U.S. Supreme Court County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) County of Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter No. 87-2050 Argued February 22,
1989 Decided July 3, 1989 492
U.S. 573 ast|>* 492
U.S. 573 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus This litigation concerns the constitutionality of two recurring
holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.
The first, a creche depicting the Christian nativity scene, was
placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse,
which is the "main," "most beautiful," and "most public" part of
the courthouse. The creche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a
Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. Its manger
had at its crest an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in
Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest." The second of
the holiday displays in question was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or
candelabrum, which was placed just outside the City-County Building
next to the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. At the foot of
the tree was a sign bearing the mayor's name and containing text
declaring the city's "salute to liberty." The menorah is owned by
Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each
year by the city. Respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union and seven local residents, filed
suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from displaying the
creche and the city from displaying the menorah on the ground that
the displays violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, made applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court denied relief, relying on Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 ,
which held that a city's inclusion of a creche in its annual
Christmas display in a private park did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing Lynch v. Donnelly and holding that the creche and the
menorah in the present case must be understood as an impermissible
governmental endorsement of Christianity and Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 . Page 492 U. S. 574 Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
part, and the cases are remanded.

															842 F.2d 655, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts III-A, IV, and V, concluding that:

															1. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612 ,
a "practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible
under the Establishment Clause," must not, inter alia, "advance [or] inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect."
Although, in refining the definition of governmental action that
unconstitutionally "advances" religion, the Court's subsequent
decisions have variously spoken in terms of "endorsement,"
"favoritism," "preference," or "promotion," the essential principle
remains the same: the Clause, at the very least, prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from "making adherence to a religion relevant
in any way to a person's standing in the political community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 687 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Pp. 492 U. S.
589 -594.

															2. When viewed in its overall context, the creche display
violates the Establishment Clause. The creche angel's words endorse
a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus
Christ. Moreover, in contrast to Lynch, nothing in the
creche's setting detracts from that message. Although the
government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, it
may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that
people praise God for the birth of Jesus. Pp. 492 U. S.
598 -602.

															3. JUSTICE KENNEDY's reasons for permitting the creche on the
Grand Staircase and his condemnation of the Court's reasons for
deciding otherwise are unpersuasive. Pp. 492 U. S.
602 -613.

															(a) History cannot legitimate practices like the creche display
that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect
or creed. Pp. 492 U. S.
602 -605.

															(b) The question whether a particular practice would constitute
governmental proselytization is much the same as the endorsement
inquiry, except to the extent the proselytization test requires an
"obvious" allegiance between the government and the favored sect.
This Court's decisions, however, impose no such burden on
demonstrating that the government has favored a particular sect or
creed, but, to the contrary, have required strict scrutiny of
practices suggesting a denominational preference. E.g., Larson
v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 , 456 U. S. 246 .
Pp. 492 U. S.
605 -609.

															(c) The Constitution mandates that the government remain
secular, rather than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or
institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating against
citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim
that prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a
religious holiday discriminates against Christians Page 492 U. S. 575 in favor of nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts the
fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In
contrast, confining the government's own Christmas celebration to
the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the religious beliefs
of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply permits the
government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an
impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs. Pp. 492 U. S.
610 -613.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded in Part
III-B that the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lynch v.
Donnelly set forth the proper analytical framework for
determining whether the government's display of objects having
religious significance improperly advances religion. 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
687 -694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id. at 465 U. S.
694 -726 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Pp. 492 U. S.
594 -597.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN concluded in Part VI that the menorah display
does not have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion, given
its "particular physical setting." Its combined display with a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty does not impermissibly
endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but simply recognizes
that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter
holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society.
The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent
secular symbol of the Christmas season emphasizes this point. The
tree, moreover, by virtue of its size and central position in the
display, is clearly the predominant element, and the placement of
the menorah beside it is readily understood as simply a recognition
that Christmas is not the only traditional way of celebrating the
season. The absence of a more secular alternative to the menorah
negates the inference of endorsement. Similarly, the presence of
the mayor's sign confirms that, in the particular context, the
government's association with a religious symbol does not represent
sponsorship of religious beliefs, but simply a recognition of
cultural diversity. Given all these considerations, it is not
sufficiently likely that a reasonable observer would view the
combined display as an endorsement or disapproval of his individual
religious choices. Pp. 492 U. S.
613 -621.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR also concluded that the city's display of a
menorah, together with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting
liberty, does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Christmas
tree, whatever its origins, is widely viewed today as a secular
symbol of the Christmas holiday. Although there may be certain
secular aspects to Chanukah, it is primarily a religious holiday,
and the menorah its central religious symbol and ritual object. By
including the menorah with the tree, however, and with the sign
saluting liberty, the city conveyed a message of pluralism and
freedom of belief during the holiday season, which, in this
particular physical setting, could not be interpreted by a
reasonable Page 492 U. S. 576 observer as an endorsement of Judaism or Christianity or
disapproval of alternative beliefs. Pp. 492 U. S.
632 -637.

															JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded that both the menorah display and the
creche display are permissible under the Establishment Clause. Pp. 492 U. S.
655 -667.

															(a) The test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 612 -- which prohibits the "principal or primary effect" of a
challenged governmental practice from either advancing or
inhibiting religion -- when applied with the proper sensitivity to
our traditions and case law, supports the conclusion that both the
creche and the menorah are permissible displays in the context of
the holiday season. The requirement of neutrality inherent in the Lemon formulation does not require a relentless
extirpation of all contact between government and religion.
Government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support
for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural
heritage, and the Establishment Clause permits government some
latitude in recognizing the central role of religion in society.
Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent
hostility to religion, as it would require government in all its
multifaceted roles to acknowledge only the secular, to the
exclusion, and so to the detriment, of the religious. Thus, this
Court's decisions disclose two principles limiting the government's
ability to recognize and accommodate religion: it may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise;
and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous
indifference, give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree
that it, in fact, establishes a state religion or tends to do so.
In other words, the government may not place its weight behind an
obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion.
On the other hand, where the government's act of recognition or
accommodation is passive and symbolic, any intangible benefit to
religion is unlikely to present a realistic risk of establishment.
To determine whether there exists an establishment, or a tendency
toward one, reference must be made to the other types of
church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our
history or that have been found permissible in our case law. For
example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 , upheld a city's holiday display of a creche, and Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 ,
held that a State's practice of employing a legislative chaplain
was permissible. Pp. 492 U. S.
655 -663.

															(b) In permitting the displays of the menorah and the creche,
the city and county sought merely to "celebrate the season," and to
acknowledge the historical background and the religious as well as
secular nature of the Chanukah and Christmas holidays. This
interest falls well within the tradition of governmental
accommodation and acknowledgment of religion Page 492 U. S. 577 that has marked our history from the beginning. If government is
to participate in its citizens' celebration of a holiday that
contains both a secular and a religious component, enforced
recognition of only the secular aspect would signify the callous
indifference toward religious faith that our cases and traditions
do not require; for by commemorating the holiday only as it is
celebrated by nonadherents, the government would be refusing to
acknowledge the plain fact, and the historical reality, that many
of its citizens celebrate the religious aspects of the holiday as
well. There is no suggestion here that the government's power to
coerce has been used to further Christianity or Judaism, or that
the city or the county contributed money to further any one faith
or intended to use the creche or the menorah to proselytize. Thus,
the creche and menorah are purely passive symbols of religious
holidays, and their use is permissible under Lynch, supra. If Marsh, supra, allows Congress and the state
legislatures to begin each day with a state-sponsored prayer
offered by a government-employed chaplain, a menorah or creche,
displayed in the limited context of the holiday season, cannot be
invalid. The facts that, unlike the creche in Lynch, the
menorah and creche at issue were both located on government
property and were not surrounded by secular holiday paraphernalia
are irrelevant, since the displays present no realistic danger of
moving the government down the forbidden road toward an
establishment of religion. Pp. 492 U. S.
663 -667.

															BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV, and V, in
which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an
opinion with respect to Parts I and II, in which STEVENS and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in
which STEVENS, J., joined, an opinion with respect to Part VII, in
which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part VI.
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in Part II of which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 623 .
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 637 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U. S. 646 .
KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and
SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 492 U. S.
655 . Page 492 U. S. 578 JUSTICE BLACKMUN announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV,
and V, an opinion with respect to Parts I and II, in which JUSTICE
STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, an opinion with respect to Part
III-B, in which JUSTICE STEVENS joins, an opinion with respect to
Part VII, in which JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, and an opinion with
respect to Part VI.

															This litigation concerns the constitutionality of two recurring
holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.
The first is a creche placed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse. The second is a Chanukah menorah
placed just outside the City-County Building, next to a Christmas
tree and a sign saluting liberty. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled that each display violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because each has the impermissible
effect of endorsing religion. Page 492 U. S. 579 842 F.2d 655 (1988). We agree that the creche display has that
unconstitutional effect, but reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment
regarding the menorah display. I A The county courthouse is owned by Allegheny County and is its
seat of government. It houses the offices of the county
commissioners, controller, treasurer, sheriff, and clerk of court.
Civil and criminal trials are held there. App. 69. The "main,"
"most beautiful," and "most public" part of the courthouse is its
Grand Staircase, set into one arch and surrounded by others, with
arched windows serving as a backdrop. Id. at 157-158; see Joint Exhibit Volume (JEV) 31.

															Since 1981, the county has permitted the Holy Name Society, a
Roman Catholic group, to display a creche in the county courthouse
during the Christmas holiday season. App. 164. Christmas, we note
perhaps needlessly, is the holiday when Christians celebrate the
birth of Jesus of Nazareth, whom they believe to be the Messiah.
[ Footnote 1 ] Western churches
have celebrated Christmas Day on December 25 since the fourth
century. [ Footnote 2 ] As
observed in this Nation, Christmas has a secular, as well as a
religious, dimension. [ Footnote
3 ] Page 492 U. S. 580 The creche in the county courthouse, like other creches, is a
visual representation of the scene in the manger in Bethlehem
shortly after the birth of Jesus, as described in the Gospels of
Luke and Matthew. [ Footnote 4 ]
The creche includes figures of the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm
animals, shepherds, and wise men, all placed in or before a wooden
representation of a manger, which has at its crest an angel bearing
a banner that proclaims "Gloria in Excelsis Deo!" [ Footnote 5 ]

															During the 1986-1987 holiday season, the creche was on display
on the Grand Staircase from November 26 to January 9. App. 15, 59.
It had a wooden fence on three sides, and bore a plaque stating:
"This Display Donated by the Holy Name Society." Sometime during
the week of December 2, the county placed red and white poinsettia
plants around the fence. Id. at 96. The county also placed
a small evergreen tree, decorated with a red bow, behind each of
the two endposts of the fence. Id. at 204; JEV 7.
[ Footnote 6 ] These trees stood
alongside the manger backdrop, and were slightly shorter than it
was. The angel thus was at the apex of the creche display.
Altogether, the creche, the fence, the poinsettias, and the trees
occupied a substantial amount of space on the Grand Staircase. No
figures of Santa Claus or other decorations Page 492 U. S. 581 appeared on the Grand Staircase. App. 188. [ Footnote 7 ] Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 671 (1984). Appendix A [omitted] at the end of this opinion is a
photograph of the display.

															The county uses the creche as the setting for its annual
Christmas carol program. See JEV 36. During the 1986
season, the county invited high school choirs and other musical
groups to perform during weekday lunch hours from December 3
through December 23. The county dedicated this program to world
peace and to the families of prisoners of war and of persons
missing in action in Southeast Asia. App. 160; JEV 30.

															Near the Grand Staircase is an area of the county courthouse
known as the "gallery forum" used for art and other cultural
exhibits. App. 163. The creche, with its fence and floral frame,
however, was distinct, and not connected with any exhibit in the
gallery forum. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7 (the forum was "not
any kind of an integral part of the Christmas display"); see
also JEV 32-34. In addition, various departments and offices
within the county courthouse had their own Christmas decorations,
but these also are not visible from the Grand Staircase. App.
167. B The City-County Building is separate and a block removed from
the county courthouse and, as the name implies, is jointly owned by
the city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County. The city's portion of
the building houses the city's principal offices, including the
mayor's. Id. at 17. The city is responsible for the
building's Grant Street entrance, which has three rounded arches
supported by columns. Id. at 194, 207.

															For a number of years, the city has had a large Christmas tree
under the middle arch outside the Grant Street entrance. Following
this practice, city employees, on November Page 492 U. S. 582 17, 1986, erected a 45-foot tree under the middle arch and
decorated it with lights and ornaments. Id. at 218-219. A
few days later, the city placed at the foot of the tree a sign
bearing the mayor's name and entitled "Salute to Liberty." Beneath
the title, the sign stated:

															"During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers
of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom."

															JEV 41.

															At least since 1982, the city has expanded its Grant Street
holiday display to include a symbolic representation of Chanukah,
an 8-day Jewish holiday that begins on the 25th day of the Jewish
lunar month of Kislev. App. 138. [ Footnote 8 ] The 25th of Kislev usually occurs in December,
[ Footnote 9 ] and thus Chanukah
is the annual Jewish holiday that falls closest to Christmas Day
each year. In 1986, Chanukah began at sundown on December 26. Id. at 138-139.

															According to Jewish tradition, on the 25th of Kislev in 164
B.C.E. (before the common era (165 B.C.)), the Maccabees
rededicated the Temple of Jerusalem after recapturing it from the
Greeks, or, more accurately, from the Greek-influenced Seleucid
Empire, in the course of a political rebellion. Id. Page 492 U. S. 583 at 138. [ Footnote 10 ]
Chanukah is the holiday which celebrates that event. [ Footnote 11 ] The early history of
the celebration of Chanukah is unclear; it appears that the
holiday's central ritual -- the lighting of lamps -- was well
established long before a single explanation of that ritual took
hold. [ Footnote 12 ]

															The Talmud [ Footnote 13 ]
explains the lamp-lighting ritual as a commemoration of an event
that occurred during the rededication of the Temple. The Temple
housed a seven-branch menorah, [ Footnote 14 ] which was to be kept burning continuously. Id. at 139, 144. When the Maccabees rededicated the
Temple, they had only enough oil to last for one day. But,
according to the Talmud, the oil miraculously lasted for eight days
(the length of time it took to obtain additional oil). Id. at 139. [ Footnote 15 ] To
celebrate and publicly proclaim this miracle, the Talmud prescribes
that it is a mitzvah ( i.e., a religious deed or
commandment), id. at 140, [ Footnote 16 ] for Jews to place a lamp with eight lights
just outside the entrance to their homes or in a front window
during the eight days of Chanukah. Id. at Page 492 U. S. 584 147. [ Footnote 17 ] Where
practicality or safety from persecution so requires, the lamp may
be placed in a window or inside the home. [ Footnote 18 ] The Talmud also ordains certain
blessings to be recited each night of Chanukah before lighting the
lamp. [ Footnote 19 ] One such
benediction has been translated into English as "We are blessing
God who has sanctified us and commanded us with mitzvot and has
told us to light the candles of Hanukkah." Id. at 306.
[ Footnote 20 ]

															Although Jewish law does not contain any rule regarding the
shape or substance of a Chanukah lamp (or "hanukkiyyah"), id. at 146, 238, [ Footnote 21 ] it became customary to evoke the memory of
the Temple menorah. Id. at 139, 144. The Temple menorah
was of a tree-and-branch design; it had a central candlestick with
six branches. Id. at 259. [ Footnote 22 ] In contrast, a Chanukah menorah of
tree-and-branch design has eight branches -- one for each day of
the holiday -- plus a ninth to hold the shamash (an extra candle
used to light the other eight). Id. at 144. [ Footnote 23 ] Also in contrast to the
Temple menorah, the Chanukah menorah is not a sanctified object; it
need not be treated with special care. [ Footnote 24 ] Page 492 U. S. 585 Lighting the menorah is the primary tradition associated with
Chanukah, but the holiday is marked by other traditions as well.
One custom among some Jews is to give children Chanukah gelt, or
money. [ Footnote 25 ] Another
is for the children to gamble their gelt using a dreidel, a top
with four sides. Each of the four sides contains a Hebrew letter;
together, the four letters abbreviate a phrase that refers to the
Chanukah miracle. Id. at 241-242. [ Footnote 26 ]

															Chanukah, like Christmas, is a cultural event as well as a
religious holiday. Id. at 143. Indeed, the Chanukah story
always has had a political or national, as well as a religious,
dimension: it tells of national heroism in addition to divine
intervention. [ Footnote 27 ]
Also, Chanukah, like Christmas, is a winter holiday; according to
some historians, it was associated in ancient times with the winter
solstice. [ Footnote 28 ] Just
as some Americans celebrate Christmas without regard to its
religious significance, some nonreligious American Jews celebrate
Chanukah as an expression of ethnic identity, and "as a cultural or
national event, rather than as a specifically religious event." Ibid. [ Footnote
29 ] Page 492 U. S. 586 The cultural significance of Chanukah varies with the setting in
which the holiday is celebrated. In contemporary Israel, the
nationalist and military aspects of the Chanukah story receive
special emphasis. [ Footnote
30 ] In this country, the tradition of giving Chanukah gelt has
taken on greater importance because of the temporal proximity of
Chanukah to Christmas. [ Footnote
31 ] Indeed, some have suggested that the proximity of Christmas
accounts for the social prominence of Chanukah in this country.
[ Footnote 32 ] Whatever the
reason, Chanukah is observed by American Jews to an extent greater
than its religious importance Page 492 U. S. 587 would indicate: in the hierarchy of Jewish holidays, Chanukah
ranks fairly low in religious significance. [ Footnote 33 ] This socially heightened status of
Chanukah reflects its cultural or secular dimension. [ Footnote 34 ]

															On December 22 of the 1986 holiday season, the city placed at
the Grant Street entrance to the City-County Building an 18-foot
Chanukah menorah of an abstract tree-and-branch design. The menorah
was placed next to the city's 45-foot Christmas tree, against one
of the columns that supports the arch into which the tree was set.
The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, [ Footnote 35 ] but is stored, erected, and
removed each year by the city. Id. at 290; see
also Brief for Petitioner in No. 88-96, p. 4. The tree, the
sign, and the menorah were all removed on January 13. App. 58,
220-221. Appendix B [omitted], p. 622, is a photograph of the tree,
the sign, and the menorah. Id. at 212; JEV 40. II This litigation began on December 10, 1986, when respondents,
the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union and seven local residents, filed suit against the county and
the city, seeking permanently to enjoin the county from displaying
the creche in the county courthouse and the city from displaying
the menorah in front of the City-County Page 492 U. S. 588 Building. [ Footnote 36 ]
Respondents claim that the displays of the creche and the menorah
each violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made
applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 48 -55
(1985). [ Footnote 37 ] Chabad
was permitted to intervene to defend the display of its menorah.
[ Footnote 38 ]

															On May 8, 1987, the District Court denied respondents' request
for a permanent injunction. Relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984), the court stated that

															"the creche was but part of the holiday decoration of the
stairwell and a foreground for the highschool choirs which
entertained each day at noon."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-2050, p. 4a. Regarding the
menorah, the court concluded that "it was but an insignificant part
of another holiday display." Ibid. The court also found
that "the displays had a secular purpose," and "did not create an
excessive entanglement of government with religion." Id. at 5a.

															Respondents appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals reversed. 842 F.2d 655 (CA3 1988). Distinguishing Lynch
v. Donnelly, the panel majority determined that the creche and
the menorah must be understood as endorsing Christianity and
Judaism. The court observed: "Each display was located at or in a
public building devoted Page 492 U. S. 589 to core functions of government." 842 F.2d at 662. The court
also stated:

															"Further, while the menorah was placed near a Christmas tree,
neither the creche nor the menorah can reasonably be deemed to have
been subsumed by a larger display of non-religious items." Ibid. Because the impermissible effect of endorsing
religion was a sufficient basis for holding each display to be in
violation of the Establishment Clause under Lemon v.
Kurzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the Court of Appeals did not consider whether either one
had an impermissible purpose or resulted in an unconstitutional
entanglement between government and religion.

															The dissenting judge stated that the creche,

															"accompanied by poinsettia plants and evergreens, does not
violate the Establishment Clause simply because plastic Santa
Clauses or reindeer are absent."

															842 F.2d at 670. As to the menorah, he asserted:

															"Including a reference to Chanukah did no more than broaden the
commemoration of the holiday season and stress the notion of
sharing its joy." Id. at 670-671.

															Rehearing en banc was denied by a 6-to-5 vote. See App.
to Pet. for Cert. in No. 87-2050, p. 45a. The county, the city, and
Chabad each filed a petition for certiorari. We granted all three
petitions. 488 U.S. 816 (1988). III A This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious
diversity that dates from the settlement of the North American
Continent. Sectarian differences among various Christian
denominations were central to the origins of our Republic. Since
then, adherents of religions too numerous to name have made the
United States their home, as have those whose beliefs expressly
exclude religion.

															Precisely because of the religious diversity that is our
national heritage, the Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of
Rights, the very first words of which declare: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or Page 492 U. S. 590 prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." Perhaps in the
early days of the Republic these words were understood to protect
only the diversity within Christianity, but today they are
recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to "the
infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such
as Islam or Judaism." Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U. at 472 U. S. 52 .
[ Footnote 39 ] It is settled
law that no government official in this Nation may violate these
fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of conscience. Id. at 472 U. S.
49 .

															In the course of adjudicating specific cases, this Court has
come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that government
may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or
organization, [ Footnote 40 ]
may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious
beliefs and practices, [ Footnote
41 ] Page 492 U. S. 591 may not delegate a governmental power to a religious
institution, [ Footnote 42 ]
and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution's
affairs. [ Footnote 43 ]
Although "the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause
values can be eroded," Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), are not susceptible to a single verbal
formulation, this Court has attempted to encapsulate the essential
precepts of the Establishment Clause. Thus, in Everson v. Board
of Education of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947),
the Court gave this often-repeated summary:

															"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa." Id. at 330 U. S.
15 -16. Page 492 U. S. 592 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, the Court sought to refine
these principles by focusing on three "tests" for determining
whether a government practice violates the Establishment Clause.
Under the Lemon analysis, a statute or practice which
touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the
Establishment Clause, must have a secular purpose; it must neither
advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect;
and it must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 403
U.S. at 403 U. S.
612 -613. This trilogy of tests has been applied
regularly in the Court's later Establishment Clause cases.
[ Footnote 44 ]

															Our subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In
recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether
the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or
effect of "endorsing" religion, a concern that has long had a place
in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 436 (1962). Thus, in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 60 ,
the Court held unconstitutional Alabama's moment-of-silence statute
because it was "enacted . . . for the sole purpose of expressing
the State's endorsement of prayer activities." The Court similarly
invalidated Louisiana's "Creationism Act" because it "endorses
religion" in its purpose. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 , 482 U. S. 593 (1987). And the educational Page 492 U. S. 593 program in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S.
389 -392 (1985), was held to violate the Establishment
Clause because of its "endorsement" effect. See also Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 , 489 U. S. 17 (1989) (plurality opinion) (tax exemption limited to religious
periodicals "effectively endorses religious belief ").

															Of course, the word "endorsement" is not self-defining. Rather,
it derives its meaning from other words that this Court has found
useful over the years in interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Thus, it has been noted that the prohibition against governmental
endorsement of religion "preclude[s] government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred. " Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 70 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). Accord, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. at 489 U. S. 27 , 489 U. S. 28 (separate opinion concurring in judgment) (reaffirming that
"government may not favor religious belief over disbelief" or adopt
a "preference for the dissemination of religious ideas"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 593 ("preference" for
particular religious beliefs constitutes an endorsement of
religion); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The fullest realization of true
religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no
favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion").
Moreover, the term "endorsement" is closely linked to the term
"promotion," Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 691 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), and this Court long since has held that
government "may not . . . promote one religion or religious theory
against another or even against the militant opposite," Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 , 393 U. S. 104 (1968). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 59 -60
(using the concepts of endorsement, promotion, and favoritism
interchangeably).

															Whether the key word is "endorsement," "favoritism," or
"promotion," the essential principle remains the same. The Page 492 U. S. 594 Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief
or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 687 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). B We have had occasion in the past to apply Establishment Clause
principles to the government's display of objects with religious
significance. In Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 (1980), we held that the display of a copy of the Ten
Commandments on the walls of public classrooms violates the
Establishment Clause. Closer to the facts of this litigation is Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, in which we considered whether
the city of Pawtucket, R.I., had violated the Establishment Clause
by including a creche in its annual Christmas display, located in a
private park within the downtown shopping district. By a 5-to-4
decision in that difficult case, the Court upheld inclusion of the
creche in the Pawtucket display, holding, inter alia, that
the inclusion of the creche did not have the impermissible effect
of advancing or promoting religion. [ Footnote 45 ]

															The rationale of the majority opinion in Lynch is none
too clear: the opinion contains two strands, neither of which
provides guidance for decision in subsequent cases. First, the
opinion states that the inclusion of the creche in the display was
"no more an advancement or endorsement of religion" than other
"endorsements" this Court has approved in the past, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 683 -- but the opinion offers no discernible measure for distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible endorsements. Second, the
opinion observes that any benefit the government's display of the
creche gave to religion was no more than "indirect, remote, and
incidental," ibid. -- without saying how or why. Page 492 U. S. 595 Although JUSTICE O'CONNOR joined the majority opinion in Lynch, she wrote a concurrence that differs in significant
respects from the majority opinion. The main difference is that the
concurrence provides a sound analytical framework for evaluating
governmental use of religious symbols.

															First and foremost, the concurrence squarely rejects any notion
that this Court will tolerate some government endorsement of
religion. Rather, the concurrence recognizes any endorsement of
religion as "invalid," id. at 465 U. S. 690 ,
because it

															"sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community," id. at 465 U. S.
688 .

															Second, the concurrence articulates a method for determining
whether the government's use of an object with religious meaning
has the effect of endorsing religion. The effect of the display
depends upon the message that the government's practice
communicates: the question is "what viewers may fairly understand
to be the purpose of the display." Id. at 465 U. S. 692 .
That inquiry, of necessity, turns upon the context in which the
contested object appears:

															"[A] typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the
religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of
endorsement of that content." Ibid. The concurrence thus emphasizes that the
constitutionality of the creche in that case depended upon its
"particular physical setting," ibid., and further
observes: "Every government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it [endorses] religion," id. at 465 U. S. 694 .
[ Footnote 46 ] Page 492 U. S. 596 The concurrence applied this mode of analysis to the Pawtucket
creche, seen in the context of that city's holiday celebration as a
whole. In addition to the creche, the city's display contained: a
Santa Claus house with a live Santa distributing candy; reindeer
pulling Santa's sleigh; a live 40-foot Christmas tree strung with
lights; statues of carolers in old-fashioned dress; candy-striped
poles; a "talking" wishing well; a large banner proclaiming
"SEASONS GREETINGS"; a miniature "village" with several houses and
a church; and various "cut-out" figures, including those of a
clown, a dancing elephant, a robot, and a teddy bear. See 525 F.
Supp. 1150 , 1155 (RI 1981). The concurrence concluded that,
both because the creche is "a traditional symbol" of Christmas, a
holiday with strong secular elements, and because the creche was
"displayed along with purely secular symbols," the creche's setting
"changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display" and "negates any message of endorsement" of "the
Christian beliefs represented by the creche." 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
692 .

															The four Lynch dissenters agreed with the concurrence
that the controlling question was "whether Pawtucket ha[d] run
afoul of the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion through its
display of the creche." Id. at 465 U. S. 698 ,
n. 3 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The dissenters also agreed with
the Page 492 U. S. 597 general proposition that the context in which the government
uses a religious symbol is relevant for determining the answer to
that question. Id. at 465 U. S.
705 -706. They simply reached a different answer: the
dissenters concluded that the other elements of the Pawtucket
display did not negate the endorsement of Christian faith caused by
the presence of the creche. They viewed the inclusion of the creche
in the city's overall display as placing "the government's
imprimatur of approval on the particular religious beliefs
exemplified by the creche." Id. at 465 U. S. 701 .
Thus, they stated:

															"The effect on minority religious groups, as well as on those
who may reject all religion, is to convey the message that their
views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled
to public support." Ibid. Thus, despite divergence at the bottom line, the five Justices
in concurrence and dissent in Lynch agreed upon the
relevant constitutional principles: the government's use of
religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use
of religious symbolism depends upon its context. These general
principles are sound, and have been adopted by the Court in
subsequent cases. Since Lynch, the Court has made clear
that, when evaluating the effect of government conduct under the
Establishment Clause, we must ascertain whether

															"the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices." Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 390 .
Accordingly, our present task is to determine whether the display
of the creche and the menorah, in their respective "particular
physical settings," has the effect of endorsing or disapproving
religious beliefs. [ Footnote
47 ] Page 492 U. S. 598 IV We turn first to the county's creche display. There is no doubt,
of course, that the creche itself is capable of communicating a
religious message. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 685 (majority opinion); id. at 465 U. S. 692 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id. at 465 U. S. 701 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); id. at 465 U. S. 727 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Indeed, the creche in this lawsuit uses
words, as well as the picture of the nativity scene, to make its
religious meaning unmistakably clear. "Glory to God in the
Highest!" says the angel in the creche -- Glory to God because of
the birth of Jesus. This praise to God in Christian terms is
indisputably religious -- indeed sectarian -- just as it is when
said in the Gospel or in a church service.

															Under the Court's holding in Lynch, the effect of a
creche display turns on its setting. Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display detracts from
the creche's religious message. The Lynch display
comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had
its own focal point. Santa's house and his reindeer were objects of
attention separate from the creche, and had their specific visual
story to tell. Similarly, whatever a "talking" wishing well may be,
it obviously was a center of attention separate from the creche.
Here, in contrast, the creche stands alone: it is the single
element of the display on the Grand Staircase. [ Footnote 48 ] Page 492 U. S. 599 The floral decoration surrounding the creche cannot be viewed as
somehow equivalent to the secular symbols in the overall Lynch display. The floral frame, like all good frames,
serves only to draw one's attention to the message inside the
frame. The floral decoration surrounding the creche contributes to,
rather than detracts from, the endorsement of religion conveyed by
the creche. It is as if the county had allowed the Holy Name
Society to display a cross on the Grand Staircase at Easter, and
the county had surrounded the cross with Easter lilies. The county
could not say that surrounding the cross with traditional flowers
of the season would negate the endorsement of Christianity conveyed
by the cross on the Grand Staircase. Its contention that the
traditional Christmas greens negate the endorsement effect of the
creche fares no better.

															Nor does the fact that the creche was the setting for the
county's annual Christmas carol program diminish its religious
meaning. First, the carol program in 1986 lasted only from December
3 to December 23, and occupied, at most, one hour a day. JEV 28.
The effect of the creche on those who viewed it when the choirs
were not singing -- the vast majority of the time -- cannot be
negated by the presence of the choir program. Second, because some
of the carols performed at the site of the creche were religious in
nature, [ Footnote 49 ] those
carols were more likely to augment the religious quality of the
scene than to secularize it.

															Furthermore, the creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the "main"
and "most beautiful part" of the building that is the seat of
county government. App. 157. No viewer could reasonably think that
it occupies this location without the Page 492 U. S. 600 support and approval of the government. [ Footnote 50 ] Thus, by permitting the "display of
the creche in this particular physical setting," Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 692 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), the county sends an unmistakable
message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God
that is the creche's religious message.

															The fact that the creche bears a sign disclosing its ownership
by a Roman Catholic organization does not alter this conclusion. On
the contrary, the sign simply demonstrates that the government is
endorsing the religious message of that organization, rather than
communicating a message of its own. But the Establishment Clause
does not limit only the religious content of the government's own
communications. It also prohibits the government's support and
promotion of religious communications by religious organizations. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S.
1 (1989) (government support of the distribution of
religious messages by religious organizations violates the
Establishment Clause). Indeed, the very concept of "endorsement"
conveys Page 492 U. S. 601 the sense of promoting someone else's message. Thus, by
prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment
Clause prohibits precisely what occurred here: the government's
lending its support to the communication of a religious
organization's religious message.

															Finally, the county argues that it is sufficient to validate the
display of the creche on the Grand Staircase that the display
celebrates Christmas, and Christmas is a national holiday. This
argument obviously proves too much. It would allow the celebration
of the Eucharist inside a courthouse on Christmas Eve. While the
county may have doubts about the constitutional status of
celebrating the Eucharist inside the courthouse under the
government's auspices, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9, this
Court does not. The government may acknowledge Christmas as a
cultural phenomenon, but, under the First Amendment, it may not
observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise
God for the birth of Jesus. [ Footnote 51 ]

															In sum, Lynch teaches that government may celebrate
Christmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses
Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has transgressed this
line. It has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the
effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for
the birth of Jesus Christ. Under Lynch, and the rest of
our cases, nothing more is required to Page 492 U. S. 602 demonstrate a violation of the Establishment Clause. The display
of the creche in this context, therefore, must be permanently
enjoined. V JUSTICE KENNEDY and the three Justices who join him would find
the display of the creche consistent with the Establishment Clause.
He argues that this conclusion necessarily follows from the Court's
decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.
S. 783 (1983), which sustained the constitutionality of
legislative prayer. Post at 492 U. S. 665 .
He also asserts that the creche, even in this setting, poses "no
realistic risk" of "represent[ing] an effort to proselytize," post at 492 U. S. 664 ,
having repudiated the Court's endorsement inquiry in favor of a
"proselytization" approach. The Court's analysis of the creche, he
contends, "reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion." Post at 492 U. S.
655 .

															JUSTICE KENNEDY's reasons for permitting the creche on the Grand
Staircase and his condemnation of the Court's reasons for deciding
otherwise are so far-reaching in their implications that they
require a response in some depth. A In Marsh, the Court relied specifically on the fact
that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the same time that
it produced the Bill of Rights. See 492 U.
S. 46, supra. JUSTICE KENNEDY, however, argues
that Marsh legitimates all "practices with no greater
potential for an establishment of religion" than those "accepted
traditions dating back to the Founding." Post at 492 U. S. 669 , 492 U. S. 670 .
Otherwise, the Justice asserts, such practices as our national
motto ("In God We Trust") and our Pledge of Allegiance (with the
phrase "under God," added in 1954, Pub.L. 396, 68 Stat. 249) are in
danger of invalidity.

															Our previous opinions have considered in dicta the motto and the
pledge, characterizing them as consistent with the proposition that
government may not communicate an endorsement Page 492 U. S. 603 of religious belief. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 693 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); id. at 465 U. S.
716 -717 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). We need not return to
the subject of "ceremonial deism," see n 46, supra, because there is an
obvious distinction between creche displays and references to God
in the motto and the pledge. However history may affect the
constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the
government, [ Footnote 52 ]
history cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the
government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed.

															Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not
even the "unique history" of legislative prayer, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 791 ,
can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect
of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or
belief. Id. at 463 U. S.
794 -795. The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this principle, because the
particular chaplain had "removed all references to Christ." Id. at 463 U. S. 793 ,
n. 14. Thus, Marsh plainly does not stand for the sweeping
proposition JUSTICE KENNEDY apparently would ascribe to it, namely,
that all accepted practices 200 years old and their equivalents are
constitutional today. Nor can Marsh, given its facts and
its reasoning, compel the conclusion that the display of the creche
involved in this lawsuit is constitutional. Although JUSTICE
KENNEDY says that he "cannot comprehend" how the creche display
could be invalid after Marsh, post at 492 U. S. 665 ,
surely he is able to distinguish between a specifically Christian
symbol, like a creche, and more general religious references, like
the legislative prayers in Marsh. Page 492 U. S. 604 JUSTICE KENNEDY's reading of Marsh would gut the core
of the Establishment Clause as this Court understands it. The
history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous
examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity specifically. See M. Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels (1984). [ Footnote 53 ] Some of these examples
date back to the Founding of the Republic, [ Footnote 54 ] but this heritage of official
discrimination Page 492 U. S. 605 against non-Christians has no place in the jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause. Whatever else the Establishment Clause may
mean (and we have held it to mean no official preference even for
religion over nonreligion, see, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989)),
it certainly means, at the very least, that government may not
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed
(including a preference for Christianity over other religions).
"The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.
S. 228 , 456 U. S. 244 (1982). There have been breaches of this command throughout this
Nation's history, but they cannot diminish in any way the force of
the command. Cf. Laycock, supra, n 39, at 923. [ Footnote 55 ] B Although JUSTICE KENNEDY's misreading of Marsh is
predicated on a failure to recognize the bedrock Establishment
Clause principle that, regardless of history, government may not
demonstrate a preference for a particular faith, even he is forced
to acknowledge that some instances of such favoritism are
constitutionally intolerable. Post at 492 U. S.
664 -665, n. 3. He concedes also that the term
"endorsement" long has been another way of defining a forbidden
"preference" for Page 492 U. S. 606 a particular sect, post at 492 U. S.
668 -669, but he would repudiate the Court's endorsement
inquiry as a "jurisprudence of minutiae," post at 492 U. S. 674 ,
because it examines the particular contexts in which the government
employs religious symbols.

															This label, of course, could be tagged on many areas of
constitutional adjudication. For example, in determining whether
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant and probable cause before
the government may conduct a particular search or seizure,

															"we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy
interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable
cause requirements in the particular context, " Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 , 489 U. S. 619 (1989) (emphasis added), an inquiry that " depends on all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of
the search or seizure itself,'" ibid., quoting United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.
S. 531 , 473 U. S. 537 (1985); see also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U. S. 656 , 489 U. S. 666 (1989) (repeating the principle that the applicability of the
warrant requirement turns on "the particular context" of the search
at issue). It is perhaps unfortunate, but nonetheless inevitable,
that the broad language of many clauses within the Bill of Rights
must be translated into adjudicatory principles that realize their
full meaning only after their application to a series of concrete
cases. Indeed, not even under JUSTICE KENNEDY's preferred approach can
the Establishment Clause be transformed into an exception to this
rule. The Justice would substitute the term "proselytization" for
"endorsement," post at 492 U.S. 659 -660, 492 U. S. 661 , 492 U. S. 664 ,
but his "proselytization" test suffers from the same "defect," if
one must call it that, of requiring close factual analysis. JUSTICE
KENNEDY has no doubt,

															"for example, that the [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to
permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of
city hall . . . because such an obtrusive year-round religious
display Page 492 U. S. 607 would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to
proselytize on behalf of a particular religion." Post at 492 U. S. 661 .
He also suggests that a city would demonstrate an unconstitutional
preference for Christianity if it displayed a Christian symbol
during every major Christian holiday, but did not display the
religious symbols of other faiths during other religious holidays. Post at 492 U. S.
664 -665, n. 3. But, for JUSTICE KENNEDY, would it be
enough of a preference for Christianity if that city each year
displayed a creche for 40 days during the Christmas season and a
cross for 40 days during Lent (and never the symbols of other
religions)? If so, then what if there were no cross, but the 40-day
creche display contained a sign exhorting the city's citizens "to
offer up their devotions to God their Creator, and his Son Jesus
Christ, the Redeemer of the world"? See n. 53, supra. The point of these rhetorical questions is obvious. In order to
define precisely what government could and could not do under
JUSTICE KENNEDY's "proselytization" test, the Court would have to
decide a series of cases with particular fact patterns that fall
along the spectrum of government references to religion (from the
permanent display of a cross atop city hall to a passing reference
to divine Providence in an official address). If one wished to be
"uncharitable" to JUSTICE KENNEDY, see post at 492 U. S. 675 ,
one could say that his methodology requires counting the number of
days during which the government displays Christian symbols and
subtracting from this the number of days during which non-Christian
symbols are displayed, divided by the number of different
non-Christian religions represented in these displays, and then
somehow factoring into this equation the prominence of the
display's location and the degree to which each symbol possesses an
inherently proselytizing quality. JUSTICE KENNEDY, of course, could
defend his position by pointing to the inevitably fact-specific
nature of the question whether a particular governmental practice
signals the government's Page 492 U. S. 608 unconstitutional preference for a specific religious faith. But
because JUSTICE KENNEDY's formulation of this essential
Establishment Clause inquiry is no less fact-intensive than the
"endorsement" formulation adopted by the Court, JUSTICE KENNEDY
should be wary of accusing the Court's formulation as "using little
more than intuition and a tape measure," post at 492 U. S. 675 ,
lest he find his own formulation convicted on an identical
charge.

															Indeed, perhaps the only real distinction between JUSTICE
KENNEDY's "proselytization" test and the Court's "endorsement"
inquiry is a burden of "unmistakable" clarity that JUSTICE KENNEDY
apparently would require of government favoritism for specific
sects in order to hold the favoritism in violation of the
Establishment Clause. Post at 492 U. S.
664 -665, n. 3. The question whether a particular
practice "would place the government's weight behind an obvious
effort to proselytize for a particular religion," post at 492 U. S. 661 ,
is much the same as whether the practice demonstrates the
government's support, promotion, or "endorsement" of the particular
creed of a particular sect -- except to the extent that it requires
an "obvious" allegiance between the government and the sect.
[ Footnote 56 ]

															Our cases, however, impose no such burden on demonstrating that
the government has favored a particular sect or creed. On the
contrary, we have expressly required "strict Page 492 U. S. 609 scrutiny" of practices suggesting "a denominational preference," Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 246 ,
in keeping with " the unwavering vigilance that the Constitution
requires'" against any violation of the Establishment Clause. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589 , 487 U. S. 623 (1988) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), quoting id. at 487 U. S. 648 (dissenting opinion); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) ("[T]he myriad, subtle ways in which
Establishment Clause values can be eroded" necessitates "careful
judicial scrutiny" of "[g]overnment practices that purport to
celebrate or acknowledge events with religious significance").
Thus, when all is said and done, JUSTICE KENNEDY's effort to
abandon the "endorsement" inquiry in favor of his "proselytization"
test seems nothing more than an attempt to lower considerably the
level of scrutiny in Establishment Clause cases. We choose,
however, to adhere to the vigilance the Court has managed to
maintain thus far, and to the endorsement inquiry that reflects our
vigilance. [ Footnote
57 ] Page 492 U. S. 610 C Although JUSTICE KENNEDY repeatedly accuses the Court of
harboring a "latent hostility" or "callous indifference" toward
religion, post at 492 U. S. 657 , 492 U. S. 664 ,
nothing could be further from the truth, and the accusations could
be said to be as offensive as they are absurd. JUSTICE KENNEDY
apparently has misperceived a respect for religious pluralism, a
respect commanded by the Constitution, as hostility or indifference
to religion. No misperception could be more antithetical to the
values embodied in the Establishment Clause.

															JUSTICE KENNEDY's accusations are shot from a weapon triggered
by the following proposition: if government may celebrate the
secular aspects of Christmas, then it must be allowed to celebrate
the religious aspects as well because, otherwise, the government
would be discriminating against citizens who celebrate Christmas as
a religious, and not just a secular, holiday. Post at 492 U. S.
663 -664. This proposition, however, is flawed at its
foundation. The government does not discriminate against any
citizen on the basis of the citizen's religious faith if the
government is secular in its functions and operations. On the
contrary, the Constitution mandates that the government remain
secular, rather than affiliate itself with religious beliefs or
institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating among
citizens on the basis of their religious faiths.

															A secular state, it must be remembered, is not the same as an
atheistic or antireligious state. A secular state establishes
neither atheism nor religion as its official creed. JUSTICE KENNEDY
thus has it exactly backwards when he says that enforcing the
Constitution's requirement that government Page 492 U. S. 611 remain secular is a prescription of orthodoxy. Post at 492 U. S. 678 .
It follows directly from the Constitution's proscription against
government affiliation with religious beliefs or institutions that
there is no orthodoxy on religious matters in the secular state.
Although JUSTICE KENNEDY accuses the Court of "an Orwellian
rewriting of history," ibid., perhaps it is JUSTICE
KENNEDY himself who has slipped into a form of Orwellian newspeak
when he equates the constitutional command of secular government
with a prescribed orthodoxy.

															To be sure, in a pluralistic society, there may be some would-be
theocrats who wish that their religion were an established creed,
and some of them perhaps may be even audacious enough to claim that
the lack of established religion discriminates against their
preferences. But this claim gets no relief, for it contradicts the
fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. The
antidiscrimination principle inherent in the Establishment Clause
necessarily means that would-be discriminators on the basis of
religion cannot prevail.

															For this reason, the claim that prohibiting government from
celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates against
Christians in favor of nonadherents must fail. Celebrating
Christmas as a religious, as opposed to a secular, holiday,
necessarily entails professing, proclaiming, or believing that
Jesus of Nazareth, born in a manger in Bethlehem, is the Christ,
the Messiah. If the government celebrates Christmas as a religious
holiday (for example, by issuing an official proclamation saying:
"We rejoice in the glory of Christ's birth!"), it means that the
government really is declaring Jesus to be the Messiah, a
specifically Christian belief. In contrast, confining the
government's own celebration of Christmas to the holiday's secular
aspects does not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over
those of Christians. Rather, it simply permits the government to
acknowledge the holiday without expressing an allegiance to Page 492 U. S. 612 Christian beliefs, an allegiance that would truly favor
Christians over non-Christians. To be sure, some Christians may
wish to see the government proclaim its allegiance to Christianity
in a religious celebration of Christmas, but the Constitution does
not permit the gratification of that desire, which would contradict
the " the logic of secular liberty'" it is the purpose of the
Establishment Clause to protect. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 244 ,
quoting B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 265 (1967). Of course, not all religious celebrations of Christmas located
on government property violate the Establishment Clause. It
obviously is not unconstitutional, for example, for a group of
parishioners from a local church to go caroling through a city park
on any Sunday in Advent or for a Christian club at a public
university to sing carols during their Christmas meeting. Cf.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). [ Footnote 58 ] The
reason is that activities of this nature do not demonstrate the
government's allegiance to, or endorsement of, the Christian
faith.

															Equally obvious, however, is the proposition that not all
proclamations of Christian faith located on government property are
permitted by the Establishment Clause just because they occur
during the Christmas holiday season, as the example of a Mass in
the courthouse surely illustrates. And once the judgment has been
made that a particular proclamation of Christian belief, when
disseminated from a particular location on government property, has
the effect of demonstrating the government's endorsement of
Christian faith, then it necessarily follows that the practice must
be enjoined to protect the constitutional rights of those citizens
who follow some creed other than Christianity. It is thus
incontrovertible that the Court's decision today, premised on the
determination that the creche display on the Grand Staircase
demonstrates Page 492 U. S. 613 the county's endorsement of Christianity, does not represent a
hostility or indifference to religion but, instead, the respect for
religious diversity that the Constitution requires. [ Footnote 59 ] VI The display of the Chanukah menorah in front of the City-County
Building may well present a closer constitutional question. The
menorah, one must recognize, is a religious symbol: it serves to
commemorate the miracle of the oil as described in the Talmud. But
the menorah's message is not exclusively religious. The menorah is
the primary visual Page 492 U. S. 614 symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious
and secular dimensions. [ Footnote 60 ]

															Moreover, the menorah here stands next to a Christmas tree and a
sign saluting liberty. While no challenge has been made here to the
display of the tree and the sign, their presence is obviously
relevant in determining the effect of the menorah's display. The
necessary result of placing a menorah next to a Christmas tree is
to create an "overall holiday setting" that represents both
Christmas and Chanukah -- two holidays, not one. See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 692 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

															The mere fact that Pittsburgh displays symbols of both Christmas
and Chanukah does not end the constitutional inquiry. If the city
celebrates both Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays, then
it violates the Establishment Clause. Page 492 U. S. 615 The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and Christianity is no
less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity
alone. [ Footnote 61 ]

															Conversely, if the city celebrates both Christmas and Chanukah
as secular holidays, then its conduct is beyond the reach of the
Establishment Clause. Because government may celebrate Christmas as
a secular holiday, [ Footnote
62 ] it follows that government may also acknowledge Chanukah as
a secular holiday. Simply put, it would be a form of discrimination
against Jews to allow Pittsburgh to celebrate Christmas as a
cultural tradition while simultaneously disallowing the city's
acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous cultural tradition.
[ Footnote 63 ] Page 492 U. S. 616 Accordingly, the relevant question for Establishment Clause
purposes is whether the combined display of the tree, the sign, and
the menorah has the effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish
faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in our society. Of the two
interpretations of this particular display, the latter seems far
more plausible, and is also in line with Lynch. [ Footnote 64 ]

															The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a
religious symbol. Although Christmas trees once carried religious
connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of
Christmas. See American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v.
St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 271 (CA7), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1295 (2d
ed.1988) (Tribe). [ Footnote
65 ] Numerous Americans place Page 492 U. S. 617 Christmas trees in their homes without subscribing to Christian
religious beliefs, and when the city's tree stands alone in front
of the City-County Building, it is not considered an endorsement of
Christian faith. Indeed, a 40-foot Christmas tree was one of the
objects that validated the creche in Lynch. The widely
accepted view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent secular
symbol of the Christmas holiday season serves to emphasize the
secular component of the message communicated by other elements of
an accompanying holiday display, including the Chanukah menorah.
[ Footnote 66 ]

															The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element in the
city's display. The 45-foot tree occupies the central position
beneath the middle archway in front of the Grant Street entrance to
the City-County Building; the 18-foot menorah is positioned to one
side. Given this configuration, it is much more sensible to
interpret the meaning of the menorah in light of the tree, rather
than vice-versa. In the shadow of the tree, the menorah is readily
understood as simply a recognition that Christmas is not the only
traditional way of observing the winter holiday season. In these
circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the menorah
communicates not a simultaneous endorsement of both the
Christian Page 492 U. S. 618 and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular celebration of
Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of Chanukah as a
contemporaneous alternative tradition.

															Although the city has used a symbol with religious meaning as
its representation of Chanukah, this is not a case in which the
city has reasonable alternatives that are less religious in nature.
It is difficult to imagine a predominantly secular symbol of
Chanukah that the city could place next to its Christmas tree. An
18-foot dreidel would look out of place, and might be interpreted
by some as mocking the celebration of Chanukah. The absence of a
more secular alternative symbol is itself part of the context in
which the city's actions must be judged in determining the likely
effect of its use of the menorah. Where the government's secular
message can be conveyed by two symbols, only one of which carries
religious meaning, an observer reasonably might infer from the fact
that the government has chosen to use the religious symbol that the
government means to promote religious faith. See Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 295 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause forbids use of
religious means to serve secular ends when secular means suffice); see also Tribe 1285. [ Footnote 67 ] But where, as here, no such choice has been
made, this inference of endorsement is not present. [ Footnote 68 ] Page 492 U. S. 619 The mayor's sign further diminishes the possibility that the
tree and the menorah will be interpreted as a dual endorsement of
Christianity and Judaism. The sign states that, during the holiday
season, the city salutes liberty. Moreover, the sign draws upon the
theme of light, common to both Chanukah and Christmas as winter
festivals, and links that theme with this Nation's legacy of
freedom, which allows an American to celebrate the holiday season
in whatever way he wishes, religiously or otherwise. While no sign
can disclaim an overwhelming message of endorsement, see Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 41 , an
"explanatory plaque" may confirm that in particular contexts the
government's association with a religious symbol does not represent
the government's sponsorship of religious beliefs. See
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 707 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Here, the mayor's sign serves to confirm
what the context already reveals: that the display of the menorah
is not an endorsement of religious faith, but simply a recognition
of cultural diversity. Page 492 U. S. 620 Given all these considerations, it is not "sufficiently likely"
that residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of
the tree, the sign, and the menorah as an "endorsement" or
"disapproval . . . of their individual religious choices." Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 390 .
While an adjudication of the display's effect must take into
account the perspective of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish,
as well as of those who adhere to either of these religions, ibid., the constitutionality of its effect must also be
judged according to the standard of a "reasonable observer," see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 , 474 U. S. 493 (1986) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); see also Tribe 1296 (challenged government
practices should be judged "from the perspective of a reasonable non-adherent'"). When measured against this
standard, the menorah need not be excluded from this particular
display. The Christmas tree alone in the Pittsburgh location does
not endorse Christian belief; and, on the facts before us, the
addition of the menorah "cannot fairly be understood to" result in
the simultaneous endorsement of Christian and Jewish faiths. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 693 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). On the contrary, for purposes of the
Establishment Clause, the city's overall display must be understood
as conveying the city's secular recognition of different traditions
for celebrating the winter-holiday season. [ Footnote 69 ] The conclusion here that, in this particular context, the
menorah's display does not have an effect of endorsing
religious Page 492 U. S. 621 faith does not foreclose the possibility that the display of the
menorah might violate either the "purpose" or "entanglement" prong
of the Lemon analysis. These issues were not addressed by
the Court of Appeals, and may be considered by that court on
remand. [ Footnote 70 ] VII Lynch v. Donnelly confirms, and in no way repudiates,
the longstanding constitutional principle that government may not
engage in a practice that has the effect of promoting or endorsing
religious beliefs. The display of the creche in the county
courthouse has this unconstitutional effect. The display of the
menorah in front of the City-County Building, however, does not
have this effect, given its "particular physical setting."

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings. It is so ordered. Page 492 U. S. 623 * Together with No. 88-90, Chabad v. American Civil
Liberties Union et al., and No. 88-96, City of Pittsburgh
v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, et
al., also on certiorari to the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ] See 8 Encyclopedia of Religion, "Jesus," 15, 18
(1987).

															[ Footnote 2 ] See 3 Encyclopedia of Religion, "Christmas," 460
(1987). Some eastern churches, however, have not adopted December
25 as the Feast of the Nativity, retaining January 6 as the date
for celebrating both the birth and the baptism of Jesus. R. Myers,
Celebrations: The Complete Book of American Holidays 15, 17 (1972)
(Myers).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"[T]he Christmas holiday in our national culture contains both
secular and sectarian elements." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 709 ,
and n. 15 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It has been suggested
that the cultural aspect of Christmas in this country now exceeds
the theological significance of the holiday. See J.
Barnett, The American Christmas, a Study in National Culture 23
(1954) (Barnett) ("[B]y the latter part of the last century, the
folk-secular aspects of Christmas were taking precedence over its
religious ones").

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Luke 2:1-21; Matthew 2

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															This phrase comes from Luke, who tells of an angel appearing to
the shepherds to announce the birth of the Messiah. After the angel
told the shepherds that they would find the baby lying in a
manger,

															"suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly
host praising God, and saying, Glory to God in the highest, and on
earth peace, good will towards men."

															Luke 2:13-14 (King James Version). It is unlikely that an
observer standing at the bottom of the Grand Staircase would be
able to read the text of the angel's banner from that distance, but
might be able to do so from a closer vantage point.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															On each side of the staircase was a sign indicating the
direction of county offices. JEV 7-8. A small evergreen tree,
decorated much like the trees behind the endposts, was placed next
to each directional sign. Ibid. [ Footnote 7 ]

															In the arched windows behind the staircase were two large
wreaths, each with a large red ribbon. Ibid. [ Footnote 8 ] See generally A. Bloch, The Biblical and Historical
Background of the Jewish Holy Days 49-78 (1978) (Bloch, Holy Days);
A. Bloch, The Biblical and Historical Background of Jewish Customs
and Ceremonies 267-278 (1980) (Bloch, Ceremonies); 6 Encyclopedia
of Religion, "Hanukkah," 193194; 7 Encyclopaedia Judaica,
"Hanukkah," 1280-1288 (1972); O. Rankin, The Origins of the
Festival of Hanukkah (1930) (Rankin); A. Chill, The Minhagim
241-254 (1979) (Chill); L. Trepp, The Complete Book of Jewish
Observance 137-151 (1980) (Trepp); M. Strassfeld, The Jewish
Holidays 161-177 (1985) (Strassfeld).

															[ Footnote 9 ] See Columbia Encyclopedia 1190 (4th ed.1975); J.
Williams, What Americans Believe and How they Worship 348 (3d
ed.1969); Myers 302; see also Strassfeld 202; see
generally A. Spier, The Comprehensive Hebrew Calendar
(1981).

															[ Footnote 10 ] See P. Johnson, A History of the Jews 104 (1987)
(Johnson); R. Seltzer, Jewish People, Jewish Thought: The Jewish
Experience in History 158 (1980) (Seltzer).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The word Chanukah, sometimes spelled Chanukkah or Hanukkah, is
drawn from the Hebrew for "dedication." 7 Encyclopaedia Judaica
1280.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Strassfeld 161-163; Rankin 133.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The Talmud (specifically the Babylonian Talmud) is a collection
of rabbinic commentary on Jewish law that was compiled before the
sixth century, App. 140. See 14 Encyclopedia of Religion,
"Talmud," 256-259; see also Seltzer 265.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															"Menorah" is Hebrew for "candelabrum." See 11
Encyclopaedia Judaica, "Menorah," at 1356.

															[ Footnote 15 ] See The Babylonian Talmud, Seder Mo'ed, 1 Shabbath 21b
(Soncino Press 1938); Strassfeld 163; Trepp 143.

															[ Footnote 16 ] Cf. "Mitzvah," in 12 Encyclopaedia Judaica 162 (4th
ed., 1972) ("In common usage, mitzvah has taken on the
meaning of a good deed. Already in the Talmud, this word was used
for a meritorious act, as distinct from a positive commandment").
The plural of mitzvah is mitzvot.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See also Bloch, Ceremonies 269. According to some
Jewish authorities, the miracle of Chanukah is the success of the
Maccabees over the Seleucids, rather than the fact that the oil
lasted eight days. App. 141. Either way, the purpose of lighting
the Chanukah candles, as a religious mitzvah, is to celebrate a
miracle. Ibid. [ Footnote 18 ]

															Trepp 146; 7 Encyclopaedia Judaica 1283; Talmud Shabbath
21b.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Bloch, Ceremonies 274.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															Another translation is

															"Praised are you, Lord our God, Ruler of the universe, who has
sanctified our lives through His commandments, commanding us to
kindle the Hanukkah lights."

															Strassfeld 167.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															Trepp 145; see generally 7 Encyclopaedia Judaica,
"Hanukkah Lamp," 1288-1316.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															The design of the menorah is set forth in Exodus 25:31-40; see also 11 Encyclopaedia Judaica 1356-1370.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Bloch, Ceremonies 274-275.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															A Torah scroll -- which contains the five Books of Moses -- must
be buried in a special manner when it is no longer usable. App.
237-238.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Strassfeld 167; Bloch, Ceremonies 277.

															[ Footnote 26 ] Id. at 277-278; Trepp 147. It is also a custom to serve
potato pancakes or other fried foods on Chanukah because the oil in
which they are fried is, by tradition, a reminder of the miracle of
Chanukah. App. 242-243; Strassfeld 168.

															[ Footnote 27 ] Id. at 164

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															Trepp 144, 150; 6 Encyclopedia of Religion 193; see
also Strassfeld 176. Of course, the celebration of Christmas
and Chanukah in the Southern Hemisphere occurs during summer.
Nonetheless, both Christmas and Chanukah first developed in the
Northern Hemisphere, and have longstanding cultural associations
with the beginning of winter. In fact, ancient rabbis chose
Chanukah as the means to mark the beginning of winter. See Bloch, Holy Days 77.

															[ Footnote 29 ] See also App. 229, 237. The Court of Appeals in this
litigation plainly erred when it asserted that Chanukah "is not . .
. a holiday with secular aspects." 842 F.2d 655, 662 (CA3 1988).
This assertion contradicts uncontroverted record evidence presented
by respondents' own expert witness:

															"There are also those Jews within the Jewish community who are
nontheistic. . . . [T]hey base their celebration [of Chanukah] on
something other than religion."

															App. 143. In response to further questioning, the expert added
that the celebration of Chanukah as a cultural event "certainly
exists." Ibid. Thus, on this record, Chanukah
unquestionably has "secular aspects," although it is also a
religious holiday. See Chill 241 (Chanukah is celebrated
by secular as well as religious Jews).

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															Strassfeld 164-165; see also 7 Encyclopaedia Judaica
1288.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															"In America, Hanukkah has been influenced by the celebration of
Christmas. While a tradition of giving Hanukkah gelt -- money -- is
an old one, the proximity to Christmas has made gift-giving an
intrinsic part of the holiday."

															Strassfeld 164.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															"In general, the attempt to create a Jewish equivalent to
Christmas has given Hanukkah more significance in the festival
cycle than it has had in the past." Ibid. "Hanukkah has prospered because it comes about
the same time as Christmas and can be used as the Jewish
equivalent." D. Elazar, Community and Polity: The Organizational
Dynamics of American Jewry 119 (1976). "Hanukkah was elaborated by
American Jews to protect the child and to defend Judaism against
the glamour and seductive power of Christmas." C. Liebman, The
Ambivalent American Jew 66 (1973). See also M. Sklare
& J. Greenblum, Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier 58
(1967):

															"The aspects of Hanukkah observance currently emphasized -- the
exchange of gifts and the lighting and display of the menorah in the windows of homes -- offer ready parallels
to the general mode of Christmas observance, as well as provide a
"

															"'Jewish' alternative to the holiday. Instead of alienating the
Jew from the general culture, Hanukkah helps situate him as a
participant in that culture. Hanukkah, in short, becomes for some
the Jewish Christmas."

															[ Footnote 33 ] See Chill 241 (from the perspective of Jewish religious
law, Chanukah is "only a minor festival").

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															Additionally, menorahs -- like Chanukah itself -- have a
secular, as well as a religious, dimension. The record in this
litigation contains a passing reference to the fact that menorahs
"are used extensively by secular Jewish organizations to represent
the Jewish people." App. 310.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															Chabad, also known as Lubavitch, is an organization of Hasidic
Jews who follow the teachings of a particular Jewish leader, the
Lubavitch Rebbe. Id. at 228, 253-254. The Lubavitch
movement is a branch of Hasidism, which itself is a branch of
orthodox Judaism. Id. at 249-250. Pittsburgh has a total
population of 45,000 Jews; of these, 100 to 150 families attend
synagogue at Pittsburgh's Lubavitch Center. Id. at
247-251.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															Respondents also sought a preliminary injunction against the
display of the creche and menorah for the 1986-1987 holiday season.
Characterizing the creche and menorah as " de minimis in
the context of the First Amendment," the District Court, on
December 15, denied respondents' motion for preliminary injunctive
relief. Id. at 10.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Respondents, however, do not claim that the city's Christmas
tree violates the Establishment Clause, and do not seek to enjoin
its display. Respondents also do not claim that the county's
Christmas carol program is unconstitutional. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 32.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															In addition to agreeing with the city that the menorah's display
does not violate the Establishment Clause, Chabad contends that it
has a constitutional right to display the menorah in front of the
City-County Building. In light of the Court's disposition of the
Establishment Clause question as to the menorah, there is no need
to address Chabad's contention.

															[ Footnote 39 ] See also M. Borden, Jews, Turks, and Infidels (1984)
(charting the history of discrimination against non-Christian
citizens of the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries);
Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About
Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 876, 919-920 (1986)
(Laycock) (the intolerance of late 18th-century Americans towards
Catholics, Jews, Moslems, and atheists cannot be the basis of
interpreting the Establishment Clause today).

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															A State may neither allow public school students to receive
religious instruction on public school premises, Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71,
Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), nor allow religious school students to receive
state-sponsored education in their religious schools. School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.
S. 373 (1985). Similarly unconstitutional is
state-sponsored prayer in public schools. Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). And the content of a public school's curriculum may not be
based on a desire to promote religious beliefs. Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 (1968). For the same reason, posting the Ten
Commandments on the wall of a public school classroom violates the
Establishment Clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 (1980).

															[ Footnote 41 ]

															A statute that conditions the holding of public office on a
belief in the existence of God is unconstitutional, Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), as is one that grants a tax exemption for only religious
literature, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S.
1 (1989), and one that grants an employee a right not to
work on his Sabbath, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703 , 472 U. S.
709 -710, and n. 9 (1985) (reasoning that other employees
might also have strong reasons for taking a particular day off from
work each week). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.
S. 228 (1982) (invalidating a statute that imposed
registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious
organizations that solicit more than 50% of their funds from
nonmembers).

															[ Footnote 42 ] Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.
S. 116 (1982).

															[ Footnote 43 ] See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.
S. 402 , 473 U. S. 409 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S. 254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 , 421 U. S. 370 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 , 403 U. S.
619 -622 (1971).

															[ Footnote 44 ] See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.
S. 589 , 487 U. S. 602 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 583 ; Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 , 474 U. S. 485 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 410 ; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S.
382 -383; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 708 ; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 55 -56
(1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 123 ; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 40 ; Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U. S. 646 , 444 U. S. 653 (1980); Meek v. Pittenger, supra; Sloan v. Lemon , 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S.
772 -773 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.
S. 734 , 413 U. S. 741 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 , 413 U. S.
481 -482 (1973).

															[ Footnote 45 ]

															There is no need here to review the applications in Lynch of the "purpose" and "entanglement" elements of the Lemon inquiry, since, in the present action, the Court of
Appeals did not consider these issues.

															[ Footnote 46 ]

															The difference in approach between the Lynch majority
and the concurrence is especially evident in each opinion's
treatment of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.
S. 783 (1983). In that case, the Court sustained the
practice of legislative prayer based on its unique history:
Congress authorized the payment of legislative chaplains during the
same week that it reached final agreement on the language of the
Bill of Rights. Id. at 463 U. S. 788 .
The Lynch majority employed Marsh comparatively:
to forbid the use of the creche

															while the Congress and legislatures open sessions with prayers
by paid chaplains would be a stilted overreaction contrary to our
history and to our holdings. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
686 .

															The concurrence, in contrast, harmonized the result in Marsh with the endorsement principle in a rigorous way,
explaining that legislative prayer (like the invocation that
commences each session of this Court) is a form of acknowledgment
of religion that

															"serve[s], in the only wa[y] reasonably possible in our culture,
the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions,
expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 693 .
The function and history of this form of ceremonial deism suggest
that "those practices are not understood as conveying government
approval of particular religious beliefs." Ibid.; see also
id. at 465 U. S. 717 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 47 ]

															The county and the city argue that their use of religious
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless they are
shown to be "coercive." Reply Brief for Petitioners County of
Allegheny et al. 1-6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 11. They
recognize that this Court repeatedly has stated that "proof of
coercion" is "not a necessary element of any claim under the
Establishment Clause." Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 786 ; see also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
222 -223; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 430 .
But they suggest that the Court reconsider this principle. Reply
Brief for Petitioners Allegheny County et al. 3; cf.
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 137 (CA7
1987) (dissenting opinion); McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element
of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 933 (1986). The Court
declines to do so, and proceeds to apply the controlling
endorsement inquiry, which does not require an independent showing
of coercion.

															[ Footnote 48 ]

															The presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere
in the county courthouse, and of the nearby gallery forum, fail to
negate the endorsement effect of the creche. The record
demonstrates clearly that the creche, with its floral frame, was
its own display distinct from any other decorations or exhibitions
in the building. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.

															[ Footnote 49 ] See App. 169 (religious as well as nonreligious carols
were sung at the program).

															[ Footnote 50 ]

															The Grand Staircase does not appear to be the kind of location
in which all were free to place their displays for weeks at a time,
so that the presence of the creche in that location for over six
weeks would then not serve to associate the government with the
creche. Even if the Grand Staircase occasionally was used for
displays other than the creche (for example, a display of flags
commemorating the 25th anniversary of Israel's independence, id. at 176), it remains true that any display located
there fairly may be understood to express views that receive the
support and endorsement of the government. In any event, the
county's own press releases made clear to the public that the
county associated itself with the creche. JEV 28 (flier identifying
the choral program as county sponsored); id. at 30; App.
174 (linking the creche to the choral program). Moreover, the
county created a visual link between itself and the creche: it
placed next to official county signs two small evergreens identical
to those in the creche display. In this respect, the creche here
does not raise the kind of "public forum" issue, cf. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), presented by the creche in McCreary v. Stone, 739
F.2d 716 (CA2 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Board of Trustees of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U. S.
83 (1985) (private creche in public park).

															[ Footnote 51 ]

															Nor can the display of the creche be justified as an
"accommodation" of religion. See Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 (1987). Government efforts to accommodate religion are permissible
when they remove burdens on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 483 U. S. 348 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). The display of a creche in
a courthouse does not remove any burden on the free exercise of
Christianity. Christians remain free to display creches in their
homes and churches. To be sure, prohibiting the display of a creche
in the courthouse deprives Christians of the satisfaction of seeing
the government adopt their religious message as their own, but this
kind of government affiliation with particular religious messages
is precisely what the Establishment Clause precludes.

															[ Footnote 52 ]

															It is worth noting that, just because Marsh sustained
the validity of legislative prayer, it does not necessarily follow
that practices like proclaiming a National Day of Prayer are
constitutional. See post at 492 U. S.
672 -673. Legislative prayer does not urge citizens to
engage in religious practices, and, on that basis, could well be
distinguishable from an exhortation from government to the people
that they engage in religious conduct. But, as this practice is not
before us, we express no judgment about its constitutionality.

															[ Footnote 53 ]

															Among the stories this scholar recounts is one that is
especially apt in light of JUSTICE KENNEDY's citation of
Thanksgiving Proclamations, post at 492 U. S.
671 :

															"When James H. Hammond, governor of South Carolina, announced a
day of 'Thanksgiving, Humiliation, and Prayer' in 1844, he . . .
exhorted"

															"our citizens of all denominations to assemble at their
respective places of worship, to offer up their devotions to God
their Creator, and his Son Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the
world."

															"The Jews of Charleston protested, charging Hammond with"

															"such obvious discrimination and preference in the
tenor of your proclamation, as amounted to an utter exclusion of a
portion of the people of South Carolina."

															"Hammond responded that"

															"I have always thought it a settled matter that I lived in a
Christian land! And that I was the temporary chief magistrate of a
Christian people. That in such a country and among such a people I
should be, publicly, called to an account, reprimanded and required
to make amends for acknowledging Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of
the world, I would not have believed possible, if it had not come
to pass."

															"( The Occident, January 1845)."

															Borden 142, n. 2 (emphasis in Borden). Thus, not all
Thanksgiving proclamations fit the nonsectarian or deist mold as
did those examples quoted by JUSTICE KENNEDY. Moreover, the Jews of
Charleston succinctly captured the precise evil caused by such
sectarian proclamations as Governor Hammond's -- they demonstrate
an official preference for Christianity and a
corresponding official discrimination against all
non-Christians, amounting to an exclusion of a portion of the
political community. It is against this very evil that the
Establishment Clause, in part, is directed. Indeed, the Jews of
Charleston could not better have formulated the essential concepts
of the endorsement inquiry.

															[ Footnote 54 ]

															In 1776, for instance, Maryland adopted a "Declaration of
Rights" that allowed its legislature to impose a tax "for the
support of the Christian religion" and a requirement that all state
officials declare "a belief in the Christian religion." 1 A.
Stokes, Church and State in the United States 865-866 (1950).
Efforts made in 1797 to remove these discriminations against
non-Christians were unsuccessful. Id. at 867. See also
id. at 513 (quoting the explicitly Christian proclamation of
President John Adams, who urged all Americans to seek God's grace
"through the Redeemer of the world" and "by His Holy Spirit").

															[ Footnote 55 ]

															JUSTICE KENNEDY evidently believes that contemporary references
to exclusively Christian creeds (like the Trinity or the divinity
of Jesus) in official acts or proclamations is justified by the
religious sentiments of those responsible for the adoption of the
First Amendment. See 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1874, p. 663 (1858) (at the
time of the First Amendment's adoption, "the general, if not the
universal, sentiment in America was that Christianity ought to
receive encouragement from the state"). This Court, however,
squarely has rejected the proposition that the Establishment Clause
is to be interpreted in light of any favoritism for Christianity
that may have existed among the Founders of the Republic. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S.
52 .

															[ Footnote 56 ]

															In describing what would violate his "proselytization" test,
JUSTICE KENNEDY uses the adjectives "permanent," "year-round," and
"continual," post at 492 U. S. 661 , 492 U. S.
664 -665, n. 3, as if to suggest that temporary acts of
favoritism for a particular sect do not violate the Establishment
Clause. Presumably, however, JUSTICE KENNEDY does not really intend
these adjectives to define the limits of his principle, since it is
obvious that the government's efforts to proselytize may be of
short duration, as Governor Hammond's Thanksgiving Proclamation
illustrates. See n 53, supra. In any event, the Court repudiated any notion
that preferences for particular religious beliefs are permissible
unless permanent when, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.
S. 589 , 487 U. S. 620 (1988), it ordered an inquiry into the "specific instances of
impermissible behavior" that may have occurred in the
administration of a statutory program.

															[ Footnote 57 ]

															It is not clear, moreover, why JUSTICE KENNEDY thinks the
display of the creche in this lawsuit is permissible even under his
lax "proselytization" test. Although, early on in his opinion, he
finds "no realistic risk that the creche . . . represent[s] an
effort to proselytize," post at 492 U. S. 664 ,
at the end, he concludes: "[T]he eager proselytizer may seek to use
[public creche displays] for his own ends. The urge to use them to
teach or to taunt is always present. " Post at 492 U. S. 678 (emphasis added). Whatever the cause of this inconsistency, it
should be obvious to all that the creche on the Grand Staircase
communicates the message that Jesus is the Messiah and to be
worshipped as such, an inherently prosyletizing message if ever
there was one. In fact, the angel in the creche display represents,
according to Christian tradition, one of the original
"proselytizers" of the Christian faith: the angel who appeared to
the shepherds to tell them of the birth of Christ. Thus, it would
seem that JUSTICE KENNEDY should find this display unconstitutional
according to a consistent application of his principle that
government may not place its weight behind obvious efforts to
proselytize Christian creeds specifically.

															Contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY's assertion, the Court's decision in Lynch does not foreclose this conclusion. Lynch certainly is not "dispositive of [a] claim," post at 492 U. S. 665 ,
regarding the government's display of a creche bearing an
explicitly proselytizing sign (like "Let's all rejoice in Jesus
Christ, the Redeemer of the world," cf. n 53, supra ). As much as JUSTICE
KENNEDY tries, see post at 492 U. S.
665 -666, there is no hiding behind the fiction that Lynch decides the constitutionality of every possible
government creche display. Once stripped of this fiction, JUSTICE
KENNEDY's opinion transparently lacks a principled basis,
consistent with our precedents, for asserting that the creche
display here must be held constitutional.

															[ Footnote 58 ]

															Thus, JUSTICE KENNEDY is incorrect when he says, post at 492 U. S. 674 ,
n. 10, that the Court fails to explain why today's decision does
not require the elimination of all religious Christmas music from
public property.

															[ Footnote 59 ]

															In his attempt to legitimate the display of the creche on the
Grand Staircase, JUSTICE KENNEDY repeatedly characterizes it as an
"accommodation" of religion. See, e.g., post at 492 U. S. 663 , 492 U. S. 664 .
But an accommodation of religion, in order to be permitted under
the Establishment Clause, must lift "an identifiable burden on
the exercise of religion. " Corporation of Presiding Bishop
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. at 483 U. S. 348 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original); see also McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985
S.Ct.Rev. 1, 3-4 (defining "accommodation" as government action as
"specifically for the purpose of facilitating the free exercise of
religion," usually by exempting religious practices from general
regulations). Defined thus, the concept of accommodation plainly
has no relevance to the display of the creche in this lawsuit. See n 51, supra. One may agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that the scope of
accommodations permissible under the Establishment Clause is larger
than the scope of accommodations mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause. See post at 492 U. S. 663 ,
n. 2. An example prompted by the Court's decision in Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503 (1986), comes readily to mind: although the Free Exercise Clause
does not require the Air Force to exempt yarmulkes from a
no-headdress rule, it is at least plausible that the Establishment
Clause permits the Air Force to promulgate a regulation exempting
yarmulkes (and similar religiously motivated headcoverings) from
its no-headdress rule. But a category of "permissible
accommodations of religion not required by the Free Exercise
Clause" aids the creche on the Grand Staircase not at all.
Prohibiting the display of a creche at this location, it bears
repeating, does not impose a burden on the practice of Christianity
(except to the extent that some Christian sect seeks to be an
officially approved religion), and therefore permitting the display
is not an "accommodation" of religion in the conventional
sense.

															[ Footnote 60 ]

															JUSTICE KENNEDY is clever but mistaken in asserting that the
description of the menorah, supra, at 492 U. S.
582 -587, purports to turn the Court into a "national
theology board." Post at 492 U. S. 678 .
Any inquiry concerning the government's use of a religious object
to determine whether that use results in an unconstitutional
religious preference requires a review of the factual record
concerning the religious object -- even if the inquiry is conducted
pursuant to JUSTICE KENNEDY's "proselytization" test. Surely
JUSTICE KENNEDY cannot mean that this Court must keep itself in
ignorance of the symbol's conventional use and decide the
constitutional question knowing only what it knew before the case
was filed. This prescription of ignorance obviously would bias this
Court according to the religious and cultural backgrounds of its
Members, a condition much more intolerable than any which results
from the Court's efforts to become familiar with the relevant
facts.

															Moreover, the relevant facts concerning Chanukah and the menorah
are largely to be found in the record, as indicated by the
extensive citation to the Appendix, supra at 492 U. S.
582 -585. In any event, Members of this Court have not
hesitated in referring to secondary sources in aid of their
Establishment Clause analysis, see, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 465 U. S.
709 -712, 465 U. S.
721 -724 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), because the question
"whether a government activity communicates an endorsement of
religion" is "in large part a legal question to be answered on the
basis of judicial interpretation of social facts," id. at 465 U. S.
693 -694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 61 ]

															The display of a menorah next to a creche on government property
might prove to be invalid. Cf. Greater Houston Chapter of
American Civil Liberties Union v. Eckels, 589 F.
Supp. 222 (SD Tex.1984), appeal dism'd, 755 F.2d 426
(CA5), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (war memorial
containing crosses and a Star of David unconstitutionally favored
Christianity and Judaism, discriminating against the beliefs of
patriotic soldiers who were neither Christian nor Jewish).

															[ Footnote 62 ]

															It is worth recalling here that no Member of the Court in Lynch suggested that government may not celebrate the
secular aspects of Christmas. On the contrary, the four dissenters
there stated:

															"If public officials . . . participate in the secular celebration of Christmas -- by, for example, decorating public
places with such secular images as wreaths, garlands, or Santa
Claus figures -- they move closer to the limits of their
constitutional power but nevertheless remain within the boundaries
set by the Establishment Clause."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
710 -711 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).

															[ Footnote 63 ]

															Thus, to take the most obvious of examples, if it were
permissible for the city to display in front of the City-County
Building a banner exclaiming "Merry Christmas," then it would also
be permissible for the city to display in the same location a
banner proclaiming "Happy Chanukah."

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, however, seems to suggest that even this
practice is problematic, because holidays associated with other
religious traditions would be excluded. See post at 492 U. S. 664 .
But when the government engages in the secular celebration of
Christmas, without any reference to holidays celebrated by
non-Christians, other traditions are excluded -- and yet JUSTICE
BRENNAN has approved the government's secular celebration of
Christmas. See n. 62 supra. [ Footnote 64 ]

															It is distinctly implausible to view the combined display of the
tree, the sign, and the menorah as endorsing the Jewish faith
alone. During the time of this litigation, Pittsburgh had a
population of 387,000, of which approximately 45,000 were Jews.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 34 (108th ed.1988); App. 247. When a city like
Pittsburgh places a symbol of Chanukah next to a symbol of
Christmas, the result may be a simultaneous endorsement of
Christianity and Judaism (depending upon the circumstances of the
display). But the city's addition of a visual representation of
Chanukah to its preexisting Christmas display cannot reasonably be
understood as an endorsement of Jewish -- yet not Christian --
belief. Thus, unless the combined Christmas-Chanukah display fairly
can be seen as a double endorsement of Christian and Jewish faiths,
it must be viewed as celebrating both holidays without endorsing
either faith.

															The conclusion that Pittsburgh's combined Christmas-Chanukah
display cannot be interpreted as endorsing Judaism alone does not
mean, however, that it is implausible, as a general matter, for a
city like Pittsburgh to endorse a minority faith. The display of a
menorah alone might well have that effect.

															[ Footnote 65 ] See also Barnett 141-142 (describing the Christmas
tree, along with gift giving and Santa Claus, as those aspects of
Christmas which have become "so intimately identified with national
life" that immigrants feel the need to adopt these customs in order
to be a part of American culture). Of course, the tree is capable
of taking on a religious significance if it is decorated with
religious symbols. Cf. Gilbert, The Season of Good Will
and Inter-religious Tension, 24 Reconstructionist 13 (1958)
(considering the Christmas tree, without the Star of Bethlehem, as
one of "the cultural aspects of the Christmas celebration").

															[ Footnote 66 ]

															Although the Christmas tree represents the secular celebration
of Christmas, its very association with Christmas (a holiday with
religious dimensions) makes it conceivable that the tree might be
seen as representing Christian religion when displayed next to an
object associated with Jewish religion. For this reason, I agree
with JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS that one must ask whether
the tree and the menorah together endorse the religious beliefs of Christians and Jews. For the reasons stated in the text,
however, I conclude the city's overall display does not have this
impermissible effect.

															[ Footnote 67 ]

															Contrary to the assertions of JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE
KENNEDY, I have not suggested here that the government's failure to
use an available secular alternative necessarily results
in an Establishment Clause violation. Rather, it suffices to say
that the availability or unavailability of secular alternatives is
an obvious factor to be considered in deciding whether the
government's use of a religious symbol amounts to an endorsement of
religious faith.

															[ Footnote 68 ]

															In Lynch, in contrast, there was no need for Pawtucket
to include a creche in order to convey a secular message about
Christmas. See 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
726 -727 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Thus, unless the
addition of the creche to the Pawtucket display was recognized as
an endorsement of Christian faith, the creche there was "relegated
to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season," id. at 465 U. S. 727 ,
serving no function different from that performed by the secular
symbols of Christmas. But the same cannot be said of the addition
of the menorah to the Pittsburgh display. The inclusion of the
menorah here broadens the Pittsburgh display to refer not only to
Christmas but also to Chanukah -- a different holiday belonging to
a different tradition. It does not demean Jewish faith or the
religious significance of the menorah to say that the menorah in
this context represents the holiday of Chanukah as a whole (with
religious and secular aspects), just as the Christmas tree in this
context can be said to represent the holiday of Christmas as a
whole (with its religious and secular aspects).

															Thus, the menorah retains its religious significance even in
this display, but it does not follow that the city has endorsed
religious belief over nonbelief. In displaying the menorah next to
the tree, the city has demonstrated no preference for the religious celebration of the holiday season. This
conclusion, however, would be untenable had the city substituted a
creche for its Christmas tree or if the city had failed to
substitute for the menorah an alternative, more secular,
representation of Chanukah.

															[ Footnote 69 ]

															This is not to say that the combined display of a Christmas tree
and a menorah is constitutional wherever it may be located on
government property. For example, when located in a public school,
such a display might raise additional constitutional
considerations. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S.
583 -584 (Establishment Clause must be applied with
special sensitivity in the public school context).

															[ Footnote 70 ]

															In addition, nothing in this opinion forecloses the possibility
that on other facts a menorah display could constitute an
impermissible endorsement of religion. Indeed, there is some
evidence in this record that, in the past, Chabad lit the menorah
in front of the City-County Building in a religious ceremony that
included the recitation of traditional religious blessings. See App. 281. Respondents, however, did not challenge this
practice, there are no factual findings on it, and the Court of
Appeals did not consider it in deciding that the display of a
menorah in this location necessarily endorses Judaism. See 842 F.2d at 662.

															There is also some suggestion in the record that Chabad
advocates the public display of menorahs as part of its own
proselytizing mission, but again there have been no relevant
factual findings that would enable this Court to conclude that
Pittsburgh has endorsed Chabad's particular proselytizing message.
Of course, nothing in this opinion forecloses a challenge to a
menorah display based on such factual findings.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join as to Part II, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. I Judicial review of government action under the Establishment
Clause is a delicate task. The Court has avoided drawing lines
which entirely sweep away all government recognition and
acknowledgment of the role of religion in the lives of our
citizens, for to do so would exhibit not neutrality, but hostility,
to religion. Instead, the courts have made case-specific
examinations of the challenged government action and have attempted
to do so with the aid of the standards described by JUSTICE
BLACKMUN in Part III-A of the Court's opinion. Ante at 492 U. S.
590 -594. Unfortunately, even the development of
articulable standards and guidelines has not always resulted in
agreement among the Members of this Court on the results in
individual cases. And so it is again today.

															The constitutionality of the two displays at issue in these
cases turns on how we interpret and apply the holding in Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984), in which we rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to
the city of Pawtucket's inclusion of a creche in its annual
Christmas holiday display. The seasonal display reviewed in Lynch was located in a privately owned park in the heart
of the shopping district. Id. at 465 U. S. 671 .
In addition to the creche, the display included

															"a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh,
candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy
bear, hundreds of colored lights, [and] a large banner that rea[d]
'SEASONS GREETINGS.'" Ibid. The city owned all the components of the display.
Setting up and dismantling the creche cost the city about $20 a
year, and nominal expenses were incurred in lighting the
creche.

															The Lynch Court began its analysis by stating that
Establishment Clause cases call for careful line drawing: "[N]o
fixed, per se rule can be framed." Id. at 465 U. S. 678 .
Although declaring Page 492 U. S. 624 that it was not willing to be confined to any single test, the
Court essentially applied the Lemon test, asking

															"whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose,
whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit
religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of
government with religion."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 679 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 (1971)). In reversing the lower court's decision,
which held that inclusion of the creche in the holiday display
violated the Establishment Clause, the Court stressed that the
lower court erred in "focusing almost exclusively on the creche."
465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
680 .

															"In so doing, it rejected the city's claim that its reasons for
including the creche are essentially the same as its reasons for
sponsoring the display as a whole." Ibid. When viewed in the "context of the Christmas
Holiday season," the Court reasoned, there was insufficient
evidence to suggest that inclusion of the creche as part of the holiday display was an effort to advocate a
particular religious message. Ibid. The Court concluded
that Pawtucket had a secular purpose for including the creche in
its Christmas holiday display, namely, "to depict the origins of
that Holiday." Id. at 465 U. S.
681 .

															The Court also concluded that inclusion of the creche in the
display did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.

															"[D]isplay of the creche is no more an advancement or
endorsement of religion than the Congressional and Executive
recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's
Mass,' or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious
paintings in governmentally supported museums." Id. at 465 U. S. 683 .
Finally, the Court found no excessive entanglement between religion
and government. There was

															"no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the
content or design of the exhibit prior to or since Pawtucket's
purchase of the creche." Id. at 465 U. S.
684 .

															I joined the majority opinion in Lynch because, as I
read that opinion, it was consistent with the analysis set forth in
my separate concurrence, which stressed that

															"[e]very government Page 492 U. S. 625 practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to
determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of
religion." Id. at 465 U. S. 694 (emphasis added). Indeed, by referring repeatedly to "inclusion of
the creche" in the larger holiday display, id. at 465 U. S. 671 , 465 U. S.
680 -682, 465 U. S. 686 ,
the Lynch majority recognized that the creche had to be
viewed in light of the total display of which it was a part.
Moreover, I joined the Court's discussion in Part II of Lynch concerning government acknowledgments of religion in
American life because, in my view, acknowledgments such as the
legislative prayers upheld in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), and the printing of "In God We Trust" on our coins serve
the secular purposes of

															"solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 693 (concurring opinion). Because they serve such secular purposes and
because of their "history and ubiquity," such government
acknowledgments of religion are not understood as conveying an
endorsement of particular religious beliefs. Ibid. At the
same time, it is clear that

															"[g]overnment practices that purport to celebrate or acknowledge
events with religious significance must be subjected to careful
judicial scrutiny." Id. at 465 U. S.
694 .

															In my concurrence in Lynch, I suggested a clarification
of our Establishment Clause doctrine to reinforce the concept that
the Establishment Clause "prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community." Id. at 465 U. S. 687 .
The government violates this prohibition if it endorses or
disapproves of religion. Id. at 465 U. S.
688 .

															"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community." Ibid. Disapproval of religion conveys the opposite
message. Thus, in my view, the central issue in Lynch was
whether the city of Pawtucket had Page 492 U. S. 626 endorsed Christianity by displaying a creche as part of a larger
exhibit of traditional secular symbols of the Christmas holiday
season.

															In Lynch, I concluded that the city's display of a
creche in its larger holiday exhibit in a private park in the
commercial district had neither the purpose nor the effect of
conveying a message of government endorsement of Christianity or
disapproval of other religions. The purpose of including the creche
in the larger display was to celebrate the public holiday through
its traditional symbols, not to promote the religious content of
the creche. Id. at 465 U. S. 691 .
Nor, in my view, did Pawtucket's display of the creche along with
secular symbols of the Christmas holiday objectively convey a
message of endorsement of Christianity. Id. at 465 U. S.
692 .

															For the reasons stated in 492 U. S. I
agree that the creche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse, the seat of county government, conveys
a message to nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full
members of the political community, and a corresponding message to
Christians that they are favored members of the political
community. In contrast to the creche in Lynch, which was
displayed in a private park in the city's commercial district as
part of a broader display of traditional secular symbols of the
holiday season, this creche stands alone in the county courthouse.
The display of religious symbols in public areas of core government
buildings runs a special risk of "mak[ing] religion relevant, in
reality or public perception, to status in the political
community." Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S. 692 (concurring opinion). See also American Jewish Congress v.
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128 (CA7 1987) ("Because City Hall is
so plainly under government ownership and control, every display
and activity in the building is implicitly marked with the stamp of
government approval. The presence of a nativity scene in the lobby,
therefore, inevitably creates a clear and strong impression that
the local government tacitly endorses Page 492 U. S. 627 Christianity"). The Court correctly concludes that placement of
the central religious symbol of the Christmas holiday season at the
Allegheny County Courthouse has the unconstitutional effect of
conveying a government endorsement of Christianity. II In his separate opinion, JUSTICE KENNEDY asserts that the
endorsement test "is flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in
practice." Post at 492 U. S. 669 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). In
my view, neither criticism is persuasive. As a theoretical matter,
the endorsement test captures the essential command of the
Establishment Clause, namely, that government must not make a
person's religious beliefs relevant to his or her standing in the
political community by conveying a message "that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred." Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 70 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); School Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S. 389 (1985). See also Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The
Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice
O'Connor, 62 Notre Dame L.Rev. 151 (1987); Note, Developments in
the Law -- Religion and the State, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 1606, 1647
(1987) (Developments in the Law). We live in a pluralistic society.
Our citizens come from diverse religious traditions, or adhere to
no particular religious beliefs at all. If government is to be
neutral in matters of religion, rather than showing either
favoritism or disapproval towards citizens based on their personal
religious choices, government cannot endorse the religious
practices and beliefs of some citizens without sending a clear
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders or less than full
members of the political community.

															An Establishment Clause standard that prohibits only "coercive"
practices or overt efforts at government proselytization, post at 492 U.S.
659 -662, 492 U. S.
664 -665, but fails to take account of the numerous more
subtle ways that government can show favoritism Page 492 U. S. 628 to particular beliefs or convey a message of disapproval to
others, would not, in my view, adequately protect the religious
liberty or respect the religious diversity of the members of our
pluralistic political community. Thus, this Court has never relied
on coercion alone as the touchstone of Establishment Clause
analysis. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , 413 U. S. 786 (1973) ("[W]hile proof of coercion might provide a basis for a
claim under the Free Exercise Clause, it [is] not a necessary
element of any claim under the Establishment Clause"); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 430 (1962). To require a showing of coercion, even indirect coercion,
as an essential element of an Establishment Clause violation would
make the Free Exercise Clause a redundancy. See Abington School
District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 223 (1963) ("The distinction between the two clauses is apparent -- a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion,
while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended"). See also Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 875,
922 (1986) ("If coercion is also an element of the establishment
clause, establishment adds nothing to free exercise"). Moreover, as
even JUSTICE KENNEDY recognizes, any Establishment Clause test
limited to " direct coercion" clearly would fail to account
for forms of "[s]ymbolic recognition or accommodation of religious
faith" that may violate the Establishment Clause. Post at 492 U. S.
661 .

															I continue to believe that the endorsement test asks the right
question about governmental practices challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the
display of religious symbols. Moreover, commentators in the
scholarly literature have found merit in the approach. See,
e.g., Beschle, supra, at 174; Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986
B.Y.U.L.Rev. 465; Marshall, "We Know It When We Page 492 U. S. 629 See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. Cal.L.Rev.
495 (1986); Developments in the Law 1647. I also remain convinced
that the endorsement test is capable of consistent application.
Indeed, it is notable that the three Circuit courts which have
considered challenges to the display of a creche standing alone at
city hall have each concluded, relying in part on endorsement
analysis, that such a practice sends a message to nonadherents of
Christianity that they are outsiders in the political community. See 842 F.2d 655 (CA3 1988); American Jewish Congress
v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 127-128 (CA7 1987); ACLU v.
Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1566-1567 (CA6), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986). See also Friedman v. Board of
County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777,
780-782 (CA10 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986) (county seal including Latin cross and Spanish motto
translated as "With This We Conquer," conveys a message of
endorsement of Christianity). To be sure, the endorsement test
depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of
a particular challenged practice and, like any test that is
sensitive to context, it may not always yield results with
unanimous agreement at the margins. But that is true of many
standards in constitutional law, and even the modified coercion
test offered by JUSTICE KENNEDY involves judgment and hard choices
at the margin. He admits as much by acknowledging that the
permanent display of a Latin cross at city hall would violate the
Establishment Clause, as would the display of symbols of Christian
holidays alone. Post at 492 U. S. 661 , 492 U. S.
664 -665, n. 3. Would the display of a Latin cross for
six months have such an unconstitutional effect, or the display of
the symbols of most Christian holidays and one Jewish holiday?
Would the Christmastime display of a creche inside a courtroom be
"coercive" if subpoenaed witnesses had no opportunity to "turn
their backs" and walk away? Post at 492 U. S. 664 .
Would displaying a creche in front of a public school violate the
Establishment Clause under JUSTICE KENNEDY's test? Page 492 U. S. 630 We cannot avoid the obligation to draw lines, often close and
difficult lines, in deciding Establishment Clause cases, and that
is not a problem unique to the endorsement test.

															JUSTICE KENNEDY submits that the endorsement test is
inconsistent with our precedents and traditions because, in his
words, if it were "applied without artificial exceptions for
historical practice," it would invalidate many traditional
practices recognizing the role of religion in our society. Post at 492 U. S. 670 .
This criticism shortchanges both the endorsement test itself and my
explanation of the reason why certain longstanding government
acknowledgments of religion do not, under that test, convey a
message of endorsement. Practices such as legislative prayers or
opening Court sessions with "God save the United States and this
honorable Court" serve the secular purposes of "solemnizing public
occasions" and "expressing confidence in the future," Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 693 (concurring opinion). These examples of ceremonial deism do not
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny simply by virtue of their
historical longevity alone. Historical acceptance of a practice
does not, in itself, validate that practice under the Establishment
Clause if the practice violates the values protected by that
Clause, just as historical acceptance of racial or gender based
discrimination does not immunize such practices from scrutiny under
the 14th Amendment. As we recognized in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York City, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 678 (1970),

															"[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of
the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers
our entire national existence and indeed predates it."

															Under the endorsement test, the "history and ubiquity" of a
practice is relevant not because it creates an "artificial
exception" from that test. On the contrary, the "history and
ubiquity" of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the
context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a
challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement
of religion. It is the combination of the Page 492 U. S. 631 longstanding existence of practices such as opening legislative
sessions with legislative prayers or opening Court sessions with
"God save the United States and this honorable Court," as well as
their nonsectarian nature, that leads me to the conclusion that
those particular practices, despite their religious roots, do not
convey a message of endorsement of particular religious beliefs. See Lynch, supra, at 465 U.S. 465 U. S. 693 (concurring opinion); Developments in the Law 1652-1654. Similarly,
the celebration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, despite its
religious origins, is now generally understood as a celebration of
patriotic values, rather than particular religious beliefs. The
question under endorsement analysis, in short, is whether a
reasonable observer would view such longstanding practices as a
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices, in light of
the fact that they serve a secular purpose, rather than a sectarian
one, and have largely lost their religious significance over time. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1294-1296 (2d
ed.1988). Although the endorsement test requires careful and often
difficult linedrawing and is highly context-specific, no
alternative test has been suggested that captures the essential
mandate of the Establishment Clause as well as the endorsement test
does, and it warrants continued application and refinement.

															Contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY's assertions, neither the
endorsement test nor its application in this case reflects "an
unjustified hostility toward religion." Post at 492 U. S. 655 . See also post at 492 U. S. 663 , 492 U. S.
667 -678. Instead, the endorsement standard recognizes
that the religious liberty so precious to the citizens who make up
our diverse country is protected, not impeded, when government
avoids endorsing religion or favoring particular beliefs over
others. Clearly, the government can acknowledge the role
of religion in our society in numerous ways that do not amount to
an endorsement. See Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S. 693 (concurring opinion). Moreover, the government can accommodate religion by lifting government-imposed burdens
on religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 Page 492 U. S. 632 U.S. at 472 U. S. 83 -84
(opinion concurring in judgment). Indeed, the Free Exercise Clause
may mandate that it do so in particular cases. In cases involving
the lifting of government burdens on the free exercise of religion,
a reasonable observer would take into account the values underlying
the Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged
practice conveyed a message of endorsement. Id. at 472 U. S. 83 . By
"build[ing] on the concerns at the core of nonestablishment
doctrine and recogniz[ing] the role of accommodations in furthering
free exercise," the endorsement test "provides a standard capable
of consistent application and avoids the criticism leveled against
the Lemon test." Rostain, Permissible Accommodations of
Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 Yale L.J.
1147, 1159-1160 (1987). The cases before the Court today, however,
do not involve lifting a governmental burden on the free exercise
of religion. By repeatedly using the terms "acknowledgment" of
religion and "accommodation" of religion interchangeably, however, post at 492 U. S.
662 -664, 492 U. S. 670 , 492 U. S. 678 ,
JUSTICE KENNEDY obscures the fact that the displays at issue in
these cases were not placed at city hall in order to remove a
government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion.
Christians remain free to display their creches at their homes and
churches. Ante at 492 U. S. 601 , n. 51. Allegheny County has neither
placed nor removed a governmental burden on the free exercise of
religion, but rather, for the reasons stated in Part IV of the
Court's opinion, has conveyed a message of governmental endorsement
of Christian beliefs. This the Establishment Clause does not
permit. III For reasons which differ somewhat from those set forth in 492 U. S. I
also conclude that the city of Pittsburgh's combined holiday
display of a Chanukah menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign
saluting liberty does not have the effect of conveying an
endorsement of religion. I agree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN, ante at 492 U. S.
616 -617, Page 492 U. S. 633 that the Christmas tree, whatever its origins, is not regarded
today as a religious symbol. Although Christmas is a public holiday
that has both religious and secular aspects, the Christmas tree is
widely viewed as a secular symbol of the holiday, in contrast to
the creche, which depicts the holiday's religious dimensions. A
Christmas tree displayed in front of city hall, in my view, cannot
fairly be understood as conveying government endorsement of
Christianity. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion acknowledges that
a Christmas tree alone conveys no endorsement of Christian beliefs,
it formulates the question posed by Pittsburgh's combined display
of the tree and the menorah as whether the display

															"has the effect of endorsing both Christian and Jewish
faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in our society." Ante at 492 U. S. 616 (emphasis added).

															That formulation of the question disregards the fact that the
Christmas tree is a predominantly secular symbol, and, more
significantly, obscures the religious nature of the menorah and the
holiday of Chanukah. The opinion is correct to recognize that the
religious holiday of Chanukah has historical and cultural, as well
as religious, dimensions, and that there may be certain "secular
aspects" to the holiday. But that is not to conclude, however, as
JUSTICE BLACKMUN seems to do, that Chanukah has become a "secular
holiday" in our society. Ante at 492 U. S. 615 .
The Easter holiday celebrated by Christians may be accompanied by
certain "secular aspects" such as Easter bunnies and Easter egg
hunts, but it is nevertheless a religious holiday. Similarly,
Chanukah is a religious holiday with strong historical components
particularly important to the Jewish people. Moreover, the menorah
is the central religious symbol and ritual object of that religious
holiday. Under JUSTICE BLACKMUN's view, however, the menorah "has
been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday
season," Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
727 Page 492 U. S. 634 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), almost devoid of any religious
significance. In my view, the relevant question for Establishment
Clause purposes is whether the City of Pittsburgh's display of the
menorah, the religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty sends a message of
government endorsement of Judaism, or whether it sends a message of
pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs.

															In characterizing the message conveyed by this display as either
a "double endorsement" or a secular acknowledgment of the winter
holiday season, the opinion states that "[i]t is distinctly
implausible to view the combined display of the tree, the sign, and
the menorah as endorsing Jewish faith alone." Ante at 492 U. S. 616 ,
n. 64. That statement, however, seems to suggest that it would be
implausible for the city to endorse a faith adhered to by a
minority of the citizenry. Regardless of the plausibility of a
putative governmental purpose, the more important inquiry here is
whether the governmental display of a minority faith's religious
symbol could ever reasonably be understood to convey a message of
endorsement of that faith. A menorah standing alone at city hall
may well send such a message to nonadherents, just as, in this
case, the creche standing alone at the Allegheny County Courthouse
sends a message of governmental endorsement of Christianity,
whatever the county's purpose in authorizing the display may have
been. Thus, the question here is whether Pittsburgh's holiday
display conveys a message of endorsement of Judaism, when the
menorah is the only religious symbol in the combined display and
when the opinion acknowledges that the tree cannot reasonably be
understood to convey an endorsement of Christianity. One need not
characterize Chanukah as a "secular" holiday or strain to argue
that the menorah has a "secular" dimension, ante at 492 U. S. 587 ,
n. 34, in order to conclude that the city of Pittsburgh's combined
display does not convey a message of endorsement of Judaism or of
religion in general. Page 492 U. S. 635 In setting up its holiday display, which included the lighted
tree and the menorah, the city of Pittsburgh stressed the theme of
liberty and pluralism by accompanying the exhibit with a sign
bearing the following message:

															"'During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers
of the flame of liberty and our legacy of freedom.'" Ante at 492 U. S. 582 .
This sign indicates that the city intended to convey its own
distinctive message of pluralism and freedom. By accompanying its
display of a Christmas tree -- a secular symbol of the Christmas
holiday season -- with a salute to liberty, and by adding a
religious symbol from a Jewish holiday also celebrated at roughly
the same time of year, I conclude that the city did not endorse
Judaism or religion in general, but rather conveyed a message of
pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season.
"Although the religious, and indeed sectarian, significance" of the
menorah "is not neutralized by the setting," Lynch, 465
U.S. at 465 U. S. 692 (concurring opinion), this particular physical setting

															"changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display -- as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing
the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message
of endorsement of that content." Ibid. The message of pluralism conveyed by the city's combined holiday
display is not a message that endorses religion over nonreligion.
Just as government may not favor particular religious beliefs over
others, "government may not favor religious belief over disbelief." Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S.
1 , 489 U. S. 27 (1989) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 52 -54; id. at 472 U. S. 70 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Here, by displaying a
secular symbol of the Christmas holiday season rather than a
religious one, the city acknowledged a public holiday celebrated by
both religious and nonreligious citizens alike, and it did so
without endorsing Christian beliefs. A reasonable observer would,
in my view, appreciate that the combined Page 492 U. S. 636 display is an effort to acknowledge the cultural diversity of
our country and to convey tolerance of different choices in matters
of religious belief or nonbelief by recognizing that the winter
holiday season is celebrated in diverse ways by our citizens. In
short, in the holiday context, this combined display in its
particular physical setting conveys neither an endorsement of
Judaism or Christianity nor disapproval of alternative beliefs, and
thus does not have the impermissible effect of "mak[ing] religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the
political community." Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S. 692 (concurring opinion).

															My conclusion does not depend on whether or not the city had "a
more secular alternative symbol" of Chanukah, ante at 492 U. S. 618 ,
just as the Court's decision in Lynch clearly did not turn
on whether the city of Pawtucket could have conveyed its tribute to
the Christmas holiday season by using a "less religious"
alternative to the creche symbol in its display of traditional
holiday symbols. See Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 7 ("JUSTICE BRENNAN argues that the city's objectives could have
been achieved without including the creche in the display, [465
U.S.] at 465 U. S. 699 .
True or not, that is irrelevant. The question is whether the
display of the creche violates the Establishment Clause"). In my
view, JUSTICE BLACKMUN's new rule, ante at 492 U. S. 618 ,
that an inference of endorsement arises every time government uses
a symbol with religious meaning if a "more secular alternative" is
available is too blunt an instrument for Establishment Clause
analysis, which depends on sensitivity to the context and
circumstances presented by each case. Indeed, the opinion appears
to recognize the importance of this contextual sensitivity by
creating an exception to its new rule in the very case announcing
it: the opinion acknowledges that "a purely secular symbol" of
Chanukah is available, namely, a dreidel or four-sided top, but
rejects the use of such a symbol because it "might be interpreted
by some as mocking the celebration of Chanukah." Ibid. This recognition that the more religious Page 492 U. S. 637 alternative may, depending on the circumstances, convey a
message that is least likely to implicate Establishment Clause
concerns is an excellent example of the need to focus on the
specific practice in question in its particular physical setting
and context in determining whether government has conveyed or
attempted to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred.

															In sum, I conclude that the city of Pittsburgh's combined
holiday display had neither the purpose nor the effect of endorsing
religion, but that Allegheny County's creche display had such an
effect. Accordingly, I join Parts I, II, III-A, IV, V, and VII of
the Court's opinion, and concur in the judgment.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I have previously explained at some length my views on the
relationship between the Establishment Clause and
government-sponsored celebrations of the Christmas holiday. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S.
694 -726 (1984) (dissenting opinion). I continue to
believe that the display of an object that "retains a specifically
Christian [or other] religious meaning," id. at 465 U. S. 708 ,
is incompatible with the separation of church and state demanded by
our Constitution. I therefore agree with the Court that Allegheny
County's display of a creche at the county courthouse signals an
endorsement of the Christian faith in violation of the
Establishment Clause, and join Parts III-A, IV, and V of the
Court's opinion. I cannot agree, however, that the city's display
of a 45-foot Christmas tree and an 18-foot Chanukah menorah at the
entrance to the building housing the mayor's office shows no
favoritism towards Christianity, Judaism, or both. Indeed, I should
have thought that the answer as to the first display supplied the
answer to the second.

															According to the Court, the creche display sends a message
endorsing Christianity because the creche itself bears a Page 492 U. S. 638 religious meaning, because an angel in the display carries a
banner declaring "Glory to God in the highest!," and because the
floral decorations surrounding the creche highlight it, rather than
secularize it. The display of a Christmas tree and Chanukah
menorah, in contrast, is said to show no endorsement of a
particular faith or faiths, or of religion in general, because the
Christmas tree is a secular symbol which brings out the secular
elements of the menorah. Ante at 492 U. S.
616 -617. And, JUSTICE BLACKMUN concludes, even though
the menorah has religious aspects, its display reveals no
endorsement of religion because no other symbol could have been
used to represent the secular aspects of the holiday of Chanukah
without mocking its celebration. Ante at 492 U. S. 618 .
Rather than endorsing religion, therefore, the display merely
demonstrates that "Christmas is not the only traditional way of
observing the winter holiday season," and confirms our "cultural
diversity." Ante at 492 U. S. 617 , 492 U. S.
619 .

															Thus, the decision as to the menorah rests on three premises:
the Christmas tree is a secular symbol; Chanukah is a holiday with
secular dimensions, symbolized by the menorah; and the government
may promote pluralism by sponsoring or condoning displays having
strong religious associations on its property. None of these is
sound. I The first step toward JUSTICE BLACKMUN's conclusion is the claim
that, despite its religious origins, the Christmas tree is a
secular symbol. He explains:

															"The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a
religious symbol. Although Christmas trees once carried religious
connotations, today they typify the secular celebration of
Christmas. Numerous Americans place Christmas trees in their homes
without subscribing to Christian religious beliefs, and when the
city's tree stands alone in front of the City-County Building, it
is not considered an endorsement of Christian faith. Indeed, Page 492 U. S. 639 a 40-foot Christmas tree was one of the objects that validated
the creche in Lynch. The widely accepted view of the
Christmas tree as the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas
holiday season serves to emphasize the secular component of the
message communicated by other elements of an accompanying holiday
display, including the Chanukah menorah." Ante at 492 U. S.
616 -617 (citations and footnotes omitted). JUSTICE
O'CONNOR accepts this view of the Christmas tree because,

															"whatever its origins, [it] is not regarded today as a religious
symbol. Although Christmas is a public holiday that has both
religious and secular aspects, the Christmas tree is widely viewed
as a secular symbol of the holiday, in contrast to the creche,
which depicts the holiday's religious dimensions." Ante at 492 U. S.
633 .

															Thus, while acknowledging the religious origins of the Christmas
tree, JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR dismiss their significance. In
my view, this attempt to take the "Christmas" out of the Christmas
tree is unconvincing. That the tree may, without controversy, be
deemed a secular symbol if found alone does not mean that it will
be so seen when combined with other symbols or objects. Indeed,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN admits that "the tree is capable of taking on a
religious significance if it is decorated with religious symbols." Ante at 492 U. S. 617 ,
n. 65.

															The notion that the Christmas tree is necessarily secular is,
indeed, so shaky that, despite superficial acceptance of the idea,
JUSTICE O'CONNOR does not really take it seriously. While conceding
that the "menorah standing alone at city hall may well send" a
message of endorsement of the Jewish faith, she nevertheless
concludes:

															"By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree -- a secular
symbol of the Christmas holiday season -- with a salute to liberty,
and by adding a religious symbol from a Jewish holiday also
celebrated at roughly the same time of year, I conclude that the
city did not endorse Judaism or religion in general, but rather
conveyed a message Page 492 U. S. 640 of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday
season." Ante at 492 U. S. 635 .
But the "pluralism" to which JUSTICE O'CONNOR refers is religious pluralism, and the "freedom of belief" she
emphasizes is freedom of religious belief.* The display of
the tree and the menorah will symbolize such pluralism and freedom
only if more than one religion is represented; if only Judaism is
represented, the scene is about Judaism, not about pluralism. Thus,
the pluralistic message JUSTICE O'CONNOR stresses depends
on the tree's possessing some religious significance.

															In asserting that the Christmas tree, regardless of its
surroundings, is a purely secular symbol, JUSTICES BLACKMUN and
O'CONNOR ignore the precept they otherwise so enthusiastically
embrace: that context is all-important in determining the message
conveyed by particular objects. See ante at 492 U. S. 597 (BLACKMUN, J.) (relevant question is "whether the Page 492 U. S. 641 display of the creche and the menorah, in their respective particular physical settings,' has the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs") (quoting School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S. 390 (1985)); ante at 492 U. S. 624 (O'CONNOR, J.) ("`[E]very government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes
an endorsement or disapproval of religion'") (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)); ante at 492 U. S. 636 (O'CONNOR, J.) ("Establishment Clause analysis . . . depends on
sensitivity to the context and circumstances presented by each
case"); ante at 492 U. S. 637 (O'CONNOR, J.) (emphasizing "the need to focus on the specific
practice in question in its particular physical setting and
context"). In analyzing the symbolic character of the Christmas
tree, both JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR abandon this contextual
inquiry. In doing so, they go badly astray. Positioned as it was, the Christmas tree's religious
significance was bound to come to the fore. Situated next to the
menorah -- which, JUSTICE BLACKMUN acknowledges, is "a symbol with
religious meaning," ante at 492 U. S. 618 ,
and indeed, is "the central religious symbol and ritual object of "
Chanukah, ante at 492 U. S. 633 (O'CONNOR, J.) -- the Christmas tree's
religious dimension could not be overlooked by observers of the
display. Even though the tree alone may be deemed predominantly
secular, it can hardly be so characterized when placed next to such
a forthrightly religious symbol. Consider a poster featuring a star
of David, a statue of Buddha, a Christmas tree, a mosque, and a
drawing of Krishna. There can be no doubt that, when found in such
company, the tree serves as an unabashedly religious symbol.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN believes that it is the tree that changes the
message of the menorah, rather than the menorah that alters our
view of the tree. After the abrupt dismissal of the suggestion that
the flora surrounding the creche might have diluted the religious
character of the display at the county courthouse, ante at 492 U. S. 599 ,
his quick conclusion that Page 492 U. S. 642 the Christmas tree had a secularizing effect on the menorah is
surprising. The distinguishing characteristic, it appears, is the
size of the tree. The tree, we are told, is much taller -- 2 1/2
times taller, in fact -- than the menorah, and is located directly
under one of the building's archways, whereas the menorah "is
positioned to one side . . . [i]n the shadow of the tree." Ante at 492 U. S.
617 .

															As a factual matter, it seems to me that the sight of an 18-foot
menorah would be far more eye-catching than that of a rather
conventionally sized Christmas tree. It also seems to me likely
that the symbol with the more singular message will predominate
over one lacking such a clear meaning. Given the homogenized
message that JUSTICE BLACKMUN associates with the Christmas tree, I
would expect that the menorah, with its concededly religious
character, would tend to dominate the tree. And, though JUSTICE
BLACKMUN shunts the point to a footnote at the end of his opinion, ante at 492 U. S. 621 ,
n. 70, it is highly relevant that the menorah was lit during a
religious ceremony complete with traditional religious blessings. I
do not comprehend how the failure to challenge separately this
portion of the city's festivities precludes us from considering it
in assessing the message sent by the display as a whole. But
see ibid. With such an openly religious introduction, it is
most likely that the religious aspects of the menorah would be
front and center in this display.

															I would not, however, presume to say that my interpretation of
the tree's significance is the "correct" one, or the one shared by
most visitors to the City-County Building. I do not know how we can
decide whether it was the tree that stripped the religious
connotations from the menorah or the menorah that laid bare the
religious origins of the tree. Both are reasonable interpretations
of the scene the city presented, and thus both, I think, should
satisfy JUSTICE BLACKMUN's requirement that the display "be judged
according to the standard of a reasonable observer.'" Ante at 492 U. S. 620 .
I Page 492 U. S. 643 shudder to think that the only "reasonable observer" is one who
shares the particular views on perspective, spacing, and accent
expressed in JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion, thus making analysis under
the Establishment Clause look more like an exam in Art 101 than an
inquiry into constitutional law. II The second premise on which today's decision rests is the notion
that Chanukah is a partly secular holiday, for which the menorah
can serve as a secular symbol. It is no surprise and no anomaly
that Chanukah has historical and societal roots that range beyond
the purely religious. I would venture that most, if not all, major
religious holidays have beginnings and enjoy histories studded with
figures, events, and practices that are not strictly religious. It
does not seem to me that the mere fact that Chanukah shares this
kind of background makes it a secular holiday in any meaningful
sense. The menorah is indisputably a religious symbol, used
ritually in a celebration that has deep religious significance.
That, in my view, is all that need be said. Whatever secular
practices the holiday of Chanukah has taken on in its contemporary
observance are beside the point.

															Indeed, at the very outset of his discussion of the menorah
display, JUSTICE BLACKMUN recognizes that the menorah is a
religious symbol. Ante at 492 U. S. 613 .
That should have been the end of the case. But, as did the Court in Lynch, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,

															"by focusing on the holiday 'context' in which the [menorah]
appeared, seeks to explain away the clear religious import of the
[menorah]. . . ."

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 705 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). By the end of the opinion, the menorah
has become but a coequal symbol, with the Christmas tree, of "the
winter-holiday season." Ante at 492 U. S. 620 .
Pittsburgh's secularization of an inherently religious symbol,
aided and abetted here by JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion, recalls the
effort in Lynch to render the creche a secular symbol. As
I said then:

															"To suggest, as the Court does, that such a symbol Page 492 U. S. 644 is merely 'traditional,' and therefore no different from Santa's
house or reindeer, is not only offensive to those for whom the
creche has profound significance but insulting to those who insist,
for religious or personal reasons, that the story of Christ is in
no sense a part of 'history,' nor an unavoidable element of our
national 'heritage.'"

															465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
711 -712. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR rightly observes, JUSTICE
BLACKMUN "obscures the religious nature of the menorah and the
holiday of Chanukah." Ante at 492 U. S.
633 .

															I cannot, in short, accept the effort to transform an emblem of
religious faith into the innocuous "symbol for a holiday that . . .
has both religious and secular dimensions." Ante at 492 U. S. 614 (BLACKMUN, J.). III JUSTICE BLACKMUN, in his acceptance of the city's message of
"diversity," ante at 492 U. S. 619 ,
and, even more so, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, in her approval of the
"message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs," ante at 492 U. S. 634 ,
appear to believe that, where seasonal displays are concerned, more
is better. Whereas a display might be constitutionally problematic
if it showcased the holiday of just one religion, those problems
vaporize as soon as more than one religion is included. I know of
no principle under the Establishment Clause, however, that permits
us to conclude that governmental promotion of religion is
acceptable so long as one religion is not favored. We have, on the
contrary, interpreted that Clause to require neutrality, not just
among religions, but between religion and nonreligion. See,
e.g., Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 15 (1947); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S.
38 , 472 U. S. 52 -54
(1985).

															Nor do I discern the theory under which the government is
permitted to appropriate particular holidays and religious objects
to its own use in celebrating "pluralism." The message of the sign
announcing a "Salute to Liberty" is not religious, but patriotic;
the government's use of religion to promote its Page 492 U. S. 645 own cause is undoubtedly offensive to those whose religious
beliefs are not bound up with their attitude toward the Nation.

															The uncritical acceptance of a message of religious pluralism
also ignores the extent to which even that message may offend. Many
religious faiths are hostile to each other, and indeed refuse even
to participate in ecumenical services designed to demonstrate the
very pluralism JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR extol. To lump the
ritual objects and holidays of religions together without regard to
their attitudes toward such inclusiveness, or to decide which
religions should be excluded because of the possibility of offense,
is not a benign or beneficent celebration of pluralism: it is
instead an interference in religious matters precluded by the
Establishment Clause.

															The government-sponsored display of the menorah alongside a
Christmas tree also works a distortion of the Jewish religious
calendar. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN acknowledges, "the proximity of
Christmas [may] accoun[t] for the social prominence of Chanukah in
this country." Ante at 492 U. S. 586 .
It is the proximity of Christmas that undoubtedly accounts for the
city's decision to participate in the celebration of Chanukah,
rather than the far more significant Jewish holidays of Rosh
Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Contrary to the impression the city and
JUSTICES BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR seem to create, with their emphasis
on "the winter holiday season," December is not the holiday season
for Judaism. Thus, the city's erection alongside the Christmas tree
of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish religious holiday, far
from conveying "the city's secular recognition of different
traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season," ante at 492 U. S. 620 (BLACKMUN, J.), or "a message of pluralism and freedom of belief," ante at 492 U. S. 635 (O'CONNOR, J.), has the effect of promoting a Christianized version
of Judaism. The holiday calendar they appear willing to accept
revolves exclusively around a Christian holiday. And those
religions that have Page 492 U. S. 646 no holiday at all during the period between Thanksgiving and New
Year's Day will not benefit, even in a second-class manner, from
the city's once-a-year tribute to "liberty" and "freedom of
belief." This is not "pluralism" as I understand it.

															* If it is not religious pluralism that the display signifies,
then I do not know what kind of "pluralism" JUSTICE O'CONNOR has in
mind. Perhaps she means the cultural pluralism that results from
recognition of many different holidays, religious and nonreligious.
In that case, however, the display of a menorah next to a giant
firecracker, symbolic of the Fourth of July, would seem to be
equally representative of this pluralism, yet I do not sense that
this display would pass muster under JUSTICE O'CONNOR's view. If,
instead, JUSTICE O'CONNOR means to approve the pluralistic message
associated with a symbolic display that may stand for either the
secular or religious aspects of a given holiday, then this view
would logically entail the conclusion that the display of a Latin
cross next to an Easter bunny in the springtime would be valid
under the Establishment Clause; again, however, I sense that such a
conclusion would not comport with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's views. The
final possibility, and the one that seems most consonant with the
views outlined in her opinion, see ante at 492 U. S. 635 ,
is that the pluralism that JUSTICE O'CONNOR perceives in
Pittsburgh's display arises from the recognition that there are
many different ways to celebrate "the winter holiday season," ante at 492 U. S. 636 .
But winter is " the holiday season" to Christians, not to
Jews, and the implicit message that it, rather than autumn, is the
time for pluralism sends an impermissible signal that only holidays
stemming from Christianity, not those arising from other religions,
favorably dispose the government towards "pluralism." See
infra at 492 U. S.
645 .

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															Governmental recognition of not one but two religions
distinguishes these cases from our prior Establishment Clause
cases. It is, therefore, appropriate to reexamine the text and
context of the Clause to determine its impact on this novel
situation.

															Relations between church and state at the end of the 1780's fell
into two quite different categories. In several European countries,
one national religion, such as the Church of England in Great
Britain, was established. The established church typically was
supported by tax revenues, by laws conferring privileges only upon
members, and sometimes by violent persecution of nonadherents. In
contrast, although several American Colonies had assessed taxes to
support one chosen faith, none of the newly United States
subsidized a single religion. Some States had repealed
establishment laws altogether, while others had replaced single
establishments with laws providing for nondiscriminatory support of
more than one religion. [ Footnote
2/1 ] Page 492 U. S. 647 It is against this historical backdrop that James Madison, then
a Representative from Virginia, rose to the floor of the First
Congress on June 8, 1789, and proposed a number of amendments to
the Constitution, including the following:

															"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of
religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience
be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."

															1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789) (emphasis added). Congressional
debate produced several reformulations of the italicized language.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] One Member suggested
the words "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, " id. at 731 (emphasis added), soon amended to "Congress
shall make no law establishing religion, " id. at
766 (emphasis added). After further alteration, this passage became
one of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Ratified in
1791, they state that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," U.S.Const., Amdt. 1 (emphasis added).

															By its terms, the initial draft of the Establishment Clause
would have prohibited only the national established church that
prevailed in England; multiple establishments, such as existed in
six States, would have been permitted. But even Page 492 U. S. 648 in those States and even among members of the established
churches, there was widespread opposition to multiple
establishments because of the social divisions they caused.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Perhaps in response
to this opposition, subsequent drafts broadened the scope of the
Establishment Clause from "any national religion" to "religion," a
word understood primarily to mean "[v]irtue, as founded upon
reverence of God, and expectation of future rewards and
punishments," and only secondarily "[a] system of divine faith and
worship, as opposite to others." S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language (7th ed. 1785); accord, T. Sheridan, A
Complete Dictionary of the English Language 6th ed. (1796). Cf.
Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.
S. 829 , 489 U. S. 834 (1989) (construing "religion" protected by Free Exercise Page 492 U. S. 649 Clause to include "sincerely held religious belief" apart from
"membership in an organized religious denomination"). Plainly, the
Clause as ratified proscribes federal legislation establishing a
number of religions as well as a single national church. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Similarly expanded was the relationship between government and
religion that was to be disallowed. Whereas earlier drafts had
barred only laws "establishing" or "touching" religion, the final
text interdicts all laws "respecting an establishment of religion."
This phrase forbids even a partial establishment, Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 612 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 436 (1962), not only of a particular sect in favor of others, but also
of religion in preference to nonreligion, Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 52 (1985). It is also significant that the final draft contains the
word "respecting." Like "touching," "respecting" means concerning,
or with reference to. But it also means with respect -- that is,
"reverence," "good will," "regard" -- to. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Taking into account this richer meaning,
the Establishment Clause, in banning laws that concern religion,
especially prohibits those that pay homage to religion.

															Treatment of a symbol of a particular tradition demonstrates
one's attitude toward that tradition. Cf. Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989). Thus the prominent display of religious symbols on
government property falls within the compass of the First
Amendment, even though interference with personal choices about
supporting a church, by means of governmental tithing, was the
primary concern in 1791. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York
City, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 668 (1970); 492
U.S. 573 fn2/3|>n. 3, supra. Whether the vice in
such a display is Page 492 U. S. 650 characterized as "coercion," see post at 492 U. S.
660 -661 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part), or "endorsement," see ante at 492 U. S. 625 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), or
merely as state action with the purpose and effect of providing
support for specific faiths, cf. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612 ,
it is common ground that this symbolic governmental speech
"respecting an establishment of religion" may violate the
Constitution. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Cf. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 60 -61; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984). In my opinion, the Establishment Clause should be construed
to create a strong presumption against the display of religious
symbols on public property. [ Footnote
2/7 ] There is always a Page 492 U. S. 651 risk that such symbols will offend nonmembers of the faith being
advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular
advertisement disrespectful. Some devout Christians believe that
the creche should be placed only in reverential settings, such as a
church or perhaps a private home; they do not countenance its use
as an aid to commercialization of Christ's birthday. Cf.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
726 -727 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 2/8 ] In this very suit, members of the
Jewish faith firmly opposed the use to which the menorah was put by
the particular sect that sponsored the display at Pittsburgh's
City-county Building. [ Footnote
2/9 ] Even though "[p]assersby who disagree with the message
conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn
their backs," see post at 492 U. S. 664 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part), displays of this kind inevitably have a greater tendency to
emphasize sincere and deeply felt differences among individuals
than to achieve an ecumenical goal. The Establishment Clause does
not allow public bodies to foment such disagreement. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Page 492 U. S. 652 Application of a strong presumption against the public use of
religious symbols scarcely will "require a relentless extirpation
of all contact between government and religion," see post at 492 U. S. 657 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part), [ Footnote 2/11 ] for it
will prohibit a display only when its message, evaluated in the
context in which it is presented, is nonsecular. [ Footnote 2/12 ] For example, a carving of Moses
holding the Ten Commandments, if that is the only adornment on a
courtroom wall, conveys an equivocal message, perhaps of respect
for Judaism, for religion in general, or for law. The addition of
carvings depicting Confucius and Mohammed may honor religion, or
particular religions, to an extent that the First Amendment does
not tolerate any more than it does "the permanent erection of a
large Latin cross on the roof of city hall." See post at 492 U. S. 661 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 (1980) (per curiam). Placement of secular figures
such as Caesar Augustus, William Blackstone, Napoleon Bonaparte,
and John Marshall alongside these three religious leaders, however,
signals respect not Page 492 U. S. 653 for great proselytizers but for great lawgivers. It would be
absurd to exclude such a fitting message from a courtroom,
[ Footnote 2/13 ] as it would to
exclude religious paintings by Italian Renaissance masters from a
public museum. Cf. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
712 -713, 465 U. S. 717 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Far from "border[ing] on latent
hostility toward religion," see post at 492 U. S. 657 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part), this careful consideration of context gives due regard to
religious and nonreligious members of our society. [ Footnote 2/14 ] Thus, I find wholly
unpersuasive JUSTICE KENNEDY's attempts, post at 492 U. S.
664 -667, to belittle the importance of the obvious
differences between the display of the creche in this case and that
in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984). Even if I had not dissented from the Court's conclusion
that the creche in Lynch was constitutional, I would
conclude that Allegheny County's unambiguous exposition of a sacred
symbol inside its courthouse promoted Christianity to a degree Page 492 U. S. 654 that violated the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, I concur in
the Court's judgment regarding the creche for substantially the
same reasons discussed in JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion, which I join,
as well as 492 U. S. S.
623|>Part I of JUSTICE O'CONNOR's opinion.

															I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that the display at
Pittsburgh's City-County Building was constitutional. Standing
alone in front of a governmental headquarters, a lighted, 45-foot
evergreen tree might convey holiday greetings linked too tenuously
to Christianity to have constitutional moment. Juxtaposition of
this tree with an 18-foot menorah does not make the latter secular,
as JUSTICE BLACKMUN contends, ante at 492 U. S. 616 .
Rather, the presence of the Chanukah menorah, unquestionably a
religious symbol, [ Footnote 2/15 ]
gives religious significance to the Christmas tree. The overall
display thus manifests governmental approval of the Jewish and
Christian religions. Cf. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 60 -61
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
690 -691 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)). Page 492 U. S. 655 Although it conceivably might be interpreted as sending "a
message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs," ante at 492 U. S. 634 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); accord, ante at 492 U. S.
617 -618 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.), the message is not
sufficiently clear to overcome the strong presumption that the
display, respecting two religions to the exclusion of all others,
is the very kind of double establishment that the First Amendment
was designed to outlaw. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals in its entirety.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The history of religious establishments is discussed in, e.g., J. Swomley, Religious Liberty and the Secular State
24-41 (1987) (Swomley). See generally L. Levy, The
Establishment Clause (1986) (Levy). One historian describes the
situation at the time of the passage of the First Amendment as
follows:

															"In America, there was no establishment of a single church, as
in England. Four states had never adopted any establishment
practices. Three had abolished their establishments during the
Revolution. The remaining six states -- Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia --
changed to comprehensive or 'multiple' establishments. That is, aid
was provided to all churches in each state on a nonpreferential
basis, except that the establishment was limited to churches of the
Protestant religion in three states and to those of the Christian
religion in the other three states. Since there were almost no
Catholics in the first group of states, and very few Jews in any
state, this meant that the multiple establishment practices
included every religious group with enough members to form a
church. It was this nonpreferential assistance to organized
churches that constituted 'establishment of religion' in 1791, and
it was this practice that the amendment forbade Congress to
adopt."

															C. Pritchett, The American Constitution 401 (3d ed.1977).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															For a comprehensive narration of this process, see Levy
75-89. See also e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S.
38 , 472 U. S. 92 -97
(1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Swomley 43-49; Drakeman,
Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the First Amendment,
in James Madison on Religious Liberty 233-235 (R. Alley
ed.1985).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															"Other members of the established church also disapproved
taxation for religious purposes. One of these, James Sullivan, who
was later elected Governor of Massachusetts, wrote about such
taxation:"

															"This glaring piece of religious tyranny was founded upon one or
the other of these suppositions: that the church members were more
religious, had more understanding, or had a higher privilege than,
or a preeminence over, those who were not in full communion, or in
other words, that their growth in grace or religious requirements,
gave them the right of taking and disposing of the property of
other people against their consent."

															"The struggle for religious liberty in Massachusetts was the
struggle against taxation for religious purposes. In that struggle,
there was civil disobedience; there were appeals to the Court and
to the Crown in faraway England. Societies were organized to fight
the tax. Even after some denominations had won the right to be
taxed only for their own churches or meetings, they continued to
resist the tax, even on the nonpreferential basis by which all
organized religious groups received tax funds. Finally, the state
senate, which had refused to end establishment, voted in 1831 to
submit the issue to the people. The vote, which took place in 1833,
was 32,234 for disestablishment to 3,273 for keeping the multiple
establishments of religion. It was a 10 to 1 vote, and in 1834, the
amendment was made effective by legislation."

															Swomley 28. Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 , 370 U. S. 432 (1962) ("Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an
awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established
religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand").

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															This proscription applies to the States by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S.
48 -55.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															"Respect," as defined in T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of
the English Language (6th ed. 1796). See S. Johnson, A
Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785); see
also The Oxford English Dictionary 733-734 (1989); Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1004 (1988).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The criticism that JUSTICE KENNEDY levels at JUSTICE O'CONNOR's
endorsement standard for evaluating symbolic speech, see
post at 492 U. S.
668 -678, is not only "uncharitable," post at 492 U. S. 675 ,
but also largely unfounded. Inter alia, he neglects to
mention that 1 of the 2 articles he cites as disfavoring the
endorsement test, post at 699, itself cites no fewer than
16 articles and 1 book lauding the test. See Smith,
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 266, 274,
n. 45 (1987). JUSTICE KENNEDY's preferred "coercion" test,
moreover, is, as he himself admits, post at 492 U. S. 660 ,
out of step with our precedent. The Court has stated:

															"The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion, and
is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not." Engel, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 430 .
Even if the law were not so, it seems unlikely that "coercion"
identifies the line between permissible and impermissible religious
displays any more brightly than does "endorsement."

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In a similar vein, we have interpreted the Amendment's strictly
worded Free Speech and Free Press Clauses to raise a strong
presumption against, rather than to ban outright, state abridgment
of communications. See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496 , 413 U. S. 504 (1973). By suggesting such a presumption plays a role in
considering governmental symbolic speech about religion, I do not
retreat from my position that a " high and impregnable' wall"
should separate government funds from parochial schools'
treasuries. See Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 , 444 U. S. 671 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (quoting Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 18 (1947)). [ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The point is reiterated here by amicus the Governing
Board Of the National Counsel of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
which argues that "government acceptance of a creche on public
property . . . secularizes and degrades a sacred symbol of
Christianity," Brief for American Jewish Committee et al. as Amici Curiae ii. See also Engel, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 431 .
Indeed, two Roman Catholics testified before the District Court in
this case that the creche display offended them. App. 79-80,
93-96.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See Brief for American Jewish Committee et al. as Amici Curiae i-ii; Brief for American Jewish Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 1-2; Tr. of Oral Arg.
44.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															These cases illustrate the danger that governmental displays of
religious symbols may give rise to unintended divisiveness, for the
net result of the Court's disposition is to disallow the display of
the creche but to allow the display of the menorah. Laypersons
unfamiliar with the intricacies of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence may reach the wholly unjustified conclusion that the
Court itself is preferring one faith over another. See Goldman
v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503 , 475 U. S.
512 -513 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring). Cf. Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 623 (1971) ("[T]he Constitution's authors sought to protect religious
worship from the pervasive power of government"); Engel, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 430 ("Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral
nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is
voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the
Establishment Clause").

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The suggestion that the only alternative to governmental support
of religion is governmental hostility to it represents a giant step
backward in our Religion Clause jurisprudence. Indeed in its first
contemporary examination of the Establishment Clause, the Court,
while differing on how to apply the principle, unanimously agreed
that government could not require believers or nonbelievers to
support religions. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 15 -16; see also id. at 330 U. S. 31 -33
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Accord, Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S.
52 -55.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ] Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.
S. 747 , 458 U. S. 778 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("The question whether
a specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment
always requires some consideration of both its content and its
context").

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															All these leaders, of course, appear in friezes on the walls of
our courtroom. See The Supreme Court of the United States
31 (published with the cooperation of the Historical Society of the
Supreme Court of the United States).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															The Court long ago rejected a contention similar to that JUSTICE
KENNEDY advances today:

															"It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way
as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious
services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward
religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong.
The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. . .
. [Early Americans] knew that the First Amendment, which tried to
put an end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was
not written to destroy either. They knew rather that it was written
to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt arising
out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's
tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that
government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that
government wanted them to pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor
antireligious to say that each separate government in this country
should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official
prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance." Engel, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S.
433 -435 (footnotes omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															After the judge and counsel for both sides agreed at a
preliminary injunction hearing that the menorah was a religious
symbol, App. 144-145, a rabbi testified as an expert witness that
the menorah and the creche "are comparable symbols, that they both
represent what we perceive to be miracles," id. at 146,
and that he had never "heard of Hanukkah being declared a general
secular holiday in the United States," id. at 148.
Although a witness for intervenor Chabad testified at a later
hearing that,

															"[w]hen used on Hanukkah in the home, it is definitely
symbolizing a religious ritual . . . whereas, at other times, the
menorah can symbolize anything that one wants it to symbolize," id. at 240, he also agreed that lighting the menorah in
a public place "probably would" publicize the miracle it
represents, id. at 263.

															Nonetheless, JUSTICE BLACKMUN attaches overriding secular
meaning to the menorah. Ante at 492 U. S.
613 -616. Contra, ante at 492 U. S.
632 -634 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment); ante at 492 U. S. 638 , 492 U. S.
641 -643 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); post at 492 U. S. 664 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part). He reaches this conclusion only after
exhaustive reference, not only to facts of record but primarily to
academic treatises, to assess the degrees to which the menorah, the
tree, and the creche are religious or secular. Ante at 492 U. S.
579 -587, 492 U. S.
616 .

															JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and
JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.

															The majority holds that the County of Allegheny violated the
Establishment Clause by displaying a creche in the county
courthouse, because the "principal or primary effect" of the
display is to advance religion within the meaning of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971). This view of the Establishment Clause
reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility
inconsistent with our history and our precedents, and I dissent
from this holding. The creche display is constitutional, and, for
the same reasons, the display of a menorah by the city of
Pittsburgh is permissible as well. On this latter point, I concur
in the result, but not the reasoning, of 492 U.
S. I In keeping with the usual fashion of recent years, the majority
applies the Lemon test to judge the constitutionality of
the holiday displays here in question. I am content for present
purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but do not
wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our
primary guide in this difficult area. Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578 , 482 U. S.
636 -640 (1987) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); Page 492 U. S. 656 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 , 473 U. S.
426 -430 (1985) (O'CONNOR J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S.
108 -113 (1985) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Roemer
v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.
S. 736 , 426 U. S.
768 -769 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). Our
cases often question its utility in providing concrete answers to
Establishment Clause questions, calling it but a " helpful
signpos[t]'" or "`guidelin[e]'" to assist our deliberations, rather
than a comprehensive test. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 , 463 U. S. 394 (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.
S. 734 , 413 U. S. 741 (1973)); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S. 773 ,
n. 31 (1973) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 , 403 U. S.
677 -678 (1971)); see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in
order; but it is unnecessary to undertake that task today, for even
the Lemon test, when applied with proper sensitivity to
our traditions and our case law, supports the conclusion that both
the creche and the menorah are permissible displays in the context
of the holiday season. The only Lemon factor implicated in these cases directs
us to inquire whether the "principal or primary effect" of the
challenged government practice is "one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612 .
The requirement of neutrality inherent in that formulation has
sometimes been stated in categorical terms. For example, in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U. S.
1 (1947), the first case in our modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Justice Black wrote that the Clause forbids
laws "which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another." Id. at 330 U. S. 15 -16.
We have stated that government "must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice" and "may not aid, foster,
or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even
against the Page 492 U. S. 657 militant opposite." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S.
103 -104 (1968). And we have spoken of a prohibition
against conferring an " imprimatur of state approval'" on
religion, Mueller v. Allen, supra, at 463 U. S. 399 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 , 454 U. S. 274 (1981)), or "favor[ing] the adherents of any sect or religious
organization," Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 , 401 U. S. 450 (1971). These statements must not give the impression of a formalism
that does not exist. Taken to its logical extreme, some of the
language quoted above would require a relentless extirpation of all
contact between government and religion. But that is not the
history or the purpose of the Establishment Clause. Government
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion
are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage. As
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of New York City, 397 U. S. 664 (1970), we must be careful to avoid "[t]he hazards of placing too
much weight on a few words or phrases of the Court," and so we
have

															"declined to construe the Religion Clauses with a literalness
that would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective as
illuminated by history." Id. at 397 U. S.
670 -671.

															Rather than requiring government to avoid any action that
acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits
government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the
central role religion plays in our society. Lynch v. Donnelly,
supra, at 465 U. S. 678 ; Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 397 U. S. 669 .
Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on latent
hostility toward religion, as it would require government, in all
its multifaceted roles, to acknowledge only the secular, to the
exclusion and so to the detriment of the religious. A categorical
approach would install federal courts as jealous guardians of an
absolute "wall of separation," sending a clear message of
disapproval. In this century, as the modern administrative state
expands to touch the lives of its citizens in such diverse ways and
redirects Page 492 U. S. 658 their financial choices through programs of its own, it is
difficult to maintain the fiction that requiring government to
avoid all assistance to religion can, in fairness, be viewed as
serving the goal of neutrality.

															Our cases reflect this understanding. In Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), for example, we permitted New York City's public school
system to accommodate the religious preferences of its students by
giving them the option of staying in school or leaving to attend
religious classes for part of the day. Justice Douglas wrote for
the Court:

															"When the state encourages religious instruction . . . , it
follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the
religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service
to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe." Id. at 343 U. S.
313 -314.

															Nothing in the First Amendment compelled New York City to
establish the release-time policy in Zorach, but the fact
that the policy served to aid religion, and in particular those
sects that offer religious education to the young, did not
invalidate the accommodation. Likewise, we have upheld government
programs supplying textbooks to students in parochial schools, Board of Education of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), providing grants to church-sponsored universities and
colleges, Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, supra; Tilton
v. Richardson, supra, and exempting churches from the
obligation to pay taxes, Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City,
supra. These programs all have the effect of providing
substantial benefits to particular religions, see, e.g.,
Tilton, supra, at 403 U. S. 679 (grants to church-sponsored educational institutions "surely aid"
those institutions), but they are nonetheless permissible. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, supra; 366 U. S. Page 492 U. S. 659 Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 445 (1961); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of
School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.
S. 203 , 333 U. S.
211 -212 (1948). As Justice Goldberg wrote in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 (1963):

															"It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward
religion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the
concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results
which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement
with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or
even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only
not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are
prohibited by it."

															"Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the
significance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe
in and worship God and that many of our legal, political and
personal values derive historically from religious teachings.
Government must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of
religion. . . ." Id. at 374 U. S. 306 (concurring opinion, joined by Harlan, J.).

															The ability of the organized community to recognize and
accommodate religion in a society with a pervasive public sector
requires diligent observance of the border between accommodation
and establishment. Our cases disclose two limiting principles:
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion
in such a degree that it, in fact, "establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 678 .
These two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it
would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some
measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of
taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would sustain Page 492 U. S. 660 a state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or
governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to
proselytizing.

															It is no surprise that, without exception, we have invalidated
actions that further the interests of religion through the coercive
power of government. Forbidden involvements include compelling or
coercing participation or attendance at a religious activity, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 366 U. S. 452 (discussing McCollum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No.
71, Champaign County, supra ), requiring religious oaths to
obtain government office or benefits, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), or delegating government power to religious groups, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.
S. 116 (1982). The freedom to worship as one pleases
without government interference or oppression is the great object
of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. Barring
all attempts to aid religion through government coercion goes far
toward attainment of this object. See McGowan v. Maryland,
supra, at 366 U. S. 441 ,
quoting 1 Annals of Congress 730 (1789) (James Madison, who
proposed the First Amendment in Congress, " apprehended the
meaning of the [Religion Clauses] to be that Congress should not
establish a religion and enforce the legal observation of it by
law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience'"); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940) (the Religion Clauses "forestal[l] compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship"). As JUSTICE BLACKMUN observes, ante at 492 U. S.
597 -598, n. 47, some of our recent cases reject the view
that coercion is the sole touchstone of an Establishment Clause
violation. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 370 U. S. 430 (dictum) (rejecting, without citation of authority, proposition
that coercion is required to demonstrate an Establishment Clause
violation); Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S. 223 ; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 786 .
That may be true if by "coercion" is meant Page 492 U. S. 661 direct coercion in the classic sense of an establishment of
religion that the Framers knew. But coercion need not be a direct
tax in aid of religion or a test oath. Symbolic recognition or
accommodation of religious faith may violate the Clause in an
extreme case. [ Footnote 3/1 ] I
doubt not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit
the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city
hall. This is not because government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would have it, but because
such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion. Cf. Friedman v. Board of
County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777 (CA10 1985)
(en banc) (Latin cross on official county seal); American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (CA11 1983) (cross erected in public
park); Lowe v. Eugene, 254 Ore. 518, 463 P.2d
360 (1969) (same). Speech may coerce in some circumstances, but
this does not justify a ban on all government recognition of
religion. As Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court in Walz: "The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist Page 492 U. S. 662 without sponsorship and without interference."

															397 U.S. at 397 U. S.
669 .

															This is most evident where the government's act of recognition
or accommodation is passive and symbolic, for in that instance any
intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to present a realistic
risk of establishment. Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of
religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal.
Our cases reflect this reality by requiring a showing that the
symbolic recognition or accommodation advances religion to such a
degree that it actually "establishes a religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
678 .

															In determining whether there exists an establishment, or a
tendency toward one, we refer to the other types of church-state
contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our history, or
that have been found permissible in our case law. In Lynch, for example, we upheld the city of Pawtucket's
holiday display of a creche, despite the fact that "the display
advance[d] religion in a sense." Id. at 465 U. S. 683 .
We held that the creche conferred no greater benefit on religion
than did governmental support for religious education, legislative
chaplains, "recognition of the origins of the [Christmas] Holiday
itself as Christ's Mass,'" or many other forms of symbolic or
tangible governmental assistance to religious faiths that are
ensconced in the safety of national tradition. Id. at 465 U. S. 681 , 465 U. S. 683 .
And in Marsh v. Chambers, we found that Nebraska's
practice of employing a legislative chaplain did not violate the
Establishment Clause, because "legislative prayer presents no more potential for establishment
than the provision of school transportation, beneficial grants for
higher education, or tax exemptions for religious
organizations."

															463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 791 (citations omitted). Noncoercive government action within the realm
of flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it
benefits religion in a way Page 492 U. S. 663 more direct and more substantial than practices that are
accepted in our national heritage. II These principles are not difficult to apply to the facts of the
cases before us. In permitting the displays on government property
of the menorah and the creche, the city and county sought to do no
more than "celebrate the season," Brief for Petitioner County of
Allegheny in No. 87-2050, p. 27, and to acknowledge, along with
many of their citizens, the historical background and the
religious, as well as secular, nature of the Chanukah and Christmas
holidays. This interest falls well within the tradition of
government accommodation and acknowledgment of religion that has
marked our history from the beginning. [ Footnote 3/2 ] It cannot be disputed that government, if
it chooses, may participate in sharing with its citizens the joy of
the holiday season, by declaring public holidays, installing or
permitting festive displays, sponsoring celebrations and parades,
and providing holiday vacations for its employees. All levels of
our government do precisely that. As we said in Lynch, "Government has long recognized -- indeed it has subsidized --
holidays with religious significance." 465 U.S. at 465 U. S.
676 .

															If government is to participate in its citizens' celebration of
a holiday that contains both a secular and a religious component,
enforced recognition of only the secular aspect would Page 492 U. S. 664 signify the callous indifference toward religious faith that our
cases and traditions do not require; for, by commemorating the
holiday only as it is celebrated by nonadherents, the government
would be refusing to acknowledge the plain fact, and the historical
reality, that many of its citizens celebrate its religious aspects
as well. Judicial invalidation of government's attempts to
recognize the religious underpinnings of the holiday would signal
not neutrality, but a pervasive intent to insulate government from
all things religious. The Religion Clauses do not require
government to acknowledge these holidays or their religious
component; but our strong tradition of government accommodation and
acknowledgment permits government to do so. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, supra; cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 314 ; Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

															There is no suggestion here that the government's power to
coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or
Judaism in any way. No one was compelled to observe or participate
in any religious ceremony or activity. Neither the city nor the
county contributed significant amounts of tax money to serve the
cause of one religious faith. The creche and the menorah are purely
passive symbols of religious holidays. Passersby who disagree with
the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or
even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they
disagree with any other form of government speech.

															There is no realistic risk that the creche and the menorah
represent an effort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step
down the road to an establishment of religion. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Lynch Page 492 U. S. 665 is dispositive of this claim with respect to the creche, and I
find no reason for reaching a different result with respect to the
menorah. Both are the traditional symbols of religious holidays
that, over time, have acquired a secular component. Ante at 492 U. S. 579 ,
and n. 3, 492 U. S. 585 ,
and n. 29. Without ambiguity, Lynch instructs that "the
focus of our inquiry must be on the [religious symbol] in the
context of the [holiday] season," 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 679 .
In that context, religious displays that serve "to celebrate the
Holiday and to depict the origins of that Holiday" give rise to no
Establishment Clause concern. Id. at 465 U. S. 681 .
If Congress and the state legislatures do not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause when they begin each day with a
state-sponsored prayer for divine guidance offered by a chaplain
whose salary is paid at government expense, I cannot comprehend how
a menorah or a creche, displayed in the limited context of the
holiday season, can be invalid. [ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Respondents say that the religious displays involved here are
distinguishable from the creche in Lynch because they are
located on government property and are not surrounded Page 492 U. S. 666 by the candy canes, reindeer, and other holiday paraphernalia
that were a part of the display in Lynch. Nothing in Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch provides
support for these purported distinctions. After describing the
facts, the Lynch opinion makes no mention of either of
these factors. It concentrates instead on the significance of the
creche as part of the entire holiday season. Indeed, it is clear
that the Court did not view the secular aspects of the display as
somehow subduing the religious message conveyed by the creche, for
the majority expressly rejected the dissenters' suggestion that it
sought " to explain away the clear religious import of the
creche'" or had "equated the creche with a Santa's house or
reindeer." Id. at 465 U. S. 685 , n. 12. Crucial to the Court's conclusion
was not the number, prominence, or type of secular items contained
in the holiday display, but the simple fact that, when displayed by
government during the Christmas season, a creche presents no
realistic danger of moving government down the forbidden road
toward an establishment of religion. Whether the creche be
surrounded by poinsettias, talking wishing wells, or carolers, the
conclusion remains the same, for the relevant context is not the
items in the display itself, but the season as a whole. The fact that the creche and menorah are both located on
government property, even at the very seat of government, is
likewise inconsequential. In the first place, the Lynch Court did not rely on the fact that the setting for Pawtucket's
display was a privately owned park, and it is difficult to suggest
that anyone could have failed to receive a message of government
sponsorship after observing Santa Claus ride the city fire engine
to the park to join with the mayor of Pawtucket in inaugurating the
holiday season by turning on the lights of the city-owned display. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F.
Supp. 1150 , 1156 (RI 1981). Indeed, the District Court in Lynch found that "people might reasonably mistake Page 492 U. S. 667 the Park for public property," and rejected as "frivolous" the
suggestion that the display was not directly associated with the
city. Id. at 1176, and n. 35.

															Our cases do not suggest, moreover, that the use of public
property necessarily converts otherwise permissible government
conduct into an Establishment Clause violation. To the contrary, in
some circumstances, the First Amendment may require that
government property be available for use by religious groups, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S.
67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 (1951), and even where not required, such use has
long been permitted. The prayer approved in Marsh v.
Chambers, for example, was conducted in the legislative
chamber of the State of Nebraska, surely the single place most
likely to be thought the center of state authority.

															Nor can I comprehend why it should be that placement of a
government-owned creche on private land is lawful, while placement
of a privately owned creche on public land is not. [ Footnote 3/5 ] If anything, I should have thought
government ownership of a religious symbol presented the more
difficult question under the Establishment Clause, but as Lynch resolved that question to sustain the government
action, the sponsorship here ought to be all the easier to sustain.
In short, nothing about the religious displays here distinguishes
them in any meaningful way from the creche we permitted in Lynch. If Lynch is still good law -- and until today it was --
the judgment below cannot stand. I accept and indeed approve both
the holding and the reasoning of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Lynch, and so I must dissent from the judgment that the
creche display is unconstitutional. On the same reasoning, I agree
that the menorah display is constitutional. Page 492 U. S. 668 III The majority invalidates display of the creche not because it
disagrees with the interpretation of Lynch applied above,
but because it chooses to discard the reasoning of the Lynch majority opinion in favor of JUSTICE O'CONNOR's
concurring opinion in that case. See ante at 492 U. S.
594 -597. It has never been my understanding that a
concurring opinion "suggest[ing] a clarification of our . . .
doctrine," Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 687 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), could take precedence over an opinion
joined in its entirety by five Members of the Court. [ Footnote 3/6 ] As a general rule, the
principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only
to the holdings of our prior cases but also to their explications
of the governing rules of law. Since the majority does not state
its intent to overrule Lynch, I find its refusal to apply
the reasoning of that decision quite confusing.

															Even if Lynch did not control, I would not commit this
Court to the test applied by the majority today. The notion that
cases arising under the Establishment Clause should be decided by
an inquiry into whether a " reasonable observer'" may "`fairly
understand'" government action to "`sen[d] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community,'" is a recent, and, in my view, most
unwelcome, addition to our tangled Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Ante at 492 U. S. 595 , 492 U. S. 620 .
Although a scattering of our cases have used "endorsement" as
another word for "preference" or "imprimatur," the endorsement test
applied by the majority had its genesis in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's
concurring opinion in Lynch. See also Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 , 483 U. S. 346 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U. S. 703 , 472 U. S. 711 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); Wallace Page 492 U. S. 669 v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 67 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). The endorsement test has
been criticized by some scholars in the field, see, e.g., Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 266
(1987); Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn.Law Rev.
701, 711-712 (1986). Only one opinion for the Court has purported
to apply it in full, see School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S.
389 -392 (1985), but the majority's opinion in this case
suggests that this novel theory is fast becoming a permanent
accretion to the law. See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 , 489 U. S. 8 -9
(1989) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). For the reasons expressed below, I
submit that the endorsement test is flawed in its fundamentals and
unworkable in practice. The uncritical adoption of this standard is
every bit as troubling as the bizarre result it produces in the
cases before us. A I take it as settled law that, whatever standard the Court
applies to Establishment Clause claims, it must at least suggest
results consistent with our precedents and the historical practices
that, by tradition, have informed our First Amendment
jurisprudence. See supra at 492 U. S.
655 -663; Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S.
673 -674; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S.
790 -791; Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S. 671 .
It is true that, for reasons quite unrelated to the First
Amendment, displays commemorating religious holidays were not
commonplace in 1791. See generally J. Barnett, The
American Christmas: A Study in National Culture 2-11 (1954). But
the relevance of history is not confined to the inquiry into
whether the challenged practice itself is a part of our accepted
traditions dating back to the Founding.

															Our decision in Marsh v. Chambers illustrates this
proposition. The dissent in that case sought to characterize the
decision as

															"carving out an exception to the Establishment Page 492 U. S. 670 Clause, rather than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to
accommodate legislative prayer,"

															463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 796 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), but the majority rejected the suggestion
that "historical patterns ca[n] justify contemporary violations of
constitutional guarantees," id. at 463 U. S. 790 . Marsh stands for the proposition not that specific
practices common in 1791 are an exception to the otherwise broad
sweep of the Establishment Clause, but rather that the meaning of
the Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices
and understandings. [ Footnote 3/7 ]
Whatever test we choose to apply must permit not only legitimate
practices two centuries old, but also any other practices with no
greater potential for an establishment of religion. See
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 808 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting in part). The First Amendment is a rule,
not a digest or compendium. A test for implementing the protections
of the Establishment Clause that, if applied with consistency,
would invalidate longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading
of the Clause.

															If the endorsement test, applied without artificial exceptions
for historical practice, reached results consistent with history,
my objections to it would have less force. But, as I understand
that test, the touchstone of an Establishment Clause violation is
whether nonadherents would be made to feel like "outsiders" by
government recognition or accommodation of religion. Few of our
traditional practices recognizing the part religion plays in our
society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this
formula. Page 492 U. S. 671 Some examples suffice to make plain my concerns. Since the
Founding of our Republic, American Presidents have issued
Thanksgiving Proclamations establishing a national day of
celebration and prayer. The first such proclamation was issued by
President Washington at the request of the First Congress, and
"recommend[ed] and assign[ed]" a day

															"to be devoted by the people of these States to the service of
that great and glorious Being who is the beneficent author of all
the good that was, that is, or that will be,"

															so that

															"we may then unite in most humbly offering our prayers and
supplications to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and beseech
Him to . . . promote the knowledge and practice of true religion
and virtue. . . ."

															1 J. Richardson, A Compilation of Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1899). Most of President Washington's
successors have followed suit, [ Footnote 3/8 ] and the forthrightly religious nature of
these proclamations has not waned with the years. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt went so far as to "suggest a nationwide
reading of the Holy Scriptures during the period from Thanksgiving
Day to Christmas" so that "we may bear more earnest witness to our
gratitude to Almighty God." Presidential Proclamation No. 2629, 58
Stat. 1160. It requires little imagination to conclude that these
proclamations would cause nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they
have been a part of our national heritage from the beginning.
[ Footnote 3/9 ] Page 492 U. S. 672 The Executive has not been the only Branch of our Government to
recognize the central role of religion in our society. The fact
that this Court opens its sessions with the request that "God save
the United States and this honorable Court" has been noted
elsewhere. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 677 .
The Legislature has gone much further, not only employing
legislative chaplains, see 2 U.S.C. § 61d, but also
setting aside a special prayer room in the Capitol for use by
Members of the House and Senate. The room is decorated with a large
stained glass panel that depicts President Washington kneeling in
prayer; around him is etched the first verse of the 16th Psalm:
"Preserve me, O God, for in Thee do I put my trust." Beneath the
panel is a rostrum on which a Bible is placed; next to the rostrum
is an American Flag. See L. Aikman, We the People: The
Story of the United States Capitol 122 (1978). Some endorsement is
inherent in these reasonable accommodations, yet the Establishment
Clause does not forbid them.

															The United States Code itself contains religious references that
would be suspect under the endorsement test. Congress has directed
the President to

															"set aside and proclaim a suitable day each year . . . as a
National Day of Prayer, on which the people of the United States
may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups,
and as individuals."

															36 U.S.C. § 169h. This statute does not require anyone to pray,
of course, but it is a straightforward endorsement of the concept
of "turn[ing] to God in prayer." Also by statute, the Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag describes the United States as "one Nation
under God." 36 U.S.C. § 172. Page 492 U. S. 673 To be sure, no one is obligated to recite this phrase, see
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), but it borders on sophistry to suggest that the
" reasonable'" atheist would not feel less than a "`full
membe[r] of the political community'" every time his fellow
Americans recited, as part of their expression of patriotism and
love for country, a phrase he believed to be false. Likewise, our
national motto, "In God we trust," 36 U.S.C. § 186, which is
prominently engraved in the wall above the Speaker's dias in the
Chamber of the House of Representatives and is reproduced on every
coin minted and every dollar printed by the Federal Government, 31
U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1), 5114(b), must have the same effect. If the intent of the Establishment Clause is to protect
individuals from mere feelings of exclusion, then legislative
prayer cannot escape invalidation. It has been argued that

															"[these] government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the
only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what
is worthy of appreciation in society." Lynch, supra, at 465 U. S. 693 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). I fail to see why prayer is the only
way to convey these messages; appeals to patriotism, moments of
silence, and any number of other approaches would be as effective,
were the only purposes at issue the ones described by the Lynch concurrence. Nor is it clear to me why "encouraging
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society" can
be characterized as a purely secular purpose if it can be achieved
only through religious prayer. No doubt prayer is "worthy of
appreciation," but that is most assuredly not because it is
secular. Even accepting the secular solemnization explanation at
face value, moreover, it seems incredible to suggest that the
average observer of legislative prayer who either believes in no
religion or whose faith rejects the concept of God would not
receive the clear message that his faith is out of step with
the Page 492 U. S. 674 political norm. Either the endorsement test must invalidate
scores of traditional practices recognizing the place religion
holds in our culture or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid
inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the
past, while condemning similar practices with no greater
endorsement effect simply by reason of their lack of historical
antecedent. [ Footnote 3/10 ]
Neither result is acceptable. B In addition to disregarding precedent and historical fact, the
majority's approach to government use of religious symbolism
threatens to trivialize constitutional adjudication. By
mischaracterizing the Court's opinion in Lynch as an
endorsement-in-context test, ante at 492 U. S. 597 ,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN embraces a jurisprudence of minutiae. A reviewing
court must consider whether the city has included Santas, talking
wishing wells, reindeer, or other secular symbols as "a center of
attention separate from the creche." Ante at 492 U. S. 598 .
After determining whether these centers of attention are
sufficiently "separate" that each "had their specific visual story
to tell," the court must then measure their proximity to the
creche. Ante at 492 U. S. 598 ,
and n. 48. A community that wishes to construct a constitutional
display must also Page 492 U. S. 675 take care to avoid floral frames or other devices that might
insulate the creche from the sanitizing effect of the secular
portions of the display. Ibid. The majority also notes the
presence of evergreens near the creche that are identical to two
small evergreens placed near official county signs. Ante at 492 U. S. 600 ,
n. 50. After today's decision, municipal greenery must be used with
care.

															Another important factor will be the prominence of the setting
in which the display is placed. In this case, the Grand Staircase
of the county courthouse proved too resplendent. Indeed, the Court
finds that this location itself conveyed an "unmistakable message
that [the county] supports and promotes the Christian praise to God
that is the creche's religious message." Ante at 492 U. S.
600 .

															My description of the majority's test, though perhaps
uncharitable, is intended to illustrate the inevitable difficulties
with its application. [ Footnote
3/11 ] This test could provide workable guidance to the lower
courts, if ever, only after this Court has decided a long series of
holiday display cases, using little more than intuition and a tape
measure. Deciding cases on Page 492 U. S. 676 the basis of such an unguided examination of marginalia is
irreconcilable with the imperative of applying neutral principles
in constitutional adjudication.

															"It would be appalling to conduct litigation under the
Establishment Clause as if it were a trademark case, with experts
testifying about whether one display is really like another, and
witnesses testifying they were offended -- but would have been less
so were the creche five feet closer to the jumbo candy cane." American Jewish Congress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130
(CA7 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN employs in many respects a similar analysis
with respect to the menorah, principally discussing its proximity
to the Christmas tree and whether "it is . . . more sensible to
interpret the menorah in light of the tree, rather than vice
versa." Ante at 492 U. S. 617 ; see also ante at 492 U. S. 635 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(concluding that combination of tree, menorah, and salute to
liberty conveys no message of endorsement to reasonable observers).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN goes further, however, and, in upholding the
menorah as an acknowledgment of a holiday with secular aspects,
emphasizes the city's lack of "reasonable alternatives that are
less religious in nature." Ante at 492 U. S. 618 ; see ibid. (noting absence of a "more secular alternative
symbol"). This least-religious-means test presents several
difficulties. [ Footnote 3/12 ]
First, it creates an internal inconsistency in JUSTICE BLACKMUN's
opinion. JUSTICE BLACKMUN earlier suggests that the display of a
creche is sometimes constitutional. Ante at 492 U. S. 598 .
But it is obvious that there are innumerable secular symbols of
Christmas, and that there will always be a more secular alternative
available in place of a creche. Second, the test as applied by
JUSTICE BLACKMUN is unworkable, for it requires not only that the
Court engage in the unfamiliar task of deciding whether a
particular alternative Page 492 U. S. 677 symbol is more or less religious, but also whether the
alternative would "look out of place." Ante at 492 U. S. 618 .
Third, although JUSTICE BLACKMUN purports not to be overruling Lynch, the more-secular-alternative test contradicts that
decision, as it comes not from the Court's opinion, nor even from
the concurrence, but from the dissent. See 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 699 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The Court in Lynch noted that
the dissent "argues that the city's objectives could have been
achieved without including the creche in the display." Id. at 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 7. "True or false," we said, "that is irrelevant."

															The result the Court reaches in these cases is perhaps the
clearest illustration of the unwisdom of the endorsement test.
Although JUSTICE O'CONNOR disavows JUSTICE BLACKMUN's suggestion
that the minority or majority status of a religion is relevant to
the question whether government recognition constitutes a forbidden
endorsement, ante at 492 U. S. 634 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), the
very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the
feelings of the objective observer, easily lends itself to this
type of inquiry. If there be such a person as the "reasonable
observer," I am quite certain that he or she will take away a
salient message from our holding in these cases: the Supreme Court
of the United States has concluded that the First Amendment creates
classes of religions based on the relative numbers of their
adherents. Those religions enjoying the largest following must be
consigned to the status of least favored faiths so as to avoid any
possible risk of offending members of minority religions. I would
be the first to admit that many questions arising under the
Establishment Clause do not admit of easy answers, but whatever the
Clause requires, it is not the result reached by the Court
today. IV The approach adopted by the majority contradicts important
values embodied in the Clause. Obsessive, implacable resistance to
all but the most carefully scripted and secularized Page 492 U. S. 678 forms of accommodation requires this Court to act as a censor,
issuing national decrees as to what is orthodox and what is not.
What is orthodox, in this context, means what is secular; the only
Christmas the State can acknowledge is one in which references to
religion have been held to a minimum. The Court thus lends its
assistance to an Orwellian rewriting of history as many understand
it. I can conceive of no judicial function more antithetical to the
First Amendment.

															A further contradiction arises from the majority's approach, for
the Court also assumes the difficult and inappropriate task of
saying what every religious symbol means. Before studying this
case, I had not known the full history of the menorah, and I
suspect the same was true of my colleagues. More important, this
history was, and is, likely unknown to the vast majority of people
of all faiths who saw the symbol displayed in Pittsburgh. Even if
the majority is quite right about the history of the menorah, it
hardly follows that this same history informed the observers' view
of the symbol and the reason for its presence. This Court is
ill-equipped to sit as a national theology board, and I question
both the wisdom and the constitutionality of its doing so. Indeed,
were I required to choose between the approach taken by the
majority and a strict separationist view, I would have to respect
the consistency of the latter.

															The suit before us is admittedly a troubling one. It must be
conceded that, however neutral the purpose of the city and county,
the eager proselytizer may seek to use these symbols for his own
ends. The urge to use them to teach or to taunt is always present.
It is also true that some devout adherents of Judaism or
Christianity may be as offended by the holiday display as are
nonbelievers, if not more so. To place these religious symbols in a
common hallway or sidewalk, where they may be ignored or even
insulted, must be distasteful to many who cherish their
meaning. Page 492 U. S. 679 For these reasons, I might have voted against installation of
these particular displays were I a local legislative official. But
we have no jurisdiction over matters of taste within the realm of
constitutionally permissible discretion. Our role is enforcement of
a written Constitution. In my view, the principles of the
Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic traditions of
diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable
judgments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgment of
holidays with both cultural and religious aspects. No
constitutional violation occurs when they do so by displaying a
symbol of the holiday's religious origins.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS is incorrect when he asserts that requiring a
showing of direct or indirect coercion in Establishment Clause
cases is "out of step with our precedent." Ante at 492 U.S. 650 , n. 6. As is
demonstrated by the language JUSTICE STEVENS quotes from Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 430 (1962), our cases have held only that direct coercion need not
always be shown to establish an Establishment Clause violation. The
prayer invalidated in Engel was unquestionably coercive in
an indirect manner, as the Engel Court itself recognized
in the sentences immediately following the passage JUSTICE STEVENS
chooses to quote. Id. at 370 U. S.
430 -431.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The majority rejects the suggestion that the display of the
creche can "be justified as an accommodation' of religion,"
because it "does not remove any burden on the free exercise of
Christianity." Ante at 492 U. S. 601 ,
n. 51. Contrary to the assumption implicit in this analysis,
however, we have never held that government's power to accommodate
and recognize religion extends no further than the requirements of
the Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, "[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are
by no means coextensive with the non-interference mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.
S. 664 , 397 U. S. 673 (1970). Cf. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S.
1 , 489 U. S. 38 (1989) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															One can imagine a case in which the use of passive symbols to
acknowledge religious holidays could present this danger. For
example, if a city chose to recognize, through religious displays,
every significant Christian holiday while ignoring the holidays of
all other faiths, the argument that the city was simply recognizing
certain holidays celebrated by its citizens without establishing an
official faith or applying pressure to obtain adherents would be
much more difficult to maintain. On the facts of these cases, no
such unmistakable and continual preference for one faith has been
demonstrated or alleged.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The majority suggests that our approval of legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers is to be distinguished from these cases
on the ground that legislative prayer is nonsectarian, while
creches and menorahs are not. Ante at 492 U. S. 603 .
In the first place, of course, this purported distinction is
utterly inconsistent with the majority's belief that the
Establishment Clause "mean[s] no official preference even for
religion over nonreligion." Ante at 492 U. S. 605 .
If year-round legislative prayer does not express "official
preference for religion over nonreligion," a creche or menorah
display in the context of the holiday season certainly does not
"demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed." Ibid. Moreover, the majority chooses to ignore the Court's
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 (1984), which applied precisely the same
analysis as that I apply today:

															"to conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is
to advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would
require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an
endorsement of religion . . . than . . . the legislative prayers
upheld in Marsh v. Chambers. . . ." Id. at 465 U. S.
681 -682.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The creche in Lynch was owned by Pawtucket. Neither the
creche nor the menorah at issue in this case is owned by a
governmental entity.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The majority illustrates the depth of its error in this regard
by going so far as to refer to the concurrence and dissent in Lynch as "[o]ur previous opinions. . . ." Ante at 492 U. S. 602 .

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Contrary to the majority's discussion, ante at 492 U. S.
604 -605, and nn. 53-54, the relevant historical
practices are those conducted by governmental units which were
subject to the constraints of the Establishment Clause. Acts of
"official discrimination against non-Christians" perpetrated in the
18th and 19th centuries by States and municipalities are, of
course, irrelevant to this inquiry, but the practices of past
Congresses and Presidents are highly informative.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															In keeping with his strict views of the degree of separation
mandated by the Establishment Clause, Thomas Jefferson declined to
follow this tradition. See 11 Writings of Thomas Jefferson
429 (A. Lipscomb ed.1904).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Similarly, our presidential inaugurations have traditionally
opened with a request for divine blessing. At our most recent such
occasion, on January 20, 1989, thousands bowed their heads in
prayer to this invocation:

															"Our Father and our God, Thou hast said blessed is the nation
whose God is the Lord."

															"We recognize on this historic occasion that we are a nation
under God. This faith in God is our foundation and our heritage. .
. ."

															"As George Washington reminded us in his Farewell Address,
morality and faith are the pillars of our society. May we never
forget that."

															" * * * *" "We acknowledge Thy divine help in the selection of our
leadership each 4 years."

															" * * * *" "All this we pray in the name of the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit. Amen."

															135 Cong.Rec. S67 (Jan. 20, 1989) (Rev. Billy Graham).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															If the majority's test were to be applied logically, it would
lead to the elimination of all nonsecular Christmas caroling in
public buildings or, presumably, anywhere on public property. It is
difficult to argue that lyrics like "Good Christian men, rejoice,"
"Joy to the world! the Savior reigns," "This, this is Christ the
King," "Christ, by highest heav'n adored," and "Come and behold
Him, Born the King of angels" have acquired such a secular nature
that nonadherents would not feel "left out" by a
government-sponsored or approved program that included these
carols. See W. Ehret & G. Evans, The International
Book of Christmas Carols 12, 28, 30, 46, 318 (1963). We do not
think for a moment that the Court will ban such carol programs,
however. Like Thanksgiving Proclamations, the reference to God in
the Pledge of Allegiance, and invocations to God in sessions of
Congress and of this Court, they constitute practices that the
Court will not proscribe, but that the Court's reasoning today does
not explain.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR defend the majority's test
by suggesting that the approach followed in Lynch would
require equally difficult line drawing. Ante at 492 U. S. 606 ; ante at 492 U. S.
629 -630 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). It is true that the Lynch test may involve
courts in difficult linedrawing in the unusual case where a
municipality insists on such extreme use of religious speech that
an establishment of religion is threatened. See supra at 492 U. S. 661 .
Only adoption of the absolutist views that either all government
involvement with religion is permissible or that none is can
provide a bright line in all cases. That price for clarity is
neither exacted nor permitted by the Constitution. But for the most
part, JUSTICE BLACKMUN's and JUSTICE O'CONNOR's objections are not
well taken. As a practical matter, the only cases of symbolic
recognition likely to arise with much frequency are those involving
simple holiday displays, and, in that context, Lynch provides unambiguous guidance. I would follow it. The majority's
test, on the other hand, demands the Court to draw exquisite
distinctions from fine detail in a wide range of cases. The
anomalous result the test has produced here speaks for itself.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															Of course, a majority of the Court today rejects JUSTICE
BLACKMUN's approach in this regard. See ante at 492 U. S.
636 -637 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).

Summary: In *County of Allegheny v. ACLU*, the US Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of two holiday displays on public property in Pittsburgh: a Christian nativity scene and an 18-foot menorah. The Court held that the nativity scene violated the Establishment Clause as it endorsed Christianity, but the menorah, in context, did not violate the Establishment Clause as it did not endorse Judaism. The Court's decision considered the religious nature of the displays, their location on public property, and their potential to exclude non-adherents.