U.S. Supreme Court Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703 (1985) Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc. No. 83-1158 Argued November 7,
1984 Decided June 26, 1985 472
U.S. 703 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CONNECTICUT Syllabus Petitioner's decedent, Donald E. Thornton, worked in a
managerial position at a Connecticut store owned by respondent,
which operated a chain of New England retail stores. In 1979,
Thornton informed respondent that he would no longer work on
Sundays, as was required by respondent as to managerial employees.
Thornton invoked the Connecticut statute which provides:

															"No person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on
such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not
constitute grounds for his dismissal."

															Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him to a
management job in a Massachusetts store that was closed on Sundays,
or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory position in the Connecticut
store at a lower salary. Subsequently, respondent transferred
Thornton to a clerical position in the Connecticut store; Thornton
resigned two days later and filed a grievance with the State Board
of Mediation and Arbitration, alleging that he was discharged from
his manager's position in violation of the Connecticut statute. The
Board sustained the grievance, ordering respondent to reinstate
Thornton, and the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed the Board's
ruling, concluding that the statute did not offend the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Connecticut
Supreme Court reversed. Held: The Connecticut statute, by providing Sabbath
observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on
their chosen Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause. To meet
constitutional requirements under that Clause, a statute must not
only have a secular purpose and not foster excessive entanglement
of government with religion, its primary effect must not advance or
inhibit religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 . The Connecticut statute imposes on employers and
employees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to
the particular religious practices of an employee by enforcing
observance of the Sabbath that the latter unilaterally designates.
The State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns
automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace;
the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the
employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath.
In granting unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over
all other interests, the statute has a Page 472 U. S. 704 primary effect that impermissibly advances a particular
religious practice. Pp. 472 U. S.
708 -711.

															191 Conn.336, 464 A.2d 785, affirmed. BURGR, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR,
JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 472 U. S. 711 .
REHNQUIST, J., dissented.

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari to decide whether a state statute that
provides employees with the absolute right not to work Page 472 U. S. 705 on their chosen Sabbath violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. I In early 1975, petitioner's decedent Donald E. Thornton
[ Footnote 1 ] began working for
respondent Caldor, Inc., a chain of New England retail stores; he
managed the men's and boys' clothing department in respondent's
Waterbury, Connecticut, store. At that time, respondent's
Connecticut stores were closed on Sundays pursuant to state law.
Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 53-300 to 53-303 (1958).

															In 1977, following the state legislature's revision of the
Sunday closing laws, [ Footnote
2 ] respondent opened its Connecticut stores for Sunday
business. In order to handle the expanded store hours, respondent
required its managerial employees to work every third or fourth
Sunday. Thornton, a Presbyterian who observed Sunday as his
Sabbath, initially Page 472 U. S. 706 complied with respondent's demand and worked a total of 31
Sundays in 1977 and 1978. In October, 1978, Thornton was
transferred to a management position in respondent's Torrington
store; he continued to work on Sundays during the first part of
1979. In November, 1979, however, Thornton informed respondent that
he would no longer work on Sundays because he observed that day as
his Sabbath; he invoked the protection of Conn.Gen.Stat. §
53-303e(b) (1985), which provides:

															"No person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on
such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not
constitute grounds for his dismissal. [ Footnote 3 ]"

															Thornton rejected respondent's offer either to transfer him to a
management job in a Massachusetts store that was closed on Sundays
or to transfer him to a nonsupervisory position in the Torrington
store at a lower salary. [ Footnote
4 ] In March, 1980, respondent transferred Thornton to a
clerical position in the Torrington store; Thornton resigned two
days later Page 472 U. S. 707 and filed a grievance with the State Board of Mediation and
Arbitration alleging that he was discharged from his manager's
position in violation of Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985).

															Respondent defended its action on the ground that Thornton had
not been "discharged" within the meaning of the statute; respondent
also urged the Board to find that the statute violated Article 7 of
the Connecticut Constitution as well as the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.

															After holding an evidentiary hearing the Board evaluated the
sincerity of Thornton's claim and concluded it was based on a
sincere religious conviction; it issued a formal decision
sustaining Thornton's grievance. The Board framed the statutory
issue as follows: "If a discharge for refusal to work Sunday hours
occurred and Sunday was the Grievant's Sabbath . . . ," §
53-303e(b) would be violated; the Board held that respondent had
violated the statute by "discharg[ing] Mr. Thornton as a management
employee for refusing to work . . . [on] Thornton's . . . Sabbath."
App. 11a, 12a. The Board ordered respondent to reinstate Thornton
with backpay and compensation for lost fringe benefits. [ Footnote 5 ] The Superior Court, in
affirming that ruling, concluded that the statute did not offend
the Establishment Clause.

															The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, holding the statute
did not have a "clear secular purpose." Caldor, Inc. v.
Thornton, 191 Conn.336, 349, 464 A.2d 785, 793 (1983).
[ Footnote 6 ] By authorizing
each employee to designate his own Sabbath as a day off, the
statute evinced the "unmistakable purpose . . . [of] allow[ing]
those persons who wish to worship on a particular day the freedom
to do so." Ibid. The court then held that the "primary
effect" of the statute was to advance Page 472 U. S. 708 religion because the statute

															"confers its 'benefit' on an explicitly religious basis. Only
those employees who designate a Sabbath are entitled not to work on
that particular day, and may not be penalized for so doing." Id. at 350, 464 A.2d at 794. The court noted that the
statute required the State Mediation Board to decide which
religious activities may be characterized as an "observance of
Sabbath" in order to assess employees' sincerity, and concluded
that this type of inquiry is

															"exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and
continuing state surveillance' . . . which creates excessive
governmental entanglements between church and state." Id. at 351, 464 A.2d at 794 ( quoting Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 619 (1971)).

															We granted certiorari, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984). [ Footnote 7 ] We affirm. II Under the Religion Clauses, government must guard against
activity that impinges on religious freedom, and must take pains
not to compel people to act in the name of any religion. In setting
the appropriate boundaries in Establishment Clause cases, the Court
has frequently relied on our holding in Lemon, supra, for
guidance, and we do so here. To pass constitutional muster under Lemon a statute must not only have a secular purpose and
not foster excessive entanglement of government with religion, its
primary effect must not advance or inhibit religion.

															The Connecticut statute challenged here guarantees every
employee, who "states that a particular day of the week is observed
as his Sabbath," the right not to work on his chosen day.
Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53-303e(b) (1985). The State has thus decreed that
those who observe a Sabbath any day of the week as a matter of
religious conviction must be relieved of the duty to work on that
day, no matter what burden or Page 472 U. S. 709 inconvenience this imposes on the employer or fellow workers.
The statute arms Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified
right not to work on whatever day they designate as their Sabbath.
[ Footnote 8 ]

															In essence, the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and
employees an absolute duty to conform their business practices to
the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing
observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates. The
State thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically
control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute
takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or
those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. The employer
and others must adjust their affairs to the command of the State
whenever the statute is invoked by an employee.

															There is no exception under the statute for special
circumstances, such as the Friday Sabbath observer employed in an
occupation with a Monday through Friday schedule a school teacher,
for example; the statute provides for no special consideration if a
high percentage of an employer's workforce asserts rights to the
same Sabbath. Moreover, there is no exception when honoring the
dictates of Sabbath observers Page 472 U. S. 710 would cause the employer substantial economic burdens or when
the employer's compliance would require the imposition of
significant burdens on other employees required to work in place of
the Sabbath observers. [ Footnote
9 ] Finally, the statute allows for no consideration as to
whether the employer has made reasonable accommodation
proposals.

															This unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all
other interests contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion
Clauses, so well articulated by Judge Learned Hand:

															"The First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist
that, in pursuit of their own interests, others must conform their
conduct to his own religious necessities." Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61
(CA2 1953). As such, the statute goes beyond having an incidental
or remote effect of advancing religion. See, e.g., Roemer v.
Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.
S. 736 , 426 U. S. 747 (1976); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968). The statute has a primary effect that
impermissibly advances a particular religious practice. III We hold that the Connecticut statute, which provides Sabbath
observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to Page 472 U. S. 711 work on their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Connecticut is Affirmed. JUSTICE REHNQUIST dissents.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Thornton died on February 4, 1982, while his appeal was pending
before the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The administrator of
Thornton's estate has continued the suit on behalf of the
decedent's estate.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The state legislature revised the Sunday closing laws in 1976
after a state court held that the existing laws were
unconstitutionally vague. State v. Anonymous, 33
Conn.Supp. 55, 364 A.2d 244 (Com.Pl.1976). The legislature modified
the laws to permit certain classes of businesses to remain open.
Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53-302a (1985). At the same time, a new provision
was added, § 53-303e, which prohibited employment of more than six
days in any calendar week and guaranteed employees the right not to
work on the Sabbath of their religious faith. See n 3, infra. Soon after the
revised Sunday closing law was enacted, the Court of Common Pleas
once again declared it unconstitutional. State v.
Anonymous, 33 Conn.Supp. 141, 366 A.2d 200 (1976). This
decision was limited to the provision requiring Sunday closing, §
53-302a; the court did not consider the validity of other
provisions such as § 53-303e. In 1978, the state legislature tried
its hand at enacting yet another Sunday closing law, Pub. Act No.
78-329, 1978 Conn.Pub. Acts 700-702; the Supreme Court of
Connecticut declared the statute unconstitutional. Caldor's
Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn.304, 417 A.2d 343 (1979).
As had the Court of Common Pleas, the Connecticut Supreme Court did
not address the constitutionality of § 53-303e and that provision
remained in effect until challenged in this action.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Thornton had learned of this statutory protection by consulting
with an attorney. See App. 88a-9Oa.

															Section 53-303e was enacted as part of the 1976 revision of the
Sunday closing laws. Apart from the 6-day week and the Sabbath
observance provisions, see n 2, supra, the remainder of the statute
provides:

															"(c) Any employee, who believes that his discharge was in
violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section may appeal such
discharge to the state board of mediation and arbitration. If said
board finds that the employee was discharged in violation of said
subsection (a) or (b), it may order whatever remedy will make the
employee whole, including but not limited to reinstatement to his
former or a comparable position."

															"(d) No employer may, as a prerequisite to employment, inquire
whether the applicant observes any Sabbath."

															"(e) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall
not be fined more than two hundred dollars."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The collective bargaining agreement in effect for nonsupervisory
employees provided that they were not required to work on Sundays
if it was "contrary [to the employee's] personal religious
convictions." App. 91a.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Board refused to consider respondent's constitutional
challenge on the ground that, as a quasi-judicial body, it had no
authority to pass on the constitutionality of state law. Id. at 9a-10a.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The court expressly chose not to consider whether the statute
violated Article 7 of the Connecticut Constitution. 191 Conn. at
346, n. 7, 464 A.2d at 792, n. 7.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															We also granted the State of Connecticut's motion to intervene
as of right to defend the constitutionality of the state law. 465
U.S. 1098 (1984).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration construed the
statute as providing Thornton with the absolute right not to work
on his Sabbath. Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, Conn.Bd. Med.
& Arb. No. 7980-A-727 (Oct. 20, 1980), App. 11a-12a; accord, G. Fox & Co. v. Rinaldi, Conn.Bd. Med. &
Arb. No. 8182-A-440 (Nov. 17, 1982) ("There is no question that . .
. the employee has an absolute right to designate any day of the
week as his or her sabbath [and that § 53-303e(b) would be violated
if] the termination was as a result of the employee's refusal to
work on her sabbath"). Following settled state law, see, e.g.,
Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn.14, 18,
458 A.2d 685, 688 (1983) (per curiam), the State Superior Court and
the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the Board's construction
of the statute, 191 Conn. at 340-343, 350, 464 A.2d at 789-790,
794. This construction of the state law is, of course, binding on
federal courts. E.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.
S. 161 , 432 U. S. 167 (1977); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.
S. 157 , 368 U. S. 169 (1961); Murdock v. City of
Memphis , 20 Wall. 590 (1875).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Section 53-303e(b) gives Sabbath observers the valuable right to
designate a particular weekly day off -- typically a weekend day,
widely prized as a day off. Other employees who have strong and
legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a weekend day off
have no rights under the statute. For example, those employees who
have earned the privilege through seniority to have weekend days
off may be forced to surrender this privilege to the Sabbath
observer; years of service and payment of "dues" at the workplace
simply cannot compete with the Sabbath observer's absolute right
under the statute. Similarly, those employees who would like a
weekend day off, because that is the only day their spouses are
also not working, must take a back seat to the Sabbath
observer.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
concurring.

															The Court applies the test enunciated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971), and concludes that Conn.Gen.Stat. §
53-303e(b) (1985) has a primary effect that impermissibly advances
religion. I agree, and I join the Court's opinion and judgment. In
my view, the Connecticut Sabbath law has an impermissible effect
because it conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath
observance.

															All employees, regardless of their religious orientation, would
value the benefit which the statute bestows on Sabbath observers --
the right to select the day of the week in which to refrain from
labor. Yet Connecticut requires private employers to confer this
valued and desirable benefit only on those employees who adhere to
a particular religious belief. The statute singles out Sabbath
observers for special and, as the Court concludes, absolute
protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and
religious beliefs and practices of other private employees. There
can be little doubt that an objective observer or the public at
large would perceive this statutory scheme precisely as the Court
does today. Ante at 472 U. S.
708 -710. The message conveyed is one of endorsement of a
particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not
share it. As such, the Connecticut statute has the effect of
advancing religion, and cannot withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny.

															I do not read the Court's opinion as suggesting that the
religious accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 are similarly invalid. These provisions preclude
employment discrimination based on a person's religion Page 472 U. S. 712 and require private employers to reasonably accommodate the
religious practices of employees unless to do so would cause undue
hardship to the employer's business. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(J) and
2000e-2(a)(1). Like the Connecticut Sabbath law, Title VII attempts
to lift a burden on religious practice that is imposed by private employers, and hence it is not the sort of
accommodation statute specifically contemplated by the Free
Exercise Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree, ante at 472 U. S. 83 -84
(opinion concurring in judgment). The provisions of Title VII must
therefore manifest a valid secular purpose and effect to be valid
under the Establishment Clause. In my view, a statute outlawing
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring
employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S.
63 , 432 U. S. 90 , n.
4 (1977) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Since Title VII calls for
reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and extends that
requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than
protecting only the Sabbath observance, I believe an objective
observer would perceive it as an antidiscrimination law rather than
an endorsement of religion or a particular religious practice.

Summary: In *Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Connecticut statute granting employees an absolute right to refuse work on their chosen Sabbath day violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court held that the statute had the primary effect of advancing a particular religious practice by imposing an absolute duty on employers to accommodate an employee's Sabbath observance, without considering the interests of the employer or other employees. The statute's unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers was seen as an endorsement of a particular religious belief, impermissibly advancing religion.