OPINION OF THE COURT MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Titles III and
IV.*

															   This opinion addresses issues
involving miscellaneous Title III and IV provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81. For
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court with respect to these provisions. BCRA §305 BCRA §305 amends the federal
Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) §315(b), 48 Stat.
1088, as amended, 86 Stat. 4, which requires that, 45 days before a
primary or 60 days before a general election, broadcast stations
must sell a qualified candidate the “lowest unit charge of the
station for the same class and amount of time for the same period,”
47 U. S. C. §315(b). Section 305’s amendment, in turn, denies
a candidate the benefit of that lowest unit charge unless the
candidate “provides written certification to the broadcast station
that the candidate (and any authorized committee of the candidate)
shall not make any direct reference to another candidate for the
same office,” or the candidate, in the manner prescribed in BCRA
§305(a)(3), clearly identifies herself at the end of the broadcast
and states that she approves of the broadcast. 47 U.
S. C. A. §§315(b)(2)(A), (C) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs
challenge §305. They argue that Senator McConnell’s testimony that
he plans to run advertisements critical of his opponents in the
future and that he had run them in the past is sufficient to
establish standing. We think not. Article III of the Constitution limits the
“judicial power” to the resolution of “cases” and “controversies.”
One element of the “bedrock” case-or-controversy requirement is
that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811 , 818
(1997). On many occasions, we have reiterated the three
requirements that constitute the “ ‘irreducible constitutional
minimum’ ” of standing. Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 , 771
(2000). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate an “injury in fact,”
which is “concrete,” “distinct and palpable,” and “actual or
imminent.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149 , 155
(1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, a
plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not …
th[e] result [of] some third party not before the court.’ ” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , 560–561
(1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U. S. 26 , 41–42
(1976)). Third, a plaintiff must show the “ ‘substantial
likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged
injury in fact.” Stevens, supra, at 771.

															   As noted above, §305 amended the Communication
Act’s requirements with respect to the lowest unit charge for
broadcasting time. But this price is not available to qualified
candidates until 45 days before a primary election or 60 days
before a general election. Because Senator McConnell’s current term
does not expire until 2009, the earliest day he could be affected
by §305 is 45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008.
This alleged injury in fact is too remote temporally to satisfy
Article III standing. See Whitmore, supra, at 158 (“A
threatened injury must be certainly impending to
constitute injury in fact” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 , 102 (1983)
(A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show he is
“ ‘immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as
[a] result” of the challenged conduct). Because we hold that the
McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge §305, we affirm the
District Court’s dismissal of the challenge to BCRA §305. BCRA §307 BCRA §307, which amends
§315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86
Stat. 3, as added, 90 Stat. 487, increases and indexes for
inflation certain FECA contribution limits. The Adams and Paul
plaintiffs challenge §307 in this Court. Both groups contend that
they have standing to sue. Again, we disagree. The Adams plaintiffs, a group
consisting of voters, organizations representing voters, and
candidates, allege two injuries, and argue each is legally
cognizable, “as established by case law outlawing electoral
discrimination based on economic status … and upholding the right
to an equally meaningful vote … .” Brief for Appellants Adams
et al. in No. 02–1740, p. 31. First, they assert that the increases in
hard money limits enacted by §307 deprive them of an equal ability
to participate in the election process based on their economic
status. But, to satisfy our standing requirements, a plaintiff’s
alleged injury must be an invasion of a concrete and particularized
legally protected interest. Lujan, supra , at 560. We have
noted that “[a]lthough standing in no way depends on the merits of
the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal, … it
often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 , 500
(1975) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We have
never recognized a legal right comparable to the broad and diffuse
injury asserted by the Adams plaintiffs. Their reliance on this
Court’s voting rights cases is misplaced. They rely on cases
requiring nondiscriminatory access to the ballot and a single,
equal vote for each voter. See, e.g. , Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974)
(invalidating a statute requiring a ballot-access fee fixed at a
percentage of the salary for the office sought because it
unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 666–668
(1966) (invalidating a state poll tax because it effectively denied
the right to vote).

															   None of these plaintiffs claims a denial of
equal access to the ballot or the right to vote. Instead, the
plaintiffs allege a curtailment of the scope of their participation
in the electoral process. But we have noted that “[p]olitical ‘free
trade’ does not necessarily require that all who participate in the
political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 , 257
(1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 48 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the asserted government interest
of “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections” to justify the burden on speech
presented by expenditure limits). This claim of injury by the Adams
plaintiffs is, therefore, not to a legally cognizable right.

															   Second, the Adams plaintiffs-candidates
contend that they have suffered a competitive injury. Their
candidates “do not wish to solicit or accept large campaign
contributions as permitted by BCRA” because “[t]hey believe such
contributions create the appearance of unequal access and
influence.” Adams Complaint ¶ ;53. As a result, they claim that
BCRA §307 puts them at a “fundraising disadvantage,” making it more
difficult for them to compete in elections. See id. , ¶
;56.

															   The second claimed injury is based on the same
premise as the first: BCRA §307’s increased hard money limits allow
plaintiffs-candidates’ opponents to raise more money, and,
consequently, the plaintiffs-candidates’ ability to compete or
participate in the electoral process is diminished. But they cannot
show that their alleged injury is “fairly traceable” to BCRA §307.
See Lujan, supra, at 562. Their alleged inability to
compete stems not from the operation of §307, but from their own
personal “wish” not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e ., their personal choice. Accordingly, the Adams
plaintiffs fail here to allege an injury in fact that is “fairly
traceable” to BCRA.

															   The Paul plaintiffs maintain that BCRA §307
violates the Freedom of Press Clause of the First Amendment. They
contend that their political campaigns and public interest advocacy
involve traditional press activities and that, therefore, they are
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of
press. The Paul plaintiffs argue that the contribution limits
imposed by BCRA §307, together with the individual and political
action committee contribution limitations of FECA §315, impose
unconstitutional editorial control upon candidates and their
campaigns. The Paul plaintiffs argue that by imposing economic
burdens upon them, but not upon the institutional media, see 2 U.
S. C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting “any news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting
station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication,
unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political
party, political committee, or candidate” from the definition of
expenditure), BCRA §307 and FECA §315 violate the freedom of the
press.

															   The Paul plaintiffs cannot show the
“ ‘substantial likelihood’ that the requested relief will
remedy [their] alleged injury in fact,” Stevens , 529 U.
S., at 771. The relief the Paul plaintiffs seek is for this Court
to strike down the contribution limits, removing the alleged
disparate editorial controls and economic burdens imposed on them.
But §307 merely increased and indexed for inflation certain FECA
contribution limits. This Court has no power to adjudicate a
challenge to the FECA limits in this case because challenges to the
constitutionality of FECA provisions are subject to direct review
before an appropriate en banc court of appeals, as provided in 2 U.
S. C. §437h, not in the three-judge District Court convened
pursuant to BCRA §403(a). Although the Court has jurisdiction to
hear a challenge to §307, if the Court were to strike down the
increases and indexes established by BCRA §307, it would not remedy
the Paul plaintiffs’ alleged injury because both the limitations
imposed by FECA and the exemption for news media would remain
unchanged. A ruling in the Paul plaintiffs’ favor, therefore, would
not redress their alleged injury, and they accordingly lack
standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523
U. S. 83 , 105–110 (1998).

															   For the reasons above, we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of the Adams and Paul plaintiffs’ challenges to
BCRA §307 for lack of standing. BCRA §§304, 316, and 319 BCRA §§304 and 316, which
amend FECA §315, and BCRA §319, which adds FECA §315A, collectively
known as the “millionaire provisions,” provide for a series of
staggered increases in otherwise applicable
contribution-to-candidate limits if the candidate’s opponent spends
a triggering amount of his personal funds.[ Footnote 1 ] The provisions also eliminate the
coordinated expenditure limits in certain circumstances.[ Footnote 2 ] In their challenge to the
millionaire provisions, the Adams plaintiffs allege the same
injuries that they alleged with regard to BCRA §307. For the
reasons discussed above, they fail to allege a cognizable injury
that is “fairly traceable” to BCRA. Additionally, as the District
Court noted, “none of the Adams plaintiffs is a candidate in an
election affected by the millionaire provisions—i.e., one in
which an opponent chooses to spend the triggering amount in his own
funds—and it would be purely ‘conjectural’ for the court to assume
that any plaintiff ever will be.” 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 431 (DC
2003) (case below) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Lujan , 504 U. S., at
560). We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Adams
plaintiffs’ challenge to the millionaire provisions for lack of
standing. BCRA §311 FECA §318 requires that
certain communications “authorized” by a candidate or his political
committee clearly identify the candidate or committee or, if not so
authorized, identify the payor and announce the lack of
authorization. 2 U. S. C. A. §441d (main ed. and Supp.
2003). BCRA §311 makes several amendments to FECA §318, among them
the expansion of this identification regime to include
disbursements for “electioneering communications” as defined in
BCRA §201. The McConnell and Chamber of
Commerce plaintiffs challenge BCRA §311 by simply noting that §311,
along with all of the “electioneering communications” provisions of
BCRA, is unconstitutional. We disagree. We think BCRA §311’s
inclusion of electioneering communications in the FECA §318
disclosure regime bears a sufficient relationship to the important
governmental interest of “shed[ding] the light of publicity” on
campaign financing. Buckley , 424 U. S., at 81. Assuming as we
must that FECA §318 is valid to begin with, and that FECA §318 is
valid as amended by BCRA §311’s amendments other than the inclusion
of electioneering communications, the challenged inclusion of
electioneering communications is not itself unconstitutional. We
affirm the District Court’s decision upholding §311’s expansion of
FECA §318(a) to include disclosure of disbursements for
electioneering communications. BCRA §318 BCRA §318, which adds FECA
§324, prohibits individuals “17 years old or younger” from making
contributions to candidates and contributions or donations to
political parties. 2 U. S. C. A. §441k (Supp. 2003). The
McConnell and Echols plaintiffs challenge the provision; they argue
that §318 violates the First Amendment rights of minors. We
agree. Minors enjoy the protection
of the First Amendment. See, e.g ., Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 , 511–513
(1969). Limitations on the amount that an individual may contribute
to a candidate or political committee impinge on the protected
freedoms of expression and association. See Buckley,
supra, at 20–22. When the Government burdens the right to
contribute, we apply heightened scrutiny. See ante , at
25–26 (joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.) (“[A]
contribution limit involving even ‘significant interference’ with
associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the
‘lesser demand’ of being ‘closely drawn’ to match a ‘sufficiently
important interest.’ ” (quoting Federal Election
Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip
op., at 15)). We ask whether there is a “sufficiently important
interest” and whether the statute is “closely drawn” to avoid
unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. Ante, at 25–26; Buckley , 424 U. S., at 25. The Government
asserts that the provision protects against corruption by conduit;
that is, donations by parents through their minor children to
circumvent contribution limits applicable to the parents. But the
Government offers scant evidence of this form of evasion.[ Footnote 3 ] Perhaps the Government’s
slim evidence results from sufficient deterrence of such activities
by §320 of FECA, which prohibits any person from “mak[ing] a
contribution in the name of another person” or “knowingly
accept[ing] a contribution made by one person in the name of
another,” 2 U. S. C. §441f. Absent a more convincing case of
the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for §318
to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC , 528 U. S. 377 , 391
(2000) (“The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification
raised”).

															   Even assuming, arguendo , the
Government advances an important interest, the provision is
overinclusive. The States have adopted a variety of more tailored
approaches— e.g., counting contributions by minors against
the total permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower
cap on contributions by minors, and prohibiting contributions by
very young children. Without deciding whether any of these
alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold that the provision
here sweeps too broadly. We therefore affirm the District Court’s
decision striking down §318 as unconstitutional. BCRA §403(b) The National Right to Life
plaintiffs argue that the District Court’s grant of intervention to
the intervenor-defendants, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a) and BCRA §403(b), must be reversed because the
intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing. It is clear,
however, that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing,
and therefore we need not address the standing of the
intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the
FEC’s. See, e.g. , Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U. S.
417 , 431–432, n. 19 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 , 721
(1986). Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54 , 68–69,
n. 21 (1986) (reserving the question for another day).

															   For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the District Court’s judgment finding the plaintiffs’
challenges to BCRA §305, §307, and the millionaire provisions
nonjusticiable, striking down as unconstitutional BCRA §318, and
upholding BCRA §311. The judgment of the District Court is

															Affirmed.

															* Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Souter join this opinion in its entirety.
Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this
opinion, except with respect to BCRA §305. Justice Thomas joins
this opinion with respect to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and
403(b). Footnote 1 To qualify for increased candidate
contribution limits, the “opposition personal funds amount,” which
depends on expenditures by a candidate and her self-financed
opponent, must exceed a “threshold amount.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§§441a(i)(1)(D), 441a–1(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2003). Footnote 2 If the “opposition personal funds amount” is
at least 10 times the “threshold amount” in a Senate race, or
exceeds $350,000 in a House of Representatives race, the
coordinated party expenditure limits do not apply.
§§441a(i)(1)(C)(iii), 441a–1(a)(1)(C). Footnote 3 Although some examples were presented to the
District Court, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 588–590 (2003)
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.), none were offered to this Court. OPINION OF THE COURT MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Stevens and Justice
O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA
Titles I and II.*

															   The Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, contains a series of amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 86 Stat. 11,
as amended, 2 U. S. C. A. §431 et seq. (main ed.
and Supp. 2003), the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088, as
amended, 47 U. S. C. A. §315, and other portions of the
United States Code, 18 U. S. C. A. §607 (Supp. 2003), 36
U. S. C. A. §§510–511, that are challenged in these
cases.[ Footnote 1 ] In this
opinion we discuss Titles I and II of BCRA. The opinion of the
Court delivered by The Chief Justice, post, p. ___,
discusses Titles III and IV, and the opinion of the Court delivered
by Justice Breyer, post , p. ___, discusses Title V.

															I

															   More than a century ago the
“sober-minded Elihu Root” advocated legislation that would prohibit
political contributions by corporations in order to prevent
“ ‘the great aggregations of wealth, from using their
corporate funds, directly or indirectly,’ ” to elect
legislators who would “ ‘vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the
public.’ ” United States v. Automobile
Workers, 352 U. S. 567 , 571 (1957) (quoting E.
Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 143 (R. Bacon &
J. Scott eds. 1916)). In Root’s opinion, such legislation would
“ ‘strik[e] at a constantly growing evil which has done more
to shake the confidence of the plain people of small means of this
country in our political institutions than any other practice which
has ever obtained since the foundation of our Government.’ ”
352 U. S., at 571. The Congress of the United States has repeatedly
enacted legislation endorsing Root’s judgment.

															   BCRA is the most recent federal
enactment designed “to purge national politics of what was
conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign
contributions.” Id., at 572. As Justice Frankfurter
explained in his opinion for the Court in Automobile
Workers , the first such enactment responded to President
Theodore Roosevelt’s call for legislation forbidding all
contributions by corporations “ ‘to any political committee or
for any political purpose.’ ” Ibid. (quoting 40 Cong.
Rec. 96 (1906)). In his annual message to Congress in December
1905, President Roosevelt stated that “ ‘directors should not
be permitted to use stockholders’ money’ ” for political
purposes, and he recommended that “ ‘a prohibition’ ” on
corporate political contributions “ ‘would be, as far as it
went, an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt
practices acts.’ ” 352 U. S., at 352. The resulting 1907
statute completely banned corporate contributions of “money … in
connection with” any federal election. Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34
Stat. 864. Congress soon amended the statute to require the public
disclosure of certain contributions and expenditures and to place
“maximum limits on the amounts that congressional candidates could
spend in seeking nomination and election.” Automobile
Workers, supra , at 575–576.

															   In 1925 Congress extended the prohibition of
“contributions” “to include ‘anything of value,’ and made
acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of
such a contribution a crime.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 , 209 (1982) (citing
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, §§301, 313, 43 Stat. 1070,
1074). During the debates preceding that amendment, a leading
Senator characterized “ ‘the apparent hold on political
parties which business interests and certain organizations seek and
sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign
contributions’ ” as “ ‘one of the great political evils
of the time.’ ” Automobile Workers, supra ,
at 576 (quoting 65 Cong. Rec. 9507–9508 (1924)). We upheld the
amended statute against a constitutional challenge, observing that
“[t]he power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to
that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of
Congress.” Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U. S. 534 , 547
(1934).

															   Congress’ historical concern with the
“political potentialities of wealth” and their “untoward
consequences for the democratic process,” Automobile
Workers , supra , at 577–578, has long reached beyond
corporate money. During and shortly after World War II, Congress
reacted to the “enormous financial outlays” made by some unions in
connection with national elections. 352 U. S., at 579. Congress
first restricted union contributions in the Hatch Act, 18 U.
S. C. §610,[ Footnote 2 ]
and it later prohibited “union contributions in connection with
federal elections … altogether.” National Right to Work,
supra , at 209 (citing War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally
Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, §9, 57 Stat. 167). Congress subsequently
extended that prohibition to cover unions’ election-related
expenditures as well as contributions, and it broadened the
coverage of federal campaigns to include both primary and general
elections. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 136. See Automobile Workers, supra , at 578–584.
During the consideration of those measures, legislators repeatedly
voiced their concerns regarding the pernicious influence of large
campaign contributions. See 93 Cong. Rec. 3428, 3522 (1947);
H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. Rep.
No. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1947); H. R. Rep. No.
2093, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945). As we noted in a unanimous
opinion recalling this history, Congress’ “careful legislative
adjustment of the federal election laws, in a ‘cautious advance,
step by step,’ to account for the particular legal and economic
attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants
considerable deference.” National Right to Work, 352 U.
S., at 209 (citations omitted).

															   In early 1972 Congress continued its steady
improvement of the national election laws by enacting FECA, 86
Stat. 3. As first enacted, that statute required disclosure of all
contributions exceeding $100 and of expenditures by candidates and
political committees that spent more than $1,000 per year. Id. , at 11–19. It also prohibited contributions made in
the name of another person, id., at 19, and by Government
contractors, id., at 10. The law ratified the earlier
prohibition on the use of corporate and union general treasury
funds for political contributions and expenditures, but it
expressly permitted corporations and unions to establish and
administer separate segregated funds (commonly known as political
action committees, or PACs) for election-related contributions and
expenditures. Id ., at 12–13.[ Footnote 3 ] See Pipefitters v. United
States, 407 U. S. 385 , 409–410
(1972).

															   As the 1972 presidential elections made clear,
however, FECA’s passage did not deter unseemly fundraising and
campaign practices. Evidence of those practices persuaded Congress
to enact the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88
Stat. 1263. Reviewing a constitutional challenge to the amendments,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit described
them as “by far the most comprehensive … reform legislation [ever]
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President,
Vice-President and members of Congress.” Buckley v. Valeo , 519 F. 2d 821, 831 (1975) (en banc) (per
curiam) .

															   The 1974 amendments closed the loophole that
had allowed candidates to use an unlimited number of political
committees for fundraising purposes and thereby to circumvent the
limits on individual committees’ receipts and disbursements. They
also limited individual political contributions to any single
candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation
of $25,000 by any contributor; imposed ceilings on spending by
candidates and political parties for national conventions; required
reporting and public disclosure of contributions and expenditures
exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation. Id ., at 831–834 . The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974
amendments almost in their entirety.[ Footnote 4 ] It concluded that the clear and compelling
interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process
provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive
provisions of the Act. Id. , at 841. The court’s opinion
relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated
access to public officials[ Footnote
5 ] and described methods of evading the contribution limits
that had enabled contributors of massive sums to avoid disclosure. Id. , at 837–841.[ Footnote
6 ]

															   The Court of Appeals upheld the provisions
establishing contribution and expenditure limitations on the theory
that they should be viewed as regulations of conduct rather than
speech. Id. , at 840–841 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 376–377
(1968)). This Court, however, concluded that each set of
limitations raised serious—though different—concerns under the
First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 , 14–23 (1976) (per
curiam) . We treated the limitations on candidate and
individual expenditures as direct restraints on speech, but we
observed that the contribution limitations, in contrast, imposed
only “a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to
engage in free communication.” Id. , at 20–21. Considering
the “deeply disturbing examples” of corruption related to candidate
contributions discussed in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, we
determined that limiting contributions served an interest in
protecting “the integrity of our system of representative
democracy.” Id. , at 26–27. In the end, the Act’s primary
purpose—“to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions”—provided
“a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.” Id., at 26.

															   We prefaced our analysis of the $1,000
limitation on expenditures by observing that it broadly encompassed
every expenditure “ ‘relative to a clearly identified
candidate.’ ” Id. , at 39 (quoting 18 U. S. C.
§608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)). To avoid vagueness concerns we
construed that phrase to apply only to “communications that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office.” 424 U. S., at 42– 44. We
concluded, however, that as so narrowed, the provision would not
provide effective protection against the dangers of quid pro
quo arrangements, because persons and groups could eschew
expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate while remaining “free to spend as much
as they want to promote the candidate and his views.” Id. ,
at 45. We also rejected the argument that the expenditure limits
were necessary to prevent attempts to circumvent the Act’s
contribution limits, because FECA already treated expenditures
controlled by or coordinated with the candidate as contributions,
and we were not persuaded that independent expenditures posed the
same risk of real or apparent corruption as coordinated
expenditures. Id. , at 46–47. We therefore held that
Congress’ interest in preventing real or apparent corruption was
inadequate to justify the heavy burdens on the freedoms of
expression and association that the expenditure limits imposed.

															   We upheld all of the disclosure and reporting
requirements in the Act that were challenged on appeal to this
Court after finding that they vindicated three important interests:
providing the electorate with relevant information about the
candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and
discouraging the use of money for improper purposes; and
facilitating enforcement of the prohibitions in the Act. Id. , at 66–68. In order to avoid an overbreadth problem,
however, we placed the same narrowing construction on the term
“expenditure” in the disclosure context that we had adopted in the
context of the expenditure limitations. Thus, we construed the
reporting requirement for persons making expenditures of more than
$100 in a year “to reach only funds used for communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.” Id. , at 80 (footnote omitted).

															   Our opinion in Buckley addressed
issues that primarily related to contributions and expenditures by
individuals, since none of the parties challenged the prohibition
on contributions by corporations and labor unions. We noted,
however, that the statute authorized the use of corporate and union
resources to form and administer segregated funds that could be
used for political purposes. Id. , at 28–29, n. 31;
see also n. 3, supra .

															   Three important developments in the years
after our decision in Buckley persuaded Congress that
further legislation was necessary to regulate the role that
corporations, unions, and wealthy contributors play in the
electoral process. As a preface to our discussion of the specific
provisions of BCRA, we comment briefly on the increased importance
of “soft money,” the proliferation of “issue ads,” and the
disturbing findings of a Senate investigation into campaign
practices related to the 1996 federal elections. Soft Money Under FECA, “contributions”
must be made with funds that are subject to the Act’s disclosure
requirements and source and amount limitations. Such funds are
known as “federal” or “hard” money. FECA defines the term
“contribution,” however, to include only the gift or advance of
anything of value “made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.” 2 U. S. C.
§431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added). Donations made solely for the
purpose of influencing state or local elections are therefore
unaffected by FECA’s requirements and prohibitions. As a result,
prior to the enactment of BCRA, federal law permitted corporations
and unions, as well as individuals who had already made the maximum
permissible contributions to federal candidates, to contribute
“nonfederal money”—also known as “soft money”—to political parties
for activities intended to influence state or local elections.

															   Shortly after Buckley was decided, questions arose concerning the treatment of
contributions intended to influence both federal and state
elections. Although a literal reading of FECA’s definition of
“contribution” would have required such activities to be funded
with hard money, the FEC ruled that political parties could fund
mixed-purpose activities—including get-out-the-vote drives and
generic party advertising—in part with soft money.[ Footnote 7 ] In 1995 the FEC concluded that
the parties could also use soft money to defray the costs of
“legislative advocacy media advertisements,” even if the ads
mentioned the name of a federal candidate, so long as they did not
expressly advocate the candidate’s election or defeat. FEC Advisory
Op. 1995–25.

															   As the permissible uses of soft money
expanded, the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national
political parties increased exponentially. Of the two major
parties’ total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6
million) in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in
1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million) in
2000.[ Footnote 8 ] The national
parties transferred large amounts of their soft money to the state
parties, which were allowed to use a larger percentage of soft
money to finance mixed-purpose activities under FEC rules.[ Footnote 9 ] In the year 2000, for
example, the national parties diverted $280 million—more than half
of their soft money—to state parties.

															   Many contributions of soft money were
dramatically larger than the contributions of hard money permitted
by FECA. For example, in 1996 the top five corporate soft-money
donors gave, in total, more than $9 million in nonfederal funds to
the two national party committees.[ Footnote 10 ] In the most recent election cycle the
political parties raised almost $300 million—60% of their total
soft-money fundraising—from just 800 donors, each of which
contributed a minimum of $120,000.[ Footnote 11 ] Moreover, the largest corporate donors often
made substantial contributions to both parties.[ Footnote 12 ] Such practices corroborate
evidence indicating that many corporate contributions were
motivated by a desire for access to candidates and a fear of being
placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to
other contributors, rather than by ideological support for the
candidates and parties.[ Footnote
13 ]

															   Not only were such soft-money contributions
often designed to gain access to federal candidates, but they were
in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves. Candidates
often directed potential donors to party committees and tax-exempt
organizations that could legally accept soft money. For example, a
federal legislator running for reelection solicited soft money from
a supporter by advising him that even though he had already
“contributed the legal maximum” to the campaign committee, he could
still make an additional contribution to a joint program supporting
federal, state, and local candidates of his party.[ Footnote 14 ] Such solicitations were not
uncommon.[ Footnote 15 ]

															   The solicitation, transfer, and use of soft
money thus enabled parties and candidates to circumvent FECA’s
limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection
with federal elections. Issue Advertising In Buckley we construed
FECA’s disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as its
expenditure limitations, “to reach only funds used for
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate.” 424 U. S., at 80 (footnote omitted).
As a result of that strict reading of the statute, the use or
omission of “magic words” such as “Elect John Smith” or “Vote
Against Jane Doe” marked a bright statutory line separating
“express advocacy” from “issue advocacy.” See id. , at 44,
n. 52. Express advocacy was subject to FECA’s limitations and could
be financed only using hard money. The political parties, in other
words, could not use soft money to sponsor ads that used any magic
words, and corporations and unions could not fund such ads out of
their general treasuries. So-called issue ads, on the other hand,
not only could be financed with soft money, but could be aired
without disclosing the identity of, or any other information about,
their sponsors.

															   While the distinction between
“issue” and express advocacy seemed neat in theory, the two
categories of advertisements proved functionally identical in
important respects. Both were used to advocate the election or
defeat of clearly identified federal candidates, even though the
so-called issue ads eschewed the use of magic words.[ Footnote 16 ] Little difference existed,
for example, between an ad that urged viewers to “vote against Jane
Doe” and one that condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular issue
before exhorting viewers to “call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think.”[ Footnote 17 ] Indeed,
campaign professionals testified that the most effective campaign
ads, like the most effective commercials for products such as
Coca-Cola, should, and did, avoid the use of the magic
words.[ Footnote 18 ]
Moreover, the conclusion that such ads were specifically intended
to affect election results was confirmed by the fact that almost
all of them aired in the 60 days immediately preceding a federal
election.[ Footnote 19 ]
Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dollars of
their general funds to pay for these ads,[ Footnote 20 ] and those expenditures, like soft-money
donations to the political parties, were unregulated under FECA.
Indeed, the ads were attractive to organizations and candidates
precisely because they were beyond FECA’s reach, enabling
candidates and their parties to work closely with friendly interest
groups to sponsor so-called issue ads when the candidates
themselves were running out of money.[ Footnote 21 ]

															   Because FECA’s disclosure requirements did not
apply to so-called issue ads, sponsors of such ads often used
misleading names to conceal their identity. “Citizens for Better
Medicare,” for instance, was not a grassroots organization of
citizens, as its name might suggest, but was instead a platform for
an association of drug manufacturers.[ Footnote 22 ] And “Republicans for Clean Air,” which ran
ads in the 2000 Republican Presidential primary, was actually an
organization consisting of just two individuals—brothers who
together spent $25 million on ads supporting their favored
candidate.[ Footnote 23 ]

															   While the public may not have been fully
informed about the sponsorship of so-called issue ads, the record
indicates that candidates and officeholders often were. A former
Senator confirmed that candidates and officials knew who their
friends were and “sometimes suggest[ed] that corporations or
individuals make donations to interest groups that run ‘issue
ads.’ ”[ Footnote 24 ] As
with soft-money contributions, political parties and candidates
used the availability of so-called issue ads to circumvent FECA’s
limitations, asking donors who contributed their permitted quota of
hard money to give money to nonprofit corporations to spend on
“issue” advocacy.[ Footnote
25 ] Senate Committee Investigation In 1998 the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs issued a six-volume report summarizing the
results of an extensive investigation into the campaign practices
in the 1996 federal elections. The report gave particular attention
to the effect of soft money on the American political system,
including elected officials’ practice of granting special access in
return for political contributions. The committee’s principal
findings relating to Democratic Party fundraising were set forth in
the majority’s report, while the minority report primarily
described Republican practices. The two reports reached consensus,
however, on certain central propositions. They agreed that the
“soft money loophole” had led to a “meltdown” of the campaign
finance system that had been intended “to keep corporate, union and
large individual contributions from influencing the electoral
process.”[ Footnote 26 ] One
Senator stated that “the hearings provided overwhelming evi- dence
that the twin loopholes of soft money and bogus issue advertising
have virtually destroyed our campaign finance laws, leaving us with
little more than a pile of legal rubble.”[ Footnote 27 ] The report was critical of both parties’
methods of raising soft money, as well as their use of those funds.
It concluded that both parties promised and provided special access
to candidates and senior Government officials in exchange for large
soft-money contributions. The Committee majority described the
White House coffees that rewarded major donors with access to
President Clinton,[ Footnote
28 ] and the courtesies extended to an international businessman
named Roger Tamraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of
about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were motivated by
his interest in gaining the Federal Government’s support for an
oil-line project in the Caucasus.[ Footnote 29 ] The minority described the promotional
materials used by the RNC’s two principal donor programs, “Team
100” and the “Republican Eagles,” which promised “special access to
high-ranking Republican elected officials, including governors,
senators, and representatives.”[ Footnote 30 ] One fundraising letter recited that the
chairman of the RNC had personally escorted a donor on appointments
that “ ‘turned out to be very significant in legislation
affecting public utility holding companies’ ” and made the
donor “ ‘a hero in his industry.’ ”[ Footnote 31 ]

															   In 1996 both parties began to use large
amounts of soft money to pay for issue advertising designed to
influence federal elections. The Committee found such ads highly
problematic for two reasons. Since they accomplished the same
purposes as express advocacy (which could lawfully be funded only
with hard money), the ads enabled unions, corporations, and wealthy
contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to
provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates,
the ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by,
the campaigns.[ Footnote 32 ]
The ads thus provided a means for evading FECA’s candidate
contribution limits.

															   The report also emphasized the role of state
and local parties. While the FEC’s allocation regime permitted
national parties to use soft money to pay for up to 40% of the
costs of both generic voter activities and issue advertising, they
allowed state and local parties to use larger percentages of soft
money for those purposes.[ Footnote 33 ] For that reason, national parties often made
substantial transfers of soft money to “state and local political
parties for ‘generic voter activities’ that in fact ultimately
benefit[ed] federal candidates because the funds for all practical
purposes remain[ed] under the control of the national committees.”
The report concluded that “[t]he use of such soft money thus
allow[ed] more corporate, union treasury, and large contributions
from wealthy individuals into the system.”[ Footnote 34 ]

															   The report discussed potential reforms,
including a ban on soft money at the national and state party
levels and restrictions on sham issue advocacy by nonparty
groups.[ Footnote 35 ] The
majority expressed the view that a ban on the raising of soft money
by national party committees would effectively address the use of
union and corporate general treasury funds in the federal political
process only if it required that candidate-specific ads be funded
with hard money.[ Footnote
36 ] The minority similarly recommended the elimination of
soft-money contributions to political parties from individuals,
corporations, and unions, as well as “reforms addressing candidate
advertisements masquerading as issue ads.”[ Footnote 37 ]

															II

															   In BCRA, Congress enacted many of
the committee’s proposed reforms. BCRA’s central provisions are
designed to address Congress’ concerns about the increasing use of
soft money and issue advertising to influence federal elections.
Title I regulates the use of soft money by political parties,
officeholders, and candidates. Title II primarily prohibits
corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for
communications that are intended to, or have the effect of,
influencing the outcome of federal elections.

															   Section 403 of BCRA provides
special rules for actions challenging the constitutionality of any
of the Act’s provisions. 2 U. S. C. A. §437h note (Supp.
2003). Eleven such actions were filed promptly after the statute
went into effect in March 2002. As required by §403, those actions
were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and
heard by a three-judge court. Section 403 directed the District
Court to advance the cases on the docket and to expedite their
disposition “to the greatest possible extent.” The court received a
voluminous record compiled by the parties and ultimately delivered
a decision embodied in a two-judge per curiam opinion and
three separate, lengthy opinions, each of which contained extensive
commentary on the facts and a careful analysis of the legal issues.
251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003). The three judges reached unanimity on
certain issues but differed on many. Their judgment, entered on May
1, 2003, held some parts of BCRA unconstitutional and upheld
others. 251 F. Supp. 2d 948.

															   As authorized by §403, all of the losing
parties filed direct appeals to this Court within 10 days. 2 U.
S. C. A. §437h note. On June 5, 2003, we noted probable
jurisdiction and ordered the parties to comply with an expedited
briefing schedule and present their oral arguments at a special
hearing on September 8, 2003. 539 U. S. ___. To simplify the
presentation, we directed the parties challenging provisions of
BCRA to proceed first on all issues, whether or not they prevailed
on any issue in the District Court. Ibid . Mindful of
§403’s instruction that we expedite our disposition of these
appeals to the greatest extent possible, we also consider each of
the issues in order. Accordingly, we first turn our attention to
Title I of BCRA.

															III

															   Title I is Congress’ effort to
plug the soft-money loophole. The cornerstone of Title I is new
FECA §323(a), which prohibits national party committees and their
agents from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft
money. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 38 ] In short, §323(a) takes
national parties out of the soft-money business.

															   The remaining provisions of new
FECA §323 largely reinforce the restrictions in §323(a). New FECA
§323(b) prevents the wholesale shift of soft-money influence from
national to state party committees by prohibiting state and local
party committees from using such funds for activities that affect
federal elections. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b). These “Federal
election activit[ies],” defined in new FECA §301(20)(A), are almost
identical to the mixed-purpose activities that have long been
regulated under the FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation regime. 2 U.
S. C. A. §431(20)(A). New FECA §323(d) reinforces these
soft-money restrictions by prohibiting political parties from
soliciting and donating funds to tax-exempt organizations that
engage in electioneering activities. 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(d). New FECA §323(e) restricts federal candidates and
officeholders from receiving, spending, or soliciting soft money in
connection with federal elections and limits their ability to do so
in connection with state and local elections. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(e). Finally, new FECA §323(f) prevents
circumvention of the restrictions on national, state, and local
party committees by prohibiting state and local candidates from
raising and spending soft money to fund advertisements and other
public communications that promote or attack federal candidates. 2
U. S. C. A. §441i(f).

															   Plaintiffs mount a facial First Amendment
challenge to new FECA §323, as well as challenges based on the
Elections Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §4, principles of
federalism, and the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause. We address these challenges in turn.

															A

															   In Buckley and
subsequent cases, we have subjected restrictions on campaign
expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign
contributions. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14);
see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 , 387–388 (2000); Buckley , 424 U. S., at 19. In these cases we have
recognized that contribution limits, unlike limits on expenditures,
“entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s
ability to engage in free communication.” Id., at 20; see
also, e.g., Beaumont , supra, at ___
(slip op., at 14); Shrink Missouri , supra, at
386–388. In Buckley we said that:

															“A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication
by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of
the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size
of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor’s support for the candidate. A limitation on the
amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign
organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support
evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the
contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While
contributions may result in political expression if spent by a
candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the
transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other than the contributor.” 424 U. S., at 21
(footnote omitted).

															Because the communicative value of large
contributions inheres mainly in their ability to facilitate the
speech of their recipients, we have said that contribution limits
impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to
“preven[t] candidates and political committees from amassing the
resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Ibid. We have recognized that contribution limits
may bear “more heavily on the associational right than on freedom
to speak,” Shrink Missouri , supra , at 388, since
contributions serve “to affiliate a person with a candidate” and
“enabl[e] like-minded persons to pool their resources,” Buckley , 424 U. S., at 22. Unlike expenditure limits,
however, which “preclud[e] most associations from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents,” contribution limits both
“leave the contributor free to become a member of any political
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts
on behalf of candidates,” and allow associations “to aggregate
large sums of money to promote effective advocacy.” Ibid. The “overall effect” of dollar limits on contributions is “merely
to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from
a greater number of persons.” Id., at 21–22. Thus, a
contribution limit involving even “ ‘significant
interference’ ” with associational rights is nevertheless
valid if it satisfies the “lesser demand” of being “ ‘closely
drawn’ ” to match a “ ‘sufficiently important
interest.’ ” Beaumont , supra , at ___ (slip
op., at 15) (quoting Shrink Missouri , supra , at
387–388).[ Footnote 39 ]

															   Our treatment of contribution restrictions
reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First
Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the
interests that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing
“both the actual corruption threatened by large financial
contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral
process through the appearance of corruption.” National Right
to Work, 459 U. S., at 208; see also Federal Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 , 440–441 (2001) (Colorado II) . We have said that these interests directly
implicate “ ‘the integrity of our electoral process, and, not
less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the
successful functioning of that process.’ ” National Right
to Work, supra , at 208 (quoting Automobile
Workers, 352 U. S., at 570). Because the electoral process is
the very “means through which a free society democratically
translates political speech into concrete governmental action,” Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 401 (Breyer, J.,
concurring), contribution limits, like other measures aimed at
protecting the integrity of the process, tangibly benefit public
participation in political debate. For that reason, when reviewing
Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, “there is no place
for a strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort
often thought to accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’ ” Id. , at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). The less rigorous
standard of review we have applied to contribution limits
( Buckley ’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper
deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional
interests in an area in which it enjoys particular expertise. It
also provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and
respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to
protect the integrity of the political process.

															   Our application of this less rigorous degree
of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past
from our dissenting colleagues. See, e.g. , Shrink
Missouri , 528 U. S., at 405–410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. , at 410–420 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604 , 635–644 (1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., dissenting). We have rejected
such criticism in previous cases for the reasons identified above.
We are also mindful of the fact that in its lengthy deliberations
leading to the enactment of BCRA, Congress properly relied on the
recognition of its authority contained in Buckley and its
progeny. Considerations of stare decisis , buttressed by
the respect that the Legislative and Judicial Branches owe to one
another, provide additional powerful reasons for adhering to the
analysis of contribution limits that the Court has consistently
followed since Buckley was decided. See Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197 , 202
(1991).[ Footnote 40 ]

															   Like the contribution limits we upheld in Buckley , §323’s restrictions have only a marginal impact
on the ability of contributors, candidates, officeholders, and
parties to engage in effective political speech. Beaumont ,
539 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Complex as its provisions may
be, §323, in the main, does little more than regulate the ability
of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute
large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal
candidates, and federal officeholders.

															   Plaintiffs contend that we must apply strict
scrutiny to §323 because many of its provisions restrict not only
contributions but also the spending and solicitation of funds
raised outside of FECA’s contribution limits. But for purposes of
determining the level of scrutiny, it is irrelevant that Congress
chose in §323 to regulate contributions on the demand rather than
the supply side. See, e.g. , National Right to Work,
supra, at 206–211 (upholding a provision restricting PACs’
ability to solicit funds). The relevant inquiry is whether the
mechanism adopted to implement the contribution limit, or to
prevent circumvention of that limit, burdens speech in a way that a
direct restriction on the contribution itself would not. That is
not the case here.

															   For example, while §323(a) prohibits national
parties from receiving or spending nonfederal money, and §323(b)
prohibits state party committees from spending nonfederal money on
federal election activities, neither provision in any way limits
the total amount of money parties can spend. 2 U.
S. C. A. §§441i(a), (b) (Supp. 2003). Rather, they simply
limit the source and individual amount of donations. That they do
so by prohibiting the spending of soft money does not render them
expenditure limitations.[ Footnote 41 ]

															   Similarly, the solicitation provisions of
§323(a) and §323(e), which restrict the ability of national party
committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders to
solicit nonfederal funds, leave open ample opportunities for
soliciting federal funds on behalf of entities subject to FECA’s
source and amount restrictions. Even §323(d), which on its face
enacts a blanket ban on party solicitations of funds to certain
tax-exempt organizations, nevertheless allows parties to solicit
funds to the organizations’ federal PACs. 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(d). As for those organizations that cannot or do not
administer PACs, parties remain free to donate federal funds
directly to such organizations, and may solicit funds expressly for
that purpose. See infra , at 72–73 (construing §323(d)’s
restriction on donations by parties to apply only to donations from
a party committee’s nonfederal or soft-money account). And as with
§323(a), §323(d) places no limits on other means of endorsing
tax-exempt organizations or any restrictions on solicitations by
party officers acting in their individual capacities. 2 U.
S. C. A. §§441i(a), (d).

															   Section 323 thus shows “due regard for the
reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes or for particular views.” Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 , 632
(1980). The fact that party committees and federal candidates and
officeholders must now ask only for limited dollar amounts or
request that a corporation or union contribute money through its
PAC in no way alters or impairs the political message “intertwined”
with the solicitation. Cf. Riley v. National
Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781 , 795
(1988) (treating solicitation restriction that required fundraisers
to disclose particular information as a content-based regulation
subject to strict scrutiny because it “necessarily alter[ed] the
content of the speech”). And rather than chill such solicitations,
as was the case in Schaumburg , the restriction here tends
to increase the dissemination of information by forcing parties,
candidates, and officeholders to solicit from a wider array of
potential donors. As with direct limits on contributions,
therefore, §323’s spending and solicitation restrictions have only
a marginal impact on political speech.[ Footnote 42 ]

															   Finally, plaintiffs contend that the type of
associational burdens that §323 imposes are fundamentally different
from the burdens that accompanied Buckley ’s contribution
limits, and merit the type of strict scrutiny we have applied to
attempts to regulate the internal processes of political parties. E.g. , California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 , 573–574 (2000). In
making this argument, plaintiffs greatly exaggerate the effect of
§323, contending that it precludes any collaboration among
national, state, and local committees of the same party in
fundraising and electioneering activities. We do not read the
provisions in that way. See infra , at 51–52. Section 323
merely subjects a greater percentage of contributions to parties
and candidates to FECA’s source and amount limitations. Buckley has already acknowledged that such limitations
“leave the contributor free to become a member of any political
association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts
on behalf of candidates.” 424 U. S., at 22. The modest impact that
§323 has on the ability of committees within a party to associate
with each other does not independently occasion strict scrutiny.
None of this is to suggest that the alleged associational burdens
imposed on parties by §323 have no place in the First Amendment
analysis; it is only that we account for them in the application,
rather than the choice, of the appropriate level of
scrutiny.[ Footnote 43 ]

															   With these principles in mind, we apply the
less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to
evaluate the constitutionality of new FECA §323. Because the five
challenged provisions of §323 implicate different First Amendment
concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful, however, that
Congress enacted §323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the
Government’s important interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption. New FECA §323(a)’s Restrictions on National
Party Committees The core of Title I is new
FECA §323(a), which provides that “national committee[s] of a
political party … may not solicit, receive, or direct to another
person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other
thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”
2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition
extends to “any officer or agent acting on behalf of such a
national committee, and any entity that is directly or indirectly
established, financed, or maintained, or controlled by such a
national committee.” §441(a)(2). The main goal of §323(a) is
modest. In large part, it simply effects a return to the scheme
that was approved in Buckley and that was subverted by the
creation of the FEC’s allocation regime, which permitted the
political parties to fund federal electioneering efforts with a
combination of hard and soft money. See supra , at 11–13,
and n. 7. Under that allocation regime, national parties were
able to use vast amounts of soft money in their efforts to elect
federal candidates. Consequently, as long as they directed the
money to the political parties, donors could contribute large
amounts of soft money for use in activities designed to influence
federal elections.[ Footnote
44 ] New §323(a) is designed to put a stop to that practice.

															1. Governmental Interests Underlying
New FECA     §323(a) The Government defends
§323(a)’s ban on national parties’ involvement with soft money as
necessary to prevent the actual and apparent corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders. Our cases have made clear that the
prevention of corruption or its appearance constitutes a
sufficiently important interest to justify political contribution
limits. We have not limited that interest to the elimination of
cash-for-votes exchanges. In Buckley , we expressly rejected
the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive
alternative to FECA’s contribution limits, noting that such laws
“deal[t] with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those
with money to influence government action.” 424 U. S., at 28. Thus,
“[i]n speaking of ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for
abuse’ in addition to ‘ quid pro quo arrangements,’ we
[have] recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public
officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.” Shrink
Missouri , 528 U. S., at 389; see also Colorado II ,
533 U. S., at 441 (acknowledging that corruption extends beyond
explicit cash-for-votes agreements to “undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment”).

															   Of “almost equal” importance has
been the Government’s interest in combating the appearance or
perception of corruption engendered by large campaign
contributions. Buckley , supra , at 27; see also Shrink Missouri, supra, at 390; Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470
U. S. 480 , 496–497 (1985). Take away Congress’ authority to
regulate the appearance of undue influence and “the cynical
assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize the
willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.” Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 390; see also id .,
at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring). And because the First Amendment
does not require Congress to ignore the fact that “candidates,
donors, and parties test the limits of the current law,” Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 457, these interests have been
sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but
laws preventing the circumvention of such limits, id ., at
456 (“[A]ll Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a
valid theory of corruption”).

															   “The quantum of empirical evidence needed to
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will
vary up or down with the novelty or the plausibility of the
justification raised.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 391. The
idea that large contributions to a national party can corrupt or,
at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible. For
nearly 30 years, FECA has placed strict dollar limits and source
restrictions on contributions that individuals and other entities
can give to national, state, and local party committees for the
purpose of influencing a federal election. The premise behind these
restrictions has been, and continues to be, that contributions to a
federal candidate’s party in aid of that candidate’s campaign
threaten to create—no less than would a direct contribution to the
candidate—a sense of obligation. See Buckley , supra, at 38 (upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on aggregate
yearly contributions to a candidate, political committee, and
political party committee as a “quite modest restraint … to prevent
evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation” by, among other
things, “huge contributions to the candidate’s political party”).
This is particularly true of contributions to national parties,
with which federal candidates and officeholders enjoy a special
relationship and unity of interest. This close affiliation has
placed national parties in a unique position, “whether they like it
or not,” to serve as “agents for spending on behalf of those who
seek to produce obligated officeholders.” Colorado II , supra, at 452; see also Shrink Missouri , supra, at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[Respondent]
asks us to evaluate his speech claim in the context of a system
which favors candidates and officeholders whose campaigns are
supported by soft money, usually funneled through political
parties ” (emphasis added)). As discussed below, rather than
resist that role, the national parties have actively embraced
it.

															   The question for present purposes is whether
large soft-money contributions to national party
committees have a corrupting influence or give rise to the
appearance of corruption. Both common sense and the ample record in
these cases confirm Congress’ belief that they do. As set forth
above, supra , at 11–13, and n. 7, the FEC’s
allocation regime has invited widespread circumvention of FECA’s
limits on contributions to parties for the purpose of influencing
federal elections. Under this system, corporate, union, and wealthy
individual donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of
soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for
the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate’s
federal election. It is not only plausible, but likely, that
candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors
would seek to exploit that gratitude.[ Footnote 45 ]

															   The evidence in the record shows that
candidates and donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money
loophole, the former to increase their prospects of election and
the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders, with the
national parties serving as willing intermediaries. Thus, despite
FECA’s hard-money limits on direct contributions to candidates,
federal officeholders have commonly asked donors to make soft-money
donations to national and state committees “solely in order to
assist federal campaigns,” including the officeholder’s own. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 472 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration
of Wade Randlett, CEO, Dashboard Technology ¶ ;¶ ;6–9 (hereinafter
Randlett Decl.), App. 713–714); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
471–473, 478–479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at 842–843
(Leon, J.). Parties kept tallies of the amounts of soft money
raised by each officeholder, and “the amount of money a Member of
Congress raise[d] for the national political committees often
affect[ed] the amount the committees g[a]ve to assist the Member’s
campaign.” Id ., at 474–475 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Donors
often asked that their contributions be credited to particular
candidates, and the parties obliged, irrespective of whether the
funds were hard or soft. Id ., at 477–478 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.); id ., at 824, 847 (Leon, J.). National party
committees often teamed with individual candidates’ campaign
committees to create joint fundraising committees, which enabled
the candidates to take advantage of the party’s higher contribution
limits while still allowing donors to give to their preferred
candidate. Id ., at 478 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id .,
at 847–848 (Leon, J.); see also App. 1286 (Krasno & Sorauf
Expert Report (characterizing the joint fundraising committee as
one “in which Senate candidates in effect rais[e] soft money for
use in their own races”)). Even when not participating directly in
the fundraising, federal officeholders were well aware of the
identities of the donors: National party committees would
distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or donors
themselves would report their generosity to officeholders. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 487–488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“[F]or a Member
not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must actively
avoid such knowledge, as it is provided by the national political
parties and the donors themselves”); id ., at 853–855
(Leon, J.).

															   For their part, lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy
individuals alike all have candidly admitted donating substantial
sums of soft money to national committees not on ideological
grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over
federal officials. For example, a former lobbyist and partner at a
lobbying firm in Washington, D. C., stated in his
declaration:

															“ ‘You are doing a favor for somebody by
making a large [soft-money] donation and they appreciate it.
Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger
favor for someone—that is, write a larger check—and they feel even
more compelled to reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are
rarely exchanged about contributions, but people do have
understandings.’ ” Id., at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(quoting declaration of Robert Rozen, partner, Ernst & Young ¶
;14; see 8–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 33).[ Footnote 46 ]

															Particularly telling is the fact that, in 1996 and
2000, more than half of the top 50 soft-money donors gave
substantial sums to both major national parties, leaving
room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking
influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any
particular ideology. See, e.g., 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
508–510 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing Mann Expert Report Tbls. 5–6);
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (“ ‘Giving soft money to both
parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense at all
unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access.’ ”
(quoting declaration of former Sen. Dale Bumpers ¶ ;15, App.
175)).[ Footnote 47 ]

															   The evidence from the federal officeholders’
perspective is similar. For example, one former Senator described
the influence purchased by nonfederal donations as follows:

															“ ‘Too often, Members’ first thought is not
what is right or what they believe, but how it will affect
fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously contend that a $100,000
donation does not alter the way one thinks about—and quite possibly
votes on—an issue? … When you don’t pay the piper that
finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from
that piper. Since money is the mother’s milk of politics, you never
want to be in that situation.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen. Alan
Simpson ¶ ;10 (hereinafter Simpson Decl.), App. 811); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 851 (Leon, J.) (same).

															See also id ., at 489 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(“ ‘The majority of those who contribute to political parties
do so for business reasons, to gain access to influential Members
of Congress and to get to know new Members.” (quoting Hickmott
Decl., Exh. A, ¶ ;46)). By bringing soft-money donors and federal
candidates and officeholders together, “[p]arties are thus
necessarily the instruments of some contributors whose object is
not to support the party’s message or to elect party candidates
across the board, but rather to support a specific candidate for
the sake of a position on one narrow issue, or even to support any
candidate who will be obliged to the contributors.” Colorado
II , 533 U. S., at 451–452.

															   Plaintiffs argue that without concrete
evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder has
actually switched a vote (or, presumably, evidence of a specific
instance where the public believes a vote was switched), Congress
has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption. But
the record is to the contrary. The evidence connects soft money to
manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’
failure to enact, among other things, generic drug legislation,
tort reform, and tobacco legislation. See, e.g. , 251 F.
Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at 852 (Leon,
J.); App. 390–394 (declaration of Sen. John McCain ¶ ;¶ ;5, 8–11
(hereinafter McCain Decl.)); App. 811 (Simpson Decl. ¶ ;10)
(“Donations from the tobacco industry to Republicans scuttled
tobacco legislation, just as contributions from the trial lawyers
to Democrats stopped tort reform”); App. 805 (declaration of former
Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;¶ ;13–14). To claim that such actions do not
change legislative outcomes surely misunderstands the legislative
process.

															   More importantly, plaintiffs conceive of
corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that
Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple
cash-for-votes corruption to curbing “undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.” Colorado II , supra , at 441. Many of the “deeply
disturbing examples” of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 27, to justify FECA’s contribution
limits were not episodes of vote buying, but evidence that various
corporate interests had given substantial donations to gain access
to high-level government officials. See Buckley , 519
F. 2d, at 821, 839–840, n. 36; nn. 5–6, supra. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it certainly
gave the “appearance of such influence.” Colorado II , supra , at 441; see also 519 F. 2d , at 838.

															   The record in the present case is replete with
similar examples of national party committees peddling access to
federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large
soft-money donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 492–506
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). As one former Senator put it:

															“ ‘Special interests who give large amounts of
soft money to political parties do in fact achieve their
objectives. They do get special access. Sitting Senators and House
Members have limited amounts of time, but they make time available
in their schedules to meet with representatives of business and
unions and wealthy individuals who gave large sums to their
parties. These are not idle chit-chats about the philosophy of
democracy… . Senators are pressed by their benefactors to
introduce legislation, to amend legislation, to block legislation,
and to vote on legislation in a certain way.’ ” Id. ,
at 496 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of former Sen.
Warren Rudman ¶ ;7 (hereinafter Rudman Decl.), App. 742); 251 F.
Supp. 2d, at 858 (Leon, J.) (same).

															So pervasive is this practice that the six national
party committees actually furnish their own menus of opportunities
for access to would-be soft-money donors, with increased prices
reflecting an increased level of access. For example, the DCCC
offers a range of donor options, starting with the $10,000-per-year
Business Forum program, and going up to the $100,000-per-year
National Finance Board program. The latter entitles the donor to
bimonthly conference calls with the Democratic House leadership and
chair of the DCCC, complimentary invitations to all DCCC
fundraising events, two private dinners with the Democratic House
leadership and ranking members, and two retreats with the
Democratic House leader and DCCC chair in Telluride, Colorado, and
Hyannisport, Massachusetts. Id ., at 504–505
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); see also id ., at 506 (describing
records indicating that DNC offered meetings with President in
return for large donations); id ., at 502–503 (describing
RNC’s various donor programs); id ., at 503–504 (same for
NRSC); id ., at 500–503 (same for DSCC); id ., at
504 (same for NRCC). Similarly, “the RNC’s donor programs offer
greater access to federal office holders as the donations grow
larger, with the highest level and most personal access offered to
the largest soft money donors.” Id ., at 500–503 (finding,
further, that the RNC holds out the prospect of access to
officeholders to attract soft-money donations and encourages
officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors); accord, id ., at 860–861 (Leon, J.).

															   Despite this evidence and the close ties that
candidates and officeholders have with their parties, Justice
Kennedy would limit Congress’ regulatory interest only to
the prevention of the actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption “inherent in” contributions made directly to,
contributions made at the express behest of, and expenditures made
in coordination with, a federal officeholder or candidate. Post , at 8–10, 15. Regulation of any other donation or
expenditure—regardless of its size, the recipient’s relationship to
the candidate or officeholder, its potential impact on a
candidate’s election, its value to the candidate, or its unabashed
and explicit intent to purchase influence—would, according to
Justice Kennedy, simply be out of bounds. This crabbed view of
corruption, and particularly of the appearance of corruption,
ignores precedent, common sense, and the realities of political
fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.[ Footnote 48 ]

															   Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of the First
Amendment would render Congress powerless to address more subtle
but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as troubling to a
functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption
is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the
merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the
wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued
by the officeholder. Even if it occurs only occasionally, the
potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight
cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily
detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention
is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth
above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence
contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money
contributions to political parties carry with them just such
temptation.

															   Justice Kennedy likewise takes too narrow a
view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those
transactions with “inherent corruption potential,” which he again
limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the
inference “that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of
real corruption.” Post , at 14.[ Footnote 49 ] In our view, however, Congress is not
required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular
practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be
sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone
is insufficient to justify regulation. Post , at 12–14. As
the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders that
has given rise to the appearance of undue influence. Implicit (and,
as the record shows, sometimes explicit) in the sale of access is
the suggestion that money buys influence. It is no surprise then
that purchasers of such access unabashedly admit that they are
seeking to purchase just such influence. It was not unwarranted for
Congress to conclude that the selling of access gives rise to the
appearance of corruption.

															   In sum, there is substantial evidence to
support Congress’ determination that large soft-money contributions
to national political parties give rise to corruption and the
appearance of corruption.

															2. New FECA §323(a)’s Restriction on
Spending and     Receiving Soft Money Plaintiffs and The Chief
Justice contend that §323(a) is impermissibly overbroad because it
subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to
FECA’s hard-money source and amount limits, including, for example,
funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal
office is at stake.[ Footnote
50 ] Post , 2–5 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
Such activities, The Chief Justice asserts, pose “little or no
potential to corrupt … federal candidates or officeholders.” Post, at 5 (dissenting opinion). This observation is
beside the point. Section 323(a), like the remainder of §323,
regulates contributions, not activities. As the record
demonstrates, it is the close relationship between federal
officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by
which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all
large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect.

															   As one expert noted,
“ ‘[t]here is no meaningful distinction between the national
party committees and the public officials who control them.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 468–469 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Mann
Expert Report 29). The national committees of the two major parties
are both run by, and largely composed of, federal officeholders and
candidates. Indeed, of the six national committees of the two major
parties, four are composed entirely of federal officeholders. Ibid . The nexus between national parties and federal
officeholders prompted one of Title I’s framers to conclude:

															“Because the national parties operate at the
national level, and are inextricably intertwined with federal
officeholders and candidates, who raise the money for the national
party committees, there is a close connection between the funding
of the national parties and the corrupting dangers of soft money on
the federal political process. The only effective way to address
this [soft-money] problem of corruption is to ban entirely all
raising and spending of soft money by the national parties.” 148
Cong. Rec. H409 (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Rep. Shays).

															Given this close connection and alignment of
interests, large soft-money contributions to national parties are
likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of
federal officeholders, regardless of how those funds are ultimately
used.

															   This close affiliation has also placed
national parties in a position to sell access to federal
officeholders in exchange for soft-money contributions that the
party can then use for its own purposes. Access to federal
officeholders is the most valuable favor the national party
committees are able to give in exchange for large donations. The
fact that officeholders comply by donating their valuable time
indicates either that officeholders place substantial value on the
soft-money contribution themselves, without regard to their end
use, or that national committees are able to exert considerable
control over federal officeholders. See, e.g. , App.
1196–1198 (Expert Report of Donald P. Green, Yale University)
(“Once elected to legislative office, public officials enter an
environment in which political parties-in-government control the
resources crucial to subsequent electoral success and legislative
power. Political parties organize the legislative caucuses that
make committee assignments”); App. 1298 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert
Report) (indicating that officeholders’ re-election prospects are
significantly influenced by attitudes of party leadership). Either
way, large soft-money donations to national party committees are
likely to buy donors preferential access to federal officeholders
no matter the ends to which their contributions are eventually put.
As discussed above, Congress had sufficient grounds to regulate the
appearance of undue influence associated with this practice. The
Government’s strong interests in preventing corruption, and in
particular the appearance of corruption, are thus sufficient to
justify subjecting all donations to national parties to the source,
amount, and disclosure limitations of FECA.[ Footnote 51 ]

															3. New FECA §323(a)’s Restriction on
Soliciting or     Directing Soft Money Plaintiffs also contend that
§323(a)’s prohibition on national parties’ soliciting or directing
soft-money contributions is substantially overbroad. The reach of
the solicitation prohibition, however, is limited. It bars only
solicitations of soft money by national party committees and by
party officers in their official capacities. The committees remain
free to solicit hard money on their own behalf, as well as to
solicit hard money on behalf of state committees and state and
local candidates.[ Footnote
52 ] They also can contribute hard money to state committees and
to candidates. In accordance with FEC regulations, furthermore,
officers of national parties are free to solicit soft money in
their individual capacities, or, if they are also officials of
state parties, in that capacity. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49083
(2002). This limited restriction on
solicitation follows sensibly from the prohibition on national
committees’ receiving soft money. The same observations that led us
to approve the latter compel us to reach the same conclusion
regarding the former. A national committee is likely to respond
favorably to a donation made at its request regardless of whether
the recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This
principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in
federal laws. E.g. , 18 U. S. C. §201(b)(2) (prohibition
on public officials “demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] … anything of value
personally or for any other person or entity …” (emphasis
added)); 5 CFR §2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to
federal employees encompasses gifts “[g]iven to any other person,
including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation,
recommendation, or other specification by the employee”).

															   Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates
the overbreadth of §323(a)’s solicitation ban. They point in
particular to §323(e), which allows federal candidates and
officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from
individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2 U.
S. C. A §441i(a) with §441i(e) (Supp. 2003). The
differences between §§323(a) and 323(e), however, are without
constitutional significance. We have recognized that “the
‘differing structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may
require different forms of regulation in order to protect the
integrity of the electoral process,’ ” National Right to
Work , 459 U. S., at 210, and we respect Congress’ decision to
proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance
regulation, see Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U. S. 238 , 258, n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley , 424 U. S., at 105. The differences between the
two provisions reflect Congress’ reasonable judgments about the
function played by national committees and the interactions between
committees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of
Congress have vastly superior knowledge.

															4. New FECA §323(a)’s Application to
Minor Parties The McConnell and political
party plaintiffs contend that §323(a) is substantially overbroad
and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes
the speech and associational rights of minor parties such as the
Libertarian National Committee, which, owing to their slim
prospects for electoral success and the fact that they receive few
large soft-money contributions from corporate sources, pose no
threat of corruption comparable to that posed by the RNC and DNC.
In Buckley , we rejected a similar argument concerning limits
on contributions to minor-party candidates, noting that “any
attempt to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from the
Act’s contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor-party
candidates may win elective office or have a substantial impact on
the outcome of an election.” 424 U. S., at 34–35. We have thus
recognized that the relevance of the interest in avoiding actual or
apparent corruption is not a function of the number of legislators
a given party manages to elect. It applies as much to a minor party
that manages to elect only one of its members to federal office as
it does to a major party whose members make up a majority of
Congress. It is therefore reasonable to require that all parties
and all candidates follow the same set of rules designed to protect
the integrity of the electoral process.

															   We add that nothing in §323(a)
prevents individuals from pooling resources to start a new national
party. Post , at 5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Only when an
organization has gained official status, which carries with it
significant benefits for its members, will the proscriptions of
§323(a) apply. Even then, a nascent or struggling minor party can
bring an as-applied challenge if §323(a) prevents it from “amassing
the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Buckley , supra , at 21.

															5. New FECA §323(a)’s Associational
Burdens Finally, plaintiffs assert
that §323(a) is unconstitutional because it impermissibly
interferes with the ability of national committees to associate
with state and local committees. By way of example, plaintiffs
point to the Republican Victory Plans, whereby the RNC acts in
concert with the state and local committees of a given State to
plan and implement joint, full-ticket fundraising and
electioneering programs. See App. 693, 694–697 (declaration of John
Peschong, RNC Western Reg. Political Dir. (describing the
Republican Victory Plans)). The political parties assert that
§323(a) outlaws any participation in Victory Plans by RNC
officers, including merely sitting down at a table and engaging in
collective decisionmaking about how soft money will be solicited,
received, and spent. Such associational burdens, they argue, are
too great for the First Amendment to bear.

															   We are not persuaded by this
argument because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the
terms “spend,” “receive,” “direct,” and “solicit.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003). Nothing on the face of
§323(a) prohibits national party officers, whether acting in their
official or individual capacities, from sitting down with state and
local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to
raise and spend soft money. As long as the national party officer
does not personally spend, receive, direct, or solicit soft money,
§323(a) permits a wide range of joint planning and electioneering
activity. Intervenor-defendants, the principal drafters and
proponents of the legislation, concede as much. Brief for
Intervenor-Defendants Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02– 1674
et al., p. 22 (“BCRA leaves parties and candidates free
to coordinate campaign plans and activities, political messages,
and fundraising goals with one another”). The FEC’s current
definitions of §323(a)’s terms are consistent with that view. See, e.g. , 11 CFR §300.2(m) (2002) (defining “solicit” as “to ask … another person” (emphasis added)); §300.2(n)
(defining “direct” as “to ask a person who has expressed
an intent to make a contribution . . . to make that contribution …
including through a conduit or intermediary” (emphasis added));
§300.2(c) (laying out the factors that determine whether an entity
will be considered to be controlled by a national committee).

															   Given the straightforward meaning of this
provision, Justice Kennedy is incorrect that “[a] national party’s
mere involvement in the strategic planning of fundraising for a
state ballot initiative” or its assistance in developing a state
party’s Levin-money fundraising efforts risks a finding that the
officers are in “ ‘indirect control’ ” of the state party
and subject to criminal penalties. Post , at 5–6. Moreover,
§323(a) leaves national party committee officers entirely free to
participate, in their official capacities, with state and local
parties and candidates in soliciting and spending hard money; party
officials may also solicit soft money in their unofficial
capacities.

															   Accordingly, we reject the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment challenge to new FECA §323(a). New FECA §323(b)’s Restrictions on State and
Local Party Committees In constructing a coherent
scheme of campaign finance regulation, Congress recognized that,
given the close ties between federal candidates and state party
committees, BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity
would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees
remained available as a conduit for soft-money donations.[ Footnote 53 ] Section 323(b) is
designed to foreclose wholesale evasion of §323(a)’s anticorruption
measures by sharply curbing state committees’ ability to use large
soft-money contributions to influence federal elections. The core
of §323(b) is a straightforward contribution regulation: It
prevents donors from contributing nonfederal funds to state and
local party committees to help finance “Federal election activity.”
2 U. S. C A. §441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2003). The term “Federal
election activity” encompasses four distinct categories of
electioneering: (1) voter registration activity during the 120 days
preceding a regularly scheduled federal election; (2) voter
identification, get-out-the-vote (GOTV), and generic campaign
activity[ Footnote 54 ] that
is “conducted in connection with an election in which a candidate
for Federal office appears on the ballot”; (3) any “public
communication”[ Footnote 55 ]
that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”
and “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks,” or “opposes” a candidate for
that office; and (4) the services provided by a state committee
employee who dedicates more than 25% of his or her time to
“activities in connection with a Federal election.”
§§431(20)(A)(i)–(iv). The Act explicitly excludes several
categories of activity from this definition: public communications
that refer solely to nonfederal candidates;[ Footnote 56 ] contributions to nonfederal
candidates;[ Footnote 57 ]
state and local political conventions; and the cost of grassroots
campaign materials like bumper stickers that refer only to state
candidates. §431(20)(B). All activities that fall within the
statutory definition must be funded with hard money.
§441i(b)(1). Section 323(b)(2), the
so-called Levin Amendment, carves out an exception to this general
rule. A refinement on the pre-BCRA regime that permitted parties to
pay for certain activities with a mix of federal and nonfederal
funds, the Levin Amendment allows state and local party committees
to pay for certain types of federal election activity with an
allocated ratio of hard money and “Levin funds”—that is, funds
raised within an annual limit of $10,000 per person. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(b)(2). Except for the $10,000 cap and
certain related restrictions to prevent circumvention of that
limit, §323(b)(2) leaves regulation of such contributions to the
States.[ Footnote
58 ] The scope of the Levin Amendment is
limited in two ways. First, state and local parties can use Levin
money to fund only activities that fall within categories (1) and
(2) of the statute’s definition of federal election
activity—namely, voter registration activity, voter identification
drives, GOTV drives, and generic campaign activities. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(b)(2)(A). And not all of these activities
qualify: Levin funds cannot be used to pay for any activities that
refer to “a clearly identified candidate for Federal office”; they
likewise cannot be used to fund broadcast communications unless
they refer “solely to a clearly identified candidate for State or
local office.” §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Second, both the Levin funds and the
allocated portion of hard money used to pay for such activities
must be raised entirely by the state or local committee that spends
them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). This means that a state party committee
cannot use Levin funds transferred from other party committees to
cover the Levin funds portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. It
also means that a state party committee cannot use hard money
transferred from other party committees to cover the hard-money
portion of a Levin Amendment expenditure. Furthermore, national
committees, federal candidates, and federal officeholders generally
may not solicit Levin funds on behalf of state committees, and
state committees may not team up to raise Levin funds.
§441i(b)(2)(C). They can, however, jointly raise the hard money
used to make Levin expenditures. 1.  Governmental Interests Underlying
New FECA     §323(b) We begin by noting that, in
addressing the problem of soft-money contributions to state
committees, Congress both drew a conclusion and made a prediction.
Its conclusion, based on the evidence before it, was that the
corrupting influence of soft money does not insinuate itself into
the political process solely through national party committees.
Rather, state committees function as an alternate avenue for
precisely the same corrupting forces.[ Footnote 59 ] Indeed, both candidates and parties already
ask donors who have reached the limit on their direct contributions
to donate to state committees.[ Footnote 60 ] There is at least as much evidence as there
was in Buckley that such donations have been made with the
intent—and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influence
over federal officeholders.[ Footnote 61 ] Section 323(b) thus promotes an important
governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that
soft-money donations to political parties already have.

															   Congress also made a prediction.
Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire
history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that
soft-money donors would react to §323(a) by scrambling to find
another way to purchase influence. It was “neither novel nor
implausible,” Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 391, for
Congress to conclude that political parties would react to §323(a)
by directing soft-money contributors to the state committees, and
that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these
contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed
to the national parties. We “must accord substantial deference to
the predictive judgments of Congress,” Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 , 665
(1994), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly
rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting
activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby
eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental
interest.

															2. New FECA §323(b)’s
Tailoring Plaintiffs argue that even if
some legitimate interest might be served by §323(b), the
provision’s restrictions are unjustifiably burdensome and therefore
cannot be considered “closely drawn” to match the Government’s
objectives. They advance three main contentions in support of this
proposition. First, they argue that the provision is substantially
overbroad because it federalizes activities that pose no
conceivable risk of corrupting or appearing to corrupt federal
officeholders. Second, they argue that the Levin Amendment imposes
an unconstitutional burden on the associational rights of political
parties. Finally, they argue that the provision prevents them from
amassing the resources they need to engage in effective advocacy.
We address these points in turn. a.  §323(b)’s Application to Federal
Election Activity Plaintiffs assert that
§323(b) represents a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of
state-focused electioneering activities that cannot possibly
corrupt or appear to corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes
well beyond Congress’ concerns about the corruption of the federal
electoral process. We disagree. It is true that §323(b)
captures some activities that affect state campaigns for nonfederal
offices. But these are the same sorts of activities that already
were covered by the FEC’s pre-BCRA allocation rules, and thus had
to be funded in part by hard money, because they affect federal as
well as state elections. See 11 CFR §106.5 (2002). As a practical
matter, BCRA merely codifies the principles of the FEC’s allocation
regime while at the same time justifiably adjusting the formulas
applicable to these activities in order to restore the efficacy of
FECA’s longtime statutory restriction—approved by the Court and
eroded by the FEC’s allocation regime—on contributions to state and
local party committees for the purpose of influencing federal
elections. See 2 U. S. C. §§431(8)(A), 441a(a)(1)(C); see also
Buckley , 424 U. S., at 38 (upholding FECA’s $25,000 limit on
aggregate contributions to candidates and political committees);
cf. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 453
U. S. 182 (1981) (upholding FECA’s $5,000 limit on
contributions to multicandidate political committees).

															   Like the rest of Title I, §323(b) is premised
on Congress’ judgment that if a large donation is capable of
putting a federal candidate in the debt of the contributor, it
poses a threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption. As we
explain below, §323(b) is narrowly focused on regulating
contributions that pose the greatest risk of this kind of
corruption: those contributions to state and local parties that can
be used to benefit federal candidates directly. Further, these
regulations all are reasonably tailored, with various temporal and
substantive limitations designed to focus the regulations on the
important anti-corruption interests to be served. We conclude that
§323(b) is a closely-drawn means of countering both corruption and
the appearance of corruption.

															   The first two categories of “Federal election
activity,” voter registration efforts, §301(20)(A)(i), and voter
identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activities conducted in
connection with a federal election, §301(20)(A)(ii), clearly
capture activity that benefits federal candidates. Common sense
dictates, and it was “undisputed” below, that a party’s efforts to
register voters sympathetic to that party directly assist the
party’s candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 460
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates
reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number
of like-minded registered voters who actually go to the
polls.[ Footnote 62 ] See, e.g. , id ., at 459 (“ ‘[The evidence] shows
quite clearly that a campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly
Republican precinct will produce a harvest of votes for Republican
candidates for both state and federal offices. A campaign need not
mention federal candidates to have a direct effect on voting for
such a candidate… . [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct
effect on federal elections’ ” (quoting Green Expert Report
14)). Representatives of the four major congressional campaign
committees confirmed that they “ ‘transfe[r] federal and
nonfederal money to state and/or local party committees for’ ”
both voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities, and that
“ ‘[t]hese efforts have a significant effect on the election
of federal candidates.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 459, 461
(citations omitted).

															   The record also makes quite clear that federal
officeholders are grateful for contributions to state and local
parties that can be converted into GOTV-type efforts. See id. , at 459 (quoting a letter thanking a California
Democratic Party donor and noting that CDP’s voter registration and
GOTV efforts would help “ ‘increase the number of Californian
Democrats in the United States Congress’ ” and “ ‘deliver
California’s 54 electoral votes’ ” to the Democratic
presidential candidate).

															   Because voter registration, voter
identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity all confer
substantial benefits on federal candidates, the funding of such
activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent
corruption. Section 323(b) is a reasonable response to that risk.
Its contribution limitations are focused on the subset of voter
registration activity that is most likely to affect the election
prospects of federal candidates: activity that occurs within 120
days before a federal election. And if the voter registration drive
does not specifically mention a federal candidate, state committees
can take advantage of the Levin Amendment’s higher contribution
limits and relaxed source restrictions. 2 U. S. C. A.
§§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (Supp. 2003). Similarly, the contribution
limits applicable to §301(20)(A)(ii) activities target only those
voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign efforts that occur
“in connection with an election in which a candidate for a Federal
office appears on the ballot.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§431(20)(A)(ii). Appropriately, in implementing this subsection,
the FEC has categorically excluded all activity that takes place
during the run-up to elections when no federal office is at
stake.[ Footnote 63 ]
Furthermore, state committees can take advantage of the Levin
Amendment’s higher contribution limits to fund any §301(A)(20)(i)
and §301(A)(20)(ii) activities that do not specifically mention a
federal candidate. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
The prohibition on the use of soft money in connection with these
activities is therefore closely drawn to meet the sufficiently
important governmental interests of avoiding corruption and its
appearance.

															   “Public communications” that promote or attack
a candidate for federal office—the third category of “Federal
election activity,” §301(20)(A)(iii)—also undoubtedly have a
dramatic effect on federal elections. Such ads were a prime
motivating force behind BCRA’s passage. See 3 1998 Senate Report
4535 (additional views of Sen. Collins) (“[T]he hearings provided
overwhelming evidence that the twin loopholes of soft money and
bogus issue advertising have virtually destroyed our campaign
finance laws, leaving us with little more than a pile of legal
rubble”). As explained below, any public communication that
promotes or attacks a clearly identified federal candidate directly
affects the election in which he is participating. The record on
this score could scarcely be more abundant. Given the overwhelming
tendency of public communications, as carefully defined in
§301(20)(A)(iii), to benefit directly federal candidates, we hold
that application of §323(b)’s contribution caps to such
communications is also closely drawn to the anticorruption interest
it is intended to address.[ Footnote 64 ]

															   As for the final category of “Federal election
activity,” §301(20)(A)(iv), we find that Congress’ interest in
preventing circumvention of §323(b)’s other restrictions justifies
the requirement that state and local parties spend federal funds to
pay the salary of any employee spending more than 25% of his or her
compensated time on activities in connection with a federal
election. In the absence of this provision, a party might use soft
money to pay for the equivalent of a full-time employee engaged in
federal electioneering, by the simple expedient of dividing the
federal workload among multiple employees. Plaintiffs have
suggested no reason for us to strike down this provision.
Accordingly, we give “deference to [the] congressional
determination of the need for [this] prophylactic rule.” National Conservative Political Action Comm. , 470 U. S.,
at 500.

															b. Associational Burdens Imposed by
the Levin     Amendment Plaintiffs also contend that
§323(b) is unconstitutional because the Levin Amendment
unjustifiably burdens association among party committees by
forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers
of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin
expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state
parties. We recognize, as we have in the past, the importance of
preserving the associational freedom of parties. See, e.g. , California Democratic Party v. Jones , 530 U. S. 567 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm. , 489 U. S. 214 (1989).
But not every minor restriction on parties’ otherwise unrestrained
ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11.

															   As an initial matter, we note
that state and local parties can avoid these associational burdens
altogether by forgoing the Levin Amendment option and electing to
pay for federal election activities entirely with hard money. But
in any event, the restrictions on the use, transfer, and raising of
Levin funds are justifiable anticircumvention measures. Without the
ban on transfers of Levin funds among state committees, donors
could readily circumvent the $10,000 limit on contributions to a
committee’s Levin account by making multiple $10,000 donations to
various committees that could then transfer the donations to the
committee of choice.[ Footnote
65 ] The same anticircumvention goal undergirds the ban on joint
solicitation of Levin funds. Without this restriction, state and
local committees could organize “all hands” fundraisers at which
individual, corporate, or union donors could make large soft-money
donations to be divided between the committees. In that case, the
purpose, if not the letter, of §323(b)(2)’s $10,000 limit would be
thwarted: Donors could make large, visible contributions at
fundraisers, which would provide ready means for corrupting federal
officeholders. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory
scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the
Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to
prevent circumvention of the entire scheme.

															   Section 323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s apparent
prohibition on the transfer of hard money by a national, state, or
local committee to help fund the allocable hard-money portion of a
separate state or local committee’s Levin expenditures presents a
closer question. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv) (Supp.
2003). The Government defends the restriction as necessary to
prevent the donor committee, particularly a national committee,
from leveraging the transfer of federal money to wrest control over
the spending of the recipient committee’s Levin funds. This
purported interest is weak, particularly given the fact that
§323(a) already polices attempts by national parties to engage in
such behavior. See 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(2) (extending
§323(a)’s restrictions to entities controlled by national
party committees). However, the associational burdens posed by the
hard-money transfer restriction are so insubstantial as to be de minimis . Party committees, including national party
committees, remain free to transfer unlimited hard money so long as
it is not used to fund Levin expenditures. State and local party
committees can thus dedicate all “homegrown” hard money to their
Levin activities while relying on outside transfers to defray the
costs of other hard-money expenditures. Given the strong
anticircumvention interest vindicated by §323(b)(2)(B)(iv)’s
restriction on the transfer of Levin funds, we will not strike down
the entire provision based upon such an attenuated claim of
associational infringement.

															c. New FECA §323(b)’s Impact on
Parties’ Ability     to Engage in Effective
Advocacy Finally, plaintiffs contend
that §323(b) is unconstitutional because its restrictions on
soft-money contributions to state and local party committees will
prevent them from engaging in effective advocacy. As Judge
Kollar-Kotelly noted, the political parties’ evidence regarding the
impact of BCRA on their revenues is “speculative and not based on
any analysis.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 524. If the history of
campaign finance regulation discussed above proves anything, it is
that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to
new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere
fact that §323(b) may reduce the relative amount of money available
to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is
largely inconsequential. The question is not whether §323(b)
reduces the amount of funds available over previous election
cycles, but whether it is “so radical in effect as to … drive the
sound of [the recipient’s] voice below the level of notice.” Shrink
Missouri , 528 U. S., at 397. If indeed state or local parties
can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain
available.

															   We accordingly conclude that
§323(b), on its face, is closely drawn to match the important
governmental interests of preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption. New FECA §323(d)’s Restrictions on Parties’
Solicitations for, and Donations to, Tax-Exempt
Organizations Section 323(d)
prohibits national, state, and local party committees, and their
agents or subsidiaries, from “solicit[ing] any funds for, or
mak[ing] or direct[ing] any donations” to, any organization
established under §501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code[ Footnote 66 ] that makes expenditures
in connection with an election for federal office, and any
political organizations established under §527 “other than a
political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a
political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a
candidate for State or local office.”[ Footnote 67 ] 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (Supp.
2003). The District Court struck down the provision on its face. We
reverse and uphold §323(d), narrowly construing the section’s ban
on donations to apply only to the donation of funds not raised in
compliance with FECA. 1. New FECA §323(d)’s
Regulation of Solicitations The Government
defends §323(d)’s ban on solicitations to tax-exempt organizations
engaged in political activity as preventing circumvention of Title
I’s limits on contributions of soft money to national, state, and
local party committees. That justification is entirely reasonable.
The history of Congress’ efforts at campaign finance reform well
demonstrates that “candidates, donors, and parties test the limits
of the current law.” Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 457. Absent
the solicitation provision, national, state, and local party
committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their
formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of
access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded
tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their
candidates.[ Footnote 68 ] All
of the corruption and appearance of corruption attendant on the
operation of those fundraising apparatuses would follow. Donations
made at the behest of party committees would almost certainly be
regarded by party officials, donors, and federal officeholders
alike as benefiting the party as well as its candidates. Yet, by
soliciting the donations to third-party organizations, the parties
would avoid FECA’s source-and-amount limitations, as well as its
disclosure restrictions. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 348
(Henderson, J.) (citing various declarations demonstrating that,
prior to BCRA, most tax-exempt organizations did not disclose the
source or amount of contributions); id ., at 521
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Experience under the
current law demonstrates that Congress’ concerns about
circumvention are not merely hypothetical. Even without the added
incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties
already solicit unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt
organizations for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering
activity. See , e.g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 (“In
addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups,
the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of
the coalition’s nonprofit organizations”); id ., at 5983
(minority views) (“Tax-exempt ‘issue advocacy’ groups and other
conduits were systematically used to circumvent federal campaign
finance laws”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates have also
begun to take advantage of so-called “politician 527s,” which are
little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular
federal officeholders and their interests. See id., at 519
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘Virtually every member of Congress in
a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group… .
In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who
have their own 527s’ ” (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch,
Congressional Leaders’ Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign
Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 849–850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at
raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as
well as from the national parties themselves. See id. , at
519–520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 industries had each
donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527
groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to
politician 527 groups (citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, at 10–11)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.)
(same). Given BCRA’s tighter restrictions on the raising and
spending of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such
organizations will only increase. Section 323(d)’s solicitation
restriction is closely drawn to prevent political parties from
using tax-exempt organizations as soft-money surrogates. Though
phrased as an absolute prohibition, the restriction does nothing
more than subject contributions solicited by parties to FECA’s
regulatory regime, leaving open substantial opportunities for
solicitation and other expressive activity in support of these
organizations. First, and most obviously, §323(d) restricts
solicitations only to those §501(c) groups “mak[ing] expenditures
or disbursements in connection with an election for Federal
office,” 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d)(1) (Supp. 2003), and to
§527 organizations, which by definition engage in partisan
political activity, §441i(d)(2); 26 U. S. C. §527(e). Second,
parties remain free to solicit hard-money contributions to a
§501(c)’s federal PAC, as well as to §527 organizations that
already qualify as federal PACs.[ Footnote 69 ] Third, §323(d) allows parties to endorse
qualifying organizations in ways other than direct solicitations of
unregulated donations. For example, with respect to §501(c)
organizations that are prohibited from administering PACs, parties
can solicit hard-money donations to themselves for the express
purpose of donating to these organizations. See supra , at
72–73. Finally, as with §323(a), §323(d) in no way restricts
solicitations by party officers acting in their individual
capacities. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (extending
restrictions to solicitations and donations made by “an officer or
agent acting on behalf of any such party committee”
(emphasis added)). In challenging §323(d)’s ban on
solicitations, plaintiffs renew the argument they made with respect
to §323(a)’s solicitation restrictions: that it cannot be squared
with §323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to
solicit limited donations of soft money to tax-exempt organizations
that engage in federal election activities. Compare 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(d) with §441i(e)(4). But if §323(d)’s
restrictions on solicitations are otherwise valid, they are not
rendered unconstitutional by the mere fact that Congress chose not
to regulate the activities of another group as stringently as it
might have. See National Right to Work , 459 U. S., at 210;
see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 656–657
(1966). In any event, the difference between the two provisions is
fully explained by the fact that national party officers, unlike
federal candidates and officeholders, are able to solicit soft
money on behalf of nonprofit organizations in their individual
capacities. Section 323(e), which is designed to accommodate the
individual associational and speech interests of candidates and
officeholders in lending personal support to nonprofit
organizations, also places tight content, source, and amount
restrictions on solicitations of soft money by federal candidates
and officeholders. Given those limits, as well as the less rigorous
standard of review, the greater allowances of §323(e) do not render
§323(d)’s solicitation restriction facially invalid. 2. New FECA §323(d)’s
Regulation of Donations Section 323(d)
also prohibits national, state, and local party committees from
making or directing “any donatio[n]” to qualifying §501(c) or §527
organizations. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d) (Supp. 2003). The
Government again defends the restriction as an anticircumvention
measure. We agree insofar as it prohibits the donation of soft
money. Absent such a restriction, state and local party committees
could accomplish directly what the antisolicitation restrictions
prevent them from doing indirectly— namely, raising large sums of
soft money to launder through tax-exempt organizations engaging in
federal election activities. Because the party itself would be
raising and collecting the funds, the potential for corruption
would be that much greater. We will not disturb Congress’
reasonable decision to close that loophole, particularly given a
record demonstrating an already robust practice of parties’ making
such donations. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517–518
(Kollar-Kotelly); id ., at 848–849 (Leon, J.). The prohibition does
raise overbreadth concerns if read to restrict donations from a
party’s federal account— i.e. , funds that have already been
raised in compliance with FECA’s source, amount, and disclosure
limitations. Parties have many valid reasons for giving to
tax-exempt organizations, not the least of which is to associate
themselves with certain causes and, in so doing, to demonstrate the
values espoused by the party. A complete ban on donations prevents
parties from making even the “general expression of support” that a
contribution represents. Buckley , 424 U. S., at 21. At the
same time, prohibiting parties from donating funds already raised
in compliance with FECA does little to further Congress’ goal of
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders. The Government asserts that the
restriction is necessary to prevent parties from leveraging their
hard money to gain control over a tax-exempt group’s soft money.
Even if we accepted that rationale, it would at most justify a
dollar limit, not a flat ban. Moreover, any legitimate concerns
over capture are diminished by the fact that the restrictions set
forth in §§323(a) and (b) apply not only to party committees, but
to entities under their control. See 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(a)(2) (extending prohibitions on national party committees to
“any entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed,
maintained, or controlled by such a national committee”
(emphasis added)); §441i(b)(1) (same for state and local party
committees). These observations do not,
however, require us to sustain plaintiffs’ facial challenge to
§323(d)’s donation restriction. “When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and … a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson , 285 U. S. 22 , 62 (1932);
see also Boos v. Barry , 485 U. S. 312 , 331
(1988); New York v. Ferber , 458 U. S. 747 , 769, n.
24 (1982). Given our obligation to avoid constitutional problems,
we narrowly construe §323(d)’s ban to apply only to donations of
funds not raised in compliance with FECA. This construction is
consistent with the concerns animating Title I, whose purpose is to
plug the soft-money loophole. Though there is little legislative
history regarding BCRA generally, and almost nothing on §323(d)
specifically, the abuses identified in the 1998 Senate report
regarding campaign finance practices involve the use of nonprofit
organizations as conduits for large soft-money donations.
See, e.g. , 3 1998 Senate Report 4565 (“The evidence
indicates that the soft-money loophole is fueling many of the
campaign abuses investigated by the Committee… . Soft money
also supplied the funds parties used to make contributions to
tax-exempt groups, which in turn used the funds to pay for
election-related activities”); id. , at 4568–4569
(describing as an “egregious exampl[e]” of misuse a $4.6 million
donation of nonfederal funds by the RNC to Americans for Tax
Reform, which the organization spent on “direct mail and phone bank
operations to counter anti-Republican advertising”). We have found
no evidence that Congress was concerned about, much less that it
intended to prohibit, donations of money already fully regulated by
FECA. Given Title I’s exclusive focus on abuses related to soft
money, we would expect that if Congress meant §323(d)’s restriction
to have this dramatic and constitutionally questionable effect, it
would say so explicitly. Because there is nothing that compels us
to conclude that Congress intended “donations” to include transfers
of federal money, and because of the constitutional infirmities
such an interpretation would raise, we decline to read §323(d) in
that way. Thus, political parties remain free to make or direct
donations of money to any tax-exempt organization that has
otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA. New FECA §323(e)’s Restrictions on
Federal Candidates and Officeholders New FECA §323(e)
regulates the raising and soliciting of soft money by federal
candidates and officeholders. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)
(Supp. 2003). It prohibits federal candidates and officeholders
from “solicit[ing], receiv[ing], direct[ing], transfer[ing], or
spend[ing]” any soft money in connection with federal elections.
§441i(e)(1)(A). It also limits the ability of federal candidates
and officeholders to solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend
soft money in connection with state and local elections.
§441i(e)(1)(B).[ Footnote
70 ] Section 323(e)’s
general prohibition on solicitations admits of a number of
exceptions. For instance, federal candidates and officeholders are
permitted to “attend, speak, or be a featured guest” at a state or
local party fundraising event. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(3).
Section 323(e) specifically provides that federal candidates and
officeholders may make solicitations of soft money to §501(c)
organizations whose primary purpose is not to engage in “Federal
election activit[ies]” as long as the solicitation does not specify
how the funds will be spent, 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(e)(4)(A); to §501(c) organizations whose primary purpose
is to engage in “Federal election activit[ies]” as long as the
solicitations are limited to individuals and the amount solicited
does not exceed $20,000 per year per individual, 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(e)(4)(B); and to §501(c) organizations for
the express purpose of carrying out such activities, again so long
as the amount solicited does not exceed $20,000 per year per
individual, 2 U. S. C. A. §441(e)(4)(B). No party seriously questions the
constitutionality of §323(e)’s general ban on donations of soft
money made directly to federal candidates and officeholders, their
agents, or entities established or controlled by them. Even on the
narrowest reading of Buckley , a regulation restricting
donations to a federal candidate, regardless of the ends to which
those funds are ultimately put, qualifies as a contribution limit
subject to less rigorous scrutiny. Such donations have only
marginal speech and associational value, but at the same time pose
a substantial threat of corruption. By severing the most direct
link between the soft-money donor and the federal candidate,
§323(e)’s ban on donations of soft money is closely drawn to
prevent the corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders. Section 323(e)’s restrictions on
solicitations are justified as valid anticircumvention measures.
Large soft-money donations at a candidate’s or officeholder’s
behest give rise to all of the same corruption concerns posed by
contributions made directly to the candidate or officeholder.
Though the candidate may not ultimately control how the funds are
spent, the value of the donation to the candidate or officeholder
is evident from the fact of the solicitation itself. Without some
restriction on solicitations, federal candidates and officeholders
could easily avoid FECA’s contribution limits by soliciting funds
from large donors and restricted sources to like-minded
organizations engaging in federal election activities. As the
record demonstrates, even before the passage of BCRA, federal
candidates and officeholders had already begun soliciting donations
to state and local parties, as well as tax-exempt organizations, in
order to help their own, as well as their party’s, electoral cause.
See Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting fundraising
letter from a Congressman explaining to contributor that
“ ‘you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to
my campaign,’ but ‘you can further help my campaign by assisting
the Colorado Republican Party’ ”); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
479–480 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal
officeholders’ soliciting funds to state and local parties); id ., at 848 (Leon, J.) (same); id ., at 518
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (surveying evidence of federal officeholders’
soliciting funds for nonprofits for electioneering purposes); id ., at 849 (Leon, J.) (same). The incentives to do so, at
least with respect to solicitations to tax-exempt organizations,
will only increase with Title I’s restrictions on the raising and
spending of soft money by national, state, and local
parties. Section 323(e) addresses these
concerns while accommodating the individual speech and
associational rights of federal candidates and officeholders.
Rather than place an outright ban on solicitations to tax-exempt
organizations, §323(e)(4) permits limited solicitations of soft
money. 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(e)(4). This allowance
accommodates individuals who have long served as active members of
nonprofit organizations in both their official and individual
capacities. Similarly, §§323(e)(1)(B) and 323(e)(3) preserve the
traditional fundraising role of federal officeholders by providing
limited opportunities for federal candidates and officeholders to
associate with their state and local colleagues through joint
fundraising activities. 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(e)(1)(B),
441i(e)(3). Given these many exceptions, as well as the substantial
threat of corruption or its appearance posed by donations to or at
the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, §323(e) is
clearly constitutional. We accordingly uphold §323(e) against
plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge. New FECA §323(f)’s Restrictions on
State Candidates and Officeholders The final
provision of Title I is new FECA §323(f). 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(f) (Supp. 2003). Section 323(f) generally prohibits
candidates for state or local office, or state or local
officeholders, from spending soft money to fund “public
communications” as defined in §301(20)(A)(iii)— i.e. , a
communication that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office … and that promotes or supports a candidate for that
office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(f)(1); §431(20)(A)(iii). Exempted from
this restriction are communications made in connection with an
election for state or local office which refer only to the state or
local candidate or officeholder making the expenditure or to any
other candidate for the same state or local office.
§441i(f)(2). Section 323(f) places
no cap on the amount of money that state or local candidates can
spend on any activity. Rather, like §§323(a) and 323(b), it limits
only the source and amount of contributions that state and local
candidates can draw on to fund expenditures that directly impact
federal elections. And, by regulating only contributions used to
fund “public communications,” §323(f) focuses narrowly on those
soft-money donations with the greatest potential to corrupt or give
rise to the appearance of corruption of federal candidates and
officeholders. Plaintiffs advance two principal
arguments against §323(f). We have already rejected the first
argument, that the definition of “public communications” in new
FECA §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
See supra , 62, n. 64. We add only that, plaintiffs’
and Justice Kennedy’s contrary reading notwithstanding, post , at 34, this provision does not prohibit a state or
local candidate from advertising that he has received a federal
officeholder’s endorsement.[ Footnote 71 ] The second argument, that
soft-money contributions to state and local candidates for “public
communications” do not corrupt or appear to corrupt federal
candidates, ignores both the record in this litigation and
Congress’ strong interest in preventing circumvention of otherwise
valid contribution limits. The proliferation of sham issue ads has
driven the soft-money explosion. Parties have sought out every
possible way to fund and produce these ads with soft money: They
have labored to bring them under the FEC’s allocation regime; they
have raised and transferred soft money from national to state party
committees to take advantage of favorable allocation ratios; and
they have transferred and solicited funds to tax-exempt
organizations for production of such ads. We will not upset
Congress’ eminently reasonable prediction that, with these other
avenues no longer available, state and local candidates and
officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money
funding of sham issue advertising. We therefore uphold §323(f)
against plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.[ Footnote 72 ] B Several plaintiffs
contend that Title I exceeds Congress’ Election Clause authority to
“make or alter” rules governing federal elections, U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §4, and, by impairing the authority of the States to
regulate their own elections, violates constitutional principles of
federalism. In examining congressional enactments for infirmity
under the Tenth Amendment, this Court has focused its attention on
laws that commandeer the States and state officials in carrying out
federal regulatory schemes. See Printz v. United
States , 521 U.
S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States , 505 U. S. 144 (1992). By contrast, Title I of BCRA only regulates the conduct of
private parties. It imposes no requirements whatsoever upon States
or state officials, and, because it does not expressly pre-empt
state legislation, it leaves the States free to enforce their own
restrictions on the financing of state electoral campaigns. It is
true that Title I, as amended, prohibits some fundraising tactics
that would otherwise be permitted under the laws of various States,
and that it may therefore have an indirect effect on the financing
of state electoral campaigns. But these indirect effects do not
render BCRA unconstitutional. It is not uncommon for federal law to
prohibit private conduct that is legal in some States. See, e.g. , United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483 (2001).
Indeed, such conflict is inevitable in areas of law that involve
both state and federal concerns. It is not in and of itself a
marker of constitutional infirmity. See Ex parte Siebold , 100 U. S. 371 ,
392 (1879). Of course, in
maintaining the federal system envisioned by the Founders, this
Court has done more than just prevent Congress from commandeering
the States. We have also policed the absolute boundaries of
congressional power under Article I. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995).
But plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Congress has
overstepped its Elections Clause power in enacting BCRA. Congress
has a fully legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of
federal officeholders and preventing corruption of federal
electoral processes through the means it has chosen. Indeed, our
above analysis turns on our finding that those interests are
sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Given that finding,
we cannot conclude that those interests are insufficient to ground
Congress’ exercise of its Elections Clause power. See Morrison , supra, at 607 (respect owed to
coordinate branches “demands that we invalidate a congressional
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds”). C Finally, plaintiffs
argue that Title I violates the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminates
against political parties in favor of special interest groups such
as the National Rifle Association (NRA), American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), and Sierra Club. As explained earlier, BCRA imposes
numerous restrictions on the fundraising abilities of political
parties, of which the soft-money ban is only the most prominent.
Interest groups, however, remain free to raise soft money to fund
voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings, and broadcast
advertising (other than electioneering communications). We conclude
that this disparate treatment does not offend the
Constitution. As an initial matter,
we note that BCRA actually favors political parties in many ways.
Most obviously, party committees are entitled to receive individual
contributions that substantially exceed FECA’s limits on
contributions to nonparty political committees; individuals can
give $25,000 to political party committees whereas they can give a
maximum of $5,000 to nonparty political committees. In addition,
party committees are entitled in effect to contribute to candidates
by making coordinated expenditures, and those expenditures may
greatly exceed the contribution limits that apply to other donors.
See 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d) (Supp. 2003). More importantly, however,
Congress is fully entitled to consider the real-world differences
between political parties and interest groups when crafting a
system of campaign finance regulation. See National Right to
Work , 459 U. S., at 210. Interest groups do not select slates
of candidates for elections. Interest groups do not determine who
will serve on legislative committees, elect congressional
leadership, or organize legislative caucuses. Political parties
have influence and power in the legislature that vastly exceeds
that of any interest group. As a result, it is hardly surprising
that party affiliation is the primary way by which voters identify
candidates, or that parties in turn have special access to and
relationships with federal officeholders. Congress’ efforts at
campaign finance regulation may account for these salient
differences. Taken seriously, appellants’ equal protection
arguments would call into question not just Title I of BCRA, but
much of the pre-existing structure of FECA as well. We therefore
reject those arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the District Court insofar as it upheld §§323(e) and
323(f). We reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar as it
invalidated §§323(a), 323(b), and 323(d). IV Title II of BCRA,
entitled “Noncandidate Campaign Expenditures,” is divided into two
subtitles: “Electioneering Communications” and “Independent and
Coordinated Expenditures.” We consider each challenged section of
these subtitles in turn. BCRA §201’s Definition of
“Electioneering Communication” The first section
of Title II, §201, comprehensively amends FECA §304, which requires
political committees to file detailed periodic financial reports
with the FEC. The amendment coins a new term, “electioneering
communication,” to replace the narrowing construction of FECA’s
disclosure provisions adopted by this Court in Buckley . As
discussed further below, that construction limited the coverage of
FECA’s disclosure requirement to communications expressly
advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates. By
contrast, the term “electioneering communication” is not so
limited, but is defined to encompass any “broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication” that “(I) refers to a clearly identified
candidate for Federal office; “(II) is made within— “(aa) 60 days before a general,
special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate;
or “(bb) 30 days before a primary or
preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party
that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought
by the candidate; and “(III) in the case of a communication which refers
to a candidate other than President or Vice President, is targeted
to the relevant electorate.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 73 ] New FECA §304(f)(3)(C) further provides
that a communication is “ ‘targeted to the relevant
electorate’ ” if it “can be received by 50,000 or more
persons” in the district or State the candidate seeks to represent.
2 U. S. C. A. §434(f )(3)(C). In addition to setting forth this
definition, BCRA’s amendments to FECA §304 specify significant
disclosure requirements for persons who fund electioneering
communications. BCRA’s use of this new term is not, however,
limited to the disclosure context: A later section of the Act (BCRA
§203, which amends FECA §316(b)(2)) restricts corporations’ and
labor unions’ funding of electioneering communications. Plaintiffs
challenge the constitutionality of the new term as it applies in
both the disclosure and the expenditure contexts. The major premise of plaintiffs’
challenge to BCRA’s use of the term “electioneering communication”
is that Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated line
between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that
speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in
the latter category of speech. Thus, plaintiffs maintain, Congress
cannot constitutionally require disclosure of, or regulate
expenditures for, “electioneering communications” without making an
exception for those “communications” that do not meet Buckley ’s definition of express advocacy. That position misapprehends our
prior decisions, for the express advocacy restriction was an
endpoint of statutory interpretation, not a first principle of
constitutional law. In Buckley we began by examining
then-18 U. S. C. §608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which
restricted expenditures “ ‘relative to a clearly identified
candidate,’ ” and we found that the phrase “ ‘relative
to’ ” was impermissibly vague. 424 U. S., at 40–42 . We concluded that the vagueness deficiencies could “be avoided only
by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include
explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a
candidate.”[ Footnote 74 ] Id ., at 43. We provided examples of words of express
advocacy, such as “ ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ …
‘defeat,’ [and] ‘reject,’ ” id ., at 44, n. 52, and
those examples eventually gave rise to what is now known as the
“magic words” requirement. We then considered FECA’s
disclosure provisions, including 2 U. S. C. §431(f) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV), which defined “ ‘expenditur[e]’ ” to include
the use of money or other assets “ ‘for the purpose of …
influencing’ ” a federal election. Buckley, 424 U.
S., at 77. Finding that the “ambiguity of this phrase” posed
“constitutional problems,” ibid., we noted our “obligation
to construe the statute, if that can be done consistent with the
legislature’s purpose, to avoid the shoals of vagueness,” id ., at 77–78 (citations omitted). “To insure that the
reach” of the disclosure requirement was “not impermissibly broad,
we construe[d] ‘expenditure’ for purposes of that section in the
same way we construed the terms of §608(e)—to reach only funds used
for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate.” Id ., at 80 (footnote
omitted). Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation,
in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the
product of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
command.[ Footnote 75 ] In
narrowly reading the FECA provisions in Buckley to avoid
problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested that a
statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be required to
toe the same express advocacy line. Nor did we suggest as much in MCFL, 479
U. S. 238 (1986), in which we addressed the scope of another
FECA expenditure limitation and confirmed the understanding that Buckley ’s express advocacy category was a product of
statutory construction.[ Footnote
76 ] In short, the concept of express
advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an
effort to avoid constitutional infirmities. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 , 500
(1979) (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy ,
2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804)). We have long “rigidly adhered” to the
tenet “ ‘never to formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied,’ ” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 , 21 (1960)
(citation omitted), for “[t]he nature of judicial review constrains
us to consider the case that is actually before us,” James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U. S. 529 , 547
(1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Consistent with that principle,
our decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific
to the statutory language before us; they in no way drew a
constitutional boundary that forever fixed the permissible scope of
provisions regulating campaign-related speech. Nor are we persuaded, independent
of our precedents, that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier
between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy. That notion
cannot be squared with our longstanding recognition that the
presence or absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish
electioneering speech from a true issue ad. See Buckley,
supra , at 45. Indeed, the unmistakable lesson from the record
in this litigation, as all three judges on the District Court
agreed, is that Buckley ’s magic-words requirement is
functionally meaningless. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 303–304
(Henderson, J.); id. , at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 875–879 (Leon, J.). Not only can advertisers
easily evade the line by eschewing the use of magic words, but they
would seldom choose to use such words even if permitted.[ Footnote 77 ] And although the
resulting advertisements do not urge the viewer to vote for or
against a candidate in so many words, they are no less clearly
intended to influence the election.[ Footnote 78 ] Buckley ’s express advocacy line, in
short, has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or
apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the flaws
it found in the existing system. Finally we observe that new FECA
§304(f)(3)’s definition of “electioneering communication” raises
none of the vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley . The term “electioneering communication” applies
only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for
federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4)
targeted to an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or
listeners. These components are both easily understood and
objectively determinable. See Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 , 108–114 (1972). Thus,
the constitutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA’s reach to express advocacy is
simply inapposite here. BCRA §201’s Disclosure
Requirements Having rejected
the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat
so-called issue advocacy differently from express advocacy, we turn
to plaintiffs’ other concerns about the use of the term
“electioneering communication” in amended FECA §304’s disclosure
provisions. Under those provisions, whenever any person makes
disbursements totaling more than $10,000 during any calendar year
for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering
communications, he must file a statement with the FEC identifying
the pertinent elections and all persons sharing the costs of the
disbursements. 2 U. S. C. A. §§434(f)(2)(A), (B), and (D)
(Supp. 2003). If the disbursements are made from a corporation’s or
labor union’s segregated account,[ Footnote 79 ] or by a single individual who has collected
contributions from others, the statement must identify all persons
who contributed $1,000 or more to the account or the individual
during the calendar year. §§434(f)(2)(E), (F). The statement must
be filed within 24 hours of each “disclosure date”—a term defined
to include the first date and all subsequent dates on which a
person’s aggregate undisclosed expenses for electioneering
communications exceed $10,000 for that calendar year. §§434(f)(1),
(2) and (4). Another subsection further provides that the execution
of a contract to make a disbursement is itself treated as a
disbursement for purposes of FECA’s disclosure requirements.
§434(f)(5). In addition to
the failed argument that BCRA’s amendments to FECA §304 improperly
extend to both express and issue advocacy, plaintiffs challenge
amended FECA §304’s disclosure requirements as unnecessarily (1)
requiring disclosure of the names of persons who contributed $1,000
or more to the individual or group that paid for a communication,
and (2) mandating disclosure of executory contracts for
communications that have not yet aired. The District Court rejected
the former submission but accepted the latter, finding invalid new
FECA §304(f)(5), which governs executory contracts. Relying on
BCRA’s severability provision,[ Footnote 80 ] the court held that invalidation of the
executory contracts subsection did not render the balance of BCRA’s
amendments to FECA §304 unconstitutional. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 242
(per curiam) . We agree with the District Court
that the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure
requirements—providing the electorate with information, deterring
actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and
gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive
electioneering restrictions—apply in full to BCRA.[ Footnote 81 ] Accordingly, Buckley amply supports application of FECA §304’s disclosure requirements
to the entire range of “electioneering communications.” As the
authors of the District Court’s per curiam opinion
concluded after reviewing evidence concerning the use of purported
“issue ads” to influence federal elections: “The factual record demonstrates that
the abuse of the present law not only permits corporations and
labor unions to fund broadcast advertisements designed to influence
federal elections, but permits them to do so while concealing their
identities from the public. BCRA’s disclosure provisions require
these organizations to reveal their identities so that the public
is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast
advertisements influencing certain elections. Plaintiffs’ disdain
for BCRA’s disclosure pro-visions is nothing short of surprising.
Plaintiffs chal-lenge BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering
communications on the premise that they should be permitted to
spend corporate and labor union general treasury funds in the sixty
days before the federal elections on broadcast advertisements,
which refer to federal candidates, because speech needs to be
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ McConnell Br. at 44 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 270
(1964)). Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run
these advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading
names like: ‘The Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change’
(funded by business organizations opposed to organized labor),
‘Citizens for Better Medicare’ (funded by the pharmaceutical
industry), ‘Republicans for Clean Air’ (funded by brothers Charles
and Sam Wyly). Findings ¶ ;¶ ;44, 51, 52. Given these tactics,
Plaintiffs never satisfactorily answer the question of how
‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ speech can occur when
organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting
public. McConnell Br. at 44. Plaintiffs’ argument for striking down
BCRA’s disclosure provisions does not reinforce the precious First
Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but
ignores the competing First Amendment interests of individual
citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political
marketplace.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 237. The District Court
was also correct that Buckley forecloses a facial attack
on the new provision in §304 that requires disclosure of the names
of persons contributing $1,000 or more to segregated funds or
individuals that spend more than $10,000 in a calendar year on
electioneering communications. Like our earlier decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958),[ Footnote 82 ] Buckley recognized that compelled disclosures may impose
an unconstitutional burden on the freedom to associate in support
of a particular cause. Nevertheless, Buckley rejected the
contention that FECA’s disclosure requirements could not
constitutionally be applied to minor parties and independent
candidates because the Government’s interest in obtaining
information from such parties was minimal and the danger of
infringing their rights substantial. In Buckley , unlike NAACP , we found no evidence that any party had been
exposed to economic reprisals or physical threats as a result of
the compelled disclosures. Buckley , 424 U. S., at 69–70.
We acknowledged that such a case might arise in the future,
however, and addressed the standard of proof that would then
apply: “We recognize that unduly strict
requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden, but it does not
follow that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary.
Minor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof
of injury to assure a fair consideration of their claim. The
evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject
them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties.” Id. , at 74. A few years later we used that standard
to resolve a minor party’s challenge to the constitutionality of
the State of Ohio’s disclosure requirements. We held that the First
Amendment prohibits States from compelling disclosures that would
subject identified persons to “threats, harassment, and reprisals,”
and that the District Court’s findings had established a
“reasonable probability” of such a result.[ Footnote 83 ] Brown v. Socialist
Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87 , 100 (1982). In this litigation the District
Court applied Buckley ’s evidentiary standard and
found—consistent with our conclusion in Buckley , and in
contrast to that in Brown —that the evidence did not
establish the requisite “reasonable probability” of harm to any
plaintiff group or its members. The District Court noted that some
parties had expressed such concerns, but it found a “lack of
specific evidence about the basis for these concerns.” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 247 (per curiam) . We agree, but we
note that, like our refusal to recognize a blanket exception for
minor parties in Buckley, our rejection of plaintiffs’
facial challenge to the requirement to disclose individual donors
does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular
applications of that requirement. We also are unpersuaded by
plaintiffs’ challenge to new FECA §304(f)(5), which requires
disclosure of executory contracts for electioneering
communications: “Contracts to disburse “For purposes of this subsection,
a person shall be treated as having made a disbursement if the
person has executed a contract to make the disbursement.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §434(f)(5) (Supp. 2003). In our view, this provision serves an
important purpose the District Court did not advance. BCRA’s
amendments to FECA §304 mandate disclosure only if and when a
person makes disbursements totaling more than $10,000 in any
calendar year to pay for electioneering communications. Plaintiffs
do not take issue with the use of a dollar amount, rather than the
number or dates of the ads, to identify the time when a person
paying for electioneering communications must make disclosures to
the FEC. Nor do they question the need to make the contents of
parties’ disclosure statements available to curious voters in
advance of elections. Given the relatively short time frames in
which electioneering communications are made, the interest in
assuring that disclosures are made promptly and in time to provide
relevant information to voters is unquestionably significant. Yet
fixing the deadline for filing disclosure statements based on the
date when aggregate disbursements exceed $10,000 would open a
significant loophole if advertisers were not required to disclose
executory contracts. In the absence of that requirement, political
supporters could avoid preelection disclosures concerning ads
slated to run during the final week of a campaign simply by making
a preelection downpayment of less than $10,000, with the balance
payable after the election. Indeed, if the advertiser waited to pay
that balance until the next calendar year then, as long as the
balance did not itself exceed $10,000, the advertiser might avoid
the disclosure requirements completely. The record contains little
evidence identifying any harm that might flow from the enforcement
of §304(f)(5)’s “advance” disclosure requirement. The District
Court speculated that disclosing information about contracts “that
have not been performed, and may never be performed, may lead to
confusion and an unclear record upon which the public will evaluate
the forces operating in the political marketplace.” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 241 (per curiam) . Without evidence
relating to the frequency of nonperformance of executed contracts,
such speculation cannot outweigh the public interest in ensuring
full disclosure before an election actually takes place. It is no
doubt true that §304(f)(5) will sometimes require the filing of
disclosure statements in advance of the actual broadcast of an
advertisement.[ Footnote 84 ]
But the same would be true in the absence of an advance disclosure
requirement, if a television station insisted on advance payment
for all of the ads covered by a contract. Thus, the possibility
that amended §304 may sometimes require disclosures prior to the
airing of an ad is as much a function of the use of disbursements
(rather than the date of an ad) to trigger the disclosure
requirement as it is a function of §304(f)(5)’s treatment of
executory contracts. As the District Court observed,
amended FECA §304’s disclosure requirements are constitutional
because they “ ‘d[o] not prevent anyone from speaking.’ ” Ibid . (quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition in No. 02–582
et al. (DC), p. 112). Moreover, the required disclosures
“ ‘would not have to reveal the specific content of the
advertisements, yet they would perform an important function in
informing the public about various candidates’ supporters before election day.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 241
(quoting Brief for FEC in Opposition, supra , at 112)
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
District Court insofar as it upheld the disclosure requirements in
amended FECA §304 and rejected the facial attack on the provisions
relating to donors of $1,000 or more, and reverse that judgment
insofar as it invalidated FECA §304(f)(5). BCRA §202’s Treatment of
“Coordinated Communications” as Contributions Section 202 of
BCRA amends FECA §315(a)(7)(C) to provide that disbursements for
“electioneering communication[s]” that are coordinated with a
candidate or party will be treated as contributions to, and
expenditures by, that candidate or party. 2 U. S. C. A.
§441a(a)(7)(C) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 85 ] The amendment clarifies the scope of the
preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B), which states more generally
that “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation,
or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of  ” a
candidate or party will constitute contributions. 2 U. S. C.
§§441a(a)(7)(B)(i)–(ii). In Buckley we construed the statutory
term “expenditure” to reach only spending for express advocacy. 424
U. S., at 40–43, and n. 52 (addressing 18 U. S. C. §608(e)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV), which placed a $1,000 cap on expenditures
“ ‘relative to a clearly identified candidate’ ”). BCRA
§202 pre-empts a possible claim that §315(a)(7)(B) is similarly
limited, such that coordinated expenditures for communications that
avoid express advocacy cannot be counted as contributions. As we
explained above, see supra , at 83–86, Buckley ’s
narrow interpretation of the term “expenditure” was not a
constitutional limitation on Congress’ power to regulate federal
elections. Accordingly, there is no reason why Congress may not
treat coordinated disbursements for electioneering communications
in the same way it treats all other coordinated expenditures. We
affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it held that
plaintiffs had advanced “no basis for finding Section 202
unconstitutional.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 250. BCRA §203’s Prohibition of
Corporate and Labor Disbursements for Electioneering
Communications Since our
decision in Buckley , Congress’ power to prohibit corporations
and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance
advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of
candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our
law. The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds
authorized by FECA §316, 2 U. S. C. A. §441b (main ed.
and Supp. 2003), has provided corporations and unions with a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express
advocacy. That has been this Court’s unanimous view,[ Footnote 86 ] and it is not challenged in
this litigation. Section 203 of BCRA
amends FECA §316(b)(2) to extend this rule, which previously
applied only to express advocacy, to all “electioneering
communications” covered by the definition of that term in amended
FECA §304(f)(3), discussed above. 2 U. S. C. A.
§441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 87 ] Thus, under BCRA, corporations and unions
may not use their general treasury funds to finance electioneering
communications, but they remain free to organize and administer
segregated funds, or PACs, for that purpose. Because corporations
can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money, it is
“simply wrong” to view the provision as a “complete ban” on
expression rather than a regulation. Beaumont , 539 U. S.,
at ___, ___ (slip op., at 15). As we explained in Beaumont: “The PAC option allows corporate
political participation without the temptation to use corporate
funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the
sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the
government regulate campaign activity through registration and
disclosure, see [2 U. S. C.] §§432–434, without jeopardizing
the associational rights of advocacy organizations’ members.”
Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 16) (citation omitted). See also Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 , 658
(1990). Rather than arguing that the
prohibition on the use of general treasury funds is a complete ban
that operates as a prior restraint, plaintiffs instead challenge
the expanded regulation on the grounds that it is both overbroad
and underinclusive. Our consideration of plaintiffs’ challenge is
informed by our earlier conclusion that the distinction between
express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy is not
constitutionally compelled. In that light, we must examine the
degree to which BCRA burdens First Amendment expression and
evaluate whether a compelling governmental interest justifies that
burden. Id., at 657. The latter question—whether the state
interest is compelling—is easily answered by our prior decisions
regarding campaign finance regulation, which “represent respect for
the ‘legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation.’ ” Beaumont , supra , at ___ (slip
op., at 8) (quoting National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at
209–210). We have repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at “the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra , at 660; see Beaumont, supra , at ___ (slip op., at 7–8); National
Right to Work, supra , at 209–210. Moreover, recent cases have
recognized that certain restrictions on corporate electoral
involvement permissibly hedge against “ ‘circumvention of
[valid] contribution limits.’ ” Beaumont , supra , at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Colorado
II, 533 U. S., at 456, and n. 18.) In light of our precedents,
plaintiffs do not contest that the Government has a compelling
interest in regulating advertisements that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate for federal office. Nor do they
contend that the speech involved in so-called issue advocacy is any
more core political speech than are words of express advocacy.
After all, “the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office,” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265 , 272
(1971), and “[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for
federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First
Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or
advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48. Rather, plaintiffs argue that
the justifications that adequately support the regulation of
express advocacy do not apply to significant quantities of speech
encompassed by the definition of electioneering
communications. This argument fails to the extent
that the issue ads broadcast during the 30- and 60-day periods
preceding federal primary and general elections are the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. The justifications for the
regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during
those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’
decisions and have that effect. The precise percentage of issue ads
that clearly identified a candidate and were aired during those
relatively brief preelection time spans but had no electioneering
purpose is a matter of dispute between the parties and among the
judges on the District Court. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 307–312
(Henderson, J.); id ., at 583–587 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at 796–798 (Leon, J.). Nevertheless, the vast
majority of ads clearly had such a purpose. Annenberg Report 13–14;
App. 1330–1348 (Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 573–578 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at
826–827 (Leon, J.). Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may
have been in the past, in the future corporations and unions may
finance genuine issue ads during those time frames by simply
avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates, or in
doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a segregated
fund.[ Footnote
88 ] We are therefore not persuaded
that plaintiffs have carried their heavy burden of proving that
amended FECA §316(b)(2) is overbroad. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 , 613 (1973). Even if we
assumed that BCRA will inhibit some constitutionally protected
corporate and union speech, that assumption would not “justify
prohibiting all enforcement” of the law unless its application to
protected speech is substantial, “not only in an absolute sense,
but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate
applications.” Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. ___,
___ (2003) (slip op., at 5–6). Far from establishing that BCRA’s
application to pure issue ads is substantial, either in an absolute
sense or relative to its application to election-related
advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary
conclusion. Plaintiffs also argue that FECA
§316(b)(2)’s segregated-fund requirement for electioneering
communications is underinclusive because it does not apply to
advertising in the print media or on the Internet. 2 U.
S. C. A. §434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003). The records
developed in this litigation and by the Senate Committee adequately
explain the reasons for this legislative choice. Congress found
that corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual
torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods
immediately preceding federal elections, and that remedial
legislation was needed to stanch that flow of money. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 569–573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at
799 (Leon, J.); 3 1998 Senate Report 4465, 4474–4481; 5 id., at 7521–7525. As we held in Buckley, “reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” 424 U. S.,
at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One might
just as well argue that the electioneering communication definition
is underinclusive because it leaves advertising 61 days in advance
of an election entirely unregulated. The record amply justifies
Congress’ line drawing. In addition to arguing that
§316(b)(2)’s segregated-fund requirement is underinclusive, some
plaintiffs contend that it unconstitutionally discriminates in
favor of media companies. FECA §304(f)(3)(B)(i) excludes from the
definition of electioneering communications any “communication
appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station, unless such
facilities are owned or controlled by any political party,
political committee, or candidate.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§434(f)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Plaintiffs argue this provision
gives free rein to media companies to engage in speech without
resort to PAC money. Section 304(f)(3)(B)(i)’s effect, however, is
much narrower than plaintiffs suggest. The provision excepts news
items and commentary only; it does not afford carte
blanche to media companies generally to ignore FECA’s
provisions. The statute’s narrow exception is wholly consistent
with First Amendment principles. “A valid distinction … exists
between corporations that are part of the media industry and other
corporations that are not involved in the regular business of
imparting news to the public.” Austin, 494 U. S., at 668.
Numerous federal statutes have drawn this distinction to ensure
that the law “does not hinder or prevent the institutional press
from reporting on, and publishing editorials about, newsworthy
events.” Ibid . (citations omitted); see, e.g. , 2
U. S. C. §431(9)(B)(i) (exempting news stories, commentaries,
and editorials from FECA’s definition of “expenditure”); 15 U.
S. C. §§1801–1804 (providing a limited antitrust exemption for
newspapers); 47 U. S. C. §315(a) (excepting newscasts, news
interviews, and news documentaries from the requirement that
broadcasters provide equal time to candidates for public
office).[ Footnote
89 ] We affirm the District Court’s
judgment to the extent that it upheld the constitutionality of FECA
§316(b)(2); to the extent that it invalidated any part of
§316(b)(2), we reverse the judgment. BCRA §204’s Application to
Nonprofit Corporations Section 204 of
BCRA, which adds FECA §316(c)(6), applies the prohibition on the
use of general treasury funds to pay for electioneering
communications to not-for-profit corporations.[ Footnote 90 ] Prior to the enactment of BCRA,
FECA required such corporations, like business corporations, to pay
for their express advocacy from segregated funds rather than from
their general treasuries. Our recent decision in Federal Election
Comm’n v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. ___ (2003), confirmed
that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a
sub-category of corporations described as “ MCFL organizations,” as defined by our decision in MCFL, 479
U. S. 238 (1986).[ Footnote
91 ] The constitutional objection to applying FECA’s
segregated-fund requirement to so-called MCFL organizations necessarily applies with equal force to FECA
§316(c)(6). Our decision in MCFL related to a carefully defined category of entities.
We identified three features of the organization at issue in that
case that were central to our holding: “ First , it was formed for the
express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in
business activities. If political fundraising events are expressly
denominated as requests for contributions that will be used for
political purposes, including direct expenditures, these events
cannot be considered business activities. This ensures that
political resources reflect political support. Second , it
has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to have a
claim on its assets or earnings. This ensures that persons
connected with the organization will have no economic disincentive
for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political
activity. Third , MCFL was not established by a business
corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept
contributions from such entities. This prevents such corporations
from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending that
creates a threat to the political marketplace.” Id. , at
264. That FECA §316(c)(6)
does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its
prohibition is not a sufficient reason to invalidate the entire
section. If a reasonable limiting construction “has been or could
be placed on the challenged statute” to avoid constitutional
concerns, we should embrace it. Broadrick, 413 U. S., at
613; Buckley, 424 U. S., at 44. Because our decision in
the MCFL case was on the books for many years before BCRA
was enacted, we presume that the legislators who drafted §316(c)(6)
were fully aware that the provision could not validly apply to MCFL -type entities. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879 , 896
(1988); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 , 696–697
(1979). Indeed, the Government itself concedes that §316(c)(6) does
not apply to MCFL organizations. As so construed, the
provision is plainly valid. See Austin, 494 U. S., at
661–665 (holding that a segregated-fund requirement that did not
explicitly carve out an MCFL exception could apply to a
nonprofit corporation that did not qualify for MCFL status). Accordingly, the judgment of the
District Court upholding §316(c)(6) as so limited is
affirmed. BCRA §212’s Reporting Requirement
for $1,000 Expenditures Section 212 of
BCRA amends FECA §304 to add a new disclosure requirement, FECA
§304(g), which applies to persons making independent expenditures
of $1,000 or more during the 20-day period immediately preceding an
election. Like FECA §304(f)(5), discussed above, new §304(g) treats
the execution of a contract to make a disbursement as the
functional equivalent of a payment for the goods or services
covered by the contract.[ Footnote 92 ] In challenging this provision, plaintiffs
renew the argument we rejected in the context of §304(f)(5): that
they have a constitutional right to postpone any disclosure until
after the performance of the services purchased by their
expenditure. The District
Court held that the challenge to FECA §304(g) was not ripe because
the FEC has issued regulations “provid[ing] Plaintiffs with the
exact remedy they seek”—that is, specifically declining to “require
disclosure of independent express advocacy expenditures prior to
their ‘publi[c] disseminat[ion].’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
251, and n. 85 (per curiam) (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452
(2003) (codified at 11 CFR §§109.10(c), (d) (2003))). We are not
certain that a regulation purporting to limit the range of
circumstances in which a speech-burdening statute will be enforced
can render nonjusticiable a facial challenge to the (concededly
broader) underlying statute. Nevertheless, we need not separately
address the constitutionality of §304(g), for our ruling as to BCRA
§201, see supra , at 82– 89, renders the issue essentially
moot. BCRA §213’s Requirement that
Political Parties Choose Between Coordinated and Independent
Expenditures After Nominating a Candidate Section 213 of
BCRA amends FECA §315(d)(4) to impose certain limits on party
spending during the postnomination, preelection period.[ Footnote 93 ] At first blush, the
text of §315(d)(4)(A) appears to require political parties to make
a straightforward choice between using limited coordinated
expenditures or unlimited independent expenditures to support their
nominees. All three judges on the District Court concluded that the
provision placed an unconstitutional burden on the parties’ right
to make unlimited independent expenditures. 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 388 (Henderson, J.); id. , at 650–651 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), id. , at 805–808 (Leon, J.). In the end, we agree with that
conclusion but believe it important to identify certain
complexities in the text of §315(d)(4) that affect our analysis of
the issue. Section 315 of FECA
sets forth various limitations on contributions and expenditures by
individuals, political parties, and other groups. Section 315(a)(2)
restricts “contributions” by parties to $5,000 per candidate. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441a(a)(2). Because §315(a)(7) treats
expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate as contributions
to that candidate, 2 U. S. C. A. §441(a)(7) (Supp. 2003),
the $5,000 limit also operates as a cap on parties’ coordinated
expenditures. Section 315(d), however, provides that,
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to
limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions,”
political parties may make “expenditures” in support of their
candidates under a formula keyed to the voting-age population of
the candidate’s home State or, in the case of a candidate for
President, the voting-age population of the United States. 2 U.
S. C. A. §§441a(d)(1)–(3) (main ed. and Supp.
2003).[ Footnote 94 ] In the
year 2000, that formula permitted expenditures ranging from $33,780
to $67,650 for House of Representatives races, and from $67,650 to
$1.6 million for Senate races. Colorado II, 533 U. S., at
439, n. 3. We held in Colorado I that parties have a
constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures,
and we invalidated §315(d) to the extent that it restricted such
expenditures. As a result of that decision, §315(d) applies only to
coordinated expenditures, replacing the $5,000 cap on contributions
set out in §315(a)(2) with the more generous limitations prescribed
by §§315(d)(1)–(3). We sustained that limited application in Colorado II, supra . Section 213 of BCRA amends §315(d)
by adding a new paragraph (4). New §315(d)(4)(A) provides that,
after a party nominates a candidate for federal office, it must
choose between two spending options. Under the first option, a
party that “makes any independent expenditure (as defined in
section [301(17)])” is thereby barred from making “any coordinated
expenditure under this subsection.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§441a(d)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The phrase “this subsection” is a
reference to subsection (d) of §315. Thus, the consequence of
making an independent expenditure is not a complete prohibition of
any coordinated expenditure: Although the party cannot take
advantage of the increased spending limits under §§315(d)(1)–(3),
it still may make up to $5,000 in coordinated expenditures under
§315(a)(2). As the difference between $5,000 and $1.6 million
demonstrates, however, that is a significant cost to impose on the
exercise of a constitutional right. The second option is the converse
of the first. It provides that a party that makes any coordinated
expenditure “under this subsection” ( i.e. , one that
exceeds the ordinary $5,000 limit) cannot make “any independent
expenditure (as defined in section [301(17)]) with respect to the
candidate.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d)(4)(A)(ii). Section
301(17) defines “ ‘independent expenditure’ ” to mean a
non-coordinated expenditure “expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§431(17)(A).[ Footnote 95 ]
Therefore, as was true of the first option, the party’s choice is
not as stark as it initially appears: The consequence of the larger
coordinated expenditure is not a complete prohibition of any
independent expenditure, but the forfeiture of the right to make
independent expenditures for express advocacy . As we
explained in our discussion of the provisions relating to
electioneering communications, supra , at 83–87, express
advocacy represents only a tiny fraction of the political
communications made for the purpose of electing or defeating
candidates during a campaign. Regardless of which option parties
choose, they remain free to make independent expenditures for the
vast majority of campaign ads that avoid the use of a few magic
words. In sum, the coverage of new FECA
§315(d)(4) is much more limited than it initially appears. A party
that wishes to spend more than $5,000 in coordination with its
nominee is forced to forgo only the narrow category of independent
expenditures that make use of magic words. But while the category
of burdened speech is relatively small, it plainly is entitled to
First Amendment protection. See Buckley , 424 U. S., at
44–45, 48. Under §315(d)(4), a political party’s exercise of its
constitutionally protected right to engage in “core First Amendment
expression,” id., at 48, results in the loss of a valuable
statutory benefit that has been available to parties for many
years. To survive constitutional scrutiny, a provision that has
such consequences must be supported by a meaningful governmental
interest. The interest in requiring
political parties to avoid the use of magic words is not such an
interest. We held in Buckley that a $1,000 cap on
expenditures that applied only to express advocacy could not be
justified as a means of avoiding circumvention of contribution
limits or preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption
because its restrictions could easily be evaded: “So long as
persons and groups eschew expenditures that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,
they are free to spend as much as they want to promote the
candidate and his views.” Id. , at 45. The same is true in
this litigation. Any claim that a restriction on independent
express advocacy serves a strong Government interest is belied by
the overwhelming evidence that the line between express advocacy
and other types of election-influencing expression is, for
Congress’ purposes, functionally meaningless. Indeed, Congress
enacted the new “electioneering communication[s]” provisions
precisely because it recognized that the express advocacy test was
woefully inadequate at capturing communications designed to
influence candidate elections. In light of that recognition, we are
hard pressed to conclude that any meaningful purpose is served by
§315(d)(4)’s burden on a party’s right to engage independently in
express advocacy. The Government argues that
§315(d)(4) nevertheless is constitutional because it is not an
outright ban (or cap) on independent expenditures, but rather
offers parties a voluntary choice between a constitutional right
and a statutory benefit. Whatever merit that argument might have in
the abstract, it fails to account for new §315(d)(4)(B), which
provides: “For purposes of this paragraph, all
political committees established and maintained by a national
political party (including all congressional campaign committees)
and all political committees established and maintained by a State
political party (including any subordinate committee of a State
committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee.”
2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d)(4)(B) (Supp. 2003). Given that provision,
it simply is not the case that each party committee can make a
voluntary and independent choice between exercising its right to
engage in independent advocacy and taking advantage of the
increased limits on coordinated spending under §§315(d)(1)–(3).
Instead, the decision resides solely in the hands of the first
mover, such that a local party committee can bind both the state
and national parties to its chosen spending option.[ Footnote 96 ] It is one thing to say that
Congress may require a party committee to give up its right to make
independent expenditures if it believes that it can accomplish more
with coordinated expenditures. It is quite another thing, however,
to say that the RNC must limit itself to $5,000 in coordinated
expenditures in support of its presidential nominee if any state or
local committee first makes an independent expenditure for an ad
that uses magic words. That odd result undermines any claim that
new §315(d)(4) can withstand constitutional scrutiny simply because
it is cast as a voluntary choice rather than an outright
prohibition on independent expenditures. The portion of the judgment of the
District Court invalidating BCRA §213 is affirmed. BCRA §214’s Changes in FECA’s
Provisions Covering Coordinated Expenditures Ever since our
decision in Buckley , it has been settled that expenditures by
a noncandidate that are “controlled by or coordinated with the
candidate and his campaign” may be treated as indirect
contributions subject to FECA’s source and amount limitations. 424
U. S., at 46. Thus, FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(i) long has provided that
“expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his
authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be
considered to be a contribution to such candidate.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i) (Supp. 2003). Section 214(a)
of BCRA creates a new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) that applies the same
rule to expenditures coordinated with “a national, State, or local
committee of a political party.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§441a(a)(7)(B)(ii).[ Footnote
97 ] Sections 214(b) and (c) direct the FEC to repeal its
current regulations[ Footnote
98 ] and to promulgate new regulations dealing with “coordinated
communications” paid for by persons other than candidates or their
parties. Subsection (c) provides that the new “regulations shall
not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish
coordination.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(a) note. Plaintiffs do not
dispute that Congress may apply the same coordination rules to
parties as to candidates. They argue instead that new FECA
§315(a)(7)(B)(ii) and its implementing regulations are overbroad
and unconstitutionally vague because they permit a finding of
coordination even in the absence of an agreement. Plaintiffs point
out that political supporters may be subjected to criminal
liability if they exceed the contribution limits with expenditures
that ultimately are deemed coordinated. Thus, they stress the
importance of a clear definition of “coordination” and argue any
definition that does not hinge on the presence of an agreement
cannot provide the “precise guidance” that the First Amendment
demands. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States
et al., Appellant in No. 02–1756, p. 48. As plaintiffs readily
admit, that argument reaches beyond BCRA, calling into question
FECA’s pre-existing provisions governing expenditures coordinated
with candidates. We are not persuaded that the
presence of an agreement marks the dividing line between
expenditures that are coordinated—and therefore may be regulated as
indirect contributions—and expenditures that truly are independent.
We repeatedly have struck down limitations on expenditures “made
totally independently of the candidate and his campaign,” Buckley , 424 U. S., at 47, on the ground that such
limitations “impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech
and association” than do limits on contributions and coordinated
expenditures, id. , at 44, while “fail[ing] to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or
appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” id .,
at 47–48. See also Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 613–614
(striking down limit on expenditure made by party officials prior
to nomination of candidates and without any consultation with
potential nominees). We explained in Buckley: “Unlike contributions, …
independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with
the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.” 424 U. S., at 47. Thus, the rationale
for affording special protection to wholly independent expenditures
has nothing to do with the absence of an agreement and everything
to do with the functional consequences of different types of
expenditures. Independent expenditures “are poor sources of
leverage for a spender because they might be duplicative or
counterproductive from a candidate’s point of view.” Colorado
II, 533 U. S., at 446. By contrast, expenditures made after a
“wink or nod” often will be “as useful to the candidate as cash.” Id. , at 442, 446. For that reason, Congress has always
treated expenditures made “at the request or suggestion of” a
candidate as coordinated.[ Footnote 99 ] 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(i)
(Supp. 2003). A supporter easily could comply with a candidate’s
request or suggestion without first agreeing to do so, and the
resulting expenditure would be “ ‘virtually indistinguishable
from [a] simple contributio[n],’ ” Colorado II , supra , at 444–445. Therefore, we cannot agree with the
submission that new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is overbroad because it
permits a finding of coordination or cooperation notwithstanding
the absence of a pre-existing agreement. Nor are we persuaded that the
absence of an agreement requirement renders §315(a)(7)(B)(ii)
unconstitutionally vague. An agreement has never been required to
support a finding of coordination with a candidate under
§315(a)(7)(B)(i), which refers to expenditures made “in
cooperation, consultation, or concer[t] with, or at the request or
suggestion of” a candidate. Congress used precisely the same
language in new §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) to address expenditures
coordinated with parties. FECA’s longstanding definition of
coordination “delineates its reach in words of common
understanding.” Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 , 616
(1968). Not surprisingly, therefore, the relevant statutory
language has survived without constitutional challenge for almost
three decades. Although that fact does not insulate the definition
from constitutional scrutiny, it does undermine plaintiffs’ claim
that the language of §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is intolerably vague.
Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that the definition has
chilled political speech, whether between candidates and their
supporters or by the supporters to the general public. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521
U. S. 844 , 874 (1997) (noting risk that vague statutes may
chill protected expression). And, although plaintiffs speculate
that the FEC could engage in intrusive and politically motivated
investigations into alleged coordination, they do not even attempt
to explain why an agreement requirement would solve that problem.
Moreover, the only evidence plaintiffs have adduced regarding the
enforcement of the coordination provision during its 27-year
history concerns three investigations in the late 1990’s into
groups on different sides of the political aisle. Such meager
evidence does not support the claim that §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) will
“foster ‘arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ ” Buckley, supra, at 41, n. 48 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U. S., at 108–109). We conclude that
FECA’s definition of coordination gives “fair notice to those to
whom [it] is directed,” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 412
(1950), and is not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, portions of plaintiffs’
challenge to BCRA §214 focus on the regulations the FEC has
promulgated under §214(c). 11 CFR §109.21 (2003). As the District
Court explained, issues concerning the regulations are not
appropriately raised in this facial challenge to BCRA, but must be
pursued in a separate proceeding. Thus, we agree with the District
Court that plaintiffs’ challenge to §§214(b) and (c) is not ripe to
the extent that the alleged constitutional infirmities are found in
the implementing regulations rather than the statute
itself. The portions of the District Court
judgment rejecting plaintiffs’ challenges to BCRA §214 are
affirmed. V Many years ago we
observed that “[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass
appropriate legislation to safeguard … an election from the
improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the
nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S., at 545. We
abide by that conviction in considering Congress’ most recent
effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our
political system. We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the
last congressional statement on the matter. Money, like water, will
always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how Congress
will respond, are concerns for another day. In the main we uphold
BCRA’s two principal, complementary features: the control of soft
money and the regulation of electioneering communications.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the District
Court’s judgment with respect to Titles I and II. It is so ordered. * Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its
entirety. Footnote 1 The parties to the litigation are
described in the findings of the District Court. 251 F. Supp.
2d 176, 221–226 (DC 2003) (per curiam) . For the sake of
clarity, we refer to the parties who challenged the law in the
District Court as the “plaintiffs,” referring to specific
plaintiffs by name where necessary. We refer to the parties who
intervened in defense of the law as the
“intervenor-defendants.” Footnote 2 The Hatch Act also limited both
the amount political committees could expend and the amount they
could receive in contributions. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54
Stat. 767. Senator Bankhead, in offering the amendment from the
Senate floor, said: “ ‘We all know that money is
the chief source of corruption. We all know that large
contributions to political campaigns not only put the political
party under obligation to the large contributors, who demand pay in
the way of legislation, but we also know that large sums of money
are used for the purpose of conducting expensive campaigns through
the newspapers and over the radio; in the publication of all sorts
of literature, true and untrue; and for the purpose of paying the
expenses of campaigners sent out into the country to spread
propaganda, both true and untrue.’ ” United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567 , 577–578 (1957) (quoting
86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940)). Footnote 3 As a general rule, FECA permits
corporations and unions to solicit contributions to their PACs from
their shareholders or members, but not from outsiders. 2 U.
S. C. §§441b(b)(4)(A), (C); see Federal Election
Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 , 198–199, and n. 1
(1982). Footnote 4 The court held that one
disclosure provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo , 519 F. 2d 821, 832 (CADC
1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U. S. C.
§437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)). No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 , 10, n. 7 (1976) (per
curiam) . Footnote 5 The Court of Appeals
found: “Large contributions are intended
to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign
for consideration of the contributor’s particular concerns. Senator
Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the
feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a
reaction that the average American has no significant role in the
political process.” Buckley , 519 F. 2d, at 838
(footnotes omitted). The court also noted: “Congress found and the District Court confirmed
that such contributions were often made for the purpose of
furthering business or private interests by facilitating access to
government officials or influencing governmental decisions, and
that, conversely, elected officials have tended to afford special
treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93–689,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4–5; Findings I, ¶ ;¶ ;108, 110, 118, 170.” Id. , at 838, n. 32. Citing further evidence of
corruption, the court explained: “The disclosures of illegal
corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of
executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was
necessary as a ‘calling card, something that would get us in the
door and make our point of view heard,’ Hearings before the
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities , 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.—Orin Atkins,
Chairman) or ‘in response to pressure for fear of a competitive
disadvantage that might result,’ id. at 5495, 5514
(American Airlines—George Spater, former chairman); see Findings I, ¶ ;105. The record before Congress was replete with
specific examples of improper attempts to obtain governmental favor
in return for large campaign contributions. See Findings
I, ¶ ;¶ ;159–64.” Id. , at 839, n. 37. Footnote 6 The court cited the intricate
scheme of the American Milk Producers, Inc., as an example of the
lengths to which contributors went to avoid their duty to
disclose: “Since the milk producers, on
legal advice, worked on a $2500 limit per committee, they evolved a
procedure, after consultation in November 1970 with Nixon fund
raisers, to break down [their $2 million donation] into numerous
smaller contributions to hundreds of committees in various states
which could then hold the money for the President’s reelection
campaign, so as to permit the producers to meet independent
reporting requirements without disclosure.” Id., at 839,
n. 36. The milk producers contributed
large sums to the Nixon campaign “in order to gain a meeting with
White House officials on price supports.” Ibid. Footnote
7 In 1977 the FEC promulgated a
rule allowing parties to allocate their administrative expenses “on
a reasonable basis” between accounts containing funds raised in
compliance with FECA and accounts containing nonfederal funds,
including corporate and union donations. 11 CFR §102.6(a)(2). In
advisory opinions issued in 1978 and 1979, the FEC allowed parties
similarly to allocate the costs of voter registration and
get-out-the-vote drives between federal and nonfederal accounts.
FEC Advisory Op. 1978–10; FEC Advisory Op. 1979–17. See 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 195–197 (per curiam) . In 1990 the FEC clarified the
phrase “on a reasonable basis” by promulgating fixed allocation
rates. 11 CFR §106.5 (1991). The regulations required the
Republican National Committee (RNC) and Democratic National
Committee (DNC) to pay for at least 60% of mixed-purpose activities
(65% in presidential election years) with funds from their federal
accounts. §106.5(b)(2). By contrast, the regulations required state
and local committees to allocate similar expenditures based on the
ratio of federal to nonfederal offices on the State’s ballot,
§106.5(d)(1), which in practice meant that they could expend a
substantially greater proportion of soft money than national
parties to fund mixed-purpose activities affecting both federal and
state elections. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 198–199 (per
curiam) . Footnote 8 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 1, Tbl. 2
(report of Thomas E. Mann, Chair & Sr. Fellow, Brookings
Institution (hereinafter Mann Expert Report)); 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 197–201 (per curiam). Footnote
9 Mann Expert Report 26;
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 441 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote
10 Id., at 494 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.). Footnote
11 Mann Expert Report 24. Footnote
12 In the 2000 election cycle, 35 of
the 50 largest soft-money donors gave to both parties; 28 of the 50
gave more than $100,000 to both parties. Mann Expert Report Tbl. 6;
see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 509 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 785, n. 77 (Leon, J.). Footnote
13 A former chief executive officer of a
large corporation explained: “Business and labor leaders
believe, based on their experience, that disappointed Members, and
their party colleagues, may shun or disfavor them because they have
not contributed. Equally, these leaders fear that if they refuse to
contribute (enough), competing interests who do contribute
generously will have an advantage in gaining access to and
influencing key Congressional leaders on matters of importance to
the company or union.” App. 283, ¶ ;9 (declaration of Gerald
Greenwald, United Airlines (hereinafter Greenwald
Decl.)). Amici Curiae Committee
for Economic Development and various business leaders attest that
corporate soft-money contributions are “coerced and, at bottom,
wholly commercial” in nature, and that “[b]usiness leaders
increasingly wish to be freed from the grip of a system in which
they fear the adverse consequences of refusing to fill the coffers
of the major parties.” Brief for Committee for Economic Development
et al. as Amici Curiae 28. Footnote
14 See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 480
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 842 (Leon, J.). Footnote
15 See id. , at 479–480
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 842–843 (Leon, J.). One
former party official explained to the District Court: “ ‘Once you’ve helped a federal candidate by
contributing hard money to his or her campaign, you are sometimes
asked to do more for the candidate by making donations of hard
and/or soft money to the national party committees, the relevant
state party (assuming it can accept corporate contributions), or an
outside group that is planning on doing an independent expenditure
or issue advertisement to help the candidate’s campaign.’ ” Id. , at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote
16 Id. , at 532–537
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id ., at 875–879 (Leon, J.). As the
former chair of one major advocacy organization’s PAC put it,
“ ‘[i]t is foolish to believe there is any practical
difference between issue advocacy and advocacy of a political
candidate. What separates issue advocacy and political advocacy is
a line in the sand drawn on a windy day.’ ” Id., at
536–537 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Tanya K. Metaksa, Opening
Remarks at the American Assn. of Political Consultants Fifth
General Session on “Issue Advocacy,” Jan. 17, 1997, p. 2); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 878–879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote
17 Id., at 304 (Henderson, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. , at 534 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 875–879
(Leon, J.). Footnote
18 It is undisputed that very few
ads—whether run by candidates, parties, or interest groups—used
words of express advocacy. Id., at 303 (Henderson, J.); id. , at 529 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at 874
(Leon, J.). In the 1998 election cycle, just 4% of candidate
advertisements used magic words; in 2000, that number was a mere
5%. App. 1334 (report of Jonathan S. Krasno, Yale University, &
Frank J. Sorauf, University of Minnesota, pp. 53–54 (hereinafter
Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report); see 1 Defs. Exhs., Tab 2, pp.
53–54). Footnote
19 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 564, and
n. 6 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing report of Kenneth M.
Goldstein, University of Wisconsin-Madison, App. A, Tbl. 16; see
3–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 7); Tr. of Oral Arg. 202–203; see also 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Footnote
20 The spending on electioneering
communications climbed dramatically during the last decade. In the
1996 election cycle, $135 to $150 million was spent on multiple
broadcasts of about 100 ads. In the next cycle (1997-1998), 77
organizations aired 423 ads at a total cost between $270 and $340
million. By the 2000 election, 130 groups spent over an estimated
$500 million on more than 1,100 different ads. Two out of every
three dollars spent on issue ads in the 2000 cycle were
attributable to the two major parties and six major interest
groups. Id., at 303–304 (Henderson, J.) (citing Annenberg
Public Policy Center, Issue Advertising in the 1999–2000 Election
Cycle 1–15 (2001) (hereinafter Annenberg Report); see 38 Defs.
Exhs., Tab 22); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 527 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(same); id ., at 879 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote
21 Id., at 540 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.) (quoting internal AFL-CIO Memorandum from Brian Weeks to Mike
Klein, “Electronic Buy for Illinois Senator,” (Oct. 9, 1996),
AFL-CIO 005244); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 886 (Leon, J.)
(same). Footnote
22 The association was known as the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA). Id. , at 232 (per curiam) . Footnote
23 Id ., at 232–233. Other
examples of mysterious groups included “Voters for Campaign Truth,”
“Aretino Industries,” “Montanans for Common Sense Mining Laws,”
“American Seniors, Inc.,” “American Family Voices,” App. 1355
(Krasno & Sorauf Expert Report 71–77), and the “Coalition to
Make our Voices Heard,” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 538
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Some of the actors behind these groups
frankly acknowledged that “ ‘in some places it’s much more
effective to run an ad by the ‘Coalition to Make Our Voices Heard’
than it is to say paid for by ‘the men and women of the
AFL–CIO.’ ” Ibid. (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting
report of David B. Magleby, Brigham Young University 18–19
(hereinafter Magleby Expert Report), App. 1484–1485). Footnote
24 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 518–519
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote
25 Id., at 478–479
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing declaration of Robert Hickmott, Senior
V. P., Smith-Free Group, ¶ ;8 (hereinafter Hickmott Decl.);
see 6–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 19, ¶ ;8). Footnote
26 S. Rep. No. 105–167, vol. 4,
p. 4611 (1998) (hereinafter 1998 Senate Report); 5 id., at 7515. Footnote
27 3 id., at 4535
(additional views of Sen. Collins). Footnote
28 1 id., at 41–42,
195–200. The report included a memorandum written by the DNC
finance chairman suggesting the use of White House coffees and
“overnights” to give major donors “quality time” with the
President, and noted that the guests accounted for $26.4 million in
contributions. Id. , at 194, 196. Footnote
29 2 id., at 2913–2914,
2921. Despite concerns about Tamraz’s background and a possible
conflict with United States foreign policy interests, he was
invited to six events attended by the President. Id. , at
2920–2921. Similarly, the minority noted that in exchange for
Michael Kojima’s contribution of $500,000 to the 1992 President’s
Dinner, he and his wife had been placed at the head table with
President and Mrs. Bush. Moreover, Kojima received several
additional meetings with the President, other administration
officials, and United States embassy officials. 4 id., at
5418, 5422, 5428. Footnote
30 The former requires an initial
contribution of $100,000, and $25,000 for each of the next three
years; the latter requires annual contributions of $15,000. 5 id., at 7968. Footnote
31 Id. , at 7971. Footnote
32 1 id., at 49; 3 id., at 3997–4006. Footnote
33 Id ., at 4466. Footnote
34 Ibid. Footnote
35 Id. , at 4468–4470,
4480–4481, 4491–4494. Footnote
36 Id. , at 4492. Footnote
37 6 id., at
9394. Footnote
38 The national party committees of
the two major political parties are: the Republican National
Committee (RNC); the Democratic National Committee (DNC); the
National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC); the National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC); the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC); and the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Footnote
39 Justice Kennedy accuses us of
engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating “unseemly corporate
speech” with the speech of political parties and candidates, and
then adverting to the “corporate speech rationale as if it were the
linchpin of the litigation.” Post , at 7 (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The
principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are
the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny
that regulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and
political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than
direct restraints on speech—including “unseemly corporate
speech.” Footnote
40 Since our decision in Buckley , we have consistently applied less rigorous
scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of
corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g. ,
424 U. S., at 23–36 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s
$1,000 limit on individual contributions to a candidate and FECA’s
$5,000 limit on PAC contributions to a candidate); id. , at
38 (applying less rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $25,000 aggregate
yearly limit on contributions to candidates, political party
committees, and political committees); California Medical
Assn. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 453
U. S. 182 , 195–196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (applying less
rigorous scrutiny to FECA’s $5,000 limit on contributions to
multicandidate political committees); National Right to
Work , 459 U. S., at 208–211 (applying less rigorous scrutiny
to antisolicitation provision buttressing an otherwise valid
contribution limit); Colorado II , 533 U. S. 431 , 456 (2001) (applying
less rigorous scrutiny to expenditures coordinated with a
candidate); Federal Election Comm’n v . Beaumont, 539 U. S.___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 14–15) (applying less
rigorous scrutiny to provisions intended to prevent circumvention
of otherwise valid contribution limits). Footnote
41 Indeed, Congress structured
§323(b) in such a way as to free individual, corporate, and union
donations to state committees for nonfederal elections
from federal source and amount restrictions. Footnote
42 Justice Kennedy’s contention that
less rigorous scrutiny applies only to regulations burdening
political association, rather than political speech, misreads Buckley . In Buckley , we recognized that
contribution limits burden both protected speech and association,
though they generally have more significant impacts on the latter.
424 U. S., at 20–22. We nevertheless applied less rigorous scrutiny
to FECA’s contribution limits because neither burden was
sufficiently weighty to overcome Congress’ countervailing interest
in protecting the integrity of the political process. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 528 U. S. 377 , 388 (2000) (“While we
did not [in Buckley ] attempt to parse [the] distinctions
between the speech and association standards of scrutiny for
contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions
bore more heavily on the associational right than on [the] freedom
to speak. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a
contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational
abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held
the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review.”
(citation omitted)). It is thus simply untrue in the campaign
finance context that all “burdens on speech necessitate strict
scrutiny review.” Post , at 29. Footnote
43 Justice Kennedy is no doubt
correct that the associational burdens imposed by a particular
piece of campaign-finance regulation may at times be so severe as
to warrant strict scrutiny. Ibid. In light of our
interpretation of §323(a), however, see infra, at 46–47,
§323 does not present such a case. As Justice Kennedy himself
acknowledges, even “ significant interference” with
“protected rights of association” are subject to less rigorous
scrutiny. Beaumont , 539 U. S., at _____ (slip op., at 15);
see post , at 28. There is thus nothing inconsistent in our
decision to account for the particular associational burdens
imposed by §323(a) when applying the appropriate level of
scrutiny. Footnote
44 The fact that the post-1990
explosion in soft-money spending on federal electioneering was
accompanied by a series of efforts in Congress to clamp down on
such uses of soft money (culminating, of course, in BCRA)
underscores the fact that the FEC regulations permitted more than
Congress, in enacting FECA, had ever intended. See J. Cantor,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Campaign
Finance Legislation in the 101st Congress (1990) (9 bills seeking
to limit the influence of soft money introduced); J. Cantor, CRS
Report for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 102nd
Congress (1991) (10 such bills introduced); J. Cantor, CRS Report
for Congress: Campaign Finance Legislation in the 103rd Congress
(1993) (16 bills); J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress: Campaign
Finance Legislation in the 104th Congress (1996) (18 bills); see
also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 201–206 (per curiam) (discussing legislative efforts to curb soft money in 105th and
subsequent Congresses). Footnote
45 Justice Kennedy contends that the
plurality’s observation in Colorado I that large
soft-money donations to a political party pose little threat of
corruption “establish[es] that” such contributions are not
corrupting. Post , at 17–18 (citing Colorado I , 518 U. S. 604 , 616, 617–618 (1996)).
The cited dictum has no bearing on the present case. Colorado
I addressed an entirely different question—namely, whether
Congress could permissibly limit a party’s independent
expenditures—and did so on an entirely different set of facts. It
also had before it an evidentiary record frozen in 1990—well before
the soft-money explosion of the 1990’s. See Federal Election
Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. ,
839 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (Colo. 1993). Footnote
46 Other business leaders agreed.
For example, the chairman of the board and CEO of a major toy
company explained: “ ‘Many in the corporate world view large soft
money donations as a cost of doing business. … I remain convinced
that in some of the more publicized cases, federal officeholders
actually appear to have sold themselves and the party cheaply. They
could have gotten even more money, because of the potential
importance of their decisions to the affected business.’ ” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 491 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration
of Alan G. Hassenfeld, CEO, Hasbro, Inc., ¶ ;16; see 6–R Defs.
Exhs., Tab 17). Similarly the chairman emeritus of a major airline
opined: “ ‘Though a soft money check might be made out
to a political party, labor and business leaders know that those
checks open the doors of the offices of individual and important
Members of Congress and the Administration… . Labor and
business leaders believe—based on experience and with good
reason—that such access gives them an opportunity to shape and
affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so
derives from the fact that they have given large sums of money to
the parties.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 498 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 283–284, ¶ ;10); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 858–859 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote
47 Even more troubling is evidence
in the record showing that national parties have actively exploited
the belief that contributions purchase influence or protection to
pressure donors into making contributions. As one CEO
explained: “ ‘[I]f you’re giving a lot of soft money to
one side, the other side knows. For many economically-oriented
donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the
other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a
friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests
before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other
side noticed. They’ll get a message that basically asks: ‘Are you
sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don’t you want to have
friends on both sides of the aisle?’ If your interests are subject
to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that
you may suffer a penalty if you don’t give… . [D]uring the
1990’s, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying
you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or
the person’s opponent.’ ” Id. , at 510
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Randlett Decl. ¶ ;12, App. 715); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 868 (Leon, J.) (same). Footnote
48 In addition to finding no support
in our recent cases, see, e.g. , Colorado II , 533
U. S., at 441 (defining corruption more broadly than quid pro
quo arrangements); Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 389
(same), Justice Kennedy’s contention that Buckley limits
Congress to regulating contributions to a candidate ignores Buckley itself. There, we upheld FECA’s $25,000 limit on
aggregate yearly contributions to candidates, political
committees , and party committees out of recognition
that FECA’s $1,000 limit on candidate contributions would be
meaningless if individuals could instead make “huge contributions
to the candidate’s political party.” 424 U. S., at 38. Likewise, in California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 453
U. S. 182 (1981), we upheld FECA’s $5,000 limit on
contributions to multicandidate political committees. It is no
answer to say that such limits were justified as a means of
preventing individuals from using parties and political committees
as pass-throughs to circumvent FECA’s $1,000 limit on individual
contributions to candidates. Given FECA’s definition of
“contribution,” the $5,000 and $25,000 limits restricted not only
the source and amount of funds available to parties and political
committees to make candidate contributions, but also the source and
amount of funds available to engage in express advocacy and
numerous other noncoordinated expenditures. If indeed the First
Amendment prohibited Congress from regulating contributions to fund
the latter, the otherwise-easy-to-remedy exploitation of parties as
pass-throughs ( e.g. , a strict limit on donations that
could be used to fund candidate contributions) would have provided
insufficient justification for such overbroad
legislation. Footnote
49 At another point, describing our
“flawed reasoning,” Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that Congress’
interest in regulating the appearance of corruption extends only to
those contributions that actually “create … corrupt donor
favoritism among … officeholders.” Post , at 16. This
latter formulation would render Congress’ interest in stemming the
appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in
preventing actual corruption. Footnote
50 In support of this claim, the
political party plaintiffs assert that, in 2001, the RNC spent
$15.6 million of nonfederal funds (30% of the nonfederal amount
raised that year) on purely state and local election activity,
including contributions to state and local candidates, transfers to
state parties, and direct spending. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–103
(statement of counsel Bobby R. Burchfield); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at
336–337 (Henderson, J.); id ., at 464–465 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.); id. , at 830 (Leon, J.). Footnote
51 The close relationship of federal
officeholders and candidates to their parties answers not only The
Chief Justice’s concerns about §323(a), but also his fear that our
analysis of §323’s remaining provisions bespeaks no limiting
principle. Post , at 6–7 (dissenting opinion). As set forth
in our discussion of those provisions, the record demonstrates
close ties between federal officeholders and the state and local
committees of their parties. That close relationship makes state
and local parties effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt
federal candidates and officeholders. Thus, in upholding §§323(b),
(d), and (f), we rely not only on the fact that they regulate
contributions used to fund activities influencing federal
elections, but also that they regulate contributions to or at the
behest of entities uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for
corruption. We agree with The Chief Justice that Congress could not
regulate financial contributions to political talk show hosts or
newspaper editors on the sole basis that their activities conferred
a benefit on the candidate. Post , at 7
(dissenting opinion). Footnote
52 Plaintiffs claim that the option
of soliciting hard money for state and local candidates is an
illusory one, since several States prohibit state and local
candidates from establishing multiple campaign accounts, which
would preclude them from establishing separate accounts for federal
funds. See Cal. Fair Pol. Practs. Comm’n Advisory Op. A–91–448
(Dec. 16, 1991), 1991 WL 772902; Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §2(3);
Iowa Code §56.5A (Supp. 2003); and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.10(J)
(Anderson Supp. 2002). Plaintiffs maintain that §323(a) combines
with these state laws to make it impossible for state and local
candidates to receive hard-money donations. But the challenge we
are considering is a facial one, and on its face §323(a) permits
solicitations. The fact that a handful of States might interfere
with the mechanism Congress has chosen for such solicitations is an
argument that may be addressed in an as-applied
challenge. Footnote
53 Even opponents of campaign
finance reform acknowledged that “a prohibition of soft money
donations to national party committees alone would be wholly
ineffective.” The Constitution and Campaign Reform: Hearings on S.
522 before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 106th
Cong., 2d Sess., 301 (2000) (statement of Bobby R. Burchfield,
Partner, Covington & Burling). Footnote
54 Generic campaign activity
promotes a political party rather than a specific candidate. 2 U.
S. C. A. §431(21). Footnote
55 A public communication is “a
communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility,
mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other
form of general public political advertising.” §431(22). Footnote
56 So long as the communication does
not constitute voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, or
generic campaign activity. §431(20)(B)(i). Footnote
57 Unless the contribution is
earmarked for federal election activity.
§431(20)(B)(ii). Footnote
58 The statute gives the FEC
responsibility for setting the allocation ratio. §441i(b)(2)(A);
see also 11 CFR §300.33(b) (2003) (defining allocation
ratios). Footnote
59 One former Senator
noted: “ ‘The fact is that much of
what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates.
The national parties know it; the candidates know it; the state and
local parties know it. If state and local parties can use soft
money for activities that affect federal elections, then the
problem will not be solved at all. The same enormous incentives to
raise the money will exist; the same large contributions by
corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals will be made; the
federal candidates who benefit from state party use of these funds
will know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of
beholdenness and obligation will arise; the same distortions on the
legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism will
erode the foundations of our democracy—except it will all be worse
in the public’s mind because a perceived reform was undercut once
again by a loophole that allows big money into the system.’ ”
251 F. Supp. 2d, at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Rudman
Decl. ¶ ;19, App. 746). Footnote
60 E.g ., 251 F. Supp.
2d, at 479 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘It is … not uncommon for
the RNC to put interested donors in touch with various state
parties. This often occurs when a donor has reached his or her
federal dollar limits to the RNC, but wishes to make additional
contributions to the state party’ ” (quoting declaration of
Thomas Josefiak, RNC Chief Counsel ¶ ;68, App 308)); see also Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 458 (quoting Congressman Wayne
Allard’s Aug. 27, 1996, fundraising letter informing the recipient
that “ ‘you are at the limit of what you can directly
contribute to my campaign,’ ” but “ ‘you can further help
my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party’ ”);
251 F. Supp 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (“ ‘Both political
parties have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard
money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the
most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply
‘pass throughs’ to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or
direct mail’ ” (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App.
1510–1511.)). Footnote
61 The 1998 Senate Report found
that, in exchange for a substantial donation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for
the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998
Senate Report 43–44; 2 id. , at 2907–2931; 5 id .,
at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes
that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to
state Democratic committees in apparent exchange for access and
influence. 1 id ., at 44–46; 2 id., at 3167–3194;
see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men,
Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40)). Footnote
62 Since voter identification is a
necessary precondition of any GOTV program, the findings regarding
GOTV funding obviously apply with equal force to the funding of
voter identification efforts. Footnote
63 With respect to GOTV, voter
identification, and other generic campaign activity, the FEC has
interpreted §323(b) to apply only to those activities conducted
after the earliest filing deadline for access to the federal
election ballot or, in States that do not conduct primaries, after
January 1 of even-numbered years. 11 CFR §100.24(a)(1) (2002). Any
activities conducted outside of those periods are completely exempt
from regulation under §323(b). Of course, this facial challenge
does not present the question of the FEC regulations’
constitutionality. But the fact that the statute provides this
basis for the FEC reasonably to narrow §301(20)(A)(ii) further
calls into question plaintiffs’ claims of facial overbreadth. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 , 613 (1973). Footnote
64 We likewise reject the argument
that §301(20)(A)(iii) is unconstitutionally vague. The words
“promote,” “oppose,” “attack,” and “support” clearly set forth the
confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to
avoid triggering the provision. These words “provide explicit
standards for those who apply them” and “give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited.” Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 , 108–109 (1972). This is
particularly the case here, since actions taken by political
parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns.
See Buckley , 424 U. S., at 79 (noting that a general
requirement that political committees disclose their expenditures
raised no vagueness problems because the term “political committee”
“need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a
candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or
election of a candidate” and thus a political committee’s
expenditures “are, by definition, campaign related”). Furthermore,
should plaintiffs feel that they need further guidance, they are
able to seek advisory opinions for clarification, see 2 U.
S. C. §437f (a)(1), and thereby “remove any doubt there
may be as to the meaning of the law,” Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 , 580
(1973). Footnote
65 Any doubts that donors would
engage in such a seemingly complex scheme are put to rest by the
record evidence in Buckley itself. See n. 6, supra (setting forth the Court of Appeals’ findings
regarding the efforts of milk producers to obtain a meeting with
White House officials). Footnote
66 Section 501(c) organizations are
groups generally exempted from taxation under the Internal Revenue
Code. 26 U. S. C. §501(a). These include §501(c)(3) charitable
and educational organizations, as well as §501(c)(4) social welfare
groups. Footnote
67 Section 527 “political
organizations” are, unlike §501(c) groups, organized for the
express purpose of engaging in partisan political activity. They
include any “party, committee, association, fund, or other
organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and operated
primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting
contributions or making expenditures” for the purpose of
“influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination,
or appointment of any individual for Federal, State, or local
public office.” 26 U. S. C. §527(e). Footnote
68 The record shows that many of the
targeted tax-exempt organizations engage in sophisticated and
effective electioneering activities for the purpose of influencing
federal elections, including waging broadcast campaigns promoting
or attacking particular candidates and conducting large-scale voter
registration and GOTV drives. For instance, during the final weeks
of the 2000 presidential campaign, the NAACP’s National Voter Fund
registered more than 200,000 people, promoted a GOTV hotline, ran
three newspaper print ads, and made several direct mailings. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 348–349 (Henderson, J.). The NAACP reports
that the program turned out one million additional African-American
voters and increased turnout over 1996 among targeted groups by 22%
in New York, 50% in Florida, and 140% in Missouri. Ibid .
The effort, which cost $10 million, was funded primarily by a $7
million contribution from an anonymous donor. Id., at 349
(citing cross-examination of Donald P. Green, Yale University
15–20, Exh. 3; see I Defs. Refiling Trs. on Pub. Record); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same); id .,
at 851 (Leon, J.) (same); see also id., at 349 (Henderson,
J.) (stating that in 2000 the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League (NARAL) spent $7.5 million and mobilized 2.1
million pro-choice voters (citing declaration of Mary Jane
Gallagher, Exec. V. P., NARAL, 8, App. 271–272, ¶ ;24)); 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 522 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same). Footnote
69 Notably, the FEC has interpreted
§323(d)(2) to permit state, district, and local party committees to
solicit donations to §527 organizations that are state-registered
PACs, that support only state or local candidates, and that do not
make expenditures or disbursements in connection with federal
elections. 11 CFR §300.37(a)(3)(iv) (2003). The agency determined
that this interpretation of “political committee”—at least with
respect to state, district, and local committees—was consistent
with BCRA’s fundamental purpose of prohibiting soft money from
being used in connection with federal elections. 67 Fed. Reg. 49106
(2002). Footnote
70 Section 323(e)(1)(B) tightly
constrains the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to
solicit or spend nonfederal money in connection with state or local
elections. Contributions cannot exceed FECA’s analogous hard-money
contribution limits or come from prohibited sources. In effect,
§323(e)(1)(B) doubles the limits on what individuals can contribute
to or at the behest of federal candidates and officeholders, while
restricting the use of the additional funds to activities not
related to federal elections. If the federal candidate or
officeholder is also a candidate for state or local office, he or
she may solicit, receive, and spend an unlimited amount of
nonfederal money in connection with that election, subject only to
state regulation and the requirement that such solicitation or
expenditures refer only to the relevant state or local office. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(e)(2). Footnote
71 See 148 Cong. Rec. S2143 (Mar.
20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (Section 323(f) does not
prohibit “spending non-federal money to run advertisements that
mention that [state or local candidates] have been endorsed by a
Federal candidate or say that they identify with a position of a
named Federal candidate, so long as those advertisements do not
support, attack, promote or oppose the Federal
candidate”). Footnote
72 Justice Kennedy faults our
“unwillingness” to confront that “Title I’s entirety … look[s] very
much like an incumbency protection plan,” citing §323(e), which
provides officeholders and candidates with greater opportunities to
solicit soft money than §§323(a) and (d) permit party officers. Post , at 23–24. But, §323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates and allows only minimally greater
opportunities for solicitation out of regard for the fact that
candidates and officeholders, unlike party officers, can never step
out of their official roles. Supra , at 70–71; 42 U.
S. C. A. §441i(e). Any concern that Congress might
opportunistically pass campaign-finance regulation for self-serving
ends is taken into account by the applicable level of scrutiny.
Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of
financial transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance
of corruption and that the chosen means of regulation are closely
drawn to address that real or apparent corruption. It has done so
here. At bottom, Justice Kennedy has long disagreed with the basic
holding of Buckley and its progeny that less rigorous
scrutiny—which shows a measure of deference to Congress in an area
where it enjoys particular expertise—applies to assess limits on
campaign contributions. Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 465
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Thomas for the
proposition that “ Buckley should be overrruled” (citation
omitted)); Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 405–410
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Footnote
73 BCRA also provides a “backup”
definition of “electioneering communication,” which would become
effective if the primary definition were “held to be
constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support
the regulation provided herein.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§434(f)(3)(A)(ii). We uphold all applications of the primary
definition and accordingly have no occasion to discuss the backup
definition. Footnote
74 We then held that, so construed,
the expenditure restriction did not advance a substantial
government interest, because independent express advocacy did not
pose a danger of real or apparent corruption, and the line between
express advocacy and other electioneering activities was easily
circumvented. Concluding that §608(e)(1)’s heavy First Amendment
burden was not justified, we invalidated the provision. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 45–48. Footnote
75 Our adoption of a narrowing
construction was consistent with our vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines. See Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 613; Grayned, 408 U. S., at 108–114. Footnote
76 The provision at issue in MCFL —2 U. S. C. §441b (1982 ed.)—required
corporations and unions to use separate segregated funds, rather
than general treasury moneys, on expenditures made “ ‘in
connection with’ ” a federal election. MCFL, 479 U.
S., at 241. We noted that Buckley had limited the
statutory term “ ‘expenditure’ ” to words of express
advocacy “in order to avoid problems of overbreadth.” 479 U. S., at
248. We held that “a similar construction ” must apply to
the expenditure limitation before us in MCFL and that the
reach of 2 U. S. C. §441b was therefore constrained to express
advocacy. 479 U. S., at 249 (emphasis added). Footnote
77 As one major-party political
consultant testified, “ ‘it is rarely advisable to use such
clumsy words as “vote for” or “vote against.” ’ ” 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.) (quoting declaration of
Douglas L. Bailey, founder, Bailey, Deardourff & Assoc., 1–2,
App. 24, ¶ ;3). He explained: “ ‘All advertising professionals
understand that the most effective advertising leads the viewer to
his or her own conclusion without forcing it down their
throat.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson, J.). Other
political professionals and academics confirm that the use of magic
words has become an anachronism. See id ., at 531
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting declaration of Raymond D. Strother,
Pres., Strother/Duffy/Strother ¶ ;4, 9 Defs. Exhs., Tab 40); see
Unsealed Pp. Vol., Tab 7); App. 1334–1335 (Krasno & Sorauf
Expert Report)); see also 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 305 (Henderson,
J.); id. , at 532 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. , at
875–76 (Leon, J.). Footnote
78 One striking example is an ad
that a group called “Citizens for Reform” sponsored during the 1996
Montana congressional race, in which Bill Yellowtail was a
candidate. The ad stated: “Who is Bill Yellowtail? He
preaches family values but took a swing at his wife. And
Yellowtail’s response? He only slapped her. But ‘her nose was not
broken.’ He talks law and order … but is himself a convicted felon.
And though he talks about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to
make his own child support payments—then voted against child
support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support
family values.” 5 1998 Senate Report 6305 (minority
views). The notion that this advertisement was designed
purely to discuss the issue of family values strains
credulity. Footnote
79 As discussed below, infra , at 97–103, BCRA §203 bars corporations and labor
unions from funding electioneering communications with money from
their general treasuries, instead requiring them to establish a
“separate segregated fund” for such expenditures. 2 U.
S. C. A. §441b(b)(2). Footnote
80 Section 401 of BCRA
provides: “If any provision of this Act or
amendment made by this Act . . ., or the application of a provision
or amendment to any person or circumstance, is held to be
unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act and amendments made by
this Act, and the application of the provisions and amendment to
any person or circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding.”
2 U. S. C. A. §454 note. Footnote
81 The disclosure requirements that
BCRA §201 added to FECA §304 are actually somewhat less intrusive
than the comparable requirements that have long applied to persons
making independent expenditures. For example, the previous version
of §304 required groups making independent expenditures to identify
donors who contributed more than $200. 2 U. S. C. §434(c)(2)(C)
(2000 ed.). The comparable requirement in the amendments applies
only to donors of $1,000 or more. 2 U. S. C. A.
§§434(f)(2)(E), (F) (Supp. 2003). Footnote
82 NAACP v. Alabama arose out of a judgment holding the NAACP in
contempt for refusing to produce the names and addresses of its
members and agents in Alabama. The NAACP “made an uncontroverted
showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its
rank-and-file members ha[d] exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and
other manifestations of public hostility.” 357 U. S., at 462. We
thought it apparent that the compelled disclosure would “affect
adversely” the NAACP and its members’ ability “to pursue their
collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the
right to advocate.” Id. , at 462–463. Under these
circumstances, we concluded that Alabama’s interest in determining
whether the NAACP was doing business in the State was plainly
insufficient to justify its production order. Id. , at
464–466. Footnote
83 We stated: “The District Court properly
applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The
District Court found ‘substantial evidence of both governmental and
private hostility toward and harassment of [Socialist Workers Party
(SWP)] members and supporters.’ Appellees introduced proof of
specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the
SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial.
These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring
States, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning
of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ property, police
harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP
office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before
trial 22 SWP members, including 4 in Ohio, were fired because of
their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the
Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply
supports the District Court’s conclusion that ‘private hostility
and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to
maintain employment.’ The District Court also found a past history
of Government harassment of the SWP.” Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87 , 98–99 (1982) (paragraph
break omitted). Footnote
84 We cannot judge the likelihood
that this will occur, as the record contains little if any
description of the contractual provisions that commonly govern
payments for electioneering communications. Nor does the record
contain any evidence relating to Justice Kennedy’s speculation, post , at 39–40, that advance disclosure may disadvantage
an advertiser. Footnote
85 New FECA §315(a)(7)(C) reads as
follows: “if — “(i) any person makes, or
contracts to make, any disbursement for any electioneering
communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of this
title); and “(ii) such disbursement is
coordinated with a candidate or an authorized committee of such
candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee
thereof, or an agent or official of any such candidate, party, or
committee; such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as
a contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering
communication or that candidate’s party and as an expenditure by
that candidate or that candidate’s party. . . .” 2 U.
S. C. A. §441a(a)(7)(C). Footnote
86 We have explained: “The statutory purpose of §441b …
is to prohibit contributions or expenditures by corporations or
labor organizations in connection with federal elections. 2 U.
S. C. §441b(a). The section, however, permits some
participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral
process by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative
expenses of ‘separate segregated fund[s],’ which may be ‘utilized
for political purposes.’ 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2)(C). The Act
restricts the operations of such segregated funds, however, by
making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit contributions to a
fund established by it from persons other than its ‘stockholders
and their families and its executive or administrative personnel
and their families.’ 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4)(A).” National
Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 201–202. Footnote
87 The amendment is straightforward.
Prior to BCRA, FECA §316(a) made it “unlawful … for any corporation
whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with” certain federal elections. 2 U.
S. C. §441b(a) (2000 ed.). BCRA amends FECA §316(b)(2)’s
definition of the term “contribution or expenditure” to include
“any applicable electioneering communication.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §441b(b)(2) (Supp. 2003). Footnote
88 As Justice Kennedy emphasizes in
dissent, post , at 44–45, we assume that the interests that
justify the regulation of campaign speech might not apply to the
regulation of genuine issue ads. The premise that apparently
underlies Justice Kennedy’s principal submission is a conclusion
that the two categories of speech are nevertheless entitled to the
same constitutional protection. If that is correct, Justice Kennedy
must take issue with the basic holding in Buckley and,
indeed, with our recognition in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978),
that unusually important interests underlie the regulation of
corporations’ campaign-related speech. In Bellotti we
cited Buckley , among other cases, for the proposition that
“[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing
corruption, and ‘sustain[ing] the active, alert responsibility of
the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of the
government’ are interests of the highest importance.” 435 U. S., at
788–789 (citations and footnote omitted). “Preservation of the
individual citizen’s confidence in government,” we added, “is
equally important.” Id ., at 789. BCRA’s fidelity to those
imperatives sets it apart from the statute in Bellotti —and, for that matter, from the Ohio statute
banning the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, struck
down in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995). Footnote
89 In a different but somewhat
related argument, one set of plaintiffs contends that political
campaigns and issue advocacy involve press activities, and that
BCRA therefore interferes with speakers’ rights under the Freedom
of the Press Clause. U. S. Const., Amdt. 1. We affirm the District
Court’s conclusion that this contention lacks merit. Footnote
90 The statutory scheme is somewhat
complex. In its provision dealing with “Rules Relating to
Electioneering Communications,” BCRA §203(c)(2) (adding FECA
§316(c)(2)) makes a blanket exception for designated nonprofit
organizations, which reads as follows: “Exception “Notwithstanding paragraph (1),
the term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not include
a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization or a political
organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of Title 26) made
under section 434(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this title if the
communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided directly by
individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully
admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20)
of Title 8). For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term
‘provided directly by individuals’ does not include funds the
source of which is an entity described in subsection (a) of this
section.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441b(c)(2) (Supp.
2003). BCRA §204, however, amends FECA
§316(c) to exclude “targeted communications” from that exception.
New FECA §316(c)(6) states that the §316(c)(2) exception “shall not
apply in the case of a targeted communication that is made by an
organization described” in §316(b)(2). 2 U. S. C. A. ¶
;441b(c)(6)(A). Subparagraph (B) then defines the term “targeted
communication” for the purpose of the provision as including all
electioneering communications. The parties and the judges on the
District Court have assumed that amended FECA §316(c)(6) completely
canceled the exemption for nonprofit corporations set forth in
§316(c)(2). 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 804 (Leon, J.) (“Section 204
completely cancels out the exemption for all nonprofit corporations
provided by Section 203”). Footnote
91 “[A] unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory
burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit
funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation’s
sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at
201–202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy
corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different
conclusion here.” Beaumont , 539 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 16). Footnote
92 New FECA §304(g)
provides: “Time for reporting certain expenditures “(1) Expenditures aggregating
$1,000 “(A) Initial report “A person (including a political
committee) that makes or contracts to make independent expenditures
aggregating $1,000 or more after the 20th day, but more than 24
hours, before the date of an election shall file a report
describing the expenditures within 24 hours. “(B) Additional reports “After a person files a report
under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an additional report
within 24 hours after each time the person makes or contracts to
make independent expenditures aggregating an additional $1,000 with
respect to the same election as that to which the initial report
relates.” 2 U. S. C. A. §434 (Supp. 2003). Footnote
93 New FECA §315(d)(4) reads as
follows: “Independent versus coordinated
expenditures by party “(A) In general “On or after the date on which a
political party nominates a candidate, no committee of the
political party may make— “(i) any coordinated expenditure
under this subsection with respect to the candidate during the
election cycle at any time after it makes any independent
expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with
respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or “(ii) any independent expenditure
(as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the
candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any
coordinated expenditure under this subsection with respect to the
candidate during the election cycle. “(B) Application “For purposes of this paragraph,
all political committees established and maintained by a national
political party (including all congressional campaign committees)
and all political committees established and maintained by a State
political party (including any subordinate committee of a State
committee) shall be considered to be a single political
committee. “(C) Transfers “A committee of a political party
that makes coordinated expenditures under this subsection with
respect to a candidate shall not, during an election cycle,
transfer any funds to, assign authority to make coordinated
expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of
funds from, a committee of the political party that has made or
intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the
candidate.” 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d)(4) (Supp.
2003). Footnote
94 After exempting political parties
from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the
statute, 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(d)(1), FECA §315(d) imposes
the following substitute limitations on party spending: “(2) The national committee of a
political party may not make any expenditure in connection with the
general election campaign of any candidate for President of the
United States who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an
amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of
the United States (as certified under subsection (e) of this
section). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition
to any expenditure by a national committee of a political party
serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate for
office of President of the United States. “(3) The national committee of a
political party, or a State committee of a political party,
including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not
make any expenditure in connection with the general election
campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is
affiliated with such party which exceeds— “(A) in the case of a candidate
for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a
State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater
of— “(i) 2 cents multiplied by the
voting age population of the State (as certified under subsection
(e) of this section); or “(ii) $20,000; and “(B) in the case of a candidate
for election to the officer of Representative, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000.” 2 U. S. C.
§§441a(d)(2)–(3). Footnote
95 As amended by BCRA, §301(17)
provides: “Independent
expenditure “The term ‘independent
expenditure’ means an expenditure by a person— “(A) expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate;
and “(B) that is not made in concert
or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such
candidate, the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their
agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” 2 U.
S. C. A. §431(17) (Supp. 2003). The version of the definition
prior to its amendment by BCRA also included the phrase “expressly
advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.” 2 U. S. C. §431(17) (2000 ed.). That definition
had been adopted in 1976, presumably to reflect the narrowing
construction that the Court adopted in Buckley . Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. 475. Footnote
96 Although the District Court and
all the parties to this litigation endorse the interpretation set
forth in the text, it is not clear that subparagraph (B) should be
read so broadly: The reference to “a State” instead of “the States”
suggests that Congress meant to distinguish between committees
associated with the party for each State (which would be grouped
together by State, with each grouping treated as a single committee
for purposes of the choice) and committees associated with a
national party (which would likewise be grouped together and
treated as a separate political committee). We need not resolve the
interpretive puzzle, however, because even under the more limited
reading a local party committee would be able to tie the hands of a
state committee or other local committees in the same
State. Footnote
97 The italicized portion of the
following partial quotation of FECA §315(a)(7) was added by §214 of
BCRA: “For purposes of this
subsection— “(A) contributions to a named
candidate made to any political committee authorized by such
candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered
to be contributions made to such candidate; “(B)(i) expenditures made by any
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the
request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political
committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a
contribution to such candidate; “(ii) expenditures made by any
person (other than a candidate or candidate’s authorized committee)
in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political
party, shall be considered to be contributions made to such party
committee … .” 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(a)(7) (Supp.
2003). Footnote
98 Pre-BCRA FEC regulations defined
coordinated expenditures to include expenditures made “[a]t the
request or suggestion of” a candidate or party; communications in
which a candidate or party “exercised control or decision-making
authority over the content, timing, location, mode, intended
audience, volume of distribution, or frequency of placement”; and
communications produced “[a]fter substantial discussion or
negotiation” with a party or candidate, “the result of which is
collaboration or agreement.” 11 CFR §100.23(c)(2)
(2001). Footnote
99 Contrary to plaintiffs’
contention, the statutory framework was not significantly different
at the time of our decision in Buckley . The relevant
provision, 18 U. S. C. §608(e)(1), treated as coordinated any
expenditures “authorized or requested by the candidate.”
(Emphasis added.) And the legislative history, on which we relied
for “guidance in differentiating individual expenditures that are
contributions … from those treated as independent expenditures,”
described as “independent” an expenditure made by a supporter
“ ‘completely on his own, and not at the request or suggestion
of the candidate or his agen[t].’ ” 424 U. S., at 46–47, n. 53
(quoting S. Rep. No. 93–689, p. 18 (1974)). OPINION OF THE COURT MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Breyer delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to BCRA Title V.*

															   We consider here the
constitutionality of §504 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), amending the Communications Act of 1934. That section
requires broadcasters to keep publicly available records of
politically related broadcasting requests. 47 U. S. C. A.
§315(e) (Supp. 2003). The McConnell plaintiffs, who include the
National Association of Broadcasters, argue that §504 imposes
onerous administrative burdens, lacks any offsetting justification,
and consequently violates the First Amendment. For similar reasons,
the three judges on the District Court found BCRA §504
unconstitutional on its face. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (DC
2003) (per curiam) (case below). We disagree, and we
reverse that determination.

															I

															   BCRA §504’s key requirements are
the following:

															   (1) A “candidate request”
requirement calls for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast
requests “made by or on behalf of” any “legally qualified candidate
for public office.” 47 U. S. C. A. §315(e)(1)(A) (Supp.
2003).

															   (2) An “election message request” requirement
calls for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone)
to broadcast “message[s]” that refer either to a “legally qualified
candidate” or to “any election to Federal office.”
§§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii).

															   (3) An “issue request” requirement calls for
broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to
broadcast “message[s]” related to a “national legislative issue of
public importance,” §315(e)(1)(B)(iii), or otherwise relating to a
“political matter of national importance,” §315(e)(1)(B).

															   We shall consider each provision in turn.

															II

															   BCRA §504’s “candidate request”
requirements are virtually identical to those contained in a
regulation that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
promulgated as early as 1938 and which with slight modifications
the FCC has maintained in effect ever since. 47 CFR §73.1943
(2002); compare 3 Fed. Reg. 1692 (1938) (47 CFR §36a4); 13 Fed.
Reg. 7486 (1948) (47 CFR §§3.190(d), 3.290(d), 3.690(d)); 17 Fed.
Reg. 4711 (1952) (47 CFR §3.590(d)); 19 Fed. Reg. 5949 (1954); 23
Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 28 Fed. Reg. 13593 (1963) (47 CFR
§73.120(d)); 43 Fed. Reg. 32795 (1978) (47 CFR §73.1940(d)); 57
Fed. Reg. 210 (1992) (47 CFR §73.1943). See generally Brief in
Opposition to Motion of Appellee National Association of
Broadcasters for Summary Affirmance in No. 02–1676, pp. 9–10
(hereinafter Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance).

															   In its current form the FCC
regulation requires broadcast licensees to “keep” a publicly
available file “of all requests for broadcast time made by or on
behalf of a candidate for public office,” along with a notation
showing whether the request was granted, and (if granted) a history
that includes “classes of time,” “rates charged,” and when the
“spots actually aired.” 47 CFR §73.1943(a) (2002); §76.1701(a)
(same for cable systems). These regulation-imposed requirements
mirror the statutory requirements imposed by BCRA §504 with minor
differences which no one here challenges. Compare 47 CFR §73.1943
with 47 U. S. C. A. §315(e)(2) (see Appendix, infra ).

															   The McConnell plaintiffs argue that these
requirements are “intolerabl[y]” “burdensome and invasive.” Brief
for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell et al.
in No. 02–1674 et al., p. 74 (hereinafter Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs). But we do not see how that could be so. The FCC has
consistently estimated that its “candidate request” regulation
imposes upon each licensee an additional administrative burden of
six to seven hours of work per year. See 66 Fed. Reg. 37468 (2001); id., at 18090; 63 Fed. Reg. 26593 (1998); id., at
10379; 57 Fed. Reg. 18492 (1992); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 29963
(2001) (total annual burden of one hour per cable system). That
burden means annual costs of a few hundred dollars at most, a
microscopic amount compared to the many millions of dollars of
revenue broadcasters receive from candidates who wish to
advertise.

															   Perhaps for this reason, broadcasters in the
past did not strongly oppose the regulation or its extension. Cf., e.g. , 17 Fed. Reg. 4711 (1952) (“No comments adverse to
the adoption of the proposed rule have been received”); 43 Fed.
Reg. 32794 (1978) (no adverse comments). Indeed in 1992, “CBS”
itself “suggest[ed]” that the candidate file “include a record of
all requests for time.” 57 Fed. Reg. 206 (1992); cf. 63 Fed. Reg.
49493 (1998) (FCC “not persuaded that the current retention period
[two years] is overly burdensome to licensees”).

															   In any event, as the FCC wrote in an analogous
context, broadcaster recordkeeping requirements “ ‘simply run
with the territory.’ ” 40 Fed. Reg. 18398 (1975). Broadcasters
must keep and make publicly available numerous records. See 47 CFR
§73.3526 (2002) (general description of select recordkeeping
requirements for commercial stations); see also §§73.1202,
73.3526(e)(9)(i) (retention of all “written comments and
suggestions [including letters and e-mail] received from the public
regarding operation of the station” for three years); §73.1212(e)
(sponsorship identification records, including the identification
of a sponsoring entity’s executive officers and board-level members
when sponsoring “political matter or matter involving the
discussion of a controversial issue of public importance”);
§73.1840 (retention of station logs); §73.1942 (candidate broadcast
records); §73.2080 (equal employment oppor- tunities records);
§§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (“list of programs that have provided
the station’s most significant treatment of community issues during
the preceding three month period,” including “brief narrative
describing [the issues, and] time, date, duration, and title”);
§§73.3526(e)(11)(ii), (iii) (reports of children’s program, and
retention of records sufficient to substantiate “compliance with
the commercial limits on children’s programming”); §73.3613(a)
(network affiliation contracts); §§73.3613(b), 73.3615,
73.3526(e)(5) (ownership-related reports); §73.3613(c)
(“[m]anagement consultant agreements”); §73.3613(d) (“[t]ime
brokerage agreements”). Compared to these longstanding
recordkeeping requirements, an additional six to seven hours is a
small drop in a very large bucket.

															   The McConnell plaintiffs also
claim that the “candidate requests” requirement fails significantly
to further any important governmental interest. Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs 74. But, again, we cannot agree. The FCC has pointed out
that “[t]hese records are necessary to permit political candidates
and others to verify that licensees have complied with their
obligations relating to use of their facilities by candidates for
political office” pursuant to the “equal time” provision of 47 U.
S. C. §315(a). 63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998). They also help the
FCC determine whether broadcasters have violated their obligation
to sell candidates time at the “lowest unit charge.” 47 U.
S. C. §315(b). As reinforced by BCRA, the “candidate request”
requirements will help the FCC, the Federal Election Commission,
and “the public to evaluate whether broadcasters are processing
[candidate] requests in an evenhanded fashion,” Brief Opposing
Summary Affirmance 9, thereby helping to assure broadcasting
fairness. 47 U. S. C. §315(a); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 , 390
(1969). They will help make the public aware of how much money
candidates may be prepared to spend on broadcast messages. 2 U.
S. C. A. §434 (main ed. and Supp. 2003); see ante , at 87–93 (joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor,
JJ.) (hereinafter joint opinion). And they will provide an
independently compiled set of data for purposes of verifying
candidates’ compliance with the disclosure requirements and source
limitations of BCRA and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
2 U. S. C. A. §434; cf. Adventure Communications,
Inc. v. Kentucky Registry of Election Finance , 191
F. 3d 429, 433 (CA4 1999) (candidate compliance verification);
63 Fed. Reg. 49493 (1998) (FCC finding record retention provision
provides public with “necessary and adequate
access”).

															   We note, too, that the FCC’s
regulatory authority is broad. Red Lion , supra ,
at 380 (“broad” mandate to assure broadcasters operate in public
interest); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U. S. 190 , 219
(1943) (same). And we have previously found broad governmental
authority for agency information demands from regulated entities.
Compare United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338
U. S. 632 , 642–643 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 , 209
(1946); Donovan v. Lone Steer,
Inc., 464
U. S. 408 , 414–415 (1984).

															   The Chief Justice suggests that the Government
has not made these particular claims. But it has—though
succinctly—for it has cross-referenced the relevant regulatory
rules. Compare post , at 12–13 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.
J.), with Brief Opposing Summary Affirmance; Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs 73–74; Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674
et al., pp. 132–133. And succinctness through cross-reference
was necessary given our procedural requirement that the Government
set forth in a 140-page brief all its arguments concerning
each of the 20 BCRA provisions here under contest. 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 186–188.

															   In sum, given the Government’s reference to
the 65-year-old FCC regulation and the related considerations we
have mentioned, we cannot accept the argument that the
constitutionality of the “candidate request” provision lacks
evidentiary support. The challengers have made no attempt to
explain away the FCC’s own contrary conclusions and the mass of
evidence in related FCC records and proceedings. E.g. , 57
Fed. Reg. 189 (1992); cf. s upra , at 4–5; ante , at
117–118 (joint opinion) (upholding BCRA’s coordination provision
based, in part, on prior experience under similar provision).
Because we cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC
regulation unconstitutional, we likewise cannot strike down the
“candidate request” provision in BCRA §504; for the latter simply
embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency
attempt to repeal it.

															III

															   BCRA §504’s “election message
request” requirements call for broadcasters to keep records of
requests (made by any member of the public) to broadcast a
“message” about “a legally qualified candidate” or “any election to
Federal office.” 47 U. S. C. A. §§315(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii)
(Supp. 2003). Although these requirements are somewhat broader than
the “candidate request” requirement, they serve much the same
purposes. A candidate’s supporters or opponents account for many of
the requests to broadcast “message[s]” about a “candidate.”
Requests to broadcast messages about an “election” may include
messages that favor one candidate or another, along with other
messages that may be more neutral.

															   Given the nature of many of the
messages, recordkeeping can help both the regulatory agencies and
the public evaluate broadcasting fairness, and determine the amount
of money that individuals or groups, supporters or opponents,
intend to spend to help elect a particular candidate. Cf. ante , at 100–101 (joint opinion) (upholding stringent
restrictions on all election-time advertising that refers
to a candidate because such advertising will often convey
message of support or opposition). Insofar as the request is to
broadcast neutral material about a candidate or election, the
disclosure can help the FCC carry out other statutory functions,
for example, determining whether a broadcasting station is
fulfilling its licensing obligation to broadcast material important
to the community and the public. 47 U. S. C. §315(a)
(“obligation … to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on issues of public importance”); 47 CFR
§73.1910 (2002); §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping
requirements for issues important to the community).

															   For reasons previously discussed, supra , at 4–5, and on the basis of the material presented,
we cannot say that these requirements will impose disproportionate
administrative burdens. They ask the broadcaster to keep
information about the disposition of the request, and information
identifying the individual or company requesting the broadcast time
(name, address, contact information, or, if the requester is not an
individual, the names of company officials). 47 U.
S. C. A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). Insofar as the
“request” is made by a candidate’s “supporters,” the “candidate
request” regulation apparently already requires broadcasters to
keep such records. 43 Fed. Reg. 32794 (1978). Regardless, the
information should prove readily available, for the individual
requesting a broadcast must provide it to the broadcaster should
the broadcaster accept the request. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002). And
as we have previously pointed out, the recordkeeping requirements
do not reach significantly beyond other FCC recordkeeping rules,
for example, those requiring broadcasting licensees to keep
material showing com- pliance with their license-related promises
to broad- cast material on issues of public importance. See, e.g. , §§73.3526(e)(11)(i), (e)(12) (recordkeeping
requirements for issues important to the community); supra , at 4–5 (collecting regulations); Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC , 707
F. 2d 1413, 1421–1422 (CADC 1983) (describing FCC rules, in
force during 1960–1981, that required nonentertainment programming
in 14 specific areas and mandated publicly available records
detailing date, time, source, and description to substantiate
compliance). If, as we have held, the “candidate request”
requirements are constitutional, supra , at 7, the
“election message” requirements, which serve similar governmental
interests and impose only a small incremental burden, must be
constitutional as well.

															IV

															   The “issue request” requirements
call for broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by any
member of the public) to broadcast “message[s]” about “a national
legislative issue of public importance” or “any political matter of
national importance.” 47 U. S. C. A. §§315(e)(1)(B),
(e)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2003). These recordkeeping requirements seem
likely to help the FCC determine whether broadcasters are carrying
out their “obligations to afford reasonable opportunity for the
discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance,” 47
CFR §73.1910 (2002), and whether broadcasters are too heavily
favoring entertainment, and discriminating against broadcasts
devoted to public affairs, see ibid.; 47 U. S. C
§315(a); Red Lion , 395 U. S., at 380.

															   The McConnell plaintiffs claim
that the statutory language—“political matter of national
importance” or “national legislative issue of public importance”—is
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs 74–75. But that language is no more general than the
language that Congress has used to impose other obligations upon
broadcasters. Compare 47 U. S. C. A. §315(e)(1)(B) (Supp.
2003) (“political matter of national importance”) and
§315(e)(1)(B)(iii) (“national legislative issue of public
importance”) (both added by BCRA §504), with 47 U. S. C.
§315(a) (“obligation … to operate in the public interest” and to
afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of “issues of public
importance”); §317(a)(2) (FCC disclosure requirements relating to
any “political program” or “discussion of any controversial
issue”); cf. 47 CFR §73.1212(e) (2002) (“political matter or … a
controversial issue of public importance”); and 9 Fed. Reg. 14734
(1944) (“public controversial issues”); ante , at 117–118
(joint opinion) (noting that the experience under longstanding
regulations undermines claims of chilling effect). And that
language is also roughly comparable to other language in BCRA that
we uphold today. E.g. , ante , at 61–62, and
n. 64 (joint opinion) (upholding 2 U. S. C. A.
§431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003) (“public communication that refers to
a clearly identified candidate for Federal office … and that
promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or
opposes a candidate for that office”)), ante, at 117–118
(upholding 2 U. S. C. A. §441a(a)(7)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2003)
(counting as coordinated disbursements that are made “in
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of [a political party]”) against challenge and noting
that an “agreement” is not necessary for precision).

															   Whether these requirements impose
disproportionate administrative burdens is more difficult to say.
On the one hand, the burdens are likely less heavy than many that
other FCC regulations have imposed, for example, the burden of
keeping and disclosing “[a]ll written comments and suggestions”
received from the public, including every e-mail. 47 CFR §§73.1202,
73.3526(e)(9) (2002); see also supra , at 4–5. On the other
hand, the burdens are likely heavier than those imposed by BCRA
§504’s other provisions, previously discussed.

															   The regulatory burden, in practice, will
depend on how the FCC interprets and applies this provision. The
FCC has adequate legal authority to write regulations that may
limit, and make more specific, the provision’s potential linguistic
reach. 47 U. S. C. §315(d). It has often ameliorated
regulatory burdens by interpretation in the past, and there is no
reason to believe it will not do so here. See 14 FCC Rcd. 4653, ¶
;25 (1999) (relaxing the recordkeeping requirements in respect to
cable systems that serve fewer than 5,000 subscribers); 14 FCC Rcd.
11121, ¶ ;¶ ;20–22 (1999) (requiring candidates to inspect the
political file at a station rather than requiring licensees to send
out photocopies of the files to candidates upon telephone request).
The parties remain free to challenge the provisions, as interpreted
by the FCC in regulations, or as otherwise applied. Any such
challenge will likely provide greater information about the
provisions’ justifications and administrative burdens. Without that
additional information, we cannot now say that the burdens are so
great, or the justifications so minimal, as to warrant finding the
provisions unconstitutional on their face.

															   The McConnell plaintiffs and The Chief Justice
make one final claim. They say that the “issue request” requirement
will force them to disclose information that will reveal their
political strategies to opponents, perhaps prior to a broadcast.
See post , at 14–15 (dissenting opinion). We are willing to
assume that the Constitution includes some form of protection
against premature disclosure of campaign strategy—though, given the
First Amendment interest in free and open discussion of campaign
issues, we make this assumption purely for argument’s sake.
Nonetheless, even on that assumption we do not see how BCRA §504
can be unconstitutional on its face.

															   For one thing, the statute requires disclosure
of names, addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require
disclosure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U.
S. C. A. §315(e)(2) (Supp. 2003). For another, the
statutory words “as soon as possible,” §315(e)(3), would seem to
permit FCC disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature
disclosure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further, the
plaintiffs do not point to—and our own research cannot find—any
specific indication of such a “strategy-disclosure” problem arising
during the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC “candidate
request” requirement, where the strategic problem might be expected
to be more acute. Finally, we today reject an analogous facial
attack—premised on speculations of “advance disclosure”—on a
similar BCRA provision. See ante , at 94 (joint opinion).
Thus, the “strategy disclosure” argument does not show that BCRA
§504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain
free to raise this argument when §504 is applied.

															V

															   The Chief Justice makes two
important arguments in response to those we have set forth. First,
he says that we “approac[h] §504 almost exclusively from the
perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of
candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association
rights are affected.” Post , at 11 (dissenting opinion).
The Chief Justice is certainly correct in emphasizing the
importance of the speech interests of candidates and other
potential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amendment
“perspective.”

															   To the contrary, we have
discussed the speakers’ interests together with the broadcasters’
interests because the two sets of interests substantially overlap.
For example, the speakers’ vagueness argument is no different from
the broadcasters’, and it fails for the same reasons, e.g. , the fact that BCRA §504’s language is just as
definite and precise as other language that we today uphold. See supra , at 10.

															   We have separately discussed the one and
only speech-related claim advanced on behalf of candidates (or
other speakers) that differs from the claims set forth by the
broadcasters. See supra , at 11–12. This is the claim that
the statute’s disclosure requirements will require candidates to
reveal their political strategies to opponents. We just said, and
we now repeat, that BCRA §504 can be applied, in a significant
number of cases, without requiring any such political-strategy
disclosure—either because disclosure in many cases will not create
any such risk or because the FCC may promulgate rules requiring
disclosure only after any such risk disappears, or both.

															   Moreover, candidates (or other speakers) whom
§504 affects adversely in this way (or in other ways) remain free
to challenge the lawfulness of FCC implementing regulations and to
challenge the constitutionality of §504 as applied. To find that
the speech-related interests of candidates and others may be
vindicated in an as-applied challenge is not to “ignor[e]” those
interests.

															   Second, The Chief Justice says that “the
Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support
§504 as a whole,” adding that the existence of “pre-existing
unchallenged agency regulations imposing similar disclosure
requirements” cannot “compel the conclusion that §504 is
constitutional,” nor somehow “relieve the Government of its burden
of advancing a constitutionally sufficient justification for §504.” Post , at 12–13 (dissenting opinion).

															   Again The Chief Justice is correct in saying
that the mere existence of similar FCC regulation-imposed
requirements—even if unchallenged for at least 65 years—cannot
prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the existence
of those regulations means that we must read beyond the briefs in
this case before holding those requirements unconstitutional.
Before evaluating the relevant burdens and justifications, we must
at least become acquainted with the FCC’s own view of the matter.
We must follow the Government’s regulation-related references to
the relevant regulatory records, related FCC regulatory
conclusions, and the FCC’s enforcement experience. We must take
into account, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is “nothing in the record that indicates licensees have
treated purchasers unfairly,” post , at 13 (Rehnquist,
C. J., dissenting), is that for many decades similar FCC
regulations have made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we
are to avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what
we find in agency records and related experience before holding
this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its face.

															   Even a superficial examination of
those relevant agency materials reveals strong supporting
justifications, and a lack of significant administrative burdens.
And any additional burden that the statute, viewed facially,
imposes upon interests protected by the First Amendment seems
slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it
serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the statutory
requirements must survive a facial attack under any
potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of
heightened scrutiny.

															   That is why the regulations are relevant. That
is why the brevity of the Government’s discussion here cannot be
determinative. That is why we fear that The Chief Justice’s
contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate—and at present
unjustified—revolution in communications law. And that is why we
disagree with his dissent.

															   The portion of the judgment of the District
Court invalidating BCRA §504 is reversed.

															It is so ordered.

															APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

															   Title 47 U. S. C. A.
§315(e) (Supp. 2003), as amended by BCRA §504, provides:

															“Political record

															   “(1) In general

															   “A licensee shall maintain, and make available
for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase
broadcast time that—

															   “(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally
qualified candidate for public office; or

															   “(B) communicates a message relating to any
political matter of national importance, including—

															   “(i) a legally qualified candidate;

															   “(ii) any election to Federal office; or

															   “(iii) a national legislative issue of public
importance.

															   “(2) Contents of record

															   “A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall
contain information regarding—

															   “(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast
time is accepted or rejected by the licensee;

															   “(B) the rate charged for the broadcast
time;

															   “(C) the date and time on which the
communication is aired;

															   “(D) the class of time that is purchased;

															   “(E) the name of the candidate to which the
communication refers and the office to which the candidate is
seeking election, the election to which the communication refers,
or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable);

															   “(F) in the case of a request made by, or on
behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized
committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee;
and

															   “(G) in the case of any other request, the
name of the person purchasing the time, the name, address, and
phone number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the
chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or
of the board of directors of such person.

															   “(3) Time to maintain file

															   “The information required under this
subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible
and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than
2 years.”

															Title 47 CFR §73.1943 (2002) provides:

															“Political file.

															   “(a) Every licensee shall keep and permit
public inspection of a complete and orderly record (political file)
of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a
candidate for public office, together with an appropriate notation
showing the disposition made by the licensee of such requests, and
the charges made, if any, if the request is granted. The
‘disposition’ includes the schedule of time purchased, when spots
actually aired, the rates charged, and the classes of time
purchased.

															   “(b) When free time is provided for use by or
on behalf of candidates, a record of the free time provided shall
be placed in the political file.

															   “(c) All records required by this paragraph
shall be placed in the political file as soon as possible and shall
be retained for a period of two years. As soon as possible means
immediately absent unusual circumstances.”

															*Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, Justice Souter,
and Justice Ginsburg join this opinion in its entirety. REHNQUIST, C. J., DISSENTING MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I and V.*

															   Although I join Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in full, I write separately to highlight my disagreement
with the Court on Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, and to dissent from the Court’s opinion
upholding §504 of Title V.

															I

															   The issue presented by Title I is
not, as the Court implies, whether Congress can permissibly
regulate campaign contributions to candidates, de facto or
otherwise, or seek to eliminate corruption in the political
process. Rather, the issue is whether Congress can permissibly
regulate much speech that has no plausible connection to candidate
contributions or corruption to achieve those goals. Under our
precedent, restrictions on political contributions implicate
important First Amendment values and are constitutional only if
they are “closely drawn” to reduce the corruption of federal
candidates or the appearance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 26– 27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court glosses over the breadth of
the restrictions, characterizing Title I of BCRA as “do[ing] little
more that regulat[ing] the ability of wealthy individuals,
corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to
influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal
officeholders.” Ante , at 28 (joint opinion of Stevens and
O’Connor, JJ.). Because, in reality, Title I is much broader than
the Court allows, regulating a good deal of speech that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and
officeholders, I dissent.

															   The lynchpin of Title I, new FECA
§323(a), prohibits national political party committees from
“solicit[ing],” “receiv[ing],” “direct[ing] to another person,” and
“spend[ing]” any funds not subject to federal regulation,
even if those funds are used for nonelection related activities. 2
U. S. C. A. §441i(a)(1) (Supp. 2003). The Court concludes
that such a restriction is justified because under FECA, “donors
have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the
national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific
purpose of influencing a particular candidate’s federal election.” Ante , at 36. Accordingly, “[i]t is not only plausible, but
likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and
that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude.” Ibid .
But the Court misses the point. Certainly “infusions of money into
[candidates’] campaigns,” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470
U. S. 480 , 497 (1985), can be regulated, but §323(a) does not
regulate only donations given to influence a particular federal
election; it regulates all donations to national political
committees, no matter the use to which the funds are put.

															   The Court attempts to sidestep the
unprecedented breadth of this regulation by stating that the “close
relationship between federal officeholders and the national
parties” makes all donations to the national parties “suspect.” Ante, at 45. But a close association with others,
especially in the realm of political speech, is not a surrogate for
corruption; it is one of our most treasured First Amendment rights.
See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567 , 574
(2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Comm., 489
U. S. 214 , 225 (1989); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208 , 214
(1986). The Court’s willingness to impute corruption on the basis
of a relationship greatly infringes associational rights and
expands Congress’ ability to regulate political speech. And there
is nothing in the Court’s analysis that limits congressional
regulation to national political parties. In fact, the Court relies
in part on this closeness rationale to regulate nonprofit
organizations . Ante , at 47–48, n. 51. Who knows
what association will be deemed too close to federal officeholders
next. When a donation to an organization has no potential to
corrupt a federal officeholder, the relationship between the
officeholder and the organization is simply irrelevant.

															   The Court fails to recognize that the national
political parties are exemplars of political speech at all levels
of government, in addition to effective fundraisers for federal
candidates and officeholders. For sure, national political party
committees exist in large part to elect federal candidates, but as
a majority of the District Court found, they also promote
coordinated political messages and participate in public policy
debates unrelated to federal elections, promote, even in off-year
elections, state and local candidates and seek to influence policy
at those levels, and increase public participation in the electoral
process. See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 334–337 (DC 2003) (per
curiam) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id. , at 820–821 (Leon, J.). Indeed,
some national political parties exist primarily for the purpose of
expressing ideas and generating debate. App. 185–186 (declaration
of Stephen L. Dasbach et al. ¶ ;11 (describing Libertarian
Party)).

															   As these activities illustrate, political
parties often foster speech crucial to a healthy democracy, 251
F. Supp. 2d, at 820 (Leon, J.), and fulfill the need for
like-minded individuals to ban together and promote a political
philosophy, see Jones, supra , at 574; Eu , supra , at 225. When political parties engage
in pure political speech that has little or no potential to corrupt
their federal candidates and officeholders, the government cannot
constitutionally burden their speech any more than it could burden
the speech of individuals engaging in these same activities. E.g. , National Conservative Political Action
Comm., supra , at 496–497; Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 , 297–298
(1981); Buckley , 424 U. S., at 27. Notwithstanding the
Court’s citation to the numerous abuses of FECA, under any
definition of “exacting scrutiny,” the means chosen by Congress,
restricting all donations to national parties no matter the purpose
for which they are given or are used, are not “closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms,” id. , at 25.

															   BCRA’s overinclusiveness is not limited to
national political parties. To prevent the circumvention of the ban
on the national parties’ use of nonfederal funds, BCRA extensively
regulates state parties, primarily state elections, and state
candidates. For example, new FECA §323(b), by reference to new FECA
§§301(20)(A)(i)–(ii), prohibits state parties from using nonfederal
funds[ Footnote 1 ] for general
partybuilding activities such as voter registration, voter
identification, and get out the vote for state candidates even if
federal candidates are not mentioned. See 2 U. S. C. A.
§§441i(b), 431(20)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. 2003). New FECA §323(d)
prohibits state and local political party committees, like their
national counterparts, from soliciting and donating “any funds” to
nonprofit organizations such as the National Rifle Association or
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). See 2 U. S. C. A. §441i(d). And, new FECA
§323(f) requires a state gubernatorial candidate to abide by
federal funding restrictions when airing a television ad that tells
voters that, if elected, he would oppose the President’s policy of
increased oil and gas exploration within the State because it would
harm the environment. See 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(f),
431(20)(A)(iii) (regulating “public communication[s] that refe[r]
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of
whether a candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or
identified) and that … attacks or opposes a candidate for that
office”).

															   Although these provisions are more focused on
activities that may affect federal elections, there is
scant evidence in the record to indicate that federal candidates or
officeholders are corrupted or would appear corrupted by donations
for these activities. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 403, 407, 416,
422 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part); id. , at 779–780, 791 (Leon, J.); see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal
Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604 , 616
(1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that “the opportunity for
corruption posed by [nonfederal contributions for state elections,
get-out-the-vote, and voter registration activities] is, at best,
attenuated”). Nonetheless, the Court concludes that because these
activities benefit federal candidates and officeholders,
see ante , at 59 or prevent the circumvention of
pre-existing or contemporaneously enacted restrictions,[ Footnote 2 ] see ante , at 57,
67, 71, 78, it must defer to the “ ‘predictive judgments of
Congress,’ ” ante , at 57 (quoting Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 , 665
(1994)).

															   Yet the Court cannot truly mean what it says.
Newspaper editorials and political talk shows benefit federal candidates and officeholders every bit as much as a generic
voter registration drive conducted by a state party; there is
little doubt that the endorsement of a major newspaper affects federal elections, and federal candidates and
officeholders are surely “grateful,” ante , at 60, for
positive media coverage. I doubt, however, the Court would
seriously contend that we must defer to Congress’ judgment if it
chose to reduce the influence of political endorsements in federal
elections.[ Footnote 3 ] See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 , 247, 250
(1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required
newspapers to provide “right to reply” to any candidate who was
personally or professionally assailed in order to eliminate the
“abuses of bias and manipulative reportage” by the press).

															   It is also true that any circumvention
rationale ultimately must rest on the circumvention itself leading
to the corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 (upholding restrictions on funds
donated to national political parties “for the purpose of
influencing any election for a Federal office” because they were
prophylactic measures designed “to prevent evasion” of the
contribution limit on candidates ). All political speech
that is not sifted through federal regulation circumvents the
regulatory scheme to some degree or another, and thus by the
Court’s standard would be a “loophole” in the current
system.[ Footnote 4 ] Unless the
Court would uphold federal regulation of all funding of political
speech, a rationale dependent on circumvention alone will not do.
By untethering its inquiry from corruption or the appearance of
corruption, the Court has removed the touchstone of our campaign
finance precedent and has failed to replace it with any logical
limiting principle.

															   But such an untethering is necessary to the
Court’s analysis. Only by using amorphous language to conclude a
federal interest, however vaguely defined, exists can the Court
avoid the obvious fact that new FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and
(f ) are vastly overinclusive. Any campaign finance law aimed
at reducing corruption will almost surely affect federal elections
or prohibit the circumvention of federal law, and if broad enough,
most laws will generally reduce some appearance of corruption.
Indeed, it is precisely because broad laws are likely to nominally
further a legitimate interest that we require Congress to tailor
its restrictions; requiring all federal candidates to self-finance
their campaigns would surely reduce the appearance of donor
corruption, but it would hardly be constitutional. In allowing
Congress to rely on general principles such as affecting a federal
election or prohibiting the circumvention of existing law, the
Court all but eliminates the “closely drawn” tailoring requirement
and meaningful judicial review.

															   No doubt Congress was convinced by the many
abuses of the current system that something in this area must be
done. Its response, however, was too blunt. Many of the abuses
described by the Court involve donations that were made for the
“purpose of influencing a federal election,” and thus are already
regulated. See Buckley , supra . Congress could
have sought to have the existing restrictions enforced or to enact
other restrictions that are “closely drawn” to its legitimate
concerns. But it should not be able to broadly restrict political
speech in the fashion it has chosen. Today’s decision, by not
requiring tailored restrictions, has significantly reduced the
protection for political speech having little or nothing to do with
corruption or the appearance of corruption.

															II

															   BCRA §504 amends §315 of the
Communications Act to require broadcast licensees to maintain and
disclose records of any request to purchase broadcast time
that “is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified candidate for
public office” or that “communicates a message relating to any
political matter of national importance,” including communications
relating to “a legally qualified candidate,” “any election to
Federal office,” and “a national legislative issue of public
importance.” BCRA §504; 47 U. S. C. A. §315(e)(1) (Supp.
2003).[ Footnote 5 ] This section
differs from other BCRA disclosure sections because it requires broadcast licensees to disclose requests to
purchase broadcast time rather than requiring purchasers to disclose their disbursements for broadcast time. See, e.g. , BCRA §201. The Court concludes that §504 “must
survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable
First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny.” Ante , at 15 (opinion of Breyer, J.). I disagree.

															   This section is deficient because
of the absence of a sufficient governmental interest to justify
disclosure of mere requests to purchase broadcast time, as well as
purchases themselves. The Court approaches §504 almost exclusively
from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the
interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and
association rights are affected by §504. See, e.g. , ante, at 5 (noting that broadcasters are subject to
numerous recordkeeping requirements); ante , at 7 (opining
that this Court has recognized “broad governmental authority for
agency information demands from regulated entities”); ante , at 8–9 (“[W]e cannot say that these requirements
will impose disproportionate administrative burdens”). An approach
that simply focuses on whether the administrative burden is
justifiable is untenable. Because §504 impinges on core First
Amendment rights, it is subject to a more demanding test than mere
rational-basis review. The Court applies the latter by asking
essentially whether there is any conceivable reason to support
§504. See ante , at 8 (discussing the ways in which the
disclosure “can help” the FCC and the public); ante , at 10
(noting that the “recordkeeping requirements seem likely to help
the FCC” enforce the fairness doctrine).

															   Required disclosure provisions that deter
constitutionally protected association and speech rights are
subject to heightened scrutiny. See Buckley , 424 U. S., at
64. When applying heightened scrutiny, we first ask whether the
Government has asserted an interest sufficient to justify the
disclosure of requests to purchase broadcast time. Ibid.; see ante , at 89 (joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor,
JJ.) (concluding that the important state interests the Buckley Court held justified FECA’s disclosure
requirements apply to BCRA §201’s disclosure requirement). But the
Government, in its brief, proffers no interest whatever to support
§504 as a whole.

															   Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, ante , at 7 (opinion of Breyer, J.), the Government’s brief
does not succinctly present interests sufficient to support §504.
The two paragraphs that the Court relies on provide the
following:

															   “As explained in the government’s
brief in opposition to the motion for summary affirmance on this
issue filed by plaintiff National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB), longstanding FCC regulations impose disclosure requirements
with respect to the sponsorship of broadcast matter ‘involving the
discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.’ 47
C. F. R. 73.1212(d) and (e) (2002); see 47
C. F. R. 76.1701(d) (2002) (same standard used in
disclosure regulation governing cablecasting). By enabling viewers
and listeners to identify the persons actually responsible for
communications aimed at a mass audience, those regulations assist
the public in evaluating the message transmitted. See Bellotti , 435 U.S. at 792 n. 32 (‘Identification of
the source of advertising may be required … so that the people will
be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being
subjected.’).

															   “The range of information required to be
disclosed under BCRA §504 is comparable to the disclosures mandated
by pre-existing FCC rules. Compare 47 U. S. C. 315(e)(2)(G)
(added by BCRA §504), with 47 C. F. R. 73.1212(e) and
76.1701(d) (2002). Plaintiffs do not attempt to show that BCRA
§504’s requirements are more onerous than the FCC’s longstanding
rules, nor do they contend that the pre-existing agency regulations
are themselves unconstitutional. See generally 02–1676 Gov’t Br. in
Opp. to Mot. of NAB for Summ. Aff. 4–9. Because BCRA §504 is
essentially a codification of established and unchallenged
regulatory requirements, plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim should
be rejected.” Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al.,
pp. 132–133; ante, at 7.

															While these paragraphs attempt to set forth a
justification for the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B),
discussed below, I fail to see any justification for BCRA §504 in
its entirety. Nor do I find persuasive the Court’s and the
Government’s argument that pre-existing unchallenged agency
regulations imposing similar disclosure requirements compel the
conclusion that §504 is constitutional and somehow relieve the
Government of its burden of advancing a constitutionally sufficient
justification for §504.

															   At oral argument, the Government counsel
indicated that one of the interests supporting §504 in its entirety
stems from the fairness doctrine, Tr. of Oral Arg. 192, which in
general imposes an obligation on licensees to devote a “reasonable
percentage” of broadcast time to issues of public importance in a
way that reflects opposing views. See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969).
Assuming, arguendo , this latter-day assertion should be
considered, I think the District Court correctly noted that there
is nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated
purchasers unfairly. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 812 (Leon, J.). In
addition, this interest seems wholly unconnected to the central
purpose of BCRA, and it is not at all similar to the governmental
interests in Buckley that we found to be “sufficiently
important to outweigh the possibility of infringement,” 424 U. S.,
at 66.

															   As to the disclosure requirements involving
“any political matter of national importance” under the new
Communications Act §315(e)(1)(B), the Government suggests that the
disclosure enables viewers to evaluate the message
transmitted.[ Footnote 6 ] First,
insofar as BCRA §504 requires reporting of “request[s for]
broadcast time” as well as actual broadcasts, it is not supported
by this goal. Requests that do not mature into actual purchases
will have no viewers, but the information may allow competitors or
adversaries to obtain information regarding organizational or
political strategies of purchasers. Second, even as to broadcasts
themselves, in this noncandidate-related context, this goal is a
far cry from the Government interests endorsed in Buckley ,
which were limited to evaluating and preventing corruption of
federal candidates. Ibid.; see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 , 354
(1995).

															   As to disclosure requirements with respect to
candidates under the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), BCRA
§504 significantly overlaps with §201, which is today also upheld
by this Court, ante , at 87–95 (joint opinion of Stevens
and O’Connor, JJ.), and requires purchasers of “electioneering
communications” to disclose a wide array of information, including
the amount of each disbursement and the elections to which
electioneering communications pertain. While I recognize that there
is this overlap, §504 imposes a different burden on the purchaser’s
First Amendment rights: as noted above, §201 is limited to purchasers’ disclosure of disbursements for
electioneering communications, whereas §504 requires broadcast
licensees’ disclosure of requests for broadcast time
by purchasers. Not only are the purchasers’ requests, which may
never result in an actual advertisement, subject to the disclosure
requirements, but §504 will undoubtedly result in increased costs
of communication because the licensees will shift the costs of the
onerous disclosure and recordkeeping requirements to purchasers.
The Government fails to offer a reason for the separate burden and
apparent overlap.

															   The Government cannot justify, and for that
matter, has not attempted to justify, its requirement that
“request[s for] broadcast” time be publicized. On the record before
this Court, I cannot even speculate as to a governmental interest
that would allow me to conclude that the disclosure of “requests”
should be upheld. Such disclosure risks, inter alia ,
allowing candidates and political groups the opportunity to ferret
out a purchaser’s political strategy and, ultimately, unduly
burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers.

															   Absent some showing of a Government interest
served by §504 and in light of the breadth of disclosure of
“requests,” I must conclude that §504 fails to satisfy First
Amendment scrutiny.

															* Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy join this
opinion in its entirety. Footnote 1 The Court points out that state parties may
use Levin funds for certain activities. Levin funds, however, are
still federal restrictions on speech, even if they are less onerous
than the restrictions placed on national parties. Footnote 2 Ironically, in the Court’s view, Congress
cannot be trusted to exercise judgment independent of its parties’
large donors in its usual voting decisions because donations may be
used to further its members’ reelection campaigns, but yet must be
deferred to when it passes a comprehensive regulatory regime that
restricts election-related speech. It seems to me no less likely
that Congress would create rules that favor its Members’ reelection
chances, than be corrupted by the influx of money to its political
parties, which may in turn be used to fund a portion of the
Members’ reelection campaigns. Footnote 3 The Court’s suggestion that the “close
relationship” between federal officeholders and state and local
political parties in some way excludes the media from its rationale
is unconvincing, see ante, at 24, n. 15 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in
part), particularly because such a relationship may be proved with
minimal evidence. Indeed, although the Court concludes that local
political parties have a “close relationship” with federal
candidates, thus warranting greater congressional regulation, I am
unaware of any evidence in the record that indicates that
local political parties have any relationship with federal
candidates. Footnote 4 BCRA does not even close all of the
“loopholes” that currently exist. Nonprofit organizations are
currently able to accept, without disclosing, unlimited donations
for voter registration, voter identification, and get-out-the-vote
activities, and the record indicates that such organizations
already receive large donations, sometimes in the millions of
dollars, for these activities, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 323 (DC
2003) (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that the NAACP Voter Fund received a single,
anonymous $7 million donation for get-out-the-vote activities).
There is little reason why all donations to these nonprofit
organizations, no matter the purpose for which the money is used,
will deserve any more protection than the Court provides state
parties if Congress decides to regulate them. And who knows what
the next “loophole” will be. Footnote 5 Section 315(e), as amended by BCRA §504,
provides:

															   “Political record

															   “(1) In general

															   “A licensee shall maintain, and make available
for public inspection, a complete record of a request to purchase
broadcast time that—

															   “(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally
qualified candidate for public office; or

															   “(B) communicates a message relating to any
political matter of national importance, including—

															   “(i) a legally qualified candidate;

															   “(ii) any election to Federal office; or

															   “(iii) a national legislative issue of public
importance.

															   “(2) Contents of record

															   “A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall
contain information regarding—

															   “(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast
time is accepted or rejected by the licensee;

															   “(B) the rate charged for the broadcast
time;

															   “(C) the date and time on which the
communication is aired;

															   “(D) the class of time that is purchased;

															   “(E) the name of the candidate to which the
communication refers and the office to which the candidate is
seeking election, the election to which the communication refers,
or the issue to which the communication refers (as applicable);

															   “(F) in the case of a request made by, or on
behalf of, a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized
committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such committee;
and

															   “(G) in the case of any other request, the
name of the person purchasing the time, the name, and phone number
of a contact person for such person, and a list of the chief
executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the
board of directors of such person.

															   “(3) Time to maintain file

															   “The information required under this
subsection shall be placed in a political file as soon as possible
and shall be retained by the licensee for a period of not less than
2 years.” Footnote 6 Communications relating to candidates will be
covered by the new Communications Act §315(e)(1)(A), so, in this
context, we must consider, for example, the
plaintiff-organizations, which may attempt to use the broadcast
medium to convey a message espoused by the organizations. STEVENS, J., DISSENTING MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Stevens, dissenting with
respect to §305.*

															   The Chief Justice, writing for
the Court, concludes that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge §305 of BCRA because Senator McConnell cannot be affected
by the provision until “45 days before the Republican primary
election in 2008.” Ante , at 4. I am not persuaded that
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement imposes such a strict
temporal limit on our jurisdiction. By asserting that he has run
attack ads in the past, that he plans to run such ads in his next
campaign, and that §305 will adversely affect his campaign
strategy, Senator McConnell has identified a “concrete,”
“ ‘distinct,’ ” and “ ‘actual’ ” injury, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149 , 155
(1990). That the injury is distant in time does not make it
illusory.

															   The second prong of the standing
inquiry—whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the
defendants’ challenged action and not the result of a third party’s
independent choices† OPINION OF KENNEDY, J. MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Kennedy, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA
Titles I and II.*

															   The First Amendment guarantees
our citizens the right to judge for themselves the most effective
means for the expression of political views and to decide for
themselves which entities to trust as reliable speakers.
Significant portions of Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or Act) constrain that freedom. These new
laws force speakers to abandon their own preference for speaking
through parties and organizations. And they provide safe harbor to
the mainstream press, suggesting that the corporate media alone
suffice to alleviate the burdens the Act places on the rights and
freedoms of ordinary citizens.

															   Today’s decision upholding these laws purports
simply to follow Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) , and to abide by stare decisis , see ante , at 27 (joint opinion of Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.
(hereinafter Court or majority)); but the majority, to make its
decision work, must abridge free speech where Buckley did
not. Buckley did not authorize Congress to decide what
shapes and forms the national political dialogue is to take. To
reach today’s decision, the Court surpasses Buckley ’s
limits and expands Congress’ regulatory power. In so doing, it
replaces discrete and respected First Amendment principles with
new, amorphous, and unsound rules, rules which dismantle basic
protections for speech.

															   A few examples show how BCRA reorders speech
rights and codifies the Government’s own preferences for certain
speakers. BCRA would have imposed felony punishment on Ross Perot’s
1996 efforts to build the Reform Party. Compare Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §§309(d)(1)(A), 315(a)(1)(B), and
323(a)(1) (prohibiting, by up to five years’ imprisonment, any
individual from giving over $25,000 annually to a national party),
with Spending By Perot, The Houston Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1996,
p. 43 (reporting Perot’s $8 million founding contribution to
the Reform Party). BCRA makes it a felony for an environmental
group to broadcast an ad, within 60 days of an election, exhorting
the public to protest a Congressman’s impending vote to permit
logging in national forests. See BCRA §203. BCRA escalates
Congress’ discrimination in favor of the speech rights of giant
media corporations and against the speech rights of other
corporations, both profit and nonprofit. Compare BCRA §203, with Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 , 659–660 (1990) (first
sanctioning this type of discrimination).

															   To the majority, all this is not only valid
under the First Amendment but also is part of Congress’ “steady
improvement of the national election laws.” Ante , at 6. We
should make no mistake. It is neither. It is the codification of an
assumption that the mainstream media alone can protect freedom of
speech. It is an effort by Congress to ensure that civic discourse
takes place only through the modes of its choosing. And BCRA is
only the beginning, as its congressional proponents freely
admit:

															“This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is
an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some
ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money
aspect of the system.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Feingold). Id., at S2097 (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (“[P]assing this legislation … will whet people’s
appetite for more”); id., at S2101 (statement of Sen.
Boxer) (“[T]his bill is not the be-all or the end-all, but it is a
strong start”); id., at S2152 (statement of Sen. Corzine)
(“[T]his should not and will not be the last time campaign finance
reform is debated on the Senate floor. We have many more important
campaign finance issues to explore”); id., at S2157
(statement of Sen. Torricelli) (“Make [BCRA] the beginning of a
reform, not the end of reform”); id., at H442 (Feb. 13,
2002) (statement of Rep. Doggett) (“Mr. Chairman, if [BCRA] has any
defect, it is that it does too little, not too much”).

															   Our precedents teach, above all, that
Government cannot be trusted to moderate its own rules for
suppression of speech. The dangers posed by speech regulations have
led the Court to insist upon principled constitutional lines and a
rigorous standard of review. The majority now abandons these
distinctions and limitations.

															   With respect, I dissent from the majority
opinion upholding BCRA Titles I and II. I concur in the judgment as
to BCRA §213 and new FECA §323(e) and concur in the judgment in
part and dissent in part as to BCRA §§201, 202, and 214.

															I. TITLE I AND COORDINATION PROVISIONS

															   Title I principally bans the
solicitation, receipt, transfer and spending of soft money by the
national parties (new FECA §323(a), 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(a) (Supp. 2003)). It also bans certain uses of soft money by
state parties (new FECA §323(b)); the transfer of soft money from
national parties to nonprofit groups (new FECA §323(d)); the
solicitation, receipt, transfer, and spending of soft money by
federal candidates and officeholders (new FECA §323(e)); and
certain uses of soft money by state candidates (new FECA §323(f)).
These provisions, and the other provisions with which this opinion
is principally concerned, are set out in full, see Appendix, infra . Even a cursory review of the speech and association
burdens these laws create makes their First Amendment infirmities
obvious:

															   Title I bars individuals with
shared beliefs from pooling their money above limits set by
Congress to form a new third party. See new FECA §323(a).

															   Title I bars national party officials from
soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a
state ballot initiative. This is true even if no federal office
appears on the same ballot as the state initiative. See new FECA
§323(a).

															   A national party’s mere involvement in the
strategic planning of fundraising for a state ballot initiative
risks a determination that the national party is exercising
“indirect control” of the state party. If that determination is
made, the state party must abide by federal regulations. And this
is so even if the federal candidate on the ballot, if there is one,
runs unopposed or is so certain of election that the only voter
interest is in the state and local campaigns. See new FECA
§323(a).

															   Title I compels speech. Party officials who
want to engage in activity such as fundraising must now speak magic
words to ensure the solicitation cannot be interpreted as anything
other than a solicitation for hard, not soft, money. See ibid. Title I prohibits the national parties from
giving any sort of funds to nonprofit entities, even federally
regulated hard money, and even if the party hoped to sponsor the
interest group’s exploration of a particular issue in advance of
the party’s addition of it to their platform. See new FECA
§323(d).

															   By express terms, Title I imposes multiple
different forms of spending caps on parties, candidates, and their
agents. See new FECA §§323(a), (e), and (f).

															   Title I allows state parties to raise
quasi-soft money Levin funds for use in activities that might
affect a federal election; but the Act prohibits national parties
from assisting state parties in developing and executing these
fundraising plans, even when the parties seek only to advance state
election interests. See new FECA §323(b).

															   Until today’s consolidated cases,
the Court has accepted but two principles to use in determining the
validity of campaign finance restrictions. First is the
anticorruption rationale. The principal concern, of course, is the
agreement for a quid pro quo between officeholders (or
candidates) and those who would seek to influence them. The Court
has said the interest in preventing corruption allows limitations
on receipt of the quid by a candidate or officeholder,
regardless of who gives it or of the intent of the donor or
officeholder. See Buckley , 424 U. S., at 26– 27, 45–48; infra , at  7–10. Second, the Court has analyzed laws
that classify on the basis of the speaker’s corporate or union
identity under the corporate speech rationale. The Court has said
that the willing adoption of the entity form by corporations and
unions justifies regulating them differently: Their ability to give
candidates quids may be subject not only to limits but
also to outright bans; their electoral speech may likewise be
curtailed. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 659–660; Federal
Election Comm’n v. National Right to Work
Comm., 459
U. S. 197 , 201–211 (1982).

															   The majority today opens with rhetoric that
suggests a conflation of the anticorruption rationale with the
corporate speech rationale. See ante , at 3–6 (hearkening
back to, among others, Elihu Root and his advocacy against the use
of corporate funds in political campaigning). The conflation
appears designed to cast the speech regulated here as unseemly
corporate speech. The effort, however, is unwarranted, and not just
because money is not per se the evil the majority thinks.
Most of the regulations at issue, notably all of the Title I soft
money bans and the Title II coordination provisions, do not draw
distinctions based on corporate or union status. Referring to the
corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case,
when corporate speech is not primarily at issue, adds no force to
the Court’s analysis. Instead, the focus must be on Buckley ’s anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment
rights of individual citizens.

															A. Constitutionally Sufficient Interest

															   In Buckley, the Court
held that one, and only one, interest justified the significant
burden on the right of association involved there: eliminating, or
preventing, actual corruption or the appearance of corruption
stemming from contributions to candidates.

															“It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary
purpose—to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions—in order to
find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation.” 424 U. S., at 26.

															See also ibid. (concluding this corruption
interest was sufficiently “significant” to sustain “closely drawn”
interference with protected First Amendment rights).

															   In parallel, Buckley concluded the
expenditure limitations in question were invalid because they did
not advance that same interest. See id., at 47–48 (“[T]he
independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of
corruption in the electoral process”); see also id., at
45, 46.

															   Thus, though Buckley subjected
expenditure limits to strict scrutiny and contribution limits to
less exacting review, it held neither could withstand
constitutional challenge unless it was shown to advance the
anticorruption interest. In these consolidated cases, unless Buckley is to be repudiated, we must conclude that the
regulations further that interest before considering whether they
are closely drawn or narrowly tailored. If the interest is not
advanced, the regulations cannot comport with the Constitution,
quite apart from the standard of review. Buckley made clear, by its express
language and its context, that the corruption interest only
justifies regulating candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of what
we can call the “ quids ” in the quid pro quo formulation. The Court rested its decision on the principle that
campaign finance regulation that restricts speech without requiring
proof of particular corrupt action withstands constitutional
challenge only if it regulates conduct posing a demonstrable quid pro quo danger:

															“To the extent that large contributions are given
to secure a political quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.” Id., at
26–27.

															See also id., at 45 (“[A]ssuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the
same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions …”). That Buckley rested its decision on this quid pro quo standard is not a
novel observation. We have held this was the case:

															“The exception [of contribution limits being
justified under the First Amendment] relates to the perception of
undue influence of large contributions to a candidate: ‘ To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a
political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined.’ ” Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for
Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290 , 297 (1981) (quoting Buckley, supra, at 26–27).

															See also Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. ___ (2003) (furthering this
anticorruption rationale by upholding limits on contributions given
directly to candidates); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 (2000)
(same).

															   Despite the Court’s attempt to rely on
language from cases like Shrink Missouri to establish that
the standard defining corruption is broader than conduct that
presents a quid pro quo danger, see ante , at 43,
n. 48, in those cases the Court in fact upheld limits on conduct
possessing quid pro quo dangers, and nothing more. See
also infra , 12. For example, the Shrink Missouri Court’s distinguishing of what was at issue there and quid pro
quo , in fact, shows only that it used the term quid pro
quo to refer to actual corrupt, vote-buying exchanges, as
opposed to interactions that possessed quid pro quo potential even if innocently undertaken. Thus, the Court said:

															“[W]e spoke in Buckley of the perception of
corruption ‘inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions’ to candidates for public office . . . as a source of
concern “almost equal” to quid pro quo improbity.” 528 U.
S., at 390 (citations omitted).

															Thus, the perception of corruption that the
majority now asserts is somehow different from the quid pro
quo potential discussed in this opinion, was created by an
exchange featuring quid pro quo potential—contributions
directly to a candidate.

															   In determining whether conduct poses a quid pro quo danger the analysis is functional. In Buckley , the Court confronted an expenditure limitation
provision that capped the amount of money individuals could spend
on any activity intended to influence a federal election
( i.e. , it reached to both independent and coordinated
expenditures). See 424 U. S., at 46–47. The Court concluded that
though the limitation reached both coordinated and independent
expenditures, there were other valid FECA provisions that barred
coordinated expenditures. Hence, the limit at issue only added
regulation to independent expenditures. On that basis it concluded
the provision was unsupported by any valid corruption interest. The
conduct to which it added regulation (independent expenditures)
posed no quid pro quo danger. See ibid .

															   Placing Buckley ’s anticorruption
rationale in the context of the federal legislative power yields
the following rule: Congress’ interest in preventing corruption
provides a basis for regulating federal candidates’ and
officeholders’ receipt of quids , whether or not the
candidate or officeholder corruptly received them. Conversely, the
rule requires the Court to strike down campaign finance regulations
when they do not add regulation to “actual or apparent quid pro
quo arrangements.” Id., at 45.

															   The Court ignores these constitutional bounds
and in effect interprets the anticorruption rationale to allow
regulation not just of “actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements,” ibid., but of any conduct that wins
goodwill from or influences a Member of Congress. It is not that
there is any quarrel between this opinion and the majority that the
inquiry since Buckley has been whether certain conduct
creates “undue influence.” See ante , at 40–41. On that we
agree. The very aim of Buckley ’s standard, however, was to
define undue influence by reference to the presence of quid pro
quo involving the officeholder. The Court, in contrast,
concludes that access, without more, proves influence is undue.
Access, in the Court’s view, has the same legal ramifications as
actual or apparent corruption of officeholders. This new definition
of corruption sweeps away all protections for speech that lie in
its path.

															   The majority says it is not abandoning our
cases in this way, but its reasoning shows otherwise:

															   “More importantly, plaintiffs
conceive of corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly
established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond
preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to curbing ‘undue
influence on an officeholder’s judgment, or the appearance of such
influence.’ [ Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 , 441
(2001) (Colorado II) ]. Many of the ‘deeply disturbing
examples’ of corruption cited by this Court in Buckley to
justify FECA’s contribution limits were not episodes of vote
buying, but evidence that various corporate interests had given
substantial donations to gain access to high-level government
officials. Even if that access did not secure actual influence, it
certainly gave the ‘appearance of such influence.’ Colorado
II , supra , at 441; see also [ Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 838 (CADC 1975)].

															   “The record in the present case is replete
with similar examples of national party committees peddling access
to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large
soft-money donations. See [251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 492–506 (DC
2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)].” Ante, at 40–41.

															   The majority notes that access
flowed from the regulated conduct at issue in Buckley and
its progeny, then uses that fact as the basis for concluding that
access peddling by the parties equals corruption by the candidates.
That conclusion, however, is tenable only by a quick and subtle
shift, and one that breaks new ground: The majority ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to
our earlier decisions. It relies instead solely on the fact that
access flowed from the conduct.

															   To ignore the fact that in Buckley the money at issue was given to candidates, creating an obvious quid pro quo danger as much as it led to the candidates
also providing access to the donors, is to ignore the Court’s
comments in Buckley that show quid pro quo was of
central importance to the analysis. See 424 U. S., at 26–27, 45.
The majority also ignores that in Buckley , and ever since,
those party contributions that have been subject to congressional
limit were not general party-building contributions but were only
contributions used to influence particular elections. That is, they
were contributions that flowed to a particular candidate’s benefit,
again posing a quid pro quo danger. And it ignores that in Colorado II , the party spending was that which was
coordinated with a particular candidate, thereby implicating quid pro quo dangers. In all of these ways the majority
breaks the necessary tether between quid and access and
assumes that access, all by itself, demonstrates corruption and so
can support regulation. See also ante , at 47 (“[L]arge
soft-money donations to national party committees are likely to buy
donors preferential access to federal officeholders no matter the
ends to which their contributions are eventually put”).

															   Access in itself, however, shows only that in
a general sense an officeholder favors someone or that someone has
influence on the officeholder. There is no basis, in law or in
fact, to say favoritism or influence in general is the same as
corrupt favoritism or influence in particular. By equating vague
and generic claims of favoritism or influence with actual or
apparent corruption, the Court adopts a definition of corruption
that dismantles basic First Amendment rules, permits Congress to
suppress speech in the absence of a quid pro quo threat,
and moves beyond the rationale that is Buckley ’s very
foundation.

															   The generic favoritism or influence theory
articulated by the Court is at odds with standard First Amendment
analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no limiting
principle. Any given action might be favored by any given person,
so by the Court’s reasoning political loyalty of the purest sort
can be prohibited. There is no remaining principled method for
inquiring whether a campaign finance regulation does in fact
regulate corruption in a serious and meaningful way. We are left to
defer to a congressional conclusion that certain conduct creates
favoritism or influence.

															   Though the majority cites common sense as the
foundation for its definition of corruption, see ante, at
35, 43, in the context of the real world only a single definition
of corruption has been found to identify political corruption
successfully and to distinguish good political responsiveness from
bad—that is quid pro quo . Favoritism and influence are
not, as the Government’s theory suggests, avoidable in
representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected
representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary
corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those
policies. It is well understood that a substantial and legitimate
reason, if not the only reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a
contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candidate
will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter
favors. Democracy is premised on responsiveness. Q uid pro
quo corruption has been, until now, the only agreed upon
conduct that represents the bad form of responsiveness and presents
a justiciable standard with a relatively clear limiting principle:
Bad responsiveness may be demonstrated by pointing to a
relationship between an official and a quid .

															   The majority attempts to mask its extension of Buckley under claims that BCRA prevents the appearance of
corruption, even if it does not prevent actual corruption, since
some assert that any donation of money to a political party is
suspect. See ante , at 40–42. Under Buckley ’s
holding that Congress has a valid “interest in stemming the reality
or appearance of corruption,” 424 U. S., at 47–48, however, the
inquiry does not turn on whether some persons assert that an
appearance of corruption exists. Rather, the inquiry turns on
whether the Legislature has established that the regulated conduct
has inherent corruption potential, thus justifying the inference
that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real
corruption. Buckley was guided and constrained by this
analysis. In striking down expenditure limits the Court in Buckley did not ask whether people thought large election
expenditures corrupt, because clearly at that time many persons,
including a majority of Congress and the President, did. See id., at 25 (“According to the parties and amici ,
the primary interest served . . . by the Act as a whole, is the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption”).
Instead, the Court asked whether the Government had proved that the
regulated conduct, the expenditures, posed inherent quid pro
quo corruption potential. See id., at 46.

															   The Buckley decision made this
analysis even clearer in upholding contribution limitations. It
stated that even if actual corrupt contribution practices had not
been proved, Congress had an interest in regulating the appearance
of corruption that is “inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions.” Id., at 27 (discussing
contributions to candidates). See also id., at 28, 30. The quid pro quo nature of candidate contributions justified
the conclusion that the contributions pose inherent corruption
potential; and this in turn justified the conclusion that their
regulation would stem the appearance of real corruption.

															   From that it follows that the Court today
should not ask, as it does, whether some persons, even Members of
Congress, conclusorily assert that the regulated conduct appears
corrupt to them. Following Buckley , it should instead
inquire whether the conduct now prohibited inherently poses a real
or substantive quid pro quo danger, so that its regulation
will stem the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.

															1. New FECA §§323(a), (b), (d), and (f)

															   Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and
(f), 2 U. S. C. A. §§441i(a), (b), (d), and (f )
(Supp. 2003), cannot stand because they do not add regulation to
conduct that poses a demonstrable quid pro quo danger.
They do not further Buckley ’s corruption interest.

															   The majority, with a broad brush,
paints §323(a) as aimed at limiting contributions possessing
federal officeholder corruption potential. From there it would
justify §323’s remaining provisions as necessary complements to
ensure the national parties cannot circumvent §323(a)’s
prohibitions. The broad brush approach fails, however, when the
provisions are reviewed under Buckley ’s proper definition
of corruption potential.

															   On its face §323(a) does not regulate federal
candidates’ or officeholders’ receipt of quids because it
does not regulate contributions to, or conduct by, candidates or
officeholders. See BCRA §101(a) (setting out new FECA §323(a):
National parties may not “solicit, receive, or direct to another
person … or spend any [soft money]”).

															   The realities that underlie the statute,
furthermore, do not support the majority’s interpretation. Before
BCRA’s enactment, parties could only use soft money for a
candidate’s “benefit” ( e.g. , through issue ads, which all
parties now admit may influence elections) independent of that
candidate. And, as discussed later, §323(e) validly prohibits
federal candidate and officeholder solicitation of soft money party
donations. See infra , at 31. Section 323(a), therefore,
only adds regulation to soft money party donations not solicited
by, or spent in coordination with, a candidate or officeholder.

															   These donations (noncandidate or officeholder
solicited soft money party donations that are independently spent)
do not pose the quid pro quo dangers that provide the
basis for restricting protected speech. Though the government
argues §323(a) does regulate federal candidates’ and officeholders’
receipt of quids , it bases its argument on this flawed
reasoning:

															   (1) “[F]ederal elected
officeholders are inextricably linked to their political parties,”
Brief for Appellees/Cross Appellants FEC et al. in No. 02–1674
et al., p. 21; cf. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604 , 626 (1996) (Colorado I) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting in part).

															   (2) All party receipts must be connected to,
and must create, corrupt donor favoritism among these
officeholders.

															   (3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts
equals regulation of quids to the party’s
officeholders.

															   The reasoning is flawed because
the Government’s reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorado
I concurrence only establishes the first step in its chain of
logic: that a party is a proxy for its candidates generally. It
does not establish the second step: that as a proxy for its
candidates generally, all moneys the party receives (not
just candidate solicited-soft money donations, or donations used in
coordinated activity) represent quids for all the party’s
candidates and officeholders. The Government’s analysis is
inconsistent with what a majority of the Justices, in different
opinions, have said.

															   Justice Thomas’ dissent in Colorado
II , 533 U. S., at 476–477, taken together with Justice
Breyer’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Colorado I , rebuts the second step of the Government’s
argument. Justice Thomas demonstrated that a general
party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he pointed
out:

															“The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is
unsurprising in light of the unique relationship between a
political party and its candidates: ‘The very aim of a political
party is to influence its candidate’s stance on issues and, if the
candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.’ If coordinated
expenditures help achieve this aim, the achievement ‘does not …
constitute “a subversion of the political process.” ’ ” Colorado II, supra, at 476–477 (citations
omitted) . Justice Breyer reached
the same conclusion about the corrupting effect general party
receipts could have on particular candidates, though on narrower
grounds. He concluded that independent party conduct lacks quid
pro quo corruption potential. See Colorado I, 518 U.
S., at 617–618; id., at 617 (“If anything, an independent
[party] expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but
controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would
seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger)
independent expenditure made directly by that donor”); id., at 616 (“[T]he opportunity for corruption posed by
[soft money] contributions is, at best, attenuated” because they
may not be used for the purposes of influencing a federal election
under FECA).

															   These opinions establish that independent
party activity, which by definition includes independent receipt
and spending of soft money, lacks a possibility for quid pro
quo corruption of federal officeholders. This must be all the
more true of a party’s independent receipt and spending of soft
money donations neither directed to nor solicited by a
candidate.

															   The Government’s premise is also unsupported
by the record before us. The record confirms that soft money party
contributions, without more, do not create quid pro quo corruption potential. As a conceptual matter, generic party
contributions may engender good will from a can- didate or
officeholder because, as the Government says: “[A] Member of
Congress can be expected to feel a natural temptation to favor
those persons who have helped the ‘team,’ ” Brief for
Appellees/Cross-Appellants FEC et al. in No. 02–1674
et al., p. 33. Still, no Member of Congress testified
this favoritism changed voting behavior.

															   The piece of record evidence the Government
puts forward on this score comes by way of deposition testimony
from former Senator Simon and Senator Feingold. See 251
F. Supp. 2d 176, 482 (DC 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Senator
Simon reported an unidentified colleague indicated frustration with
Simon’s opposition to legislation that would benefit a party
contributor on the grounds that “ ‘we’ve got to pay attention
to who is buttering our bread’ ” and testified he did not
think there was any question “ ‘this’ ” ( i.e. ,
“donors getting their way”) was why the legislation passed. See
App. 805. Senator Feingold, too, testified an unidentified
colleague suggested he support the legislation because “ ‘they
[ i.e. , the donor] just gave us [ i.e. , the party]
$100,000.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.).

															   That evidence in fact works against the
Government. These two testifying Senators expressed disgust toward
the favoring of a soft money giver, and not the good will one would
have expected under the Government’s theory. That necessarily
undercuts the inference of corruption the Government would have us
draw from the evidence.

															   Even more damaging to the Government’s
argument from the testimony is the absence of testimony that the
Senator who allegedly succumbed to corrupt influence had himself
solicited soft money from the donor in question. Equally, there is
no indication he simply favored the company with his vote because
it had, without any involvement from him, given funds to the party
to which he belonged. This fact is crucial. If the Senator himself
had been the solicitor of the soft money funds in question, the
incident does nothing more than confirm that Congress’ efforts at
campaign finance reform ought to be directed to conduct that
implicates quid pro quo relationships. Only if there was
some evidence that the officeholder had not solicited funds from
the donor could the Court extrapolate from this episode that
general party contributions function as quids , inspiring
corrupt favoritism among party members. The episode is the single
one of its type reported in the record and does not seem sufficient
basis for major incursions into settled practice. Given the
Government’s claim that the corrupt favoritism problem is
widespread, its inability to produce more than a single instance
purporting to illustrate the point demonstrates the Government has
not fairly characterized the general attitudes of Members towards
soft money donors from whom they have not solicited.

															   Other aspects of the record confirm the
Government has not produced evidence that Members corruptly favor
soft money donors to their party as a per se matter. Most
testimony from which the Government would have the Court infer
corruption is testimony that Members are rewarded by their parties
for soliciting soft money. See i d., at 438–521
(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). This says nothing about how Members feel
about a party’s soft money donors from whom they have not
solicited. Indeed, record evidence on this point again cuts against
the Government:

															“ ‘As a Member of the Senate Finance
Committee, I experienced the pressure first hand. On several
occasions when we were debating important tax bills, I needed a
police escort to get into the Finance Committee hearing room
because so many lobbyists were crowding the halls, trying to get
one last chance to make their pitch to each Senator. Senators
generally knew which lobbyist represented the interests of which
large donor. I was often glad that I limited the amount of soft
money fundraising I did and did not take PAC contributions, because
it would be extremely difficult not to feel beholden to these
donors otherwise.’ ” Id., at 482 (testimony of former
Senator Boren; see 6–R Defs. Exhs., Tab 8, ¶ ;8).

															Thus, one of the handful of Senators on whom the
Government relies to make its case candidly admits the pressure of
appeasing soft money donors derives from the Members’ solicitation
of donors, not from those donors’ otherwise giving to their
party.

															   In light of all this, §323(a) has no valid
anticorruption interest. The anticircumvention interests the
Government offers in defense of §§323(b), (d), and (f) must also
fall with the interests asserted to justify §323(a). Any
anticircumvention interest can be only as compelling as the
interest justifying the underlying regulation.

															   None of these other sections has an
independent justifying interest. Section 323(b), for example, adds
regulation only to activity undertaken by a state party. In the
District Court two of the three judges found as fact that
particular state and local parties exist primarily to participate
in state and local elections, that they spend the majority of their
resources on those elections, and that their voter registration and
Get Out The Vote (GOTV) activities, in particular, are directed
primarily at state and local elections. See 251 F. Supp. 2d,
at 301–302 (Henderson, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); id., at 837–840 (Leon, J.). These
findings, taken together with BCRA’s other, valid prohibitions
barring coordination with federal candidates or officeholders and
their soft money solicitation, demonstrate that §323(b) does not
add regulation to conduct that poses a danger of a federal
candidate’s or officeholder’s receipt of quids .

															   Even §323(b)’s narrowest regulation, which
bans state party soft money funded ads that (1) refer to a clearly
identified federal candidate, and (2) either support or attack any
candidate for the office of the clearly mentioned federal
candidate, see new FECA §301(20)(A)(iii), fails the constitutional
test. The ban on conduct that by the statute’s own definition may
serve the interest of a federal candidate suggests to the majority
that it is conduct that poses quid pro quo danger for
federal candidates or officeholders. Yet, even this
effect—considered after excising the coordination and
candidate-solicited funding aspects elsewhere prohibited by BCRA
§§202 and 214(a) and new FECA §323(a)—poses no danger of a federal
candidate’s or officeholder’s receipt of a quid . That
conduct is no different from an individual’s independent
expenditure referring to and supporting a clearly identified
candidate—and this poses no regulable danger.

															   Section 323(d), which governs relationships
between the national parties and nonprofit groups, fails for
similar reasons. It is worth noting that neither the record nor our
own experience tells us how significant these funds transfers are
at this time. It is plain, however, that the First Amendment ought
not to be manipulated to permit Congress to forbid a political
party from aiding other speakers whom the party deems more
effective in addressing discrete issues. One of the central flaws
in BCRA is that Congress is determining what future course the
creation of ideas and the expression of views must follow. Its
attempt to foreclose new and creative partnerships for speech, as
illustrated here, is consistent with neither the traditions nor
principles of our Free Speech guarantee, which insists that the
people, and not the Congress, decide what modes of expression are
the most legitimate and effective.

															   The majority’s upholding §323(d) is all the
more unsettling because of the way it ignores the Act as Congress
wrote it. Congress said national parties “shall not solicit any
funds for, or make or direct any donations to” §501(c) nonprofit
organizations that engage in federal election activity or to §527
political committees. The Court, however, reads out the word “any”
and construes the words “funds” and “donations” to mean “soft money
funds” and “soft money donations.” See ante , at 72 (“This
construction is consistent with the concerns animating Title I,
whose purpose is to plug the soft-money loophole”). The Court’s
statutory amendment may be consistent with its anti-soft-money
rationale; it is not, however, consistent with the plain and
unavoidable statutory text Congress has given us. Even as construed
by the Court, moreover, it is invalid.

															   The majority strains to save the provision
from what must seem to it an unduly harsh First Amendment. It does
so by making a legislative determination Congress chose not to
make: to prefer hard money to soft money within the construct of
national party relationships with nonprofit groups. Congress gave
no indication of a preference to regulate either hard money or soft
in this context. Rather, it simply proscribed all transfers of
money between the two organizations and all efforts by the national
parties to raise any money on the nonprofit groups’ behalf. The
question the Court faces is not which part of a text to sever and
strike, but whether Congress can prohibit such transfers
altogether. The answer, as the majority recognizes, is no. See ante , at 71 (“[P]rohibiting parties from donating funds
already raised in compliance with FECA does little to further
Congress’ goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption of federal candidates and officeholders”).

															   Though §323(f) in effect imposes limits on
candidate contributions, it does not address federal candidate and
officeholder contributions. Yet it is the possibility of federal
officeholder quid pro quo corruption potential that
animates Buckley ’s rule as it relates to Acts of Congress
(as opposed to Acts of state legislatures). See 424 U. S., at 13
(“The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal
elections is well established”).

															   When one recognizes that §§323(a), (b), (d),
and (f) do not serve the interest the anticorruption rationale
contemplates, Title I’s entirety begins to look very much like an
incumbency protection plan. See J. Miller, Monopoly Politics 84–101
(1999) (concluding that regulations limiting election fundraising
and spending constrain challengers more than incumbents). That
impression is worsened by the fact that Congress exempted its
officeholders from the more stringent prohibitions imposed on party
officials. Compare new FECA §323(a) with new FECA §323(e). Section
323(a) raises an inflexible bar against soft money solicitation, in
any way, by parties or party officials. Section 323(e), in
contrast, enacts exceptions to the rule for federal officeholders
(the very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to
solicit soft money for various uses and organizations.

															   The law in some respects even weakens the
regulation of federal candidates and officeholders. Under former
law, officeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard
money by their campaign committees. See 2 U. S. C. §§431, 441a
(setting out the pre-BCRA FECA regime). BCRA, however, now allows
them and their campaign committees to receive soft money that fits
the hard money source and amount restrictions, so long as the
officeholders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates.
See new FECA §323(e)(1)(B). The majority’s characterization of this
weakening of the regime as “tightly constrain[ing]” candidates, ante, at 73, n. 70, is a prime example of its
unwillingness to confront Congress’ own interest or the persisting
fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms. The
more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven politicians
than to party officials who represent broad national constituencies
must render all the more suspect Congress’ claim that the Act’s
sole purpose is to stop corruption.

															   The majority answers this charge
by stating the obvious, that “§323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates .” Ante , at 78, n. 72. The
controlling point, of course, is the practical burden on
challengers. That the prohibition applies to both incumbents and
challengers in no way establishes that it burdens them equally in
that regard. Name recognition and other advantages held by
incumbents ensure that as a general rule incumbents will be
advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds.

															   The Government identifies no
valid anticorruption interest justifying §§323(a), (b), (d), and
(f). The very nature of the restrictions imposed by these
provisions makes one all the more skeptical of the Court’s
explanation of the interests at stake. These provisions cannot
stand under the First Amendment.

															2. New FECA §323(e)

															   Ultimately, only one of the
challenged Title I provisions satisfies Buckley ’s
anticorruption rationale and the First Amendment’s guarantee. It is
§323(e). This provision is the sole aspect of Title I that is a
direct and necessary regulation of federal candidates’ and
officeholders’ receipt of quids . Section 323(e) governs
“candidate[s], individual[s] holding Federal office, agent[s] of a
candidate or an individual holding Federal office, or an entity
directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or
controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 or more candidates or
individuals holding Federal office.” 2 U. S. C. A.
§441i(e) (Supp. 2003). These provisions, and the regulations that
follow, limit candidates’ and their agents’ solicitation of soft
money. The regulation of a candidate’s receipt of funds furthers a
constitutionally sufficient interest. More difficult, however, is
the question whether regulation of a candidate’s solicitation of
funds also furthers this interest if the funds are given to
another.

															   I agree with the Court that the
broader solicitation regulation does further a sufficient interest.
The making of a solicited gift is a quid both to the
recipient of the money and to the one who solicits the payment (by
granting his request). Rules governing candidates’ or
officeholders’ solicitation of contributions are, therefore,
regulations governing their receipt of quids . This
regulation fits under Buckley ’s anticorruption
rationale.

															B. Standard of Review

															   It is common ground between the
majority and this opinion that a speech-suppressing campaign
finance regulation, even if supported by a sufficient Government
interest, is unlawful if it cannot satisfy our designated standard
of review. See ante , at 24–27. In Buckley , we
applied “closely drawn” scrutiny to contribution limitations and
strict scrutiny to expenditure limitations. Compare 424 U. S., at
25, with id., at 44–45. Against that backdrop, the
majority assumes that because Buckley applied the
rationale in the context of contribution and expenditure limits,
its application gives Congress and the Court the capacity to
classify any challenged campaign finance regulation as either a
contribution or an expenditure limit. Thus, it first concludes
Title I’s regulations are contributions limits and then proceeds to
apply the lesser scrutiny.

															“Complex as its provisions may be, §323, in the
main, does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy
individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of
money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and
federal officeholders.” Ante, at 28.

															   Though the majority’s analysis
denies it, Title I’s dynamics defy this facile, initial
classification.

															   Title I’s provisions prohibit the receipt of
funds; and in most instances, but not all, this can be defined as a
contribution limit. They prohibit the spending of funds; and in
most instances this can be defined as an expenditure limit. They
prohibit the giving of funds to nonprofit groups; and this falls
within neither definition as we have ever defined it. Finally, they
prohibit fundraising activity; and the parties dispute the
classification of this regulation (the challengers say it is core
political association, while the Government says it ultimately
results only in a limit on contribution receipts).

															   The majority’s classification overlooks these
competing characteristics and exchanges Buckley ’s
substance for a formulaic caricature of it. Despite the parties’
and the majority’s best efforts on both sides of the question, it
ignores reality to force these regulations into one of the two
legal categories as either contribution or expenditure limitations.
Instead, these characteristics seem to indicate Congress has
enacted regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure
limits, or are perhaps both at once.

															   Even if the laws could be classified in broad
terms as only contribution limits, as the majority is inclined to
do, that still leaves the question what “contribution limits” can
include if they are to be upheld under Buckley . Buckley ’s application of a less exacting review to
contribution limits must be confined to the narrow category of
money gifts that are directed, in some manner, to a candidate or
officeholder. Any broader definition of the category contradicts Buckley ’s quid pro quo rationale and overlooks Buckley ’s language, which contemplates limits on
contributions to a candidate or campaign committee in explicit
terms. See 424 U. S., at 13 (applying less exacting review to
“contribution … limitations in the Act prohibit[ing] individuals
from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or more than
$1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign”); id., at 45 (“[T]he contribution limitations’ [apply a]
total ban on the giving of large amounts of money to candidates”).
See also id., at 20, 25, 28.

															   The Court, it must be acknowledged, both in Buckley and on other occasions, has described contribution
limits due some more deferential review in less than precise terms.
At times it implied that donations to political parties would also
qualify as contributions whose limitation too would be subject to
less exacting review. See id., at 23–24, n. 24
(“[T]he general understanding of what constitutes a political
contribution[:] Funds provided to a candidate or political party or
campaign committee either directly or indirectly through an
intermediary constitute a contribution”). See also Federal
Election Comm’n v. Beaumont , 539 U. S., at ___ (2003)
(slip op., at 14) (“ ‘[C]ontributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association’ ”).

															   These seemingly conflicting statements are
best reconciled by reference to Buckley ’s underlying
rationale for applying less exacting review. In a similar, but more
imperative, sense proper application of the standard of review to
regulations that are neither contribution nor expenditure limits
(or which are both at once) can only be determined by reference to
that rationale. Buckley ’s underlying rationale is
this: Less exacting review applies to Government regulations that
“significantly interfere” with First Amendment rights of
association. But any regulation of speech or associational rights
creating “markedly greater interference” than such significant
interference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised
though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this
test:

															“Even a ‘ “significant interference” with
protected rights of political association’ may be sustained if the
State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and [2]
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda ,
[ 419 U. S. 477 ,
488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [ 371 U. S. 415 , 438
(1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker [ 364 U. S. 479 , 488
(1960)] .” 424 U. S., at 25.

															“The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [referring to
‘the freedom of speech and association’] caused by [expenditure
limits] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in
maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution
limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of [the expenditure
limits] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its
support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on
core First Amendment rights of political expression.” Id., at 44–45.† OPINION OF SCALIA, J. MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Scalia, concurring with
respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, dissenting with respect to BCRA
Titles I and V, and concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Title II.

															   With respect to Titles I, II, and
V: I join in full the dissent of The Chief Justice; I join the
opinion of Justice Kennedy, except to the extent it upholds new
§323(e) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and
§202 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) in part;
and because I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam), was wrongly decided, I also join Parts I, II–A, and
II–B of the opinion of Justice Thomas. With respect to Titles III
and IV, I join The Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court. Because
these cases are of such extraordinary importance, I cannot avoid
adding to the many writings a few words of my own.

															   This is a sad day for the freedom of speech.
Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past
four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such
inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002),
tobacco advertising, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U. S. 525 (2001), dissemination of illegally intercepted
communications, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001),
and sexually explicit cable programming, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000),
would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what
the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the
government. For that is what the most offensive provisions of this
legislation are all about. We are governed by Congress, and this
legislation prohibits the criticism of Members of Congress by those
entities most capable of giving such criticism loud voice: national
political parties and corporations, both of the commercial and the
not-for-profit sort. It forbids pre-election criticism of
incumbents by corporations, even not-for-profit corporations, by
use of their general funds; and forbids national-party use of
“soft” money to fund “issue ads” that incumbents find so
offensive.

															   To be sure, the legislation is evenhanded: It
similarly prohibits criticism of the candidates who oppose Members
of Congress in their reelection bids. But as everyone knows, this
is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have
an enormous advantage. Likewise, if incumbents and challengers are
limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are
favored. In other words, any restriction upon a type of
campaign speech that is equally available to challengers and
incumbents tends to favor incumbents.

															   Beyond that, however, the present legislation targets for prohibition certain categories of campaign
speech that are particularly harmful to incumbents. Is it
accidental, do you think, that incumbents raise about three times
as much “hard money”—the sort of funding generally not restricted by this legislation—as do their challengers? See FEC,
1999–2000 Financial Activity of All Senate and House Campaigns
(Jan. 1, 1999–Dec. 31, 2000) (last modified on May 15, 2001),
http://www.fec.gov/press/ 051501congfinact/tables/allcong2000.xls
(all Internet ma-terials as visited Dec. 4, 2003, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file). Or that lobbyists (who seek the favor
of incumbents) give 92 percent of their money in “hard”
contributions? See U. S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), The
Lobbyist’s Last Laugh: How K Street Lob- byists Would Benefit from
the McCain-Feingold Cam- paign Finance Bill 3 (July 5, 2001),
http://www.pirg.org/ democracy/democracy.asp?id2=5068. Is it an
oversight, do you suppose, that the so-called “millionaire
provisions” raise the contribution limit for a candidate running
against an individual who devotes to the campaign (as challengers
often do) great personal wealth, but do not raise the limit for a
candidate running against an individual who devotes to the campaign
(as incumbents often do) a massive election “war chest”? See BCRA
§§304, 316, and 319. And is it mere happenstance, do you estimate,
that national-party funding, which is severely limited by the Act,
is more likely to assist cash-strapped challengers than
flush-with-hard-money incumbents? See A. Gierzynski &
D. Breaux, The Financing Role of Parties, in Campaign Finance
in State Legislative Elections 195–200 (J. Thompson &
S. Moncrief eds. 1998). Was it unintended, by any chance, that
incumbents are free personally to receive some soft money and even
to solicit it for other organizations, while national parties are
not? See new FECA §§323(a) and (e).

															   I wish to address three fallacious
propositions that might be thought to justify some or all of the
provisions of this legislation—only the last of which is explicitly
embraced by the principal opinion for the Court, but all of which
underlie, I think, its approach to these cases.

															(a)  Money is Not Speech

															   It was said by congressional
proponents of this legislation, see 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997)
(remarks of Sen. Boxer), 145 Cong. Rec. S12612 (Oct. 14, 1999)
(remarks of Sen. Cleland), 147 Cong. Rec. S2436 (Mar. 19, 2001)
(remarks of Sen. Dodd), with support from the law reviews, see, e.g. , Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech?, 85 Yale L. J. 1001 (1976), that since this
legislation regulates nothing but the expenditure of money for
speech, as opposed to speech itself, the burden it imposes is not
subject to full First Amendment scrutiny; the government may
regulate the raising and spending of campaign funds just as it
regulates other forms of conduct, such as burning draft cards, see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), or
camping out on the National Mall, see Clark v. Community for Creative
Non&nbhyph;Violence, 468 U. S. 288 (1984).
That proposition has been endorsed by one of the two authors of
today’s principal opinion: “The right to use one’s own money to
hire gladiators, [and] to fund ‘speech by proxy,’ … [are] property
rights . . . not entitled to the same protection as the right to
say what one pleases.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 , 399
(2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). Until today, however, that view
has been categorically rejected by our jurisprudence. As we said in Buckley, 424 U. S., at 16, “this Court has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money
operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.”

															   Our traditional view was correct,
and today’s cavalier attitude toward regulating the financing of
speech (the “exacting scrutiny” test of Buckley , see ibid. , is not uttered in any majority opinion, and is not
observed in the ones from which I dissent) frustrates the
fundamental purpose of the First Amendment. In any economy operated
on even the most rudimentary principles of division of labor,
effective public communication requires the speaker to make use of
the services of others. An author may write a novel, but he will
seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance reporter may
write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to
subscribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode
of organization presents opportunities: Control any cog in the
machine, and you can halt the whole apparatus. License printers,
and it matters little whether authors are still free to write.
Restrict the sale of books, and it matters little who prints them.
Predictably, repressive regimes have exploited these principles by
attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas.
See, e.g. , Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. II, c. 33, §§1,
4, 7 (punishing printers, importers, and booksellers); Printing Act
of 1649, 2 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 245, 246, 250
(punishing authors, printers, booksellers, importers, and buyers).
In response to this threat, we have interpreted the First Amendment
broadly. See, e.g. , Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 , 65,
n. 6 (1963) (“The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
press embraces the circulation of books as well as their
publication …”).

															   Division of labor requires a means of
mediating exchange, and in a commercial society, that means is
supplied by money. The publisher pays the author for the right to
sell his book; it pays its staff who print and assemble the book;
it demands payments from booksellers who bring the book to market.
This, too, presents opportunities for repression: Instead of
regulating the various parties to the enterprise individually, the
government can suppress their ability to coordinate by regulating
their use of money. What good is the right to print books without a
right to buy works from authors? Or the right to publish newspapers
without the right to pay deliverymen? The right to speak would be
largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in
financial transactions that are the incidents of its exercise.

															   This is not to say that any regulation of money is a regulation of speech. The government may
apply general commercial regulations to those who use money for
speech if it applies them evenhandedly to those who use money for
other purposes. But where the government singles out money used to
fund speech as its legislative object, it is acting against speech
as such, no less than if it had targeted the paper on which a book
was printed or the trucks that deliver it to the bookstore.

															   History and jurisprudence bear this out. The
best early examples derive from the British efforts to tax the
press after the lapse of licensing statutes by which the press was
first regulated. The Stamp Act of 1712 imposed levies on all
newspapers, including an additional tax for each advertisement. 10
Anne, c. 18, §113. It was a response to unfavorable war coverage,
“obvious[ly] … designed to check the publication of those
newspapers and pamphlets which depended for their sale on their
cheapness and sensationalism.” F. Siebert, Freedom of the
Press in England, 1476–1776, pp. 309–310 (1952). It succeeded
in killing off approximately half the newspapers in England in its
first year. Id. , at 312. In 1765, Parliament applied a
similar Act to the Colonies. 5 Geo. III, c. 12, §1. The colonial
Act likewise placed exactions on sales and advertising revenue, the
latter at 2s. per advertisement, which was “by any standard . . .
excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3 to 5s.
and still less for repeated insertions.” A. Schlesinger, Prelude to
Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764–1776, p. 68
(1958). The founding generation saw these taxes as grievous
incursions on the freedom of the press. See, e.g. , 1
D. Ramsay, History of the American Revolution 61–62 (L. Cohen
ed. 1990); J. Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal
Law (1765), reprinted in 3 Life and Works of John Adams 445, 464
(C. Adams ed. 1851). See generally Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 245–249
(1936); Schlesinger, supra, at 67–84.

															   We have kept faith with the Founders’
tradition by prohibiting the selective taxation of the press. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r
of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 (1983)
(ink and paper tax); Grosjean , supra (advertisement tax). And we have done so whether the tax was the
product of illicit motive or not. See Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co., supra , at 592. These press-taxation cases belie
the claim that regulation of money used to fund speech is not
regulation of speech itself. A tax on a newspaper’s advertising
revenue does not prohibit anyone from saying anything; it merely
appropriates part of the revenue that a speaker would otherwise
obtain. That is even a step short of totally prohibiting
advertising revenue— which would be analogous to the total
prohibition of certain campaign-speech contributions in the present
cases. Yet it is unquestionably a violation of the First
Amendment.

															    Many other cases exemplify the same principle
that an attack upon the funding of speech is an attack upon speech
itself. In Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980), we
struck down an ordinance limiting the amount charities could pay
their solicitors. In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105 (1991), we
held unconstitutional a state statute that appropriated the
proceeds of criminals’ biographies for payment to the victims. And
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515
U. S. 819 (1995), we held unconstitutional a university’s
discrimination in the disbursement of funds to speakers on the
basis of viewpoint. Most notable, perhaps, is our famous opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964),
holding that paid advertisements in a newspaper were entitled to
full First Amendment protection:

															“Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers
from carrying ‘editorial advertisements’ of this type, and so might
shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information
and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to
publishing facilities—who wish to exercise their freedom of speech
even though they are not members of the press. The effect would be
to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to secure ‘the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.’ ” Id ., at 266 (citations omitted).

															This passage was relied on in Buckley for
the point that restrictions on the expenditure of money for speech
are equivalent to restrictions on speech itself. 424 U. S., at
16–17. That reliance was appropriate. If denying protection to
paid-for speech would “shackle the First Amendment,” so also does
forbidding or limiting the right to pay for speech.

															   It should be obvious, then, that a law
limiting the amount a person can spend to broadcast his political
views is a direct restriction on speech. That is no different from
a law limiting the amount a newspaper can pay its editorial staff
or the amount a charity can pay its leafletters. It is equally
clear that a limit on the amount a candidate can raise from any one individual for the purpose of speaking is also a
direct limitation on speech. That is no different from a law
limiting the amount a publisher can accept from any one shareholder
or lender, or the amount a newspaper can charge any one advertiser
or customer.

															(b)  Pooling Money is Not Speech

															   Another proposition which could
explain at least some of the results of today’s opinion is that the
First Amendment right to spend money for speech does not include
the right to combine with others in spending money for speech. Such
a proposition fits uncomfortably with the concluding words of our
Declaration of Independence: “And for the support of this
Declaration, . . . we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.” (Emphasis added.) The
freedom to associate with others for the dissemination of ideas—not
just by singing or speaking in unison, but by pooling financial
resources for expressive purposes—is part of the freedom of
speech.

															“Our form of government is built on the premise
that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association. This right was enshrined in the First
Amendment of the Bill of Rights. Exercise of these basic freedoms
in America has traditionally been through the media of political
associations. Any interference with the freedom of a party is
simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.” NAACP v. Button , 371 U. S. 415 , 431
(1963) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															“The First Amendment protects political association as well as
political expression. The constitutional right of association
explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 , 460
(1958), stemmed from the Court’s recognition that ‘[e]ffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.’
Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee ‘ “freedom to associate with others for
the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,” ’
… .” Buckley, supra, at 15.

															We have said that “implicit in the right to engage
in activities protected by the First Amendment” is “a corresponding
right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.” Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 , 622
(1984). That “right to associate . . . in pursuit” includes the
right to pool financial resources.

															   If it were otherwise, Congress would be
empowered to enact legislation requiring newspapers to be sole
proprietorships, banning their use of partnership or corporate
form. That sort of restriction would be an obvious violation of the
First Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the conclusion
should change when what is at issue is the pooling of funds for the
most important (and most perennially threatened) category of
speech: electoral speech. The principle that such financial
association does not enjoy full First Amendment protection
threatens the existence of all political parties.

															(c) Speech by Corporations Can Be Abridged

															   The last proposition that might
explain at least some of today’s casual abridgment of free-speech
rights is this: that the particular form of association known as a
corporation does not enjoy full First Amendment protection. Of
course the text of the First Amendment does not limit its
application in this fashion, even though “[b]y the end of the
eighteenth century the corporation was a familiar figure in
American economic life.” C. Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company
92 (1951). Nor is there any basis in reason why First Amendment
rights should not attach to corporate associations—and we have said
so. In First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), we
held unconstitutional a state prohibition of corporate speech
designed to influence the vote on referendum proposals. We
said:

															   “[T]here is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. If the
speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the
State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual.” Id. , at 776–777 (internal quotation marks,
footnotes, and citations omitted).

															In NAACP v. Button, supra , at
428–429, 431, we held that the NAACP could assert First Amendment
rights “on its own behalf, . . . though a corporation,” and that
the activities of the corporation were “modes of expression and
association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of
Cal. , 475 U. S.
1 , 8 (1986), we held unconstitutional a state effort to compel
corporate speech. “The identity of the speaker,” we said, “is not
decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations
and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the
‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.” And in Buckley , 424 U. S. 1 , we held unconstitutional
FECA’s limitation upon independent corporate expenditures.

															   The Court changed course in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce , 494 U. S. 652 (1990),
upholding a state prohibition of an independent corporate
expenditure in support of a candidate for state office. I dissented
in that case, see id ., at 679, and remain of the view that
it was error. In the modern world, giving the government power to
exclude corporations from the political debate enables it
effectively to muffle the voices that best represent the most
significant segments of the economy and the most passionately held
social and political views. People who associate—who pool their
financial resources—for purposes of economic enterprise
overwhelmingly do so in the corporate form; and with increasing
frequency, incorporation is chosen by those who associate to defend
and promote particular ideas—such as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the National Rifle Association, parties to these cases.
Imagine, then, a government that wished to suppress nuclear
power—or oil and gas exploration, or automobile manufacturing, or
gun ownership, or civil liberties—and that had the power to
prohibit corporate advertising against its proposals. To be sure,
the individuals involved in, or benefited by, those industries, or
interested in those causes, could (given enough time) form
political action committees or other associations to make their
case. But the organizational form in which those enterprises
already exist , and in which they can most quickly and most
effectively get their message across, is the corporate form. The
First Amendment does not in my view permit the restriction of that
political speech. And the same holds true for corporate electoral
speech: A candidate should not be insulated from the most effective
speech that the major participants in the economy and major
incorporated interest groups can generate.

															   But what about the danger to the political
system posed by “amassed wealth”? The most direct threat from that
source comes in the form of undisclosed favors and payoffs to
elected officials—which have already been criminalized, and will be
rendered no more discoverable by the legislation at issue here. The
use of corporate wealth (like individual wealth) to speak to the
electorate is unlikely to “distort” elections— especially if disclosure requirements tell the people where the
speech is coming from. The premise of the First Amendment is that
the American people are neither sheep nor fools, and hence fully
capable of considering both the substance of the speech presented
to them and its proximate and ultimate source. If that premise is
wrong, our democracy has a much greater problem to overcome than
merely the influence of amassed wealth. Given the premises of
democracy, there is no such thing as too much speech.

															   But, it is argued, quite apart from its effect
upon the electorate, corporate speech in the form of contributions
to the candidate’s campaign, or even in the form of independent
expenditures supporting the candidate, engenders an obligation
which is later paid in the form of greater access to the
officeholder, or indeed in the form of votes on particular bills.
Any quid-pro-quo agreement for votes would of course
violate criminal law, see 18 U. S. C. §201, and actual payoff votes have not even been claimed by those favoring the
restrictions on corporate speech. It cannot be denied, however,
that corporate (like noncorporate) allies will have greater access
to the officeholder, and that he will tend to favor the same causes
as those who support him (which is usually why they
supported him). That is the nature of politics—if not indeed human
nature—and how this can properly be considered “corruption” (or
“the appearance of corruption”) with regard to corporate allies and
not with regard to other allies is beyond me. If the Bill of Rights
had intended an exception to the freedom of speech in order to
combat this malign proclivity of the officeholder to agree with
those who agree with him, and to speak more with his supporters
than his opponents, it would surely have said so. It did not do so,
I think, because the juice is not worth the squeeze. Evil corporate
(and private affluent) influences are well enough checked (so long
as adequate campaign-expenditure disclosure rules exist) by the
politician’s fear of being portrayed as “in the pocket” of
so-called moneyed interests. The incremental benefit obtained by
muzzling corporate speech is more than offset by loss of the
information and persuasion that corporate speech can contain. That,
at least, is the assumption of a constitutional guarantee which
prescribes that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of
speech.

															   But let us not be deceived. While the
Government’s briefs and arguments before this Court focused on the
horrible “appearance of corruption,” the most passionate floor
statements during the debates on this legislation pertained to
so-called attack ads, which the Constitution surely protects, but
which Members of Congress analogized to “crack cocaine,” 144 Cong.
Rec. S868 (Feb. 24, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Daschle), “drive-by
shooting[s],” id., at S879 (remarks of Sen. Durbin), and
“air pollution,” 143 Cong. Rec. 20505 (1997) (remarks of Sen.
Dorgan). There is good reason to believe that the ending of
negative campaign ads was the principal attraction of the
legislation. A Senate sponsor said, “I hope that we will not allow
our attention to be distracted from the real issues at hand—how to
raise the tenor of the debate in our elections and give people real
choices. No one benefits from negative ads. They don’t aid our
Nation’s political dialog.” Id., at 20521–20522 (remarks
of Sen. McCain). He assured the body that “[y]ou cut off the soft
money, you are going to see a lot less of that [attack ads].
Prohibit unions and corporations, and you will see a lot less of
that. If you demand full disclosure for those who pay for those
ads, you are going to see a lot less of that . . . .” 147 Cong.
Rec. S3116 (Mar. 29, 2001) (remarks of Sen. McCain). See also, e.g. , 148 Cong. Rec. S2117 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of
Sen. Cantwell) (“This bill is about slowing the ad war. . . . It is
about slowing political advertising and making sure the flow of
negative ads by outside interest groups does not continue to
permeate the airwaves”); 143 Cong. Rec. 20746 (1997) (remarks of
Sen. Boxer) (“These so-called issues ads are not regulated at all
and mention candidates by name. They directly attack candidates
without any accountability. It is brutal… . We have an
opportunity in the McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . .”); 145
Cong. Rec. S12606–S12607 (Oct. 14, 1999) (remarks of Sen.
Wellstone) (“I think these issue advocacy ads are a nightmare. I
think all of us should hate them… . [By passing the
legislation], [w]e could get some of this poison politics off
television”).

															   Another theme prominent in the legislative
debates was the notion that there is too much money spent on
elections. The first principle of “reform” was that “there should
be less money in politics.” 147 Cong. Rec. S3236 (Apr. 2, 2001)
(remarks of Sen. Murray). “The enormous amounts of special interest
money that flood our political system have become a cancer in our
democracy.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2151 (Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy). “[L]arge sums of money drown out the voice of the average
voter.” 148 Cong. Rec. H373 (Feb. 13, 2002) (remarks of Rep.
Langevin). The system of campaign finance is “drowning in money.” Id., at H404 (remarks of Rep. Menendez). And most
expansively:

															“Despite the ever-increasing sums spent on
campaigns, we have not seen an improvement in campaign discourse,
issue discussion or voter education. More money does not mean more
ideas, more substance or more depth. Instead, it means more of what
voters complain about most. More 30-second spots, more negativity
and an increasingly longer campaign period.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2150
(Mar. 20, 2002) (remarks of Sen. Kerry).

															Perhaps voters do detest these 30-second
spots—though I suspect they detest even more hour-long
campaign-debate interruptions of their favorite entertainment
programming. Evidently, however, these ads do persuade voters, or else they would not be so routinely used by
sophisticated politicians of all parties. The point, in any event,
is that it is not the proper role of those who govern us to judge
which campaign speech has “substance” and “depth” (do you think it
might be that which is least damaging to incumbents?) and to
abridge the rest.

															   And what exactly are these outrageous sums
frittered away in determining who will govern us? A report prepared
for Congress concluded that the total amount, in hard and soft
money, spent on the 2000 federal elections was between $2.4 and
$2.5 billion. J. Cantor, CRS Report for Congress, Campaign Finance
in the 2000 Federal Elections: Overview and Estimates of the Flow
of Money (2001). All campaign spending in the United
States, including state elections, ballot initiatives, and judicial
elections, has been estimated at $3.9 billion for 2000, Nelson,
Spending in the 2000 Elections, in Financing the 2000 Election 24,
Tbl. 2–1 (D. Magleby ed. 2002), which was a year that “shattered
spending and contribution records,” id. , at 22. Even
taking this last, larger figure as the benchmark, it means that
Americans spent about half as much electing all their Nation’s
officials, state and federal, as they spent on movie tickets ($7.8
billion); about a fifth as much as they spent on cosmetics and
perfume ($18.8 billion); and about a sixth as much as they spent on
pork (the nongovernmental sort) ($22.8 billion). See U. S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Tbl. 2.6U (Col. AS; Rows
356, 214, and 139), http:// www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/206u.csv. If our
democracy is drowning from this much spending, it cannot swim.

															* * *

															   Which brings me back to where I
began: This litigation is about preventing criticism of the
government. I cannot say for certain that many, or some, or even
any, of the Members of Congress who voted for this legislation did
so not to produce “fairer” campaigns, but to mute criticism of
their records and facilitate reelection. Indeed, I will stipulate
that all those who voted for the Act believed they were acting for
the good of the country. There remains the problem of the Charlie
Wilson Phenomenon, named after Charles Wilson, former president of
General Motors, who is supposed to have said during the Senate
hearing on his nomination as Secretary of Defense that “what’s good
for General Motors is good for the country.”* Those in power, even
giving them the benefit of the greatest good will, are inclined to
believe that what is good for them is good for the country. Whether
in prescient recognition of the Charlie Wilson Phenomenon, or out
of fear of good old-fashioned, malicious, self-interested
manipulation, “[t]he fundamental approach of the First Amendment .
. . was to assume the worst, and to rule the regulation of
political speech ‘for fairness’ sake’ simply out of bounds.” Austin , 494 U. S., at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Having
abandoned that approach to a limited extent in Buckley , we
abandon it much further today.

															   We will unquestionably be called upon to
abandon it further still in the future. The most frightening
passage in the lengthy floor debates on this legislation is the
following assurance given by one of the cosponsoring Senators to
his colleagues:

															“This is a modest step, it is a first step, it is
an essential step, but it does not even begin to address, in some
ways, the fundamental problems that exist with the hard money
aspect of the system.” 148 Cong. Rec. S2101 (Mar. 20, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Feingold).

															The system indeed. The first instinct of power is
the retention of power, and, under a Constitution that requires
periodic elections, that is best achieved by the suppression of
election-time speech. We have witnessed merely the second scene of
Act I of what promises to be a lengthy tragedy. In scene 3 the
Court, having abandoned most of the First Amendment weaponry that Buckley left intact, will be even less equipped to resist
the incumbents’ writing of the rules of political debate. The
federal election campaign laws, which are already (as today’s
opinions show) so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no
ordinary citizen dare run for office, or even contribute a
significant sum, without hiring an expert advisor in the field, can
be expected to grow more voluminous, more detailed, and more
complex in the years to come—and always, always, with the objective
of reducing the excessive amount of speech.

															* It is disillusioning to learn that the
fabled quote is inaccurate. Wilson actually said: “[F]or years I
thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors,
and vice versa. The difference did not exist.” Hearings before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 26
(1953). OPINION OF THOMAS, J. MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NOS. 02-1674, 02-1675, 02-1676, 02-1702, 02-1727, 02-1733,
02-1734;02-1740, 02-1747, 02-1753, 02-1755, AND
02-1756 MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1674 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1675 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1676 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES SENATOR, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1702 v .

															MITCH McCONNELL, UNITED STATES SENATOR,
et al.;

															REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1727 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1733 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, APPELLANTS

															02–1734 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1740 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															RON PAUL, UNITED STATES CONGRESSMAN, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1747 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al.,
APPELLANTS

															02–1753 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1755 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.;

															CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
et al., APPELLANTS

															02–1756 v .

															FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al.

															on appeals from the united states district court
for the district of columbia

															[December 10, 2003]

															   Justice Thomas, concurring with
respect to BCRA Titles III and IV, except for BCRA §§311 and 318,
concurring in the result with respect to BCRA §318, concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA
Title II, and dissenting with respect to BCRA Titles I, V, and
§311.*

															   The First Amendment provides that
“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.”
Nevertheless, the Court today upholds what can only be described as
the most significant abridgment of the freedoms of speech and
association since the Civil War. With breathtaking scope, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), directly targets and
constricts core political speech, the “primary object of First
Amendment protection.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 , 410–411
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because “the First Amendment ’has
its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office,” Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214 , 223
(1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265 , 272
(1971)), our duty is to approach these restrictions “with the
utmost skepticism” and subject them to the “strictest scrutiny.” Shrink Missouri , supra , at 412 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).

															   In response to this assault on the free
exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the
appropriate standard of review or of the Court’s traditional role
of protecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very
“purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 , 390
(1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that “the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market,” Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616 , 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), is cast aside in the purported
service of preventing “corruption,” or the mere “appearance of
corruption.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 26 (1976) (per curiam). Apparently, the marketplace of ideas is to
be fully open only to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964);
nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501
U. S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002);
flag burners, United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990);
and cross burners, Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S.
___ (2003).

															   Because I cannot agree with the treatment
given by Justice Stevens’ and Justice O’Connor’s opinion
(hereinafter joint opinion) to speech that is “indispensable to the
effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society,” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 , 103 (1940),
I respectfully dissent. I also dissent from Justice Breyer’s
opinion upholding BCRA §504. I join The Chief Justice’s opinion in
regards to BCRA §§304, 305, 307, 316, 319, and 403(b); concur in
the result as to §318; and dissent from the opinion as to §311. I
also fully agree with Justice Kennedy’s discussion of §213 and join
that portion of his opinion. Post , at 37–38.

															I

															A

															   “[C]ampaign finance laws are
subject to strict scrutiny,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont , 539 U. S. ___, ___ (2003) (slip op., at 1)
(Thomas, J., dissenting), and thus Title I must satisfy that
demanding standard even if it were (incorrectly) conceived of as
nothing more than a contribution limitation. The defendants do not
even attempt to defend Title I under this standard, and for good
reason: The various restrictions imposed by Title I are much less
narrowly tailored to target only corrupting or problematic
donations than even the contribution limits in Shrink
Missouri . See 528 U. S., at 427–430 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see also Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604 , 641–644
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado I). And, as I
have previously noted, it is unclear why “[b]ribery laws [that] bar
precisely the quid pro quo arrangements that are targeted
here” and “disclosure laws” are not “less restrictive means of
addressing [the Government’s] interest in curtailing corruption.” Shrink Missouri , supra , at 428.

															   The joint opinion not only
continues the errors of Buckley v. Valeo, by
applying a low level of scrutiny to contribution ceilings, but also
builds upon these errors by expanding the anticircumvention
rationale beyond reason. Admittedly, exploitation of an
anticircumvention concept has a long pedigree, going back at least
to Buckley itself. Buckley upheld a $1,000
contribution ceiling as a way to combat both the “actuality and
appearance of corruption.” 424 U. S., at 26. The challengers in Buckley contended both that bribery laws represented “a
less restrictive means of dealing with ‘proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements,’ ” id ., at 27,
and that the $1,000 contribution ceiling was overbroad as “most
large contributors do not seek improper influence over a
candidate’s position or an officeholder’s action,” id ., at
29. The Court rejected the first argument on the grounds that “laws
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the
most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence
governmental action,” id ., at 27–28, and rejected the
second on the grounds that “it [is] difficult to isolate suspect
contributions,” id ., at 30.[ Footnote 1 ] But a broadly drawn bribery law[ Footnote 2 ] would cover even subtle and
general attempts to influence government officials corruptly,
eliminating the Court’s first concern. And, an effective bribery
law would deter actual quid pro quos and would, in all
likelihood, eliminate any appearance of corruption in the
system.

															   Hence, at root, the Buckley Court was
concerned that bribery laws could not be effectively enforced to
prevent quid pro quos between donors and officeholders,
and the only rational reading of Buckley is that it
approved the $1,000 contribution ceiling on this ground. The Court
then, however, having at least in part concluded that individual
contribution ceilings were necessary to prevent easy evasion of
bribery laws, proceeded to uphold a separate contribution
limitation, using, as the only justification, the “prevent[ion]
[of] evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation.” Id .,
at 38. The need to prevent circumvention of a limitation that was
itself an anticircumvention measure led to the upholding of another
significant restriction on individuals’ freedom of speech.

															   The joint opinion now repeats this process.
New Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) §323(a), 2 U.
S. C. A. §441i(a) (Supp. 2003), is intended to prevent
easy circumvention of the (now) $2,000 contribution ceiling. The
joint opinion even recognizes this, relying heavily on evidence
that, for instance, “candidates and donors alike have in fact
exploited the soft-money loophole, the former to increase their
prospects of election and the latter to create debt on the part of
officeholders, with the national parties serving as willing
intermediaries.” Ante , at 36. The joint opinion upholds
§323(a), in part, on the grounds that it had become too easy to
circumvent the $2,000 cap by using the national parties as
go-betweens.

															   And the remaining provisions of new FECA §323
are upheld mostly as measures preventing circumvention of other
contribution limits, including §323(a), ante, at 55–57
(§323(b)); ante, at 66–69 (§323(d)); ante, at 75
(§323(e)); ante, at 77–78 (§323(f)), which, as I have
already explained, is a second-order anticircumvention measure. The
joint opinion’s handling of §323(f) is perhaps most telling, as it
upholds §323(f) only because of “Congress’ eminently reasonable prediction that … state and local candidates and
officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money
funding of sham issue advertising.” Ante, at 78 (emphasis
added). That is, this Court upholds a third-order anticircumvention
measure based on Congress’ anticipation of circumvention of these
second-order anticircumvention measures that might possibly, at
some point in the future, pose some problem.

															   It is not difficult to see where this leads.
Every law has limits, and there will always be behavior not covered
by the law but at its edges; behavior easily characterized as
“circumventing” the law’s prohibition. Hence, speech regulation
will again expand to cover new forms of “circumvention,” only to
spur supposed circumvention of the new regulations, and so forth.
Rather than permit this never-ending and self-justifying process, I
would require that the Government explain why proposed speech
restrictions are needed in light of actual Government interests,
and, in particular, why the bribery laws are not sufficient.

															B

															   But Title I falls even on the
joint opinion’s terms. This Court has held that “[t]he quantum of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justification raised.” Shrink
Missouri , 528 U. S., at 391. And three Members of today’s
majority have observed that “the opportunity for corruption”
presented by “[u]nregulated ‘soft money’ contributions” is “at
best, attenuated.” Colorado I , 518 U. S., at 616 (opinion
of Breyer, J., joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.). Such an
observation is quite clearly correct. A donation to a political
party is a clumsy method by which to influence a candidate, as the
party is free to spend the donation however it sees fit, and could
easily spend the money as to provide no help to the candidate. And,
a soft-money donation to a party will be of even less benefit to a
candidate, “because of legal restrictions on how the money may be
spent.” Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674 et al.,
p. 43. It follows that the defendants bear an especially heavy
empirical burden in justifying Title I.

															   The evidence cited by the joint
opinion does not meet this standard and would barely suffice for
anything more than rational-basis review. The first category of the
joint opinion’s evidence is evidence that “federal officeholders
have commonly asked donors to make soft-money donations to national
and state committees solely in order to assist federal campaigns,
including the officeholder’s own.” Ante , at 36 (internal
quotation marks omitted). But to the extent that donors and federal
officeholders have collaborated so that donors could give donations
to a national party committee “for the purpose of influencing any
election for Federal office,” the alleged soft-money donation is in
actuality a regular “contribution” as already defined and regulated
by FECA. See 2 U. S. C. §431(8)(A)(i). Neither the joint
opinion nor the defendants present evidence that enforcement of
pre-BCRA law has proved to be impossible, ineffective, or even
particularly difficult.

															   The second category is evidence that
“lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals” have “donat[ed]
substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on
ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing
influence over federal officials.” Ante , at 37. Even if
true (and the cited evidence consists of nothing more than vague
allegations of wrongdoing), it is unclear why existing bribery laws
could not address this problem. Again, neither the joint opinion
nor the defendants point to evidence that the enforcement of
bribery laws has been or would be ineffective. If the problem has
been clear and widespread, as the joint opinion suggests, I would
expect that convictions, or at least prosecutions, would be more
frequent.

															   The third category is evidence characterized
by the joint opinion as “connect[ing] soft money to manipulations
of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact,
among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and
tobacco legislation.” Ante , at 40. But the evidence for
this is no stronger than the evidence that there has been actual
vote buying or vote switching for soft money. The joint opinion’s
citations to the record do not stand for the propositions that they
claim. For instance, the McCain declaration does not provide any
evidence of any exchange of legislative action for donations of any
kind (hard or soft).[ Footnote
3 ] Neither do the Simpson or Simon declarations, with perhaps
one exception effectively addressed by Justice Kennedy’s
opinion.[ Footnote 4 ] See post , at 18–19. In fact, the findings by two of the
District Court’s judges confirm that the evidence of any quid
pro quo corruption is exceedingly weak, if not nonexistent.
See 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 349–352 (DC 2003) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id ., at 851–853 (Leon, J.). The evidence cited by the
joint opinion is properly described as “at best, [the Members of
Congress’] personal conjecture regarding the impact of soft money
donations on the voting practices of their present and former
colleagues.” Id. , at 852 (Leon, J.).

															   The joint opinion also places a substantial
amount of weight on the fact that “in 1996 and 2000, more than half
of the top 50 soft-money donors gave substantial sums to both major national parties,” and suggests that this fact
“leav[es] room for no other conclusion but that these donors were
seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting
any particular ideology.” Ante , at 38 (emphasis in
original). But that is not necessarily the case. The two major
parties are not perfect ideological opposites, and supporters or
opponents of certain policies or ideas might find substantial
overlap between the two parties. If donors feel that both major
parties are in general agreement over an issue of importance to
them, it is unremarkable that such donors show support for both
parties. This commonsense explanation surely belies the joint
opinion’s too-hasty conclusion drawn from a relatively innocent
fact.

															   The Court today finds such sparse evidence
sufficient. This cannot be held to satisfy even the “relatively
complaisant review” of Beaumont , 539 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 14), unless, as it appears, the Court intends to abdicate
entirely its role.[ Footnote
5 ]

															II

															   The Court is not content with
“balanc[ing] away First Amendment freedoms,” Shrink
Missouri, 528 U. S., at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting), in the
context of the restrictions imposed by Title I, which could
arguably (if wrongly) be thought to be mere contribution limits.
The Court also, in upholding virtually all of Title II, proceeds to
do the same for limitations on expenditures, which constitute
“political expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of
the First Amendment freedoms,’ ” Buckley, 424 U. S.,
at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes , 393 U. S. 23 , 32 (1968)).
Today’s holding continues a disturbing trend: the steady decrease
in the level of scrutiny applied to restrictions on core political
speech. See Buckley , supra , at 16 (First
Amendment requires “exacting scrutiny”); Shrink Missouri , supra , at 387 (applying “ Buckley ’s standard of
scrutiny”); Beaumont, supra , at ___ (slip op., at 14)
(referencing “relatively complaisant review”).[ Footnote 6 ] Although this trend is most obvious
in the review of contribution limits, it has now reached what even
this Court today would presumably recognize as a direct restriction
on core political speech: limitations on independent
expenditures.

															A

															   Of course, by accepting Congress’
expansion of what constitutes “coordination” for purposes of
treating expenditures as limitations, the Court can pretend that it
is, in fact, still only restricting primarily “contributions.” I
need not say much about this illusion. I have already discussed how
the language used in new FECA §315(a)(7)(B)(ii) is, even under Buckley ’s framework, overly broad and restricts fully
protected speech. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431 , 467–468
(2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Colorado II). The
particular language used, “expenditures made by any person … in
cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, a national, State, or local committee of a political
party,” BCRA §214(a)(2), captures expenditures with “no
constitutional difference” from “a purely independent one.” Id., at 468 (Thomas, J., dissenting).[ Footnote 7 ] And new FECA
§315(a)(7)(C), although using the neutral term “coordinated,”
certainly has the purpose of “clarif[ying] the scope of the
preceding subsection, §315(a)(7)(B),” ante , at 95 (joint
opinion), and thus should be read to be as expansive as the overly
broad language in §315(a)(7)(B). Hence, it too is
unconstitutional. B As for §§203 and 204,
the Court rests its decision on another vast expansion of the First
Amendment framework described in Buckley , this time of the
Court’s, rather than Congress’, own making. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 , 659–660
(1990), the Court recognized a “different type of corruption” from
the “ ‘financial quid pro quo’ ” : the “corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.” The only effect, however, that the
“immense aggregations” of wealth will have (in the context of
independent expenditures) on an election is that they might be used
to fund communications to convince voters to select certain
candidates over others. In other words, the “corrosive and
distorting effects” described in Austin are that
corporations, on behalf of their shareholders, will be able to
convince voters of the correctness of their ideas. Apparently,
winning in the marketplace of ideas is no longer a sign that “the
ultimate good” has been “reached by free trade in ideas,” or that
the speaker has survived “the best test of truth” by having “the
thought … get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams , 250 U. S., at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is
now evidence of “corruption.” This conclusion is antithetical to
everything for which the First Amendment stands. See, e.g.,
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 , 790 (1978) (“[T]he fact
that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it”); Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U. S. 684 , 689
(1959) (“[I]n the realm of ideas [the Constitution] protects
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is
unconvincing”). Because Austin ’s definition of “corruption” is incompatible with
the First Amendment, I would overturn Austin and hold that
the potential for corporations and unions to influence voters, via
independent expenditures aimed at convincing these voters to adopt
particular views, is not a form of corruption justifying any state
regulation or suppression. Without Austin ’s peculiar
variation of “corruption,” §§203 and 204 are supported by no
compelling government interest. The joint opinion does not even
argue that these provisions address quid pro quo corruption.[ Footnote 8 ] And the
shareholder protection rationale is equally unavailing. The
“shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is
free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason,” Bellotti, supra , at 794, n. 34. Hence, no
compelling interest can be found in protecting minority
shareholders from the corporation’s use of its general treasury,
especially where, in other contexts, “equally important and
controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by a
predetermined percentage of the shareholders.” Ibid . C I must now address an
issue on which I differ from all of my colleagues: the disclosure
provisions in BCRA §201, now contained in new FECA §304(f). The
“historical evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed
attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities
on the ground that forced disclosure violated the ‘freedom of the
press.’ ” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 , 361 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).[ Footnote 9 ]
Indeed, this Court has explicitly recognized that “the interest in
having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring
disclosure as a condition of entry,” and thus that “an author’s
decision to remain anonymous … is an aspect of the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment.” Id ., at 342. The
Court now backs away from this principle, allowing the established
right to anonymous speech to be stripped away based on the
flimsiest of justifications. The only plausible
interest asserted by the defendants to justify the disclosure
provisions is the interest in providing “information” about the
speaker to the public. But we have already held that “[t]he simple
interest in providing voters with additional relevant information
does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements
or disclosures she would otherwise omit.” Id., at 348. Of
course, Buckley upheld the disclosure requirement on
expenditures for communications using words of express advocacy
based on this informational interest. 424 U. S., at 81. And
admittedly, McIntyre purported to distinguish Buckley . McIntyre , supra, at 355–356.
But the two ways McIntyre distinguished Buckley —one, that the disclosure of “an expenditure and
its use, without more, reveals far less information [than a forced
identification of the author of a pamphlet,]” 514 U. S., at 355;
and two, that in candidate elections, the “Government can identify
a compelling state interest in avoiding the corruption that might
result from campaign expenditures,” id ., at 356—are
inherently implausible. The first is simply wrong. The revelation
of one’s political expenditures for independent communications
about candidates can be just as revealing as the revelation of
one’s name on a pamphlet for a noncandidate election. See also id. , at 384 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The second was
outright rejected in Buckley itself, where the Court
concluded that independent expenditures did not create any
substantial risk of real or apparent corruption. 424 U. S., at 47.
Hence, the only reading of McIntyre that remains
consistent with the principles it contains is that it overturned Buckley to the extent that Buckley upheld a
disclosure requirement solely based on the governmental interest in
providing information to the voters. The right to anonymous speech
cannot be abridged based on the interests asserted by the
defendants. I would thus hold that the disclosure requirements of
BCRA §201 are unconstitutional. Because of this conclusion, the
so-called advance disclosure requirement of §201 necessarily falls
as well.[ Footnote
10 ] D I have long
maintained that Buckley was incorrectly decided and should
be overturned. See Colorado II , 533 U. S., at 465; Shrink Missouri , 528 U. S., at 410; Colorado I ,
518 U. S., at 640. But, most of Title II should still be held
unconstitutional even under the Buckley framework. Under Buckley and Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL) , it is, or at least was, clear that any regulation
of political speech beyond communications using words of express
advocacy is unconstitutional. Hence, even under the joint opinion’s
framework, most of Title II is unconstitutional, as both the
“primary definition” and “backup definition” of “electioneering
communications” cover a significant number of communications that
do not use words of express advocacy. 2 U. S. C. A.
§434(f)(3)(A) (Supp. 2003).[ Footnote 11 ] In Buckley ,
the Court was presented with the ambiguous language “ ‘any
expenditure … relative to a clearly identified candidate.’ ”
424 U. S., at 41. The Court noted that the “use of so indefinite a
phrase as ‘relative to’ a candidate fails to clearly mark the
boundary between permissible and impermissible speech.” Ibid . Hence, the Court read the phrase to mean “advocating
the election or defeat of a candidate.” Id ., at 42
(internal quotation marks omitted). But this construction did not
complete the vagueness inquiry. As the Court observed: “[T]he distinction between discussion
of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Candidates,
especially incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues
involving legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only
do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on various
public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of public
interest.” Ibid. The Court then recognized that the
constitutional issues raised by the provision “can be avoided only
by reading §608(e)(1) as limited to communications that include
explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate.”
Id ., at 43. The joint opinion argues that Buckley adopted this narrow reading only to avoid
addressing a constitutional question. “[T]he concept of express
advocacy and the concomitant class of magic words were born of an
effort to avoid constitutional infirmities,” concludes the joint
opinion after examining the language of Buckley . Ante , at 85. This ignores the fact that the Court then
struck down the expenditure limitation precisely because it was too
narrow: “The exacting interpretation of the
statutory language necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness
thus undermines the limitation’s effectiveness as a
loophole-closing provision by facilitating circumvention by those
seeking to exert improper influence upon a candidate or
officeholder. It would naively underestimate the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to
believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures
that skirted the restriction on express advocacy of election or
defeat but nevertheless benefited the candidate’s campaign. Yet no
substantial societal interest would be served by a loophole-closing
provision designed to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous
persons and organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in
order to obtain improper influence over candidates for elective
office.” 424 U. S., at 45. Far from saving the provision from
constitutional doubt, the Court read the provision in such a way as
to guarantee its unconstitutionality. If there were some
possibility that regulation of communications without words of
express advocacy were constitutional, the provision would have to
have been read to include these communications, and the
constitutional question addressed head on.[ Footnote 12 ] Indeed, the exceedingly narrow
reading of the relevant language in Buckley is far from
mandated by the text; it is, in fact, a highly strained reading.
“ ‘[A]ny expenditure … relative to a clearly identified
candidate,’ ” id ., at 41, would be better read to
cover, for instance, any expenditure for an advertisement aired
close to an election that is “intended to influence the voters’
decisions and ha[s] that effect,” a standard apparently endorsed by
the joint opinion as being sufficiently “equivalent” to express
advocacy to justify its regulation. Ante , at 99–100. By
deliberately adopting a strained and narrow reading of the
statutory text and then striking down the provision in question for
being too narrow, the Court made clear that regulation of
nonexpress advocacy was strictly forbidden. This reading is confirmed by other
portions of Buckley and by other cases. For instance, in
limiting FECA’s disclosure provisions to expenditures involving
express advocacy, the Court noted that it gave such a narrowing
interpretation “[t]o insure that the reach of [the disclosure
provision] is not impermissibly broad .” 424 U. S., at 80
(emphasis added). If overbreadth were a concern in limiting the
scope of a disclosure provision, it surely was equally a concern in
the limitation of an actual cap on expenditures. And, in MCFL , the Court arguably eliminated any ambiguity
remaining in Buckley when it explicitly stated that the
narrowing interpretations taken in Buckley were necessary
“in order to avoid problems of overbreadth.” MCFL , 479 U.
S., at 248. The joint opinion’s attempt to explain away MCFL ’s uncomfortable language is unpersuasive. The joint
opinion emphasizes that the MCFL Court “held that a
‘similar construction ’ must apply to the expenditure
limitation,” as if that somehow proved its point. Ante , at
85, n. 76 (emphasis in original). The fact that the MCFL Court said this does not establish anything, of
course; adopting a narrow construction of a statute “in order to
avoid problems of overbreadth,” 479 U. S., at 248, is perfectly
consistent with a holding that, lacking the narrowing construction,
the statute would be overly broad, i.e. ,
unconstitutional. The defendants’ principal argument
in response is that “it would be bizarre to conclude that
the Constitution permits Congress to prohibit the use of corporate
or union general treasury funds for electioneering advertisements,
but that the only standard that it can constitutionally
use (express advocacy) is one that misses the vast majority (88.6
percent) of advertisements that candidates themselves use for
electioneering.” Brief for FEC et al. in No. 02–1674
et al., p. 103 (emphasis in original). The joint opinion echoes this, stating
that the express advocacy line “cannot be squared with our
longstanding recognition that the presence or absence of magic
words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering speech from a
true issue ad.” Ante , at 86. First, the presence of the
“magic words” does differentiate in a meaningful way
between categories of speech. Speech containing the “magic words”
is “unambiguously campaign related,” Buckley , supra , at 81, while speech without these words is not.
Second, it is far from bizarre to suggest that (potentially
regulable) speech that is in practice impossible to differentiate
from fully protected speech must be fully protected. It is, rather,
part and parcel of First Amendment first principles. See, e.g., Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S., at 255
(“The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to
suppress unlawful speech. Protected speech does not become
unprotected merely because it resembles the latter. The
Constitution requires the reverse”). In fact, First Amendment
protection was extended to that fundamental category of artistic
and entertaining speech not for its own sake, but only because it
was indistinguishable, practically, from speech intended to inform.
See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495 , 501
(1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 , 510
(1948) (rejecting suggestion that “the constitutional protection
for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas” as the
“line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of that basic right,” noting that “[w]hat is one
man’s amusement, teaches another’s doctrine”). This principle
clearly played a significant role in Buckley itself, see
424 U. S., at 42 (after noting that “the distinction between
discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application,”
holding that the “express advocacy” standard must be adopted as the
interpretation of the relevant language in FECA). The
express-advocacy line was drawn to ensure the protection of the
“discussion of issues and candidates,” not out of some strange
obsession of the Court to create meaningless lines. And the joint
opinion misses the point when it notes that “ Buckley ’s
express advocacy line, in short, has not aided the legislative
effort to combat real or apparent corruption.” Ante , at
86–87. Buckley did not draw this line solely to aid in
combating real or apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure
the protection of speech unrelated to election campaigns.[ Footnote 13 ] Nor is this to say that speech
with words of express advocacy is somehow less protected, as the
joint opinion claims. Ante, at 99. The Court in Buckley recognized an informational interest that
justified the imposition of a disclosure requirement on
campaign-related speech. See 424 U. S., at 81. This interest is not
implicated with regard to speech that is unrelated to an election
campaign. Hence, it would be unconstitutional to impose such a
disclosure requirement on non-election-related speech. And, as “the
distinction between discussion of issues and candidates … may often
dissolve in practical application,” id ., at 42, the only
way to prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection speech is
to impose the regulation only on speech that is “unambiguously
campaign related,” id ., at 81, i.e. , speech using
words of express advocacy. Hence, speech that uses words of express
advocacy is protected under the same standard, strict scrutiny, as
all other forms of speech. The only difference is that, under Buckley , there is a governmental interest supporting some
regulation of those using words of express advocacy not present in
other forms of speech. * * * The chilling endpoint
of the Court’s reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright
regulation of the press. None of the rationales offered by the
defendants, and none of the reasoning employed by the Court,
exempts the press. “This is so because of the difficulty, and
perhaps impossibility, of distinguishing, either as a matter of
fact or constitutional law, media corporations from [nonmedia]
corporations.” Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 796 (Burger,
C. J., concurring). Media companies can run procandidate
editorials as easily as nonmedia corporations can pay for
advertisements. Candidates can be just as grateful to media
companies as they can be to corporations and unions. In terms of
“the corrosive and distorting effects” of wealth accumulated by
corporations that has “little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas,” Austin ,
494 U. S., at 660, there is no distinction between a media
corporation and a nonmedia corporation.[ Footnote 14 ] Media corporations are influential. There
is little doubt that the editorials and commentary they run can
affect elections. Nor is there any doubt that media companies often
wish to influence elections. One would think that the New York
Times fervently hopes that its endorsement of Presidential
candidates will actually influence people. What is to stop a future
Congress from determining that the press is “too influential,” and
that the “appearance of corruption” is significant when media
organizations endorse candidates or run “slanted” or “biased” news
stories in favor of candidates or parties? Or, even easier, what is
to stop a future Congress from concluding that the availability of
unregulated media corporations creates a loophole that allows for
easy “circumvention” of the limitations of the current campaign
finance laws?[ Footnote
15 ] Indeed, I believe
that longstanding and heretofore unchallenged opinions such as Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), are in peril.
There, the Court noted that “[c]hains of newspapers, national
newspapers, national wire and news services, and one-newspaper
towns, are the dominant features of a press that has become
noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its
capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of
events.” Id ., at 249. Despite expressing some sympathy for
those arguing for a legally created “right of access” to encourage
diversity in viewpoints in the media, the Court struck down such
laws, noting that these laws acted both to suppress speech and to
“intru[de] into the function of editors” by interfering with “the
exercise of editorial control and judgment.” Id ., at
257–258. Now, supporters of such laws need only argue that the
press’ “capacity to manipulate popular opinion” gives rise to an
“appearance of corruption,” especially when this capacity is used
to promote a particular candidate or party. After drumming up some
evidence,[ Footnote 16 ] laws
regulating media outlets in their issuance of editorials would be
upheld under the joint opinion’s reasoning (a result considered so
beyond the pale in Miami Herald Publishing that the Court
there used it as a reductio ad absurdum against the
right-of-access law being addressed, see id ., at 256). Nor
is there anything in the joint opinion that would prevent Congress
from imposing the Fairness Doctrine, not just on radio and
television broadcasters, but on the entire media. See Red Lion
Broadcasting , 395 U. S., at 369 (defining the “fairness
doctrine” as a “requirement that discussion of public issues be
presented … and that each side of those issues must be given fair
coverage”). Hence, “the freedom of the press,”
described as “one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty,” 1 J.
Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 335 (___ ed. 1876)
(declaration of Rhode Island upon the ratification of the
Constitution),[ Footnote 17 ]
could be next on the chopping block. Although today’s opinion does
not expressly strip the press of First Amendment protection, there
is no principle of law or logic that would prevent the application
of the Court’s reasoning in that setting. The press now operates at
the whim of Congress. *  Justice Scalia joins Parts
I, II–A, and II–B of this opinion. Footnote 1 The Court also rejected an
overbreadth challenge, reasoning that “Congress was justified in
concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance
of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in
the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated.” Buckley , 424 U. S., at 30. But this justification was
inextricably intertwined with the Court’s concern over the
difficulty of isolating suspect contributions. If it were easy to
isolate suspect contributions, and if bribery laws could be quickly
and effectively enforced, then there would be no “opportunity for
abuse inherent in the process,” ibid., and hence no need
for an otherwise overbroad contribution ceiling. Footnote 2 Arguably, the current antibribery
statute, 18 U. S. C. §201, is broad enough to cover the
unspecified other “attempts … to influence governmental action”
that the Buckley Court seemed worried about. 424 U. S., at
28. Footnote 3 Indeed, the principal contents of
Senator McCain’s declaration are his complaints that several bills
he supported were defeated. The Senator also suggests, without
evidence, that there had been some connection between the defeat of
his favored policy outcomes and certain soft-money donors. See, e.g. , App. 393–394, ¶ ;10 (declaration of Sen. John McCain
¶ ;10) (noting Democratic “parliamentary procedural device” used to
block one of Senator McCain’s proposed amendments to the
Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance bill). The possibility that his
favored policy outcomes lost due to lack of public support, or
because the opponents of the amendment honestly believed it would
do harm to the public, does not appear to be addressed. Footnote 4 Former Senators Simpson and Simon
both seem to have the same response as Senator McCain, see
n. 3, supra, in having their favored interests voted
down, and similarly do not consider alternative explanations for
the failure of their proposals. See App. 811, ¶ ;11 (declaration of
former Sen. Alan Simpson ¶ ;11); App. 805, ¶ ;14 (declaration of
former Sen. Paul Simon ¶ ;14). Footnote 5 Because there is not an iota of
evidence supporting the Government’s asserted interests in BCRA
§318, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that this provision is
unconstitutional. Footnote 6 The joint opinion continues yet
another disturbing trend: the application of a complaisant level of
scrutiny under the guise of “strict scrutiny.” See Grutter v. Bollinger , 539 U. S. ___ (2003). Footnote 7 This is doubly so now that the
Court has decided that there is no constitutional need for the
showing even of an “agreement” in order to transform an expenditure
into a “coordinated expenditur[e]” and hence into a contribution
for FECA purposes. Ante , at 115–117 (joint
opinion). Footnote 8 The National Rifle Association
(NRA) plaintiffs compellingly state that “[a]s a measure designed
to prevent official corruption, of either the quid pro quo or the ‘gratitude’ variety, Title II … makes no more sense than a
bribery statute requiring corporations to pay for their bribes
using funds from PACs.” Brief for Appellants NRA et al. in No.
02–1675, pp. 24–25. And, regarding the appearance of
corruption: “Defendants’ own witnesses concede that the public’s
perceptions of ads is not affected in the slightest by whether they
are purchased with general treasury funds or with PAC money.” Id ., at 25. Footnote 9 The fact that the Founders
located the right to anonymous speech in the “freedom of the press”
is of no moment, as “it makes little difference in terms of our
analysis, which seeks to determine only whether the First
Amendment, as originally understood, protects anonymous writing.” McIntyre , 514 U. S., at 360 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Footnote
10 BCRA §212(a) is also
unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs only challenge the
advance disclosure requirement of §212(a), by requiring disclosure
of communications using express advocacy, the entire reporting
requirement is unconstitutional for the same reasons that §201 is
unconstitutional. Consequently, it follows that the advance
disclosure provision is unconstitutional. BCRA §§311 and 504 also violate
the First Amendment. By requiring any television or radio
advertisement that satisfies the definition of “electioneering
communication” to include the identity of the sponsor, and even a
“full-screen view of a representative of the political committee or
other person making the statement” in the case of a television
advertisement, new FECA §318, §311 is a virtual carbon copy of the
law at issue in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995) (the only
difference being the irrelevant distinction between a printed
pamphlet and a television or radio advertisement). And §504 not
only has the precise flaws of §201, but also sweeps broadly as
well, covering any “message relating to any political matter of
national importance, including … a national legislative issue of
public importance.” Hence, both §§311 and 504 should be struck
down. Footnote
11 The Court, in upholding most of
its provisions by concluding that the “express advocacy” limitation
derived by Buckley is not a constitutionally mandated
line, has, in one blow, overturned every Court of Appeals that has
addressed this question (except, perhaps, one). See Clifton v. FEC , 114 F. 3d 1309, 1312 (CA1
1997); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell , 221 F. 3d 376, 387 (CA2 2000); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc ., 110 F. 3d 1049,
1064 (CA4 1997); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore ,
288 F. 3d 187, 193 (CA5 2000); Iowa Right to Life Comm.,
Inc. v. Williams , 187 F. 3d 963, 968–970 (CA8
1999); Citizens for Responsible Govt. State Political Action
Comm. v. Davidson , 236 F. 3d 1174, 1187 (CA10
2000). The one possible exception is the Ninth Circuit. See FEC v. Furgatch , 807 F. 2d 857, 862–863
(1987). Footnote
12 After all, the constitutional
avoidance doctrine counsels us to adopt constructions of statutes
to “avoid decision of constitutional questions,” not to
deliberately create constitutional questions. United
States v. Thirty&nbhyph;seven
Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 , 373
(1971); see also United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 , 408
(1909). Footnote
13 This very case is an excellent
example of why such a bright-line rule is necessary. The Court,
having “rejected the notion that the First Amendment requires
Congress to treat so-called issue advocacy differently from express
advocacy,” ante , at 87–88, proceeds to uphold significant
new restrictions on speech that is, in every sense of the word,
pure issue-related speech. The Court abandons the bright-line rule,
and now subjects political speech of virtually any kind to the risk
of regulation by Congress. Footnote
14 Chief Justice Burger presciently
commented on precisely this point in First Nat. Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 , 796–797 (1978)
(citations omitted): “In terms of ‘unfair advantage in the political
process’ and ‘corporate domination of the electoral process,’ it
could be argued that such media conglomerates as I describe pose a
much more realistic threat to valid interests than do appellants
and similar entities not regularly concerned with shaping popular
opinion on public issues. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo , [ 418 U. S. 241 (1974)]. In Tornillo , for example, we noted the serious contentions
advanced that a result of the growth of modern media empires ‘has
been to place in a few hands the power to inform the American
people and shape public opinion.’ 418 U. S., at 250.” Footnote
15 It appears that “circumvention”
of the campaign finance laws by exploiting media exemptions is
already being planned by one of the plaintiffs in this litigation.
See Theimer, NRA Seeks Status as News Outlet , Washington
Post A09 (Dec. 7, 2003) (reporting that the NRA is looking to
acquire a broadcast outlet and seeking to be classified as a news
organization). Footnote
16 Given the quality of the evidence
the Court relies upon to uphold Title I, the evidence should not be
hard to come by. See Kane & Preston, Fox Chief on Hot Seat,
Roll Call (June 12, 2003) (“GOP leaders such as House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) have labeled CNN as the ‘Communist News
Network’ and the ‘Clinton News Network’—suggesting they only
presented the liberal viewpoint and that of former President
Clinton”); Jones, Fox News Moves from the Margins to the
Mainstream, Shorenstein Center, Harvard (Dec. 1, 2002) (quoting Al
Gore as describing Fox News and the Washington Times as “part and
parcel of the Republican Party”). Footnote
17 See also 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 151 (1769) (“The liberty of the
press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state”).

Summary: In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, including its provisions on broadcast advertising and campaign finance regulations. The Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding that the Act's amendments to the Communications Act of 1934 were valid. The case addressed a range of issues related to political speech and campaign finance, with the Court ultimately siding with increased regulation.