U.S. Supreme Court Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298 (1922) Balzac v. Porto Rico Nos. 178, 179 Argued March 20, 1922 Decided April 10,
1922 258
U.S. 298 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PORTO
RICO Syllabus 1. The Act of January 28, 1915, c. 22, 38 Stat. 803, amending §
246 of the Judicial Code, and providing that writs of error from
this Court may be prosecuted to the supreme courts of Porto Rico
and Hawaii in the same classes of cases as to the courts of last
resort of the states under Jud.Code, § 237, meant to assimilate the
jurisdiction over those territorial courts to that over the state
courts and is to be construed as embracing subsequent changes in §
237 not obviously inapplicable, such as the amendments made by the
Act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, 39 Stat. 726. P. 258 U. S.
300 .

															2. In prosecutions for criminal libel in a district court of
Porto Rico, defendant demanded a jury under the Sixth Amendment,
which was denied him upon a construction of local statutes,
applicable to this and other misdemeanors. Held that the
demand drew in question the validity of the statutes, within the
meaning of Jud.Code § 237, as amended in 1916, and that judgments
of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico affirming the convictions were
reviewable here by writ of error. P. 258 U. S.
302 .

															3. To present the constitutionality of a statute, it is not
essential that an assignment of error should mention the statute in
question, if the record definitely shows that its constitutionality
was questioned and the assignment is clearly directed to that
controversy. P. 258 U. S.
303 .

															4. The provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing jury trial in
all criminal prosecutions do not apply to a territory belonging to
the Page 258 U. S. 299 United States which has not been incorporated into the Union,
and Porto Rico was not so incorporated by the Act of April 12,
1900, c.191, 31 Stat. 77, which gave it a temporary government. P. 258 U. S. 304 . Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 .

															5. The Organic Act for Porto Rico of March 2, 1917, c. 145, 39
Stat. 951, known as the Jones Act, did not have the effect of
incorporating Porto Rico into the United States. P. 258 U. S.
305 .

															6. Since the Spanish War, an intention of Congress to
incorporate new territory into the Union is not to be admitted
without express declaration or an implication so strong as to
exclude any other view. P. 258 U. S. 306 .

															7. The provisions of § 5 of the Organic Act, supra, for
extending federal citizenship to citizens and certain residents of
Porto Rico, did not extend the jury system there. P. 258 U. S.
307 .

															8. Neither can incorporation into the United States be implied
from the organization of the United States District Court in Porto
Rico, allowance of review of cases from its Supreme Court involving
the Constitution, admission of Porto Ricans to the Military and
Naval Academies, sale of United States stamps in the Island, or
extension to it of federal revenue, navigation, banking,
bankruptcy, employers' liability, safety appliance, extradition and
census laws. P. 258 U. S.
311 .

															9. Published reflections on the Governor of Porto Rico held libelous and not legitimate comment protected by the
guaranty of free speech and free press in the First Amendment of
the Constitution. P. 258 U. S. 314 .

															28 P.R. 139, 141 affirmed.

															Review of two judgments of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico which
affirmed judgments of the District Court for Arecibo imposing
sentences to imprisonment based on convictions of criminal
libel. Page 258 U. S. 300 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

															These are two prosecutions for criminal libel, brought against
the same defendant, Jesus M. Balzac, on informations filed in the
District Court for Arecibo, Porto Rico, by the district attorney
for that district. Balzac was the editor of a daily paper published
in Arecibo, known as "El Baluarte," and the articles upon which the
charges of libel were based were published on April 16 and April
23, 1918, respectively. In each case, the defendant demanded a
jury. The Code of Criminal Procedure of Porto Rico grants a jury
trial in cases of felony, but not in misdemeanors. The defendant
nevertheless contended that he was entitled to a jury in such a
case, under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, and that the
language of the alleged libels was only fair comment, and their
publication was protected by the First Amendment. His contentions
were overruled; he was tried by the court, and was convicted in
both cases and sentenced to five months' imprisonment in the
district jail in the first, and to four months in the second, and
to the payment of the costs in each. The defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court of Porto Rico. That court affirmed both judgments. People v. Balzac, 28 P.R. Co. 139; second case, 28 P.R.
Co. 141.

															The first question in these cases is one of jurisdiction of this
Court. By § 244 of the Judicial Code, approved March 3, 1911, it
was provided that writs of error and appeals from the final
judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico might be
prosecuted to this Court in any case in which was drawn in question
the validity of a treaty or statute of, or authority exercised
under, the United States or wherein the Constitution of the United
States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress was brought in
question and the right claimed thereunder was denied, and this
without regard to the Page 258 U. S. 301 amount involved. By the Act of January 28, 1915 (38 Stat. 803),
§ 244 of the Judicial Code was repealed, but § 246 was amended and
made to apply to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in
respect to the decisions of the Supreme Court, not only of Hawaii,
as before, but also Porto Rico, and it was provided that writs of
error to those courts from this Court could be prosecuted in the
same class of cases as those in which this Court was authorized
under § 237 of the Judicial Code to review decisions of state
courts of last resort. Section 237 at that time allowed a writ of
error to final decisions in state courts of last resort where was
drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or a statute of, or an
authority exercised under, the United States and the decision was
against its validity, or where was drawn in question the validity
of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States and the decision was in favor of its
validity, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity was
claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or
commission held, or authority exercised under, the United States,
and the decision was against the title, right, privilege or
immunity especially set up or claimed by either party under such
Constitution, treaty, statute, commission or authority. By Act of
January 28, 1915, 38 Stat. 803, 804, amending § 246, this Court was
given power by certiorari to bring up for review all final
judgments or decrees in civil or criminal cases in the Supreme
Courts of Porto Rico and Hawaii, other than those reviewable here
by writ of error because in the class similar to that described in
§ 237 of the Judicial Code. By Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat.
726, the jurisdiction of this Court to review by writ of error,
under § 237, final judgments and decrees of state courts of last
resort was cut down by omitting cases (other than those involving
the validity of Page 258 U. S. 302 a treaty, statute or authority exercised under the United States
or any state) wherein a title, right, privilege, or immunity, was
claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or
commission held, or authority exercised under, the United States,
and the decision was against such title, right, privilege or
immunity, and such cases, it was provided, could only be examined
on review in this Court by certiorari.

															The question now presented is whether the amendment to § 237 of
the Judicial Code by the Act of 1916 applies to, and affects, the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court in reviewing decisions of the
Supreme Court of Porto Rico. We think it does. We think that the
manifest purpose of the Act of 1915, amending § 246 of the Code, in
its reference to § 237 of the Judicial Code was to assimilate the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court over the Supreme Courts of
Porto Rico and Hawaii to that over state courts of last resort, and
that the reference in amended § 246, to § 237 may be fairly
construed to embrace subsequent changes in § 237 that are not
obviously inapplicable.

															This brings us to the question whether there was drawn in
question in these cases the validity of a statute of Porto Rico
under the Constitution of the United States. The Penal Code of
Porto Rico divides crimes into felonies and misdemeanors
(Rev.Stats. and Codes of Porto Rico 1911, Penal Code, § 13). A
felony is described as a crime punishable by death or imprisonment
in the penitentiary. Every other crime is declared to be a
misdemeanor. Penal Code, § 14. Section 178 of the Porto Rican Code
of Criminal Procedure provided that issues of fact in cases of
felony should be tried by a jury when the defendant so elected, but
gave no such right in the case of misdemeanors. This was construed
by the Supreme Court to deny such right. People v. Bird, 5
P.R. Co. 387.

															By § 244 (5676) of the Penal Code (as amended by Act of March 9,
1911, p. 71), the publication of a libel is made Page 258 U. S. 303 punishable by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment in
jail for a term not exceeding two years, or both such fine and
imprisonment, and also the costs of the action, in the discretion
of the court. It is therefore plain that libel under the Porto
Rican law is a misdemeanor, and a jury trial was not required
therein. By the Act of July 22, 1919 (Laws of Porto Rico 1919, No.
84, p. 684), a jury trial is now given in misdemeanors, but that
did not come into force until after these libels were published and
these trials had.

															When the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were
first passed in 1901, they both contained the provision that, in
all cases of libel, the jury should determine the law and the fact.
It was held, however, by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico in People v. Bird, 5 P.R. Co. 387, 405, that this did not
give a jury trial, but only made provision that, if and when a
right of jury trial was given in such cases, the jury should have
the power to determine the law and the fact. Thereafter, the Act of
March 10, 1904 (Laws of Porto Rico 1904, p. 130), expressly
repealed all reference to trials for libel in the Jury Act.

															The effect of the Penal Code of Procedure, as construed by the
Supreme Court of Porto Rico, and of the Act of March 10, 1904,
repealing the jury act as to libel cases, was a statutory denial of
the right of jury trial in such cases. A demand for a jury trial in
this case therefore drew in question the validity of the statutes
upon which the court relied in denying the demand. This necessarily
leads to the conclusion that these cases are in the same class as
those which come to this Court by writ of error under § 237, as
amended by the Act of 1916, and that jurisdiction by writ of error
exists.

															Was the issue properly saved in the record by the defendant? We
think it was. The demand for a jury trial, the statute to the
contrary notwithstanding, was made at the trial. It was renewed in
the assignments of error in Page 258 U. S. 304 the Porto Rican Supreme Court and here. Those assignments did
not mention the statutes whose validity was involved, but merely
averred that the defendant had been denied his right as an American
citizen under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. While this
is informal, we think that it is sufficient when the record
discloses the real nature of the controversy and the specification
of the assignment leaves no doubt that it is directed to that
controversy.

															We have now to inquire whether that part of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution which requires that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, applies to Porto Rico.
Another provision on the subject is in Article III of the
Constitution, providing that the trial of all crimes, except in
cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be
held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed,
but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. The
Seventh Amendment of the Constitution provides that, in suits at
common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. It is well
settled that these provisions for jury trial in criminal and civil
cases apply to the Territories of the United States. Webster v.
Reid , 11 How. 437, 52 U. S. 460 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 , 98 U. S. 167 ; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 , 127 U. S. 556 ; American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.
S. 464 ; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.
S. 343 , 170 U. S. 347 ; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S.
1 ; Black v. Jackson, 177 U.
S. 349 ; Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U. S. 516 , 197 U. S. 528 ; Gurvich v. United States, 198 U.S. 581. But it is just as
clearly settled that they do not apply to territory belonging to
the Page 258 U. S. 305 United States which has not been incorporated into the Union. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197 ; Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 , 195 U. S. 145 .
It was further settled in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.
S. 244 , and confirmed by Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 ,
that neither the Philippines nor Porto Rico was territory which had
been incorporated in the Union or become a part of the United
States, as distinguished from merely belonging to it, and that the
acts giving temporary governments to the Philippines, 32 Stat. 691,
and to Porto Rico, 31 Stat. 77, had no such effect. The Insular
Cases revealed much diversity of opinion in this Court as to
the constitutional status of the territory acquired by the Treaty
of Paris ending the Spanish War, but the Dorr case shows
that the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the
Court. The conclusion of this Court in the Dorr case, p. 195 U. S. 149 ,
was as follows:

															"We conclude that the power to govern territory, implied in the
right to acquire it, and given to Congress in the Constitution in
Article IV, § 3, to whatever other limitations it may be subject,
the extent of which must be decided as questions arise, does not
require that body to enact for ceded territory, not made part of
the United States by congressional action, a system of laws which
shall include the right of trial by jury, and that the Constitution
does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such
right to territory so situated."

															The question before us therefore is: has Congress, since the
Foraker Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77), enacted legislation
incorporating Porto Rico into the Union? Counsel for the plaintiff
in error give, in their brief, an extended list of acts, to which
we shall refer later, which they urge as indicating a purpose to
make the island a part of the United States, but they chiefly rely
on the Organic Act of Porto Rico of March 2, 1917, c. 145, 39 Stat.
951, known as the Jones Act. Page 258 U. S. 306 The act is entitled "An act to provide a civil government for
Porto Rico and for other purposes." It does not indicate by its
title that it has a purpose to incorporate the island into the
Union. It does not contain any clause which declares such purpose
or effect. While this is not conclusive, it strongly tends to show
that Congress did not have such an intention. Few questions have
been the subject of such discussion and dispute in our country as
the status of our territory acquired from Spain in 1899. The
division between the political parties in respect to it, the
diversity of the views of the members of this Court in regard to
its constitutional aspects, and the constant recurrence of the
subject in the Houses of Congress fixed the attention of all on the
future relation of this acquired territory to the United States.
Had Congress intended to take the important step of changing the
treaty status of Porto Rico by incorporating it into the Union, it
is reasonable to suppose that it would have done so by the plain
declaration, and would not have left it to mere inference. Before
the question became acute at the close of the Spanish War, the
distinction between acquisition and incorporation was not regarded
as important, or at least it was not fully understood and had not
aroused great controversy. Before that, the purpose of Congress
might well be a matter of mere inference from various legislative
acts; but in these latter days, incorporation is not to be assumed
without express declaration, or an implication so strong as to
exclude any other view.

															Again, the second section of the act is called a "Bill of
Rights," and included therein is substantially every one of the
guaranties of the federal Constitution except those relating to
indictment by a grand jury in the case of infamous crimes and the
right of trial by jury in civil and criminal cases. If it was
intended to incorporate Porto Rico into the Union by this act,
which would ex proprio vigore make applicable the whole
Bill of Rights Page 258 U. S. 307 of the Constitution to the island, why was it thought necessary
to create for it a Bill of Rights and carefully exclude trial by
jury? In the very forefront of the act is this substitute for
incorporation and application of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution. This seems to us a conclusive argument against the
contention of counsel for the plaintiff in error.

															The section of the Jones Act which counsel press on us is § 5.
This in effect declares that all persons who under the Foraker Act
were made citizens of Porto Rico and certain other residents shall
become citizens of the United States, unless they prefer not to
become such, in which case they are to declare such preference
within six months, and thereafter they lose certain political
rights under the new government. In the same section, the United
States district court is given power separately to naturalize
individuals of some other classes of residents. We set out the
section in full in the margin. * Unaffected by
the considerations Page 258 U. S. 308 already suggested, perhaps the declaration of § 5 would furnish
ground for an inference such as counsel for plaintiff in error
contend, but, under the circumstances, we find it entirely
consistent with nonincorporation. When Porto Ricans passed from
under the government of Spain, they lost the protection of that
government as subjects of the King of Spain, a title by which they
had been known for centuries. They had a right to expect, in
passing under the dominion of the United States, a status entitling
them to the protection of their new sovereign. In theory and in
law, they had it as citizens of Porto Rico, but it was an anomalous
status, or seemed to be so in view of the fact that those who owed
and rendered allegiance to the other great world powers were given
the same designation and status as those living in their respective
home countries so far as protection against foreign injustice went.
It became a yearning of the Porto Ricans to be American citizens,
therefore, and this act gave them the boon. What additional rights
did it give them? It enabled them to move into the continental
United States and becoming residents of any state there, to enjoy
every right of any other citizen of the United States, civil,
social and political. A citizen of the Philippines must be
naturalized before he can settle and vote in this country. Act of
June 29, 1906, § 30, 34 Stat. 606. Not so the Porto Rican under the
Organic Act of 1917. Page 258 U. S. 309 In Porto Rico, however, the Porto Rican cannot insist upon the
right of trial by jury except as his own representatives in his
legislature shall confer it on him. The citizen of the United
States living in Porto Rico cannot there enjoy a right of trial by
jury under the federal Constitution, any more than the Porto Rican.
It is locality that is determinative of the application of the
Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the
status of the people who live in it.

															It is true that, in the absence of other and countervailing
evidence, a law of Congress or a provision in a treaty acquiring
territory, declaring an intention to confer political and civil
rights on the inhabitants of the new lands as American citizens,
may be properly interpreted to mean an incorporation of it into the
Union, as in the case of Louisiana and Alaska. This was one of the
chief grounds upon which this Court placed its conclusion that
Alaska had been incorporated in the Union in Rasmussen v.
United States, 197 U. S. 516 . But
Alaska was a very different case from that of Porto Rico. It was an
enormous territory, very sparsely settled, and offering opportunity
for immigration and settlement by American citizens. It was on the
American continent, and within easy reach of the then United
States. It involved none of the difficulties which incorporation of
the Philippines and Porto Rico presents, and one of them is in the
very matter of trial by jury. This Court refers to the difficulties
in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.
S. 138 , 195 U. S.
148 :

															"If the right to trial by jury were a fundamental right which
goes wherever the jurisdiction of the United States extends, or if
Congress, in framing laws for outlying territory, . . . was obliged
to establish that system by affirmative legislation, it would
follow that, no matter what the needs or capacities of the people,
trial by jury, and in no other way, must be forthwith established,
although the result may be to work injustice Page 258 U. S. 310 and provoke disturbance, rather than to aid the orderly
administration of justice. . . . Again, if the United States shall
acquire by treaty the cession of territory having an established
system of jurisprudence, where jury trials are unknown, but a
method of fair and orderly trial prevails under an acceptable and
long established code, the preference of the people must be
disregarded, their established customs ignored, and they themselves
coerced to accept, in advance of incorporation into the United
States, a system of trial unknown to them and unsuited to their
needs. We do not think it was intended, in giving power to Congress
to make regulations for the territories, to hamper its exercise
with this condition."

															The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the
responsibilities of jurors. In common law countries, centuries of
tradition have prepared a conception of the impartial attitude
jurors must assume. The jury system postulates a conscious duty of
participation in the machinery of justice which it is hard for
people not brought up in fundamentally popular government at once
to acquire. One of its greatest benefits is in the security it
gives the people that they, as jurors, actual or possible, being
part of the judicial system of the country, can prevent its
arbitrary use or abuse. Congress has thought that a people like the
Filipinos, or the Porto Ricans, trained to a complete judicial
system which knows no juries, living in compact and ancient
communities, with definitely formed customs and political
conceptions, should be permitted themselves to determine how far
they wish to adopt this institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and
when. Hence the care with which, from the time when Mr. McKinley
wrote his historic letter to Mr. Root in April of 1900 (Public Laws
Philippine Commission, 6-9-Act of July 2, 1902, 691, 692)
concerning the character of government to be set up for the
Philippines by the Phillippine Commission, until the Act Page 258 U. S. 311 of 1917, giving a new Organic Act to Porto Rico, the United
States has been liberal in granting to the islands acquired by the
Treaty of Paris most of the American constitutional guaranties, but
has been sedulous to avoid forcing a jury system on a Spanish and
civil law country until it desired it. We cannot find any intention
to depart from this policy in making Porto Ricans American
citizens, explained as this is by the desire to put them as
individuals on an exact equality with citizens from the American
homeland, to secure them more certain protection against the world,
and to give them an opportunity, should they desire, to move into
the United States proper, and there without naturalization to enjoy
all political and other rights.

															We need not dwell on another consideration which requires us not
lightly to infer, from acts thus easily explained on other grounds,
an intention to incorporate in the Union these distant ocean
communities of a different origin and language from those of our
continental people. Incorporation has always been a step, and an
important one, leading to statehood. Without in the slightest
degree intimating an opinion as to the wisdom of such a policy, for
that is not our province, it is reasonable to assume that, when
such a step is taken, it will be begun and taken by Congress
deliberately, and with a clear declaration of purpose, and not left
a matter of mere inference or construction.

															Counsel for the plaintiff in error also rely on the organization
of a United States district court in Porto Rico, on the allowance
of review of the Porto Rican Supreme Court in cases when the
Constitution of the United States is involved, on the statutory
permission that Porto Rican youth can attend West Point and
Annapolis Academies, on the authorized sale of United States stamps
in the island, on the extension of revenue, navigation,
immigration, Page 258 U. S. 312 national banking, bankruptcy, federal employers' liability,
safety appliance, extradition, and census laws in one way or
another to Porto Rico. With the background of the considerations
already stated, none of these, nor all of them put together,
furnish ground for the conclusion pressed on us.

															The United States district court is not a true United States
court established under Article III of the Constitution to
administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign congressional
faculty, granted under Article IV, § 3, of that instrument, of
making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction
to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial
court. Nor does the legislative recognition that federal
constitutional questions may arise in litigation in Porto Rico have
any weight in this discussion. The Constitution of the United
States is in force in Porto Rico, as it is wherever and whenever
the sovereign power of that government is exerted. This has not
only been admitted, but emphasized, by this Court in all its
authoritative expressions upon the issues arising in the Insular cases, especially in the Downes v.
Bidwell and the Dorr cases. The Constitution,
however, contains grants of power, and limitations which in the
nature of things are not always and everywhere applicable and the
real issue in the Insular cases was not whether the
Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we went
there, but which ones of its provisions were applicable by way of
limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power in
dealing with new conditions and requirements. The guaranties of
certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution,
as, for instance, Page 258 U. S. 313 that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, had from the beginning full application
in the Philippines and Porto Rico, and, as this guaranty is one of
the must fruitful in causing litigation in our own country,
provision was naturally made for similar controversy in Porto Rico.
Indeed, provision is made for the consideration of constitutional
questions coming on appeal and writs of error from the Supreme
Court of the Philippines, which are certainly not incorporated in
the Union. Judicial Code, § 248.

															On the whole, therefore, we find no features in the Organic Act
of Porto Rico of 1917 from which we can infer the purpose of
Congress to incorporate Porto Rico into the United States with the
consequences which would follow.

															This Court has passed on substantially the same questions
presented here in two cases, Porto Rico v. Tapia, 245 U.S.
639, and People v. Muratti, 245 U.S. 639. In the former,
the question was whether one who was charged with committing a
felonious homicide some 12 days after the passage of the Organic
Act in 1917 could be brought to trial without an indictment of a
grand jury as required by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The United States District Court of Porto Rico, on a writ of habeas
corpus, held that he could not be held to answer, and discharged
him. In the other case, the felony charged was alleged to have been
committed before the passage of the Organic Act, but prosecution
was begun afterwards. In that, the Supreme Court of Porto Rico held
that an indictment was not rendered necessary by the Organic Act.
This Court reversed the district court in the Tapia case
and affirmed the Supreme Court in the Muratti case,
necessarily holding the Organic Act had not incorporated Porto Rico
into the United States. These cases were disposed of by a per
curiam. Counsel have urged us in the cases Page 258 U. S. 314 at the bar to deal with the questions raised more at length in
exposition of the effect of the Organic Act of 1917 upon the issue,
and we have done so.

															A second assignment of error is based on the claim that the
alleged libels here did not pass the bounds of legitimate comment
on the conduct of the governor of the island, against whom they
were directed, and that its prosecution is a violation of the First
Amendment to the Constitution, securing free speech and a free
press. A reading of the two articles removes the slightest doubt
that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of meridional
speech," to use the expression of this Court in a similar case in Gandia v. Pittingill, 222 U. S. 452 , 222 U. S. 458 .
Indeed, they are so excessive and outrageous in their character
that they suggest the query whether their superlative vilification
has not overleaped itself and become unconsciously humorous. But
this is not a defense.

															The judgments of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico are Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES concurs in the result.

															*

															"Sec. 5. That all citizens of Porto Rico as defined by section
seven of the act of April twelfth, nineteen hundred, 'temporarily
to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for
other purposes,' and all natives of Porto Rico who were temporarily
absent from that island on April eleventh, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and have since returned and are permanently residing
in that island, and are not citizens of any foreign country, are
hereby declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, citizens of
the United States: Provided, that any person hereinbefore
described may retain his present political status by making a
declaration, under oath, of his decision to do so within six months
of the taking effect of this act before the district court in the
district in which he resides, the declaration to be in form as
follows:"

															"I, _____, _____, being duly sworn, hereby declare my intention
not to become a citizen of the United States as provided in the act
of Congress conferring United States citizenship upon citizens of
Porto Rico and certain natives permanently residing in said
island."

															In the case of any such person who may be absent from the island
during said six months, the term of this proviso may be availed of
by transmitting a declaration, under oath, in the form herein in
provided within six months of the taking effect of the act to the
executive secretary of Porto Rico: And provided further, that any person who is born in Porto Rico of an alien parent and is
permanently residing in that island may, if of full age, within six
months of the taking his majority or within or if a minor, upon
reaching his majority or within one year thereafter, make a sworn
declaration of allegiance to the United States before the United
States district court for Porto Rico setting forth therein all the
facts connected with his or her birth and residence in Porto Rico
and accompanying due proof thereof, and, from and after the making
of such declaration, shall be considered to be a citizen of the
United States.

Summary:
The case of Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922) dealt with the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in a US territory that had not been incorporated into the Union. The defendant, Balzac, was denied a jury trial in a criminal libel case in Porto Rico (now Puerto Rico), and the Supreme Court was asked to review the decision.

The key issue was whether the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial applied to US territories like Porto Rico, which had not been fully incorporated into the Union. The Court held that it did not, affirming the judgments of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico. It found that neither the Act of April 12, 1900, nor the Organic Act of 1917 (the Jones Act) incorporated Porto Rico into the United States, and therefore, the territory was not subject to the same constitutional guarantees as states within the Union.

The case also addressed the defendant's claim that his right to free speech and press under the First Amendment had been violated, but the Court found that the libelous nature of the articles in question was not protected by the First Amendment.


U.S. Supreme Court Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) Gideon v. Wainwright No. 155 Argued January 15,
1963 Decided March 18,
1963 372
U.S. 335 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
FLORIDA Syllabus Charged in a Florida State Court with a noncapital felony,
petitioner appeared without funds and without counsel and asked the
Court to appoint counsel for him, but this was denied on the ground
that the state law permitted appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in capital cases only. Petitioner conducted his own
defense about as well as could be expected of a layman, but he was
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. Subsequently, he applied
to the State Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, on the
ground that his conviction violated his rights under the Federal
Constitution. The State Supreme Court denied all relief. Held: The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal
trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial, and petitioner's trial and conviction
without the assistance of counsel violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455 , overruled. Pp. 372 U. S.
336 -345.

															Reversed and cause remanded. Page 372 U. S. 336 MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having
broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor.
This offense is a felony under Page 372 U. S. 337 Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a
lawyer, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel for him,
whereupon the following colloquy took place:

															"The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel
to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of
Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a
Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I
am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel
to defend you in this case."

															"The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am
entitled to be represented by Counsel."

															Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about
as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening
statement to the jury, cross-examined the State's witnesses,
presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify
himself, and made a short argument "emphasizing his innocence to
the charge contained in the Information filed in this case." The
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to
serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in
the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his
conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court's
refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights "guaranteed by
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States
Government." [ Footnote 1 ]
Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the
State Supreme Court, "upon consideration thereof" but without an
opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 , was
decided by a divided Page 372 U. S. 338 Court, the problem of a defendant's federal constitutional right
to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of
controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.
[ Footnote 2 ] To give this
problem another review here, we granted certiorari. 370 U.S. 908.
Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we
appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to
discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following: "Should
this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455 , be reconsidered?" I The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been
unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to
assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here
bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicted for
robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the
trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the
court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the
practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants
except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had
witnesses summoned, cross-examined the State's witnesses, examined
his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by
the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in
prison. Page 372 U. S. 339 Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging
that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief,
and, on review, this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to
appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did
not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which, for reasons given, the Court deemed to be the
only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court
said:

															"Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an
appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may,
in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short
of such denial."

															316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 462 .
Treating due process as "a concept less rigid and more fluid than
those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the
Bill of Rights," the Court held that refusal to appoint counsel
under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not so "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness" as to amount to a denial of due process. Since the facts
and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable,
we think the Betts v. Brady holding, if left standing,
would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution
guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full
reconsideration, we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be
overruled. II The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." We have construed Page 372 U. S. 340 this to mean that, in federal courts, counsel must be provided
for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is
competently and intelligently waived. [ Footnote 3 ] Betts argued that this right is extended to
indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
response, the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid
down

															"no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs
whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national
courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair
trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory
upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."

															316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 465 .
In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered

															"[r]elevant data on the subject . . . afforded by constitutional
and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States
prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national
Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial
history of the States to the present date."

															316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 465 .
On the basis of this historical data, the Court concluded that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a
fair trial." 316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 471 .
It was for this reason the Betts Court refused to accept
the contention that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for
indigent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of
that Court, "made obligatory upon, the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of
counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was "a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial," it would have held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state
court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court. Page 372 U. S. 341 We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for
acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are
fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment
are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was
recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), a case upholding the right of counsel, where the Court held
that, despite sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), the Fourteenth Amendment "embraced" those " fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions,'" even though they had been
"specifically dealt with in another part of the federal
Constitution." 287 U.S. at 287 U. S. 67 . In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature
of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the
Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States.
Explicitly recognized to be of this "fundamental nature," and
therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or
some part of it, are the First Amendment's freedoms of speech,
press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of
grievances. [ Footnote 4 ] For
the same reason, though not always in precisely the same
terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth
Amendment's command that Page 372 U. S. 342 private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation, [ Footnote 5 ] the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures, [ Footnote 6 ] and the
Eighth's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. [ Footnote 7 ] On the other hand, this Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment made the
double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment obligatory on the
States. In so refusing, however, the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Cardozo, was careful to emphasize that

															"immunities that are valid as against the federal government by
force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the
states,"

															and that guarantees "in their origin . . . effective against the
federal government alone" had, by prior cases,

															"been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill
of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process
of absorption."

															302 U.S. at 302 U. S.
324 -326.

															We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was
on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is
"fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental
rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after
full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared that "the right to the
aid of Page 372 U. S. 343 counsel is of this fundamental character." Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 287 U. S. 68 (1932). While the Court, at the close of its Powell opinion, did, by its language, as this Court frequently does, limit
its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case,
its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to
counsel are unmistakable. Several years later, in 1936, the Court
reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel in this language:

															"We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by
the first eight amendments against federal action, were also
safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right
of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal
prosecution." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.
S. 233 , 297 U. S.
243 -244 (1936). And again, in 1938, this Court said:

															"[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the
Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights
of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant
admonition that, if the constitutional safeguards it provides be
lost, justice will not 'still be done.'" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 304 U. S. 462 (1938). To the same effect, see Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940), and Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.
S. 329 (1941). In light of these and many other prior
decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that "one
charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be
furnished counsel by the State," conceded that "[e]xpressions in
the opinions of this court lend color to the argument. . . ." 316
U.S. at 316 U. S.
462 -463. The fact is that, in deciding as it did -- that
"appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, Page 372 U. S. 344 essential to a fair trial" -- the Court in Betts v.
Brady made an abrupt break with its own well considered
precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder, we
believe, than the new, we but restore constitutional principles
established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these
precedents, but also reason and reflection, require us to recognize
that, in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to
be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite
properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try
defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere
deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime,
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to
prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to
defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right
of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.
This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A
defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the
moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v.
Alabama: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be Page 372 U. S. 345 heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put
on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence."

															287 U.S. at 287 U. S. 68 -69.
The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom
upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as
friends of the Court, argue that Betts was "an anachronism
when handed down," and that it should now be overruled. We
agree.

															The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with
this opinion. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Later, in the petition for habeas corpus, signed and apparently
prepared by petitioner himself, he stated, "I, Clarence Earl
Gideon, claim that I was denied the rights of the 4th, 5th and 14th
amendments of the Bill of Rights."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Of the many such cases to reach this Court, recent examples are Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.
S. 697 (1960); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.
S. 155 (1957). Illustrative cases in the state courts
are Artrip v. State, 136 So. 2d 574 (Ct.App.Ala.1962); Shafer v. Warden, 211 Md. 635, 126 A.2d 573 (1956). For
examples of commentary, see Allen, The Supreme Court,
Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 De Paul L.Rev.
213 (1959); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused,
30 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1962); The Right to Counsel, 45 Minn.L.Rev.
693 (1961).

															[ Footnote 3 ] Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).

															[ Footnote 4 ] E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.
S. 652 , 268 U. S. 666 (1925) (speech and press); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 , 303 U. S. 450 (1938) (speech and press); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 , 355 U. S. 321 (1958) (speech); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 297 U. S. 244 (1936) (press); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940) (religion); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.
S. 353 , 299 U. S. 364 (1937) (assembly); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 , 364 U. S. 486 ,
488 (1960) (association); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 , 366 U. S. 296 (1961) (association); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) (speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances).

															[ Footnote 5 ] E.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 , 166 U. S.
235 -241 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.
S. 466 , 169 U. S.
522 -526 (1898).

															[ Footnote 6 ] E.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25 , 338 U. S. 27 -28
(1949); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 213 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 367 U. S. 655 (1961).

															[ Footnote 7 ] Robinson v. California, 370 U.
S. 660 , 370 U. S. 666 (1962).

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS.

															While I join the opinion of the Court, a brief historical resume
of the relation between the Bill of Rights and the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment seems pertinent. Since the adoption of
that Amendment, ten justices have felt that it protects from
infringement by the States the privileges, protections, and
safeguards granted by the Bill of Rights. Page 372 U. S. 346 Justice Field, the first Justice Harlan, and probably Justice
Brewer, took that position in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 , 144 U. S.
362 -363, 144 U. S.
370 -371, as did Justices BLACK, DOUGLAS, Murphy and
Rutledge in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 , 332 U. S. 71 -72,
124. And see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.
S. 497 , 367 U. S.
515 -522 (dissenting opinion). That view was also
expressed by Justices Bradley and Swayne in the Slaughter-House
Cases , 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S.
118 -119, 83 U. S. 122 ,
and seemingly was accepted by Justice Clifford when he dissented
with Justice Field in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S.
90 , 92 U. S. 90 , 92 U. S. 92 .
[ Footnote 2/1 ] Unfortunately, it
has never commanded a Court. Yet, happily, all constitutional
questions are always open. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 . And
what we do today does not foreclose the matter.

															My Brother HARLAN is of the view that a guarantee of the Bill of
Rights that is made applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a lesser version of that same guarantee as
applied to the Federal Government. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Mr. Justice Jackson shared that view.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 372 U. S. 347 But that view has not prevailed, [ Footnote 2/4 ] and rights protected against state
invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are
not watered-dow versions of what the Bill of Rights guarantees.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Justices Bradley, Swayne and Field emphasized that the first
eight Amendments granted citizens of the United States certain
privileges and immunities that were protected from abridgment by
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Slaughter-House
Cases, supra, at 83 U. S.
118 -119; O'Neil v. Vermont, supra, at 144 U. S. 363 .
Justices Harlan and Brewer accepted the same theory in the O'Neil case ( see id. at 144 U. S.
370 -371), though Justice Harlan indicated that all
"persons," not merely "citizens," were given this protection. Ibid. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.
78 , 211 U. S. 117 ,
Justice Harlan's position was made clear:

															"In my judgment, immunity from self-incrimination is protected
against hostile state action not only by . . . [the Privileges and
Immunities Clause], but [also] by . . . [the Due Process
Clause]."

															Justice Brewer, in joining the opinion of the Court, abandoned
the view that the entire Bill of Rights applies to the States in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 .

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.
S. 476 , 354 U. S. 501 ,
506; Smith v. California, 361 U.
S. 147 , 361 U. S.
169 .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.
S. 250 , 343 U. S. 288 . Cf. the opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 , 268 U. S. 672 ,
and Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357 , 274 U. S.
372 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The cases are collected by MR. JUSTICE BLACK in Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U. S. 513 , 357 U. S. 530 . And see Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263 , 364 U. S.
274 -276.

															MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in the result.

															In Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (1948), this Court found no special circumstances requiring the
appointment of counsel, but stated that,

															"if these charges had been capital charges, the court would have
been required, both by the state statute and the decisions of this
Court interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, to take some such
steps." Id. at 339 U. S. 674 .
Prior to that case, I find no language in any cases in this Court
indicating that appointment of counsel in all capital cases was
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 3/1 ] At the next Term of the Court, Mr. Justice
Reed revealed that the Court was divided as to noncapital cases,
but that "the due process clause . . . requires counsel for all
persons charged with serious crimes. . . ." Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 , 335 U. S. 441 (1948). Finally, in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S.
52 (1961), we said that, "[w]hen one pleads to a capital
charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine
whether prejudice resulted." Id. at 368 U. S.
55 . Page 372 U. S. 348 That the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in "all
criminal prosecutions" is clear both from the language of the
Amendment and from this Court's interpretation. See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). It is equally clear from the above cases, all decided after Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), that the Fourteenth Amendment requires such appointment in
all prosecutions for capital crimes. The Court's decision today,
then, does no more than erase a distinction which has no basis in
logic and an increasingly eroded basis in authority. In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.
S. 234 (1960), we specifically rejected any
constitutional distinction between capital and noncapital offenses
as regards congressional power to provide for court-martial trials
of civilian dependents of armed forces personnel. Having previously
held that civilian dependents could not constitutionally be
deprived of the protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments in capital cases, Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S.
1 (1957), we held that the same result must follow in
noncapital cases. Indeed, our opinion there foreshadowed the
decision today, [ Footnote 3/2 ] as
we noted that:

															"Obviously Fourteenth Amendment cases dealing with state action
have no application here, but if Page 372 U. S. 349 they did, we believe that to deprive civilian dependents of the
safeguards of a jury trial here . . . would be as invalid under
those cases as it would be in cases of a capital nature."

															361 U.S. at 361 U. S.
246 -247.

															I must conclude here, as in Kinsella, supra, that the
Constitution makes no distinction between capital and noncapital
cases. The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the
deprival of "liberty," just as for deprival of "life," and there
cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality of the
process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction
involved. How can the Fourteenth Amendment tolerate a procedure
which it condemns in capital cases on the ground that deprival of
liberty may be less onerous than deprival of life -- a value
judgment not universally accepted [ Footnote 3/3 ] -- or that only the latter deprival is
irrevocable? I can find no acceptable rationalization for such a
result, and I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															It might, however, be said that there is such an implication in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940), a capital case in which counsel had been appointed, but in
which the petitioner claimed a denial of "effective" assistance.
The Court, in affirming, noted that,

															"[h]ad petitioner been denied any representation of counsel at
all, such a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
of assistance of counsel would have required reversal of his
conviction." Id. at 308 U. S. 445 .
No "special circumstances" were recited by the Court, but, in
citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45 (1932), as authority for its dictum, it appears that
the Court did not rely solely on the capital nature of the
offense.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Portents of today's decision may be found as well in Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), and Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.
S. 570 (1961). In Griffin, a noncapital case,
we held that the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated
by the State's procedure, which provided free transcripts for
indigent defendants only in capital cases. In Ferguson, we
struck down a state practice denying the appellant the effective
assistance of counsel, cautioning that

															"[o]ur decision does not turn on the facts that the appellant
was tried for a capital offense and was represented by employed
counsel. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment also applies in
the case of an accused tried for a noncapital offense, or
represented by appointed counsel."

															365 U.S. at 365 U. S.
596 .

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See, e.g., Barzun, In Favor of Capital Punishment, 31
American Scholar 181, 188-189 (1962).

															MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

															I agree that Betts v. Brady should be overruled, but
consider it entitled to a more respectful burial than has been
accorded, at least on the part of those of us who were not on the
Court when that case was decided.

															I cannot subscribe to the view that Betts v. Brady represented "an abrupt break with its own well considered
precedents." Ante, p. 372 U. S. 344 .
In 1932, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45 , a capital case, this Court declared that, under the
particular facts there presented --

															"the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth,
the circumstances of public hostility . . . and, above all, that
they stood in deadly peril of their lives"

															(287 U.S. at 287 U. S. 71 ) --
the state court had a duty to assign counsel for Page 372 U. S. 350 the trial as a necessary requisite of due process of law. It is
evident that these limiting facts were not added to the opinion as
an afterthought; they were repeatedly emphasized, see 287
U.S. at 287 U. S. 52 , 287 U. S. 57 -58, 287 U. S. 71 ,
and were clearly regarded as important to the result.

															Thus, when this Court, a decade later, decided Betts v.
Brady, it did no more than to admit of the possible existence
of special circumstances in noncapital, as well as capital, trials,
while at the same time insisting that such circumstances be shown
in order to establish a denial of due process. The right to
appointed counsel had been recognized as being considerably broader
in federal prosecutions, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , but
to have imposed these requirements on the States would indeed have
been "an abrupt break" with the almost immediate past. The
declaration that the right to appointed counsel in state
prosecutions, as established in Powell v. Alabama, was not
limited to capital cases was, in truth, not a departure from, but
an extension of, existing precedent.

															The principles declared in Powell and in Betts, however, have had a troubled journey throughout the
years that have followed first the one case and then the other.
Even by the time of the Betts decision, dictum in at least
one of the Court's opinions had indicated that there was an
absolute right to the services of counsel in the trial of state
capital cases. [ Footnote 4/1 ] Such
dicta continued to appear in subsequent decisions, [ Footnote 4/2 ] and any lingering doubts were finally
eliminated by the holding of Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 .

															In noncapital cases, the "special circumstances" rule has
continued to exist in form while its substance has been
substantially and steadily eroded. In the first decade after Betts, there were cases in which the Court Page 372 U. S. 351 found special circumstances to be lacking, but usually by a
sharply divided vote. [ Footnote
4/3 ] However, no such decision has been cited to us, and I have
found none, after Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.
S. 660 , decided in 1950. At the same time, there have
been not a few cases in which special circumstances were found in
little or nothing more than the "complexity" of the legal questions
presented, although those questions were often of only routine
difficulty. [ Footnote 4/4 ] The
Court has come to recognize, in other words, that the mere
existence of a serious criminal charge constituted, in itself,
special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.
In truth, the Betts v. Brady rule is no longer a
reality.

															This evolution, however, appears not to have been fully
recognized by many state courts, in this instance charged with the
front-line responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional
rights. [ Footnote 4/5 ] To continue
a rule which is honored by this Court only with lip service is not
a healthy thing, and, in the long run, will do disservice to the
federal system.

															The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in
capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be
similarly abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses
which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence. (Whether the rule should extend to all
criminal cases need not now be decided.) This indeed does no more
than to make explicit something that has long since been
foreshadowed in our decisions. Page 372 U. S. 352 In agreeing with the Court that the right to counsel in a case
such as this should now be expressly recognized as a fundamental
right embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment, I wish to make a
further observation. When we hold a right or immunity, valid
against the Federal Government, to be "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" [ Footnote 4/6 ] and
thus valid against the States, I do not read our past decisions to
suggest that, by so holding, we automatically carry over an entire
body of federal law and apply it in full sweep to the States. Any
such concept would disregard the frequently wide disparity between
the legitimate interests of the States and of the Federal
Government, the divergent problems that they face, and the
significantly different consequences of their actions. Cf. Roth
v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S.
496 -508 (separate opinion of this writer). In what is
done today, I do not understand the Court to depart from the
principles laid down in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.
S. 319 , or to embrace the concept that the Fourteenth
Amendment "incorporates" the Sixth Amendment as such.

															On these premises I join in the judgment of the Court.

															[ Footnote 4/1 ] Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 , 308 U. S.
445 .

															[ Footnote 4/2 ] E.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.
S. 640 , 333 U. S. 674 ; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 , 335 U. S.
441 .

															[ Footnote 4/3 ] E.g., Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.
S. 134 ; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.
S. 640 ; Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.
S. 728 .

															[ Footnote 4/4 ] E.g., Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.
S. 471 ; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.
S. 697 ; Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.
S. 443 .

															[ Footnote 4/5 ] See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 405
Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961); Shaffer v. Warden, 211 Md.
635, 126 A.2d 573 (1956); Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d
363 (C.A. 6th Cir.1958).

															[ Footnote 4/6 ] Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 , 302 U. S.
325 .

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright:

The Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant in a criminal trial has the right to have legal assistance, which is essential for a fair trial. This right is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and state courts are responsible for enforcing it. The Court overruled Betts v. Brady, which allowed states to deny counsel to indigent defendants in non-capital cases. The Court recognized that the right to counsel is a fundamental right and should be explicitly guaranteed in non-capital cases where the defendant faces a substantial prison sentence. Justice Black, delivering the opinion, emphasized that this decision did not mean that the entire body of federal law regarding the right to counsel would be applied to the states.