U.S. Supreme Court Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984) Allen v. Wright No. 81-757 Argued February 29,
1984 Decided July 3, 1984 468
U.S. 737 ast|>* 468
U.S. 737 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denies tax-exempt status
under the Internal Revenue Code -- and hence eligibility to receive
charitable contributions deductible from income taxes under the
Code -- to racially discriminatory private schools, and has
established guidelines and procedures for determining whether a
particular school is in fact racially nondiscriminatory.
Respondents, parents of black children who were attending public
schools in seven States in school districts undergoing
desegregation, brought a nationwide class action in Federal
District Court against petitioner Government officials (petitioner
Allen, the head of a private school identified in the complaint,
intervened as a defendant), alleging that the IRS has not adopted
sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to
deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools,
and has thereby harmed respondents directly and interfered with
their children's opportunity to receive an education in
desegregated public schools. Respondents also alleged that many
racially segregated private schools were created or expanded in
their communities at the time the public schools were undergoing
desegregation, and had received tax exemptions despite the IRS
policy and guidelines; and that these unlawful tax exemptions
harmed respondents in that they constituted tangible financial aid
for racially segregated educational institutions and encouraged the
organization and expansion of institutions that provided segregated
educational opportunities for white students avoiding attendance in
the public schools. Respondents did not allege that their children
had ever applied or would ever apply for admission to any private
school. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District
Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents lacked
standing to bring the suit. The Court of Appeals reversed. Held: Respondents do not have standing to bring this
suit. Pp. 468 U. S.
750 -766.

															(a) The "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III of the
Constitution defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea
of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded,
and the Art. III Page 468 U. S. 738 doctrine of "standing" has a core constitutional component that
a plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed
by the requested relief. The concepts of standing doctrine present
questions that must be answered by reference to the Art. III notion
that federal courts may exercise power only in the last resort and
as a necessity, and only when adjudication is consistent with a
system of separated powers and the dispute is one traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.
Pp. 468 U. S.
750 -752.

															(b) Respondents' claim that they are harmed directly by the mere
fact of Government financial aid to discriminatory private schools
fails because it does not constitute judicially cognizable injury.
Insofar as the claim may be interpreted as one simply to have the
Government avoid the alleged violation of law in granting the tax
exemptions, an asserted right to have the Government act in
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer
jurisdiction on a federal court. Nor do respondents have standing
to litigate their claim based on the stigmatizing injury often
caused by racial discrimination. Such injury accords a basis for
standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal
treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct, and respondents
do not allege a stigmatic injury suffered as a direct result of
having personally been denied equal treatment. Pp. 468 U. S.
753 -756.

															(c) Respondents' claim of injury as to their children's
diminished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated
school because of the federal tax exemptions granted to some
racially discriminatory private schools -- though a judicially
cognizable injury -- fails because the alleged injury is not fairly
traceable to the Government conduct that is challenged as unlawful.
Respondents have not alleged that there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in
respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make
an appreciable difference in public school integration. Moreover,
it is entirely speculative whether withdrawal of a particular
school's tax exemption would lead the school to change its
policies; whether any given parent of a child attending such a
private school would decide to transfer the child to public school
as a result of any changes in policy of a private school threatened
with loss of tax-exempt status; or whether, in a particular
community, a large enough number of school officials and parents
would reach decisions that collectively would have a significant
impact on the racial composition of the public schools. To
recognize respondents' standing to seek a restructuring of the
apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal
duties would run afoul of the idea of separation of powers that
underlies standing doctrine. The Page 468 U. S. 739 Constitution assigns to the Executive Branch, not to the
Judicial Branch, the duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. Pp. 468 U. S.
756 -761.

															(d) None of the cases relied on by the Court of Appeals and by
respondents to establish standing -- Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 ; Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 ; and Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997, summarily aff'g Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 115 -- requires a finding of standing
here. Pp. 468 U. S.
761 -766.

															211 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 656 F.2d 820, reversed.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 468 U. S. 766 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J.,
joined, post, p. 468 U. S. 783 .
MARSHALL, J., took no part in the decision of the cases.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Parents of black public school children allege in this
nationwide class action that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its
obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools. They assert that the IRS thereby harms them
directly and interferes with the ability of their Page 468 U. S. 740 children to receive an education in desegregated public schools.
The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring
this suit. We hold that they do not. I The IRS denies tax-exempt status under §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) -- and
hence eligibility to receive charitable contributions deductible
from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the Code, 26
U.S.C. §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) -- to racially discriminatory
private schools. Rev.Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230. [ Footnote 1 ] The IRS policy requires
that a school applying for tax-exempt status show that it

															"admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges,
programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to
students at that school and that the school does not discriminate
on the basis of race in administration of its educational policies,
admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and athletic
and other school-administered programs." Ibid. To carry out this policy, the IRS has established
guidelines and procedures for determining whether a particular
school is in fact racially nondiscriminatory. Rev.Proc. 75-50,
1975-2 Cum.Bull. 587. [ Footnote
2 ] Failure to comply with the guidelines "will ordinarily
result in the proposed revocation of" tax-exempt status. Id. § 4.08, p. 589. Page 468 U. S. 741 The guidelines provide that

															"[a] school must show affirmatively both that it has adopted a
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made known
to the general public and that since the adoption of that policy it
has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance therewith." Id. § 2.02. [ Footnote
3 ] The school must state its nondiscrimination policy in its
organizational charter, id. § 4.01. pp. 587-588, and in
all of its brochures, catalogs, and other advertisements to
prospective students, id. § 4.02, p. 588. The school must
make its nondiscrimination policy known to the entire community
served by the school, and must publicly disavow any contrary
representations made on its behalf once it becomes aware of them. Id. § 4.03. [ Footnote
4 ] The school must have nondiscriminatory Page 468 U. S. 742 policies concerning all programs and facilities, id. §
4.04, p. 589, including scholarships and loans, id. §
4.05, [ Footnote 5 ] and the
school must annually certify, under penalty of perjury, compliance
with these requirements, id. § 4.07. [ Footnote 6 ] The IRS rules require a school
applying for tax-exempt status to give a breakdown along racial
lines of its student body and its faculty and administrative staff, id. § 5.01-1, as well as of scholarships and loans
awarded, id. § 5.01-2. They also require the applicant
school to state the year of its organization, id. §
5.01-5, and to list "incorporators, founders, board members, and
donors of land or buildings," id. § 5.01-3, and state
whether any of the organizations among these have an objective of
maintaining segregated public or private school education, id. § 5.01-4. The rules further provide that, once given
an exemption, a school must keep specified records to document the
extent of compliance with the IRS guidelines. Id. § 7, p.
590. [ Footnote 7 ] Finally,
the Page 468 U. S. 743 rules announce that any information concerning discrimination at
a tax-exempt school is officially welcomed. Id. § 6.
[ Footnote 8 ]

															In 1976, respondents challenged these guidelines and procedures
in a suit filed in Federal District Court against the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. [ Footnote 9 ] The plaintiffs named in the
complaint are parents of black children who, at the time the
complaint was filed, were attending public schools in seven States
in school districts undergoing desegregation. They brought this
nationwide class action

															"on behalf of themselves and their children, and . . . on behalf
of all other parents of black children attending public school
systems undergoing, or which may in the future undergo,
desegregation pursuant to court order [or] HEW regulations and
guidelines, under state law, or voluntarily."

															App. 22-23. They estimated that the class they seek to represent
includes several million persons. Id. at 23.

															Respondents allege in their complaint that many racially
segregated private schools were created or expanded in their Page 468 U. S. 744 communities at the time the public schools were undergoing
desegregation. Id. at 23-24. According to the complaint,
many such private schools, including 17 schools or school systems
identified by name in the complaint (perhaps some 30 schools in
all), receive tax exemptions either directly or through the
tax-exempt status of "umbrella" organizations that operate or
support the schools. Id. at 23-38. [ Footnote 10 ] Respondents allege that, despite
the IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools, and despite the IRS guidelines and
procedures for implementing that policy, some of the tax-exempt
racially segregated private schools created or expanded in
desegregating districts in fact have racially discriminatory
policies. Id. at 17-18 (IRS permits "schools to receive
tax exemptions merely on the basis of adopting and certifying --
but not implementing -- a policy of nondiscrimination"); id. at 25 (same). [ Footnote 11 ] Respondents Page 468 U. S. 745 allege that the IRS grant of tax exemptions to such racially
discriminatory schools is unlawful. [ Footnote 12 ]

															Respondents allege that the challenged Government conduct harms
them in two ways. The challenged conduct

															"(a) constitutes tangible federal financial aid and other
support for racially segregated educational institutions, and"

															"(b) fosters and encourages the organization, operation and
expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in
desegregating public school districts, and thereby interferes with
the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to
desegregate public school districts which have been operating
racially dual school systems." Id. at 38-39. Page 468 U. S. 746 Thus, respondents do not allege that their children have been
the victims of discriminatory exclusion from the schools whose tax
exemptions they challenge as unlawful. Indeed, they have not
alleged at any stage of this litigation that their children have
ever applied or would ever apply to any private school. See
Wright v. Regan, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 238, 656 F.2d 820, 827
(1981) ("Plaintiffs . . . maintain they have no interest whatever
in enrolling their children in a private school"). Rather,
respondents claim a direct injury from the mere fact of the
challenged Government conduct and, as indicated by the restriction
of the plaintiff class to parents of children in desegregating
school districts, injury to their children's opportunity to receive
a desegregated education. [ Footnote 13 ] The latter injury is traceable to the IRS
grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools,
respondents allege, chiefly because contributions to such schools
are deductible from income taxes under §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code and the

															"deductions facilitate the raising of finds to organize new
schools and expand existing schools in order to accommodate white
students avoiding attendance in desegregating public school
districts."

															App. 24. [ Footnote
14 ]

															Respondents request only prospective relief. Id. at
40-41. They ask for a declaratory judgment that the challenged IRS
tax-exemption practices are unlawful. They also Page 468 U. S. 747 ask for an injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions
to a considerably broader class of private schools than the class
of racially discriminatory private schools. Under the requested
injunction, the IRS would have to deny tax-exempt status to all
private schools

															"which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments,
which are located in or serve desegregating public school
districts, and which either -- "

															"(1) were established or expanded at or about the time the
public school districts in which they are located or which they
serve were desegregating;"

															"(2) have been determined in adversary judicial or
administrative proceedings to be racially segregated; or"

															"(3) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially
segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding
attendance in desegregating public school systems. . . ." Id. at 40. Finally, respondents ask for an order
directing the IRS to replace its 1975 guidelines with standards
consistent with the requested injunction.

															In May, 1977 the District Court permitted intervention as a
defendant by petitioner Allen, the head of one of the private
school systems identified in the complaint. Id. at 54-55.
Thereafter, progress in the lawsuit was stalled for several years.
During this period, the IRS reviewed its challenged policies and
proposed new Revenue Procedures to tighten requirements for
eligibility for tax-exempt status for private schools. See 43 Fed.Reg. 37296 (1978); 44 Fed.Reg. 9451 (1979). [ Footnote 15 ] In 1979, however, Congress
blocked any strengthening Page 468 U. S. 748 of the IRS guidelines at least until October, 1980. [ Footnote 16 ] The District Court
thereupon considered and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint, concluding that respondents lack standing, that the
judicial task proposed by respondents is inappropriately intrusive
for a federal court, and that awarding the requested relief would
be contrary to the will of Congress expressed in the 1979 ban on
strengthening IRS guidelines. Wright v.
Miller, 480 F.
Supp. 790 (DC 1979).

															The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, concluding that respondents have standing to
maintain this lawsuit. The court acknowledged that Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26 (1976),

															"suggests that litigation concerning tax liability is a matter
between taxpayer and IRS, with the door Page 468 U. S. 749 barely ajar for third party challenges."

															211 U.S.App.D.C. at 239, 656 F.2d at 828. The court concluded,
however, that the Simon case is inapposite, because
respondents claim no injury dependent on taxpayers' actions:
"[t]hey claim indifference as to the course private schools would
take." Id. at 240, 656 F.2d at 829. [ Footnote 17 ] Instead, the court observed,

															"[t]he sole injury [respondents] claim is the denigration they
suffer as black parents and schoolchildren when their government
graces with tax-exempt status educational institutions in their
communities that treat members of their race as persons of lesser
worth." Id. at 238, 656 F.2d at 827. The court held this
denigration injury enough to give respondents standing, since it
was this injury which supported standing in Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), summarily aff'g Green v.
Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.
S. 455 (1973); and Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 (1974). 211 U.S.App.D.C. at 239-243, 656 F.2d at 828-832. The Court
of Appeals also held that the 1979 congressional actions were not
intended to preclude judicial remedies, and that the relief
requested by respondents could be fashioned "without large-scale
judicial intervention in the administrative process," id. at 248, 656 F.2d at 837. [ Footnote 18 ] The court accordingly remanded the case to
the District Court for further proceedings, enjoining the
defendants meanwhile from granting tax-exempt status to any
racially discriminatory school, App. 81-84. Page 468 U. S. 750 The Government defendants and defendant-intervenor Allen filed
separate petitions for a writ of certiorari in this Court. They
both sought review of the Court of Appeals' holding that
respondents have standing to bring this lawsuit. We granted
certiorari, 462 U.S. 1130 (1983), and now reverse. II A Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to
adjudicating actual "cases" and "controversies." As the Court
explained in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.
S. 464 , 454 U. S.
471 -476 (1982), the "case or controversy" requirement
defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation
of powers on which the Federal Government is founded. The several
doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are
"founded in concern about the proper -- and properly limited --
role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 498 (1975).

															"All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III -- not only
standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like
-- relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an
idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to
the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind
of government." Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 226 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 26-27, 699
F.2d 1166, 1178-1179 (1983) (Bork, J., concurring). The
case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on federal
judicial power in our system of government.

															The Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have
"standing" to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the
most important of these doctrines.

															"In essence, the question of standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the Page 468 U. S. 751 court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues." Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 422 U. S. 498 .
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits
on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general
prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights,
the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the
requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked. See Valley Forge,
supra, at 454 U. S.
474 -475. The requirement of standing, however, has a
core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff
must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. 454 U.S. at 454 U. S.
472 .

															Like the prudential component, the constitutional component of
standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible
of precise definition. The injury alleged must be, for example,
" distinct and palpable,'" Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 , 441 U. S. 100 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, supra, at 422 U. S.
501 ), and not "abstract" or "conjectural" or
"hypothetical," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S.
95 , 461 U. S.
101 -102 (1983); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 , 414 U. S. 494 (1974). The injury must be "fairly" traceable to the challenged
action, and relief from the injury must be "likely" to follow from
a favorable decision. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 38 , 426 U. S. 41 .
These terms cannot be defined so as to make application of the
constitutional standing requirement a mechanical exercise. The absence of precise definitions, however, as this Court's
extensive body of case law on standing illustrates, see
generally Valley Forge, supra, at 454 U. S.
471 -476, hardly leaves courts at sea in applying the law
of standing. Like most legal notions, the standing concepts have
gained considerable definition from developing case law. In many
cases, the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing
the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior
standing Page 468 U. S. 752 cases. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, supra, at 461 U. S.
102 -105. More important, the law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea -- the idea of separation of powers.
It is this fact which makes possible the gradual clarification of
the law through judicial application. Of course, both federal and
state courts have long experience in applying and elaborating in
numerous contexts the pervasive and fundamental notion of
separation of powers.

															Determining standing in a particular case may be facilitated by
clarifying principles or even clear rules developed in prior cases.
Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires careful judicial
examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the
particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted. Is the injury too abstract, or
otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable?
Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too
attenuated? Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as
a result of a favorable ruling too speculative? These questions and
any others relevant to the standing inquiry must be answered by
reference to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise
power only "in the last resort, and as a necessity," Chicago
& Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.
S. 339 , 143 U. S. 345 (1892), and only when adjudication is

															"consistent with a system of separated powers and [the dispute
is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through
the judicial process," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S. 97 (1968). See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S.
472 -473. B Respondents allege two injuries in their complaint to support
their standing to bring this lawsuit. First, they say that they are
harmed directly by the mere fact of Government financial aid to
discriminatory private schools. Second, they say that the federal
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in their
communities impair Page 468 U. S. 753 their ability to have their public schools desegregated. See
supra at 468 U. S.
745 .

															In the Court of Appeals, respondents apparently relied on the
first injury. Thus, the court below asserted that "[t]he sole
injury [respondents] claim is the denigration they suffer" as a
result of the tax exemptions. 211 U.S.App.D.C. at 238, 656 F.2d at
827. In this Court, respondents have not focused on this claim of
injury. Here they stress the effect of the tax exemptions on their
"equal educational opportunities," see, e.g., Brief for
Respondents 12, 14, renewing reliance on the second injury
described in their complaint.

															Because respondents have not clearly disclaimed reliance on
either of the injuries described in their complaint, we address
both allegations of injury. We conclude that neither suffices to
support respondents' standing. The first fails under clear
precedents of this Court because it does not constitute judicially
cognizable injury. The second fails because the alleged injury is
not fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS.
[ Footnote 19 ] 1 Respondents' first claim of injury can be interpreted in two
ways. It might be a claim simply to have the Government Page 468 U. S. 754 avoid the violation of law alleged in respondents' complaint.
Alternatively, it might be a claim of stigmatic injury, or
denigration, suffered by all members of a racial group when the
Government discriminates on the basis of race. [ Footnote 20 ] Under neither interpretation
is this claim of injury judicially cognizable.

															This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have
the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient,
standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 (1974), for example, the Court rejected a claim of citizen standing
to challenge Armed Forces Reserve commissions held by Members of
Congress as violating the Incompatibility Clause of Art. I, § 6, of
the Constitution. As citizens, the Court held, plaintiffs alleged
nothing but "the abstract injury in nonobservance of the
Constitution. . . ." Id. at 418 U. S. 223 ,
n. 13. More recently, in Valley Forge, supra, we rejected
a claim of standing to challenge a Government conveyance of
property to a religious institution. Insofar as the plaintiffs
relied simply on " their shared individuated right'" to a
Government that made no law respecting an establishment of
religion, id. at 454 U. S. 482 (quoting Americans United v. U.S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F.2d
252, 261 (CA3 1980)), we held that plaintiffs had not alleged a
judicially cognizable injury. "[A]ssertion of a right to a particular kind of Government
conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently,
cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining
those requirements of meaning."

															454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 483 . See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.
S. 166 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S.
1 (1972); Page 468 U. S. 755 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). Respondents here
have no standing to complain simply that their Government is
violating the law.

															Neither do they have standing to litigate their claims based on
the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination.
There can be no doubt that this sort of noneconomic injury is one
of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government
action, and is sufficient in some circumstances to support
standing. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.
S. 728 , 465 U. S.
739 -740 (1984). Our cases make clear, however, that such
injury accords a basis for standing only to "those persons who are
personally denied equal treatment" by the challenged discriminatory
conduct, ibid. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.
S. 163 (1972), the Court held that the plaintiff had no
standing to challenge a club's racially discriminatory membership
policies, because he had never applied for membership. Id. at 407 U. S.
166 -167. In O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 (1974), the Court held that the plaintiffs had no
standing to challenge racial discrimination in the administration
of their city's criminal justice system, because they had not
alleged that they had been, or would likely be, subject to the
challenged practices. The Court denied standing on similar facts in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362 (1976). In each of those cases, the plaintiffs alleged official
racial discrimination comparable to that alleged by respondents
here. Yet standing was denied in each case because the plaintiffs
were not personally subject to the challenged discrimination.
Insofar as their first claim of injury is concerned, respondents
are in exactly the same position: unlike the appellee in Heckler v. Mathews, supra, at 465 U. S.
740 -741, n. 9, they do not allege a stigmatic injury
suffered as a direct result of having personally been denied equal
treatment.

															The consequences of recognizing respondents' standing on the
basis of their first claim of injury illustrate why our cases
plainly hold that such injury is not judicially cognizable. If the
abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing Page 468 U. S. 756 would extend nationwide to all members of the particular racial
groups against which the Government was alleged to be
discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially
discriminatory school, regardless of the location of that school.
All such persons could claim the same sort of abstract stigmatic
injury respondents assert in their first claim of injury. A black
person in Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a
racially discriminatory school in Maine. Recognition of standing in
such circumstances would transform the federal courts into "no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders." United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669 , 412 U. S. 687 (1973). Constitutional limits on the role of the federal courts
preclude such a transformation. [ Footnote 21 ] 2 It is in their complaint's second claim of injury that
respondents allege harm to a concrete, personal interest that can
support standing in some circumstances. The injury they identify --
their children's diminished ability to receive an education in a
racially integrated school -- is, beyond any doubt, not only
judicially cognizable but, as shown by cases from Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), to Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system. Despite the constitutional importance of curing the Page 468 U. S. 757 injury alleged by respondents, however, the federal judiciary
may not redress it unless standing requirements are met. In this
case, respondents' second claim of injury cannot support standing,
because the injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the
Government conduct respondents challenge as unlawful. [ Footnote 22 ]

															The illegal conduct challenged by respondents is the IRS's grant
of tax exemptions to some racially discriminatory schools. The line
of causation between that conduct and desegregation of respondents'
schools is attenuated, at best. From the perspective of the IRS,
the injury to respondents is highly indirect, and "results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 42 . As
the Court pointed out in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 505 ,
"the Page 468 U. S. 758 indirectness of the injury . . . may make it substantially more
difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. III. . . ."

															The diminished ability of respondents' children to receive a
desegregated education would be fairly traceable to unlawful IRS
grants of tax exemptions only if there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in
respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions to make
an appreciable difference in public school integration. Respondents
have made no such allegation. It is, first, uncertain how many
racially discriminatory private schools are in fact receiving tax
exemptions. [ Footnote 23 ]
Moreover, it is entirely speculative, as respondents themselves
conceded in the Court of Appeals, see n 17, supra, whether withdrawal of a
tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to
change its policies. See 480 F. Supp. at 796. It is just
as speculative whether any given parent of a child attending such a
private school would decide to transfer the child to public school
as a result of any changes in educational or financial policy made
by the private school once it was threatened with loss of
tax-exempt status. It is also pure speculation whether, in a
particular community, a large enough number of the numerous
relevant school officials and parents would reach decisions that
collectively would have a significant impact on the racial
composition of the public schools. Page 468 U. S. 759 The links in the chain of causation between the challenged
Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the
chain as a whole to sustain respondents' standing. In Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, the Court held
that standing to challenge a Government grant of a tax exemption to
hospitals could not be founded on the asserted connection between
the grant of tax-exempt status and the hospitals' policy concerning
the provision of medical services to indigents. [ Footnote 24 ] The causal connection depended
on the decisions hospitals would make in response to withdrawal of
tax-exempt status, and those decisions were sufficiently uncertain
to break the chain of causation between the plaintiffs' injury and
the challenged Government action. Id. at 426 U. S. 40 -46. See also Warth v. Seldin, supra. The chain of causation is
even weaker in this case. It involves numerous third parties
(officials of racially discriminatory schools receiving tax
exemptions and the parents of children attending such schools) who
may not even exist in respondents' communities and whose
independent decisions may not collectively have a significant
effect on the ability of public school students to receive a
desegregated education.

															The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing
doctrine explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that
respondents' alleged injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged
action" of the IRS. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., supra, at 426 U. S. 41 .
That conclusion would pave the way generally for suits challenging,
not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the
particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal
obligations. Such suits, even when premised on allegations of Page 468 U. S. 760 several instances of violations of law, are rarely, if ever,
appropriate for federal court adjudication.

															"Carried to its logical end, [respondents'] approach would have
the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom
and soundness of Executive action; such a role is appropriate for
the Congress, acting through its committees and the 'power of the
purse;' it is not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present
or immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful
governmental action." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 15 . See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S.
1 , 413 U. S. 14 (1973) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring).

															The same concern for the proper role of the federal courts is
reflected in cases like O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 (1974), Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.
S. 362 (1976), and Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983). In all three cases, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
directed at certain systemwide law enforcement practices. [ Footnote 25 ] The Court held in each
case that, absent an allegation of a specific threat of being
subject to the challenged practices, plaintiffs had no standing to
ask for an injunction. Animating this Court's holdings was the
principle that "[a] federal court . . . is not the proper forum to
press" general complaints about the way in which government goes
about its business. Id. at 461 U. S.
112 .

															Case-or-controversy considerations, the Court observed in O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 414 U. S. 499 ,
"obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint
states a sound basis for equitable relief." The latter set of
considerations should therefore inform our judgment about whether
respondents Page 468 U. S. 761 have standing. Most relevant to this case is the principle
articulated in Rizzo v. Goode, supra, at 423 U. S.
378 -379:

															"When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government
agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend
with "the well-established rule that the Government has
traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch
of its own internal affairs,' Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 , 367 U. S. 896 (1961)," quoted in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S.
61 , 415 U. S. 83 (1974)." When transported into the Art. III context, that principle,
grounded as it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels
against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce
specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm, but
to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. The Constitution,
after all, assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial
Branch, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S.Const., Art. II, § 3. We could not recognize
respondents' standing in this case without running afoul of that
structural principle. [ Footnote
26 ] C The Court of Appeals relied for its contrary conclusion on Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.
S. 556 (1974), on Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973), and on Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), summarily aff'g Green v. Connally, Page 468 U. S. 762 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC). Respondents in this Court, though stressing a
different injury from the one emphasized by the Court of Appeals, see supra at 468 U. S.
752 -753, place principal reliance on those cases as
well. None of the cases, however, requires that we find standing in
this lawsuit.

															In Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, supra, the plaintiffs
asserted a constitutional right, recognized in an outstanding
injunction, to use the city's public parks on a nondiscriminatory
basis. They alleged that the city was violating that equal
protection right by permitting racially discriminatory private
schools and other groups to use the public parks. The Court
recognized plaintiffs' standing to challenge this city policy
insofar as the policy permitted the exclusive use of the parks by
racially discriminatory private schools: the plaintiffs had alleged
direct cognizable injury to their right to nondiscriminatory access
to the public parks. Id. at 417 U. S.
570 -571, n. 10. [ Footnote 27 ]

															Standing in Gilmore thus rested on an allegation of
direct deprivation of a right to equal use of the parks. Like the
plaintiff in Heckler v. Mathews -- indeed, like the
plaintiffs having standing in virtually any equal protection case
-- the plaintiffs in Gilmore alleged that they were
personally being denied equal treatment. 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
740 -741, n. 9. The Gilmore Court did not rest
its finding of standing on an abstract denigration injury, and no
problem of attenuated causation attended the plaintiffs' claim of
injury. [ Footnote 28 ] Page 468 U. S. 763 In Norwood v. Harrison, supra, parents of public school
children in Tunica County, Miss., filed a statewide class action
challenging the State's provision of textbooks to students
attending racially discriminatory private schools in the State. The
Court held the State's practice unconstitutional because it
breached "the State's acknowledged duty to establish a unitary
school system," id. at 413 U. S.
460 -461. See id. at 413 U. S.
463 -468. The Court did not expressly address the basis
for the plaintiffs' standing.

															In Gilmore, however, the Court identified the basis for
standing in Norwood: "The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school
desegregation order, and the relief they sought was directly
related to the concrete injury they suffered."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 571 ,
n. 10. Through the school desegregation decree, the plaintiffs had
acquired a right to have the State "steer clear" of any
perpetuation of the racially dual school system that it had once
sponsored. 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 467 .
The interest acquired was judicially cognizable because it was a
personal interest, created by law, in having the State refrain from
taking specific actions. Cf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 500 (standing may exist by virtue of legal rights created by statute).
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the State directly injured
that interest by aiding racially discriminatory private schools.
Respondents in this lawsuit, of course, have no injunctive rights
against the IRS that are allegedly being harmed by the challenged
IRS action.

															Unlike Gilmore and Norwood, Coit v. Green,
supra, cannot easily be seen to have based standing on an
injury different in kind from any asserted by respondents here. The
plaintiffs Page 468 U. S. 764 in Coit, parents of black schoolchildren in
Mississippi, sued to enjoin the IRS grant of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools in the State. Nevertheless, Coit in no way mandates the conclusion that respondents
have standing.

															First, the decision has little weight as a precedent on the law
of standing. This Court's decision in Coit was merely a
summary affirmance; for that reason alone, it could hardly
establish principles contrary to those set out in opinions issued
after full briefing and argument. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379 , 419 U. S. 392 (1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring); see also Tully v. Griffin,
Inc., 429 U. S. 68 , 429 U. S. 74 (1976). Moreover, when the case reached this Court, the plaintiffs
and the IRS were no longer adverse parties; and the ruling that was
summarily affirmed, Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC 1971), did not include a ruling on the issue of
standing, which had been briefly considered in a prior ruling of
the District Court, Green v. Kennedy, 309
F. Supp. 1127 , 1132 (DC), appeal dism'd sub nom. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). Thus, "the Court's affirmance in Green lacks the precedential weight of a case involving a
truly adversary controversy." Bob Jones University v.
Simon, 416 U. S. 725 , 416 U. S. 740 ,
n. 11 (1974).

															In any event, the facts in the Coit case are
sufficiently different from those presented in this lawsuit that
the absence of standing here is unaffected by the possible
propriety of standing there. In particular, the suit in Coit was limited to the public schools of one State.
Moreover, the District Court found, based on extensive evidence
before it as well as on the findings in Coffey v. State
Educational Finance Comm'n, 296 F.
Supp. 1389 (SD Miss.1969), that large numbers of segregated
private schools had been established in the State for the purpose
of avoiding a unitary public school system, 309 F.Supp. at
1133-1134; that the tax exemptions were critically important to the
ability of such schools to succeed, id. at 1134-1136; and
that the connection between Page 468 U. S. 765 the grant of tax exemptions to discriminatory schools and
desegregation of the public schools in the particular State was
close enough to warrant the conclusion that irreparable injury to
the interest in desegregated education was threatened if the tax
exemptions continued, id. at 1138-1139. [ Footnote 29 ] What made possible those
findings was the fact that, when the Mississippi plaintiffs filed
their suit, the IRS had a policy of granting tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory private schools; thus, the suit was
initially brought, not simply to reform Executive Branch
enforcement procedures, but to challenge a fundamental IRS policy
decision, which affected numerous identifiable schools in the State
of Mississippi. See id. at 1130. [ Footnote 30 ]

															The limited setting, the history of school desegregation in
Mississippi at the time of the Coit litigation, the nature
of the IRS conduct challenged at the outset of the litigation, and
the District Court's particular findings, which were never
challenged as clearly erroneous, see Motion to Dismiss or
Affirm in Coit v. Green, O.T. 1971, No. 71-425, p. 13,
amply distinguish the Coit case from respondents' lawsuit.
Thus, we Page 468 U. S. 766 need not consider whether standing was properly found to exist
in Coit. Whatever the answer to that question,
respondents' complaint, which aims at nationwide relief and does
not challenge particular identified unlawful IRS actions, alleges
no connection between the asserted desegregation injury and the
challenged IRS conduct direct enough to overcome the substantial
separation of powers barriers to a suit seeking an injunction to
reform administrative procedures. III "The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial
power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III
requirement." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 39 .
Respondents have not met this fundamental requirement. The judgment
of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the injunction
issued by that court is vacated. It is so ordered. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of these
cases.

															* Together with No. 81-970, Regan, Secretary of the
Treasury, et al. v. Wright et al., also on certiorari to the
same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															As the Court explained last Term in Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U. S. 574 , 461 U. S. 579 (1983), the IRS announced this policy in 1970 and formally adopted
it in 1971. Rev.Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 Cum.Bull. 230. This change in
prior policy was prompted by litigation over tax exemptions for
racially discriminatory private schools in the State of
Mississippi, litigation that resulted in the entry of an injunction
against the IRS largely, if not entirely, coextensive with the
position the IRS had voluntarily adopted. Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F.
Supp. 1127 (DC) (entering preliminary injunction), appeal
dism'd sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC) (entering permanent injunction), summarily
aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The 1975 guidelines replaced guidelines issued for the same
purpose in 1972. Rev.Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 Cum.Bull. 834.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The definition of "racially nondiscriminatory policy" is
qualified in one respect:

															"A policy of a school that favors racial minority groups with
respect to admissions, facilities and programs, and financial
assistance will not constitute discrimination on the basis of race
when the purpose and effect is to promote the establishment and
maintenance of that school's racially nondiscriminatory policy as
to students."

															Rev. Proc. 75-50, § 3.02, 1975-2 Cum.Bull. 587.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															One way a school can satisfy the publication requirement is to
disseminate notice of the nondiscrimination policy through the
print or broadcast media. Id. § 4.03-1, p. 588. Detailed
IRS rules govern what print and broadcast media may be selected, as
well as the content of the notice. Ibid. Although the IRS
encourages all schools to follow that route, see id. §
4.03-2, p. 589, there are three alternative ways to satisfy the
publication requirement.

															First, a parochial or church-related school at least 75% of
whose students in the preceding three years were members of the
church satisfies the requirement if it gives notice of its
nondiscrimination policy in church publications, unless it
advertises in newspapers of general circulation. Id. §
4.03-2(a), p. 588. Second, a school that draws its students from
areas larger than the local community satisfies the requirement if
it enrolls minority students in meaningful numbers or engages in
promotional and recruitment activities reasonably designed to reach
all racial segments of the areas from which students are drawn. Id. § 4.03-2(b). Third, a school serving only a local
community satisfies the publication requirement if it actually
enrolls minority students in meaningful numbers. Id. §
4.03-2(c), pp. 588-589. A school choosing any of these three
options "must be prepared to demonstrate" on audit that this choice
was justified. Id. § 4.03-2, p. 589.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Scholarships and loans must generally be available without
regard to race, and this fact must be known in the community served
by the school. An exception is made, however, consistent with §
3.02 of Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 Cum.Bull. 587, see n 3, supra, for
financial assistance programs favoring minority students that are
designed to promote the school's nondiscriminatory policy. A second
exception is made for financial assistance programs

															"favoring members of one or more racial groups that do not
significantly derogate from the school's racially nondiscriminatory
policy. . . ."

															Rev. Proc. 75-50, § 4.05, 1975-2 Cum.Bull. 589.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The regulations also declare that discrimination in the
employment of faculty and administrative staff (or its absence) is
indicative of discrimination with respect to students (or its
absence). Id. § 4.07.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Records must be kept, and preserved for three years, concerning
the racial composition of the student body, the faculty and
administrative staff, and the group of students receiving financial
assistance. Copies of brochures, catalogs, and advertising must
also be kept. Id. § 7.01, p. 590. Although the method of
figuring racial composition must be described in the records
compiled by the school, the school need not require students,
applicants, or staff to furnish information not otherwise required,
and the school generally need not release personally identifiable
records. Id., § 7.02. Cf. id. § 5.02, pp. 589-590
(information furnished by applicant for tax-exempt status subject
to similar qualifications). Reports containing the required
information, if filed in accordance with law with a Government
agency, may satisfy the recordkeeping requirement if the
information is current and the school maintains copies of the
reports. Id. § 7.03, p. 590. Failure to maintain the
required records gives rise to a presumption of noncompliance with
the guidelines. Id. § 7.04.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Revenue Procedure expressly notes, id. § 8, that
its provisions are superseded by, to the extent they differ from,
the injunction concerning Mississippi schools issued in Green
v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Shortly before respondents filed this action, the plaintiffs in
the Green litigation, concerning the tax-exempt status of
private schools in Mississippi, ibid., moved to reopen
that suit, making allegations comparable to those in respondents'
complaint. See Wright v. Regan, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 236,
656 F.2d 820, 825 (1981). In 1977, the Mississippi litigation was
consolidated with this suit. Ibid. The Green litigation was not consolidated with this lawsuit on appeal,
however, and it is not before this Court.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Hereafter, references to a private school's tax exemption
embrace both tax-exempt status of the school and tax-exempt status
of an "umbrella" organization. We assume, without deciding, that a
grant of tax-exempt status to an "umbrella" organization of the
sort respondents have in mind is subject to the same legal
constraints as a grant of tax-exempt status directly to a
school.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The complaint generally uses the phrase "racially segregated
school" to mean simply that no or few minority students attend the
school, irrespective of the school's maintenance of racially
discriminatory policies or practices. Although the complaint, on
its face, alleges that granting tax-exempt status to any "racially
segregated" school in a desegregating public school district is
unlawful, App. 39, it is clear that respondents premise their
allegation of illegality on discrimination, not on segregation
alone.

															The nub of respondents' complaint is that current IRS guidelines
and procedures are inadequate to detect false certifications of
nondiscrimination policies. See id. at 17-18, 25. This
allegation would be superfluous if respondents were claiming that
racial segregation even without racial discrimination made the
grant of tax-exempt status unlawful. Moreover respondents have
noticeably refrained from asserting that the IRS violates the law
when it grants a tax exemption to a nondiscriminatory private
school that happens to have few minority students. Indeed,
respondents' brief in this Court makes a point of noting that their
complaint alleges not only segregation, but discrimination, see Brief for Respondents 10, n. 8, and it repeatedly
states that the challenged Government conduct is the granting of
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools, see,
e.g., id. at 9-10 ("Respondents alleged that the federal
petitioners are continuing to grant tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools . . ."); id. at 13-14.

															Since respondents' entire argument is built on the assertion
that their rights are violated by IRS grants of tax-exempt status
to some number of unidentified racially discriminatory private
schools in desegregating districts, we resolve the ambiguity in
respondents' complaint by reading it as making that assertion.

															Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN's statement, post at 468 U. S. 768 ,
the complaint does not allege that each desegregating district in
which they reside contains one or more racially discriminatory
private schools unlawfully receiving a tax exemption.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The complaint alleges that the challenged IRS conduct violates
several laws: § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; Rev.Stat. § 1977,
42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

															Last Term, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), the Court concluded that racially discriminatory private
schools do not qualify for a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Respondents did not allege in their 1976 complaint that their
children were currently attending racially segregated schools. In
1979, during argument before the District Court, counsel for
respondents stated that his clients' children "do go to
desegregated schools. . . ." App. 62.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Several additional tax benefits accrue to an organization
receiving a tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Such an
organization is exempt not only from income taxes but also from
federal social security taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B), and from
federal unemployment taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8). Moreover,
contributions to the organization are deductible not only from
income taxes, 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(a)(1) and (c)(2), but also from
federal estate taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a)(2), and from federal gift
taxes, 26 U.S.C. § 2522(a)(2).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															The first proposal was made on August 22, 1978. 43 Fed.Reg.
37296. It placed the burden of proving good faith operation on a
nondiscriminatory basis, evaluated according to specified factors,
on any private school that had an insignificant number of minority
students and that had been formed or substantially expanded at a
time the public schools in its community were undergoing
desegregation. The second proposal was made on February 13, 1979,
after public comment and hearings. 44 Fed.Reg. 9451. It afforded
private schools "greater flexibility" in proving nondiscriminatory
operation, permitting satisfaction of this proof requirement by a
showing that the school has "undertaken actions or programs
reasonably designed to attract minority students on a continuing
basis." Id. at 9452, 9454.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1980, §§ 103 and 615, 93 Stat. 562, 577. Section 615 of the
Act, known as the Dornan Amendment, specifically forbade the use of
funds to carry out the IRS's proposed Revenue Procedures. Section
103 of the Act, known as the Ashbrook Amendment, more generally
forbade the use of funds to make the requirements for tax-exempt
status of private schools more stringent than those in effect prior
to the IRS's proposal of its new Revenue Procedures.

															These provisions expired on October 1, 1980, but Congress
maintained its interest in IRS policies regarding tax exemptions
for racially discriminatory private schools. The Dornan and
Ashbrook Amendments were reinstated for the period December 16,
1980, through September 30, 1981. H.J.Res. 644, Pub.L. 96-536, §§
101(a)(1) and (4), 94 Stat. 3166, as amended by Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescission Act of 1981, § 401, 95 Stat. 95. For
fiscal year 1982, Congress specifically denied funding for carrying
out not only administrative actions but also court orders entered
after the date of the IRS's proposal of its first revised Revenue
Procedure. H.J.Res. 325, Pub.L. 97-51, § 101(a)(3), 95 Stat. 958.
No such spending restrictions are currently in force.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Indeed, the Court of Appeals observed that respondents

															"do not dispute that it is 'speculative,' within the Eastern
Kentucky frame, whether any private school would welcome
blacks in order to retain tax exemption, or would relinquish
exemption to retain current practices."

															211 U.S.App.D.C. at 240, 656 F.2d at 829 (footnotes
omitted).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Judge Tamm dissented from the holding of the Court of Appeals.
He concluded that standing in the three cases relied on by the
majority was based on injury to rights under a court decree, and
that respondents in this case asserted nothing more than the
abstract interest in securing enforcement of the law against the
Government. Id. at 249-259, 656 F.2d at 838-848.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The "fairly traceable" and "redressability" components of the
constitutional standing inquiry were initially articulated by this
Court as "two facets of a single causation requirement." C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts § 13, p. 68, n. 43 (4th ed.1983). To the
extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the
causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the
alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection
between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested. Cases
such as this, in which the relief requested goes well beyond the
violation of law alleged, illustrate why it is important to keep
the inquiries separate if the "redressability" component is to
focus on the requested relief. Even if the relief respondents
request might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of
public schools, whatever deficiencies exist in the opportunities
for desegregated education for respondents' children might not be
traceable to IRS violations of law -- grants of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory schools in respondents' communities.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															We assume, arguendo, that the asserted stigmatic injury
may be caused by the Government's grant of tax exemptions to
racially discriminatory schools even if the Government is granting
those exemptions without knowing or believing that the schools in
fact discriminate. That is, we assume, without deciding, that the
challenged Government tax exemptions are the equivalent of
Government discrimination.

															[ Footnote 21 ] Cf. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.
S. 464 , 454 U. S.
489 -490, n. 26 (1982) (citations omitted):

															"Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury"
consisting solely of an alleged violation of a " personal
constitutional right' to a government that does not establish
religion," a principled consistency would dictate recognition of
respondents' standing to challenge execution of every capital
sentence on the basis of a personal right to a government that does
not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge
every affirmative action program on the basis of a personal right
to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to
choose but two among as many possible examples as there are
commands in the Constitution." [ Footnote 22 ]

															Respondents' stigmatic injury, though not sufficient for
standing in the abstract form in which their complaint asserts it,
is judicially cognizable to the extent that respondents are
personally subject to discriminatory treatment. See Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U. S. 728 , 465 U. S.
739 -740 (1984). The stigmatic injury thus requires
identification of some concrete interest with respect to which
respondents are personally subject to discriminatory treatment.
That interest must independently satisfy the causation requirement
of standing doctrine.

															In Heckler v. Mathews, for example, the named plaintiff
(appellee) was being denied monetary benefits allegedly on a
discriminatory basis. We specifically pointed out that the
causation component of standing doctrine was satisfied with respect
to the claimed benefits. In distinguishing the case from Simon
v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26 (1976), we said:

															"there can be no doubt about the direct causal relationship
between the Government's alleged deprivation of appellee's right to
equal protection and the personal injury appellee has suffered --
denial of Social Security benefits solely on the basis of his
gender."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 741 ,
n. 9.

															In this litigation, respondents identify only one interest that
they allege is being discriminatorily impaired -- their interest in
desegregated public school education. Respondents' asserted
stigmatic injury, therefore, is sufficient to support their
standing in this litigation only if their school desegregation
injury independently meets the causation requirement of standing
doctrine.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Indeed, contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent, post at 468 U. S.
774 -775, and n. 5, of the schools identified in
respondents' complaint, none of those alleged to be directly
receiving a tax exemption is alleged to be racially discriminatory,
and only four schools -- Delta Christian Academy and Tallulah
Academy in Madison Parish, La.; River Oaks School in Monroe, La.;
and Bowman Academy in Orangeburg, S.C. -- are alleged to have
discriminatory policies that deprive them of direct tax exemptions,
yet operate under the umbrella of a tax-exempt organization. These
allegations constitute an insufficient basis for the only claim
made by respondents -- a claim for a change in the IRS regulations
and practices. Cf. Wright v. Miller, 480 F.
Supp. 790 , 796 (DC 1979) ("it is purely speculative whether, in
the final analysis, any fewer schools would be granted tax
exemptions under plaintiffs' system than under the current IRS
system").

															[ Footnote 24 ] Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, framed its standing discussion in terms of the redressability of
the alleged injury. The relief requested by the plaintiffs,
however, was simply the cessation of the allegedly illegal conduct.
In those circumstances, as the opinion for the Court in Simon itself illustrates, see id. at 426 U. S. 40 -46,
the "redressability" analysis is identical to the "fairly
traceable" analysis. See n. 19 supra. [ Footnote 25 ]

															In O'Shea v. Littleton and Rizzo v. Goode, the
plaintiffs sought wide-ranging reform of local law enforcement
systems. In Los Angeles v. Lyons, by contrast, the
plaintiff sought cessation of a particular police practice. The
Court concluded in Lyons, however, that this difference
did not distinguish the cases for standing purposes as long as the
plaintiff could show no realistic threat of being subject to the
challenged practice.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															We disagree with JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestions that separation of
powers principles merely underlie standing requirements, have no
role to play in giving meaning to those requirements, and should be
considered only under a distinct justiciability analysis. Post at 468 U. S.
789 -792. Moreover, our analysis of this case does not
rest on the more general proposition that no consequence of the
allocation of administrative enforcement resources is judicially
cognizable. Post at 468 U. S.
792 -793. Rather, we rely on separation of powers
principles to interpret the "fairly traceable" component of the
standing requirement.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															On the merits, the Court found that permitting such exclusive
use by school groups was unlawful, because it violated the city's
constitutional obligation, spelled out in an outstanding school
desegregation order, to take no action that would impede the
integration of the public schools. Exclusive availabililty of the
public parks "significantly enhanced the attractiveness of
segregated private schools . . . by enabling them to offer complete
athletic programs." 417 U.S. at 417 U. S.
569 .

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															Indeed, the Court stressed the importance of a particularized
factual record when it stated that it was

															"not prepared, at this juncture and on this record, to assume
the standing of these plaintiffs to claim relief against certain
nonexclusive uses by private school groups." Id. at 417 U. S. 570 ,
n. 10. "Without a properly developed record," said the Court, it
was not clear that such nonexclusive use "would result in
cognizable injury to these plaintiffs." Id. at 417 U. S. 571 ,
n. 10.

															The Court said nothing about the plaintiffs' standing to
challenge the use of the parks, exclusive or nonexclusive, by
racially discriminatory groups other than schools. It was
unnecessary to do so, because the Court declined to consider the
merits of that challenge on the record before it. Id. at 417 U. S.
570 -574.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.
S. 455 , 413 U. S. 467 ,
n. 9 (1973), this Court described the experience of one county in
Mississippi:

															"all white children were withdrawn from public schools and
placed in a private academy housed in local church facilities and
staffed by the principal and 17 high school teachers of the county
system, who resigned in mid-year to accept jobs at the new
academy."

															The Court observed that similar histories in various other
localities in Mississippi were recited by the plaintiffs without
challenge. Ibid. [ Footnote 30 ]

															The relatively simple either-or nature of the challenged
decision affects the extent to which the initial complaint
implicated separation of powers concerns. When the IRS altered its
policy concerning the grant of tax exemptions to racially
discriminatory schools, see Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. at 1156, the plaintiffs were left with an action more closely
resembling this lawsuit. We have no occasion to consider here the
effect on a plaintiff's standing of a defendant's partial cessation
of challenged conduct when that partial cessation leaves the
plaintiff with a complaint presenting substantially greater
uncertainty about standing than the initial complaint did.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

															Once again, the Court

															"uses 'standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs
who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the
merits.'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.
S. 464 , 454 U. S. 490 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U. S. 159 , 397 U. S. 178 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result and dissenting)). And
once again, the Court does so by "wax[ing] eloquent" on
considerations that provide little justification for the decision
at hand. See 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 491 .
This time, however, the Court focuses on "the idea of separation of
powers," ante at 468 U. S. 750 , 468 U. S. 752 , 468 U. S. 759 , 468 U. S. 761 ,
as if the mere incantation of that phrase provides an obvious
solution to the difficult questions presented by these cases. Page 468 U. S. 767 One could hardly dispute the proposition that Art. III of the
Constitution, by limiting the judicial power to "Cases" or
"Controversies," embodies the notion that each branch of our
National Government must confine its actions to those that are
consistent with our scheme of separated powers. But simply stating
that unremarkable truism provides little, if any, illumination of
the standing inquiry that must be undertaken by a federal court
faced with a particular action filed by particular plaintiffs.

															"The question whether a particular person is a proper party to
maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of
powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas
committed to other branches of the Federal Government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S. 100 (1968).

															The Court's attempt to obscure the standing question must be
seen, therefore, as no more than a cover for its failure to
recognize the nature of the specific claims raised by the
respondents in these cases. By relying on generalities concerning
our tripartite system of government, the Court is able to conclude
that the respondents lack standing to maintain this action without
acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged.
In so doing, the Court displays a startling insensitivity to the
historical role played by the federal courts in eradicating race
discrimination from our Nation's schools -- a role that has played
a prominent part in this Court's decisions from Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), through Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983). Because I cannot join in such misguided decisionmaking, I
dissent. I The respondents, suing individually and on behalf of their minor
children, are parents of black children attending public schools in
various school districts across the Nation. Each of these school
districts, the respondents allege, [ Footnote 2/1 ] was once segregated Page 468 U. S. 768 and is now in the process of desegregating pursuant to court
order, federal regulations or guidelines, state law, or voluntary
agreement. Moreover, each contains one or more private schools that
discriminate against black schoolchildren and that operate with the
assistance of tax exemptions unlawfully granted to them by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). See Complaint �� 24-48,
App. 26-38.

															To eliminate this federal financial assistance for
discriminating schools, the respondents seek a declaratory judgment
that current IRS practices are inadequate both in identifying
racially discriminatory schools and in denying requested tax
exemptions or revoking existing exemptions for any schools so
identified. In particular, they allege that existing IRS guidelines
permit schools to receive tax exemptions simply by adopting and
certifying -- but not implementing -- a policy of
nondiscrimination. Pursuant to these ineffective guidelines,
[ Footnote 2/2 ] many private schools
that discriminate on the basis of Page 468 U. S. 769 race continue to benefit illegally from their tax-exempt status
and the resulting charitable deductions granted to taxpayers who
contribute to such schools. The respondents therefore seek a
permanent injunction requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions to
any private schools

															"which have insubstantial or nonexistent minority enrollments,
which are located in or serve desegregating school districts, and
which either -- "

															"(a) were established or expanded at or about the time the
public school districts in which they are located or which they
serve were desegregating;"

															"(b) have been determined in adversary judicial or
administrative proceedings to be racially segregated; or"

															"(c) cannot demonstrate that they do not provide racially
segregated educational opportunities for white children avoiding
attendance in desegregating public school systems."

															Complaint � 4, App.19. This requested relief is substantially
similar to the enforcement guidelines promulgated by the IRS itself
in 1978 and 1979, before congressional action temporarily stayed,
and the agency withdrew, the amended procedures. See 44
Fed.Reg. 9451 (1979); 43 Fed.Reg. 37296 (1978). Cf. ante at 468 U. S. 747 ,
and nn. 15-16. Page 468 U. S. 770 II Persons seeking judicial relief from an Art. III court must have
standing to maintain their cause of action. At a minimum, the
standing requirement is not met unless the plaintiff has

															"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends. . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). Under the Court's cases, this "personal stake" requirement
is satisfied if the person seeking redress has suffered, or is
threatened with, some "distinct and palpable injury," Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 501 (1975), and if there is some causal connection between the asserted
injury and the conduct being challenged, Simon v. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26 , 426 U. S. 41 (1976). See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.
S. 728 , 465 U. S. 738 (1984); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.
S. 363 , 455 U. S. 376 (1982); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S.
472 . A In these cases, the respondents have alleged at least one type
of injury that satisfies the constitutional requirement of
"distinct and palpable injury." [ Footnote 2/3 ] In particular, they claim Page 468 U. S. 771 that the IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools directly injures their children's
opportunity and ability to receive a desegregated education. As the
complaint specifically alleges, the IRS action being challenged

															"fosters and encourages the organization, operation and
expansion of institutions providing racially segregated educational
opportunities for white children avoiding attendance in
desegregating public school districts, and thereby interferes with
the efforts of federal courts, HEW and local school authorities to
desegregate public school districts which have been operating
racially dual school systems."

															Complaint � 50(b), App. 39.

															The Court acknowledges that this alleged injury is sufficient to
satisfy constitutional standards. See ante at 468 U. S. 756 .
It does so only grudgingly, however, without emphasizing the
significance of the harm alleged. Nonetheless, we have consistently
recognized throughout the last 30 years that the deprivation of a
child's right to receive an education in a desegregated school is a
harm of special significance; surely, it satisfies any
constitutional requirement of injury in fact. Just last Term, in Bob Jones University v. United States, for example, we
acknowledged that

															"[a]n unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of
Education establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental
national public policy, as well as rights of
individuals. "

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 593 (1983) (emphasis added). See Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 , 417 U. S. 568 (1974) ("[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be
discriminated against . . . can neither be nullified openly and Page 468 U. S. 772 directly . . . nor nullified indirectly . . . through evasive
schemes for segregation whether attempted ingeniously or
ingenuously'") (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S.
1 , 358 U. S. 17 (1958)); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.
S. 455 , 413 U. S.
468 -469 (1973). "The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds
in schools . . . is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is
embraced in the concept of due process of law." Cooper v. Aaron, supra, at 358 U. S. 19 ; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 (1954).

															In the analogous context of housing discrimination, the Court
has similarly recognized that the denial of an opportunity to live
in an integrated community is injury sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional requirements of standing. In particular, we have
recognized that injury is properly alleged when plaintiffs claim a
deprivation "of the social and professional benefits of living in
an integrated society." Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91 , 441 U. S.
111 -112 (1979). See also Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, supra, at 455 U. S. 376 ,
and n. 17; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972). Noting "the importance of the benefits [obtained] from
interracial associations'" as well as the oft-stated principle
"that noneconomic injuries may suffice to provide standing," we
have consistently concluded that such an injury is "sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of actual or
threatened harm." Gladstone, Realtors, supra, at 441 U. S. 112 (quoting Trafficante, supra, at 409 U. S. 210 ,
and citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.
S. 727 , 405 U. S.
734 -735 (1972)). There is, of course, no rational basis on which to treat
children who seek to be educated in desegregated school districts
any differently for purposes of standing than residents who seek to
live in integrated housing communities. Indeed, if anything,
discriminatory practices by private schools, which "exer[t] a
pervasive influence on the entire educational process," Norwood, supra, at 413 U. S. 469 (citing Brown v. Board of Education, supra, and quoted in Bob Jones University, supra, at Page 468 U. S. 773 461 U. S.
595 ), have been more readily recognized to constitute
injury redressable in the federal courts. It is therefore beyond
peradventure that the denial of the benefits of an integrated
education alleged by the respondents in these cases constitutes
"distinct and palpable injury." B Fully explicating the injury alleged helps to explain why it is
fairly traceable to the governmental conduct challenged by the
respondents. As the respondents specifically allege in their
complaint:

															"Defendants have fostered and encouraged the development,
operation and expansion of many of these racially segregated
private schools by recognizing them as 'charitable' organizations
described in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and
exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(a) of the
Code. Once the schools are classified as tax-exempt, . . .
contributions made to them are deductible from gross income on
individual and corporate income tax returns. . . . Moreover, [the]
organizations . . . are also exempt from federal social security
taxes . . . and from federal unemployment taxes. . . . The
resulting exemptions and deductions provide tangible financial aid
and other benefits which support the operation of racially
segregated private schools. In particular, the resulting deductions
facilitate the raising of funds to organize new schools and expand
existing schools in order to accommodate white students avoiding
attendance in desegregating public school districts. Additionally,
the existence of a federal tax exemption amounts to a federal stamp
of approval which facilitates fund raising on behalf of racially
segregated private schools. Finally, by supporting the development,
operation and expansion of institutions providing racially
segregated educational opportunities Page 468 U. S. 774 for white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public
schools, defendants are thereby interfering with the efforts of
courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public
school districts which have been operating racially dual school
systems."

															Complaint � 21, App. 24. [ Footnote
2/4 ]

															Viewed in light of the injuries they claim, the respondents have
alleged a direct causal relationship between the Government action
they challenge and the injury they suffer: their inability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school is directly
and adversely affected by the tax-exempt status granted by the IRS
to racially discriminatory schools in their respective school
districts. Common sense alone would recognize that the elimination
of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private schools
would serve to lessen the impact that those institutions have in
defeating efforts to desegregate the public schools.

															The Court admits that

															"[t]he diminished ability of respondents' children to receive a
desegregated education would be Page 468 U. S. 775 fairly traceable to unlawful IRS grants of tax exemptions . . .
if there were enough racially discriminatory private schools
receiving tax exemptions in respondents' communities for withdrawal
of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in public
school integration,"

															but concludes that "[r]espondents have made no such allegation." Ante at 468 U. S. 758 .
With all due respect, the Court has either misread the complaint or
is improperly requiring the respondents to prove their case on the
merits in order to defeat a motion to dismiss. [ Footnote 2/5 ] For example, the respondents
specifically refer by name to at least 32 private schools that
discriminate on the basis of race, and yet continue to benefit
illegally from tax-exempt status. Eighteen of those schools --
including at least 14 elementary schools, 2 junior high schools,
and 1 high school -- are located in the city of Memphis, Tenn.,
which has been the subject of several court orders to desegregate. See Complaint �� 24-27, 45, App. 26-27, 35-36. Similarly,
the respondents cite two private schools in Orangeburg, S.C., that
continue to benefit from federal tax exemptions even though they
practice race discrimination in school districts that are
desegregating pursuant to judicial and administrative orders. See Complaint �� 29, 46, App. 28, 36. At least with
respect to these school districts, as well as the others
specifically mentioned in the complaint, there can be little doubt
that the respondents have identified communities containing

															"enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax
exemptions . . . to make an appreciable difference in public school
integration," ante at 468 U. S. 758 .
[ Footnote 2/6 ] Page 468 U. S. 776 Moreover, the Court has previously recognized the existence, and
constitutional significance, of such direct relationships between
unlawfully segregated school districts and government support for
racially discriminatory private schools in those districts. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 (1973), for example, we considered a Mississippi program that
provided textbooks to students attending both public and private
schools, without regard to whether any participating school had
racially discriminatory policies. In declaring that program
constitutionally invalid, we noted that

															"'a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons
to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to
accomplish.'" Id. at 413 U. S. 465 .
We then spoke directly to the causal relationship between the
financial aid provided by the state textbook program and the
constitutional rights asserted by the students and their
parents:

															"The District Court laid great stress on the absence of a
showing by appellants that"

															"any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free
textbooks, would withdraw from private school and subsequently
enroll in the public schools. . . ."

															" We do not agree with the District Court in its analysis of
the legal consequences of this uncertainty, for the Constitution
does not permit the State to aid discrimination even when there is
no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to a
private school and the continued wellbeing of that school. A State
may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if
that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and
support private discrimination. " Id. at 413 U. S.
465 -466 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Page 468 U. S. 777 Thus, Norwood explicitly stands for the proposition
that governmental aid to racially discriminatory schools is a
direct impediment to school desegregation.

															The Court purports to distinguish Norwood from the
present litigation because " [t]he plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order,'"
and therefore "had acquired a right to have the State 'steer clear' of any
perpetuation of the racially dual school system that it had once
sponsored," ante at 468 U. S. 763 (quoting Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 571 ,
n. 10, and Norwood, supra, at 413 U. S.
467 ), whereas the "[r]espondents in this lawsuit . . .
have no injunctive rights against the IRS that are allegedly being
harmed," ante at 468 U. S. 763 .
There is nothing to suggest, however, that the relevant injunction
in Norwood was anything more than an order to desegregate
the schools in Tunica County, Miss. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Given that many of the school districts
identified in the respondents' complaint have also been the subject
of court-ordered integration, the standing inquiry in these cases
should not differ. And, although the respondents do not
specifically allege that they are named parties to Page 468 U. S. 778 any outstanding desegregation orders, that is undoubtedly due to
the passage of time since the orders were issued, and not to any
difference in the harm they suffer.

															Even accepting the relevance of the Court's distinction,
moreover, that distinction goes to the injury suffered by the
respective plaintiffs, and not to the causal connection between the
harm alleged and the governmental action challenged. Cf.
ante at 468 U. S. 756 (conceding that the respondents have alleged constitutionally
sufficient harm in these cases). The causal relationship existing
in Norwood between the alleged harm ( i.e., interference with the plaintiffs' injunctive rights to a
desegregated school system) and the challenged governmental action
( i.e., free textbooks provided to racially discriminatory
schools) is indistinguishable from the causal relationship existing
in the present cases, unless the Court intends to distinguish the
lending of textbooks from the granting of tax-exempt status. The
Court's express statement on causation in Norwood therefore bears repeating:

															"the Constitution does not permit the State to aid
discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship
between state financial aid to a private school and the continued
wellbeing of that school."

															413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
465 -466. See Note, The Judicial Role in
Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93
Harv.L.Rev. 378, 385-386 (1979). [ Footnote 2/8 ] Page 468 U. S. 779 Similarly, although entitled to less weight than a decision
after full briefing and oral argument on the merits, see Tully
v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68 , 429 U. S. 74 (1976), our summary affirmance in Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971), summarily aff'g Green v.
Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (DC), is directly relevant to the standing of the
respondents in this litigation. The plaintiffs in Coit v.
Green were black parents of minor children attending public
schools in desegregating school districts. Like the respondents in
these cases, the plaintiffs charged that the IRS had failed to
confine tax-exempt status to private schools that were not racially
discriminatory. And like the present respondents, they sought new
IRS procedures as their exclusive remedy.

															The three-judge District Court expressly concluded that the
plaintiffs had standing to maintain their action:

															"This case is properly maintained as a class action, pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by Negro school
children in Mississippi and the parents of those children on behalf
of themselves and all persons similarly situated. They have
standing to attack the constitutionality of statutory provisions
which they claim provid[e] an unconstitutional system of benefits
and Page 468 U. S. 780 matching grants that fosters and supports a system of segregated
private schools as an alternative available to white students
seeking to avoid desegregated public schools. We follow the
precedent on this point of the three-judge District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi in Coffey v. State Educational
Finance Commission, 296 F.
Supp. 1389 (1969)." Green v. Kennedy, 309
F. Supp. 1127 , 1132 (DC), appeal dism'd sub nom. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).

															When the case was properly appealed to this Court, the standing
issue was expressly raised in the jurisdictional statement filed by
intervenor Coit on behalf of a class of parents and children who
supported or attended all-white private schools. Juris. Statement,
O.T. 1971, No. 71-425, p. 11. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 63 ,
and n. 11 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Nonetheless, the
Court summarily affirmed, Coit v. Green, supra, thereby
indicating our agreement with the District Court's conclusion.
[ Footnote 2/9 ] See also Griffin v.
County Page 468 U. S. 781 School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.
S. 218 , 377 U. S. 224 (1964).

															Given these precedents, the Court is forced to place primary
reliance on our decision in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., supra. In that case, the Court denied standing to
plaintiffs who challenged an IRS Revenue Ruling that granted
charitable status to hospitals even though they failed to operate
to the extent of their financial ability when refusing medical
services for indigent patients. The Court found that the injury
alleged was not one "that fairly can be traced to the challenged
action of the defendant." Id. at 426 U. S. 41 . In
particular, it was "purely speculative" whether the denial of
access to hospital services alleged by the plaintiffs fairly could
be traced to the Government's grant of tax-exempt status to the
relevant hospitals, primarily because the hospitals were likely
making their service decisions without regard to the tax
implications. Id. at 426 U. S.
42 -43.

															Even accepting the correctness of the causation analysis
included in that decision, however, it is plainly distinguishable
from the cases at hand. The respondents in these cases do not
challenge the denial of any service by a tax-exempt Page 468 U. S. 782 institution; admittedly, they do not seek access to racially
discriminatory private schools. Rather, the injury they allege, and
the injury that clearly satisfies constitutional requirements, is
the deprivation of their children's opportunity and ability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school district. See supra at 468 U. S.
770 -773. This injury, as the Court admits, ante at 468 U. S.
757 -758, and as we have previously held in Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
465 -466, is of a kind that is directly traceable to the
governmental action being challenged. The relationship between the
harm alleged and the governmental action cannot simply be deemed
"purely speculative," as was the causal connection at issue in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., supra, at 426 U. S. 42 .
Indeed, as I have previously explained, supra at 468 U. S.
773 -778, the Court's conclusion to the contrary is based
on a unjustifiably narrow reading of the respondents' complaint and
an indefensibly limited interpretation of our holding in Norwood. By interposing its own version of pleading
formalities between the respondents and the federal courts, the
Court not only has denied access to litigants who properly seek
vindication of their constitutional rights, but also has ignored
the important historical role that the courts have played in the
Nation's efforts to eliminate racial discrimination from our
schools. III More than one commentator has noted that the causation component
of the Court's standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise for
the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claims. [ Footnote 2/10 ] The Court today does
nothing to avoid that criticism. What is most disturbing about
today's decision, therefore, is not the standing analysis applied,
but the indifference Page 468 U. S. 783 evidenced by the Court to the detrimental effects that racially
segregated schools, supported by tax-exempt status from the Federal
Government, have on the respondents' attempt to obtain an education
in a racially integrated school system. I cannot join such
indifference, and would give the respondents a chance to prove
their case on the merits.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Because the District Court granted a motion to dismiss, see
Wright v. Miller, 480 F.
Supp. 790 , 793 (DC 1979), we must " accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and . . . construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party.'" Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S.
91 , 441 U. S. 109 (1979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490 , 422 U. S. 501 (1975)). See 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 112 . Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 , 355 U. S. 45 -46
(1957). [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															As I have recognized in 468
U.S. 737 fn2/1|>n. 1, supra, we must accept as true
the factual allegations made by the respondents. It nonetheless
should be noted that significant evidence exists to support the
respondents' claim that the IRS guidelines are ineffective. Indeed,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue admitted as much in testimony
before the Congress:

															"This litigation prompted the Service once again to review its
procedures in this area. It focused our attention on the adequacy
of existing policies and procedures as we moved to formulate a
litigation position. We concluded that the Service's procedures
were ineffective in identifying schools which, in actual operation,
discriminate against minority students, even though the
schools may profess an open enrollment policy and comply with the
yearly publication requirements of Revenue Procedure 75-50."

															" * * * *" "A clear indication that our rules require strengthening is the
fact that a number of private schools continue to hold tax
exemption even though they have been held by Federal courts to be
racially discriminatory. This position is indefensible. Just last year, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights criticized the
Service's enforcement in this area as inadequate, emphasizing the
continuing tax exemption of such adjudicated schools."

															Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1979) (statement of Jerome Kurtz,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue) (emphasis added). See also
id. at 236-251 (letter and memorandum from U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights criticizing IRS enforcement policies); id. at
1181-1182, 1187-1191 (statement and letter from Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice criticizing IRS
guidelines).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Because I conclude that the second injury alleged by the
respondents is sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements, I
do not need to reach what the Court labels the "stigmatic injury." See ante at 468 U. S.
754 -756, and n. 22. I note, however, that the Court has
mischaracterized this claim of injury by misreading the complaint
filed by the respondents. In particular, the respondents have not
simply alleged that, as blacks, they have suffered the denigration
injury "suffered by all members of a racial group when the
Government discriminates on the basis of race." Ante at 468 U. S. 754 .
Rather, the complaint, fairly read, limits the claim of stigmatic
injury from illegal governmental action to black children attending
public schools in districts that are currently desegregating, yet
contain discriminatory private schools benefiting from illegal tax
exemptions. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
at 455 U. S. 377 (injury from racial steering practices confined to "relatively
compact neighborhood[s]"). Thus, the Court's "parade of horribles"
concerning black plaintiffs from Hawaii challenging tax exemptions
granted to schools in Maine, see ante, at 468 U. S. 756 ,
is completely irrelevant for purposes of Art. III standing in this
action. Indeed, even if relevant, that criticism would go to the
scope of the class certified or the relief granted in the lawsuit,
issues that were not reached by the District Court or the Court of
Appeals and are not now before this Court.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The substance of these allegations is also summarized in � 2 of
the complaint:

															"Contrary to law and their public responsibility, defendants
have fostered and encouraged the development, operation and
expansion of these racially segregated private schools by granting
them, or the organizations that operate them, exemptions from
federal income taxation. . . . Defendants have thereby ensured that
these private schools will be exempt from federal income taxation,
and that contributions to them will be deductible by corporate and
individual donors for federal tax purposes. These federal tax
benefits are important to the financial wellbeing of private
segregated schools, and significantly support their development,
operation and expansion. Moreover, by facilitating the development,
operation and expansion of racially segregated schools which
provide alternative educational opportunities for white children
avoiding attendance in desegregating public school systems,
defendants are thereby interfering with the efforts of federal
courts, HEW and local school authorities to desegregate public
school districts which have operated racially dual school
systems."

															App. 17-18.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Court's confusion is evident from note 23 of its opinion, ante at 468 U. S. 758 .
The Court claims that "none of [the schools] alleged to be directly
receiving a tax exemption is alleged to be racially
discriminatory." This is directly contradicted not only by the
plain language of the complaint, see Complaint �� 2, 22,
App. 17-18, 25, but also by the Court's earlier concession that the
respondents' complaint alleges "grants of tax-exempt status to . .
. racially discriminatory private schools in desegregating
districts," ante at 468 U. S. 745 ,
n. 11.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Even if the Court were correct in its conclusion that there is
an insufficient factual basis alleged in the complaint, the proper
disposition would be to remand in order to afford the respondents
an opportunity to amend their complaint. See Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 , 455 U. S.
377 -378 (1982); Simon v. Eastern. Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26 , 426 U. S. 55 , n.
6 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Cf. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 12(e).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In particular, the plaintiffs in Norwood, suing on
behalf of a statewide class of black students, characterized the
basis for their standing as follows:

															"The named plaintiffs . . . are black citizens of the United
States residing in Tunica County, Mississippi. They are students in
attendance at the public schools of the Tunica County School
District. Their right to a racially integrated and otherwise
nondiscriminatory public school system, vindicated by order of [the
District Court] dated January 23, 1970 [ United States and
Driver v. Tunica County School District, Civil Action Nos. DC
6718 and 7013], and their right to the elimination of state support
for racially segregated schools, has been frustrated and/or
abridged by the creation of the racially segregated Tunica County
Institute of Learning and the policies and practices of defendants
as set forth below."

															App. 20 and Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Norwood v. Harrison, O.T. 1972, No. 72-77, p. 5. For the
reasons explained in the text, I find these allegations legally
indistinguishable from the allegations in the present
litigation.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Our subsequent decision in Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U. S. 556 (1974), heavily relied on our decision in Norwood. In Gilmore, we considered a challenge to a city policy that
permitted racially segregated schools and other segregated private
groups and clubs to use city parks and recreational facilities. In
affirming an injunction against exclusive access to such
facilities, we noted:

															"Any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level,
which significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in
whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible."

															"[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified
indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation, whether
attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"

															"This means that any tangible state assistance, outside the
generalized services government might provide to private segregated
schools in common with other schools and with all citizens, is
constitutionally prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.' The
constitutional obligation of the State"

															"requires it to steer clear not only of operating the old dual
system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving
significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other
invidious discrimination."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S.
568 -569 (citations omitted).

															The Court notes that the case in Gilmore was remanded
to the District Court for development of a more particularized
record to ensure that the nonexclusive use of the city's parks
" would result in cognizable injury to these plaintiffs.'" Ante at 468 U. S. 763 ,
n. 28 (quoting Gilmore, supra, at 417 U. S.
570 -571, n. 10). At most, however, this simply suggests
that a remand for more particularized pleadings is the proper
disposition in the present litigation. Cf. 468
U.S. 737 fn2/6|>n. 6, supra. The Court is therefore
no more faithful to the procedures followed in Gilmore than it is to the substance of that decision. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															The Court's discussion of our summary affirmance in Coit v.
Green simply stretches the imagination beyond its breaking
point. The Court concludes that

															"[t]he limited setting, the history of school desegregation in
Mississippi at the time of the Coit litigation, the nature
of the IRS conduct challenged at the outset of the litigation, and
the District Court's particular findings . . . amply distinguish
the Coit case from respondents' lawsuit." Ante at 468 U. S. 765 .
With all due respect, none of these criteria should be relevant to
the determination of standing in these cases.

															First, although the Coit litigation was limited to the
State of Mississippi, that relates solely to the scope of a
properly certified class, and not to the standing of class members
to maintain their action. Cf. 468
U.S. 737 fn2/3|>n. 3, supra. Second, although the
District Court made extensive findings concerning the importance of
tax exemptions to the discriminatory schools involved in the Coit litigation, that only helps to prove the truth of the
allegations made by the respondents in these cases. It also
demonstrates why the respondents should be given either an
opportunity to prove their case on the merits or an opportunity to
amend their pleadings with more particularized allegations. Cf. nn. 468
U.S. 737 fn2/6|>6, 468
U.S. 737 fn2/8|>8, supra. Because the respondents in
this litigation have never had their day in court, the Court's use
of the specific findings made in the Coit litigation to
deny the respondents standing in this litigation makes a mockery of
the standing inquiry. Third, although it is correct that, before
the Coit litigation, the IRS initially followed a policy
of granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools, that
should have no bearing on the respondents' standing in these cases;
indeed, the respondents have alleged that the current IRS
enforcement policy is so ineffective as to be the functional
equivalent of the Government's policy prior to the Coit litigation. See supra at 468 U. S. 768 ,
and n. 2. Finally, if the "history of school desegregation in
Mississippi at the time of the Coit litigation" is at all
relevant to the standing inquiry, it weighs in favor of allowing
the respondents to maintain their present lawsuit. From the
perspective of black children attending desegregating public
schools, and according to the allegations included in their
complaint, current IRS policies toward racially discriminatory
private schools represent a substantial continuation of the onerous
history of school desegregation in the affected school districts.
With all respect, therefore, the Court has simply failed to
distinguish these cases from our summary affirmance in Coit v.
Green. [ Footnote 2/10 ] See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-21
(1978); Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 14-22 (1982); Nichol, Causation as a
Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint,
69 Ky.L.J. 185 (1980-1981); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A
Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell L.Rev. 663 (1977).

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins,
dissenting.

															Three propositions are clear to me: (1) respondents have
adequately alleged "injury in fact"; (2) their injury is fairly
traceable to the conduct that they claim to be unlawful; and (3)
the "separation of powers" principle does not create a
jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the merits of their
claim. I Respondents, the parents of black schoolchildren, have alleged
that their children are unable to attend fully desegregated schools
because large numbers of white children in the areas in which
respondents reside attend private schools which do not admit
minority children. The Court, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and I all agree that
this is an adequate allegation of "injury in fact." The Court is
quite correct when it writes:

															"The injury they identify -- their children's diminished ability
to receive an education in a racially integrated school -- is,
beyond any doubt, not only judicially cognizable but, as shown by
cases from Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S.
483 (1954), to Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983), one of the
most serious injuries recognized in our legal system." Ante at 468 U. S. 756 .
This kind of injury may be actionable whether it is caused by the
exclusion of black children from public schools or by an official
policy of encouraging white children to attend nonpublic Page 468 U. S. 784 schools. A subsidy for the withdrawal of a white child can have
the same effect as a penalty for admitting a black child. II In final analysis, the wrong respondents allege that the
Government has committed is to subsidize the exodus of white
children from schools that would otherwise be racially integrated.
The critical question in these cases, therefore, is whether
respondents have alleged that the Government has created that kind
of subsidy.

															In answering that question, we must, of course, assume that
respondents can prove what they have alleged. Furthermore, at this
stage of the litigation, we must put to one side all questions
about the appropriateness of a nationwide class action. [ Footnote 3/1 ] The controlling issue is
whether the causal connection between the injury and the wrong has
been adequately alleged.

															An organization that qualifies for preferential treatment under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, because it is "operated
exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes," 26 Page 468 U. S. 785 U.S.C. § 501(C)(3), is exempt from paying federal income taxes,
and, under § 170 of the Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170, persons who
contribute to such organizations may deduct the amount of their
contributions when calculating their taxable income. Only last
Term, we explained the effect of this preferential treatment:

															"Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy
that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has
much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible
contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion
of the individual's contributions." Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540 , 461 U. S. 544 (1983) (footnote omitted). The purpose of this scheme, like the
purpose of any subsidy, is to promote the activity subsidized; the
statutes "seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the
development of certain organizations through the grant of tax
benefits." Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574 , 461 U. S. 587 ,
n. 10 (1983). If the granting of preferential tax treatment would
"encourage" private segregated schools to conduct their
"charitable" activities, it must follow that the withdrawal of the
treatment would "discourage" them, and hence promote the process of
desegregation. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Page 468 U. S. 786 We have held that, when a subsidy makes a given activity more or
less expensive, injury can be fairly traced to the subsidy for
purposes of standing analysis because of the resulting increase or
decrease in the ability to engage in the activity. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Indeed, we have employed exactly this
causation analysis in the same context at issue here -- subsidies
given private schools that practice racial discrimination. Thus, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.
S. 556 (1974), we easily recognized the causal
connection between official policies that enhanced the
attractiveness of segregated schools and the failure to bring about
or maintain a desegregated public school system. [ Footnote 3/4 ] Similarly, in Norwood
v. Harrison , Page 468 U. S. 787 413 U. S. 455 (1973), we concluded that the provision of textbooks to
discriminatory private schools "has a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." Id. at 413 U. S.
466 .

															The Court itself appears to embrace this reading of Gilmore and Norwood. It describes Gilmore as holding that a city's policy of permitting
segregated private schools to use public parks

															"would impede the integration of the public schools. Exclusive
availability of the public parks 'significantly enhanced the
attractiveness of segregated private schools . . . by enabling them
to offer complete athletic programs.'" Ante at 468 U. S. 762 ,
n. 27 (quoting 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 569 ). It characterizes Norwood as
having concluded that the provision of textbooks to such schools
would impede court-ordered desegregation. Ante at 468 U. S. 763 .
Although the form of the subsidy for segregated private schools
involved in Gilmore and Norwood was different
from the "cash grant" that flows from a tax exemption, the economic
effect and causal connection between the subsidy and the impact on
the complaining litigants was precisely the same in those cases as
it is here. Page 468 U. S. 788 This causation analysis is nothing more than a restatement of
elementary economics: when something becomes more expensive, less
of it will be purchased. Sections 170 and 501(c)(3) are premised on
that recognition. If racially discriminatory private schools lose
the "cash grants" that flow from the operation of the statutes, the
education they provide will become more expensive, and hence less
of their services will be purchased. Conversely, maintenance of
these tax benefits makes an education in segregated private schools
relatively more attractive by decreasing its cost. Accordingly,
without tax-exempt status, private schools will either not be
competitive in terms of cost or have to change their admissions
policies, hence reducing their competitiveness for parents seeking
"a racially segregated alternative" to public schools, which is
what respondents have alleged many white parents in desegregating
school districts seek. [ Footnote
3/5 ] In either event, the process of desegregation will be
advanced in the same way that it was advanced in Gilmore and Norwood -- the withdrawal of the subsidy for
segregated schools means the incentive structure facing white
parents who seek such schools for their children will be altered.
Thus, the laws of economics, not to mention the laws of Congress
embodied in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3), compel the conclusion that the
injury respondents have alleged -- the increased segregation of
their children's schools because of the ready availability of
private schools that admit whites only -- will be redressed if
these schools' operations are inhibited through the denial of
preferential tax treatment. [ Footnote
3/6 ] Page 468 U. S. 789 III Considerations of tax policy, economics, and pure logic all
confirm the conclusion that respondents' injury in fact is fairly
traceable to the Government's allegedly wrongful conduct. The Court
therefore is forced to introduce the concept of "separation of
powers" into its analysis. The Court writes that the separation of
powers "explains why our cases preclude the conclusion" that
respondents' injury is fairly traceable to the conduct they
challenge. Ante at 468 U. S.
759 .

															The Court could mean one of three things by its invocation of
the separation of powers. First, it could simply be expressing the
idea that, if the plaintiff lacks Art. III standing to bring a
lawsuit, then there is no "case or controversy" Page 468 U. S. 790 within the meaning of Art. III, and hence the matter is not
within the area of responsibility assigned to the Judiciary by the
Constitution. As we have written in the past, through the standing
requirement,

															"Art. III limit[s] the federal judicial power 'to those disputes
which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of
separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capable
of resolution through the judicial process.'" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.
S. 464 , 454 U. S. 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
83 , 392 U. S. 97 (1968)). [ Footnote 3/7 ] While there
can be no quarrel with this proposition, in itself it provides no
guidance for determining if the injury respondents have alleged is
fairly traceable to the conduct they have challenged.

															Second, the Court could be saying that it will require a more
direct causal connection when it is troubled by the separation of
powers implications of the case before it. That approach confuses
the standing doctrine with the justiciability of the issues that
respondents seek to raise. The purpose of the standing inquiry is
to measure the plaintiff's stake in the outcome, not whether a
court has the authority to provide it with the outcome it
seeks:

															"[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to
warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and
to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S.
498 -499 (1975) (emphasis in original) (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962)). [ Footnote 3/8 ] Page 468 U. S. 791 Thus, the

															"'fundamental aspect of standing' is that it focuses primarily
on the party seeking to get his complaint before the
federal court, rather than 'on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated,'" United States v. Richardson, 418 U.
S. 166 , 418 U. S. 174 (1974) (emphasis in original) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 99 ).
The strength of the plaintiff's interest in the outcome has nothing
to do with whether the relief it seeks would intrude upon the
prerogatives of other branches of government; the possibility that
the relief might be inappropriate does not lessen the plaintiff's
stake in obtaining that relief. If a plaintiff presents a
nonjusticiable issue, or seeks relief that a court may not award,
then its complaint should be dismissed for those reasons, and not
because the plaintiff lacks a stake in obtaining that relief, and
hence has no standing. [ Footnote
3/9 ] Imposing an undefined but clearly more rigorous standard
for redressability for reasons unrelated to the causal nexus
between the injury and the challenged conduct Page 468 U. S. 792 can only encourage undisciplined, ad hoc litigation, a
result that would be avoided if the Court straightforwardly
considered the justiciability of the issues respondents seek to
raise, rather than using those issues to obfuscate standing
analysis. [ Footnote 3/10 ]

															Third, the Court could be saying that it will not treat as
legally cognizable injuries that stem from an administrative
decision concerning how enforcement resources will be allocated.
This surely is an important point. Respondents do seek to
restructure the IRS's mechanisms for enforcing the legal
requirement that discriminatory institutions not receive tax-exempt
status. Such restructuring would dramatically Page 468 U. S. 793 affect the way in which the IRS exercises its prosecutorial
discretion. The Executive requires latitude to decide how best to
enforce the law, and in general the Court may well be correct that
the exercise of that discretion, especially in the tax context, is
unchallengeable.

															However, as the Court also recognizes, this principle does not
apply when suit is brought "to enforce specific legal obligations
whose violation works a direct harm," ante at 468 U. S. 761 .
For example, despite the fact that they were challenging the
methods used by the Executive to enforce the law, citizens were
accorded standing to challenge a pattern of police misconduct that
violated the constitutional constraints on law enforcement
activities in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.
S. 802 (1974). [ Footnote
3/11 ] Here, respondents contend that the IRS is violating a
specific constitutional limitation on its enforcement discretion.
There is a solid basis for that contention. In Norwood, we
wrote:

															"A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear,
not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated
schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that
practice racial or other invidious discrimination."

															413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 467 . Gilmore echoed this theme:

															"[A]ny tangible State assistance, outside the generalized
services government might provide to private segregated schools in
common with other schools, and with all citizens, is
constitutionally prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.' Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455 , 413 U. S.
466 (1973). The constitutional obligation of the State
'requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual
system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving
significant aid to institutions that practice racial Page 468 U. S. 794 or other invidious discrimination.' Id. at 413 U. S.
467 ."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S.
568 -569.

															Respondents contend that these cases limit the enforcement
discretion enjoyed by the IRS. They establish, respondents argue,
that the IRS cannot provide "cash grants" to discriminatory schools
through preferential tax treatment without running afoul of a
constitutional duty to refrain from "giving significant aid" to
these institutions. Similarly, respondents claim that the Internal
Revenue Code itself, as construed in Bob Jones, constrains
enforcement discretion. [ Footnote
3/12 ] It has been clear since Marbury v.
Madison , 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is." Id. at 5 U. S. 177 .
Deciding whether the Treasury has violated a specific legal Page 468 U. S. 795 limitation on its enforcement discretion does not intrude upon
the prerogatives of the Executive, for, in so deciding, we are
merely saying "what the law is." Surely the question whether the
Constitution or the Code limits enforcement discretion is one
within the Judiciary's competence, and I do not believe that the
question whether the law, as enunciated in Gilmore,
Norwood, and Bob Jones, imposes such an obligation
upon the IRS is so insubstantial that respondents' attempt to raise
it should be defeated for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
the ground that it infringes the Executive's prerogatives.
[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															In short, I would deal with the question of the legal
limitations on the IRS's enforcement discretion on its merits,
rather than by making the untenable assumption that the granting of
preferential tax treatment to segregated schools does not make
those schools more attractive to white students, and hence does not
inhibit the process of desegregation. I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The question whether respondents have adequately alleged their
standing must be separated from the question whether they can prove
what has been alleged. It may be that questions concerning the
racial policies of given schools, and the impact of their tax
treatment on enrollment, vary widely from school to school, making
inappropriate the nationwide class described in respondents'
complaint. A case in which it was proved that a segregated private
school opened just as a nearby public school system began
desegregating pursuant to court order, that the IRS knew the school
did not admit blacks, and that the school prospered only as a
result of favorable tax treatment, might be very different from one
in which the plaintiff attempted to prove a nationwide policy and
its effect. However, as JUSTICE BRENNAN observes, ante at 468 U. S.
770 -771, n. 3, 780-781, n. 9, that goes to whether
respondents can prove the nationwide policy they have alleged, and
whether the factual issues they raise are sufficiently national in
scope to justify the certification of a nationwide class. I rather
doubt that a nationwide class would be appropriate, but, at this
stage, respondents' allegations of injury must be taken as true, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 422 U. S. 501 (1975), and hence we must assume that respondents can prove the
existence of a nationwide policy and its alleged effects.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Respondents' complaint is premised on precisely this theory. The
complaint, in �� 39-48, describes a number of private schools which
receive preferential tax treatment and which allegedly discriminate
on the basis of race, providing white children with "a racially
segregated alternative to attendance" in the public schools which
respondents' children attend. The complaint then states:

															"There are thousands of other racially segregated private
schools which operate or serve desegregating public school
districts and which function under the umbrella of organizations
which have received, applied for, or will apply for, federal tax
exemptions. Moreover, many additional public school districts will,
in the future, begin desegregating pursuant to court order or
[government] regulations and guidelines, under state law or
voluntarily. Additional racially segregated private schools may be
organized or expanded, many of which will be operated by
organizations which have received, applied for, or will apply for
federal tax exemptions. As in the case of those representative
organizations and private schools described in paragraphs 39-48, supra, such organizations and schools provide, or will
provide, white children with a racially segregated alternative to
desegregating public schools. By recognizing these
organizations as exempt from federal taxation, defendants
facilitate their development, operation and expansion and the
provision of racially segregated educational opportunities for
white children avoiding attendance in desegregating public school
systems. Defendants thereby also interfere with the efforts of
federal courts, [the Federal Government] and local school
authorities to eliminate racially dual school systems. "

															App. 38 (emphasis supplied).

															Thus, like JUSTICE BRENNAN, ante at 468 U. S.
774 -775, I do not understand why the Court states that
the complaint contains no allegation that the tax benefits received
by private segregated schools "make an appreciable difference in
public school integration," ante at 468 U. S. 758 ,
unless the Court requires "intricacies of pleading that would have
gladdened the heart of Baron Parke." Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 1281, 1305 (1976).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59 , 438 U. S. 74 -78
(1978); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.
S. 669 , 412 U. S.
687 -689 (1973); see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 (1970).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															We agreed with the District Court's following reasoning:

															"Montgomery officials were under an affirmative duty to bring
about and to maintain a desegregated public school system.
Providing recreational facilities to de facto or de
jure segregated private schools was inconsistent with that
duty, because such aid enhanced the attractiveness of those
schools, generated capital savings that could be used to improve
their private educational offerings, and provided means to raise
other revenue to support the institutions, all to the detriment of
establishing the constitutionally mandated unitary public school
system."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 563 .
We went on to write:

															"Any arrangement, implemented by state officials at any level,
which significantly tends to perpetuate a dual school system, in
whatever manner, is constitutionally impermissible."

															"[T]he constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated
against . . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified
indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether
attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously.'"

															"This means that any tangible state assistance, outside the
generalized services government might provide to private segregated
schools in common with other schools, and with all citizens, is
constitutionally prohibited if it has 'a significant tendency to
facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.'" Id. at 417 U. S. 568 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S.
1 , 358 U. S. 17 (1958), and Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.
S. 455 , 413 U. S. 466 (1973)).

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															It is this "racially segregated alternative" to public schools
-- the availability of schools that "receive tax exemptions merely
on the basis of adopting and certifying -- but not implementing --
a policy of nondiscrimination," App. 17-18, which respondents
allege white parents have found attractive, see id. at
23-24, and which would either lose their cost advantage or their
character as a segregated alternative if denied tax-exempt status
because of their discriminatory admissions policies.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															This causation analysis explains the holding in the case on
which the Court chiefly relies, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976). There, the plaintiffs -- indigent persons in need of free
medical care -- alleged that they were harmed by the Secretary of
the Treasury's decision to permit hospitals to retain charitable
status while offering a reduced level of free care. However, while
here the source of the causal nexus is the price that white parents
must pay to obtain a segregated education, which is inextricably
intertwined with the school's tax status, in Simon, the
plaintiffs were seeking free care, which hospitals could decide not
to provide for any number of reasons unrelated to their tax status. See id. at 426 U. S. 42 -43,
and n. 23. Moreover, in Simon, the hospitals had to spend
money in order to obtain charitable status. Therefore, they had an
economic incentive to forgo preferential treatment. As the Court
observed:

															"It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the
Court's remedial powers in this suit would result in the
availability to respondents of such services. So far as the
complaint sheds light, it is just as plausible that the hospitals
to which respondents may apply for service would elect to forgo
favorable tax treatment to avoid the undetermined financial drain
of an increase in the level of uncompensated services. . . .
[C]onflicting evidence supports the common sense proposition that
the dependence upon special tax benefits may vary from hospital to
hospital." Id. at 426 U. S.
43 .

															In contrast, the tax benefits private schools receive here
involve no "financial drain," since the schools need not provide
"uncompensated services" in order to obtain preferential tax
treatment. Thus, the economic effect of the challenged tax
treatment in these cases is not "speculative," as the Court
concluded it was in Simon. Here the financial incentives
run in only one direction.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 498 ; Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208 , 418 U. S. 222 (1974).

															[ Footnote 3/8 ] See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S.
95 , 461 U. S.
101 -102 (1983); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 438 U. S. 72 ; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426
U.S. at 426 U. S. 38 ; Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U.S. at 418 U. S.
220 -221; United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 , 418 U. S. 179 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 , 414 U. S.
493 -494 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.
S. 113 , 410 U. S. 123 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.
S. 727 , 405 U. S.
731 -732 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
83 , 392 U. S. 99 (1968).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															The Flast Court made precisely this point:

															"When the emphasis in the standing problem is placed on whether
the person invoking a federal court's jurisdiction is a proper
party to maintain the action, the weakness of the Government's
argument in this case becomes apparent. The question whether a
particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does
not, by its own force, raise separation of powers problems related
to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at
all, only from the substantive issues the individual seeks to have
adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal
court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in
standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court
jurisdiction has 'a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy,' and whether the dispute touches upon 'the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Id. at 392 U. S.
100 -101 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962), and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 , 300 U. S.
240 -241 (1937)).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															The danger of the Court's approach is illustrated by its failure
to provide any standards to guide courts in determining when it is
appropriate to require a more rigorous redressability showing
because of separation of powers concerns, or how redressability can
be demonstrated in a case raising separation of power concerns. The
only guidance the Court offers is that the separation of powers
counsels against recognizing standing when the plaintiff "seek[s] a
restructuring of the apparatus established by the Executive Branch
to fulfill its legal duties." Ante at 468 U. S. 761 .
That cannot be an appropriate test; the separation of powers
tolerates quite a bit of "restructuring" in order to eliminate the
effects of racial segregation. For example, in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954), we held that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Executive
from maintaining a dual school system. We have subsequently made it
clear that the courts have authority to restructure both school
attendance patterns and curriculum when necessary to eliminate the
effects of a dual school system. See, e.g., Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.
S. 267 (1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971).
At the same time, standing doctrine has never stood as a barrier to
such "restructuring." In the seminal case of Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), the Court accorded voters standing to challenge population
variations between electoral districts despite the fact that the
legislative reapportionment sought would, and eventually did, have
dramatic "restructuring" effects. Only two Terms ago, in Watt
v. Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.
S. 151 , 454 U. S.
160 -162 (1981), the Court accorded California standing
to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's methods for accepting
bids on oil and gas rights despite the fact that this would affect
the manner in which the Executive Branch discharged "[its] duty to take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed,'" ante at 468 U. S.
761 . [ Footnote 3/11 ] See also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.
S. 210 , 466 U. S. 217 ,
n. 4 (1984).

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															In Bob Jones, we clearly indicated that the Internal
Revenue Code not only permits, but in fact requires, the denial of
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools:

															"Few social or political issues in our history have been more
vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue
of racial discrimination, particularly in education. Given the
stress and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the
shackles of the 'separate but equal' doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), it cannot
be said that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons,
practice racial discrimination are institutions exercising
'beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life,' Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S.
673 (1970), or should be encouraged by having all
taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax status."

															"There can thus be no question that the interpretation of § 170
and § 501(C)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct. That it
may be seen as belated does not undermine its soundness. It would
be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption
to grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory educational entities, which 'exer[t] a pervasive
influence on the entire educational process.' Norwood V.
Harrison, [413 U.S.] at 413 U. S.
469 . Whatever may be the rationale for such private
schools' policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial
discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. Racially
discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as
conferring a public benefit within the 'charitable' concept
discussed earlier, or within the congressional intent underlying §
170 and § 501(C)(3)."

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S.
595 -596.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															It has long been the rule that, unless a claim is wholly
insubstantial, it may not be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.
S. 678 (1946).

Summary: In Allen v. Wright, the United States Supreme Court ruled that parents of black children attending desegregating public schools lacked standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) over its tax-exempt status policy for racially discriminatory private schools. The parents argued that the IRS's failure to deny tax-exempt status to these private schools harmed their children's opportunity to receive an education in desegregated public schools. However, the Court held that the parents could not demonstrate a personal injury fairly traceable to the IRS's conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.