U.S. Supreme Court United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973) United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno No. 72-534 Argued April 23, 1973 Decided June 25, 1973 413
U.S. 528 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA Syllabus Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971,
generally excludes from participation in the food stamp program any
household containing an individual who is unrelated to any other
household member. The Secretary of Agriculture issued regulations
thereunder rendering ineligible for participation in the program
any "household" whose members are not "all related to each other."
Congress stated that the purposes of the Act were

															"to safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's
population and raise levels of nutrition among low income
households . . . [and] that increased utilization of food in
establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition
will promote the distribution . . . of our agricultural abundance
and will strengthen cur agricultural economy. . . ."

															The District Court held that the "unrelated person" provision of
§ 3(e) creates an irrational classification in violation of the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Held: The legislative classification here involved
cannot be sustained, the classification being clearly irrelevant to
the stated purposes of the Act and not rationally furthering any
other legitimate governmental interest. In practical operation, the
Act excludes not those who are "likely to abuse the program," but,
rather, only those who so desperately need aid that they cannot
even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain
their eligibility. Pp. 533-538. 345 F.
Supp. 310 , affirmed.

															BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. DOUGLAS J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 413 U. S. 538 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
joined, post, p. 413 U. S.
545 . Page 413 U. S. 529 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case requires us to consider the constitutionality of §
3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e), as amended
in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, which, with certain exceptions, excludes
from participation in the food stamp program any household
containing an individual who is unrelated to any other member of
the household. In practical effect, § 3(e) creates two classes of
persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of those
individuals who live in households all of whose members are related
to one another, and the other class consists of those individuals
who live in households containing one or more members who are
unrelated to the rest. The latter class of persons is denied
federal food assistance. A three-judge District Court for the
District of Columbia held this classification invalid as violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 345 F.
Supp. 310 (1972). We noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U.S. 1036
(1972). We affirm. I The federal food stamp program was established in 1964 in an
effort to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among the more needy
segments of our society. 7 U.S.C. § 2011. Eligibility for
participation in the program is determined on a household, rather
than an individual basis. 7 CFR § 271.3(a). An eligible household
purchases sufficient food stamps to provide that household with a
nutritionally adequate diet. The household pays for the stamps at a
reduced rate based Page 413 U. S. 530 upon its size and cumulative income. The food stamps are then
used to purchase food at retail stores, and the Government redeems
the stamps at face value, thereby paying the difference between the
actual cost of the food and the amount paid by the household for
the stamps. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2016, 2025(a).

															As initially enacted, § 3(e) defined a "household" as

															"a group of related or non-related individuals, who are
not residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living
as one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom
food is customarily purchased in common. [ Footnote 1 ]"

															In January, 1971, however, Congress redefined the term
"household" so as to include only groups of related individuals. [ Footnote 2 ]
Pursuant to this amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture
promulgated regulations rendering ineligible for participation in
the program any "household" whose members are not "all related to
each other." [ Footnote 3 ] Page 413 U. S. 531 Appellees in this case consist of several groups of individuals
who allege that, although they satisfy the income eligibility
requirements for federal food assistance, they have nevertheless
been excluded from the program solely because the persons in each
group are not "all related to each other." Appellee Jacinta Moreno,
for example, is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with Ermina
Sanchez and the latter's three children. They share common living
expenses, and Mrs. Sanchez helps to care for appellee. Appellee's
monthly income, derived from public assistance, is $75; Mrs.
Sanchez receives $133 per month from public assistance. The
household pays $135 per month for rent, gas, and electricity, of
which appellee pays $50. Appellee spends $10 per month for
transportation to a hospital for regular visits, and $5 per month
for laundry. That leaves her $10 per month for food and other
necessities. Despite her poverty, appellee has been denied federal
food assistance solely because she is unrelated to the other
members of her household. Moreover, although Mrs. Sanchez and her
three children were permitted to purchase $108 worth of food stamps
per month for $18, their participation in the program will be Page 413 U. S. 532 terminated if appellee Moreno continues to live with them.

															Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children.
Although the Hejnys are indigent, they took in a 20-year-old girl,
who is unrelated to them, because "we felt she had emotional
problems." The Hejnys receive $144 worth of food stamps each month
for $14. If they allow the 20-year-old girl to continue to live
with them, they will be denied food stamps by reason of § 3(e).

															Appellee Victoria Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing
deficiency. The daughter requires special instruction in a school
for the deaf. The school is located in an area in which appellee
could not ordinarily afford to live. Thus, in order to make the
most of her limited resources, appellee agreed to share an
apartment near the school with a woman who, like appellee, is on
public assistance. Since appellee is not related to the woman,
appellee's food stamps have been, and will continue to be, cut off
if they continue to live together.

															These and two other groups of appellees instituted a class
action against the Department of Agriculture, its Secretary, and
two other departmental officials, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the enforcement of the 1971 amendment of
§ 3(e) and its implementing regulations. In essence, appellees
contend, [ Footnote 4 ] and the
District Court held, that the "unrelated person" provision of §
3(e) creates an irrational classification in violation Page 413 U. S. 533 of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. [ Footnote
5 ] We agree. II Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative
classification must be sustained if the classification itself is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 , 406 U. S. 546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S.
78 , 404 U. S. 81 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.
S. 471 , 397 U. S. 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 426 (1961). The purposes of the Food Stamp Act were expressly set forth
in the congressional "declaration of policy":

															"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress . . . to
safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's population and
raise levels of nutrition among low income households. The Congress
hereby finds that the limited food purchasing power of low income
households contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of
such households. The Congress further finds that increased
utilization of food in establishing and maintaining adequate
national levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a
beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will
strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more
orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such
hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized
which will permit low income households to Page 413 U. S. 534 purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels
of trade."

															7 U.S.C. § 2011. The challenged statutory classification
(households of related persons versus households containing one or
more unrelated persons) is clearly irrelevant to the stated
purposes of the Act. As the District Court recognized,

															"[t]he relationships among persons constituting one economic
unit and sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their
abilities to stimulate the agricultural economy by purchasing farm
surpluses, or with their personal nutritional requirements."

															345 F. Supp. at 313.

															Thus, if it is to be sustained, the challenged classification
must rationally further some legitimate governmental interest other
than those specifically stated in the congressional "declaration of
policy." Regrettably, there is little legislative history to
illuminate the purposes of the 1971 amendment of § 3(e). [ Footnote 6 ] The legislative history
that does exist, however, indicates that that amendment was
intended to prevent so-called "hippies" and "hippie communes" from
participating in the food stamp program. See H.R.Conf.Rep.
No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong.Rec. 44439 (1970) (Sen. Holland). The
challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by reference
to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional conception
of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must, at the
very least, mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result,

															"[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of
itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations
in the Page 413 U. S. 535 public interest, justify the 1971 amendment."

															345 F. Supp. at 314 n. 11.

															Although apparently conceding this point, the Government
maintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless be
upheld as rationally related to the clearly legitimate governmental
interest in minimizing fraud in the administration of the food
stamp program. [ Footnote 7 ] In
essence, the Government contends that, in adopting the 1971
amendment, Congress might rationally have thought (1) that
households with one or more unrelated members are more likely than
"fully related" households to contain individuals who abuse the
program by fraudulently failing to report sources of income or by
voluntarily remaining poor; and (2) that such households are
"relatively unstable," thereby increasing the difficulty of
detecting such abuses. But even if we were to accept as rational
the Government's wholly unsubstantiated assumptions concerning the
differences between "related" and "unrelated" households, we still
could not agree with the Government's conclusion that the denial of
essential Page 413 U. S. 536 federal food assistance to all otherwise eligible households
containing unrelated members constitutes a rational effort to deal
with these concerns.

															At the outset, it is important to note that the Food Stamp Act
itself contains provisions, wholly independent of § 3(e), aimed
specifically at the problems of fraud and of the voluntarily poor.
For example, with certain exceptions, § 5(c) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §
2014(c), renders ineligible for assistance any household containing
"an able-bodied adult person between the ages of eighteen and
sixty-five" who fails to register for, and accept, offered
employment. Similarly, §§ 14(b) and (c), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and
(c), specifically impose strict criminal penalties upon any
individual who obtains or uses food stamps fraudulently. [ Footnote 8 ] The existence of these
provisions Page 413 U. S. 537 necessarily casts considerable doubt upon the proposition that
the 1971 amendment could rationally have been intended to prevent
those very same abuses. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 , 405 U. S. 452 (1972); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 , 405 U. S.
353 -354 (1972).

															Moreover, in practical effect, the challenged classification
simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention
of fraud. As previously noted, § 3(e) defines an eligible
"household" as

															"a group of related individuals . . . [1] living as one economic
unit [2] sharing common cooking facilities [and 3] for whom food is
customarily purchased in common."

															Thus, two unrelated persons living together and meeting
all three of these conditions would constitute a single household
ineligible for assistance. If financially feasible, however, these
same two individuals can legally avoid the "unrelated person"
exclusion simply by altering their living arrangements so as to
eliminate any one of the three conditions. By so doing, they
effectively create two separate "households," both of which are
eligible for assistance. See Knowles v.
Butz, 358 F.
Supp. 228 (ND Cal.1973). Indeed, as the California Director of
Social Welfare has explained:

															"The 'related household' limitations will eliminate many
households from eligibility in the Food Stamp Program. It is my
understanding that the Congressional intent of the new regulations
are specifically aimed at the 'hippies' and 'hippie communes.' Most
people in this category can and will alter their living
arrangements in order to remain eligible for food stamps. However,
the AFDC mothers who try to raise their standard of living by
sharing housing will be affected. They will not be able to Page 413 U. S. 538 utilize the altered living patterns in order to continue o be
eligible without giving up their advantage of shared housing
costs."

															Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from
participation in the food stamp program, not those persons
who are "likely to abuse the program" but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they
cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to
retain their eligibility. Traditional equal protection analysis
does not require that every classification be drawn with precise
" mathematical nicety.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. at 397 U. S. 485 .
But the classification here in issue is not only "imprecise," it is
wholly without any rational basis. The judgment of the District
Court holding the "unrelated person" provision invalid under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is therefore Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															78 Stat. 703 (emphasis added). The act provided further that

															"[t]he term 'household' shall also mean a single individual
living alone who has cooking facilities and who purchases and
prepares food for home consumption." Ibid. [ Footnote 2 ]

															84 Stat. 2048. The 1971 amendment did not affect certain groups
of nonrelated individuals over 60 years of age. As amended, § 3(e)
now provides:

															"The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals
(including legally adopted children and legally assigned foster
children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not
residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as
one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom
food is customarily purchased in common. The term 'household' shall
also mean (1) a single individual living alone who has cooking
facilities and who purchases and prepares food for home
consumption, or (2) an elderly person who meets the requirements of
section 2019(h) of this title."

															7 U.S.C. § 2012(e).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Title 7 CFR § 270.2(jj) provides:

															"(jj) 'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers,
boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical,
housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an
institution or boarding house, and who are living as one economic
unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is
customarily purchased in common: Provided, That: "

															"(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age,
they are all related to each other; and"

															"(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60
years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60
years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age is
related to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60
years of age or older."

															"It shall also mean (i) a single individual living alone who
purchases and prepares food for home consumption, or (ii) an
elderly person as defined in this section, and his spouse."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Appellees also argued that the regulations themselves were
invalid because beyond the scope of the authority conferred upon
the secretary by the statute. The District Court rejected that
contention, and appellees have not pressed that argument on appeal.
Moreover, appellees did not challenge the constitutionality of the
statutes reliance on "households" rather than "individuals" as the
basic unit of the food stamp program. We therefore intimate no view
on that question.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															"[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process.'" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163 , 377 U. S. 168 (1964); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.
S. 677 , 411 U. S. 680 n. 5 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 , 394 U. S.
641 -642 (1969); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 (1954).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Indeed, the amendment first materialized, bare of committee
consideration, during a conference committee's consideration of
differing House and Senate bills.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The Government initially argued to the District Court that the
challenged classification might be justified as a means to foster
"morality." In rejecting that contention, the District Court noted
that "interpreting the amendment as an attempt to regulate morality
would raise serious constitutional questions." 345 F.
Supp. 310 , 314. Indeed, citing this Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.
S. 557 (1969), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), the District Court observed that it was doubtful, at best,
whether Congress, "in the name of morality," could "infringe the
rights to privacy and freedom of association in the home. "
345 F. Supp. at 314. (Emphasis in original.) Moreover, the court
also pointed out that the classification established in § 3(e) was
not rationally related

															"to prevailing notions of morality, since it in terms
disqualifies all households of unrelated individuals, without
reference to whether a particular group contains both sexes." Id. at 315. The Government itself has now abandoned the
"morality" argument. See Brief for Appellants 9.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Title 7 U.S.C. §§ 2023(b) and (c) provide:

															"(b) Whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or
possesses coupons or authorization to purchase cards in any manner
not authorized by this [Act] or the regulations issued pursuant to
this [Act] shall, if such coupons or authorization to purchase
cards are of the value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony and
shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years or both, or, if such
coupons or authorization to purchase cards are of a value of less
than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned for
not more than one year, or both."

															"(c) Whoever presents, or causes to be presented, coupons for
payment or redemption of the value of $100 or more, knowing the
same to have been received, transferred, or used in any manner in
violation of the provisions of this [Act] or the regulations issued
pursuant to this [Act] shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than five years, or both, or, if such coupons are of a
value of less than $100, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

															Appellee Jacinta Moreno is a 56-year-old diabetic who lives with
Ermina Sanchez and the latter's three children. The two share
common living expenses, Mrs. Sanchez helping to care for this
appellee. Appellee's monthly income is $75, derived from public
assistance, and Mrs. Sanchez' is $133, also derived from public
assistance. This household pays $95 a month for rent, of which
appellee pays $40, and $40 a month for gas and electricity, of
which appellee pays $10. Appellee spends $10 a month for
transportation to a hospital for regular visits and $5 a month for
laundry. That leaves her $10 a month for food and other
necessities. Mrs. Sanchez and the three children received $108
worth of food stamps per month for $18. But under the "unrelated"
person Page 413 U. S. 539 provision of the Act, [ Footnote
2/1 ] she will be cut off if appellee Moreno continues to live
with her.

															Appellee Sheilah Hejny is married and has three children, ages
two to five. She and her husband took in a 20-year-old girl who is
unrelated to them. She shares in the housekeeping. The Hejnys pay
$14 a month and receive $144 worth of food stamps. The Hejnys
comprise an indigent household. But if they allow the 20-year-old
girl to live with them, they too will be cut off from food stamps
by reason of the "unrelated" person provision. Page 413 U. S. 540 Appellee Keppler has a daughter with an acute hearing deficiency
who requires instruction in a school for the deaf. The school is in
an area where the mother cannot afford to live. So she and her two
minor children moved into a nearby apartment with a woman who, like
appellee Keppler, is on public assistance but who is not related to
her. As a result, appellee Keppler's food stamps have been cut off
because of the "unrelated" person provision.

															These appellees instituted a class action to enjoin the
enforcement of the "unrelated" person provision of the Act.

															The "unrelated" person provision of the Act creates two classes
of persons for food stamp purposes: one class is composed of people
who are all related to each other and all in dire need, and the
other class is composed of households that have one or more persons
unrelated to the others but have the same degree of need as those
in the first class. The first type of household qualifies for
relief, the second cannot qualify, no matter the need. It is that
application of the Act which is said to violate the conception of
equal protection that is implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 , 347 U. S.
499 .

															The test of equal protection is whether the legislative line
that is drawn bears "some rational relationship to a legitimate"
governmental purpose. [ Footnote
2/2 ] Weber v.
Aetna Page 413 U. S. 541 Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 , 406 U. S. 172 .
The requirement of equal protection denies government

															"the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to
persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective"

															of the enactment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S.
71 , 404 U. S.
75 -76.

															This case involves desperately poor people with acute problems
who, though unrelated, come together for mutual help and
assistance. The choice of one's associates for social, political,
race, or religious purposes is basic in our constitutional scheme. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 , 357 U. S. 460 ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 , 299 U. S. 363 ; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 , 371 U. S.
429 -431; Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Committee, 372 U. S. 539 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U. S. 288 . It
extends to "the associational rights of the members" of a trade
union. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U. S. 1 , 377 U. S. 8 .

															I suppose no one would doubt that an association of people
working in the poverty field would be entitled to the same
constitutional protection as those working in the racial, banking,
or agricultural field. I suppose poor people holding a meeting or
convention would be under the same constitutional umbrella as
others. The dimensions of the "unrelated" person problem under the
Food Stamp Act are in that category. As the facts of this case
show, the poor are congregating in households where they can better
meet the adversities of poverty. This banding together is an
expression of the right of freedom of association that is very deep
in our traditions. Page 413 U. S. 542 Other like rights have been recognized that are only peripheral
First Amendment rights -- the right to send one's child to a
religious school, the right to study the German language in a
private school, the protection of the entire spectrum of learning,
teaching, and communicating ideas, the marital right of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 , 381 U. S.
482 -483.

															As the examples indicate, these peripheral constitutional rights
are exercised not necessarily in assemblies that congregate in
halls or auditoriums but in discrete individual actions such as
parents placing a child in the school of their choice. Taking a
person into one's home because he is poor or needs help or brings
happiness to the household is of the same dignity.

															Congress might choose to deal only with members of a family of
one or two or three generations, treating it all as a unit.
Congress, however, has not done that here. Concededly an individual
living alone is not disqualified from the receipt of food stamp
aid, even though there are other members of the family with whom he
might theoretically live. Nor are common law couples disqualified:
they, like individuals living alone, may qualify under the Act if
they are poor -- whether they have abandoned their wives and
children and however anti-family their attitudes may be. In other
words, the "unrelated" person provision was not aimed at the
maintenance of normal family ties. It penalizes persons or families
who have brought under their roof an "unrelated" needy person. It
penalizes the poorest of the poor for doubling up against the
adversities of poverty.

															But for the constitutional aspects of the problem, the
"unrelated" person provision of the Act might well be sustained as
a means to prevent fraud. Fraud is a concern of the Act. 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2023(b) and (c). Able-bodied persons must register and accept
work or lose their food. stamp rights. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c). I Page 413 U. S. 543 could not say that this "unrelated" person provision has no
"rational" relation to control of fraud. We deal here, however,
with the right of association, protected by the First Amendment.
People who are desperately poor but unrelated come together and
join hands with the aim better to combat the crises of poverty. The
need of those living together better to meet those crises is
denied, while the need of households made up of relatives that is
no more acute is serviced. Problems of the fisc, as we stated in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 633 ,
are legitimate concerns of government. But government "may not
accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes
of its citizens." Ibid. The legislative history of the Act indicates that the
"unrelated" person provision of the Act was to prevent "essentially
unrelated individuals who voluntarily chose to cohabit and live off
food stamps" [ Footnote 2/3 ] --
so-called "hippies" or "hippy communes" -- from participating in
the food stamp program. As stated in the Conference Report,
[ Footnote 2/4 ] the definition of
household was "designed to prohibit food stamp assistance to
communal families' of unrelated individuals." The right of association, the right to invite the stranger into
one's home is too basic in our constitutional regime to deal with
roughshod. If there are abuses inherent in that pattern of living
against which the food stamp program should be protected, the Act
must be "narrowly drawn," Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 307 ,
to meet the precise end. The method adopted and applied to these
cases makes § 3(e) of the Act unconstitutional by reason of the
invidious discrimination between the two classes of needy
persons. Page 413 U. S. 544 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 , is not opposed. It sustained a Maryland grant of
welfare, against the claim of violation of equal protection, which
placed an upper limit on the monthly amount any single family could
receive. The claimants had large families, so that their standard
of need exceeded the actual grants. Their claim was that the grants
of aid, considered in light of the size of their families, created
an invidious discrimination against them and in favor of small
needy families. The claim was rejected on the basis that state
economic or social legislation had long been judged by a less
strict standard than comes into play when constitutionally
protected rights are involved. Id. at 397 U. S.
484 -48. Laws touching social and economic matters can
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause though they are
imperfect, the test being whether the classification has some
"reasonable basis." Ibid. Dandridge held that
"the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to
impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy." Id. at 397 U. S. 486 .
But for the First Amendment aspect of the case, Dandridge would control here. Dandridge, however, did not reach classifications
touching on associational rights that lie in the penumbra of the
First Amendment. Since the "unrelated" person provision is not
directed to the maintenance of the family as a unit but treats
impoverished households composed of relatives more favorably than
impoverished households having a single unrelated person, it draws
a line that can be sustained only on a showing of a "compelling"
governmental interest.

															The "unrelated" person provision of the present Act has an
impact on the rights of people to associate for lawful purposes
with whom they choose. When state action "may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to Page 413 U. S. 545 associate" it "is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S.
460 -461. The "right of the people peaceably to assemble"
guaranteed by the First Amendment covers a wide spectrum of human
interests -- including, as stated in id. at 357 U. S. 460 ,
"political, economic, religious, or cultural matters." Banding
together to combat the common foe of hunger is in that category.
The case therefore falls within the zone represented by Shapiro
v. Thompson, supra, which held that a waiting period on
welfare imposed by a State on the "in-migration of indigents"
penalizing the constitutional right to travel could not be
sustained absent a "compelling governmental interest." Id. at 394 U. S. 631 , 394 U. S.
634 .

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act provides in relevant
part:

															"The term 'household' shall mean a group of related individuals
(including legally adopted children and legally assigned foster
children) or non-related individuals over age 60 who are not
residents of an institution or boarding house, but are living as
one economic unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom
food is customarily purchased in common."

															7 U.S.C. § 2012(e).

															The Regulations provide:

															"'Household' means a group of persons, excluding roomers,
boarders, and unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical,
housekeeping, or child care reasons, who are not residents of an
institution or boarding house, and who are living as one economic
unit sharing common cooking facilities and for whom food is
customarily purchased in common: Provided, That: "

															"(1) When all persons in the group are under 60 years of age,
they are all related to each other; and"

															"(2) When more than one of the persons in the group is under 60
years of age, and one or more other persons in the group is 60
years of age or older, each of the persons under 60 years of age is
related to each other or to at least one of the persons who is 60
years of age or older."

															7 CFR § 270.2(jj).

															"Eligibility for and participation in the program shall be on a
household basis. All persons, excluding roomers, boarders, and
unrelated live-in attendants necessary for medical, housekeeping,
or child care reasons, residing in common living quarters shall be
consolidated into a group prior to determining if such a group is a
household as determined in § 270.2(jj) of this subchapter."

															7 CFR § 271.3(a).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The purpose of the present Act was stated by Congress:

															"[T]o safeguard the health and wellbeing of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low income households. The Congress hereby finds that the
limited food purchasing power of low income households contributes
to hunger and malnutrition among members of such
households. The Congress further finds that increased utilization
of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national
levels of nutrition will promote the distribution in a
beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and will
strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more
orderly marketing and distribution of food. To alleviate such
hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp program is herein authorized
which will permit low income households to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of
trade."

															7 U.S.C. § 2011. (Italics added.)

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See 116 Cong.Rec. 42003.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8.

															MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs,
dissenting.

															For much the same reasons as those stated in my dissenting
opinion in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,
ante p. 413 U. S. 522 ,
I am unable to agree with the Court's disposition of this case.
Here, appellees challenged a provision in the Federal Food Stamp
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., which limited food stamps to
related people living in one "household." The result of this
provision is that unrelated persons who live under the same roof
and pool their resources may not obtain food stamps even though
otherwise eligible.

															The Court's opinion would make a very persuasive congressional
committee report arguing against the adoption of the limitation in
question. Undoubtedly, Congress attacked the problem with a rather
blunt instrument, and, just as undoubtedly, persuasive arguments
may be made that what we conceive to be its purpose will not be
significantly advanced by the enactment of the limitation. But
questions such as this are for Congress, rather than for this
Court; our role is limited to the Page 413 U. S. 546 determination of whether there is any rational basis on which
Congress could decide that public funds made available under the
food stamp program should not go to a household containing an
individual who is unrelated to any other member of the
household.

															I do not believe that asserted congressional concern with the
fraudulent use of food stamps is, when interpreted in the light
most favorable to sustaining the limitation, quite as irrational as
the Court seems to believe. A basic unit which Congress has chosen
for determination of availability for food stamps is the
"household," a determination which is not criticized by the Court.
By the limitation here challenged, it has singled out households
which contain unrelated persons and made such households
ineligible. I do not think it is unreasonable for Congress to
conclude that the basic unit which it was willing to support with
federal funding through food stamps is some variation on the family
as we know it -- a household consisting of related individuals.
This unit provides a guarantee which is not provided by households
containing unrelated individuals that the household exists for some
purpose other than to collect federal food stamps.

															Admittedly, as the Court points out, the limitation will make
ineligible many households which have not been formed for the
purpose of collecting federal food stamps, and will, at the same
time, not wholly deny food stamps to those households which may
have been formed in large part to take advantage of the program.
But, as the Court concedes, "[t]raditional equal protection
analysis does not require that every classification be drawn with
precise mathematical nicety,'" ante at 413 U. S. 538 .
And earlier this Term, the constitutionality of a similarly
"imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act
was challenged Page 413 U. S. 547 on grounds such as those urged by appellees here. In Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973), the imposition of the rule on all members of a defined
class was sustained because it served to discourage evasion by a
substantial portion of that class of disclosure mechanisms chosen
by Congress for consumer protection.

															The limitation which Congress enacted could, in the judgment of
reasonable men, conceivably deny food stamps to members of
households which have been formed solely for the purpose of taking
advantage of the food stamp program. Since the food stamp program
is not intended to be a subsidy for every individual who desires
low-cost food, this was a permissible congressional decision quite
consistent with the underlying policy of the Act. The fact that the
limitation will have unfortunate and perhaps unintended
consequences beyond this does not make it unconstitutional.

Summary:
The Supreme Court ruled that a provision in the Food Stamp Act of 1964 that excluded households with unrelated members from the food stamp program was unconstitutional. The Court found that the classification was irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act and did not rationally further any legitimate governmental interest. The Court also noted that the provision excluded those who desperately needed aid, while not necessarily preventing those likely to abuse the program from receiving benefits.

Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justices Douglas, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell joining. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion, while Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger.