U.S. Supreme Court Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444 (1990) Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz No. 88-1897 Argued Feb. 27, 1990 Decided June 14, 1990 496
U.S. 444 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case poses the question whether a State's use of highway
sobriety checkpoints violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not, and
therefore reverse the contrary holding of the Court of Appeals of
Michigan.

															Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State Police and its
Director, established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program in early
1986. The Director appointed a Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory
Committee comprising representatives of the State Police force,
local police forces, state prosecutors, and the University of
Michigan Transportation Research Institute. Pursuant to its charge,
the Advisory Committee created guidelines setting forth procedures
governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity.

															Under the guidelines, checkpoints would be set up at selected
sites along state roads. All vehicles passing through a checkpoint
would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of
intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected signs of
intoxication, the motorist would be directed to a location out of
the traffic flow where an officer would check the motorist's
driver's license and car registration and, if warranted, conduct
further sobriety tests. Should the field tests and the officer's
observations suggest that the driver was intoxicated, an arrest
would be made. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their
journey immediately. [448 ]

															The first -- and to date the only -- sobriety checkpoint
operated under the program was conducted in Saginaw County with the
assistance of the Saginaw County Sheriff's Department. During the
hour-and-fifteen-minute duration of the checkpoint's operation, 126
vehicles passed through the checkpoint. The average delay for each
vehicle was approximately 25 seconds. Two drivers were detained for
field sobriety testing, and one of the two was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. A third driver who drove through
without stopping was pulled over by an officer in an observation
vehicle and arrested for driving under the influence.

															On the day before the operation of the Saginaw County
checkpoint, respondents filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of
Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from
potential subjection to the checkpoints. Each of the respondents
"is a licensed driver in the State of Michigan . . . who regularly
travels throughout the State in his automobile." See Complaint,
App. 3a-4a. During pretrial proceedings, petitioners agreed to
delay further implementation of the checkpoint program pending the
outcome of this litigation.

															After the trial, at which the court heard extensive testimony
concerning, inter alia , the "effectiveness" of highway
sobriety checkpoint programs, the court ruled that the Michigan
program violated the Fourth Amendment and Art. 1, § 11, of the
Michigan Constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. 132a. On appeal, the
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the holding that the program
violated the Fourth Amendment and, for that reason, did not
consider whether the program violated the Michigan Constitution.
170 Mich.App. 433, 445, 429 N.W.2d 180, 185 (1988). After the
Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners' application for leave to
appeal, we granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 806 (1989).

															To decide this case, the trial court performed a balancing test
derived from our opinion in Brown v. Texas , 443 U. S. 47 (1979). As
described by the Court of Appeals, the test in- [449 ]

															volved "balancing the state's interest in preventing accidents
caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints
in achieving that goal, and the level of intrusion on an
individual's privacy caused by the checkpoints." 170 Mich.App. at
439, 429 N.W.2d, at 182 (citing Brown, supra , 443 U.S. at
50-51). The Court of Appeals agreed that "the Brown three-prong
balancing test was the correct test to be used to determine the
constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint plan." 170 Mich.App.,
at 439, 429 N.W.2d, at 182.

															As characterized by the Court of Appeals, the trial court's
findings with respect to the balancing factors were that the State
has "a grave and legitimate" interest in curbing drunken driving;
that sobriety checkpoint programs are generally "ineffective" and,
therefore, do not significantly further that interest; and that the
checkpoints' "subjective intrusion" on individual liberties is
substantial. Id. at 439 and 440, 429 N.W.2d, at 183 and
184. According to the court, the record disclosed no basis for
disturbing the trial court's findings, which were made within the
context of an analytical framework prescribed by this Court for
determining the constitutionality of seizures less intrusive than
traditional arrests. Id. at 445, 429 N.W.2d at 185.

															In this Court, respondents seek to defend the judgment in their
favor by insisting that the balancing test derived from Brown
v. Texas, supra , was not the proper method of analysis.
Respondents maintain that the analysis must proceed from a basis of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion and rely for support on
language from our decision last Term in Treasury Employees v.
Von Raab , 489 U.
S. 656 (1989). We said in Von Raab: "Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary
to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to
require a warrant [450 ] or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular
context." Id. at 665-666. Respondents argue that there must be a showing of some special
governmental need "beyond the normal need" for criminal law
enforcement before a balancing analysis is appropriate, and that
petitioners have demonstrated no such special need.

															But it is perfectly plain from a reading of Von Raab ,
which cited and discussed with approval our earlier decision in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543 (1976),
that it was in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing
with police stops of motorists on public highways. Martinez-Fuerte, supra , which utilized a balancing
analysis in approving highway checkpoints for detecting illegal
aliens, and Brown v. Texas, supra , are the relevant
authorities here.

															Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a
checkpoint. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see Martinez-Fuerte,
supra , at 556 ("It is agreed that checkpoint stops are
'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); Brower
v. County of Inyo , 489 U. S. 593 , 597 (1989)
(Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied " (emphasis in original)). The question thus becomes
whether such seizures are "reasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.

															It is important to recognize what our inquiry is not about. No allegations are before us of unreasonable treatment of
any person after an actual detention at a particular checkpoint.
See Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. at 559 ("claim that a
particular exercise of discretion in locating or operating a
checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop judicial
review"). As pursued in the lower courts, the instant action
challenges only the use of sobriety checkpoints generally. We
address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a
checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and ob- [451 ]

															servation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular
motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require
satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. Id. at 567.

															No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken
driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media
reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's
roads are legion. The anecdotal is confirmed by the statistical.
"Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 [ Footnote * ]and in the same
time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than
five billion dollars in property damage." 4 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 10.8(d), p. 71 (2d
ed. 1987). For decades, this Court has "repeatedly lamented the
tragedy." South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U. S. 553 , 558
(1983); see Breithaupt v. Abram , 352 U. S. 432 , 439 (1957)
("The increasing slaughter on our highways . . . now reaches the
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield").

															Conversely, the weight bearing on the other scale -- the measure
of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety
checkpoints -- is slight. We reached a similar conclusion as to the
intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway
checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. See Martinez-Fuerte,
supra , at 558. We see virtually no difference between the
levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists [452 ]

															from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two
types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem
identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint
officers might ask. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus,
accurately gauged the "objective" intrusion, measured by the
duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, as
minimal. See 170 Mich.App. at 444, 429 N.W.2d at 184.

															With respect to what it perceived to be the "subjective"
intrusion on motorists, however, the Court of Appeals found such
intrusion substantial. See supra at 449. The court first
affirmed the trial court's finding that the guidelines governing
checkpoint operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the
scene. But the court also agreed with the trial court's conclusion
that the checkpoints have the potential to generate fear and
surprise in motorists. This was so because the record failed to
demonstrate that approaching motorists would be aware of their
option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints. On
that basis, the court deemed the subjective intrusion from the
checkpoints unreasonable. Id. at 443-444, 429 N.W.2d at
184-185.

															We believe the Michigan courts misread our cases concerning the
degree of "subjective intrusion" and the potential for generating
fear and surprise. The "fear and surprise" to be considered are not
the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of
being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and
surprise engendered in law abiding motorists by the nature of the
stop. This was made clear in Martinez-Fuerte. Comparing
checkpoint stops to roving patrol stops considered in prior cases,
we said, "we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the
subjective intrusion -- the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers -- is appreciably less in the case of
a checkpoint stop. In [ United States v. ] Ortiz, [ 422 U.S. 891 (1975),] we noted: [453 ] "'[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search
are far less intrusive than those attending a roving patrol stop.
Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and
their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints, the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 422 U.S. at
894-895." Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U.S. at 558. See also id. at 559. Here, checkpoints are selected
pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop
every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief
stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes
indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. The Court of Appeals went on to consider as part of the
balancing analysis the "effectiveness" of the proposed checkpoint
program. Based on extensive testimony in the trial record, the
court concluded that the checkpoint program failed the
"effectiveness" part of the test, and that this failure materially
discounted petitioners' strong interest in implementing the
program. We think the Court of Appeals was wrong on this point as
well.

															The actual language from Brown v. Texas , upon which the
Michigan courts based their evaluation of "effectiveness,"
describes the balancing factor as "the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest." 443 U.S. at 51. This passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically
accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among
reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be
employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police
science might disagree over which of several methods of
apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such
reasonable alternatives [454 ]

															remains with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public
resources, including a finite number of police officers. Brown's rather general reference to "the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest" was derived, as the
opinion makes clear, from the line of cases culminating in Martinez-Fuerte, supra. Neither Martinez-Fuerte nor Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648 (1979),
however, the two cases cited by the Court of Appeals as providing
the basis for its "effectiveness" review, see 170 Mich.App. at 442,
429 N.W.2d at 183, supports the searching examination of
"effectiveness" undertaken by the Michigan court.

															In Delaware v. Prouse, supra , we disapproved random
stops made by Delaware Highway Patrol officers in an effort to
apprehend unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles. We observed that
no empirical evidence indicated that such stops would be an
effective means of promoting roadway safety and said that "[i]t
seems common sense that the percentage of all drivers on the road
who are driving without a license is very small, and that the
number of licensed drivers who will be stopped in order to find one
unlicensed operator will be large indeed." 440 U.S. at 659-660. We
observed that the random stops involved the "kind of standardless
and unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has
discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the
discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least
to some extent." Id. at 661. We went on to state that our
holding did not "cast doubt on the permissibility of roadside truck
weigh-stations and inspection checkpoints, at which some vehicles
may be subject to further detention for safety and regulatory
inspection than are others." Id. at 663, n. 26.

															Unlike Prouse , this case involves neither a complete
absence of empirical data nor a challenge to random highway stops.
During the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, the
detention of each of the 126 vehicles that entered the checkpoint
resulted in the arrest of two drunken drivers. [455 ]

															Stated as a percentage, approximately 1.5 percent of the drivers
passing through the checkpoint were arrested for alcohol
impairment. In addition, an expert witness testified at the trial
that experience in other States demonstrated that, on the whole,
sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of around
1 percent of all motorists stopped. 170 Mich.App. at 441, 429
N.W.2d at 183. By way of comparison, the record from one of the
consolidated cases in Martinez-Fuerte showed that, in the
associated checkpoint, illegal aliens were found in only 0.12
percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint. See 428
U.S. at 554. The ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles
stopped (considering that on occasion two or more illegal aliens
were found in a single vehicle) was approximately 0.5 percent. See Ibid. We concluded that this "record . . . provides a
rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente
checkpoint", ibid, , and we sustained its
constitutionality. We see no justification for a different
conclusion here.

															In sum, the balance of the State's interest in preventing
drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be
said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon
individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of
the state program. We therefore hold that it is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment. The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals is
accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

															I concur only in the judgment.

															I fully agree with the Court's lamentations about the slaughter
on our highways, and about the dangers posed to almost everyone by
the driver who is under the influence of alcohol or other drug. I
add this comment only to remind the Court that it has been almost
20 years since, in Perez v. [456 ] Campbell , 402 U. S. 637 , 657
(1971), in writing for three others (no longer on the Court) and
myself, I noted that the "slaughter on the highways of this Nation
exceeds the death toll of all our wars," and that I detected
"little genuine public concern about what takes place in our very
midst and on our daily travel routes." See also Tate v.
Short , 401 U. S.
395 , 401 (1971) (concurring statement). And in the Appendix to
my writing in Perez , 402 U.S. at 672, I set forth official
figures to the effect that, for the period from 1900 through 1969,
motor vehicle deaths in the United States exceeded the death toll
of all our wars. I have little doubt that those figures, when
supplemented for the two decades since 1969, would disclose an even
more discouraging comparison. I am pleased, of course, that the
Court is now stressing this tragic aspect of American life. See ante at 451.

															Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															Today, the Court rejects a Fourth Amendment challenge to a
sobriety checkpoint policy in which police stop all cars and
inspect all drivers for signs of intoxication without any
individualized suspicion that a specific driver is intoxicated. The
Court does so by balancing "the State's interest in preventing
drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be
said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon
individual motorists who are briefly stopped." Ante at
455. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE STEVENS in Parts I and II of
his dissenting opinion, I agree that the Court misapplies that test
by undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the
law enforcement need to use the roadblocks to prevent drunken
driving. See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543 ,
567 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). I write separately to express
a few additional points.

															The majority opinion creates the impression that the Court
generally engages in a balancing test in order to determine [457 ]

															the constitutionality of all seizures, or at least those
"dealing with police stops of motorists on public highways." Ante at 450. This is not the case. In most cases, the
police must possess probable cause for a seizure to be judged
reasonable. See Dunaway v. New York , 442 U. S. 200 , 209
(1979). Only when a seizure is " substantially less
intrusive," id. at 210, than a typical arrest is the
general rule replaced by a balancing test. I agree with the Court
that the initial stop of a car at a roadblock under the Michigan
State Police sobriety checkpoint policy is sufficiently less
intrusive than an arrest so that the reasonableness of the seizure
may be judged, not by the presence of probable cause, but by
balancing "the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty." Brown v. Texas , 443 U. S. 47 , 51 (1979).
But one searches the majority opinion in vain for any
acknowledgment that the reason for employing the balancing test is
that the seizure is minimally intrusive.

															Indeed, the opinion reads as if the minimal nature of the
seizure ends rather than begins the inquiry into
reasonableness. Once the Court establishes that the seizure is
"slight," ante at 451, it asserts without explanation that
the balance "weighs in favor of the state program." Ante at 455. The Court ignores the fact that, in this class of minimally
intrusive searches, we have generally required the Government to
prove that it had reasonable suspicion for a minimally intrusive
seizure to be considered reasonable. See, e.g., Delaware v.
Prouse , 440 U.
S. 648 , 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U. S. 873 ,
882-883 (1975); Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1 , 27, (1968).
Some level of individualized suspicion is a core component of the
protection the Fourth Amendment provides against arbitrary
government action. See Prouse, supra , 440 U.S. at 654-655; Martinez-Fuerte, supra , 428 U.S. at 577 (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting) ("Action based merely on [458 ]

															whatever may pique the curiosity of a particular officer is the
antithesis of the objective standards requisite to reasonable
conduct and to avoiding abuse and harassment"). By holding that no
level of suspicion is necessary before the police may stop a car
for the purpose of preventing drunken driving, the Court
potentially subjects the general public to arbitrary or harassing
conduct by the police. I would have hoped that before taking such a
step, the Court would carefully explain how such a plan fits within
our constitutional framework.

															Presumably, the Court purports to draw support from Martinez-Fuerte, supra , which is the only case in which
the Court has upheld a program that subjects the general public to
suspicionless seizures. But as Justice STEVENS demonstrates, post at 463-466, 471-472, the Michigan State Police policy
is sufficiently different from the program at issue in Martinez-Fuerte that such reliance is unavailing.
Moreover, even if the policy at issue here were comparable to the
program at issue in Martinez-Fuerte , it does not follow
that the balance of factors in this case also justifies abandoning
a requirement of individualized suspicion. In Martinez-Fuerte , the Court explained that suspicionless
stops were justified because "[a] requirement that stops . . . be
based on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow
of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study
of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible
carrier of illegal aliens." 428 U.S. at 557. There has been no
showing in this case that there is a similar difficulty in
detecting individuals who are driving under the influence of
alcohol, nor is it intuitively obvious that such a difficulty
exists. See Prouse, supra , 440 U.S. at 661. That stopping
every car might make it easier to prevent drunken driving, but see post at 469-471, is an insufficient justification for
abandoning the requirement of individualized suspicion. "The needs
of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections [459 ]

															of the individual against certain exercises of official power.
It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels
a resolute loyalty to constitutional
safeguards." Alameida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U. S. 266 , 273
(1973). Without proof that the police cannot develop individualized
suspicion that a person is driving while impaired by alcohol, I
believe the constitutional balance must be struck in favor of
protecting the public against even the "minimally intrusive"
seizures involved in this case.

															I do not dispute the immense social cost caused by drunken
drivers, nor do I slight the government's efforts to prevent such
tragic losses. Indeed, I would hazard a guess that today's opinion
will be received favorably by a majority of our society, who would
willingly suffer the minimal intrusion of a sobriety checkpoint
stop in order to prevent drunken driving. But consensus that a
particular law enforcement technique serves a laudable purpose has
never been the touchstone of constitutional analysis. "The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against
official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by
some 'balancing test' than its intrusion on individual privacy; it
was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy
whose protections could be breached only where the 'reasonable'
requirements of the probable cause standard were met. Moved by
whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials --
perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens -- may be tempted
to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to
assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the
principle that a true balance between the individual and society
depends on the recognition of 'the right to be let alone -- the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.' Olmstead v. United States , 277 U. S. 438 , 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)." New Jersey [460 ] v. T.L.O. , 469 U. S. 325 , 361-362
(1985) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnote omitted). In the face of the "momentary evil" of drunken driving, the
Court today abdicates its role as the protector of that fundamental
right. I respectfully dissent.

															Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL
join as to Parts I and II, dissenting.

															A sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an
unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method. The test
operation conducted by the Michigan State Police and the Saginaw
County Sheriff's Department began shortly after midnight and lasted
until about 1 a.m. During that period, the 19 officers
participating in the operation made two arrests and stopped and
questioned 125 other unsuspecting and innocent drivers. [ Footnote 1 ] It is, of course, not known
how many arrests would have been made during that period if those
officers had been engaged in normal patrol activities. However, the
findings of the trial court, based on an extensive record and
affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, indicate that the net
effect of sobriety checkpoints on traffic safety is infinitesimal
and possibly negative.

															Indeed, the record in this case makes clear that a decision
holding these suspicionless seizures unconstitutional would not
impede the law enforcement community's remarkable progress in
reducing the death toll on our highways. [ Footnote 2 ] Because [461 ]

															the Michigan program was patterned after an older program in
Maryland, the trial judge gave special attention to that State's
experience. Over a period of several years, Maryland operated 125
checkpoints; of the 41,000 motorists passing through those
checkpoints, only 143 persons (0.3%) were arrested. [ Footnote 3 ] The number of man-hours devoted
to these [462 ]

															operations is not in the record, but it seems inconceivable that
a higher arrest rate could not have been achieved by more
conventional means. [ Footnote
4 ] Yet, even if the 143 checkpoint arrests were assumed to
involve a net increase in the number of drunk driving arrests per
year, the figure would still be insignificant by comparison to the
71,000 such arrests made by Michigan State Police without
checkpoints in 1984 alone. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 97a.

															Any relationship between sobriety checkpoints and an actual
reduction in highway fatalities is even less substantial than the
minimal impact on arrest rates. As the Michigan Court of Appeals
pointed out, "Maryland had conducted a study comparing traffic
statistics between a county using checkpoints and a control county.
The results of the study showed that alcohol-related accidents in
the checkpoint county decreased by ten percent, whereas the control
county saw an eleven percent decrease; and while fatal accidents in
the control county fell from sixteen to three, fatal accidents in
the checkpoint county actually doubled from the prior year." 170
Mich.App. 433, 443, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184.

															In light of these considerations, it seems evident that the
Court today misapplies the balancing test announced in Brown v.
Texas , 443 U. S.
47 , 50-51 (1979). The Court overvalues the law enforcement
interest in using sobriety checkpoints, undervalues the citizen's
interest in freedom from random, unannounced investigatory
seizures, and mistakenly assumes that there is "virtually no
difference" between a routine stop at a permanent, fixed checkpoint
and a [463 ]

															surprise stop at a sobriety checkpoint. I believe this case is
controlled by our several precedents condemning suspicionless
random stops of motorists for investigatory purposes. Delaware
v. Prouse , 440
U. S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U. S. 873 (1975); United States v. Ortiz , 422 U. S. 891 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U. S. 266 (1973); cf. Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132 , 153-154
(1925). I There is a critical difference between a seizure that is
preceded by fair notice and one that is effected by surprise. See Wyman v. James , 400 U. S. 309 , 320-321
(1971); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543 , 559
(1976); Michigan v. Tyler , 436 U. S. 499 , 513-514
(1978) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). That is one reason why a border search, or indeed any
search at a permanent and fixed checkpoint, is much less intrusive
than a random stop. A motorist with advance notice of the location
of a permanent checkpoint has an opportunity to avoid the search
entirely, or at least to prepare for, and limit, the intrusion on
her privacy.

															No such opportunity is available in the case of a random stop or
a temporary checkpoint, which both depend for their effectiveness
on the element of surprise. A driver who discovers an unexpected
checkpoint on a familiar local road will be startled and
distressed. She may infer, correctly, that the checkpoint is not
simply "business as usual," and may likewise infer, again
correctly, that the police have made a discretionary decision to
focus their law enforcement efforts upon her and others who pass
the chosen point.

															This element of surprise is the most obvious distinction between
the sobriety checkpoints permitted by today's majority and the
interior border checkpoints approved by this Court in Martinez-Fuerte. The distinction casts immediate doubt
upon the majority's argument, for Martinez-Fuerte is the
only case in which we have upheld suspicionless seizures [464 ]

															of motorists. But the difference between notice and surprise is
only one of the important reasons for distinguishing between
permanent and mobile checkpoints. With respect to the former, there
is no room for discretion in either the timing or the location of
the stop -- it is a permanent part of the landscape. In the latter
case, however, although the checkpoint is most frequently employed
during the hours of darkness on weekends (because that is when
drivers with alcohol in their blood are most apt to be found on the
road), the police have extremely broad discretion in determining
the exact timing and placement of the roadblock. [ Footnote 5 ]

															There is also a significant difference between the kind of
discretion that the officer exercises after the stop is made. A
check for a driver's license, or for identification papers at an
immigration checkpoint, is far more easily standardized than is a
search for evidence of intoxication. A Michigan officer who
questions a motorist at a sobriety checkpoint has virtually
unlimited discretion to detain the driver on the basis [465 ]

															of the slightest suspicion. A ruddy complexion, an unbuttoned
shirt, bloodshot eyes or a speech impediment may suffice to prolong
the detention. Any driver who had just consumed a glass of beer, or
even a sip of wine, would almost certainly have the burden of
demonstrating to the officer that her driving ability was not
impaired. [ Footnote 6 ]

															Finally, it is significant that many of the stops at permanent
checkpoints occur during daylight hours, whereas the sobriety
checkpoints are almost invariably operated at night. A seizure
followed by interrogation and even a cursory search at night is
surely more offensive than a daytime stop that is almost as routine
as going through a toll gate. Thus we thought it important to point
out that the random stops at issue in Ortiz frequently
occurred at night. 422 U.S. at 894.

															These fears are not, as the Court would have it, solely the lot
of the guilty. See ante at 452. To be law abiding is not
necessarily to be spotless, and even the most virtuous can be
unlucky. Unwanted attention from the local police need not be less
discomforting simply because one's secrets are not the stuff of
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, those who have found -- by reason
of prejudice or misfortune -- that encounters with the police may
become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have
grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of
suspicious behavior. Being stopped by the police is distressing
even when it should not be terrifying, and what begins mildly may
by happenstance turn severe.

															For all these reasons, I do not believe that this case is
analogous to Martinez-Fuerte. In my opinion, the sobriety
checkpoints are instead similar to -- and in some respects more
intrusive than -- the random investigative stops that the Court
held unconstitutional in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse. In the latter case, the Court explained: [466 ] "We cannot agree that stopping or detaining a vehicle on an
ordinary city street is less intrusive than a roving-patrol stop on
a major highway, and that it bears greater resemblance to a
permissible stop and secondary detention at a checkpoint near the
border. In this regard, we note that Brignoni-Ponce was
not limited to roving-patrol stops on limited-access roads, but
applied to any roving-patrol stop by Border Patrol agents on any
type of roadway on less than reasonable suspicion. See 422 U.S. at
882-883; United States v. Ortiz , 422 U. S. 891 , 894 (1975). We cannot
assume that the physical and psychological intrusion visited upon
the occupants of a vehicle by a random stop to check documents is
of any less moment than that occasioned by a stop by border agents
on roving patrol. Both of these stops generally entail law
enforcement officers signaling a moving automobile to pull over to
the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly unsettling show of
authority. Both interfere with freedom of movement, are
inconvenient, and consume time. Both may create substantial
anxiety." 440 U.S. at 657. We accordingly held that the State must produce evidence
comparing the challenged seizure to other means of law enforcement,
so as to show that the seizure "is a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion
upon Fourth Amendment interests which such stops entail. On the
record before us, that question must be answered in the negative.
Given the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and
those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced that the
incremental contribution to highway safety of the random spot check
justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
659. [467 ] II The Court, unable to draw any persuasive analogy to Martinez-Fuerte , rests its decision today on application
of a more general balancing test taken from Brown v.
Texas , 443 U. S.
47 (1979). In that case, the appellant, a pedestrian, had been
stopped for questioning in an area of El Paso, Texas, that had "a
high incidence of drug traffic" because he "looked suspicious." Id. at 49. He was then arrested and convicted for refusing
to identify himself to police officers. We set aside his conviction
because the officers stopped him when they lacked any reasonable
suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. In our opinion,
we stated: "Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures
involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by
the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty." Id. at 50-51. The gravity of the public concern with highway safety that is
implicated by this case is, of course, undisputed. [ Footnote 7 ] [468 ]

															Yet that same grave concern was implicated in Delaware v.
Prouse. Moreover, I do not understand the Court to have placed
any lesser value on the importance of the drug problem implicated
in Texas v. Brown , or on the need to control the illegal
border crossings that were at stake in Almeida-Sanchez and
its progeny. [ Footnote 8 ] A
different result in this case must be justified by the other two
factors in the Brown formulation.

															As I have already explained, I believe the Court is quite wrong
in blithely asserting that a sobriety checkpoint is no more
intrusive than a permanent checkpoint. In my opinion, unannounced
investigatory seizures are, particularly when [469 ]

															they take place at night, the hallmark of regimes far different
from ours; [ Footnote 9 ] the
surprise intrusion upon individual liberty is not minimal. On that
issue, my difference with the Court may amount to nothing less than
a difference in our respective evaluations of the importance of
individual liberty, a serious albeit inevitable source of
constitutional disagreement. [ Footnote 10 ] On the degree to which the sobriety
checkpoint seizures advance the public interest, however, the
Court's position is wholly indefensible.

															The Court's analysis of this issue resembles a business decision
that measures profits by counting gross receipts and ignoring
expenses. The evidence in this case indicates that sobriety
checkpoints result in the arrest of a fraction of one percent of
the drivers who are stopped, [ Footnote 11 ] but there is absolutely no evidence that
this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that
would have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in
conventional patrols. [ Footnote
12 ] Thus, although the gross number of arrests is more [470 ]

															than zero, there is a complete failure of proof on the question
whether the wholesale seizures have produced any net advance in the
public interest in arresting intoxicated drivers.

															Indeed, the position adopted today by the Court is not one
endorsed by any of the law enforcement authorities to whom the
Court purports to defer, see ante at 453-454. The Michigan
police do not rely, as the Court does, ante at 454-455, on
the arrest rate at sobriety checkpoints to justify the
stops made there. Colonel Hough, the commander of the Michigan
State Police and a leading proponent of the checkpoints, admitted
at trial that the arrest rate at the checkpoints was "very low." 1
Record 87. Instead, Colonel Hough and the State have maintained
that the mere threat of such arrests is sufficient to
deter drunk driving and so to reduce the accident rate. [ Footnote 13 ] The Maryland police
officer who testified [471 ]

															at trial took the same position with respect to his State's
program. [ Footnote 14 ] There
is, obviously, nothing wrong with a law enforcement technique that
reduces crime by pure deterrence without punishing anybody; on the
contrary, such an approach is highly commendable. One cannot,
however, prove its efficacy by counting the arrests that were made.
One must instead measure the number of crimes that were avoided.
Perhaps because the record is wanting, the Court simply ignores
this point.

															The Court's sparse analysis of this issue differs markedly from
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Martinez-Fuerte. He did not merely count the 17,000 arrests made at the San Clemente
checkpoint in 1973, 428 U.S. at 554; he also carefully explained
why those arrests represented a net benefit to the law enforcement
interest at stake. [ Footnote
15 ] Common [472 ]

															sense, moreover, suggests that immigration checkpoints are more
necessary than sobriety checkpoints: there is no reason why
smuggling illegal aliens should impair a motorist's driving
ability, but if intoxication did not noticeably affect driving
ability, it would not be unlawful. Drunk driving, unlike smuggling,
may thus be detected absent any checkpoints. A program that
produces thousands of otherwise impossible arrests is not a
relevant precedent for a program that produces only a handful of
arrests which would be more easily obtained without resort to
suspicionless seizures of hundreds of innocent citizens. [ Footnote 16 ] [473 ] III The most disturbing aspect of the Court's decision today is that
it appears to give no weight to the citizen's interest in freedom
from suspicionless unannounced investigatory seizures. Although the
author of the opinion does not reiterate his description of that
interest as "diaphanous," see Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S.
at 666 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), the Court's opinion implicitly
adopts that characterization. On the other hand, the Court places a
heavy thumb on the law enforcement interest by looking only at
gross receipts instead of net benefits. Perhaps this tampering with
the scales of justice can be explained by the Court's obvious
concern about the slaughter on our highways, and a resultant
tolerance for policies designed to alleviate the problem by
"setting an example" of a few motorists. This possibility prompts
two observations.

															First, my objections to random seizures or temporary checkpoints
do not apply to a host of other investigatory procedures that do
not depend upon surprise and are unquestionably permissible. These
procedures have been used to address other threats to human life no
less pressing than the threat posed by drunken drivers. It is, for
example, common practice to require every prospective airline
passenger, or every visitor to a public building, to pass through a
metal detector that will reveal the presence of a firearm or an
explosive. Permanent, nondiscretionary checkpoints could be used to
control serious dangers at other publicly operated facilities.
Because concealed weapons obviously represent one such substantial
threat to public safety, [ Footnote 17 ] I would suppose [474 ]

															that all subway passengers could be required to pass through
metal detectors, so long as the detectors were permanent and every
passenger was subjected to the same search. [ Footnote 18 ] Likewise, I would suppose that a
State could condition access to its toll roads upon not only paying
the toll but also taking a uniformly administered breathalizer
test. That requirement might well keep all drunken drivers off the
highways that serve the fastest and most dangerous traffic. This
procedure would not be subject to the constitutional objections
that control this case: the checkpoints would be permanently fixed,
the stopping procedure would apply to all users of the toll road in
precisely the same way, and police officers would not be free to
make arbitrary choices about which neighborhoods should be targeted
or about which individuals should be more thoroughly searched.
Random, suspicionless seizures designed to search for evidence of
firearms, drugs, or intoxication belong, however, in a
fundamentally different category. These seizures play upon the
detained individual's reasonable expectations of privacy, injecting
a suspicionless search into a context where none would normally
occur. The imposition that seems diaphanous today may be
intolerable tomorrow. See Boyd v. United States , 116 U. S. 616 , 636
(1886). [475 ]

															Second, sobriety checkpoints are elaborate, and disquieting,
publicity stunts. The possibility that anybody, no matter how
innocent, may be stopped for police inspection is nothing if not
attention-getting. The shock value of the checkpoint program may be
its most effective feature: Lieutenant Cotton of the Maryland State
Police, a defense witness, testified that "the media coverage . . .
has been absolutely overwhelming. . . . Quite frankly, we got
benefits just from the controversy of the sobriety checkpoints."
[ Footnote 19 ] In- [476 ]

															sofar as the State seeks to justify its use of sobriety
checkpoints on the basis that they dramatize the public interest in
the prevention of alcohol related accidents, the Court should heed
Justice SCALIA's comment upon a similar justification for a drug
screening program: "The only plausible explanation, in my view, is what the
Commissioner himself offered in the concluding sentence of his
memorandum to Customs Service employees announcing the program:
'Implementation of the drug screening program would set an
important example in our country's struggle with this most serious
threat to our national health and security.' App. 12. Or as
respondent's brief to this Court asserted: 'if a law enforcement
agency and its employees do not take the law seriously, neither
will the public on which the agency's effectiveness depends.' Brief
for Respondent 36. What better way to show that the Government is
serious about its 'war on drugs' than to subject its employees on
the front line of that war to this invasion of their privacy and
affront to their dignity? To be sure, there is only a slight chance
that it will prevent some serious public harm resulting from
Service employee drug use, but it will show to the world that the
Service is 'clean,' and -- most important of all -- will
demonstrate the determination of the Government to eliminate this
scourge of our society! I think it obvious that this justification
is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties cannot
be the means of making a point; that symbolism, [477 ] even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of
unlawful drugs, cannot validate an otherwise unreasonable search." Treasury Employees v. Von Raab , 489 U. S. 656 , 686 (1989)
(dissenting opinion). This is a case that is driven by nothing more than symbolic
state action -- an insufficient justification for an otherwise
unreasonable program of random seizures. Unfortunately, the Court
is transfixed by the wrong symbol -- the illusory prospect of
punishing countless intoxicated motorists -- when it should keep
its eyes on the road plainly marked by the Constitution.

															I respectfully dissent. Footnotes [ Footnote * ]

															* Statistical evidence incorporated in the dissent suggests that
this figure declined between 1982 and 1988. See post at 496 U.S. 460 -461 n. 2 and
467-468, n. 7 (citing National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Fatal Accident Reporting System 1988). It was
during this same period that police departments experimented with
sobriety checkpoint systems. Petitioners, for instance, operated
their checkpoint in May, 1986, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a, and
the Maryland State Police checkpoint program, about which much
testimony was given before the trial court, began in December,
1982. See id. at 84a. Indeed, it is quite possible that
jurisdictions which have recently decided to implement sobriety
checkpoint systems have relied on such data from the 1980s in
assessing the likely utility of such checkpoints.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The 19 officers present at the sole Michigan checkpoint were not
the standard detail; a few were observers. Nevertheless, the
standard plan calls for having at least 8 and as many as 12
officers on hand. 1 Record 82-83.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The fatality rate per 100 million miles traveled has steadily
declined from 5.2 in 1968 to 2.3 in 1988. During the same span, the
absolute number of fatalities also decreased, albeit less steadily,
from more than 52,000 in 1968 to approximately 47,000 in 1988. U.S.
Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Fatal Accident Reporting System 1988 Ch. 1, p. 6
(Dec.1989) (hereinafter Fatal Accident Reporting System 1988).

															Alcohol remains a substantial cause of these accidents, but
progress has been made on this front as well: "Since 1982, alcohol use by drivers in fatal crashes has
steadily decreased. The proportion of all drivers who were
estimated to have been legally intoxicated (BAC of .10 or greater)
dropped from 30% in 1982 to 24.6% in 1988. The reduction from
1982-1988 is 18%."

															"The proportion of fatally injured drivers who were legally
intoxicated dropped from 43.8% in 1982 to 37.5% in 1988 -- a 14%
decrease."

															"During the past seven years, the proportion of drivers involved
in fatal crashes who were intoxicated decreased in all age groups.
The most significant drop continues to be in the 15 to 19 year old
age group. In 1982, NHTSA estimated that 28.4% of these teenaged
drivers in fatal crashes were drunk, compared with 18.3% in 1988." Id. Overview, p. 2. All of these improvements have been achieved despite resistance
-- now ebbing at last -- to the use of airbags and other passive
restraints, improvements that would almost certainly result in even
more dramatic reductions in the fatality rate. Indeed, the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimates that an additional
5,000 lives per year would be saved if the 21 States without
mandatory safety belt usage laws were to enact such legislation --
even though only 50% of motorists obey such laws. Id. Overview, p. 4, Ch. 2, p. 13.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a-81a. The figures for other States are
roughly comparable. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice
Ct. , 136 Ariz. 1, 2, 663 P.2d
992 , 993 (1983) (5,763 cars stopped, 14 persons arrested for
drunken driving); Ingersoll v. Palmer , 43 Cal. 3d
1321 , 1327, 241 Cal. Rptr.
42 , 46, 743 P.2d
1299 , 1303 (1987) (233 vehicles screened, no arrests for
drunken driving); State v. Garcia , 481
N.E.2d 148 , 150 (Ind. App.1985) (100 cars stopped, seven
arrests for drunken driving made in two hours of operation); State v. McLaughlin , 471 N.E.2d
1125 , 1137 (Ind. App. 1984) (115 cars stopped, three arrests
for drunken driving); State v. Deskins , 234 Kan. 529, 545, 673 P.2d 1174 ,
1187 (1983) (Prager, J., dissenting) (2,000 to 3,000 vehicles
stopped, 15 arrests made, 140 police man-hours consumed); Commonwealth v. Trumble , 396 Mass. 81, 85, 483
N.E.2d 1102 , 1105 (1985) (503 cars stopped, eight arrests, 13
participating officers); State v. Koppel , 127 N.H. 286,
288, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (1985) (1,680 vehicles stopped, 18 arrests
for driving while intoxicated).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															"The then sheriffs of Macomb County, Kalamazoo County, and Wayne
County all testified as to other means used in their counties to
combat drunk driving and as to their respective opinions that other
methods currently in use, e.g. , patrol cars, were more
effective means of combating drunk driving and utilizing law
enforcement resources than sobriety checkpoints." 170 Mich.App.
433, 443, 429 N.W.2d 180, 184 ( 1988).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Michigan Plan provides that locations should be selected
after consideration of "previous alcohol and drug experience per
time of day and day of week as identified by arrests and/or
Michigan Accident Location Index data," App. to Pet. for Cert.
148a, and that "specific site selection" should be based on the
following criteria: "1. Safety of the location for citizens and law enforcement
personnel. The site selected shall have a safe area for stopping a
driver and must afford oncoming traffic sufficient sight distance
for the driver to safely come to a stop upon approaching the
checkpoint."

															"2. The location must ensure minimum inconvenience for the
driver and facilitate the safe stopping of traffic in one direction
during the pilot program."

															"3. Roadway choice must ensure that sufficient adjoining space
is available to pull the vehicle off the traveled portion of the
roadway for further inquiry if necessary."

															"4. Consideration should be given to the physical space
requirements as shown in Appendixes 'A' and 'B.'" Id. at
149a-150a. Although these criteria are not as open-ended as those used in Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648 (1979),
they certainly would permit the police to target an extremely wide
variety of specific locations.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															See, e.g. , 1 Record 107.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															It is, however, inappropriate for the Court to exaggerate that
concern by relying on an outdated statistic from a tertiary source.
The Court's quotation from the 1987 edition of Professor LaFave's
treatise, ante , at 5, is in turn drawn from a 1983 law
review note which quotes a 1982 House committee report that does
not give the source for its figures. See 4 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 10.8(d), p. 71 (2d ed. 1987), citing, Note, Curbing the
Drunk Driver under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 Geo.L.J. 1457, 1457, n. I (1983), citing,
H.R.Rep. No. 97-867, p. 7.

															Justice BLACKMUN's citation, ante at 455-456
(concurring opinion) to his own opinion in Perez v.
Campbell , 402 U.
S. 637 , 657 (1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part) is even wider of the mark, since that case had nothing to
do with drunken driving, and the number of highway fatalities has
since declined significantly despite the increase in highway
usage.

															By looking instead at recent data from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, one finds that, in 1988, there were
18,501 traffic fatalities involving legally intoxicated persons,
and an additional 4,850 traffic fatalities involving persons with
some alcohol exposure. Of course, the latter category of persons
could not be arrested at a sobriety checkpoint, but even the total
number of alcohol related traffic fatalities (23,352) is
significantly below the figure located by the student commentator
and embraced by today's Court. These numbers, of course, include
any accidents that might have been caused by a sober driver but
involved an intoxicated person. They also include accidents in
which legally intoxicated pedestrians and bicyclists were killed;
such accidents account for 2,180 of the 18,501 total accidents
involving legally intoxicated persons. The checkpoints would
presumably do nothing to intercept tipsy pedestrians or cyclists.
See Fatal Accident Reporting System 1988 Overview, p. 1; Id. Ch. 2, p. 5; see also 1 Record 58.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The dissents in those cases touted the relevant State interests
in detail. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U. S. 266 , 293
(1973), Justice WHITE, joined by the author of today's majority
opinion, wrote: "The fact is that illegal crossings at other than the legal
ports of entry are numerous and recurring. If there is to be any
hope of intercepting illegal entrants and of maintaining any kind
of credible deterrent, it is essential that permanent or temporary
checkpoints be maintained away from the borders, and roving patrols
be conducted to discover and intercept illegal entrants as they
filter to the established roads and highways and attempt to move
away from the border area. It is for this purpose that the Border
Patrol maintained the roving patrol involved in this case and
conducted random, spot checks of automobiles and other vehicular
traffic." Then-Justice REHNQUIST argued in a similar vein in his dissent
in Delaware v. Prouse , in which he observed that: "The whole point of enforcing motor vehicle safety regulations
is to remove from the road the unlicensed driver before he
demonstrates why he is unlicensed." 440 U.S. at 666. [ Footnote 9 ]

															"It is well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon
after his return from the Nuremberg Trials: "These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere
second-class rights, but belong in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every
arbitrary government.' Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160 , 180 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting)." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U.S.
at 273-274. [ Footnote 10 ]

															See, e.g., Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation
Survivors , 473
U. S. 305 , 371-372 (1985) (dissenting opinion); Hudson v.
Palmer , 468 U.
S. 517 , 556-558 (1984) (dissenting opinion); Meachum v.
Fano , 427 U. S.
215 , 229-230 (1976) (dissenting opinion).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The Court refers to the expert testimony that the arrest rate is
"around I percent," ante at 455, but a fair reading of the
entire testimony of that witness, together with the other
statistical evidence in the record, points to a significantly lower
percentage.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Indeed, a single officer in a patrol car parked at the same
place as the sobriety checkpoint would no doubt have been able to
make some of the arrests based on the officer's observation of the
way the intoxicated driver was operating his vehicle.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Colonel Hough's testimony included the following exchanges: "Q. It is true, is it not, Colonel that your purpose in
effectuating or attempting to effectuate this Checkpoint Plan is
not to obtain large numbers of arrest of drunk drivers?"

															"A. That is correct."

															"Q. Is it correct, is it, as far as you are aware, other states
that have tried this have not found they are getting a high rate of
arrests?"

															"A. Yes, that's my understanding."

															"Q. What was your purpose then, Colonel, in attempting to
implement this plan if you don't intend to use it to get drunk
drivers arrested?"

															"A. Deter them from drinking and driving." App. 77a.

															"Q. To your knowledge, in the Maryland study, the part you
reviewed, the check lanes are not an effective tool for arresting
drunk drivers?"

															"A. They have not relied upon the number of arrests to judge the
successfulness in my understanding." Id. at 82a.

															"Q. Are you aware that within the announcements that went out to
the public was an indication that the checkpoints were to
effectuate or [sic] arrest of drunk drivers. There was a goal to
effectuate arrests of drunk drivers?"

															"A. Well, it is part of the role, sure."

															"Q. Certainly not your primary goal, is it?"

															"A. The primary goal is to reduce alcohol-related
accidents."

															"Q. It's not your primary goal by any stretch, is it, to
effectuate a high rate of arrests within this program?"

															"A. No."

															"Q. If your goal was to effectuate a rise of arrests, you would
use a different technique, wouldn't you?"

															"A. l don't know that." 1 Record 88-89. Respondents informed this Court that, at trial, "the Defendants
did not even attempt to justify sobriety roadblocks on the basis of
the number of arrests obtained." Brief for Respondents 25. In
answer, the State said, "Deterrence and public information are the
primary goals of the sobriety checkpoint program, but the program
is also clearly designed to apprehend any drunk drivers who pass
through the checkpoint." Reply Brief for Petitioner 34. This claim,
however, does not directly controvert respondents' argument or
Colonel Hough's concession: even if the checkpoint is designed to
produce some arrests, it does not follow that it has been adopted
in order to produce arrests, or that it can be justified on such
grounds.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															"Dr. Ross' testimony regarding the low actual arrest rate of
checkpoint programs was corroborated by the testimony of one of
defendants' witnesses, Lieutenant Raymond Cotten of the Maryland
State Police." 170 Mich.App. at 442, 429 N.W.2d at 184.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															"Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a
traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary because the
flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the
border. We note here only the substantiality of the public interest
in the practice of routine stops for inquiry at permanent
checkpoints, a practice which the Government identifies as the most
important of the traffic-checking operations. Brief for United
States in No. 741560, pp. 19-20. These checkpoints are located on
important highways; in their absence, such highways would offer
illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the interior. Routine
checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and illegal aliens
who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the prospect of such
inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are less
heavily traveled, slowing their movement and making them more
vulnerable to detection by roving patrols. Cf. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. at 883-885.

															"A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based
on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of
traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of
a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible
carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would
largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised
smuggling operations, even though smugglers are known to use these
highways regularly." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543 ,
556-557 (1976) (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Alcohol-related traffic fatalities are also susceptible to
reduction by public information campaigns in a way that crimes such
as, for example, smuggling or armed assault are not. An intoxicated
driver is her own most likely victim: more than 55% of those killed
in accidents involving legally intoxicated drivers are legally
intoxicated drivers themselves. Fatal Accident Reporting System
1988 Overview, p. 1. Cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Assn. , 489 U. S.
602 , 634, (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) ("if they are conscious of the possibilities that such an
accident might occur and that alcohol or drug use might be a
contributing factor, if the risk of serious personal injury does
not deter their use of these substances, it seems highly unlikely
that the additional threat of loss of employment would have an
effect on their behavior").

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															For example, in 1988 there were 18,501 traffic fatalities
involving legally intoxicated persons. If one subtracts from this
number the 10,210 legally intoxicated drivers who were themselves
killed in these crashes, there remain 8,291 fatalities in which
somebody other than the intoxicated driver was killed in an
accident involving legally intoxicated persons (this number still
includes, however, accidents in which legally intoxicated
pedestrians stepped in front of sober drivers and were killed).
Fatal Accident Reporting System 1988 Overview, p. 1; see also supra , n 15.

															By contrast, in 1986 there were a total of 19,257 murders and
non-negligent manslaughters. Of these, approximately 11,360 were
committed with a firearm, and another 3,850 were committed with
some sort of knife. U.S. Dep. of Justice, 1987 Sourcebook of
Criminal Justice Statistics 337 (1988).

															From these statistics, it would seem to follow that someone who
does not herself drive when legally intoxicated is more likely to
be killed by an armed assailant than by an intoxicated driver. The
threat to life from concealed weapons thus appears comparable to
the threat from drunk driving.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Permanent, nondiscretionary checkpoints are already a common
practice at public libraries, which now often require every patron
to submit to a brief search for books, or to leave by passing
through a special detector.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															2 Record 40. Colonel Hough and Lieutenant Cotton agreed that
publicity from the news media was an integral part of the
checkpoint program. Colonel Hough, for example, testified as
follows: "Q. And you have observed, haven't you, Colonel, any time you
have a media campaign with regard to a crackdown you're
implementing, it does have a positive effect?"

															"A. We believe it has an effect, yes."

															"Q. And in order for the positive effect of the media campaign
to continue would be necessary to continue the announcements that
you are putting out there?"

															"A. Yes."

															"Q. It's true, isn't it, much of the media publicity attendant
to this sobriety checkpoint has come from your public service
announcements about the general media attention to this issue and
placing it in our newspapers as a public interest story?"

															"A. Yes. . . . "

															"Q. Or other television public interest stories?"

															"A. Yes."

															"Q. You don't anticipate, do you, Colonel, that the level of
media interest in this matter will continue over the long haul, do
you?"

															"A. I am certain it will wane in a period of time."

															"Q. Have you ever given any thought to whether or not a
different type of deterrent program with the same type of attendant
media attention would have a similar deterrent effect as to what
you can expect at the checkpoint?"

															"A. We have done it both with a SAVE Program and CARE Program
and selective enforcement. Probably it has not received as great of
attention as this has."

															"Q. Any question, have you ever given any thought to whether or
not a different technique with the same attendant media publicity
that this has gotten would have the same effect you're looking for
here?"

															"A. No." 1 id. at 91-92. In addition, Point 6 of the Michigan State Police Sobriety
Checkpoint Guidelines indicates that each driver stopped should be
given a brochure describing the checkpoint's purposes and
operation. "The brochure will explain the purpose of the sobriety
checkpoint program, furnish information concerning the effects of
alcohol and safe consumption levels, and include a detachable
pre-addressed questionnaire." Trial Exhibit A, Michigan State
Police Sobriety Checkpoint Guidelines 8 (Feb. 1986). The Maryland
program had a similar feature. 2 Record 18.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the key points from the case:

Michigan State Police v. Sitz (1990) concerned the constitutionality of highway sobriety checkpoints established by the Michigan Department of State Police.

The case posed the question of whether these checkpoints violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Supreme Court held that the state's use of highway sobriety checkpoints was constitutional and did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments.

The Court considered the state's interest in preventing drunk driving and the intrusiveness of the checkpoints, including the average delay of approximately 25 seconds for each vehicle.

The Court balanced the state's interest in highway safety against the individual's privacy interest and found that the checkpoints, as designed, were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court also noted the importance of publicity and public awareness campaigns in conjunction with the checkpoints to enhance their deterrent effect.

As a result, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Michigan, which had found the checkpoints unconstitutional.


U.S. Supreme Court Alabama v. White, 496
U.S. 325 (1990) Alabama v. White No. 89-789 Argued April 17, 1990 Decided June 11, 1990 496
U.S. 325 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF ALABAMA Syllabus Police received an anonymous telephone tip that respondent White
would be leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a
particular vehicle, that she would be going to a particular motel,
and that she would be in possession of cocaine. They immediately
proceeded to the apartment building, saw a vehicle matching the
caller's description, observed White as she left the building and
entered the vehicle, and followed her along the most direct route
to the motel, stopping her vehicle just short of the motel. A
consensual search of the vehicle revealed marijuana and, after
White was arrested, cocaine was found in her purse. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Alabama reversed her conviction on possession
charges, holding that the trial court should have suppressed the
marijuana and cocaine because the officers did not have the
reasonable suspicion necessary under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , to
justify the investigatory stop of the vehicle. Held: The anonymous tip, as corroborated by independent
police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to provide
reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. Pp. 496 U. S.
328 -332.

															(a) Under Adams v. Williams, 407 U.
S. 143 , 407 U. S. 147 ,
an informant's tip may carry sufficient "indicia of reliability" to
justify a Terry stop even though it may be insufficient to
support an arrest or search warrant. Moreover, Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 462 U. S. 230 ,
adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining
whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause, whereby the
informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are
highly relevant. These factors are also relevant in the reasonable
suspicion context, although allowance must be made in applying them
for the lesser showing required to meet that standard. Pp. 496 U. S.
328 -329.

															(b) Standing alone, the tip here is completely lacking in the
necessary indicia of reliability, since it provides virtually
nothing from which one might conclude that the caller is honest or
his information reliable, and gives no indication of the basis for
his predictions regarding White's criminal activities. See
Gates, supra, at 462 U. S. 227 .
However, although it is a close question, the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates that significant aspects of the
informant's story were sufficiently corroborated by the police to
furnish reasonable suspicion. Although not every detail Page 496 U. S. 326 mentioned by the tipster was verified -- e.g., the name
of the woman leaving the apartment building or the precise
apartment from which she left -- the officers did corroborate that
a woman left the building and got into the described vehicle. Given
the facts that they proceeded to the building immediately after the
call, and that White emerged not too long thereafter, it also
appears that her departure was within the timeframe predicted by
the caller. Moreover, since her four-mile route was the most direct
way to the motel, but nevertheless involved several turns, the
caller's prediction of her destination was significantly
corroborated, even though she was stopped before she reached the
motel. Furthermore, the fact that the caller was able to predict
her future behavior demonstrates a special familiarity with her
affairs. Thus there was reason to believe that the caller was
honest and well informed, and to impart some degree of reliability
to his allegation that White was engaged in criminal activity. See id. at 462 U. S. 244 , 462 U. S. 245 .
Pp. 496 U. S.
329 -332. 550 So. 2d 1074 (Ala.Cr.App.1989), reversed and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which BRENNAN
and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 496 U. S.
333 .

															Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Based on an anonymous telephone tip, police stopped respondent's
vehicle. A consensual search of the car revealed drugs. The issue
is whether the tip, as corroborated by independent Page 496 U. S. 327 police work, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to
provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. We
hold that it did.

															On April 22, 1987, at approximately 3 p.m., Corporal B.H. Davis
of the Montgomery Police Department received a telephone call from
an anonymous person stating that Vanessa White would be leaving
235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown
Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that
she would be going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would be in
possession of about an ounce of cocaine inside a brown attache
case. Corporal Davis and his partner, Corporal P. A. Reynolds,
proceeded to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments. The officers saw a
brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight in the
parking lot in front of the 235 building. The officers observed
respondent leave the 235 building, carrying nothing in her hands,
and enter the station wagon. They followed the vehicle as it drove
the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. When the vehicle reached
the Mobile Highway, on which Dobey's Motel is located, Corporal
Reynolds requested a patrol unit to stop the vehicle. The vehicle
was stopped at approximately 4:18 p.m., just short of Dobey's
Motel. Corporal Davis asked respondent to step to the rear of her
car, where he informed her that she had been stopped because she
was suspected of carrying cocaine in the vehicle. He asked if they
could look for cocaine, and respondent said they could look. The
officers found a locked brown attache case in the car and, upon
request, respondent provided the combination to the lock. The
officers found marijuana in the attache case, and placed respondent
under arrest. During processing at the station, the officers found
three milligrams of cocaine in respondent's purse.

															Respondent was charged in Montgomery County court with
possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine. The trial court
denied respondent's motion to suppress, and she pleaded guilty to
the charges, reserving the right to appeal Page 496 U. S. 328 the denial of her suppression motion. The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Alabama held that the officers did not have the
reasonable suspicion necessary under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
to justify the investigatory stop of respondent's car, and that the
marijuana and cocaine were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional
detention. The court concluded that respondent's motion to dismiss
should have been granted, and reversed her conviction. 550 So. 2d 1074 (1989). The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the
State's petition for writ of certiorari, two justices dissenting. 550 So.
2d 1081 (1989). Because of differing views in the state and
federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable
suspicion for a stop, we granted the State's petition for
certiorari, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990). We now reverse. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), sustained a Terry stop and frisk undertaken on the
basis of a tip given in person by a known informant who had
provided information in the past. We concluded that, while the
unverified tip may have been insufficient to support an arrest or
search warrant, the information carried sufficient "indicia of
reliability" to justify a forcible stop. 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 147 .
We did not address the issue of anonymous tips in Adams except to say that "[t]his is a stronger case than obtains in the
case of an anonymous telephone tip," id. at 407 U. S.
146 . Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (1983), dealt with an anonymous tip in the probable cause context.
The Court there abandoned the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.
S. 410 (1969), in favor of a "totality of the
circumstances" approach to determining whether an informant's tip
establishes probable cause. Gates made clear, however,
that those factors that had been considered critical under Aguilar and Spinelli -- an informant's
"veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" -- remain
"highly relevant in determining the value of his report." 462 U.S.
at 462 U. S. 230 .
These factors are also relevant in the reasonable suspicion
context, although allowance Page 496 U. S. 329 must be made in applying them for the lesser showing required to
meet that standard.

															The opinion in Gates recognized that an anonymous tip
alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or
veracity, inasmuch as ordinary citizens generally do not provide
extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations,
and given that the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is
"by hypothesis largely unknown and unknowable," Id. at 462 U. S. 237 .
This is not to say that an anonymous caller could never provide the
reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. But the
tip in Gates was not an exception to the general rule, and
the anonymous tip in this case is like the one in Gates: "[it] provides virtually nothing from which one might conclude
that [the caller] is either honest or his information reliable;
likewise, the [tip] gives absolutely no indication of the basis for
the [caller's] predictions regarding [Vanessa White's] criminal
activities."

															462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 227 .
By requiring "[s]omething more," as Gates did, ibid., we merely apply what we said in Adams: "Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would
either warrant no police response or require further investigation
before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized,"

															407 U.S. at 470 U. S. 147 .
Simply put, a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not
" warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that [a
stop] was appropriate." Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 22 ,
quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 (1925). As there was in Gates, however, in this case there is
more than the tip itself. The tip was not as detailed, and the
corroboration was not as complete, as in Gates, but the
required degree of suspicion was likewise not as high. We discussed
the difference in the two standards last Term in United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 , 490 U. S. 7 (1989):

															"The officer [making a Terry stop] . . . must be able
to articulate something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch.'" [ Terry, 392 U.S.] at 392 U. S. 27 .
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal Page 496 U. S. 330 level of objective justification" for making the stop. INS
v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984). That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that
probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found," [ Gates, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
238 ], and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable
cause."

															Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be
established with information that is different in quantity or
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that
is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Adams v. Williams, supra, demonstrates as much. We there
assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not
have been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but
nevertheless found it sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 147 .
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both
the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability. Both factors -- quantity and quality -- are considered
in the "totality of the circumstances -- the whole picture," United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 , 449 U. S. 417 (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether
there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low
degree of reliability, more information will be required to
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required
if the tip were more reliable. The Gates Court applied its
totality of the circumstances approach in this manner, taking into
account the facts known to the officers from personal observation,
and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its
indicia of reliability as established through independent police
work. The same approach applies in the reasonable suspicion
context, the only difference Page 496 U. S. 331 being the level of suspicion that must be established. Contrary
to the court below, we conclude that when the officers stopped
respondent, the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to
furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in
criminal activity, and that the investigative stop therefore did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.

															It is true that not every detail mentioned by the tipster was
verified, such as the name of the woman leaving the building or the
precise apartment from which she left; but the officers did
corroborate that a woman left the 235 building and got into the
particular vehicle that was described by the caller. With respect
to the time of departure predicted by the informant, Corporal Davis
testified that the caller gave a particular time when the woman
would be leaving, App. 5, but he did not state what that time was.
He did testify that, after the call, he and his partner proceeded
to the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to put the 235 building under
surveillance, id. at 5-6. Given the facts that the
officers proceeded to the indicated address immediately after the
call, and that respondent emerged not too long thereafter, it
appears from the record before us that respondent's departure from
the building was within the timeframe predicted by the caller. As
for the caller's prediction of respondent's destination, it is true
that the officers stopped her just short of Dobey's Motel and did
not know whether she would have pulled in or continued on past it.
But, given that the four-mile route driven by respondent was the
most direct route possible to Dobey's Motel, 550 So. 2d at 1075,
Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, but nevertheless involved several turns, App.
7, Tr. of Oral Arg. 24, we think respondent's destination was
significantly corroborated.

															The Court's opinion in Gates gave credit to the
proposition that, because an informant is shown to be right about
some things, he is probably right about other facts that he has
alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged
in criminal activity. 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 244 .
Thus, it is not Page 496 U. S. 332 unreasonable to conclude in this case that the independent
corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the
informer's predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the
other allegations made by the caller.

															We think it also important that, as in Gates, "the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not
just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time
of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not
easily predicted." Gates, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 245 .
The fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the
caller's description in front of the 235 building is an example of
the former. Anyone could have "predicted" that fact, because it was
a condition presumably existing at the time of the call. What was
important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's future behavior, because it demonstrated inside
information -- a special familiarity with respondent's affairs. The
general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent
would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and
drive the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. Because only a small
number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary,
it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to
such information is likely to also have access to reliable
information about that individual's illegal activities. See
Gates, supra, at 462 U. S. 245 .
When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified,
there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest,
but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify
the stop.

															Although it is a close case, we conclude that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the anonymous tip, as corroborated,
exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the
investigatory stop of respondent's car. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, and remand
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Page 496 U. S. 333 Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL
join, dissenting.

															Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time
every day, carrying an attache case and heading for a destination
known to their neighbors. Usually, however, the neighbors do not
know what the briefcase contains. An anonymous neighbor's
prediction about somebody's time of departure and probable
destination is anything but a reliable basis for assuming that the
commuter is in possession of an illegal substance -- particularly
when the person is not even carrying the attache case described by
the tipster.

															The record in this case does not tell us how often respondent
drove from the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to Dobey's Motel; for all
we know, she may have been a room clerk or telephone operator
working the evening shift. It does not tell us whether Officer
Davis made any effort to ascertain the informer's identity, his
reason for calling, or the basis of his prediction about
respondent's destination. Indeed, for all that this record tells
us, the tipster may well have been another police officer who had a
"hunch" that respondent might have cocaine in her attache case.

															Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her
the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will
certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one
predicting Vanessa White's excursion. In addition, under the
Court's holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and
questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the
warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever
conduct the officer just observed. Fortunately, the vast majority
of those in our law enforcement community would not adopt such a
practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the
citizen from the over-zealous and unscrupulous officer, as well as
from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes
a mockery of that protection.

															I respectfully dissent.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The Supreme Court ruled that police officers had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip that was corroborated by their own observations. The tip provided specific details about the suspect's itinerary, which indicated that the informant had insider knowledge of the suspect's plans. While the tip alone lacked reliability, the Court held that the totality of the circumstances, including the police's independent corroboration, justified the stop under Terry v. Ohio. The Court adopted a "totality of the circumstances" approach, considering the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, while allowing for a lesser standard than probable cause.

The case highlights the balance between an individual's Fourth Amendment rights and the police's ability to act on anonymous tips in situations where criminal activity is suspected but not yet confirmed.