U.S. Supreme Court Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990) Burnham v. Superior Court of
California, County of Marin No. 89-44 Argued Feb. 28, 1990 Decided May 29, 1990 495
U.S. 604 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT Syllabus During a trip to California to conduct business and visit his
children, petitioner Burnham, a New Jersey resident, was served
with a California court summons and his estranged wife's divorce
petition. The California Superior Court denied his motion to quash
the service of process, and the State Court of Appeal denied
mandamus relief, rejecting his contention that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited California courts
from asserting jurisdiction over him because he lacked "minimum
contacts" with the State. The latter court held it to be a valid
predicate for in personam jurisdiction that he was
personally served while present in the forum State. Held: The judgment is affirmed.

															Justice SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and
Justice KENNEDY, concluded in Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C that the
Due Process Clause does not deny a State's courts jurisdiction over
a nonresident, who was personally served with process while
temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his activities in
the State. Pp. 495 U. S.
2 -12.

															(a) To determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
is consistent with due process, this Court has long relied on the
principles traditionally followed by American courts in marking out
the territorial limits of each State's authority. See Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , 95 U. S. 722 .
The classic expression of that criterion appeared in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 ,
which held that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction
must not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." Pp. 495 U. S.
608 -610.

															(b) A formidable body of precedent, stretching from common law
antecedents through decisions at or near the crucial time of the
Fourteenth Amendment's adoption to many recent cases, reflects the
near-unanimous view that service of process confers state court
jurisdiction over a physically present nonresident, regardless of
whether he was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of
action is related to his activities there. Pp. 495 U. S.
610 -616.

															(c) Burnham's contention that, in the absence of "continuous and
systematic" contacts with the forum, a nonresident defendant can be
subjected Page 495 U. S. 605 to judgment only as to matters that arise out of or relate to
his contacts with the forum misreads this Court's decisions
applying that standard. The standard was developed by analogy to
the traditional "physical presence" requirement as a means of
evaluating novel state procedures designed to do away with that
requirement with respect to in personam jurisdiction over
absent defendants. Nothing in International Shoe or the
subsequent cases supports the proposition that a defendant's
presence in the forum is not only unnecessary to validate such
novel assertions of jurisdiction, but is itself no longer
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Pp. 495 U. S.
616 -619.

															Justice SCALIA, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice KENNEDY,
concluded in Parts II-D and III that:

															1. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 -- which applied the jurisdictional rules
developed under International Shoe to invalidate a
Delaware court's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction
over absent defendants whose sole contact with the State (ownership
of property) was unrelated to the suit -- does not support
Burnham's position. When read in context, Shaffer's statement that "all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the [ International Shoe ]
standards," id. at 433 U. S. 212 ,
means only that quasi in rem jurisdiction, like other
forms of in personam jurisdiction over absent defendants,
must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement. Nothing in Shaffer compels the conclusion that physically present
defendants must be treated identically to absent ones or expands
the "minimum contacts" requirement beyond situations involving the
latter persons. Pp. 495 U. S.
619 -622.

															2. The proposal of Justice BRENNAN's concurrence to apply
"contemporary notions of due process" to the constitutional
analysis constitutes an outright break with the International
Shoe standard, and, without authority, seeks to measure state
court jurisdiction not only against traditional doctrines and
current practice, but also against each Justice's subjective
assessment of what is fair and just. In effect, the proposed
standard amounts to a "totality of the circumstances" test,
guaranteeing uncertainty and unnecessary litigation over the
preliminary issue of the forum's competence. Pp. 495 U. S.
622 -627.

															Justice WHITE concluded that the traditionally accepted rule
allowing jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal
service in the forum State cannot be invalidated absent a showing
that, as a general proposition, it is so arbitrary and lacking in
common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative
of due process in every case. Until such a difficult showing is
made, claims in individual cases that the rule would operate
unfairly as applied to the particular nonresident involved need not
be entertained, at least in the usual instance where presence in
the forum State is intentional. P. 495 U. S.
628 . Page 495 U. S. 606 Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN,
and Justice O'CONNOR, although agreeing that the traditional
"transient jurisdiction" rule is generally valid, concluded that
historical pedigree, although important, is not the only factor to
be taken into account in establishing whether a jurisdictional rule
satisfies due process, and that an independent inquiry into the
fairness of the prevailing in-State service rule must be
undertaken. Pp. 495 U. S.
628 -640.

															(a) Reliance solely on historical precedent is foreclosed by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 ,
and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 , 433 U. S. 212 ,
which demonstrate that all rules of state court jurisdiction, even
ancient ones such as transient jurisdiction, must satisfy
contemporary notions of due process. While Shaffer's
holding may have been limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, its mode of analysis -- which discarded an "ancient
form without substantial modern justification" -- was not. Minimum
contacts analysis represents a far more sensible construct for the
exercise of state court jurisdiction. Pp. 495 U. S.
629 -633.

															(b) The transient jurisdiction rule will generally satisfy due
process requirements. Tradition, although alone not dispositive, is
relevant, because the fact that American courts have announced the
rule since the latter part of the 19th century provides a defendant
voluntarily present in a particular State today with clear notice
that he is subject to suit in that forum. Thus, the rule is
consistent with reasonable expectations, and is entitled to a
strong presumption that it comports with due process. Moreover, by
visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually avails
himself of significant benefits provided by the State: police,
fire, and emergency services, the freedom to travel its roads and
waterways, the enjoyment of the fruits of its economy, the
protection of its laws, and the right of access to its courts.
Without transient jurisdiction, the latter right would create an
asymmetry, since a transient would have the full benefit of the
power of the State's courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity
from their authority as a defendant. Furthermore, the potential
burdens on a transient defendant are slight in light of modern
transportation and communications methods, and any burdens that do
arise can be ameliorated by a variety of procedural devices. Pp. 495 U. S.
633 -640.

															Justice STEVENS concluded that the historical evidence, a
persisting consensus, considerations of fairness, and common sense
all indicated that the judgment should be affirmed. P. 495 U. S.
640 .

															SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., joined, and in
which Page 495 U. S. 607 WHITE, J., joined as to Parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C. WHITE,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 495 U. S. 628 .
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 495 U. S. 628 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 495 U. S.
640 .

															Justice SCALIA announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice KENNEDY join, and
in which Justice WHITE joins with respect to Parts I, II-A, II-B,
and II-C.

															The question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a
nonresident who was personally served with process while
temporarily in that State in a suit unrelated to his activities in
the State. I Petitioner Dennis Burnham married Francie Burnham in 1976, in
West Virginia. In 1977, the couple moved to New Jersey, where their
two children were born. In July, 1987, the Burnhams decided to
separate. They agreed that Mrs. Burnham, who intended to move to
California, would take custody of the children. Shortly before Mrs.
Burnham departed for California that same month, she and petitioner
agreed that she would file for divorce on grounds of
"irreconcilable differences."

															In October 1987, petitioner filed for divorce in New Jersey
state court on grounds of "desertion." Petitioner did not, however,
obtain an issuance of summons against his wife, and did not attempt
to serve her with process. Mrs. Burnham, after unsuccessfully
demanding that petitioner adhere to Page 495 U. S. 608 their prior agreement to submit to an "irreconcilable
differences" divorce, brought suit for divorce in California state
court in early January, 1988.

															In late January, petitioner visited southern California on
business, after which he went north to visit his children in the
San Francisco Bay area, where his wife resided. He took the older
child to San Francisco for the weekend. Upon returning the child to
Mrs. Burnham's home on January 24, 1988, petitioner was served with
a California court summons and a copy of Mrs. Burnham's divorce
petition. He then returned to New Jersey.

															Later that year, petitioner made a special appearance in the
California Superior Court, moving to quash the service of process
on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
because his only contacts with California were a few short visits
to the State for the purposes of conducting business and visiting
his children. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the
California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief, rejecting
petitioner's contention that the Due Process Clause prohibited
California courts from asserting jurisdiction over him because he
lacked "minimum contacts" with the State. The court held it to be
"a valid jurisdictional predicate for in personam jurisdiction" that the "defendant [was] present in the forum state
and personally served with process." App. to Pet. for Cert. 5. We
granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 807 (1989). II A The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking
jurisdiction is void traces back to the English Year Books, see
Bowser v. Collins, Y.B.Mich. 22 Edw. 4, f. 30, pl. 11, 145
Eng.Rep. 97 (1482), and was made settled law by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co.Rep. 68b, 77 Eng.Rep. 1027,
1041 (K.B. 1612). Traditionally that proposition was embodied in
the phrase coram non judice, Page 495 U. S. 609 "before a person not a judge" -- meaning, in effect, that the
proceeding in question was not a judicial proceeding
because lawful judicial authority was not present, and could
therefore not yield a judgment. American courts
invalidated, or denied recognition to, judgments that violated this
common law principle long before the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. See, e.g., Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11, 134) (CC
Mass.1828); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N.Y.Ch. 1834); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v.
Smith, 7 Watts & Serg. 447 (Pa.1844); Boswell's Lessee
v. Otis, 50 U. S. 336 , 51 U. S. 350 (1850). In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 , 95 U. S. 732 (1878), we announced that the judgment of a court lacking personal
jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well.

															To determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, we have long relied on the principles
traditionally followed by American courts in marking out the
territorial limits of each State's authority. That criterion was
first announced in Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, in which we
stated that due process

															"mean[s] a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rights," id. at 733, including the "well-established principles
of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State
over persons and property," id. at 95 U. S. 722 .
In what has become the classic expression of the criterion, we said
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 (1945), that a State court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process Clause if it does
not violate " traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" Id. at 326 U. S. 316 , quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940). See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694 , 456 U. S. 703 (1982). Since International Shoe, we have only been called
upon to decide whether these "traditional notions" permit Page 495 U. S. 610 States to exercise jurisdiction over absent defendants in a
manner that deviates from the rules of jurisdiction applied in the
19th century. We have held such deviations permissible, but only
with respect to suits arising out of the absent defendant's
contacts with the State. [ Footnote
1 ] See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U. S. 408 , 466 U. S. 414 (1984). The question we must decide today is whether due process
requires a similar connection between the litigation and the
defendant's contacts with the State in cases where the defendant is
physically present in the State at the time process is served upon
him. B Among the most firmly established principles of personal
jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State
have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in
the State. The view developed early that each State had the power
to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within
its borders, and that, once having acquired jurisdiction over such
a person by properly serving him with process, the State could
retain jurisdiction to enter Page 495 U. S. 611 judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit. See,
e.g., Potter v. Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn.1793); Barrell
v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819). That view had antecedents in
English common law practice, which sometimes allowed "transitory"
actions, arising out of events outside the country, to be
maintained against seemingly nonresident defendants who were
present in England. See, e.g., Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98
Eng.Rep. 1021 (K.B.1774); Cartwright v. Pettus, 22
Eng.Rep. 916 (Ch. 1675). Justice Story believed the principle,
which he traced to Roman origins, to be firmly grounded in English
tradition: "[B]y the common law[,] personal actions, being
transitory, may be brought in any place, where the party defendant
may be found," for "every nation may . . . rightfully exercise
jurisdiction over all persons within its domains." J. Story,
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §§ 554, 543 (1846). See
also §§ 530-538; Picquet v. Swan, supra, at 611-612
(Story, J.) ("Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be
subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment
pronounced, on such process, against him").

															Recent scholarship has suggested that English tradition was not
as clear as Story thought, see Hazard, A General Theory of
State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.Ct.Rev. 241, 253-260;
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289 (1956).
Accurate or not, however, judging by the evidence of
contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous decisions, one must
conclude that Story's understanding was shared by American courts
at the crucial time for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted. The following passage in a decision of the
Supreme Court of Georgia, in an action on a debt having no apparent
relation to the defendant's temporary presence in the State, is
representative:

															"Can a citizen of Alabama be sued in this State, as he passes
through it? " Page 495 U. S. 612 "Undoubtedly he can. The second of the axioms of Huberus, as translated by Story, is:"

															"that all persons who are found within the limits of a
government, whether their residence is permanent or temporary, are
to be deemed subjects thereof."

															"(Stor.Conf.Laws, § 29, Note 3.)"

															". . . [A] citizen of another State, who is merely passing
through this, resides, as he passes, wherever he is. Let him be
sued, therefore, wherever he may, he will be sued where he
resides."

															"The plaintiff in error, although a citizen of Alabama, was
passing through the County of Troup, in this State, and whilst
doing so, he was sued in Troup. He was liable to be sued in this
State, and in Troup County of this State." Murphy v. J.S. Winter & Co., 18 Ga. 690, 691-692
(1855). See also, e.g., Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass.
217, 220 (1870) (relying on Story for the same principle); Alley v. Caspari, 80 Me. 234, 236-237, 14 A. 12, 13 (1888)
(same).

															Decisions in the courts of many States in the 19th and early
20th centuries held that personal service upon a physically present
defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction, without regard to
whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the
cause of action was related to his activities there. See, e.g.,
Vinal v. Core, 18 W.Va. 1, 20 (1881); Roberts v.
Dunsmuir, 75 Cal. 203, 204, 16 P. 782 (1888); De Poret v.
Gusman, 30 La.Ann., pt. 2, pp. 930, 932 (1878); Smith v.
Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 285, 3 So. 321 (1887); Savin v.
Bond, 57 Md. 228, 233 (1881); Hart v. Granger, 1
Conn. 154, 165 (1814); Mussina v. Belden, 6 Abb.Pr. 165,
176 (N.Y.1858); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116,
120-121(1872); Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 549-550,
21 S.W. 29, 30 (1893); Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex.Civ.App.
28, 29, 82 S.W. 1049, 1050 (1904). See also Reed v.
Hollister, 106 Ore. 407, 412-414, 212 P. 367, 369-370 (1923); Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 751, 169 So. 391, 392-393
(1936); Vaughn Page 495 U. S.
613 v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 280, 188 A. 299, 302 (1936).
[ Footnote 2 ] Although research
has not revealed a case deciding the issue in every State's courts,
that appears to be because the issue was so well settled that it
went unlitigated. See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law §
24, p. 43 (1968) ("The law is so clear on this point that there are
few decisions on it"); Note, Developments in the Law -- State Court
Jurisdiction, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 937-938 (1960). Opinions from the
courts of other States announced the rule in dictum. See, e.g.,
Reed v. Browning, 130 Ind. 575, 577, 30 N.E. 704, 705 (1892); Nathanson v. Spitz, 19 R.I. 70, 72, 31 A. 690, 691 (1895); McLeod v. Connecticut & P.R. Co., 58 Vt. 727, 733-734,
6 A. 648, 649, 650 (1886); New Orleans J & G.N.R. Co. v.
Wallace, 50 Miss. 244, 248-249 (1874); Wagner v.
Hallack, 3 Colo. 176, 182-183 (1877); Downer v. Shaw, 22 N.H. 277, 281 (1851); Moore v. Smith, 41 Ky. 340, 341
(1842); Adair County Bank v. Forrey, 74 Neb. 811, 815, 105
N.W. 714, 715-716 (1905). Most States, moreover, had statutes or
common law rules that exempted from service of process individuals
who were brought into the forum by force or fraud, see, e.g.,
Wanzer v. Bright, 52 Ill. 35 (1869), or who were there as a
party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings, see, e.g.,
Burroughs v. Cocke & Willis, 56 Okla.
627 , 156 P. 196 (1916); Malloy v. Brewer, 7 S.D. 587,
64 N.W. 1120 (1895). These exceptions obviously rested upon the
premise that service of process conferred jurisdiction. See
Anderson v. Atkins, 161 Tenn. 137, 140, 29 S.W.2d 248, 249
(1930). Particularly striking is the fact that, as far as we have
been able to determine, not one American case Page 495 U. S. 614 from the period (or, for that matter, not one American case
until 1978) held, or even suggested, that in-state personal service
on an individual was insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.
[ Footnote 3 ] Commentators were
also seemingly unanimous Page 495 U. S. 615 on the rule. See, e.g., 1 A. Freeman, Law of Judgments
470-471 (1873); 1 H. Black, Law of Judgments 276-277 (1891); W.
Alderson, Law of Judicial Writs and Process 225-226 (1895). See
also Restatement of Conflict of Laws, §§ 77-78 (1934).

															This American jurisdictional practice is, moreover, not merely
old; it is continuing. It remains the practice of not only a
substantial number of the States, but, as far as we are aware, all
the States and the federal government -- if one disregards (as one
must for this purpose) the few opinions since 1978 that have
erroneously said, on grounds similar to those that petitioner
presses here, that this Court's due process decisions render the
practice unconstitutional. See Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress
of the U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (CA3 1985); Schreiber v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 1079 , 1088-1091 (D.Kan.1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (CA10 1979); Harold M. Pitman Co. v.
Typecraft Software, 626 F.
Supp. 305 , 310-314 (N.D.Ill.1986); Bershaw v.
Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667, 671 (La.App.1986). We
do not know of a single State or federal statute, or a single
judicial decision resting upon State law, that has abandoned
in-State service as a basis of jurisdiction. Many recent cases
reaffirm it. See Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, Page 495 U. S. 616 513, 330 S.E.2d
341 , 342 (1985); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis.2d 683, 273 N.W.2d
285 (1979); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d
581 (1987); Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 (Wyo.1988); Klavan v. Klavan, 405 Mass. 1105, 1106, 544
N.E.2d 863, 864 (1989); Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481,
483, 484, 119 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1963); Read v. Sonat Offshore
Drilling, Inc., 515 So. 2d
1229 , 1230 (Miss.1987); Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial District
Court, 104 Nev. 544, 762 P.2d 886 (1988); El-Maksoud v. El-Maksoud, 237 N.J.Super. 483,
486-490, 568 A.2d 140 , 142-144 (1989); Carr v.
Carr, 375 S.E.2d
190 , 192 (W.Va.1988); O'Brien v.
Eubanks, 701 P.2d
614 , 616 (Colo.App. 1985); Wolfson v. Wolfson, 455 So.
2d 577, 578 (Fla.App.1984); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 146 Ill.App.3d 990, 991-992, 100 Ill.Dec. 640, 641-642, 497 N.E.2d
818, 819-820 (1986); Swarts v. Dean, 13 Kan.App.2d 228, 766 P.2d
1291 , 1292 (1989). C Despite this formidable body of precedent, petitioner contends,
in reliance on our decisions applying the International
Shoe standard, that in the absence of "continuous and
systematic" contacts with the forum, see note 1 supra, a nonresident
defendant can be subjected to judgment only as to matters that
arise out of or relate to his contacts with the forum. This
argument rests on a thorough misunderstanding of our cases.

															The view of most courts in the 19th century was that a court
simply could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident who had not been personally served with process in the
forum. See, e.g., Reber v. Wright, 68 Pa. 471, 476-477
(1871); Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429, 431 (1861); Weil
v. Lowenthal, 10 Iowa 575, 578 (1860); Freeman, Law of
Judgments, at 468-470; see also D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U. S. 165 , 53 U. S. 176 (1851); Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 U. S.
58 (1874). Pennoyer v. Neff, while renowned for
its statement of the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment Page 495 U. S. 617 prohibits such an exercise of jurisdiction, in fact set that
forth only as dictum, and decided the case (which involved a
judgment rendered more than two years before the Fourteenth
Amendment's ratification) under "well established principles of
public law." 95 U.S. at 95 U. S. 722 .
Those principles, embodied in the Due Process Clause, required (we
said) that when proceedings

															"involv[e] merely a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within [the court's] jurisdiction
by service of process within the State, or his voluntary
appearance." Id. at 95 U. S. 733 .
We invoked that rule in a series of subsequent cases, as either a
matter of due process or a "fundamental principl[e] of
jurisprudence," Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U. S.
41 , 144 U. S. 46 (1892). See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S. 518 , 241 U. S.
522 -523 (1916); Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 , 156 U. S. 521 (1895).

															Later years, however, saw the weakening of the Pennoyer rule. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, changes in the
technology of transportation and communication, and the tremendous
growth of interstate business activity led to an "inevitable
relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction" over
nonresident individuals and corporations. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U. S. 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting). States required, for example, that
nonresident corporations appoint an in-state agent upon whom
process could be served as a condition of transacting business
within their borders, see, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882), and provided in-state "substituted service" for nonresident
motorists who caused injury in the State and left before personal
service could be accomplished, see, e.g., Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.
S. 352 (1927). We initially upheld these laws under the
Due Process Clause on grounds that they complied with Pennoyer's rigid requirement of either "consent," see,
e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, supra, at 274 U. S. 356 ,
or "presence," see, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading R. Co. v.
McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 , 243 U. S. 265 (1917). As many observed, Page 495 U. S. 618 however, the consent and presence were purely fictional. See, e.g., 1 J. Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws
360, 384 (1935); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.). Our opinion in International Shoe cast those fictions aside, and made
explicit the underlying basis of these decisions: due process does
not necessarily require the States to adhere to the unbending
territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer. The validity of assertion of jurisdiction over a nonconsenting
defendant who is not present in the forum depends upon whether "the
quality and nature of [his] activity" in relation to the forum, 326
U.S. at 326 U. S. 319 ,
renders such jurisdiction consistent with " traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 326 U. S. 316 (citation omitted). Subsequent cases have derived from the International Shoe standard the general rule that a State
may dispense with in-forum personal service on nonresident
defendants in suits arising out of their activities in the State. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S.
414 -415. As International Shoe suggests, the
defendant's litigation-related "minimum contacts" may take the
place of physical presence as the basis for jurisdiction: "Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding on him. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , 95 U. S.
733 . But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of
notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Page 495 U. S. 619 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 (citations omitted).

															Nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have
followed it, however, offers support for the very different
proposition petitioner seeks to establish today: that a defendant's
presence in the forum is not only unnecessary to validate novel,
nontraditional assertions of jurisdiction, but is itself no longer
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. That proposition is
unfaithful to both elementary logic and the foundations of our due
process jurisprudence. The distinction between what is needed to
support novel procedures and what is needed to sustain traditional
ones is fundamental, as we observed over a century ago:

															"[A] process of law which is not otherwise forbidden must be
taken to be due process of law if it can show the sanction of
settled usage both in England and in this country; but it by no
means follows that nothing else can be due process of law. . . .
[That which], in substance, has been immemorially the actual law of
the land . . . therefor[e] is due process of law. But to hold that
such a characteristic is essential to due process of law would be
to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it
incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the
Medes and Persians." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.
S. 516 , 110 U. S.
528 -529 (1884). The short of the matter is that
jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal
system that define the due process standard of "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." That standard was developed
by analogy to "physical presence," and it would be
perverse to say it could now be turned against that touchstone of
jurisdiction. D Petitioner's strongest argument, though we ultimately reject it,
relies upon our decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 Page 495 U. S. 620 (1977). In that case, a Delaware court hearing a shareholder's
derivative suit against a corporation's directors secured
jurisdiction quasi in rem by sequestering the out-of-State
defendants' stock in the company, the situs of which was Delaware
under Delaware law. Reasoning that Delaware's sequestration
procedure was simply a mechanism to compel the absent defendants to
appear in a suit to determine their personal rights and
obligations, we concluded that the normal rules we had developed
under International Shoe for jurisdiction over suits
against absent defendants should apply -- viz., Delaware
could not hear the suit because the defendants' sole contact with
the State (ownership of property there) was unrelated to the
lawsuit. 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
213 -215.

															It goes too far to say, as petitioner contends, that Shaffer compels the conclusion that a State lacks
jurisdiction over an individual unless the litigation arises out of
his activities in the State. Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an absent defendant, and it stands for nothing more than the
proposition that, when the "minimum contact" that is a substitute
for physical presence consists of property ownership, it must, like
other minimum contacts, be related to the litigation. Petitioner
wrenches out of its context our statement in Shaffer that
"all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny," 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 212 .
When read together with the two sentences that preceded it, the
meaning of this statement becomes clear:

															"The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is
anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the
property supports an ancient form without substantial modern
justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow
state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the
defendant."

															"We therefore conclude that all assertions of state
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the Page 495 U. S. 621 standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny." Ibid. (emphasis added). Shaffer was saying, in
other words, not that all bases for the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction (including, presumably, in-state
service) must be treated alike and subjected to the "minimum
contacts" analysis of International Shoe, but rather that quasi in rem jurisdiction, that fictional "ancient form,"
and in personam jurisdiction, are really one and the same,
and must be treated alike -- leading to the conclusion that quasi in rem jurisdiction, i.e., that form of in personam jurisdiction based upon a "property ownership"
contact and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state
service, must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International Shoe. The logic of Shaffer's holding -- which places all suits against absent nonresidents on
the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate
Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact -- does
not compel the conclusion that physically present defendants must
be treated identically to absent ones. As we have demonstrated at
length, our tradition has treated the two classes of defendants
quite differently, and it is unreasonable to read Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction. International
Shoe confined its "minimum contacts" requirement to situations
in which the defendant "be not present within the territory of the
forum," 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 ,
and nothing in Shaffer expands that requirement beyond
that.

															It is fair to say, however, that while our holding today does
not contradict Shaffer, our basic approach to the due
process question is different. We have conducted no independent
inquiry into the desirability or fairness of the prevailing
in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures
that are free to amend it; for our purposes, its validation is its
pedigree, as the phrase " traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" makes clear. Shaffer did conduct
such an independent inquiry, asserting that

															"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can
be as readily offended Page 495 U. S. 622 by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer
justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional
heritage."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 212 .
Perhaps that assertion can be sustained when the "perpetuation of
ancient forms" is engaged in by only a very small minority of the
States. [ Footnote 4 ] Where,
however, as in the present case, a jurisdictional principle is both
firmly approved by tradition and still favored, it is impossible to
imagine what standard we could appeal to for the judgment that it
is "no longer justified." While in no way receding from or casting
doubt upon the holding of Shaffer or any other case, we
reaffirm today our time-honored approach, see, e.g., Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U. S. 94 , 256 U. S.
110 -112 (1921); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 , 110 U. S.
528 -529 (1884); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U. S. 272 , 60 U. S.
276 -277 (1856). For new procedures, hitherto unknown,
the Due Process Clause requires analysis to determine whether
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" have
been offended. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 .
But a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that dates back to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally
observed unquestionably meets that standard. III A few words in response to Justice BRENNAN's concurrence: It
insists that we apply "contemporary notions of due process" to
determine the constitutionality of California's assertion of
jurisdiction. Post at 495 U. S. 632 .
But our analysis today comports with that prescription, at least if
we give it the only sense allowed by our precedents. The
"contemporary notions of due process" applicable to personal Page 495 U. S. 623 jurisdiction are the enduring " traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" established as the test by International Shoe. By its very language, that test is
satisfied if a state court adheres to jurisdictional rules that are
generally applied and have always been applied in the United
States.

															But the concurrence's proposed standard of "contemporary notions
of due process" requires more: it measures state court jurisdiction
not only against traditional doctrines in this country, including
current state court practice, but against each Justice's subjective
assessment of what is fair and just. Authority for that seductive
standard is not to be found in any of our personal jurisdiction
cases. It is, indeed, an outright break with the test of
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," which
would have to be reformulated " our notions of fair play
and substantial justice."

															The subjectivity, and hence inadequacy, of this approach becomes
apparent when the concurrence tries to explain why the assertion of
jurisdiction in the present case meets its standard of
continuing-American-tradition- plus -innate-fairness.
Justice BRENNAN lists the "benefits" Mr. Burnham derived from the
State of California -- the fact that, during the few days he was
there,

															"his health and safety [were] guaranteed by the State's police,
fire, and emergency medical services; he [was] free to travel on
the State's roads and waterways; he likely enjoy[ed] the fruits of
the State's economy." Post at 495 U. S.
637 -638. Three days' worth of these benefits strike us
as powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, that
it is "fair" for California to decree the ownership of all Mr.
Burnham's worldly goods acquired during the ten years of his
marriage, and the custody over his children. We daresay a
contractual exchange swapping those benefits for that power would
not survive the "unconscionability" provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Even less persuasive are the other "fairness"
factors alluded to by Justice BRENNAN. It would create "an
asymmetry," we are told, if Burnham were permitted (as he
is) to appear Page 495 U. S. 624 in California courts as a plaintiff, but were not compelled to appear in California courts as defendant; and
travel being as easy as it is nowadays, and modern procedural
devices being so convenient, it is no great hardship to appear in
California courts. Post at 638-639. The problem with these
assertions is that they justify the exercise of jurisdiction over everyone, whether or not he ever comes to California. The
only "fairness" elements setting Mr. Burnham apart from the rest of
the world are the three-days' "benefits" referred to above -- and
even those do not set him apart from many other people who have
enjoyed three days in the Golden State (savoring the fruits of its
economy, the availability of its roads and police services) but who
were fortunate enough not to be served with process while they were
there, and thus are not (simply by reason of that savoring) subject
to the general jurisdiction of California's courts. See, e.g.,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S.
414 -416. In other words, even if one agreed with Justice
BRENNAN's conception of an equitable bargain, the "benefits" we
have been discussing would explain why it is "fair" to assert
general jurisdiction over "Burnham returned to New Jersey after
service" only at the expense of proving that it is also "fair" to
assert general jurisdiction over "Burnham returned to New Jersey without service" -- which we know does not conform with
"contemporary notions of due process."

															There is, we must acknowledge, one factor mentioned by Justice
BRENNAN that both relates distinctively to the assertion
of jurisdiction on the basis of personal in-state service and is fully persuasive -- namely, the fact that a
defendant voluntarily present in a particular State has a
"reasonable expectatio[n]" that he is subject to suit there. Post at 495 U. S. 637 .
By formulating it as a "reasonable expectation" Justice BRENNAN
makes that seem like a "fairness" factor; but in reality, of
course, it is just tradition masquerading as "fairness." The only
reason for charging Mr. Burnham with the reasonable expectation of
being subject to suit is that the Page 495 U. S. 625 States of the Union assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over the
person, and have always asserted adjudicatory jurisdiction over the
person, by serving him with process during his temporary physical
presence in their territory. That continuing tradition, which
anyone entering California should have known about, renders it
"fair" for Mr. Burnham, who voluntarily entered California, to be
sued there for divorce -- at least "fair" in the limited sense that
he has no one but himself to blame. Justice BRENNAN's long journey
is a circular one, leaving him, at the end of the day, in complete
reliance upon the very factor he sought to avoid: The existence of
a continuing tradition is not enough; fairness also must be
considered; fairness exists here because there is a continuing
tradition.

															While Justice BRENNAN's concurrence is unwilling to confess that
the Justices of this Court can possibly be bound by a continuing
American tradition that a particular procedure is fair, neither is
it willing to embrace the logical consequences of that refusal --
or even to be clear about what consequences (logical or otherwise)
it does embrace. Justice BRENNAN says that

															"[f]or these reasons [ i.e., because of the
reasonableness factors enumerated above], as a rule the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary
presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due
process." Post at 495 U. S. 639 .
The use of the word "rule" conveys the reassuring feeling that he
is establishing a principle of law one can rely upon -- but of
course he is not. Since Justice BRENNAN's only criterion of
constitutionality is "fairness," the phrase "as a rule" represents
nothing more than his estimation that, usually, all the
elements of "fairness" he discusses in the present case will exist.
But what if they do not? Suppose, for example, that a defendant in
Mr. Burnham's situation enjoys not three days' worth of
California's "benefits," but fifteen minutes' worth. Or suppose we
remove one of those "benefits" -- "enjoy[ment of] the fruits of the
State's economy" -- by positing that Mr. Burnham had not Page 495 U. S. 626 come to California on business, but only to visit his children.
Or suppose that Mr. Burnham were demonstrably so impecunious as to
be unable to take advantage of the modern means of transportation
and communication that Justice BRENNAN finds so relevant. Or
suppose, finally, that the California courts lacked the "variety of
procedural devices," post at 495 U. S. 639 ,
that Justice BRENNAN says can reduce the burden upon out-of-state
litigants. One may also make additional suppositions relating not
to the absence of the factors that Justice BRENNAN discusses, but
to the presence of additional factors bearing upon the ultimate
criterion of "fairness." What if, for example, Mr. Burnham were
visiting a sick child? Or a dying child? Cf. Kulko v.
California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84 , 436 U. S. 93 (1978) (finding the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over an
absent parent unreasonable because it would "discourage parents
from entering into reasonable visitation agreements"). Since, so
far as one can tell, Justice BRENNAN's approval of applying the
in-state service rule in the present case rests on the presence of all the factors he lists, and on the absence of any
others, every different case will present a different litigable
issue. Thus, despite the fact that he manages to work the word
"rule" into his formulation, Justice BRENNAN's approach does not
establish a rule of law at all, but only a "totality of the
circumstances" test, guaranteeing what traditional territorial
rules of jurisdiction were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty
and litigation over the preliminary issue of the forum's
competence. It may be that those evils, necessarily accompanying a
freestanding "reasonableness" inquiry, must be accepted at the
margins, when we evaluate non traditional forms of
jurisdiction newly adopted by the states, see, e.g., Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U. S. 102 , 480 U. S. 115 (1987). But that is no reason for injecting them into the core of
our American practice, exposing to such a "reasonableness" inquiry
the ground of jurisdiction that has hitherto Page 495 U. S. 627 been considered the very baseline of reasonableness,
physical presence.

															The difference between us and Justice BRENNAN has nothing to do
with whether "further progress [is] to be made" in the "evolution
of our legal system." Post at 495 U. S. 631 ,
n. 3. It has to do with whether changes are to be adopted as
progressive by the American people or decreed as progressive by the
Justices of this Court. Nothing we say today prevents individual
States from limiting or entirely abandoning the in-state service
basis of jurisdiction. And nothing prevents an overwhelming
majority of them from doing so, with the consequence that the
"traditional notions of fairness" that this Court applies may
change. But the states have overwhelmingly declined to adopt such
limitation or abandonment, evidently not considering it to be
progress. [ Footnote 5 ] The
question is whether, armed with no authority other than individual
Justices' perceptions of fairness that conflict with both past and
current practice, this Court can compel the states to make such a
change on the ground that "due process" requires it. We hold that
it cannot. Page 495 U. S. 628 * * * * Because the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the California
courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on the
fact of in-state service of process, the judgment is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															We have said that

															"[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate
to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due
process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to
its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient
contacts between the State and the foreign corporation." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S.
at 466 U. S. 414 .
Our only holding supporting that statement, however, involved
"regular service of summons upon [the corporation's] president
while he was in [the forum State] acting in that capacity." See
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.
S. 437 , 342 U. S. 440 (1952). It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting
"continuous and systematic" contacts, id. at 438, to
support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated to activity
in the forum, applies only to corporations, which have never fitted
comfortably in a jurisdictional regime based primarily upon " de
facto power over the defendant's person." International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 (1945). We express no views on these matters -- and, for
simplicity's sake, omit reference to this aspect of
"contacts"-based jurisdiction in our discussion.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Justice BRENNAN's assertion that some of these cases involved
dicta rather than holdings, post at 495 U. S.
636 -637, n. 10, is incorrect. In each case, personal
service within the State was the exclusive basis for the judgment
that jurisdiction existed, and no other factor was relied upon. Nor
is it relevant for present purposes that these holdings might
instead have been rested on other available grounds.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Given this striking fact, and the unanimity of both cases and
commentators in supporting the in-state service rule, one can only
marvel at Justice BRENNAN's assertion that the rule "was rather
weakly implanted in American jurisprudence," post at 495 U. S.
633 -634, and "did not receive wide currency until well
after our decision in Pennoyer v. Neff," post at 495 U. S. 635 .
I have cited pre- Pennoyer cases clearly supporting the
rule from no less than nine States, ranging from Mississippi to
Colorado to New Hampshire, and two highly respected
pre- Pennoyer commentators. (It is, moreover, impossible to
believe that the many other cases decided shortly after Pennoyer represented some sort of instant mutation -- or,
for that matter, that Pennoyer itself was not drawing upon
clear contemporary understanding.) Justice BRENNAN cites neither
cases nor commentators from the relevant period to support his
thesis (with exceptions I shall discuss presently), and instead
relies upon modern secondary sources that do not mention, and were
perhaps unaware of, many of the materials I have discussed. The
cases cited by Justice BRENNAN, post at 495 U. S.
634 -635, n. 9, do not remotely support his point. The
dictum he quotes from Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 441, 458 (1874), to
the effect that "a man shall only be liable to be called on to
answer for civil wrongs in the forum of his home, and the tribunal
of vicinage," was addressing the situation where no personal
service in the State had been obtained. This is clear from the
court's earlier statements that

															"there is no mode of reaching by any process issuing from a
court of common law, the person of a nonresident defendant not
found within the jurisdiction," id. at 456, and

															"[u]pon a summons, unless there is service within the
jurisdiction, there can be no judgment for want of appearance
against the defendant." Ibid. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 John. *134
(N.Y.1817), and Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb.Pr.R. 316 (N.Y.
Common Pleas 1859), are irrelevant to the present discussion. Gardner, in which the court declined to adjudicate a tort
action between two British subjects for a tort that occurred on the
high seas aboard a British vessel, specifically affirmed that
jurisdiction did exist, but said that its exercise "must, on
principles of policy, often rest in the sound discretion of the
Court." Gardner v. Thomas, supra, at 120. The decision is
plainly based, in modern terms, upon the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Molony did indeed hold that in-state service could
not support the adjudication of an action for physical assault by
one Californian against another in California (acknowledging that
this appeared to contradict an earlier New York case), but it
rested that holding upon a doctrine akin to the principle that no
state will enforce the penal laws of another -- that is, resting
upon the injury to the public peace of the other state that such an
assault entails, and upon the fact that the damages awarded include
penal elements. Molony v. Dows, supra, at 330. The
fairness or propriety of exercising jurisdiction over the parties
had nothing to do with the decision, as is evident from the court's
acknowledgment that if the Californians were suing one another over
a contract dispute jurisdiction would lie, no matter where the
contract arose. Id. at 328. As for Justice BRENNAN's
citation of the 1880 commentator John Cleland Wells, post at 495 U. S. 635 n. 9, it suffices to quote what is set forth on the very page
cited:

															"It is held to be a principle of the common law that any
nonresident defendant voluntarily coming within the jurisdiction
may be served with process, and compelled to answer."

															1 J. Wells, Jurisdiction of Courts 76 (1880).

															[ Footnote 4 ] Shaffer may have involved a unique state procedure in
one respect: Justice STEVENS noted that Delaware was the only State
that treated the place of incorporation as the situs of corporate
stock when both owner and custodian were elsewhere. See 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 218 (opinion concurring in judgment).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															I find quite unacceptable as a basis for this Court's decisions
Justice BRENNAN's view that

															"the raison d'etre of various constitutional doctrines
designed to protect out-of-staters such as the Art. IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause," post at 495 U. S. 640 ,
n. 14, entitles this Court to brand as "unfair," and hence
unconstitutional, the refusal of all 50 states "to limit or abandon
bases of jurisdiction that have become obsolete," post at 495 U. S. 639 ,
n. 14. "Due process" (which is the constitutional text at issue
here) does not mean that process which shifting majorities of this
Court feel to be "due," but that process which American society --
self-interested American society, which expresses its judgments in
the laws of self-interested states -- has traditionally considered
"due." The notion that the Constitution, through some penumbra
emanating from the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the
Commerce Clause, establishes this Court as a platonic check upon
the society's greedy adherence to its traditions can only be
described as imperious.

															Justice WHITE, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															I join Part I and Parts II-A, II-B, and II-C of Justice SCALIA's
opinion and concur in the judgment of affirmance. The rule allowing
jurisdiction to be obtained over a nonresident by personal service
in the forum state, without more, has been and is so widely
accepted throughout this country that I could not possibly strike
it down, either on its face or as applied in this case, on the
ground that it denies due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court has the authority under
the Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and
declare them invalid, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (1977), there has been no showing here or elsewhere that, as a
general proposition, the rule is so arbitrary and lacking in common
sense in so many instances that it should be held violative of Due
Process in every case. Furthermore, until such a showing is made,
which would be difficult indeed, claims in individual cases that
the rule would operate unfairly as applied to the particular
nonresident involved need not be entertained. At least this would
be the case where presence in the forum state is intentional, which
would almost always be the fact. Otherwise, there would be endless,
fact-specific litigation in the trial and appellate courts,
including this one. Here, personal service in California, without
more, is enough, and I agree that the judgment should be
affirmed.

															Justice BRENNAN, with whom Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN,
and Justice O'CONNOR join, concurring in the judgment.

															I agree with Justice SCALIA that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment generally permits a state Page 495 U. S. 629 court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served
with process while voluntarily present in the forum State.
[ Footnote 2/1 ] I do not perceive
the need, however, to decide that a jurisdictional rule that
" has been immemorially the actual law of the land,'" ante at 495 U. S. 619 ,
quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.
S. 516 , 110 U. S. 528 (1884), automatically comports with due process simply by virtue of
its "pedigree." Although I agree that history is an important
factor in establishing whether a jurisdictional rule satisfies due
process requirements, I cannot agree that it is the only factor such that all traditional rules of jurisdiction are, ipso facto, forever constitutional. Unlike Justice SCALIA,
I would undertake an "independent inquiry into the . . . fairness
of the prevailing in-state service rule." Ante at 495 U. S. 621 .
I therefore concur only in the judgment. I I believe that the approach adopted by Justice SCALIA's opinion
today -- reliance solely on historical pedigree -- is foreclosed by
our decisions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 (1977). In International Shoe, we held
that a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction does not
violate the Due Process Clause if it is consistent with
" traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 ,
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940). [ Footnote 2/2 ] In Shaffer, we stated that " all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
212 Page 495 U. S. 630 (emphasis added). The critical insight of Shaffer is
that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy
contemporary notions of due process. No longer were we content to
limit our jurisdictional analysis to pronouncements that "[t]he
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 , 243 U. S. 91 (1917), and that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878). While acknowledging that

															"history must be considered as supporting the proposition that
jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property satisfie[d]
the demands of due process,"

															we found that this factor could not be "decisive." 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
211 -212. We recognized that

															"'[t]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures
that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional
heritage." Id. at 433 U. S. 212 (citations omitted). I agree with this approach, and continue to
believe that

															"the minimum contacts analysis developed in International
Shoe . . . represents a far more sensible construct for the
exercise of state court jurisdiction than the patchwork of legal
and factual fictions that has been generated from the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff." Id. at 433 U. S. 219 (citation omitted) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

															While our holding in Shaffer may have been
limited to quasi in rem jurisdiction, our mode of analysis
was not. Indeed, that we were willing in Shaffer to
examine anew the appropriateness of the quasi in rem rule
-- until that time dutifully accepted by American courts for at
least a century -- demonstrates that we did not believe that the
"pedigree" of a jurisdictional practice was dispositive in deciding
whether it was consistent with due process. We later characterized Shaffer as

															"abandon[ing] the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S.
215 (1905), that the interest of a creditor in a
debt Page 495 U. S. 631 could be extinguished or otherwise affected by any State having
transitory jurisdiction over the debtor." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.
S. 286 , 444 U. S. 296 (1980); see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.
S. 320 , 444 U. S.
325 -326 (1980). If we could discard an "ancient form
without substantial modern justification" in Shaffer,
supra, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 212 ,
we can do so again. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Lower courts, [ Footnote 2/4 ]
commentators, [ Footnote 2/5 ] and
the American Law Page 495 U. S. 632 Institute [ Footnote 2/6 ] all
have interpreted International Shoe and Shaffer to mean that every assertion of state court jurisdiction, even one
pursuant to a "traditional" rule such as transient jurisdiction,
must comport with contemporary notions of due process.
Notwithstanding the nimble gymnastics of Justice Page 495 U. S. 633 SCALIA's opinion today, it is not faithful to our decision in Shaffer. II Tradition, though alone not dispositive, is of course relevant to the question whether the rule of transient
jurisdiction is consistent with due process. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Tradition is salient not in the sense that
practices of the past are automatically reasonable today; indeed,
under such a standard, the legitimacy of transient jurisdiction
would be called into question because the rule's historical
"pedigree" is a matter of intense debate. The rule was a stranger
to the common law [ Footnote 2/8 ]
and was rather Page 495 U. S. 634 weakly implanted in American jurisprudence "at the crucial time
for present purposes: 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted." Ante at 495 U. S. 611 . For much of the 19th century, American
courts did not uniformly recognize the concept of transient
jurisdiction, [ Footnote 2/9 ] and it
appears that the Page 495 U. S. 635 transient rule did not receive wide currency until well after
our decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1878). [ Footnote
2/10 ]

															Rather, I find the historical background relevant because,
however murky the jurisprudential origins of transient
jurisdiction, Page 495 U. S. 636 the fact that American courts have announced the rule for
perhaps a century (first in dicta, more recently in holdings)
provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today "clear notice that [he] is subject to suit" in Page 495 U. S. 637 the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , 444 U. S. 297 (1980). Regardless of whether Justice Story's account of the rule's
genesis is mythical, our common understanding now, fortified by a century of judicial practice, is that jurisdiction
is often a function of geography. The transient rule is consistent
with reasonable expectations, and is entitled to a strong
presumption that it comports with due process.

															"If I visit another State, . . . I knowingly assume some risk
that the State will exercise its power over my property or my
person while there. My contact with the State, though minimal,
gives rise to predictable risks." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 218 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 , 471 U. S. 476 (1985) ("[t]erritorial presence frequently will enhance a potential
defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable
foreseeability of suit there"); Glen, An Analysis of "Mere
Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 607, 611-612 (1979). Thus, proposed revisions to the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 28, p. 39 (1986),
provide that

															"[a] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual who is present within its territory unless the
individual's relationship to the state is so attenuated as to make
the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable. [ Footnote 2/11 ]"

															By visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually
"avail[s]" himself, Burger King, supra, at 471 U. S. 476 ,
of significant benefits provided by the State. His health and
safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and emergency
medical services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and
waterways; Page 495 U. S. 638 he likely enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well.
Moreover, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV
prevents a state government from discriminating against a transient
defendant by denying him the protections of its law or the right of
access to its courts. [ Footnote
2/12 ] See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U. S. 274 , 470 U. S. 281 ,
n. 10 (1985); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U. S. 371 , 436 U. S. 387 (1978); see also Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U. S. 59 , 487 U. S. 64 -65
(1988). Subject only to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, an out-of-state plaintiff may use state courts in
all circumstances in which those courts would be available to state
citizens. Without transient jurisdiction, an asymmetry would arise:
a transient would have the full benefit of the power of the forum
State's courts as a plaintiff while retaining immunity from their
authority as a defendant. See Maltz, Sovereign Authority,
Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: The Case for the Doctrine of
Transient Jurisdiction, 66 Wash.U.L.Q. 671, 698-699 (1988).

															The potential burdens on a transient defendant are slight.
" [M]odern transportation and communications have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself'" in a State
outside his place of residence. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 474 ,
quoting McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220 , 355 U. S. 223 (1957). That the defendant has already journeyed Page 495 U. S. 639 at least once before to the forum -- as evidenced by the fact
that he was served with process there -- is an indication that suit
in the forum likely would not be prohibitively inconvenient.
Finally, any burdens that do arise can be ameliorated by a variety
of procedural devices. [ Footnote
2/13 ] For these reasons, as a rule the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary presence in
the forum will satisfy the requirements of due process. [ Footnote 2/14 ] See 495
U.S. 604 fn2/11|>n. 11, supra. Page 495 U. S. 640 In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was served with
process while voluntarily and knowingly in the State of California.
I therefore concur in the judgment.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															1 use the term "transient jurisdiction" to refer to jurisdiction
premised solely on the fact that a person is served with process
while physically present in the forum State.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Our reference in International Shoe to " traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,'" 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 ,
meant simply that those concepts are indeed traditional ones, not
that, as Justice SCALlA's opinion suggests, see ante at 495 U. S. 621 , 495 U. S. 622 ,
their specific content was to be determined by tradition
alone. We recognized that contemporary societal norms must play a
role in our analysis. See, e.g., 326 U.S. at 326 U. S. 317 (considerations of "reasonable[ness], in the context of our federal
system of government"). [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Even Justice SCALIA's opinion concedes that sometimes courts may discard "traditional" rules when they no longer comport
with contemporary notions of due process. For example, although,
beginning with the Romans, judicial tribunals for over a millenium
permitted jurisdiction to be acquired by force, see L.
Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure 46-47 (O.
Fisk trans., rev. ed. 1986), by the 19th century, as Justice SCALIA
acknowledges, this method had largely disappeared. See
ante at 495 U. S. 613 .
I do not see why Justice SCALIA's opinion assumes that there is no
further progress to be made, and that the evolution of our legal
system, and the society in which it operates, ended 100 years
ago.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Some lower courts have concluded that transient jurisdiction did
not survive Shaffer. See Nehemiah v. Athletics
Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (CA3 1985); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F.
Supp. 1079 , 1088-1091 (Kan.1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (CA10 1979); Harold M. Pitman Co. v.
Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F.
Supp. 305 , 310-314 (ND Ill.1986); Bershaw v.
Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 657, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
Others have held that transient jurisdiction is alive and well. See ante at 495 U. S.
615 -616. But even cases falling into the latter category
have engaged in the type of due process analysis that Justice
SCALIA's opinion claims is unnecessary today. See, e.g.,
Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (CA5
1985); Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d
341 , 342 (1985); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 146
Ill.App.3d 990, 992, 100 Ill.Dec. 640, 641-642, 497 N.E.2d 818,
819820 (1986); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86
Wis.2d 683, 688-692, 273 N.W.2d
285 , 287-290 (1979); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C.
66, 71-72, 361 S.E.2d
581 , 585 (1987); NutriWest v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693 ,
695-696 (Wyo. 1988); Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial District
Court, 104 Nev. 544, 547, 762 P.2d 886 ,
888 (1988); El-Maksoud v. El-Maksoud, 237 N.J.Super. 483,
489, 568 A.2d 140 , 143 (1989); Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d
190 , 192, and n. 5 (W.Va.1988).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Although commentators have disagreed over whether the rule of
transient jurisdiction is consistent with modern conceptions of due
process, that they have engaged in such a debate at all shows that
they have rejected the methodology employed by Justice SCALIA's
opinion today. See Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam
Jurisdiction?, 25 Vill.L.Rev. 38, 47-68 (1979-1980); Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
Tex.L.Rev. 721, 748-755 (1988); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction,
26 Emory L.J. 739, 770-773 (1977); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and
Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 Ore.L.Rev.
505, 510 (1978); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial
Jurisdiction After Worldwide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha"
Theory, 30 Emory L.J. 729, 735, n. 30 (1981); Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw.U.L.Rev. 1112, 1117 n. 35 (1981); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 1031, 1035 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 75 (1978);
Vernon, Single Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction -- A
Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner 1978
Wash.U.L.Q. 273, 303; Von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:
General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 279, 300-307
(1983); Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5
Hastings Const.L.Q. 15, 24 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 24,
Comment h p. 29 (Proposed Revisions 1986) ("One basic principle
underlies all rules of jurisdiction. This principle is that a state
does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis
for exercising it. With respect to judicial jurisdiction, this
principle was laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
in International Shoe. . . . "); id. at 30
("Three factors are primarily responsible for existing rules of
judicial jurisdiction. Present-day notions of fair play and
substantial justice constitute the first factor"); id. at
41, § 28, Comment b, ("The Supreme Court held in Shaffer v.
Heitner that the presence of a thing in a state gives that
state jurisdiction to determine interests in the thing only in
situations where the exercise of such jurisdiction would be
reasonable. . . . It must likewise follow that considerations of
reasonableness qualify the power of a state to exercise personal
jurisdiction over an individual on the basis of his physical
presence within its territory"); Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 8, Comment a, p. 64 (Tent. Draft No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978)
( Shaffer establishes " minimum contacts' in place of
presence as the principal basis for territorial
jurisdiction"). [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															I do not propose that the "contemporary notions of due process"
to be applied are no more than "each Justice's subjective
assessment of what is fair and just." Ante at 495 U. S. 623 .
Rather, the inquiry is guided by our decisions beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 (1945), and the specific factors that we have
developed to ascertain whether a jurisdictional rule comports with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See, e.g., Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 480 U. S. 102 , 480 U. S. 113 (1987) (noting "several factors," including "the burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining relief"). This analysis may not be
"mechanical or quantitative," International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 326 U. S. 319 ,
but neither is it "freestanding," ante at 495 U. S. 626 ,
or dependent on personal whim. Our experience with this approach
demonstrates that it is well within our competence to employ.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															As Justice SCALIA's opinion acknowledges, American courts in the
19th century erected the theory of transient jurisdiction largely
upon Justice Story's historical interpretation of Roman and
continental sources. Justice SCALIA's opinion concedes that the
rule's tradition "was not as clear as Story thought," ante at 495 U. S. 611 ;
in fact, it now appears that, as a historical matter, Story was
almost surely wrong. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of
Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65
Yale L.J. 289, 293-303 (1956); Hazard, A General Theory of State
Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.Ct. Rev. 241, 261 ("Story's system
reflected neither decided authority nor critical analysis").
Undeniably, Story's views are in considerable tension with English
common law -- a "tradition" closer to our own, and thus, I would
imagine, one that in Justice SCALIA's eyes is more deserving of our
study than civil law practice. See R. Boote, An Historical
Treatise of an Action or Suit at Law 97 (3d ed. 1805); G. Cheshire,
Private International Law 601 (4th ed. 1952); J. Westlake, Private
International Law 101-102 (1859); Note, British Precedents for Due
Process Limitations on In Personam Jurisdiction, 48 Colum.L.Rev.
605, 610-611 (1948) ("The [British] cases evidence a judicial
intent to limit the rules to those instances where their
application is consonant with the demands of fair play' and
'substantial justice' "). It seems that Justice Story's interpretation of historical
practice amounts to little more than what Justice Story himself
perceived to be "fair and just." See ante at 495 U. S. 611 (quoting Justice Story's statement that " [w]here a party is
within a territory, he may justly be subjected to its
process'") (emphasis added and citation omitted). I see no reason
to bind ourselves forever to that perception. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															In Molony v. Dows, 8 Abbott's Pr. R. 316 (N.Y. Common
Pleas 1859), for example, the court dismissed an action for a tort
that had occurred in California, even though the defendant was
served with process while he was in the forum State of New York.
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that it possessed
"jurisdiction of all actions, local and transitory, where the
defendant resides, or is personally served with process," id. at 325, with the comment that

															"an action cannot be maintained in this court, or in any court
of this State, to recover a pecuniary satisfaction in damages for a
willful injury to the person, inflicted in another State, where, at
the time of the act, both the wrongdoer and the party injured were
domiciled in that State as resident citizens." Id. at 326. The court reasoned that it could not

															"undertake to redress every wrong that may have happened in any
part of the world, [merely] because the parties, plaintiff or
defendant, may afterwards happen to be within [the court's]
jurisdiction." Id. at 327-328. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court declared it

															"the most important principle of all municipal
law of Anglo-Saxon origin, that a man shall only be liable to be
called upon to answer for civil wrongs in the forum of his home,
and the tribunal of his vicinage." Coleman's Appeal, 75 Pa. 441, 458 (1874) (emphasis
added). And in Gardner v. Thomas, 14 John. *134
(N.Y.1817), the court was faced with the question

															"whether this Court will lake cognizance of a tort committed on
the high seas, on board of a foreign vessel, both the parties being
subjects or citizens of the country to which the vessel
belongs,"

															after the ship had docked in New York and suit was commenced
there. The court observed that Lord Mansfield had appeared

															"to doubt whether an action may be maintained in England for an injury in consequence of two persons
fighting in France, [even] when both are within the
jurisdiction of the Court." Id. at 137. The court distinguished the instant case as
an action "for an injury on the high seas" -- a location, "of
course, without the actual or exclusive territory of any nation." Ibid. Nevertheless, the court found that, while

															"our Courts may take cognizance of torts committed on the high
seas, on board of a foreign vessel where both parties are
foreigners, . . . it must, on principles of policy, often rest in
the sound discretion of the Court to afford jurisdiction or not,
according to the circumstances of the case." Id. at 137-138. In the particular case before it, the
court found jurisdiction lacking. See id. at 138. See
also 1 J. Wells, Jurisdiction of Courts 76 (1880) (reporting
that a state court had argued that "courts have jurisdiction of
actions for torts as to property, even where the parties are
nonresident, and the torts were committed out of the state, if the
defendant is served with process within the state," but also noting
that "Clerke, J., very vigorously dissented in the case, and, I
judge, with good reason").

															It is possible to distinguish these cases narrowly on their
facts, as Justice SCALIA demonstrates. See ante at 495 U. S.
614 -615, n. 3. Thus, Molony could be
characterized as a case about the reluctance of one State to punish
assaults occurring in another, Gardner as a forum non
conveniens case, and Coleman's Appeal as a case in
which there was no in-state service of process. But such an
approach would mistake the trees for the forest. The truth is that
the transient rule as we now conceive it had no clear counterpart
at common law. Just as today there is an interaction among rules
governing jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and choice
of law, see, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.
S. 516 , 494 U. S.
530 -531 (1990); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
224 -226 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.
S. 235 , 357 U. S. 254 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting), at common law there was a complex
interplay among pleading requirements, venue, and substantive law
-- an interplay which in large part substituted for a theory of
"jurisdiction:"

															"A theory of territorial jurisdiction would in any event have
been premature in England before, say, 1688, or perhaps even 1832.
Problems of jurisdiction were the essence of medieval English law,
and remained significant until the period of Victorian reform. But,
until after 1800, it would have been impossible, even if it had
been thought appropriate, to disentangle the question of
territorial limitations on jurisdiction from those arising out of
charter, prerogative, personal privilege, corporate liberty,
ancient custom, and the fortuities of rules of pleading, venue, and
process. The intricacies of English jurisdictional law of that time
resist generalization on any theory except a franchisal one; they
seem certainly not reducible to territorial dimension. The English
precedents on jurisdiction were therefore of little relevance to
American problems of the nineteenth century."

															Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965
Sup.Ct.Rev. 241, 252-253. See also Twitchell, The Myth of
General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 610, 617 (1988). The salient
point is that many American courts followed English precedents and
restricted the place where certain actions could be brought,
regardless of the defendant's presence or whether he was served
there.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															One distinguished legal historian has observed that

															"notwithstanding dogmatic generalizations later sanctioned by
the Restatement [of Conflict of Laws], appellate courts hardly ever
in fact held transient service sufficient as such"

															and that, "although the transient rule has often been mouthed by
the courts, it has but rarely been applied." Ehrenzweig, supra, at 292, 295 (footnote omitted). Many of the cases
cited in Justice SCALIA's opinion, see ante at 2111-2112,
involve either announcement of the rule in dictum or situations
where factors other than in-state service supported the exercise of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Alley v. Caspari, 80 Me. 234,
236, 14 A. 12 (1888) (defendant found to be resident of forum); De Poret v. Gusman, 30 La.Ann. 930, 930 (1878) (cause of
action arose in forum); Savin v. Bond, 57 Md. 228, 233
(1881) (both defendants residents of forum State); Hart v.
Granger, 1 Conn. 154, 154-155 (1814) (suit brought against
former resident of forum State based on contract entered into
there); Baisley v. Baisley, 113 Mo. 544, 550 (1893) (court
ruled for plaintiff on grounds of estoppel because defendant had
failed to raise timely objection to jurisdiction in a prior suit); Bowman v. Flint, 37 Tex.Civ.App. 28, 28-29, 82 S.W. 1049,
1049-1050 (1904) (defendant did business within forum State, and
cause of action arose there as well). In Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11, 134) (C.C.Mass.1828), Justice Story found
jurisdiction to be lacking over a suit by a French citizen (a
resident of Paris) against an American citizen also residing in
Paris. See also Hazard, supra, at 261
(criticizing Story's reasoning in Picquet as "at variance"
with both American and English decisions).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															As the Restatement suggests, there may be cases in which a
defendant's involuntary or unknowing presence in a State does not
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The facts
of the instant case do not require us to determine the outer limits
of the transient jurisdiction rule.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															That these privileges may independently be required by the
Constitution does not mean that they must be ignored for purposes
of determining the fairness of the transient jurisdiction rule. For
example, in the context of specific jurisdiction, we consider
whether a defendant "has availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business" in the forum State, Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz. 471 U. S. 462 , 471 U. S. 476 (1985), or has " invok[ed] the benefits and protections of its
laws,'" id. at 475, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U.S. 253 (1958), even
though the State could not deny the defendant the right to do so. See also Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 480 U.S. at 480 U. S.
108 -109 (plurality opinion); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770 , 465 U. S. 781 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , 444 U. S. 297 (1980). [ Footnote 2/13 ]

															For example, in the federal system, a transient defendant can
avoid protracted litigation of a spurious suit through a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim or though a motion for summary
judgment. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) and 56. He can use
relatively inexpensive methods of discovery, such as oral
deposition by telephone (Rule 30(b)(7)), deposition upon written
questions (Rule 31), interrogatories (Rule 33), and requests for
admission (Rule 36), while enjoying protection from harassment
(Rule 26(c)), and possibly obtaining costs and attorney's fees for
some of the work involved (Rule 37(a)(4), (b)-(d)). Moreover, a
change of venue may be possible. 28 U.S.C. § 1404. In state court,
many of the same procedural protections are available, as is the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which the suit may
be dismissed. See generally Abrams, Power, Convenience,
and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
58 Ind. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1982).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															Justice SCALIA's opinion maintains that, viewing transient
jurisdiction as a contractual bargain, the rule is
"unconscionabl[e]," ante at 495 U. S. 623 ,
according to contemporary conceptions of fairness. But the opinion
simultaneously insists that, because of its historical "pedigree,"
the rule is "the very baseline of reasonableness." Ante at 495 U. S. 627 .
Thus is revealed Justice SCALIA's belief that tradition alone is completely dispositive, and that no showing of
unfairness can ever serve to invalidate a traditional
jurisdictional practice. I disagree both with this belief and with
Justice SCALIA's assessment of the fairness of the transient
jurisdiction bargain.

															I note, moreover, that the dual conclusions of Justice SCALIA's
opinion create a singularly unattractive result. Justice SCALIA
suggests that, when and if a jurisdictional rule becomes
substantively unfair or even "unconscionable," this Court is
powerless to alter it. Instead, he is willing to rely on individual
States to limit or abandon bases of jurisdiction that have become
obsolete. See ante at 495 U. S. 627 ,
and n. 5. This reliance is misplaced, for States have little
incentive to limit rules such as transient jurisdiction that make
it easier for their own citizens to sue out-of-state
defendants. That States are more likely to expand their
jurisdiction is illustrated by the adoption by many States of
long-arm statutes extending the reach of personal jurisdiction to
the limits established by the Federal Constitution. See 2
J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink, & C. Thompson, Moore's Federal
Practice � 4.41-1[4], p. 4-336 (2d ed. 1989); 4 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1068, pp. 336-339 (1987).
Out-of-staters do not vote in state elections or have a voice in
state government. We should not assume therefore, that States will
be motivated by "notions of fairness" to curb jurisdictional rules
like the one at issue here. The reasoning of Justice SCALlA's
opinion today is strikingly oblivious to the raison d'etre of various constitutional doctrines designed to protect
out-of-staters, such as the Art. IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Commerce Clause.

															Justice STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

															As I explained in my separate writing, I did not join the
Court's opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 (1977), because I was concerned by its
unnecessarily broad reach. Id. at 433 U. S.
217 -219 (opinion concurring in judgment). The same
concern prevents me from joining either Justice SCALIA's or Justice
BRENNAN's opinion in this case. For me, it is sufficient to note
that the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice
SCALIA, the considerations of fairness identified by Justice
BRENNAN, and the common sense displayed by Justice WHITE, all
combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case. * Accordingly, I
agree that the judgment should be affirmed.

															* Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be
revised to cover easy cases.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

The Supreme Court ruled that a non-resident defendant who is physically served with legal process while temporarily in a state can be subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts, even if the case is unrelated to their activities in the state. This decision affirmed the "transient jurisdiction" rule, where personal service of process is sufficient for a state court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

The Court's opinion, written by Justice Scalia, relied on historical precedent and traditional notions of fairness, concluding that this rule did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brennan's opinion highlighted the fairness of the rule, while Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, noting the consensus between historical evidence and fairness considerations.