U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973) United States v.
Robinson No. 72-936 Argued October 9,
1973 Decided December 11,
1973 414
U.S. 218 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus Having, as a result of a previous check of respondent's
operator's permit, probable cause to arrest respondent for driving
while his license was revoked, a police officer made a full custody
arrest of respondent for such offense. In accordance with
prescribed procedures, the officer made a search of respondent's
person, in the course of which he found in a coat pocket a
cigarette package containing heroin. The heroin was admitted into
evidence at the District Court trial, which resulted in
respondent's conviction for a drug offense. The Court of Appeals
reversed on the ground that the heroin had been obtained as a
result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Held: In the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full
search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable"
search under that Amendment. Pp. 414 U. S.
224 -237.

															(a) A search incident to a valid arrest is not limited to a
frisk of the suspect's outer clothing and removal of such weapons
as the arresting officer may, as a result of such frisk, reasonably
believe and ascertain that the suspect has in his possession, and
the absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the
particular crime for which the arrest is made does not narrow the
standards applicable to such a search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ,
distinguished. Pp. 414 U. S.
227 -229; 23235.

															(b) A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment and, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification, such
as the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would, in fact, be found upon the suspect's person; and
whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the
authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest
need not be litigated in each case. P. 414 U. S.
235 .

															(c) Since the custodial arrest here gave rise to the
authority Page 414 U. S. 219 to search, it is immaterial that the arresting officer did not
fear the respondent or suspect that he was armed. Pp. 414 U. S.
236 -237.

															153 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 471 F.2d 1082, reversed

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ.,
joined. POWELL J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 414 U. S. 237 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and
BRENNAN, JJ., joined, post, p. 414 U. S.
238 .

															MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Respondent Robinson was convicted in United States District
Court for the District of Columbia of the possession and
facilitation of concealment of heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C. §
4704(a) (1964 ed.), and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964 ed.). He was
sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment for these offenses.
On his appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, Page 414 U. S. 220 that court first remanded the case to the District Court for an
evidentiary hearing concerning the scope of the search of
respondent's person which and occurred at the time of his arrest.
145 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 447 F.2d 1215 (1971). The District Court made
findings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to respondent, and
he again appealed. This time the Court of Appeals en banc reversed
the judgment of conviction, holding that the heroin introduced in
evidence against respondent had been obtained as a result of a
search which violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 153 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972). We
granted certiorari, 410 U.S. 982 (1973), and set the case for
argument together with Gustafson v. Florida, No. 71-1669, post, p. 414 U. S. 260 ,
also decided today.

															On April 23, 1968, at approximately 11 p.m., Officer Richard
Jenks, a 15-year veteran of the District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department, observed the respondent driving a 1965 Cadillac
near the intersection of 8th and C Streets, N.E., in the District
of Columbia. Jenks, as a result of previous investigation following
a check of respondent's operator's permit four days earlier,
determined there was reason to believe that respondent was
operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his operator's
permit. This is an offense defined by statute in the District of
Columbia which carries a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory
minimum fine, or both. D.C.Code Ann. § 40-302(d) (1967).

															Jenks signaled respondent to stop the automobile, which
respondent did, and all three of the occupants emerged from the
car. At that point, Jenks informed respondent that he was under
arrest for "operating after revocation and obtaining a permit by
misrepresentation." It was assumed by the Court of Appeals, and is
conceded by the respondent here, that Jenks had Page 414 U. S. 221 probable cause to arrest respondent, and that he effected a
full-custody arrest. [ Footnote
1 ]

															In accordance with procedures prescribed in police department
instructions, [ Footnote 2 ]
Jenks then began to search Page 414 U. S. 222 respondent. He explained at a subsequent hearing that he was
"face-to-face" with the respondent, and

															"placed [his] hands on [the respondent], my right hand to
his Page 414 U. S. 223 left breast like this (demonstrating) and proceeded to pat him
down thus [with the right hand]."

															During this pat-down, Jenks felt an object in the left breast
pocket of the heavy coat respondent was wearing, but testified that
he "couldn't tell what it was," and also that he "couldn't actually
tell the size of it." Jenks then reached into the pocket and pulled
out the object, which turned out to be a "crumpled up cigarette
package." Jenks testified that, at this point he still did not know
what was in the package:

															"As I felt the package, I could feel objects in the package, but
I couldn't tell what they were. . . . I knew they weren't
cigarettes."

															The officer then opened the cigarette pack and found 14 gelatin
capsules of white powder which he thought to be, and which later
analysis proved to be, heroin. Jenks then continued his search of
respondent to completion, feeling around his waist and trouser
legs, and examining the remaining pockets. The heroin seized from
the respondent was admitted into evidence at the trial which
resulted in his conviction in the District Court.

															The opinion for the plurality judges of the Court of Appeals,
written by Judge Wright, the concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Bazelon, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Wilkey, concurred in
by three judges, gave careful and comprehensive treatment to the
authority of a police officer to search the person of one Page 414 U. S. 224 who has been validly arrested and taken into custody. We
conclude that the search conducted by Jenks in this case did not
offend the limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment, and we therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is
a traditional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. This general exception has historically been formulated
into two distinct propositions. The first is that a search may be
made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.
The second is that a search may be made of the area within the
control of the arrestee.

															Examination of this Court's decisions shows that these two
propositions have been treated quite differently. The validity of
the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has been
regarded as settled from its first enunciation, and has remained
virtually unchallenged until the present case. The validity of the
second proposition, while likewise conceded in principle, has been
subject to differing interpretations as to the extent of the area
which may be searched.

															Because the rule requiring exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment was first enunciated in Weeks
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), it is understandable that virtually all of this Court's
search and seizure law has been developed since that time. In Weeks, the Court made clear its recognition of the
validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest:

															"What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state
what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of
the Page 414 U. S. 225 Government, always recognized under English and American law, to
search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been
uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure,
§ 211; Wharton, Crim.Plead. and Practice, 8th ed., § 60; Dillon
v. O'Brien and Davis, 16 Cox C.C. 245." Id. at 392. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 (1925), decided 11 years after Weeks, repeats the categorical recognition of the validity of a search
incident to lawful arrest:

															"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape from custody, is not to be doubted." Id. at 269 U. S.
30 .

															Throughout the series of cases in which the Court has addressed
the second proposition relating to a search incident to a lawful
arrest -- the permissible area beyond the person of the arrestee
which such a search may cover -- no doubt has been expressed as to
the unqualified authority of the arresting authority to search the
person of the arrestee. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Marron v. United States, 275 U.
S. 192 (1927); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.
S. 452 (1932); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.
S. 699 (1948); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950); Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364 (1964); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, where the Court overruled Rabinowitz and Harris as to the area Page 414 U. S. 226 of permissible search incident to a lawful arrest, full
recognition was again given to the authority to search the person
of the arrestee:

															"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest
or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
762 -763.

															Three years after the decision in Chimel, supra, we
upheld the validity of a search in which heroin had been taken from
the person of the defendant after his arrest on a weapons charge,
in Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), saying:

															"Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the
gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the weapons charge was
supported by probable cause, and the search of his person and of
the car incident to that arrest was lawful." Id. at 407 U. S. 149 .
Last Term, in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.
S. 291 , 412 U. S. 295 (1973), we again reaffirmed the traditional statement of the
authority to search incident to a valid arrest.

															Thus, the broadly stated rule, and the reasons for it, have been
repeatedly affirmed in the decisions of this Court since Weeks
v. United States, supra, nearly 60 years ago. Since the
statements in the cases speak not simply in terms of an exception
to the warrant requirement, but in terms of an affirmative
authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also
meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Page 414 U. S. 227 II In its decision of this case, the Court of Appeals decided that
even after a police officer lawfully places a suspect under arrest
for the purpose of taking him into custody, he may not ordinarily
proceed to fully search the prisoner. He must, instead, conduct a
limited frisk of the outer clothing and remove such weapons that he
may, as a result of that limited frisk, reasonably believe and
ascertain that the suspect has in his possession. While recognizing
that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
dealt with a permissible "frisk" incident to an investigative stop
based on less than probable cause to arrest, the Court of Appeals
felt that the principles of that case should be carried over to
this probable cause arrest for driving while one's license is
revoked. Since there would be no further evidence of such a crime
to be obtained in a search of the arrestee, the court held that
only a search for weapons could be justified. Terry v. Ohio, supra, did not involve an arrest for
probable cause, and it made quite clear that the "protective frisk"
for weapons which it approved might be conducted without probable
cause. Id. at 392 U. S. 21 -22, 392 U. S. 24 -25.
This Court's opinion explicitly recognized that there is a
"distinction in purpose, character, and extent between a search
incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons."

															"The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged
necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a
concealed weapon, Preston v. United States, 376 U. S.
364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964), is
also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore
involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search
for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however,
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies Page 414 U. S. 228 which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S.
294 , 387 U. S. 310 (1967) (MR.
JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring). Thus, it must be limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to
harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be
characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though
it remains a serious intrusion."

															". . . An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon
individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the
interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different.
An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed,
and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the
individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons,
on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person." Id. at 392 U. S. 25 -26
(footnote omitted). Terry therefore affords no basis to
carry over to a probable cause arrest the limitations this Court
placed on a stop-and-frisk search permissible without probable
cause.

															The Court of Appeals also relied on language in Peters v.
New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 392 U. S. 66 (1968), a companion case to Terry. There, the Court held
that the police officer had authority to search Peters because he
had probable cause to arrest him, and went on to say:

															"[T]he incident search was obviously justified"

															"by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be
used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the Page 414 U. S. 229 destruction of evidence of the crime."

															" Preston v. United States, 376 U. S.
364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964).
Moreover, it was reasonably limited in scope by these purposes.
Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thoroughgoing
examination of Peters and his personal effects." Id. at 392 U. S.
67 .

															It is, of course, possible to read the second sentence from this
quotation as imposing a novel limitation on the established
doctrine set forth in the first sentence. It is also possible to
read it as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his opinion concurring in the
result:

															"The second possible source of confusion is the Court's
statement that 'Officer Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and
thorough-going examination of Peters and his personal effects.'
[392 U.S.] at 392 U. S. 67 . Since the Court
found probable cause to arrest Peters, and since an officer
arresting on probable cause is entitled to make a very full
incident search, I assume that this is merely a factual
observation. As a factual matter, I agree with it." Id. at 392 U. S. 77 (footnote omitted).

															We do not believe that the Court in Peters intended, in
one unexplained and unelaborated sentence, to impose a novel and
far-reaching limitation on the authority to search the person of an
arrestee incident to his lawful arrest. While the language from Peters was quoted with approval in Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 764 ,
it is preceded by a full exposition of the traditional and
unqualified authority of the arresting officer to search the
arrestee's person. Id. at 395 U. S. 763 .
We do not believe that either Terry or Peters, when considered in the light of the previously discussed statements
of this Court, justified the sort of limitation upon that authority
which the Court of Appeals fashioned in this case. Page 414 U. S. 230 III Virtually all of the statements of this Court affirming the
existence of an unqualified authority to search incident to a
lawful arrest are dicta. We would not, therefore, be foreclosed by
principles of stare decisis from further examination into
history and practice in order to see whether the sort of
qualifications imposed by the Court of Appeals in this case were,
in fact, intended by the Framers of the Fourth Amendment or
recognized in cases decided prior to Weeks. Unfortunately,
such authorities as exist are sparse. Such common law treatises as
Blackstone's Commentaries and Holmes' Common Law are simply silent
on the subject. Pollock and Maitland, in their History of English
Law, describe the law of arrest as "rough and rude" before the time
of Edward I, but do not address the authority to search incident to
arrest. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law
582 (2d ed.1909).

															The issue was apparently litigated in the English courts in Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245 (Exch.Ireland, 1887),
cited in Weeks v. United States, supra. There Baron Palles
said:

															"But the interest of the State in the person charged being
brought to trial in due course necessarily extends as well to the
preservation of material evidence of his guilt or innocence as to
his custody for the purpose of trial. His custody is of no value if
the law is powerless to prevent the abstraction or destruction of
this evidence, without which a trial would be no more than an empty
form. But if there be a right to production or preservation of this
evidence, I cannot see how it can be enforced otherwise than by
capture."

															16 Cox C.C. at 250. Page 414 U. S. 231 Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9 (1848), represents an
early holding in this country that evidence may be seized from one
who is lawfully arrested. In Closson v. Morrison, 47 N.H.
482 (1867), the Court made the following statement:

															"[W]e think that an officer would also be justified in taking
from a person whom he had arrested for crime any deadly weapon he
might find upon him, such as a revolver, a dirk, a knife, a sword
cane, a slung shot, or a club, though it had not been used or
intended to be used in the commission of the offence for which the
prisoner had been arrested, and even though no threats of violence
towards the officer had been made. A due regard for his own safety
on the part of the officer, and also for the public safety, would
justify a sufficient search to ascertain if such weapons were
carried about the person of the prisoner, or were in his
possession, and if found, to seize and hold them until the prisoner
should be discharged, or until they could be otherwise properly
disposed of. Spalding v. Preston, 21 Vt. 9, 16."

															"So we think it might be with money or other articles of value,
found upon the prisoner, by means of which, if left in his
possession, he might procure his escape, or obtain tools, or
implements, or weapons with which to effect his escape. We think
the officer arresting a man for crime not only may, but frequently
should, make such searches and seizures; that, in many cases they
might be reasonable and proper, and courts would hold him harmless
for so doing when he acts in good faith and from a regard to his
own or the public safety or the security of his prisoner." Id. at 484-485. Page 414 U. S. 232 Similarly, in Holker v. Hennessey, 141 Mo. 527, 42 S.W.
1090 (1897), the Supreme Court of Missouri said:

															"Generally speaking, in the absence of a statute, an officer has
no right to take any property from the person of the prisoner
except such as may afford evidence of the crime charged, or means
of identifying the criminal, or may be helpful in making an
escape." Id. at 539, 42 S.W. at 1093.

															Then Associate Judge Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals
summarized his understanding of the historical basis for the
authority to search incident to arrest in these words:

															"The basic principle is this: search of the person is unlawful
when the seizure of the body is a trespass, and the purpose of the
search is to discover grounds as yet unknown for arrest or
accusation [citation omitted]. Search of the person becomes lawful
when grounds for arrest and accusation have been discovered and the
law is in the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its
physical dominion."

															"The distinction may seem subtle, but in truth it is founded in
shrewd appreciation of the necessities of government. We are not to
strain an immunity to the point at which human nature rebels
against honoring it in conduct. The peace officer empowered to
arrest must be empowered to disarm. If he may disarm, he may
search, lest a weapon be concealed. The search being lawful, he
retains what he finds if connected with the crime." People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E. 583,
584 (1923).

															While these earlier authorities are sketchy, they tend to
support the broad statement of the authority to Page 414 U. S. 233 search incident to arrest found in the successive decisions of
this Court, rather than the restrictive one which was applied by
the Court of Appeals in this case. The scarcity of case law before Weeks is doubtless due in part to the fact that the
exclusionary rule there enunciated had been first adopted only 11
years earlier in Iowa; but it would seem to be also due in part to
the fact that the issue was regarded as well settled. [ Footnote 3 ]

															The Court of Appeals in effect determined that the only reason
supporting the authority for a full search incident to lawful
arrest was the possibility of discovery of evidence or fruits.
[ Footnote 4 ] Concluding that
there could be no evidence or fruits in the case of an offense such
as that with which respondent was charged, it held that any
protective search would have to be limited by the conditions laid
down in Terry for a search upon less than probable cause
to arrest. Quite apart from the fact that Terry clearly
recognized the distinction between the two types of searches, and
that a different rule governed one than governed the other, we find
additional reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals. Page 414 U. S. 234 The justification or reason for the authority to search incident
to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the
suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to
preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Agnello
v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Abel v. United States, 362 U.
S. 217 (1960). The standards traditionally governing a
search incident to lawful arrest are not, therefore, commuted to
the stricter Terry standards by the absence of probable
fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for which the
arrest is made.

															Nor are we inclined, on the basis of what seems to us to be a
rather speculative judgment, to qualify the breadth of the general
authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest on an
assumption that persons arrested for the offense of driving while
their licenses have been revoked are less likely to possess
dangerous weapons than are those arrested for other crimes.
[ Footnote 5 ] It is scarcely
open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the
case of the extended exposure which Page 414 U. S. 235 follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting
him to the police station than in the case of the relatively
fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry -type
stop. This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests
alike for purposes of search justification.

															But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental
disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion
that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or
not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority
for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not
think the long line of authorities of this Court dating back to Weeks, or what we can glean from the history of practice
in this country and in England, requires such a case-by-case
adjudication. A police officer's determination as to how and where
to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth
Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into
an analysis of each step in the search. The authority to search the
person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the
need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would, in fact, be found upon
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we
hold that, in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search under
that Amendment. Page 414 U. S. 236 IV The search of respondent's person conducted by Officer Jenks in
this case and the seizure from him o the heroin, were permissible
under established Fourth Amendment law. While thorough, the search
partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive characteristics
which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Rochin v. California, 342 U.
S. 165 (1952). Since it is the fact of custodial arrest
which gives rise to the authority to search, [ Footnote 6 ] it is of no moment that Jenks did not
indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not
himself suspect that respondent was armed. [ Footnote 7 ] Having in the course of a lawful search
come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to
inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules,
he was entitled to seize them as "fruits, instrumentalities, or
contraband" probative of criminal conduct. Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. at 331 U. S.
154 -155; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 , 387 U. S. 299 ,
307 (1967); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
149 . Page 414 U. S. 237 The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding otherwise is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The Court of Appeals noted that there was a difference in the
presentation of the facts in the various proceedings that were
conducted in the District Court. Counsel for respondent on appeal
stressed that respondent had a record of two prior narcotics
convictions, and suggested that Officer Jenks may have been aware
of that record through his investigation of criminal records, while
Jenks was checking out the discrepancies in the birthdates on the
operator's permit and on the Selective Service card that had been
given to him for examination when he had confronted the respondent
on the previous occasion. Respondent argued below that Jenks may
have used the subsequent traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext
for a narcotics search which would not have been allowed by a
neutral magistrate had Jenks sought a warrant. The Court of Appeals
found that Jenks had denied he had any such motive, and, for the
purposes of its opinion, accepted the Government's version of that
factual question, since, even accepting that version, it still
found the search involved to be unconstitutional. 153 U.S.App.D.C.
114, 120 n. 3, 471 F.2d 1082, 1088 n. 3. We think it is sufficient
for purposes of our decision that respondent was lawfully arrested
for an offense, and that Jenks' placing him in custody following
that arrest was not a departure from established police department
practice. See n 2, infra. We leave for another day questions which would
arise on facts different from these.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Government introduced testimony at the evidentiary hearing
upon the original remand by the Court of Appeals as to certain
standard operating procedures of the Metropolitan Police
Department. Sergeant Dennis C. Donaldson, a Metropolitan Police
Department Training Division instructor, testified that, when a
police officer makes "a full custody arrest," which he defined as
one where an officer "would arrest a subject and subsequently
transport him to a police facility for booking," the officer is
trained to make a full "field type search":

															"Q. Would you describe the physical acts the officer is
instructed to perform with respect to this field search in a full
custody arrest situation?"

															"A. (Sgt. Donaldson). Basically, it is a thorough search of the
individual. We would expect in a field search that the officer
completely search the individual and inspect areas such as behind
the collar, underneath the collar, the waistband of the trousers,
the cuffs, the socks and shoes. Those are the areas we would ask a
complete thorough search of."

															"Q. What are the instructions in a field type search situation
when an officer feels something on the outside of the garment?"

															"A. If it is a full custody arrest, and he is conducting a field
search, we expect him to remove anything and examine it to
determine exactly what it is."

															"THE COURT: That is a full custody arrest. What is the last part
of it?"

															"THE WITNESS: In conducting a field search, which is done any
time there is a full custody arrest, we expect the officer to
examine anything he might find on the subject."

															"THE COURT: Would he do the same thing in a pat-down
search?"

															"THE WITNESS: If he could determine in his pat-down or frisk by
squeezing that it was not, in fact, a weapon that could be used
against him, then we don't instruct him to go further."

															"THE COURT: But in a field search, even though he may feel
something that he believes is not a weapon, is he instructed to
take it out?"

															"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir."

															Sergeant Donaldson testified that officers are instructed to
examine the "contents of all of the pockets" of the arrestee in the
course of the field search. It was stated that these standard
operating procedures were initiated by the police department

															"[p]rimarily, for [the officer's] own safety, and, secondly, for
the safety of the individual he has placed under arrest and,
thirdly, to search for evidence of the crime."

															While the officer is instructed to make a full field search of
the person of the individual he arrests, he is instructed, and
police department regulations provide, that, in the case of a
full-custody arrest for driving after revocation,

															"areas beyond [the arrestee's] immediate control should not be
searched, because there is no probable cause to believe that the
vehicle contains fruits, instrumentalities, contraband or evidence
of the offense of driving after revocation."

															Those regulations also provide that, in the case of some traffic
offenses, including the crime of operating a motor vehicle after
revocation of an operator's permit, the officer shall make a
summary arrest of the violator and take the violator, in custody,
to the station house for booking. D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department General Order No. 3, series 1959 (Apr. 24, 1959).

															Such operating procedures are not, of course, determinative of
the constitutional issues presented by this case.

															[ Footnote 3 ] See T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional
Interpretation 44-45 (1969).

															Taylor suggests that there "is little reason to doubt that
search of an arrestee's person and premises is as old as the
institution of arrest itself." Id. at 28.

															"Neither in the reported cases nor the legal literature is there
any indication that search of the person of an arrestee, or the
premises in which he was taken, was ever challenged in England
until the end of the nineteenth century . . . , [and] the English
courts gave the point short shrift." Id. at 29.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Where the arrest is made for a crime for which it is reasonable
to believe that evidence exists, the Court of Appeals recognizes
that "warrantless intrusion into the pockets of the arrestee to
discover such evidence is reasonable under the search incident'
exception." 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 127, 471 F.2d at 1095. The court
then states that the officer may use this "reasonable [evidentiary]
intrusion" to simultaneously look for weapons. Ibid. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Such an assumption appears at least questionable in light of the
available statistical data concerning assaults on police officers
who are in the course of making arrests. The danger to the police
officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant
proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for
arrest. One study concludes that approximately 30% of the shootings
of police officers occur when an officer stops a person in an
automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings -- A Tactical
Evaluation, 54 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963), cited in Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 407 U. S. 148 (1972). The Government, in its brief, notes that the Uniform Crime
Reports, prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, indicate
that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs
when the officers are making traffic stops. Brief for the United
States 23. Those reports indicate that, during January-March 1973,
35 police officers were murdered; 11 of those officers were killed
while engaged in making traffic stops. Ibid. [ Footnote 6 ]

															The opinion of the Court of Appeals also discussed its
understanding of the law where the police officer makes what the
court characterized as "a routine traffic stop," i.e., where the officer would simply issue a notice of violation and
allow the offender to proceed. Since in this case the officer did
make a full-custody arrest of the violator, we do not reach the
question discussed by the Court of Appeals.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The United States concedes that, "in searching respondent,
[Officer Jenks] was not motivated by a feeling of imminent danger,
and was not specifically looking for weapons." Brief for the United
States 34. Officer Jenks testified, "I just searched him
[Robinson]. I didn't think about what I was looking for. I just
searched him." As previously noted, Officer Jenks also testified
that, upon removing the cigarette package from the respondent's
custody, he was still unsure what was in the package, but that he
knew it was not cigarettes.

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. * Although I join the opinions of the Court, I write briefly to
emphasize what seems to me to be the essential premise of our
decisions.

															The Fourth Amendment safeguards the right of "the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." These are areas of an
individual's life about which he entertains legitimate expectations
of privacy. I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a
custodial arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest
in the privacy of his person. Under this view, the custodial arrest
is the significant intrusion of state power into the privacy of
one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded
by the Fourth Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and
overriding governmental concern. No reason then exists to frustrate
law enforcement by requiring some independent justification for a
search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This seems to me the
reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person,
even if that search is not narrowly limited by the twin rationales
of seizing evidence and disarming the arrestee. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The search incident to arrest Page 414 U. S. 238 is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy
interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately
abated by the fact of arrest. [ Footnote
2/2 ]

															* This opinion also applies to No. 71-1669, Gustafson v.
Florida, post, p. 414 U. S. 260 .

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated this
rationale in Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386,
388-389 (1960):

															"Power over the body of the accused is the essence of his
arrest; the two cannot be separated. To say that the police may
curtail the liberty of the accused but refrain from impinging upon
the sanctity of his pockets except for enumerated reasons is to
ignore the custodial duties which devolve upon arresting
authorities. Custody must of necessity be asserted initially over
whatever the arrested party has in his possession at the time of
apprehension. Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to
the physical dominion of the law, inspections of his person,
regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed unlawful unless they
violate the dictates of reason either because of their number or
their manner of perpetration."

															(Citation omitted.)

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															In Gustafson, post, p. 414 U. S. 260 , the
petitioner conceded the validity of the custodial arrest, although
that conclusion was not as self-evident as in Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a different question if the
petitioner could have proved that he was taken into custody only to
afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral
objectives. But no such question is before us.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.

															Certain fundamental principles have characterized this Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over the years. Perhaps the most
basic of these was expressed by Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a
unanimous Court in Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931): "There is no formula for the determination of
reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances." Id. at 282 U. S. 357 .
As we recently held:

															"The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is
preeminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the
concrete factual context of the individual case." Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 392 U. S. 59 (1968). And the intensive, at times painstaking, case-by-case
analysis characteristic of our Fourth Amendment decisions bespeaks
our "jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of individual
rights." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 367 U. S.
647 Page 414 U. S. 239 (1961). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 , 232 U. S. 393 (1914).

															In the present case, however, the majority turns its back on
these principles, holding that "the fact of the lawful arrest"
always establishes the authority to conduct a full search of the
arrestee's person, regardless of whether, in a particular case
"there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for
a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest." Ante at 414 U. S. 235 .
The majority's approach represents a clear and marked departure
from our long tradition of case-by-case adjudication of the
reasonableness of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
I continue to believe that

															"[t]he scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only
when it is assured that, at some point the conduct of those charged
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached,
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of
a particular search or seizure in light of the particular
circumstances." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 21 (1968). Because I find the majority's reasoning to be at odds with
these fundamental principles, I must respectfully dissent. I On April 19, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks stopped a 1965 Cadillac
driven by respondent at the intersection of 9th and U Streets, N.W.
in the District of Columbia, for what was called a "routine spot
check." At that time, Officer Jenks examined respondent's temporary
operator's permit, automobile registration card, and Selective
Service classification card. Although he permitted respondent to go
on his way, Officer Jenks pursued a discrepancy he had noted
between the "1938" date of birth given on the operator's permit and
the "1927" date of birth given on the Selective Service card. A
check of police traffic records showed that an operator's Page 414 U. S. 240 permit issued to one Willie Robinson, Jr., born in 1927, had
been revoked, and that a temporary operator's permit had
subsequently been issued to one Willie Robinson, born in 1938. The
pictures on the revoked permit and on the application for the
temporary permit were of the same man -- the person stopped by
Jenks for the routine check on April 19. Having investigated the
matter himself in this fashion, it is clear that Officer Jenks had
probable cause to believe that respondent had violated a provision
of the District of Columbia Motor Vehicle Code making it unlawful
for any person to operate a motor vehicle in the District during
the period for which his operator's permit is revoked. D.C.Code
Ann. § 40-302(d) (1967).

															Four days later, on April 23, 1968, while on duty in their
patrol car, Officer Jenks and his partner saw respondent driving
the same vehicle. They pulled up behind respondent's car and
signaled it to stop. From all indications in the record, respondent
immediately complied and brought his car to a stop alongside the
curb, the officers parking their patrol car immediately behind
his.

															Respondent got out of his car and walked back toward the patrol
car. Both Officer Jenks and his partner got out of the patrol car
and started toward respondent's car. Officer Jenks asked respondent
for his permit and registration card and, when shown the same
permit respondent had given him four days earlier, informed
respondent that he was under arrest for operating a motor vehicle
after revocation of his operator's permit.

															Jenks then began to search respondent. His normal procedure in
conducting a search of an arrestee would be to "have him
spread-eagle over a wall or something of that nature." But in
Jenks' own words, "I think almost every search is different. It
depends on the man's size and the nature of the crime." Since he
had a substantial Page 414 U. S. 241 height and weight advantage over respondent, and because the
arrest was only for a traffic offense, Jenks chose instead to
conduct the search face to face, in contrast to his normal
practice.

															The first step in the search was for Jenks to place both his
hands on respondent's chest and begin to pat him down. During this
pat -down, Jenks felt something in the left breast pocket of
respondent's heavy overcoat. Jenks later testified that he could
not immediately tell what was in the pocket. The record does
indicate, however, that the object did not feel like a gun, and
that Jenks had no particular indication it was a weapon of any
kind. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Nonetheless,
he reached into the pocket and took the object out. It turned out
to be a crumpled-up cigarette package.

															With the package now in his hands, Jenks could feel objects
inside, but could not tell what they were. It does not appear that
Jenks had any reason to believe, or did, in fact, believe, that the
objects were weapons of any sort. He nevertheless opened up the
package and looked inside, thereby finding the gelatin capsules of
heroin which were introduced against respondent at his trial for
the possession and facilitation of concealment of heroin. II Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 13 -14
(1948), explained:

															"The point of the Fourth Amendment which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies Page 414 U. S. 242 law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman
or government enforcement agent." See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S. 449 (1971). The majority's fear of overruling the "quick ad
hoc judgment" of the police officer is thus inconsistent with
the very function of the Amendment -- to ensure that the quick ad hoc judgments of police officers are subject to review
and control by the judiciary.

															In the vast majority of cases, the determination of when the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is
required to be made by a neutral judicial officer before the search
is conducted. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S.
356 -357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 269 U. S. 33 (1925). The Constitution requires that "the deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the
citizen and the police. . . ." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S.
481 -482 (1963).

															The requirement that the police seek prior approval of a search
from a judicial officer is, no doubt, subject to "a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions," Katz
v. United States, supra, at 389 U. S. 357 ;
including searches of a moving vehicle, Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); searches in certain exigent circumstances, Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S.
298 -299 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 335 U. S. 454 155 (1948); and searches incident to a lawful Page 414 U. S. 243 arrest, Agnello v. United States, supra; Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). But because an exception is invoked to justify a search
without a warrant does not preclude further judicial inquiry into
the reasonableness of that search. It is the role of the judiciary,
not of police officers, to delimit the scope of exceptions to the
warrant requirement.

															"[T]he general requirement that a search warrant be obtained is
not lightly to be dispensed with, and 'the burden is on those
seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the need for
it. . . .'" Id. at 395 U. S. 762 ,
quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 , 342 U. S. 51 (1951). Exceptions to the warrant requirement are not talismans
precluding further judicial inquiry whenever they are invoked, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 403 U. S. 461 ,
but rather are "jealously and carefully drawn." Jones v. United
States, 357 U. S. 493 , 357 U. S. 499 (1958).

															Carrying out our mandate of delineating the proper scope of the
"search incident to arrest" exception requires consideration of the
purposes of that exception as they apply to the particular search
that occurred in this case. See Chimel v. California,
supra, at 395 U. S.
762 -763; Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364 , 376 U. S. 367 (1964). Yet the majority, rather than focusing on the facts of this
case, places great emphasis on the police department order which
instructed Officer Jenks to conduct a full search and to examine
carefully everything he found whenever making an in-custody arrest. See ante at 414 U. S. 221 and n. 2. But this mode of analysis was explicitly rejected in Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968). There, both the defendant and the State urged that the
principal issue before us was the constitutionality of a state
statute which authorized the search there in question. We declined,
however, to engage in what we viewed "as the abstract and
unproductive exercise" of laying the words of the statute next to
the Fourth Amendment "in an effort to determine whether the two are
in some Page 414 U. S. 244 sense compatible." Id. at 392 U. S. 59 .
"Our constitutional inquiry," we concluded,

															"would not be furthered here by an attempt to pronounce judgment
on the words of the statute. We must confine our review instead to
the reasonableness of the searches and seizures which underlie
these two convictions." Id. at 392 U. S.
62 .

															The majority also suggests that the Court of Appeals reached a
novel and unprecedented result by imposing qualifications on the
historically recognized authority to conduct a full search incident
to a lawful arrest. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the
Court of Appeals itself was so careful to point out.

															One need not go back to Blackstone's Commentaries, Holmes'
Common Law, or Pollock & Maitland in search of precedent for
the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, given the
fact that mass production of the automobile did not begin until the
early decades of the present century, I find it somewhat puzzling
that the majority even looks to these sources for guidance on the
only question presented in this case: the permissible scope of a
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a
motor vehicle regulation. The fact is that this question has been
considered by several state and federal courts, the vast majority
of which have held that, absent special circumstances, a police
officer has no right to conduct a full search of the person
incident to a lawful arrest for violation of a motor vehicle
regulation.

															In Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264
(1964), for example, police officers stopped a car for a brake
light violation. Rather than simply issue a citation, the officers
placed the driver under arrest. A full search of the driver's
person was then conducted, including shining a flashlight into his
overcoat pocket, disclosing a small quantity of marihuana and a
package of cigarette papers. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held Page 414 U. S. 245 the search of the driver's pocket unreasonable. While expressly
holding that, where a traffic offender is actually arrested, as
distinguished from being given a summons, it is reasonable for the
arresting officer to search his person for weapons, nevertheless
the court held it unreasonable to look inside the driver's overcoat
pocket with a flashlight. "We cannot conceive," the court said,

															"that this aspect of the search was a legitimate search for
weapons. . . . We reject the state's contention that any search of
the person of one lawfully arrested is a valid search." Id. at 126, 130 N.W.2d at 269.

															In State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d
631 (1971), police officers stopped a car which had defective
tail lights and which had made an illegal right turn. The officers
decided to take the driver down to the station house and searched
him for weapons before putting him in the squad car. One of the
officers felt the outside of the driver's pockets. As in Robinson's
case, the officer "detected some object, but couldn't tell what it
was. I t did not feel like a gun or knife." Id. at 430,
190 N.W.2d at 632.

															"Neither officer expressed any concern for his personal safety.
There was no testimony that they suspected defendant of any other
criminal activity or were aware of any dangerous propensities on
his part." Id. at 431, 190 N.W.2d at 633. Nevertheless the officer
reached into the pocket, resulting in the discovery of a package of
marihuana. The Minnesota Supreme Court held the search unlawful.
While recognizing the "concern for the injuries and loss of life
experienced by police officers in face-to-face confrontations with
traffic offenders," the court held that

															"the validity of a search for weapons following a traffic arrest
depends on whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe a
search was necessary for his own safety or to prevent an
escape." Id. at 436-437, 190 N.W.2d at 636, citing Shelton Page 414 U. S. 246 v. State, 3 Md.App. 394, 399, 239 A.2d 610 , 613 (1968). Of like import is the decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court in State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d
951 (1968) (en banc). Here defendant's automobile was stopped
because it had no rear license plate. When asked to produce an
operator's license, the defendant produced a temporary operator's
license issued to another person which had expired several years
earlier. The officers then arrested defendant and placed him in the
back seat of the police car.

															"One of the officers got in the police car and asked the
defendant to remove his money from his wallet and give his wallet
to the officer. The defendant did so, and the officer took papers
from the wallet and examined them. When the officer unfolded one
piece of paper, a half-smoked marijuana cigarette fell out." Id. at 164-165, 444 P.2d at 952. The court held the
search unlawful. Again, while recognizing the officer's right to
conduct a search incident to arrest in order to protect the officer
and deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape, the court
held:

															"The search of the wallet obviously had nothing to do with the
officers' safety. The defendant testified that the officers 'patted
him down' before placing him in the police car. The officers did
not remember whether they had or had not. In any event, it is
difficult to see how defendant's wallet could have reasonably been
believed to have contained a weapon." Id. at 166, 444 P.2d at 953. See also People v.
Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783 (1967); People v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d 186 ,
496 P.2d 1205 (1972); State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962) (en banc); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d
456 (1960). The Tenth Circuit has likewise stated that it
is

															"in complete agreement with the prevailing federal and state
authority Page 414 U. S. 247 which condemns the search of persons and automobiles following
routine traffic violations." United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1058 (1969). See also Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308,
315 (CA5 1968) (Wisdom, J.).

															Accordingly, I think it disingenuous for the Court to now
pronounce that what precedents exist on the question

															"tend to support the broad statement of the authority to search
incident to arrest found in the successive decisions of this Court,
rather than the restrictive one which was applied by the Court of
Appeals in this ease. [ Footnote
3/2 ]" Ante at 414 U. S.
232 -233. It is disquieting, to say the least, to see the
Court at once admit that "[v]irtually all of the statements of this
Court affirming the existence of an unqualified authority to search
incident to a lawful arrest are dicta" and concede that we are
presented with an open question on which "further examination into
history and practice" would be helpful, yet then conduct an
examination Page 414 U. S. 248 into prior practice which is not only wholly superficial, but
totally inaccurate and misleading.

															The majority's attempt to avoid case-by-case adjudication of
Fourth Amendment issues is not only misguided as a matter of
principle, but is also doomed to fail as a matter of practical
application. As the majority itself is well aware, see
ante at 414 U. S. 221 n. 1, the powers granted the police in this case are strong ones,
subject to potential abuse. Although, in this particular case,
Officer Jenks was required by police department regulations to make
an in-custody arrest, rather than to issue a citation, in most
jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses, the determination of
whether to issue a citation or effect a full arrest is
discretionary with the officer. There is always the possibility
that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search
warrant, will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a
search. See, e.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States,
supra. I suggest this possibility not to impugn the integrity
of our police, but merely to point out that case-by-case
adjudication will always be necessary to determine whether a full
arrest was effected for purely legitimate reasons or, rather, as a
pretext for searching the arrestee. "An arrest may not be used as a
pretext to search for evidence." United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 , 285 U. S. 467 (1932). See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. at 357 U.S. 500 ; Abel v.
United States, 362 U. S. 217 , 362 U. S. 226 and 362 U. S. 230 (1960); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 , 339 U. S. 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
767 -768. III The majority states that

															"[a]police officer's determination as to how and where to search
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not Page 414 U. S. 249 require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of
each step in the search. [ Footnote
3/3 ]" Ante at 414 U. S. 235 .
No precedent is cited for this broad assertion -- not surprisingly,
since there is none. Indeed, we only recently rejected such

															"a rigid, all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation
under the Amendment, [for] it obscures the utility of limitations
upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police action as a
means of constitutional regulation. This Court has held in the past
that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 17 -18.
As we there concluded,

															"in determining whether the seizure and search were
'unreasonable,' our inquiry is a dual one -- whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." Id. at 392 U. S.
19 -20.

															As I view the matter, the search in this case divides into three
distinct phases: the pat-down of respondent's coat pocket; the
removal of the unknown object from the Page 414 U. S. 250 pocket; and the opening of the crumpled-up cigarette
package. A No question is raised here concerning the lawfulness of the
pat-down of respondent's coat pocket. The Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed the right of a police officer to conduct a
limited frisk for weapons when making an in-custody arrest,
regardless of the nature of the crime for which the arrest was
made. As it said:

															"[I]t would seem clearly unreasonable to expect a police officer
to place a suspect in his squad car for transportation to the
stationhouse without first taking reasonable measures to insure
that the suspect is unarmed. We therefore conclude that, whenever a
police officer, acting within the bounds of his authority, makes an
in-custody arrest, he may also conduct a limited frisk of
the suspect's outer clothing in order to remove any weapons the
suspect may have in his possession."

															153 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 130, 471 F.2d 1082, 1098 (1972) (footnote
omitted; emphasis in original). B With respect to the removal of the unknown object from the coat
pocket, the first issue presented is whether that aspect of the
search can be sustained as part of the limited frisk for weapons.
The weapons search approved by the Court of Appeals was modeled
upon the narrowly drawn protective search for weapons authorized in Terry, which consists "of a limited patting of the outer
clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used
as instruments of assault." See Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. at 392 U. S. 65 . See also Terry, supra, at 392 U. S. 30 .

															It appears to have been conceded by the Government below that
the removal of the object from respondent's coat pocket exceeded
the scope of a Terry frisk for Page 414 U. S. 251 weapons, since, under Terry, an officer may not remove
an object from the suspect's pockets unless he has reason to
believe it to be a dangerous weapon. 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 121 and n.
9, 471 F.2d at 1089 and n. 9, citing ALI Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(4) (Proposed Official Draft No.
1, 1972). Cf. Sibron v. New York, supra, at 392 U. S. 65 .
[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															In the present case, however, Officer Jenks had no reason to
believe and did not, in fact, believe that the object in
respondent's coat pocket was a weapon. He admitted later that the
object did not feel like a gun. See 414
U.S. 218 fn3/1|>n. 1, supra. In fact, he did not
really have any thoughts one way or another about what was in the
pocket. As Jenks himself testified, "I just searched him. I didn't
think about what I was looking for. I just searched him." Since the
removal of the object from the pocket cannot be justified as part
of a limited Terry weapons frisk, the question arises
whether it is reasonable for a police officer, when effecting an
in-custody arrest of a traffic offender, to make a fuller search of
the person than is permitted pursuant to Terry. The underlying rationale of a search incident to arrest of a
traffic offender initially suggests as reasonable a search whose
scope is similar to the protective weapons frisk permitted in Terry. A search incident to arrest, as the majority
indicates, has two basic functions: the removal of weapons the
arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect an escape, and the
seizure of evidence or fruits of the crime for which the arrest is
made, so as to prevent their concealment or destruction. See
ante at 414 U. S. 234 ; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
763 . Page 414 U. S. 252 The Government does not now contend that the search of
respondent's pocket can be justified by any need to find and seize
evidence in order to present its concealment or destruction, for,
as the Court of Appeals found, there is no evidence or fruits of
the offense with which respondent was charged. The only rationale
for a search in this case, then, is the removal of weapons which
the arrestee might use to harm the officer and attempt an escape.
This rationale, of course, is identical to the rationale of the
search permitted in Terry. As we said there,

															"The sole justification of the search in the present situation
is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 29 .
Since the underlying rationale of a Terry search and the
search of a traffic violator are identical, the Court of Appeals
held that the scope of the searches must be the same. And in view
of its conclusion that the removal of the object from respondent's
coat pocket exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk, a
conclusion not disputed by the Government or challenged by the
majority here, the plurality of the Court of Appeals held that the
removal of the package exceeded the scope of a lawful search
incident to arrest of a traffic violator.

															The problem with this approach, however, is that it ignores
several significant differences between the context in which a
search incident to arrest for a traffic violation is made, and the
situation presented in Terry. Some of these differences
would appear to suggest permitting a more thorough search in this
case than was permitted in Terry; other differences
suggest a narrower, more limited right to search than was there
recognized.

															The most obvious difference between the two contexts relates to
whether the officer has cause to believe that Page 414 U. S. 253 the individual he is dealing with possesses weapons which might
be used against him. Terry did not permit an officer to
conduct a weapons frisk of anyone he lawfully stopped on the
street, but rather, only where "he has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual. . . ." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 27 .
While the policeman who arrests a suspected rapist or robber may
well have reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous person, certainly this does not hold true with equal
force with respect to a person arrested for a motor vehicle
violation of the sort involved in this case.

															Nor was there any particular reason in this case to believe that
respondent was dangerous. He had not attempted to evade arrest, but
had quickly complied with the police both in bringing his car to a
stop after being signaled to do so and in producing the documents
Officer Jenks requested. In fact, Jenks admitted that he searched
respondent face to face, rather than in spread-eagle fashion,
because he had no reason to believe respondent would be
violent.

															While this difference between the situation presented in Terry and the context presented in this case would tend to
suggest a lesser authority to search here than was permitted in Terry, other distinctions between the two cases suggest
just the opposite. As the Court of Appeals noted, a crucial feature
distinguishing the in-custody arrest from the Terry context " is not the greater likelihood that a person taken into
custody is armed, but rather the increased likelihood of danger to
the officer if, in fact, the person is armed.'" 153
U.S.App.D.C. at 130, 471 F.2d at 1098, quoting People v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d at 214, 496
P.2d at 1225 (Wright, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). A Terry stop involves a momentary encounter between officer
and suspect, while an in-custody arrest places the two in close
proximity Page 414 U. S. 254 for a much longer period of time. If the individual happens to
have a weapon on his person, he will certainly have much more
opportunity to use it against the officer in the in-custody
situation. The prolonged proximity also makes it more likely that
the individual will be able to extricate any small hidden weapon
which might go undetected in a weapons frisk, such as a safety pin
or razor blade. In addition, a suspect taken into custody may feel
more threatened by the serious restraint on his liberty than a
person who is simply stopped by an officer for questioning, and may
therefore be more likely to resort to force.

															Thus, in some senses there is less need for a weapons search in
the in-custody traffic arrest situation than in a Terry context, while, in other ways, there is a greater need. Balancing
these competing considerations in order to determine what is a
reasonable warrantless search in the traffic arrest context is a
difficult process, one for which there may be no easy analytical
guideposts. We are dealing with factors not easily quantified and,
therefore, not easily weighed one against the other. And the
competing interests we are protecting -- the individual's interest
in remaining free from unnecessarily intrusive invasions of privacy
and society's interest that police officers not take unnecessary
risks in the performance of their duties -- are each deserving of
our most serious attention, and do not themselves tip the balance
in any particular direction.

															As will be explained more fully below, I do not think it
necessary to solve this balancing equation in this particular case.
It is important to note, however, in view of the reasoning adopted
by the majority, that available empirical evidence supports the
result reached by the plurality of the Court of Appeals, rather
than the result reached by the Court today. Page 414 U. S. 255 The majority relies on statistics indicating that a significant
percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers
are making traffic stops. But these statistics only confirm what we
recognized in Terry -- that "American criminals have a
long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country,
many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty and
thousands more are wounded." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 23 . As
the very next sentence in Terry recognized, however,
"[v]irtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives." Id. at 392 U. S. 24 . The
statistics relied on by the Government in this case support this
observation. Virtually all of the killings are caused by guns and
knives, the very type of weapons which will not go undetected in a
properly conducted weapons frisk. [ Footnote 3/5 ] It requires more than citation to these
statistics, then, to support the proposition that it is reasonable
for police officers to conduct more than a Terry -type
frisk for weapons when seeking to disarm a traffic offender who is
taken into custody. C The majority opinion fails to recognize that the search
conducted by Officer Jenks did not merely involve a search of
respondent's person. It also included a separate search of effects
found on his person. And even were we to assume, arguendo, that it was reasonable for Jenks to remove the object he felt in
respondent's pocket, clearly there was no justification consistent
with Page 414 U. S. 256 the Fourth Amendment which would authorize his opening the
package and looking inside.

															To begin with, after Jenks had the cigarette package in his
hands, there is no indication that he had reason to believe or did,
in fact, believe that the package contained a weapon. More
importantly, even if the crumpled-up cigarette package had, in
fact, contained some sort of small weapon, it would have been
impossible for respondent to have used it once the package was in
the officer's hands. Opening the package, therefore, did not
further the protective purpose of the search. Even the dissenting
opinion in the Court of Appeals conceded that, "since the package
was now in the officer's possession, any risk of the prisoner's use
of a weapon in this package had been eliminated." [ Footnote 3/6 ] 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 471 F.2d at
1118 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).

															It is suggested, however, that, since the custodial arrest
itself represents a significant intrusion into the privacy of the
person, any additional intrusion by way of opening or examining
effects found on the person is not worthy of constitutional
protection. But such an approach was expressly rejected by the
Court in Chimel. There, it Page 414 U. S. 257 was suggested that, since the police had lawfully entered
petitioner's house to effect an arrest, the additional invasion of
privacy stemming from an accompanying search of the entire house
was inconsequential. The Court answered:

															"[W]e can see no reason why, simply because some interference
with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully
taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed
despite the absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would
otherwise require."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
766 -767, n. 12.

															The Fourth Amendment preserves the right of "the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." Chimel established the principle that the lawful right of the police to
interfere with the security of the person did not, standing alone,
automatically confer the right to interfere with the security and
privacy of his house. Hence, the mere fact of an arrest should be
no justification, in and of itself, for invading the privacy of the
individual's personal effects.

															The Government argues that it is difficult to see what
constitutionally protected "expectation of privacy" a prisoner has
in the interior of a cigarette pack. One wonders if the result in
this case would have been the same were respondent a businessman
who was lawfully taken into custody for driving without a license
and whose wallet was taken from him by the police. Would it be
reasonable for the police officer, because of the possibility that
a razor blade was hidden somewhere in the wallet, to open it,
remove all the contents, and examine each item carefully. Or
suppose a lawyer lawfully arrested for a traffic offense is found
to have a sealed envelope on his person. Would it be permissible
for the arresting officer to tear open the envelope in order to
make sure that it did not contain a clandestine weapon -- perhaps a
pin or a razor blade? Cf. 331 U. S. United Page 414 U. S. 258 States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947); Chimel v. California, supra at 395 U. S. 758 .
Would it not be more consonant with the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment and the legitimate needs of the police to require the
officer, if he has any question whatsoever about what the wallet or
letter contains, to hold on to it until the arrestee is brought to
the precinct station? [ Footnote
3/7 ] Page 414 U. S. 259 I, for one, cannot characterize any of these intrusions into the
privacy of an individual's papers and effects as being negligible
incidents to the more serious intrusion into the individual's
privacy stemming from the arrest itself. Nor can any principled
distinction be drawn between the hypothetical searches I have posed
and the search of the cigarette package in this case. The only
reasoned distinction is between warrantless searches which serve
legitimate protective and evidentiary functions and those that do
not. See Chimel, supra, at 395 U. S.
766 .

															The search conducted by Officer Jenks in this case went far
beyond what was reasonably necessary to protect him from harm or to
ensure that respondent would not effect an escape from custody. In
my view, it therefore fell outside the scope of a properly drawn
"search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals holding that the fruits of the search should have been
suppressed at respondent's trial.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															At the suppression hearing, Officer Jenks was shown a small
derringer and was asked, after the gun was placed in a coat pocket,
"whether or not it feels like the lump you felt in Mr. Robinson's
pocket the night you arrested him?" Jenks answered that the object
"does not feel the same", but rather felt "harder," "larger," and
"[m]uch more suspicious."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Even the Court's attempt to dip into the English common law is
selective. The power to conduct a search incident to arrest was
litigated in Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox C.C. 329 (Oxford Circuit
1853), a civil case in which the plaintiff, a lawyer, was stopped
while on the road and arrested by defendant superintendent of
police. After the plaintiff was taken to the station house, a
police constable searched him, at the defendant's direction, and a
tobacco box and a piece of paper were taken from him. In
instructing the jury, the learned judge stated:

															"With respect to searching a prisoner, there is no doubt that a
man when in custody may so conduct himself, by reason of violence
of language or conduct, that a police officer may reasonably think
it prudent and right to search him in order to ascertain whether he
has any weapon with which he might do mischief to the person or
commit a breach of the peace; but, at the same time, it is quite
wrong to suppose that a general rule can be applied to such a case.
Even when a man is confined for being drunk and disorderly, it is
not correct to say that he must submit to the degradation of being
searched, as the searching of such a person must depend upon all
the circumstances of the case." Id. at 332.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The majority's reference to the quick ad hoc judgment
of the police officer may be read as an expression of doubt whether
this kind of on-the-street police activity can effectively be
controlled by court-imposed standards. This problem was discussed
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
where we recognized "the limitations of the judicial function in
controlling the myriad daily situations in which policemen and
citizens confront each other on the street." Id. at 392 U. S. 12 . But
as we concluded there, even though

															"[n]o judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of the
street encounter, . . . courts still retain their traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct . . . which trenches
upon personal security without the objective evidentiary
justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is
identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary, and its fruits
must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials." Id. at 392 U. S. 15 .

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															This was also the position of the Police Department itself.
Sergeant Donaldson, a Police Department Training Division
instructor, testified:

															"If [the officer] could determine in his pat-down or frisk by
squeezing that it was not, in fact, a weapon that could be used
against him, then we don't instruct him to go further."

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The Uniform Crime Reports prepared by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, which are relied on by the majority, see
ante at 414 U. S. 234 n. 5, indicate that 112 police officers were killed nationwide in
1972. Of these, 108 were killed by firearms. Two of the remaining
four were killed with knives, and the last two cases involved a
bomb and an automobile.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The dissent argued, however, that

															"further inspection of the package was still justifiable as a
protective measure. If the package had contained a razor
blade, or live bullets, the officer would have been alerted to
search Robinson much more thoroughly, since the possibility of
there being other weapons concealed on his person would
increase."

															153 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 471 F.2d at 1118 (emphasis in
original). But as Chief Judge Bazelon indicated in his opinion
below, this kind of reasoning would render meaningless scope
limitations on searches. Were one to accept this logic, for
example, it would have been reasonable for the police to search the
entire house in Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 (1969), for, if a weapon had been found somewhere
in the house, the arresting officer would have been alerted to
search Chimel himself more thoroughly, as the possibility of there
being other weapons concealed on his person would arguably have
increased.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Nor would it necessarily have been reasonable for the police to
have opened the cigarette package at the police station. The
Government argued below, as an alternative theory to justify the
search in this case, that, when a suspect is booked and is about to
be placed in station house detention, it is reasonable to search
his person to prevent the introduction of weapons or contraband
into the jail facility and to inventory the personal effects found
on the suspect. Since respondent's cigarette package would have
been removed and opened at the station house anyway, the argument
goes, the search might just as well take place in the field at the
time of the arrest. This argument fails for two reasons. First, as
the Court of Appeals had indicated in its opinion in United
States v. Mills, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 156, 472 F.2d 1231 (1972)
(en banc), the justification for stationhouse searches is not the
booking process itself, but rather the fact that the suspect will
be placed in jail. In the District of Columbia, petty offenses of
the sort involved in the present case are bailable, and, as the
Government stipulated in Mills, the normal procedure is
for offenders to be advised of the opportunity to post collateral
at the station house and to avoid an inventory search unless they
are unable or refuse to do so. Id. at 160-161, 472 F.2d at
1235-1236. One cannot justify a full search in the field on a
subsequent event that quite possibly may never take place.

															Second, even had it become necessary to place respondent in
confinement, it is still doubtful whether one could justify opening
up the cigarette package and examining its contents. The purposes
of preventing the introduction of weapons or contraband into the
jail facility are fully served simply by removing the package from
the prisoner. It is argued that the police must inventory effects
found on the prisoner in order to avoid a later claim by the
prisoner that jail personnel stole his property. But as the Court
of Appeals noted in Mills, the police can protect
themselves against such claims by means involving a less extreme
intrusion on privacy than would be entailed in opening up and
examining the contents of all effects found on the person. As an
example, the Court of Appeals suggested that the prisoner be
given

															"an opportunity, like that accorded someone given a bathhouse
locker for temporary use, to 'check' his belongings in a sealed
envelope, perhaps upon executing a waiver releasing the officer of
any responsibility." Id. at 164 n. 11, 472 F.2d at 1239 n. 11.

															The Government also suggested in oral argument before this Court
that it would be administratively inconvenient to require a police
officer, after removing an object from an arrestee, to hold on to
the object, rather than to look inside and determine what it
contained. Mere administrative inconvenience, however, cannot
justify invasion of Fourth Amendment rights. See Chimel v.
California, supra, at 395 U. S. 768 . One can no doubt imagine cases where the
inconvenience might be so substantial as to interfere with the task
of transporting the suspect into custody. While these situations
might necessitate a different rule, certainly in this case there
would have been no inconvenience whatsoever. Officer Jenks could
easily have placed the cigarette package in his own pocket or
handed it to his partner to hold onto until they reached the
precinct station.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the United States v. Robinson case:

Respondent Robinson was convicted of a drug offense after heroin was found in his pocket during a search following a valid custodial arrest for driving with a revoked license. The Supreme Court upheld the search, ruling that a full search of a person is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and is reasonable during a lawful custodial arrest. The Court rejected the argument that the search was invalid because the officer did not fear the respondent or suspect he was armed, emphasizing the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest. The Court also addressed the station-house search justification and the scope of searches during arrests for minor offenses.