U.S. Supreme Court Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22 (1932) Crowell v. Benson No. 19 Argued October 20, 21,
1931 Decided February 23, 1932 285 U.S.
22 ast|>* 285 U.S.
22 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEAL FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. In virtue of its power to alter or revise the maritime law,
Congress may provide that, where employees in maritime employment
are disabled or die from accidental injuries arising out of or in
the course of their employment upon the navigable waters of the
United States, their employers shall pay reasonable compensation,
without regard to fault as the cause of injury, and be thereby
relieved from other liability. P. 285 U. S.
39 .

															2. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
which provides a scheme for compensation in the class of cases
above described, applicable if recovery "through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law,"
upheld as to substantive provisions. P. 285 U. S. 22 .

															3. The classifications of disabilities and beneficiaries and the
amounts of compensation provided in the Act not being unreasonable,
the Act in those respects is consistent with the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 285 U. S.
41 -42.

															4. The difficulty of ascertaining actual damages justifies the
fixing of standard compensation in such an Act at figures
reasonably approximating probable damages. Id. 5. Considerations respecting the relation of master and servant,
which sustain workmen's compensation laws of the States against
objections under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, are applicable to the substantive provisions of this Act
of Congress, tested by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. 6. Claims for compensation under the above-mentioned Act are
filed with administrative officers called deputy commissioners, who
"shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all
questions in respect of such claim." They may issue subpoenas which
are enforceable through contempt proceedings in federal courts. In
investigating Page 285 U. S. 23 and hearing claims they, are not to be bound by the common law
or statutory rules of evidence, except as provided in the Act, but
are to proceed in such manner "as to best ascertain the rights of
the parties." Hearings are to be public and reported
stenographically, and records are to be made for which the
Commission created by the Act must provide by regulation. Orders
for compensation are to become final in 30 days. When compensation
ordered is not paid, a supplementary order may be made declaring
the amount in default, and judgment for that amount may be entered
in a federal court if the order "is in accordance with law." Review
of such judgment may be had as in suits for damages at common law.
The Act further provides that, if a compensation order is "not in
accordance with law," it may be suspended or set aside, in whole or
in part, through injunction proceedings against the deputy
commissioner who made it; and also that beneficiaries of such an
order, or the deputy commissioner, may have it enforced in a
federal court if the court determines that the order " was made and
served in accordance with law." Held: (1) As the claims are governed by the maritime law and within
the admiralty jurisdiction, trial by jury is not required by the
Seventh Amendment. P. 285 U. S.
45 .

															(2) The Act reserves to the admiralty courts full power to pass
upon all questions of law, including the power to deny effect to an
administrative finding which is without evidence or contrary to the
indisputable character of the evidence, or where the hearing was
inadequate, unfair, or arbitrary. In this respect it, satisfies due
process and attempts no interference with the judicial power in
admiralty and maritime cases. Pp. 285 U. S. 46 , 285 U. S.
49 .

															(3) As regards questions of fact, the Act does not expressly
preclude the court, in proceedings to set aside an order as not in
accordance with law, from making its own examination and
determination of facts whenever that is deemed necessary to enforce
constitutional rights; and, as the Act is to be construed to
support, rather than to defeat it, no such limitation should be
implied. P. 285 U. S.
46 .

															(4) Apart from constitutional rights to be enforced in court,
the Act contemplates that, in cases within its purview, the
findings of a deputy commissioner on questions of fact respecting
injuries to employees shall be final if supported by evidence. P. 285 U. S.
46 .

															(5) So limited, the use of the administrative method for
determining facts (assuming due notice and opportunity to be heard
and that findings are based upon evidence) is consistent with due
process Page 285 U. S. 24 and is not an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial power.
Pp. 285 U. S. 47 , 285 U.S. 51 .

															(6) The Act requires a public hearing, and that all proceedings
upon a particular claim shall be shown in the record and open to
challenge and opposing evidence; facts known to the deputy
commissioner but not put in evidence will not support a
compensation order. P. 285 U. S.
48 .

															(7) The provision that the deputy commissioner shall not be
bound by the rules of evidence applicable in a court or by
technical rules of procedure is compatible with due process
provided the substantial rights of the parties be not infringed. Id. (8) Equipping the admiralty courts with power of injunction, for
enforcing the standards of maritime law as defined by the Act, is
consistent with Art. III of the Constitution. P. 285 U. S.
49 .

															(9) Where the question of fact relates to either of the two
fundamental and jurisdictional conditions of the statute, viz., (a) occurrence of the injury upon navigable waters
of the United States, and (b) existence of the relation of master
and servant, the finding of the deputy commissioner is not
conclusive, but the question is determinable de novo by
the court on full pleadings and proofs in a suit for an injunction,
in which the court is not confined to the evidence taken and record
made before the deputy commissioner. The statute is susceptible of
this construction, and must be so construed to avoid
unconstitutionality. Pp. 285 U. S. 54 , 285 U. S.
62 .

															(10) In amending and revising the maritime law, Congress can not
reach beyond the constitutional limits of the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. P. 285 U. S.
55 .

															(11) Congress has no general authority to amend the maritime law
so as to establish liability without fault in maritime cases
regardless of particular circumstances or relations -- in this
instance, the relation of master and servant. P. 285 U. S.
56 .

															7. As respects the power of Congress to provide for
determinations of fact otherwise than through the exercise of the
judicial power reposed by the Constitution in the courts of the
United States, a clear distinction exists between cases arising
between the Government and other persons which, by their nature, do
not require judicial determination (though they may be susceptible
of it) and cases of private right, that is, of the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined. P. 285 U. S.
50 .

															8. Proper maintenance of the federal judicial power in enforcing
constitutional restrictions precludes a power in Congress to
substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
of the United Page 285 U. S. 25 States is vested, an administrative agency for the final
determination of facts upon which the enforcement of the
constitutional rights of the citizen depend. P. 285 U. S.
56 .

															9. A State, on the other hand, may distribute its powers as it
sees fit, provided only that it acts consistently with the
essential demands of due process and does not transgress
restrictions of the Federal Constitution applicable to state
authority. P. 285 U. S.
57 .

															10. The power of Congress to change the procedure of the courts
of admiralty would not justify lodging in an administrative officer
final decision of facts upon which the constitutional rights of
individuals are dependent. P. 285 U. S.
61 .

															11. In deciding upon the validity of an Act of Congress, regard
must be had to substance, rather than form. P. 285 U. S.
53 .

															12. Where the validity of an Act of Congress is drawn in
question or where a serious doubt of its constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that the court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the Act is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided. P. 285 U. S.
62 .

															13. A declaration in a statute that if any of its provisions, or
the application thereof to any persons or circumstances, shall be
found unconstitutional, the validity of the remainder of the
statute and the applicability of its provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected evidences an intention that no
implication from the terms of the Act which would render them
invalid should be indulged. P. 285 U. S.
63 .

															45 F.2d 66, affirmed.

															Certiorari, 283 U.S. 814, to review a decree which affirmed a
decree of the District Court, 33 F.2d
137 ; 38 id. 306, enjoining the enforcement of an award
of compensation made by a deputy commissioner under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Page 285 U. S. 36 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This suit was brought in the District Court to enjoin the
enforcement of an award made by petitioner Crowell, as Deputy
Commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation
Commission, in favor of the petitioner Knudsen and against the
respondent Benson. The award was made under the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44
Stat. 1424, U.S.C. Tit. 33, §§ 901-950), and rested upon Page 285 U. S. 37 the finding of the deputy commissioner that Knudsen was injured
while in the employ of Benson and performing service upon the
navigable waters of the United States. The complainant alleged that
the award was contrary to law for the reason that Kundsen was not
at the time of his injury an employee of the complainant, and his
claim was not "within the jurisdiction" of the Deputy Commissioner.
An amended complaint charged that the Act was unconstitutional upon
the grounds that it violated the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the provision of the Seventh Amendment as to trial by
jury, that of the Fourth Amendment as to unreasonable search and
seizure, and the provisions of Article III with respect to the
judicial power of the United States. The District Judge denied
motions to dismiss and granted a hearing de novo upon the
facts and the law, expressing the opinion that the Act would be
invalid if not construed to permit such a hearing. The case was
transferred to the admiralty docket, answers were filed presenting
the issue as to the fact of employment, and, the evidence of both
parties having been heard, the District Court decided that Knudsen
was not in the employ of the petitioner and restrained the
enforcement of the award. 33 F.2d
137 ; 38 F.2d 306. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals (45 F.2d 66) and this Court granted writs of certiorari.
283 U.S. 814.

															The question of the validity of the Act may be considered in
relation to (1) its provisions defining substantive rights and (2)
its procedural requirements. First. The Act has two limitations that are
fundamental. It deals exclusively with compensation in respect of
disability or death resulting "from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States" if recovery "through
workmen's compensation proceedings Page 285 U. S. 38 may not validly be provided by State law," and it applies only
when the relation of master and servant exists. § 3. [ Footnote 1 ] "Injury," within the statute,
"means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the course
of employment," and the term "employer" means one "any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in
part," upon such navigable waters. § 2(2)(4). Employers are made
liable for the payment to their employees of prescribed
compensation "irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury." §
4. The liability is exclusive, unless the employer fails to secure
payment of the compensation. § 5. The employer is required to
furnish appropriate medical and other treatment. § 7. The
compensation for temporary or permanent disability, total or
partial, according to the statutory classification, and, in case of
the death of the employee, is fixed, being based upon prescribed
percentages of average weekly wages, and the persons to whom
payments are to be made are designated. §§ 6, 8, 9, 10. Employers
must secure the payment Page 285 U. S. 39 of compensation by procuring insurance or by becoming
self-insurers in the manner stipulated. § 32. Failure to provide
such security is a misdemeanor. § 38 (33 USCA § 938).

															As the Act relates solely to injuries occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States, it deals with the maritime
law, applicable to matters that fall within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction (Const. Art. 3, § 2; Nogueira v. N.Y.,
N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U. S. 128 , 281 U. S. 138 ),
and the general authority of the Congress to alter or revise the
maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country is beyond
dispute. [ Footnote 2 ] In
limiting the application of the Act to cases where recovery
"through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be
provided by State law," the Congress evidently had in view the
decisions of this Court with respect to the scope of the exclusive
authority of the national legislature. [ Footnote 3 ] The propriety Page 285 U. S. 40 of providing by federal statute for compensation of employees in
such cases had been expressly recognized by this Court, [ Footnote 4 ] and, within its sphere, the
statute was designed to accomplish the same general purpose as the
Workmen's Compensation Laws of the states. [ Footnote 5 ] In defining Page 285 U. S. 41 substantive rights, the Act provides for recovery in the absence
of fault, classifies disabilities resulting from injuries, fixes
the range of compensation in case of disability or death, and
designates the classes of beneficiaries. In view of federal power
to alter and revise the maritime law, there appears to be no room
for objection on constitutional grounds to the creation of these
rights, unless it can be found in the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. But it cannot be said that either the
classifications of the statute or the extent of the compensation
provided are unreasonable. In view of the difficulties which inhere
in the ascertainment of actual damages, the Congress was entitled
to provide for the payment of amounts which would reasonably
approximate the probable damages. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S. 70 , 228 U. S. 84 ; compare Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Tucker, 230
U. S. 346 , 230 U. S. 348 .
Liability without fault is not unknown to the maritime law,
[ Footnote 6 ] and, Page 285 U. S. 42 apart from this fact, considerations are applicable to the
substantive provisions of this legislation, with respect to the
relation of master and servant, similar to those which this Court
has found sufficient to sustain workmen's compensation laws of the
states against objections under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 ; Mountain Timber Company v. Washington, 243 U.
S. 219 ; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.
S. 503 ; Lower Vein Coal Co. v. Industrial
Board, 255 U. S. 144 ; Madera Sugar Pine Company v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 262 U. S. 499 , 262 U. S. 501 , 262 U. S. 502 ; Sheehan Company v. Shuler, 265 U.
S. 371 ; Dahlstrom Metallic Door Company v.
Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. See Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H.
& H.R. Co., supra, at pp. 281 U. S. 136 , 281 U. S.
137 . Second. The objections to the procedural requirements
of the Act relate to the extent of the administrative authority
which it confers. The administration of the Act -- "except as
otherwise specifically provided" -- was given to the United States
Employees' Compensation Commission, [ Footnote 7 ] which was authorized to establish compensation
districts, appoint deputy commissioners, and make regulations. §§
39, 40. Claimants must give written notice to the deputy
commissioner and to the employer of the injury or death within
thirty days thereafter; the deputy commissioner may excuse failure
to give such notice for satisfactory reasons. § 12. If the employer
contests the right to compensation, he is to file notice to that
effect. § 14(d). A claim for compensation must be filed with Page 285 U. S. 43 the deputy commissioner within a prescribed period, and it is
provided that the deputy commissioner shall have full authority to
hear and determine all questions in respect to the claim. §§ 13,
19(a). Within ten days after the claim is filed, the deputy
commissioner, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Commission, must notify the employer and any other person who is
considered by the deputy commissioner to be an interested party.
The deputy commissioner is required to make, or cause to be made,
such investigations as he deems to be necessary, and upon
application of any interested party must order a hearing, upon
notice, at which the claimant and the employer may present
evidence. Employees claiming compensation must submit to medical
examination. § 19. In conducting investigations and hearings, the
deputy commissioner is not bound by common law or statutory rules
of evidence, or by technical or formal rules or procedure, except
as the Act provides, but he is to proceed in such manner "as to
best ascertain the rights of the parties." § 23(a). He may issue
subpoenas, administer oaths, compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses, the production of documents or other evidence or the
taking of depositions, and may do all things conformable to law
which may be necessary to enable him effectively to discharge his
duties. Proceedings may be brought before the appropriate federal
court to punish for misbehavior or contumacy as in case of
contempt. § 27. Hearings before the deputy commissioner are to be
public and reported stenographically, and the Commission is to
provide by regulation for the preparation of a record. § 23(b).
[ Footnote 8 ] Compensation
orders are to be filed in the office of the deputy commissioner,
and copies must be sent Page 285 U. S. 44 to the claimant and employer. § 19. The Act provides that it
shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act,
that sufficient notice of claim has been given, that the injury was
not occasioned solely by the intoxication of the injured employee,
or by the willful intention of such employee to injure or kill
himself or another. § 20. A compensation order becomes effective
when filed, and, unless proceedings are instituted to suspend it or
set it aside, it becomes final at the expiration of thirty days. §
21(a). If there is a change in conditions, the order may be
modified or a new order made. § 22. In case of default for thirty
days in the payment of compensation, application may be made to the
deputy commissioner for a supplementary order declaring the amount
in default. Such an order is to be made after investigation,
notice, and hearing, as in the case of claims. Upon filing a
certified copy of the supplementary order with the clerk of the
federal court, as stated, judgment is to be entered for the amount
declared in default, if such supplementary order "is in accordance
with law." Review of the judgment may be had as in civil suits for
damages at common law, and the judgment may be enforced by writ of
execution. § 18.

															The Act further provides that, if a compensation order is "not
in accordance with law," it

															"may be suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through
injunction proceedings, mandatory or otherwise, brought by any
party in interest"

															against the deputy commissioner making the order and instituted
in the federal District Court for the judicial district in which
the injury occurred. [ Footnote
9 ] Payment is not to be stayed pending such proceedings unless,
on hearing after notice, the court allows the stay on evidence Page 285 U. S. 45 showing that the employer would otherwise suffer irreparable
damage. § 21(b). Beneficiaries of awards or the deputy commissioner
may apply for enforcement to the federal District Court, and, if
the court determines that the order "was made and served in
accordance with law," obedience may be compelled by writ of
injunction or other proper process. § 21(c). [ Footnote 10 ]

															As the claims which are subject to the provisions of the Act are
governed by the maritime law as established by the Congress, and
are within the admiralty jurisdiction, the objection raised by the
respondent's pleading as to the right to a trial by jury under the
Seventh Amendment is unavailing ( Waring v.
Clarke , 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 459 , 46 U. S. 460 ),
and that, under the Fourth Amendment, is neither explained nor
urged. The other objections as to procedure invoke the due process
clause and the provision as to the judicial power of the United
States.

															(1) The contention under the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment relates to the determination of questions of fact.
Rulings of the deputy commissioner upon questions of law are
without finality. So far as Page 285 U. S. 46 the latter are concerned, full opportunity is afforded for their
determination by the federal courts through proceedings to suspend
or to set aside a compensation order, 21(b), by the requirement
that judgment is to be entered on a supplementary order declaring
default only in case the order follows the law (§ 18), and by the
provision that the issue of injunction or other process in a
proceeding by a beneficiary to compel obedience to a compensation
order is dependent upon a determination by the court that the order
was lawfully made and served. § 21(c). Moreover, the statute
contains no express limitation attempting to preclude the court, in
proceedings to set aside an order as not in accordance with law,
from making its own examination and determination of facts whenever
that is deemed to be necessary to enforce a constitutional right
properly asserted. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon
Borough, 253 U. S. 287 , 253 U. S. 289 ; Ng Fung Ho. v. White, 259 U. S. 276 , 259 U. S. 284 , 259 U. S. 285 ; Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S.
43 , 262 U. S. 50 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.
S. 420 , 280 U. S. 443 , 280 U. S. 444 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.
S. 589 , 283 U. S. 600 .
As the statute is to be construed so as to support, rather than to
defeat it, no such limitation is to be implied. Panama Railroad
Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 , 264 U. S.
390 .

															Apart from cases involving constitutional rights to be
appropriately enforced by proceedings in court, there can be no
doubt that the Act contemplates that as to questions of fact,
arising with respect to injuries to employees within the purview of
the Act, the findings of the deputy commissioner, supported by
evidence and within the scope of his authority, shall be final. To
hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the
legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task. Page 285 U. S. 47 The object is to secure within the prescribed limits of the
employer's liability an immediate investigation and a sound
practical judgment, and the efficacy of the plan depends upon the
finality of the determinations of fact with respect to the
circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the employee's
injuries and the amount of compensation that should be awarded. And
this finality may also be regarded as extending to the
determination of the question of fact whether the injury

															"was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by
the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another."

															While the exclusion of compensation in such cases is found in
what are called "coverage" provisions of the Act (§ 3), the
question of fact still belongs to the contemplated routine of
administration, for the case is one of employment within the scope
of the Act, and the cause of the injury sustained by the employee
as well as its character and effect must be ascertained in applying
the provisions for compensation. The use of the administrative
method for these purposes, assuming due notice, proper opportunity
to be heard, and that findings are based upon evidence, falls
easily within the principle of the decisions sustaining similar
procedure against objections under the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [ Footnote 11 ]

															The statute provides for notice and hearing, and an award made
without proper notice, or suitable opportunity Page 285 U. S. 48 to be heard, may be attacked and set aside as without validity.
The objection is made that, as the deputy commissioner is
authorized to prosecute such inquiries as he may consider
necessary, the award may be based wholly or partly upon an ex
parte investigation and upon unknown sources of information,
and that the hearing may be merely a formality. The statute,
however, contemplates a public hearing, and regulations are to
require "a record of the hearings and other proceedings before the
deputy commissioners." § 23(b). This implies that all proceedings
by the deputy commissioner upon a particular claim shall be
appropriately set forth, and that whatever facts he may ascertain
and their sources shall be shown in the record and be open to
challenge and opposing evidence. Facts conceivably known to the
deputy commissioner, but not put in evidence so as to permit
scrutiny and contest, will not support a compensation order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., 227 U. S. 88 , 227 U. S. 93 ; The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.
S. 258 , 264 U. S. 263 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., 265 U. S. 274 , 265 U. S. 288 .
An award not supported by evidence in the record is not in
accordance with law. But the fact that the deputy commissioner is
not bound by the rules of evidence which would be applicable to
trials in court or by technical rules of procedure (§ 23(a)), does
not invalidate the proceeding, provided substantial rights of the
parties are not infringed. Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U. S. 25 , 194 U. S. 44 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R.
Co., supra; Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 253 U. S. 117 , 253 U. S. 131 ; United States v. Abilene & Southern Railway Co., supra;
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, supra, at p. 280 U. S.
442 .

															(2) The contention based upon the judicial power of the United
States, as extended "to all Cases of admiralty Page 285 U. S. 49 and maritime jurisdiction" (Const. Art. III), presents a
distinct question. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 59 U. S. 284 ,
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, said:

															"To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it
proper to state that we do not consider congress can either
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity,
or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the
judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject
for judicial determination."

															The question in the instant case, in this aspect, can be deemed
to relate only to determinations of fact. The reservation of legal
questions is to the same court that has jurisdiction in admiralty,
and the mere fact that the court is not described as such is
unimportant. Nor is the provision for injunction proceedings, §
21(b), open to objection. The Congress was at liberty to draw upon
another system of procedure to equip the court with suitable and
adequate means for enforcing the standards of the maritime law as
defined by the Act. The Genesee
Chief , 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 459 , 53 U. S. 460 . Compare Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra, at p. 264 U. S. 388 .
By statute and rules, courts of admiralty may be empowered to grant
injunctions, as in the case of limitation of liability proceedings. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific
Co., 273 U. S. 207 , 273 U. S. 218 . See also Marine Transit Corporation v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263 ,
decided January 4, 1932. The Congress did not attempt to define
questions of law, and the generality of the description leaves no
doubt of the intention to reserve to the Federal court full
authority to pass upon all matters which this Court had held to
fall within that category. There is thus no attempt to interfere
with, but rather provision is made to facilitate, the exercise by
the court of its jurisdiction Page 285 U. S. 50 to deny effect to any administrative finding which is without
evidence, or "contrary to the indisputable character of the
evidence," or where the hearing is "inadequate," or "unfair," or
arbitrary in any respect. Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville R. Co., supra, at pp. 227 U. S. 91 , 227 U. S. 92 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, supra. As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once
apparent between cases of private right and those which arise
between the government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of
the executive or legislative departments. The Court referred to
this distinction in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., supra, pointing out that

															"there are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of acting
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but
which Congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper."

															Thus the Congress, in exercising the powers confided to it, may
establish "legislative" courts (as distinguished from
"constitutional courts in which the judicial power conferred by the
Constitution can be deposited") which are to form part of the
government of territories or of the District of Columbia, [ Footnote 12 ] or to serve as special
tribunals

															"to examine and determine various matters, arising between the
government and others, which, from their nature, do not require
judicial determination and yet are susceptible of it."

															But

															"the mode of determining matters of this class is completely
within congressional control. Congress may reserve to itself the
power to decide, may delegate that power to executive officers, or
may commit it to judicial tribunals." Ex Page 285 U. S. 51 parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.
S. 438 , 279 U. S. 451 .
Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the
determination of such matters are found in connection with the
exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign
commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health,
the facilities of the post office, pensions, and payments to
veterans. [ Footnote 13 ]

															The present case does not fall within the categories just
described, but is one of private right, that is, of the liability
of one individual to another under the law as defined. But, in
cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to
maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all
determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by
judges. On the common law side of the federal courts, the aid of
juries is not only deemed appropriate, but is required by the
Constitution itself. In cases of equity and admiralty, it is
historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without
the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or
assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for
example, to take and state an account or to find the amount of
damages. While the reports of masters and commissioners in such
cases are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not been the
practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based
upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law, [ Footnote 14 ] Page 285 U. S. 52 and the parties have no right to demand that the court shall
redetermine the facts thus found. In admiralty, juries were
anciently in use not only in criminal cases, but apparently in
civil cases also. [ Footnote
15 ] The Act of February 26, 1845 (c. 20, 5 Stat. 726),
purporting to extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
District Courts to certain cases arising on the Great Lakes, gave
the right to "trial by jury of all facts put in issue in such
suits, where either party shall require it." After the decision in
the case of The Genesee Chief, supra, holding that the
federal District Courts possessed general jurisdiction in admiralty
over the lakes, and navigable waters connecting them, under the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 (chapter 20, § 9, 1
Stat. pp. 76, 77), this Court regarded the Enabling Act of 1845 as
"obsolete and of no effect, with the exception of the clause which
gives to either party the right of trial by jury when requested." The Eagle , 8
Wall. 15, 75 U. S. 25 . And
this provision, the court said, was "rather a mode of exercising
jurisdiction than any substantial part of it." See R.S.
566, U.S.C., Tit. 28, § 770. [ Footnote 16 ] Chief Justice Taney, in delivering the
opinion of the court in the case of The Genesee Chief,
supra, referring to this requirement, thus broadly stated the
authority of Congress to change the procedure in courts of
admiralty: Page 285 U. S. 53 "The power of Congress to change the mode of proceeding in this
respect in its courts of admiralty will, we suppose, hardly be
questioned. The Constitution declares that the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to 'all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.' But it does not direct that the court shall
proceed according to ancient and established forms, or shall adopt
any other form or mode of practice. The grant defines the subjects
to which the jurisdiction may be extended by Congress. But the
extent of the power, as well as the mode of proceeding in which
that jurisdiction is to be exercised, like the power and practice
in all the other courts of the United States, are subject to the
regulation of Congress, except where that power is limited by the
terms of the Constitution, or by necessary implication from its
language. In admiralty and maritime cases, there is no such
limitation as to the mode of proceeding, and Congress may
therefore, in cases of that description, give either party right of
trial by jury, or modify the practice of the court in any other
respect that it deems more conducive to the administration of
justice."

															It may also be noted that while, on an appeal in admiralty
cases, "the facts, as well as the law, would be subjected to review
and retrial," this Court has recognized the power of the Congress
"to limit the effect of an appeal to a review of the law as
applicable to facts finally determined below." The Francis
Wright, 105 U. S. 381 , 105 U. S. 386 ; The Connemara, 108 U. S. 352 , 108 U. S. 359 . Compare Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.
S. 533 , 272 U. S. 536 , 272 U. S.
537 .

															In deciding whether the Congress, in enacting the statute under
review, has exceeded the limits of its authority to prescribe
procedure in cases of injury upon navigable waters, regard must be
had, as in other cases where constitutional limits are invoked, not
to mere matters of form, but to the substance of what is
required. Page 285 U. S. 54 The statute has a limited application, being confined to the
relation of master and servant, and the method of determining the
questions of fact, which arise in the routine of making
compensation awards to employees under the Act, is necessary to its
effective enforcement. The Act itself, where it applies,
establishes the measure of the employer's liability, thus leaving
open for determination the questions of fact as to the
circumstances, nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries
sustained by the employee for which compensation is to be made in
accordance with the prescribed standards. Findings of fact by the
deputy commissioner upon such questions are closely analogous to
the findings of the amount of damages that are made according to
familiar practice by commissioners or assessors, and the
reservation of full authority to the court to deal with matters of
law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function
in this class of cases. For the purposes stated, we are unable to
find any constitutional obstacle to the action of the Congress in
availing itself of a method shown by experience to be essential in
order to apply its standards to the thousands of cases involved,
thus relieving the courts of a most serious burden while preserving
their complete authority to insure the proper application of the
law.

															(3) What has been said thus far relates to the determination of
claims of employees within the purview of the Act. A different
question is presented where the determinations of fact are
fundamental or "jurisdictional" [ Footnote 17 ] in the sense that their existence is a
condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme. These
fundamental Page 285 U. S. 55 requirements are that the injury occurs upon the navigable
waters of the United States, and that the relation of master and
servant exists. These conditions are indispensable to the
application of the statute not only because the Congress has so
provided explicitly (§ 3), but also because the power of the
Congress to enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these
conditions.

															In amending and revising the maritime law, [ Footnote 18 ] the Congress cannot reach beyond
the constitutional limits which are inherent in the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. [ Footnote
19 ] Unless the injuries to which the Act relates occur upon the
navigable waters of the United States, they fall outside that
jurisdiction. [ Footnote 20 ]
Not only is navigability itself a question of fact, as waters that
are navigable in fact are navigable in law, [ Footnote 21 ] but, where navigability is not in
dispute, the locality of the injury, that is, whether it has
occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, determines
the existence of the congressional power to create the liability
prescribed by the statute. [ Footnote 22 ] Again, it Page 285 U. S. 56 cannot be maintained that the Congress has any general authority
to amend the maritime law so as to establish liability without
fault in maritime cases, regardless of particular circumstances or
relations. It is unnecessary to consider what circumstances or
relations might permit the imposition of such a liability by
amendment of the maritime law, but it is manifest that some
suitable selection would be required. In the present instance, the
Congress has imposed liability without fault only where the
relation of master and servant exists in maritime employment, and,
while we hold that the Congress could do this, the fact of that
relation is the pivot of the statute, and, in the absence of any
other justification, underlies the constitutionality of this
enactment. If the person injured was not an employee of the person
sought to be held, or if the injury did not occur upon the
navigable waters of the United States, there is no ground for an
assertion that the person against whom the proceeding was directed
could constitutionally be subjected, in the absence of fault upon
his part, to the liability which the statute creates.

															In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the
ordinary one as to the propriety of provision for administrative
determinations. Nor have we simply the question of due process in
relation to notice and hearing. It is, rather, a question of the
appropriate maintenance of the federal judicial power in requiring
the observance of constitutional restrictions. It is the question
whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in
which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an
administrative agency -- in this instance, a single deputy
commissioner [ Footnote 23 ]
-- for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon
which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen
depend. The recognition of Page 285 U. S. 57 the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for the
investigation and finding of facts within their proper province,
and the support of their authorized action, does not require the
conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the
Congress could completely oust the courts of all determinations of
fact by vesting the authority to make them with finality in its own
instrumentalities or in the executive department. That would be to
sap the judicial power as it exists under the federal Constitution,
and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to
our system wherever fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently
they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in
effect finality in law.

															In this aspect of the question, the irrelevancy of state
statutes and citations from state courts as to the distribution of
state powers is apparent. A state may distribute its powers as it
sees fit, provided only that it acts consistently with the
essential demands of due process and does not transgress those
restrictions of the Federal Constitution which are applicable to
state authority. [ Footnote
24 ] In relation to the federal government, we have already
noted the inappositeness to the present inquiry of decisions with
respect to determinations of fact, upon evidence and within the
authority conferred, made by administrative agencies which have
been created to aid in the performance of governmental functions,
and where the mode of determination is within the control of the
Congress, as, e.g., in the proceedings of the Land Office
pursuant to provisions for the disposition of public lands, of the
authorities of the Post Office in relation to postal privileges, of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue with respect to taxes, and of the
Labor Department as to the Page 285 U. S. 58 admission and deportation of aliens. Ex parte Bakelite
Corporation, supra. [ Footnote 25 ] Similar considerations apply to decisions
with respect to determinations of fact by boards and commissions
created by the Congress to assist it in its legislative process in
governing various transactions subject to its authority, as, for
example, the rates and practices of interstate carriers, the
legislature thus being able to apply its standards to a host of
instances which it is impracticable to consider and legislate upon
directly and the action being none the less legislative in
character because taken through a subordinate body. [ Footnote 26 ] And where administrative
bodies have been appropriately created to meet the exigencies of
certain classes of cases and their action is of a judicial
character, the question of the conclusiveness of their
administrative findings of fact generally arises where the facts
are clearly not jurisdictional [ Footnote 27 ] and the scope of review as to such facts has
been determined by the applicable legislation. None of the
decisions of this sort touch the question which is presented where
the facts involved are jurisdictional, [ Footnote 28 ] or where the question concerns the proper
exercise of the judicial power of the United States in enforcing
constitutional limitations.

															Even where the subject lies within the general authority of the
Congress, the propriety of a challenge by judicial proceedings of
the determinations of fact deemed to be jurisdictional, as
underlying the authority of executive officers, has been
recognized. When proceedings are taken against a person under the
military law, and enlistment is denied, the issue has been tried
and determined de novo upon habeas corpus. In re
Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 , 137 U. S.
154 , Page 285 U. S. 59 137 U. S. 155 . See also In re Morrissey, 137 U.
S. 157 , 137 U. S. 158 ; Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11 , 155 U. S. 20 .
While, in the administration of the public land system, questions
of fact are for the consideration and judgment of the Land
Department and its decision of such questions is conclusive, it is
equally true that, if lands

															"never were public property, or had previously been disposed of,
or if Congress had made no provision for their sale, or had
reserved them, the department would have no jurisdiction to
transfer them."

															This Court has held that

															"matters of this kind, disclosing a want of jurisdiction, may be
considered by a court of law. In such cases, the objection to the
patent reaches beyond the action of the special tribunal, and goes
to the existence of a subject upon which it was competent to
act." Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 , 104 U. S. 641 .
In such a case, the invalidity of the patent may be shown in a
collateral proceeding. Polk v.
Wendell , 9 Cranch. 87; Patterson
v. Winn , 11 Wheat. 380; Minter v.
Crommelin , 18 How. 87; Morton v.
Nebraska , 21 Wall 660, 88 U. S. 675 ; Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.
S. 165 , 147 U. S. 174 .
The question whether a publication is a "book" or a "periodical"
has been reviewed upon the evidence received in a suit brought to
restrain the Postmaster General from acting beyond his authority in
excluding the publication from carriage as second class mail
matter. Hitchcock v. Smith, 34 App. D. C. 521, 530-533; id., 266 U.S. 54, 59 [argument of counsel -- omitted].
[ Footnote 29 ] Page 285 U. S. 60 In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial
power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent
determination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to
the performance of that supreme function. The case of confiscation
is illustrative, the ultimate conclusion almost invariably
depending upon the decisions of questions of fact. This court has
held the owner to be entitled to

															"a fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial
tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to
both law and facts." Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, supra. See also Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43 , 262 U. S. 50 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, supra; Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 , 283 U. S. 600 .
Jurisdiction in the executive to order deportation exists only if
the person arrested is an alien, and while, if there were
jurisdiction, the findings of fact of the executive department
would be conclusive, the claim of citizenship "is thus a denial of
an essential jurisdictional fact," both in the statutory and the
constitutional sense, and a writ of habeas corpus will issue "to
determine the status." Persons claiming to be citizens of the
United States "are entitled to a judicial determination of their
claims," said this Court in Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra, at
p. 259 U. S. 285 ,
and, in that case, the cause was remanded to the Federal District
Court "for trial in that court of the question of citizenship."

															In the present instance, the argument that the Congress has
constituted the deputy commissioner a factfinding tribunal is
unavailing, as the contention makes the untenable assumption that
the constitutional courts may be Page 285 U. S. 61 deprived in all cases of the determination of facts upon
evidence even though a constitutional right may be involved.
Reference is also made to the power of the Congress to change the
procedure in courts of admiralty, a power to which we have alluded
in dealing with the function of the deputy commissioner in passing
upon the compensation claims of employees. But when fundamental
rights are in question, this Court has repeatedly emphasized "the
difference in security of judicial over administrative action." Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra. Even where issues of fact are
tried by juries in the federal courts, such trials are under the
constant superintendence of the trial judge. In a trial by jury in
a federal court, the judge is "not a mere moderator," but "is the
governor of the trial" for the purpose of assuring its proper
conduct as well as of determining questions of law. Herron v.
Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91 , 283 U. S. 95 . In
the federal courts, trial by jury

															"is a trial by a jury of 12 men in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law
and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a
criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his opinion, it
is against the law or the evidence." Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S.
1 , 1 174 U. S. 3 , 174 U. S. 14 .
Where testimony in an equity cause is not taken before the court,
the proceeding is still constantly subject to the court's control.
And while the practice of obtaining the assistance of masters in
chancery and commissioners in admiralty may be regarded, as we have
pointed out, as furnishing a certain analogy in relation to the
normal authority of the deputy commissioner in making what is
virtually an assessment of damages, the proceedings of such masters
and commissioners are always subject to the direction of the court,
and their reports are essentially advisory, a distinction of
controlling importance when questions of a fundamental character
are in issue. Page 285 U. S. 62 When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible
by which the question may be avoided. [ Footnote 30 ] We are of the opinion that such a
construction is permissible, and should be adopted in the instant
case. The Congress has not expressly provided that the
determinations by the deputy commissioner of the fundamental or
jurisdictional facts as to the locality of the injury and the
existence of the relation of master and servant shall be final. The
finality of such determinations of the deputy commissioner is
predicated primarily upon the provision, § 19(a), that he "shall
have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions
in respect of such claim." But "such claim" is the claim for
compensation under the Act, and, by its explicit provisions, is
that of an "employee," as defined in the Act, against his
"employer." The fact of employment is an essential condition
precedent to the right to make the claim. The other provision upon
which the argument rests is that which authorizes the federal court
to set aside a compensation order if it is "not in accordance with
law." § 21(b). In the absence of any provision as to the finality
of the determination by the deputy commissioner of the
jurisdictional fact of employment, the statute is open to the
construction that the court, in determining whether a compensation
order is in accordance with law, may determine the fact of
employment which underlies the operation of the statute. And, to
remove the question as to validity, we think that the statute
should be so construed. Further, the Act expressly requires
that, Page 285 U. S. 63 if any of its provisions is found to be unconstitutional, "or
the applicability thereof to any person or circumstances" is held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and "the
applicability of such provision to other persons and circumstances"
shall not be affected. § 50. We think that this requirement clearly
evidences the intention of the Congress not only that an express
provision found to be unconstitutional should be disregarded
without disturbing the remainder of the statute, but also that any
implication from the terms of the Act which would render them
invalid should not be indulged. This provision also gives assurance
that there is no violation of the purpose of the Congress in
sustaining the determinations of fact of the deputy commissioner
where he acts within his authority in passing upon compensation
claims while denying finality to his conclusions as to the
jurisdictional facts upon which the valid application of the
statute depends.

															Assuming that the federal court may determine for itself the
existence of these fundamental or jurisdictional facts, we come to
the question: upon what record is the determination to be made?
There is no provision of the statute which seeks to confine the
court in such a case to the record before the deputy commissioner
or to the evidence which he has taken. The remedy which the statute
makes available is not by an appeal or by a writ of certiorari for
a review of his determination upon the record before him. The
remedy is "through injunction proceedings mandatory or otherwise."
§ 21(b). The question in the instant case is not whether the deputy
commissioner has acted improperly or arbitrarily as shown by the
record of his proceedings in the course of administration in cases
contemplated by the statute, but whether he has acted in a case to
which the statute is inapplicable. By providing for injunction
proceedings, the Congress evidently contemplated a suit as in
equity, and, in such Page 285 U. S. 64 a suit, the complainant would have full opportunity to plead and
prove either that the injury did not occur upon the navigable
waters of the United States or that the relation of master and
servant did not exist, and hence that the case lay outside the
purview of the statute. As the question is one of the
constitutional authority of the deputy commissioner as an
administrative agency, the court is under no obligation to give
weight to his proceedings pending the determination of that
question. If the court finds that the facts existed which gave the
deputy commissioner jurisdiction to pass upon the claim for
compensation, the injunction will be denied insofar as these
fundamental questions are concerned; if, on the contrary, the court
is satisfied that the deputy commissioner had no jurisdiction of
the proceedings before him, that determination will deprive them of
their effectiveness for any purpose. We think that the essential
independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United
States in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that
the federal court should determine such an issue upon its own
record and the facts elicited before it.

															The argument is made that there are other facts besides the
locality of the injury and the fact of employment which condition
the action of the deputy commissioner. That contention in any
aspect could not avail to change the result in the instant case.
But we think that there is a clear distinction between cases where
the locality of the injury takes the case out of the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, or where the fact of employment being absent
there is lacking under this statute any basis for the imposition of
liability without fault, and those cases which fall within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and where the relation of
master and servant in maritime employment exists. It is in the
latter field that the provisions for compensation apply, and that,
for the reasons stated in the earlier part of this opinion, the
determination Page 285 U. S. 65 of the facts relating to the circumstances of the injuries
received, as well as their nature and consequences, may
appropriately be subjected to the scheme of administration for
which the Act provides.

															It cannot be regarded as an impairment of the intended
efficiency of an administrative agency that it is confined to its
proper sphere, but it may be observed that the instances which
permit of a challenge to the application of the statute, upon the
grounds we have stated, appear to be few. Out of the many thousands
of cases which have been brought before the deputy commissioners
throughout the country, a review by the courts has been sought in
only a small number, [ Footnote
31 ] and an inconsiderable proportion of these appear to have
involved the question whether the injury occurred within the
maritime jurisdiction or whether the relation of employment
existed.

															We are of the opinion that the District Court did not err in
permitting a trial de novo on the issue of employment.
Upon that issue, the witnesses who had testified before the deputy
commissioner and other witnesses were heard by the District Court.
The writ of certiorari was not granted to review the particular
facts, but to pass upon the question of principle. With respect to
the facts, the two courts below are in accord, and we find no
reason to disturb their decision. Decree affirmed. * Together with No. 20, Crowell, Deputy Commissioner, and
Knudsen v. Benson. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Section three of the Act as to "Coverage" provides:

															"Sec. 3. (a) Compensation shall be payable under this Act in
respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any drydock) and
if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.
No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or
death of --"

															"(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel nor any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel
under eighteen tons net; or"

															"(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof."

															"(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was
occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another."

															[ Footnote 2 ] Waring v.
Clarke , 5 How. 441, 46 U. S. 457 , 46 U. S. 458 ; The
Lottawanna , 21 Wall. 558, 88 U. S. 577 ; Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527 , 130 U. S. 556 , 130 U. S. 557 ; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 , 14 U. S. 14 ; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398 , 207 U. S. 404 ; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S.
52 , 234 U. S. 62 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205 , 244 U. S. 214 , 244 U. S. 215 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149 , 253 U. S. 160 ; State of Washington v. Dawson, 264 U.
S. 219 , 264 U. S. 227 , 264 U. S. 228 ; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375 , 264 U. S. 386 , 264 U. S.
38 .

															Important illustrations of the exercise of this authority are
the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (9 Stat. 635; Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U. S. 207 , 273 U. S.
213 -215); the Seamen's Act of 1915 (38 Stat. 1185; Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.
S. 372 , 247 U. S. 381 , 247 U. S.
384 ); the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 1000; Morse Drydock & Repair Co. v. Northern Star, 271 U. S. 552 , 271 U. S. 555 , 271 U. S.
556 ); and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (41 Stat.
988), incorporating, in relation to seamen, the Federal Employers'
Liability Act into the maritime law of the United States. 41 Stat.
1007; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra; Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33 , 271 U. S. 35 ; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez , 271 U.
S. 557 , 271 U. S. 559 , 271 U. S. 560 ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U.
S. 142 , 278 U. S. 147 . See U.S.C., titles 33 and 46.

															[ Footnote 3 ] Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 ; Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 ; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.
S. 449 . For decisions since the passage of the Act in
question, see Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.
S. 427 ; Northern Coal & Dock Co. v. Strand, 278 U. S. 142 ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 279 U. S. 109 , 279 U. S. 125 ; Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.
S. 222 .

															The application of state Workmen's Compensation Acts has been
sustained where the work of the employee has been deemed to have no
direct relation to navigation or commerce, and the operation of the
local law "would work no material prejudice to the essential
features of the general maritime law." Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 , 257 U. S. 242 ; Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.
S. 469 , 257 U. S. 477 ; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S.
59 , 270 U. S. 64 ; Sultan Railway & Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U. S. 135 , 277 U. S. 137 ; Baizley Iron Works v. Span, supra, at pp. 281 U. S. 230 , 281 U. S. 231 . See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109 .

															[ Footnote 4 ] Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 , 264 U. S. 227 ,
where the court said:

															"Without doubt, Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise
the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its
will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of
a general Employers' Liability Law or general provisions for
compensating injured employees, but it may not be delegated to the
several states."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, in reporting upon
the proposed measure, said (Sen.Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 16):

															"The committee deems it unnecessary to comment upon the modern
change in the relation between employers and employees establishing
systems of compensation as distinguished from liability. Nearly
every State in the Union has a compensation law through which
employees are compensated for injuries occurring in the course of
their employment without regard to negligence on the part of the
employer or contributory negligence on the part of the employee. If
longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of State
compensation laws, there would be no occasion for this legislation;
but, unfortunately, they are excluded from these laws by reason of
the character of their employment; and they are not only excluded,
but the Supreme Court has more than once held that Federal
legislation cannot, constitutionally, be enacted that will apply
State laws to this occupation. ( Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 ; Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 ; Washington v.
Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 .)"

															The House Committee, in its report, made the following statement
(House Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 20):

															"The principle of workmen's compensation has become so firmly
established that simple justice would seem to require that this
class of maritime workers should be included in this legislation. .
. ."

															"The bill as amended, therefore, will enable Congress to
discharge its obligation to the maritime workers placed under their
jurisdiction by the Constitution of the United States by providing
for them a law whereby they may receive the benefits of workmen's
compensation and thus afford them the same remedies that have been
provided by legislation for those killed or injured in the course
of their employment in nearly every State in the Union."

															[ Footnote 6 ] See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.
S. 158 , 189 U. S. 169 ; The Iroquois, 194 U. S. 240 , 194 U. S. 241 , 194 U. S. 242 .
In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582 , 183 U. S. 586 ,
the Court said:

															"Our jurisprudence affords examples of legal liability without
fault, and the deprivation of property without fault being
attributable to its owner. The law of deodands was such an example.
The personification of the ship in admiralty law is another." See Holmes, "The Common Law," pp. 26-29; The China , 7
Wall. 53, 74 U. S. 67 , 74 U. S. 68 ; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 , 93 U. S.
105 -108; Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406 , 182 U. S. 413 , 182 U. S. 414 .
As to the basis of general average contribution, see Ralli v.
Troop, 157 U. S. 386 , 157 U. S. 394 , 157 U. S.
395 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															This Commission was created by the Act of September 7, 1916, c.
458, § 28, 39 Stat. 748, U.S.C., Tit. 5, § 778.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															In the regulations promulgated by the Commission in the form of
instructions to deputy commissioners, provision was made for
findings of fact. Report, United States Employees' Compensation
Commission, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, p. 64. See
Howard v. Monahan, 33 F.2d 220.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In the District of Columbia, the proceedings are to be
instituted in the Supreme Court of the District.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The United States Employees' Compensation Commission estimates
that the number of employees who at times are engaged in
employments covered by the Act is in excess of 300,000. Report for
fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, p. 66. The Commission states that
138,788 cases have been closed during the four years that the law
has been in operation. Id., p. 69. During the last fiscal
year, the injuries reported under the Act numbered 28,861, of which
156 were "fatal" cases. The total number of cases disposed of
during that year, including those brought forward from the
preceding years, was 30,489, of which there were 13,261 "nonfatal"
cases which caused no loss of time, and 4,067 of such cases in
which the duration of disability did not exceed seven days.
Compensation payments were completed in 11,776 cases. Hearings held
by deputy commissioners during the fiscal year number 1,217, of
which 905 involved compensation payments. At the end of the fiscal
year, there were 102 cases pending in federal District Courts
wherein the plaintiffs asked review of compensation orders. Id., 68-70.

															[ Footnote 11 ] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.
S. 685 , 166 U. S. 695 ; Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142 , 258 U. S. 147 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 , 260 U. S. 580 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.
S. 221 , 266 U. S. 225 ; Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, 272 U.
S. 658 , 272 U. S. 663 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.
S. 420 , 280 U. S. 442 ; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 , 280 U. S. 297 ; Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362 , 281 U. S. 369 ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.
S. 589 , 281 U. S. 600 . See also Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.
Glidden, 284 U. S. 151 ; New York Central R. Co. v. White, supra, at pp. 243 U. S. 194 , 243 U. S. 207 , 243 U. S. 208 ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, supra, at p. 343 U. S.
233 .

															[ Footnote 12 ] American Insurance Co. v.
Canter , 1 Pet. 511, 26 U. S. 546 ; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.
S. 428 , 261 U. S.
442 -444; Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut
Co., 272 U. S. 693 , 272 U. S.
700 .

															[ Footnote 13 ] Virginian Railway Co. v. United States, supra; Tagg Bros.
& Moorhead v. United States, supra; International Shoe Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra; Phillips v. Commissioner, supra;
United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 , 198 U. S. 263 ; United States v. Babcock, 250 U.
S. 328 , 250 U. S. 331 ; Burfenning v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 163 U. S. 321 , 163 U. S. 323 ; Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.
S. 106 , 104 U. S. 109 ; Houston v. St. Louis Packing Co., 249 U.
S. 479 , 249 U. S. 484 ; Passavant v. United States, 148 U.
S. 214 , 148 U. S. 219 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.
S. 221 , 266 U. S.
225 .

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															As to masters in chancery, see Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136 , 125 U. S. 149 , 125 U. S. 150 ; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617 , 128 U. S. 666 , 128 U. S. 667 ; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512 , 129 U. S. 523 , 129 U. S. 524 ; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631 , 155 U. S.
636 .

															As to commissioners in admiralty, see The Cayuga (C.C.A. 6th), 59 F. 483, 488; La Bourgogne (C.C.A. 2d),
144 F. 781, 782, 783; The North Star (C.C.A. 2d), 151 F.
168, 177; Western Transit Co. v. Davidson S.S. Co. (C.C.A.
6th), 212 F. 696, 701; P. Sanford Ross, Inc. v. Public Service
Corp. (C.C.A. 3d), 42 F.2d 79, 80.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															4 Chr. Robinson's Admiralty Reports, p. 74, note; Black Book of
the Admiralty (Twiss' Ed.) vol. 1, pp. 49, 53, 245; 1 Abbott on
Shipping (5th Am. Ed.) pp. 283, 284; 1 Benedict's Admiralty (5th
Ed.) p. 304, note.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															As to the effect of the verdict of the jury in such cases, see The Western States, 159 F. 354, 358, 359; Sweeting
v. The Western States, 210 U.S. 433; The Nyack, 199
F. 383, 389; 1 Benedict's Admiralty (5th Ed.) p. 305.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The term "jurisdictional," although frequently used, suggests
analogies which are not complete when the reference is to
administrative officials or bodies. See Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.
S. 474 , 224 U. S. 484 .
In relation to administrative agencies, the question in a given
case is whether it falls within the scope of the authority validly
conferred.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															This power is distinct from the authority to regulate interstate
or foreign commerce, and is not limited to cases arising in that
commerce. The Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh , 12 How. 443, 53 U. S. 452 ; The Commerce , 1 Black 574, 66 U. S. 578 , 66 U. S. 579 ; The Belfast , 7
Wall. 624, 74 U. S. 640 , 74 U. S. 641 ; Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629 , 109 U. S. 632 ; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1 , 141 U. S. 15 ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 279 U. S. 109 , 279 U. S.
124 .

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The Belfast, supra; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra; The Genesee
Chief, supra, at p. 459 of 12 How., 13 L. Ed. 1058; 1 Benedict's
Admiralty (5th Ed.) § 32, p. 47.

															[ Footnote 20 ] Cleveland Terminal & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship
Co., 208 U. S. 316 ; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, supra, at pp. 234 U. S. 59 , 234 U. S. 60 ; Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U.
S. 263 , 259 U. S. 273 ; Washington v. Dawson, supra, at pp. 264 U. S. 227 , 264 U. S. 235 ; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 281 U.
S. 128 , 281 U. S. 133 , 281 U. S. 138 .

															[ Footnote 21 ] The Daniel
Ball , 10 Wall. 557, 77 U. S. 563 ; United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U. S.
49 , 270 U. S. 56 ; United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64 , 283 U. S. 76 , 283 U. S. 77 ; Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 , 283 U. S.
452 .

															[ Footnote 22 ] Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., supra; Washington
v. Dawson, supra; Nogueira v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co.,
supra; 1 Benedict's Admiralty, 5th ed., § 29, pp. 41, 42,
note.

															[ Footnote 23 ] See Report of United States Employees' Compensation
Commission for fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, pp. 108, 109.

															[ Footnote 24 ] Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.
S. 210 , 211 U. S. 225 ; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54 , 251 U. S. 56 ; Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S.
40 , 271 U. S.
42 .

															[ Footnote 25 ] Supra, note
13 [ Footnote 26 ] See Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 370 .

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															Freund, "Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property," §
154, p. 293.

															[ Footnote 28 ] Id., § 153, pp. 291-293.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															Where the doctrine of personal liability of an officer for
acting without jurisdiction is applied, courts have received
evidence to show the jurisdictional defect. Thus in Miller v.
Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100, an action was brought
against the members of a town board of health who had killed a
horse in obedience to an order of the commissioners on contagious
diseases among domestic animals, acting under the alleged authority
of the state Legislature. The order recited that the animal had
been examined and was adjudged to have the glanders. The judge
before whom the case was tried "found the horse had not the
glanders," but declined to rule against the defendants. The Supreme
Judicial Court sustained exceptions, holding that

															"The fact as to the horse having the disease was open to
investigation in the present action, and, on the finding that it
did not have it, the plaintiff was entitled to a ruling that the
defendants had failed to make out their justification." Id., p. 548. See also Pearson v. Zehr, 138
Ill. 48, 51, 52, 29 N.E. 854.

															[ Footnote 30 ] Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra, at p. 264 U. S. 390 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.
S. 466 , 270 U. S. 471 , 270 U. S. 472 ; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.
S. 331 , 275 U. S. 346 ; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 , 275 U. S. 148 ; Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573 , 279 U. S.
577 .

															[ Footnote 31 ] Supra, note
10 fmx

															MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, dissenting.

															Knudsen filed a claim against Benson under § 19(a) of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, March 4, 1927,
c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424. Benson's answer denied, among other things,
that the relation of employer and employee existed between him and
the claimant. The evidence introduced before the deputy Page 285 U. S. 66 commissioner, which occupies 78 pages of the printed record, was
directed largely to that issue, and was conflicting. The deputy
commissioner found that the claimant was in Benson's employ at the
time of the injury, and filed an order for compensation under §
21(a). Benson brought this proceeding under § 21(b) to set aside
the order. The District Judge transferred the suit to the admiralty
side of the court and held a trial de novo , refusing to
consider upon any aspect of the case the record before the deputy
commissioner. On the evidence introduced in court, he found that
the relation of employer and employee did not exist, and entered a
decree setting aside the compensation order. 33 F.2d
137 , 38 F.2d 306. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decree. 45 F.2d 66. This Court granted certiorari. 283 U.S. 814. In
my opinion, the decree should be reversed, because Congress did not
authorize a trial de novo. The primary question for consideration is not whether Congress
provided, or validly could provide, that determinations of fact by
the deputy commissioner should be conclusive upon the District
Court. The question is: upon what record shall the District Court's
review of the order of the deputy commissioner be based? The courts
below held that the respondent was entitled to a trial de
novo; that all the evidence introduced before the deputy
commissioner should go for naught; and that respondent should have
the privilege of presenting new, and even entirely different,
evidence in the District Court. Unless that holding was correct,
the judgment below obviously cannot be affirmed. First. The initial question is one of construction of
the Longshoremen's Act. The Act does not, in terms, declare whether
there may be a trial de novo either as to the issue
whether the relation of employer and employee existed at the time
of the injury or as to any other issue, tried or triable, before
the deputy commissioner. It provides, by § 19(a), that "the deputy
commissioner shall Page 285 U. S. 67 have full power and authority to hear and determine all
questions in respect of" a claim; by § 21(a), that the compensation
order made by the deputy commissioner "shall become effective" when
filed in his office, and,

															"unless proceedings for the suspension or setting aside of such
order are instituted as provided in subdivision (b) of this §,
shall become final . . . ;"

															and, by § 21(b), that,

															"if not in accordance with law, a compensation order may be
suspended or set aside, in whole or in part, through injunction
proceedings . . . instituted in the Federal district court. . .
."

															The phrase in § 21(b) providing that the order may be set aside
"if not in accordance with law" was adopted from the statutory
provision, enacted by the same Congress, for review by the Circuit
Courts of Appeals of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals.
[ Footnote 2/1 ] This Court has
settled that the phrase, as used in the tax statute, means a review
upon the record made before the Board. Phillips v.
Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 , 283 U. S. 600 .
The Compensation Commission has consistently construed the
Longshoremen's Act as providing for finality of the deputy
commissioners' findings on all questions of fact; [ Footnote 2/2 ] and care Page 285 U. S. 68 has been taken to provide for formal hearings appropriate to
that intention. Compare Brown v. United States, 113 U. S. 568 , 113 U. S. 571 ; Mason v. Routzahn, 275 U. S. 175 , 275 U. S. 178 .
The lower federal courts, except in the case at bar, have uniformly
construed the Act as denying a trial de novo of any issue
determined by the deputy commissioner; have held that, in respect
to those issues, the review afforded must be held upon the record
made before the deputy commissioner; and that the deputy
commissioner's findings of fact must be accepted as conclusive if
supported by evidence, unless there was some irregularity in the
proceeding before him. [ Footnote
2/3 ] Nearly all the state Page 285 U. S. 69 courts have construed the state workmen's compensation laws, as
limiting the judicial review to matters of law. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Provisions in other federal statutes,
similar to Page 285 U. S. 70 those here in question, creating, various administrative
tribunals, have likewise been treated as not conferring the right
to a judicial trial de novo. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 285 U. S. 71 The safeguards with which Congress has surrounded the
proceedings before the deputy commissioner would be without meaning
if those proceedings were to serve merely as an inquiry preliminary
to a contest in the courts. [ Footnote
2/6 ] Specific provisions of the Longshoremen's Act make clear
that it was the aim of Congress to expedite the relief afforded.
With a view to obviating the delays incident to judicial
proceedings, the Act substitutes an administrative tribunal for the
court, and, besides providing for notice and opportunity to be
heard, endows the proceedings before the deputy commissioner with
the customary incidents of a judicial hearing. It prescribes that
the parties in interest may be represented by counsel, § 19(d);
that the attendance of witnesses and the Page 285 U. S. 72 production of documents may be compelled, § 27(a); that the
hearings shall be public, and that they shall be stenographically
reported, § 23(b); that there shall be made "a record of the
hearings and other proceedings before the deputy commissioners," §
23(b); that "the deputy commissioner shall have full power and
authority to hear and determine all questions in respect of" a
claim, § 19(a); and that his order shall become final after thirty
days, unless a proceeding is filed under § 21(b), charging that it
is "not in accordance with law." Procedure of this character,
instead of expediting relief, would entail useless expense and
delay if the proceedings before the deputy commissioner were to be
repeated in court and the case tried from the beginning, at the
option of either party. The conclusion that Congress did not so
intend is confirmed by reference to the legislative history of the
Act. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Compare
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 , 242 U. S.
490 . Page 285 U. S. 73 Second. Nothing in the statute warrants the
construction that the right to a trial de novo which
Congress has concededly denied as to most issues of fact determined
by the deputy commissioner has been granted in respect to the issue
of the existence of the employer-employee relation. The language
which is held sufficient to foreclose the right to such a trial on
some issues forecloses it as to all. Whether the peculiar relation
which the fact of employment is asserted to bear to the scheme of
the statute and to the constitutional authority under which it was
passed might conceivably have induced Congress to provide a special
method of review upon that question, it is not necessary to
inquire. For Congress expressly declared its intention to put, for
purposes of review, all the issues of fact on the same basis, by
conferring upon the deputy commissioner "full power to hear and
determine all questions in respect of such claim," subject only to
the power of the court to set aside his order "if not in accordance
with law."

															The suggestion that "such claim" may be construed to mean only a
claim within the purview of the Act seems to me without substance.
Logically applied, the suggestion would leave the deputy
commissioner powerless to hear or determine any issue of asserted
nonliability under the Act. For nonexistence of the employer
employee relation is only one of many grounds of nonliability.
Thus, there is no liability if the injury was occasioned solely by
the intoxication of the employee; or if the injury was due to the
willful intention of the employee to Page 285 U. S. 74 injure or kill himself or another; or if it did not arise "out
of or in the course of employment"; or if the employer was not
engaged in maritime employment in whole or in part; or if the
injured person was the employee of a subcontractor who has secured
payment of compensation; or if the proceeding is brought against
the wrong person as employer; or if the disability or death is that
of a master or a member of the crew of any vessel; or if it is that
of a person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net; or if it is that of an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof; or
if it is that of an officer or employee of any state, or foreign
government, or any political subdivision thereof; or if recovery
for the disability or death through workmen's compensation
proceedings may be validly provided by state law. And obviously
there is no liability if there was in fact neither disability nor
death. It is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to
set up a factfinding tribunal of first instance, shorn of power to
find a portion of the facts required for any decision of the case;
or that, in enacting legislation designed to withdraw from
litigation the great bulk of maritime accidents, it contemplated a
procedure whereby the same facts must be twice litigated before a
longshoreman could be assured the benefits of compensation.

															The circumstance that Congress provided, in § 21(b), of the Act,
for review of orders of the deputy commissioner by injunction
proceedings is urged as indicative of an intention that in such
proceedings the complainant should have full opportunity to plead
and prove any facts showing that the case lay outside the purview
of the statute. But by this reasoning, again, many other questions
besides those referred to by the Court would be open to retrial
upon new, and different, evidence. The simple answer is that on
bills in equity to set aside orders of a federal Page 285 U. S. 75 administrative board there is no trial de novo of
issues of fact determined by that tribunal. As stated in Tagg
Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.
S. 420 , 280 U. S. 443 ,
concerning orders of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers
and Stockyards Act:

															"A proceeding under § 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act is a
judicial review, not a trial de novo. The validity of an
order of the Secretary, like that of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, must be determined upon the record of the
proceedings before him -- save as there may be an exception of
issues presenting claims of constitutional right, a matter which
need not be considered or decided now. [ Footnote 2/8 ]"

															In the review of the quasi judicial decisions of these federal
administrative tribunals the bill in equity serves the purpose
which at common law, and under the practice of many of the states,
is performed by writs of certiorari. [ Footnote 2/9 ] It presents to the reviewing court the
record of the proceedings before the administrative tribunal in
order that determination may be made, among other things, whether
the authority conferred has been properly exercised. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Neither upon bill in
equity in the federal Page 285 U. S. 76 courts nor writ of certiorari in the states is it the practice
to permit fresh evidence to be offered in the reviewing court.
There is no foundation for the suggestion that Congress intended to
provide otherwise in the Longshoremen's Act. Third. It is said that the provision for a trial de
novo of the existence of the employer employee relation should
be read into the Act in order to avoid a serious constitutional
doubt. It is true that, where a statute is equally susceptible of
two constructions, under one of which it is clearly valid and under
the other of which it may be unconstitutional, the court will adopt
the former construction. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.
S. 252 , 116 U. S. 269 ; Knights Templars' Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.
S. 197 , 187 U. S. 205 ; Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118 , 250 U. S. 122 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.
S. 466 , 270 U. S. 471 , 270 U. S. 472 .
But this Act is not equally susceptible to two constructions. The
court may not, in order to avoid holding a statute
unconstitutional, engraft upon it an exception or other provision. Butts v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126 , 230 U. S. 133 ; The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463 , 207 U. S.
500 -502; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S.
82 , 100 U. S. 99 ; United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670 , 95 U. S. 672 , 95 U. S. 673 ; United
States Page 285 U. S. 77 v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 , 92 U. S. 221 . Compare Illinois Central R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U.
S. 514 , 203 U. S. 529 ; Cella Commission Co. v. Bohlinger, 147 F. 419, 423, 424.
Neither may it do so to avoid having to resolve a constitutional
doubt. To hold that Congress conferred the right to a trial de
novo on the issue of the employer employee relation seems to
me a remaking of the statute and not a construction of it. Fourth. Trial de novo of the issue of the
existence of the employer employee relation is not required by the
due process clause. That clause ordinarily does not even require
that parties shall be permitted to have a judicial tribunal pass
upon the weight of the evidence introduced before the
administrative body. See Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v.
Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. The findings of fact of the
deputy commissioner, the Court now decides, are conclusive as to
most issues if supported by evidence. Yet, as to the issue of
employment, the Court holds not only that such findings may not be
declared final, but that it would create a serious constitutional
doubt to construe the Act as committing to the deputy commissioner
the simple function of collecting the evidence upon which the court
will ultimately decide the issue.

															It is suggested that this exception is required as to issues of
fact involving claims of constitutional right. For reasons which I
shall later discuss, I cannot believe that the issue of employment
is one of constitutional right. But even assuming it to be so, the
conclusion does not follow that trial of the issue must therefore
be upon a record made in the District Court. That the function of
collecting evidence may be committed to an administrative tribunal
is settled by a host of cases, [ Footnote 2/11 ] and Page 285 U. S. 78 supported by persuasive analogies, none of which justify a
distinction between issues of constitutional right and any others.
Resort to administrative remedies may be made a condition precedent
to a judicial hearing. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Solum, 247 U. S. 477 , 247 U. S. 483 , 247 U. S. 484 ; First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of County
Commissioners, 264 U. S. 450 , 264 U. S. 454 , 264 U. S. 455 ; United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U. S. 474 .
This is so even though a party is asserting deprivation of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution. First National Bank of
Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, supra. In federal
equity suits, the taking of evidence on any issue in open court did
not become common until 1913, [ Footnote 2/12 ] compare 224 U.
S. Page 285 U. S. 79 Corp, v. James, 272 U. S. 701 ; and
in admiralty, it was not required by the rules of this Court until
1921. [ Footnote 2/13 ] Compare
The P. R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122. On appeals in admiralty,
further proof is now taken by a commission. [ Footnote 2/14 ] As was said concerning a similar
tribunal in Washington ex rel. Oregon Railroad & Navigation
Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 , 224 U. S. 527 ,
the function of the deputy commissioner is like that of a master in
chancery who has been required to take testimony and report his
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Compare Los Angeles
Brush Corporation v. James, supra; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512 , 129 U. S. 524 , 129 U. S. 525 ; Armstrong v. Belding Bros. & Co., 297 F. 728, 729. The
holding that the difference between the procedure prescribed by the
Longshoremen's Act and these historic methods of hearing evidence
transcends the limits of congressional power when applied to the
issue of the existence of a relation of employment, as
distinguished from that of the circumstances of an injury or the
existence of a relation of dependency, seems to me without
foundation in reality. Certainly there is no difference to the
litigant. Page 285 U. S. 80 Even in respect to the question, discussed by the Court, of the
finality to be accorded administrative findings of fact in a civil
case involving pecuniary liability, I see no reason for making
special exception as to issues of constitutional right unless it be
that, under certain circumstances, there may arise difficulty in
reaching conclusions of law without consideration of the evidence
as well as the findings of fact. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead
v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 , 280 U. S. 443 . Compare Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 . The
adequacy of that reason need not be discussed. For, as to the issue
of employment, no such difficulty can be urged. Two decades of
experience in the states testify to the appropriateness of the
administrative process as applied to this issue, as well as all
others, in workmen's compensation controversies. Fifth. Trial de novo of the existence of the
employer employee relation is not required by the Judiciary Article
of the Constitution. The mere fact that the Act deals only with
injuries arising on navigable waters, and that, independently of
legislation, such injuries can be redressed only in courts of
admiralty, [ Footnote 2/15 ]
obviously does not preclude Congress from denying a trial de
novo. For the Court holds that it is compatible with the grant
of power under Article III to deny a trial de novo as to
most of the facts Page 285 U. S. 81 upon which rest the allowance of a claim and the amount of
compensation. Its holding that the Constitution requires a trial de novo of the issue of the employer employee relation is
based on the relation which that fact bears to the statutory scheme
propounded by Congress, and to the constitutional authority under
which the Act was passed. The argument is that existence of the
relation of employer and employee is, as a matter of substantive
law, indispensable to the application of the statute, because the
power of Congress to enact the legislation turns upon its
existence, and that, whenever the question of constitutional power
depends upon an issue of fact, that issue must, as a matter of
procedure, be determinable independently upon evidence freshly
introduced in a court. [ Footnote
2/16 ] Neither proposition seems to me well founded.

															Whether the power of Congress to provide compensation for
injuries occurring on navigable waters is limited to cases in which
the employer employee relation exists has not heretofore been
passed upon by this Court, and was not argued in this case. I see
no justification for assuming, under those circumstances, that it
is so limited. Page 285 U. S. 82 Without doubt the word "employee" was used in the Longshoremen's
Act in the sense in which the common law defines it. But that
definition is not immutable, and no provision of the Constitution
confines the application of liability without fault to instances
where the relation of employment, as so defined, exists. [ Footnote 2/17 ] Compare Louis Pisitz
Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112 , 274 U. S. 116 .
Whether an individual is an employer or an independent contractor
depends upon criteria often subtle and uncertain of application,
[ Footnote 2/18 ] criteria which
have been developed, by processes Page 285 U. S. 83 of judicial exclusion and inclusion, largely since the adoption
of the Constitution [ Footnote
2/19 ] and with reference, for the most part, to considerations
foreign to industrial accident litigation. It is not to be assumed
that Congress, having power to amend and revise the maritime law,
is prevented from modifying those criteria and enlarging the
liability imposed by this Act so as to embrace all persons who are
engaged or engage themselves in the work of another, including
those now designated as independent contractors. In the
Longshoremen's Act itself, Congress, far from declaring the
relation of master and servant indispensable in all cases to the
application of the statute, provided expressly that a contractor
shall be liable to employees of a subcontractor who has failed to
secure payment of compensation. § 4(a) of the Act. State Workmen's
Compensation Laws almost invariably contain provisions for
liability either to independent contractors or to their employees,
sometimes absolute and sometimes conditioned upon default by the
immediate employer; [ Footnote
2/20 ] and these provisions Page 285 U. S. 84 appear to have been uniformly upheld. [ Footnote 2/21 ] I cannot doubt that, even upon the view
of the evidence taken by the District Court, Congress might have
made Benson liable to Knudsen for the injury which he
sustained. Sixth. Even if the constitutional power of Congress to
provide compensation is limited to cases in which the Page 285 U. S. 85 employer-employee relation exists, I see no basis for a
contention that the denial of the right to a trial de novo upon the issue of employment is in any manner subversive of the
independence of the federal judicial power. Nothing in the
Constitution, or in any prior decision of this Court to which
attention has been called, lends support to the doctrine that a
judicial finding of any fact involved in any civil proceeding to
enforce a pecuniary liability may not be made upon evidence
introduced before a properly constituted administrative tribunal,
or that a determination so made may not be deemed an independent
judicial determination. Congress has repeatedly exercised authority
to confer upon the tribunals which it creates, be they
administrative bodies or courts of limited jurisdiction, the power
to receive evidence concerning the facts upon which the exercise of
federal power must be predicated, and to determine whether those
facts exist. The power of Congress to provide by legislation for
liability under certain circumstances subsumes the power to provide
for the determination of the existence of those circumstances. It
does not depend upon the absolute existence in reality of any
fact.

															It is true that, so far as Knudsen is concerned, proof of the
existence of the employer employee relation is essential to
recovery under the Act. But under the definition laid down in Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U.
S. 165 , 147 U. S. 173 , 147 U. S. 174 ,
that fact is not jurisdictional. It is quasi jurisdictional. The existence of a relation of employment is a
question going to the applicability of the substantive law, not to
the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Jurisdiction is the power to
adjudicate between the parties concerning the subject-matter. Compare Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.
S. 254 , 140 U. S. 268 .
Obviously, the deputy commissioner had not only the power but the
duty to determine whether the employer employee relation existed.
When a duly constituted tribunal has jurisdiction Page 285 U. S. 86 of the parties and of the subject matter, that jurisdiction is
not impaired by errors, however grave, in applying the substantive
law. Dennison v. Payne, 293 F. 333, 341. Compare
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 , 270 U. S. 617 ; Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U. S. 142 , 247 U. S. 149 ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.
S. 291 , 263 U. S.
305 -307. This is true of tribunals of special as well as
of those of general jurisdiction. It is true of administrative, as
well as of judicial, tribunals. If errors in the application of law
may not be made the basis of collateral attack upon the decision of
an administrative tribunal, once that decision has become final, no
"jurisdictional" defect can compel the independent reexamination in
court, upon direct review, of the facts affecting such
applicability.

															The "judicial power" of Article III of the Constitution is the
power of the federal government, and not of any inferior tribunal.
There is in that article nothing which requires any controversy to
be determined as of first instance in the federal District Courts.
The jurisdiction of those courts is subject to the control of
Congress. [ Footnote 2/22 ]
Matters Page 285 U. S. 87 which may be placed within their jurisdiction may instead be
committed to the state courts. If there be any controversy to which
the judicial power extends that may not be subjected to the
conclusive determination of administrative bodies or federal
legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition against
the diminution of the jurisdiction of the federal District Courts
as such, but because, under certain circumstances, the
constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of
judicial process. An accumulation of precedents, already referred
to, [ Footnote 2/23 ] has
established that in civil proceedings involving Page 285 U. S. 88 property rights determination of facts may constitutionally be
made otherwise than judicially; and, necessarily, that evidence as
to such facts may be taken outside of a court. I do not conceive
that Article III has properly any bearing upon the question
presented in this case. Seventh. The cases cited by the Court in support of its
conclusion that the statute would be invalid if construed to deny a
trial de novo of issues of fact affecting the existence of
the employer employee relation seem to me irrelevant. Most of those
decisions dealt with tribunals exercising functions generically
different from the function which Congress has assigned to the
deputy commissioners under the Longshoremen's Act, and no question
arose analogous to that now presented.

															By the Longshoremen's Act, Congress created factfinding and
fact-gathering tribunals, supplementing the courts and intrusted
with power to make initial determinations in matters within, and
not outside, ordinary judicial purview. The purpose of these
administrative bodies is to withdraw from the courts, subject to
the power of judicial review, a class of controversy which
experience has shown can be more effectively and expeditiously
handled in the first instance by a special and expert tribunal. The
proceedings of the deputy commissioners are endowed with every
substantial safeguard of a judicial hearing. Their conclusions are,
as a matter of right, open to reexamination in the courts on all
questions of law; and, we assume for the purposes of this
discussion, may be open even on all questions of the weight of the
evidence.

															The administrative bodies in the cases referred to by the Court,
on the contrary, are in no sense fact-gathering Page 285 U. S. 89 or factfinding tribunals of first instance. They are tribunals
of final resort within the scope of their authority. Their concern
is with matters ordinarily outside of judicial competence -- the
deportation of aliens, the enforcement of military discipline, the
granting of land patents, and the use of the mails -- matters which
are within the power of Congress to commit to conclusive executive
determination. Compare Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438 , 279 U. S. 451 .
Their procedure may be summary and frequently is. [ Footnote 2/24 ] With respect to them, the function
of the courts is not one of review but essentially of control-the
function of keeping them within their statutory authority.
[ Footnote 2/25 ] Page 285 U. S. 90 No method of judicial review of the administrative action had
been provided by Congress in any of the cases cited, and the
question of the power to confine review to the administrative
record accordingly did not arise. In each case, the Court held
that, if the administrative officer had acted outside his
authority, the unwritten law supplied a remedy, and that relief
could be had, according to the nature of the case, on bill in
equity or habeas corpus. [ Footnote
2/26 ] Page 285 U. S. 91 The question decided in each case was that Congress should not
be taken, in the absence of specific provision, to have intended to
subject the individual to the uncontrolled action of a public
administrative officer. See American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 , 187 U. S. 110 .
No comparable issue is presented here.

															Reliance is also placed, as illustrative of the necessary
independence of the federal judicial power, upon the decision in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.
S. 287 . [ Footnote
2/27 ] That case, however, involved only the question Page 285 U. S. 92 of the scope of review, upon the administrative record, in
confiscation cases. It held that the reviewing court must have
power to weigh the evidence upon which the administrative tribunal
entered the order. It decided nothing concerning the right to a
trial de novo in court, and the opinion made no reference
to such a trial. It could not have decided anything as to the
effect of Article III of the Constitution. For the case came here
from the highest court of the state, arose under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and did not relate to the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. Moreover, in no event, can the issues presented in
the review of rate orders alleged to be confiscatory, which involve
difficult questions of mixed law and fact, be deemed parallel to
those presented in the review of workmen's compensation awards.
[ Footnote 2/28 ] Compare the issues in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, supra,
with that in Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Industrial
Board, 284 U.S. 594.

															Whatever may be the propriety of the rule permitting special
reexamination in a trial court of so-called "jurisdictional Page 285 U. S. 93 facts" passed upon by administrative bodies having otherwise
final jurisdiction over matters properly committed to them, I find
no warrant for extending the doctrine to other and different
administrative tribunals whose very function is to hear evidence
and make initial determinations concerning those matters which it
is sought to reexamine. Such a doctrine has never been applied to
tribunals properly analogous to the deputy commissioners, such as
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,
the Secretary of Agriculture acting under the Packers and
Stockyards Act, and the like. [ Footnote 2/29 ] Logically applied, it would seriously
impair the entire administrative process. [ Footnote 2/30 ] Eighth. No good reason is suggested why all the
evidence which Benson presented to the District Court in this cause
could not have been presented before the deputy commissioner, nor
why he should have been permitted to try his case provisionally
before the administrative tribunal and then to retry it in the
District Court upon additional evidence theretofore withheld. To
permit him to do so violates the salutary principle that
administrative remedied must first be exhausted before resorting to
the court, imposes unnecessary and burdensome expense upon the
other party, and cripples the effective administration of the Act.
Under the prevailing practice, by which the judicial review has
been confined to questions of law, the proceedings before the
deputy commissioners Page 285 U. S. 94 have proved for the most part noncontroversial, [ Footnote 2/31 ] and relatively few cases
have reached the courts. [ Footnote
2/32 ] To permit a contest de novo in the District
Court of an issue tried, or triable, before the deputy commissioner
will, I fear, gravely hamper the effective administration of the
Act. The prestige of the deputy commissioner will necessarily be
lessened by the opportunity of relitigating facts in the courts.
The number of controverted cases may be largely increased.
Persistence in controversy will be encouraged. And since the
advantage of prolonged litigation lies with the party able to bear
heavy expenses, the purpose of the Act will be in part defeated.
[ Footnote 2/33 ]

															In my opinion, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeal
should be reversed, and the case remanded to the District Court,
sitting as a court of equity, for consideration and decision upon
the record made before the deputy commissioner.

															MR. JUSTICE STONE and MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS join in this
opinion.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 110:

															"Sec. 1003. (a) The Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the board. . . ."

															"(b) Upon such review, such courts shall have power to affirm
or, if the decision of the board is not in accordance with law, to
modify or reverse the decision of the board, with or without
remanding the case for a rehearing as justice may require."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															This opinion was expressed in regulations promulgated by the
Commission, under authority conferred by § 39(a), in the form of
instructions to deputy commissioners, dated September 28, 1927; and
it was repeated in the Commission's report at the close of the
first year of its administration of the Act. Report of United
States Employees' Compensation Commission, for fiscal year ending
June 30, 1928, p. 33. See also id., June 30, 1929, p. 77; id., June 30, 1930, pp. 63-64; id., June 30,
1931, p. 71. The instructions to deputy commissioners, elaborated
December 10, 1927, and May 15, 1928, required that the record of
proceedings and findings of fact be prepared, and the proceedings
be conducted, in consonance with this view of the law.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The question of judicial review under the Act has been passed
upon by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeals, as well as the Fifth; by a District Court in the Sixth
Circuit; and by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
under the Act of May 17, 1928, c. 612, 45 Stat. 600. Pocahontas
Fuel Co. v. Monahan, 41 F.2d 48, 49 (C.C.A. 1st), affirming 34 F.2d 549, 551, 1929 A.M.C. 1336 (D.C.Me.); Joyce v. United States Deputy Commissioner, 33 F.2d
218 , 219 (D.C.Me.); Jarka Corporation v. Monahan, 48
F.2d 283, 284 (D.C.Mass.); Booth v. Monahan, 56 F.2d 168
(D.C.Me.); Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Locke, 50 F.2d 81, 82
(C.C.A. 2d); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Locke, 56 F.2d 443
(D.C.S.D.N.Y.); Calabrese v. Locke, 56 F.2d 458
(D.C.S.D.N.Y.); W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining & Molasses Co.
v. Norton, 43 F.2d 505, 506 (C.C.A. 3d), affirming 34
F.2d 499 (D.C.E.D.Pa.); Independent Pier Co. v. Norton, 54
F.2d 734 (C.C.A. 3d); Baltimore & Carolina S.S. Co. v.
Norton, 40 F.2d
271 , 272 (D.C.E.D.Pa.); Merchants' & Miners' Transp.
Co. v. Norton, 32 F.2d
513 , 515 (D.C.E.D.Pa.); Jarka Corporation v.
Norton, 56 F.2d 287 (D.C.E.D.Pa.); Frank Marra Co. v. Norton, 56 F.2d 246
(D.C.E.D.Pa.); Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. McManigal, 41
F.2d 593, 594, 595 (C.C.A. 4th); Obrecht-Lynch Corporation v.
Clark, 30 F.2d
144 , 146 (D.C.Md.); Keyway Stevedoring Co. v.
Clark, 43 F.2d 983 (D.C.Md.); Kranski v. Atlantic Coast Shipping Co., 56 F.2d
166 (D.C.Md.); Chesapeake Ship Ceiling Co. v. Clark (D.C.Md.), decided May 22, 1930 (oral opinion); Goble v.
Clark, 56 F.2d 170 (D.C.Md.); Michigan Transit Corporation
v. Brown, 56 F.2d 200 (D.C.W.D.Mich.); Northwestern Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 41 F.2d 28, 29 (C.C.A. 9th); Gunther v. United States
Employees' Compensation Commission, 41 F.2d 151, 153 (C.C.A.
9th); Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v.
Marshall, 36 F.2d
814 , 815 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Zurich General Accident &
Liability Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 42 F.2d 1010, 1011
(D.C.W.D.Wash.); Tood Dry Docks, Inc. v. Marshall, 49 F.2d
621, 623 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v.
Marshall, 36 F.2d 814 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Rothschild & Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d
415 (D.C.W.D.Wash.), reversed on other grounds, 44 F.2d
546 (C.C.A. 9th); Lea Mathew Shipping Corporation v.
Marshall, 56 F.2d 860 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Griffiths &
Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 665
(D.C.W.D.Wash.); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Marshall, 56
F.2d 441 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Nelson v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 654
(D.C.W.D.Wash.); Grant v. Marshall, 56 F.2d 654
(D.C.W.D.Wash.); Zurich General Accident & Liability Co. v.
Marshall, 56 F.2d 652 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); Ocean Accident
& Guarantee Corporation v. Solberg, 56 F.2d 607
(D.C.W.D.Wash.). Compare Lake Washington Shipyards v.
Brueggeman, 56 F.2d 655 (D.C.W.D.Wash.); New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 46 F.2d 837 (App.D.C.); Hoage v.
Murch Bros. Const. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 984 (App.D.C.). See
also the following decisions by district courts in the Fifth
Circuit: Showers v. Crowell, 46 F.2d 361 (W.D.La.); Howard v. Monahan, 31 F.2d 480, 481 (S.D.Tex.); id., 33 F.2d 220, 221 (S.D.Tex.). Compare T. J. Moss
Tie Co. v. Tanner, 44 F.2d 928 (C.C.A. 5th); Houston Ship
Channel Stevedoring Co. v. Sheppeard, 57 F.2d 259, 1931 A.M.C.
1605 (S.D.Tex.).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The Court has been referred to no case arising under the state
Workmen's Compensation Laws recognizing a right to trial de
novo in court. Numerous decisions declare administrative
findings of fact to be conclusive. The following decisions all
dealt with controversies concerning the existence of a relation of
employment. Hillen v. Industrial Accident Commission, 199
Cal. 577, 580, 250 P. 570; York Junction Transfer & Storage
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissioners, 202 Cal. 517, 521,
261 P. 704; Index Mines Corporation v. Industrial
Commission, 82 Colo. 272, 275, 259 P. 1036; Ocean Accident
& Guarantee Corp. v. Wilson, 36 Ga. App. 784, 138 S.E.
246; Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Idaho, 707, 721,
218 P. 356; Cinofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill.
521, 525 125 N.E. 286; Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 296 Ill. 329, 334, 129 N.E. 811; A. E. Norris
Coal Co. v. Jackson, 80 Ind. App. 423, 425, 141 N.E. 227; Murphy v. Shipley, 200 Iowa, 857, 859, 205 N.W. 497; Churchill's Case, 265 Mass. 117, 119, 164 N.E. 68; Hill's Case, 268 Mass. 491, 493, 167 N.E. 914; Matter
of Dale v. Saunders Brothers, 218 N.Y. 59, 63, 112 N.E. 571; Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Thomas, 99 Okl. 24,
26, 225 P. 967; Oklahoma Pipe Line Co. v. Lindsey, 113
Okl. 296, 298, 241 P. 1092; Belmonte v. Connor, 263 Pa.
470, 472, 106 A. 787.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															(a) Interstate Commerce Commission: Act of June 18, 1910, c.
309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539; see Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88 , 227 U. S. 92 ; United States v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 235 U. S. 314 , 235 U. S. 320 , 235 U. S. 321 ; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. United States, 245 U. S. 463 , 245 U. S. 466 ,
and other cases collected in I. L. Sharfman, "The Interstate
Commerce Commission II," pp. 384-393, 417 et seq.; Act of
June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 539, 555; Act of March 1,
1913; c. 92, 37 Stat. 701, 703. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead
v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 , 280 U. S.
444 n.

															(b) Federal Trade Commission: Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311,
§ 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719, 720; see Federal Trade Commission v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U. S. 568 , 260 U. S. 579 , 260 U. S. 580 ; Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade
Assn., 273 U. S. 52 , 273 U. S. 63 ; Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Assn. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 18 F.2d 866, 870, 871; Gregory Hankin,
"Conclusiveness of the Federal Trade Commission's Findings as to
Facts," 23 Mich.L.Rev. 233, 262-267; Act of October 15, 1914, c.
323, § 11, 38 Stat. 730, 735 (applicable also in appropriate cases
to Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Reserve Board); see Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra;
International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 , 280 U. S.
297 .

															(c) Federal Power Commission: Act of June 10, 1920, c. 285, §
20, 41 Stat. 1063, 1074.

															(d) United States Shipping Board: Act of September 7, 1916, c.
451, §§ 29, 31, 39 Stat. 728, 737, 738; see Isthmian Steamship
Co. v. United States (S.D.N.Y.), 53 F.2d 251, decided December
7, 1931; compare United States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S.
Co., 284 U. S. 474 ,
decided February 15, 1932.

															(e) Secretary of Agriculture: Act of August 15, 1921, c. 64, §§
315, 316, 42 Stat. 159, 168; see Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v.
United States, 280 U. S. 420 , 280 U. S. 443 , 280 U. S. 444 ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 , 258 U. S. 512 ;
Act of August 15, 1921, c. 64, § 204, 42 Stat. 159, 162; Act of
June 10, 1930, c. 436, §§ 10, 11, 46 Stat. 531, 535.

															(f) Board of Tax Appeals: Act of February 26, 1926, c. 27, §
1003(a), 44, Stat. 9, 110; see Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589 , 283 U. S.
600 .

															(g) Grain Futures Commission: Act of September 21, 1922, c. 369,
§ 6(b), 42 Stat. 998, 1002.

															(h) District of Columbia Rent Commission: Act of October 22,
1919, c. 80, Title 2, § 108, 41 Stat. 297, 301; see Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 , 256 U. S. 158 ; Killgore v. Zinkhan, 51 App.D.C. 60, 274, F. 140, 142.

															In instances in which Congress intended to permit the
introduction of additional evidence in the District Court, it has
so provided in express terms. See, e.g., Act of February
18, 1922, c. 57, § 2, 42 Stat. 388, 389 (7 USCA § 292). Compare the provision for review of reparation orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309,
313, 36 Stat. 539, 554, and of orders for the payment of money by
the Shipping Board. Act of September 7, 1916, c. 451, § 30, 39
Stat. 728, 737.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] Compare Freund, "Administrative Powers Over Persons and
Property," p. 279.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Two bills providing workmen's compensation for longshoremen and
harbor workers were before the Congress at the same time. H.R.
9498, which was first reported favorably to the House, declared in
terms, §§ 22, 24, that "the decision of the deputy commissioner
shall be final as to all questions of fact and except as provided
in § 24 as to all questions of law." This bill was abandoned by the
House in favor of S. 3170, in order that some legislation on the
subject, under what was regarded as an emergency, might be passed
at that session. H.D., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pt. 2, pp.
139-141. Although the differences between the two bills were
minutely examined in the hearings before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, no reference was made to any change in the provisions
for review of compensation orders, but, on the contrary, it was
affirmatively stated the Senate bill likewise enacted
administrative finality upon questions of fact. Id., pt.
2, p. 200. The same statement was made in the Senate hearings. Id., pt. 1, pp. 53, 66. The bill was reported to the House
as having been amended to "conform substantially" to the bill
theretofore reported. H.Rep., No. 1767, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. Both
in this report and in the brief debates in both houses, the bill
was described as designed to prevent the delay and injustice
incident to litigation, and as affording to maritime workers the
same remedies as those provided in state workmen's compensation
laws. See 67 Cong. Rec. 10614; 68 Cong. Rec. 5410-5414,
5908. The state Workmen's Compensation Statutes have, almost
universally, been construed to provide for final administrative
determination of questions of fact, including the fact of the
existence of an employment. See 285 U.S.
22 fn2/4|>note 4, supra. [ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Congress has incorporated by reference the provisions for review
of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission in authorizing
judicial review of certain orders of the Federal Power Commission
and the Shipping Board, as it did in the Packers and Stockyards
Act. See 285 U.S.
22 fn2/5|>note 5, supra. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															In People ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v.
McCall, 219 N.Y. 84, 88, 90, 113 N.E. 795, it was held that
the scope of the review on certiorari of an order of the Public
Service Commission was the same as that of the federal court on
bill in equity of the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission
as declared in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 215 U. S. 452 , 215 U. S. 470 . Compare Vanfleet, "Collateral Attack on Judicial
Proceedings," §§ 2, 3.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															Certiorari is the historic writ for determining whether the
action of an inferior tribunal has been taken within its
jurisdiction, and it has sometimes been held that the writ lies
only to determine this question. Compare Jackson v.
People, 9 Mich. 111. But, although there is considerable
divergence is the practice of the various states as to the scope of
the review, the proceeding, apart from extraordinary statutory
provisions, is universally upon the record and the evidence before
the inferior tribunal, and not a trial de novo.. Fore
v. Fore, 44 Ala. 478, 484; City of Los Angeles v.
Young, 118 Cal. 295, 298, 50 P. 534; Great Western Power
Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 180, 185, 186, 149 P. 35; Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N.E. 128; Tiedt v. Carstensen, 61 Iowa, 334, 336, 16 N.W. 214; Lord v. County Commissioners, 105 Me. 556, 561, 75 A. 126; Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 119, 120; Wait v.
Krewson, 59 N.J.Law, 71, 75, 35 A. 742; Milwaukee Western
Fuel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 159 Wis. 635, 641, 642, 150
N.W. 998. It was so at common law. See Freund,
"Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property," pp. 267-269.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ] See the statutes and cases cited in 285 U.S.
22 fn2/5|>note 5, supra. Similar decisions have been
repeatedly made, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in cases coming
from the state courts. This court has recently decided that a state
Workmen's Compensation Act may validly provide for judicial review
upon matters of law only. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v.
Industrial Board, 284 U.S. 594. See also New York Central
R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 , 243 U. S. 207 , 243 U. S. 208 .
In Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S.
40 , 271 U. S. 42 , ,
it was held that a state board of health might be empowered, upon
reasonable notice, specification of charges, and opportunity to be
heard, to revoke a physician's license, subject only to review in
the courts upon certiorari. In Washington ex rel. Oregon
Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.
S. 510 , 224 U. S. 527 ,
a statute was upheld which confined the court upon review of a
public service commission's order to the evidence introduced before
the commission. See also Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v.
Georgia, 235 U. S. 651 , 235 U. S. 661 ; New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345 , 245 U. S. 348 , 245 U. S. 349 ; Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U. S. 366 , 251 U. S. 370 ; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 268 U. S. 39 , 268 U. S. 42 . In Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.
S. 685 , 166 U. S. 695 ,
it was held that the findings of fact by commissioners in assessing
damages in condemnation proceedings might be made final, leaving
open to the court only the question whether there was any error in
the basis of appraisal, or otherwise. See also Crane v.
Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142 , 258 U. S. 147 ; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151 . Compare Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.
S. 440 , 241 U. S. 451 , 241 U. S.
452 .

															[ Footnote 2/12 ] See Griswold and Mitchell, "The Narrative Record in
Federal Equity Appeals," 42 Harv.L.Rev. 483, 488, 491; Lane, "One
Year Under the New Federal Equity Rules," 27 Harv.L.Rev. 629, 639.
Compare 2 Daniell, "Chancery Practice" (2d Ed.) 1045, 1046, 1053,
1054, 1069 et seq. [ Footnote 2/13 ]

															Admiralty Rule 46, 254 U.S. 698. Subsequent to 1842, when the
procedure in admiralty became subject to rules promulgated by this
Court, and prior to 1921, no rule specifically required that
evidence be taken orally in open court, and the practice in some
districts appears to have been to take proofs by a commission. Compare Admiralty Rules 44, 46, 210 U.S. 558; The Guy
C. Goss, 53 F. 826, 827; The Wavelet, 25 F. 733, 734. See also The Sun, 271 F. 953, 954. Under the present
rules, the District Court may still, upon proper circumstances,
refer causes in admiralty to a commissioner, without the consent of
the parties, to hear the testimony and report conclusions on issues
of fact and law. The P. R.R. No. 35, 48 F.2d 122; Sorenson & Co. v. Liverpool, Brazil & River Plate Steam
Nav. Co., 47 F.2d
332 . Compare The City of Washington, 92 U. S.
31 , 92 U. S. 39 ; Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.
S. 701 . The commissioner's findings of fact are not
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. The La Bourgogne, 144
F. 781, 783, affirmed, 210 U. S. 210 U.S.
95; Anderson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 22 F.2d 532, 535.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ] See Admiralty Rule 45, 254 U.S. 698; Supreme Court Rule
15, 275 U.S. 607.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															The decision of the District Court, acquiesced in by the Circuit
Court of Appeals and this Court, that the remedy under § 21(b) of
the Longshoreman's Act is in admiralty, seems to me unfounded. The
provision in that section for suspending or setting aside a
compensation order by injunction clearly implies a proceeding upon
bill in equity. Congress may authorize actions for maritime torts
to be brought on the law side of the federal District Courts, Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375 , 264 U. S. 385 ;
or in the state courts, Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S.
33 , 271 U. S. 37 . See also Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.
S. 372 , 247 U. S. 384 .
No constitutional objection can exist, therefore, to giving effect
to the remedy in equity provided in this Act.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															The opinion of the Court suggests that, upon similar reasoning,
the issue whether the injury occurred on navigable waters must
likewise be open to independent redetermination, upon the facts as
well as the law, in the District Court. The question whether any
peculiar significance attaches to such a controversy, entitling it
to be twice tried, is not before us. It has never been decided that
the power of Congress to provide compensation for injuries to
workmen received in the course of maritime employment depends upon
the injury having occurred upon navigable waters. See Benedict, "The American Admiralty" (5th Ed.) § 25. Compare
Soper v. Hammond Lumber Co. 4 F.2d 872 ; State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263 . The
Longshoremen's Act undertakes to cover only the field of admiralty
jurisdiction within which the decisions of this Court have held
uniformity to be required. See Stanley Morrison,
"Workmen's Compensation and the Maritime Law," 38 Yale L.J. 472,
500.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															That Legislatures may abolish defenses recognized at common law
and create new causes of action not so recognized is beyond
question. So also is the power, under proper circumstances, to
provide for liability without fault. Compare St. Louis &
San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S.
1 ; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Zernecke, 183 U. S. 582 ; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 ; New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.
S. 188 . Congress may provide that a carrier shall be
liable for loss or damage to goods occurring beyond its own lines. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 , 219 U. S. 203 . See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Glenn, 239 U.
S. 388 , 239 U. S. 393 .
"The rule," said the Court, "is adapted to secure the rights of the
shipper by securing unity of transportation with unity of
responsibility." That Congress might not similarly secure unity of
responsibility for injuries to all persons working upon the same
enterprise, irrespective of the particular relation existing of
contract or employment, is not to be assumed without argument and
in the absence of circumstances presenting the question. The logic
upon which workmen's compensation acts have been sustained does not
require insistence upon a technical master and servant relation. Compare Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.
S. 503 . See also Jeremiah Smith, "Sequel to
Workmen's Compensation Acts," 27 Harv.L.Rev. 235, 344.

															The common law, of course, holds many examples of liability to
third persons for injury sustained at the hands of an independent
contractor or his servant. E.g., Ellis v. Sheffield Co., 2
E. & B. 767; Pickard v. Smith, 10 C.B. (N. S.) 470; Doll v. Ribetti, 203 F. 593.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ] See the analysis and criticism in William O. Douglas,
"Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk," 38 Yale L.J. 584,
594-604. Compare O. W. Holmes, "Agency," 5 Harv.L.Rev. 1,
14-16.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ] See Baty, "Vicarious Liability," passim; Francis Bowes Sayre, "Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another,"
43 Harv.L.Rev. 689, 691-694; O. W. Holmes, "Agency," 4 Harv.L.Rev.
345, 5 Id. 1. The first textbook on Agency did not appear until
1812. Paley, "The Law of Principal and Agent."

															[ Footnote 2/20 ] See the digests of the statutes in L. V. Hill and Ralph
H. Wilkin, "Workmen's Compensation Statute Law"; and F. Robertson
Jones, "Digest of Workmen's Compensation Laws" (10th Ed.). The
provision in the New York Workmen's Compensation Act (Consol. Laws,
c. 67), § 56, is illustrative:

															"A contractor, the subject of whose contract is, involves or
includes a hazardous employment, who subcontracts all or any part
of such contract shall be liable for and shall pay compensation to
any employee injured. . . ."

															In 1927, in recommending the extension of this provision to
include owners or lessees as well as general contractors, the State
Industrial Commissioner said:

															"From the point of view of making sure of compensation to
injured workers, all the reasons for the existing obligations put
upon a general contractor for a piece of building work who sublets
part of the work, are equally cogent for doing the same in case of
an owner or lessee of premises who lets part of building work in
precisely the same way. The practical need for doing it has been
shown by experience to be extensive owing to the large amount of
building work now being done under the method above noted and which
this amendment is designed to cover."

															"The existing provision has proven very beneficial in the case
of contractors, and it will be equally useful in the case of the
type of owner-contractor, so to speak who must now be dealt with
for solution of the same problem."

															Annual Report of the Industrial Commissioner (1927) pp. 4,
5.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ] See, e.g., Industrial Commission v. Continental Investment
Co., 78 Colo. 399, 401, 402, 242 P. 49; Palumbo v. George
A. Fuller Co., 99 Conn. 355, 358, 122 A. 63; Fisk v.
Bonner Tie Co., 40 Idaho, 304, 308, 232 P. 569; Parker-Washington Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 498,
504, 113 N.E. 976; American Steel Foundries v. Industrial
Board, 284 Ill. 99, 103, 119 N.E. 902; McDowell v.
Duer, 78 Ind.App. 440, 444, 445, 133 N.E. 839; Burt v.
Clay, 207 Ky. 278, 281, 269 S.W. 322; Seabury v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Corp., 171 La. 199, 204, 205, 130 So. 1; White
v. George B. H. Macomber Co., 244 Mass. 195, 198, 138 N.E.
239; Burt v. Munising Woodenware Co., 222 Mich. 699, 702,
703, 193 N.W. 895; De Lonjay v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. 35 S.W..2d 911, 912; Sherlock v.
Sherlock, 112 Neb. 797, 799, 201 N.W. 645; O'Banner v.
Pendlebury, 107 N.J.Law, 245, 247, 153 A. 494; Clark v.
Monarch Engineering Co., 248 N.Y. 107, 110, 161 N.E. 436; De Witt v. State, 108 Ohio St. 513, 522-525, 141 N.E. 551; Green v. State Industrial Commission, 121 Okl. 211, 212,
249 P. 933; Qualp v. James Stewart Co., 266 Pa. 502, 109
A. 780; Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah, 430, 436,
439, 274 P. 940; Threshermen's Nat. Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 201 Wis. 303, 306, 230 N.W. 67; Wisinger v.
White Oil Corp., 24 F.2d 101, 102. But compare Flickenger
v. Industrial Accident Commission, 181 Cal. 425, 432, 433, 184
P. 851. Liability to pay compensation obtains in England under
circumstances in which no relation of employment exists. See
Mulrooney v. Todd (1909), 1 K.B. 165; Marks v. Carne (1909), 2 K.B. 516.

															[ Footnote 2/22 ] Turner v. Bank of North
America , 4 Dall. 8, 4
U. S. 10 ; United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin , 7 Cranch, 32, 11 U. S. 33 ; Shelden v.
Sill , 8 How. 441, 49 U. S. 449 ; Justices v.
Murray , 9 Wall. 274, 76 U. S. 280 ; Home Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunn , 19 Wall. 214, 86 U. S. 226 ; Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165 , 195 U. S. 167 ; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.
S. 226 , 260 U. S. 234 .
It was not until the Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470,
that Congress extended the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to
"cases arising under the laws of the United States," thus
permitting to be exercised "the vast range of power which had lain
dormant in the Constitution since 1789." See Felix
Frankfurter and James M. Landis, "The Business of the Supreme
Court," pp. 65-68; Charles Warren, "Federal Criminal Laws and the
State Courts," 38 Harv.L.Rev. 545. Large areas of the potential
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts are now occupied by other
tribunals. As to legislative courts, see Wilber Griffith
Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894. Congress
has repeatedly exercised power to exclude from the federal courts
cases not involving the requisite jurisdictional amount. Cases
arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act are triable in
either the state courts or the federal District Courts. See
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1 , 223 U. S. 56 , 223 U. S. 57 -59; Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 . So,
also, cases under § 20 of the Seamen's Act, as amended by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33 , 271 U. S. 37 ; Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.
S. 557 , 271 U. S. 562 .

															[ Footnote 2/23 ] See decisions and statutes collected in 285 U.S.
22 fn2/5|>note 5, supra. So far as concerns the
question here presented, it is immaterial whether the controversy
is wholly between private parties or is between the government and
a citizen. The fact that litigation under the Longshoremen's Act
is, in substance, between private parties (even though under §
21(b) the deputy commissioner is the only necessary party
respondent) does not warrant the inference that the administrative
features of the Act present a question not heretofore decided. The
tribunals in 285 U.S.
22 fn2/5|>note 5, supra, listed deal with matters
outside the scope of the doctrine recently examined in Ex parte
Bakelite Corporation, 279 U. S. 438 .
While the opinion in that case referred to "various matters,
arising between the government and others," as appropriate for the
cognizance of legislative courts, the reference was restricted to
matters "which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it," the mode of
determining which "is completely within congressional control." Id. at 279 U. S. 451 .
The suggestion that due process does not require judicial process
in any controversy to which the government is a party would involve
a revision of historic conceptions of the nature of the federal
judicial system. That all questions arising in the administration
of the Interstate Commerce Act, for example, or between a taxpayer
and the government under the tax laws, could be committed by
Congress exclusively to executive officers, in respect to issues of
law as well as of fact, has never been supposed. Thus, there is no
indication in the opinion in Ex parte Bakelite Corporation that the Commerce Court was a legislative court, although instances
of the creation of such courts were considered in detail. See Wilber Griffith Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43
Harv.L.Rev. 894, 914, 915.

															[ Footnote 2/24 ] Compare Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100,
and Pearson v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N.E. 854, cited by
the Court. These cases involved summary administrative action, and
the complaining individuals had been given no opportunity to be
heard on the question whether their property was in fact subject to
the destruction ordered. The degree of finality appropriate in
administrative action must always depend upon the character of the
administrative hearing provided. Compare Dickinson,
"Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law," pp. 260-261; E.
F. Albertsworth, "Judicial Review of Administrative action by the
Federal Supreme Court," 35 Harv.L.Rev. 127, 152, 153. In most
states, the tendency appears to be to deny the right, in a tort
action against an administrative officer, to question the existence
of the fact justifying his act, if a hearing was provided or if a
suit for injunction could have been brought. See Freund,
"Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property," pp. 248-252; Kirk v. Board of Health, 83 S.C. 372, 383, 65 S.E. 387. Compare North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 , 211 U. S. 316 , 211 U. S. 317 .
In cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Laws, where
formal hearing is available, the Massachusetts and Illinois courts,
in common with many others, have held the administrative finding of
the fact of employment conclusive. Churchill's Case, 265
Mass. 117, 164 N.E. 68; Hill's Case, 268 Mass. 491, 167
N.E. 914; Cinofsky v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 521,
125 N.E. 286; Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 296 Ill. 329, 129 N.E. 811.

															[ Footnote 2/25 ] Compare Frankfurter and Davison, "Cases on
Administrative Law," Preface, p. viii. See Albert Levitt,
"The Judicial Review of Executive Acts," 23 Mich.L.Rev. 588, 595 et. seq. This authority may embrace as well the
determination of questions of law as of fact, depending upon the
judicial construction given to the authority of the tribunal. Thus,
in In Re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 ; In Re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157 ; Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.
S. 165 ; Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S.
53 ; and Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 , all
cited in note 285 U.S.
22 fn2/26|>26, infra, the Court recognized the
conclusiveness of many decisions of law by the tribunals in
question. Tribunals of this character are, of course, empowered,
under ordinary circumstances, to make conclusive determinations of
fact. See e.g., Passavant v. United States, 148 U.
S. 214 , 148 U. S. 219 ; Medbury v. United States, 173 U.
S. 492 , 173 U. S. 497 , 173 U. S. 498 ; Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.
S. 221 , 266 U. S. 225 ; Quon Quon Roy v. Johnson, 273 U.
S. 352 , 273 U. S.
358 .

															[ Footnote 2/26 ]

															(a) In Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.
S. 276 , the statute authorized the deportation only of
aliens, without provision for judicial review of the executive
order. Act of February 5, 1917, c. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
Upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, by a person arrested
who claimed to be a citizen, it was held that he was entitled to a
judicial determination of that claim. No question arose as to
whether Congress might validly have provided for review exclusively
upon the record made in the executive department; nor as to the
scope of review which might have been permissible upon such
record.

															(b) In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147 , and In re Morrissey, 137 U. S. 157 ,
deal with the action of military tribunals. Military tribunals from
a system of courts separate from the civil courts and created by
virtue of an independent grant of power in the Constitution.
Article 1, § 8, clauses 14, 16. They have authority to determine
finally any case over which they have jurisdiction;

															"and their proceedings . . . are not open to review by the civil
tribunals, except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject matter,
and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its
powers in the sentence pronounced." Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496 , 177 U. S. 498 ; Grafton v. United States, 206 U.
S. 333 , 206 U. S. 347 .
As Congress did not provide any method for review by the courts of
the decision of military tribunals, all questions of law concerning
military jurisdiction are open to independent determination in the
civil courts; and the cases of In re Grimley and In re
Morrissey, decide nothing more. Whether Congress could make
the findings of "jurisdictional facts," of military tribunals
conclusive upon civil courts is a question which appears never to
have been raised.

															(c) In Noble v. Union River Logging Co, 147 U.
S. 165 , 147 U. S. 174 ,
relief was granted by bill in equity to stay illegal and
unauthorized action of the Secretary of the Interior in respect to
the public lands, there being no method of judicial review
prescribed by statute. Compare St. Louis Smelting Co. v.
Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 , 104 U. S.
641 .

															(d) In Smith v. Hitchcock, 226 U. S.
53 , 226 U. S. 58 , as
in Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.
S. 106 , 194 U. S. 109 , 104 U. S. 110 ,
and American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 , 187 U. S. 109 ,
bills in equity were entertained to review acts of the Postmaster
General alleged to be unauthorized, Congress not having provided
any method of judicial review. In each case the question involved
was stated to be one of law.

															[ Footnote 2/27 ]

															The decision in the Ohio Valley Water Co. case has
evoked extensive and varied comment. See, e.g., Curtis,
"Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulation -- The Ohio
Valley Case," 34 Harv.L.Rev. 862; Albertsworth, "Judicial
Review of Administrative action by the Federal Supreme Court," 35
Harv.L.Rev. 127; C. W. Pound, "The Judicial Power," 35 Harv.L.Rev.
787; Brown, "The Functions of Courts and Commissions in Public
Utility Rate Regulations," 38 Harv.L.Rev. 141; Wiel,
"Administrative Finality," 38 Harv.L.Rev. 447; Buchanan, "The Ohio Valley Water Co. Case and the Valuation of
Railroads," 40 Harv.L.Rev. 1033; Beutel, "Valuation as a
Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases," 43 Harv.L.Rev.
1249; Green, "The Ohio Valley Water Case, " 4 Ill.L.Q. 55;
Freund, "The Right to a Judicial Review in Rate Controversies," 27
W.Va.L.Q. 207; Hardman, "Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due
Process in Rate Regulation," 30 Yale L.J. 681; Isaacs, "Judicial
Review of Administrative Findings," 30 Yale L.J. 781. No
commentator, however, appears to have understood the decision as
recognizing in any manner a right to trial de novo in
court upon confiscation issues.

															[ Footnote 2/28 ]

															It is cause for regret that the Court, in determining this
controversy, should have declared, obiter, that, in
matters of state public utility regulation involving administrative
action of a special character, and raising questions under a
different constitutional provision, a mode of procedure is required
contrary to that almost universally established under state law
( see David E. Lilienthal, "The Federal Courts and State
Regulation of Public Utilities," 43 Harv.L.Rev. 379, 412, 413), and
calculated seriously to embarrass the operation of the
administrative method in that field.

															[ Footnote 2/29 ] But see Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 , 227 U. S. 92 .
The statement by Mr. Justice Jamar there, however, went no further
than to indicate that, in some circumstances, the courts on review
of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission might pass an
independent judgment upon the evidence adduced before the
Commission. See also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co., 216 U. S. 538 , 216 U. S. 544 ; Manufacturers' Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U.
S. 457 , 246 U. S.
488 -490.

															[ Footnote 2/30 ] See Dickinson, "Administrative Justice and the
Supremacy of Law," p. 310.

															[ Footnote 2/31 ]

															Out of the 30,383 nonfatal cases disposed of during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1931, the deputy commissioners held hearings
in only 729, according to information furnished by the United
States Employees' Compensation Commission. Compensation payments
were completed in 11,776 cases, or 38.8 percent of the total. In
17,328 cases, or 57 percent, the injured employee failed to receive
compensation because no time was lost, or less than seven days, on
account of the injury. The balance of 1,279 cases, amounting to 4.2
percent of the whole, were dismissed because they did not come
within the scope of the law. Among the 18,607 noncompensated cases,
formal claims were filed by the employee in only 1,025 instances. See also Report of the Compensation Commission, 1930, pp.
68-70.

															[ Footnote 2/32 ]

															For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1931, 101 new cases were
filed in the District Courts, out of a total of 30,489 cases
disposed of. Report of the United States Employee's Compensation
Commission, pp. 69, 71. For the three preceding years, the number
of cases filed in the courts was, respectively, 61, 58, and 15.
Report, 1930, p. 62; id., 1929, p. 70; id., 1928,
p. 34. The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case at
bar declaring the right to a trial de novo was rendered
November 17, 1930, and the first opinion of the District Court on
May 27, 1929.

															[ Footnote 2/33 ]

															How serious these consequences will be is a question of
speculation, but it is plain that they will be aggravated by the
inherent uncertainty in the scope of the doctrine announced. The
determination of what facts are "jurisdictional" or "fundamental"
is calculated to provoke a multitude of disputes. That there is a
difference in kind, for example, between the defense that the
injured claimant is not an employee and that he was not acting as
an employee when he was injured, or that there is a difference
between the latter defense and the defense that the disability, if
any, from which he suffers resulted only in part, or not at all,
from the employment in which he claims to have suffered it, are
propositions which employers will be unlikely to accept until they
have submitted them to the decision of the courts. The
effectiveness of this legislation will be lessened by this
opportunity for barren controversy over procedural rights and by
delayed or thwarted determination of substantive ones.

Summary:
In Crowell v. Benson, the US Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the power to provide reasonable compensation, regardless of fault, for employees in maritime work who are injured or killed due to their job. The Court upheld the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which established a framework for compensation in such cases. The Act's classifications and amounts of compensation were deemed reasonable and consistent with due process.

The Court also addressed the claims process, where administrative officers called deputy commissioners have the authority to hear and determine claims, issuing subpoenas and conducting investigations. The Act provides for reviews and appeals of compensation orders and judgments, with the possibility of suspension or alteration if the order is not in accordance with the law.

The case sets a precedent for federal workers' compensation legislation and the role of administrative officers in handling claims and ensuring fair and efficient resolution processes.