U.S. Supreme Court Beckwith v. United States, 425
U.S. 341 (1976) Beckwith v. United
States No. 74-1243 Argued December 1,
1975 Decided April 21,
1976 425
U.S. 341 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus Statements made by petitioner taxpayer to Internal Revenue
agents during the course of a noncustodial interview in a criminal
tax investigation held admissible against him in the ensuing
criminal tax fraud prosecution even though he was not given
warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 . Although the "focus" of the investigation may
have been on petitioner when he was interviewed, in the sense that
his tax liability was under scrutiny, that is not the equivalent of
"focus" for Miranda purposes, which involves

															"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 384 U. S. 444 (emphasis supplied). Pp. 425 U. S.
344 -348.

															166 U.S. App.D.C. 361, 510 F.2d 741, affirmed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 425 U. S. 348 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 425 U. S. 349 .
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The important issue presented in this case is whether a special
agent of the Internal Revenue Service, investigating potential
criminal income tax violations, must, in Page 425 U. S. 342 an interview with a taxpayer, not in custody, give the warnings
called for by this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
holding of the Court of Appeals in this case, which is consistent
with the weight of authority on the issue, [ Footnote 1 ] and the position adopted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. [ Footnote 2 ]

															The District Court conducted a thorough inquiry into the facts
surrounding the interview of petitioner before ruling on his motion
to suppress the statements at issue. After a considerable amount of
investigation, two special agents of the Intelligence Division of
the Internal Revenue Service met with petitioner in a private home
where petitioner occasionally stayed. The senior agent testified
that they went to see petitioner at this private residence at 8
a.m. in order to spare petitioner the possible embarrassment of
being interviewed at his place of employment, which opened at 10
a.m. Upon their arrival, they identified themselves to the person
answering the door and asked to speak to petitioner. The agents
were invited into the house and, when petitioner entered the room
where they were waiting, they introduced themselves Page 425 U. S. 343 and, according to the testimony of the senior agent, Beckwith
then excused himself for a period in excess of five minutes, to
finish dressing. [ Footnote 3 ]
Petitioner then sat down at the dining room table with the agents;
they presented their credentials and stated they were attached to
the Intelligence Division and that one of their functions was to
investigate the possibility of criminal tax fraud. They then
informed petitioner that they were assigned to investigate his
federal income tax liability for the years 1966 through 1971. The
senior agent then read to petitioner from a printed card the
following:

															"As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the
possibility of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws,
and related offenses."

															"Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit
any information if such answers or information might tend to
incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything which
you say and any information which you submit may be used against
you in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise
you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an
attorney before responding."

															App. 65-66. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood his
rights. The agents then interviewed him until about 11 o'clock. The
agents described the conversation as "friendly" and "relaxed." The
petitioner noted that the agents did not "press" him on any
question he could not or chose not to answer.

															Prior to the conclusion of the interview, the senior agent
requested that petitioner permit the agents to Page 425 U. S. 344 inspect certain records. Petitioner indicated that they were at
his place of employment. The agents asked if they could meet him
there later. Having traveled separately from petitioner, the agents
met petitioner approximately 45 minutes later, and the senior agent
advised the petitioner that he was not required to furnish any
books or records; petitioner, however, supplied the books to the
agents.

															Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress all statements he
made to the agents or evidence derived from those statements on the
ground that petitioner had not been given the warnings mandated by Miranda. The District Court ruled that he was entitled to
such warnings "when the court finds as a fact that there were
custodial circumstances." The District Judge went on to find that,
"on this record . . . , there is no evidence whatsoever of any such
situation." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction. 166 U.S.App.D.C. 361, 510 F.2d 741 (1975). It noted
that the reasoning of Miranda was based "in crucial part"
on whether the suspect "has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom in any significant way," id. at
362, 510 F.2d at 742, citing Miranda, supra at 384 U. S. 477 ;
and agreed with the District Court that "Beckwith was neither
arrested nor detained against his will." 166 U.S.App.D.C. at 362,
510 F.2d at 742. We agree with the analysis of the Court of
Appeals, [ Footnote 4 ] and
therefore affirm its judgment.

															Petitioner contends that the "entire starting point" for the
criminal prosecution brought against him was secured from his own
statements and disclosures during the interview with the Internal
Revenue agents from the Page 425 U. S. 345 Intelligence Division. He correctly points out that cases are
assigned to the Intelligence Division only when there is some
indication of criminal fraud, and that, especially since tax
offenses rarely result in pretrial custody, the taxpayer is clearly
the "focus" of a criminal investigation when a matter is assigned
to the Intelligence Division. Given the complexity of the tax
structure and the confusion on the part of taxpayers between the
civil and criminal function of the Internal Revenue Service, such a
confrontation, argues petitioner, places the taxpayer under
"psychological restraints" which are the functional, and,
therefore, the legal, equivalent of custody. In short, we agree
with Chief Judge Bazelon, speaking for a unanimous Court of
Appeals, that

															"[t]he major thrust of Beckwith's argument is that the principle
of Miranda and Mathis [ Footnote 5 ] should be extended to cover interrogation
in noncustodial circumstances after a police investigation has
focused on the suspect." Ibid. With the Court of Appeals, we "are not impressed with this
argument in the abstract, nor as applied to the particular facts of
Beckwith's interrogation." Ibid. It goes far beyond the
reasons for that holding and such an extension of the Miranda requirements would cut this Court's holding in
that case completely loose from its own explicitly stated
rationale. The narrow issue before the Court in Miranda was presented very precisely in the opening paragraph of that
opinion -- "the admissibility of statements obtained from an
individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 439 .
[ Footnote 6 ] (Emphasis
supplied.) The Court concluded Page 425 U. S. 346 that compulsion is "inherent in custodial surroundings,"
[ Footnote 7 ] id. at 384 U. S. 458 ,
and, consequently, that special safeguards were required in the
case of

															"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warnings of constitutional rights." Id. at 384 U. S. 445 .
In subsequent decisions, the Court specifically stressed that it
was the custodial nature of the interrogation which
triggered the necessity for adherence to the specific requirements
of its Miranda holding. Oroxco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S.
1 (1968). See generally Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 247 (1973).

															Petitioner's argument that he was placed in the functional, and,
therefore, legal, equivalent of the Miranda situation asks
us now to ignore completely that Miranda was grounded
squarely in the Court's explicit and detailed assessment of the
peculiar "nature and setting of . . . in-custody interrogation,"
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 445 .
That Courts of Appeals have so read Miranda is suggested
by Chief Judge Lumbard in United States v. Caiello, 420
F.2d 471, 473 (CA2 1969):

															"'It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and
not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the
time the questioning was conducted, which led the court to impose
the Page 425 U. S. 347 Miranda requirements with regard to custodial
questioning.'" Mathis v. United States, supra, directly supports this
conclusion in holding that the Miranda requirements are
applicable to interviews with Internal Revenue agents concerning
tax liability when the subject is in custody; the Court
thus squarely grounded its holding on the custodial aspects of the
situation, not the subject matter of the interview. [ Footnote 8 ]

															An interview with Government agents in a situation such as the
one shown by this record simply does not present the elements which
the Miranda Court found so inherently coercive as to
require its holding. Although the "focus" of an investigation may
indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the
sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he
hardly found himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding. Miranda implicitly defined "focus," for its purposes,
as

															"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 444 .
(Emphasis supplied.) It may well be true, as petitioner contends,
that the "starting point" for the criminal prosecution was the
information obtained from petitioner and the records exhibited by
him. But this amounts to no more than saying that a tax return
signed by a taxpayer can be the "starting point" for a
prosecution.

															We recognize, of course, that noncustodial interrogation might
possibly, in some situations, by virtue of some Page 425 U. S. 348 special circumstances, be characterized as one where

															"the behavior of . . . law enforcement officials was such as to
overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions
not freely self-determined. . . ." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 , 365 U. S. 544 (1961). When such a claim is raised, it is the duty of an appellate
court, including this Court, "to examine the entire record and make
an independent determination of the ultimate issue of
voluntariness." Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.
S. 737 , 384 U. S.
741 -742 (1966). Proof that some kind of warnings were
given or that none were given would be relevant evidence only on
the issue of whether the questioning was, in fact, coercive. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731 , 394 U. S. 79 (1969); Davis v. North Carolina, supra at 384 U. S.
740 -741. In the present case, however, as Chief Judge
Bazelon noted, "[t]he entire interview was free of coercion," 166
U.S.App.D.C. at 363, 510 F.2d at 743 (footnote omitted).

															Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ] See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558,
566 (CA1 1968), aff'd on another ground, 394 U.
S. 316 (1969); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401
F.2d 219, 221-222 (CA2), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923
(1968); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 417-420
(CA3 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United
States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48, 51-52 (CA4 1970); United
States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1027-1031 (CA5), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v.
Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 771 (CA6), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. MacLeod, 436 F.2d 947,
950 (CA8), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 907 (1971); United
States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13, 16 (CA9 1973); Hensley v.
United States, 406 F.2d 481, 484 (CA10 1968); but cf.
United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 422 (CA10 1971).

															[ Footnote 2 ] United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (1969).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Petitioner claimed at the suppression hearing that he was fully
dressed when he first met the agents. The District Court did not
explicitly resolve this conflict in testimony.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															On petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, Beckwith does
not challenge the further holding of the Court of Appeals that, the Miranda question aide, the "entire interview was free of
coercion," 166 U.S.App.D.C. at 363, 510 F.2d at 743 (footnote
omitted).

															[ Footnote 5 ] Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S.
1 (1968).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Court also stated:

															"The constitutional issue we decide . . . is the admissibility
of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 445 .
The Court specifically defined "custodial interrogation" to
mean

															"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 384 U. S.
444 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The Court gave great weight to contemporaneous police manuals,
and concluded that custodial interrogation was "psychologically . .
. oriented," id. at 384 U. S. 448 ,
and that the principal psychological factor contributing to
successful interrogation was isolating the suspect in unfamiliar
surroundings "for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner." Id. at 384 U. S.
457 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Four Members of the Court joined Mr. Justice Black; the
dissenters regarded Mathis as an extension of Miranda largely because the custody and the interrogation
were in no way related, and because a prisoner interrogated in
prison was not in unfamiliar surroundings.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment.

															While the Internal Revenue Service agents in this case did not
give petitioner the full warnings prescribed in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), they did give him the following warning before questioning
him:

															"As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the
possibility of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws,
and related offenses."

															"Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit
any information if such answers or information might tend to
incriminate Page 425 U. S. 349 you in any way. I also advise you that anything which you say
and any information which you submit may be used against you in any
criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further
that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney
before responding."

															App. 65-66. Under the circumstances of this case, in which
petitioner was not under arrest and the interview took place in a
private home where petitioner occasionally stayed, the warning
recited above satisfied the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. If
this warning had not been given, however, I would not join the
judgment of the Court.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

															I respectfully dissent. In my view, the District Court should
have granted petitioner's motion to suppress all statements made by
him to the agents because the agents did not give petitioner the
warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966). The Court affirms the conviction on the
ground that,

															"[a]lthough the 'focus' of an investigation may indeed have been
on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was
his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself
in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding." Ante at 384 U. S. 347 (emphasis supplied). But the fact that Beckwith had not been taken
into formal "custody" is not determinative of the question whether
the agents were required to give him the Miranda warnings.
I agree with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the
warnings are also mandated when the taxpayer is, as here,
interrogated by Intelligence Division agents of the Internal
Revenue Service in surroundings where, as in the case of the
subject in "custody," the practical compulsion Page 425 U. S. 350 to respond to questions about his tax returns is comparable to
the psychological pressures described in Miranda. United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (1969); United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (1974).
Interrogation under conditions that have the practical consequence
of compelling the taxpayer to make disclosures, and interrogation
in "custody" having the same consequence, are, in my view, peas
from the same pod. Oliver states the analysis with which I
agree, and which requires suppression of Beckwith's statements:

															"The application of Miranda does not turn on such a
simple axis as whether or not the suspect is in custody when he is
being questioned. As the Court repeatedly indicated, the prescribed
warnings are required if the defendant is in custody 'or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' The fact
of custody is emphasized in the [ Miranda ] opinion as
having the practical consequence of compelling the accused to make
disclosures. But the test also differentiates between the
questioning of a mere witness and the interrogation of an accused
for the purpose of securing his conviction; the test serves the
purpose"

															"of determining when the adversary process has begun, i.e., when the investigative machinery of the government
is directed toward the ultimate conviction of a particular
individual and when, therefore, a suspect should be advised of his
rights."

															"Since the constitutional protection is expressly applicable to
testimony in the criminal case itself, for the purpose of
determining when warnings are required, the Miranda analysis treats the adversary proceeding as though it commences
when a prospective defendant is taken into custody or otherwise
significantly restrained. After that point is reached, it is not
unreasonable to treat any compelled disclosure Page 425 U. S. 351 as protected by the Fifth Amendment unless, of course, the
constitutional protection has been waived. Adequate warnings, or
the advise [ sic ] of counsel, are essential if such a
waiver is to be effective."

															"The requirement of warnings set forth in Dickerson rests on the same underlying rationale. While the commencement of
adversary proceedings against Dickerson had not been marked by
taking him into custody, the I.R.S., by assigning the matter to the
Intelligence Division, had commenced the preparation of its
criminal case. When the agents questioned him about his tax return,
without clearly explaining their mission, the dual criminal-civil
nature of an I.R.S. interrogation created three key
misapprehensions for the taxpayer."

															" Incriminating statements elicited in reliance upon the
taxpayer's misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry, his
obligation to respond, and the possible consequences of doing
so must be regarded as equally violative of constitutional
protections as a custodial confession extracted without proper
warnings."

															"413 F.2d at 1116 (emphasis added). The practical effect of
these misapprehensions during questioning of a taxpayer was to
'compel' him to provide information that could be used to obtain
his conviction in a criminal tax fraud proceeding, in much the same
way that placing a suspect under physical restraint leads to
psychological compulsion. Thus, the misapprehensions are tantamount
to the deprivation of the suspect's 'freedom of action in any
significant way,' repeatedly referred to in Miranda. "

															505 F.2d at 30305. (Footnotes omitted.)

															I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand to the
District Court for a new trial.

Summary: In the case of Beckwith v. United States (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that statements made by a taxpayer to Internal Revenue agents during a non-custodial interview are admissible in a criminal tax fraud prosecution, even if the taxpayer was not given Miranda warnings. The Court emphasized that the "focus" of an investigation for Miranda purposes involves questioning by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of their freedom of action, which was not the case for the taxpayer.