U.S. Supreme Court Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) Wisconsin v. Yoder No. 70-110 Argued December 8,
1971 Decided May 15, 1972 406
U.S. 205 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
WISCONSIN Syllabus Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (which requires a
child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their
children to public or private school after they had graduated from
the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish provide
continuing informal vocational education to their children designed
to prepare them for life in the rural Amish community. The evidence
also showed that respondents sincerely believed that high school
attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life, and
that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their
children by complying with the law. The State Supreme Court
sustained respondents' claim that application of the compulsory
school attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Held: 1. The State's interest in universal education is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental
rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
Pp. 406 U. S.
213 -215.

															2. Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement
of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth
grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of
their religious beliefs. Pp. 406
U.S. 215 -219

															3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable
religious sect and a long history as a successful and
self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have
demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role
that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing survival of
Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by the
State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others.
Beyond this, they have Page 406 U. S. 206 carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of
their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education
in terms of the overall interest that the State relies on in
support of its program of compulsory high school education. In
light of this showing, and weighing the minimal difference between
what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it
was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its
admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Pp. 406 U. S.
212 -29, 406 U. S.
234 -236.

															4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens
patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to
children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be
sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by
this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two
additional years of compulsory education will not impair the
physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability
to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society. Pp. 406 U. S.
229 -234.

															49 Wis.2d 430, 182 N.W.2d
539 , affirmed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 406 U. S. 237 .
WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN and
STEWART, JJ., joined, post, p. 406 U. S. 237 .
DOUGLAS, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 406 U. S. 241 .
POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Page 406 U. S. 207 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															On petition of the State of Wisconsin, we granted the writ of
certiorari in this case to review a decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court holding that respondents' convictions of violating
the State's compulsory school attendance law were invalid under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. For the reasons hereafter stated, we affirm the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

															Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the
Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of
the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families
are residents of Green County, Wisconsin. Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law required them to cause their children to
attend public or private school until reaching age 16, but the
respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to
public school after they completed the eighth grade. [ Footnote 1 ] The children were not enrolled in
any private school, or within any recognized exception to the
compulsory attendance law, [ Footnote 2 ] and they are conceded to be subject to the
Wisconsin statute. Page 406 U. S. 208 On complaint of the school district administrator for the public
schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted of
violating the compulsory attendance law in Green County Court, and
were fined the sum of $5 each. [ Footnote 3 ] Respondents defended on the ground that the
application Page 406 U. S. 209 of the compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. [ Footnote 4 ] The trial testimony showed that respondents
believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish
communities generally, that their children's attendance at high
school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and
way of life. They believed that, by sending their children to high
school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the
censure of the church community, but, as found by the county court,
also endanger their own salvation and that of their children. The
State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were
sincere.

															In support of their position, respondents presented as expert
witnesses scholars on religion and education whose testimony is
uncontradicted. They expressed their opinions on the relationship
of the Amish belief concerning school attendance to the more
general tenets of their religion, and described the impact that
compulsory high school attendance could have on the continued
survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United States
today. The history of the Amish Page 406 U. S. 210 sect was given in some detail, beginning with the Swiss
Anabaptists of the 16th century, who rejected institutionalized
churches and sought to return to the early, simple, Christian life
deemphasizing material success, rejecting the competitive spirit,
and seeking to insulate themselves from the modern world. As a
result of their common heritage, Old Order Amish communities today
are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires
life in a church community separate and apart from the world and
worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and
its values is central to their faith.

															A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their
devotion to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as
exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that
continued in America during much of our early national life. Amish
beliefs require members of the community to make their living by
farming or closely related activities. Broadly speaking, the Old
Order Amish religion pervades and determines the entire mode of
life of its adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail
by the Ordnung, or rules, of the church community. Adult
baptism, which occurs in late adolescence, is the time at which
Amish young people voluntarily undertake heavy obligations, not
unlike the Bar Mitzvah of the Jews, to abide by the rules of the
church community. [ Footnote
5 ]

															Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is
firmly grounded in these central religious concepts. They object to
the high school, and higher education generally, because the values
they teach Page 406 U. S. 211 are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of
life; they view secondary school education as an impermissible
exposure of their children to a "worldly" influence in conflict
with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize intellectual
and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness,
worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish society
emphasizes informal "learning through doing;" a life of "goodness,"
rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical
knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and
separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary worldly
society.

															Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary
to Amish beliefs not only because it places Amish children in an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs, with increasing emphasis on
competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform
to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also
because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of
life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish attitudes
favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills
needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife.
They must learn to enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned
basic reading, writing, and elementary mathematics, these traits,
skills, and attitudes admittedly fall within the category of those
best learned through example and "doing," rather than in a
classroom. And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also
grow in his faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he
is to be prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult
baptism. In short, high school attendance with teachers who are not
of the Amish faith -- and may even be hostile to it -- interposes a
serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into Page 406 U. S. 212 the Amish religious community. Dr. John Hostetler, one of the
experts on Amish society, testified that the modern high school is
not equipped, in curriculum or social environment, to impart the
values promoted by Amish society.

															The Amish do not object to elementary education through the
first eight grades as a general proposition, because they agree
that their children must have basic skills in the "three R's" in
order to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be
able to deal with non-Amish people when necessary in the course of
daily affairs. They view such a basic education as acceptable
because it does not significantly expose their children to worldly
values or interfere with their development in the Amish community
during the crucial adolescent period. While Amish accept compulsory
elementary education generally, wherever possible. they have
established their own elementary schools, in many respects like the
small local schools of the past. In the Amish belief, higher
learning tends to develop values they reject as influences that
alienate man from God.

															On the basis of such considerations, Dr. Hostetler testified
that compulsory high school attendance could not only result in
great psychological harm to Amish children, because of the
conflicts it would produce, but would also, in his opinion,
ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community as it exists in the United States today. The testimony of
Dr. Donald A. Erickson, an expert witness on education, also showed
that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children
to be productive members of the Amish community. He described their
system of learning through doing the skills directly relevant to
their adult roles in the Amish community as "ideal," and perhaps
superior to ordinary high school education. The evidence also
showed that the Amish have an excellent Page 406 U. S. 213 record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of
society.

															Although the trial court, in its careful findings, determined
that the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law, "does
interfere with the freedom of the Defendants to act in accordance
with their sincere religious belief," it also concluded that the
requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a
"reasonable and constitutional" exercise of governmental power, and
therefore denied the motion to dismiss the charges. The Wisconsin
Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, however, sustained respondents' claim under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and reversed the
convictions. A majority of the court was of the opinion that the
State had failed to make an adequate showing that its interest in
"establishing and maintaining an educational system overrides the
defendants' right to the free exercise of their religion." 49
Wis.2d 430, 447, 182 N.W.2d
539 , 547 (1971). I There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510 , 268 U. S. 534 (1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide
an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There, the
Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public
school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the
interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring,
including their education in church-operated schools. As that case
suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing Page 406 U. S. 214 and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society. See also Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 390 U. S. 639 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923); cf. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728 (1970). Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the
words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional
obligations." 268 U.S. at 268 U. S.
535 .

															It follows that, in order for Wisconsin to compel school
attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such
attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious
belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free
exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Long before
there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal
education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed
the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing
this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit,
prohibition against the establishment of any religion by
government. The values underlying these two provisions relating to
religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the
expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance.
The invalidation of financial aid to parochial schools by
government grants for a salary subsidy for teachers is but one
example of the extent to which courts have gone in this regard,
notwithstanding that such aid programs were legislatively
determined to be in the public interest and the service of sound
educational policy by States and by Congress. Lemon
v. Page 406 U. S. 215 Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 (1971). See also Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 18 (1947).

															The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject
is that only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that,
however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory
education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests. E.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 , 321 U. S. 165 (1944). II We come then to the quality of the claims of the respondents
concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance statute on their rights and the rights of their
children to the free exercise of the religious beliefs they and
their forebears have adhered to for almost three centuries. In
evaluating those claims, we must be careful to determine whether
the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they
claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, however
virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely
secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a
determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled
to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question,
[ Footnote 6 ] the very concept
of ordered liberty precludes Page 406 U. S. 216 allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values
accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social
values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their
claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.

															Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see
that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the
traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared
by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. That
the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from
their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their
literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle
of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this world. . . ." This
command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for the Old
Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief.
As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion
pervades and determines virtually their entire way of life,
regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the
strictly enforced rules of the church community.

															The record shows that the respondents' religious beliefs and
attitude toward life, family, and home have remained constant --
perhaps some would say static -- in a period of unparalleled
progress in human knowledge generally and great changes in
education. [ Footnote 7 ] The
respondents Page 406 U. S. 217 freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that
their religious beliefs and what we would today call "lifestyle"
have not altered in fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life
in a church-oriented community, separated from the outside world
and "worldly" influences, their attachment to nature, and the soil,
is a way inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to
preserve against the pressure to conform. Their rejection of
telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of
dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them
apart from much of contemporary society; these customs are both
symbolic and practical.

															As the society around the Amish has become more populous, urban,
industrialized, and complex, particularly in this century,
government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become
more detailed and pervasive. The Amish mode of life has thus come
into conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary
society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to
majoritarian standards. So long as compulsory education laws were
confined to eight grades of elementary basic education imparted in
a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of
the Amish faith, the Old Order Amish had little basis to fear that
school attendance would expose their children to the worldly
influence they reject. But modern compulsory secondary education in
rural areas is now largely carried on in a consolidated school,
often remote from the student's home and alien to his daily home
life. As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of
the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the
fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion; modern
laws requiring compulsory secondary education have accordingly
engendered great concern and conflict. [ Footnote 8 ] Page 406 U. S. 218 The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by
exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of
attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by
substantially interfering with the religious development of the
Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish
faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development,
contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish
faith, both as to the parent and the child.

															The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents'
practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable,
for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. See Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S. 605 (1961). Nor is the impact of the compulsory attendance law confined
to grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a
subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory
school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a
very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious
practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and
be assimilated into society at large or be forced to migrate to
some other and more tolerant region. [ Footnote 9 ] Page 406 U. S. 219 In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in
education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent
practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and
regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that
enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal
education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger, if not
destroy, the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs. III Neither the findings of the trial court nor the Amish claims as
to the nature of their faith are challenged in this Court by the
State of Wisconsin. Its position is that the State's interest in
universal compulsory formal secondary education to age 16 is so
great that it is paramount to the undisputed claims of respondents
that their mode of preparing their youth for Amish life, after the
traditional elementary education, is an essential part of their
religious belief and practice. Nor does the State undertake to meet
the claim that the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable
from and a part of the basic tenets of their religion -- indeed, as
much a part of their religious belief and practices as baptism, the
confessional, or a sabbath may be for others.

															Wisconsin concedes that, under the Religion Clauses, religious
beliefs are absolutely free from the State's control, but it argues
that "actions," even though religiously grounded, are outside the
protection of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 10 ] But our decisions have rejected the idea
that Page 406 U. S. 220 religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of
individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to
regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power
to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal
Government in the exercise of its delegated powers. See, e.g.,
Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.
S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 (1879). But to agree that religiously grounded
conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the
State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and thus beyond
the power of the State to control, even under regulations of
general applicability. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.
S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S.
303 -304 (1940). This case, therefore, does not become
easier because respondents were convicted for their "actions" in
refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this
context, belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.S. at 403 U. S.
612 .

															Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's
requirement for school attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to
all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate
against religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated
by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its face
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the
free exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, supra; cf. Walz
v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception Page 406 U. S. 221 from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds
may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot
be allowed to prevent any exception, no matter how vital it may be
to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise.
By preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a
sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses,

															"we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy
and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of
established religion. This is a 'tight rope,' and one we have
successfully traversed." Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 397 U. S.
672 .

															We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its
interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling
that even the established religious practices of the Amish must
give way. Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at
stake, however, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its
admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its
requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment
to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed
Amish exemption. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.
S. 147 (1939).

															The State advances two primary arguments in support of its
system of compulsory education. It notes, as Thomas Jefferson
pointed out early in our history, that some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We
accept these propositions. Page 406 U. S. 222 However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is
persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of
formal high school for Amish children in place of their
long-established program of informal vocational education would do
little to serve those interests. Respondents' experts testified at
trial, without challenge, that the value of all education must be
assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the child for life. It
is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two
beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority
live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as
the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 262 U. S. 400 .

															The State attacks respondents' position as one fostering
"ignorance" from which the child must be protected by the State. No
one can question the State's duty to protect children from
ignorance, but this argument does not square with the facts
disclosed in the record. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by
the majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish community
has been a highly successful social unit within our society, even
if apart from the conventional "mainstream." Its members are
productive and very law-abiding members of society; they reject
public welfare in any of its usual modern forms. The Congress
itself recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption
of such groups as the Amish from the obligation to pay social
security taxes. [ Footnote
11 ] Page 406 U. S. 223 It is neither fair nor correct to suggest that the Amish are
opposed to education beyond the eighth grade level. What this
record shows is that they are opposed to conventional formal
education of the type provided by a certified high school because
it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious
development. Dr. Donald Erickson, for example, testified that their
system of "learning by doing" was an "ideal system" of education in
terms of preparing Amish children for life as adults in the Amish
community, and that "I would be inclined to say they do a better
job in this than most of the rest of us do." As he put it,

															"These people aren't purporting to be learned people, and it
seems to me the self-sufficiency of the community is the best
evidence I can point to -- whatever is being done seems to function
well. [ Footnote 12 ]"

															We must not forget that, in the Middle Ages, important values of
the civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of
religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly
influences against great obstacles. There can be no assumption that
today's majority is Page 406 U. S. 224 "right," and the Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way
of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights
or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different.

															The State, however, supports its interest in providing an
additional one or two years of compulsory high school education to
Amish children because of the possibility that some such children
will choose to leave the Amish community, and that, if this occurs,
they will be ill-equipped for life. The State argues that, if Amish
children leave their church, they should not be in the position of
making their way in the world without the education available in
the one or two additional years the State requires. However, on
this record, that argument is highly speculative. There is no
specific evidence of the loss of Amish adherents by attrition, nor
is there any showing that, upon leaving the Amish community, Amish
children, with their practical agricultural training and habits of
industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society because
of educational shortcomings. Indeed, this argument of the State
appears to rest primarily on the State's mistaken assumption,
already noted, that the Amish do not provide any education for
their children beyond the eighth grade, but allow them to grow in
"ignorance." To the contrary, not only do the Amish accept the
necessity for formal schooling through the eighth grade level, but
continue to provide what has been characterized by the undisputed
testimony of expert educators as an "ideal" vocational education
for their children in the adolescent years.

															There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish
qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work
would fail to find ready markets in today's society. Absent some
contrary evidence supporting the Page 406 U. S. 225 State's position, we are unwilling to assume that persons
possessing such valuable vocational skills and habits are doomed to
become burdens on society should they determine to leave the Amish
faith, nor is there any basis in the record to warrant a finding
that an additional one or two years of formal school education
beyond the eighth grade would serve to eliminate any such problem
that might exist.

															Insofar as the State's claim rests on the view that a brief
additional period of formal education is imperative to enable the
Amish to participate effectively and intelligently in our
democratic process, it must fall. The Amish alternative to formal
secondary school education has enabled them to function effectively
in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations on
relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in
contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly
self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in this country.
In itself, this is strong evidence that they are capable of
fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship
without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price
of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief. [ Footnote 13 ] When Thomas Jefferson
emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a free people
against tyranny, there is nothing to indicate he had in mind
compulsory education through any fixed age beyond a basic
education. Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and
reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the "sturdy
yeoman" who would form the basis of what he considered as the Page 406 U. S. 226 ideal of a democratic society. [ Footnote 14 ] Even their idiosyncratic separateness
exemplifies the diversity we profess to admire and encourage.

															The requirement for compulsory education beyond the eighth grade
is a relatively recent development in our history. Less than 60
years ago, the educational requirements of almost all of the States
were satisfied by completion of the elementary grades, at least
where the child was regularly and lawfully employed. [ Footnote 15 ] The independence Page 406 U. S. 227 and successful social functioning of the Amish community for a
period approaching almost three centuries and more than 200 years
in this country are strong evidence that there is, at best, a
speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship,
from an additional one or two years of compulsory formal education.
Against this background, it would require a more particularized
showing from the State on this point to justify the severe
interference with religious freedom such additional compulsory
attendance would entail.

															We should also note that compulsory education and child labor
laws find their historical origin in common humanitarian instincts,
and that the age limits of both laws have been coordinated to
achieve their related objectives. [ Footnote 16 ] In the context of this case, such
considerations, Page 406 U. S. 228 if anything, support rather than detract from, respondents'
position. The origins of the requirement for school attendance to
age 16, an age falling after the completion of elementary school
but before completion of high school, are not entirely clear. But,
to some extent, such laws reflected the movement to prohibit most
child labor under age 16 that culminated in the provisions of the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. [ Footnote 17 ] It is true, then, that the 16-year
child labor age limit may, to some degree, derive from a
contemporary impression that children should be in school until
that age. But, at the same time, it cannot be denied that,
conversely, the 16-year education limit reflects, in substantial
measure, the concern that children under that age not be employed
under conditions hazardous to their health, or in work that should
be performed by adults.

															The requirement of compulsory schooling to age 16 must therefore
be viewed as aimed not merely at providing educational
opportunities for children, but as an alternative to the equally
undesirable consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult
workers, or, on the other hand, forced idleness. [ Footnote 18 ] The two kinds of statutes --
compulsory school attendance and child labor laws -- tend to keep
children of certain ages off the labor market and in school; this
regimen, in turn, provides opportunity to prepare for a livelihood
of a higher order than that which children could pursue without
education, and protects their health in adolescence.

															In these terms, Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school
attendance of Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less
substantial than requiring such attendance Page 406 U. S. 229 for children generally. For, while agricultural employment is
not totally outside the legitimate concerns of the child labor
laws, employment of children under parental guidance and on the
family farm from age 14 to age 16 is an ancient tradition that lies
at the periphery of the objectives of such laws. [ Footnote 19 ] There is no intimation that
the Amish employment of their children on family farms is in any
way deleterious to their health, or that Amish parents exploit
children at tender years. Any such inference would be contrary to
the record before us. Moreover, employment of Amish children on the
family farm does not present the undesirable economic aspects of
eliminating jobs that might otherwise be held by adults. IV Finally, the State, on authority of Prince v.
Massachusetts, argues that a decision exempting Amish children
from the State's requirement fails to recognize the substantive
right of the Amish child to a secondary education, and fails to
give due regard to the power of the State as parens
patriae to extend the benefit of secondary education to
children regardless of the wishes of their parents. Taken at its
broadest sweep, the Court's language in Prince might be
read to give support to the State's position. However, the Court
was not confronted in Prince with a situation comparable
to that of the Amish as revealed in this record; this is shown by
the Page 406 U. S. 230 Court's severe characterization of the evils that it thought the
legislature could legitimately associate with child labor, even
when performed in the company of an adult. 321 U.S. at 321 U. S.
169 -170. The Court later took great care to confine Prince to a narrow scope in Sherbert v. Verner, when it stated:

															"On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the
Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt
acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when
the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, [it] is
not totally free from legislative restrictions.' Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S.
603 . The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.
158 . . . ."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
402 -403.

															This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety,
peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly
inferred. [ Footnote 20 ] The
record is to the contrary, and any reliance on that theory would
find no support in the evidence.

															Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion of MR.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS, our holding today in no degree depends on the
assertion of the religious interest of the child, as contrasted
with that of the parents. It is the parents who are subject to
prosecution here for failing to cause their children to attend
school, and it Page 406 U. S. 231 is their right of free exercise, not that of their children,
that must determine Wisconsin's power to impose criminal penalties
on the parent. The dissent argues that a child who expresses a
desire to attend public high school in conflict with the wishes of
his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no
reason for the Court to consider that point, since it is not an
issue in the case. The children are not parties to this litigation.
The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that
respondents were preventing their children from attending school
against their expressed desires, and, indeed, the record is to the
contrary. [ Footnote 21 ] The
state's position from the outset has been that it is empowered to
apply its compulsory attendance law to Amish parents in the same
manner as to other parents -- that is, without regard to the wishes
of the child. That is the claim we reject today.

															Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of
possible competing interests of parents, children, and the State in
an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the
State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing
their minor children from attending high school despite their
expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the
State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question
traditional concepts of parental control over the religious
upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this
Court's past decisions. It is clear that such an intrusion by a
State into family decisions in the area of religious training would
give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable to
those raised here Page 406 U. S. 232 and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). On this record, we neither reach nor decide those
issues.

															The State's argument proceeds without reliance on any actual
conflict between the wishes of parents and children. It appears to
rest on the potential that exemption of Amish parents from the
requirements of the compulsory education law might allow some
parents to act contrary to the best interests of their children by
foreclosing their opportunity to make an intelligent choice between
the Amish way of life and that of the outside world. The same
argument could, of course, be made with respect to all church
schools short of college. There is nothing in the record or in the
ordinary course of human experience to suggest that non-Amish
parents generally consult with children of ages 14-16 if they are
placed in a church school of the parents' faith.

															Indeed, it seems clear that, if the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to "save" a child from himself or his
Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of compulsory
formal high school education, the State will, in large measure,
influence, if not determine, the religious future of the child.
Even more markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case
involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of
their children. The history and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition. If not the first, perhaps the
most significant statements of the Court in this area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court
observed:

															"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390 , we think it entirely plain that the Act Page 406 U. S. 233 of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."

															268 U.S. at 268 U. S.
534 -535.

															The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations,"
referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation
of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship. Pierce, of course, recognized that, where
nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture
and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute
that the State acts "reasonably" and constitutionally in requiring
education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the
standards prescribed by the State.

															However read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing
of their children. And, when the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this
record, more than merely a "reasonable relation to some purpose
within the competency of the State" is required to sustain the
validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment. To
be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free
exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince Page 406 U. S. 234 if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health
or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social
burdens. But, in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive
evidence undermining the arguments the State has advanced to
support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society
as a whole. The record strongly indicates that accommodating the
religious objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two,
additional years of compulsory education will not impair the
physical or mental health of the child or result in an inability to
be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities
of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the
welfare of society.

															In the face of our consistent emphasis on the central values
underlying the Religion Clauses in our constitutional scheme of
government, we cannot accept a parens patriae claim of
such all-encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential for
broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the State. V For the reasons stated we hold, with the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend
formal high school to age 16. [ Footnote 22 ] Our disposition of this case, however, in no
way Page 406 U. S. 235 alters our recognition of the obvious fact that courts are not
school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine
the "necessity" of discrete aspects of a State's program of
compulsory education. This should suggest that courts must move
with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate
task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced
with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable
educational requirements. It cannot be overemphasized that we are
not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group
claiming to have recently discovered some "progressive" or more
enlightened process for rearing children for modern life.

															Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable
religious sect and a long history as a successful and
self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case
have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious
beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life,
the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued
survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious
organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement
of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have
carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the
adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal
vocational education in terms of precisely those overall interests
that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory
high school education. In light of this convincing Page 406 U. S. 236 showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects
could make, and weighing the minimal difference between what the
State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was
incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its
admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Sherbert v. Verner, supra. Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general
applicability of the State's compulsory school attendance statutes
or to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable
standards that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion,
provide for continuing agricultural vocational education under
parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish or others
similarly situated. The States have had a long history of amicable
and effective relationships with church-sponsored schools, and
there is no basis for assuming that, in this related context,
reasonable standards cannot be established concerning the content
of the continuing vocational education of Amish children under
parental guidance, provided always that state regulations are not
inconsistent with what we have said in this opinion. [ Footnote 23 ] Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case. Page 406 U. S. 237 [ Footnote 1 ]

															The children, Frieda Yoder, aged 15, Barbara Miller, aged 15,
and Vernon Yutzy, aged 14, were all graduates of the eighth grade
of public school.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Wis.Stat. § 118.15 (1969) provides in pertinent part:

															"118.15 Compulsory school attendance"

															"(1)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated
from high school, any person having under his control a child who
is between the ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to
attend school regularly during the full period and hours, religious
holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such
child should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school
term, quarter or semester of the school year in which he becomes 16
years of age."

															" * * * *" "(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in
proper physical or mental condition to attend school, to any child
exempted for good cause by the school board of the district in
which the child resides or to any child who has completed the full
4-year high school course. The certificate of a reputable physician
in general practice shall be sufficient proof that a child is
unable to attend school."

															"(4) Instruction during the required period elsewhere than at
school may be substituted for school attendance. Such instruction
must be approved by the state superintendent as substantially
equivalent to instruction given to children of like ages in the
public or private schools where such children reside."

															"(5) Whoever violates this section . . . may be fined not less
than $5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or
both."

															Section 118.15(1)(b) requires attendance to age 18 in a school
district containing a "vocational, technical and adult education
school," but this section is concededly inapplicable in this case,
for there is no such school in the district involved.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Prior to trial, the attorney for respondents wrote the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction in an effort to explore the
possibilities for a compromise settlement. Among other
possibilities, he suggested that perhaps the State Superintendent
could administratively determine that the Amish could satisfy the
compulsory attendance law by establishing their own vocational
training plan similar to one that has been established in
Pennsylvania. Supp.App. 6. Under the Pennsylvania plan, Amish
children of high school age are required to attend an Amish
vocational school for three hours a week, during which time they
are taught such subjects as English, mathematics, health, and
social studies by an Amish teacher. For the balance of the week,
the children perform farm and household duties under parental
supervision, and keep a journal of their daily activities. The
major portion of the curriculum is home projects in agriculture and
homemaking. See generally J. Hostetler & G.
Huntington, Children in Amish Society: Socialization and Community
Education, c. 5 (1971). A similar program has been instituted in
Indiana. Ibid. See also Iowa Code § 299.24
(1971); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 72-1111 (Supp. 1971).

															The Superintendent rejected this proposal on the ground that it
would not afford Amish children "substantially equivalent
education" to that offered in the schools of the area. Supp.App.
6.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ."

															[ Footnote 5 ] See generally J. Hostetler, Amish Society (1968); J.
Hostetler & G. Huntington, Children in Amish Society (1971);
Littell, Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Must
Technological Objectives Prevail?, in Public Controls for Nonpublic
Schools 61 (D. Erickson ed.1969).

															[ Footnote 6 ] See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.
S. 333 , 398 U. S.
351 -361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S.
78 (1944).

															[ Footnote 7 ] See generally R. Butts & L. Cremin, A History of
Education in American Culture (1953); L. Cremin, The Transformation
of the School (1961).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Hostetler, supra, n 5, c. 9; Hostetler & Huntington, supra, n 5.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Some States have developed working arrangements with the Amish
regarding high school attendance. See n 3, supra. However, the danger to the
continued existence of an ancient religious faith cannot be ignored
simply because of the assumption that its adherents will continue
to be able, at considerable sacrifice, to relocate in some more
tolerant State or country or work out accommodations under threat
of criminal prosecution. Forced migration of religious minorities
was an evil that lay at the heart of the Religion Clauses. See,
e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 9 -10
(1947); Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, 2 Writings of James Madison 183 (G. Hunt ed.1901).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															That has been the apparent ground for decision in reversal
previous state cases rejecting claims for exemption similar to that
here. See, e.g., State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 51 (1967); State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144
N.E.2d 693 (1955); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168 Pa.Super.
462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Title 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h) authorizes the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to exempt members of "a recognized religious
sect" existing at all times since December 31, 1950, from the
obligation to pay social security taxes if they are, by reason of
the tenets of their sect, opposed to receipt of such benefits and
agree to waive them, provided the Secretary finds that the sect
makes reasonable provision for its dependent members. The history
of the exemption shows it was enacted with the situation of the Old
Order Amish specifically in view. H.R.Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 101-102 (1965).

															The record in this case establishes without contradiction that
the Green County Amish had never been known to commit crimes, that
none had been known to receive public assistance, and that none was
unemployed.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Dr. Erickson had previously written:

															"Many public educators would be elated if their programs were as
successful in preparing students for productive community life as
the Amish system seems to be. In fact, while some public schoolmen
strive to outlaw the Amish approach, others are being forced to
emulate many of its features."

															Erickson, Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse: A Description and
Analysis of the Iowa Controversy, in Public Controls for Nonpublic
Schools 15, 53 (D. Erickson ed.1969). And see Littell, supra, n 5, at 61.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															All of the children involved in this case are graduates of the
eighth grade. In the county court, the defense introduced a study
by Dr. Hostetler indicating that Amish children in the eighth grade
achieved comparably to non-Amish children in the basic skills.
Supp.App. 11. See generally Hostetler & Huntington, supra, n 5, at 88
96.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															While Jefferson recognized that education was essential to the
welfare and liberty of the people, he was reluctant to directly
force instruction of children "in opposition to the will of the
parent." Instead, he proposed that state citizenship be conditioned
on the ability to "read readily in some tongue, native or
acquired." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, Sept. 9,
1817, in 17 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 417, 423-424 (Mem.
ed.1904). And it is clear that, so far as the mass of the people
were concerned, he envisaged that a basic education in the "three
R's" would sufficiently meet the interests of the State. He
suggested that, after completion of elementary school,

															"those destined for labor will engage in the business of
agriculture, or enter into apprenticeships to such handicraft art
as may be their choice."

															Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, Sept. 7, 1814, in
Thomas Jefferson and Education in a Republic 93-106 (Arrowood
ed.1930). See also id. at 60-64, 70, 83, 136-137.

															[ Footnote 15 ] See Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Education, Bulletin
No. 47, Digest of State Laws Relating to Public Education 527-559
(1916); Joint Hearings on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on Labor,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 416.

															Even today, an eighth grade education fully satisfies the
educational requirements of at least six States. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 15-321(b)(4) (1956); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 80-1504
(1947); Iowa Code § 299.2 (1971); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. § 13-27-1
(1967); Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 21.1-48 (Supp. 1971). (Mississippi has no
compulsory education law.) A number of other States have flexible
provisions permitting children aged 14 or having completed the
eighth grade to be excused from school in order to engage in lawful
employment. E.g., Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 123-20-5, 80-6-1
to 80-6-12 (1963); Conn.Gen.Stat.Rev. §§ 10-184, 10-189 (1964);
D.C.Code Ann. §§ 31-202, 36-201 to 36-228 (1967); Ind.Ann.Stat. §§
28-505 to 28-506, 28-519 (1948); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., c. 76, § 1
(Supp. 1972) and c. 149, § 86 (1971); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 167.031,
294.051 (1969); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 392.110 (1968); N.M.Stat.Ann. §
77-10-6 (1968).

															An eighth grade education satisfied Wisconsin's formal education
requirements until 1933. See Wis.Laws 1927, c. 425, § 97;
Laws 1933, c. 143. (Prior to 1933, provision was made for
attendance at continuation or vocational schools by working
children past the eighth grade, but only if one was maintained by
the community in question.) For a general discussion of the early
development of Wisconsin's compulsory education and child labor
laws, see F. Ensign, Compulsory School Attendance and
Child Labor 203-230 (1921).

															[ Footnote 16 ] See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra, n 15, pt. 1, at 185-187 (statement
of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), pt. 2, at 381-387
(statement of Katherine Lenroot, Chief, Children's Bureau,
Department of Labor); National Child Labor Committee, 40th
Anniversary Report, The Long Road (1944); 1 G. Abbott, The Child
and the State 259-269, 566 (Greenwood reprint 1968); L. Cremin, The
Transformation of the School, c. 3 (1961); A. Steinhilber & C.
Sokolowski, State Law on Compulsory Attendance 3-4 (Dept. of
Health, Education, and Welfare 1966).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.

															[ Footnote 18 ] See materials cited n 16, supra; Casad, Compulsory Education and
Individual Rights, in 5 Religion and the Public Order 51, 82 (D.
Giannella ed.1969).

															[ Footnote 19 ] See, e.g., Abbott, supra, n 16, at 266. The Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 excludes from its definition of "[o]ppressive child
labor" employment of a child under age 16 by

															"a parent . . . employing his own child . . . in an occupation
other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the
Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment
of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or
detrimental to their health or wellbeing."

															29 U.S.C. § 203(1).

															[ Footnote 20 ] Cf., e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11 (1905); Wright v. DeWitt School District, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d
644 (1965); Application of President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 118 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 87-90, 331 F.2d
1000, 1007-1010 (in chambers opinion), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 978 (1964).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															The only relevant testimony in the record is to the effect that
the wishes of the one child who testified corresponded with those
of her parents. Testimony of Frieda Yoder, Tr. 994, to the effect
that her personal religious beliefs guided her decision to
discontinue school attendance after the eighth grade. The other
children were not called by either side.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															What we have said should meet the suggestion that the decision
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognizing an exemption for the
Amish from the State's system of compulsory education constituted
an impermissible establishment of religion. In Walz v. Tax
Commission, the Court saw the three main concerns against
which the Establishment Clause sought to protect as "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 668 (1970). Accommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish can hardly
be characterized as sponsorship or active involvement. The purpose
and effect of such an exemption are not to support, favor, advance,
or assist the Amish, but to allow their centuries-old religious
society, here long before the advent of any compulsory education,
to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance with the
Wisconsin compulsory education law would impose. Such an
accommodation

															"reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of
neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not
represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions
which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to
forestall." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , 374 U. S. 409 (1963).

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Several States have now adopted plans to accommodate Amish
religious beliefs through the establishment of an "Amish vocational
school." See n 3, supra. These are not schools in the traditional sense of
the word. As previously noted, respondents attempted to reach a
compromise with the State of Wisconsin patterned after the
Pennsylvania plan, but those efforts were not productive. There is
no basis to assume that Wisconsin will be unable to reach a
satisfactory accommodation with the Amish in light of what we now
hold, so as to serve its interests without impinging on
respondents' protected free exercise of their religion.

															MR JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
concurring.

															This case involves the constitutionality of imposing criminal
punishment upon Amish parents for their religiously based refusal
to compel their children to attend public high schools. Wisconsin
has sought to brand these parents as criminals for following their
religious beliefs, and the Court today rightly holds that Wisconsin
cannot constitutionally do so.

															This case in no way involves any questions regarding the right
of the children of Amish parents to attend public high schools, or
any other institutions of learning, if they wish to do so. As the
Court points out, there is no suggestion whatever in the record
that the religious beliefs of the children here concerned differ in
any way from those of their parents. Only one of the children
testified. The last two questions and answers on her
cross-examination accurately sum up her testimony:

															"Q. So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going
to school, and did not go to school since last September, is
because of your religion?"

															"A. Yes."

															"Q. That is the only reason?"

															"A. Yes."

															(Emphasis supplied.)

															It is clear to me, therefore, that this record simply does not
present the interesting and important issue discussed in 406 U. S. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. With this observation, I join the opinion and the
judgment of the Court.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE
STEWART join, concurring.

															Cases such as this one inevitably call for a delicate balancing
of important but conflicting interests. I join the opinion and
judgment of the Court because I cannot Page 406 U. S. 238 say that the State's interest in requiring two more years of
compulsory education in the ninth and tenth grades outweighs the
importance of the concededly sincere Amish religious practice to
the survival of that sect.

															This would be a very different case for me if respondents' claim
were that their religion forbade their children from attending any
school at any time and from complying in any way with the
educational standards set by the State. Since the Amish children
are permitted to acquire the basic tools of literacy to survive in
modern society by attending grades one through eight, and since the
deviation from the State's compulsory education law is relatively
slight, I conclude that respondents' claim must prevail, largely
because

															"religious freedom -- the freedom to believe and to practice
strange and, it may be, foreign creeds -- has classically been one
of the highest values of our society." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S. 612 (1961) (BRENNAN, J., concurring and dissenting).

															The importance of the state interest asserted here cannot be
denigrated, however:

															"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 , 347 U. S. 493 (1954). Page 406 U. S. 239 As recently as last Term, the Court reemphasized the legitimacy
of the State's concern for enforcing minimal educational standards, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 613 (1971). [ Footnote 2/1 ] Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), lends no support to the contention that parents may replace
state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views
of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member
of society; in Pierce, both the parochial and military
schools were in compliance with all the educational standards that
the State had set, and the Court held simply that, while a State
may posit such standards, it may not preempt the educational
process by requiring children to attend public schools. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In the present case, the
State is not concerned with the maintenance of an educational
system as an end in itself; it is rather attempting to nurture and
develop the human potential of its children, whether Amish or
non-Amish: to expand their knowledge, broaden their sensibilities,
kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free inquiry, and
increase their human understanding and tolerance. It is possible
that most Amish Page 406 U. S. 240 children will wish to continue living the rural life of their
parents, in which case their training at home will adequately equip
them for their future role. Others, however, may wish to become
nuclear physicists, ballet dancers, computer programmers, or
historians, and for these occupations, formal training will be
necessary. There is evidence in the record that many children
desert the Amish faith when they come of age. [ Footnote 2/3 ] A State has a legitimate interest not
only in seeking to develop the latent talents of its children, but
also in seeking to prepare them for the lifestyle that they may
later choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than
the life they have led in the past. In the circumstances of this
case, although the question is close, I am unable to say that the
State has demonstrated that Amish children who leave school in the
eighth grade will be intellectually stultified or unable to acquire
new academic skills later. The statutory minimum school attendance
age set by the State is, after all, only 16.

															Decision in cases such as this and the administration of an
exemption for Old Order Amish from the State's compulsory school
attendance laws will inevitably involve the kind of close and
perhaps repeated scrutiny of religious practices, as is exemplified
in today's opinion, which the Court has heretofore been anxious to
avoid. But such entanglement does not create a forbidden
establishment of religion where it is essential to implement
free Page 406 U. S. 241 exercise values threatened by an otherwise neutral program
instituted to foster some permissible, nonreligious state
objective. I join the Court because the sincerity of the Amish
religious policy here is uncontested, because the potentially
adverse impact of the state requirement is great, and because the
State's valid interest in education has already been largely
satisfied by the eight years the children have already spent in
school.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The challenged Amish religious practice here does not pose a
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order; if it did,
analysis under the Free Exercise Clause would be substantially
different. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S.
14 (1946); Application of President and Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 118 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															"No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public
welfare." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510 , 268 U. S. 534 (1925).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Dr. Hostetler testified that, though there was a gradual
increase in the total number of Old Order Amish in the United
States over the past 50 years, "at the same time, the Amish have
also lost members [of] their church," and that the turnover rate
was such that "probably two-thirds [of the present Amish] have been
assimilated non-Amish people." App. 110. Justice Heffernan,
dissenting below opined that "[l]arge numbers of young people
voluntarily leave the Amish community each year, and are thereafter
forced to make their way in the world." 49 Wis.2d 430, 451, 182 N.W.2d
539 , 549 (1971).

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissenting in part. I I agree with the Court that the religious scruples of the Amish
are opposed to the education of their children beyond the grade
schools, yet I disagree with the Court's conclusion that the matter
is within the dispensation of parents alone. The Court's analysis
assumes that the only interests at stake in the case are those of
the Amish parents, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the
other. The difficulty with this approach is that, despite the
Court's claim, the parents are seeking to vindicate not only their
own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age
children.

															It is argued that the right of the Amish children to religious
freedom is not presented by the facts of the case, as the issue
before the Court involves only the Amish parents' religious freedom
to defy a state criminal statute imposing upon them an affirmative
duty to cause their children to attend high school.

															First, respondents' motion to dismiss in the trial court
expressly asserts not only the religious liberty of the adults, but
also that of the children, as a defense to the prosecutions. It is,
of course, beyond question that the parents have standing as
defendants in a criminal prosecution to assert the religious
interests of their Page 406 U. S. 242 children as a defense. [ Footnote
3/1 ] Although the lower courts and a majority of this Court
assume an identity of interest between parent and child, it is
clear that they have treated the religious interest of the child as
a factor in the analysis.

															Second, it is essential to reach the question to decide the case
not only because the question was squarely raised in the motion to
dismiss, but also because no analysis of religious liberty claims
can take place in a vacuum. If the parents in this case are allowed
a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the
parents' notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the
child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires,
it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an
imposition without canvassing his views. As in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 , it
is an imposition resulting from this very litigation. As the child
has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation that his
rights should be considered. And if an Amish child desires to
attend high school, and is mature enough to have that desire
respected, the State may well be able to override the parents'
religiously motivated objections. Page 406 U. S. 243 Religion is an individual experience. It is not necessary, nor
even appropriate, for every Amish child to express his views on the
subject in a prosecution of a single adult. Crucial, however, are
the views of the child whose parent is the subject of the suit.
Frieda Yoder has in fact, testified that her own religious views
are opposed to high-school education. I therefore join the judgment
of the Court as to respondent Jonas Yoder. But Frieda Yoder's views
may not be those of Vernon Yutzy or Barbara Miller. I must dissent,
therefore, as to respondents Adin Yutzy and Wallace Miller, as
their motion to dismiss also raised the question of their
children's religious liberty. II This issue has never been squarely presented before today. Our
opinions are full of talk about the power of the parents over the
child's education. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 . And
we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and
State with little regard for the views of the child. See Prince
v. Massachusetts, supra. Recent cases, however, have clearly
held that the children themselves have constitutionally protectible
interests.

															These children are "persons" within the meaning of the Bill of
Rights. We have so held over and over again. In Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 , we
extended the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment in a state
trial of a 15-year-old boy. In In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1 , 387 U. S. 13 , we
held that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone." In In re Winship, 397 U.
S. 358 , we held that a 12-year-old boy, when charged
with an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, was
entitled to procedural safeguards contained in the Sixth
Amendment. Page 406 U. S. 244 In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.
S. 503 , we dealt with 13-year-old, 15-year-old, and
16-year-old students who wore armbands to public schools and were
disciplined for doing so. We gave them relief, saying that their
First Amendment rights had been abridged.

															"Students, in school as well as out of school, are 'persons'
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect
their obligations to the State." Id. at 393 U. S.
511 .

															In Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.
S. 624 , we held that school children whose religious
beliefs collided with a school rule requiring them to salute the
flag could not be required to do so. While the sanction included
expulsion of the students and prosecution of the parents, id. at 319 U. S. 630 ,
the vice of the regime was its interference with the child's free
exercise of religion. We said: "Here . . . we are dealing with a
compulsion of students to declare a belief." Id. at 319 U. S. 631 .
In emphasizing the important and delicate task of boards of
education we said:

															"That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,
if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." Id. at 319 U. S.
637 .

															On this important and vital matter of education, I think the
children should be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent
dissent, normally speak for the entire family, the education of the
child is a matter on which the child will often have decided views.
He may want to be a pianist or an astronaut or an
oceanographer. Page 406 U. S. 245 To do so he will have to break from the Amish tradition.
[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,
that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his child
out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of
diversity that we have today. The child may decide that that is the
preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the student's judgment,
not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning
to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of
students to be masters of their own destiny. [ Footnote 3/3 ] If he is harnessed to the Amish way of
life Page 406 U. S. 246 by those in authority over him, and if his education is
truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed. The child,
therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard before the
State gives the exemption which we honor today.

															The views of the two children in question were not canvassed by
the Wisconsin courts. The matter should be explicitly reserved so
that new hearings can be held on remand of the case. [ Footnote 3/4 ] III I think the emphasis of the Court on the "law and order" record
of this Amish group of people is quite irrelevant. A religion is a
religion irrespective of what the misdemeanor or felony records of
its members might be. I am not at all sure how the Catholics,
Episcopalians, the Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unitarians,
and my own Presbyterians would make out if subjected to such a
test. It is, of course, true that, if a group or society was
organized to perpetuate crime, and if that is its motive, we would
have rather startling problems akin to those that were raised when,
some years back, a particular sect was challenged here as operating
on a fraudulent basis. United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 . But
no such factors are present here, and the Amish, whether with a
high or low criminal Page 406 U. S. 247 record, [ Footnote 3/5 ] certainly
qualify by all historic standards as a religion within the meaning
of the First Amendment.

															The Court rightly rejects the notion that actions, even though
religiously grounded, are always outside the protection of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In so ruling, the Court
departs from the teaching of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 , 98 U. S. 164 ,
where it was said, concerning the reach of the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment,

															"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order."

															In that case, it was conceded at polygamy was a part of the
religion of the Mormons. Yet the Court said, "It matters not that
his belief [in polygamy] was a part of his professed religion: it
was still belief, and belief only." Id. at 98 U. S.
167 .

															Action which the Court deemed to be antisocial could be punished
even though it was grounded on deeply held and sincere religious
convictions. What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the
way to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever
enjoyed, and it even promises that in time Reynolds will
be overruled.

															In another way, however, the Court retreats when, in reference
to Henry Thoreau, it says his "choice was philosophical Page 406 U. S. 248 and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not
rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." That is contrary to
what we held in United States v. Seeger 380 U.
S. 163 , where we were concerned with the meaning of the
words "religious training and belief" in the Selective Service Act,
which were the basis of many conscientious objector claims. We
said:

															"Within that phrase would come all sincere religious beliefs
which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith to which all
else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent.
The test might be stated in these words: a sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction
avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different
religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in
accord with the well established congressional policy of equal
treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in
their religious tenets." Id. at 380 U. S.
176 . Welsh v. United States, 398 U.
S. 333 , was in the same vein, the Court saying:

															"In this case, Welsh's conscientious objection to war was
undeniably based in part on his perception of world politics. In a
letter to his local board, he wrote: "

															"I can only act according to what I am and what I see. And I see
that the military complex wastes both human and material resources,
that it fosters disregard for (what I consider a paramount concern)
human needs and ends; I see that the means we employ to 'defend'
our 'way of life' profoundly change that way of life. I see that,
in our failure to Page 406 U. S. 249 recognize the political, social, and economic realities of the
world, we, as a nation, fail our responsibility as a
nation. " Id. at 398 U. S.
342 .

															The essence of Welsh's philosophy, on the basis of which we held
he was entitled to an exemption, was in these words:

															""I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its
living; therefore I will not injure or kill another human being.
This belief (and the corresponding duty' to abstain from
violence toward another person) is not `superior to those arising
from any human relation.' On the contrary: it is essential to
every human relation. I cannot, therefore, conscientiously
comply with the Government's insistence that I assume duties which
I feel are immoral and totally repugnant."" Id. at 398 U. S.
343 .

															I adhere to these exalted views of "religion," and see no
acceptable alternative to them now that we have become a Nation of
many religions and sects, representing all of the diversities of
the human race. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S.
192 -193 (concurring opinion).

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Thus, in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.
S. 158 , a Jehovah's Witness was convicted for having
violated a state child labor law by allowing her nine-year-old
niece and ward to circulate religious literature on the public
streets. There, as here, the narrow question was the religious
liberty of the adult. There, as here, the Court analyzed the
problem from the point of view of the State's conflicting interest
in the welfare of the child. But, as MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, speaking
for the Court, has so recently pointed out,

															"The Court [in Pierce ] implicitly held that the
custodian had standing to assert alleged freedom of religion . . .
rights of the child that were threatened in the very litigation
before the Court, and that the child had no effective way of
asserting herself." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 , 405 U. S. 446 n. 6. Here, as in Pierce, the children have no effective
alternate means to vindicate their rights. The question, therefore,
is squarely before us.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															A significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order.
Professor Hostetler notes that "[t]he loss of members is very
limited in some Amish districts, and considerable in others." J.
Hostetler, Amish Society 226 (1968). In one Pennsylvania church, he
observed a defection rate of 30%. Ibid. Rates up to 50%
have been reported by others. Casad, Compulsory High School
Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v.
Garber, 16 Kan.L.Rev. 423, 434 n. 51 (1968).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The court below brushed aside the students' interests with the
offhand comment that, "[w]hen a child reaches the age of judgment,
he can choose for himself his religion." 49 Wis.2d 430, 440, 182 N.W.2d
539 , 543. But there is nothing in this record to indicate that
the moral and intellectual judgment demanded of the student by the
question in this case is beyond his capacity. Children far younger
than the 14- and 15-year-olds involved here are regularly permitted
to testify in custody and other proceedings. Indeed, the failure to
call the affected child in a custody hearing is often reversible
error. See, e.g., Callicott v. Callicott, 364 S.W.2d 455
(Civ.App. Tex.) (reversible error for trial judge to refuse to hear
testimony of eight-year-old in custody battle). Moreover, there is
substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists
that the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old
approaches that of the adult. See, e.g., J. Piaget, The
Moral Judgment of the Child (1948); D. Elkind, Children and
Adolescents 750 (1970); Kohlberg, Moral Education in the Schools: A
Developmental View, in R. Muuss, Adolescent Behavior and Society
193, 199-200 (1971); W. Kay, Moral Development 172-183 (1968); A.
Gesell & F. Ilg, Youth: The Years From Ten to Sixteen 175-182
(1956). The maturity of Amish youth, who identify with and assume
adult roles from early childhood, see M. Goodman, The
Culture of Childhood 92-94 (1970), is certainly not less than that
of children in the general population.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Canvassing the views of all school-age Amish children in the
State of Wisconsin would not present insurmountable difficulties. A
1968 survey indicated that there were at that time only 256 such
children in the entire State. Comment, 1971 Wis.L.Rev. 832, 852 n.
132.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The observation of Justice Heffernan, dissenting below, that the
principal opinion in his court portrayed the Amish as leading a
life of "idyllic agrarianism," is equally applicable to the
majority opinion in this Court. So, too, is his observation that
such a portrayal rests on a "mythological basis." Professor
Hostetler has noted that "[d]rinking among the youth is common in
all the large Amish settlements." Amish Society 283. Moreover,
"[i]t would appear that, among the Amish, the rate of suicide is
just as high, if not higher, than for the nation." Id. at
300. He also notes an unfortunate Amish "preoccupation with filthy
stories," id. at 282, as well as significant "rowdyism and
stress." Id. at 281. These are not traits peculiar to the
Amish, of course. The point is that the Amish are not people set
apart and different.

Summary: In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the US Supreme Court ruled in favor of Amish parents who refused to send their children to public school past the eighth grade, citing religious beliefs and a different mode of informal vocational education. The Court balanced the state's interest in universal education with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and parental rights, ultimately upholding the lower court's decision that compulsory school attendance beyond eighth grade violated the Amish community's religious freedom. The Amish successfully demonstrated the sincerity of their beliefs and the adequacy of their alternative educational methods, and the state failed to show how exempting the Amish would harm its interest in compulsory education.