U.S. Supreme Court Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) Strickland v.
Washington No. 82-1554 Argued January 10,
1984 Decided May 14, 1984 466
U.S. 668 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an
indictment that included three capital murder charges. In the plea
colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that, although he had
committed a string of burglaries, he had no significant prior
criminal record and that, at the time of his criminal spree, he was
under extreme stress caused by his inability to support his family.
The trial judge told respondent that he had "a great deal of
respect for people who are willing to step forward and admit their
responsibility." In preparing for the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel spoke with respondent about his background, but did not
seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric examination.
Counsel's decision not to present evidence concerning respondent's
character and emotional state reflected his judgment that it was
advisable to rely on the plea colloquy for evidence as to such
matters, thus preventing the State from cross-examining respondent
and from presenting psychiatric evidence of its own. Counsel did
not request a presentence report, because it would have included
respondent's criminal history and thereby would have undermined the
claim of no significant prior criminal record. Finding numerous
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the trial
judge sentenced respondent to death on each of the murder counts.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, and respondent then sought
collateral relief in state court on the ground, inter
alia, that counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the
sentencing proceeding in several respects, including his failure to
request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character
witnesses, and to seek a presentence report. The trial court denied
relief, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then
filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court advancing
numerous grounds for relief, including the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the District
Court denied relief, concluding that, although counsel made errors
in judgment in failing to investigate mitigating evidence further
than he did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from
any such error in judgment. The Court of Appeals ultimately
reversed, stating that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal
defendants a right Page 466 U. S. 669 to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the
totality of the circumstances." After outlining standards for
judging whether a defense counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances and whether counsel's errors
were sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversal, the Court of
Appeals remanded the case for application of the standards. Held: 1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel, and the benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that
the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. The
same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding -- such
as the one provided by Florida law -- that is sufficiently like a
trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards
for decision that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to
counsel's role at trial. Pp. 466 U. S.
684 -687.

															2. A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was
so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or setting
aside of a death sentence requires that the defendant show, first,
that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. Pp. 466
U.S. 687 -696.

															(a) The proper standard for judging attorney performance is that
of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the
circumstances. When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential, and a fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time. A court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. These standards require no special
amplification in order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the
duty at issue in this case. Pp. 466 U.S. 687 -691.

															(b) With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the proper
standard requires the defendant to show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome. A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider
the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Pp. 466 U. S.
691 -696. Page 466 U. S. 670 3. A number of practical considerations are important for the
application of the standards set forth above. The standards do not
establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be
on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being
challenged. A court need not first determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered
by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed. The
principles governing ineffectiveness claims apply in federal
collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions
for a new trial. And in a federal habeas challenge to a state
criminal judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered
effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the
federal court to the extent stated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but is a
mixed question of law and fact. Pp. 466 U. S.
696 -698.

															4. The facts of this case make it clear that counsel's conduct
at and before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be found
unreasonable under the above standards. They also make it clear
that, even assuming counsel's conduct was unreasonable, respondent
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death
sentence. Pp. 466 U. S.
698 -700.

															693 F.2d 1243, reversed.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, post, p. 466 U. S. 701 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 466 U. S.
706 . Page 466 U. S. 671 JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case requires us to consider the proper standards for
judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitution
requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because
counsel's assistance at the trial or sentencing was
ineffective. I A During a 10-day period in September, 1976, respondent planned
and committed three groups of crimes, which included Page 466 U. S. 672 three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnaping, severe
assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft. After
his two accomplices were arrested, respondent surrendered to police
and voluntarily gave a lengthy statement confessing to the third of
the criminal episodes. The State of Florida indicted respondent for
kidnaping and murder and appointed an experienced criminal lawyer
to represent him.

															Counsel actively pursued pretrial motions and discovery. He cut
his efforts short, however, and he experienced a sense of
hopelessness about the case, when he learned that, against his
specific advice, respondent had also confessed to the first two
murders. By the date set for trial, respondent was subject to
indictment for three counts of first-degree murder and multiple
counts of robbery, kidnaping for ransom, breaking and entering and
assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Respondent waived his right to a jury trial, again acting against
counsel's advice, and pleaded guilty to all charges, including the
three capital murder charges.

															In the plea colloquy, respondent told the trial judge that,
although he had committed a string of burglaries, he had no
significant prior criminal record, and that, at the time of his
criminal spree, he was under extreme stress caused by his inability
to support his family. App. 50-53. He also stated, however, that he
accepted responsibility for the crimes. E.g., id. at 54, 57. The trial judge told respondent that he had "a great
deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and
admit their responsibility," but that he was making no statement at
all about his likely sentencing decision. Id. at 62.

															Counsel advised respondent to invoke his right under Florida law
to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing. Respondent
rejected the advice and waived the right. He chose instead to be
sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation.

															In preparing for the sentencing hearing, counsel spoke with
respondent about his background. He also spoke on Page 466 U. S. 673 the telephone with respondent's wife and mother, though he did
not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort to meet with them. He
did not otherwise seek out character witnesses for respondent. App.
to Pet. for Cert. A265. Nor did he request a psychiatric
examination, since his conversations with his client gave no
indication that respondent had psychological problems. Id. at A266.

															Counsel decided not to present, and hence not to look further
for, evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional
state. That decision reflected trial counsel's sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of
respondent's confessions to the gruesome crimes. See id. at A282. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to
rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's
background and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea
colloquy communicated sufficient information about these subjects,
and by forgoing the opportunity to present new evidence on these
subjects, counsel prevented the State from cross-examining
respondent on his claim and from putting on psychiatric evidence of
its own. Id. at A223-A225.

															Counsel also excluded from the sentencing hearing other evidence
he thought was potentially damaging. He successfully moved to
exclude respondent's "rap sheet." Id. at A227; App. 311.
Because he judged that a presentence report might prove more
detrimental than helpful, as it would have included respondent's
criminal history and thereby would have undermined the claim of no
significant history of criminal activity, he did not request that
one be prepared. App. to Pet. for Cert. A227-A228, A265-A266.

															At the sentencing hearing, counsel's strategy was based
primarily on the trial judge's remarks at the plea colloquy as well
as on his reputation as a sentencing judge who thought it important
for a convicted defendant to own up to his crime. Counsel argued
that respondent's remorse and acceptance of responsibility
justified sparing him from the death penalty. Id. at
A265-A266. Counsel also argued that respondent had no history of
criminal activity, and that respondent committed Page 466 U. S. 674 the crimes under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, thus
coming within the statutory list of mitigating circumstances. He
further argued that respondent should be spared death because he
had surrendered, confessed, and offered to testify against a
codefendant, and because respondent was fundamentally a good person
who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful
circumstances. The State put on evidence and witnesses largely for
the purpose of describing the details of the crimes. Counsel did
not cross-examine the medical experts who testified about the
manner of death of respondent's victims.

															The trial judge found several aggravating circumstances with
respect to each of the three murders. He found that all three
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all
involving repeated stabbings. All three murders were committed in
the course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, and
since all involved robbery, the murders were for pecuniary gain.
All three murders were committed to avoid arrest for the
accompanying crimes and to hinder law enforcement. In the course of
one of the murders, respondent knowingly subjected numerous persons
to a grave risk of death by deliberately stabbing and shooting the
murder victim's sisters-in-law, who sustained severe -- in one
case, ultimately fatal -- injuries.

															With respect to mitigating circumstances, the trial judge made
the same findings for all three capital murders. First, although
there was no admitted evidence of prior convictions, respondent had
stated that he had engaged in a course of stealing. In any case,
even if respondent had no significant history of criminal activity,
the aggravating circumstances "would still clearly far outweigh"
that mitigating factor. Second, the judge found that, during all
three crimes, respondent was not suffering from extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, and could appreciate the criminality of his
acts. Third, none of the victims was a participant in, or consented
to, respondent's conduct. Fourth, respondent's Page 466 U. S. 675 participation in the crimes was neither minor nor the result of
duress or domination by an accomplice. Finally, respondent's age
(26) could not be considered a factor in mitigation, especially
when viewed in light of respondent's planning of the crimes and
disposition of the proceeds of the various accompanying thefts.

															In short, the trial judge found numerous aggravating
circumstances and no (or a single comparatively insignificant)
mitigating circumstance. With respect to each of the three
convictions for capital murder, the trial judge concluded:

															"A careful consideration of all matters presented to the court
impels the conclusion that there are insufficient mitigating
circumstances . . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." See Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d
658 , 663-664 (Fla.1978) (quoting trial court findings), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). He therefore sentenced
respondent to death on each of the three counts of murder and to
prison terms for the other crimes. The Florida Supreme Court upheld
the convictions and sentences on direct appeal. B Respondent subsequently sought collateral relief in state court
on numerous grounds, among them that counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding. Respondent
challenged counsel's assistance in six respects. He asserted that
counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a continuance
to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to
investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence
investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to the
sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner's reports
or cross-examine the medical experts. In support of the claim,
respondent submitted 14 affidavits from friends, neighbors, and
relatives stating that they would have testified if asked to do so.
He also submitted one psychiatric report and one psychological
report stating that respondent, though not under the influence Page 466 U. S. 676 of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, was "chronically
frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma" at the
time of his crimes. App. 7; see also id. at 14.

															The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing,
finding that the record evidence conclusively showed that the
ineffectiveness claim was meritless. App. to Pet. for Cert.
A206-A243. Four of the assertedly prejudicial errors required
little discussion. First, there were no grounds to request a
continuance, so there was no error in not requesting one when
respondent pleaded guilty. Id. at A218-A220. Second,
failure to request a presentence investigation was not a serious
error because the trial judge had discretion not to grant such a
request and because any presentence investigation would have
resulted in admission of respondent's "rap sheet," and thus would
have undermined his assertion of no significant history of criminal
activity. Id. at A226-A228. Third, the argument and
memorandum given to the sentencing judge were "admirable" in light
of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances and absence of
mitigating circumstances. Id. at A228. Fourth, there was
no error in failure to examine the medical examiner's reports or to
cross-examine the medical witnesses testifying on the manner of
death of respondent's victims, since respondent admitted that the
victims died in the ways shown by the unchallenged medical
evidence. Id. at A229.

															The trial court dealt at greater length with the two other bases
for the ineffectiveness claim. The court pointed out that a
psychiatric examination of respondent was conducted by state order
soon after respondent's initial arraignment. That report states
that there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of
the crimes. Moreover, both the reports submitted in the collateral
proceeding state that, although respondent was "chronically
frustrated and depressed because of his economic dilemma," he was
not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
All three Page 466 U. S. 677 reports thus directly undermine the contention made at the
sentencing hearing that respondent was suffering from extreme
mental or emotional disturbance during his crime spree.
Accordingly, counsel could reasonably decide not to seek
psychiatric reports; indeed, by relying solely on the plea colloquy
to support the emotional disturbance contention, counsel denied the
State an opportunity to rebut his claim with psychiatric testimony.
In any event, the aggravating circumstances were so overwhelming
that no substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at
sentencing of the psychiatric evidence offered in the collateral
attack.

															The court rejected the challenge to counsel's failure to develop
and to present character evidence for much the same reasons. The
affidavits submitted in the collateral proceeding showed nothing
more than that certain persons would have testified that respondent
was basically a good person who was worried about his family's
financial problems. Respondent himself had already testified along
those lines at the plea colloquy. Moreover, respondent's admission
of a course of stealing rebutted many of the factual allegations in
the affidavits. For those reasons, and because the sentencing judge
had stated that the death sentence would be appropriate even if
respondent had no significant prior criminal history, no
substantial prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of
the character evidence offered in the collateral attack.

															Applying the standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated by
the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v.
State, 394 So. 2d 997 (1981), the trial court concluded that respondent had not shown
that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious
deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was
likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.
The court specifically found:

															"[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates
beyond any doubt that even if [counsel] had done each of the . . .
things [that respondent alleged counsel had failed to do] Page 466 U. S. 678 at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remotest chance
that the outcome would have been any different. The plain fact is
that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case were
completely overwhelming. . . ."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. A230.

															The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (1981). For essentially the reasons given by the trial court, the
State Supreme Court concluded that respondent had failed to make
out a prima facie case of either "substantial deficiency
or possible prejudice" and, indeed, had "failed to such a degree
that we believe, to the point of a moral certainty, that he is
entitled to no relief. . . ." Id. at 287. Respondent's
claims were "shown conclusively to be without merit, so as to
obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing." Id. at
286. C Respondent next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. He advanced numerous grounds for relief, among them
ineffective assistance of counsel based on the same errors, except
for the failure to move for a continuance, as those he had
identified in state court. The District Court held an evidentiary
hearing to inquire into trial counsel's efforts to investigate and
to present mitigating circumstances. Respondent offered the
affidavits and reports he had submitted in the state collateral
proceedings; he also called his trial counsel to testify. The State
of Florida, over respondent's objection, called the trial judge to
testify.

															The District Court disputed none of the state court factual
findings concerning trial counsel's assistance and made findings of
its own that are consistent with the state court findings. The
account of trial counsel's actions and decisions given above
reflects the combined findings. On the legal issue of
ineffectiveness, the District Court concluded that, although trial
counsel made errors in judgment in failing to Page 466 U. S. 679 investigate nonstatutory mitigating evidence further than he
did, no prejudice to respondent's sentence resulted from any such
error in judgment. Relying in part on the trial judge's testimony
but also on the same factors that led the state courts to find no
prejudice, the District Court concluded that "there does not appear
to be a likelihood, or even a significant possibility" that any
errors of trial counsel had affected the outcome of the sentencing
proceeding. App. to Pet. for Cert. A285-A286. The District Court
went on to reject all of respondent's other grounds for relief,
including one not exhausted in state court, which the District
Court considered because, among other reasons, the State urged its
consideration. Id. at A286-A292. The court accordingly
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

															On appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with
instructions to apply to the particular facts the framework for
analyzing ineffectiveness claims that it developed in its opinion.
673 F.2d 879 (1982). The panel decision was itself vacated when
Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh Circuit,
decided to rehear the case en banc. 679 F.2d 23 (1982). The full
Court of Appeals developed its own framework for analyzing
ineffective assistance claims and reversed the judgment of the
District Court and remanded the case for new factfinding under the
newly announced standards. 693 F.2d 1243 (1982).

															The court noted at the outset that, because respondent had
raised an unexhausted claim at his evidentiary hearing in the
District Court, the habeas petition might be characterized as a
mixed petition subject to the rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982), requiring dismissal of the entire petition. The court held,
however, that the exhaustion requirement is "a matter of comity,
rather than a matter of jurisdiction," and hence admitted of
exceptions. The court agreed with the District Court that this case
came within an exception to the mixed petition rule. 693 F.2d at
1248, n. 7. Page 466 U. S. 680 Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals stated that the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel accorded criminal
defendants a right to "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the
circumstances." Id. at 1250. The court remarked in passing
that no special standard applies in capital cases such as the one
before it: the punishment that a defendant faces is merely one of
the circumstances to be considered in determining whether counsel
was reasonably effective. Id. at 1250, n. 12. The court
then addressed respondent's contention that his trial counsel's
assistance was not reasonably effective because counsel breached
his duty to investigate nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.

															The court agreed that the Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a
duty to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must
be based on professional decisions and informed legal choices can
be made only after investigation of options. The court observed
that counsel's investigatory decisions must be assessed in light of
the information known at the time of the decisions, not in
hindsight, and that "[t]he amount of pretrial investigation that is
reasonable defies precise measurement." Id. at 1251.
Nevertheless, putting guilty plea cases to one side, the court
attempted to classify cases presenting issues concerning the scope
of the duty to investigate before proceeding to trial.

															If there is only one plausible line of defense, the court
concluded, counsel must conduct a "reasonably substantial
investigation" into that line of defense, since there can be no
strategic choice that renders such an investigation unnecessary. Id. at 1252. The same duty exists if counsel relies at
trial on only one line of defense, although others are available.
In either case, the investigation need not be exhaustive. It must
include " an independent examination of the facts,
circumstances, pleadings and laws involved.'" Id. at 1253
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 104 (CA 1979)).
The scope of the duty, however, depends Page 466 U. S. 681 on such facts as the strength of the government's case and the
likelihood that pursuing certain leads may prove more harmful than
helpful. 693 F.2d at 1253, n. 16.

															If there is more than one plausible line of defense, the court
held, counsel should ideally investigate each line substantially
before making a strategic choice about which lines to rely on at
trial. If counsel conducts such substantial investigations, the
strategic choices made as a result "will seldom if ever" be found
wanting. Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because
the adversary system requires deference to counsel's informed
decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these
circumstances if they are based on professional judgment. Id. at 1254.

															If counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into
each of several plausible lines of defense, assistance may
nonetheless be effective. Counsel may not exclude certain lines of
defense for other than strategic reasons. Id. at
1257-1258. Limitations of time and money, however, may force early
strategic choices, often based solely on conversations with the
defendant and a review of the prosecution's evidence. Those
strategic choices about which lines of defense to pursue are owed
deference commensurate with the reasonableness of the professional
judgments on which they are based. Thus,

															"when counsel's assumptions are reasonable, given the totality
of the circumstances, and when counsel's strategy represents a
reasonable choice based upon those assumptions, counsel need not
investigate lines of defense that he has chosen not to employ at
trial." Id. at 1255 (footnote omitted). Among the factors
relevant to deciding whether particular strategic choices are
reasonable are the experience of the attorney, the inconsistency of
unpursued and pursued lines of defense, and the potential for
prejudice from taking an unpursued line of defense. Id. at
1256-1257, n. 23.

															Having outlined the standards for judging whether defense
counsel fulfilled the duty to investigate, the Court of Appeals
turned its attention to the question of the prejudice to the Page 466 U. S. 682 defense that must be shown before counsel's errors justify
reversal of the judgment. The court observed that only in cases of
outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government interference
in the representation process, or of inherently prejudicial
conflicts of interest had this Court said that no special showing
of prejudice need be made. Id. at 1258-1259. For cases of
deficient performance by counsel, where the government is not
directly responsible for the deficiencies and where evidence of
deficiency may be more accessible to the defendant than to the
prosecution, the defendant must show that counsel's errors
"resulted in actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of
his defense." Id. at 1262. This standard, the Court of
Appeals reasoned, is compatible with the "cause and prejudice"
standard for overcoming procedural defaults in federal collateral
proceedings, and discourages insubstantial claims by requiring more
than a showing, which could virtually always be made, of some
conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors.
The specified showing of prejudice would result in reversal of the
judgment, the court concluded, unless the prosecution showed that
the constitutionally deficient performance was, in light of all the
evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
1260-1262.

															The Court of Appeals thus laid down the tests to be applied in
the Eleventh Circuit in challenges to convictions on the ground of
ineffectiveness of counsel. Although some of the judges of the
court proposed different approaches to judging ineffectiveness
claims either generally or when raised in federal habeas petitions
from state prisoners, id. at 1264-1280 (opinion of
Tjoflat, J.); id. at 1280 (opinion of Clark, J.); id. at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J., joined by Fay and
Hill, JJ.); id. at 1288-1291 (opinion of Hill, J.), and
although some believed that no remand was necessary in this case, id. at 1281-1285 (opinion of Johnson, J., joined by
Anderson, J.); id. at 1285-1288 (opinion of Roney, J.,
joined by Fay and Hill, JJ.); id. at 1288-1291 (opinion of
Hill, J.), a majority Page 466 U. S. 683 of the judges of the en banc court agreed that the case should
be remanded for application of the newly announced standards.
Summarily rejecting respondent's claims other than ineffectiveness
of counsel, the court accordingly reversed the judgment of the
District Court and remanded the case. On remand, the court finally
ruled, the state trial judge's testimony, though admissible "to the
extent that it contains personal knowledge of historical facts or
expert opinion," was not to be considered admitted into evidence to
explain the judge's mental processes in reaching his sentencing
decision. Id. at 1262-1263; see Fayerweather v.
Ritch, 195 U. S. 276 , 195 U. S.
306 -307 (1904). D Petitioners, who are officials of the State of Florida, filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The petition presents a type of Sixth
Amendment claim that this Court has not previously considered in
any generality. The Court has considered Sixth Amendment claims
based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether, as well as claims based on state interference with the
ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused. E.g., United States v. Cronic, ante p. 466 U. S. 648 .
With the exception of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.
S. 335 (1980), however, which involved a claim that
counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of
interest, the Court has never directly and fully addressed a claim
of "actual ineffectiveness" of counsel's assistance in a case going
to trial. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S.
97 , 427 U. S. 102 ,
n. 5 (1976).

															In assessing attorney performance, all the Federal Courts of
Appeals and all but a few state courts have now adopted the
"reasonably effective assistance" standard in one formulation or
another. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149,
151-152 (CA2 1983); App. B to Brief for United States in United
States v. Cronic, O.T. 1983, No. 82-660, pp. 3a-6a; Sarno, Page 466 U. S. 684 Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State Courts as to
Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client, 2
A.L.R. 4th 99-157, §§ 7-10 (1980). Yet this Court has not had
occasion squarely to decide whether that is the proper standard.
With respect to the prejudice that a defendant must show from
deficient attorney performance, the lower courts have adopted tests
that purport to differ in more than formulation. See App.
C to Brief for United States in United States v. Cronic,
supra, at 7a-10a; Sarno, supra, at 83-99, § 6. In
particular, the Court of Appeals in this case expressly rejected
the prejudice standard articulated by Judge Leventhal in his
plurality opinion in United States v. Decoster, 199
U.S.App.D.C. 359, 371, 374-375, 624 F.2d 196, 208, 211-212 (en
banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979), and adopted by
the State of Florida in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d at
1001, a standard that requires a showing that specified deficient
conduct of counsel was likely to have affected the outcome of the
proceeding. 693 F.2d at 1261-1262.

															For these reasons, we granted certiorari to consider the
standards by which to judge a contention that the Constitution
requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because of the
actual ineffective assistance of counsel. 462 U.S. 1105 (1983). We
agree with the Court of Appeals that the exhaustion rule requiring
dismissal of mixed petitions, though to be strictly enforced, is
not jurisdictional. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 455 U. S.
515 -520. We therefore address the merits of the
constitutional issue. II In a long line of cases that includes Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.
S. 458 (1938), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental
right to a fair trial. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial
through Page 466 U. S. 685 the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a
fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause:

															"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."

															Thus, a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for
resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill
and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the "ample
opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution" to which they are
entitled. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 , 317 U. S. 275 , 317 U. S. 276 (1942); see Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 287 U. S.
68 -69.

															Because of the vital importance of counsel's assistance, this
Court has held that, with certain exceptions, a person accused of a
federal or state crime has the right to have counsel appointed if
retained counsel cannot be obtained. See Algersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst,
supra. That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at
trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the
constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a
role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to
produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role
necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. Page 466 U. S. 686 For that reason, the Court has recognized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759 , 397 U. S. 771 ,
n. 14 (1970). Government violates the right to effective assistance
when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to
make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S.
80 (1976) (bar on attorney-client consultation during
overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.
S. 853 (1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605 , 406 U. S.
612 -613 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first
defense witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.
S. 570 , 365 U. S.
593 -596 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant).
Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to
effective assistance, simply by failing to render "adequate legal
assistance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 344 . Id. at 446 U. S.
345 -350 (actual conflict of interest adversely affecting
lawyer's performance renders assistance ineffective).

															The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the
constitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter
class of cases -- that is, those presenting claims of "actual
ineffectiveness." In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we
must take its purpose -- to ensure a fair trial -- as the guide.
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result.

															The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding
such as that provided by Florida law. We need not consider the role
of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which may involve informal
proceedings and standardless discretion in the sentencer, and hence
may require a different approach to the definition of
constitutionally effective assistance. A capital sentencing
proceeding like the one involved in this case, however, is
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the
existence of standards for decision, See Barclay Page 466 U. S. 687 v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 , 463 U. S.
952 -954 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 (1981), that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to
counsel's role at trial -- to ensure that the adversarial testing
process works to produce a just result under the standards
governing decision. For purposes of describing counsel's duties,
therefore, Florida's capital sentencing proceeding need not be
distinguished from an ordinary trial. III A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence
has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it
cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from
a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result
unreliable. A As all the Federal Courts of Appeals have now held, the proper
standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective
assistance. See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d at
151-152. The Court indirectly recognized as much when it stated in McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 397 U. S. 770 , 397 U. S. 771 ,
that a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal
advice unless counsel was not "a reasonably competent attorney" and
the advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases." See also Cuyler v. Sullivan,
supra, at 446 U. S. 344 .
When a convicted defendant Page 466 U. S. 688 complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the
defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.

															More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth
Amendment refers simply to "counsel," not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the
legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify
the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the
adversary process that the Amendment envisions. See Michel v.
Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91 , 350 U. S.
100 -101 (1955). The proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.

															Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic
duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence
counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid
conflicts of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 446 U. S. 346 .
From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more
particular duties to consult with the defendant on important
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a
duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the
trial a reliable adversarial testing process. See Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. at 287 U. S.
68 -69.

															These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations
of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney
performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the
performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the
like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to
4-8.6 (2d ed.1980) ("The Defense Function"), are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No
particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take Page 466 U. S. 689 account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel
or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to
represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would
interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making
tactical decisions. See United States v. Decoster, 199
U.S.App.D.C. at 371, 624 F.2d at 208. Indeed, the existence of
detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from
the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's
cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance
to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.

															Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it
is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or
omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107 , 456 U. S.
133 -134 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances
of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, at 350 U. S. 101 .
There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not
defend a particular client in the same way. See Goodpaster, Page 466 U. S. 690 The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 343 (1983).

															The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney
performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal
trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly
come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to
serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel
and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the
ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage
the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between
attorney and client.

															Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must
judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the
facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective
assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all
the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside
the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making
that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's
function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to
make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case.
At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.

															These standards require no special amplification in order to
define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty at issue in this
case. As the Court of Appeals concluded, strategic choices made
after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic Page 466 U. S. 691 choices made after less than complete investigation are
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words,
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not
to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all
the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments.

															The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or
actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on
informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information
supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation
decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.
For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line
of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the
defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be
considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a
defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain
investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's
failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged
as unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations
with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of
counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a
proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions. See
United States v. Decoster, supra, at 372-373, 624 F.2d at
209-210. B An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if
the error had no effect on the judgment. Cf. United States v.
Morrison, 449 U. S. 361 , 449 U. S.
364 -365 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure Page 466 U. S. 692 that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any
deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the
Constitution.

															In certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.
Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are
various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance. See United States v. Cronic, ante at 466 U. S. 659 ,
and n. 25. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost. Ante at 466 U. S. 658 .
Moreover, such circumstances involve impairments of the Sixth
Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and
because the prosecution is directly responsible, easy for the
government to prevent.

															One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar,
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 345 -350, the Court held that prejudice is
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of
interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of
loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it
is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of
representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the
obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the
ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations
likely to give rise to conflicts, see, e.g., Fed.Rule
Crim.Proc. 44(c), it is reasonable for the criminal justice system
to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts
of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims
mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant
demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting
interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan,
supra, at 446 U. S. 350 , 446 U. S. 348 (footnote omitted). Page 466 U. S. 693 Conflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims
alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a
general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove
prejudice. The government is not responsible for, and hence not
able to prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a
conviction or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite
variety, and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular
case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified
according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be
defined with sufficient precision to inform defense attorneys
correctly just what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art, and
an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound
or even brilliant in another. Even if a defendant shows that
particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the
defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the
defense.

															It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually
every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, cf.
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.
S. 858 , 458 U. S.
866 -867 (1982), and not every error that conceivably
could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the
result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing
that the errors "impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief
for Respondent 58. That standard, however, provides no workable
principle. Since any error, if it is indeed an error, "impairs" the
presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate,
because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are
sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the
proceeding.

															On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show
that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case. This outcome-determinative standard has
several strengths. It defines the relevant inquiry in a way
familiar to courts, though the inquiry, as is inevitable, is
anything but precise. The standard also reflects the profound
importance of finality in criminal proceedings. Page 466 U. S. 694 Moreover, it comports with the widely used standard for
assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-20, and nn. 10, 11. Nevertheless, the standard is not quite
appropriate.

															Even when the specified attorney error results in the omission
of certain evidence, the newly discovered evidence standard is not
an apt source from which to draw a prejudice standard for
ineffectiveness claims. The high standard for newly discovered
evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a
presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the
proceeding whose result is challenged. Cf. United States v.
Johnson, 327 U. S. 106 , 327 U. S. 112 (1946). An ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one
of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is
reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the
appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower. The
result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the
proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the
outcome.

															Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots
in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not
disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 104 , 427 U. S.
112 -113, and in the test for materiality of testimony
made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of a
witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, at 458 U. S.
872 -874. The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.

															In making the determination whether the specified errors
resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent
challenge to the judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency,
that the judge or jury acted according to law. Page 466 U. S. 695 An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to
the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness,
whimsy, caprice, "nullification," and the like. A defendant has no
entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a
lawless decision cannot be reviewed. The assessment of prejudice
should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is
reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards
that govern the decision. It should not depend on the
idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker, such as unusual
propensities toward harshness or leniency. Although these factors
may actually have entered into counsel's selection of strategies
and, to that limited extent, may thus affect the performance
inquiry, they are irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Thus,
evidence about the actual process of decision, if not part of the
record of the proceeding under review, and evidence about, for
example, a particular judge's sentencing practices, should not be
considered in the prejudice determination.

															The governing legal standard plays a critical role in defining
the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel's
errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.
When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at
issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer -- including an
appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the
evidence -- would have concluded that the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.

															In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness
claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge
or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by
the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been
affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive
effect on the inferences to Page 466 U. S. 696 be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary
picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect.
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the
record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a
given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the
remaining findings, a court making the prejudice inquiry must ask
if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision
reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the
errors. IV A number of practical considerations are important for the
application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in
adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court
should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not
establish mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide
the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being
challenged. In every case, the court should be concerned with
whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result
of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown
in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce
just results.

															To the extent that this has already been the guiding inquiry in
the lower courts, the standards articulated today do not require
reconsideration of ineffectiveness claims rejected under different
standards. Cf. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d at 153
(in several years of applying "farce and mockery" standard along
with "reasonable competence" standard, court "never found that the
result of a case hinged on the choice of a particular standard").
In particular, the minor differences in the lower courts' precise
formulations of the performance standard are insignificant: the
different Page 466 U. S. 697 formulations are mere variations of the overarching
reasonableness standard. With regard to the prejudice inquiry, only
the strict outcome-determinative test, among the standards
articulated in the lower courts, imposes a heavier burden on
defendants than the tests laid down today. The difference, however,
should alter the merit of an ineffectiveness claim only in the
rarest case.

															Although we have discussed the performance component of an
ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to
approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.
The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's
performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive
to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as
a result.

															The principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in
federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in
motions for a new trial. As indicated by the "cause and prejudice"
test for overcoming procedural waivers of claims of error, the
presumption that a criminal judgment is final is at its strongest
in collateral attacks on that judgment. See United States v.
Frady, 456 U. S. 152 , 456 U. S.
162 -169 (1982); Engel v. Isaac, 456 U.
S. 107 , 456 U. S.
126 -129 (1982). An ineffectiveness claim, however, as
our articulation of the standards that govern decision of such
claims makes clear, is an attack on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is challenged. Since fundamental fairness
is the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, see
id. Page 466 U. S. 698 at 456 U. S. 126 ,
no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims made
in habeas proceedings.

															Finally, in a federal habeas challenge to a state criminal
judgment, a state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective
assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court to
the extent stated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ineffectiveness is not a
question of "basic, primary, or historical fac[t]," Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U. S. 293 , 372 U. S. 309 ,
n. 6 (1963). Rather, like the question whether multiple
representation in a particular case gave rise to a conflict of
interest, it is a mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 342 . Although state court findings of fact
made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject
to the deference requirement of § 2254(d), and although district
court findings are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), both the performance and
prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed
questions of law and fact. V Having articulated general standards for judging ineffectiveness
claims, we think it useful to apply those standards to the facts of
this case in order to illustrate the meaning of the general
principles. The record makes it possible to do so. There are no
conflicts between the state and federal courts over findings of
fact, and the principles we have articulated are sufficiently close
to the principles applied both in the Florida courts and in the
District Court that it is clear that the factfinding was not
affected by erroneous legal principles. See Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U. S. 273 , 456 U. S.
291 -292 (1982).

															Application of the governing principles is not difficult in this
case. The facts as described above, see supra at 466 U. S.
671 -678, make clear that the conduct of respondent's
counsel at and before respondent's sentencing proceeding cannot be
found unreasonable. They also make clear that, even assuming
the Page 466 U. S. 699 challenged conduct of counsel was unreasonable, respondent
suffered insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death
sentence.

															With respect to the performance component, the record shows that
respondent's counsel made a strategic choice to argue for the
extreme emotional distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as
fully as possible on respondent's acceptance of responsibility for
his crimes. Although counsel understandably felt hopeless about
respondent's prospects, see App. 383-384, 400-401, nothing
in the record indicates, as one possible reading of the District
Court's opinion suggests, see App. to Pet. for Cert. A282,
that counsel's sense of hopelessness distorted his professional
judgment. Counsel's strategy choice was well within the range of
professionally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek
more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand
was likewise reasonable.

															The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to one's
crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances
were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel could reasonably surmise
from his conversations with respondent that character and
psychological evidence would be of little help. Respondent had
already been able to mention at the plea colloquy the substance of
what there was to know about his financial and emotional troubles.
Restricting testimony on respondent's character to what had come in
at the plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and
psychological evidence and respondent's criminal history, which
counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. On
these facts, there can be little question, even without application
of the presumption of adequate performance, that trial counsel's
defense, though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable
professional judgment.

															With respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of
respondent's claim is even more stark. The evidence that respondent
says his trial counsel should have offered at the Page 466 U. S. 700 sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing
profile presented to the sentencing judge. As the state courts and
District Court found, at most, this evidence shows that numerous
people who knew respondent thought he was generally a good person
and that a psychiatrist and a psychologist believed he was under
considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the level of
extreme disturbance. Given the overwhelming aggravating factors,
there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would
have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence
imposed. Indeed, admission of the evidence respondent now offers
might even have been harmful to his case: his "rap sheet" would
probably have been admitted into evidence, and the psychological
reports would have directly contradicted respondent's claim that
the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance
applied to his case.

															Our conclusions on both the prejudice and performance components
of the ineffectiveness inquiry do not depend on the trial judge's
testimony at the District Court hearing. We therefore need not
consider the general admissibility of that testimony, although, as
noted supra, at 466 U. S. 695 ,
that testimony is irrelevant to the prejudice inquiry. Moreover,
the prejudice question is resolvable, and hence the ineffectiveness
claim can be rejected, without regard to the evidence presented at
the District Court hearing. The state courts properly concluded
that the ineffectiveness claim was meritless without holding an
evidentiary hearing.

															Failure to make the required showing of either deficient
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness
claim. Here there is a double failure. More generally, respondent
has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered
unreliable by a breakdown in the adversary process caused by
deficiencies in counsel's assistance. Respondent's sentencing
proceeding was not fundamentally unfair. Page 466 U. S. 701 We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly
declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I join the Court's opinion, but dissent from its judgment.
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153 , 428 U. S. 227 (1976) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would vacate respondent's death
sentence and remand the case for further proceedings. [ Footnote 1 ] Page 466 U. S. 702 I This case and United States v. Cronic, ante p. 466 U. S. 648 ,
present our first occasions to elaborate the appropriate standards
for judging claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Cronic, the Court considers such claims in the context of
cases

															"in which the surrounding circumstances [make] it so unlikely
that any lawyer could provide effective assistance that
ineffectiveness [is] properly presumed without inquiry into actual
performance at trial," ante at 466 U. S. 661 .
This case, in contrast, concerns claims of ineffective assistance
based on allegations of specific errors by counsel -- claims which,
by their very nature, require courts to evaluate both the
attorney's performance and the effect of that performance on the
reliability and fairness of the proceeding. Accordingly, a
defendant making a claim of this kind must show not only that his
lawyer's performance was inadequate, but also that he was
prejudiced thereby. See also Cronic, ante at 466 U. S. 659 ,
n. 26.

															I join the Court's opinion because I believe that the standards
it sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to courts
considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also
permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve
progressive development of this area of the law. Like all federal
courts and most state courts that have previously addressed the
matter, see ante at 466 U. S.
683 -684, the Court concludes that "the proper standard
for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective
assistance." Ante at 466
U.S. 687 . And, Page 466 U. S. 703 rejecting the strict "outcome-determinative" test employed by
some courts, the Court adopts as the appropriate standard for
prejudice a requirement that the defendant

															"show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different,"

															defining a "reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ante at 466 U. S. 694 .
I believe these standards are sufficiently precise to permit
meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that
deprive defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do
not; at the same time, the standards are sufficiently flexible to
accommodate the wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of
this kind.

															With respect to the performance standard, I agree with the
Court's conclusion that a "particular set of detailed rules for
counsel's conduct" would be inappropriate. Ante at 466 U. S. 688 .
Precisely because the standard of "reasonably effective assistance"
adopted today requires that counsel's performance be measured in
light of the particular circumstances of the case, I do not believe
our decision "will stunt the development of constitutional doctrine
in this area," post at 466 U. S. 709 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court's suggestion that
today's decision is largely consistent with the approach taken by
the lower courts, ante at 466 U. S. 696 ,
simply indicates that those courts may continue to develop
governing principles on a case-by-case basis in the common law
tradition, as they have in the past. Similarly, the prejudice
standard announced today does not erect an insurmountable obstacle
to meritorious claims, but rather simply requires courts carefully
to examine trial records in light of both the nature and
seriousness of counsel's errors and their effect in the particular
circumstances of the case. Ante at 466 U. S. 695 .
[ Footnote 2 ] Page 466 U. S. 704 II Because of their flexibility and the requirement that they be
considered in light of the particular circumstances of the case,
the standards announced today can and should be applied with
concern for the special considerations that must attend review of
counsel's performance in a capital sentencing proceeding. In
contrast to a case in which a finding of ineffective assistance
requires a new trial, a conclusion that counsel was ineffective
with respect to only the penalty phase of a capital trial imposes
on the State the far lesser burden of reconsideration of the
sentence alone. On the other hand, the consequences to the
defendant of incompetent assistance at a capital sentencing could
not, of course, be greater. Recognizing the unique seriousness of
such a proceeding, we have repeatedly emphasized that

															"'where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so
grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken
or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.'" Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862 , 462 U. S. 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
188 -189 (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ.)).

															For that reason, we have consistently required that capital
proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of
factfinding. As JUSTICE MARSHALL emphasized last Term:

															"This Court has always insisted that the need for procedural
safeguards is particularly great where life is at stake. Long
before the Court established the right to counsel in all felony
cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S.
335 (1963), it recognized that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 , 287 U. S.
71 -72 (1932). Time Page 466 U. S. 705 and again, the Court has condemned procedures in capital cases
that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case. See,
e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S.
430 (1981); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S.
625 (1980); Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (1979) (per curiam); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S.
586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S.
349 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S.
280 (1976). . . ."

															"Because of th[e] basic difference between the death penalty and
all other punishments, this Court has consistently recognized that
there is"

															"a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case."

															" Ibid. " Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880 , 463 U. S.
913 -914 (1983) (dissenting opinion). See also
id. at 463 U. S. 924 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). In short, this Court has taken special
care to minimize the possibility that death sentences are "imposed
out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 , 455 U. S. 118 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

															In the sentencing phase of a capital case,

															"[w]hat is essential is that the jury have before it all
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose
fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 , 428 U. S. 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). For that
reason, we have repeatedly insisted that "the sentencer in capital
cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating
factor." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 455 U. S. 112 .
In fact, as JUSTICE O'CONNOR has noted, a sentencing judge's
failure to consider relevant aspects of a defendant's character and
background creates such an unacceptable risk that the death penalty
was unconstitutionally imposed that, even in cases where the matter
was not raised below, the "interests of justice" may impose on
reviewing courts "a duty to remand [the] case for resentencing." Id. at 455 U. S. 117 ,
n., and 455 U. S. 119 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Page 466 U. S. 706 Of course,

															"[t]he right to present, and to have the sentencer consider, any
and all mitigating evidence means little if defense counsel fails
to look for mitigating evidence or fails to present a case in
mitigation at the capital sentencing hearing."

															Comment, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983). See, e.g.,
Burger v. Zant, 718 F.2d 979 (CA11 1983) (defendant, 17 years
old at time of crime, sentenced to death after counsel failed to
present any evidence in mitigation), stay granted, post at
902. Accordingly, counsel's general duty to investigate, ante at 466 U. S. 690 ,
takes on supreme importance to a defendant in the context of
developing mitigating evidence to present to a judge or jury
considering the sentence of death; claims of ineffective assistance
in the performance of that duty should therefore be considered with
commensurate care.

															That the Court rejects the ineffective assistance claim in this
case should not, of course, be understood to reflect any diminution
in commitment to the principle that

															"'the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death.'" Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, at 455 U. S. 112 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280 , 428 U. S. 304 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.)). I am
satisfied that the standards announced today will go far towards
assisting lower federal courts and state courts in discharging
their constitutional duty to ensure that every criminal defendant
receives the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Court's judgment leaves standing another in an increasing
number of capital sentences purportedly imposed in compliance with
the procedural standards developed in cases beginning with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976). Earlier this Term, I reiterated my view that these
procedural requirements have proven unequal to the task of
eliminating the irrationality that necessarily attends decisions by
juries, trial judges, and appellate courts whether to take or spare
human life. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S.
37 , 465 U. S. 59 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The inherent difficulty in
imposing the ultimate sanction consistent with the rule of law, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 , 408 U. S.
274 -277 (1972) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); McGautha
v. California, 402 U. S. 183 , 402 U. S.
248 -312 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), is confirmed
by the extraordinary pressure put on our own deliberations in
recent months by the growing number of applications to stay
executions. See Wainwright v. Adams, post at 965
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (stating that "haste and confusion
surrounding . . . decision [to vacate stay] is degrading to our
role as judges"); Autry v. McKaskle, 465 U.
S. 1085 (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court for "dramatically expediting its normal deliberative
processes to clear the way for an impending execution"); Stephens v. Kemp, 464 U. S. 1027 ,
1032 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (contending that procedures by
which stay applications are considered "undermines public
confidence in the courts and in the laws we are required to
follow"); Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.
S. 109 , 464 U. S. 112 (1983) (BURGER, C.J., concurring) (accusing lawyers seeking review
of their client's death sentences of turning "the administration of
justice into [a] sporting contest"); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U. S. 1 , 464 U. S. 6 (1983)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Court's practice in
reviewing applications in death cases "injects uncertainty and
disparity into the review procedure, adds to the burdens of
counsel, distorts the deliberative process within this Court, and
increases the risk of error"). It is difficult to believe that the
decision whether to put an individual to death generates any less
emotional pressure among juries, trial judges, and appellate courts
than it does among Members of this Court.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Indeed, counsel's incompetence can be so serious that it rises
to the level of a constructive denial of counsel which can
constitute constitutional error without any showing of prejudice. See Cronic, ante at 466 U. S.
659 -660; Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831,
834 (CA9 1984) ("Prejudice is inherent in this case because
unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at
all").

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

															The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a person accused
of a crime the right to the aid of a lawyer in preparing and
presenting his defense. It has long been settled that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance Page 466 U. S. 707 of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.
S. 759 , 397 U. S. 771 ,
n. 14 (1970). The state and lower federal courts have developed
standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance.
[ Footnote 2/1 ] Today, for the first
time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those
standards. For the most part, the majority's efforts are unhelpful.
Neither of its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve
the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims. And, in its zeal to
survey comprehensively this field of doctrine, the majority makes
many other generalizations and suggestions that I find
unacceptable. Most importantly, the majority fails to take adequate
account of the fact that the locus of this case is a capital
sentencing proceeding. Accordingly, I join neither the Court's
opinion nor its judgment. I The opinion of the Court revolves around two holdings. First,
the majority ties the constitutional minima of attorney performance
to a simple "standard of reasonableness." Ante at 466 U. S. 688 .
Second, the majority holds that only an error of counsel that has
sufficient impact on a trial to "undermine confidence in the
outcome" is grounds for overturning a conviction. Ante at 466 U. S. 694 .
I disagree with both of these rulings. A My objection to the performance standard adopted by the Court is
that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no
grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the manner in
which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different
courts. To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a
criminal defendant must behave Page 466 U. S. 708 "reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably competent
attorney," ante at 466
U.S. 687 , is to tell them almost nothing. In essence, the
majority has instructed judges called upon to assess claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own intuitions
regarding what constitutes "professional" representation, and has
discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed standards
governing the performance of defense counsel. In my view, the Court
has thereby not only abdicated its own responsibility to interpret
the Constitution, but also impaired the ability of the lower courts
to exercise theirs.

															The debilitating ambiguity of an "objective standard of
reasonableness" in this context is illustrated by the majority's
failure to address important issues concerning the quality of
representation mandated by the Constitution. It is an unfortunate
but undeniable fact that a person of means, by selecting a lawyer
and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly, usually can
obtain better representation than that available to an indigent
defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has
limited time and resources to devote to a given case. Is a
"reasonably competent attorney" a reasonably competent adequately
paid retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney?
It is also a fact that the quality of representation available to
ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies
significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated by the
Sixth Amendment vary by locale? [ Footnote 2/2 ] The majority offers no clues as to the
proper responses to these questions.

															The majority defends its refusal to adopt more specific
standards primarily on the ground that

															"[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account Page 466 U. S. 709 of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant." Ante at 466 U. S.
688 -689. I agree that counsel must be afforded "wide
latitude" when making "tactical decisions" regarding trial
strategy, see ante at 466 U. S. 689 ; cf. infra, at 466 U. S. 712 , 466 U. S. 713 ,
but many aspects of the job of a criminal defense attorney are more
amenable to judicial oversight. For example, much of the work
involved in preparing for a trial, applying for bail, conferring
with one's client, making timely objections to significant,
arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge, and filing a notice
of appeal if there are colorable grounds therefor could profitably
be made the subject of uniform standards.

															The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case represents one
sound attempt to develop particularized standards designed to
ensure that all defendants receive effective legal assistance. See 693 F.2d 1243, 1251-1258 (CA5 1982) (en banc). For
other, generally consistent efforts, see United States v.
Decoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 333-334, 487 F.2d 1197,
1203-1204 (1973), disapproved on rehearing, 199
U.S.App.D.C. 359, 624 F.2d 196 (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226
(CA4), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968); People v.
Pope, 23 Cal. 3d
412 , 424-425, 590 P.2d 859, 866 (1979); State v.
Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 550-557, 205 N.W.2d
1 , 6-9 (1973). [ Footnote 2/3 ]
By refusing to address the merits of these proposals, and indeed
suggesting that no such effort is worthwhile, the opinion of the
Court, I fear, will stunt the development of constitutional
doctrine in this area. Page 466 U. S. 710 B I object to the prejudice standard adopted by the Court for two
independent reasons. First, it is often very difficult to tell
whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was
ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had
been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be
dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record,
it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain
how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared
lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are
exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the
defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the
incompetence of defense counsel. [ Footnote 2/4 ] In view of all these impediments to a fair
evaluation of the probability that the outcome of a trial was
affected by ineffectiveness of counsel, it seems to me senseless to
impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been
incompetent the burden of demonstrating prejudice. Page 466 U. S. 711 Second and more fundamentally, the assumption on which the
Court's holding rests is that the only purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to
reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted. In my
view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convictions are
obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The majority contends that
the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty
defendant is convicted after a trial in which he was represented by
a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every defendant
is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which
the defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the
forces of the State does not, in my opinion, constitute due
process.

															In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S.
18 , 386 U. S. 23 (1967), we acknowledged that certain constitutional rights are "so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." Among these rights is the right to the assistance
of counsel at trial. Id. at 386 U. S. 23 , n.
8; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.
S. 335 (1963). [ Footnote
2/6 ] In my view, the right Page 466 U. S. 712 to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the
right to counsel, and abridgment of the former is equivalent to
abridgment of the latter. [ Footnote
2/7 ] I would thus hold that a showing that the performance of a
defendant's lawyer departed from constitutionally prescribed
standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the defendant
suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby. II Even if I were inclined to join the majority's two central
holdings, I could not abide the manner in which the majority
elaborates upon its rulings. Particularly regrettable are the
majority's discussion of the "presumption" of reasonableness to be
accorded lawyers' decisions and its attempt to prejudge the merits
of claims previously rejected by lower courts using different legal
standards. A In defining the standard of attorney performance required by the
Constitution, the majority appropriately notes that many problems
confronting criminal defense attorneys admit of "a range of
legitimate" responses. Ante at 466 U. S. 689 .
And the majority properly cautions courts, when reviewing a
lawyer's selection amongst a set of options, to avoid the hubris of
hindsight. Ibid. The majority goes on, however, to suggest
that reviewing courts should "indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct" was constitutionally acceptable, ibid.; see
ante at 466 U. S. 690 , 466 U. S. 696 ,
and should "appl[y] a heavy measure of deference to counsel's
judgments," ante at 466 U. S.
691 .

															I am not sure what these phrases mean, and I doubt that they
will be self-explanatory to lower courts. If they denote nothing
more than that a defendant claiming he was denied effective
assistance of counsel has the burden of proof, I Page 466 U. S. 713 would agree. See United States v. Cronic, ante at 466 U. S. 658 .
But the adjectives "strong" and "heavy" might be read as imposing
upon defendants an unusually weighty burden of persuasion. If that
is the majority's intent, I must respectfully dissent. The range of
acceptable behavior defined by "prevailing professional norms," ante at 466 U. S. 688 ,
seems to me sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the
flexibility they need in responding to novel problems of trial
strategy. To afford attorneys more latitude, by "strongly
presuming" that their behavior will fall within the zone of
reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences
obtained on the basis of incompetent conduct by defense
counsel.

															The only justification the majority itself provides for its
proposed presumption is that undue receptivity to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel would encourage too many
defendants to raise such claims, and thereby would clog the courts
with frivolous suits and "dampen the ardor" of defense counsel. See ante at 466 U. S. 690 .
I have more confidence than the majority in the ability of state
and federal courts expeditiously to dispose of meritless arguments
and to ensure that responsible, innovative lawyering is not
inhibited. In my view, little will be gained and much may be lost
by instructing the lower courts to proceed on the assumption that a
defendant's challenge to his lawyer's performance will be
insubstantial. B For many years, the lower courts have been debating the meaning
of "effective" assistance of counsel. Different courts have
developed different standards. On the issue of the level of
performance required by the Constitution, some courts have adopted
the forgiving "farce-and-mockery" standard, [ Footnote 2/8 ] while others have adopted various versions
of Page 466 U. S. 714 the "reasonable competence" standard. [ Footnote 2/9 ] On the issue of the level of prejudice
necessary to compel a new trial, the courts have taken a wide
variety of positions, ranging from the stringent
"outcome-determinative" test [ Footnote 2/10 ] to the rule that a showing of
incompetence on the part of defense counsel automatically requires
reversal of the conviction regardless of the injury to the
defendant. [ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The Court today substantially resolves these disputes. The
majority holds that the Constitution is violated when defense
counsel's representation falls below the level expected of
reasonably competent defense counsel, ante at 466 U.S. 687 -691, and so affects the
trial that there is a "reasonable probability" that, absent
counsel's error, the outcome would have been different, ante at 466 U. S.
691 -696.

															Curiously, though, the Court discounts the significance of its
rulings, suggesting that its choice of standards matters little,
and that few if any cases would have been decided differently if
the lower courts had always applied the tests announced today. See ante at 466 U. S.
696 -697. Surely the judges in the state and lower
federal courts will be surprised to learn that the distinctions
they have so fiercely debated for many years are, in fact,
unimportant.

															The majority's comments on this point seem to be prompted
principally by a reluctance to acknowledge that today's decision
will require a reassessment of many previously rejected ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. The majority's unhappiness on this
score is understandable, but its efforts to mitigate the perceived
problem will be ineffectual. Nothing the majority says can relieve
lower courts that hitherto Page 466 U. S. 715 have been using standards more tolerant of ineffectual advocacy
of their obligation to scrutinize all claims, old as well as new,
under the principles laid down today. III The majority suggests that, "[f]or purposes of describing
counsel's duties," a capital sentencing proceeding "need not be
distinguished from an ordinary trial." Ante at 466 U.S. 687 . I cannot
agree.

															The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the Constitution
requires stricter adherence to procedural safeguards in a capital
case than in other cases.

															"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality,
differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.
S. 280 , 428 U. S. 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). [ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The performance of defense counsel is a crucial component of the
system of protections designed to ensure that capital punishment is
administered with some degree of rationality. "Reliability" in the
imposition of the death sentence can be approximated only if the
sentencer is fully informed of "all possible relevant information
about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 , 428 U. S. 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). The job of
amassing that information and presenting it Page 466 U. S. 716 in an organized and persuasive manner to the sentencer is
entrusted principally to the defendant's lawyer. The importance to
the process of counsel's efforts, [ Footnote 2/13 ] combined with the severity and
irrevocability of the sanction at stake, require that the standards
for determining what constitutes "effective assistance" be applied
especially stringently in capital sentencing proceedings. [ Footnote 2/14 ]

															It matters little whether strict scrutiny of a claim that
ineffectiveness of counsel resulted in a death sentence is achieved
through modification of the Sixth Amendment standards or through
especially careful application of those standards. JUSTICE BRENNAN
suggests that the necessary adjustment of the level of performance
required of counsel in capital sentencing proceedings can be
effected simply by construing the phrase, "reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms," in a manner that takes into account
the nature of the impending penalty. Ante at 466 U. S.
704 -706. Though I would prefer a more specific iteration
of counsel's duties in this special context, [ Footnote 2/15 ] I can accept that proposal.
However, when instructing lower courts regarding the probability of
impact upon the outcome that requires a resentencing, I think the
Court would do best explicitly to modify the legal standard itself.
[ Footnote 2/16 ] In my view, a
person on death row, whose counsel's performance fell below
constitutionally acceptable levels, should not be compelled to
demonstrate a "reasonable probability" Page 466 U. S. 717 that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had
been competent, see ante at 466 U. S. 694 ;
if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the
outcome would have been different, he surely should be entitled to
a redetermination of his fate. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 , 427 U. S.
121 -122 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 2/17 ] IV The views expressed in the preceding section oblige me to
dissent from the majority's disposition of the case before us.
[ Footnote 2/18 ] It is undisputed
that respondent's trial counsel made virtually no investigation of
the possibility of obtaining testimony from respondent's relatives,
friends, or former employers pertaining to respondent's character
or background. Had counsel done so, he would have found several
persons willing and able to testify that, in their experience,
respondent was a responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his
family, and active in the affairs of his church. See App.
338-365. Respondent contends that his lawyer could have and should
have used that testimony to "humanize" respondent, to counteract
the impression conveyed by the trial that he was little more than a
cold-blooded killer. Had this evidence been admitted, respondent
argues, his chances of obtaining a life sentence would have been
significantly better. Page 466 U. S. 718 Measured against the standards outlined above, respondent's
contentions are substantial. Experienced members of the death
penalty bar have long recognized the crucial importance of adducing
evidence at a sentencing proceeding that establishes the
defendant's social and familial connections. See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 300-303, 334-335 (1983).
The State makes a colorable -- though, in my view, not compelling
-- argument that defense counsel in this case might have made a
reasonable "strategic" decision not to present such evidence at the
sentencing hearing on the assumption that an unadorned
acknowledgment of respondent's responsibility for his crimes would
be more likely to appeal to the trial judge, who was reputed to
respect persons who accepted responsibility for their actions.
[ Footnote 2/19 ] But however
justifiable such a choice might have been after counsel had fairly
assessed the potential strength of the mitigating evidence
available to him, counsel's failure to make any significant effort
to find out what evidence might be garnered from respondent's
relatives and acquaintances surely cannot be described as
"reasonable." Counsel's failure to investigate is particularly
suspicious in light of his candid admission that respondent's
confessions and conduct in the course of the trial gave him a
feeling of "hopelessness" regarding the possibility of saving
respondent's life, see App. 383-384, 400-401. Page 466 U. S. 719 That the aggravating circumstances implicated by respondent's
criminal conduct were substantial, see ante at 466 U. S. 700 ,
does not vitiate respondent's constitutional claim; judges and
juries in cases involving behavior at least as egregious have shown
mercy, particularly when afforded an opportunity to see other
facets of the defendant's personality and life. [ Footnote 2/20 ] Nor is respondent's contention
defeated by the possibility that the material his counsel turned up
might not have been sufficient to establish a statutory mitigating
circumstance under Florida law; Florida sentencing judges and the
Florida Supreme Court sometimes refuse to impose death sentences in
cases

															"in which, even though statutory mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh statutory aggravating circumstances,
the addition of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances tips the
scales in favor of life imprisonment." Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939 , 463 U. S. 964 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis in
original).

															If counsel had investigated the availability of mitigating
evidence, he might well have decided to present some such material
at the hearing. If he had done so, there is a significant chance
that respondent would have been given a life sentence. In my view,
those possibilities, conjoined with the unreasonableness of
counsel's failure to investigate, are more than sufficient to
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment and to entitle
respondent to a new sentencing proceeding.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ] See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective
Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United
States v. Decoster, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 752, 756-758 (1980); Note,
Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair
Trial Guarantee, 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1380, 1386-1387, 1399-1401,
1408-1410 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] Cf., e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736
(CA3 1970) (defining the constitutionally required level of
performance as "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge
which normally prevails at the time and place").

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															For a review of other decisions attempting to develop guidelines
for assessment of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel
in a Criminal Case, 17 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 233, 242-248 (1979). Many of
these decisions rely heavily on the standards developed by the
American Bar Association. See ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice 4-1.1 - 4-8.6 (2d ed.1980).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] Cf. United States v. Ellison, 557 F.2d 128, 131 (CA7
1977). In discussing the related problem of measuring injury caused
by joint representation of conflicting interests, we observed:

															"[T]he evil . . . is in what the advocate finds himself
compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial, but
also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the
sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify
from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure
to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the
sentencing hearing available, it would be difficult to judge
intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's
representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict
of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in
plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry
into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most
cases, unguided speculation." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 , 436 U. S.
490 -491 (1978) (emphasis in original). When defense
counsel fails to take certain actions, not because he is
"compelled" to do so, but because he is incompetent, it is often
equally difficult to ascertain the prejudice consequent upon his
omissions.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] See United States v. Decoster, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 369,
464-457, 624 F.2d 196, 291-294 (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Note, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at
767-770.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															In cases in which the government acted in a way that prevented
defense counsel from functioning effectively, we have refused to
require the defendant, in order to obtain a new trial, to
demonstrate that he was injured. In Glasser v. United
States, 315 U. S. 60 , 315 U. S. 76 -76
(1942), for example, we held:

															"To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by [a
defendant] as a result of the court's appointment of [the same
counsel for two codefendants with conflicting interests] is at once
difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge
in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its
denial."

															As the Court today acknowledges, United State v. Cronic,
ante at 466 U. S. 662 ,
n. 31, whether the government or counsel himself is to blame for
the inadequacy of the legal assistance received by a defendant
should make no difference in deciding whether the defendant must
prove prejudice.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865, n. 1
(CA6), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (CA6 1974); Commonwealth
v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 243-244, 393 A.2d
642 , 644 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See, e.g., State v. Pacheco, 121 Ariz. 88, 91, 588 P.2d 830 ,
833 (1978); Hoover v. State, 270 Ark. 978, 980, 606 S.W.2d
749 , 761 (1980); Line v. State, 272 Ind. 353, 354-355, 397 N.E.2d
975 , 976 (1979).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See, e.g., Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155
(CA2 1983); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-1330
(CA9 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 199 U.S.App.D.C.
at 370, and n. 74, 624 F.2d at 208, and n. 74 (plurality opinion); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d
997 , 1001 (Fla.1981).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ] See 466
U.S. 668 fn2/7|>n. 7, supra. [ Footnote 2/12 ] See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.
S. 862 , 462 U. S.
884 -885 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 , 455 U. S.
110 -112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.
S. 586 , 438 U. S. 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] See Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299,
303 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															As JUSTICE BRENNAN points out, ante at 466 U. S. 704 ,
an additional reason for examining especially carefully a Sixth
Amendment challenge when it pertains to a capital sentencing
proceeding is that the result of finding a constitutional violation
in that context is less disruptive than a finding that counsel was
incompetent in the liability phase of a trial.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ] See 466 U. S. supra. For a sensible effort to formulate guidelines for
the conduct of defense counsel in capital sentencing proceedings, see Goodpaster, supra, at 343-345, 360-362.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															For the purposes of this and the succeeding section, I assume,
solely for the sake of argument, that some showing of prejudice is
necessary to state a violation of the Sixth Amendment. But
cf. 466 U. S. supra. [ Footnote 2/17 ]

															As I read the opinion of the Court, it does not preclude this
kind of adjustment of the legal standard. The majority defines
"reasonable probability" as "a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Ante at 466 U. S. 694 .
In view of the nature of the sanction at issue, and the difficulty
of determining how a sentencer would have responded if presented
with a different set of facts, it could be argued that a lower
estimate of the likelihood that the outcome of a capital sentencing
proceeding was influenced by attorney error is sufficient to
"undermine confidence" in that outcome than would be true in an
ordinary criminal case.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															Adhering to my view that the death penalty is unconstitutional
under all circumstances, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.
S. 153 , 428 U. S. 231 (1976) (MARSHALL J., dissenting), I would vote to vacate
respondent's sentence even if he had not presented a substantial
Sixth Amendment claim.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Two considerations undercut the State's explanation of counsel's
decision. First, it is not apparent why adducement of evidence
pertaining to respondent's character and familial connections would
have been inconsistent with respondent's acknowledgment that he was
responsible for his behavior. Second, the Florida Supreme Court
possesses -- and frequently exercises -- the power to overturn
death sentences it deems unwarranted by the facts of a case. See State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 ,
10 (1973). Even if counsel's decision not to try to humanize
respondent for the benefit of the trial judge were deemed
reasonable, counsel's failure to create a record for the benefit of
the State Supreme Court might well be deemed unreasonable.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ] See, e.g., Farmer & Kinard, The Trial of the
Penalty Phase (1976), reprinted in 2 California State Public
Defender, California Death Penalty Manual N-33, N-45 (1980).

Summary: In the case of Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the standards for judging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court outlined a two-part test: first, the defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient, and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The Court defined "reasonable probability" as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. The Court also noted that a lower estimate of the likelihood that the outcome of a capital sentencing proceeding was influenced by attorney error may be sufficient to undermine confidence in that outcome compared to an ordinary criminal case.