U.S. Supreme Court Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976) Mathews v. Lucas No. 75-88 Argued January 13,
1976 Decided June 29, 1976 427
U.S. 495 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE
ISLAND Syllabus The Social Security Act provides that a child of an individual
who died fully insured under the Act, is entitled to surviving
child's benefits if the child is under 18, or a student under 22,
and was dependent at the time of the parent's death. A child is
considered dependent if the insured parent was living with him or
contributed to the child's support at the time of death. Certain
children, however, need not submit such individualized proof of
dependency. Unless adopted by some other person, a child who is
legitimate or would be entitled to inherit from the insured parent
under state law is considered dependent at the time of the parent's
death, or even lacking this relationship under state intestacy law
is entitled to a presumption of dependency if the decedent before
death had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent,
resulting in a purported marriage which, but for a nonobvious
defect, would have been valid, or had acknowledged in writing that
the child was his, or had been decreed by a court to be the child's
father, or had been ordered by a court to support the child because
the child was his. After their father died, appellee illegitimate
children were administratively denied surviving children's benefits
on the ground that they failed to show dependency by proof that
their father lived with them or was contributing to their support
at the time of his death, or by any of the statutory presumptions
of dependency. After this ruling was upheld on administrative
appeal, appellees filed an action for review against appellant
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, alleging that the
denial of benefits violated the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because other children,
including all legitimate children, are statutorily entitled, as
appellee children are not, to survivors' benefits regardless of
actual dependency. The District Court held that the statutory
classifications were constitutionally impermissible, reversing the
administrative decision and ordering that benefits be paid to the
children. Held: 1. The judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted to cases
involving Page 427 U. S. 496 discrimination along lines of race or national origin is not
required because legislation treats legitimate and illegitimate
offspring differently. Pp. 427 U. S. 503 -506.

															2. The challenged statutory classifications are permissible
because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency
at death, and in failing to extend any presumption of dependency to
appellee children and others like them, the Act does not
impermissibly discriminate against them as compared with legitimate
children or those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed
dependent. Pp. 427 U. S.
507 -516.

															(a) While Congress was unwilling to assume that every child of a
deceased insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming
dependency on the basis of relatively readily documented facts,
such as legitimate birth, or a support order or paternity decree,
which could be relied upon to indicate the likelihood of continued
actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the burden and
expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large number
of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such
presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the
Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does
not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable
level of scrutiny. Pp. 427 U. S.
509 -510.

															(b) The challenged classifications are justified as reasonable
empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify
entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of
the parent's death. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.
S. 535 ; New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 ; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 ; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 ; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.
S. 628 ; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.
S. 677 , distinguished. Pp. 427 U. S.
510 -516. 390 F.
Supp. 1310 , reversed.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN
and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 427 U. S.
516 . Page 427 U. S. 497 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the issue of the constitutionality, under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of those provisions of
the Social Security Act that condition the eligibility of certain
illegitimate children for a surviving child's insurance benefits
upon a showing that the deceased wage earner was the claimant
child's parent and, at the time of his death was living with the
child or was contributing to his support. I Robert Cuffee, now deceased, lived with Belmira Lucas during the
years 1948 through 1966, but they were never married. Two children
were born to them during these years: Ruby M. Lucas, in 1953, and
Darin E. Lucas, in 1960. In 1966, Cuffee and Lucas separated.
Cuffee died in Providence, R.I., his home, in 1968. He died without
ever having acknowledged in writing his paternity of either Ruby or
Darin, and it was never determined in any judicial proceeding
during his lifetime that he was the father of either child. After
Cuffee's death, Mrs. Lucas filed an application on behalf of Ruby
and Darin for surviving children's benefits under § 202(d)(1) of
the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 807, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
402(d)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), based upon Cuffee's earnings
record. II In operative terms, the Act provides that an unmarried son or
daughter of an individual, who died fully or currently insured
under the Act, may apply for and be Page 427 U. S. 498 entitled to a survivor's benefit, if the applicant is under 18
years of age at the time of application (or is a full-time student
and under 22 years of age) and was dependent, within the meaning of
the statute, at the time of the parent's death. [ Footnote 1 ] A child is considered dependent
for this purpose if the insured father was living with or
contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Certain
children, however, are relieved of the burden of such
individualized proof of dependency. Unless the child has been
adopted by some other individual, a child Page 427 U. S. 499 who is legitimate, or a child who would be entitled to inherit
personal property from the insured parent's estate under the
applicable state intestacy law is considered to have been dependent
at the time of the parent's death. [ Footnote 2 ] Even lacking this relationship under state
law, a child, unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled
to a presumption of dependency if the decedent, before death, (a)
had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent,
resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a
nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing
had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a
court to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court
to support the child because the child was his. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 427 U. S. 500 Examiner of the Social Security Administration, after hearings,
determined that, while Cuffee's paternity was established, the
children had failed to demonstrate their dependency by proof that
Cuffee either lived with them or was contributing to their support
at the time Page 427 U. S. 501 of his death, or by any of the statutory presumptions of
dependency, and thus that they were not entitled to survivorship
benefits under the Act. The Appeals Council of the Social Security
Administration affirmed these rulings, and they became the final
decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Lucas
then timely filed this action, pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), in the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island on behalf of the two children (hereinafter
sometimes called the appellees) for review of the Secretary's
decision.

															The District Court ultimately affirmed each of the factual
findings of the administrative agency: that Robert Cuffee was the
children's father; that he never acknowledged his paternity in
writing; that his paternity or support obligations had not been the
subject of a judicial proceeding during his lifetime; that no
common law marriage had ever been contracted between Cuffee and
Lucas, so that the children could not inherit Cuffee's personal
property under the intestacy law of Rhode Island; and that, at the
time of his death, he was neither living with the children nor
contributing to their support. 390 F.
Supp. 1310 , 1312-1314 (1975). None of these factual matters is
at issue here. [ Footnote 4 ] Page 427 U. S. 502 A motion for summary judgment, filed by the appellees, relied on Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974). It was urged that denial of benefits in this case, where
paternity was clear, violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, as that provision comprehends the principle of equal
protection of the laws, [ Footnote
5 ] because other children, including all legitimate children,
are statutorily entitled, as the Lucas children are not, to
survivorship benefits regardless of actual dependency. Addressing
this issue, the District Court ruled that the statutory
classifications were constitutionally impermissible. [ Footnote 6 ] 390 F. Supp. at 1314-1321.
Recognizing that the web of statutory provisions regarding
presumptive dependency was overinclusive because it entitled some
children, who were not actually dependent, to survivorship benefits
under the Act -- although not underinclusive, since no otherwise
eligible child who could establish actual dependency at the time of
death was denied such benefits -- the court concluded that the Act
was not intended merely to replace actual support that a
child lost through the death of the insured parent. Id. at
1319-1320. Rather, the court characterized the statute as one
designed to replace obligations of support or potential Page 427 U. S. 503 support lost through death, where the obligation was perceived
by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the relation
between the child's parents, to be a valid one. Thus, the court
concluded:

															"[The Act] conditions eligibility on the basis of Congress'
views as to who is entitled to support and reflects society's view
that legitimate and 'legitimated' children are more entitled to
support by or through a parent than are illegitimate children. But
this is not a legitimate governmental interest, and thus
cannot support the challenged classification. Gomez v.
Perez , [ 409 U.S.
535 (1973)]." Id. at 1320. (Emphasis in original.) With this
conclusion, the District Court reversed the administrative decision
and ordered the Secretary to pay benefits for both children.
Jurisdictional Statement 28a.

															The Secretary appealed directly to this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
We noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for argument with Norton v. Mathews, post, p. 427 U. S. 524 . 423 U. S. 19 (1975). III The Secretary does not disagree that the Lucas children and
others similarly circumstanced are treated differently, as a class,
from those children -- legitimate and illegitimate -- who are
relieved by statutory presumption of any requirement of proving
actual dependency at the time of death through cohabitation or
contribution: for children in the advantaged classes may be
statutorily entitled to benefits even if they have never been
dependent upon the father through whom they claim. [ Footnote 7 ] Statutory Page 427 U. S. 504 classifications, of course, are not per se unconstitutional; the matter depends upon the character of the
discrimination and its relation to legitimate legislative aims.

															"The essential inquiry . . . is . . . inevitably a dual one:
what legitimate [governmental] interest does the classification
promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?" Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 , 406 U. S. 173 (1972).

															Although the District Court concluded that close judicial
scrutiny of the statute's classifications was not necessary to its
conclusion invalidating those classifications, it also concluded
that legislation treating legitimate and illegitimate offspring
differently is constitutionally suspect, [ Footnote 8 ] 390 F. Supp. at 1318-1319, and requires the
judicial scrutiny traditionally devoted to cases involving
discrimination along lines of race [ Footnote 9 ] or national origin. [ Footnote 10 ] Appellees echo this approach. We
disagree. [ Footnote 11 ] Page 427 U. S. 505 It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy,
however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic
determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate
individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to
participate in and contribute to society. The Court recognized in Weber that visiting condemnation upon the child in order
to express society's disapproval of the parents' liaisons

															"is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the
illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual -- as well as an unjust -- way of deterring the
parent."

															406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 175 .
(Footnote omitted.) But where the law is arbitrary in such a way,
we have had no difficulty in finding the discrimination
impermissible on less demanding standards than those advocated
here. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin; 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Weber,
supra; Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). And such irrationality in some classifications does not in
itself demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made
in part on the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable.
Moreover, while the law has long Page 427 U. S. 506 placed the illegitimate child in an inferior position relative
to the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly in regard
to obligations of support or other aspects of family law, see
generally, e.g., H. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social
Policy 212 (1971); Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the
Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1,
19-38 (1969), perhaps in part because the roots of the
discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather than the
child, [ Footnote 12 ] and
perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious
badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against illegitimates
has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic
legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.
S. 677 , 411 U. S.
684 -686 (1973) (plurality opinion).

															We therefore adhere to our earlier view, see Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), that the Act's discrimination between individuals on the
basis of their legitimacy does not "command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process," San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. ___, 28 (1973),
which our most exacting scrutiny would entail. [ Footnote 13 ] See Jimenez, 417 U.S.
at 417 U. S.
631 -634, 417 U. S. 636 ; Weber, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 173 , 406 U. S.
175 -176. Page 427 U. S. 507 IV Relying on Weber, the Court, in Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U. S. 535 , 409 U. S. 538 (1973), held that

															"once a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of
children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an
essential right to a child simply because its natural father has
not married its mother."

															The same principle, which we adhere to now, applies when the
judicially enforceable right to needed support lies against the
Government, rather than a natural father. See New Jersey
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, supra. Consistent with our decisions, the Secretary explains the design
of the statutory scheme assailed here as a program to provide for
all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their "need"
in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths. Cf. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 634 .
He authenticates this description by reference to the explicit
language of the Act specifying that the applicant child's
classification as legitimate, or acknowledged, etc., is ultimately
relevant only to the determination of dependency, and by reference
to legislative history indicating that the statute was not a
general welfare provision for legitimate or otherwise "approved"
children of deceased insureds, but was intended just "to replace
the support lost by a child when his father . . . dies. . . ."
S.Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1965).

															Taking this explanation at face value, we think it clear that
conditioning entitlement upon dependency at the time of death is
not impermissibly discriminatory in providing only for those
children for whom the loss of the parent is an immediate source of
the need. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.
S. 484 , 417 U. S.
492 -497 (1974); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher , Page 427 U. S. 508 404 U. S. 78 (1971). See also Weber, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S.
174 -175.

															But appellees contend that the actual design of the statute
belies the Secretary's description, and that the statute was
intended to provide support for insured decedents' children
generally, if they had a "legitimate" claim to support, without
regard to actual dependency at death; in any case, they assert, the
statute's matrix of classifications bears no adequate relationship
to actual dependency at death. Since such dependency does not
justify the statute's discriminations, appellees argue, those
classifications must fall under Gomez v. Perez, supra. These assertions are, in effect, one and the same. [ Footnote 14 ] The basis for appellees'
argument is the obvious fact that Page 427 U. S. 509 each of the presumptions of dependency renders the class of
benefit recipients incrementally overinclusive, in the sense that
some children within each class of presumptive dependents are
automatically entitled to benefits under the statute although they
could not in fact prove their economic dependence upon insured wage
earners at the time of death. We conclude that the statutory
classifications are permissible, however, because they are
reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death. A Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presumptions of
dependency was obviously to serve administrative convenience. While
Congress was unwilling to assume that every child of a deceased
insured was dependent at the time of death, by presuming dependency
on the basis of relatively readily documented facts, such as
legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or paternity
decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the likelihood of
continued actual dependency, Congress was able to avoid the burden
and expense of specific case-by-case determination in the large
number of cases where dependency is objectively probable. Such
presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may
approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the
Fifth Amendment so long as that lack of precise equivalence does
not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable
level of scrutiny. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.
S. 749 , 422 U. S. 772 (1975). [ Footnote 15 ]

															In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations must be
supported at least by a showing that the Government's Page 427 U. S. 510 dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by
a dollar "saved" in administrative expense avoided. Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 689 (plurality opinion). Under the standard of review appropriate here,
however, the materiality of the relation between the statutory
classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly
reflect need not be " scientifically substantiated.'" James
v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 , 407 U. S. 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.
S. 476 , 354 U. S. 501 (1957) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Nor, in any case, do we believe
that Congress is required in this realm of less than strictest
scrutiny to weigh the burdens of administrative inquiry solely in
terms of dollars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts
devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 784 .
Finally, while the scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged
is not a toothless one, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 691 (STEWART, J., concurring in judgment, POWELL, J., concurring in
judgment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the appellees to demonstrate the
insubstantiality of that relation. See Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61 , 220 U. S. 78 -79
(1911); cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S.
63 , 380 U. S. 67 (1965). B Applying these principles, we think that the statutory
classifications challenged here are justified as reasonable
empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify
entitlement to benefits upon a child's dependency at the time of
the parent's death. To begin with, we note that the statutory
scheme is significantly different from the provisions confronted in
cases in which the Page 427 U. S. 511 Court has invalidated legislative discriminations among children
on the basis of legitimacy. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U. S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S.
68 (1968). These differences render those cases of
little assistance to appellees. It could not have been fairly
argued, with respect to any of the statutes struck down in those
cases, that the legitimacy of the child was simply taken as an
indication of dependency, or of some other valid ground of
qualification. Under all but one of the statutes, not only was the
legitimate child automatically entitled to benefits, but an
illegitimate child was denied benefits solely and finally on the
basis of illegitimacy, and regardless of any demonstration of
dependency or other legitimate factor. See also Griffin v.
Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.
Supp. 588 (Conn.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972). In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra, the sole partial exception, the statutory scheme
provided for a child's equal recovery under a workmen's
compensation plan in the event of the death of the father, not only
if the child was dependent, but also only if the dependent child
was legitimate. 406 U.S. at 406 U. S.
173 -174, and n. 12. Jimenez v. Weinberger,
supra, invalidating discrimination among afterborn
illegitimate children as to entitlement to a child's disability
benefits under the Social Security Act, is similarly
distinguishable. Under the somewhat related statutory matrix
considered there, legitimate children and those capable of
inheriting personal property under state intestacy law, and those
illegitimate solely on account of a nonobvious defect in their
parents' marriage, were eligible for benefits, even if they were
born after the onset of the father's disability. Page 427 U. S. 512 Other (illegitimate) afterborn children were conclusively denied
any benefits, regardless of any showing of dependency. The Court
held the discrimination among illegitimate afterborn children
impermissible, rejecting the Secretary's claim that the
classification was based upon considerations regarding trustworthy
proof of dependency, because it could not accept the assertion:

															"[T]he blanket and conclusive exclusion of appellants' subclass
of illegitimates is reasonably related to the prevention of
spurious claims [of dependency]. Assuming that the appellants are
in fact dependent on the claimant [father], it would not serve the
purposes of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to
establish their dependency and their right to insurance
benefits."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 636 .
Hence, it was held that

															"to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively
available to the other denies the former the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 417 U. S. 637 . See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.
S. 636 , 420 U. S. 645 (1975); cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 401 U. S. 539 .
But this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of
afterborn illegitimate children, which belied the asserted
legislative reliance on dependency in Jimenez, is absent
here, for, as we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may
qualify for survivorship benefits by showing contribution to
support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. Cf. Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U. S. 441 , 412 U. S.
452 -453, n. 9 (1973), distinguishing Starns v.
Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234 (Minn.1970), summarily aff'd, 401 U.S. 985
(1971).

															It is, of course, not enough simply that any child of a deceased
insured is eligible for benefits upon some showing Page 427 U. S. 513 of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, we
found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement to dependent's
benefits of a married woman in the uniformed services upon an
individualized showing of her husband's actual dependence upon her
for more than half his income, when no such showing of actual
dependency was required of a married man in the uniformed services
to obtain dependent's benefits on account of his wife. The
invalidity of that gender-based discrimination rested upon the
"overbroad" assumption, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 , 419 U. S. 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination

															"that male workers' earnings are vital to the support of their
families, while the earnings of female wage earners do not
significantly contribute to their families' support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 643 ; see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 689 n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate
between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is
carefully tuned to alternative considerations. The presumption of
dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant
indication of the likelihood of actual dependency. Moreover, we
cannot say that the factors that give rise to a presumption of
dependency lack any substantial relation to the likelihood of
actual dependency. Rather, we agree with the assessment of the
three-judge court as it originally ruled in Norton v.
Weinberger, 364 F.
Supp. 1117 , 1128 (Md. 1973): [ Footnote 16 ]

															"[I]t is clearly rational to presume the overwhelming number of
legitimate children are actually dependent upon their parents for
support. Likewise . . . the children of an invalid marriage . .
. Page 427 U. S. 514 would typically live in the wage earner's home or be supported
by him. . . . When an order of support is entered by a court it is
reasonable to assume compliance occurred. A paternity decree, while
not necessarily ordering support, would almost as strongly suggest
support was subsequently obtained. Conceding that a written
acknowledgment lacks the imprimatur of a judicial proceeding, it
too establishes the basis for a rational presumption. Men do not
customarily affirm in writing their responsibility for an
illegitimate child unless the child is theirs and a man who has
acknowledged a child is more likely to provide it support than one
who does not."

															Similarly, we think, where state intestacy law provides that a
child may take personal property from a father's estate, it may
reasonably be thought that the child will more likely be dependent
during the parent's life and at his death. [ Footnote 17 ] For in its embodiment of the
popular Page 427 U. S. 515 view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his
property devolve among his children in the event of death, without
specific directions, such legislation also reflects to some degree
the popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental
obligation to such an "illegitimate" child in other circumstances,
and thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support
during, as well as after, life. [ Footnote 18 ] Accord, Watts v. Veneman, 155
U.S.App.D.C. 84, 88, 476 F.2d 529, 533 (1973).

															To be sure, none of these statutory criteria compels the
extension of a presumption of dependency. But the constitutional
question is not whether such a presumption is required, but whether
it is permitted. Nor, in ratifying these statutory classifications,
is our role to hypothesize independently on the desirability or
feasibility of any possible alternative basis for presumption.
These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are
for Congress. Drawing upon its own practical experience, Page 427 U. S. 516 Congress has tailored statutory classifications in accord with
its calculations of the likelihood of actual support suggested by a
narrow set of objective and apparently reasonable indicators. Our
role is simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions are so
inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of
its conclusions that individualized factual inquiry in order to
isolate each nondependent child in a given class of cases is
unwarranted as an administrative exercise. In the end, the precise
accuracy of Congress' calculations is not a matter of specialized
judicial competence, and we have no basis to question their detail
beyond the evident consistency and substantiality. Cf. United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 380 U. S. 67 . We
cannot say that these expectations are unfounded, or so
indiscriminate as to render the statute's classifications baseless.
We conclude, in short, that, in failing to extend any presumption
of dependency to appellees and others like them, the Act does not
impermissibly discriminate against them as compared with legitimate
children or those illegitimate children who are statutorily deemed
dependent. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 202(d)(1) of the Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
402(d)(1), provides in pertinent part:

															"Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) . . .
of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual,
if such child -- "

															"(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,"

															"(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and
(i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time
student and had not attained the age of 22 . . . and"

															"(C) was dependent upon such individual --"

															" * * * *" "(ii) if such individual has died, at the time of such death, .
. ."

															" * * * *" "shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each
month, beginning with the first month after August, 1950, in which
such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits. . .
."

															Section 216(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), includes, under the
definition of child, inter alia, "the child . . . of an
individual," certain legally adopted children, certain
stepchildren, and certain grandchildren and stepgrandchildren.
Additionally, § 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A),
provides:

															"In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a
fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this
subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied
in determining the devolution of intestate personal property . . .
by the courts of the State in which [such insured individual] was
domiciled at the time of his death. . . . Applicants who according
to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate
personal property as a child . . . shall be deemed such."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Section 202(d)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3), provides in
pertinent part:

															"A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father or adopting
father or his mother or adopting mother at the time specified in
paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection unless, at such time, such
individual was not living with or contributing to the support of
such child and -- "

															"(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of
such individual, or"

															"(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual."

															Additionally, any child who qualifies under § 216(h)(2)(A), see n 1, supra, is considered legitimate for § 202(d)(3) purposes,
and thus dependent.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Section 202(d)(3), as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3),
provides in pertinent part that

															"a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured
individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) .
. . shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such
individual,"

															and therefore presumptively dependent. Section 216(h)(2)(B), as
set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(b), provides:

															"If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently
insured individual but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child
of such insured individual under subparagraph (A), such applicant
shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured
individual if such insured individual and the mother or father, as
the case may be, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony
resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a
legal impediment described in the last sentence of paragraph
(1)(b), would have been a valid marriage."

															The specified last sentence of § 216(h)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
416(h)(1)(b), in turn, refers only to

															"an impediment (i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a
previous marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous
marriage or its dissolution, or (ii) resulting from a defect in the
procedure followed in connection with such purported marriage."

															Section 216(h)(3), as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3),
provides:

															"An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently
insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the
child of such insured individual under paragraph (2) of this
subsection, shall nevertheless be deemed to be the chi!d of such
insured individual if:"

															" * * * *" "(C) In the case of a deceased individual --"

															"(i) such insured individual -- "

															"(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son
or daughter,"

															"(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the
applicant, or"

															"(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support
of the applicant because the applicant was his son or
daughter,"

															"and such acknowledgment, court decree, or court order was made
before the death of such individual, or"

															"(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory
to the Secretary to have been the father of the applicant, and such
insured individual was living with or contributing to the support
of the applicant at the time such insured individual died."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Upon the original petition for review under § 205(g), the
District Court affirmed the administrative findings that had then
been made, but remanded the case to the Secretary for him to
determine the common law status of the relationship between the
children's parents, a question left unconsidered in the first
administrative proceeding. After an adverse determination on this
point and an unsuccessful administrative appeal, Lucas, on behalf
of the children, again timely sought review in the District Court,
presenting the common law marriage question and asserting a
constitutional challenge to the Act. The District Court affirmed
the administrative conclusion of no common law marriage, and then
turned to the constitutional questions that are the subject of this
appeal.

															[ Footnote 5 ] See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 637 ; United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528 , 413 U. S. 533 n. 5 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.
S. 677 , 411 U. S. 680 n. 5 (1973) (plurality opinion).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The District Court affirmed the Secretary's factual findings in
a "Memorandum and Order" entered August 30, 1974, Viewing the
constitutional claim as one requiring the convention of a
three-judge district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284, the
single District Judge did not reach that issue. A three-judge
District Court was convened, but disbanded when appellees' renewed
motion for summary judgment omitted their earlier request for
injunctive relief. The constitutional claim thus was correctly
determined by a single District Judge.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															It adds nothing to say that the illegitimate child is also
saddled with the procedural burden of proving entitlement on the
basis of facts the legitimate child need not prove. The legitimate
child is required, like the illegitimate, to prove the facts upon
which his statutory entitlement rests.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Appellees do not suggest, nor could they successfully, that
strict judicial scrutiny of the statutory classifications is
required here because, in regulating entitlement to survivorship
benefits, the statute discriminatorily interferes with interests of
constitutional fundamentality. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 , 422 U. S.
768 -770 (1975); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).

															The Court, of course, has found the privacy of familial
relationships to be entitled to procedural due process protections
from disruption by the State, whether or not those relationships
were legitimized by marriage under state law. Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972). But the concerns relevant to that context are only
tangential to the analysis here, since the statutory scheme does
not interfere in any way with familial relations.

															[ Footnote 9 ] See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 , 388 U. S. 11 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 (1954).

															[ Footnote 10 ] See Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633 , 332 U. S.
644 -646 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 , 323 U. S. 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81 , 320 U. S. 100 (1943).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															That the statutory classifications challenged here discriminate
among illegitimate children does not mean, of course, that they are
not also properly described as discriminating between legitimate
and illegitimate children. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra;
cf. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 , 406 U. S. 169 ,
172 (1972). In view of our conclusion regarding the applicable
standard of judicial scrutiny, we need not consider how the classes
of legitimate and illegitimate children would be constitutionally
defined under appellees' approach.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The significance of this consideration would seem to be
suggested by provisions enabling the parents to legitimatize
children born illegitimate. Compare Weber, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S.
170 -171, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.
S. 532 , 401 U. S. 539 (1971). Of course, the status of "dependency" as recognized by the
statute here is wholly within the control of the parent.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															In Rodriguez, the Court identified a "suspect class"
entitled to the protections of strict judicial scrutiny as one

															"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."

															411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 28 .

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															We are not bound to agree with the Secretary's description of
the legislative design if the legislative history and the structure
of the provisions themselves belie it. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 , 420 U. S. 648 n. 16 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 634 .
Appellees are unable, however, to summon any meaningful legislative
history to support their position regarding the congressional
design. They rely largely upon a section of the House-Senate
Conference Committee Report on the 1965 Amendments to the Social
Security Act, reproduced at 111 Cong.Rec. 18383 (1965), partially
explaining, id. at 18387, the addition of § 216(h)(3), set
forth in n 3, supra, to the Act:

															"A child would be paid benefits based on his father's earnings
without regard to whether he has the status of a child under State
inheritance laws if the father was supporting the child or had a
legal obligation to do so."

															But the clause's reference to legal obligations to support
hardly establishes that the statute was designed to replace any
potential source of lifetime support; in our view the passage
appears only to be a partial description of the actual effect of §§
416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II) and (III), set forth in n 3, supra, not an enunciation of the general
purpose of the Act.

															Thus, appellees, in order to make their case, must ultimately
rely upon the asserted failure of the legislative product
adequately to fit the purported legitimate aim.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															That these provisions may thus reflect a "secondary" purpose of
Congress is, of course, of no moment. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263 , 410 U. S.
274 -277 (1973).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Vacated and remanded for further proceedings in light of Jimenez, 418 U.S. 902 (1972); adhered to on remand, 390 F.
Supp. 1084 (1975); aff'd sub nom. Norton v. Mathews,
post, p. 427 U. S. 524 .

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The Secretary, pointing out that § 202(d)(3), as set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 402(d)(3), in specific terms provides only that

															"a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently insured
individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3). .
. shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such
individual,"

															urges that we misconstrued the statute in Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 631 n. 2, in concluding that an applicant qualifying as a child under §
216(h)(2)(A) is to be considered as a legitimate child,
and therefore dependent under § 202(d)(3). We have no question,
however, as to the correctness of that conclusion. First, it is
only through operation of § 216(h)(2)(A) that the recognition of
"legitimacy" by state law under § 202(d)(3)(A) as giving rise to a
presumption of dependency takes on a consistent operational
meaning. Second, §§ 216(h)(2)(B) and (3) specifically exclude any
child qualified under § 216(h)(2)(A); if a § 216(h)(2)(A) child
were not considered legitimate under § 202(d)(3), this would have
the anomalous effect that an illegitimate child who had been
acknowledged in a written statement by the insured father, for
example, would be deprived of otherwise established eligibility for
benefits, see § 216(h)(3)(C)(i)(I), if under applicable
state law such an acknowledgment worked to make the child an
intestate heir. Moreover, the legislative history is clear that the
Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub.L. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924, §§
208(b) and (d), 42 U.S.C. § 408(b) and (d), adding § 216(h)(2)(b)
to the Act and inserting the provision in § 202(d)(3) specifying
that a § 216(h)(2)(B) child shall be deemed to be a legitimate, and
therefore dependent, child for death benefit purposes, were
intended to have the effect of deeming any § 216(h)(2)
child "legitimate," and thus "dependent." See S.Rep. No.
1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 78-79, 133 (1960) (discussing §§ 207(b)
and (d)); H.R.Rep. No. 1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 91-92, 152
(1960).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Appellees do not suggest, and we are unwilling to assume, that
discrimination against children in appellees' class in state
intestacy laws is constitutionally prohibited, see Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), in which case appellees would be made eligible for benefits
under § 216(h)(2)(A).

															MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.

															The reason why the United States Government should not add to
the burdens that illegitimate children inevitably acquire at birth
is radiantly clear: we are committed to the proposition that all
persons are created equal. The Court's reason for approving
discrimination against this class -- "administrative convenience"
-- is opaque and insufficient: opaque because the difference
between this justification and the argument rejected in Jimenez
v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 , is
so difficult to Page 427 U. S. 517 discern; insufficient because it unfairly evaluates the
competing interests at stake. I Jimenez involved a requirement that the wage earner
must have contributed to the support of his illegitimate child
prior to the onset of his disability; this case involves the
requirement that the deceased wage earner was contributing to the
support of his illegitimate child at the time of his death. The
critical objections to the classification held invalid in Jimenez apply with equal force in this case.

															The classification in Jimenez was "overinclusive"
because it conclusively presumed that all legitimates and some
illegitimates were dependent on the disabled wage earner when many
such persons were not in fact dependent. Since legitimate as well
as illegitimate children are sometimes abandoned by their father
before his death, precisely the same objection applies to this
statutory classification. Moreover, the Jimenez classification was "underinclusive" because it conclusively
excluded some illegitimates who were in fact dependent on the wage
earner. [ Footnote 2/1 ] In this
case, the two appellee children Page 427 U. S. 518 were conclusively excluded from the class of eligibles even
though they had been supported by their father for 15 years and
eight years, respectively. If the underinclusiveness of the Jimenez classification was arbitrary, this classification
is even more objectionable, because it attaches greater weight to
support at a particular moment in time than to support of several
years' duration.

															In Jimenez, the Secretary told the Court that the
classification was "designed only to prevent spurious claims." Id. at 417 U. S. 633 .
The Court held that objective insufficient to justify "the blanket
and conclusive exclusion" of a subclass of illegitimates. Id. at 417 U. S. 636 .
The statute has not changed, but now we are told that the
justification for a similar blanket and conclusive exclusion is
"administrative convenience." I suggest that this is merely a
different name for the same federal interest. For the statutory
classification will not affect the processing of claims in any way
except by substituting a mechanical test of dependency for the kind
of inquiry that would otherwise be required to differentiate
between the spurious and the genuine.

															I am unable to identify a relevant difference between Jimenez and this case. II The Court recognizes

															"that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is,
like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes
not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears
no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and
contribute to society." Ante at 427 U. S. 505 .
For that reason, as the Court also recognizes,

															"'imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship Page 427 U. S. 519 to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.'" Ibid. Thus, the Court starts its analysis from the
premise that the statutory classification is both " illogical
and unjust.'" Ibid. It seems rather plain to me that this
premise demands a conclusion that the classification is invalid
unless it is justified by a weightier governmental interest than
merely "administrative convenience." The Court has characterized the purpose of the statute as
providing benefits not for those individuals who had a legitimate
claim to support from the deceased wage earner, but rather for
those who were actually dependent on the wage earner at the time of
his death. In this analysis, the provisions of the statute which
allow certain classes -- such as legitimate children -- to receive
benefits without showing actual dependency are no more than
statutory presumptions in aid of administrative convenience. This
is an appropriate reading of the statute. [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court goes on, however, to hold that such presumptions in
aid of "administrative convenience" are permissible so long as the
lack of precise equivalence between the fact giving rise to the
presumption and the fact presumed "does not exceed the bounds of
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny," ante at 427 U. S. 509 .
The opinion tells us very little, however, about the "applicable
level of scrutiny." It is not "our most exacting scrutiny," ante at 427 U. S. 506 ;
on the other hand, if the classification derives "possibly
rational" support from another source, it is not "inherently
untenable" simply because it rests in part on illegitimacy. Ante at 427 U. S. 505 .
I believe an admittedly illogical and unjust result Page 427 U. S. 520 should not be accepted without both a better explanation and
also something more than a "possibly rational" basis.

															The Court has repeatedly held that distinctions which disfavor
illegitimates simply because they are illegitimate are invalid. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 ; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 . However irrational it may be to burden innocent
children because their parents did not marry, illegitimates are
nonetheless a traditionally disfavored class in our society.
Because of that tradition of disfavor, the Court should be
especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves
illegitimacy. For a traditional classification is more likely to be
used without pausing to consider its justification than is a newly
created classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem
acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our
history, there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black
and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no
rational relationship -- other than pure prejudicial discrimination
[ Footnote 2/3 ] -- to the Page 427 U. S. 521 stated purpose for which the classification is being made.

															In this case, the "true" classification, according to the Court,
is one between children dependent on their fathers and children who
are not so dependent. All of the subsidiary classifications (which
have the actual effect of allowing certain children to be eligible
for benefits regardless of actual dependency) are supposedly
justified by the increased convenience for the agency in not being
required in every case to determine dependency. But do these
classifications actually bear any substantial relationship to the
fact of dependency?

															In this statute, one or another of the criteria giving rise to a
"presumption of dependency" exists to make almost all children of
deceased wage earners eligible. If a child is legitimate, he
qualifies. If the child is illegitimate only because of a
nonobvious defect in his parents' marriage, he qualifies. If a
court has declared his father to be in fact his father, or has
issued an order of support against his father, or if the father has
acknowledged the child in writing, he qualifies. Apart from any of
these qualifications, if the child is lucky enough to live in a
State which allows him to inherit from his intestate father on a
par with other children, he also qualifies. And in none of these
situations need he allege, much less prove, actual dependency.
Indeed, if the contrary fact is undisputed, he is nevertheless
qualified.

															The Court today attempts, at some length, to explain that each
of these factors is rationally and substantially related to the
actual fact of dependency, adopting even the somewhat tenuous
rationalization of the District Court that

															"'[m]en do not customarily affirm in writing their
responsibility for an illegitimate child unless the Page 427 U. S. 522 child is theirs and a man who has acknowledged a child is more
likely to provide it support than one who does not,'" ante at 427 U. S. 514 ,
without also noting that a man who lives with a woman for 18 years,
during which two children are born, who has always orally
acknowledged that the children are his, and who has lived with the
children and supported them, may never perceive a need to make a
formal written acknowledgment of paternity. Even more tenuous is
the asserted relationship between the status of the illegitimate
under state intestacy law and actual dependency. The Court asserts
that,

															"in its embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction
of how a parent would have his property devolve among his children
in the event of death, without specific directions, such
legislation also reflects to some degree the popular conception
within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation to such an
'illegitimate' child in other circumstances, and thus something of
the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after,
life." Ante at 427 U. S.
514 -515. That nebulous inference upon inference is
treated as more acceptable evidence of actual dependency than proof
of actual support for many years. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Whether the classification is expressed in terms of eligible
classes or in terms of presumptions of dependency, the fact remains
that legitimacy, written acknowledgments, or state law make
eligible many children who are no more likely to be "dependent"
than are the children in appellees' situation. Yet, in the name of
"administrative convenience," the Court allows these survivors'
benefits to be allocated on grounds which have Page 427 U. S. 523 only the most tenuous connection to the supposedly controlling
factor -- the child's dependency on his father.

															I am persuaded that the classification which is sustained today
in the name of "administrative convenience" is more probably the
product of a tradition of thinking of illegitimates as less
deserving persons than legitimates. The sovereign should firmly
reject that tradition. The fact that illegitimacy is not as
apparent to the observer as sex or race does not make this
governmental classification any less odious. It cannot be denied
that it is a source of social opprobrium, even if wholly unmerited,
or that it is a circumstance for which the individual has no
responsibility whatsoever

															A fair evaluation of the competing interests at stake in this
litigation requires affirmance of the judgment of the District
Court.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															"Even if children might rationally be classified on the basis of
whether they are dependent upon their disabled parent, the Act's
definition of these two subclasses of illegitimates is
'overinclusive' in that it benefits some children who are
legitimated, or entitled to inherit, or illegitimate solely because
of a defect in the marriage of their parents, but who are not
dependent on their disabled parent. Conversely, the Act is
'underinclusive' in that it conclusively excludes some
illegitimates in appellants' subclass who are, in fact, dependent
upon their disabled parent. Thus, for all that is shown in this
record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing,
and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both;
hence, to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively
available to the other denies the former the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth
Amendment."

															417 U.S. at 417 U. S.
637 .

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															There are other survivors who receive benefits only if they show
dependency, e.g., parents, 42 U.S.C. § 402(h), and
widowers, 42 U.S.C.§ 402(f).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate
purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially
sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth.

															"Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry
are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81 , 320 U. S. 100 .
From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to
treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes
of the law. The Declaration of Independence states:

															"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness."

															And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of
any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United
States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at
birth.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															If the relationship between an entitling presumption and the
actual fact of dependency is so nebulous that the conclusion can be
supported only by resort to a supposed popular conception within a
jurisdiction, the classification must either be irrational or serve
a purpose other than the one by which it is assertedly
justified.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

In Mathews v. Lucas, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the denial of surviving child benefits to illegitimate children under the Social Security Act violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that the different treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children under the Act was not subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny as discrimination based on race or national origin.

The Court upheld the Act's dependency requirements for surviving child benefits, finding that they were reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at the time of the parent's death. The Court also found that the Act did not impermissibly discriminate against illegitimate children by failing to extend a presumption of dependency to them, as it did for legitimate children and some illegitimate children in specific circumstances.

The Court's decision affirmed the District Court's ruling, which had reversed the administrative denial of benefits to the appellee illegitimate children and ordered that benefits be paid to them.