OPINION OF THE COURT DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-11328 WILLIE GENE DAVIS, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 16, 2011]

															   Justice Alito delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   The Fourth Amendment protects the
right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but it
is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the
bare text, this Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent
sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence
obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation. The question here
is whether to apply this sanction when the police conduct a search
in compliance with binding precedent that is later overruled.
Because suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in
these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to
both the truth and the public safety, we hold that searches
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.

															I

															   The question presented arises in
this case as a result of a shift in our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on searches of automobiles incident to arrests of
recent occupants.

															A

															   Under this Court’s decision in Chimel v. California , 395 U. S. 752 (1969), a police officer
who makes a lawful arrest may conduct a warrantless search of the
arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control.” Id. , at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). This rule
“may be stated clearly enough,” but in the early going after Chimel it proved difficult to apply, particularly in cases
that involved searches “inside [of] automobile[s] after the
arrestees [we]re no longer in [them].” See New York v. Belton , 453 U. S. 454 , 458–459 (1981). A
number of courts up-held the constitutionality of vehicle searches
that were “substantially contemporaneous” with occupants’
arrests.[ Footnote 1 ] Other
courts disapproved of automobile searches incident to arrests, at
least absent some continuing threat that the arrestee might gain
access to the vehicle and “destroy evidence or grab a
weapon.”[ Footnote 2 ] In New
York v. Belton, this Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict. See id. , at 459–460.

															   In Belton , a police
officer conducting a traffic stop lawfully arrested four occupants
of a vehicle and ordered the arrestees to line up, un-handcuffed,
along the side of the thruway. Id. , at 456; see Brief for
Petitioner in New York v. Belton , O. T.
1980, No. 80–328, p. 3. The officer then searched the vehicle’s
passenger compartment and found cocaine inside a jacket that lay on
the backseat. Belton , 453 U. S., at 456. This Court upheld
the search as reasonable incident to the occupants’ arrests. In an
opinion that repeatedly stressed the need for a “straightforward,”
“workable rule” to guide police conduct, the Court announced “that
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id. , at 459–460 (footnote omitted).

															   For years, Belton was widely
understood to have set down a simple, bright-line rule. Numerous
courts read the decision to authorize automobile searches incident
to arrests of recent occupants, regardless of whether the arrestee
in any particular case was within reaching distance of the vehicle
at the time of the search. See Thornton v. United
States , 541 U.
S. 615 , 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(collecting cases). Even after the arrestee had stepped out of the
vehicle and had been subdued by police, the prevailing
understanding was that Belton still authorized a
substantially contemporaneous search of the automobile’s passenger
compartment.[ Footnote 3 ]

															   Not every court, however, agreed with this
reading of Belton . In State v. Gant , 216
Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640 (2007), the Arizona Supreme Court
considered an automobile search conducted after the vehicle’s
occupant had been arrested, handcuffed, and locked in a patrol car.
The court distinguished Belton as a case in which “four
unsecured” arrestees “presented an immediate risk of loss of
evidence and an obvious threat to [a] lone officer’s safety.” 216
Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643. The court held that where no
such “exigencies exis[t]”—where the arrestee has been subdued and
the scene secured—the rule of Belton does not apply. 216
Ariz., at 4, 162 P. 3d, at 643.

															   This Court granted certiorari in Gant , see 552 U. S. 1230 (2008),
and affirmed in a 5-to-4 decision. Arizona v. Gant , 556 U. S. ___ (2009). Four of the Justices in the
majority agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court that Belton ’s holding applies only where “the arrestee is
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search.” 556 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10).
The four dissenting Justices, by contrast, understood Belton to have explicitly adopted the simple, bright-line
rule stated in the Belton Court’s opinion. 556 U. S., at
___ (opinion of Alito, J.) (slip op., at 3); see Belton ,
453 U. S., at 460 (“[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may,
as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile” (footnote omitted)). To limit Belton to cases involving unsecured arrestees, the
dissenters thought, was to overrule the decision’s clear holding. Gant , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 2–3). Justice
Scalia, who provided the fifth vote to affirm in Gant ,
agreed with the dissenters’ understanding of Belton ’s
holding. 556 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1–2) (concurring opinion).
Justice Scalia favored a more ex-plicit and complete overruling of Belton , but he joined what became the majority opinion to
avoid “a 4-to-1-to-4” disposition. 556 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
2–4). As a result, the Court adopted a new, two-part rule under
which an automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
is constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the vehicle during the search, or (2) if the police have reason
to believe that the vehicle contains “evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 9–10) (citing Thornton , supra , at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment); internal quotation marks omitted).

															B

															   The search at issue in this case
took place a full two years before this Court announced its new
rule in Gant . On an April evening in 2007, police officers
in Greenville, Alabama, conducted a routine traffic stop that
eventually resulted in the arrests of driver Stella Owens (for
driving while intoxicated) and passenger Willie Davis (for giving a
false name to police). The police handcuffed both Owens and Davis,
and they placed the arrestees in the back of separate patrol cars.
The police then searched the passenger compartment of Owens’s
vehicle and found a revolver inside Davis’s jacket pocket.

															   Davis was indicted in the Middle
District of Alabama on one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. See 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). In his motion to
suppress the revolver, Davis acknowledged that the officers’ search
fully complied with “existing Eleventh Circuit precedent.” App.
13–15. Like most courts, the Eleventh Circuit had long read Belton to establish a bright-line rule authorizing
substantially contemporaneous vehicle searches incident to arrests
of recent occupants. See United States v. Gonzalez , 71 F. 3d 819, 822, 824–827 (CA11 1996)
(upholding automobile search conducted after the defendant had been
“pulled from the vehicle, handcuffed, laid on the ground, and
placed under arrest”). Davis recognized that the Dis-trict Court
was obligated to follow this precedent, but he raised a Fourth
Amendment challenge to preserve “the issue for review” on appeal.
App. 15. The District Court denied the motion, and Davis was
convicted on the firearms charge.

															   While Davis’s appeal was pending, this Court
decided Gant . The Eleventh Circuit, in the opinion below,
applied Gant ’s new rule and held that the vehicle search
incident to Davis’s arrest “violated [his] Fourth Amendment
rights.” 598 F. 3d 1259, 1263 (CA11 2010). As for whether this
constitutional violation warranted suppression, the Eleventh
Circuit viewed that as a separate issue that turned on “the
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” Id. , at 1265 (quoting Herring v. United
States , 555 U. S. 135 , 137 (2009); internal
quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that “penalizing the
[arresting] officer” for following binding appellate precedent
would do nothing to “dete[r] … Fourth Amendment violations.” 598
F. 3d, at 1265–1266 (bracketing and internal quotation marks
omitted). It therefore declined to apply the exclusionary rule and
affirmed Davis’s conviction. We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___
(2010).

															II

															   The Fourth Amendment protects the
“right of the peo-ple to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and ef-fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
The Amendment says nothing about suppressing evidence ob-tained in
violation of this command. That rule—the exclusionary rule—is a
“prudential” doctrine, Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and
Parole v. Scott , 524 U. S. 357 , 363
(1998), created by this Court to “compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty.” Elkins v. United
States , 364 U.
S. 206 , 217 (1960); see Weeks v. United
States , 232 U.
S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S. 643 (1961). Exclusion is
“not a personal constitutional right,” nor is it designed to
“redress the injury” occasioned by an unconstitutional search. Stone v. Powell , 428 U. S. 465 , 486
(1976); see United States v. Janis , 428 U. S. 433 , 454,
n. 29 (1976) (exclusionary rule “unsupportable as reparation
or compensatory dispensation to the injured criminal” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The rule’s sole purpose, we have
repeatedly held, is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations. E.g. , Herring , supra, at 141, and
n. 2; United States v. Leon , 468 U. S. 897 , 909, 921, n. 22
(1984); Elkins , supra , at 217 (“calculated to
prevent, not to repair”). Our cases have thus limited the rule’s
operation to situations in which this purpose is “thought most
efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra , 414 U. S. 338 ,
348 (1974). Where suppression fails to yield “appreciable
deterrence,” exclusion is “clearly . . . unwarranted.” Janis , supra , at 454.

															   Real deterrent value is a
“necessary condition for exclusion,” but it is not “a sufficient”
one. Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U. S. 586 , 596
(2006). The analysis must also account for the “substantial social
costs” generated by the rule. Leon , supra, at
907. Exclusion exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and
society at large. Stone , 428 U. S., at 490–491. It almost
always requires courts to ignore reliable, trustworthy evidence
bearing on guilt or innocence. Ibid . And its bottom-line
effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth and set the
criminal loose in the community without punishment. See Herring , supra , at 141. Our cases hold that
society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, but only as a
“last resort.” Hudson , supra, at 591. For
exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression
must outweigh its heavy costs. See Herring, supra , at 141; Leon , supra , at 910.

															   Admittedly, there was a time when our
exclusionary-rule cases were not nearly so discriminating in their
approach to the doctrine. “Expansive dicta” in several deci-sions,
see Hudson , supra , at 591, suggested that the
rule was a self-executing mandate implicit in the Fourth Amendment
itself. See Olmstead v. United States , 277 U. S. 438 , 462
(1928) (remarking on the “striking outcome of the Weeks case” that “the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or
limiting the use of evidence in courts, really forbade its
introduction”); Mapp , supra, at 655 (“[A]ll
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state
court”). As late as our 1971 decision in Whiteley v. Warden , Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560 , 568–569,
the Court “treated identification of a Fourth Amendment violation
as synonymous with application of the exclusionary rule.” Arizona v. Evans , 514 U. S. 1 , 13 (1995). In
time, however, we came to acknowledge the exclusionary rule for
what it undoubtedly is—a “judicially created remedy” of this
Court’s own making. Calandra , supra, at 348. We
abandoned the old, “reflexive” application of the doctrine, and
imposed a more rigorous weighing of its costs and deterrence
benefits. Evans , supra , at 13; see, e.g. , Calandra , supra; Janis , supra; Stone , supra; INS v. Lopez-Mendoza , 468 U. S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Havens , 446 U. S. 620 (1980). In
a line of cases beginning with United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 , we also recalibrated
our cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus the inquiry
on the “flagrancy of the police misconduct” at issue. Id. ,
at 909, 911.

															   The basic insight of the Leon line of
cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion “var[y] with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct” at issue. Herring , 555 U. S., at 143. When the police exhibit
“deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligent” disregard for
Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong
and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. Id., at
144 . But when the police act with an objectively
“reasonable good-faith belief” that their conduct is lawful, Leon , supra , at 909 (internal quotation marks
omitted), or when their conduct involves only simple, “isolated”
negligence, Herring , supra , at 137, the
“ ‘deterrence rationale loses much of its force,’ ” and
exclusion cannot “pay its way.” See Leon , supra ,
at 919, 908, n. 6 (quoting United States v. Peltier , 422 U. S. 531 , 539
(1975)).

															   The Court has over time applied this
“good-faith” exception across a range of cases. Leon itself, for example, held that the exclusionary rule does not apply
when the police conduct a search in “objectively reasonable
reliance” on a warrant later held invalid. 468 U. S., at 922. The
error in such a case rests with the issuing magistrate, not the
police officer, and “punish[ing] the errors of judges” is not the
office of the exclusionary rule. Id. , at 916; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard , 468 U. S. 981 , 990
(1984) (companion case declining to apply exclusionary rule where
warrant held invalid as a result of judge’s clerical error).

															   Other good-faith cases have sounded a similar
theme. Illinois v. Krull , 480 U. S. 340 (1987), extended the
good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance
on subsequently invalidated statutes. Id. , at 349–350
(“legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the
rule”). In Arizona v. Evans , supra , the
Court applied the good-faith exception in a case where the police
reasonably relied on erroneous information concerning an arrest
warrant in a database maintained by judicial employees. Id. , at 14. Most recently, in Herring v. United States , 555 U. S. 135 , we extended Evans in a case where police employees erred in
maintaining records in a warrant database. “[I]solated,”
“nonrecurring” police negligence, we determined, lacks the
culpability required to justify the harsh sanction of exclusion.
555 U. S., at 137, 144.

															III

															   The question in this case is
whether to apply the exclusionary rule when the police conduct a
search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial
precedent. At the time of the search at issue here, we had not yet
decided Arizona v. Gant , 556 U. S. ___, and the
Eleventh Circuit had interpreted our decision in New York v. Belton , 453 U. S. 454 , to establish a
bright-line rule authorizing the search of a vehicle’s passenger
compartment incident to a recent occupant’s arrest. Gonzalez , 71 F. 3d, at 825. The search incident to Davis’s
arrest in this case followed the Eleventh Circuit’s Gonzalez precedent to the letter. Although the search
turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant , all agree
that the officers’ conduct was in strict compliance with
then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in any way. See Brief
for Petitioner 49 (“suppression” in this case would “impl[y] no
assignment of blame”).

															   Under our exclusionary-rule
precedents, this acknowledged absence of police culpability dooms
Davis’s claim. Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of
exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield
“meaningfu[l]” deterrence, and culpable enough to be “worth the
price paid by the justice system.” Herring , 555 U. S., at
144. The conduct of the officers here was neither of these things.
The officers who conducted the search did not violate Davis’s
Fourth Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross
negligence. See ibid. Nor does this case involve any
“recurring or systemic negligence” on the part of law enforcement. Ibid . The police acted in strict compliance with binding
precedent, and their behavior was not wrongful. Unless the
exclusionary rule is to become a strict-liability regime, it can
have no application in this case.

															   Indeed, in 27 years of practice under Leon ’s good-faith exception, we have “never applied” the
exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
nonculpable, innocent police conduct. Herring , supra , at 144. If the police in this case had reasonably
relied on a warrant in conducting their search, see Leon , supra , or on an erroneous warrant record in a government
database, Herring , supra , the exclusionary rule
would not apply. And if Congress or the Alabama Legislature had
enacted a statute codifying the precise holding of the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez ,[ Footnote 4 ] we would swiftly conclude that
“ ‘[p]enalizing the officer for the legislature’s error …
cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment
violations.’ ” See Krull , 480 U. S., at 350. The same
should be true of Davis’s attempt here to “ ‘[p]enaliz[e] the
officer for the [appellate judges’] error.’ ” See ibid .

															   About all that exclusion would deter in this
case is conscientious police work. Responsible law-enforcement
officers will take care to learn “what is required of them” under
Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these
rules. Hudson , 547 U. S., at 599. But by the same token,
when binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a
particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should
use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety
responsibilities. An of-ficer who conducts a search in reliance on
binding appellate precedent does no more than “ ‘ac[t] as a
reasonable officer would and should act’ ” under the
circumstances. Leon , 468 U. S., at 920 (quoting Stone , 428 U. S., at 539–540 (White, J., dissenting)). The
deterrent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to
discourage the officer from “ ‘do[ing] his duty.’ ” 468
U. S., at 920.

															   That is not the kind of deterrence the
exclusionary rule seeks to foster. We have stated before, and we
reaffirm today, that the harsh sanction of exclusion “should not be
applied to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Id., at 919. Evidence obtained during a search conducted
in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the
exclusionary rule.

															IV

															   Justice Breyer’s dissent and
Davis argue that, although the police conduct in this case was in
no way culpable, other considerations should prevent the good-faith
exception from applying. We are not persuaded.

															A

															1

															   The principal argument of both
the dissent and Davis is that the exclusionary rule’s availability
to enforce new Fourth Amendment precedent is a retroactivity issue,
see Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U. S. 314 (1987), not a good-faith
issue. They contend that applying the good-faith exception where
police have relied on overruled precedent effectively revives the
discarded retroactivity regime of Linkletter v. Walker , 381
U. S. 618 (1965). See post , at 2–5.

															   In Linkletter , we held
that the retroactive effect of a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure should be determined on a case-by-case weighing
of interests. For each new rule, Linkletter required
courts to consider a three-factor balancing test that looked to the
“purpose” of the new rule, “reliance” on the old rule by law
enforcement and others, and the effect retroactivity would have “on
the administration of justice.” 381 U. S., at 636. After
“weigh[ing] the merits and demerits in each case,” courts decided
whether and to what extent a new rule should be given retroactive
effect. Id. , at 629. In Linkletter itself, the
balance of interests prompted this Court to conclude that Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S. 643 —which incorporated the
exclusionary rule against the States—should not apply retroactively
to cases already final on direct review. 381 U. S., at 639–640. The
next year, we extended Linkletter to retroactivity
determinations in cases on direct review. See Johnson v. New Jersey , 384 U. S. 719 , 733
(1966) (holding that Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
and Escobedo v. Illinois , 378 U. S. 478 (1964),
applied retroactively only to trials commenced after the decisions
were released).

															   Over time, Linkletter proved
difficult to apply in a consistent, coherent way. Individual
applications of the standard “produced strikingly divergent
results,” see Dan-forth v. Minnesota , 552 U. S. 264 , 273
(2008), that many saw as “incompatible” and “inconsistent.” Desist v. United States , 394 U. S. 244 , 258
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan in particular, who
had endorsed the Linkletter standard early on, offered a
strong critique in which he argued that “basic judicial” norms
required full retroactive application of new rules to all cases
still subject to direct review. 394 U. S., at 258–259; see also Mackey v. United States , 401 U. S. 667 , 675–702
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Eventually, and after more than 20 years of toil under Linkletter , the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s view and
held that newly announced rules of constitutional criminal
procedure must apply “retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception.” Griffith , supra , at 328.

															2

															   The dissent and Davis argue that
applying the good-faith exception in this case is “incompatible”
with our retroactivity precedent under Griffith . See post , at 2; Reply Brief for Petitioner 3–7. We think this
argument conflates what are two distinct doctrines.

															   Our retroactivity jurisprudence
is concerned with whether, as a categorical matter, a new rule is
available on direct review as a potential ground for
relief. Retroactive application under Griffith lifts what
would otherwise be a categorical bar to obtaining redress for the
government’s violation of a newly announced constitutional rule.
See Danforth , supra, at 271, n. 5 (noting
that it may “make more sense to speak in terms of the
‘redressability’ of violations of new rules, rather than the
‘retroactivity’ of such new rules”). Retroactive application does
not, however, determine what “appropriate remedy” (if any) the
defendant should obtain. See Powell v. Nevada , 511 U. S. 79 , 84
(1994) (noting that it “does not necessarily follow” from
retroactive application of a new rule that the defendant will “gain
… relief”). Remedy is a separate, analytically distinct issue. Cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith , 496 U. S. 167 , 189
(1990) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Court has never equated its
retroactivity principles with remedial principles”). As a result,
the retroactive application of a new rule of substantive Fourth
Amendment law raises the question whether a suppression
remedy applies; it does not answer that question. See Leon , 468 U. S., at 906 (“Whether the exclusionary
sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case … is ‘an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment
rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct’ ”).

															   When this Court announced its decision in Gant , Davis’s conviction had not yet become final on
direct review. Gant therefore applies retroactively to
this case. Davis may invoke its newly announced rule of substantive
Fourth Amendment law as a basis for seeking relief. See Griffith , supra , at 326, 328. The question, then,
becomes one of remedy, and on that issue Davis seeks application of
the exclusionary rule. But exclusion of evidence does not
automatically follow from the fact that a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred. See Evans , 514 U. S., at 13–14. The
remedy is subject to exceptions and applies only where its “purpose
is effectively advanced.” Krull , 480 U. S., at 347.

															   The dissent and Davis recognize that at least
some of the established exceptions to the exclusionary rule limit
its availability in cases involving new Fourth Amendment rules.
Suppression would thus be inappropriate, the dissent and Davis
acknowledge, if the inevitable-discovery exception were applicable
in this case. See post , at 3; Reply Brief for Petitioner
22 (“Doctrines such as inevitable discovery, independent source,
attenuated basis, [and] standing … sharply limit the impact of
newly-announced rules”). The good-faith exception, however, is no
less an established limit on the remedy of exclusion than
is inevitable discovery. Its application here neither contravenes Griffith nor denies retroactive effect to Gant .[ Footnote 5 ]

															   It is true that, under the old retroactivity
regime of Linkletter , the Court’s decisions on the
“retroactivity prob-lem in the context of the exclusionary rule”
did take into account whether “law enforcement officers reasonably
believed in good faith” that their conduct was in compliance with
governing law. Peltier , 422 U. S., at 535–537. As a matter
of retroactivity analysis, that approach is no longer applicable.
See Griffith , 479 U. S. 314 . It does not follow,
however, that reliance on binding precedent is irrelevant in
applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. When
this Court adopted the good-faith exception in Leon , the
Court’s opinion explicitly relied on Peltier and imported
its reasoning into the good-faith inquiry. See 468 U. S., at
918–919. That reasonable reliance by police was once a factor in
our retroactivity cases does not make it any less relevant under
our Leon line of cases.[ Footnote 6 ]

															B

															   Davis also contends that applying
the good-faith ex-ception to searches conducted in reliance on
binding pre-cedent will stunt the development of Fourth Amendment
law. With no possibility of suppression, criminal defendants will
have no incentive, Davis maintains, to request that courts overrule
precedent.[ Footnote 7 ]

															1

															   This argument is difficult to
reconcile with our modern understanding of the role of the
exclusionary rule. We have never held that facilitating the
overruling of precedent is a relevant consideration in an
exclusionary-rule case. Rather, we have said time and again that
the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
misconduct by law enforcement. See, e.g. , Sheppard , 468 U. S., at 990 (“ ‘adopted to deter
unlawful searches by police’ ”); Evans , supra, at 14 (“historically designed as a means of
deterring police misconduct”).

															   We have also repeatedly rejected
efforts to expand the focus of the exclusionary rule beyond
deterrence of culpable police conduct. In Leon, for
example, we made clear that “the exclusionary rule is designed to
deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of
judges.” 468 U. S., at 916; see id ., at 918 (“If exclusion
of evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequently invalidated warrant
is to have any deterrent effect … it must alter the behavior of
individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their
departments”). Krull too noted that “legislators, like
judicial officers, are not the focus” of the exclusionary rule. 480
U. S., at 350. And in Evans , we said that the exclusionary
rule was aimed at deterring “police misconduct, not mistakes by
court employees.” 514 U. S., at 14. These cases do not suggest that
the exclusionary rule should be modified to serve a purpose other
than deterrence of culpable law-enforcement conduct.

															2

															   And in any event, applying the
good-faith exception in this context will not prevent judicial
reconsideration of prior Fourth Amendment precedents. In most
instances, as in this case, the precedent sought to be challenged
will be a decision of a Federal Court of Appeals or State Supreme
Court. But a good-faith exception for objectively reasonable
reliance on binding precedent will not prevent review and
correction of such decisions. This Court reviews criminal
convictions from 12 Federal Courts of Appeals, 50 state courts of
last resort, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. If one
or even many of these courts uphold a particular type of search or
seizure, defendants in jurisdictions in which the question remains
open will still have an undiminished incentive to litigate the
issue. This Court can then grant certiorari, and the de-velopment
of Fourth Amendment law will in no way be stunted.[ Footnote 8 ]

															   Davis argues that Fourth
Amendment precedents of this Court will be effectively
insulated from challenge under a good-faith exception for reliance
on appellate precedent. But this argument is overblown. For one
thing, it is important to keep in mind that this argument applies
to an exceedingly small set of cases. Decisions overruling this
Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents are rare. Indeed, it has been
more than 40 years since the Court last handed down a decision of
the type to which Davis refers. Chimel v. California , 395 U. S. 752 (overruling United
States v. Rabinowitz , 339 U. S. 56 (1950), and Harris v. United States , 331 U. S. 145 (1947)).
And even in those cases, Davis points out that no fewer than eight
separate doctrines may preclude a defendant who successfully
challenges an existing precedent from getting any relief. Brief for
Petitioner 50. Moreover, as a practical matter, defense counsel in
many cases will test this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents in
the same way that Belton was tested in Gant —by
arguing that the precedent is distinguishable. See Brief for
Respondent in Arizona v. Gant , O. T. 2008,
No. 07–542, pp. 22–29.[ Footnote
9 ]

															   At most, Davis’s argument might suggest
that—to prevent Fourth Amendment law from becoming ossified—the
petitioner in a case that results in the overruling of one of this
Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents should be given the benefit of
the victory by permitting the suppression of evidence in that one
case. Such a result would undoubtedly be a windfall to this one
random litigant. But the exclusionary rule is “not a personal
constitutional right.” Stone , 428 U. S., at 486. It is a
“judicially created” sanction, Calandra , 414 U. S., at
348, specifically designed as a “windfall” remedy to deter future
Fourth Amendment violations. See Stone , supra , at
490. The good-faith exception is a judicially created exception to
this judicially created rule. Therefore, in a future case, we
could, if necessary, recognize a limited exception to the
good-faith exception for a defendant who obtains a judgment
over-ruling one of our Fourth Amendment prece- dents. Cf. Friendly,
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Cal. L. Rev.
929, 952–953 (1965) (“[T]he same authority that empowered the Court
to supplement the amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and
twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify
that rule as the lessons of experience may teach” (internal
quotation marks and footnotes omitted)).[ Footnote 10 ]

															   But this is not such a case. Davis did not
secure a decision overturning a Supreme Court precedent; the police
in his case reasonably relied on binding Circuit precedent. See United States v. Gonzalez , 71 F. 3d 819. That
sort of blameless police conduct, we hold, comes within the
good-faith exception and is not properly subject to the
exclusionary rule.

															*  *  *

															   It is one thing for the criminal
“to go free because the constable has blundered.” People v. Defore , 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587
(1926) (Cardozo, J.). It is quite another to set the criminal free
because the constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law.
Excluding evidence in such cases deters no police misconduct and
imposes substantial social costs. We therefore hold that when the
police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on
binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
is

															Affirmed. Footnote 1 See e.g. , United States v. Sanders , 631 F. 2d 1309, 1313–1314 (CA8 1980); United States v. Dixon , 558 F. 2d 919, 922
(CA9 1977); United States v. Frick , 490
F. 2d 666, 668–669 (CA5 1973); Hinkel v. Anchorage , 618 P. 2d 1069, 1069–1071 (Alaska
1980). Footnote 2 See e.g. , United States v. Benson , 631 F. 2d 1336, 1340 (CA8 1980); see also United States v. Rigales , 630 F. 2d 364,
366–367 (CA5 1980); Ulesky v. State , 379
So. 2d 121, 125–126 (Fla. App. 1979). Footnote 3 See, e.g. , United States v. Dorsey , 418 F. 3d 1038, 1041, 1043–1044 (CA9 2005)
(upholding automobile search conducted after the officer had
“handcuffed [the arrestee] and put him in the back of [the] patrol
car”); United States v. Barnes , 374 F. 3d
601, 604 (CA8 2004) (same). Footnote 4 Cf. Kan. Stat. Ann. §22–2501(c) (2007) (“When
a lawful arrest is effected a law enforcement officer may
reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such
person’s immediate presence for the purpose of … [d]iscovering the
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime”). The Kansas
Supreme Court recently struck this provision down in light of Arizona v. Gant , 556 U. S. ___ (2009). State v. Henning , 289 Kan. 136, 137, 209
P. 3d 711, 714 (2009). But it has applied Illinois v. Krull , 480 U. S. 340 (1987), and the
good-faith exception to searches conducted in reasonable reliance
on the statute. See State v. Daniel , 291 Kan.
490, 497–504, 242 P. 3d 1186, 1191–1195 (2010). Footnote 5 The dissent argues that the good-faith
exception is “unlike … inevitable discovery” because the former
applies in all cases where the police reasonably rely on binding
precedent, while the latter “applies only upon occasion.” Post , at 3. We fail to see how this distinction makes any
difference. The same could be said—indeed, the same was said—of searches conducted in reasonable reliance on statutes. See Krull , 480 U. S., at 368–369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that result in Krull was inconsistent with Griffith ). When this Court strikes down a statute on
Fourth Amendment grounds, the good-faith exception may prevent the
exclusionary rule from applying “in every case pending
when [the statute] is overturned.” Post , at 3. This result
does not make the Court’s newly announced rule of Fourth Amendment
law any less retroactive. It simply limits the applicability of a
suppression remedy. See Krull , supra , at 354–355,
n. 11. Footnote 6 Nor does United States v. Johnson , 457 U. S. 537 (1982),
foreclose application of the good-faith exception in cases
involving changing law. Johnson distinguished Peltier and held that all Fourth Amendment cases should be
retroactive on direct review so long as the new decision is not a
“clear break” from prior precedent. 457 U. S., at 562. Johnson had no occasion to opine on the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, which we adopted two years
later in Leon . Footnote 7 Davis also asserts that a good-faith rule
would permit “new Fourth Amendment decisions to be applied only
prospectively,” thus amounting to “a regime of rule-creation by
advisory opinion.” Brief for Petitioner 23, 25. For reasons
discussed in connection with Davis’s argument that application of
the good-faith exception here would revive the Linkletter regime, this argument conflates the question of retroactivity with
the question of remedy. Footnote 8 The dissent does not dispute this point, but
it claims that the good-faith exception will prevent us from
“rely[ing] upon lower courts to work out Fourth Amendment
differences among themselves.” Post , at 5. If that is
correct, then today’s holding may well lead to more circuit splits in Fourth Amendment cases and a fuller docket of Fourth Amendment cases in this Court. See this Court’s
Rule 10. Such a state of affairs is unlikely to result in
ossification of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Footnote 9 Where the search at issue is conducted in
accordance with a municipal “policy” or “custom,” Fourth Amendment
precedents may also be challenged, without the obstacle of the
good-faith exception or qualified immunity, in civil suits against
municipalities. See 42 U. S. C. §1983; Los Angeles
County v. Humphries , 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip
op., at 7) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Servs ., 436 U. S. 658 , 690–691
(1978)). Footnote 10 Davis contends that a criminal defendant will
lack Article III standing to challenge an existing Fourth Amendment
precedent if the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
precludes the defendant from obtaining relief based on police
conduct that conformed to that precedent. This argument confuses
weakness on the merits with absence of Article III standing. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish , 490 U. S. 605 , 624
(1989) (standing does not “ ‘depen[d] on the merits of [a
claim]’ ”). And as a practical matter, the argument is also
overstated. In many instances, as in Gant , see 556 U. S.,
at __ (slip op., at 8), defendants will not simply concede that the
police conduct conformed to the precedent; they will argue instead
that the police conduct did not fall within the scope of the
precedent.

															   In any event, even if some criminal defendants
will be unable to challenge some precedents for the reason that
Davis suggests, that provides no good reason for refusing to apply
the good-faith exception. As noted, the exclusionary rule is not a
personal right, see Stone , 428 U. S., at 486, 490, and
therefore the rights of these defendants will not be impaired. And
because (at least in almost all instances) the precedent can be
challenged by others, Fourth Amendment case law will not be
insulated from reconsideration. SOTOMAYOR, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-11328 WILLIE GENE DAVIS, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 16, 2011]

															   Justice Sotomayor, concurring in
the judgment.

															   Under our precedents, the primary
purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations.” Ante , at 6; see, e.g. , Herring v. United States , 555 U. S. 135 , 141
(2009); Illinois v. Krull , 480 U. S. 340 , 347–348
(1987). Accordingly, we have held, application of the exclusionary
rule is unwarranted when it “ ‘does not result in appreciable
deterrence.’ ” Arizona v. Evans , 514 U. S. 1 , 11 (1995)
(quoting United States v. Janis , 428 U. S. 433 , 454
(1976)). In the circumstances of this case, where “binding
appellate precedent specifically authorize[d] a particular
police practice,” ante , at 11—in accord with the holdings
of nearly every other court in the country—application of the
exclusionary rule cannot reasonably be expected to yield
appreciable deterrence. I am thus compelled to conclude that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in this case and to agree with the
Court’s disposition.

															   This case does not present the markedly
different question whether the exclusionary rule applies when the
law governing the constitutionality of a particular search is
unsettled. As we previously recognized in deciding whether to apply
a Fourth Amendment holding retroactively, when police decide to
conduct a search or seizure in the absence of case law (or other
authority) specifically sanctioning such action, exclusion of the
evidence obtained may deter Fourth Amendment violations:

															   “If, as the Government argues,
all rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should
be nonretroactive, then, in close cases, law enforcement officials
would have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional
behavior. Official awareness of the dubious constitutionality of a
practice would be counterbalanced by official certainty that, so
long as the Fourth Amendment law in the area remained un-settled,
evidence obtained through the questionable practice would be
excluded only in the one case definitively resolving the unsettled
question.” United States v. Johnson , 457 U. S. 537 , 561
(1982) (footnote omitted).

															The Court of Appeals recognized as much in limiting
its application of the good-faith exception it articulated in this
case to situations where its “precedent on a given point [is]
unequivocal.” 598 F. 3d 1259, 1266 (CA11 2010); see id. , at 1266–1267 (“[W]e do not mean to encourage police
to adopt a ‘ “let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided approach” ’
to ‘unsettled’ questions of Fourth Amendment law” (quoting Johnson , 457 U. S., at 561)). Whether exclusion would
deter Fourth Amendment violations where appellate precedent does
not specifically authorize a certain practice and, if so, whether
the benefits of exclusion would outweigh its costs are questions
unanswered by our previous decisions.

															   The dissent suggests that today’s decision
essentially answers those questions, noting that an officer who
conducts a search in the face of unsettled precedent “is no more
culpable than an officer who follows erroneous ‘binding
precedent.’ ” Post , at 7 (opinion of Breyer, J.). The
Court does not address this issue. In my view, whether an officer’s
conduct can be characterized as “culpable” is not itself
dispositive. We have never refused to apply the exclusionary rule
where its application would appreciably deter Fourth Amendment
violations on the mere ground that the officer’s conduct could be
characterized as nonculpable. Rather, an officer’s culpability is
relevant because it may inform the overarching inquiry whether
exclusion would result in appreciable deterrence. See ante , at 8 (“The basic insight of the Leon line
of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion var[y] with
the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue” (internal
quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)); see also, e.g. , Herring , 555 U. S., at 143 (“The extent to
which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence
principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement
conduct”); United States v. Leon , 468 U. S. 897 , 919
(1984) (“ ‘Where the official action was pursued in complete
good faith, . . . the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force’ ” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U. S. 433 ,
447 (1974))). Whatever we have said about culpability, the ultimate
questions have always been, one, whether exclusion would result in
appreciable deterrence and, two, whether the benefits of exclusion
outweigh its costs. See, e.g. , ante , at 6–7; Herring , 555 U. S., at 141; Krull , 480 U. S., at
347.

															   As stated, whether exclusion would result in
appreciable deterrence in the circumstances of this case is a
different question from whether exclusion would appreciably deter
Fourth Amendment violations when the governing law is unsettled.
The Court’s answer to the former question in this case thus does
not resolve the latter one. BREYER, J., DISSENTING DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-11328 WILLIE GENE DAVIS, PETITIONER v. UNITED
STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 16, 2011]

															   Justice Breyer, with whom Justice
Ginsburg joins, dissenting.

															   In 2009, in Arizona v. Gant , 556 U. S. ___, this Court held that a police search
of an automobile without a warrant violates the Fourth Amendment if
the police have pre-viously removed the automobile’s occupants and
placed them securely in a squad car. The present case involves
these same circumstances, and it was pending on appeal when this
Court decided Gant . Because Gant represents a
“shift” in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, ante , at 1, we must decide whether and how Gant’ s new rule applies here.

															I

															   I agree with the Court about whether Gant ’s new rule applies. It does apply. Between
1965, when the Court decided Linkletter v. Walker , 381
U. S. 618 , and 1987, when it decided Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U. S. 314 , that
conclusion would have been more difficult to reach. Under Linkletter , the Court determined a new rule’s
retroactivity by looking to several different factors, including
whether the new rule represented a “clear break” with the past and
the degree of “reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards.” Desist v. United States , 394 U. S. 244 , 248–249
(1969) (internal quotation marks omitted) (also citing “the purpose
to be served by the new standards” and “the effect on the
administration of justice” as factors (internal quotation marks
omitted)). And the Court would often not apply the new rule to
identical cases still pending on appeal. See ibid. After 22 years of struggling
with its Linkletter approach, however, the Court decided in Griffith that Linkletter had proved unfair and
unworkable. It then substituted a clearer approach, stating that “a
new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the
new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.” 479 U. S., at
328. The Court today, following Griffith , concludes that Gant’ s new rule applies here. And to that extent I agree
with its decision.

															II

															   The Court goes on, however, to
decide how Gant’ s new rule will apply. And here it adds a
fatal twist. While conceding that, like the search in Gant, this search violated the Fourth Amendment, it holds
that, unlike Gant , this defendant is not entitled to a
remedy. That is be-cause the Court finds a new “good faith”
exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally
seized evidence. Weeks v. United States , 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio , 367
U. S. 643 (1961) . Leaving Davis with a right but not a
remedy, the Court “keep[s] the word of promise to our ear” but
“break[s] it to our hope.”

															A

															   At this point I can no longer
agree with the Court. A new “good faith” exception and this Court’s
retroactivity decisions are incompatible. For one thing, the
Court’s distinction between (1) retroactive application of a new
rule and (2) availability of a remedy is highly artificial and runs
counter to precedent. To determine that a new rule is retroactive is to determine that, at least in the normal case, there
is a remedy. As we have previously said, the “source of a ‘new
rule’ is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create
new rules of law”; hence, “[w]hat we are actually determining when
we assess the ‘retroactivity’ of a new rule is not the temporal
scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the
right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will
entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.” Danforth v. Minnesota , 552 U. S. 264 , 271
(2008). The Court’s “good faith” exception (unlike, say, inevitable
discovery, a remedial doctrine that applies only upon occasion)
creates “a categorical bar to obtaining redress” in every case pending when a precedent is overturned. Ante , at
13–14.

															   For another thing, the Court’s
holding re-creates the very problems that led the Court to abandon Linkletter ’s approach to retroactivity in favor of Griffith ’s . One such problem concerns
workability. The Court says that its exception applies where there
is “objectively reasonable” police “reliance on binding appellate
precedent.” Ante , at 1, 19. But to apply the term “binding
appellate precedent” often requires resolution of complex questions
of degree. Davis conceded that he faced binding anti- Gant precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. But future litigants will be
less forthcoming. Ante , at 18. Indeed, those litigants
will now have to create distinctions to show that previous Circuit
precedent was not “binding” lest they find relief foreclosed even
if they win their constitutional claim.

															   At the same time, Fourth Amendment precedents
frequently require courts to “slosh” their “way through the
factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ” Scott v. Harris , 550
U. S. 372 , 383 (2007). Suppose an officer’s conduct is
consistent with the language of a Fourth Amendment rule that a
court of appeals announced in a case with clearly distinguishable
facts? Suppose the case creating the rele-vant precedent did not
directly announce any general rule but involved highly analogous
facts? What about a rule that all other jurisdictions, but not the
defendant’s jurisdiction, had previously accepted? What rules can
be developed for determining when, where, and how these different
kinds of precedents do, or do not, count as relevant “binding
precedent”? The Linkletter- like result is likely complex
legal argument and police force confusion. See Williams v. United States , 401 U. S. 646 , 676
(1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (describing trying to follow Linkletter decisions as “almost as difficult” as trying to
follow “the tracks made by a beast of prey in search of its
intended victim”).

															   Another such problem concerns fairness.
Today’s holding, like that in Linkletter , “violates basic
norms of con-stitutional adjudication.” Griffith , supra, at 322. It treats the defendant in a case
announcing a new rule one way while treating similarly situated
defendants whose cases are pending on appeal in a different way.
See ante , at 18–19. Justice Harlan explained why this
approach is wrong when he said:

															“We cannot release criminals from jail merely
because we think one case is a particularly appropriate one [to
announce a constitutional doctrine] … . Simply fishing one
case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a
stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that
new rule constitute an indefensible departure from [our ordinary]
model of judicial review.” Williams , supra, at
679 . And in Griffith , the Court “embraced to a
significant extent the comprehensive analysis presented by Justice
Harlan.” 479 U. S., at 322.

															   Of course, the Court may, as it suggests,
avoid this un-fairness by refusing to apply the exclusionary rule
even to the defendant in the very case in which it announces a “new
rule.” But that approach would make matters worse. What would then
happen in the lower courts? How would courts of appeals, for
example, come to reconsider their prior decisions when other
circuits’ cases lead them to believe those decisions may be wrong?
Why would a defendant seek to overturn any such decision? After
all, if the (incorrect) circuit precedent is clear, then even if
the defendant wins (on the constitutional question), he loses (on
relief). See Stovall v. Denno , 388 U. S. 293 , 301
(1967). To what extent then could this Court rely upon lower courts
to work out Fourth Amendment differences among themselves—through
circuit reconsideration of a precedent that other circuits have
criticized? See Ari- zona v. Evans , 514 U. S. 1 , 23, n. 1 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

															B

															   Perhaps more important, the
Court’s rationale for creating its new “good faith” exception
threatens to undermine well-settled Fourth Amendment law. The Court
correctly says that pre- Gant Eleventh Circuit precedent
had held that a Gant- type search was constitutional; hence
the police conduct in this case, consistent with that precedent,
was “innocent.” Ante , at 10. But the Court then finds this
fact sufficient to create a new “good faith” exception to the
exclusionary rule. It reasons that the “sole purpose” of the
exclusionary rule “is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations,” ante , at 6. The “deterrence benefits of exclusion vary
with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct at issue,” ante , at 8 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). Those benefits are sufficient to jus- tify exclusion
where “police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights,” ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). But those benefits do not justify
exclusion where, as here, the police act with “simple, isolated
negligence” or an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief that
their conduct is lawful,” ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

															   If the Court means what it says,
what will happen to the exclusionary rule, a rule that the Court
adopted nearly a century ago for federal courts, Weeks v. United States , 232 U. S. 383 , and made
applicable to state courts a half century ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio , 367
U. S. 643 ? The Court has thought of that rule not as punishment
for the individual officer or as reparation for the individual
defendant but more generally as an effective way to secure
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment’s commands. Weeks , supra, at 393 (without the exclusionary rule, the Fourth
Amendment would be “of no value,” and “might as well be stricken
from the Constitution”). This Court has deviated from the
“suppression” norm in the name of “good faith” only a handful of
times and in limited, atypical circumstances: where a magistrate
has erroneously issued a warrant, United States v. Leon , 468
U. S. 897 (1984); where a database has erroneously informed
police that they have a warrant, Arizona v. Evans , 514 U. S. 1 (1995), Herring v. United States , 555 U. S. 135 (2009);
and where an unconstitutional statute purported to authorize the
search, Illinois v. Krull , 480 U. S. 340 (1987).
See Herring , supra, at 142 (“good faith”
exception inaptly named).

															   The fact that such exceptions are few and far
between is understandable. Defendants frequently move to suppress
evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. In many, perhaps most, of
these instances the police, uncertain of how the Fourth Amendment
applied to the particular factual circumstances they faced, will
have acted in objective good faith. Yet, in a significant
percentage of these instances, courts will find that the police
were wrong. And, unless the police conduct falls into one of the
exceptions previously noted, courts have required the suppression
of the evidence seized. 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §1.3,
pp. 103–104 (4th ed. 2004) (“good faith” exception has not yet
been applied to warrantless searches and seizures beyond the
“rather special situations” of Evans , Herring ,
and Krull ). See Valdes, Frequency and Success: An
Empirical Study of Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional
Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709,
1728 (2005) (suppression motions are filed in approximately 7% of
criminal cases; approximately 12% of suppression motions are
successful); LaFave, supra, at 64 (“Surely many more
Fourth Amendment violations result from carelessness than from
intentional constitutional violations”); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v . Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1389 (1983) (“[T]he vast majority of
fourth amendment violations … [are] motivated by commendable zeal,
not condemnable malice”).

															   But an officer who conducts a search that he
believes complies with the Constitution but which, it ultimately
turns out, falls just outside the Fourth Amendment’s bounds is no
more culpable than an officer who follows erroneous “binding
precedent.” Nor is an officer more culpable where circuit precedent
is simply suggestive rather than “binding,” where it only describes
how to treat roughly analogous instances, or where it just does not
exist. Thus, if the Court means what it now says, if it would place
determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary rule only
where a Fourth Amendment violation was “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent,” then the “good faith” exception will swallow
the exclusionary rule. Indeed, our broad dicta in Herring —dicta the Court repeats and expands upon today—may
already be leading lower courts in this direction. See United
States v. Julius , 610 F. 3d 60, 66–67 (CA2 2010)
(assuming warrantless search was unconstitutional and remanding for
District Court to “perform the cost/benefit analysis required by Herring ” and to consider “whether the degree of police
culpability in this case rose beyond mere … negligence” before
ordering suppression); United States v. Master ,
614 F. 3d 236, 243 (CA6 2010) (“[T]he Herring Court’s
emphasis seems weighed more toward preserving evidence for use in
obtaining convictions, even if illegally seized … unless the
officers engage in ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct’ ” (quoting Herring , supra, at
144)). Today’s decision will doubtless accelerate this trend.

															   Any such change (which may already be
underway) would affect not “an exceedingly small set of cases,” ante , at 18, but a very large number of cases, potentially
many thousands each year. See Valdes, supra, at 1728. And
since the exclusionary rule is often the only sanction available
for a Fourth Amendment violation, the Fourth Amendment would no
longer protect ordinary Americans from “unreasonable searches and
seizures.” See Wolf v. Colorado , 338 U. S. 25 , 41 (1949)
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (overruled by Mapp v. Ohio , 367
U. S. 643 (1961)) (In many circumstances, “there is but one
alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at all”); Herring , supra, at 152 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(the exclusionary rule is “an essential auxiliary” to the Fourth
Amendment). It would become a watered-down Fourth Amendment,
offering its protection against only those searches and sei-zures
that are egregiously unreasonable.

															III

															   In sum, I fear that the Court’s
opinion will undermine the exclusionary rule. And I believe that
the Court wrongly departs from Griffith regardless.
Instead I would follow Griffith, apply Gant’ s
rule retroactively to this case, and require suppression of the
evidence. Such an ap-proach is consistent with our precedent, and
it would indeed affect no more than “an exceedingly small set of
cases.” Ante , at 18.

															   For these reasons, with respect,
I dissent.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule, even if the precedent is later overturned. This means that if police officers conduct a search based on existing court rulings at the time, and those rulings are later changed, the evidence found during the search can still be used in court.