OCTOBER TERM, 1991

															Syllabus

															McCARTHY v. MADIGAN ET AL.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT

															No.90-6861. Argued December 9, 1991-Decided March 4,1992

															While a federal prisoner, petitioner McCarthy filed a damages
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S.
388 , alleging that respondent prison officials had violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by their deliberate indifference to his
needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation and a
history of psychiatric problems. The District Court dismissed his
complaint on the ground that he had failed to exhaust the Federal
Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy procedure, which, inter
alia, includes rapid filing and response timetables to promote
efficient dispute resolution but does not provide for any kind of
hearing or for the granting of any particular type of relief. The
court then denied McCarthy's motion for reconsideration, rejecting
his argument that exhaustion was not required because he sought
only money damages, which the Bureau could not provide. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. Held: Exhaustion of the Bureau of Prisons' administrative
procedure is not required before a federal prisoner can initiate a Bivens action solely for money damages. Pp. 144-156.

															(a) Exhaustion serves the twin purposes of protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.
Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.
Otherwise, the federal courts must exercise sound judicial
discretion, determining whether to require exhaustion by balancing
the individual's interest in retaining prompt access to a federal
judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests
favoring exhaustion. Individual interests have weighed heavily
where resort to the administrative remedy would occasion undue
prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action, where there is
some doubt as to whether the agency is empowered to grant effective
relief, or where the administrative body is shown to be biased or
has otherwise predetermined the issue before it. Pp. 144-149.

															(b) Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal prisoner's Bi vens claim. And, given the type of claim McCarthy
raises and the particular characteristics of the Bureau's general
grievance procedure, McCarthy's individual interests outweigh
countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. The
procedure's short, successive filing deadlines and the absence of
any monetary remedy heavily burden a 141 petitioning inmate's individual interests. In contrast, while
the Bureau has a substantial interest in encouraging internal
resolution of grievances and in preventing the undermining of its
authority by unnecessary resort of prisoners to the federal courts,
other institutional concerns do not weigh heavily in favor of
exhaustion. The Bureau's alleged failure to render medical care
implicates only tangentially its authority to carry out the control
and management of the federal prisons, and the Bureau does not
bring to bear any special expertise on the type of issue presented
for resolution here. Nor are the interests of judicial economy
advanced substantially by the grievance procedure, which does not
create a formal factual record of the type that can be relied on
conclusively by a court for disposition of a prisoner's claim on
the pleadings or at summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.
Pp. 149-156. 914 F.2d
1411 , reversed.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 156. Paul M. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioner.

															Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney argued the cause for
respondents. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr,
Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Amy L. Wax, Victor D. Stone,
and William D. Braun.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue
in this case is whether a federal prisoner must resort to the
internal grievance procedure promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons before he may initiate a suit, pursuant to the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971),
solely for money damages. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit ruled that exhaustion of the grievance procedure was
required. 914 F.2d
1411 (1990). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the Courts of Appeals.1 499 U. S. 974 (1991).

															1 Compare Hessbrook v. Lennon, 777 F.2d
999 (CA5 1985) (exhaustion required), and Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d
664 (CAlO 1979) (same), cert. denied, 444 U. S. lO86 (1980),
with Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d
122 (CA3 142 I

															While he was a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at
Leavenworth, petitioner John J. McCarthy filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas against four prison employees: the hospital administrator,
the chief psychologist, another psychologist, and a physician.
McCarthy alleged that respondents had violated his constitutional
rights under the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference
to his needs and medical condition resulting from a back operation
and a history of psychiatric problems. On the first page of his
complaint, he wrote:

															"This Complaint seeks Money Damages Only." App.7.

															The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
petitioner had failed to exhaust prison administrative remedies. Id., at 12. Under 28 CFR pt. 542 (1991), setting forth the
general "Administrative Remedy Procedure for Inmates" at federal
correctional institutions, a prisoner may "seek formal review of a
complaint which relates to any aspect of his imprisonment." §
542.10.2 When an inmate files a complaint or appeal, the
responsible officials are directed to acknowledge the filing with a
"signed receipt" which is returned to the inmate, to "[c]onduct an
investigation," and to "[r]espond to and sign all complaints or
appeals." §§ 542.11(a)(2) to (4). The general grievance regulations
do not provide for any kind of hearing or for the granting of any
particular type of relief.

															1984) (exhaustion not required), and Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d
27 (CA6 1982) (same).

															2 Certain categories of filings, however, "will not be accepted"
under the general procedure. These include, among others, "tort
claims." See 28 CFR § 542.12 (1991). The Bureau of Prisons has
interpreted this "tort claims" exception to include claims under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, but not constitutional claims for
relief recognized under the Bivens case. Brief for
Respondents 3, n. 1. Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act are
governed by a separate administrative procedure. See §§ 543.30 to
543.32. 143 To promote efficient dispute resolution, the procedure includes
rapid filing and response timetables. An inmate first seeks
informal resolution of his claim by consulting prison personnel. §
542.13(a). If this informal effort fails, the prisoner "may file a
formal written complaint on the appropriate form, within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the date on which the basis of the complaint
occurred." § 542.13(b). Should the warden fail to respond to the
inmate's satisfaction within 15 days, the inmate has 20 days to
appeal to the Bureau's Regional Director, who has 30 days to
respond. If the inmate still remains unsatisfied, he has 30 days to
make a final appeal to the Bureau's general counsel, who has
another 30 days to respond. §§ 542.14 and 542.15. If the inmate can
demonstrate a "valid reason for delay," he "shall be allowed" an
extension of any of these time periods for filing. § 542.13(b).

															Petitioner McCarthy filed with the District Court a motion for
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
arguing that he was not required to exhaust his administrative
remedies, because he sought only money damages which, he claimed,
the Bureau could not provide.3 1 Record, Exh. 7. The court denied
the motion. App. 14.

															The Court of Appeals, in affirming, observed that because Bivens actions are a creation of the judiciary, the courts
may impose reasonable conditions upon their filing. 914 F. 2d, at
1412. The exhaustion rule, the court reasoned, "is not keyed to the
type of relief sought, but to the need for prelim-

															3 McCarthy actually had initiated a grievance prior to filing
his complaint in the District Court. Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7.
But he did not exhaust the procedures at that time and, in any
event, he concedes that that grievance related to his request for a
private cell and not to the medical issues at the heart of his
federal complaint. After his initial grievance was dismissed, he
filed a grievance with respect to the medical issues. It was
accepted, even though it was late, but was denied by the warden on
the merits. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. McCarthy's subsequent appeal to
the Bureau's regional office was rejected because it was filed
late. Id., at 16; Brief for Petitioner 5, n. 7. 144 inary fact-finding" to determine "whether there is a possible Bivens cause of action." Ibid. Accordingly,"
'[a]lthough the administrative apparatus could not award money
damages ... , administrative consideration of the possibility of
corrective action and a record would have aided a court in
measuring liability and determining the extent of the
damages.'" Ibid., quoting Goar v. Civiletti, 688 F.2d
27 , 29 (CA6 1982) (emphasis in original). Exhaustion of the
general grievance procedure was required notwithstanding the fact
that McCarthy's request was solely for money damages.

															II

															The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is one
among related doctrines-including abstention, finality, and
ripeness-that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking. Of
"paramount importance" to any exhaustion inquiry is congressional
intent. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 ,
501 (1982). Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is
required. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561 ,
579 (1989); Patsy, 457 U. S., at 502, n. 4. But where
Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial
discretion governs. McGee v. United States, 402 U. S. 479 , 483, n. 6
(1971). See also Patsy, 457 U. S., at 518 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in part) ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule of judicial
administration,' ... and unless Congress directs otherwise,
rightfully subject to crafting by judges"). Nevertheless, even in
this field of judicial discretion, appropriate deference to
Congress' power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme under
which a claim may be heard in a federal court requires fashioning
of exhaustion principles in a manner consistent with congressional
intent and any applicable statutory scheme. Id., at 501-502,
and n. 4.

															A

															This Court long has acknowledged the general rule that parties
exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before 145 seeking relief from the federal courts. See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 , 50-51, and
n. 9 (1938) (discussing cases as far back as 1898). Exhaustion is
required because it serves the twin purposes of protecting
administrative agency authority and promoting judicial
efficiency.

															As to the first of these purposes, the exhaustion doctrine
recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress'
delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that
agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for
the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.
Exhaustion concerns apply with particular force when the action
under review involves exercise of the agency's discretionary power
or when the agency proceedings in question allow the agency to
apply its special expertise. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S. 185 ,
194 (1969). See also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467 ,
484 (1986). The exhaustion doctrine also acknowledges the
commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency ought to
have an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the
programs it administers before it is haled into federal court.
Correlatively, exhaustion principles apply with special force when
"frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes"
could weaken an agency's effectiveness by encouraging disregard of
its procedures. McKart v. United States, 395 U. S.,
at 195.

															As to the second of the purposes, exhaustion promotes judicial
efficiency in at least two ways. When an agency has the opportunity
to correct its own errors, a judicial controversy may well be
mooted, or at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided. See, e.
g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U. S. 34 , 37 (1972); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 195.
And even where a controversy survives administrative review,
exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful
record for subsequent judicial consideration, especially in a
complex or technical factual context. See, e. g.,
Weinberger 146 v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 , 765 (1975)
(exhaustion may allow agency "to compile a record which is adequate
for judicial review").

															B

															Notwithstanding these substantial institutional interests,
federal courts are vested with a "virtually unflagging obligation"
to exercise the jurisdiction given them. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 , 817-818
(1976). "We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not
given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821).
Accordingly, this Court has declined to require exhaustion in some
circumstances even where administrative and judicial interests
would counsel otherwise. In determining whether exhaustion is
required, federal courts must balance the interest of the
individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum
against countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion.
"[A]dministrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's
interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's
interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the
exhaustion doctrine is designed to further." West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d
710 , 715 (CA8 1979), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 821 (1980).
Application of this balancing principle is "intensely practical," Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S., at 484, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 , 331, n. 11
(1976), because attention is directed to both the nature of the
claim presented and the characteristics of the particular
administrative procedure provided.

															C

															This Court's precedents have recognized at least three broad
sets of circumstances in which the interests of the individual
weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion. First,
requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue
prejudice to subsequent assertion 147 of a court action. Such prejudice may result, for example, from
an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action.
See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 , 575, n. 14
(1973) (administrative remedy deemed inadequate "[m]ost often ...
because of delay by the agency"). See also Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S., at 587 ("Because the
Bank Board's regulations do not place a reasonable time limit on
FSLIC's consideration of claims, Coit cannot be required to exhaust
those procedures"); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196 ,
198 (1966) (possible delay of 10 years in administrative
proceedings makes exhaustion unnecessary); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587 , 591-592
(1926) (claimant "is not required indefinitely to await a decision
of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for
equitable relief"). Even where the administrative decisionmaking
schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular
plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate
judicial consideration of his claim. Bowen v. City of New
York, 476 U. S., at 483 (disabilitybenefit claimants "would be
irreparably injured were the exhaustion requirement now enforced
against them"); Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331
U. S. 752 , 773 (1947) ("impending irreparable injury flowing
from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure" may
contribute to finding that exhaustion is not required). By the same
token, exhaustion principles apply with less force when an
individual's failure to exhaust may preclude a defense to criminal
liability. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 , 497, n. 5
(1977) (plurality opinion); McKart v. United States, 395 U. S., at 197.

															Second, an administrative remedy may be inadequate "because of
some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to grant
effective relief." Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at
575, n. 14. For example, an agency, as a preliminary matter, may be
unable to consider whether to grant relief because it lacks
institutional competence to resolve the par- 148 ticular type of issue presented, such as the constitutionality
of a statute. See, e. g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S., at 497, n. 5; Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 , 76 (1976).
In a similar vein, exhaustion has not been required where the
challenge is to the adequacy of the agency procedure itself, such
that "'the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy
... [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of
[the plaintiff's] lawsuit.'" Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.
S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575). Alternatively, an agency may be competent to
adjudicate the issue presented, but still lack authority to grant
the type of relief requested. McNeese v. Board of Ed. for
Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668 , 675 (1963)
(students seeking to integrate public school need not file
complaint with school superintendent because the "Superintendent
himself apparently has no power to order corrective action" except
to request the Attorney General to bring suit); Montana National
Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone County, 276 U. S. 499 , 505 (1928)
(taxpayer seeking refund not required to exhaust where "any such
application [would have been] utterly futile since the county board
of equalization was powerless to grant any appropriate relief" in
face of prior controlling court decision).

															Third, an administrative remedy may be inadequate where the
administrative body is shown to be biased or has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S., at 575, n. 14; Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U. S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney
General's submission that the challenged rules of the prison were
"validly and correctly applied to petitioner," requiring
administrative review through a process culminating with the
Attorney General "would be to demand a futile act"); Association
of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 201 U. S. App. D.
C. 165, 170-171, 627 F.2d
1151 , 1156-1157 (1979) (bias of Federal Trade Commission
chairman), cert. denied, 447 U. S. 921 (1980). See also Patsy v. Florida International University, 149 634 F.2d
900 , 912-913 (CA5 1981) (en bane) (administrative procedures
must "not be used to harass or otherwise discourage those with
legitimate claims"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496 (1982).

															III

															In light of these general principles, we conclude that
petitioner McCarthy need not have exhausted his constitutional
claim for money damages. As a preliminary matter, we find that
Congress has not meaningfully addressed the appropriateness of
requiring exhaustion in this context. Although respondents'
interests are significant, we are left with a firm conviction that,
given the type of claim McCarthy raises and the particular
characteristics of the Bureau's general grievance procedure,
McCarthy's individual interests outweigh countervailing
institutional interests favoring exhaustion.

															A

															Turning first to congressional intent, we note that the general
grievance procedure was neither enacted nor mandated by Congress.
Respondents, however, urge that Congress, in effect, has acted to
require exhaustion by delegating power to the Attorney General and
the Bureau of Prisons to control and manage the federal prison
system. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 4001(b) and 4042. Brief for Respondents
3, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. We think respondents confuse what
Congress could be claimed to allow by implication with what
Congress affirmatively has requested or required. By delegating
authority, in the most general of terms, to the Bureau to
administer the federal prison system, Congress cannot be said to
have spoken to the particular issue whether prisoners in the
custody of the Bureau should have direct access to the federal
courts.

															Respondents next argue that Congress, by enactment of § 7 of the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352, 42 U.
S. C. § 1997e, has articulated a policy favoring 150 exhaustion of the prison grievance procedure prior to the filing
of a constitutional claim against prison officials. Section 1997e
imposes a limited exhaustion requirement for a claim brought by a
state prisoner under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983,
provided that the underlying state prison administrative remedy
meets specified standards. See Patsy v. Board of Regents
of Florida, 457 U. S., at 507-512. Section 1997e has no direct
application in this case, because at issue here is a Bivens claim by a federal prisoner against federal prison
officials. We find it significant that Congress, in enacting §
1997e, stopped short of imposing a parallel requirement in the
federal prison context.

															Section 1997e is not only inapplicable to Bivens claims,
but-by its own terms-cuts against respondents' claim that the
particular procedure now at issue need be exhausted. First, unlike
the rule of exhaustion proposed here, § 1997e does not authorize
dismissal of an action for failure to exhaust. Instead, it provides
that the action is to be stayed for a maximum of 90 days. See §
1997e(a)(1). Second, § 1997e does not mechanically require
exhaustion in every case where an acceptable state procedure is in
place. Rather, it directs federal courts to abstain "if the court
believes that such a [waiting] requirement would be appropriate and
in the interests of justice." § 1997e(a)(1). In other words, if an
inmate fails to meet filing deadlines under an administrative
scheme, a court has ample discretion to determine that exhaustion
nonetheless should be forgone. Third, in contrast to the absence of
any provision for the award of money damages under the Bureau's
general grievance procedure, the statute conditions exhaustion on
the existence of "effective administrative remedies."4 It is
diffi-

															4 The Conference Committee Report states: "It is the intent of
the Congress that the court not find such a requirement [of
exhaustion] appropriate in those situations in which the action
brought ... raises issues 151 cult to see why a stricter rule of exhaustion than Congress
itself has required in the state prison context should apply in the
federal prison context.

															Respondents also argue that requiring exhaustion is appropriate
because Bivens relief gives way when necessary to
accommodate either the effective functioning of Government or an
articulated congressional policy. Brief for Respondents 15. We have
recognized that a Bivens remedy does not lie in two
situations: (1) where Congress has provided an equally effective
alternative remedy and declared it to be a substitute for recovery
under the Constitution, and (2) where, in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress, special factors counsel hesitation. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 18-19 (1980). As to
the first exception, Congress did not create the remedial scheme at
issue here and that scheme, in any case, as noted above, cannot be
considered to be equally effective with respect to a claim for
money damages. As to the second exception, respondents appear to
confuse the presence of special factors with any factors counseling hesitation. In Carlson, the Court held
that "special factors" do not free prison officials from Bivens liability, because prison officials do not enjoy an
independent status in our constitutional scheme, nor are they
likely to be unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties by
the assertion of a Bivens claim. Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S., at 19.

															Interpreting the "special factors" exception in Schweiker which cannot, in reasonable probability, be resolved by the
grievance resolution system .... " H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-897, p.
15 (1980).

															The Attorney General, charged under the statute with certifying
the adequacy of state administrative remedial schemes, has provided
by regulation: "The [state] grievance procedure shall afford a
successful grievant a meaningful remedy." 28 CFR §40.6
(1991) (emphasis added). At the time of promulgating these
regulations, the Department of Justice observed on the public
record: "Presumably, where monetary relief was the sole adequate
remedy and could not be obtained through a grievance procedure,
exhaustion would not be appropriate." 46 Fed. Reg. 3845 (1981). 152 u. S. 367 (1983), the Court found the Bivens remedy
displaced because Congress had legislated an elaborate and
comprehensive remedial scheme. Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 425; Bush, 462 U. S., at 388. "When the design of a
Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it
considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional
violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we
have not created additional Bivens remedies." Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 423. Here Congress has enacted
nothing.

															B

															Because Congress has not required exhaustion of a federal
prisoner's Bivens claim, we turn to an evaluation of the
individual and institutional interests at stake in this case. The
general grievance procedure heavily burdens the individual
interests of the petitioning inmate in two ways. First, the
procedure imposes short, successive filing deadlines that create a
high risk of forfeiture of a claim for failure to comply. Second,
the administrative "remedy" does not authorize an award of monetary
damages-the only relief requested by McCarthy in this action. The
combination of these features means that the prisoner seeking only
money damages has everything to lose and nothing to gain from being
required to exhaust his claim under the internal grievance
procedure.

															The filing deadlines for the grievance procedure require an
inmate, within 15 days of the precipitating incident, not only to
attempt to resolve his grievance informally but also to file a
formal written complaint with the prison warden. 28 CFR § 542.13
(1991). Then, he must successively hurdle 20-day and 30-day
deadlines to advance to the end of the grievance process. § 542.15.
Other than the Bureau's general and quite proper interest in having
early notice of any claim, we have not been apprised of any urgency
or exigency justifying this timetable. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 435 (1944) ("The sixty days'
period allowed for protest of the Administrator's regulations
cannot be said to be 153 unreasonably short in view of the urgency and exigencies of
wartime price regulation"). As a practical matter, the filing
deadlines, of course, may pose little difficulty for the
knowledgeable inmate accustomed to grievances and court actions.
But they are a likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary inmate,
ordinarily indigent and unrepresented by counsel, with a
substantial claim.

															Respondents argue that the deadlines are not jurisdictional and
may be extended for any "valid" reason. See 28 CFR §§ 542.13(b) and
542.15 (1991). Yet the regulations do not elaborate upon what a
"valid" reason is. Moreover, it appears that prison
officials-perhaps the very officials subject to suit-are charged
with determining what is a "valid" reason.

															All in all, these deadlines require a good deal of an inmate at
the peril of forfeiting his claim for money damages. The "first" of
"the principles that necessarily frame our analysis of prisoners'
constitutional claims" is that "federal courts must take cognizance
of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , 84 (1987).
Because a prisoner ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote,
the right to file a court action might be said to be his remaining
most "fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , 370
(1886). The rapid filing deadlines counsel strongly against
exhaustion as a prerequisite to the filing of a federalcourt
action.5

															5 Petitioner concedes that if his complaint contained a prayer
for injunctive relief, exhaustion principles would apply
differently. Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 20. Were injunctive relief
sought, the grievance procedure probably would be capable of
producing the type of corrective action desired. Additionally,
because of the continuing nature of conduct subject to injunctive
relief, the short filing deadlines would pose less difficulty
because the limitations period would be triggered anew by ongoing
conduct. 154 As we have noted, the grievance procedure does not include any
mention of the award of monetary relief. Respondents argue that
this should not matter, because "in most cases there are other
things that the inmate wants." Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. This may be
true in some instances. But we cannot presume, as a general matter,
that when a litigant has deliberately forgone any claim for
injunctive relief and has singled out discrete past wrongs,
specifically requesting monetary compensation only, that he is
likely interested in "other things." The Bureau, in any case, is
always free to offer an inmate administrative relief in return for
withdrawal of his lawsuit. We conclude that the absence of any
monetary remedy in the grievance procedure also weighs heavily
against imposing an exhaustion requirement.

															In the alternative, respondents argue that, despite the absence
of any provision in the general grievance procedure for the award
of money damages, such damages in fact are available for most
prisoners asserting Bivens claims. As to Bivens claims that could have been brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),6 respondents contend that a grievance asking for money
damages can be "converted" by prison officials to a FTCA claim for
which prison officials are au-

															6 Respondents contend that Bivens claims are almost
always categorizable as FTCA claims, especially in view of the
Attorney General's concession that corrections guards are "law
enforcement" officers within the meaning of the exception to the
intentional-tort exception of the FTCA. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. As to
those claims that are not categorizable as FTCA claims, respondents
concede that the Bureau of Prisons has no authority to offer a
monetary settlement. Id., at 40. Instead, they contend that
the Department of Justice has a general settlement authority under
the federal regulations that might be exercised to dispose of
general grievance claims. 28 CFR § 50.15(c)(2) (1991). Nothing in
the record indicates that this authority has ever been exercised to
recompense a prisoner with a Bivens claim. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely that a monetary settlement would be made in the
course of an administrative proceeding, because the regulation
provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances" a monetary
settlement will not be paid "before entry of an adverse verdict,
judgment, or award." § 50.15(c)(3). 155 thorized, under 28 CFR § 543.30 (1991), to award money damages.
This "conversion" authority does not appear in the regulations
having to do with the grievance procedure, which raises substantial
doubt that an inmate would have sufficient notice as to how his
claim would be treated. In any event, respondents have not pointed
to anything in the record showing that prison officials have a
practice of converting a claim filed under the general grievance
procedure to a claim under the FTCA procedure. We agree with
petitioner that it is implausible to think that they do. The
availability of a money damages remedy is, at best, uncertain, and
the uncertainty of the administrative agency's authority to award
relief counsels against requiring exhaustion. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620 , 626
(1946); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board ofComm'rs of Weld
County, 247 U. S.
282 , 287 (1918).

															We do not find the interests of the Bureau of Prisons to weigh
heavily in favor of exhaustion in view of the remedial scheme and
particular claim presented here. To be sure, the Bureau has a
substantial interest in encouraging internal resolution of
grievances and in preventing the undermining of its authority by
unnecessary resort by prisoners to the federal courts. But other
institutional concerns relevant to exhaustion analysis appear to
weigh in hardly at all. The Bureau's alleged failure to render
medical care implicates only tangentially its authority to carry
out the control and management of the federal prisons. Furthermore,
the Bureau does not bring to bear any special expertise on the type
of issue presented for resolution here.

															The interests of judicial economy do not stand to be advanced
substantially by the general grievance procedure. No formal
factfindings are made. The paperwork generated by the grievance
process might assist a court somewhat in ascertaining the facts
underlying a prisoner's claim more quickly than if it has only a
prisoner's complaint to review. But the grievance procedure does
not create a formal factual 156 REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

															record of the type that can be relied on conclusively by a court
for disposition of a prisoner's claim on the pleadings or at
summary judgment without the aid of affidavits.

															C

															In conclusion, we are struck by the absence of supporting
material in the regulations, the record, or the briefs that the
general grievance procedure here was crafted with any thought
toward the principles of exhaustion of claims for money damages.
The Attorney General's professed concern for internal dispute
resolution has not translated itself into a more effective
grievance procedure that might encourage the filing of an
administrative complaint as opposed to a court action. Congress, of
course, is free to design or require an appropriate administrative
procedure for a prisoner to exhaust his claim for money damages.
Even without further action by Congress, we do not foreclose the
possibility that the Bureau itself may adopt an appropriate
administrative procedure consistent with congressional intent.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

															It is so ordered.

															CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE
THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment.

															I agree with the Court's holding that a federal prisoner need
not exhaust the procedures promulgated by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. My view, however, is based entirely on the fact that the
grievance procedure at issue does not provide for any award of
monetary damages. As a result, in cases such as this one where
prisoners seek monetary relief, the Bureau's administrative remedy
furnishes no effective remedy at all, and it is therefore improper
to impose an exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board
of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 U. S. 668 , 675
(1963); Montana National Bank of Billings v. Yellowstone
County, 276 U. S.
499 , 505 (1928). 157 Because I would base the decision on this ground, I do not join
the Court's extensive discussion of the general principles of
exhaustion, nor do I agree with the implication that those general
principles apply without modification in the context of a Bivens claim. In particular, I disagree with the Court's
reliance on the grievance procedure's filing deadlines as a basis
for excusing exhaustion. As the majority observes, ante, at
146-147, we have previously refused to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies where the administrative process subjects
plaintiffs to unreasonable delay or to an indefinite timeframe for
decision. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.
S. 561 , 587 (1989); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U. S. 564 , 575, n. 14
(1973); Walker v. Southern R. Co., 385 U. S. 196 , 198
(1966); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U. S. 587 ,
591-592 (1926). This principle rests on our belief that when a
plaintiff might have to wait seemingly forever for an agency
decision, agency procedures are "inadequate" and therefore need not
be exhausted. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC,
supra, at 587.

															But the Court makes strange use of this principle in holding
that filing deadlines imposed by agency procedures may provide a
basis for finding that those procedures need not be exhausted. Ante, at 152-153. Whereas before we have held that
procedures without "reasonable time limit[sJ" may be inadequate
because they make a plaintiff wait too long, Coit Independence
Joint Venture v. FSLIC, supra, at 587, today the
majority concludes that strict filing deadlines might also
contribute to a finding of inadequacy because they make a plaintiff
move too quickly. But surely the second proposition does not follow
from the first. In fact, short filing deadlines will almost always
promote quick decisionmaking by an agency, the very result that we
have advocated repeatedly in the cases cited above. So long as
there is an escape clause, as there is here, and the time limit is
within a 158 REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring in judgment

															zone of reasonableness, as I believe it is here, the length of
the period should not be a factor in deciding the adequacy of the
remedy.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a federal prisoner does not need to exhaust administrative procedures before filing a damages action under Bivens, seeking monetary compensation for alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights by prison officials. The Court considered the purposes of exhaustion, individual interests, and institutional interests, concluding that the prisoner's individual interests outweighed the need for exhaustion. The Bureau of Prisons' grievance procedure, with its short deadlines and lack of monetary relief, burdened the prisoner's interests, while the Bureau's interest in encouraging internal resolution and preventing undue resort to courts was not significantly impacted by the ruling.


Air Courier Conference v. American Postal Workers Union

U.S. Supreme Court Air Courier Conf.v. Postal Workers, 498
U.S. 517 (1991) Air Courier Conference of America
v. American Postal Workers Union,
AFL-CIO No. 89-1416 Argued Nov. 28, 1990 Decided Feb. 26, 1991 498
U.S. 517 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The United States Postal Service's monopoly over the carriage of
letters in and for the Nation is codified in a group of statutes
known as the Private Express Statutes (PES). The monopoly was
created by Congress as a revenue protection measure for the Postal
Service vis-a-vis private competitors. Pursuant to a PES provision
allowing it to suspend PES restrictions as to any mail route where
the public interest so requires, the Postal Service issued a
regulation authorizing a practice called "international remailing,"
which entails bypassing the Service and using private couriers to
deposit with foreign postal services letters destined for foreign
addresses. Respondent Unions, representing Postal Service
employees, sued in the District Court, challenging the regulation
pursuant to the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and claiming that the rulemaking record was
inadequate to support a finding that the regulation's suspension of
the PES was in the public interest. The Court of Appeals vacated
the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Postal Service and petitioner Air Courier Conference of America
(ACCA), holding that the Unions satisfied the zone-of-interests
requirement for APA review under Clarke v. Securities Industry
Assn., 479 U. S. 388 ,
and, on the merits, that the PES suspension was not justified by
the public interest. Held: 1. This Court declines to decide whether 39 U.S.C. § 410(a)
exempts the Postal Service from judicial review under the APA,
since the question was not argued to, nor considered by, either of
the lower courts, was not raised by ACCA in its certiorari
petition, was raised by the Postal Service for the first time in
its brief in opposition to the petition, and is not encompassed by
the questions presented upon which certiorari was granted. Pp. 498 U. S.
522 -523.

															2. The Unions do not have standing to challenge the Postal
Service's suspension of the PES to permit private couriers to
engage in international remailing. To establish APA standing under
Clarke and similar cases, the Unions must show, among other things,
that the claimed adverse effect on postal workers' employment
opportunities resulting from the suspension is within the zone of
interests encompassed by the PES. Page 498 U. S. 518 This they cannot do, since the language, see, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1696(c) and 39 U.S.C. § 601(a), and legislative history of
the PES demonstrate that, in enacting those statutes, Congress was
concerned not with protecting postal employment or furthering
postal job opportunities, but with the receipt of necessary
revenues for the Postal Service. The PES enable the Service to
fulfill its responsibilities to provide service to all communities
at a uniform rate by preventing private couriers from competing
selectively on the Service's most profitable routes. The postal
monopoly, therefore, exists to protect the citizenry at large, not
postal workers. Nor can the courts, in applying the
zone-of-interests test, look beyond the PES to the 1970 Postal
Reorganization Act (PRA), which, in addition to reenacting the PES
without substantive changes, contains various labor-management
provisions designed to improve pay, working conditions, and
labor-management relations for postal employees. None of the PES
provisions have any integral relationship with the PRA
labor-management provisions, and the PRA's legislative history
contains no indication that such a connection exists. It stretches
the zone-of-interests test too far to say that, simply because the
PES may be the linchpin of the Postal Service, those whom a
different part of the PRA was designed to benefit may challenge a
violation of the PES. Clarke, supra, at 479 U. S. 401 ,
distinguished. Pp. 498 U. S.
523 -530.

															3. In light of the Unions' lack of standing, this Court does not
reach the merits of their claim that the PES suspension was not in
the public interest. Pp. 498 U. S.
530 -531.

															282 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 891 F.2d 304, reversed.

															REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. STEVENS,
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL
and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 498 U. S.
531 . Page 498 U. S. 519 Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case requires us to decide whether postal employees are
within the "zone of interests" of the Private Express Statutes, so
that they may challenge the action of the United States Postal
Service in suspending the operation of the PES with respect to a
practice of private courier services called "international
remailing." We hold that they are not.

															Since its establishment, the United States Postal Service has
exercised a monopoly over the carriage of letters in and from the
United States. The postal monopoly is codified in a group of
statutes known as the Private Express Statutes (PES), 18 U.S.C. §§
1693-1699 and 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606. The monopoly was created by
Congress as a revenue protection measure for the Postal Service to
enable it to fulfill its mission. See Regents of University of
California v. Public Employment Relations Board, 485 U.
S. 589 , 485 U. S. 598 (1988). It prevents private competitors from offering service on
low-cost routes at prices below those of the Postal Service, while
leaving the Service with high-cost routes and insufficient means to
fulfill its mandate of providing uniform rates and service to
patrons in all areas, including those that are remote or less
populated. See J. Haldi, Postal Monopoly: An Assessment of
the Private Express Statutes 9 (1974); Craig & Alvis, The
Postal Monopoly: Two Hundred Years of Covering Commercial as Well
as Personal Messages, 12 U.S.F.L.Rev. 57, 60, and n. 8 (1977).

															A provision of the PES allows the Postal Service to "suspend
[the PES restrictions] upon any mail route where the public
interest requires the suspension." 39 U.S.C. § 601(b). In 1979, the
Postal Service suspended the PES restrictions for "extremely urgent
letters," thereby allowing overnight delivery of letters by private
courier services. 39 CFR § 320.6 (1990); 44 Fed.Reg. 61178 (1979).
Private courier services, including members of
petitioner-intervenor Air Courier Conference of America, relied on
that suspension to Page 498 U. S. 520 engage in a practice called "international remailing." This
entails bypassing the Postal Service and using private courier
systems to deposit with foreign postal systems letters destined for
foreign addresses. Believing this international remailing was a
misuse of the urgent-letter suspension, the Postal Service issued a
proposed modification and clarification of its regulation in order
to make clear that the suspension for extremely urgent letters did
not cover this practice. 50 Fed.Reg. 41462 (1985). The comments
received in response to the proposed rule were overwhelmingly
negative, and focused on the perceived benefits of international
remailing: Lower cost, faster delivery, greater reliability, and
enhanced ability of United States companies to remain competitive
in the international market. Because of the vigorous opposition to
the proposed rule, the Postal Service agreed to reconsider its
position, and instituted a rulemaking "to remove the cloud" over
the validity of the international remailing services. 51 Fed.Reg.
9852, 9853 (1986). After receiving additional comments and holding
a public meeting on the subject, on June 17, 1986, the Postal
Service issued a proposal to suspend operation of the PES for
international remailing. Id. at 21929-21932. Additional
comments were received, and after consideration of the record it
had compiled, the Postal Service issued a final rule suspending the
operation of the PES with respect to international remailing. Id. at 29637.

															Respondents, the American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO and the
National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (Unions), sued in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
challenging the international remailing regulation pursuant to the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (APA). They claimed that the rulemaking record was
inadequate to support a finding that the suspension of the PES for
international remailing was in the public interest. Petitioner Air
Courier Conference of America (ACCA) intervened. Page 498 U. S. 521 On December 20, 1988, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Postal Service and ACCA. American
Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal
Service, 701 F.
Supp. 880 (1988). The Unions appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, and that court vacated the
grant of summary judgment. American Postal Workers Union,
AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Service, 282 U.S.App.D.C. 5,
891 F.2d 304 (1989). It held that the Unions satisfied the
zone-of-interests requirement for APA review under Clarke v.
Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), and that the Postal Service's regulation was arbitrary and
capricious because it relied on too narrow an interpretation of
"the public interest." In determining that the Unions' interest in
employment opportunities was protected by the PES, the Court of
Appeals noted that the PES were reenacted as part of the Postal
Reorganization Act (PRA), Pub.L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, codified
at 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. The Court of Appeals found
that a "key impetus" and "principal purpose" of the PRA was "to
implement various labor reforms that would improve pay, working
conditions and labor-management relations for postal employees."
282 U.S.App.D.C. at 10-11, 891 F.2d at 309-310. Reasoning that
"[t]he Unions' asserted interest is embraced directly by the labor
reform provisions of the PRA," id. at 11, 891 F.2d at 310,
and that "[t]he PES constitute the linchpin in a statutory scheme
concerned with maintaining an effective, financially viable Postal
Service," ibid. the court concluded that

															"[t]he interplay between the PES and the entire PRA persuades us
that there is an 'arguable' or 'plausible' relationship between the
purposes of the PES and the interests of the Union[s]." Ibid. The Court of Appeals also held that

															"the revenue protective purposes of the PES, standing alone,
plausibly relate to the Unions' interest in preventing the
reduction of employment opportunities,"

															since "postal workers benefit from the PES's Page 498 U. S. 522 function in ensuring a sufficient revenue base" for the Postal
Service's activities. Ibid. Addressing the merits of the Unions' challenge to the suspension
order, the Court of Appeals held that it was arbitrary and
capricious, because the Postal Service had applied § 601(b)'s
public interest test too narrowly by considering only the benefits
of the international remail rule to the small segment of the Postal
Service's consumer base that engages in international commerce. We
granted certiorari, 496 U.S. 904 (1990), and we now reverse.

															The United States Postal Service, nominally a respondent, argues
along with ACCA that the Unions do not have standing to challenge
the Postal Service's suspension of the PES for international
remailing. The Postal Service argues now that Congress precluded
judicial review of Postal Service action under the APA by enacting
39 U.S.C. § 410(a), which the Postal Service contends provides that
Chapters 5 and 7 of Title 5 do not apply to the Postal Service.
[ Footnote 1 ] Chapters 5 and 7
of Title 5 are the provisions of the APA dealing with
"Administrative Procedure" (Chapter 5) and "Judicial Review"
(Chapter 7).

															The Postal Service raised this argument for the first time in
its brief in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari. It
was not argued to either of the lower courts, and was not
considered by either court below in deciding this case. This issue
was not raised by ACCA in its petition for writ of certiorari, nor
is it encompassed by the questions presented upon which we based
our grant of certiorari. [ Footnote
2 ] Consequently, Page 498 U. S. 523 we decline to decide whether § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service
from judicial review under the APA. [ Footnote 3 ]

															To establish standing to sue under § 702 of the APA, respondents
must establish that they have suffered a legal wrong because of the
challenged agency action, or are adversely affected or "aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5
U.S.C. § 702. Once they have shown that they are adversely
affected, i.e., have suffered an "injury in fact," see
Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 , 468 U. S. 751 (1984), the Unions must show that they are within the zone of
interests sought to be protected through the PES. Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.
S. 871 (1990); Clarke v. Securities Industry
Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Specifically,

															"the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of
( his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon
him ) falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be
protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the Page 498 U. S. 524 legal basis of his complaint." Lujan, supra, at 497 U. S. 883 (citing Clarke, supra, 479 U.S. at 479 U. S.
396 -397).

															The District Court found that the Unions had satisfied the
injury-in-fact test because increased competition through
international remailing services might have an adverse effect on
employment opportunities of postal workers. This finding of injury
in fact was not appealed. The question before us, then, is whether
the adverse effects on the employment opportunities of postal
workers resulting from the suspension is within the zone of
interests encompassed by the PES -- the statutes which the Unions
assert the Postal Service has violated in promulgating the
international remailing rule.

															The Court of Appeals found that the Unions had standing
because

															"the revenue-protective purposes of the PES, standing alone,
plausibly relate to the Unions' interest in preventing the
reduction of employment opportunities."

															282 U.S.App.D.C. at 11, 891 F.2d at 310. This view is mistaken,
for it conflates the zone-of-interests test with injury in fact. In Lujan, this Court gave the following example illustrating
how injury in fact does not necessarily mean one is within the zone
of interests to be protected by a given statute:

															"[T]he failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision
requiring 'on the record' hearings would assuredly have an adverse
effect upon the company that has the contract to record and
transcribe the agency's proceedings; but since the provision was
obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the
proceedings, and not those of the reporters, that company would not
be 'adversely affected within the meaning' of the statute."

															497 U.S. at 497 U. S.
883 .

															We must inquire then, as to Congress' intent in enacting the PES
in order to determine whether postal workers were meant to be
within the zone of interests protected by those statutes. The
particular language of the statutes provides no support for
respondents' assertion that Congress intended Page 498 U. S. 525 to protect jobs with the Postal Service. [ Footnote 4 ] In fact, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
1696(c), allowing private conveyance of letters if done on a
one-time basis or without compensation, and 39 U.S.C. § 601(a),
allowing letters to be carried out of the mails if certain
procedures are followed, indicate that the congressional concern
was not with opportunities for postal Page 498 U. S. 526 workers, but with the receipt of necessary revenues for the
Postal Service.

															Nor does the history of this legislation -- such as it is --
indicate that the PES were intended for the benefit of postal
workers. When the first statutes limiting private carriage of
letters on post roads were enacted in 1792, the Post Office offered
no pick-up or delivery services. See C. Scheele, A Short
History of the Mail Service 66, 91 (1970). Statutory authority to
employ letter carriers was not enacted until two years later, and
was largely ignored until the late 1820's. Id. at 66. The
1792 restrictions on private carriage protected the Government's
capital investment in the post roads, not the jobs of as yet
virtually nonexistent postal employees. In 1825 and 1827, Acts were
passed prohibiting the private carriage of letters through the use
of stages or other vehicles, packet boats or other vessels, § 19,
Ch. 64 of Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. at 107, and foot and horse
posts. Section 3, Ch. 61 of Act of March 2, 1827, 4 Stat. 238.
Postal employees cannot have been within the zone of interests of
either the 1824 or 1827 Acts; those Acts targeted transportation of
mail, which even then was contracted out to private carriers. See W. Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common
Life 150 (1972).

															Congress' consideration of the 1845 Act was the only occasion on
which the postal monopoly was the subject of substantial debate.
The 1845 statute, entitled

															"An Act to reduce the rates of postage, to limit the use and
correct the abuse of the franking privilege, and for the prevention
of frauds on the revenues of the Post Office Department,"

															5 Stat. 732, was the result of three circumstances, none of
which involved the interests of postal employees. First, the Post
Office Department continued to run substantial deficits in spite of
high postage rates. H.R.Rep. No. 477, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3, 5
(1844). Second, high postal rates enabled private expresses to make
substantial inroads into the domestic market for delivery of
letters, and the 1825 and 1827 Acts proved unsuccessful in
prosecuting them. Priest, The History of the Page 498 U. S. 527 Postal Monopoly in the United States, 18 J.Law & Econ., 33,
60 (1975) (citing United States v. Gray, 26 F. Cas. 18
(No. 15, 253) (Mass. 1840) and United States v. Adams, 24
F. Cas. 761 (No. 14, 421) (SDNY 1843)). Third, inauguration of the
"penny post" in England quadrupled use of the mails, and it was
thought that a substantial reduction in American postal rates would
have the dual virtues of driving private expresses out of business
and increasing mail volume of the Post Office. This, in turn, would
help reduce the Post Office's deficit. 14 Cong.Globe, 28th Cong.,
2d Sess., 213 (1845) (remarks of Sens. Simmons & Breese). See also H.R.Rep. No. 477, supra, at 5.

															The legislative history of the sections of the Act limiting
private carriage of letters shows a two-fold purpose. First, the
Postmaster General and the States most distant from the commercial
centers of the Northeast believed that the postal monopoly was
necessary to prevent users of faster private expresses from taking
advantage of early market intelligence and news of international
affairs that had not yet reached the general populace through the
slower mails. S.Doc. No. 66, 28th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1845).
Second, it was thought to be the duty of the Government to serve
outlying, frontier areas, even if it meant doing so below cost.
H.R.Rep. No. 477, supra, at 2-3. Thus, the revenue
protection provisions were not seen as an end in themselves, nor in
any sense as a means of insuring certain levels of public
employment, but rather were seen as the means to achieve national
integration and to ensure that all areas of the Nation were equally
served by the Postal Service.

															The PES enable the Postal Service to fulfill its responsibility
to provide service to all communities at a uniform rate by
preventing private courier services from competing selectively with
the Postal Service on its most profitable routes. If competitors
could serve the lower cost segment of the market, leaving the
Postal Service to handle the high-cost services, the Service would
lose lucrative portions of its business, Page 498 U. S. 528 thereby increasing its average unit cost and requiring higher
prices to all users. [ Footnote
5 ] See Report of the President's Commission on Postal
Organization, Towards Postal Excellence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 129
(Comm.Print 1968). The postal monopoly, therefore, exists to ensure
that postal services will be provided to the citizenry at large,
and not to secure employment for postal workers.

															The Unions' claim on the merits is that the Postal Service has
failed to comply with the mandate of 39 U.S.C. § 601(b) that the
PES be suspended only if the public interest requires. The
foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the PES were not
designed to protect postal employment or further postal job
opportunities, but the Unions argue that the courts should look
beyond the PES to the entire 1970 Postal Reorganization Act in
applying the zone-of-interests test. The Unions argue that, because
one of the purposes of the labor-management provisions of the PRA
was to stabilize labor-management relations within the Postal
Service, and because the PES is the "linchpin" of the Postal
Service, employment opportunities of postal workers are arguably
within the zone of interests covered by the PES. The Unions rely
upon our opinion in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), to support this contention. Page 498 U. S. 529 Clarke is the most recent in a series of cases in which
we have held that competitors of regulated entities have standing
to challenge regulations. Clarke, supra; Investment Co.
Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). In Clarke, we said that

															"we are not limited to considering the statute under which
respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to
understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank
Act."

															479 U.S. at 479 U. S. 401 .
This statement, like all others in our opinions, must be taken in
the context in which it was made. In the next paragraph of the
opinion, the Court pointed out that 12 U.S.C. § 36, which the
plaintiffs in that case claimed had been misinterpreted by the
Comptroller, was itself "a limited exception to the otherwise
applicable requirement of [12 U.S.C.] § 81," limiting the places at
which a national bank could transact business to its headquarters
and any "branches" permitted by § 36. Thus the zone-of-interests
test was to be applied not merely in the light of § 36, which was
the basis of the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, but also in the
light of § 81, to which § 36 was an exception.

															The situation in the present case is quite different. The only
relationship between the PES, upon which the Unions rely for their
claim on the merits, and the labor-management provisions of the
PRA, upon which the Unions rely for their standing, is that both
were included in the general codification of postal statutes
embraced in the PRA. The statutory provisions enacted and reenacted
in the PRA are spread over some 65 pages in the United States Code,
and take up an entire title of that volume. We said in Lujan that "the relevant statute [under the APA] of
course, is the statute whose violation is the gravamen of the
complaint." 497 U.S. at 497 U. S. 886 .
To adopt petitioners' contention would require us to hold that the
"relevant statute" in this case is the PRA, with all of its various
provisions united only by the fact that they deal with the Postal
Service. But to accept this level of generality Page 498 U. S. 530 in defining the "relevant statute" could deprive the
zone-of-interests test of virtually all meaning.

															Unlike the two sections of the National Bank Act discussed in Clarke, supra, none of the provisions of the PES has any
integral relationship with the labor-management provisions of the
PRA. When it enacted the PRA, Congress made no substantive changes
to those portions of the PES codified in the Criminal Code, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699; Congress readopted without change those
portions of the PES codified in the Postal Service Code, 39 U.S.C.
§§ 601-606; and Congress required the Postal Service to conduct a
2-year study and reevaluation of the PES before deciding whether
those laws should be modified or repealed. PRA, Pub.L. 91-375, § 7,
84 Stat. 783; S.Rep. No. 91-912, p. 22 (1970); H.R.Rep. No.
91-1104, p. 48 (1970), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1970, p.
3649.

															None of the documents constituting the PRA legislative history
suggests that those concerned with postal reforms saw any
connection between the PES and the provisions of the PRA dealing
with labor-management relations. The Senate and House Reports
simply note that the proposed bills continue existing law without
change and require the Postal Service to conduct a study of the
PES. The Court of Appeals referred to the PES as the "linchpin" of
the Postal Service, which it may well be; but it stretches the
zone-of-interests test too far to say that, because of that fact,
those whom a different part of the PRA was designed to benefit may
challenge a violation of the PES.

															It would be a substantial extension of our holdings in Clarke, supra, Data Processing, supra, and Investment
Co. Institute, supra, to allow the Unions in this case to
leapfrog from their asserted protection under the labor-management
provisions of the PRA to their claim on the merits under the PES.
We decline to make that extension, and hold that the Unions do not
have standing to challenge the Postal Service's suspension of the
PES to permit private couriers to engage in international
remailing. We therefore do not reach the Page 498 U. S. 531 merits of the Unions' claim that the suspension was not in the
public interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed [ Footnote 1 ]

															Title 39 U.S.C. § 410 provides in pertinent part:

															"[N]o Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts,
property, works, officers, employees, budgets, or funds, including
the provisions of chapters 5 and 7 of title 5, shall apply to the
exercise of the powers of the Postal Service."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The questions presented in this case are as follows:

															1. Are postal employees within the "zone of interest" of the
Private Express Statutes that establish and allow the United States
Postal Service to suspend restrictions on the private carriage of
letters when "the public interest requires?"

															2. Did the Postal Service act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously in promulgating its international remail regulation
under the "public interest" standard for suspending the Private
Express Statutes where it found no adverse effects on revenues and
found general benefits to the public, competition, and users of
remail services?

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Postal Service argues that, since "congressional preclusion
of judicial review is in effect jurisdictional," Block v.
Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.
S. 340 , 467 U. S. 353 ,
n. 4 (1984), the issue cannot be waived by the parties. We do not
agree. Section 410, at most, exempts the Postal Service from the
APA. The judicial review provisions of the APA are not
jurisdictional, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S.
99 (1977), so a defense based on exemption from the APA
can be waived by the Government. Whether § 410(a) exempts the
Postal Service from APA review is in essence a question of whether
Congress intended to allow a certain cause of action against the
Postal Service. Whether a cause of action exists is not a question
of jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being decided. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471 , 441 U. S. 476 ,
n. 5 (1979).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Title 18 U.S.C. § 1696 provides:

															" Private express for letters and packets "

															"(a) Whoever establishes any private express for the conveyance
of letters or packets, or in any manner causes or provides for the
conveyance of the same by regular trips or at stated periods over
any post route which is or may be established by law, or from any
city, town, or place to any other city, town or place, between
which mail is regularly carried, shall be fined not more than $500
or imprisoned not more than six months, or both."

															" * * * *" "(b) Whoever transmits by private express or other unlawful
means, or delivers to any agent thereof, or deposits at any
appointed place, for the purpose of being so transmitted any letter
or packet, shall be fined not more than $50."

															"(c) This chapter shall not prohibit the conveyance or
transmission of letters or packets by private hands without
compensation, or by special messenger employed for the particular
occasion only. Whenever more than twenty-five such letters or
packets are conveyed or transmitted by such special messenger, the
requirements of section 601 of title 39, shall be observed as to
each piece."

															Title 39 U.S.C. § 601 provides:

															" Letters carried out of the mail "

															"(a) A letter may be carried out of the mails when -- "

															"(1) it is enclosed in an envelope;"

															"(2) the amount of postage which would have been charged on the
letter if it had been sent by mail is paid by stamps, or postage
meter stamps, on the envelope;"

															"(3) the envelope is properly addressed;"

															"(4) the envelope is so sealed that the letter cannot be taken
from it without defacing the envelope;"

															"(5) any stamps on the envelope are canceled in ink by the
sender; and"

															"(6) the date of the letter, of its transmission or receipt by
the carrier is endorsed on the envelope in ink."

															"(b) The Postal Service may suspend the operation of any part of
this section upon any mail route where the public interest requires
the suspension."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The PES is a competition statute that regulates the conduct of
competitors of the Postal Service. The postal employees for whose
benefit the unions have brought suit here are not competitors of
either the Postal Service or remailers. Employees have generally
been denied standing to enforce competition laws, because they lack
competitive and direct injury. See, eg., Adams v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 264 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 828 F.2d 24 (1987), cert. denied sub nom. Union de Transports Aeriens v.
Beckman, 485 U.S. 934 (1988) (former airline employees denied
standing to assert antitrust claim against airline that allegedly
drove their former employer out of business); Curtis v.
Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (CA10), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1090 (1982) (employees of corporation injured
by anticompetitive conduct denied standing under antitrust
laws).

															Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice MARSHALL and Justice BLACKMUN
join, concurring in the judgment.

															There is no ambiguity in the text of 39 U.S.C. § 410(a). That
section of the Postal Reorganization Act provides that the judicial
review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do not
apply to the exercise of the powers of the Postal Service. See
ante at 498 U. S. 522 ,
n. 1. It is therefore not only unnecessary, but also unwise, for
the Court to issue an opinion on the entirely hypothetical question
whether, if the APA did authorize judicial review of actions of the
Postal Service, its employees would have standing to invoke such
review to challenge a regulation that may curtail their job
opportunities. I therefore do not join the opinion discussing this
hypothetical standing question.

															Nor do I consider it necessary to decide whether this objection
to judicial review may be waived by the Government, because it is
surely a matter that we may notice on our own motion. * Faithful
adherence to the doctrine of judicial restraint provides a fully
adequate justification for deciding this case on the best and
narrowest ground available. I would do Page 498 U. S. 532 so. Accordingly, relying solely on 39 U.S.C. § 410(a), I concur
in the Court's judgment that the Unions' challenge must be
dismissed.

															* It is at least arguable that the Government did not waive this
objection to judicial review. As the Court points out, the
Government raised this argument in its brief in opposition to the
petition for writ of certiorari. See ante at 498 U. S. 522 .
In deciding to review this case, therefore, we were cognizant that
an issue antecedent to the standing issue might first have to be
resolved. Moreover, although the Government's objection to judicial
review was not raised in the lower courts, the Court of Appeals
recognized that "the USPS is exempt from the strictures of the
Administrative Procedure Act ( APA'), see 39 U.S.C. §
410(a)," American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. United
States Postal Service, 282 U.S.App. D.C. 5, 8, 891 F.2d 304,
307 (1989), and nevertheless continued to review the actions of the
Postal Service, thus implicitly rejecting the contention made by
the Government here.

Summary:
The case centers on the United States Postal Service's monopoly over letter carriage and the Private Express Statutes (PES), which authorize the Postal Service to suspend restrictions on mail routes in the public interest. The Postal Service allowed private couriers to engage in "international remailing," bypassing the Postal Service for letters destined for foreign addresses. Postal worker unions sued, claiming the change was not in the public interest and would hurt their employment opportunities.

The Supreme Court declined to decide if the Postal Service was exempt from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) due to the lack of argumentation and consideration in lower courts. The Court also ruled that the unions lacked standing to challenge the suspension, as the PES's purpose was to protect postal revenue, not employment opportunities. The judgment vacated the lower court's decision and held that the unions could not bring the claim.