 felony cases
or 400 misdemeanor cases per attorney per year. National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Courts,
Standard 13.12, pp. 276-277 (1973). See also The Other
Face of Justice, supra, Table 109, p. 73.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															A study conducted in the State of Wisconsin, which introduced a
State Public Defender System after the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d 547, 249 N.W.2d
791 (1977), extended the right to counsel in the way urged by
petitioner in this case, indicated that the average cost of
providing counsel in a misdemeanor case was reduced from $150-$200
to $90 by using a public defender, rather than appointing private
counsel. Brief for National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. as Amicus Curiae 10-12.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ] See, e.g., Alaska: Alaska Const., Art. 1, § 11; Alaska
Stat.Ann. § 18.85.100 (1974) (any offense punishable by
incarceration; or which may result in loss of valuable license or
heavy fine); Alexander v. Anchorage, 490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971); Arizona: Ariz.Rule Crim. Proc. 6.1(b) (any criminal
proceedings which may result in punishment by loss of liberty; or
where the court concludes that the interest of justice so
requires); California: Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 987 (West Supp. 1978)
(all criminal cases); Connecticut: Conn.Gen. Stat. §§ 51-296(a),
51-297(f) (1979) (all criminal actions); Delaware: Del. Code Ann.,
Tit. 29, § 4602 (1974) (all indigents under arrest or charged with
crime if defendant requests or court orders); Hawaii: Haw.Rev.Stat.
§ 802-1 (1976) (any offense punishable by confinement in jail);
Indiana: Ind.Const., Art. I, § 13 (all criminal prosecutions); Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d
250 (1951); Kentucky: Ky.Rule Crim. Proc. 8.04 (offenses
punishable by a fine of more than $500 or by imprisonment);
Louisiana: La.Code Crim.Proc., Art. 513 (West Supp. 1978) (offenses
punishable by imprisonment); Massachusetts: Mass.Sup.Jud.Ct.Rule
3:10 (any crime for which sentence of imprisonment may be imposed);
Minnesota: Minn.Stat. §§ 609.02, 611.14 (1978) (felonies and "gross
misdemeanors"; statute defines "petty" misdemeanors as those not
punishable by imprisonment or fine over $100); New Hampshire:
N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 604-A:2, 625:9 (1974 and Supp. 1977) (offenses
punishable by imprisonment); New Mexico: N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-22A-12
(Supp. 1975) (offense carrying a possible sentence of
imprisonment); New York: N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 170.10(3) (McKinney
1971) (all misdemeanors except traffic violations); People v.
Weinstock, 80 Misc.2d 510, 363 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1974) (traffic
violations subject to possible imprisonment); Oklahoma: Okla.Stat.,
Tit. 22, § 464 (1969) (all criminal cases); Stewart v.
State, 495
P.2d 834 (Crim.App. 1972); Oregon: Brown v. Multnoma County
Dist. Ct., 29 Ore.App. 917, 566 P.2d
522 (1977) (all criminal cases); South Dakota: S.D.Comp.Laws
Ann. § 23-2-1 (Supp. 1978) (any criminal action); Tennessee:
Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-2002, 40-2003 (1975) (persons accused of any
crime or misdemeanor whatsoever); Texas: Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann.,
Art. 26.04 (Vernon 1966) (any felony or misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment); Virginia: Va.Code §§ 19.2-157, 19.2-160 (Supp. 1978)
(misdemeanors the penalty for which may be confinement in jail);
Washington: Wash.Justice Court Crim.Rule 2.11(a)(1) (all criminal
offenss punishable by loss of liberty); West Virginia: W.Va.Code §
621a (1977) (persons under indictment for a crime); Wisconsin:
Wis.Const., Art. I, § 7; State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis.2d 547, 249 N.W.2d
791 (1977) (all offenses punishable by incarceration).

															Respondent claims that the statutes and case law in some of
these States "need not be read as requiring appointment of counsel
for all imprisonable cases." Brief for Respondent 33 n. 28.
Although the law is not unambiguous in every case, ambiguities in
the laws of other States suggest that the list is perhaps too
short, or at least that other States provide counsel in all but the
most trivial offenses. E.g., Colorado: Colo.Rev.Stat. §
21-1-103 (1973) (all misdemeanors and all municipal code violations
at the discretion of the public defender); Georgia: Ga.Code §
27-3203 (1978) (any violation of a state law or local ordinance
which may result in incarceration); Missouri: Mo.Op.Atty.Gen. No.
207 (1963) (counsel should be appointed in misdemeanor cases of
"more than minor significance" and "when prejudice might result");
Montana: Mont. Rev.Codes Ann. § 95-1001 (1969) (court may assign
counsel in misdemeanors "in the interest of justice"); Nevada:
Nev.Rev.Stat. § 178.397 (1977) (persons accused of "gross
misdemeanors" or felonies); New Jersey: N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A: 158A-2
(West 1971); N.J.Crim. Rule 3:27-1 (any offense which is
indictable); Pennsylvania: Pa.Rules Crim.Proc. 316(a)-(c) (in all
but "summary cases"); Wyoming: Wyo.Stat. §§ 7-1-110(a) (entitled to
appointed counsel in "serious crimes"), 7-1108(a)(v) (serious
crimes are those for which incarceration is a "practical
possibility"), 7-9-105 (all cases where accused shall or may be
punished by imprisonment in penitentiary) (1977).

															In addition, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi were
until today covered by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the
"authorized imprisonment" standard. See Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (CA5 1976); Thomas v. Savage, 513 F.2d 536
(CA5 1975).

															Several States that have not adopted the "authorized
imprisonment" standard give courts discretionary authority to
appoint counsel in cases where it is perceived to be necessary
( e.g., Maryland, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania).

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Iowa: Iowa Rules Crim. Proc. 2, § 3; 42, § 3.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ]

															Maryland: Md.Ann.Code, Art. 27A, §§ 2(f) and (h), 4 (1976);
Mississippi: Miss.Code Ann. § 99-15-15 (1972).

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															Idaho: Idaho Code § 19-851 (Supp. 1978); Mahler v.
Birnbaum, 95 Idaho 14, 501 P.2d 282 (1972); Maine: Newell
v. State, 277 A.2d
731 (1971); Ohio: Ohio Rules Crim.Proc. 2, 44(A) and (b); Rhode
Island: R.I.Rule Crim. Proc. 44 (Super.Ct.); R.I.Rule Crim. Proc.
44 (Dist. Ct.); State v. Holliday, 109 R.I. 93, 280
A.2d 333 (1971); Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (1978); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 520 P.2d 211 (1974).

															[ Footnote 2/22 ] See nn. 440
U.S. 367 fn2/18|>18-21, supra. The actual figure may
be closer to 40 States. The following States appear to be governed
only by the "likelihood of imprisonment" standard: Arkansas:
Ark.Rule Crim.Proc. 8.2(b) (all criminal offenses except in
misdemeanor cases where court determines that under no
circumstances will conviction result in imprisonment); Florida:
Fla.Rule Crim.Proc. 3.111(b) (any misdemeanor or municipal
ordinance violation unless prior written statement by judge that
conviction will not result in imprisonment); North Carolina:
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7A-451(a) (Supp. 1977) (any case in which
imprisonment or a fine of $500 or more is likely to be adjudged);
North Dakota: N.D.Rule Crim.Proc. 44 (all nonfelony cases unless
magistrate determines that sentence upon conviction will not
include imprisonment); Vermont: Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, §§ 5201,
5231 (1974 and Supp. 1977) (any misdemeanor punishable by any
period of imprisonment or fine over $1,000 unless prior
determination that imprisonment or fine over $1,000 will not be
imposed). Two States require appointment of counsel for indigents
in cases where it is "constitutionally required": Alabama: Ala.Code
§§ 15-12-1, 15-12-20 (1975); South Carolina: S.C.Code § 17-3-10
(Supp. 1977). Some States require counsel in misdemeanor cases only
by virtue of judicial decisions reacting to Argersinger: Kansas: State v. Giddings, 216 Kan. 14, 531 P.2d 445 (1975); Michigan: People v. Studaker, 387 Mich. 698, 199 N.W.2d
177 (1972); People v. Harris, 45 Mich. App. 217, 206
N.W.2d 478 (1973); Nebraska: Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d
761 (1975).

															[ Footnote 2/23 ] See, e.g., Krantz et al., supra, 440
U.S. 367 fn2/14|>n. 14, at 445-606.

															[ Footnote 2/24 ]

															"In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right
more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333 , 435 U. S. 341 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/25 ]

															"[T]he interest protected by the right to have guilt or
innocence determined by a jury -- tempering the possibly arbitrary
and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial power -- while
important, is not as fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial
as is the right to counsel." Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 46 (POWELL, J., concurring in result) (footnotes omitted).

															MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

															For substantially the reasons stated by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN in
Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, I would hold that the
right to counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those
Amendments. Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in
a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever
the defendant is prosecuted Page 440 U. S. 390 for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more
than six months' imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S.
66 (1970), or whenever the defendant is convicted of an
offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).

															This resolution, I feel, would provide the "bright line" that
defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve
and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the
important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan,
Baldwin, and Argersinger. On this approach, of course, the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott's conviction should be
reversed, since he was convicted of an offense for which he was
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. I therefore dissent.

Summary: In the case of Scott v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court ruled that indigent criminal defendants have the right to appointed counsel if they face a term of imprisonment, but this right does not extend to cases where imprisonment is authorized but not imposed as a penalty. The Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision, upholding the conviction of a petitioner who was fined for shoplifting but not imprisoned.