NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the United States
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–174

															_________________

															GERALD E. GROFF, PETITIONER v. LOUIS
DeJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[June 29, 2023]

															Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
requires employers to accommodate the religious practice of their
employees unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.” 78Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.
S. C. §2000e(j). Based on a line in this Court’s decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , 432 U.S.
63 , 84 (1977), many lower courts, including the Third Circuit
below, have interpreted “undue hardship” to mean any effort or cost
that is “more than . . . de minimis .” In this case, however,
both parties—the plaintiff-petitioner, Gerald Groff, and the
defendant-respondent, the Postmaster General, represented by the
Solicitor General—agree that the de minimis reading of Hardison is a mistake. With the benefit of thorough briefing
and oral argument, we today clarify what Title VII requires.

															I

															Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who
believes for religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to
worship and rest, not “secular labor” and the “transport[ation]” of
worldly “goods.” App. 294. In 2012, Groff began his employment with
the United States Postal Service (USPS), which has more than
600,000 employees. He became a Rural Carrier Associate, a job that
required him to assist regular carriers in the delivery of mail.
When he took the position, it generally did not involve Sunday
work. But within a few years, that changed. In 2013, USPS entered
into an agreement with Amazon to begin facilitating Sunday
deliveries, and in 2016, USPS signed a memorandum of understanding
with the relevant union (the National Rural Letter Carriers’
Association) that set out how Sunday and holiday parcel delivery
would be handled. During a 2-month peak season, each post office
would use its own staff to deliver packages. At all other times,
Sunday and holiday deliveries would be carried out by employees
(including Rural Carrier Associates like Groff) working from a
“regional hub.” For Quarryville, Pennsylvania, where Groff was
originally stationed, the regional hub was the Lancaster Annex.

															The memorandum specifies the order in which USPS
employees are to be called on for Sunday work outside the peak
season. First in line are each hub’s “Assistant Rural Carriers”—
part-time employees who are assigned to the hub and cover only
Sundays and holidays. Second are any volunteers from the geographic
area, who are assigned on a rotating basis. And third are all other
carriers, who are compelled to do the work on a rotating basis.
Groff fell into this third category, and after the memorandum of
understanding was adopted, he was told that he would be required to
work on Sunday. He then sought and received a transfer to Holtwood,
a small rural USPS station that had only seven employees and that,
at the time, did not make Sunday deliveries. But in March 2017,
Amazon deliveries began there as well.

															With Groff unwilling to work on Sundays, USPS
made other arrangements. During the peak season, Sunday deliveries
that would have otherwise been performed by Groff were carried out
by the rest of the Holtwood staff, including the postmaster, whose
job ordinarily does not involve delivering mail. During other
months, Groff ’s Sunday assignments were redistributed to other
carriers assigned to the regional hub.[ 1 ] Throughout this time, Groff continued to receive
“progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays. 35 F. 4th
162, 166 (CA3 2022). Finally, in January 2019, he
resigned.[ 2 ]

															A few months later, Groff sued under Title VII,
asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath
practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS’s]
business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). The District Court granted
summary judgment to USPS, 2021 WL 1264030 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021),
and the Third Circuit affirmed. The panel majority felt that it was
“bound by [the] ruling” in Hardison , which it construed to
mean “that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis
cost’ to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.”
35 F. 4th, at 174, n. 18 (quoting 432 U. S., at 84). Under
Circuit precedent, the panel observed, this was “not a difficult
threshold to pass,” 35 F. 4th, at 174 (internal quotation marks
omitted), and it held that this low standard was met in this case.
Exempting Groff from Sunday work, the panel found, had “imposed on
his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workflow, and diminished
employee morale.” Id ., at 175. Judge Hardiman dissented,
concluding that adverse “effects on USPS employees in Lancaster or
Holtwood” did not alone suffice to show the needed hardship “on the
employer’s business .” Id ., at 177 (emphasis in
original).

															We granted Groff ’s ensuing petition for a writ
of certiorari. 598 U. S. ___ (2023).

															II

															Because this case presents our first
opportunity in nearly 50 years to explain the contours of Hardison , we begin by recounting the legal backdrop to that
case, including the development of the Title VII provision barring
religious discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC’s) regulations and guidance regarding that
prohibition. We then summarize how the Hardison case
progressed to final decision, and finally, we discuss how courts
and the EEOC have understood its significance. This background
helps to explain the clarifications we offer today.

															A

															Since its passage, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 has made it unlawful for covered employers “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment,
because of such individual’s . . . religion.” 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–2(a)(1) (1964 ed.). As originally enacted, Title VII did not
spell out what it meant by discrimination “because
of . . . religion,” but shortly after the statute’s
passage, the EEOC interpreted that provision to mean that employers
were sometimes required to “accommodate” the “reasonable religious
needs of employees.” 29 CFR § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). After some
tinkering, the EEOC settled on a formulation that obligated
employers “to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs
of employees” whenever that would not work an “undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer’s business.” 29 CFR § 1605.1
(1968).

															Between 1968 and 1972, the EEOC elaborated on
its understanding of “undue hardship” in a “long line of decisions”
addressing a variety of policies . Hardison , 432 U. S., at 85
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see Brief for General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists as Amicus Curiae 10–22 (collecting
decisions). Those decisions addressed many accommodation issues
that still arise frequently today, including the wearing of
religious garb[ 3 ] and time off
from work to attend to religious obligations.[ 4 ]

															EEOC decisions did not settle the question of
undue hardship. In 1970, the Sixth Circuit held (in a Sabbath case)
that Title VII as then written did not require an employer “to
accede to or accommodate” religious practice because that “would
raise grave” Establishment Clause questions. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co ., 429 F.2d 324, 334. This Court granted
certiorari, 400 U.S. 1008, but then affirmed by an evenly divided
vote, 402 U.S.
689 (1971).

															Responding to Dewey and another decision
rejecting any duty to accommodate an employee’s observance of the
Sabbath, Congress amended Title VII in 1972. Hardison , 432
U. S., at 73–74; id. , at 88–89 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Tracking the EEOC’s regulatory language, Congress
provided that “[t]he term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. II).

															B

															The Hardison case concerned a dispute
that arose during the interval between the issuance of the EEOC’s
”undue hardship” regulation and the 1972 amendment to Title VII. In
1967, Larry Hardison was hired as a clerk at the Stores Department
in the Kansas City base of Trans World Airlines (TWA). The Stores
Department was responsible for providing parts needed to repair and
maintain aircraft. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines , 375 F. Supp. 877 , 889 (WD Mo. 1974). It played an “essential
role” and operated “24 hours per day, 365 days per year.” Hardison , 432 U. S., at 66. After taking this job, Hardison
underwent a religious conversion. He began to observe the Sabbath
by absenting himself from work from sunset on Friday to sunset on
Saturday, and this conflicted with his work schedule. The problem
was solved for a time when Hardison, who worked in Building 1,
switched to the night shift, but it resurfaced when he sought and
obtained a transfer to the day shift in Building 2 so that he could
spend evenings with his wife. 375 F. Supp., at 889. In that
new building, he did not have enough seniority to avoid work during
his Sabbath. Attempts at accommodation failed, and he was
eventually “discharged on grounds of insubordination.” 432 U. S.,
at 69.

															Hardison sued TWA and his union, the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAM).[ 5 ] The Eighth Circuit
found that reasonable accommodations were available, and it
rejected the defendants’ Establishment Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc ., 527 F.2d 33,
42–44 (1975).

															Both TWA and IAM then filed petitions for
certiorari, with TWA’s lead petition asking this Court to decide
whether the 1972 amendment of Title VII violated the Establishment
Clause as applied in the decision below, particularly insofar as
that decision had approved an accommodation that allegedly overrode
seniority rights granted by the relevant collective bargaining
agreement.[ 6 ] The Court granted
both petitions. 429 U.S. 958 (1976).

															When the Court took that action, all counsel had
good reason to expect that the Establishment Clause would figure
prominently in the Court’s analysis. As noted above, in June 1971,
the Court, by an equally divided vote, had affirmed the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Dewey , which had heavily relied on
Establishment Clause avoidance to reject the interpretation of
Title VII set out in the EEOC’s reasonable-accommodation
guidelines. Just over three weeks later, the Court had handed down
its (now abrogated)[ 7 ] decision
in Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S.
602 (1971) which adopted a test under which any law whose
“principal or primary effect” “was to advance religion” was
unconstitutional. Id. , at 612–613. Because it could be
argued that granting a special accommodation to a religious
practice had just such a purpose and effect, some thought that Lemon posed a serious problem for the 1972 amendment of
Title VII. And shortly before review was granted in Hardison , the Court had announced that the Justices were
evenly divided in a case that challenged the 1972 amendment as a
violation of the Establishment Clause . Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins , 429 U.S.
65 (1976) ( per curiam ).

															Against this backdrop, both TWA and IAM
challenged the constitutionality of requiring any accommodation for
religious practice. The Summary of Argument in TWA’s brief began
with this categorical assertion: “The religious accommodation
requirement of Title VII violates the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.” Brief for Petitioner TWA in O. T. 1976, No.
75–1126, p. 19. Applying the three-part Lemon test, TWA
argued that any such accommodation has the primary purpose and
effect of advancing religion and entails “pervasive” government
“entanglement . . . in religious issues.” Brief for Petitioner TWA
in No. 75–1126, at 20. The union’s brief made a similar argument,
Brief for Petitioner IAM, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, pp. 21–24,
50–72, but stressed the special status of seniority rights under
Title VII, id. , at 24–36.

															Despite the prominence of the Establishment
Clause in the briefs submitted by the parties and their amici ,[ 8 ] constitutional
concerns played no on-stage role in the Court’s opinion, which
focused instead on seniority rights.[ 9 ] The opinion stated that “the principal issue on which
TWA and the union came to this Court” was whether Title VII
“require[s] an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority
system to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in
order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practices.” 432
U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title VII imposed no
such requirement. Ibid . This conclusion, the Court found,
was “supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded
special treatment under Title VII itself.” Id ., at 81. It
noted that Title VII expressly provides special protection for “
‘bona fide seniority . . . system[s],’ ” id ., at 81–82
(quoting 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(h)), and it cited precedent reading
the statute “ ‘to make clear that the routine application of a
bona fide seniority system [is] not . . . unlawful under Title
VII.’ ” 432 U. S., at 82 (quoting Teamsters v. United States , 431 U.S.
324 , 352 (1977)). Invoking these authorities, the Court found
that the statute did not require an accommodation that
involuntarily deprived employees of seniority rights. 432 U. S., at
80.[ 10 ]

															Applying this interpretation of Title VII and
disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s evaluation of the factual
record, the Court identified no way in which TWA, without violating
seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardison’s
request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath. The Court found
that not enough co-workers were willing to take Hardison’s shift
voluntarily, that compelling them to do so would have violated
their seniority rights, and that leaving the Stores Department
short-handed would have adversely affected its “essential” mission. Id ., at 68, 80.

															The Court also rejected two other options
offered in Justice Marshall’s dissent: (1) paying other workers
overtime wages to induce them to work on Saturdays and making up
for that increased cost by requiring Hardison to work overtime for
regular wages at other times and (2) forcing TWA to pay overtime
for Saturday work for three months, after which, the dissent
thought, Hardison could transfer back to the night shift in
Building 1. The Court dismissed both of these options as not
“feasible,” id. , at 83, n. 14, but it provided no
explanation for its evaluation of the first. In dissent, Justice
Marshall suggested one possible reason: that the collective
bargaining agreement might have disallowed Hardison’s working
overtime for regular wages. Id. , at 95 (dissenting opinion).
But the majority did not embrace that explanation.

															As for the second, the Court disputed the
dissent’s conclusion that Hardison, if he moved back to Building 1,
would have had enough seniority to choose to work the night shift. Id. , at 83, n. 14. That latter disagreement was key.
The dissent thought that Hardison could have resumed the night
shift in Building 1 after just three months, and it therefore
calculated what it would have cost TWA to pay other workers’
overtime wages on Saturdays for that finite period of time.
According to that calculation, TWA’s added expense for three months
would have been $150 (about $1,250 in 2022 dollars).[ 11 ] Id ., at 92, n. 6. But the Court
doubted that Hardison could have regained the seniority rights he
had enjoyed in Building 1 prior to his transfer, and if that were
true, TWA would have been required to pay other workers overtime
for Saturday work indefinitely. Even under Justice Marshall’s math,
that would have worked out to $600 per year at the time, or roughly
$5,000 per year today.

															In the briefs and at argument, little space was
devoted to the question of determining when increased costs amount
to an “undue hardship” under the statute, but a single, but
oft-quoted, sentence in the opinion of the Court, if taken
literally, suggested that even a pittance might be too much for an
employer to be forced to endure. The line read as follows: “To
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to
give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” Id ., at
84.

															Although this line would later be viewed by many
lower courts as the authoritative interpretation of the statutory
term “undue hardship,” it is doubtful that it was meant to take on
that large role. In responding to Justice Marshall’s dissent, the
Court described the governing standard quite differently, stating
three times that an accommodation is not required when it entails
“substantial” “costs” or “expenditures.” Id. , at 83, n. 14.
This formulation suggests that an employer may be required to bear
costs and make expenditures that are not “substantial.” Of course,
there is a big difference between costs and expenditures that are
not “substantial” and those that are “de minimis,” which is to say,
so “very small or trifling” that that they are not even worth
noticing. Black’s Law Dictionary 388 (5th ed. 1979).

															The Court’s response to Justice Marshall’s
estimate of the extra costs that TWA would have been required to
foot is also telling. The majority did not argue that Justice
Marshall’s math produced considerably “more than a de
minimis cost” (as it certainly did). Instead, the Court
responded that Justice Marshall’s calculation involved assumptions
that were not “feasible under the circumstances” and would have
produced a different conflict with “the seniority rights of other
employees.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14; see Brief for United States
29, n. 4 (noting that Hardison “specifically rejected” the
dissent’s calculations and that it is “wrong to assert” that Hardison held that a $150 cost was an undue hardship).

															Ultimately, then, it is not clear that any of
the possible accommodations would have actually solved Hardison’s
problem without transgressing seniority rights. The Hardison Court was very clear that those rights were off-limits. Its
guidance on “undue hardship” in situations not involving seniority
rights is much less clear.

															C

															Even though Hardison ’s reference to
“ de minimis ” was undercut by conflicting language and was
fleeting in comparison to its discussion of the “principal issue”
of seniority rights, lower courts have latched on to “ de
minimis ” as the governing standard.

															To be sure, as the Solicitor General notes, some
lower courts have understood that the protection for religious
adherents is greater than “more than . . . de minimis ” might
suggest when read in isolation. But a bevy of diverse religious
organizations has told this Court that the de minimis test
has blessed the denial of even minor accommodation in many cases,
making it harder for members of minority faiths to enter the job
market. See, e.g. , Brief for The Sikh Coalition et al.
as Amici Curiae 15, 19–20 (“the de minimis standard
eliminates any meaningful mandate to accommodate Sikh practices in
the workplace” and “emboldens employers to deny reasonable
accommodation requests”); Brief for Council on American-Islamic
Relations as Amicus Curiae 3 (Muslim women wearing
religiously mandated attire “have lost employment opportunities”
and have been excluded from “critical public institutions like
public schools, law enforcement agencies, and youth rehabilitation
centers”); Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of
America as Amicus Curiae 14–15 (because the “ de
minimis cost” test “can be satisfied in nearly any
circumstance,” “Orthodox Jews once again [are] left at the mercy of
their employers’ good graces”); Brief for Seventh-day Adventist
Church in Canada et al. as Amici Curiae 8 (joint brief
of Sabbatarian faiths arguing that Sabbath accommodation under the de minimis standard is left to “their employers’ and
coworkers’ goodwill”).

															The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as
prescribing a “ ‘more than a de minimis cost’ ”
test, 29 CFR §1605.2(e)(1) (2022), but has tried in some ways to
soften its impact. It has specifically cautioned (as has the
Solicitor General in this case) against extending the phrase to
cover such things as the “administrative costs” involved in
reworking schedules, the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of
premium wages for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and
swaps” when they are not contrary to a “bona fide seniority
system.” §§1605.2(e)(1), (2).

															Nevertheless, some courts have rejected even the
EEOC’s gloss on “ de minimis .”[ 12 ] And in other cases, courts have rejected
accommodations that the EEOC’s guidelines consider to be ordinarily
required, such as the relaxation of dress codes and coverage for
occasional absences.[ 13 ]
Members of this Court have warned that, if the de minimis rule represents the holding of Hardison , the decision might
have to be reconsidered. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas
& Water , 593 U. S. ___ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Patterson v. Walgreen Co. , 589
U. S. ___ (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari). Four years ago, the Solicitor General—joined on its
brief by the EEOC—likewise took that view. Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae in Patterson v. Walgreen Co. ,
O. T. 2019, No. 18–349, p. 20 (“Contrary to Hardison ,
therefore, an ‘undue hardship’ is not best interpreted to mean
‘more than a de minimis cost’ ”).

															Today, the Solicitor General disavows its prior
position that Hardison should be overruled—but only on the
understanding that Hardison does not compel courts to read
the “more than de minimis ” standard “literally” or in a
manner that undermines Hardison ’s references to
“substantial” cost.[ 14 ] Tr.
of Oral Arg. 107. With the benefit of comprehensive briefing and
oral argument, we agree.[ 15 ]

															III

															We hold that showing “more than a de
minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does
not suffice to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing
an employer’s “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred
repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better
explains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, understand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a
burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s
business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62 (argument of Solicitor
General). This fact-specific inquiry comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary
speech.

															A

															As we have explained, we do not write on a
blank slate in determining what an employer must prove to defend a
denial of a religious accommodation, but we think it reasonable to
begin with Title VII’s text. After all, as we have stressed over
and over again in recent years, statutory interpretation must
“begi[n] with,” and ultimately heed, what a statute actually says. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense , 583
U.S. 109, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Bartenwerfer v. Buckley , 598 U.S. 69,
74 (2023); Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma , 589 U. S. ___, ___–___, ___ (2020) (slip op.,
at 5–6, 9).Here, the key statutory term is “undue hardship.” In
common parlance, a “hardship” is, at a minimum, “something hard to
bear.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 646 (1966)
(Random House). Other definitions go further. See, e.g. ,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1033 (1971) (Webster’s
Third) (“something that causes or entails suffering or privation”);
American Heritage Dictionary 601 (1969) (American Heritage)
(“[e]xtreme privation; adversity; suffering”); Black’s Law
Dictionary, at 646 (“privation, suffering, adversity”). But under
any definition, a hardship is more severe than a mere burden. So
even if Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to
suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability simply
by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of
additional costs. Those costs would have to rise to the level of
hardship, and adding the modifier “undue” means that the requisite
burden, privation, or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or
“unjustifiable” level. Random House 1547; see, e.g. ,
Webster’s Third 2492 (“inappropriate,” “unsuited,” or “exceeding or
violating propriety or fitness”); American Heritage 1398
(“excessive”). The Government agrees, noting that “ ‘undue
hardship means something greater than hardship.’ ” Brief for
United States 30; see id. , at 39 (arguing that
“accommodations should be assessed while ‘keep[ing] in mind both
words in the key phrase of the actual statutory text: “undue” and
“hardship” ’ ” (quoting Adeyeye v. Heartland
Sweeteners, LLC , 721 F.3d 444, 456 (CA7 2013)).

															When “undue hardship” is understood in this way,
it means something very different from a burden that is merely more
than de minimis , i.e. , something that is “very small
or trifling.” Black’s Law Dictionary, at 388. So considering
ordinary meaning while taking Hardison as a given, we are
pointed toward something closer to Hardison ’s references to
“substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432
U. S., at 83, n. 14.

															Similarly, while we do not rely on the pre-1972
EEOC decisions described above to define the term, we do observe
that these decisions often found that accommodations that entailed
substantial costs were required. See supra , at 5, nn. 3–4.
Nothing in this history plausibly suggests that “undue hardship” in
Title VII should be read to mean anything less than its meaning in
ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough , 596 U. S. ___,
___ (2022) (slip op., at 5) (a “robust regulatory backdrop” can
“fil[l] in the details” of a statutory scheme’s use of a specific
term).

															In short, no factor discussed by the parties—the
ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” the EEOC guidelines that Hardison concluded that the 1972 amendment “ ‘ratified,’ ”
432 U. S., at 76, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted), the use
of that term by the EEOC prior to those amendments, and the common
use of that term in other statutes—supports reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line.
See Brief for United States 39 (arguing that “the Court could
emphasize that Hardison ’s language does not displace the
statutory standard”).

															B

															In this case, both parties agree that the
“ de minimis ” test is not right, but they differ slightly in
the alternative language they prefer. Groff likes the phrase
“significant difficulty or expense.” Brief for Petitioner 15; Reply
Brief 2. The Government, disavowing its prior position that Title
VII’s text requires overruling Hardison , points us to Hardison ’s repeated references to “substantial expenditures”
or “substantial additional costs.” Brief for United States 28–29
(citing 432 U. S., at 83–84, and n. 14); see Brief for United
States 39. We think it is enough to say that an employer must show
that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in
substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its
particular business. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 83,
n. 14.

															What matters more than a favored synonym for
“undue hardship” (which is the actual text) is that courts must
apply the test in a manner that takes into account all relevant
factors in the case at hand, including the particular
accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the
nature, “size and operating cost of [an] employer.” Brief for
United States 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															C

															The main difference between the parties lies
in the further steps they would ask us to take in elaborating upon
their standards. Groff would not simply borrow the phrase
“significant difficulty or expense” from the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) but would have us instruct lower courts to
“draw upon decades of ADA caselaw.” Reply Brief 13. The Government,
on the other hand, requests that we opine that the EEOC’s
construction of Hardison has been basically correct. Brief
for United States 39.

															Both of these suggestions go too far. We have no
reservations in saying that a good deal of the EEOC’s guidance in
this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by
our clarifying decision today. After all, as a public advocate for
employee rights, much of the EEOC’s guidance has focused on what
should be accommodated. Accordingly, today’s clarification may
prompt little, if any, change in the agency’s guidance explaining
why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary
shift swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs.
See 29 CFR §1605.2(d). But it would not be prudent to ratify in
toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the benefit
of the clarification we adopt today. What is most important is that
“undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should
resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of
an employer’s business in the common-sense manner that it would use
in applying any such test.

															D

															The erroneous de minimis interpretation
of Hardison may have had the effect of leading courts to pay
insufficient attention to what the actual text of Title VII means
with regard to several recurring issues. Since we are now brushing
away that mistaken view of Hardison ’s holding, clarification
of some of those issues—in line with the parties’ agreement in this
case—is in order.

															First, on the second question presented, both
parties agree that the language of Title VII requires an assessment
of a possible accommodation’s effect on “the conduct of the
employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j); see 35 F. 4th, at
177–178 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). As the Solicitor General put
it, not all “impacts on coworkers . . . are relevant,” but only
“coworker impacts” that go on to “affec[t] the conduct of the
business.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–104. So an accommodation’s effect
on co-workers may have ramifications for the conduct of the
employer’s business, but a court cannot stop its analysis without
examining whether that further logical step is shown in a
particular case.

															On this point, the Solicitor General took pains
to clarify that some evidence that occasionally is used to show
“impacts” on coworkers is “off the table” for consideration. Id. , at 102. Specifically, a coworker’s dislike of
“religious practice and expression in the workplace” or “the mere
fact [of] an accommodation” is not “cognizable to factor into the
undue hardship inquiry.” Id. , at 89–90. To the extent that
this was not previously clear, we agree. An employer who fails to
provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is
“undue,” and a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity
to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very
notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered
“undue.” If bias or hostility to a religious practice or a
religious accommodation provided a defense to a reasonable
accommodation claim, Title VII would be at war with itself. See id. , at 89 (argument of Solicitor General) (such an approach
would be “giving effect to religious hostility”); contra, EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 86 , 89 (ND Ga. 1981) (considering as hardship
“[a]dverse customer reaction” from “a simple aversion to, or
discomfort in dealing with, bearded people”).

															Second, as the Solicitor General’s authorities
underscore, Title VII requires that an employer reasonably
accommodate an employee’s practice of religion, not merely that it
assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or
accommodations. See Adeyeye , 721 F. 3d, at 455; see
also Brief for United States 30, 33, 39. This distinction matters.
Faced with an accommodation request like Groff ’s, it would
not be enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other
employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship.
Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping,
would also be necessary.

															IV

															Having clarified the Title VII undue-hardship
standard, we think it appropriate to leave the context-specific
application of that clarified standard to the lower courts in the
first instance. The Third Circuit assumed that Hardison prescribed a “more than a de minimis cost” test, 35 F. 4th, at 175,
and this may have led the court to dismiss a number of possible
accommodations, including those involving the cost of incentive
pay, or the administrative costs of coordination with other nearby
stations with a broader set of employees. Without foreclosing the
possibility that USPS will prevail, we think it appropriate to
leave it to the lower courts to apply our clarified
context-specific standard, and to decide whether any further
factual development is needed.

															*  *  *

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Notes 1 Other employees complained
about the consequences of Groff ’s absences. While the parties
dispute some of the details, it appears uncontested that at least
one employee filed a grievance asserting a conflict with his
contractual rights. After disputing any conflict with contract
rights, USPS eventually settled that claim, with the settlement
reaffirming USPS’s commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding.
App. 118, 125–126. 2 Groff represents that his
resignation was in light of expected termination, and the District
Court found “a genuine issue of material fact” foreclosed summary
judgment as to whether Groff suffered an adverse employment action.
2021 WL 1264030,*8 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021). The Government does not
dispute the point in this Court. 3 See, e.g. , EEOC Dec. No.
71–779, 1970 WL 3550, *2 (Dec. 21, 1970) (no undue hardship in
permitting nurse to wear religious headscarf). 4 See EEOC Dec. No. 71–463, 1970
WL 3544, *1–*2 (Nov. 13, 1970) (no “undue hardship” or
“unreasonable burde[n]” for employer to train co-worker to cover
two-week religious absence); EEOC Dec. No. 70–580, 1970 WL 3513,
*1–*2 (Mar. 2, 1970) (manufacturing employer asked to accommodate
sundown-to-sundown Sabbath observance did not carry “burden . . .
to demonstrate undue hardship” where it did not address “whether
another employee could be trained to substitute for the Charging
Party during Sabbath days, or whether already qualified personnel
ha[d] been invited to work a double shift”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–670,
1970 WL 3518, *2 (Mar. 30, 1970) (no “undue ‘hardship’ ” in having
other employees take on a few more on-call Saturdays per year); see
also EEOC Dec. No. 70–110, 1969 WL 2908, *1–*2 (Aug. 27, 1969)
(employer could not deny employee all Sunday “overtime
opportunities” on basis of employee’s religious inability to work
Saturday, where others not working the full weekend had been
accommodated, notwithstanding employer’s claim of “considerable
expense”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–99, 1969 WL 2905, *1 (Aug. 27, 1969)
(no obligation to accommodate seasonal employee unavailable for
Saturday work, where employer showed both “no available pool of
qualified employees” to substitute and a “practical impossibility
of obtaining and training an employee” to cover one day a week for
six weeks). 5 “Labor organization[s]”
themselves were and are bound by Title VII’s nondiscrimination
rules. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(c) (1964 ed.). 6 See Pet. for Cert. in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , O. T. 1975, No.
75–1126, pp. 2–3, 17–22. 7 See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. , 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op.,
at 22). 8 See, e.g. , Brief for
Chrysler Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (arguing an
Establishment Clause violation), and Brief for State of Michigan as Amicus Curia e 20–25 (arguing no conflict with the
Establishment Clause), in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126 etc. 9 The background summarized above
and the patent clash between the ordinary meaning of “undue
hardship” and “more than . . . de minimis” led some to interpret
the decision to rest on Establishment Clause concerns. Justice
Marshall observed in his Hardison dissent that the majority
opinion “ha[d] the singular advantage of making consideration of
petitioners’ constitutional challenge unnecessary.” 432 U. S., at
89. A few courts assumed that Hardison actually was an
Establishment Clause decision. See, e.g. , Gibson v. Missouri Pacific R. Co ., 620 F. Supp. 85 , 88–89 (ED Ark. 1985) (concluding that
requiring an employer to “incur greater than de minimis costs”
related to accommodating a Sabbath “would therefore violate the
establishment clause”); see also Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination ,
450 Mass. 327, 340–341, and n. 15, 879 N.E.2d 36, 46–48, and
n.15 (2008) (construing state law narrowly on premise that Hardison might state outer constitutional bounds). Some
constitutional scholars also suggested that Hardison must
have been based on constitutional avoidance. See, e.g. , P.
Karlan & G. Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L. J. 1, 6–7 (1996); M.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 704 (1992); cf. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water , 952 F.3d
821, 829 (CA6 2020) (Thapar, J., concurring). In doing so, some
have pointed to Hardison ’s passing reference to a need to
avoid “unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their
religion.” 432 U. S., at 84. But the Court later clarified
that “Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to
religious practices” but instead “gives them favored treatment” in
order to ensure religious persons’ full participation in the
workforce. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc. , 575 U.S. 768, 775 (2015). 10 We do not
understand Groff to challenge the continued vitality of Hardison ’s core holding on its “principal issue” (bracketing
his disputes that the memorandum of understanding set forth a
seniority system). 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. 11 The dissent
appears to have drawn its estimate from Hardison’s daily rate at
the time of termination ($3.37/hour) and deposition testimony on
typical overtime rates and shift lengths. See App. in No. 75–1126
etc., at pp. 40, 126. 12 For
example, two years ago, the Seventh Circuit told the EEOC that it
would be an undue hardship on Wal-Mart (the Nation’s largest
private employer, with annual profits of over $11 billion) to be
required to facilitate voluntary shift-trading to accommodate a
prospective assistant manager’s observance of the Sabbath. EEOC v. Walmart Stores East, L. P. , 992 F.3d 656,
659–660 (2021). See Walmart Inc., Wall Street Journal Markets (June
4, 2023). 13 See, e.g. , Wagner v. Saint Joseph’s/Candler Health
System, Inc. , 2022 WL 905551, *4–*5 (SD Ga., Mar. 28, 2022)
(Orthodox Jew fired for taking off for High Holy Days); Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc. , 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314,
1322, 1331–1332 (ND Ga., 2017) (Muslim woman who wore a hijab fired
because the sight of her might harm the business in light of
“negative stereotypes and perceptions about Muslims”); El-Amin v. First Transit, Inc. , 2005 WL 1118175,
*7–*8 (SD Ohio, May 11, 2005) (Muslim employee terminated where
religious services conflicted with “two hours” of training a week
during a month of daily training); EEOC v. Sambo’s of
Ga., Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 86 , 91 (ND Ga., 1981) (hiring a Sikh man as a
restaurant manager would be an undue hardship because his beard
would have conflicted with “customer preference”). 14 At the
certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by noting
that Government employees receive “at least as much protection for
religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title
VII.” Brief in Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how
RFRA’s cause of action—which does not rely on employment
status—interacts with Title VII’s cause of action, and the Third
Circuit has treated Title VII as exclusively governing at least
some employment-related claims brought by Government employees.
Compare Francis v. Mineta , 505 F.3d 266, 271 (CA3
2007), with Tagore v. United States , 735 F.3d 324,
330–331 (CA5 2013) (federal employee’s RFRA claim could proceed
even though de minimis standard foreclosed Title VII claim).
Because Groff did not bring a RFRA claim, we need not resolve today
whether the Government is correct that RFRA claims arising out of
federal employment are not displaced by Title VII. 15 In addition
to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices have
questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972
EEOC Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of
Title VII. See Abercrombie , 575 U. S., at 787, n. (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As explained below,
because we—like the Solicitor General—construe Hardison as
consistent with the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” we need
not reconcile any divergence between Hardison and the
statutory text. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–174

															_________________

															GERALD E. GROFF, PETITIONER v. LOUIS
DeJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[June 29, 2023]

															Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson
joins, concurring.

															As both parties here agree, the phrase “more
than a de minimis cost” from Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison , 432 U.S.
63 , 84 (1977), was loose language. An employer violates Title
VII if it fails “to reasonably accommodate” an employee’s religious
observance or practice, unless the employer demonstrates that
accommodation would result in “undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). The
statutory standard is “undue hardship,” not trivial cost. Hardison , however, cannot be reduced to
its “ de minimis ” language. Instead, that case must be
understood in light of its facts and the Court’s reasoning. The Hardison Court concluded that the plaintiff ’s proposed
accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer’s business because the accommodation would have
required the employer either to deprive other employees of their
seniority rights under a collective-bargaining agreement, or to
incur substantial additional costs in the form of lost efficiency
or higher wages. 432 U. S., at 79–81, 83–84, and n. 14.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has interpreted Title
VII’s undue-hardship standard in this way for seven consecutive
Presidential administrations, from President Reagan to President
Biden. See 29 CFR §1605.2(e) (2022) (citing Hardison , 432
U. S., at 80, 84).

															Petitioner Gerald Groff asks this Court to
overrule Hardison and to replace it with a “significant
difficulty or expense” standard. Brief for Petitioner 17–38. The
Court does not do so. That is a wise choice because stare
decisis has “enhanced force” in statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).
Congress is free to revise this Court’s statutory interpretations.
The Court’s respect for Congress’s decision not to intervene
promotes the separation of powers by requiring interested parties
to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial process to
achieve their policy goals. This justification for statutory stare decisis is especially strong here because “Congress
has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse
[ Hardison ]—openings as frequent and clear as this Court ever
sees.” Id. , at 456–457.[ 1 ] Moreover, in the decades since Hardison was
decided, Congress has revised Title VII multiple times in response
to other decisions of this Court,[ 2 ] yet never in response to Hardison . See Kimble , 576 U. S., at 457.

															Groff also asks the Court to decide that Title
VII requires the United States Postal Service to show “undue
hardship to [its] business ,” not to Groff ’s
co-workers. Brief for Petitioner 42 (emphasis added); see 35
F. 4th 162, 176 (CA3 2022) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). The
Court, however, recognizes that Title VII requires “undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42
U. S. C. §2000e(j) (emphasis added). Because the “conduct
of [a] business” plainly includes the management and performance of
the business’s employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a
business may include undue hardship on the business’s employees.
See, e.g. , Hardison , 432 U. S., at 79–81
(deprivation of employees’ bargained-for seniority rights
constitutes undue hardship). There is no basis in the text of the
statute, let alone in economics or common sense, to conclude
otherwise. Indeed, for many businesses, labor is more important to
the conduct of the business than any other factor.

															To be sure, some effects on co-workers will not
constitute “undue hardship” under Title VII. For example, animus
toward a protected group is not a cognizable “hardship” under any
antidiscrimination statute. Cf. ante , at 20. In addition,
some hardships, such as the labor costs of coordinating voluntary
shift swaps, are not “undue” because they are too insubstantial.
See 29 CFR §§1605.2(d)(1)(i), (e)(1). Nevertheless, if there is an
undue hardship on “the conduct of the employer’s business,” 42
U. S. C. §2000e(j), then such hardship is sufficient,
even if it consists of hardship on employees. With these
observations, I join the opinion of the Court. Notes 1 See, e.g. ,
H. R. 1440, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., §4(a)(4) (2021);
H. R. 5331, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., §4(a)(4) (2019);
S. 3686, 112th Cong., 2d Sess., §4(a)(3) (2012); S. 4046,
111th Cong., 2d Sess., §4(a)(3) (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong.,
2d Sess., §2(a)(1)(B) (2008); H. R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st
Sess., §2(a)(4) (2007); H. R. 1445, 109th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§2(a)(4) (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4)
(2005); S. 893, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (2003);
S. 2572, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(4) (2002); H. R.
4237, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(4) (2000); S. 1668, 106th
Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (1999); H. R. 2948, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess., §2(a)(4) (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§2(a)(4) (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a)(3)
(1997); H. R. 4117, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., §2(a)(3)
(1996). 2 See Civil Rights Act of
1991, 105Stat. 1071 (overruling Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio , 490 U.S.
642 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123Stat. 5
(overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. , 550 U.S.
618 (2007)).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Groff v. DeJoy:

The Supreme Court clarified that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to accommodate employees' religious practices unless doing so would impose an "undue hardship" on the conduct of the employer's business. The Court rejected the lower courts' interpretation of "undue hardship" as any effort or cost greater than a "de minimis" burden.

In this case, Gerald Groff, an Evangelical Christian, requested a religious accommodation from the United States Postal Service (USPS) to avoid working on Sundays. The USPS denied his request, and Groff sued, arguing that the USPS had not shown an "undue hardship." The Court agreed with Groff, stating that "undue hardship" means more than a minor inconvenience or cost.

The Court also clarified that "undue hardship" can include hardships on co-workers, such as depriving them of their bargained-for seniority rights, but it does not include animus toward a protected group or minor inconveniences like coordinating shift swaps.

The Court ultimately ruled in favor of Groff, holding that the USPS had not shown an "undue hardship" and was therefore required to accommodate his religious practice.