U.S. Supreme Court Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) Rakas v. Illinois No. 77-5781 Argued October 3,
1978 Decided December 5,
1978 439
U.S. 128 CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DIVISION Syllabus After receiving a robbery report, police stopped the suspected
getaway car, which the owner was driving and in which petitioners
were passengers. Upon searching the car, the police found a box of
rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under
the front passenger seat and arrested petitioners. Subsequently,
petitioners were convicted in an Illinois court of armed robbery at
a trial in which the rifle and shells were admitted as evidence.
Before trial petitioners had moved to suppress the rifle and shells
on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the trial court denied the motion
on the ground that petitioners lacked standing to object to the
lawfulness of the search of the car because they concededly did not
own either the car or the rifle and shells. The Illinois Appellate
Court affirmed. Held: 1. "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may
not be vicariously asserted," Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 , 394 U. S. 174 ,
and a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only
through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search
of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his
Fourth Amendment rights infringed. The rule of standing to raise
vicarious Fourth Amendment claims should not be extended by a
so-called "target" theory, whereby any criminal defendant at whom a
search was "directed" would have standing to contest the legality
of that search and object to the admission at trial of evidence
obtained as a result of the search. Pp. 439 U. S.
133 -138.

															2. In any event, the better analysis of the principle that
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be
asserted vicariously should focus on the extent of a particular
defendant's rights under that Amendment, rather than on any
theoretically separate but invariably intertwined concept of
standing. Pp. 439 U. S.
138 -140.

															3. The phrase "legitimately on premises" coined in Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257 ,
creates "too broad a gauge" for measurement of Fourth Amendment
rights. The holding in Jones can best be explained by the
fact that Jones had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
premises he was using, and therefore could claim the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 140-148. Page 439 U. S. 129 4. Petitioners, who asserted neither a property nor a possessory
interest in the automobile searched nor an interest in the property
seized, and who failed to show that they had any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the
seat of the car in which they were merely passengers, were not
entitled to challenge a search of those areas. Jones v. United
States, supra; Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , distinguished. Pp. 439 U. S.
148 -149.

															46 Ill.App.3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252, affirmed.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, POWELL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
joined, post, p. 439 U. S. 150 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL,
and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 439 U. S.
156 .

															MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court
of Kankakee County, Ill., and their convictions were affirmed on
appeal. At their trial, the prosecution offered into evidence a
sawed-off rifle and rifle shells that had been seized by police
during a search of an automobile in which petitioners had been
passengers. Neither petitioner is the owner of the automobile, and
neither has ever asserted that he owned the rifle or shells seized.
The Illinois Appellate Court held that petitioners lacked standing
to object to the allegedly Page 439 U. S. 130 unlawful search, and seizure and denied their motion to suppress
the evidence. We granted certiorari in light of the obvious
importance of the issues raised to the administration of criminal
justice, 435 U.S. 922 (1978), and now affirm. I Because we are not here concerned with the issue of probable
cause, a brief description of the events leading to the search of
the automobile will suffice. A police officer on a routine patrol
received a radio call notifying him of a robbery of a clothing
store in Bourbonnais, Ill., and describing the getaway car. Shortly
thereafter, the officer spotted an automobile which he thought
might be the getaway car. After following the car for some time and
after the arrival of assistance, he and several other officers
stopped the vehicle. The occupants of the automobile, petitioners
and two female companions, were ordered out of the car, and, after
the occupants had left the car, two officers searched the interior
of the vehicle. They discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove
compartment, which had been locked, and a sawed-off rifle under the
front passenger seat. App. 111. After discovering the rifle and the
shells, the officers took petitioners to the station and placed
them under arrest.

															Before trial petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells
seized from the car on the ground that the search violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They conceded that they did not
own the automobile, and were simply passengers; the owner of the
car had been the driver of the vehicle at the time of the search.
Nor did they assert that they owned the rifle or the shells seized.
[ Footnote 1 ] The prosecutor Page 439 U. S. 131 challenged petitioners' standing to object to the lawfulness of
the search of the car because neither the car, the shells nor the
rifle belonged to them. The trial court agreed that petitioners
lacked standing, and denied the motion to suppress the evidence.
App. 224. In view of this holding, the court did not determine
whether there was probable cause for the search and seizure. On
appeal after petitioners' conviction, the Appellate Court of
Illinois, Third Judicial District, affirmed the trial court's
denial of petitioners' motion to suppress because it held that,

															"without a proprietary or other similar interest in an
automobile, a mere passenger therein lacks standing to challenge
the legality of the search of the vehicle. Page 439 U. S. 132 46 Ill.App.3d 569, 571, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977). The court
stated:"

															"We believe that defendants failed to establish any prejudice to
their own constitutional rights, because they were not persons
aggrieved by the unlawful search and seizure. . . . They wrongly
seek to establish prejudice only through the use of evidence
gathered as a consequence of a search and seizure directed at
someone else, and fail to prove an invasion of their own privacy. Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U. S.
165 . . . ." Id. at 571-572, 360 N.E.2d at 1254. The Illinois
Supreme Court denied petitioners leave to appeal. II Petitioners first urge us to relax or broaden the rule of
standing enunciated in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), so that any criminal defendant at whom a search was
"directed" would have standing to contest the legality of that
search and object to the admission at trial of evidence obtained as
a result of the search. Alternatively, petitioners argue that they
have standing to object to the search under Jones because
they were "legitimately on [the] premises" at the time of the
search.

															The concept of standing discussed in Jones focuses on
whether the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as
a basis for suppressing evidence was himself the "victim" of the
search or seizure. Id. at 362 U. S. 261 .
[ Footnote 2 ] Adoption of Page 439 U. S. 133 the so-called "target" theory advanced by petitioners would, in
effect, permit a defendant to assert that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment rights of a third party entitled him to have evidence
suppressed at his trial. If we reject petitioners' request for a
broadened rule of standing such as this, and reaffirm the holding
of Jones and other cases that Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously, we will have
occasion to reexamine the "standing" terminology emphasized in Jones. For we are not at all sure that the determination
of a motion to suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry
identified in Jones as one of standing, rather than simply
recognizing it as one involving the substantive question of whether
or not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own
Fourth Amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure which
he seeks to challenge. We shall therefore consider, in turn,
petitioners' target theory, the necessity for continued adherence
to the notion of standing discussed in Jones as a concept
that is theoretically distinct from the merits of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment claim, and, finally, the proper disposition of
petitioners' ultimate claim in this case. A We decline to extend the rule of standing in Fourth Amendment
cases in the manner suggested by petitioners. As we stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 , 394 U. S. 174 (1969), "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like
some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously Page 439 U. S. 134 asserted." See Brown v. United States, 411 U.
S. 223 , 411 U. S. 230 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 , 390 U. S. 389 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 , 371 U. S. 492 (1963); cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 505 , 365 U. S. 511 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.
S. 298 , 255 U. S. 304 (1921). A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure
only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a
search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of
his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Alderman, supra at 394 U. S. 174 .
And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974), it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's
protections. [ Footnote 3 ] See Simmons v. United States, supra at 390 U. S. 389 .
There is no reason to think that a party whose rights have been
infringed will not, if evidence is used against him, have ample
motivation to move to suppress it. Alderman, supra at 394 U. S. 174 .
Even if such a person is not a defendant in the action, he may be
able to recover damages for the violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167 (1961), or seek redress under state law for
invasion of privacy or trespass.

															In support of their target theory, petitioners rely on the
following quotation from Jones: "In order to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure,' one must have been a victim of a search or
seizure, one against whom the search was Page 439 U. S. 135 directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a
consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else."

															362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 261 (emphasis added). They also rely on Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U. S. 543 , 391 U. S. 548 n. 11 (1968), and United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 (1951).

															The above-quoted statement from Jones suggests that the
italicized language was meant merely as a parenthetical equivalent
of the previous phrase "a victim of a search or seizure." To the
extent that the language might be read more broadly, it is dictum
which was impliedly repudiated in Alderman v. United States,
supra, and which we now expressly reject. In Jones, the Court set forth two alternative holdings: it established a rule
of "automatic" standing to contest an allegedly illegal search
where the same possession needed to establish standing is an
essential element of the offense charged, [ Footnote 4 ] and, second, it stated that "anyone
legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its
legality by way of a motion to suppress." 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 264 , 362 U. S. 267 . See Combs v. United States, 408 U.
S. 224 , 408 U. S. 227 n. 4 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.
S. 364 , 392 U. S. 368 n. 5 (198); Simmons v. United States, supra at 390 U. S. 390 .
Had the Court intended to adopt the target theory now put forth by
petitioners, neither of the above two holdings would have been
necessary, since Jones was the "target" of the police search in
that case. [ Footnote 5 ] Nor
does United States v. Jeffers, supra, or Page 439 U. S. 136 Bumper v. North Carolina, supra, support the target
theory. Standing in Jeffers was based on Jeffers'
possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property
seized. 342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 49 -50, 342 U. S. 54 ; see Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, at 392 U. S.
367 -368; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.
S. 293 , 385 U. S. 301 (1966); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.
S. 139 , 370 U. S. 143 ,
and n. 10 (1962). Similarly, in Bumper, the defendant had
a substantial possessory interest in both the house searched and
the rifle seized. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 548 ,
n. 11.

															In Alderman v. United States, Mr. Justice Fortas, in a
concurring and dissenting opinion, argued that the Court should
"include within the category of those who may object to the
introduction of illegal evidence one against whom the search
was directed.'" 394 U.S. at 394 U. S.
206 -209. The Court did not directly comment on Mr.
Justice Fortas' suggestion, but it left no doubt that it rejected
this theory by holding that persons who were not parties to
unlawfully overheard conversations or who did not own the premises
on which such conversations took place did not have standing to
contest the legality of the surveillance, regardless of whether or
not they were the "targets" of the surveillance. Id. at 394 U. S. 176 .
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring and dissenting, did squarely address
Mr. Justice Fortas' arguments, and declined to accept them. Id. at 394 U. S.
188 -189, n. 1. He identified administrative problems
posed by the target theory: "[T]he [target] rule would entail very substantial
administrative difficulties. In the majority of cases, I would
imagine that the police plant a bug with the expectation that it
may well produce leads to a large number of crimes. A lengthy
hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in order to determine
whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity at the
time the bug was Page 439 U. S. 137 planted and whether the police decision to plant a bug was
motivated by an effort to obtain information against the accused or
some other individual. I do not believe that this administrative
burden is justified in any substantial degree by the hypothesized
marginal increase in Fourth Amendment protection." Ibid. When we are urged to grant standing to a criminal
defendant to assert a violation, not of his own constitutional
rights, but of someone else's, we cannot but give weight to
practical difficulties such as those foreseen by Mr. Justice Harlan
in the quoted language.

															Conferring standing to raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims
would necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the
exclusionary rule during criminal trials. The Court's opinion in Alderman counseled against such an extension of the
exclusionary rule:

															"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those
whose rights the police have violated have been considered
sufficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even
though the case against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We
adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced that the
additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other
defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth." Id. at 394 U. S.
174 -175. Each time the exclusionary rule is applied, it
exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth
Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the
trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.
S. 268 , 435 U. S. 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 428 U. S.
489 -490 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. at 414 U. S.
348 -352. Since our cases generally Page 439 U. S. 138 have held that one whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated
may successfully suppress evidence obtained in the course of an
illegal search and seizure, misgivings as to the benefit of
enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that rule are
properly considered when deciding whether to expand standing to
assert Fourth Amendment violations. [ Footnote 6 ] B Had we accepted petitioners' request to allow persons other than
those whose own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a
challenged search and seizure to suppress evidence obtained in the
course of such police activity, it would be appropriate to retain Jones' use of standing in Fourth Amendment analysis. Under
petitioners' target theory, a court could determine that a
defendant had standing to invoke the exclusionary rule without
having to inquire into the substantive question of whether the
challenged search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights
of that particular defendant. However, having rejected petitioners'
target theory and reaffirmed the principle that the

															"rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal rights,
[which] . . . may be enforced by exclusion of evidence only at the
instance of one whose own protection was infringed by the search
and seizure," Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 389 ,
the question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful
analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing,
distinct from the merits of a defendant's Fourth Page 439 U. S. 139 Amendment claim. We can think of no decided cases of this Court
that would have come out differently had we concluded, as we do
now, that the type of standing requirement discussed in Jones and reaffirmed today is more properly subsumed under
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. Rigorous application of the
principle that the rights secured by this Amendment are personal,
in place of a notion of "standing," will produce no additional
situations in which evidence must be excluded. The inquiry under
either approach is the same. [ Footnote 7 ] But we think the better analysis forthrightly
focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but
invariably intertwined, concept of standing. The Court in Jones also may have been aware that there was a certain
artificiality in analyzing this question in terms of standing,
because, in at least three separate places in its opinion, the
Court placed that term within quotation marks. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 261 , 362 U. S. 263 , 362 U. S.
265 .

															It should be emphasized that nothing we say here casts the least
doubt on cases which recognize that, as a general proposition, the
issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the
proponent of a particular legal right has alleged "injury in fact,"
and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal
rights and interests, rather than basing his claim for relief upon
the rights of third parties. See, e.g., Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 , 428 U. S. 112 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin , Page 439 U. S. 140 422 U. S. 490 , 439 U. S. 499 (1975); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.
S. 150 , 397 U. S.
152 -153 (1970). But this Court's long history of
insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has
already answered many of these traditional standing inquiries, and
we think that definition of those rights is more properly placed
within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within
that of standing. Cf. id. at 397 U. S. 153 ,
and n. 1; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.
S. 249 , 346 U. S. 256 n. 4 (1953); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.
43 , 201 U. S. 69 -70
(1906). [ Footnote 8 ]

															Analyzed in these terms, the question is whether the challenged
search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a
criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained
during it. That inquiry, in turn, requires a determination of
whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest
of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect. We are under no illusion that, by dispensing with the
rubric of standing used in Jones, we have rendered any
simpler the determination of whether the proponent of a motion to
suppress is entitled to contest the legality of a search and
seizure. But by frankly recognizing that this aspect of the
analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing, we
think the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical
footing. C Here, petitioners, who were passengers occupying a car which
they neither owned nor leased, seek to analogize their position to
that of the defendant in Jones v. Unite States. Page 439 U. S. 141 In Jones, petitioner was present at the time of the
search of an apartment which was owned by a friend. The friend had
given Jones permission to use the apartment and a key to it, with
which Jones had admitted himself on the day of the search. He had a
suit and shirt at the apartment, and had slept there "maybe a
night," but his home was elsewhere. At the time of the search,
Jones was the only occupant of the apartment, because the lessee
was away for a period of several days. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 259 .
Under these circumstances, this Court stated that, while one
wrongfully on the premises could not move to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of searching them, [ Footnote 9 ] "anyone legitimately on premises where a
search occurs may challenge its legality." Id. at 362 U. S. 267 .
Petitioners argue that their occupancy of the automobile in
question was comparable to that of Jones in the apartment,
and that they therefore have standing to contest the legality of
the search -- or, as we have rephrased the inquiry, that they, like Jones, had their Fourth Amendment rights violated by the
search.

															We do not question the conclusion in Jones that the
defendant in that case suffered a violation of his personal Fourth
Amendment rights if the search in question was unlawful. Page 439 U. S. 142 Nonetheless, we believe that the phrase "legitimately on
premises" coined in Jones creates too broad a gauge for
measurement of Fourth Amendment right. [ Footnote 10 ] For example, applied literally, this
statement would permit a casual visitor who has never seen, or been
permitted to visit, the basement of another's house to object to a
search of the basement if the visitor happened to be in the kitchen
of the house at the time of the search. Likewise, a casual visitor
who walks into a house one minute before a search of the house
commences and leaves one minute after the search ends would be able
to contest the legality of the search. The first visitor would have
absolutely no interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in the
basement, the second would have none in the house, and it advances
no purpose served by the Fourth Amendment to permit either of them
to object to the lawfulness of the search. [ Footnote 11 ]

															We think that Jones, on its facts, merely stands for
the unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally
sufficient interest in a place other than his own home so that the
Fourth Amendment protects him from unreasonable governmental
intrusion into that place. See 362 U.S. at 362 U. S.
263 , Page 439 U. S. 143 362 U. S. 265 .
In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the view
expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane
distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests,
licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control. Id. at 362 U. S. 266 ; see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961). But the Jones statement that a person need only be
"legitimately on premises" in order to challenge the validity of
the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full sweep
beyond the facts of that case. Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 (1967), provides guidance in defining the scope
of the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. In the course of
repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U.
S. 129 (1942), that, if police officers had not been
guilty of a common law trespass, they were not prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment from eavesdropping, the Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment
depends not upon a property right in the invaded place, but upon
whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 353 ; see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 7 (1977); United States v. White, 401 U.
S. 745 , 401 U. S. 752 (1971). Viewed in this manner, the holding in Jones can
best be explained by the fact that Jones had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises he was using, and therefore
could claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to
a governmental invasion of those premises even though his
"interest" in those premises might not have been a recognized
property interest at common law. [ Footnote 12 ] See Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. at 362 U. S.
261 . Page 439 U. S. 144 Our Brother WHITE, in dissent, expresses the view that, by
rejecting the phrase "legitimately on [the] premises" as the
appropriate measure of Fourth Amendment rights, we are abandoning a
thoroughly workable, "bright line" test in favor of a less certain
analysis of whether the facts of a particular case give rise to a
legitimate expectation of privacy. Post Page 439 U. S. 145 at 439 U. S. 168 .
If "legitimately on premises" were the successful litmus test of
Fourth Amendment rights that he assumes it is, his approach would
have at least the merit of easy application, whatever it lacked in
fidelity to the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment. But a
reading of lower court cases that have applied the phrase
"legitimately on premises," and of the dissent itself, reveals that
this expression is not a shorthand summary for a bright-line rule
which somehow encapsulates the "core" of the Fourth Amendment's
protections. [ Footnote
13 ] Page 439 U. S. 146 The dissent itself shows that the facile consistency it is
striving for is illusory. The dissenters concede that "there comes
a point when use of an area is shared with so many that one simply
cannot reasonably expect seclusion." Post at 439 U. S. 164 .
But surely the "point" referred to is not one demarcating a line
which is black on one side and white on another; it is inevitably a
point which separates one shade of gray from another. We are
likewise told by the dissent that a person

															"legitimately on private premises . . . , though his
privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is
sharing it only with those persons [allowed there], and that
governmental officials will intrude only with consent or
by complying with the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. (emphasis added). This single sentence describing
the contours of the supposedly easily applied rule virtually
abounds with unanswered questions: what are "private" premises?
Indeed, what are the "premises?" It may be easy to describe the
"premises" when one is confronted with a 1-room apartment, but what
of the case of a 10-room house, or of a house with an attached
garage that is searched? Also, if one's privacy is not absolute,
how is it bounded? If he risks governmental intrusion "with
consent," who may give that consent?

															Again, we are told by the dissent that the Fourth Amendment
assures that " some expectations of privacy are justified,
and will be protected from official intrusion." Post at 439 U. S. 166 (emphasis added). But we are not told which of many possible
expectations of privacy are embraced within this sentence. And our
dissenting Brethren concede that "perhaps the Constitution provides
some degree less protection for the Page 439 U. S. 147 personal freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion when
one does not have a possessory interest in the invaded private
place." Ibid. But how much "less" protection is available
when one does not have such a possessory interest?

															Our disagreement with the dissent is not that it leaves these
questions unanswered, or that the questions are necessarily
irrelevant in the context of the analysis contained in this
opinion. Our disagreement is rather with the dissent's bland and
self-refuting assumption that there will not be fine lines to be
drawn in Fourth Amendment cases as in other areas of the law, and
that its rubric, rather than a meaningful exegesis of Fourth
Amendment doctrine, is more desirable or more easily resolves
Fourth Amendment cases. [ Footnote 14 ] In abandoning "legitimately on premises" for
the doctrine that we announce today, we are not forsaking a
time-tested and workable rule, which has produced consistent
results when applied, solely for the sake of fidelity to the values
underlying the Fourth Amendment. Rather, we are rejecting blind
adherence to a phrase which, at most, has superficial clarity, and
which conceals underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of
line drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to
apply the Fourth Amendment. Where the factual premises for a rule
are so generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would
be gained by abandoning case-by-case analysis, we have not
hesitated to do so. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 , 414 U. S. 235 (1973). But the phrase "legitimately Page 439 U. S. 148 on premises" has not been shown to be an easily applicable
measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved to be
simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been
subjected to careful analysis. We would not wish to be understood
as saying that legitimate presence on the premises is irrelevant to
one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed
controlling. D Judged by the foregoing analysis, petitioners' claims must fail.
They asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the
automobile nor an interest in the property seized. And as we have
previously indicated, the fact that they were "legitimately on
[the] premises" in the sense that they were in the car with the
permission of its owner is not determinative of whether they had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas of the
automobile searched. It is unnecessary for us to decide here
whether the same expectations of privacy are warranted in a car as
would be justified in a dwelling place in analogous circumstances.
We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to be
treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment
purposes. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 12 ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 561 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.
S. 583 , 417 U. S. 590 (1974) (plurality opinion). [ Footnote 15 ] But here petitioners' claim is one which
would fail even in an analogous situation in a dwelling place,
since they made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation
of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the
car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an
automobile, these are areas in which a Page 439 U. S. 149 passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have
a legitimate expectation of privacy. Supra at 439 U. S.
142 . Jones v. United States, 362 U.
S. 257 (1960), and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), involved significantly different factual circumstances. Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his
friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admitted
himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in the
apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had
complete dominion and control over the apartment, and could exclude
others from it. Likewise, in Katz, the defendant occupied
the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all
others, and paid the toll, which "entitled [him] to assume that the
words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to
the world." Id. at 389 U. S. 352 .
[ Footnote 16 ] Katz and Jones
could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the
subject of the search and seizure each sought to contest. No such
showing was made by these petitioners with respect to those
portions of the automobile which were searched and from which
incriminating evidence was seized. [ Footnote 17 ] Page 439 U. S. 150 III The Illinois courts were therefore correct in concluding that it
was unnecessary to decide whether the search of the car might have
violated the rights secured to someone else by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Since it
did not violate any rights of these petitioners, their judgment of
conviction is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Petitioners claim that they were never asked whether they owned
the rifle or shells seized during the search, and, citing Combs
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224 (1972), argue that, if the Court determines that a property
interest in the items seized is an adequate ground for standing to
object to their seizure, the Court should remand the case for
further proceedings on the question whether petitioners owned the
seized rifle or shells. Reply Brief for Petitioners 4 n. 2.
Petitioners do not now assert that they own the rifle or the
shells.

															We reject petitioners' suggestion. The proponent of a motion to
suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 , 390 U. S.
389 -390 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 , 362 U. S. 261 (1960). The prosecutor argued that petitioners lacked standing to
challenge the search because they did not own the rifle, the shells
or the automobile. Petitioners did not contest the factual
predicates of the prosecutor's argument, and, instead, simply
stated that they were not required to prove ownership to object to
the search. App. 23. The prosecutor's argument gave petitioners
notice that they were to be put to their proof on any issue as to
which they had the burden, and, because of their failure to assert
ownership, we must assume, for purposes of our review, that
petitioners do not own the rifle or the shells. Combs v. United
States, supra, was quite different. In Combs, the
Government had not challenged Combs' standing at the suppression
hearing, and the issue of standing was not raised until the
appellate level, where the Government conceded that its warrant was
not based on probable cause. Because the record was "virtually
barren of the facts necessary to determine" Combs' right to contest
the search and seizure, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 227 .
The Government had requested the Court to remand for further
proceedings on this issue. Brief for United States in Combs v.
United States, O.T. 1971, No. 71-517, pp. 40-41.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Although Jones v. United States was based upon an
interpretation of Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 41(e), the Court stated in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 , 394 U. S. 173 n. 6 (1969), that Rule 41(e) conforms to the general standard, and
is no broader than the constitutional rule. See United States
v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S.
348 -349, n. 6 (1974).

															There is an aspect of traditional standing doctrine that was not
considered in Jones and which we do not question. It is
the proposition that a party seeking relief must allege such a
personal stake or interest in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure the concrete adverseness which Art. III requires. See,
e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488 , 414 U. S. 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S. 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). Thus, a person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated
by a search or seizure, but who is not a defendant in a criminal
action in which the illegally seized evidence is sought to be
introduced, would not have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule
to prevent use of that evidence in that action. See Calandra,
supra, at 414 U. S. 352 n. 8.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The necessity for a showing of a violation of personal rights is
not obviated by recognizing the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule, Alderman v. United States, supra, at 394 U. S. 174 .
Despite the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule, we never have
held that unlawfully seized evidence is inadmissible in all
proceedings or against all persons. See, e.g., United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 , 435 U. S. 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 428 U. S. 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 348 .
"[T]he application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served." Ibid. [ Footnote 4 ]

															We have not yet had occasion to decide whether the automatic
standing rule of Jones survives our decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 (1968). See Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 , 411 U. S.
228 -229 (1973). Such a rule is, of course, one which may
allow a defendant to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of
another.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The search of the apartment in Jones was pursuant to a
search warrant naming Jones and another woman as occupants of the
apartment. The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant
alleged that Jones and the woman were involved in illicit narcotics
traffic and kept a supply of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia in
the apartment. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 267 -269, and n. 2; App. in Jones v. United
States, O.T. 1959, No. 69, p. 1.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															For these same prudential reasons, the Court in Alderman v.
United States rejected the argument that any defendant should
be enabled to apprise the court of unconstitutional searches and
seizures and to exclude all such unlawfully seized evidence from
trial, regardless of whether his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the search or whether he was the "target" of the
search. This expansive reading of the Fourth Amendment also was
advanced by the petitioner in Jones v. United States, and
implicitly rejected by the Court. Brief for Petitioner in Jones
v. United States, O.T. 1959, No. 69, pp. 21-25.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															So, for example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 352 (1967), the Court focused on substantive Fourth Amendment law,
concluded that a person in a telephone booth "may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment," and then proceeded to
determine whether the search was "unreasonable." In Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968), on the other hand, the Court concentrated on the issue of
standing, decided that the defendant possessed it, and with barely
any mention of the threshold substantive question of whether the
search violated DeForte's own Fourth Amendment rights, went on to
decide whether the search was "unreasonable." In both cases,
however, the first inquiry was much the same.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															This approach is consonant with that which the Court already has
taken with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, which also is a purely personal right. See,
e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U. S.
85 , 417 U. S. 89 -90
(1974); Couch v. United States, 409 U.
S. 322 , 409 U. S.
327 -328 (1973); United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 , 322 U. S.
698 -699 (1944).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The Court in Jones was quite careful to note that
"wrongful" presence at the scene of a search would not enable a
defendant to object to the legality of the search. 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 267 .
The Court stated:

															"No just interest of the Government in the effective and
rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered by
recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress,
when its fruits are proposed to be used against him. This
would, of course, not avail those who, by virtue of their wrongful
presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises
searched. " Ibid. (emphasis added). Despite this clear statement in Jones, several lower courts inexplicably have held that a
person present in a stolen automobile at the time of a search may
object to the lawfulness of the search of the automobile. See,
e.g., Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (CA9 1967); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (CA10 1965).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The Court in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, also must have
been unsatisfied with the "legitimately on premises" statement in Jones. DeForte was legitimately in his office at the time
of the search, and if the Mancusi Court had literally
applied the statement from Jones, DeForte's standing to
object to the search should have been obvious. Instead, to
determine whether DeForte possessed standing to object to the
search, the Court inquired into whether DeForte's office was an
area "in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 368 ; see id. at 392 U. S. 376 (Black, J., dissenting).

															Unfortunately, with few exceptions, lower courts have literally
applied this language from Jones, and have held that
anyone legitimately on premises at the time of the search may
contest its legality. See, e.g., Garza-Fuentes v. United
States, 400 F.2d 219 (CA5 1968); State v. Bresolin, 13 Wash. App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															This is not to say that such visitors could not contest the
lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own
property were seized during the search.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Obviously, however, a "legitimate" expectation of privacy. by
definition. means more than a subjective expectation of not being
discovered. A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the
off season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation
of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as
"legitimate." His presence, in the words of Jones, 362
U.S. at 362 U. S. 267 ,
is "wrongful"; his expectation is not "one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). And it would, of course, be merely
tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of
privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding
exclusionary rule issues in criminal cases. Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property
is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone,
Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, and one who owns or lawfully possesses
or controls property will, in all likelihood, have a legitimate
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.
Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of
course, need not be based on a common law interest in real or
personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These
ideas were rejected both in Jones, supra, and Katz,
supra. But, by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether
abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or
absence of the privacy interests protected by that Amendment. No
better demonstration of this proposition exists than the decision
in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 (1969), where the Court held that an individual's
property interest in his own home was so great as to allow him to
object to electronic surveillance of conversations emanating from
his home, even though he himself was not a party to the
conversations. On the other hand, even a property interest in
premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on
the premises or activity conducted thereon. See Katz,
supra at 389 U. S. 351 ; Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206 , 385 U. S. 210 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.
S. 559 , 274 U. S. 563 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.
57 , 265 U. S. 58 -59
(1924). [ Footnote 13 ]

															An examination of lower court decisions shows that use of this
purported "bright line" test has led to widely varying results. For
example, compare United States v.
Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F.
Supp. 690 (EDNY 1977) (defendant has standing to object to
search of codefendant's person at airport because defendant was
lawfully present at time of search), with Sumrall v. United
States, 382 F.2d 651 (CA10 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1055 (1968) (defendant did not have standing to object to
search of codefendant's purse even though defendant present at time
of search). Compare Holloway v. Wolff, 482 F.2d 110 (CA8
1973) (defendant has standing to object to search of bedroom in
house of third person because lawfully in house at time of search
even though no showing that defendant had ever been given
permission to use, or had ever been in, bedroom), with Northern
v. United States, 455 F.2d 427 (CA9 1972) (defendant lacked
standing to object to search of apartment-mate's bedroom, even
though present in apartment at time of search, since no showing
that defendant had permission to enter or use roommate's bedroom), and United States v. Miller, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 449
F.2d 974 (1971) (defendant lawfully present in third person's
office has standing to object to police entry into office, since
lawfully present, but lacks standing to object to search of drawer
of third person's desk, since no showing that he had permission to
open or use drawer). Compare United States v.
Tussell, 441 F.
Supp. 1092 (MD Pa.1977) (lessee does not have standing, because
not present at time of search), with United States v.
Potter, 419 F.
Supp. 1151 (ND Ill.1976) (lessee has standing even though not
present when premises searched). Compare United States v.
Fernandez, 430 F.
Supp. 794 (ND Cal.1976) (defendant with authorized access to
apartment has standing even though not present at time of search), with United States v. Potter, supra, (defendants with
authorized access to premises lack standing because not present at
the time of the search). Compare United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346 (CA6 1976) (defendant stopped by police in parking lot
of apartment house which he intended to visit lacks standing to
object to subsequent search of apartment, since not present in
apartment at time of search), with United States v.
Fay, 225 F.
Supp. 677 (SDNY 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 333
F.2d 28 (CA2 1964) (defendant-invitee stopped in hallway of
apartment building has standing to object to search of apartment he
intended to visit).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Commentators have expressed similar dissatisfaction with
reliance on "legitimate presence" to resolve Fourth Amendment
questions. Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the
Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L.Rev. 421, 448 (1975); White &
Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118
U.Pa.L.Rev. 333, 344-345 (1970). And, as we earlier noted supra at 142, n. 10, the Court in Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968), also implicitly recognized that the phrase "legitimately on
premises" simply does not answer the question whether the search
violated a defendant's "reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion." See id. at 392 U. S.
368 .

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															As we noted in Martinez-Fuerte, "[o]ne's expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom
in its operation are significantly different from the traditional
expectation of privacy and freedom in one's residence."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
561 .

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															The dissent states that Katz v. United States expressly
recognized protection for passengers of taxicabs, and asks why that
protection should not also extend to these petitioners. Katz relied on Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960), as support for that proposition. The question of Rios'
right to contest the search was not presented to or addressed by
the Court, and the property seized appears to have belonged to
Rios. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 (1951). Additionally, the facts of that case are
quite different from those of the present case. Rios had hired the
cab and occupied the rear passenger section. When police stopped
the cab, he placed a package he had been holding on the floor of
the rear section. The police saw the package and seized it after
defendant was removed from the cab.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															For reasons which they do not explain, our dissenting Brethren
repeatedly criticize our "holding" that, unless one has a common
law property interest in the premises searched, one cannot object
to the search. We have rendered no such "holding," however. To the
contrary, we have taken pains to reaffirm the statements in Jones and Katz that "arcane distinctions
developed in property . . . law . . . ought not to control." Supra at 439 U. S. 143 ,
and n. 12. In a similar vein, the dissenters repeatedly state or
imply that we now "hold" that a passenger lawfully in an automobile
"may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a search of
that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest
in it." Post at 439 U. S. 156 , 439 U. S.
158 -159, 439 U.S.
163 , 439 U. S. 165 , 439 U. S. 166 , 439 U. S. 168 , 439 U. S.
168 -169. It is not without significance that these
statements of today's "holding" come from the dissenting opinion,
and not from the Court's opinion. The case before us involves the
search of and seizure of property from the glove compartment and
area under the seat of a car in which petitioners were riding as
passengers. Petitioners claimed only that they were "legitimately
on [the] premises," and did not claim that they had any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the areas of the car which were searched.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the dissenters' insistence that
our decision will encourage the police to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Post at 439 U. S.
168 -169.

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring.

															I concur in the opinion of the Court, and add these thoughts. I
do not believe my dissenting Brethren correctly characterize the
rationale of the Court's opinion when they assert that it ties "the
application of the Fourth Amendment . . . to property law
concepts." Post at 439 U. S.
156 -157. On the contrary, I read the Court's opinion as
focusing on whether there was a legitimate expectation of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment.

															The petitioners do not challenge the constitutionality of the
police action in stopping the automobile in which they Page 439 U. S. 151 were riding; nor do they complain of being made to get out of
the vehicle. Rather, petitioners assert that their constitutionally
protected interest in privacy was violated when the police, after
stopping the automobile and making them get out, searched the
vehicle's interior, where they discovered a sawed-off rifle under
the front seat and rifle shells in the locked glove compartment.
The question before the Court, therefore, is a narrow one: did the
search of their friend's automobile after they had left it violate
any Fourth Amendment right of the petitioners?

															The dissenting opinion urges the Court to answer this question
by considering only the talisman of legitimate presence on the
premises. To be sure, one of the two alternative reasons given by
the Court for its ruling in Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), was that the defendant had been legitimately on the
premises searched. Since Jones, however, the view that
mere legitimate presence is enough to create a Fourth Amendment
right has been questioned. See ante at 439 U. S. 147 .
n. 14. There also has been a signal absence of uniformity in the
application of this theory. See ante at 439 U. S.
145 -146, n. 13

															This Court's decisions since Jones have emphasized a
sounder standard for determining the scope of a person's Fourth
Amendment rights: only legitimate expectations of privacy are
protected by the Constitution. In Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the Court rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment
protects places or property, ruling that the scope of the Amendment
must be determined by the scope of privacy that a free people
legitimately may expect. See id. at 389 U. S. 353 .
As Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurrence, however, it
is not enough that an individual desired or anticipated that he
would be free from governmental intrusion. Rather, for an
expectation to deserve the protection of the Fourth Amendment, it
must "be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" See id. at 389 U. S.
361 . Page 439 U. S. 152 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether one's claim to
privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the
surrounding circumstances. As the dissenting opinion states, this
standard "will not provide law enforcement officials with a bright
line between the protected and the unprotected." See post at 439 U. S. 168 .
Whatever the application of this standard may lack in ready
administration, it is more faithful to the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment than a test focusing solely or primarily on whether the
defendant was legitimately present during the search. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															In considering the reasonableness of asserted privacy
expectations, the Court has recognized that no single factor
invariably will be determinative. Thus, the Court has examined
whether a person invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment
took normal precautions to maintain his privacy -- that is,
precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy. See,
e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 11 (1977) ("By placing personal effects inside a double-locked Page 439 U. S. 153 footlocker, respondents manifested an expectation that the
contents would remain free from public examination"); Katz v.
United States, supra at 389 U. S. 352 ("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world"). Similarly, the Court has
looked to the way a person has used a location, to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment should protect his expectations of
privacy. In Jones v. United States, supra, for example,
the Court found that the defendant had a Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in an apartment in which he had slept and in which he kept
his clothing. The Court on occasion also has looked to history to
discern whether certain types of government intrusion were
perceived to be objectionable by the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Chadwick, supra at 433 U. S. 7 -9.
And, as the Court states today, property rights reflect society's
explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in
certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining
whether an individual's expectations of privacy are reasonable. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 (1969).

															The Court correctly points out that petitioners cannot invoke
decisions such as Alderman in support of their Fourth
Amendment claim, as they had no property interest in the automobile
in which they were riding. But this determination is only part of
the inquiry required under Katz. The petitioners' Fourth
Amendment rights were not abridged here, because none of the
factors relied upon by this Court on prior occasions supports
petitioners' claim that their alleged expectation of privacy from
government intrusion was reasonable.

															We are concerned here with an automobile search. Nothing is
better established in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the
distinction between one's expectation of privacy in Page 439 U. S. 154 an automobile and one's expectation when in other locations.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] We have repeatedly
recognized that this expectation in "an automobile . . . [is]
significantly different from the traditional expectation of privacy
and freedom in one's residence." United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 , 428 U. S. 561 (1976). In United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 433 U. S. 12 , the
distinction was stated more broadly:

															"[T]his Court has recognized significant differences between
motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches
of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would
not be reasonable in other contexts. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Preston
v. United States , [ 376 U.S.
364 ,] 376 U. S. 366 -367 [(1964)]; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970). See also
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 428 U. S.
367 (1976). [ Footnote
2/3 ]"

															In Chadwick, the Court recognized a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to one's locked footlocker, and
rejected the Government's argument that luggage always should be
equated with motor vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes. 433 U.S.
at 433 U. S. 13 .

															A distinction also properly may be made in some circumstances
between the Fourth Amendment rights of passengers and the right of
an individual who has exclusive control of an automobile or of its
locked compartments. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 (1976), for example, we Page 439 U. S.
155 considered "the citizen's interest in the privacy of the
contents of his automobile" where its doors were locked and windows
rolled up. See id. at 428 U. S. 379 (POWELL J., concurring). Here, there were three passengers and a
driver in the automobile searched. None of the passengers is said
to have had control of the vehicle or the keys. It is unrealistic
-- as the shared experience of us all bears witness -- to suggest
that these passengers had any reasonable expectation that the car
in which they had been riding would not be searched after they were
lawfully stopped and made to get out. The minimal privacy that
existed simply is not comparable to that, for example, of an
individual in his place of abode, see Jones v. United
States, supra; of one who secludes himself in telephone booth, Katz v. United States, supra; or of the traveler who
secures his belongings in a locked suitcase or footlocker. See
United States v. Chadwick, supra. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															This is not an area of the law in which any "bright line" rule
would safeguard both Fourth Amendment rights and the Page 439 U. S. 156 public interest in a fair and effective criminal Justice system.
The range of variables in the fact situations of search and seizure
is almost infinite. Rather than seek facile solutions, it is best
to apply principles broadly faithful to Fourth Amendment purposes.
I believe the Court has identified these principles. [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Allowing anyone who is legitimately on the premises searched to
invoke the exclusionary rule extends the rule far beyond the proper
scope of Fourth Amendment protections, as not all who are
legitimately present invariably have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. And, as the Court points out, the dissenters' standard
lacks even the advantage of easy application. See ante at 439 U. S.
145 -146.

															I do not share the dissenters' concern that the Court's ruling
will "invit[e] police to engage in patently unreasonable searches
every time an automobile contains more than one occupant." See
post at 439 U. S. 168 .
A police officer observing an automobile carrying several
passengers will not know the circumstances surrounding each
occupant's presence in the automobile, and certainly will not know
whether an occupant will be able to establish that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, there will continue to be
a significant incentive for the police to comply with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, lest otherwise valid
prosecutions be voided. Moreover, any marginal diminution in this
incentive that might result from the Court's decision today is more
than justified by society's interest in restricting the scope of
the exclusionary rule to those cases where in fact there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															There are sound reasons for this distinction: automobiles
operate on public streets; they are serviced in public places; they
stop frequently; they are usually parked in public places; their
interiors are highly visible; and they are subject to extensive
regulation and inspection. The rationale of the automobile
distinction does not apply, of course, to objects on the person of
an occupant.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Six Members of the Court joined THE CHIEF JUSTICE in Chadwick, and the two Justices who dissented in Chadwick did not disagree with the automobile
distinction.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The sawed-off rifle in this case was merely pushed beneath the
front seat, presumably by one of the petitioners. In that position,
it could have slipped into full or partial view in the event of an
accident, or indeed upon any sudden stop. As the rifle shells were
in the locked glove compartment, this might have presented a closer
case if it had been shown that one of the petitioners possessed the
keys or if a rifle had not been found in the automobile.

															The dissenting opinion suggests that the petitioners here took
the same actions to preserve their privacy as did the defendant in Katz: just as Katz closed the door to the telephone booth
after him, petitioners closed the doors to their automobile. See post at 439 U. S. 165 n. 15. Last Term, this Court determined in Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977), that passengers in automobiles have no Fourth Amendment
right not to be ordered from their vehicle once a proper stop is
made. The dissenting opinion concedes that there is no question
here of the propriety of the stopping of the automobile in which
the petitioners were riding. See post at 439 U. S. 160 n. 5. Thus, the closing of the doors of a vehicle, even if there
were only one occupant, cannot have the same significance as it
might in other contexts.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Even if one agreed with my dissenting Brethren that there was a
Fourth Amendment violation in this case, the evidence seized would
have been admissible under the modification of the exclusionary
rule proposed by MR. JUSTICE WHITE in his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 428 U. S. 538 (1976):

															"[T]he rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent
its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at
issue was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that
his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable
grounds for this belief. These are recurring situations; and
recurringly evidence is excluded without any realistic expectation
that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes
of the rule, even though the trial will be seriously affected or
the indictment dismissed." See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.
S. 590 , 422 U. S.
609 -610 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring in part).

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment protects
property, not people, and specifically that a legitimate occupant
of an automobile may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge
a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a
possessory interest in it. [ Footnote
3/1 ] Though professing to acknowledge that the primary purpose
of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches is
the protection of privacy -- not property -- the Court nonetheless
effectively ties the application of the Fourth Amendment and Page 439 U. S. 157 the exclusionary rule in this situation to property law
concepts. Insofar as passengers are concerned, the Court's opinion
today declares an "open season" on automobiles. However unlawful
stopping and searching a car may be, absent a possessory or
ownership interest, no "mere" passenger may object, regardless of
his relationship to the owner. Because the majority's conclusion
has no support in the Court's controlling decisions, in the logic
of the Fourth Amendment, or in common sense, I must respectfully
dissent. If the Court is troubled by the practical impact of the
exclusionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule's
continued validity squarely, instead of distorting other doctrines
in an attempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in
specific cases. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.
S. 465 , 428 U. S. 536 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). I Two intersecting doctrines long established in this Court's
opinions control here. The first is the recognition of some
cognizable level of privacy in the interior of an automobile.
Though the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in a
vehicle may be somewhat weaker than that in a home, see United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 433 U. S. 12 -13
(1977),

															"[a] search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of
privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness, the
Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum requirement
for a lawful search." United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.
S. 891 , 422 U. S. 896 (1975) (footnote omitted). So far, the Court has not strayed from
this application of the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The second tenet is that, when a person is legitimately present
in a private place, his right to privacy is protected from
unreasonable governmental interference even if he does Page 439 U. S. 158 not own the premises. Just a few years ago, THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
for a unanimous Court, wrote that the "[p]resence of the defendant
at the search and seizure was held, in Jones, to be a
sufficient source of standing in itself." Brown v. United
States, 411 U. S. 223 , 411 U. S. 227 n. 2 (1973); accord, id. at 411 U. S. 229 (one basis for Fourth Amendment protection is presence "on the
premises at the time of the contested search and seizure"); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960) (individual legitimately present in friend's apartment may
object to search of apartment). Brown was not the first
time we had recognized that Jones established the rights
of one legitimately in a private area against unreasonable
governmental intrusion. E.g., Combs v. United States, 408 U. S. 224 , 408 U. S. 227 ,
and n. 4 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.
S. 364 , 392 U. S. 368 ,
and n. 5 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 , 390 U. S. 390 (1968). The Court in Jones itself was unanimous in this
regard, and its holding is not the less binding because it was an
alternative one. See Combs v. United States, supra, at 408 U. S. 227 n. 4.

															These two fundamental aspects of Fourth Amendment law demand
that petitioners be permitted to challenge the search and seizure
of the automobile in this case. It is of no significance that a car
is different for Fourth Amendment purposes from a house, for if
there is some protection for the privacy of an automobile, then the
only relevant analogy is between a person legitimately in someone
else's vehicle and a person legitimately in someone else's home. If
both strands of the Fourth Amendment doctrine adumbrated above are
valid, the Court must reach a different result. Instead, it chooses
to eviscerate the Jones principle, an action in which I am
unwilling to participate. II Though we had reserved the very issue over 50 years ago, see
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 (1925), and never expressly dealt with it again until today, many
of our opinions have assumed that a mere passenger in an
automobile Page 439 U. S. 159 is entitled to protection against unreasonable searches
occurring in his presence. In decisions upholding the validity of
automobile searches, we have gone directly to the merits even
though some of the petitioners did not own or possess the vehicles
in question. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.
S. 218 (1973) (sole petitioner was not owner; in fact,
owner was not in the automobile at all); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970)
(sole petitioner was not owner); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931). In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.
S. 216 (1968), the Court, with seven Members agreeing,
upset the admission of evidence against three petitioners, though
only one owned the vehicle. See id. at 391 U. S.
221 -222. Similarly, in Preston v. United
States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964), the Court unanimously overturned a search though the single
petitioner was not the owner of the automobile. The Court's silence
on this issue in light of its actions can only mean that, until
now, we, like most lower courts, [ Footnote 3/3 ] had assumed that Jones foreclosed
the answer now supplied by the majority. That assumption was
perfectly understandable, since all private premises would seem to
be the same for the purposes of the analysis set out in Jones. III The logic of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence compels the result
reached by the above decisions. Our starting point is

															"[t]he established principle . . . that suppression of the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged
only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself. . .
." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 , 394 U. S.
171 -172 (1969). [ Footnote
3/4 ] Though the Amendment protects one's liberty Page 439 U. S. 160 and property interests against unreasonable seizures of self
[ Footnote 3/5 ] and effects,
[ Footnote 3/6 ] "the primary object
of the Fourth Amendment [is] . . . the protection of privacy." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 , 417 U. S. 589 (1974) (plurality opinion). [ Footnote
3/7 ] And privacy is the Page 439 U. S. 161 interest asserted here, [ Footnote
3/8 ] so the first step is to ascertain whether the premises
searched "fall within a protected zone of privacy." United
States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 , 425 U. S. 440 (1976). My Brethren in the majority assertedly do not deny that
automobiles warrant at least some protection from official
interference with privacy. Thus, the next step is to decide who is
entitled, vis-a-vis the State, to enjoy that privacy. The
answer to that question must be found by determining

															"whether petitioner had an interest in connection with the
searched premises that gave rise to 'a reasonable expectation [on
his part] of freedom from governmental intrusion' upon those
premises." Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 227 ,
quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 368 (bracketed material in original).

															Not only does Combs supply the relevant inquiry, it
also directs us to the proper answer. We recognized there that Jones had held that one of those protected interests is
created by legitimate presence on the searched premises, even
absent any possessory interest. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 227 n. 4. This makes unquestionable sense. We have concluded on
numerous occasions that the entitlement to an expectation of
privacy does not hinge on ownership:

															"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. .
. . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S.
351 -352 (1967). In Alderman v. United States,
supra, at 394 U. S. 196 ,
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
noted that "our own past decisions . . . have decisively rejected
the notion Page 439 U. S. 162 that the accused must necessarily have a possessory interest in
the premises before he may assert a Fourth Amendment claim." That
rejection should no have been surprising in light of our
conclusion, as early as 1960, that

															"it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by
the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 266 .
[ Footnote 3/9 ] The proposition
today overruled was stated most directly in Mancusi v. DeForte,
supra at 392 U. S.
368 :

															"[T]he protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property
right in the invaded place, but upon whether the area was one in
which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion."

															Prior to Jones, the lower federal courts had based
Fourth Amendment rights upon possession or ownership of the items
seized or the premises searched. [ Footnote 3/10 ] But Jones was foreshadowed by
Mr. Justice Jackson's remark in 1948 that "even a guest may expect
the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 , 335 U. S. 461 (1948) (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Indeed, the decision today is contrary to Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead v. United
States , 277 Page 439 U. S. 163 U.S. 438, 277 U. S. 478 (1928), expressing a view of the Fourth Amendment thought to have
been vindicated by Katz. The majority in Olmstead found the Fourth Amendment inapplicable absent a trespass on
property rights. 277 U.S. at 277 U. S. 466 .
That is exactly what the Court holds in this case; but Mr. Justice
Brandeis asserted 50 years ago that more than mere property rights
are involved, and the Court's opinion in Katz reemphasized
that " [t]he premise that property interests control the right
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.'" 389
U.S. at 389 U. S. 353 ,
quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 , 387 U. S. 304 (1967). That logic led us inescapably to the conclusion
that "[n]o less than an individual in a business office, in a
friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth
may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment."

															389 U.S. at 389 U. S. 32 (footnotes omitted). And if all of those situations are protected,
surely a person riding in an automobile next to his friend the
owner, or a child or wife with the father or spouse, must have some
protection as well.

															The same result is reached by tracing other lines of our Fourth
Amendment decisions. If a nonowner may consent to a search merely
because he is a joint user or occupant of a "premises," Frazier
v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 , 394 U. S. 740 (1969), [ Footnote 3/11 ] then that
same nonowner must have a protected privacy interest. The scope of
the authority sufficient to grant a valid consent can hardly be
broader than the contours of protected privacy. [ Footnote 3/12 ] Page 439 U. S. 164 And why should the owner of a vehicle be entitled to challenge
the seizure from it of evidence even if he is absent at the time of
the search, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971), while a nonowner enjoying in person, and
with the owner's permission, the privacy of an automobile is not so
entitled?

															In sum, one consistent theme in our decisions under the Fourth
Amendment has been, until now, that "the Amendment does not shield
only those who have title to the searched premises." Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 367 .
Though there comes a point when use of an area is shared with so
many that one simply cannot reasonably expect seclusion, see
id. at 392 U. S. 377 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861 , 416 U. S. 865 (1974), short of that limit a person legitimately on private
premises knows the others allowed there and, though his privacy is
not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is sharing it only with
those persons and that governmental officials will intrude only
with consent or by complying with the Fourth Amendment. See
Mancusi v. DeForte, supra at 392 U. S.
369 -370. [ Footnote
3/13 ]

															It is true that the Court asserts that it is not limiting the
Fourth Amendment bar against unreasonable searches to the
protection of property rights, but, in reality, it is doing exactly
that. [ Footnote 3/14 ] Petitioners
were in a private place with the permission Page 439 U. S. 165 of the owner, but the Court states that that is not sufficient
to establish entitlement to a legitimate expectation of privacy. Ante at 439 U. S. 148 .
But if that is not sufficient, what would be? We are not told, and
it is hard to imagine anything short of a property interest that
would satisfy the majority. Insofar as the Court's rationale is
concerned, no passenger in an automobile, without an ownership or
possessory interest and regardless of his relationship to the
owner, may claim Fourth Amendment protection against illegal stops
and searches of the automobile in which he is rightfully present.
The Court approves the result in Jones, but it fails to
give any explanation why the facts in Jones differ, in a
fashion material to the Fourth Amendment, from the facts here.
[ Footnote 3/15 ] More importantly,
how is the Court able to avoid answering the question why presence
in a private place with the owner's permission is insufficient? If
it is

															"tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations
of privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding
exclusionary rule issues in criminal cases," ante at 439 U. S. 144 ,
n. 12, then it surely must be tautological to decide that issue
simply by unadorned fiat. Page 439 U. S. 166 As a control on governmental power, the Fourth Amendment assures
that some expectations of privacy are justified, and will be
protected from official intrusion. That should be true in this
instance, for if protected zones of privacy can only be purchased
or obtained by possession of property, then much of our daily lives
will be unshielded from unreasonable governmental prying, and the
reach of the Fourth Amendment will have been narrowed to protect
chiefly those with possessory interests in real or personal
property. I had thought that Katz firmly established that
the Fourth Amendment was intended as more than simply a trespass
law applicable to the government. Katz had no possessory interest
in the public telephone booth, at least no more than petitioners
had in their friend's car; Katz was simply legitimately present.
And the decision in Katz was based not on property rights,
but on the theory that it was essential to securing "conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness" [ Footnote 3/16 ] that the expectation of privacy in
question be recognized. [ Footnote
3/17 ]

															At most, one could say that perhaps the Constitution provides
some degree less protection for the personal freedom from
unreasonable governmental intrusion when one does not have a
possessory interest in the invaded private place. But that would
only change the extent of the protection; it would not free police
to do the unreasonable, as does the decision today. And since the
accused should be entitled to litigate the application of the
Fourth Amendment where his privacy interest is merely arguable,
[ Footnote 3/18 ] the failure to
allow such litigation here is the more incomprehensible. Page 439 U. S. 167 IV The Court's holding is contrary not only to our past decisions
and the logic of the Fourth Amendment, but also to the everyday
expectations of privacy that we all share. Because of that, it is
unworkable in all the various situations that arise in real life.
If the owner of the car had not only invited petitioners to join
her but had said to them, "I give you a temporary possessory
interest in my vehicle so that you will share the right to privacy
that the Supreme Court says that I own," then apparently the
majority would reverse. But people seldom say such things, though
they may mean their invitation to encompass them if only they had
thought of the problem. [ Footnote
3/19 ] If the nonowner were the spouse or child of the owner,
[ Footnote 3/20 ] would the Court
recognize a sufficient interest? If so, would distant relatives
somehow have more of an expectation of privacy than close friends?
What if the nonowner were driving with the owner's permission?
Would nonowning drivers have more of an expectation of privacy than
mere passengers? What about a passenger in a taxicab? Katz expressly recognized protection for such passengers. Why should
Fourth Amendment rights be present when one pays a cabdriver for a
ride, but be absent when one is given a ride by a friend?

															The distinctions the Court would draw are based on relationships
between private parties, but the Fourth Amendment is concerned with
the relationship of one of those parties to Page 439 U. S. 168 the government. Divorced as it is from the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court's essentially property-based rationale can
satisfactorily answer none of the questions posed above. That is
reason enough to reject it. The Jones rule is relatively
easily applied by police and courts; the rule announced today will
not provide law enforcement officials with a bright line between
the protected and the unprotected. [ Footnote 3/21 ] Only rarely will police know whether one
private party has or has not been granted a sufficient possessory
or other interest by another private party. Surely, in this case,
the officers had no such knowledge. The Court's rule will ensnare
defendants and police in needless litigation over factors that
should not be determinative of Fourth Amendment rights. [ Footnote 3/22 ]

															More importantly, the ruling today undercuts the force of the
exclusionary rule in the one area in which its use is most
certainly justified -- the deterrence of bad-faith violations of
the Fourth Amendment. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
536 -542 (WHITE, J., dissenting). This decision invites
police to engage in patently unreasonable searches every time an
automobile contains more than one occupant. Should something be
found, only the owner of the vehicle, or of the item, will have
standing to seek suppression, and the evidence will Page 439 U. S. 169 presumably be usable against the other occupants. [ Footnote 3/23 ] The danger of such bad
faith is especially high in cases such as this one, where the
officers are only after the passengers, and can usually infer
accurately that the driver is the owner. The suppression remedy for
those owners in whose vehicles something is found and who are
charged with crime is small consolation for all those owners and
occupants whose privacy will be needlessly invaded by officers
following mistaken hunches not rising to the level of probable
cause but operated on in the knowledge that someone in a crowded
car will probably be unprotected if contraband or incriminating
evidence happens to be found. After this decision, police will have
little to lose by unreasonably searching vehicles occupied by more
than one person.

															Of course, most police officers will decline the Court's
invitation, and will continue to do their jobs as best they can in
accord with the Fourth Amendment. But the very purpose of the Bill
of Rights was to answer the justified fear that governmental agents
cannot be left totally to their own devices, and the Bill of Rights
is enforceable in the courts because human experience teaches that
not all such officials will otherwise adhere to the stated
precepts. Some policemen simply do act in bad faith, even if for
understandable ends, and some deterrent is needed. In the rush to
limit the applicability of the exclusionary rule somewhere,
anywhere, the Court ignores precedent, logic, and common sense to
exclude the rule's operation from situations in which,
paradoxically, it is justified and needed.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															For the most part, I agree with the Court's rejection, which was
implicit in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165 (1969), of petitioners' secondary theory of
target standing.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266 , 413 U. S. 269 (1973) ("Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause
for the search") .

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] E.g., United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (CA5 1978)
(en banc); Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (CA9
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 412 U.S.
218 (1973); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (CA4
1962).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] Accord, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.
S. 377 , 390 U. S. 389 (1968) ("[W]e have . . . held that rights assured by the Fourth
Amendment are personal rights, and that they may be enforced by
exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own
protection was infringed by the search and seizure") .

															[ Footnote 3/5 ] See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873 , 422 U. S. 878 (1975) ("The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the
person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention
short of traditional arrest"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968).

															Thus, petitioners, of course, have standing to challenge the
legality of the stop, and the evidence found may be a fruit of that
stop. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 548 , 428 U. S. 556 (1976). Petitioners have not argued that theory here, perhaps
because the justification necessary for such a stop is less than
that needed for a search. See Terry v. Ohio, supra. Nor
have petitioners chosen to argue that they were "arrested" in
constitutional terms as soon as they were ordered from the vehicle
and that the search was a fruit of that infringement on their
personal rights.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ] See United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (CA7 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976) (noted in 64 Geo.L.J.
1187 (1976)), after remand, 559 F.2d 1108 (CA7 1977).

															Petitioners never asserted a property interest in the items
seized from the automobile. The evidence found was useful to the
prosecution solely on the theory that petitioners' possession of
the items was probative of petitioners' identity as the robbers. In Jones, the Court recognized automatic standing in
possessory crimes because the prosecution should not be allowed to
take contradictory positions in the suppression hearing and then at
trial, and also because of the dilemma that the defendant would
face if he were forced to assert possession to challenge a search.
362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 263 .
In Simmons, we eliminated the dilemma by holding that the
accused's testimony at the suppression hearing could not be used
against him at trial. 390 U.S. at 390 U. S. 394 .
We also noted that the question whether automatic standing should
be recognized for possessory evidence in nonpossessory crimes was
an open one. Id. at 390 U. S.
391 -392. Finally, in Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 , 411 U. S. 229 (1973), we reserved the question whether prosecutorial
self-contradiction by itself warrants automatic standing.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 7 (1977).

															[ Footnote 3/8 ] See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 591 (plurality opinion) ("[I]nsofar as Fourth Amendment protection
extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the
touchstone of our inquiry").

															[ Footnote 3/9 ] Accord, id. at 417 U. S. 589 ("The common law notion that a warrant to
search and seize is dependent upon the assertion of a superior
government interest in property, . . . and the proposition that a
warrant is valid only when a primary right to such search and
seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the
complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right
to the possession of it' . . . were explicitly rejected as
controlling Fourth Amendment considerations in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S.
302 -306 (1967)"). [ Footnote 3/10 ]

															Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo.L.Rev. 1, 36 n.
238 (1975).

															[ Footnote 3/11 ] See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.
S. 164 , 415 U. S. 169 ,
and 171 n. 7 (1974) ("The authority which justifies the third-party
consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant
historical and legal refinements, . . . but rests rather on mutual
use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the
risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched") .

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.Chi.L.Rev.
47, 54 (1974).

															[ Footnote 3/13 ] See id. at 52 ("The fourth amendment assures us that,
when we are in a private place we are, so far as the government is
concerned, in private").

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															The Court's reliance on property law concepts is additionally
shown by its suggestion that visitors could "contest the lawfulness
of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were
seized during the search." Ante at 439 U. S. 142 n. 11. See also ante at 439 U. S. 149 ,
and n. 16. What difference should that property interest make to
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches, which is
concerned with privacy? See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S.
510 -521 (1971) (WHITE, J., with BURGER, C.J., concurring
and dissenting). Contrary to the Court's suggestion, a legitimate
passenger in a car expects to enjoy the privacy of the vehicle
whether or not he happens to carry some item along for the ride. We
have never before limited our concern for a person's privacy to
those situations in which he is in possession of personal property.
Even a person living in a barren room without possessions is
entitled to expect that the police will not intrude without
cause.

															[ Footnote 3/15 ] Jones had permission to use the apartment, had slept in
it one night, had a key, had left a suit and a shirt there, and was
the only occupant at the time of the search. Ante at 439 U. S. 141 and 439 U. S. 149 .
Petitioners here had permission to be in the car, and were
occupying it at the time of the search. Thus, the only
distinguishing fact is that Jones could exclude others from the
apartment by using his friend's key. But petitioners and their
friend the owner had excluded others by entering the automobile and
shutting the doors. Petitioners did not need a key, because the
owner was present. Similarly, the Court attempts to distinguish Katz on the theory that Katz had "shut the door behind him
to exclude all others," ante at 439 U. S. 149 ,
but petitioners here did exactly the same. The car doors remained
closed until the police ordered them opened at gunpoint.

															[ Footnote 3/16 ] Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 , 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) .

															[ Footnote 3/17 ] See Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the
Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 529, 538
(1978).

															[ Footnote 3/18 ] Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.
S. 617 , 401 U. S. 620 (1971); cf. ante at 439
U.S. 140 .

															[ Footnote 3/19 ]

															So far as we know, the owner of the automobile in question might
have expressly granted or intended to grant exactly such an
interest. Apparently not contemplating today's radical change in
the law, petitioners did not know at the suppression hearing that
the precise form of the invitation extended by the owner to the
petitioners would be dispositive of their rights against
governmental intrusion.

															[ Footnote 3/20 ]

															In fact, though it was not brought out at the suppression
hearing, one of the petitioners is the former husband of the owner
and driver of the car. He did testify at the suppression hearing
that he was with her when she purchased it.

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															Contrary to the assertions in the majority and concurring
opinions, I do not agree that the Court's rule is faithful to the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but reject it only because it
fails to provide a "bright line." As the discussion, supra at 439 U. S.
159 -166, indicates, this dissent disagrees with the
Court's view that petitioners lack a reasonable expectation of
privacy. The Court's ipse dixit is not only unexplained,
but also is unjustified in light of what persons reasonably do, and
should be entitled to, expect. My point in this portion of the
opinion is that the Court's lack of faithfulness to the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment does not have even the saving grace of
providing an easily applied rule.

															[ Footnote 3/22 ]

															To say that the Fourth Amendment goes beyond property rights, of
course, is not to say that one not enjoying privacy in person would
not be entitled to expect protection from unreasonable intrusions
into the areas he owns, such as his house. E.g., Alderman v.
United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969).

															[ Footnote 3/23 ] See Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The
Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56
B.U.L.Rev. 266, 304-305 (1976) (police may often be willing to risk
suppression at the behest of some defendants in order to gain
evidence usable against those without constitutional protection);
White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure,
118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 333, 349, 365 (1970) (same).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The Supreme Court ruled that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be claimed by individuals who are not the direct victims of an illegal search and seizure. The Court rejected the "target" theory, which would grant standing to any defendant targeted by a search. Instead, the Court focused on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy, concluding that passengers in a car who asserted no property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the seized property had no legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no standing to challenge the search.