OPINION OF THE COURT PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-665 PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., PETITIONERS v. SUMMUM

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 25, 2009]

															   Justice Alito delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   This case presents the question
whether the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment entitles a
private group to insist that a municipality permit it to place a
permanent monument in a city park in which other donated monuments
were previously erected. The Court of Appeals held that the
municipality was required to accept the monument because a public
park is a traditional public forum. We conclude, however, that
although a park is a traditional public forum for speeches and
other transitory expressive acts, the display of a permanent
monument in a public park is not a form of expression to which
forum analysis applies. Instead, the placement of a permanent
monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government
speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free
Speech Clause.

															I

															A

															   Pioneer Park (or Park) is a 2.5
acre public park located in the Historic District of Pleasant Grove
City (or City) in Utah. The Park currently contains 15 permanent
displays, at least 11 of which were donated by private groups or
individuals. These include an historic granary, a wishing well, the
City’s first fire station, a September 11 monument, and a Ten
Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in
1971.

															   Respondent Summum is a religious
organization founded in 1975 and headquartered in Salt Lake City,
Utah. On two separate occasions in 2003, Summum’s president wrote a
letter to the City’s mayor requesting permission to erect a “stone
monument,” which would contain “the Seven Aphorisms of
SUMMUM”[ Footnote 1 ] and be
similar in size and nature to the Ten Commandments monument. App.
57, 59. The City denied the requests and explained that its
practice was to limit monuments in the Park to those that “either
(1) directly relate to the history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were
donated by groups with longstanding ties to the Pleasant Grove
community.” Id. , at 61. The following year, the City
passed a resolution putting this policy into writing. The
resolution also mentioned other criteria, such as safety and
esthetics.

															   In May 2005, respondent’s president again
wrote to the mayor asking to erect a monument, but the letter did
not describe the monument, its historical significance, or Summum’s
connection to the community. The city council rejected this
request.

															B

															   In 2005, respondent filed this
action against the City and various local officials (petitioners),
asserting, among other claims, that petitioners had violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten
Commandments monument but rejecting the proposed Seven Aphorisms
monument. Respondent sought a preliminary injunction directing the
City to permit Summum to erect its monument in Pioneer Park. After
the District Court denied Summum’s preliminary injunction request,
No. 2:05CV00638, 2006 WL 3421838 (D Utah, Nov. 22, 2006),
respondent appealed, pressing solely its free speech claim.

															   A panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed. 483
F. 3d 1044 (2007). The panel noted that it had previously
found the Ten Commandments monument to be private rather than
government speech. See Summum v. Ogden , 297
F. 3d 995 (2002). Noting that public parks have traditionally
been regarded as public forums, the panel held that the City could
not reject the Seven Aphorisms monument unless it had a compelling
justification that could not be served by more narrowly tailored
means. See 483 F. 3d, at 1054. The panel then concluded that
the exclusion of respondent’s monument was unlikely to survive this
strict scrutiny, and the panel therefore held that the City was
required to erect Summum’s monument immediately.

															   The Tenth Circuit denied the
City’s petition for rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote.
499 F. 3d 1170 (2007). Judge Lucero dissented, arguing that
the Park was not a traditional public forum for the purpose of
displaying monuments. Id ., at 1171. Judge McConnell also
dissented, contending that the monuments in the Park constitute
government speech. Id ., at 1174.

															   We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2008),
and now reverse.

															II

															   No prior decision of this Court
has addressed the application of the Free Speech Clause to a
government entity’s acceptance of privately donated, permanent
monuments for installation in a public park, and the parties
disagree sharply about the line of precedents that governs this
situation. Petitioners contend that the pertinent cases are those
concerning government speech. Respondent, on the other hand, agrees
with the Court of Appeals panel that the applicable cases are those
that analyze private speech in a public forum. The parties’
fundamental disagreement thus centers on the nature of petitioners’
conduct when they permitted privately donated monuments to be
erected in Pioneer Park. Were petitioners engaging in their own
expressive conduct? Or were they providing a forum for private
speech?

															A

															   If petitioners were engaging in
their own expressive conduct, then the Free Speech Clause has no
application. The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation
of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn. , 544 U. S. 550 , 553
(2005) (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny”); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 , 139,
n. 7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Government is not
restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own
expression”). A government entity has the right to “speak for
itself.” Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth , 529 U. S. 217 , 229
(2000). “[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U. S.
819 , 833 (1995), and to select the views that it wants to
express. See Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U. S. 173 , 194
(1991); National Endowment for Arts v. Finley , 524 U. S. 569 ,
598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is the very
business of government to favor and disfavor points of view”).

															   Indeed, it is not easy to imagine
how government could function if it lacked this freedom. “If every
citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public
funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of
great concern to the public would be limited to those in the
private sector, and the process of government as we know it
radically transformed.” Keller v. State Bar of
Cal. , 496 U. S.
1 , 12–13 (1990). See also Johanns , 544 U. S., at 574
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“To govern, government has to say
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace
of ideas’ would be out of the question” (footnote omitted)).

															   A government entity may exercise this same
freedom to express its views when it receives assistance from
private sources for the purpose of delivering a
government-controlled message. See id. , at 562 (opinion of
the Court) (where the government controls the message, “it is not
precluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine merely
because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental sources”); Rosenberger , supra , at 833 (a government entity
may “regulate the content of what is or is not expressed … when it
enlists private entities to convey its own message”).

															   This does not mean that there are no
restraints on government speech. For example, government speech
must comport with the Establishment Clause. The involvement of
public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, or
practice. And of course, a government entity is ultimately
“accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy.” Southworth , 529 U. S., at 235. “If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some
different or contrary position.” Ibid . B While government
speech is not restricted by the Free Speech Clause, the government
does not have a free hand to regulate private speech on government
property. This Court long ago recognized that members of the public
retain strong free speech rights when they venture into public
streets and parks, “which ‘have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions.’ ” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. , 460 U. S. 37 , 45 (1983)
(quoting Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization , 307 U. S. 496 , 515
(1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)). In order to preserve this
freedom, government entities are strictly limited in their ability
to regulate private speech in such “traditional public fora.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,
Inc. , 473 U. S.
788 , 800 (1985). Reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are allowed, see Perry Ed. Assn. , supra , at 45, but any restriction based on the content of
the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the restriction
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest, see Cornelius , supra , at 800, and
restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited, see Carey v. Brown , 447 U. S. 455 , 463
(1980). With the concept of
the traditional public forum as a starting point, this Court has
recognized that members of the public have free speech rights on
other types of government property and in certain other government
programs that share essential attributes of a traditional public
forum. We have held that a government entity may create “a
designated public forum” if government property that has not
traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally
opened up for that purpose. See Cornelius , 473 U. S., at
802. Government restrictions on speech in a designated public forum
are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a
traditional public forum. Id. , at 800. The Court has also held that a
government entity may create a forum that is limited to use by
certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain
subjects. Perry Ed. Assn. , supra , at 46,
n. 7. In such a forum, a government entity may impose
restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.
See Good News Club v. Milford Central School , 533 U. S. 98 ,
106–107 (2001). III There may be
situations in which it is difficult to tell whether a government
entity is speaking on its own behalf or is providing a forum for
private speech, but this case does not present such a situation.
Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically
represent government speech. Governments have long
used monuments to speak to the public. Since ancient times, kings,
emperors, and other rulers have erected statues of themselves to
remind their subjects of their authority and power. Triumphal
arches, columns, and other monuments have been built to commemorate
military victories and sacrifices and other events of civic
importance. A monument, by definition, is a structure that is
designed as a means of expression. When a government entity
arranges for the construction of a monument, it does so because it
wishes to convey some thought or instill some feeling in those who
see the structure. Neither the Court of Appeals nor respondent
disputes the obvious proposition that a monument that is
commissioned and financed by a government body for placement on
public land constitutes government speech. Just as government-commissioned
and government-financed monuments speak for the government, so do
privately financed and donated monuments that the government
accepts and displays to the public on government land. It certainly
is not common for property owners to open up their property for the
installation of permanent monuments that convey a message with
which they do not wish to be associated. And because property
owners typically do not permit the construction of such monuments
on their land, persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on the property
owner’s behalf. In this context, there is little chance that
observers will fail to appreciate the identity of the speaker. This
is true whether the monument is located on private property or on
public property, such as national, state, or city park
land. We think it is fair to say that
throughout our Nation’s history, the general government practice
with respect to donated monuments has been one of selective
receptivity. A great many of the monuments that adorn the Nation’s
public parks were financed with private funds or donated by private
parties. Sites managed by the National Park Service contain
thousands of privately designed or funded commemorative objects,
including the Statue of Liberty, the Marine Corps War Memorial (the
Iwo Jima monument), and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. States and
cities likewise have received thousands of donated monuments. See, e.g. , App. to Brief for International Municipal Lawyers
Association as Amicus Curiae 15a–29a (hereinafter IMLA
Brief) (listing examples); Brief for American Legion et al. as Amici Curiae 7, and n. 2 (same). By accepting monuments
that are privately funded or donated, government entities save tax
dollars and are able to acquire monuments that they could not have
afforded to fund on their own. But while government entities
regularly accept privately funded or donated monuments, they have
exercised selectivity. An example discussed by the city of New York
as amicus curiae is illustrative. In the wake of the
controversy generated in 1876 when the city turned down a donated
monument to honor Daniel Webster, the city adopted rules governing
the acceptance of artwork for permanent placement in city parks,
requiring, among other things, that “any proposed gift of art had
to be viewed either in its finished condition or as a model before
acceptance.” Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae 4–5 (hereinafter NYC Brief). Across the country, “municipalities
generally exercise editorial control over donated monuments through
prior submission requirements, design input, requested
modifications, written criteria, and legislative approvals of
specific content proposals.” IMLA Brief 21. Public parks are often closely
identified in the public mind with the government unit that owns
the land. City parks—ranging from those in small towns, like
Pioneer Park in Pleasant Grove City, to those in major
metropolises, like Central Park in New York City—commonly play an
important role in defining the identity that a city projects to its
own residents and to the outside world. Accordingly, cities and
other jurisdictions take some care in accepting donated monuments.
Government decisionmakers select the monuments that portray what
they view as appropriate for the place in question, taking into
account such content-based factors as esthetics, history, and local
culture. The monuments that are accepted, therefore, are meant to
convey and have the effect of conveying a government message, and
they thus constitute government speech. IV A In this case, it is
clear that the monuments in Pleasant Grove’s Pioneer Park represent
government speech. Although many of the monuments were not designed
or built by the City and were donated in completed form by private
entities, the City decided to accept those donations and to display
them in the Park. Respondent does not claim that the City ever
opened up the Park for the placement of whatever permanent
monuments might be offered by private donors. Rather, the City has
“effectively controlled” the messages sent by the monuments in the
Park by exercising “final approval authority” over their selection. Johanns , 544 U. S., at 560–561. The City has selected
those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of
presenting the image of the City that it wishes to project to all
who frequent the Park; it has taken ownership of most of the
monuments in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monument that
is the focus of respondent’s concern; and the City has now
expressly set forth the criteria it will use in making future
selections. B Respondent voices the
legitimate concern that the government speech doctrine not be used
as a subterfuge for favoring certain private speakers over others
based on viewpoint. Respondent’s suggested solution is to require a
government entity accepting a privately donated monument to go
through a formal process of adopting a resolution publicly
embracing “the message” that the monument conveys. See Brief for
Respondent 33–34, 57. We see no reason for
imposing a requirement of this sort. The parks of this country
contain thousands of donated monuments that government entities
have used for their own expressive purposes, usually without
producing the sort of formal documentation that respondent now says
is required to escape Free Speech Clause restrictions. Requiring
all of these jurisdictions to go back and proclaim formally that
they adopt all of these monuments as their own expressive vehicles
would be a pointless exercise that the Constitution does not
mandate. In this case, for example,
although respondent argues that Pleasant Grove City has not
adequately “controll[ed] the message,” id. , at 31, of the
Ten Commandments monument, the City took ownership of that monument
and put it on permanent display in a park that it owns and manages
and that is linked to the City’s identity. All rights previously
possessed by the monument’s donor have been relinquished. The
City’s actions provided a more dramatic form of adoption than the
sort of formal endorsement that respondent would demand,
unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the City intends
the monument to speak on its behalf. And the City has made no
effort to abridge the traditional free speech rights—the right to
speak, distribute leaflets, etc.—that may be exercised by
respondent and others in Pioneer Park. What respondent demands, however,
is that the City “adopt” or “embrace” “the message” that it
associates with the monument. Id. , at 33–34, 57.
Respondent seems to think that a monument can convey only one
“message”—which is, presumably, the message intended by the
donor—and that, if a government entity that accepts a monument for
placement on its property does not formally embrace that message, then the government has not engaged in expressive
conduct. This argument fundamentally
misunderstands the way monuments convey meaning. The meaning
conveyed by a monument is generally not a simple one like
“ ‘Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.’ ” Johanns , supra , at 554. Even when a monument features the written
word, the monument may be intended to be interpreted, and may in
fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of ways.
Monuments called to our attention by the briefing in this case
illustrate this phenomenon. What, for example, is “the
message” of the Greco-Roman mosaic of the word “Imagine” that was
donated to New York City’s Central Park in memory of John Lennon?
See NYC Brief 18; App. to id. , at A5. Some observers may
“imagine” the musical contributions that John Lennon would have
made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the lyrics of
the Lennon song that obviously inspired the mosaic and may
“imagine” a world without religion, countries, possessions, greed,
or hunger.[ Footnote
2 ] Or, to take another example, what
is “the message” of the “large bronze statue displaying the word
‘peace’ in many world languages” that is displayed in Fayetteville,
Arkansas?[ Footnote
3 ] These text-based monuments are
almost certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the
minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do
not contain text is likely to be even more variable. Consider, for
example, the statue of Pancho Villa that was given to the city of
Tucson, Arizona, in 1981 by the Government of Mexico with,
according to a Tucson publication, “a wry sense of irony.”[ Footnote 4 ] Does this statue
commemorate a “revolutionary leader who advocated for agrarian
reform and the poor” or “a violent bandit”? IMLA Brief
13. Contrary to respondent’s apparent
belief, it frequently is not possible to identify a single
“message” that is conveyed by an object or structure, and
consequently, the thoughts or sentiments expressed by a government
entity that accepts and displays such an object may be quite
different from those of either its creator or its donor.[ Footnote 5 ] By accepting a privately
donated monument and placing it on city property, a city engages in
expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived significance of
that conduct may not coincide with the thinking of the monument’s
donor or creator. Indeed, when a privately donated memorial is
funded by many small donations, the donors themselves may differ in
their interpretation of the monument’s significance.[ Footnote 6 ] By accepting such a monument, a
government entity does not necessarily endorse the specific meaning
that any particular donor sees in the monument. The message that a government
entity conveys by allowing a monument to remain on its property may
also be altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in
the same vicinity. For example, following controversy over the
original design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, a compromise was
reached that called for the nearby addition of a flagstaff and
bronze Three Soldiers statue, which many believed changed the
overall effect of the memorial. See, e.g. , J. Mayo, War
Memorials as Political Landscape: The American Experience and
Beyond 202–203, 205 (1988); K. Hass, Carried to the Wall: American
Memory and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 15–18 (1998). The “message” conveyed by a
monument may change over time. A study of war memorials found that
“people reinterpret” the meaning of these memorials as “historical
interpretations” and “the society around them changes.” Mayo, supra , at 8–9. A striking example of how the
interpretation of a monument can evolve is provided by one of the
most famous and beloved public monuments in the United States, the
Statue of Liberty. The statue was given to this country by the
Third French Republic to express republican solidarity and
friendship between the two countries. See J. Res. 6, 44th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1877), 19 Stat. 410 (accepting the statue as an “expressive
and felicitous memorial of the sympathy of the citizens of our
sister Republic”). At the inaugural ceremony, President Cleveland
saw the statue as an emblem of international friendship and the
widespread influence of American ideals. See Inauguration of the
Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World 30 (1887). Only later did
the statue come to be viewed as a beacon welcoming immigrants to a
land of freedom. See Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald
Reagan, Vol. 2, July 3, 1986, pp. 918–919 (1989), Remarks at the
Opening Ceremonies of the Statue of Liberty Centennial Celebration
in New York, New York; J. Higham, The Transformation of the Statue
of Liberty, in Send These To Me 74–80 (rev. ed. 1984). C Respondent and the
Court of Appeals analogize the installation of permanent monuments
in a public park to the delivery of speeches and the holding of
marches and demonstrations, and they thus invoke the rule that a
public park is a traditional public forum for these activities. But
“public forum principles . . . are out of place in the context of
this case.” United States v. American Library Assn.,
Inc. , 539 U. S.
194 , 205 (2003). The forum doctrine has been applied in
situations in which government-owned property or a government
program was capable of accommodating a large number of public
speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or
the program. For example, a park can accommodate many speakers and,
over time, many parades and demonstrations. The Combined Federal
Campaign permits hundreds of groups to solicit donations from
federal employees. See Cornelius , 473 U. S., at 804–805. A
public university’s student activity fund can provide money for
many campus activities. See Rosenberger , 515 U. S., at
825. A public university’s buildings may offer meeting space for
hundreds of student groups. See Widmar v. Vincent , 454 U. S. 263 , 274–275
(1981). A school system’s internal mail facilities can support the
transmission of many messages to and from teachers and school
administrators. See Perry Ed. Assn. , 460 U. S., at 39,
46–47. See also Arkansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes , 523
U. S. 666 , 680–681 (1998) (noting that allowing any candidate
to participate in a televised political debate would be burdensome
on “logistical grounds” and “would result in less speech, not
more”). By contrast, public
parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments.
Public parks have been used, “ ‘time out of mind, . . . for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions,’ ” Perry Ed. Assn. , supra , at 45 (quoting Hague , 307 U. S., at 515),
but “one would be hard pressed to find a ‘long tradition’ of
allowing people to permanently occupy public space with any manner
of monuments.” 499 F. 3d, at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). Speakers, no matter how
long-winded, eventually come to the end of their remarks; persons
distributing leaflets and carrying signs at some point tire and go
home; monuments, however, endure. They monopolize the use of the
land on which they stand and interfere permanently with other uses
of public space. A public park, over the years, can provide a
soapbox for a very large number of orators—often, for all who want
to speak—but it is hard to imagine how a public park could be
opened up for the installation of permanent monuments by every
person or group wishing to engage in that form of
expression. Respondent contends that this
issue “can be dealt with through content-neutral time, place and
manner restrictions, including the option of a ban on all
unattended displays.” Brief for Respondent 14. On this view, when
France presented the Statue of Liberty to the United States in
1884, this country had the option of either (a) declining France’s
offer or (b) accepting the gift, but providing a comparable
location in the harbor of New York for other statues of a similar
size and nature ( e.g. , a Statue of Autocracy, if one had
been offered by, say, the German Empire or Imperial
Russia). While respondent and some of its amici deride the fears expressed about the consequences of
the Court of Appeals holding in this case, those concerns are well
founded. If government entities must maintain viewpoint neutrality
in their selection of donated monuments, they must either “brace
themselves for an influx of clutter” or face the pressure to remove
longstanding and cherished monuments. See 499 F. 3d, at 1175
(McConnell, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Every
jurisdiction that has accepted a donated war memorial may be asked
to provide equal treatment for a donated monument questioning the
cause for which the veterans fought. New York City, having accepted
a donated statue of one heroic dog (Balto, the sled dog who brought
medicine to Nome, Alaska, during a diphtheria epidemic)[ Footnote 7 ] may be pressed to accept
monuments for other dogs who are claimed to be equally worthy of
commemoration. The obvious truth of the matter is that if public
parks were considered to be traditional public forums for the
purpose of erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would
have little choice but to refuse all such donations. And where the
application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of
place. Respondent compares the present
case to Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette , 515 U. S. 753 (1995),
but that case involved a very different situation—a request by a
private group, the Ku Klux Klan, to erect a cross for a period of
16 days on public property that had been opened up for similar
temporary displays, including a Christmas tree and a menorah. See id ., at 758. Although some public parks can accommodate
and may be made generally available for temporary private displays,
the same is rarely true for permanent monuments. To be sure, there are limited
circumstances in which the forum doctrine might properly be applied
to a permanent monument—for example, if a town created a monument
on which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other
criterion) could place the name of a person to be honored or some
other private message. But as a general matter, forum analysis
simply does not apply to the installation of permanent monuments on
public property. V In sum, we hold that
the City’s decision to accept certain privately donated monuments
while rejecting respondent’s is best viewed as a form of government
speech. As a result, the City’s decision is not subject to the Free
Speech Clause, and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
We therefore reverse. It is so ordered. Footnote 1 Respondent’s brief describes the
church and the Seven Aphorisms as follows: “The Summum church incorporates
elements of Gnostic Christianity, teaching that spiritual knowledge
is experiential and that through devotion comes revelation, which
‘modifies human perceptions, and transfigures the individual.’ See The Teachings of Summum are the Teachings of Gnostic
Christianity, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/ gnosticism.shtml
(visited Aug. 15, 2008). “Central to Summum religious
belief and practice are the Seven Principles of Creation (the
“Seven Aphorisms”). According to Summum doctrine, the Seven
Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets handed down by God
to Moses on Mount Sinai… . Because Moses believed that
the Israelites were not ready to receive the Aphorisms, he shared
them only with a select group of people. In the Summum Exodus
account, Moses then destroyed the original tablets, traveled back
to Mount Sinai, and returned with a second set of tablets con-
taining the Ten Commandments. See The Aphorisms of Summum
and the Ten Commandments, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/
tencommandments.shtml (visited Aug. 15, 2008).” Brief for
Respondent 1–2. Footnote 2 The lyrics are as follows: “Imagine there’s no heaven It’s easy if you try No hell below us Above us only sky Imagine all the people Living for today... “Imagine there’s no countries It isn’t hard to do Nothing to kill or die for And no religion too Imagine all the people Living life in peace... “You may say I’m a dreamer But I’m not the only one I hope someday you’ll join us And the world will be as one “Imagine no possessions I wonder if you can No need for greed or hunger A brotherhood of man Imagine all the people Sharing all the world... “You may say I’m a dreamer But I’m not the only one I hope someday you’ll join us And the world will live as one.” J. Lennon, Imagine,
on Imagine (Apple Records 1971). Footnote 3 See IMLA Brief 6–7. Footnote 4 The Presidio Trail: A Historical
Walking Tour of Downtown Tucson, online at
http://www.visittucson.org/includes/media/docs/
DowntownTour.pdf. Footnote 5 Museum collections illustrate this phenomenon.
Museums display works of art that express many different
sentiments, and the significance of a donated work of art to its
creator or donor may differ markedly from a museum’s reasons for
accepting and displaying the work. For example, a painting of a
religious scene may have been commissioned and painted to express
religious thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is donated to
the museum by a patron who shares those thoughts and feelings, it
does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting,
intends to convey or is perceived as conveying the same
“message.” Footnote 6 For example, the Vietnam Veterans
Memorial Fund is a private organization that obtained funding from
over 650,000 donors for the construction of the memorial itself.
These donors expressed a wide range of personal sentiments in
contributing money for the memorial. See, e.g. , J. Scruggs
& J. Swerdlow, To Heal a Nation: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial
23–28, 159 (1985). Footnote 7 See NYC Brief 2; App. to Brief
for American Catholic Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae 1a–10. 555 U. S. ____ (2009) PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-665 PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., PETITIONERS v. SUMMUM

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 25, 2009]

															   Justice Stevens, with whom
Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring.

															   This case involves a property
owner’s rejection of an offer to place a permanent display on its
land. While I join the Court’s persuasive opinion, I think the
reasons justifying the city’s refusal would have been equally valid
if its acceptance of the monument, instead of being characterized
as “government speech,” had merely been deemed an implicit
endorsement of the donor’s message. See Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette , 515 U. S. 753 , 801–802
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

															   To date, our decisions relying on the recently
minted government speech doctrine to uphold government action have
been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit. See, e.g. , Garcetti v. Ceballos , 547 U. S. 410 (2006); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn. , 544 U. S. 550 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U. S. 173 (1991).
The Court’s opinion in this case signals no expansion of that
doctrine. And by joining the Court’s opinion, I do not mean to
indicate agreement with our earlier decisions. Unlike other
decisions relying on the government speech doctrine, our decision
in this case excuses no retaliation for, or coercion of, private
speech. Cf. Garcetti , 547 U. S., at 438 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Rust , 500 U. S., at 212 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Nor is it likely, given the near certainty that
observers will associate permanent displays with the governmental
property owner, that the government will be able to avoid political
accountability for the views that it endorses or expresses through
this means. Cf. Johanns , 544 U. S., at 571–572 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Finally, recognizing permanent displays on public
property as government speech will not give the government free
license to communicate offensive or partisan messages. For even if
the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government
speech, government speakers are bound by the Constitution’s other
proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses. Together with the checks imposed by our
democratic processes, these constitutional safeguards ensure that
the effect of today’s decision will be limited. SCALIA, J., CONCURRING PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-665 PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., PETITIONERS v. SUMMUM

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 25, 2009]

															   Justice Scalia, with whom Justice
Thomas joins, concurring.

															   As framed and argued by the
parties, this case presents a question under the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment. I agree with the Court’s analysis of that
question and join its opinion in full. But it is also obvious that
from the start, the case has been litigated in the shadow of the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause: the city wary of
associating itself too closely with the Ten Commandments monument
displayed in the park, lest that be deemed a breach in the
so-called “wall of separation between church and State,” Reynolds v. United States , 98 U. S. 145 , 164 (1879);
respondent exploiting that hesitation to argue that the monument is
not government speech because the city has not sufficiently
“adopted” its message. Respondent menacingly observed that while
the city could have formally adopted the monument as its own, that
“might of course raise Establishment Clause issues.” Brief for
Respondent 34, n. 11.

															   The city ought not fear that today’s victory
has propelled it from the Free Speech Clause frying pan into the
Establishment Clause fire. Contrary to respondent’s intimations,
there are very good reasons to be confident that the park displays
do not violate any part of the First Amendment.

															   In Van Orden v. Perry , 545 U. S. 677 (2005), this Court upheld against Establishment Clause challenge a
virtually identical Ten Commandments monument, donated by the very
same organization (the Fraternal Order of Eagles), which was
displayed on the grounds surrounding the Texas State Capitol.
Nothing in that decision suggested that the outcome turned on a
finding that the monument was only “private” speech. To the
contrary, all the Justices agreed that government speech was at
issue, but the Establishment Clause argument was nonetheless
rejected. For the plurality, that was because the Ten Commandments
“have an undeniable historical meaning” in addition to their
“religious significance,” id. , at 690 (opinion of
Rehnquist, C. J.). Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment,
agreed that the monument conveyed a permissible secular message, as
evidenced by its location in a park that contained multiple
monuments and historical markers; by the fact that it had been
donated by the Eagles “as part of that organization’s efforts to
combat juvenile delinquency”; and by the length of time (40 years)
for which the monument had gone unchallenged. Id. , at
701–703. See also id. , at 739–740 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).

															   Even accepting the narrowest reading of the
narrowest opinion necessary to the judgment in Van Orden ,
there is little basis to distinguish the monument in this case:
Pioneer Park includes “15 permanent displays,” ante , at
1–2; it was donated by the Eagles as part of its national effort to
combat juvenile delinquency, Brief for Respondent 3; and it was
erected in 1971, ibid. , which means it is approaching its
(momentous!) 40th anniversary.

															   The city can safely exhale. Its residents and
visitors can now return to enjoying Pioneer Park’s wishing well,
its historic granary—and, yes, even its Ten Commandments
monument—without fear that they are complicit in an establishment
of religion. 555 U. S. ____ (2009) PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-665 PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., PETITIONERS v. SUMMUM

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 25, 2009]

															   Justice Breyer, concurring.

															I agree with the Court and join its opinion. I do
so, however, on the understanding that the “government speech”
doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category. Were the City to
discriminate in the selection of permanent monuments on grounds
unrelated to the display’s theme, say solely on political grounds,
its action might well violate the First Amendment.

															In my view, courts must apply categories such as “government
speech,” “public forums,” “limited public forums,” and “nonpublic
forums” with an eye towards their purposes—lest we turn “free
speech” doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels. Cf. United
States v. Kokinda , 497 U. S. 720 , 740–743
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Consequently, we must sometimes
look beyond an initial categorization. And, in doing so, it helps
to ask whether a government action burdens speech
disproportionately in light of the action’s tendency to further a
legitimate government objective. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Assn. , ante , at 1–4 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 528 U. S. 377 , 404
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).

															Were we to do so here, we would find—for reasons that the Court
sets forth—that the City’s action, while preventing Summum from
erecting its monument, does not disproportionately restrict
Summum’s freedom of expression. The City has not closed off its
parks to speech; no one claims that the City prevents Summum’s
members from engaging in speech in a form more transient than a
permanent monument. Rather, the City has simply reserved some space
in the park for projects designed to further other than free-speech
goals. And that is perfectly proper. After all, parks do not serve
speech-related interests alone. To the contrary, cities use park
space to further a variety of recreational, historical,
educational, aesthetic, and other civic interests. To reserve to
the City the power to pick and choose among proposed monuments
according to criteria reasonably related to one or more of these
legitimate ends restricts Summum’s expression, but, given the
impracticality of alternatives and viewed in light of the City’s
legitimate needs, the restriction is not disproportionate. Analyzed
either way, as “government speech” or as a proportionate
restriction on Summum’s expression, the City’s action here is
lawful. SOUTER, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-665 PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al., PETITIONERS v. SUMMUM

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the tenth circuit

															[February 25, 2009]

															   Justice Souter, concurring in the
judgment.

															   I agree with the Court that the
Ten Commandments monument is government speech, that is, an
expression of a government’s position on the moral and religious
issues raised by the subject of the monument. See Board of
Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth , 529 U. S. 217 ,
235 (2000) (noting government speech may “promote [government’s]
own policies or . . . advance a particular idea”). And although the
government should lose when the character of the speech is at issue
and its governmental nature has not been made clear, see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn. , 544 U. S. 550 , 577
(2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), I also agree with the Court that
the city need not satisfy the particular formality urged by Summum
as a condition of recognizing that the expression here falls within
the public category. I have qualms, however, about accepting the
position that public monuments are government speech categorically.
See ante , at 8 (“Just as government-commissioned and
government-financed monuments speak for the government, so do
privately financed and donated monuments that the government
accepts and displays to the public on government land”).

															   Because the government speech doctrine, as
Justice Stevens notes, ante , at 1 (concurring opinion), is
“recently minted,” it would do well for us to go slow in setting
its bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet
explored. Even though, for example, Establishment Clause issues
have been neither raised nor briefed before us, there is no doubt
that this case and its government speech claim has been litigated
by the parties with one eye on the Establishment Clause, see ante , at 1 (Scalia, J., concurring). The interaction
between the “government speech doctrine” and Establishment Clause
principles has not, however, begun to be worked out.

															   The case shows that it may not be easy to work
out. After today’s decision, whenever a government maintains a
monument it will presumably be understood to be engaging in
government speech. If the monument has some religious character,
the specter of violating the Establishment Clause will behoove it
to take care to avoid the appearance of a flat-out establishment of
religion, in the sense of the government’s adoption of the tenets
expressed or symbolized. In such an instance, there will be safety
in numbers, and it will be in the interest of a careful government
to accept other monuments to stand nearby, to dilute the appearance
of adopting whatever particular religious position the single
example alone might stand for. As mementoes and testimonials pile
up, however, the chatter may well make it less intuitively obvious
that the government is speaking in its own right simply by
maintaining the monuments.

															   If a case like that occurred, as suspicion
grew that some of the permanent displays were not government speech
at all (or at least had an equally private character associated
with private donors), a further Establishment Clause prohibition
would surface, the bar against preferring some religious speakers
over others. See Wallace v. Jaffree , 472 U. S. 38 , 113 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Clause was also designed to stop
the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one
religious denomination or sect over others”). But the government
could well argue, as a development of government speech doctrine,
that when it expresses its own views, it is free of the
Establishment Clause’s stricture against discriminating among
religious sects or groups. Under this view of the relationship
between the two doctrines, it would be easy for a government to
favor some private religious speakers over others by its choice of
monuments to accept.

															   Whether that view turns out to be sound is
more than I can say at this point. It is simply unclear how the
relatively new category of government speech will relate to the
more traditional categories of Establishment Clause analysis, and
this case is not an occasion to speculate. It is an occasion,
however, to try to keep the inevitable issues open, and as simple
as they can be. One way to do that is to recognize that there are
circumstances in which government maintenance of monuments does not
look like government speech at all. Sectarian identifications on
markers in Arlington Cemetery come to mind. And to recognize that
is to forgo any categorical rule at this point.

															   To avoid relying on a per se rule to
say when speech is governmental, the best approach that occurs to
me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would
understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from
private speech the government chooses to oblige by allowing the
monument to be placed on public land. This reasonable observer test
for governmental character is of a piece with the one for spotting
forbidden governmental endorsement of religion in the Establishment
Clause cases. See, e.g. , County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter , 492 U.
S. 573 , 630, 635–636 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). The adoption of it would thus serve
coherence within Establishment Clause law, and it would make sense
of our common understanding that some monuments on public land
display religious symbolism that clearly does not express a
government’s chosen views.

															   Application of this observer test provides the
reason I find the monument here to be government expression.

Summary: In Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme Court ruled that a city's acceptance of a privately donated monument for display in a public park constitutes government speech, and therefore does not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court determined that a reasonable observer would understand the monument as conveying the government's own message, especially when considering the context of its placement in a public park with other monuments. This decision gives governments significant leeway in accepting or rejecting private monuments without triggering First Amendment concerns. However, Justice Souter's concurrence highlights potential issues with this approach, particularly regarding the Establishment Clause and religious monuments.