OPINION OF THE COURT BRENDLIN V. CALIFORNIA 551 U. S. ____ (2007) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 06-8120 BRUCE EDWARD BRENDLIN, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
california

															[June 18, 2007]

															   Justice Souter delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   When a police officer makes a
traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. The question in this case is whether the same
is true of a passenger. We hold that a passenger is seized as well
and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.

															I

															   Early in the morning of November
27, 2001, Deputy Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough and his partner saw a
parked Buick with expired registration tags. In his ensuing
conversation with the police dispatcher, Brokenbrough learned that
an application for renewal of registration was being processed. The
officers saw the car again on the road, and this time Brokenbrough
noticed its display of a temporary operating permit with the number
“11,” indicating it was legal to drive the car through November.
App. 115. The officers decided to pull the Buick over to verify
that the permit matched the vehicle, even though, as Brokenbrough
admitted later, there was nothing unusual about the permit or the
way it was affixed. Brokenbrough asked the driver, Karen Simeroth,
for her license and saw a passenger in the front seat, petitioner
Bruce Brendlin, whom he recognized as “one of the Brendlin
brothers.” Id., at 65. He recalled that either Scott or
Bruce Brendlin had dropped out of parole supervision and asked
Brendlin to identify himself.[ Footnote 1 ] Brokenbrough returned to his cruiser, called
for backup, and verified that Brendlin was a parole violator with
an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest. While he was in the
patrol car, Brokenbrough saw Brendlin briefly open and then close
the passenger door of the Buick. Once reinforcements arrived,
Brokenbrough went to the passenger side of the Buick, ordered him
out of the car at gunpoint, and declared him under arrest. When the
police searched Brendlin incident to arrest, they found an orange
syringe cap on his person. A patdown search of Simeroth revealed
syringes and a plastic bag of a green leafy substance, and she was
also formally arrested. Officers then searched the car and found
tubing, a scale, and other things used to produce
methamphetamine.

															   Brendlin was charged with
possession and manufacture of methamphetamine, and he moved to
suppress the evidence obtained in the searches of his person and
the car as fruits of an unconstitutional seizure, arguing that the
officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the
traffic stop. He did not assert that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated by the search of Simeroth’s vehicle, cf. Rakas v. Illinois , 439 U. S. 128 (1978),
but claimed only that the traffic stop was an unlawful seizure of
his person. The trial court denied the suppression motion after
finding that the stop was lawful and Brendlin was not seized until
Brokenbrough ordered him out of the car and formally arrested him.
Brendlin pleaded guilty, subject to appeal on the suppression
issue, and was sentenced to four years in prison.

															   The California Court of Appeal reversed the
denial of the suppression motion, holding that Brendlin was seized
by the traffic stop, which they held unlawful. 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 882
(2004) (officially depublished). By a narrow majority, the Supreme
Court of California reversed. The State Supreme Court noted
California’s concession that the officers had no reasonable basis
to suspect unlawful operation of the car, 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1114,
136 P. 3d 845, 848 (2006),[ Footnote 2 ] but still held suppression unwarranted because
a passenger “is not seized as a constitutional matter in the
absence of additional circumstances that would indicate to a
reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the peace
officer’s investigation or show of authority,” id ., at
1111, 136 P. 3d, at 846. The court reasoned that Brendlin was not
seized by the traffic stop because Simeroth was its exclusive
target, id ., at 1118, 136 P. 3d, at 851, that a passenger
cannot submit to an officer’s show of authority while the driver
controls the car, id ., at 1118–1119, 135 P. 3d, at
851–852, and that once a car has been pulled off the road, a
passenger “would feel free to depart or otherwise to conduct his or
her affairs as though the police were not present,” id .,
at 1119, 136 P. 3d, at 852. In dissent, Justice Corrigan said that
a traffic stop entails the seizure of a passenger even when the
driver is the sole target of police investigation because a
passenger is detained for the purpose of ensuring an officer’s
safety and would not feel free to leave the car without the
officer’s permission. Id ., at 1125, 136 P. 3d, at 856.

															   We granted certiorari to decide whether a
traffic stop subjects a passenger, as well as the driver, to Fourth
Amendment seizure, 549 U. S. __ (2007). We now vacate.

															II

															A

															   A person is seized by the police
and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the
Fourth Amendment when the officer, “ ‘by means of physical
force or show of authority,’ ” terminates or restrains his
freedom of movement, Florida v. Bostick , 501 U. S. 429 , 434
(1991) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1 , 19, n. 16
(1968)), “ through means intentionally applied ,” Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U. S. 593 , 597 (1989) (emphasis in
original). Thus, an “unintended person … [may be] the object of the
detention,” so long as the detention is “willful” and not merely
the consequence of “an unknowing act.” Id ., at 596; cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U. S. 833 , 844 (1998) (no seizure
where a police officer accidentally struck and killed a motorcycle
passenger during a high-speed pursuit). A police officer may make a
seizure by a show of authority and without the use of physical
force, but there is no seizure without actual submission;
otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned. See California v. Hodari D. , 499 U. S. 621 , 626, n. 2
(1991); Lewis , supra , at 844, 845, n. 7.

															   When the actions of the police do
not show an unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual’s
submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of
passive acquiescence, there needs to be some test for telling when
a seizure occurs in response to authority, and when it does not.
The test was devised by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U. S. 544 (1980),
who wrote that a seizure occurs if “in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave,” id ., at 554
(principal opinion). Later on, the Court adopted Justice Stewart’s
touchstone, see, e.g ., Hodari D ., supra ,
at 627; Michigan v. Chesternut , 486 U. S. 567 , 573
(1988); INS v. Delgado , 466 U. S. 210 , 215
(1984), but added that when a person “has no desire to leave” for
reasons unrelated to the police presence, the “coercive effect of
the encounter” can be measured better by asking whether “a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests
or otherwise terminate the encounter,” Bostick , supra , at 435–436; see also United States v. Drayton , 536 U. S. 194 , 202
(2002).

															   The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment
terms a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver “even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648 , 653 (1979); see also Whren v. United States , 517 U. S. 806 , 809–810 (1996). And
although we have not, until today, squarely answered the question
whether a passenger is also seized, we have said over and over in
dicta that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the
vehicle, not just the driver. See, e.g. , Prouse , supra , at 653 (“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the Fourth
and Fourteenth] Amendments”); Colorado v. Bannister , 449 U. S. 1 , 4, n. 3
(1980) (per curiam) (“There can be no question that the
stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitute
a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420 , 436–437
(1984) (“[W]e have long acknowledged that stopping an automobile
and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hensley , 469 U. S. 221 , 226
(1985) (“[S]topping a car and detaining its occupants constitute a
seizure”); Whren , supra , at 809–810 (“Temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the
police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,
constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the
Fourth Amendment]”).

															   We have come closest to the question here in
two cases dealing with unlawful seizure of a passenger, and neither
time did we indicate any distinction between driver and passenger
that would affect the Fourth Amendment analysis. Delaware v. Prouse considered grounds for stopping a car on the
road and held that Prouse’s suppression motion was properly
granted. We spoke of the arresting officer’s testimony that Prouse
was in the back seat when the car was pulled over, see 440 U. S.,
at 650, n. 1, described Prouse as an occupant, not as the
driver, and referred to the car’s “occupants” as being seized, id ., at 653. Justification for stopping a car was the
issue again in Whren v. United States , where we
passed upon a Fourth Amendment challenge by two petitioners who
moved to suppress drug evidence found during the course of a
traffic stop. See 517 U. S., at 809. Both driver and passenger
claimed to have been seized illegally when the police stopped the
car; we agreed and held suppression unwarranted only because the
stop rested on probable cause. Id ., at 809–810, 819.

															B

															   The State concedes that the
police had no adequate justification to pull the car over, see
n. 2, supra , but argues that the passenger was not seized
and thus cannot claim that the evidence was tainted by an
unconstitutional stop. We resolve this question by asking whether a
reasonable person in Brendlin’s position when the car stopped would
have believed himself free to “terminate the encounter” between the
police and himself. Bostick , supra , at 436. We
think that in these circumstances any reasonable passenger would
have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the
point that no one in the car was free to depart without police
permission.

															   A traffic stop necessarily
curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts
the driver, diverting both from the stream of traffic to the side
of the road, and the police activity that normally amounts to
intrusion on “privacy and personal security” does not normally (and
did not here) distinguish between passenger and driver. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S. 543 , 554
(1976). An officer who orders one particular car to pull over acts
with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a
sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow people
to come and go freely from the physical focal point of an
investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing. If the likely
wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably feel
subject to suspicion owing to close association; but even when the
wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will expect to be
subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would
be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that
no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place. Cf. Drayton , supra , at 197–199, 203–204 (finding no
seizure when police officers boarded a stationary bus and asked
passengers for permission to search for drugs).[ Footnote 3 ]

															   It is also reasonable for passengers to expect
that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or
investigation will not let people move around in ways that could
jeopardize his safety. In Maryland v. Wilson , 519 U. S. 408 (1997), we held that during a lawful traffic stop an officer may
order a passenger out of the car as a precautionary measure,
without reasonable suspicion that the passenger poses a safety
risk. Id ., at 414–415; cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434
U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (driver may be ordered
out of the car as a matter of course). In fashioning this rule, we
invoked our earlier statement that “ ‘[t]he risk of harm to
both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers
routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.’ ” Wilson , supra , at 414 (quoting Michigan v. Summers , 452 U. S. 692 , 702–703
(1981)). What we have said in these opinions probably reflects a
societal expectation of “ ‘unquestioned [police]
command’ ” at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel
free to leave, or to terminate the personal encounter any other
way, without advance permission. Wilson , supra ,
at 414.[ Footnote 4 ]

															   Our conclusion comports with the views of all
nine Federal Courts of Appeals, and nearly every state court, to
have ruled on the question. See United States v. Kimball , 25 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 1994); United
States v. Mosley , 454 F. 3d 249, 253 (CA3 2006); United States v. Rusher , 966 F. 2d 868, 874,
n. 4 (CA4 1992); United States v. Grant , 349
F. 3d 192, 196 (CA5 2003); United States v. Perez , 440 F. 3d 363, 369 (CA6 2006); United
States v. Powell , 929 F. 2d 1190, 1195 (CA7
1991); United States v. Ameling , 328 F. 3d
443, 446–447, n. 3 (CA8 2003); United States v. Twilley , 222 F. 3d 1092, 1095 (CA9 2000); United
States v. Eylicio-Montoya , 70 F. 3d 1158,
1163–1164 (CA10 1995); State v. Bowers , 334 Ark.
447, 451–452, 976 S. W. 2d 379, 381–382 (1998); State v. Haworth , 106 Idaho 405, 405–406, 679 P. 2d 1123,
1123–1124 (1984); People v. Bunch , 207 Ill. 2d 7,
13, 796 N. E. 2d 1024, 1029 (2003); State v. Eis , 348 N. W. 2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hodges , 252 Kan. 989, 1002–1005, 851
P. 2d 352, 361–362 (1993); State v. Carter ,
69 Ohio St. 3d 57, 63, 630 N. E. 2d 355, 360 (1994) (per
curiam); State v. Harris , 206 Wis. 2d 243,
253–258, 557 N. W. 2d 245, 249–251 (1996). And the treatise
writers share this prevailing judicial view that a passenger may
bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to the legality of a traffic
stop. See, e.g. , 6 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §11.3(e),
pp. 194, 195, and n. 277 (4th ed. 2004 and Supp. 2007) (“If either
the stopping of the car, the length of the passenger’s detention
thereafter, or the passenger’s removal from it are unreasonable in
a Fourth Amendment sense, then surely the passenger has standing to
object to those constitutional violations and to have suppressed
any evidence found in the car which is their fruit” (footnote
omitted)); 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and
Confessions §11:20, p. 11–98 (2d ed. 2007) (“[A] law
enforcement officer’s stop of an automobile results in a seizure of
both the driver and the passenger”).[ Footnote 5 ]

															C

															   The contrary conclusion drawn by
the Supreme Court of California, that seizure came only with formal
arrest, reflects three premises as to which we respectfully
disagree. First, the State Supreme Court reasoned that Brendlin was
not seized by the stop because Deputy Sheriff Brokenbrough only
intended to investigate Simeroth and did not direct a show of
authority toward Brendlin. The court saw Brokenbrough’s “flashing
lights [as] directed at the driver,” and pointed to the lack of
record evidence that Brokenbrough “was even aware [Brendlin] was in
the car prior to the vehicle stop.” 38 Cal. 4th, at 1118, 136 P.
3d, at 851. But that view of the facts ignores the objective Mendenhall test of what a reasonable passenger would
understand. To the extent that there is anything ambiguous in the
show of force (was it fairly seen as directed only at the driver or
at the car and its occupants?), the test resolves the ambiguity,
and here it leads to the intuitive conclusion that all the
occupants were subject to like control by the successful display of
authority. The State Supreme Court’s approach, on the contrary,
shifts the issue from the intent of the police as objectively
manifested to the motive of the police for taking the intentional
action to stop the car, and we have repeatedly rejected attempts to
introduce this kind of subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis.
See, e.g. , Whren , 517 U. S., at 813 (“Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis”); Chesternut , 486 U. S., at 575,
n. 7 (“[T]he subjective intent of the officers is relevant to
an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police
conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to
the person confronted”); Mendenhall , 446 U. S., at 554,
n. 6 (principal opinion) (disregarding a Government agent’s
subjective intent to detain Mendenhall); cf. Rakas , 439 U.
S., at 132–135 (rejecting the “target theory” of Fourth Amendment
standing, which would have allowed “any criminal defendant at whom
a search was directed” to challenge the legality of the search
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

															   California defends the State
Supreme Court’s ruling on this point by citing our cases holding
that seizure requires a purposeful, deliberate act of detention.
See Brief for Respondent 9–14. But Chesternut , supra , answers that argument. The intent that counts under
the Fourth Amendment is the “intent [that] has been conveyed to the
person confronted,” id ., at 575, n. 7, and the
criterion of willful restriction on freedom of movement is no
invitation to look to subjective intent when determining who is
seized. Our most recent cases are in accord on this point. In Lewis , 523 U. S. 833 , we considered whether a
seizure occurred when an officer accidentally ran over a passenger
who had fallen off a motorcycle during a high-speed chase, and in
holding that no seizure took place, we stressed that the officer
stopped Lewis’s movement by accidentally crashing into him, not
“through means intentionally applied.” Id ., at 844
(emphasis deleted). We did not even consider, let alone emphasize,
the possibility that the officer had meant to detain the driver
only and not the passenger. Nor is Brower , 489 U. S. 593 , to the contrary, where
it was dispositive that “Brower was meant to be stopped by the
physical obstacle of the roadblock—and that he was so stopped.” Id ., at 599. California reads this language to suggest
that for a specific occupant of the car to be seized he must be the
motivating target of an officer’s show of authority, see Brief for
Respondent 12, as if the thrust of our observation were that
Brower, and not someone else, was “meant to be stopped.” But our
point was not that Brower alone was the target but that officers
detained him “through means intentionally applied”; if the car had
had another occupant, it would have made sense to hold that he too
had been seized when the car collided with the roadblock. Neither
case, then, is at odds with our holding that the issue is whether a
reasonable passenger would have perceived that the show of
authority was at least partly directed at him, and that he was thus
not free to ignore the police presence and go about his
business.

															   Second, the Supreme Court of California
assumed that Brendlin, “as the passenger, had no ability to submit
to the deputy’s show of authority” because only the driver was in
control of the moving vehicle. 38 Cal. 4th, at 1118, 1119, 136
P. 3d, at 852. But what may amount to submission depends on
what a person was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man
is not seized until he is physically overpowered, but one sitting
in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away.
Here, Brendlin had no effective way to signal submission while the
car was still moving on the roadway, but once it came to a stop he
could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside.

															   Third, the State Supreme Court shied away from
the rule we apply today for fear that it “would encompass even
those motorists following the vehicle subject to the traffic stop
who, by virtue of the original detention, are forced to slow down
and perhaps even come to a halt in order to accommodate that
vehicle’s submission to police authority.” Id., at 1120,
136 P. 3d, at 853. But an occupant of a car who knows that he is
stuck in traffic because another car has been pulled over (like the
motorist who can’t even make out why the road is suddenly clogged)
would not perceive a show of authority as directed at him or his
car. Such incidental restrictions on freedom of movement would not
tend to affect an individual’s “sense of security and privacy in
traveling in an automobile.” Prouse , 440 U. S., at 662.
Nor would the consequential blockage call for a precautionary rule
to avoid the kind of “arbitrary and oppressive interference by
[law] enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security
of individuals” that the Fourth Amendment was intended to limit. Martinez-Fuerte , 428 U. S., at 554.[ Footnote 6 ]

															   Indeed, the consequence to worry about would
not flow from our conclusion, but from the rule that almost all
courts have rejected. Holding that the passenger in a private car
is not (without more) seized in a traffic stop would invite police
officers to stop cars with passengers regardless of probable cause
or reasonable suspicion of anything illegal.[ Footnote 7 ] The fact that evidence uncovered as a
result of an arbitrary traffic stop would still be admissible
against any passengers would be a powerful incentive to run the
kind of “roving patrols” that would still violate the driver’s
Fourth Amendment right. See, e.g. , Almeida-Sanchez v. United States , 413 U. S. 266 , 273
(1973) (stop and search by Border Patrol agents without a warrant
or probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment); Prouse , supra , at 663 (police spot check of driver’s license and
registration without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth
Amendment).

															*  *  *

															   Brendlin was seized from the
moment Simeroth’s car came to a halt on the side of the road, and
it was error to deny his suppression motion on the ground that
seizure occurred only at the formal arrest. It will be for the
state courts to consider in the first instance whether suppression
turns on any other issue. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
California is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 The parties dispute the accuracy of the
transcript of the suppression hearing and disagree as to whether
Brendlin gave his name or the false name “Bruce Brown.” App.
115. Footnote 2 California conceded that the police officers
lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop because a
“ ‘vehicle with an application for renewal of expired
registration would be expected to have a temporary operating
permit.’ ” 38 Cal. 4th, at 1114, 136 P. 3d, at 848
(quoting Brief for Respondent California in No. S123133 (Sup. Ct.
Cal.), p. 24). Footnote 3 Of course, police may also stop a car solely
to investigate a passenger’s conduct. See, e.g ., United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz , 161
F. Supp. 2d 627, 629, n. 1 (Md. 2001) (passenger’s
violation of local seatbelt law); People v. Roth ,
85 P. 3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2003) (passenger’s violation of
littering ordinance). Accordingly, a passenger cannot assume,
merely from the fact of a traffic stop, that the driver’s conduct
is the cause of the stop. Footnote 4 Although the State Supreme Court inferred
from Brendlin’s decision to open and close the passenger door
during the traffic stop that he was “awar[e] of the available
options,” 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1120, 136 P. 3d 845, 852 (2006), this
conduct could equally be taken to indicate that Brendlin felt
compelled to remain inside the car. In any event, the test is not
what Brendlin felt but what a reasonable passenger would have
understood. Footnote 5 Only two State Supreme Courts, other than
California’s, have stood against this tide of authority. See People v. Jackson , 39 P. 3d 1174, 1184–1186
(Colo. 2002) (en banc); State v. Mendez , 137
Wash. 2d 208, 222–223, 970 P. 2d 722, 729 (1999) (en
banc). Footnote 6 California claims that, under today’s rule,
“all taxi cab and bus passengers would be ‘seized’ under the Fourth
Amendment when the cab or bus driver is pulled over by the police
for running a red light.” Brief for Respondent 23. But the
relationship between driver and passenger is not the same in a
common carrier as it is in a private vehicle, and the expectations
of police officers and passengers differ accordingly. In those
cases, as here, the crucial question would be whether a reasonable
person in the passenger’s position would feel free to take steps to
terminate the encounter. Footnote 7 Compare Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U. S. 648 , 663 (1979) (requiring
“at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” to support random,
investigative traffic stops), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U. S. 873 , 880–884
(1975) (same), with Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 , 810 (1996) (“[T]he
decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”),
and Atwater v. Lago Vista , 532 U. S. 318 , 354
(2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender”).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Brendlin v. California:

The Supreme Court held that a passenger in a car that has been pulled over by police is considered "seized" under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore has the right to challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop. In this case, the Court ruled that the passenger, Bruce Brendlin, was seized when the police officer ordered him out of the car at gunpoint, and thus had the right to contest the evidence obtained during the search of his person and the car as potential violations of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Is there anything else you would like me to summarize?


OPINION OF THE COURT SCOTT V. HARRIS 550 U. S. ____ (2007) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-1631 TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR
HARRIS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[April 30, 2007]

															   Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   We consider whether a law
enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his
public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from
behind. Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to
stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent
bystanders?

															I

															   In March 2001, a Georgia county
deputy clocked respondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour
on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated
his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull
over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what
is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles
per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report that he was
pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcast its license plate number.
Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communication and
joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the
chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center
and was nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent
evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s
police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again
down a two-lane highway.

															   Following respondent’s shopping
center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s
police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six
minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott
decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a
“Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes
the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4.
Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to
“ ‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’ ” Harris v. Coweta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA11 2005).
Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent’s
vehicle.[ Footnote 1 ] As a
result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the
roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed.
Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.

															   Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and
others under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging, inter alia , a violation of his federal constitutional
rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a
motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of qualified
immunity. The District Court denied the motion, finding that “there
are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified
immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Harris v. Coweta County ,
No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 23, 2003), App. to Pet. for
Cert. 41a–42a. On interlocutory appeal,[ Footnote 2 ] the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to allow
respondent’s Fourth Amendment claim against Scott to proceed to
trial.[ Footnote 3 ] Taking
respondent’s view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals
concluded that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force”
under Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U. S. 1 (1985), and that the use of
such force in this context “would violate [respondent’s]
constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a
seizure. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott
violated [respondent’s] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F. 3d,
at 816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the law as it
existed [at the time of the incident], was sufficiently clear to
give reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair notice’ that ramming
a vehicle under these circumstances was unlawful.” Id. , at
817. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Scott was not
entitled to qualified immunity. We granted certiorari, 549 U. S. __
(2006), and now reverse.

															II

															   In resolving questions of
qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a “threshold
question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting
the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 194 , 201
(2001). If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a
constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether
the right was clearly established … in light of the specific
context of the case.” Ibid. Although this ordering
contradicts “[o]ur policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of
constitutional issues,” United States v. Treasury
Employees , 513
U. S. 454 , 478 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U.
S. 288 , 346–347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), we have
said that such a departure from practice is “necessary to set forth
principles which will become the basis for a [future] holding that
a right is clearly established.” Saucier , supra ,
at 201.[ Footnote 4 ] We
therefore turn to the threshold inquiry: whether Deputy Scott’s
actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

															III

															A

															   The first step in assessing the
constitutionality of Scott’s actions is to determine the relevant
facts. As this case was decided on summary judgment, there have not
yet been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s
version of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially from
Scott’s version. When things are in such a posture, courts are
required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences “in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment]
motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc. , 369 U. S. 654 , 655
(1962) (per curiam); Saucier , supra , at
201. In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting (as
the Court of Appeals did here) the plaintiff’s version of the
facts.

															   There is, however, an added
wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape
capturing the events in question. There are no allegations or
indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in any way,
nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what actually
happened. The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of
the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of
Appeals.[ Footnote 5 ] For
example, the Court of Appeals adopted respondent’s assertions that,
during the chase, “there was little, if any, actual threat to
pedestrians or other motorists, as the roads were mostly empty and
[respondent] remained in control of his vehicle.” 433 F. 3d,
at 815. Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets the
impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was
attempting to pass his driving test:

															“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s
viewpoint, [respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed
for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for
turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. Nor was he a
threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was
free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was
closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the
highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been
cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police
blockades of the nearby intersections.” Id. , at 815–816
(citations omitted).

															   The videotape tells quite a
different story. There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down
narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are
shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other
cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in
both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being
hit.[ Footnote 6 ] We see it run
multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of time in
the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by numerous
police cars forced to engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just
to keep up. Far from being the cautious and controlled driver the
lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely
resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,
placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk
of serious injury.[ Footnote
7 ]

															   At the summary judgment stage, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if
there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ.
Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has
carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts… . Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U. S. 574 , 586–587
(1986) (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. , 477 U. S.
242 , 247–248 (1986). When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so
that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.

															   That was the case here with regard to the
factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to
endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have
believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such
visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape.

															B

															   Judging the matter on that basis,
we think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Scott does not contest that his decision to
terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent’s
vehicle constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure
[occurs] … when there is a governmental termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U. S. 593 , 596–597 (1989)
(emphasis deleted). See also id. , at 597 (“If … the police
cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and sideswiped it,
producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect’s freedom
of movement would have been a seizure”). It is also conceded, by
both sides, that a claim of “excessive force in the course of
making [a] …‘seizure’ of [the] person … [is] properly analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 386 , 388
(1989). The question we need to answer is whether Scott’s actions
were objectively reasonable.[ Footnote 8 ]

															1

															   Respondent urges us to analyze
this case as we analyzed Garner , 471 U. S. 1 . See Brief for Respondent
16–29. We must first decide, he says, whether the actions Scott
took constituted “deadly force.” (He defines “deadly force” as “any
use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of causing
death or serious bodily injury,” id. , at 19.) If so,
respondent claims that Garner prescribes certain
preconditions that must be met before Scott’s actions can survive
Fourth Amendment scrutiny: (1) The suspect must have posed an
immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others;
(2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent
escape;[ Footnote 9 ] and (3)
where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some
warning. See Brief for Respondent 17–18 (citing Garner , supra , at 9–12). Since these Garner preconditions
for using deadly force were not met in this case, Scott’s actions
were per se unreasonable.

															   Respondent’s argument falters at
its first step; Garner did not establish a magical on/off
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s
actions constitute “deadly force.” Garner was simply an
application of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham , supra , at 388, to the use of a particular
type of force in a particular situation. Garner held that
it was unreasonable to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary
suspect, 471 U. S., at 21, by shooting him “in the back of the
head” while he was running away on foot, id. , at 4, and
when the officer “could not reasonably have believed that [the
suspect] … posed any threat,” and “never attempted to justify his
actions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape,” id ., at 21. Whatever Garner said about the
factors that might have justified shooting the suspect in
that case, such “preconditions” have scant applicability to this
case, which has vastly different facts. “ Garner had
nothing to do with one car striking another or even with car chases
in general … . A police car’s bumping a fleeing car is,
in fact, not much like a policeman’s shooting a gun so as to hit a
person.” Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff’s
Dept. , 962 F. 2d 1563, 1577 (CA11 1992) (Edmondson, J.,
dissenting), adopted by 998 F. 2d 923 (CA11 1993) (en banc) (per curiam) . Nor is the threat posed by the flight on
foot of an unarmed suspect even remotely comparable to the extreme
danger to human life posed by respondent in this case. Although
respondent’s attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the
Fourth Amendment context is admirable, in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound morass of “reasonableness.”
Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted application of “deadly
force,” all that matters is whether Scott’s actions were
reasonable.

															2

															   In determining the reasonableness
of the manner in which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place , 462 U. S. 696 , 703
(1983). Scott defends his actions by pointing to the paramount
governmental interest in ensuring public safety, and respondent
nowhere suggests this was not the purpose motivating Scott’s
behavior. Thus, in judging whether Scott’s actions were reasonable,
we must consider the risk of bodily harm that Scott’s actions posed
to respondent in light of the threat to the public that Scott was
trying to eliminate. Although there is no obvious way to quantify
the risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that
respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of any
pedestrians who might have been present, to other civilian
motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase. See Part
III–A, supra . It is equally clear that Scott’s actions
posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to
respondent—though not the near certainty of death posed
by, say, shooting a fleeing felon in the back of the head, see Garner , supra , at 4, or pulling alongside a
fleeing motorist’s car and shooting the motorist, cf. Vaughan v. Cox , 343 F. 3d 1323, 1326–1327
(CA11 2003). So how does a court go about weighing the perhaps
lesser probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders
against the perhaps larger probability of injuring or killing a
single person? We think it appropriate in this process to take into
account not only the number of lives at risk, but also their
relative culpability. It was respondent, after all, who
intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully
engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately
produced the choice between two evils that Scott confronted.
Multiple police cars, with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring,
had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but he ignored
their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been
harmed had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely
innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable
for Scott to take the action that he did.[ Footnote 10 ]

															   But wait, says respondent:
Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the
tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased
their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance
and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s action—ramming respondent
off the road—was certain to eliminate the risk that
respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of
all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to
respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go. Had
respondent looked in his rear-view mirror and seen the police cars
deactivate their flashing lights and turn around, he would have had
no idea whether they were truly letting him get away, or simply
devising a new strategy for capture. Perhaps the police knew a
shortcut he didn’t know, and would reappear down the road to
intercept him; or perhaps they were setting up a roadblock in his
path. Cf. Brower , 489 U. S., at 594. Given such
uncertainty, respondent might have been just as likely to respond
by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his
brow.[ Footnote 11 ]

															   Second, we are loath to lay down a rule
requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever
they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s
lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule
would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is
within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour,
crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red
lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation
to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more
sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent
bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it
places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.

															*  *  *

															   The car chase that respondent
initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of
serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could
conclude otherwise. Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by
forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is
entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals’ decision to the
contrary is reversed.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT
maneuver because he was “concerned that the vehicles were moving
too quickly to safely execute the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner
4. Respondent agrees that the PIT maneuver could not have been
safely employed. See Brief for Respondent 9. It is irrelevant to
our analysis whether Scott had permission to take the precise
actions he took. Footnote 2 Qualified immunity is “an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an
absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U. S. 511 ,
526 (1985). Thus, we have held that an order denying qualified
immunity is immediately appealable even though it is interlocutory;
otherwise, it would be “effectively unreviewable.” Id. , at
527. Further, “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in
litigation.” Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U. S. 224 , 227
(1991) (per curiam) . Footnote 3 None of the other claims respondent brought
against Scott or any other party are before this Court. Footnote 4 Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier ’s “rigid ‘order of battle,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U. S. 194 , 201–202
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring), we had described this order of
inquiry as the “better approach,” County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523
U. S. 833 , 841, n. 5 (1998), though not one that was
required in all cases. See id. , at 858–859 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. , at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment). There has been doubt expressed regarding the wisdom of Saucier ’s decision to make the threshold inquiry
mandatory, especially in cases where the constitutional question is
relatively difficult and the qualified immunity question relatively
straightforward. See, e.g. , Brosseau , supra , at 201 (Breyer, J., joined by Scalia and Ginsburg,
JJ., concurring); Bunting v. Mellen , 541 U. S. 1019 (2004)
(Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., respecting denial
of certiorari); id. , at 1025 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See also Lyons v. Xenia , 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J.,
concurring). We need not address the wisdom of Saucier in
this case, however, because the constitutional question with which
we are presented is, as discussed in Part III–B, infra ,
easily decided. Deciding that question first is thus the “better
approach,” Lewis , supra , at 841, n. 5,
regardless of whether it is required. Footnote 5 Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to
the videotape is somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are
misrepresenting its contents. See post , at 4 (dissenting
opinion) (“In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals
quoted by the Court … were entirely accurate”). We are happy to
allow the videotape to speak for itself. See Record 36, Exh. A,
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott_v_harris.rmvb
and in Clerk of Court’s case file. Footnote 6 Justice Stevens hypothesizes that these cars
“had already pulled to the side of the road or were driving along
the shoulder because they heard the police sirens or saw the
flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury could certainly conclude that
those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than persons who
take the same action in response to a speeding ambulance.” Post , at 3. It is not our experience that ambulances and
fire engines careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per hour,
with an unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they pose
to the public is vastly less than what respondent created here. But
even if that were not so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion
that it was unreasonable to eliminate the threat to life that
respondent posed. Society accepts the risk of speeding ambulances
and fire engines in order to save life and property; it need not
(and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed by a reckless
motorist fleeing the police. Footnote 7 This is not to say that each and every
factual statement made by the Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For
example, the videotape validates the court’s statement that when
Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it was not threatening any other
vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly Scott waited for the
road to be clear before executing his maneuver.) Footnote 8 Justice Stevens incorrectly declares this to
be “a question of fact best reserved for a jury,” and complains we
are “usurp[ing] the jury’s factfinding function.” Post , at
7. At the summary judgment stage, however, once we have determined
the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record ,
see Part III–A, supra , the reasonableness of Scott’s
actions—or, in Justice Stevens’ parlance, “[w]hether [respondent’s]
actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post , at 7—is a pure question of law. Footnote 9 Respondent, like the Court of Appeals,
defines this second precondition as “ ‘necessary to prevent
escape,’ ” Brief for Respondent 17; Harris v. Coweta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 813 (CA11 2005),
quoting Garner , 471 U. S., at 11. But that quote from Garner is taken out of context. The necessity described in Garner was, in fact, the need to prevent “serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others.” Ibid. By way of
example only, Garner hypothesized that deadly force may be
used “if necessary to prevent escape” when the suspect is known to
have “committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened
infliction of serious physical harm,” ibid. , so that his
mere being at large poses an inherent danger to society. Respondent
did not pose that type of inherent threat to society, since (prior
to the car chase) he had committed only a minor traffic offense
and, as far as the police were aware, had no prior criminal record.
But in this case, unlike in Garner , it was respondent’s
flight itself (by means of a speeding automobile) that posed the
threat of “serious physical harm … to others.” Ibid . Footnote 10 The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo , 489 U. S. 593 , 595 (1989), for its
refusal to “countenance the argument that by continuing to flee, a
suspect absolves a pursuing police officer of any possible
liability for all ensuing actions during the chase,” 433
F. 3d, at 816. The only question in Brower was
whether a police roadblock constituted a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. In deciding that question, the relative
culpability of the parties is, of course, irrelevant; a seizure
occurs whenever the police are “responsib[le] for the termination
of [a person’s] movement,” 433 F. 3d, at 816, regardless of
the reason for the termination. Culpability is relevant,
however, to the reasonableness of the seizure—to whether
preventing possible harm to the innocent justifies exposing to
possible harm the person threatening them. Footnote 11 Contrary to Justice Stevens’ assertions, we
do not “assum[e] that dangers caused by flight from a police
pursuit will continue after the pursuit ends,” post , at 6,
nor do we make any “factual assumptions,” post, at 5, with
respect to what would have happened if the police had gone home. We
simply point out the uncertainties regarding what would
have happened, in response to respondent’s factual
assumption that the high-speed flight would have ended. 550 U. S. ____ (2007) SCOTT V. HARRIS 550 U. S. ____ (2007) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-1631 TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR
HARRIS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[April 30, 2007]

															   Justice Ginsburg, concurring.

															   I join the Court’s opinion and
would underscore two points. First, I do not read today’s decision
as articulating a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post , at 3 (Breyer, J., concurring). The inquiry described
by the Court, ante , at 10–13, is situation specific. Among
relevant considerations: Were the lives and well-being of others
(motorists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk? Was there a
safer way, given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop the
fleeing vehicle? “[A]dmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an
easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context [may be],”
the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh our way through
the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ” Ante , at
10.

															   Second, were this case suitable for resolution
on qualified immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional
question, Justice Breyer’s discussion would be engaging. See post , at 1–3 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 194 (2001)).
In joining the Court’s opinion, however, Justice Breyer apparently
shares the view that, in the appeal before us, the constitutional
question warrants an answer. The video footage of the car chase, he
agrees, demonstrates that the officer’s conduct did not transgress
Fourth Amendment limitations. See post , at 1. Confronting Saucier , therefore, is properly reserved for another day
and case. See ante , at 4, n. 4. BREYER, J., CONCURRING SCOTT V. HARRIS 550 U. S. ____ (2007) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-1631 TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR
HARRIS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[April 30, 2007]

															   Justice Breyer, concurring.

															   I join the Court’s opinion with
one suggestion and two qualifications. Because watching the video
footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of the
case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the
link in the Court’s opinion, ante , at 5, n. 5, and
watch it. Having done so, I do not believe a reasonable jury could,
in this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who joined the
chase late in the day and did not know the specific reason why the
respondent was being pursued) acted in violation of the
Constitution.

															   Second, the video makes clear the highly
fact-dependent nature of this constitutional determination. And
that fact-dependency supports the argument that we should overrule
the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 194 (2001), that lower courts must first decide the “constitutional
question” before they turn to the “qualified immunity question.”
See id. , at 200 (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a
constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged”). Instead, lower courts should be free to decide the two
questions in whatever order makes sense in the context of a
particular case. Although I do not object to our deciding the
constitutional question in this particular case, I believe that in
order to lift the burden from lower courts we can and should
reconsider Saucier ’s requirement as well.

															   Sometimes ( e.g. , where a defendant is
clearly entitled to qualified immunity) Saucier ’s fixed
order-of-battle rule wastes judicial resources in that it may
require courts to answer a difficult constitutional question
unnecessarily. Sometimes ( e.g. , where the defendant loses
the constitutional question but wins on qualified immunity) that
order-of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect constitutional
ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-of-battle rule
will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of law so fact dependent
that the result will be confusion rather than clarity. And
frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser
judicial counsel “not to pass on questions of constitutionality …
unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor
Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin , 323 U. S. 101 , 105
(1944); see Ashwander v. TVA , 297 U. S. 288 , 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record,
if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of ”). In a sharp departure from this counsel, Saucier requires courts to embrace unnecessary
constitutional questions not to avoid them.

															   It is not surprising that commentators,
judges, and, in this case, 28 States in an amicus brief,
have invited us to reconsider Saucier ’s
requirement . See Leval, Judging Under the Constitution:
Dicta About Dicta, 81 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling
the requirement “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional
dictum”); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept. , 315
F. 3d 65, 69–70 (CA1 2002) (referring to the requirement as
“an uncomfortable exercise” when “the answer whether there was a
violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully
developed”); Lyons v. Xenia , 417 F. 3d 565,
580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring); Brief for State of
Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae . I would accept that
invitation.

															   While this Court should generally be reluctant
to overturn precedents, stare decisis concerns are at
their weakest here. See, e.g. , Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U. S. 808 , 828
(1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis ” are at
their weakest in cases “involving procedural and evidentiary
rules”). The order-of-battle rule is relatively novel, it primarily
affects judges, and there has been little reliance upon it.

															   Third, I disagree with the Court insofar as it
articulates a per se rule. The majority states: “A police
officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase
that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate
the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at
risk of serious injury or death.” Ante , at 13. This
statement is too absolute. As Justice Ginsburg points out, ante , at 1, whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth
Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the
majority’s rule reflects. With these qualifications, I join the
Court’s opinion. STEVENS, J., DISSENTING SCOTT V. HARRIS 550 U. S. ____ (2007) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-1631 TIMOTHY SCOTT, PETITIONER v. VICTOR
HARRIS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[April 30, 2007]

															   Justice Stevens, dissenting.

															   Today, the Court asks whether an
officer may “take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of
serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” Ante , at 1.
Depending on the circumstances, the answer may be an obvious “yes,”
an obvious “no,” or sufficiently doubtful that the question of the
reasonableness of the officer’s actions should be decided by a
jury, after a review of the degree of danger and the alternatives
available to the officer. A high speed chase in a desert in Nevada
is, after all, quite different from one that travels through the
heart of Las Vegas.

															      Relying on a de
novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nighttime chase
on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or other
“bystanders” were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation
about the possible consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight
of the jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the
views of the judges on both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on
Georgia roads than we are. The Court’s justification for this
unprecedented departure from our well-settled standard of review of
factual determinations made by a district court and affirmed by a
court of appeals is based on its mistaken view that the Court of
Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly contradicted by
the record” and that respondent’s version of the events was “so
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could
have believed him.” Ante , at 7–8.

															   Rather than supporting the conclusion that
what we see on the video “resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of
the most frightening sort,” ante , at 7,[ Footnote 1 ] the tape actually confirms, rather
than contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual
questions at issue. More important, it surely does not provide a
principled basis for depriving the respondent of his right to have
a jury evaluate the question whether the police officers’ decision
to use deadly force to bring the chase to an end was
reasonable.

															   Omitted from the Court’s description of the
initial speeding violation is the fact that respondent was on a
four-lane portion of Highway 34 when the officer clocked his speed
at 73 miles per hour and initiated the chase.[ Footnote 2 ] More significant—and contrary to the
Court’s assumption that respondent’s vehicle “force[d] cars
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid
being hit” ante, at 6—a fact unmentioned in the text of
the opinion explains why those cars pulled over prior to being
passed by respondent. The sirens and flashing lights on the police
cars following respondent gave the same warning that a speeding
ambulance or fire engine would have provided.[ Footnote 3 ] The 13 cars that respondent passed on
his side of the road before entering the shopping center, and both
of the cars that he passed on the right after leaving the center,
no doubt had already pulled to the side of the road or were driving
along the shoulder because they heard the police sirens or saw the
flashing lights before respondent or the police cruisers
approached.[ Footnote 4 ] A jury
could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no
greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a
speeding ambulance, and that their reactions were fully consistent
with the evidence that respondent, though speeding, retained full
control of his vehicle.

															   The police sirens also minimized any risk that
may have arisen from running “multiple red lights,” ibid .
In fact, respondent and his pursuers went through only two
intersections with stop lights and in both cases all other vehicles
in sight were stationary, presumably because they had been warned
of the approaching speeders. Incidentally, the videos do show that
the lights were red when the police cars passed through them but,
because the cameras were farther away when respondent did so and it
is difficult to discern the color of the signal at that point, it
is not entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red lights.
In any event, the risk of harm to the stationary vehicles was
minimized by the sirens, and there is no reason to believe that
respondent would have disobeyed the signals if he were not being
pursued.

															   My colleagues on the jury saw respondent
“swerve around more than a dozen other cars,” and “force cars
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders,” ante , at 6, but they apparently discounted the possibility
that those cars were already out of the pursuit’s path as a result
of hearing the sirens. Even if that were not so, passing a slower
vehicle on a two-lane road always involves some degree of swerving
and is not especially dangerous if there are no cars coming from
the opposite direction. At no point during the chase did respondent
pull into the opposite lane other than to pass a car in front of
him; he did the latter no more than five times and, on most of
those occasions, used his turn signal. On none of these occasions
was there a car traveling in the opposite direction. In fact, at
one point, when respondent found himself behind a car in his own
lane and there were cars traveling in the other direction, he
slowed and waited for the cars traveling in the other direction to
pass before overtaking the car in front of him while using his turn
signal to do so. This is hardly the stuff of Hollywood. To the
contrary, the video does not reveal any incidents that could even
be remotely characterized as “close calls.”

															   In sum, the factual statements by the Court of
Appeals quoted by the Court, ante , at 5–6, were entirely
accurate. That court did not describe respondent as a “cautious”
driver as my colleagues imply, ante , at 7, but it did
correctly conclude that there is no evidence that he ever lost
control of his vehicle. That court also correctly pointed out that
the incident in the shopping center parking lot did not create any
risk to pedestrians or other vehicles because the chase occurred
just before 11 p.m. on a weekday night and the center was closed.
It is apparent from the record (including the videotape) that local
police had blocked off intersections to keep respondent from
entering residential neighborhoods and possibly endangering other
motorists. I would add that the videos also show that no
pedestrians, parked cars, sidewalks, or residences were visible at
any time during the chase. The only “innocent bystanders” who were
placed “at great risk of serious injury,” ante , at 7, were
the drivers who either pulled off the road in response to the
sirens or passed respondent in the opposite direction when he was
driving on his side of the road.

															   I recognize, of course, that even though
respondent’s original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was
rather ordinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a
serious offense that merited severe punishment. It was not,
however, a capital offense, or even an offense that justified the
use of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase. The
Court’s concern about the “imminent threat to the lives of any
pedestrians who might have been present,” ante, at 11,
while surely valid in an appropriate case, should be discounted in
a case involving a nighttime chase in an area where no pedestrians
were present.

															   What would have happened if the police had
decided to abandon the chase? We now know that they could have
apprehended respondent later because they had his license plate
number. Even if that were not true, and even if he would have
escaped any punishment at all, the use of deadly force in this case
was no more appropriate than the use of a deadly weapon against a
fleeing felon in Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U. S. 1 (1985). In any
event, any uncertainty about the result of abandoning the pursuit
has not prevented the Court from basing its conclusions on its own
factual assumptions.[ Footnote
5 ] The Court attempts to avoid the conclusion that deadly force
was unnecessary by speculating that if the officers had let him go,
respondent might have been “just as likely” to continue to drive
recklessly as to slow down and wipe his brow. Ante , at 12.
That speculation is unconvincing as a matter of common sense and
improper as a matter of law. Our duty to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party would foreclose such
speculation if the Court had not used its observation of the video
as an excuse for replacing the rule of law with its ad hoc
judgment. There is no evidentiary basis for an assumption that
dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after
the pursuit ends. Indeed, rules adopted by countless police
departments throughout the country are based on a judgment that
differs from the Court’s. See, e.g. , App. to Brief for
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae A–52 (“During a pursuit, the need to apprehend the
suspect should always outweigh the level of danger created by the
pursuit. When the immediate danger to the public created by the
pursuit is greater than the immediate or potential danger to the
public should the suspect remain at large, then the pursuit should
be discontinued or terminated… . [P]ursuits should usually be
discontinued when the violator’s identity has been established to
the point that later apprehension can be accomplished without
danger to the public”).

															   Although Garner may not, as the Court
suggests, “establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid
preconditions” for the use of deadly force, ante , at 9, it
did set a threshold under which the use of deadly force would be
considered constitutionally unreasonable:

															“Where the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to
the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable
to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect
threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some
warning has been given.” 471 U. S., at 11–12.

															Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level
warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a
jury.[ Footnote 6 ] Here, the
Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding function and, in doing so,
implicitly labeled the four other judges to review the case
unreasonable. It chastises the Court of Appeals for failing to
“vie[w] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape” and
implies that no reasonable person could view the videotape and come
to the conclusion that deadly force was unjustified. Ant e,
at 8. However, the three judges on the Court of Appeals panel
apparently did view the videotapes entered into evidence[ Footnote 7 ] and described a very
different version of events:

															“At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding
and running two red lights, Harris was driving in a non-aggressive
fashion (i.e., without trying to ram or run into the officers).
Moreover, … Scott’s path on the open highway was largely clear. The
videos introduced into evidence show little to no vehicular (or
pedestrian) traffic, allegedly because of the late hour and the
police blockade of the nearby intersections. Finally, Scott issued
absolutely no warning (e.g., over the loudspeaker or otherwise)
prior to using deadly force.” Harris v. Coweta
County , 433 F. 3d 807, 819, n. 14 (CA11 2005).

															If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently
about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror
could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events.
Moreover, under the standard set forth in Garner , it is
certainly possible that “a jury could conclude that Scott
unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris by ramming him off
the road under the instant circumstances.” 433 F. 3d, at
821.

															   The Court today sets forth a per se rule that presumes its own version of the facts: “A police
officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante , at 13
(emphasis added). Not only does that rule fly in the face of the
flexible and case-by-case “reasonableness” approach applied in Garner and Graham v. Connor , 490 U. S. 386 (1989),
but it is also arguably inapplicable to the case at hand, given
that it is not clear that this chase threatened the life of any
“innocent bystande[r].”[ Footnote
8 ] In my view, the risks inherent in justifying unwarranted
police conduct on the basis of unfounded assumptions are
unacceptable, particularly when less drastic measures—in this case,
the use of stop sticks[ Footnote
9 ] or a simple warning issued from a loudspeaker—could have
avoided such a tragic result. In my judgment, jurors in Georgia
should be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to
ram respondent’s speeding vehicle in a manner that created an
obvious risk of death and has in fact made him a quadriplegic at
the age of 19.

															   I respectfully dissent. Footnote 1 I can only conclude that my colleagues were
unduly frightened by two or three images on the tape that looked
like bursts of lightning or explosions, but were in fact merely the
headlights of vehicles zooming by in the opposite lane. Had they
learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on
two-lane roads rather than on superhighways—when split-second
judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of
oncoming traffic were routine—they might well have reacted to the
videotape more dispassionately. Footnote 2 According to the District Court record, when
respondent was clocked at 73 miles per hour, the deputy who
recorded his speed was sitting in his patrol car on Highway 34
between Lora Smith Road and Sullivan Road in Coweta County,
Georgia. At that point, as well as at the point at which Highway 34
intersects with Highway 154—where the deputy caught up with
respondent and the videotape begins—Highway 34 is a four-lane road,
consisting of two lanes in each direction with a wide grass divider
separating the flow of traffic. Footnote 3 While still on the four-lane portion of
Highway 34, the deputy who had clocked respondent’s speed turned on
his blue light and siren in an attempt to get respondent to pull
over. It was when the deputy turned on his blue light that the
dash-mounted video camera was activated and began to record the
pursuit. Footnote 4 Although perhaps understandable, because
their volume on the sound recording is low (possibly due to sound
proofing in the officer’s vehicle), the Court appears to minimize
the significance of the sirens audible throughout the tape
recording of the pursuit. Footnote 5 In noting that Scott’s action “was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the
public” while “ceasing pursuit was not,” the Court prioritizes
total elimination of the risk of harm to the public over the risk
that respondent may be seriously injured or even killed. Ante , at 12 (emphasis in original). The Court is only able
to make such a statement by assuming, based on its interpretation
of events on the videotape, that the risk of harm posed in this
case, and the type of harm involved, rose to a level warranting
deadly force. These are the same types of questions that, when
disputed, are typically resolved by a jury; this is why both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals saw fit to have them be so
decided. Although the Court claims only to have drawn factual
inferences in respondent’s favor “ to the extent supportable by
the record ,” ante , at 8, n. 8 (emphasis in
original), its own view of the record has clearly precluded it from
doing so to the same extent as the two courts through which this
case has already traveled, see ante , at 2–3, 5–6. Footnote 6 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
correctly noted: “We reject the defendants’ argument that Harris’
driving must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently
reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a
substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists and
pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.” Harris v. Coweta County , 433 F. 3d 807, 815
(CA11 2005). Footnote 7 In total, there are four police tapes which
captured portions of the pursuit, all recorded from different
officers’ vehicles. Footnote 8 It is unclear whether, in referring to
“innocent bystanders,” the Court is referring to the motorists
driving unfazed in the opposite direction or to the drivers who
pulled over to the side of the road, safely out of respondent’s and
petitioner’s path. Footnote 9 “Stop sticks” are a device which can be
placed across the roadway and used to flatten a vehicle’s tires
slowly to safely terminate a pursuit.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a law enforcement official's attempt to stop a fleeing motorist by ramming their car from behind does not violate the Fourth Amendment, if the fleeing motorist endangers the lives of innocent bystanders. In this case, the deputy's use of a PIT maneuver to stop the respondent's dangerous high-speed chase was deemed reasonable and did not constitute excessive force, given the risk posed to public safety.