U.S. Supreme Court Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S.
96 (1975) Michigan v. Moseley No. 74-653 Argued October 6,
1975 Decided December 9,
1975 423 U.S.
96 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MICHIGAN Syllabus Respondent, who had been arrested in connection with certain
robberies and advised by a detective in accordance with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ,
that he was not obliged to answer any questions and that he could
remain silent if he wished, and having made oral and written
acknowledgment of the Miranda warnings, declined to
discuss the robberies, whereupon the detective ceased the
interrogation. More than two hours later, after giving Miranda warnings, another detective questioned respondent
solely about an unrelated murder. Respondent made an inculpatory
statement, which was later used in his trial for murder, which
resulted in his conviction. The appellate court reversed on the
ground that Miranda mandated a cessation of all
interrogation after respondent had declined to answer the first
detective's questions. Held: The admission in evidence of respondent's
incriminating statement did not violate Miranda principles. Respondent's right to cut off questioning was
scrupulously honored, the police having immediately ceased the
robbery interrogation after respondent's refusal to answer and
having commenced questioning about the murder only after a
significant time lapse and after a fresh set of warnings had been
given respondent. Westover v. United States, 384 U.
S. 436 , distinguished. Pp. 423 U. S.
99 -107.

															51 Mich.App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564, vacated and remanded.

															STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 423 U. S. 107 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined, post, p. 423 U. S.
111 . Page 423 U. S. 97 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The respondent, Richard Bert Mosley, was arrested in Detroit,
Mich., in the early afternoon of April 8, 1971, in connection with
robberies that had recently occurred at the Blue Goose Bar and the
White Tower Restaurant on that city's lower east side. The
arresting officer, Detective James Cowie of the Armed Robbery
Section of the Detroit Police Department, was acting on a tip
implicating Mosley and three other men in the robberies. [ Footnote 1 ] After effecting the arrest,
Detective Cowie brought Mosley to the Robbery, Breaking and
Entering Bureau of the Police Department, located on the fourth
floor of the departmental headquarters building. The officer
advised Mosley of his rights under this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , and
had him read and sign the department's constitutional rights
notification certificate. After filling out the necessary arrest
papers, Cowie began questioning Mosley about the robbery of the
White Tower Restaurant. When Mosley said he did not want to answer
any questions about the robberies, Cowie promptly ceased the
interrogation. The completion of the arrest papers and the
questioning of Mosley together took approximately 20 minutes. At no
time during the questioning did Mosley indicate a desire to consult
with a lawyer, and there is no claim that the procedures followed
to this point did not fully comply with the strictures of the Miranda opinion. Mosley was then taken to a ninth-floor
cell block.

															Shortly after 6 p.m., Detective Hill of the Detroit Page 423 U. S. 98 Police Department Homicide Bureau brought Mosley from the cell
block to the fifth-floor office of the Homicide Bureau for
questioning about the fatal shooting of a man named Leroy Williams.
Williams had been killed on January 9, 1971, during a holdup
attempt outside the 101 Ranch Bar in Detroit. Mosley had not been
arrested on this charge or interrogated about it by Detective
Cowie. [ Footnote 2 ] Before
questioning Mosley about this homicide, Detective Hill carefully
advised him of his " Miranda rights." Mosley read the
notification form both silently and aloud, and Detective Hill then
read and explained the warnings to him and had him sign the form.
Mosley at first denied any involvement in the Williams murder, but
after the officer told him that Anthony Smith had confessed to
participating in the slaying and had named him as the "shooter,"
Mosley made a statement implicating himself in the homicide.
[ Footnote 3 ] The interrogation
by Detective Hill lasted approximately 15 minutes, and at no time
during its course did Mosley ask to consult with a lawyer or
indicate that he did not want to discuss the homicide. In short,
there is no claim that the procedures followed during Detective
Hill's interrogation of Mosley, standing alone, did not fully
comply with the strictures of the Miranda opinion..
[ Footnote 4 ]

															Mosley was subsequently charged in a one-count information with
first-degree murder. Before the trial, he moved to suppress his
incriminating statement on a number of grounds, among them the
claim that, under the doctrine of the Miranda case, it was
constitutionally Page 423 U. S. 99 impermissible for Detective Hill to question him about the
Williams murder after he had told Detective Cowie that he did not
want to answer any questions about the robberies. [ Footnote 5 ] The trial court denied the motion
to suppress after an evidentiary hearing, and the incriminating
statement was subsequently introduced in evidence against Mosley at
his trial. The jury convicted Mosley of first-degree murder, and
the court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

															On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Mosley renewed his
previous objections to the use of his incriminating statement in
evidence. The appellate court reversed the judgment of conviction,
holding that Detective Hill's interrogation of Mosley had been a per se violation of the Miranda doctrine.
Accordingly, without reaching Mosley's other contentions, the Court
remanded the case for a new trial with instructions that Mosley's
statement be suppressed as evidence. 51 Mich.App. 105, 214 N.W.2d
564. After further appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court,
392 Mich. 764, the State filed a petition for certiorari here. We
granted the writ because of the important constitutional question
presented. 419 U.S. 1119.

															In the Miranda case, this Court promulgated a set of
safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of
persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. In sum, the
Court held in that case that, unless law enforcement officers give
certain specified warnings before Page 423 U. S. 100 questioning a person in custody, [ Footnote 6 ] and follow certain specified procedures during
the course of any subsequent interrogation, any statement made by
the person in custody cannot over his objection be admitted in
evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the
statement may, in fact, be wholly voluntary. See Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 , 417 U. S.
443 .

															Neither party in the present case challenges the continuing
validity of the Miranda decision, or of any of the
so-called guidelines it established to protect what the Court there
said was a person's constitutional privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. The issue in this case, rather, is whether the
conduct of the Detroit police that led to Mosley's incriminating
statement did, in fact, violate the Miranda "guidelines,"
so as to render the statement inadmissible in evidence against
Mosley at his trial. Resolution of the question turns almost
entirely on the interpretation of a single passage in the Miranda opinion, upon which the Michigan appellate court
relied in finding a per se violation of Miranda: "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right
to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody Page 423 U. S. 101 interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice
in producing a statement after the privilege has been once
invoked."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
473 -474. [ Footnote
7 ]

															This passage states that "the interrogation must cease" when the
person in custody indicates that "he wishes to remain silent." It
does not state under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of
questioning is permissible. [ Footnote 8 ] The passage could be literally read to mean
that Page 423 U. S. 102 a person who has invoked his "right to silence" can never again
be subjected to custodial interrogation by any police officer at
any time or place on any subject. Another possible construction of
the passage would characterize "any statement taken after the
person invokes his privilege" as "the product of compulsion," and
would therefore mandate its exclusion from evidence, even if it
were volunteered by the person in custody without any further
interrogation whatever. Or the passage could be interpreted to
require only the immediate cessation of questioning, and to permit
a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite.

															It is evident that any of these possible literal interpretations
would lead to absurd and unintended results. To permit the
continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation
would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by
allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of
the person being questioned. At the other extreme, a blanket
prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the
circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into
wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative
activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed
and intelligent assessments of their interests. Clearly, therefore,
neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by
any Page 423 U. S. 103 police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has
indicated a desire to remain silent. [ Footnote 9 ]

															A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to
adopt

															"fully effective means . . . to notify the person of his right
of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored. . . ."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 479 .
The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a
person's "right to cut off questioning." Id. at 384 U. S. 474 .
Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning, he can
control the time at Page 423 U. S. 104 which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the
duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement
authorities must respect a person's exercise of that option
counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We
therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained
after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends
under Miranda on whether his "right to cut off
questioning" was "scrupulously honored." [ Footnote 10 ]

															A review of the circumstances leading to Mosley's confession
reveals that his "right to cut off questioning" was fully respected
in this case. Before his initial interrogation, Mosley was
carefully advised that he was under no obligation to answer any
questions and could remain silent if he wished. He orally
acknowledged that he understood the Miranda warnings, and
then signed a printed notification-of-rights form. When Mosley
stated that he did not want to discuss the robberies, Detective
Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation, and did not try either
to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to
reconsider his position. After an interval of more than two hours,
Mosley was questioned by another police officer at another location
about an unrelated holdup murder. He was given full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second
interrogation. He was thus reminded again that he could remain
silent and could consult with a lawyer, Page 423 U. S. 105 and was carefully given a full and fair opportunity to exercise
these options. The subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosley's
previous decision not to answer Detective Cowie's inquiries.
Detective Hill did not resume the interrogation about the White
Tower Restaurant robbery or inquire about the Blue Goose Bar
robbery, but instead focused exclusively on the Leroy Williams
homicide, a crime different in nature and in time and place of
occurrence from the robberies for which Mosley had been arrested
and interrogated by Detective Cowie. Although it is not clear from
the record how much Detective Hill knew about the earlier
interrogation, his questioning of Mosley about an unrelated
homicide was quite consistent with a reasonable interpretation of
Mosley's earlier refusal to answer any questions about the
robberies. [ Footnote 11 ]

															This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor
a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by
refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by
persisting in repeated efforts to Page 423 U. S. 106 wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. In
contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the
interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a
significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of
warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that
had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.

															The Michigan Court of Appeals viewed this case as factually
similar to Westover v. United States, 384 U.
S. 436 , a companion case to Miranda. But the
controlling facts of the two cases are strikingly different.

															In Westover, the petitioner was arrested by the Kansas
City police at 9:45 p.m. and taken to the police station. Without
giving any advisory warnings of any kind to Westover, the police
questioned him that night and throughout the next morning about
various local robberies. At noon, three FBI agents took over, gave
advisory warnings to Westover, and proceeded to question him about
two California bank robberies. After two hours of questioning, the
petitioner confessed to the California crimes. The Court held that
the confession obtained by the FBI was inadmissible because the
interrogation leading to the petitioner's statement followed on the
heels of prolonged questioning that was commenced and continued by
the Kansas City police without preliminary warnings to Westover of
any kind. The Court found that "the federal authorities were the
beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody
interrogation," and that the belated warnings given by the federal
officers were "not sufficient to protect" Westover, because, from
his point of view, "the warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process." Id. at 384 U. S. 497 , 384 U. S.
496 .

															Here, by contrast, the police gave full " Miranda warnings" to Mosley at the very outset of each interrogation,
subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning, Page 423 U. S. 107 and suspended questioning entirely for a significant period
before beginning the interrogation that led to his incriminating
statement. The cardinal fact of Westover -- the failure of
the police officers to give any warnings whatever to the person in
their custody before embarking on an intense and prolonged
interrogation of him -- was simply not present in this case. The
Michigan Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in believing
that Detective Hill's questioning of Mosley was "not permitted" by
the Westover decision. 51 Mich.App. at 108, 214 N.W.2d at
566.

															For these reasons, we conclude that the admission in evidence of
Mosley's incriminating statement did not violate the principles of Miranda v. Arizona. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Michigan Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to
that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The officer testified that information supplied by an anonymous
caller was the sole basis for his arrest of Mosley.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The original tip to Detective Cowie had, however, implicated
Mosley in the Williams murder.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															During cross-examination by Mosley's counsel at the evidentiary
hearing, Detective Hill conceded that Smith, in fact, had not
confessed, but had "denied a physical participation in the
robbery."

															[ Footnote 4 ] But see n 5, infra. [ Footnote 5 ]

															In addition to the claim that Detective Hill's questioning
violated Miranda, Mosley contended that the statement was
the product of an illegal arrest, that the statement was
inadmissible because he had not been taken before a judicial
officer without unnecessary delay, and that it had been obtained
through trickery and promises of leniency. He argued that these
circumstances, either independently or in combination, required the
suppression of his incriminating statement.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The warnings must inform the person in custody

															"that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
444 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The present case does not involve the procedures to be followed
if the person in custody asks to consult with a lawyer, since
Mosley made no such request at any time. Those procedures are
detailed in the Miranda opinion as follows:

															"If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that
time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the
attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning.
If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that
he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his
decision to remain silent."

															"This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police
station must have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to
advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that, if police propose to
interrogate a person, they must make known to him that he is
entitled to a lawyer and that, if he cannot afford one, a lawyer
will be provided for him prior to any interrogation. If authorities
conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable
period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out,
they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth
Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that
time." Id. at 384 U. S.
474 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Court did state in a footnote:

															"If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has
an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which
further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of
evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of
counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the
interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a waiver of
the privilege for purposes of these statements." Id. at 384 U. S. 474 n. 44. This footnote in the Miranda opinion is not
relevant to the present case, since Mosley did not have an attorney
present at the time he declined to answer Detective Cowie's
questions, and the officer did not continue to question Mosley, but
instead ceased the interrogation in compliance with Miranda's dictates.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															It is instructive to note that the vast majority of federal and
state courts presented with the issue have concluded that the Miranda opinion does not create a per se proscription of any further interrogation once the person being
questioned has indicated a desire to remain silent. See Hill v.
Whealon, 490 F.2d 629, 630, 635 (CA6 1974); United States
v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 802 (CA2 1972) (en banc); Jennings v. United States, 391 F.2d 512, 515-516 (CA5
1968); United States v. Choice, 392 F.
Supp. 460 , 466-467 (ED Pa.1975); McIntyre v. New
York, 329 F. Supp.
9 , 13-14 (EDNY 1971); People v. Naranjo, 181 Colo.
273, 277-278, 509 P.2d 1235 ,
1237 (1973); People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d
39 , 54-56, 302 N.E.2d 7 ,
16-17 (1973); State v. McClelland, 164 N.W.2d 189 ,
192-196 (Iowa 1969); State v. Law, 214 Kan. 643, 647-649, 522 P.2d 320 ,
324-325 (1974); Conway v. State, 7 Md.App. 400, 405-411, 256 A.2d 178 , 181-184 (1969); State v. O'Neill, 299
Minn. 60, 70-71, 216 N.W.2d
822 , 829 (1974); State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451,
454-457, 155 N.W.2d
438 , 440-442 (1968); People v. Gar, 31 N.Y.2d 68,
69-70, 286 N.E.2d 263, 264 (197.2); State v. Bishop, 272
N.C. 283, 296-297, 158 S.E.2d
511 , 520 (1968); Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa.
231, 233-234, 296 A.2d 730, 731 (1972); State v. Robinson, 87 S.D. 375, 378, 209 N.W.2d
374 , 375-377 (1973); Hill v. State, 429
S.W.2d 481 , 486-487 (Tex.Crim.App. 1968); State v.
Estrada, 63 Wis.2d 476, 486-488, 217 N.W.2d
359 , 365-366 (1974). See also People v.
Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d
714 , 717-720, 441 P.2d 625, 626-628 (1968) (permitting the
suspect but not the police to initiate further questioning).

															Citation of the above cases does not imply a view of the merits
of any particular decision.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The dissenting opinion asserts that Miranda established
a requirement that, once a person has indicated a desire to remain
silent, questioning may be resumed only when counsel is present. Post at 423 U. S.
116 -117. But clearly the Court in Miranda imposed no such requirement, for it distinguished between the
procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a
request for an attorney and directed that "the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present" only "[i]f the individual
states that he wants an attorney." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
474 .

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Detective Cowie gave the only testimony at the suppression
hearing concerning the scope of Mosley's earlier refusal to answer
his questions:

															"A. I think at that time he declined to answer whether he had
been involved."

															"Q. He declined to answer?"

															"A. Yes. Anything about the robberies."

															At the suppression hearing, Mosley did not in any way dispute
Cowie's testimony. Not until trial, after the judge had denied the
motion to suppress the incriminating statement, did Mosley offer a
somewhat different version of his earlier refusal to answer
Detective Cowie's questions. The briefs submitted by Mosley's
counsel to the Michigan Court of Appeals and to this Court accepted
Detective Cowie's account of the interrogation as correct, and the
Michigan Court of Appeals decided the case on that factual premise.
At oral argument before this Court, both counsel discussed the case
solely in terms of Cowie's description of the events.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the result.

															I concur in the result and in much of the majority's reasoning.
However, it appears to me that, in an effort to make only a limited
holding in this case, the majority has implied that some custodial
confessions will be suppressed even though they follow an informed
and voluntary waiver of the defendant's rights. The majority seems
to say that a statement obtained within some unspecified time after
an assertion by an individual of his "right to silence" is always
inadmissible, even if it was the result of an informed and
voluntary decision -- following, for example, a disclosure to such
an individual of a piece of information bearing on his waiver
decision which the police had failed to give him prior to his
assertion of the privilege but which they gave him immediately
thereafter. Indeed, ante at 423 U. S. 102 ,
the majority characterizes Page 423 U. S. 108 as "absurd" any contrary rule. I disagree. I do not think the
majority's conclusion is compelled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and I suspect that, in the final analysis, the majority
will adopt voluntariness as the standard by which to judge the
waiver of the right to silence by a properly informed defendant. I
think the Court should say so now. Miranda holds that custody creates an inherent
compulsion on an individual to incriminate himself in response to
questions, and that statements obtained under such circumstances
are therefore obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination unless
the privilege is "knowingly and intelligently waived." Id. at 384 U. S. 471 , 384 U. S. 475 .
It also holds that an individual will not be deemed to have made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his "right to silence" unless the
authorities have first informed him, inter alia, of that
right -- "the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as
to its exercise." Id. at 384 U. S. 468 .
I am no more convinced that Miranda was required by the
United States Constitution than I was when it was decided. However,
there is at least some support in the law both before and after Miranda for the proposition that some rights will never be
deemed waived unless the defendant is first expressly advised of
their existence. E.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.
S. 506 (1962); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.
S. 238 (1969); Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 11, 32(a)(2). There
is little support in the law or in common sense for the proposition
that an informed waiver of a right may be ineffective even where
voluntarily made. Indeed, the law is exactly to the contrary, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.
S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.
S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790 (1970). Unless an individual is Page 423 U. S. 109 incompetent, we have in the past rejected any paternalistic rule
protecting a defendant from his intelligent and voluntary decisions
about his own criminal case; Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). To do so would be to "imprison a man in his privileges,"
[ Footnote 2/1 ] Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 , 317 U. S. 280 (1942), and to disregard " that respect for the individual which
is the lifeblood of the law,'" Faretta v. California,
supra at 422 U. S. 834 .
I am very reluctant to conclude that Miranda stands for
such a proposition. The language of Miranda no more compels such a result
than does its basic rationale. As the majority points out, the
statement in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 474 ,
requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the "right
to silence" tells us nothing, because it does not indicate how soon
this interrogation may resume. The Court showed in the very next
paragraph, moreover, that, when it wanted to create a per
se rule against further interrogation after assertion of a
right, it knew how to do so. The Court there said "[i]f the
individual states that he Page 423 U. S. 110 wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present. " Ibid. [ Footnote 2/2 ] However, when the individual indicates
that he will decide unaided by counsel whether or not to assert his
"right to silence" the situation is different. In such a situation,
the Court in Miranda simply said:

															"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel." Id. at 384 U. S. 475 .
Apparently, although placing a heavy burden on the government, Miranda intended waiver of the "right to silence" to be
tested by the normal standards. In any event, insofar as the Miranda decision might be read to require interrogation to
cease for some magical and unspecified period of time following an
assertion of the "right to silence," and to reject voluntariness as
the standard by which to judge informed waivers of that right, it
should be disapproved as inconsistent with otherwise uniformly
applied legal principles.

															In justifying the implication that questioning must inevitably
cease for some unspecified period of time following an exercise of
the "right to silence," the majority Page 423 U. S. 111 says only that such a requirement would be necessary to avoid
"undermining" "the will of the person being questioned." Yet surely
a waiver of the "right to silence" obtained by "undermining the
will" of the person being questioned would be considered an
involuntary waiver. Thus, in order to achieve the majority's only
stated purpose, it is sufficient to exclude all confessions which
are the result of involuntary waivers. To exclude any others is to
deprive the factfinding process of highly probative information for
no reason at all. The "repeated rounds" of questioning following an
assertion of the privilege, which the majority is worried about,
would, of course, count heavily against the State in any
determination of voluntariness -- particularly if no reason (such
as new facts communicated to the accused or a new incident being
inquired about) appeared for repeated questioning. There is no
reason, however, to rob the accused of the choice to answer
questions voluntarily for some unspecified period of time following
his own previous contrary decision. The Court should now so
state.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The majority's rule may cause an accused injury. Although a
recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire
not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know
immediately -- if it were true -- that his ability to explain a
particular incriminating fact or to supply an alibi for a
particular time period would result in his immediate release.
Similarly, he might wish to know -- if it were true -- that (1) the
case against him was unusually strong and that (2) his immediate
cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and conviction
of others or in the recovery of property would redound to his
benefit in the form of a reduced charge. Certainly the individual's
lawyer, if he had one, would be interested in such information,
even if communication of such information followed closely on an
assertion of the "right to silence." Where the individual has not
requested counsel and has chosen instead to make his own decisions
regarding his conversations with the authorities, he should not be
deprived even temporarily of any information relevant to the
decision.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The question of the proper procedure following expression by an
individual of his desire to consult counsel is not presented in
this case. It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the
lines of communication between the authorities and the accused open
when the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not
present when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advice with
respect thereto. The authorities may then communicate with him
through an attorney. More to the point, the accused having
expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the
authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the
authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's
presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															The Court focuses on the correct passage from Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 384 U. S.
473 -474 (1966) (footnote omitted):

															"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right
to Page 423 U. S. 112 cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation
operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a
statement after the privilege has been once invoked."

															But the process of eroding Miranda rights, begun with Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), continues with today's holding that police may renew the
questioning of a suspect who has once exercised his right to remain
silent, provided the suspect's right to cut off questioning has
been "scrupulously honored." Today's distortion of Miranda's constitutional principles can be viewed only as
yet another step in the erosion, and, I suppose, ultimate
overruling, of Miranda's enforcement of the privilege
against self-incrimination.

															The Miranda guidelines were necessitated by the
inherently coercive nature of in-custody questioning. As in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), "we sought a protective device to dispel the compelling
atmosphere of the interrogation." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 465 .
We

															"concluded that, without proper safeguards, the process of
in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 384 U. S. 467 .
[ Footnote 3/1 ] To assure safeguards
that promised to dispel the "inherently compelling pressures" of
in-custody interrogation, a prophylactic rule was fashioned to
supplement the traditional determination of voluntariness on the
facts of each case. Miranda held that any confession
obtained when not preceded by the required warnings Page 423 U. S. 113 or an adequate substitute safeguard was per se inadmissible in evidence. Id. at 384 U. S.
468 -469, 384 U. S. 479 .
Satisfaction of this prophylactic rule, therefore, was necessary,
though not sufficient, for the admission of a confession.
Certiorari was expressly granted in Miranda "to give
concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and
courts to follow," id. at 384 U. S.
441 -442, that is, clear, objective standards that might
be applied to avoid the vagaries of the traditional voluntariness
test.

															The task that confronts the Court in this case is to satisfy the Miranda approach by establishing "concrete constitutional
guidelines" governing the resumption of questioning a suspect who,
while in custody, has once clearly and unequivocally "indicate[d] .
. . that he wishes to remain silent. . . ." As the Court today
continues to recognize, under Miranda, the cost of
assuring voluntariness by procedural tests, independent of any
actual inquiry into voluntariness, is that some voluntary
statements will be excluded. Ante at 423 U. S.
99 -100. Thus, the consideration in the task confronting
the Court is not whether voluntary statements will be excluded, but
whether the procedures approved will be sufficient to assure with
reasonable certainty that a confession is not obtained under the
influence of the compulsion inherent in interrogation and
detention. The procedures approved by the Court today fail to
provide that assurance.

															We observed in Miranda: "Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of
rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or
incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is strong
evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In
these circumstances, the fact that the individual eventually made a
statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling
influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is
inconsistent with any notion Page 423 U. S. 114 of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 476 .
And, as that portion of Miranda which the majority finds
controlling observed,

															"the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the
individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after
the privilege has been once invoked." Id. at 384 U. S. 474 .
Thus, as to statements which are the product of renewed
questioning, Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable
presumption of compulsion, see id. at 384 U. S. 474 n. 44, and that presumption stands strongest where, as in this
case, a suspect, having initially determined to remain silent, is
subsequently brought to confess his crime. Only by adequate
procedural safeguards could the presumption be rebutted.

															In formulating its procedural safeguard, the Court skirts the
problem of compulsion, and thereby fails to join issue with the
dictates of Miranda. The language which the Court finds
controlling in this case teaches that renewed questioning itself is
part of the process which invariably operates to overcome the will
of a suspect. That teaching is embodied in the form of a
proscription on any further questioning once the suspect has
exercised his right to remain silent. Today's decision uncritically
abandons that teaching. The Court assumes, contrary to the
controlling language, that "scrupulously honoring" an initial
exercise of the right to remain silent preserves the
efficaciousness of initial and future warnings despite the fact
that the suspect has once been subjected to interrogation and then
has been detained for a lengthy period of time.

															Observing that the suspect can control the circumstances of
interrogation "[t]hrough the exercise of his option to terminate
questioning," the Court concludes

															"that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person
in custody has decided to remain silent depends . . . Page 423 U. S. 115 on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously
honored.'" Ante at 423 U. S. 103 , 423 U. S. 104 .
But scrupulously honoring exercises of the right to cut off
questioning is only meaningful insofar as the suspect's will to
exercise that right remains wholly unfettered. The Court's
formulation thus assumes the very matter at issue here: whether
renewed questioning following a lengthy period of detention acts to
overbear the suspect's will, irrespective of giving the Miranda warnings a second time (and scrupulously honoring
them), thereby rendering inconsequential any failure to exercise
the right to remain silent. For the Court, it is enough
conclusorily to assert that "[t]he subsequent questioning did not
undercut Mosley's previous decision not to answer Detective Cowie's
inquiries." Ante at 423 U. S. 105 .
Under Miranda, however, Mosley's failure to exercise the
right upon renewed questioning is presumptively the consequence of
an overbearing in which detention and that subsequent questioning
played central roles.

															I agree that Miranda is not to be read, on the one
hand, to impose an absolute ban on resumption of questioning "at
any time or place on any subject," ante at 423 U. S. 102 ,
or, on the other hand, "to permit a resumption of interrogation
after a momentary respite," ibid. But this surely cannot
justify adoption of a vague and ineffective procedural standard
that falls somewhere between those absurd extremes, for Miranda, in flat and unambiguous terms, requires that
questioning "cease" when a suspect exercises the right to remain
silent. Miranda's terms, however, are not so
uncompromising as to preclude the fashioning of guidelines to
govern this case. Those guidelines must, of course, necessarily be
sensitive to the reality that,

															"[a]s a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in
courts or other official investigations, Page 423 U. S. 116 where there are often impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 461 (footnote omitted).

															The fashioning of guidelines for this case is an easy task.
Adequate procedures are readily available. Michigan law requires
that the suspect be arraigned before a judicial officer "without
unnecessary delay," [ Footnote 3/2 ]
certainly not a burdensome requirement. Alternatively, a
requirement that resumption of questioning should await appointment
and arrival of counsel for the suspect would be an acceptable and
readily satisfied precondition to resumption. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Miranda expressly held
that

															"[t]he presence of counsel . . . would be the adequate
protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against
self-incrimination]." Id. at 384 U. S. 466 .
The Court expediently bypasses this alternative in its search for
circumstances where renewed questioning would be permissible.
[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Indeed, language in Miranda suggests that the Page 423 U. S. 117 presence of counsel is the only appropriate alternative. In
categorical language, we held in Miranda: "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease." Id. at 384 U. S.
473 -474. We then immediately observed:

															"If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent but has
an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in
which further questioning would be permissible. In the absence of
evidence of overbearing, statements then made in the presence of
counsel might be free of the compelling influence of the
interrogation process and might fairly be construed as a
waiver of the privilege for purposes of these statements." Id. at 384 U. S. 474 n. 44 (emphasis added). This was the only circumstance in which we
at all suggested that questioning could be resumed, and, even then,
further questioning was not permissible in all such circumstances,
for compulsion was still the presumption not easily dissipated.
[ Footnote 3/5 ] Page 423 U. S. 118 These procedures would be wholly consistent with the Court's
rejection of a " per se proscription of indefinite
duration," ante at 423 U. S. 102 ,
a rejection to which I fully subscribe. Today's decision, however,
virtually empties Miranda of principle, for plainly the
decision encourages police asked to cease interrogation to continue
the suspect's detention until the police station's coercive
atmosphere does its work, and the suspect responds to resumed
questioning. [ Footnote 3/6 ] Today's
rejection of that reality of life contrasts sharply with the
Court's acceptance only two years ago that,

															"[i]n Miranda, the Court found that the techniques of
police questioning and the nature of custodial surroundings produce
an inherently coercive situation." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.
S. 218 , 412 U. S. 247 (1973). I can only conclude that today's decision signals rejection
of Miranda's basic premise.

															My concern with the Court's opinion does not end with its
treatment of Miranda, but extends to its treatment of the
facts in this case. The Court's effort to have the Williams
homicide appear as "an unrelated holdup murder," ante at 423 U. S. 104 ,
is patently unsuccessful. The anonymous tip received by Detective
Cowie, conceded by the Court to be the sole basis for Mosley's
arrest, ante at 423 U. S. 97 n.
1, embraced both the robberies covered in Cowie's interrogation Page 423 U. S. 119 and the robbery-murder of Williams, ante at 423 U. S. 98 n.
2, about which Detective Hill questioned Mosley. Thus, when Mosley
was apprehended, Cowie suspected him of being involved in the
Williams robbery-murder in addition to the robberies about which he
tried to examine Mosley. On another matter, the Court treats the
second interrogation as being "at another location," ante at 423 U. S. 104 .
Yet the fact is that it was merely a different floor of the same
building, ante at 423 U. S. 97 -98. [ Footnote
3/7 ]

															I also find troubling the Court's finding that Mosley never
indicated that he did not want to discuss the robbery-murder, see ante at 423 U. S.
104 -106. I cannot read Cowie's testimony as the Court
does. Cowie testified that Mosley Page 423 U. S. 120 declined to answer " [a]nything about the robberies,'" ante at 423 U. S. 105 n. 11. That can be read only against the background of the
anonymous tip that implicated Mosley in the Williams incident. Read
in that light, it may reasonably be inferred that Cowie understood
"[a]nything" to include the Williams episode, since the anonymous
tip embraced that episode. More than this, the Court's reading of
Cowie's testimony is not even faithful to the standard it
articulates here today. "Anything about the robberies" may more
than reasonably be interpreted as comprehending the Williams
murder, which occurred during a robbery. To interpret Mosley's
alleged statement to the contrary, therefore, hardly honors
"scrupulously" the suspect's rights. In light of today's erosion of Miranda standards as a
matter of federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe
that no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher
standards under state law. Each State has power to impose higher
standards governing police practices under state law than is
required by the Federal Constitution. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 , 420 U. S. 719 (1975); [ Footnote 3/8 ] Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U. S. 477 , 404 U. S. 489 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58 , 386 U. S. 62 (1967). A decision particularly bearing upon the question of the
adoption of Miranda as state law is Commonwealth v.
Ware, 446 Pa. 52, 284 A.2d 700 (1971). There, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted an aspect of Miranda as state law.
This Court, on March 20, Page 423 U. S. 121 1972, granted the Commonwealth's petition for certiorari to
review that decision. 405 U.S. 987. A month later, however, the
error of the grant having been made apparent, the Court vacated the
order of March 20, "it appearing that the judgment below rests upon
an adequate state ground." 406 U.S. 910. Understandably, state
courts and legislatures are, as matters of state law, increasingly
according protections once provided as federal rights but now
increasingly depreciated by decisions of this Court. See, e.g.,
State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) (rejecting Harris v. New York, 401 U.
S. 222 (1971)); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich.
554, 227 N.W.2d
511 (1975), cert. denied, post, p. 878 (rejecting
United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745 (1971)); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d
66 (1975) (rejecting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973)); Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d
854, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (adopting "same
transaction or occurrence" view of Double Jeopardy Clause). I note
that Michigan's Constitution has its own counterpart to the
privilege against self-incrimination. Mich.Const., Art. 1, § 17; see State v. Johnson, supra. [ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The Court said further:

															"Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
458 .

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 764.13, 764.26 (1970); Mich.Stat.Ann. §§
28.871(1), 28.885 (1972). Detective Cowie's testimony indicated
that a judge was available across the street from the police
station in which Mosley was held from 2:15 p.m. until 4 p.m. or
4:30 p.m. App. 13. The actual interrogation of Mosley, however,
covered only 15 or 20 minutes of this time. Id. at 14. The
failure to comply with a simple state law requirement in these
circumstances is totally at odds with the holding that the police
"scrupulously honored" Mosley's rights.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															In addition, a break in custody for a substantial period of time
would permit -- indeed it would require -- law enforcement officers
to give Miranda warnings a second time.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															I do not mean to imply that counsel may be forced on a suspect
who does not request an attorney. I suggest only that either
arraignment or counsel must be provided before resumption of
questioning to eliminate the coercive atmosphere of in-custody
interrogation. The Court itself apparently proscribes resuming
questioning until counsel is present if an accused has exercised
the right to have an attorney present at questioning. Ante at 423 U. S. 101 n. 7.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The Court asserts that this language is not relevant to the
present case, for "Mosley did not have an attorney present at the
time he declined to answer Detective Cowie's questions." Ante at 423 U. S. 102 n. 8. The language, however, does not compel a reading that it is
applicable only if counsel is present when the suspect initially
exercises his right to remain silent. Even if it did, this would
only indicate that Miranda placed even stiffer limits on
the circumstances when questioning may be resumed than I suggest
here. Moreover, since the concern in Miranda was with
assuring the absence of compulsion upon renewed questioning, it
makes little difference whether counsel is initially present. Thus,
even if the language does not specifically address the situation
where counsel is not initially present, it certainly contemplates
that situation.

															The Court also asserts that Miranda "directed that the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present' only
`[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney.'" Ante at 423 U. S. 104 n. 10 (quoting 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 474 ). This is patently inaccurate. The
language from the quoted portion of Miranda actually
reads: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." [ Footnote 3/6 ]

															I do not suggest that the Court's opinion is to be read as
permitting unreasonably lengthy detention without arraignment so
long as any exercise of rights by a suspect is "scrupulously
honored." The question of whether there is some constitutional
limitation on the length of time police may detain a suspect
without arraignment, cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.
S. 103 (1975); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.
S. 332 (1943), is an open one, and is not now before the
Court.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] See Westover v. United States, 384 U.
S. 436 , 384 U. S. 494 (1966), where Westover confessed after being turned over to the FBI
following questioning by local police. We said:

															"Although the two law enforcement authorities are legally
distinct and the crimes for which they interrogated Westover were
different, the impact on him was that of a continuous period of
questioning. . . ."

															"We do not suggest that law enforcement authorities are
precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a
period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them
without appropriate warnings. A different case would be presented
if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority,
removed both in time and place from his original surroundings, and
then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to
exercise them. But here the FBI interrogation was conducted
immediately following the state interrogation in the same police
station -- in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining
a confession from Westover, the federal authorities were the
beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local in-custody
interrogation. In these circumstances, the giving of warnings alone
was not sufficient to protect the privilege." Id. at 384 U. S.
496 -497.

															It is no answer to say that the questioning was resumed by a
second police officer. Surely Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257 , 404 U. S. 262 (1971), requires that the case be decided as if it involved two
interrogation sessions by a single law enforcement officer.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															Although my Brother MARSHALL correctly argued in Hass, 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 728 (dissenting), that we should have remanded for the state court to
clarify whether it was relying on state or federal law, such a
disposition is not required here. In Hass, the state court
cited both federal and state authority; in this case, Mosley's
counsel has conceded that the self-incrimination argument in the
state court was based solely on the Fifth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not violate Richard Bert Mosley's Miranda rights when they questioned him about an unrelated murder after he had previously declined to answer questions about robberies. The Court found that Mosley's right to cut off questioning was "scrupulously honored" as the police immediately ceased the robbery interrogation and waited a significant amount of time before questioning him about the murder, and only after providing a fresh set of Miranda warnings. The Court distinguished this case from Westover v. United States, where the defendant confessed after being questioned by different law enforcement authorities without a break or change in surroundings.

The Court also noted that there may be constitutional limits on how long the police can detain a suspect without arraignment, but that issue was not relevant to this case.