OPINION OF THE COURT BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART 547 U. S. ____ (2006) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-502 BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH, PETITIONER v. CHARLES
W. STUART et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
utah

															[May 22, 2006]

															   Chief Justice Roberts delivered
the opinion of the Court.

															   In this case we consider whether
police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an
objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is
seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. We
conclude that they may.

															I

															   This case arises out of a melee
that occurred in a Brigham City, Utah, home in the early morning
hours of July 23, 2000. At about 3 a.m., four police officers
responded to a call regarding a loud party at a residence. Upon
arriving at the house, they heard shouting from inside, and
proceeded down the driveway to investigate. There, they observed
two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. They entered the
backyard, and saw—through a screen door and windows—an altercation
taking place in the kitchen of the home. According to the testimony
of one of the officers, four adults were attempting, with some
difficulty, to restrain a juvenile. The juvenile eventually “broke
free, swung a fist and struck one of the adults in the face.” 2005
UT 13, ¶2, 122 P. 3d 506, 508. The officer testified that he
observed the victim of the blow spitting blood into a nearby sink.
App. 40. The other adults continued to try to restrain the
juvenile, pressing him up against a refrigerator with such force
that the refrigerator began moving across the floor. At this point,
an officer opened the screen door and announced the officers’
presence. Amid the tumult, nobody noticed. The officer entered the
kitchen and again cried out, and as the occupants slowly became
aware that the police were on the scene, the altercation
ceased.

															   The officers subsequently
arrested respondents and charged them with contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and intoxication. In
the trial court, respondents filed a motion to suppress all
evidence obtained after the officers entered the home, arguing that
the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The court
granted the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

															   Before the Supreme Court of Utah, Brigham City
argued that although the officers lacked a warrant, their entry was
nevertheless reasonable on either of two grounds. The court
rejected both contentions and, over two dissenters, affirmed.
First, the court held that the injury caused by the juvenile’s
punch was insufficient to trigger the so-called “emergency aid
doctrine” because it did not give rise to an “ objectively
reasonable belief that an unconscious, semi-conscious, or missing
person feared injured or dead [was] in the home.” 122 P. 3d,
at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the court
suggested that the doctrine was inapplicable because the officers
had not sought to assist the injured adult, but instead had acted
“exclusively in their law enforcement capacity.” Ibid .

															   The court also held that the entry did not
fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. This exception applies, the court explained, where
police have probable cause and where “a reasonable person [would]
believe that the entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to
the officers or other persons.” Id., at 514 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the court stated,
the potential harm need not be as serious as that required to
invoke the emergency aid exception. Although it found the case “a
close and difficult call,” the court nevertheless concluded that
the officers’ entry was not justified by exigent circumstances. Id., at 515.

															   We granted certiorari, 546 U. S. ___ (2006),
in light of differences among state courts and the Courts of
Appeals concerning the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard
governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency
situation. Compare In re Sealed Case 96–3167, 153
F. 3d 759, 766 (CADC 1998) (“[T]he standard for exigent
circumstances is an objective one”) and People v. Hebert, 46 P. 3d 473, 480 (Colo. 2002) (en banc)
(considering the circumstances as they “would have been objectively
examined by a prudent and trained police officer”), with United
States v. Cervantes , 219 F. 3d 882, 890 (CA9
2000) (“[U]nder the emergency doctrine, ‘[a] search must not be
primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence’ ”
(quoting People v. Mitchell , 39 N. Y. 2d
173, 177, 347 N. E. 2d 607, 609 (1976)) and State v. Mountford, 171 Vt. 487, 492, 769 A. 2d 639, 645
(2000) ( Mitchell test “requir[es] courts to find that the
primary subjective motivation behind such searches was to provide
emergency aid”).

															II

															   It is a “ ‘ basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.’ ” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551 , 559
(2004) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 586
(1980) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless,
because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
“reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain
exceptions. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U. S. 11 , 13 (1999) (per curiam); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 ,
357 (1967). We have held, for example, that law enforcement
officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to
fight a fire and investigate its cause, Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U. S. 499 , 509 (1978), to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 40 (1963),
or to engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United
States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38 , 42–43
(1976). “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s
home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 393–394
(1978).

															   One exigency obviating the
requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are
seriously injured or threatened with such injury. “ ‘The need
to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.’ ” Id., at 392 (quoting Wayne v. United States , 318 F. 2d 205, 212
(CADC 1963) (Burger, J.)); see also Tyler, supra, at 509.
Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a
warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to
protect an occupant from imminent injury. Mincey, supra, at 392; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S.
___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 13–14) (“[I]t would be silly to
suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering … to
determine whether violence (or threat of violence) has just
occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur”).

															   Respondents do not take issue with these
principles, but instead advance two reasons why the officers’ entry
here was unreasonable. First, they argue that the officers were
more interested in making arrests than quelling violence. They urge
us to consider, in assessing the reasonableness of the entry,
whether the officers were “indeed motivated primarily by a desire
to save lives and property.” Brief for Respondents 3; see also
Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 6 (entry to render emergency assistance
justifies a search “only when the searching officer is acting
outside his traditional law-enforcement capacity”). The Utah
Supreme Court also considered the officers’ subjective motivations
relevant. See 122 P. 3d, at 513 (search under the “emergency
aid doctrine” may not be “primarily motivated by intent to arrest
and seize evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

															   Our cases have repeatedly rejected this
approach. An action is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment,
regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, “as long as
the circumstances, viewed objectively , justify [the]
action.” Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128 , 138
(1978) (emphasis added). The officer’s subjective motivation is
irrelevant. See Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334 , 338,
n. 2 (2000) (“The parties properly agree that the subjective
intent of the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining
whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment
… ; the issue is not his state of mind, but the objective
effect of his actions”); Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 ,
813 (1996) (“[W]e have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment
challenges based on the actual motivations of individual
officers”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 , 397
(1989) (“[O]ur prior cases make clear” that “the subjective
motivations of the individual officers … ha[ve] no bearing on
whether a particular seizure is ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth
Amendment”). It therefore does not matter here—even if
their subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled—whether the
officers entered the kitchen to arrest respondents and gather
evidence against them or to assist the injured and prevent further
violence. As respondents note, we have held
in the context of programmatic searches conducted without
individualized suspicion—such as checkpoints to combat drunk
driving or drug trafficking—that “an inquiry into programmatic purpose” is sometimes appropriate. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32 , 46 (2000)
(emphasis added); see also Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1 , 4
(1990) (an inventory search must be regulated by “standardized
criteria” or “established routine” so as not to “be a ruse for a
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence”).
But this inquiry is directed at ensuring that the purpose behind
the program is not “ultimately indistinguishable from the
general interest in crime control.” Edmond, 531 U. S., at
44. It has nothing to do with discerning what is in the mind of the
individual officer conducting the search. Id., at
48. Respondents further contend that
their conduct was not serious enough to justify the officers’
intrusion into the home. They rely on Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 , 753
(1984), in which we held that “an important factor to be considered
when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the
underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.” This
contention, too, is misplaced. Welsh involved a
warrantless entry by officers to arrest a suspect for driving while
intoxicated. There, the “only potential emergency” confronting the
officers was the need to preserve evidence ( i.e. , the
suspect’s blood-alcohol level)—an exigency that we held
insufficient under the circumstances to justify entry into the
suspect’s home. Ibid . Here, the officers were confronted
with ongoing violence occurring within the home. Welsh did not address such a situation. We think the officers’ entry here
was plainly reasonable under the circumstances. The officers were
responding, at 3 o’clock in the morning, to complaints about a loud
party. As they approached the house, they could hear from within
“an altercation occurring, some kind of a fight.” App. 29. “It was
loud and it was tumultuous.” Id., at 33. The officers
heard “thumping and crashing” and people yelling “stop, stop” and
“get off me.” Id., at 28, 29. As the trial court found,
“it was obvious that … knocking on the front door” would have been
futile. Id., at 92. The noise seemed to be coming from the
back of the house; after looking in the front window and seeing
nothing, the officers proceeded around back to investigate further.
They found two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard. From there,
they could see that a fracas was taking place inside the kitchen. A
juvenile, fists clenched, was being held back by several adults. As
the officers watch, he breaks free and strikes one of the adults in
the face, sending the adult to the sink spitting blood. In these circumstances, the
officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both
that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the
kitchen was just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
required them to wait until another blow rendered someone
“unconscious” or “semi-conscious” or worse before entering. The
role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring
order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties; an officer is
not like a boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to stop a bout only
if it becomes too one-sided. The manner of the officers’ entry
was also reasonable. After witnessing the punch, one of the
officers opened the screen door and “yelled in police.” Id., at 40. When nobody heard him, he stepped into the
kitchen and announced himself again. Only then did the tumult
subside. The officer’s announcement of his presence was at least
equivalent to a knock on the screen door. Indeed, it was probably
the only option that had even a chance of rising above the din.
Under these circumstances, there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment’s knock-and-announce rule. Furthermore, once the
announcement was made, the officers were free to enter; it would
serve no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door
awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to
their presence. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah, and remand the case for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. STEVENS, J., CONCURRING BRIGHAM CITY V. STUART 547 U. S. ____ (2006) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 05-502 BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH, PETITIONER v. CHARLES
W. STUART et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
utah

															[May 22, 2006]

															   Justice Stevens, concurring.

															   This is an odd flyspeck of a
case. The charges that have been pending against respondents for
the past six years are minor offenses—intoxication, contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, and disorderly conduct—two of which
could have been proved by evidence that was gathered by the
responding officers before they entered the home. The maximum
punishment for these crimes ranges between 90 days and 6 months in
jail. And the Court’s unanimous opinion restating well-settled
rules of federal law is so clearly persuasive that it is hard to
imagine the outcome was ever in doubt.

															   Under these circumstances, the only difficult
question is which of the following is the most peculiar: (1) that
the Utah trial judge, the intermediate state appellate court, and
the Utah Supreme Court all found a Fourth Amendment violation on
these facts; (2) that the prosecution chose to pursue this matter
all the way to the United States Supreme Court; or (3) that this
Court voted to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

															   A possible explanation for the first is that
the suppression ruling was correct as a matter of Utah law, and
neither trial counsel nor the trial judge bothered to identify the
Utah Constitution as an independent basis for the decision because
they did not expect the prosecution to appeal.* The most plausible
explanation for the latter two decisions is that they were made so
police officers in Utah may enter a home without a warrant when
they see ongoing violence—we are, of course, reversing the Utah
Supreme Court’s conclusion to the contrary. But that purpose,
laudable though it may be, cannot be achieved in this case. Our
holding today addresses only the limitations placed by the Federal
Constitution on the search at issue; we have no authority to decide
whether the police in this case violated the Utah Constitution.

															   The Utah Supreme Court, however, has made
clear that the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to the
privacy of the home than does the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Debooy , 2000 UT 32, ¶12, 996 P. 2d
546, 549. And it complained in this case of respondents’ failure to
raise or adequately brief a state constitutional challenge, thus
preventing the state courts from deciding the case on anything
other than Fourth Amendment grounds. See 2005 UT 13, ¶12, 122
P. 3d 506, 510. “[S]urpris[ed]” by “[t]he reluctance of
litigants to take up and develop a state constitutional analysis,” ibid. , the court expressly invited future litigants to
bring challenges under the Utah Constitution to enable it to
fulfill its “responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty
of our citizens” and “undertak[e] a principled exploration of the
interplay between federal and state protections of individual
rights,” id ., at 511. The fact that this admonishment and
request came from the Utah Supreme Court in this very case not only
demonstrates that the prosecution selected the wrong case for
establishing the rule it wants, but indicates that the Utah Supreme
Court would probably adopt the same rule as a matter of state
constitutional law that we reject today under the Federal
Constitution.

															   Whether or not that forecast is accurate, I
can see no reason for this Court to cause the Utah courts to
redecide the question as a matter of state law. Federal interests
are not offended when a single State elects to provide greater
protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution requires.
Indeed, I continue to believe “that a policy of judicial
restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last
word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this
Court to intervene—enables this Court to make its most effective
contribution to our federal system of government.” Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 , 1067
(1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, while I join the Court’s
opinion, I remain persuaded that my vote to deny the State’s
petition for certiorari was correct.

															* Indeed, it was the prosecution that prepared
the trial court’s order granting respondents’ motion to suppress.
See 2002 UT App. 317, ¶4, 57 P. 3d 1111, 1112.

Summary: Police officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have a reasonable belief that an occupant is in danger or seriously injured. In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the police officers' warrantless entry into a home in Brigham City, Utah, was justified as they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant was in imminent danger. The court reversed the decision of the Utah Supreme Court, which had held that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth Amendment.


Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada

OPINION OF THE COURT HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,HUMBOLDT CTY. 542 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 03-5554 LARRY D. HIIBEL, PETITIONER v. SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
nevada

															[June 21, 2004]

															   Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   The petitioner was arrested and
convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). He challenges his
conviction under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment.

															I

															   The sheriff’s department in
Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call
reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a
woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy
Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer
arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the
road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was
sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel
behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden
stop.

															   The officer approached the man
and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The
man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had
“any identification on [him],” which we understand as a request to
produce a driver’s license or some other form of written
identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to
see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an
investigation and needed to see some identification. The
unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing
wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man
was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply
with the officer’s request for identification, the man began to
taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling
the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept
up for several minutes: the officer asked for identification 11
times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he
would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer
placed him under arrest.

															   We now know that the man arrested on Grass
Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with
“willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public
officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of
his office” in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) §199.280 (2003).
The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in
carrying out his duties under §171.123, a Nevada statute that
defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the
context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in
relevant part:

															“1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom
the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably
indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about
to commit a crime.

															. . . . .

															“3. The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section
only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances
surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall
identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other
inquiry of any peace officer.”

															   Hiibel was tried in the Justice
Court of Union Township. The court agreed that Hiibel’s refusal to
identify himself as required by §171.123 “obstructed and delayed
Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty” in
violation of §199.280. App. 5. Hiibel was convicted and fined $250.
The Sixth Judicial District Court affirmed, rejecting Hiibel’s
argument that the application of §171.123 to his case violated the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. On review the Supreme Court of Nevada
rejected the Fourth Amendment challenge in a divided opinion. 118
Nev. 868, 59 P. 3d 1201 (2002). Hiibel petitioned for
rehearing, seeking explicit resolution of his Fifth Amendment
challenge. The petition was denied without opinion. We granted
certiorari. 540 U.
S. 965 (2003).

															II

															   NRS §171.123(3) is an enactment
sometimes referred to as a “stop and identify” statute. See Ala.
Code §15–5–30 (West 2003); Ark. Code Ann. §5–71–213(a)(1) (2004);
Colo. Rev. Stat. §16–3–103(1) (2003); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11,
§§1902(a), 1321(6) (2003); Fla. Stat. §856.021(2) (2003); Ga. Code
Ann. §16–11–36(b) (2003); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/107–14
(2004); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22–2402(1) (2003); La. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann., Art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); Mo. Rev. Stat. §84.710(2) (2003);
Mont. Code Ann. §46–5–401(2)(a) (2003); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29–829
(2003); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§594:2 and 644:6 (Lexis 2003);
N. M. Stat. Ann. §30–22–3 (2004); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§140.50(1) (West 2004); N. D. Cent. Code §29–29–21 (2003);
R. I. Gen. Laws §12–7–1 (2003); Utah Code Ann. §77–7–15
(2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §1983 (Supp. 2003); Wis. Stat.
§968.24 (2003). See also Note, Stop and Identify Statutes: A New
Form of an Inadequate Solution to an Old Problem, 12 Rutgers
L. J. 585 (1981); Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Issues, 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1057 (1984).

															   Stop and identify statutes often
combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions
intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory
stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an
officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few
States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a model code
that permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of
committing a crime and “demand of him his name, address, business
abroad and whither he is going.” Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942). Other statutes are based on the
text proposed by the American Law Institute as part of the
Institute’s Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code, §250.6,
Comment 4, pp. 392–393 (1980). The provision, originally designated
§250.12, provides that a person who is loitering “under
circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or
about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the
request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a
reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and
purposes.” §250.12 (Tentative Draft No. 13) (1961). In some States,
a suspect’s refusal to identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or
civil violation; in others, it is a factor to be considered in
whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In other States, a
suspect may decline to identify himself without penalty.

															   Stop and identify statutes have their roots in
early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to
face arrest unless they gave “a good Account of themselves,” 15
Geo. 2, ch. 5, §2 (1744), a power that itself reflected
common-law rights of private persons to “arrest any suspicious
night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself
… .” 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, §6,
p. 130. (6th ed. 1787). In recent decades, the Court has found
constitutional infirmity in traditional vagrancy laws. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972),
the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for
vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice
to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise
unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law. See id ., at 167–171.

															   The Court has recognized similar
constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and
identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 , 52 (1979),
the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and
identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that
the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts
establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was
involved in criminal activity. See id ., at 51–52. Absent
that factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the
risk of “arbitrary and abusive police practices” was too great and
the stop was impermissible. Id ., at 52. Four Terms later,
the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on
vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 (1983).
The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give
an officer “ ‘credible and reliable’ ” identification
when asked to identify himself. Id., at 360. The Court
held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for
determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in
“ ‘virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons
with a violation.’ ” Id., at 360 (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 , 135
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result)).

															   The present case begins where our prior cases
left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based
on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment
requirements noted in Brown . Further, the petitioner has
not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender . Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more
precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to
require a suspect to give the officer “credible and reliable”
identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has
interpreted NRS §171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose
his name. See 118 Nev., at ___, 59 P. 3d, at 1206 (opinion of
Young, C. J.) (“The suspect is not required to provide private
details about his background, but merely to state his name to an
officer when reasonable suspicion exists”). As we understand it,
the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a
driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect
either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other
means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is
satisfied and no violation occurs . See id., at
___, 59 P. 3d, at 1206–1207.

															III

															   Hiibel argues that his conviction
cannot stand because the officer’s conduct violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. We disagree.

															   Asking questions is an essential
part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police
officer is free to ask a person for identification without
implicating the Fourth Amendment. “[I]nterrogation relating to
one’s identity or a request for identification by the police does
not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 , 216
(1984). Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has
recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion
that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the
officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional
steps to investigate further. Delgado , supra , at
216; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 881
(1975). To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally
reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer’s
action must be “ ‘justified at its inception, and … reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.’ ” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 , 682
(1985) (quoting Terry , supra, at 20). For
example, the seizure cannot continue for an excessive period of
time, see United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 , 709
(1983), or resemble a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 , 212
(1979).

															   Our decisions make clear that questions
concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of
many Terry stops. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221 , 229
(1985) (“[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions,
or check identification in the absence of probable cause promotes
the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing
offenders to justice”); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U. S. 811 , 816
(1985) (“[I]f there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that a person has committed a criminal offense, that
person may be stopped in order to identify him, to question him
briefly, or to detain him briefly while attempting to obtain
additional information”); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 146
(1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily
while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light
of the facts known to the officer at the time”).

															   Obtaining a suspect’s name in the course of a Terry stop serves important government interests.
Knowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is
wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental
disorder. On the other hand, knowing identity may help clear a
suspect and allow the police to concentrate their efforts
elsewhere. Identity may prove particularly important in cases such
as this, where the police are investigating what appears to be a
domestic assault. Officers called to investigate domestic disputes
need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the
situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to
the potential victim.

															   Although it is well established that an
officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop, it has been an open question whether the
suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer. See Brown , 443 U. S., at 53, n. 3. Petitioner draws our
attention to statements in prior opinions that, according to him,
answer the question in his favor. In Terry , Justice White
stated in a concurring opinion that a person detained in an
investigative stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no
basis for an arrest.” 392 U. S., at 34. The Court cited this
opinion in dicta in Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420 , 439
(1984), a decision holding that a routine traffic stop is not a
custodial stop requiring the protections of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In
the course of explaining why Terry stops have not been
subject to Miranda , the Court suggested reasons why Terry stops have a “nonthreatening character,” among them
the fact that a suspect detained during a Terry stop “is
not obliged to respond” to questions. See Berkemer , supra, at 439, 440. According to petitioner, these
statements establish a right to refuse to answer questions during a Terry stop.

															   We do not read these statements as
controlling. The passages recognize that the Fourth Amendment does
not impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights
against the government. As a result, the Fourth Amendment itself
cannot require a suspect to answer questions. This case concerns a
different issue, however. Here, the source of the legal obligation
arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment. Further,
the statutory obligation does not go beyond answering an officer’s
request to disclose a name. See NRS §171.123(3) (“Any person so
detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer
any other inquiry of any peace officer”). As a result, we cannot
view the dicta in Berkemer or Justice White’s concurrence
in Terry as answering the question whether a State can
compel a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry stop.

															   The principles of Terry permit a
State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. The reasonableness of a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate government interests.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 654
(1979). The Nevada statute satisfies that standard. The request for
identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and
practical demands of a Terry stop. The threat of criminal
sanction helps ensure that the request for identity does not become
a legal nullity. On the other hand, the Nevada statute does not
alter the nature of the stop itself: it does not change its
duration, Place , supra , at 709, or its location, Dunaway , supra , at 212. A state law requiring a
suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

															   Petitioner argues that the Nevada statute
circumvents the probable cause requirement, in effect allowing an
officer to arrest a person for being suspicious. According to
petitioner, this creates a risk of arbitrary police conduct that
the Fourth Amendment does not permit. Brief for Petitioner 28–33.
These are familiar concerns; they were central to the opinion in Papachristou, and also to the decisions limiting the
operation of stop and identify statutes in Kolender and Brown . Petitioner’s concerns are met by the requirement
that a Terry stop must be justified at its inception and
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified”
the initial stop. 392 U. S., at 20. Under these principles, an
officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if
the request for identification is not reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop. The Court noted a similar
limitation in Hayes , where it suggested that Terry may permit an officer to determine a suspect’s
identity by compelling the suspect to submit to fingerprinting only
if there is “a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting
will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime.”
470 U. S., at 817. It is clear in this case that the request for
identification was “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified” the stop. Terry , supra, at 20. The officer’s request was a commonsense
inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify
after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The
stop, the request, and the State’s requirement of a response did
not contravene the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.

															IV

															   Petitioner further contends that
his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on
compelled self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o
person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.” To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a
communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.
See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27 , 34–38
(2000).

															   Respondents urge us to hold that
the statements NRS §171.123(3) requires are nontestimonial, and so
outside the Clause’s scope. We decline to resolve the case on that
basis. “[T]o be testimonial, an accused’s communication must
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or
disclose information.” Doe v. United
States, 487 U. S. 201 , 210
(1988). See also Hubbell, 530 U. S., at 35. Stating one’s
name may qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity.
Production of identity documents might meet the definition as well.
As we noted in Hubbell , acts of production may yield
testimony establishing “the existence, authenticity, and custody of
items [the police seek].” Id., at 41. Even if these
required actions are testimonial, however, petitioner’s challenge
must fail because in this case disclosure of his name presented no
reasonable danger of incrimination.

															    The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled
testimony that is incriminating. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 , 598
(1896) (noting that where “the answer of the witness will not
directly show his infamy, but only tend to disgrace him,
he is bound to answer”). A claim of Fifth Amendment privilege must
establish

															“ ‘reasonable ground to apprehend danger to
the witness from his being compelled to answer … . [T]he
danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with
reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course
of things,—not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial
character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely
possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would
suffer it to influence his conduct.’ ” Id., at
599–600 (quoting Queen v. Boyes , 1 Best & S.
311, 321 (1861) (Cockburn, C. J.)).

															As we stated in Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U. S. 441 , 445
(1972), the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination “protects against any disclosures that the
witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution
or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” Suspects
who have been granted immunity from prosecution may, therefore, be
compelled to answer; with the threat of prosecution removed, there
can be no reasonable belief that the evidence will be used against
them. See id., at 453.

															   In this case petitioner’s refusal to disclose
his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear
that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it “would
furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479 , 486
(1951). As best we can tell, petitioner refused to identify himself
only because he thought his name was none of the officer’s
business. Even today, petitioner does not explain how the
disclosure of his name could have been used against him in a
criminal case. While we recognize petitioner’s strong belief that
he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment
does not override the Nevada Legislature’s judgment to the contrary
absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to
incriminate him.

															   The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement
is also important. One’s identity is, by definition, unique; yet it
is, in another sense, a universal characteristic. Answering a
request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the
scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances. See Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549 , 555
(1990) (suggesting that “fact[s] the State could readily establish”
may render “any testimony regarding existence or authenticity [of
them] insufficiently incriminating”); Cf. California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424 , 432
(1971) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). In every criminal case, it
is known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being
tried. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582 , 601–602
(1990) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Even witnesses who plan to invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to
take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a
substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a
stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence
needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that
case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies,
and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must
follow. We need not resolve those questions here.

															   The judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court
is

															Affirmed. STEVENS, J., DISSENTING HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,HUMBOLDT CTY. 542 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 03-5554 LARRY D. HIIBEL, PETITIONER v. SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
nevada

															[June 21, 2004]

															   Justice Stevens, dissenting.

															   The Nevada law at issue in this
case imposes a narrow duty to speak upon a specific class of
individuals. The class includes only those persons detained by a
police officer “under circumstances which reasonably indicate that
the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a
crime”[ Footnote 1 ]—persons who
are, in other words, targets of a criminal investigation. The
statute therefore is directed not “at the public at large,” but
rather “at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities.” Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U. S. 70 , 79
(1965).

															   Under the Nevada law, a member of the targeted
class “may not be compelled to answer” any inquiry except a command
that he “identify himself.”[ Footnote 2 ] Refusal to identify oneself upon request is
punishable as a crime.[ Footnote
3 ] Presumably the statute does not require the detainee to
answer any other question because the Nevada Legislature realized
that the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling the target of a
criminal investigation to make any other statement. In my judgment,
the broad constitutional right to remain silent, which derives from
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that “[n]o person … shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” U.
S. Const., Amdt. 5,[ Footnote 4 ]
is not as circumscribed as the Court suggests, and does not admit
even of the narrow exception defined by the Nevada statute.

															   “[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 467
(1966). It is a “settled principle” that “the police have the right
to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning
unsolved crimes,” but “they have no right to compel them to
answer.” Davis v. Mississipi, 394 U. S. 721 , 727,
n. 6 (1969). The protections of the Fifth Amendment are
directed squarely toward those who are the focus of the
government’s investigative and prosecutorial powers. In a criminal
trial, the indicted defendant has an unqualified right to refuse to
testify and may not be punished for invoking that right. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U. S. 288 , 299–300
(1981). The unindicted target of a grand jury investigation enjoys
the same constitutional protection even if he has been served with
a subpoena. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U. S. 760 , 767–768
(2003). So does an arrested suspect during custodial interrogation
in a police station. Miranda , 384 U. S., at 467.

															   There is no reason why the subject of police
interrogation based on mere suspicion, rather than probable cause,
should have any lesser protection. Indeed, we have said that the
Fifth Amendment’s protections apply with equal force in the context
of Terry stops, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), where an officer’s
inquiry “must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the justification
for [the stop’s] initiation.’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420 , 439
(1984) (some internal quotation marks omitted). “Typically, this
means that the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of
questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But
the detainee is not obliged to respond.” Ibid . See also Terry, 392 U. S., at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“Of
course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation”). Given our statements to the effect that citizens are
not required to respond to police officers’ questions during a Terry stop, it is no surprise that petitioner assumed, as
have we, that he had a right not to disclose his identity.

															   The Court correctly observes that a
communication does not enjoy the Fifth Amendment privilege unless
it is testimonial. Although the Court declines to resolve this
question, ante , at 10–11, I think it clear that this case
concerns a testimonial communication. Recognizing that whether a
communication is testimonial is sometimes a “difficult question,” Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201 , 214–215 (1988), we have
stated generally that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of information from
the accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of
his own mind,’ that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause,” id ., at 211 (citations omitted). While “[t]he vast
majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial and, to that
extent at least, will fall within the privilege,” id ., at
213–214, certain acts and physical evidence fall outside the
privilege.[ Footnote 5 ] In all
instances, we have afforded Fifth Amendment protec- tion if the
disclosure in question was being admitted because of its content
rather than some other aspect of the communication.[ Footnote 6 ]

															   Considered in light of these precedents, the
compelled statement at issue in this case is clearly testimonial.
It is significant that the communication must be made in response
to a question posed by a police officer. As we recently explained,
albeit in the different context of the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause, “[w]hatever else the term [‘testimonial’]
covers, it applies at a minimum … to police interrogations.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. ___, ___ (2004)
(slip op., at 33). Surely police questioning during a Terry stop qualifies as an interrogation, and it follows
that responses to such questions are testimonial in nature.

															   Rather than determining whether the
communication at issue is testimonial, the Court instead concludes
that the State can compel the disclosure of one’s identity because
it is not “incriminating.” Ante , at 11. But our cases have
afforded Fifth Amendment protection to statements that are
“incriminating” in a much broader sense than the Court suggests. It
has “long been settled that [the Fifth Amendment’s] protection
encompasses compelled statements that lead to the discovery of
incriminating evidence even though the statements themselves are
not incriminating and are not introduced into evidence.” United
States v. Hubbell, 530 U. S. 27 , 37 (2000).
By “incriminating” we have meant disclosures that “could be used in
a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might
be so used,” Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U. S. 441 , 445
(1972)—communications, in other words, that “would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a
federal crime,” Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U. S. 479 , 486
(1951). Thus, “[c]ompelled testimony that communicates information
that may ‘lead to incriminating evidence’ is privileged even if the
information itself is not inculpatory.” Hubbell , 530 U.
S., at 38 (citing Doe , 487 U. S., at 208, n. 6).

															   Given a proper understanding of the category
of “incriminating” communications that fall within the Fifth
Amendment privilege, it is clear that the disclosure of
petitioner’s identity is protected. The Court reasons that we
should not assume that the disclosure of petitioner’s name would be
used to incriminate him or that it would furnish a link in a chain
of evidence needed to prosecute him. Ante, at 12–13. But
why else would an officer ask for it? And why else would the Nevada
Legislature require its disclosure only when circumstances
“reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing
or is about to commit a crime”?[ Footnote 7 ] If the Court is correct, then petitioner’s
refusal to cooperate did not impede the police investigation.
Indeed, if we accept the predicate for the Court’s holding, the
statute requires nothing more than a useless invasion of privacy. I
think that, on the contrary, the Nevada Legislature intended to
provide its police officers with a useful law enforcement tool, and
that the very existence of the statute demonstrates the value of
the information it demands.

															   A person’s identity obviously bears
informational and incriminating worth, “even if the [name] itself
is not inculpatory.” Hubbell , 530 U. S., at 38. A name can
provide the key to a broad array of information about the person,
particularly in the hands of a police officer with access to a
range of law enforcement databases. And that information, in turn,
can be tremendously useful in a criminal prosecution. It is
therefore quite wrong to suggest that a person’s identity provides
a link in the chain to incriminating evidence “only in unusual
circumstances.” Ante , at 12.

															   The officer in this case told petitioner, in
the Court’s words, that “he was conducting an investigation and
needed to see some identification.” Ante , at 2. As the
target of that investigation, petitioner, in my view, acted well
within his rights when he opted to stand mute. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent. Footnote 1 Nev. Rev. Stat. §171.123(1) (2003). Footnote 2 §171.123(3). Footnote 3 In this case, petitioner was charged with
violating §199.280, which makes it a crime to “willfully resis[t],
dela[y] or obstruc[t] a public officer in discharging or attempting
to discharge any legal duty of his office.” A violation of that
provision is a misdemeanor unless a dangerous weapon is
involved. Footnote 4 The Fifth Amendment’s protection against
compelled self-incrimination applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 , 6 (1964). Footnote 5 A suspect may be made, for example, to
provide a blood sample, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 , 765
(1966), a voice exemplar, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 , 7 (1973), or
a handwriting sample, Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 , 266–267
(1967). Footnote 6 See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U. S. 582 , 598–599
(1990) (respondent’s answer to the “birthday question” was
protected because the “content of his truthful answer supported an
inference that his mental faculties were impaired”); Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201 , 211, n. 10 (1988)
(“The content itself must have testimonial significance”); Fisher v. United States, 425 U. S. 391 , 410–411
(1976) (“[H]owever incriminating the contents of the accountant’s
workpapers might be, the act of producing them—the only thing which
the taxpayer is compelled to do—would not itself involve
testimonial self-incrimination”); Gilbert, 388 U. S., at
266–267 (“A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content
of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an
identifying characteristic outside its protection”); United
States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 223
(1967) (“[I]t deserves emphasis that this case presents no question
of the admissibility in evidence of anything Wade said or did at
the lineup which implicates his privilege”). Footnote 7 Nev. Rev. Stat. §171.123(1) (2003). The Court
suggests that furnishing identification also allows the
investigating officer to assess the threat to himself and others.
See ante , at 8. But to the extent that officer or public
safety is immediately at issue, that concern is sufficiently
alleviated by the officer’s ability to perform a limited patdown
search for weapons. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 25–26 (1968). BREYER, J., DISSENTING HIIBEL V. SIXTH JUDICIAL DIST. COURT OF NEV.,HUMBOLDT CTY. 542 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 03-5554 LARRY D. HIIBEL, PETITIONER v. SIXTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
nevada

															[June 21, 2004]

															   Justice Breyer, with whom Justice
Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

															   Notwithstanding the vagrancy
statutes to which the majority refers, see ante, at 4–5,
this Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents make clear that police may
conduct a Terry stop only within circumscribed limits. And
one of those limits invalidates laws that compel responses to
police questioning.

															   In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the
Court considered whether police, in the absence of probable cause,
can stop, question, or frisk an individual at all. The Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the “ ‘right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own
person.’ ” Id., at 9 (quoting Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 , 251
(1891)). At the same time, it recognized that in certain
circumstances, public safety might require a limited “seizure,” or
stop, of an individual against his will. The Court consequently set
forth conditions circumscribing when and how the police might
conduct a Terry stop. They include what has become known
as the “reasonable suspicion” standard. 392 U. S. , at
20–22. Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion, set forth
further conditions. Justice White wrote: “Of course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and
refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may
alert the officer to the need for continued observation.” Id., at 34.

															   About 10 years later, the Court, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979), held
that police lacked “any reasonable suspicion” to detain the
particular petitioner and require him to identify himself. Id., at 53. The Court noted that the trial judge had asked
the following: “I’m sure [officers conducting a Terry stop] should ask everything they possibly could find out. What
I’m asking is what’s the State’s interest in putting a man in jail
because he doesn’t want to answer . . . .” Id., at 54
(Appendix to opinion of the Court) (emphasis in original). The
Court referred to Justice White’s Terry concurrence. 443
U. S. , at 53, n. 3. And it said that it “need not
decide” the matter. Ibid. Then, five years later, the Court wrote that
an “officer may ask the [Terry] detainee a moderate number
of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain
information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to respond. ” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 , 439
(1984) (emphasis added). See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 , 365
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ( Terry suspect “must be
free to . . . decline to answer the questions put to him”); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 , 125
(2000) (stating that allow- ing officers to stop and question a
fleeing person “is quite consistent with the individual’s right to
go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face
of police questioning”).

															   This lengthy history—of concurring opinions,
of references, and of clear explicit statements—means that the
Court’s statement in Berkemer , while technically dicta, is
the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes
as a statement of the law. And that law has remained undisturbed
for more than 20 years.

															   There is no good reason now to reject this
generation-old statement of the law. There are sound reasons rooted
in Fifth Amendment considerations for adhering to this Fourth
Amendment legal condition circumscribing police authority to stop
an individual against his will. See ante, at 1–6 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Administrative considerations also militate
against change. Can a State, in addition to requiring a stopped
individual to answer “What’s your name?” also require an answer to
“What’s your license number?” or “Where do you live?” Can a police
officer, who must know how to make a Terry stop, keep
track of the constitutional answers? After all, answers to any of
these questions may, or may not, incriminate, depending upon the
circumstances.

															   Indeed, as the majority points out, a name
itself—even if it is not “Killer Bill” or “Rough ’em up Harry”—will
sometimes provide the police with “a link in the chain of evidence
needed to convict the individual of a separate offense.” Ante, at 12–13. The majority reserves judgment about
whether compulsion is permissible in such instances. Ante, at 13. How then is a police officer in the midst of a Terry stop to distinguish between the majority’s ordinary
case and this special case where the majority reserves
judgment?

															   The majority presents no evidence that the
rule enunciated by Justice White and then by the Berkemer Court, which for nearly a generation has set forth a settled Terry- stop condition, has significantly interfered with
law enforcement. Nor has the majority presented any other
convincing justification for change. I would not begin to erode a
clear rule with special exceptions.

															   I consequently dissent.

Summary: In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., the Supreme Court ruled that individuals can be required to disclose their names during a Terry stop (a brief police detention based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity), but not other information such as addresses or dates of birth. The Court's decision centered on the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment, which protects against self-incrimination. This case sets a precedent for police authority and individual rights during investigative stops.