U.S. Supreme Court Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) Wickard v. Filburn No. 59 Argued May 4, 1942 Reargued October 13,
1942 Decided November 9,
1942 317
U.S. 111 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO Syllabus 1. Pending a referendum vote of farmers upon wheat quotas
proclaimed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, the Secretary made a radio address in which
he advocated approval of the quotas and called attention to the
recent enactment by Congress of the amendatory act, later
approved Page 317 U. S. 112 May 26, 1941. The speech mentioned the provisions of the
amendment for increase of loans on wheat, but not the fact that it
also increased the penalty on excess production, and added that,
because of the uncertain world situation, extra acreages of wheat
had been deliberately planted, and "farmers should not be penalized
because they have provided insurance against shortages of food."
There was no evidence that the subsequent referendum vote approving
the quotas was influenced by the speech. Held, that, in any event, and even assuming that the
penalties referred to in the speech were those prescribed by the
Act, the validity of the vote was not thereby affected. P. 317 U. S.
117 .

															2. The wheat marketing quota and attendant penalty provisions of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by the Act of
May 26, 1941, when applied to wheat not intended in any part for
commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm, are within the
commerce power of Congress. P. 317 U. S.
118 .

															3. The effect of the Act is to restrict the amount of wheat
which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which
one may forestall resort to the market by producing for his own
needs. P. 317 U. S.
127 .

															4. That the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may
be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the
grower from the scope of federal regulation where his contribution,
taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial. P. 317 U. S.
127 .

															5. The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power
to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are
dealt in and practices affecting such prices. P. 317 U. S.
128 .

															6. A factor of such volume and variability as wheat grown for
home consumption would have a substantial influence on price
conditions on the wheat market, both because such wheat, with
rising prices, may flow into the market and check price increases
and, because, though never marketed, it supplies the need of the
grower which would otherwise be satisfied by his purchases in the
open market. P. 317 U. S.
128 .

															7. The amendatory Act of May 26, 1941, which increased the
penalty upon "farm marketing excess" and included in that category
wheat which previously had not been subject to penalty, held not invalid as retroactive legislation repugnant to
the Fifth Amendment when applied to wheat planted and growing
before it was enacted, but harvested and threshed thereafter. P. 317 U. S.
131 . 43 F.
Supp. 1017 , reversed. Page 317 U. S. 113 APPEAL from a decree of the District Court of three judges which
permanently enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture and other
appellants from enforcing certain penalties against the appellee, a
farmer, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The appellee filed his complaint against the Secretary of
Agriculture of the United States, three members of the County
Agricultural Conservation Committee for Montgomery County, Ohio,
and a member of the State Agricultural Conservation Committee for
Ohio. He sought to enjoin enforcement against himself of the
marketing penalty imposed by the amendment of May 26, 1941,
[ Footnote 1 ] to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, [ Footnote 2 ] upon that part of his 1941 wheat crop which
was available for marketing in excess of the marketing quota
established for his farm. He also sought a declaratory judgment
that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act, as amended
and applicable to him, were unconstitutional because not
sustainable Page 317 U. S. 114 under the Commerce Clause or consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

															The Secretary moved to dismiss the action against him for
improper venue, but later waived his objection and filed an answer.
The other appellants moved to dismiss on the ground that they had
no power or authority to enforce the wheat marketing quota
provisions of the Act, and, after their motion was denied, they
answered, reserving exceptions to the ruling on their motion to
dismiss. [ Footnote 3 ] The case
was submitted for decision on the pleadings and upon a stipulation
of facts.

															The appellee for many years past has owned and operated a small
farm in Montgomery County, Ohio, maintaining a herd of dairy
cattle, selling milk, raising poultry, and selling poultry and
eggs. It has been his practice to raise a small acreage of winter
wheat, sown in the Fall and harvested in the following July; to
sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock
on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for
home consumption, and to keep the rest for the following seeding.
The intended disposition of the crop here involved has not been
expressly stated.

															In July of 1940, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938, as then amended, there were established for the appellee's
1941 crop a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres and a normal
yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. He was given notice of such
allotment in July of 1940, before the Fall planting of his 1941
crop of wheat, and again in July of 1941, before it was harvested.
He sowed, however, 23 acres, and harvested from his 11.9 acres of
excess acreage 239 bushels, which, under the terms of the Act as
amended on May 26, 1941, constituted farm Page 317 U. S. 115 marketing excess, subject to a penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or
$117.11 in all. The appellee has not paid the penalty, and he has
not postponed or avoided it by storing the excess under regulations
of the Secretary of Agriculture, or by delivering it up to the
Secretary. The Committee, therefore, refused him a marketing card,
which was, under the terms of Regulations promulgated by the
Secretary, necessary to protect a buyer from liability to the
penalty and upon its protecting lien. [ Footnote 4 ]

															The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as
related to wheat is to control the volume moving in interstate and
foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the
consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to
commerce. [ Footnote 5 ] Within
prescribed limits and by prescribed standards, the Secretary of
Agriculture is directed to ascertain and proclaim each year a
national acreage allotment for the next crop of wheat, which is
then apportioned to the states and their counties, and is
eventually broken up into allotments for individual farms.
[ Footnote 6 ] Loans and payments
to wheat farmers are authorized in stated circumstances. [ Footnote 7 ]

															The Act further provides that, whenever it appears that the
total supply of wheat as of the beginning of any marketing year,
beginning July 1, will exceed a normal year's domestic consumption
and export by more than 35 percent, the Secretary shall so proclaim
not later than May 15 prior to the beginning of such marketing
year, and that, during the marketing year, a compulsory national
marketing quota shall be in effect with respect to the
marketing Page 317 U. S. 116 of wheat. [ Footnote 8 ]
Between the issuance of the proclamation and June 10, the Secretary
must, however, conduct a referendum of farmers who will be subject
to the quota, to determine whether they favor or oppose it; and, if
more than one-third of the farmers voting in the referendum do
oppose, the Secretary must, prior to the effective date of the
quota, by proclamation suspend its operation. [ Footnote 9 ]

															On May 19, 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture made a radio
address to the wheat farmers of the United States in which he
advocated approval of the quotas and called attention to the
pendency of the amendment of May 26, 1941, which had at the time
been sent by Congress to the White House, and pointed out its
provision for an increase in the loans on wheat to 85 percent of
parity. He made no mention of the fact that it also increased the
penalty from 15 cents a bushel to one-half of the parity loan rate
of about 98 cents, but stated that,

															"Because of the uncertain world situation, we deliberately
planted several million extra acres of wheat. . . . Farmers should
not be penalized because they have provided insurance against
shortages of food."

															Pursuant to the Act, the referendum of wheat growers was held on
May 31, 1941. According to the required published statement of the
Secretary of Agriculture, 81 percent of those voting favored the
marketing quota, with 19 percent opposed.

															The court below held, with one judge dissenting, that the speech
of the Secretary invalidated the referendum, and that the amendment
of May 26, 1941,

															"insofar as it increased the penalty for the farm marketing
excess over the fifteen cents per bushel prevailing at the time of
planting and subjected the entire crop to a lien for the payment
thereof,"

															should not be applied to the appellee because, Page 317 U. S. 117 as so applied, it was retroactive, and in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, and, alternatively, because the equities of the case so
required. 43 F. Supp.
1017 . Its Judgment permanently enjoined appellants from
collecting a marketing penalty of more than 15 cents a bushel on
the farm marketing excess of appellee's 1941 wheat crop, from
subjecting appellee's entire 1941 crop to a lien for the payment of
the penalty, and from collecting a 15-cent penalty except in
accordance with the provisions of § 339 of the Act as that section
stood prior to the amendment of May 26, 1941. [ Footnote 10 ] The Secretary and his codefendants
have appealed. [ Footnote
11 ] I The holding of the court below that the Secretary's speech
invalidated the referendum is manifest error. Read as a whole and
in the context of world events that constituted his principal
theme, the penalties of which he spoke were more likely those in
the form of ruinously low prices resulting from the excess supply,
rather than the penalties prescribed in the Act. But, under any
interpretation, the speech cannot be given the effect of
invalidating the referendum. There is no evidence that any voter
put upon the Secretary's words the interpretation that impressed
the court below or was in any way misled. There is no showing that
the speech influenced the outcome of the referendum. The record, in
fact, does not show that any, and does not suggest a basis for even
a guess as to how many, of the voting farmers dropped work to
listen to "Wheat Farmers and the Battle for Page 317 U. S. 118 Democracy" at 11:30 in the morning of May 19th, which was a busy
hour in one of the busiest of seasons. If this discourse intended
reference to this legislation at all, it was, of course, a public
Act, whose terms were readily available, and the speech did not
purport to be an exposition of its provisions.

															To hold that a speech by a Cabinet officer, which failed to meet
judicial ideals of clarity, precision, and exhaustiveness, may
defeat a policy embodied in an Act of Congress would invest
communication between administrators and the people with perils
heretofore unsuspected. Moreover, we should have to conclude that
such an officer is able to do by accident what he has no power to
do by design. Appellee's complaint, insofar as it is based on this
speech, is frivolous, and the injunction, insofar as it rests on
this ground, is unwarranted. United States v. Rock Royal
Cooperative, 307 U. S. 533 . II It is urged that, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
Article I, § 8, clause 3, Congress does not possess the power it
has in this instance sought to exercise. The question would merit
little consideration, since our decision in United States v.
Darby, 312 U. S. 100 ,
[ Footnote 12 ] sustaining the
federal power to regulate production of goods for commerce, except
for the fact that this Act extends federal regulation to production
not intended in any part for commerce, but wholly for consumption
on the farm. The Act includes a definition of "market" and its
derivatives, so that, as related to wheat, in addition to its
conventional meaning, it also means to dispose of

															"by feeding (in any Page 317 U. S. 119 form) to poultry or livestock which, or the products of which,
are sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so disposed of.
[ Footnote 13 ]"

															Hence, marketing quotas not only embrace all that may be sold
without penalty, but also what may be consumed on the premises.
Wheat produced on excess acreage is designated as "available for
marketing" as so defined, and the penalty is imposed thereon.
[ Footnote 14 ] Penalties do
not depend upon whether any part of the wheat, either within or
without the quota, is sold or intended to be sold. The sum of this
is that the Federal Government fixes a quota including all that the
farmer may harvest for sale or for his own farm needs, and declares
that wheat produced on excess acreage may neither be disposed of
nor used except upon payment of the penalty, or except it is stored
as required by the Act or delivered to the Secretary of
Agriculture.

															Appellee says that this is a regulation of production and
consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the
reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they
are local in character, and their effects upon interstate commerce
are, at most, "indirect." In answer, the Government argues that the
statute regulates neither production nor consumption, but only
marketing, and, in the alternative, that, if the Act does go beyond
the regulation of marketing, it is sustainable as a "necessary and
proper" [ Footnote 15 ]
implementation of the power of Congress over interstate
commerce.

															The Government's concern lest the Act be held to be a regulation
of production or consumption, rather than of marketing, is
attributable to a few dicta and decisions of this Court which might
be understood to lay it down that activities such as "production,"
"manufacturing," and Page 317 U. S. 120 "mining" are strictly "local" and, except in special
circumstances which are not present here, cannot be regulated under
the commerce power because their effects upon interstate commerce
are, as matter of law, only "indirect." [ Footnote 16 ] Even today, when this power has been held
to have great latitude, there is no decision of this Court that
such activities may be regulated where no part of the product is
intended for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects
thereof. We believe that a review of the course of decision under
the Commerce Clause will make plain, however, that questions of the
power of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula
which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as
"production" and "indirect" and foreclose consideration of the
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce.

															At the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 194 -195.
He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power
by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed
from political, rather than from judicial, processes. Id. at 22 U. S. 197 . Page 317 U. S. 121 For nearly a century, however, decisions of this Court under the
Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might
do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause, and
almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it
was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce.
During this period, there was perhaps little occasion for the
affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence of
the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting
almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of
the states. In discussion and decision, the point of reference,
instead of being what was "necessary and proper" to the exercise by
Congress of its granted power, was often some concept of
sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood.
Certain activities such as "production," "manufacturing," and
"mining" were occasionally said to be within the province of state
governments and beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. [ Footnote 17 ]

															It was not until 1887, with the enactment of the Interstate
Commerce Act, [ Footnote 18 ]
that the interstate commerce power began to exert positive
influence in American law and life. This first important federal
resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act [ Footnote 19 ]
and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others. These statutes
ushered in new phases of adjudication, which required the Court to
approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of
an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder.

															When it first dealt with this new legislation, the Court adhered
to its earlier pronouncements, and allowed but Page 317 U. S. 122 little scope to the power of Congress. United States v.
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 .
[ Footnote 20 ] These earlier
pronouncements also played an important part in several.of the five
cases in which this Court later held that Acts of Congress under
the Commerce Clause were in excess of its power. [ Footnote 21 ]

															Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive
authority were being written, however, other cases called forth
broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to
supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the
principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. Not long after the decision of United States v. Knight Co.,
supra, Mr. Justice Holmes, in sustaining the exercise of
national power over intrastate activity, stated for the Court that
"commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but
a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 , 196 U. S. 398 .
It was soon demonstrated that the effects of many kinds of
intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such as to make
them a proper subject of federal regulation. [ Footnote 22 ] In some cases sustaining the
exercise of federal power over intrastate matters, the term
"direct" Page 317 U. S. 123 was used for the purpose of stating, rather than of reaching, a
result; [ Footnote 23 ] in
others, it was treated as synonymous with "substantial" or
"material"; [ Footnote 24 ]
and in others it was not used at all. [ Footnote 25 ] Of late, its use has been abandoned in
cases dealing with questions of federal power under the Commerce
Clause.

															In the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.
S. 342 , the Court held that railroad rates of an
admittedly intrastate character and fixed by authority of the state
might, nevertheless, be revised by the Federal Government because
of the economic effects which they had upon interstate commerce.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Hughes found federal intervention
constitutionally authorized because of

															"matters having such a close and substantial relation to
interstate traffic that the control is essential or appropriate to
the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate
service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which
interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms and without
molestation or hindrance." Id. at 234 U. S.
351 .

															The Court's recognition of the relevance of the economic effects
in the application of the Commerce Clause, exemplified Page 317 U. S. 124 by this statement, has made the mechanical application of legal
formulas no longer feasible. Once an economic measure of the reach
of the power granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause is
accepted, questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by
finding the activity in question to be "production," nor can
consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them
"indirect." The present Chief Justice has said in summary of the
present state of the law:

															"The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the
exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate
commerce. . . . The power of Congress over interstate commerce is
plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed
in the Constitution. . . . It follows that no form of state
activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted
by the commerce clause to Congress. Hence, the reach of that power
extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way
interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.
S. 110 , 315 U. S.
119 .

															Whether the subject of the regulation in question was
"production," "consumption," or "marketing" is, therefore, not
material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power
before us. That an activity is of local character may help in a
doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended to reach it.
[ Footnote 26 ] The same
consideration might help in determining whether, in the absence of
Congressional action, it would be permissible for the state Page 317 U. S. 125 to exert its power on the subject matter, even though, in so
doing, it to some degree affected interstate commerce. But even if
appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce,
and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."

															The parties have stipulated a summary of the economics of the
wheat industry. Commerce among the states in wheat is large and
important. Although wheat is raised in every state but one,
production in most states is not equal to consumption. Sixteen
states, on average, have had a surplus of wheat above their own
requirements for feed, seed, and food. Thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia, where production has been below consumption,
have looked to these surplus-producing states for their supply, as
well as for wheat for export and carry-over.

															The wheat industry has been a problem industry for some years.
Largely as a result of increased foreign production and import
restrictions, annual exports of wheat and flour from the United
States during the ten-year period ending in 1940 averaged less than
10 percent of total production, while, during the 1920's, they
averaged more than 25 percent. The decline in the export trade has
left a large surplus in production which, in connection with an
abnormally large supply of wheat and other grains in recent years,
caused congestion in a number of markets; tied up railroad cars,
and caused elevators in some instances to turn away grains, and
railroads to institute embargoes to prevent further congestion.

															Many countries, both importing and exporting, have sought to
modify the impact of the world market conditions on their own
economy. Importing countries have taken measures to stimulate
production and self-sufficiency. The four large exporting countries
of Argentina, Page 317 U. S. 126 Australia, Canada, and the United States have all undertaken
various programs for the relief of growers. Such measures have been
designed, in part at least, to protect the domestic price received
by producers. Such plans have generally evolved towards control by
the central government. [ Footnote 27 ]

															In the absence of regulation, the price of wheat in the United
States would be much affected by world conditions. During 1941,
producers who cooperated with the Agricultural Adjustment program
received an average price on the farm of about $1.16 a bushel, as
compared with the world market price of 40 cents a bushel.

															Differences in farming conditions, however, make these benefits
mean different things to different wheat growers. There are several
large areas of specialization in wheat, and the concentration on
this crop reaches 27 percent of the crop land, and the average
harvest runs as high as Page 317 U. S. 127 155 acres. Except for some use of wheat as stock feed and for
seed, the practice is to sell the crop for cash. Wheat from such
areas constitutes the bulk of the interstate commerce therein.

															On the other hand, in some New England states, less than one
percent of the crop land is devoted to wheat, and the average
harvest is less than five acres per farm. In 1940, the average
percentage of the total wheat production that was sold in each
state, as measured by value ranged from 29 percent thereof in
Wisconsin to 90 percent in Washington. Except in regions of
large-scale production, wheat is usually grown in rotation with
other crops; for a nurse crop for grass seeding, and as a cover
crop to prevent soil erosion and leaching. Some is sold, some kept
for seed, and a percentage of the total production much larger than
in areas of specialization is consumed on the farm and grown for
such purpose. Such farmers, while growing some wheat, may even find
the balance of their interest on the consumer's side.

															The effect of consumption of home-grown wheat on interstate
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable
factor in the disappearance of the wheat crop. Consumption on the
farm where grown appears to vary in an amount greater than 20
percent of average production. The total amount of wheat consumed
as food varies but relatively little, and use as seed is relatively
constant.

															The maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat
undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining or
increasing the demand as by limiting the supply. The effect of the
statute before us is to restrict the amount which may be produced
for market and the extent, as well, to which one may forestall
resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That
appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself is not enough to remove him from the Page 317 U. S. 128 scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution,
taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial. Labor Board v. Fairblatt, 306 U.
S. 601 , 306 U. S. 606 et seq.; United States v. Darby supra at 312 U. S.
123 .

															It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power
to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at
which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices
affecting such prices. [ Footnote
28 ] One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to
increase the market price of wheat, and, to that end, to limit the
volume thereof that could affect the market. It can hardly be
denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and
market conditions. This may arise because being in marketable
condition such wheat overhangs the market, and, if induced by
rising prices, tends to flow into the market and check price
increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies
a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by
purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense
competes with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a
use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions
or restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt that
Congress Page 317 U. S. 129 may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm
where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have
a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to
stimulate trade therein at increased prices.

															It is said, however, that this Act, forcing some farmers into
the market to buy what they could provide for themselves, is an
unfair promotion of the markets and prices of specializing wheat
growers. It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a
restraining hand on the self-interest of the regulated, and that
advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others. The
conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who
advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by
the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative
process. [ Footnote 29 ] Such
conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And
with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of
regulation, we have nothing to do. III The statute is also challenged as a deprivation of property
without due process of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment, both
because of its regulatory effect on the appellee and because of its
alleged retroactive effect. The court below sustained the plea on
the ground of forbidden retroactivity, "or, in the alternative,
that the equities of the case as shown by the record favor the
plaintiff." 43 F.
Supp. 1017 , 1019. An Act of Congress is not to be refused
application by the courts as arbitrary and capricious and forbidden
by the Due Process Clause merely Page 317 U. S. 130 because it is deemed in a particular case to work an inequitable
result.

															Appellee's claim that the Act works a deprivation of due process
even apart from its allegedly retroactive effect is not persuasive.
Control of total supply, upon which the whole statutory plan is
based, depends upon control of individual supply. Appellee's claim
is not that his quota represented less than a fair share of the
national quota, but that the Fifth Amendment requires that he be
free from penalty for planting wheat and disposing of his crop as
he sees fit.

															We do not agree. In its effort to control total supply, the
Government gave the farmer a choice which was, of course, designed
to encourage cooperation and discourage noncooperation. The farmer
who planted within his allotment was, in effect, guaranteed a
minimum return much above what his wheat would have brought if sold
on a world market basis. Exemption from the applicability of quotas
was made in favor of small producers. [ Footnote 30 ] The farmer who produced in excess of his
quota might escape penalty by delivering his wheat to the
Secretary, or by storing it with the privilege of sale without
penalty in a later year to fill out his quota, or irrespective of
quotas if they are no longer in effect, and he could obtain a loan
of 60 percent of the rate for cooperators, or about 59 cents a
bushel, on so much of his wheat as would be subject to penalty if
marketed. [ Footnote 31 ]
Finally, he might make other disposition of his wheat, subject to
the penalty. It is agreed Page 317 U. S. 131 that, as the result of the wheat programs, he is able to market
his wheat at a price "far above any world price based on the
natural reaction of supply and demand." We can hardly find a denial
of due process in these circumstances, particularly since it is
even doubtful that appellee's burdens under the program outweigh
his benefits. It is hardly lack of due process for the Government
to regulate that which it subsidizes.

															The amendment of May 26, 1941, is said to be invalidly
retroactive in two respects: first, in that it increased the
penalty from 15 cents to 49 cents a bushel; secondly, in that, by
the new definition of "farm marketing excess," it subjected to the
penalty wheat which had theretofore been subject to no penalty at
all, i.e., wheat not "marketed" as defined in the Act.

															It is not to be denied that, between seed time and harvest,
important changes were made in the Act which affected the
desirability and advantage of planting the excess acreage. The law,
as it stood when the appellee planted his crop, made the quota for
his farm the normal or the actual production of the acreage
allotment, whichever was greater, plus any carry-over wheat that he
could have marketed without penalty in the preceding marketing
year. [ Footnote 32 ] The Act
also provided that the farmer who, while quotas were in effect,
marketed wheat in excess of the quota for the farm on which it was
produced should be subject to a penalty of 15 cents a bushel on the
excess so marketed. [ Footnote
33 ] Marketing of wheat was defined as including disposition "by
feeding (in any form) to poultry or livestock which, or the
products of which, are sold, bartered, or exchanged, . . ."
[ Footnote 34 ] The amendment
of May 26, Page 317 U. S. 132 1941, made before the appellee had harvested the growing crop,
changed the quota and penalty provisions. The quota for each farm
became the actual production of acreage planted to wheat, less the
normal or the actual production, whichever was smaller, of any
excess acreage. [ Footnote
35 ] Wheat in excess of this quota, known as the "farm marketing
excess" and declared by the amendment to be "regarded as available
for marketing," was subjected to a penalty fixed at 50 percent of
the basic loan rate for cooperators, [ Footnote 36 ] or 49 cents, instead of the penalty of 15
cents which obtained at the time of planting. At the same time,
there was authorized an increase in the amount of the loan which
might be made to noncooperators such as the appellee upon wheat
which "would be subject to penalty if marketed" from about 34 cents
per bushel to about 59 cents. [ Footnote 37 ] The entire crop was subjected by the
amendment to a lien for the payment of the penalty.

															The penalty provided by the amendment can be postponed or
avoided only by storing the farm marketing excess according to
regulations promulgated by the Secretary or by delivering it to him
without compensation; Page 317 U. S. 133 and the penalty is incurred and becomes due on threshing.
[ Footnote 38 ] Thus, the
penalty was contingent upon an act which appellee committed not
before, but after, the enactment of the statute, and, had he chosen
to cut his excess and cure it or feed it as hay, or to reap and
feed it with the head and straw together, no penalty would have
been demanded. Such manner of consumption is not uncommon. Only
when he threshed, and thereby made it a part of the bulk of wheat
overhanging the market, did he become subject to penalty. He has
made no effort to show that the value of his excess wheat consumed
without threshing was less than it would have been had it been
threshed while subject to the statutory provisions in force at the
time of planting. Concurrently with the increase in the amount of
the penalty, Congress authorized a substantial increase in the
amount of the loan which might be made to cooperators upon stored
farm marketing excess wheat. That appellee is the worse off for the
aggregate of this legislation does not appear; it only appears
that, if he could get all that the Government gives and do nothing
that the Government asks, he would be better off than this law
allows. To deny him this is not to deny him due process of law. Cf. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 . Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															55 Stat. 203, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. No. I) § 1340.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. [ Footnote 3 ]

															Because of the conclusion reached as to the merits, we need not
consider the question whether these appellants would be proper if
our decision were otherwise.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Wheat -- 507, §§ 728.240, 728.248, 6 Federal Register 2695,
2699-2701.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															§ 331, 7 U.S.C. § 1331.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															§ 335, 7 U.S.C. § 1335.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															§§ 302(b)(h), 303, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b)(h), 1303; § 10 of the
amendment of May 26, 1941, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. I), § 1340(10).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															§ 335(a), 7 U.S.C. § 1335(a).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															§ 336, 7 U.S.C. § 1336.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															7 U.S.C. § 1339. This imposed a penalty of 15� per bushel upon
wheat marketed in excess of the farm marketing quota while such
quota was in effect. See also amendments of July 26, 1939,
53 Stat. 1126, 7 U.S.C. § 1335(c), and of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat.
727, 7 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(6)(A), (B).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															50 Stat. 752-753, § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 380a.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.
S. 402 ; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110 ; Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.
S. 148 ; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.
S. 517 ; Overnight Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 .

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															54 Stat. 727, 7 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(6)(A), (B).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															§§ 1, 2, of the amendment of May 26, 1941; Wheat -- 507, §
728.251, 6 Federal Register 2695, 2701.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl. 18.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															After discussing and affirming the cases stating that such
activities were "local," and could be regulated under the Commerce
Clause only if by virtue of special circumstances their effects
upon interstate commerce were "direct," the opinion of the Court in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238 , 298 U. S. 308 ,
stated that:

															"The distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns
not upon the magnitude of either the cause or the effect, but
entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been brought
about. . . . the matter of degree has no bearing upon the question
here, since that question is not what is the extent of the local
activity or condition, or the extent of the effect produced upon
interstate commerce? but what is the relation between the activity
or condition and the effect?" See also cases cited infra, notes 17 and | 17 and S. 111fn21|>21.

															[ Footnote 17 ] Veazie v.
Moor , 14 How. 568, 55 U. S.
573 -574; Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U. S. 222 .

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															24 Stat. 379, 49 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. [ Footnote 19 ]

															26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq. [ Footnote 20 ] See also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.
S. 578 ; Anderson v. United States, 171 U.
S. 604 .

															[ Footnote 21 ] Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463 ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.
S. 251 ; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.
Co., 295 U. S. 330 ; Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.
S. 495 ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238 ; cf. 76 U. S. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S.
82 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S.
44 ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 , 260 U. S.
259 -260; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.
S. 172 , 262 U. S.
178 -179; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 .

															[ Footnote 22 ] Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.
S. 197 ; Swift & Co. v. United States, supra;
Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612 ; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 ; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 .

															[ Footnote 23 ] United Leather Workers v. Herkert Co., 265 U.
S. 457 , 265 U. S. 471 ; cf. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.
S. 469 , 310 U. S. 511 ; Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S.
34 , 273 U. S. 44 (dissent); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 , 193 U. S. 395 ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1 , 221 U. S.
66 -69.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															In Santa Cruz Co. v. Labor Board, 303 U.
S. 453 , 303 U. S.
466 -467, Chief Justice Hughes said:

															"'direct' has been contrasted with 'indirect,' and what is
'remote' or 'distant' with what is 'close and substantial.'
Whatever terminology is used, the criterion is necessarily one of
degree, and must be so defined. This does not satisfy those who
seek for mathematical or rigid formulas. But such formulas are not
provided by the great concepts of the Constitution such as
'interstate commerce,' 'due process,' 'equal protection.'"

															[ Footnote 25 ] Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 .

															[ Footnote 26 ] Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349 .

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															It is interesting to note that all of these have federated
systems of government, not, of course, without important
differences. In all of them, wheat regulation is by the national
government. In Argentina, wheat may be purchased only from the
national Grain Board. A condition of sale to the Board, which buys
at pegged prices, is the producer's agreement to become subject to
restrictions on planting. See Nolan, Argentine Grain Price
Guaranty, Foreign Agriculture (Office of Foreign Agricultural
Relations, Department of Agriculture) May, 1942, pp. 185, 202. The
Australian system of regulation includes the licensing of growers,
who may not sow more than the amount licensed, and who may be
compelled to cut part of their crops for hay if a heavy crop is in
prospect. See Wright, Australian Wheat Stabilization,
Foreign Agriculture (Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations,
Depart ment of Agriculture) September, 1942, pp. 329, 336. The
Canadian Wheat Board has wide control over the marketing of wheat
by the individual producer. 4 Geo. VI, c. 25, § 5. Canadian wheat
has also been the subject of numerous Orders in Council. E.g., 6 Proclamations and Orders in Council (1942) 183,
which gives the Wheat Board full control of sale, delivery, milling
and disposition by any person or individual. See also Wheat Acreage Reduction Act, 1942, 6 Geo. VI, c. 10.

															[ Footnote 28 ] Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375 ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.
S. 495 ; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.
S. 295 ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 ; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.
S. 420 ; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United
States, 283 U. S. 163 ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 ; United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, supra; United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.
S. 381 ; United States v. Darby, supra; United States
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra; Federal Power Commission v.
Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 .

															[ Footnote 29 ] Cf. 17 U. S. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
413 -415, 17 U. S.
435 -436; Gibbons v. Ogden, supra at 22 U. S. 197 ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 , 258 U. S. 521 ; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.
1 , 262 U. S. 37 ; Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 , 304 U. S.
412 .

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															Section 7 of the amendment of May 26, 1941 provided that a farm
marketing quota should not be applicable to any farm on which the
acreage planted to wheat is not in excess of fifteen acres. When
the appellee planted his wheat the quota was inapplicable to any
farm on which the normal production of the acreage planted to wheat
was less than 200 bushels. § 335(d) of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1938, as amended by 54 Stat. 232.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															§§ 6, 10(c) of the amendment of May 26, 1941.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															§ 335(c) as amended July 26, 1939, 53 Stat. 1126, 7 U.S.C. §
1335(c).

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															§ 339, 7 U.S.C. § 1339.

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															§ 301(b)(6)(A), (B), as amended July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 727, 7
U.S.C. § 1301(b)(6)(A), (B).

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															By an amendment of December 26, 1941, 55 Stat. 872, effective as
of May 26, 1941, it was provided that the farm marketing excess
should not be larger than the amount by which the actual production
exceeds the normal production of the farm wheat acreage allotment,
if the producer establishes such actual production to the
satisfaction of the Secretary, provision being made for adjustment
of the penalty in the event of a downward adjustment in the amount
of the farm marketing excess.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															§§ 1, 2, 3 of the amendment of May 26, 1941.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Section 302(b) had provided for a loan to noncooperators of 60%
of the basic loan rate for cooperators, which in 1940 was 64�. See United States Department of Agriculture Press Release,
May 20, 1940. The same percentage was employed in § 10(c) of the
amendment of May 26, 1941, and the increase in the amount of the
loan is the result of an increase in the basic loan rate effected
by § 10(a) of the amendment.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															Wheat -- 507, § 728.251(b), 6 Federal Register 2695, 2701.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

Wickard v. Filburn (1942):

- The case concerned a farmer, Roscoe Filburn, who exceeded the wheat production quota set by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, and the subsequent referendum vote to approve the quotas.
- The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the vote and the constitutionality of the Act, even when applied to wheat produced for consumption on the farmer's own farm and not for interstate commerce.
- The Court reasoned that wheat grown for home consumption could impact the wheat market and affect prices, as it could either flow into the market or reduce the farmer's need to purchase wheat.
- This decision expanded the Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and the ability to regulate prices and practices that affect interstate commerce.

Please note that the provided text appears to be incomplete, and the summary is based on the available information.