U.S. Supreme Court Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986) Thornburg v. Gingles No. 83-1968 Argued December 4,
1985 Decided June 30, 1986 478 U.S.
30 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH
CAROLINA Syllabus In 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a
legislative redistricting plan for the State's Senate and House of
Representatives. Appellees, black citizens of North Carolina who
are registered to vote, brought suit in Federal District Court,
challenging one single-member district and six multimember
districts on the ground, inter alia, that the
redistricting plan impaired black citizens' ability to elect
representatives of their choice in violation of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. After appellees brought suit, but before trial,
§ 2 was amended, largely in response to Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 , to
make clear that a violation of § 2 could be proved by showing
discriminatory effect alone, rather than having to show a
discriminatory purpose, and to establish as the relevant legal
standard the "results test." Section 2(a), as amended, prohibits a
State or political subdivision from imposing any voting
qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or any standards,
practices, or procedures that result in the denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color.
Section 2(b), as amended, provides that § 2(a) is violated where
the "totality of circumstances" reveals that

															"the political processes leading to nomination or election . . .
are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected
class] . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice,"

															and that the extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office is one circumstance that may be considered.
The District Court applied the "totality of circumstances" test set
forth in § 2(b), and held that the redistricting plan violated §
2(a) because it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes
in all of the disputed districts. Appellants, the Attorney General
of North Carolina and others, took a direct appeal to this Court
with respect to five of the multimember districts. Held: The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in
part. 590 F.
Supp. 345 , affirmed in part and reversed in part.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, concluding that: Page 478 U. S. 31 1. Minority voters who contend that the multimember form of
districting violates § 2 must prove that the use of a multimember
electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their
ability to elect their preferred candidates. While many or all of
the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim
of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts,
unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the
use of multimember districts generally will not impede the ability
of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. Stated
succinctly, a bloc voting majority must usually be able to
defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group. The relevance of the
existence of racial bloc voting to a vote dilution claim is
twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a
politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote
sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate. Thus, the question whether a given district experiences
legally significant racial bloc voting requires discrete inquiries
into minority and white voting practices. A showing that a
significant number of minority group members usually vote for the
same candidates is one way of proving the political cohesiveness
necessary to a vote dilution claim, and consequently establishes
minority bloc voting within the meaning of § 2. And, in general, a
white bloc vote that normally will defeat the combined strength of
minority support plus white "crossover" votes rises to the level of
legally significant white bloc voting. Because loss of political
power through vote dilution is distinct from the mere inability to
win a particular election, a pattern of racial bloc voting that
extends over a period of time is more probative of a claim that a
district experiences significant polarization than are the results
of a single election. In a district where elections are shown
usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized voting is
not present in one election or a few elections does not necessarily
negate the conclusion that the district experiences legally
significant bloc voting. Furthermore, the success of a minority
candidate in a particular election does not necessarily prove that
the district did not experience polarized voting in that election.
Here, the District Court's approach, which tested data derived from
three election years in each district in question, and which
revealed that blacks strongly supported black candidates, while, to
the black candidates' usual detriment, whites rarely did,
satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper standard for
legally significant racial bloc voting. Pp. 478 U. S.
52 -61.

															2. The language of § 2 and its legislative history plainly
demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been
elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim. Thus, the District Court
did not err, as a matter of law, in refusing to treat the fact that
some black candidates have Page 478 U. S. 32 succeeded as dispositive of appellees' § 2 claims. Where
multimember districting generally works to dilute the minority
vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it sporadically and
serendipitously benefits minority voters. Pp. 478 U. S.
74 -76.

															3. The clearly erroneous test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review of ultimate
findings of vote dilution. As both amended § 2 and its legislative
history make clear, in evaluating a statutory claim of vote
dilution through districting, the trial court is to consider the
"totality of circumstances" and to determine, based upon a
practical evaluation of the past and present realities, whether the
political process is equally open to minority voters. In this case,
the District Court carefully considered the totality of the
circumstances, and found that, in each district, racially polarized
voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters,
education, housing, employment, and health services; and the
persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in
concert with the multimember districting scheme to impair the
ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups
of black voters to participate equally in the political process and
to elect candidates of their choice. Pp. 478 U. S.
77 -79.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded in Part III-C that, for purposes of
§ 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates
to claims of vote dilution -- that is, when it is used to prove
that the minority group is politically cohesive and that white
voters will usually be able to defeat the minority's preferred
candidates -- refers only to the existence of a correlation between
the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates.
Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting, and defendants may
not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent. Pp. 478 U. S.
61 -73.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, concluded in Part
IV-B, that the District Court erred, as a matter of law, in
ignoring the significance of the sustained success black voters
have experienced in House District 23. The persistent proportional
representation for black residents in that district in the last six
elections is inconsistent with appellees' allegation that black
voters' ability in that district to elect representatives of their
choice is not equal to that enjoyed by the white majority. P. 478 U. S.
77 .

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL,
and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded that:

															1. Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting
patterns is admitted solely to establish that the minority group is
politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral
success, such a showing cannot be rebutted by evidence that the
divergent voting patterns may Page 478 U. S. 33 be explained by causes other than race. However, evidence of the
reasons for divergent voting patterns can, in some circumstances,
be relevant to the overall vote dilution inquiry, and there is no
rule against consideration of all evidence concerning voting
preferences other than statistical evidence of racial voting
patterns. Pp. 478 U. S.
100 -101.

															2. Consistent and sustained success by candidates preferred by
minority voters is presumptively inconsistent with the existence of
a § 2 violation. The District Court erred in assessing the extent
of black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District
22, as well as in House District 23. Except in House District 23,
despite these errors, the District Court's ultimate conclusion of
vote dilution is not clearly erroneous. But in House District 23,
appellees failed to establish a violation of § 2. Pp. 478 U. S.
101 -105.

															BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B,
IV-A, and V, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to
Part IV-B, in which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a
concurring opinion, post, p. 478 U. S. 82 .
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 83 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 478 U. S.
106 . Page 478 U. S. 34 JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II,
III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, an opinion with respect to Part III-C,
in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which JUSTICE
WHITE joins.

															This case requires that we construe for the first time § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982.
42 U.S.C. § 1973. The specific question to be decided is whether
the three-judge District Court, convened in the Eastern District of
North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) and 42 U.S.C. §
1973c, correctly held that the use in a legislative redistricting
plan of multimember districts in five North Carolina legislative
districts violated § 2 by impairing the opportunity of black voters
"to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." § 2(b), 96 Stat. 134. I BACKGROUND In April, 1982, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted a
legislative redistricting plan for the State's Senate Page 478 U. S. 35 and House of Representatives. Appellees, black citizens of North
Carolina who are registered to vote, challenged seven districts,
one single-member [ Footnote 1 ]
and six multimember [ Footnote
2 ] districts, alleging that the redistricting scheme impaired
black citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. [ Footnote 3 ]

															After appellees brought suit, but before trial, Congress amended
§ 2. The amendment was largely a response to this Court's plurality
opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S.
55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to
establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested
electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by
state officials for a discriminatory purpose. Congress
substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be
proved by showing discriminatory effect alone, and to establish as
the relevant legal standard the "results test," applied by this
Court in White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973), and by other federal courts before Bolden, supra. S.Rep. No. 97-417, p. 28 (1982)
(hereinafter S.Rep.). Page 478 U. S. 36 Section 2, as amended, 96 Stat. 134, reads as
follows:

															"(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in
subsection (b)."

															"(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population." Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

															The Senate Judiciary Committee majority Report accompanying the
bill that amended § 2 elaborates on the circumstances that might be
probative of a § 2 violation, noting the following "typical
factors": [ Footnote 4 ]

															"1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of Page 478 U. S. 37 the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;"

															"2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;"

															"3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;"

															"4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members
of the minority group have been denied access to that process;"

															"5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination
in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political
process;"

															"6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;"

															"7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction."

															"Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value
as part of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:"

															"whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group."

															"whether the policy underlying the state or political
subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous."

															S.Rep. at 28-29.

															The District Court applied the "totality of the circumstances"
test set forth in § 2(b) to appellees' statutory claim, and,
relying principally on the factors outlined in the Senate Page 478 U. S. 38 Report, held that the redistricting scheme violated § 2 because
it resulted in the dilution of black citizens' votes in all seven
disputed districts. In light of this conclusion, the court did not
reach appellees' constitutional claims. Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345 (EDNC 1984).

															Preliminarily, the court found that black citizens constituted a
distinct population and registered-voter minority in each
challenged district. The court noted that, at the time the
multimember districts were created, there were concentrations of
black citizens within the boundaries of each that were sufficiently
large and contiguous to constitute effective voting majorities in
single-member districts lying wholly within the boundaries of the
multimember districts. With respect to the challenged single-member
district, Senate District No. 2, the court also found that there
existed a concentration of black citizens within its boundaries and
within those of adjoining Senate District No. 6 that was sufficient
in numbers and in contiguity to constitute an effective voting
majority in a single-member district. The District Court then
proceeded to find that the following circumstances combined with
the multimember districting scheme to result in the dilution of
black citizens' votes. First, the court found that North Carolina had
officially discriminated against its black citizens with respect to
their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to
1970 by employing, at different times, a poll tax, a literacy test,
a prohibition against bullet (single-shot) voting, [ Footnote 5 ] Page 478 U. S. 39 and designated seat plans [ Footnote 6 ] for multimember districts. The court observed
that, even after the removal of direct barriers to black voter
registration such as the poll tax and literacy test, black voter
registration remained relatively depressed; in 1982, only 52.7% of
age-qualified blacks statewide were registered to vote, whereas
66.7% of whites were registered. The District Court found these
statewide depressed levels of black voter registration to be
present in all of the disputed districts, and to be traceable, at
least in part, to the historical pattern of statewide official
discrimination. Second, the court found that historic discrimination in
education, housing, employment, and health services had resulted in
a lower socioeconomic status for North Carolina blacks as a group
than for whites. The court concluded that this lower status both
gives rise to special group interests and hinders blacks' ability
to participate effectively in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. Third, the court considered other voting procedures
that may operate to lessen the opportunity of black voters to elect
candidates of their choice. It noted that North Carolina has a
majority vote requirement for primary elections, and, while
acknowledging that no black candidate for election to the State
General Assembly had failed to win solely because of this
requirement, the court concluded that it nonetheless presents a
continuing practical impediment to the opportunity of black voting
minorities to elect candidates of their choice. The court also
remarked on the fact that North Carolina does not have a
subdistrict residency requirement for members of the General
Assembly elected from multimember Page 478 U. S. 40 districts, a requirement which the court found could offset to
some extent the disadvantages minority voters often experience in
multimember districts. Fourth, the court found that white candidates in North
Carolina have encouraged voting along color lines by appealing to
racial prejudice. It noted that the record is replete with specific
examples of racial appeals, ranging in style from overt and blatant
to subtle and furtive, and in date from the 1890's to the 1984
campaign for a seat in the United States Senate. The court
determined that the use of racial appeals in political campaigns in
North Carolina persists to the present day, and that its current
effect is to lessen to some degree the opportunity of black
citizens to participate effectively in the political processes and
to elect candidates of their choice. Fifth, the court examined the extent to which blacks
have been elected to office in North Carolina, both statewide and
in the challenged districts. It found, among other things, that,
prior to World War II, only one black had been elected to public
office in this century. While recognizing that "it has now become
possible for black citizens to be elected to office at all levels
of state government in North Carolina," 590 F. Supp. at 367, the
court found that, in comparison to white candidates running for the
same office, black candidates are at a disadvantage in terms of
relative probability of success. It also found that the overall
rate of black electoral success has been minimal in relation to the
percentage of blacks in the total state population. For example,
the court noted, from 1971 to 1982, there were, at any given time,
only two-to-four blacks in the 120-member House of Representatives
-- that is, only 1.6% to 3.3% of House members were black. From
1975 to 1983, there were, at any one time, only one or two blacks
in the 50-member State Senate -- that is, only 2% to 4% of State
Senators were black. By contrast, at the time of the District
Court's opinion, blacks constituted about 22.4% of the total state
population. Page 478 U. S. 41 With respect to the success in this century of black candidates
in the contested districts, see also 478 U.S.
30 app B|>Appendix B to opinion, post p. 82, the
court found that only one black had been elected to House District
36 -- after this lawsuit began. Similarly, only one black had
served in the Senate from District 22, from 1975-1980. Before the
1982 election, a black was elected only twice to the House from
District 39 (part of Forsyth County); in the 1982 contest, two
blacks were elected. Since 1973, a black citizen had been elected
each 2-year term to the House from District 23 (Durham County), but
no black had been elected to the Senate from Durham County. In
House District 21 (Wake County), a black had been elected twice to
the House, and another black served two terms in the State Senate.
No black had ever been elected to the House or Senate from the area
covered by House District No. 8, and no black person had ever been
elected to the Senate from the area covered by Senate District No.
2.

															The court did acknowledge the improved success of black
candidates in the 1982 elections, in which 11 blacks were elected
to the State House of Representatives, including 5 blacks from the
multimember districts at issue here. However, the court pointed out
that the 1982 election was conducted after the commencement of this
litigation. The court found the circumstances of the 1982 election
sufficiently aberrational, and the success by black candidates too
minimal and too recent in relation to the long history of complete
denial of elective opportunities, to support the conclusion that
black voters' opportunities to elect representatives of their
choice were not impaired. Finally, the court considered the extent to which
voting in the challenged districts was racially polarized. Based on
statistical evidence presented by expert witnesses, supplemented to
some degree by the testimony of lay witnesses, the court found that
all of the challenged districts exhibit severe and persistent
racially polarized voting. Page 478 U. S. 42 Based on these findings, the court declared the contested
portions of the 1982 redistricting plan violative of § 2, and
enjoined appellants from conducting elections pursuant to those
portions of the plan. Appellants, the Attorney General of North
Carolina and others, took a direct appeal to this Court, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, with respect to five of the multimember
districts -- House Districts 21, 23, 36, and 39, and Senate
District 22. Appellants argue, first, that the District Court
utilized a legally incorrect standard in determining whether the
contested districts exhibit racial bloc voting to an extent that is
cognizable under § 2. Second, they contend that the court used an
incorrect definition of racially polarized voting, and thus
erroneously relied on statistical evidence that was not probative
of polarized voting. Third, they maintain that the court assigned
the wrong weight to evidence of some black candidates' electoral
success. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in
concluding that these multimember districts result in black
citizens' having less opportunity than their white counterparts to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. We noted probable jurisdiction, 471 U.S. 1064
(1985), and now affirm with respect to all of the districts except
House District 23. With regard to District 23, the judgment of the
District Court is reversed. II SECTION 2 AND VOTE DILUTION THROUGH USE OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS An understanding both of § 2 and of the way in which multimember
districts can operate to impair blacks' ability to elect
representatives of their choice is prerequisite to an evaluation of
appellants' contentions. First, then, we review amended § 2 and its
legislative history in some detail. Second, we explain the
theoretical basis for appellees' claim of vote dilution. Page 478 U. S. 43 A SECTION 2 AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Subsection 2(a) prohibits all States and political subdivisions
from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to voting,
or any standards, practices, or procedures which result in the
denial or abridgment of the right to vote of any citizen who is a
member of a protected class of racial and language minorities.
Subsection 2(b) establishes that § 2 has been violated where the
"totality of circumstances" reveals that

															"the political processes leading to nomination or election . . .
are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected
class] . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice."

															While explaining that

															"[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered"

															in evaluating an alleged violation, § 2(b) cautions that

															"nothing in [§ 2] establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population."

															The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments
elaborates on the nature of § 2 violations, and on the proof
required to establish these violations. [ Footnote 7 ] First and foremost, the Report
dispositively rejects the position of the plurality in Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), which Page 478 U. S. 44 required proof that the contested electoral practice or
mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate
against minority voters. [ Footnote
8 ] See, e.g., S.Rep. at 2, 15-16, 27. The intent test
was repudiated for three principal reasons -- it is "unnecessarily
divisive because it involves charges of racism on the part of
individual officials or entire communities," it places an
"inordinately difficult" burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it
"asks the wrong question." Id. at 36. The "right"
question, as the Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether,

															"as a result of the challenged practice or structure, plaintiffs
do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political
processes and to elect candidates of their choice. [ Footnote 9 ]" Id. at 28. See also id. at 2, 27, 29, n. 118,
36.

															In order to answer this question, a court must assess the impact
of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral
opportunities "on the basis of objective factors." Id. at
27. The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be
relevant to a § 2 claim: the history of voting-related
discrimination in the State or political Page 478 U. S. 45 subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the
State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to
which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices
or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions
against bullet voting; the exclusion of members of the minority
group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which
minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in
areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political process; the
use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and
the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction. Id. at 28-29; see also supra at 36-37. The Report notes also that
evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to
the particularized needs of the members of the minority group, and
that the policy underlying the State's or the political
subdivision's use of the contested practice or structure is
tenuous, may have probative value. Id. at 29. The Report
stresses, however, that this list of typical factors is neither
comprehensive nor exclusive. While the enumerated factors will
often be pertinent to certain types of § 2 violations, particularly
to vote dilution claims, [ Footnote 10 ] other factors may also be relevant, and may
be considered. Id. at 29-30. Furthermore, the Senate
Committee observed that "there is no requirement that any
particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them
point one way or the other." Id. at 29. Rather, the
Committee determined that

															"the question whether the political processes are 'equally open'
depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 'past and
present reality,'" id. at 30 (footnote omitted), and on a "functional"
view of the political process. Id. at 30, n. 120. Page 478 U. S. 46 Although the Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-intensive
test for § 2 violations, it limits the circumstances under which §
2 violations may be proved in three ways. First, electoral devices,
such as at-large elections, may not be considered per se violative of § 2. Plaintiffs must demonstrate that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the devices result in unequal access
to the electoral process. Id. at 16. Second, the
conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral mechanism and the
lack of proportional representation, alone, does not establish a
violation. Ibid. Third, the results test does not assume
the existence of racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it. Id. at 33. B V OTE DILUTION THROUGH THE USE OF MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS Appellees contend that the legislative decision to employ
multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested
jurisdictions dilutes their votes by submerging them in a white
majority, [ Footnote 11 ] thus
impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice.
[ Footnote 12 ] Page 478 U. S. 47 The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.
This Court has long recognized that multimember districts and
at-large voting schemes may " operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting
population.'" [ Footnote 13 ] Burns v.
Richardson , 384 U.S. Page 478 U. S. 48 73, 384 U. S. 88 (1966) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 , 379 U. S. 439 (1965)). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.
S. 613 , 458 U. S. 617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765 ; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 , 403 U. S. 143 (1971). The theoretical basis for this type of impairment is that,
where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different
candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority,
will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters. [ Footnote 14 ] See, e.g., Grofman, Alternatives, in Representation and Redistricting Issues
113-114. Multimember districts and at-large election schemes,
however, are not per se violative of minority voters'
rights. S.Rep. at 16. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, supra, at 458 U. S. 617 ; Regester, supra, at 412 U. S. 765 ; Whitcomb, supra, at 403 U. S. 142 .
Minority voters who contend that the multimember form of
districting violates § 2 must prove that the use of a multimember
electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out their
ability to elect their preferred candidates. See, e.g., S.Rep. at 16.

															While many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may
be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in
multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the
following circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally
will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect
representatives of their choice. [ Footnote 15 ] Stated succinctly, Page 478 U. S. 49 a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically
insular minority group. Bonapfel 355; Blacksher & Menefee 34;
Butler 903; Carpeneti 696-699; Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An
Overview (hereinafter Davidson), in Minority Vote Dilution 4;
Grofman, Alternatives 117. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 105 ,
n. 3 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("It is obvious Page 478 U. S. 50 that the greater the degree to which the electoral minority is
homogeneous and insular, and the greater the degree that bloc
voting occurs along majority-minority lines, the greater will be
the extent to which the minority's voting power is diluted by
multimember districting"). These circumstances are necessary
preconditions for multimember districts to operate to impair
minority voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice
for the following reasons. First, the minority group must be able
to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.
[ Footnote 16 ] If it is not,
as would be the case in a substantially integrated district, the multimember form of the district cannot be responsible for
minority voters' inability to elect its candidates. [ Footnote 17 ] Cf. Rogers, Page 478 U. S. 51 458 U.S. at 458 U. S. 616 . See also Blacksher & Menefee 51-56, 58; Bonapfel 355;
Carpeneti 696; Davidson 4; Jewell 130. Second, the minority group
must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. If the
minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot be said that
the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts
distinctive minority group interests. Blacksher & Menefee
51-55, 58-60, and n. 344; Carpeneti 696-697; Davidson 4. Third, the
minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- in the absence of special
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed, see, infra, at 478 U. S. 57 ,
and n. 26 -- usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. See, e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 51, 53, 56-57, 60. Cf. Rogers, supra, at 458 U. S.
616 -617; Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 158-159; McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043
(CA5 1984). In establishing this last circumstance, the minority
group demonstrates that submergence in a white multimember district
impedes its ability to elect its chosen representatives.

															Finally, we observe that the usual predictability of the
majority's success distinguishes structural dilution from the mere
loss of an occasional election. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer,
post at 478 U. S.
131 -133, 478 U. S.
139 -140 (opinion of WHITE, J.); Bolden, supra, at 446 U. S. 111 ,
n. 7 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Whitcomb, supra, at 403 U. S. 153 . See also Blacksher & Menefee 57, n. 333; Note,
Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights
Act, 94 Yale L.J. 189, 200, n. 66 (1984) (hereinafter Note,
Geometry and Geography). Page 478 U. S. 52 III RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING Having stated the general legal principles relevant to claims
that § 2 has been violated through the use of multimember
districts, we turn to the arguments of appellants and of the United
States as amicus curiae addressing racially polarized
voting. [ Footnote 18 ] First,
we describe the District Court's treatment of racially polarized
voting. Next, we consider appellants' claim that the District Court
used an incorrect legal standard to determine whether racial bloc
voting in the contested districts was sufficiently severe to be
cognizable as an element of a § 2 claim. Finally, we consider
appellants' contention that the trial court employed an incorrect
definition of racially polarized voting, and thus erroneously
relied on statistical evidence that was not probative of racial
bloc voting. A THE DISTRICT COURT'S TREATMENT OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING The investigation conducted by the District Court into the
question of racial bloc voting credited some testimony of lay
witnesses, but relied principally on statistical evidence presented
by appellees' expert witnesses, in particular that offered by Dr.
Bernard Grofman. Dr. Grofman collected and evaluated data from 53
General Assembly primary and general elections involving black
candidacies. These elections were held over a period of three
different election years in the six originally challenged
multimember districts. [ Footnote
19 ] Dr. Grofman subjected the data to two complementary methods
of analysis -- extreme case analysis and bivariate ecological Page 478 U. S. 53 regression analysis [ Footnote
20 ] -- in order to determine whether blacks and whites in these
districts differed in their voting behavior. These analytic
techniques yielded data concerning the voting patterns of the two
races, including estimates of the percentages of members of each
race who voted for black candidates.

															The court's initial consideration of these data took the form of
a three-part inquiry: did the data reveal any correlation between
the race of the voter and the selection of certain candidates; was
the revealed correlation statistically significant; and was the
difference in black and white voting patterns "substantively
significant"? The District Court found that blacks and whites
generally preferred different candidates and, on that basis, found
voting in the districts to be racially correlated. [ Footnote 21 ] The court accepted Dr.
Grofman's expert opinion that the correlation between the race of
the voter and the voter's choice of certain candidates was
statistically significant. [ Footnote 22 ] Finally, adopting Dr. Grofman's terminology, see Page 478 U. S. 54 Tr.195, the court found that, in all but 2 of the 53 elections,
[ Footnote 23 ] the degree of
racial bloc voting was "so marked as to be substantively
significant, in the sense that the results of the individual
election would have been different depending upon whether it had
been held among only the white voters or only the black voters."
590 F. Supp. at 368.

															The court also reported its findings, both in tabulated
numerical form and in written form, that a high percentage of black
voters regularly supported black candidates and that most white
voters were extremely reluctant to vote for black candidates. The
court then considered the relevance to the existence of legally
significant white bloc voting of the fact that black candidates
have won some elections. It determined that, in most instances,
special circumstances, such as incumbency and lack of opposition,
rather than a diminution in usually severe white bloc voting,
accounted for these candidates' success. The court also suggested
that black voters' reliance on bullet voting was a significant
factor in their successful efforts to elect candidates of their
choice. Based on all of the evidence before it, the trial court
concluded that each of the districts experienced racially polarized
voting "in a persistent and severe degree." Id. at
367. B THE DEGREE OF BLOC VOTING THAT IS LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT UNDER § 2 1 Appellants' Arguments North Carolina and the United States argue that the test used by
the District Court to determine whether voting patterns in the
disputed districts are racially polarized to an extent cognizable
under § 2 will lead to results that are inconsistent with
congressional intent. North Carolina maintains Page 478 U. S. 55 that the court considered legally significant racially polarized
voting to occur whenever "less than 50% of the white voters cast a
ballot for the black candidate." Brief for Appellants 36.
Appellants also argue that racially polarized voting is legally
significant only when it always results in the defeat of black
candidates. Id. at 39-40.

															The United States, on the other hand, isolates a single line in
the court's opinion and identifies it as the court's complete test.
According to the United States, the District Court adopted a
standard under which legally significant racial bloc voting is
deemed to exist whenever

															"'the results of the individual election would have been
different depending upon whether it had been held among only the
white voters or only the black voters in the election.'"

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting
590 F.Supp. at 368). We read the District Court opinion
differently. 2 The Standard for Legally Significant Racial Bloc
Voting The Senate Report states that the "extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized," S.Rep. at 29, is relevant to a vote dilution claim.
Further, courts and commentators agree that racial bloc voting is a
key element of a vote dilution claim. See, e.g., Escambia
County, Fla., 748 F.2d at 1043; United States v. Marengo
County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (CA11), appeal dism'd
and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984); Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax
County, 594 F.
Supp. 161 , 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom
& Wildgen, 465, 469; Parker 107; Note, Geometry and Geography
199. Because, as we explain below, the extent of bloc voting
necessary to demonstrate that a minority's ability to elect its
preferred representatives is impaired varies according to several
factual circumstances, the degree of bloc voting which constitutes
the threshold of legal significance will vary Page 478 U. S. 56 from district to district. Nonetheless, it is possible to state
some general principles, and we proceed to do so.

															The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially
polarized voting is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group
members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine
whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidates. See supra, at 478 U.S. 48 -51. Thus, the
question whether a given district experiences legally significant
racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority
and white voting practices. A showing that a significant number of
minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one
way of proving the political cohesiveness necessary to a vote
dilution claim, Blacksher & Menefee 59-60, and n. 344, and,
consequently, establishes minority bloc voting within the context
of § 2. And, in general, a white bloc vote that normally will
defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white
"crossover" votes rises to the level of legally significant white
bloc voting. Id. at 60. The amount of white bloc voting
that can generally "minimize or cancel," S.Rep. at 28; Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765 ,
black voters' ability to elect representatives of their choice,
however, will vary from district to district according to a number
of factors, including the nature of the allegedly dilutive
electoral mechanism; the presence or absence of other potentially
dilutive electoral devices, such as majority vote requirements,
designated posts, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the
percentage of registered voters in the district who are members of
the minority group; the size of the district; and, in multimember
districts, the number of seats open and the number of candidates in
the field. [ Footnote 24 ] See, e.g., Butler 874-876; Davidson 5; Jones, The Impact
of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation, 11
Urb.Aff.Q. 345 (1976); United States Commission Page 478 U. S. 57 on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled Goals 38-41
(1981).

															Because loss of political power through vote dilution is
distinct from the mere inability to win a particular election, Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 153 ,
a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over a period of time
is more probative of a claim that a district experiences legally
significant polarization than are the results of a single election.
[ Footnote 25 ] Blacksher
& Menefee 61; Note, Geometry and Geography 200, n. 66 ("Racial
polarization should be seen as an attribute not of a single
election, but rather of a polity viewed over time. The concern is
necessarily temporal and the analysis historical because the evil
to be avoided is the subordination of minority groups in American
politics, not the defeat of individuals in particular electoral
contests"). Also for this reason, in a district where elections are
shown usually to be polarized, the fact that racially polarized
voting is not present in one or a few individual elections does not
necessarily negate the conclusion that the district experiences
legally significant bloc voting. Furthermore, the success of a
minority candidate in a particular election does not necessarily
prove that the district did not experience polarized voting in that
election; special circumstances, such as the absence of an
opponent, incumbency, or the utilization of bullet voting, may
explain minority electoral success in a polarized contest.
[ Footnote 26 ]

															As must be apparent, the degree of racial bloc voting that is
cognizable as an element of a § 2 vote dilution claim will Page 478 U. S. 58 vary according to a variety of factual circumstances.
Consequently, there is no simple doctrinal test for the existence
of legally significant racial bloc voting. However, the foregoing
general principles should provide courts with substantial guidance
in determining whether evidence that black and white voters
generally prefer different candidates rises to the level of legal
significance under § 2. 3 Standard Utilized by the District Court The District Court clearly did not employ the simplistic
standard identified by North Carolina -- legally significant bloc
voting occurs whenever less than 50% of the white voters cast a
ballot for the black candidate. Brief for Appellants 36. And,
although the District Court did utilize the measure of "substantive
significance" that the United States ascribes to it --

															"'the results of the individual election would have been
different depending on whether it had been held among only the
white voters or only the black voters,'"

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29 (quoting
590 F.Supp. at 368) -- the court did not reach its ultimate
conclusion that the degree of racial bloc voting present in each
district is legally significant through mechanical reliance on this
standard. [ Footnote 27 ]
While the court did not phrase the standard for legally significant
racial bloc voting exactly as we do, a fair reading of the court's
opinion reveals that the court's analysis conforms to our view of
the proper legal standard.

															The District Court's findings concerning black support for black
candidates in the five multimember districts at issue Page 478 U. S. 59 here clearly establish the political cohesiveness of black
voters. As is apparent from the District Court's tabulated
findings, reproduced in 478 U.S.
30 app A|>Appendix A to opinion, post p. 478 U. S. 80 ,
black voters' support for black candidates was overwhelming in
almost every election. In all but 5 of 16 primary elections, black
support for black candidates ranged between 71% and 92%; and in the
general elections, black support for black Democratic candidates
ranged between 87% and 96%.

															In sharp contrast to its findings of strong black support for
black candidates, the District Court found that a substantial
majority of white voters would rarely, if ever, vote for a black
candidate. In the primary elections, white support for black
candidates ranged between 8% and 50%, and in the general elections
it ranged between 28% and 49%. See ibid. The court also
determined that, on average, 81.7% of white voters did not vote for
any black candidate in the primary elections. In the general
elections, white voters almost always ranked black candidates
either last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in
heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently ranked
black candidates last among the Democrats, if not last or next to
last among all candidates. The court further observed that
approximately two-thirds of white voters did not vote for black
candidates in general elections, even after the candidate had won
the Democratic primary and the choice was to vote for a Republican
or for no one. [ Footnote
28 ] Page 478 U. S. 60 While the District Court did not state expressly that the
percentage of whites who refused to vote for black candidates in
the contested districts would, in the usual course of events,
result in the defeat of the minority's candidates, that conclusion
is apparent both from the court's factual findings and from the
rest of its analysis. First, with the exception of House District
23, see infra at 478 U. S. 77 ,
the trial court's findings clearly show that black voters have
enjoyed only minimal and sporadic success in electing
representatives of their choice. See 478 U.S.
30 app B|>Appendix B to opinion, post, p. 478 U. S. 82 .
Second, where black candidates won elections, the court closely
examined the circumstances of those elections before concluding
that the success of these blacks did not negate other evidence,
derived from all of the elections studied in each district, that
legally significant racially polarized voting exists in each
district. For example, the court took account of the benefits
incumbency and running essentially unopposed conferred on some of
the successful black candidates, [ Footnote 29 ] as well as of the Page 478 U. S. 61 very different order of preference blacks and whites assigned
black candidates, [ Footnote
30 ] in reaching its conclusion that legally significant racial
polarization exists in each district.

															We conclude that the District Court's approach, which tested
data derived from three election years in each district, and which
revealed that blacks strongly supported black candidates, while, to
the black candidates' usual detriment, whites rarely did,
satisfactorily addresses each facet of the proper legal
standard. C EVIDENCE OF RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING 1 Appellants' Argument North Carolina and the United States also contest the evidence
upon which the District Court relied in finding that voting
patterns in the challenged districts were racially polarized. They
argue that the term "racially polarized voting" must, as a matter
of law, refer to voting patterns for which the principal
cause is race. They contend that the District Court utilized a
legally incorrect definition of racially polarized voting by
relying on bivariate statistical analyses which merely demonstrated
a correlation between the race of the voter and the level
of voter support for certain candidates, but which did not prove
that race was the primary determinant of voters' choices. According
to appellants and the United States, only multiple regression
analysis, which can take account of other variables which might
also explain voters' choices, such as "party affiliation, age,
religion, income[,] incumbency, education, campaign expenditures,"
Brief for Page 478 U. S. 62 Appellants 42, "media use measured by cost, . . . name,
identification, or distance that a candidate lived from a
particular precinct," Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 30, n. 57, can prove that race was the primary
determinant of voter behavior. [ Footnote 31 ]

															Whether appellants and the United States believe that it is the
voter's race or the candidate's race that must be the primary
determinant of the voter's choice is unclear; indeed, their
catalogs of relevant variables suggest both. [ Footnote 32 ] Age, religion, income, and
education seem most relevant to the voter; incumbency, campaign
expenditures, name identification, and media use are pertinent to
the candidate; and party affiliation could refer both to the voter
and the candidate. In either case, we disagree: for purposes of §
2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates
neither causation nor intent. It means simply that the race of
voters correlates with the selection of a certain candidate or
candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where different
races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different
candidates. Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 203. As we
demonstrate infra, appellants' theory of racially
polarized voting would thwart the goals Congress sought to achieve
when it amended § 2, and would prevent courts from performing the
"functional" analysis of the political process, S.Rep. at 30, n.
119, and the "searching practical evaluation of the past Page 478 U. S.
63 and present reality,'" id. at 30 (footnote
omitted), mandated by the Senate Report. 2 Causation Irrelevant to Section 2 Inquiry The first reason we reject appellants' argument that racially
polarized voting refers to voting patterns that are in some way caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that are
merely correlated with the race of the voter, is that the
reasons black and white voters vote differently have no relevance
to the central inquiry of § 2. By contrast, the correlation between
race of voter and the selection of certain candidates is crucial to
that inquiry.

															Both § 2 itself and the Senate Report make clear that the
critical question in a § 2 claim is whether the use of a contested
electoral practice or structure results in members of a protected
group having less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. See, e.g., S.Rep. at 2,
27, 28, 29, n. 118, 36. As we explained, supra, at 478 U. S. 47 -48,
multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect
representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a
bloc as to be able to elect their preferred candidates in a black
majority, single-member district and where a white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the candidates chosen by
blacks. It is the difference between the choices made by
blacks and whites -- not the reasons for that difference -- that
results in blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect
their preferred representatives. Consequently, we conclude that,
under the "results test" of § 2, only the correlation between race
of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the
correlation, matters.

															The irrelevance to a § 2 inquiry of the reasons why black and
white voters vote differently supports, by itself, our rejection of
appellants' theory of racially polarized voting. However, their
theory contains other equally serious flaws Page 478 U. S. 64 that merit further attention. As we demonstrate below, the
addition of irrelevant variables distorts the equation and yields
results that are indisputably incorrect under § 2 and the Senate
Report. 3 Race of Voter as Primary Determinant of Voter
Behavior Appellants and the United States contend that the legal concept
of "racially polarized voting" refers not to voting patterns that
are merely correlated with the voter's race, but to voting
patterns that are determined primarily by the voter's
race, rather than by the voter's other socioeconomic
characteristics.

															The first problem with this argument is that it ignores the fact
that members of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups
frequently share socioeconomic characteristics, such as income
level, employment status, amount of education, housing and other
living conditions, religion, language, and so forth. See,
e.g., Butler 902 (Minority group "members' shared concerns,
including political ones, are . . . a function of group status, and
as such are largely involuntary. . . . As a group blacks are
concerned, for example, with police brutality, substandard housing,
unemployment, etc., because these problems fall disproportionately
upon the group"); S. Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America
151-152 (1972) ("Socioeconomic status . . . is closely related to
race. Blacks in American society are likely to be in lower-status
jobs than whites, to have less education, and to have lower
incomes"). Where such characteristics are shared, race or ethnic
group not only denotes color or place of origin, it also functions
as a shorthand notation for common social and economic
characteristics. Appellants' definition of racially polarized
voting is even more pernicious where shared characteristics are
causally related to race or ethnicity. The opportunity to achieve
high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced
by the presence or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination. A
definition of racially polarized voting which Page 478 U. S. 65 holds that black bloc voting does not exist when black voters'
choice of certain candidates is most strongly influenced by the
fact that the voters have low incomes and menial jobs -- when the
reason most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes is
attributable to past or present racial discrimination -- runs
counter to the Senate Report's instruction to conduct a searching
and practical evaluation of past and present reality, S.Rep. at 30,
and interferes with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act to
eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the
electoral opportunities of minorities. Id. at 5, 40.

															Furthermore, under appellants' theory of racially polarized
voting, even uncontrovertible evidence that candidates strongly
preferred by black voters are always defeated by a bloc voting
white majority would be dismissed for failure to prove racial
polarization whenever the black and white populations could be
described in terms of other socioeconomic characteristics.

															To illustrate, assume a racially mixed, urban multimember
district in which blacks and whites possess the same socioeconomic
characteristics that the record in this case attributes to blacks
and whites in Halifax County, a part of Senate District 2. The
annual mean income for blacks in this district is $10,465, and
47.8% of the black community lives in poverty. More than half --
51.5% -- of black adults over the age of 25 have only an
eighth-grade education or less. Just over half of black citizens
reside in their own homes; 48.9% live in rental units. And almost a
third of all black households are without a car. In contrast, only
12.6% of the whites in the district live below the poverty line.
Whites enjoy a mean income of $19,042. White residents are better
educated than blacks -- only 25.6% of whites over the age of 25
have only an eighth-grade education or less. Furthermore, only
26.2% of whites live in rental units, and only 10.2% live in
households with no vehicle available. 1 App. Ex-44. As is the case
in Senate District 2, blacks in this Page 478 U. S. 66 hypothetical urban district have never been able to elect a
representative of their choice.

															According to appellants' theory of racially polarized voting,
proof that black and white voters in this hypothetical district
regularly choose different candidates, and that the blacks'
preferred candidates regularly lose, could be rejected as not
probative of racial bloc voting. The basis for the rejection would
be that blacks chose a certain candidate not principally because of
their race, but principally because this candidate best represented
the interests of residents who, because of their low incomes, are
particularly interested in government-subsidized health and welfare
services; who are generally poorly educated, and thus share an
interest in job training programs; who are, to a greater extent
than the white community, concerned with rent control issues; and
who favor major public transportation expenditures. Similarly,
whites would be found to have voted for a different candidate, not
principally because of their race, but primarily because that
candidate best represented the interests of residents who, due to
their education and income levels, and to their property and
vehicle ownership, favor gentrification, low residential property
taxes, and extensive expenditures for street and highway
improvements.

															Congress could not have intended that courts employ this
definition of racial bloc voting. First, this definition leads to
results that are inconsistent with the effects test adopted by
Congress when it amended § 2 and with the Senate Report's
admonition that courts take a "functional" view of the political
process, S.Rep. 30, n. 119, and conduct a searching and practical
evaluation of reality. Id. at 30. A test for racially
polarized voting that denies the fact that race and socioeconomic
characteristics are often closely correlated permits neither a
practical evaluation of reality nor a functional analysis of vote
dilution. And, contrary to Congress' intent in adopting the
"results test," appellants' proposed definition could result in the
inability of minority voters to establish a critical Page 478 U. S. 67 element of a vote dilution claim, even though both races engage
in "monolithic" bloc voting, id. at 33, and generations of
black voters have been unable to elect a representative of their
choice.

															Second, appellants' interpretation of "racially polarized
voting" creates an irreconcilable tension between their proposed
treatment of socioeconomic characteristics in the bloc voting
context and the Senate Report's statement that

															"the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health"

															may be relevant to a § 2 claim. Id. at 29. We can find
no support in either logic or the legislative history for the
anomalous conclusion to which appellants' position leads -- that
Congress intended, on the one hand, that proof that a minority
group is predominately poor, uneducated, and unhealthy should be
considered a factor tending to prove a § 2 violation, but that
Congress intended, on the other hand, that proof that the same
socioeconomic characteristics greatly influence black voters'
choice of candidates should destroy these voters' ability to
establish one of the most important elements of a vote dilution
claim. 4 Race of Candidate as Primary Determinant of Voter
Behavior North Carolina's and the United States' suggestion that racially
polarized voting means that voters select or reject candidates principally on the basis of the candidate's race is also misplaced.

															First, both the language of § 2 and a functional understanding
of the phenomenon of vote dilution mandate the conclusion that the
race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial bloc
voting analysis. Section 2(b) states that a violation is
established if it can be shown that members of a protected minority
group "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to . . . elect representatives of their choice. " Page 478 U. S. 68 (Emphasis added.) Because both minority and majority voters
often select members of their own race as their preferred
representatives, it will frequently be the case that a black
candidate is the choice of blacks, while a white candidate is the
choice of whites. Cf. Letter to the Editor from Chandler
Davidson, 17 New Perspectives 38 (Fall 1985). Indeed, the facts of
this case illustrate that tendency -- blacks preferred black
candidates, whites preferred white candidates. Thus, as a matter of
convenience, we and the District Court may refer to the preferred
representative of black voters as the "black candidate" and to the
preferred representative of white voters as the "white candidate."
Nonetheless, the fact that race of voter and race of candidate is
often correlated is not directly pertinent to a § 2 inquiry. Under
§ 2, it is the status of the candidate as the chosen
representative of a particular racial group, not the race of
the candidate, that is important.

															An understanding of how vote dilution through submergence in a
white majority works leads to the same conclusion. The essence of a
submergence claim is that minority group members prefer certain
candidates whom they could elect were it not for the interaction of
the challenged electoral law or structure with a white majority
that votes as a significant bloc for different candidates. Thus, as
we explained in Part III, supra, the existence of racial
bloc voting is relevant to a vote dilution claim in two ways. Bloc
voting by blacks tends to prove that the black community is
politically cohesive, that is, it shows that blacks prefer certain
candidates whom they could elect in a single-member, black majority
district. Bloc voting by a white majority tends to prove that
blacks will generally be unable to elect representatives of their
choice. Clearly, only the race of the voter, not the race of the
candidate, is relevant to vote dilution analysis. See,
e.g., Blacksher & Menefee 59-60; Grofman, Should
Representatives be Typical?, in Representation and Redistricting
Issues 98; Note, Geometry and Geography 207. Page 478 U. S. 69 Second, appellants' suggestion that racially polarized voting
refers to voting patterns where whites vote for white candidates
because they prefer members of their own race or are hostile to
blacks, as opposed to voting patterns where whites vote for white
candidates because the white candidates spent more on their
campaigns, utilized more media coverage, and thus enjoyed greater
name recognition than the black candidates, fails for another,
independent reason. This argument, like the argument that the race
of the voter must be the primary determinant of the voter's ballot,
is inconsistent with the purposes of § 2, and would render
meaningless the Senate Report factor that addresses the impact of
low socioeconomic status on a minority group's level of political
participation.

															Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate
inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the
vestigial effects of past purposeful discrimination. S.Rep. at 5,
40; H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, p. 31 (1981). Both this Court and other
federal courts have recognized that political participation by
minorities tends to be depressed where minority group members
suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education,
poor employment opportunities, and low incomes. See, e.g.,
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
768 -769; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds
County, Miss., 554 F.2d 139, 145-146 (CA5) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). See also S.
Verba & N. Nie, Participation in America 152 (1972). The Senate
Report acknowledges this tendency, and instructs that

															"the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process,"

															S.Rep. at 29 (footnote omitted), is a factor which may be
probative of unequal opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives. Courts and commentators have
recognized further that candidates generally must spend more money
in order to win Page 478 U. S. 70 election in a multimember district than in a single-member
district. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.
Supp. 704 , 720-721 (WD Tex.1972), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. White v. Regester, supra. Berry & Dye 88;
Davidson & Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an At-Large
Setting, in Minority Vote Dilution 122-123; Derfner 554, n. 126;
Jewell 131; Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12
Urb.Aff.Q. 223, 230 (1976). If, because of inferior education and
poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than whites, they
will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the
same level of financial support that whites can provide theirs.
Thus, electoral losses by candidates preferred by the black
community may well be attributable in part to the fact that their
white opponents outspent them. But the fact is that, in this
instance, the economic effects of prior discrimination have
combined with the multimember electoral structure to afford blacks
less opportunity than whites to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. It would be
both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to hold
that, on the one hand, the effects of past discrimination which
hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend
to prove a § 2 violation, while holding on the other hand that,
where these same effects of past discrimination deter whites from
voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a crucial element of a
vote dilution claim. Accord, Escambia County, 748 F.2d at
1043 (" [T]he failure of the blacks to solicit white votes may
be caused by the effects of past discrimination'") (quoting United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1536
(CA11 1984)); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731
F.2d at 1567. 5 Racial Animosity as Primary Determinant of Voter
Behavior Finally, we reject the suggestion that racially polarized voting
refers only to white bloc voting which is caused by Page 478 U. S. 71 white voters' racial hostility toward black candidates.
[ Footnote 33 ] To accept this
theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by
repudiating the intent test of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), and would prevent minority voters who have clearly been
denied an opportunity to elect representatives of their choice from
establishing a critical element of a vote dilution claim.

															In amending § 2, Congress rejected the requirement announced by
this Court in Bolden, supra, that § 2 plaintiffs must
prove the discriminatory intent of state or local governments in
adopting or maintaining the challenged electoral mechanism.
[ Footnote 34 ] Appellants'
suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual white
voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2 claim must fail
for the very reasons Congress rejected the intent test with respect
to governmental bodies. See Engstrom, The Reincarnation of
the Intent Standard: Federal Judges and At-Large Election Cases, 28
How.L.J. 495 (1985).

															The Senate Report states that one reason the Senate Committee
abandoned the intent test was that

															"the Committee . . . heard persuasive testimony that the intent
test is unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of
racism on the part of individual officials or entire
communities."

															S.Rep. at 36. The Committee found the testimony of Dr. Arthur
S. Page 478 U. S. 72 Flemming, Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, particularly persuasive. He testified:

															"[Under an intent test,] [l]itigators representing excluded
minorities will have to explore the motivations of individual
council members, mayors, and other citizens. The question would be
whether their decisions were motivated by invidious racial
considerations. Such inquiries can only be divisive, threatening to
destroy any existing racial progress in a community. It is the
intent test, not the results test, that would make it necessary to
brand individuals as racist in order to obtain judicial
relief." Ibid. (footnote omitted). The grave threat to racial
progress and harmony which Congress perceived from requiring proof
that racism caused the adoption or maintenance of a challenged
electoral mechanism is present to a much greater degree in the
proposed requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate that racial
animosity determined white voting patterns. Under the old intent
test, plaintiffs might succeed by proving only that a limited
number of elected officials were racist; under the new intent test,
plaintiffs would be required to prove that most of the white
community is racist in order to obtain judicial relief. It is
difficult to imagine a more racially divisive requirement.

															A second reason Congress rejected the old intent test was that,
in most cases, it placed an "inordinately difficult burden" on § 2
plaintiffs. Ibid. The new intent test would be equally, if
not more, burdensome. In order to prove that a specific factor --
racial hostility -- determined white voters' ballots, it would be
necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causal
factors, such as socioeconomic characteristics and candidate
expenditures, do not correlate better than racial animosity with
white voting behavior. As one commentator has explained: Page 478 U. S. 73 "Many of the[se] independent variables . . . would be all but
impossible for a social scientist to operationalize as
interval-level independent variables for use in a multiple
regression equation, whether on a step-wise basis or not. To
conduct such an extensive statistical analysis as this implies,
moreover, can become prohibitively expensive."

															"Compared to this sort of effort, proving discriminatory intent
in the adoption of an at-large election system is both simple and
inexpensive."

															McCrary, Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of
"Purpose" Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How.L.J. 463, 492
(1985) (footnote omitted).

															The final and most dispositive reason the Senate Report
repudiated the old intent test was that it "asks the wrong
question." S.Rep. at 36. Amended § 2 asks instead "whether
minorities have equal access to the process of electing their
representatives." Ibid. Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather than
the behavior of the voters, also asks the wrong question. All that
matters under § 2 and under a functional theory of vote dilution is
voter behavior, not its explanations. Moreover, as we have
explained in detail, supra, requiring proof that racial
considerations actually caused voter behavior will result
-- contrary to congressional intent -- in situations where a black
minority that functionally has been totally excluded from the
political process will be unable to establish a § 2 violation. The
Senate Report's remark concerning the old intent test thus is
pertinent to the new test: the requirement that a

															"court . . . make a separate . . . finding of intent, after
accepting the proof of the factors involved in the White \[v.
Regester , 412 U. S. 755 ] analysis . . .
[would] seriously clou[d] the prospects of eradicating the
remaining instances of racial discrimination in American
elections." Id. at 37. We therefore decline to adopt such a
requirement. Page 478 U. S. 74 6 Summary In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially
polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers
only to the existence of a correlation between the race of voters
and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not prove
causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case
of racial bloc voting, and defendants may not rebut that case with
evidence of causation or intent. IV THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SOME BLACK CANDIDATES'
SUCCESS A North Carolina and the United States maintain that the District
Court failed to accord the proper weight to the success of some
black candidates in the challenged districts. Black residents of
these districts, they point out, achieved improved representation
in the 1982 General Assembly election. [ Footnote 35 ] They also note that blacks in House
District 23 have enjoyed proportional representation consistently
since 1973, and that blacks in the other districts have
occasionally enjoyed nearly proportional representation. [ Footnote 36 ] This electoral Page 478 U. S. 75 success demonstrates conclusively, appellants and the United
States argue, that blacks in those districts do not have

															"less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice."

															42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Essentially, appellants and the United
States contend that, if a racial minority gains proportional or
nearly proportional representation in a single election, that fact
alone precludes, as a matter of law, finding a § 2 violation.

															Section 2(b) provides that "[t]he extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office . . . is one
circumstance which may be considered." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). The
Senate Committee Report also identifies the extent to which
minority candidates have succeeded as a pertinent factor. S.Rep. at
29. However, the Senate Report expressly states that "the election
of a few minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the
possibility of dilution of the black vote,'" noting that, if it
did, "the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade
[§ 2] by manipulating the election of a `safe' minority candidate." Id. at 29, n. 115, quoting Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1307 (CA5 1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.
S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). The Senate Committee
decided, instead, to "require an independent consideration of the
record." S.Rep. at 29, n. 115. The Senate Report also emphasizes
that the question whether "the political processes are `equally
open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the
`past Page 478 U. S. 76 and present reality.'" Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the language of § 2 and its legislative history plainly
demonstrate that proof that some minority candidates have been
elected does not foreclose a § 2 claim.

															Moreover, in conducting its "independent consideration of the
record" and its "searching practical evaluation of the past and
present reality,'" the District Court could appropriately take
account of the circumstances surrounding recent black electoral
success in deciding its significance to appellees' claim. In
particular, as the Senate Report makes clear, id. at 29,
n. 115, the court could properly notice the fact that black
electoral success increased markedly in the 1982 election -- an
election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had been filed --
and could properly consider to what extent "the pendency of this very litigation [might have] worked a
one-time advantage for black candidates in the form of unusual
organized political support by white leaders concerned to forestall
single-member districting. [ Footnote 37 ]"

															590 F. Supp. at 367, n. 27.

															Nothing in the statute or its legislative history prohibited the
court from viewing with some caution black candidates' success in
the 1982 election, and from deciding on the basis of all the
relevant circumstances to accord greater weight to blacks' relative
lack of success over the course of several recent elections.
Consequently, we hold that the District Court did not err, as a
matter of law, in refusing to treat the fact that some black
candidates have succeeded as dispositive of appellees' § 2 claim.
Where multimember districting generally works to dilute the
minority vote, it cannot be defended on the ground that it
sporadically and serendipitously benefits minority voters. Page 478 U. S. 77 B The District Court did err, however, in ignoring the
significance of the sustained success black voters have
experienced in House District 23. In that district, the last six
elections have resulted in proportional representation for black
residents. This persistent proportional representation is
inconsistent with appellees' allegation that the ability of black
voters in District 23 to elect representatives of their choice is
not equal to that enjoyed by the white majority.

															In some situations, it may be possible for § 2 plaintiffs to
demonstrate that such sustained success does not accurately reflect
the minority group's ability to elect its preferred
representatives, [ Footnote
38 ] but appellees have not done so here. Appellees presented
evidence relating to black electoral success in the last three
elections; they failed utterly, though, to offer any explanation
for the success of black candidates in the previous three
elections. Consequently, we believe that the District Court erred,
as a matter of law, in ignoring the sustained success black voters
have enjoyed in House District 23, and would reverse with respect
to that District. V ULTIMATE DETERMINATION OF VOTE DILUTION Finally, appellants and the United States dispute the District
Court's ultimate conclusion that the multimember districting scheme
at issue in this case deprived black voters of an equal opportunity
to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. A As an initial matter, both North Carolina and the United States
contend that the District Court's ultimate conclusion that the
challenged multimember districts operate to dilute Page 478 U. S. 78 black citizens' votes is a mixed question of law and fact
subject to de novo review on appeal. In support of their
proposed standard of review, they rely primarily on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of U.S. Inc. , 466 U. S. 485 (1984), a case in which we reconfirmed that, as a matter of
constitutional law, there must be independent appellate review of
evidence of "actual malice" in defamation cases. Appellants and the
United States argue that, because a finding of vote dilution under
amended § 2 requires the application of a rule of law to a
particular set of facts it constitutes a legal, rather than
factual, determination. Reply Brief for Appellants 7; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. Neither appellants
nor the United States cite our several precedents in which we have
treated the ultimate finding of vote dilution as a question of fact
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). See,
e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 458 U. S.
622 -627; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 , 446 U. S. 183 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
765 -770. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564 , 470 U. S. 573 (1985).

															In Regester, supra, we noted that the District Court
had based its conclusion that minority voters in two multimember
districts in Texas had less opportunity to participate in the
political process than majority voters on the totality of the
circumstances, and stated that

															"we are not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as
they do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the . . . multimember district in the light of
past and present reality, political and otherwise." Id. at 412 U. S.
769 -770. Quoting this passage from Regester with approval, we expressly held in Rogers v. Lodge,
supra, that the question whether an at-large election system
was maintained for discriminatory purposes and subsidiary issues,
which include whether that system had the effect of diluting the
minority vote, were questions of fact, reviewable under Rule
52(a)'s Page 478 U. S. 79 clearly erroneous standard. 458 U.S. at 458 U. S.
622 -623. Similarly, in City of Rome v. United
States, we declared that the question whether certain
electoral structures had a "discriminatory effect," in the sense of
diluting the minority vote, was a question of fact subject to
clearly erroneous review. 446 U.S. at 446 U. S.
183 .

															We reaffirm our view that the clearly erroneous test of Rule
52(a) is the appropriate standard for appellate review of a finding
of vote dilution. As both amended § 2 and its legislative history
make clear, in evaluating a statutory claim of vote dilution
through districting, the trial court is to consider the "totality
of the circumstances" and to determine, based "upon a searching
practical evaluation of the past and present reality,'" S.Rep.
at 30 (footnote omitted), whether the political process is equally
open to minority voters. "`This determination is peculiarly
dependent upon the facts of each case,'" Rogers, supra, at
621, quoting Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 224 (CA5
1978), and requires "an intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact" of the contested electoral mechanisms. 458 U.S. at 458 U. S. 622 .
The fact that amended § 2 and its legislative history provide legal
standards which a court must apply to the facts in order to
determine whether § 2 has been violated does not alter the standard
of review. As we explained in Bose, Rule 52(a) "does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors
of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding
of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is predicated on a
misunderstanding of the governing rule of law. Page 478 U. S. 80 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 501 , citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S.
273 , 456 U. S. 287 (1982); Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S.
844 , 456 U. S. 855 , n. 15 (1982).
Thus, the application of the clearly erroneous standard to ultimate
findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial
court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political
reality without endangering the rule of law." B The District Court in this case carefully considered the
totality of the circumstances and found that, in each district,
racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in
voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial
prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme
to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically
cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the
political process and to elect candidates of their choice. It found
that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in these
districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982
elections, perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion.
Excepting House District 23, with respect to which the District
Court committed legal error, see supra, at 478 U. S. 77 , we
affirm the District Court's judgment. We cannot say that the
District Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted
with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in
concluding that use of a multimember electoral structure has caused
black voters in the districts other than House District 23 to have
less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of
their choice.

															The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed in part and reversed in part. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Appellees challenged Senate District No. 2, which consisted of
the whole of Northampton, Hertford, Gates, Bertie, and Chowan
Counties, and parts of Washington, Martin, Halifax, and Edgecombe
Counties.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Appellees challenged the following multimember districts: Senate
No. 22 (Mecklenburg and Cabarrus Counties -- four members), House
No. 36 (Mecklenburg County -- eight members), House No. 39 (part of
Forsyth County -- five members), House No. 23 (Durham County --
three members), House No. 21 (Wake County -- six members), and
House No. 8 (Wilson, Nash, and Edgecombe Counties -- four
members).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Appellants initiated this action in September, 1981, challenging
the North Carolina General Assembly's July, 1981, redistricting.
The history of this action is recounted in greater detail in the
District Court's opinion in this case, Gingles v.
Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345 , 350-358 (EDNC 1984). It suffices here to note that
the General Assembly revised the 1981 plan in April, 1982, and that
the plan at issue in this case is the 1982 plan.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															These factors were derived from the analytical framework of White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), as refined and developed by the lower courts, in particular
by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School
Board v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). S.Rep. at 28, n. 113.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Bullet (single-shot) voting has been described as follows:

															"'Consider [a] town of 600 whites and 400 blacks with an
at-large election to choose four council members. Each voter is
able to cast four votes. Suppose there are eight white candidates,
with the votes of the whites split among them approximately
equally, and one black candidate, with all the blacks voting for
him and no one else. The result is that each white candidate
receives about 300 votes, and the black candidate receives 400
votes. The black has probably won a seat. This technique is called
single-shot voting. Single-shot voting enables a minority group to
win some at-large seats if it concentrates its vote behind a
limited number of candidates, and if the vote of the majority is
divided among a number of candidates.'" City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.
S. 156 , 446 U. S. 184 ,
n.19 (1980), quoting United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Voting Rights Act: Ten Years After, pp. 206-207 (1975).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Designated (or numbered) seat schemes require a candidate for
election in multimember districts to run for specific seats, and
can, under certain circumstances, frustrate bullet voting. See,
e.g., City of Rome, supra, at 446 U. S. 185 ,
n. 21.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The United States urges this Court to give little weight to the
Senate Report, arguing that it represents a compromise among
conflicting "factions," and thus is somehow less authoritative than
most Committee Reports. Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 8, n. 12, 24, n. 49. We are not persuaded that the
legislative history of amended § 2 contains anything to lead us to
conclude that this Senate Report should be accorded little weight.
We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for
legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill. See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S.
70 , 469 U. S. 76 ,
and n. 3 (1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.
S. 168 , 396 U. S. 186 (1969).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Senate Report states that amended § 2 was designed to
restore the "results test" -- the legal standard that governed
voting discrimination cases prior to our decision in Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980). S.Rep. at 15-16. The Report notes that, in
pre- Bolden cases such as White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973),
plaintiffs could prevail by showing that, under the totality of the
circumstances, a challenged election law or procedure had the
effect of denying a protected minority an equal chance to
participate in the electoral process. Under the "results test,"
plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate that the challenged
electoral law or structure was designed or maintained for a
discriminatory purpose. S.Rep. at 16.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The Senate Committee found that "voting practices and procedures
that have discriminatory results perpetuate the effects of past
purposeful discrimination." Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
As the Senate Report notes, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act
was

															"'not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the
denying to Negroes of the right to register and vote, but also to
deal with the accumulation of discrimination.'" Id. at 5 (quoting 111 Cong.Rec. 8295 (1965) (remarks of
Sen. Javits)).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just
vote dilution. S.Rep. at 30.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Dilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused
by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute
an ineffective minority of voters or from the concentration of
blacks into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.
Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thorns from the Thicket: An
Empirical Test of the Existence of Racial Gerrymandering, 2
Legis.Stud.Q. 465, 465-466 (1977) (hereinafter Engstrom &
Wildgen). See also Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the
Right to Vote, 26 Vand.L.Rev. 523, 553 (1973) (hereinafter
Derfner); F. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative
Reapportionment (hereinafter Parker), in Minority Vote Dilution
86-100 (Davidson ed., 1984) (hereinafter Minority Vote
Dilution).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The claim we address in this opinion is one in which the
plaintiffs alleged and attempted to prove that their ability to
elect the representatives of their choice was impaired by the
selection of a multimember electoral structure. We have no occasion
to consider whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards
should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group that is not
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember
district impairs its ability to influence elections.

															We note also that we have no occasion to consider whether the
standards we apply to respondents' claim that multimember districts
operate to dilute the vote of geographically cohesive minority
groups that are large enough to constitute majorities in
single-member districts, and that are contained within the
boundaries of the challenged multimember districts, are fully
pertinent to other sorts of vote dilution claims, such as a claim
alleging that the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive
minority between two or more multimember or single-member districts
resulted in the dilution of the minority vote.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Commentators are in widespread agreement with this conclusion. See, e.g., Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory Effects of
At-Large Elections, 7 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 85 (1979) (hereinafter Berry
& Dye); Blacksher & Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 Hastings L.J. 1 (1982)
(hereinafter Blacksher & Menefee); Bonapfel, Minority
Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10
Ga.L.Rev. 353 (1976) (hereinafter Bonapfel); Butler, Constitutional
and Statutory Challenges to Election Structures: Dilution and the
Value of the Right to Vote, 42 La.L.Rev. 851 (1982) (hereinafter
Butler); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember
Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. 666 (1972)
(hereinafter Carpeneti); Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections
and Minority Group Representation, in Minority Vote Dilution 65;
Derfner; B. Grofman, Alternatives to Single-Member Plurality
Districts: Legal and Empirical Issues (hereinafter Grofman,
Alternatives), in Representation and Redistricting Issues 107 (B.
Grofman, R. Luphart, H. McKay, & H. Scarrow eds., 1982)
(hereinafter Representation and Redistricting Issues); Hartman,
Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers, 50 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.
689 (1982); Jewell, The Consequences of Single- and Multimember
Districting, in Representation and Redistricting Issues 129 (1982)
(hereinafter Jewell); Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems
on Political Representation, 11 Urb.Aff Q. 345 (1976); Karnig,
Black Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J.Pol. 134
(1979); Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils, 12
Urb.Aff.Q. 223 (1976); Parker 87-88.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Not only does "[v]oting along racial lines" deprive minority
voters of their preferred representative in these circumstances, it
also "allows those elected to ignore [minority] interests without
fear of political consequences," Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
at 458 U. S. 623 ,
leaving the minority effectively unrepresented. See, e.g., Grofman, Should Representatives Be Typical of Their Constituents?,
in Representation and Redistricting Issues 97; Parker 108.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Under a "functional" view of the political process mandated by §
2, S.Rep. at 30, n. 120, the most important Senate Report factors
bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember districts are the "extent
to which minority group members have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction" and the "extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or political subdivision is racially
polarized." Id. 28-29. If present, the other factors, such
as the lingering effects of past discrimination, the use of appeals
to racial bias in election campaigns, and the use of electoral
devices which enhance the dilutive effects of multimember districts
when substantial white bloc voting exists -- for example antibullet
voting laws and majority vote requirements, are supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter's claim.

															In recognizing that some Senate Report factors are more
important to multimember district vote dilution claims than others,
the Court effectuates the intent of Congress. It is obvious that,
unless minority group members experience substantial difficulty
electing representatives of their choice, they cannot prove that a
challenged electoral mechanism impairs their ability "to elect." §
2(b). And, where the contested electoral structure is a multimember
district, commentators and courts agree that, in the absence of
significant white bloc voting, it cannot be said that the ability
of minority voters to elect their chosen representatives is
inferior to that of white voters. See, e.g., McMillan v.
Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (CA5 1984); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546,
1566 (CA11), appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976
(1984); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); Johnson v. Halifax
County, 594 F.
Supp. 161 , 170 (EDNC 1984); Blacksher & Menefee; Engstrom
& Wildgen 469; Parker 107. Consequently, if difficulty in
electing and white bloc voting are not proved, minority voters have
not established that the multimember structure interferes with
their ability to elect their preferred candidates. Minority voters
may be able to prove that they still suffer social and economic
effects of past discrimination, that appeals to racial bias are
employed in election campaigns, and that a majority vote is
required to win a seat, but they have not demonstrated a
substantial inability to elect caused by the use of a multimember
district. By recognizing the primacy of the history and extent of
minority electoral success and of racial bloc voting, the Court
simply requires that § 2 plaintiffs prove their claim before they
may be awarded relief.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															In this case, appellees allege that, within each contested
multimember district, there exists a minority group that is
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a single-member
district. In a different kind of case, for example, a gerrymander
case, plaintiffs might allege that the minority group that is
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a single-member
district has been split between two or more multimember or
single-member districts, with the effect of diluting the potential
strength of the minority vote.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The reason that a minority group making such a challenge must
show, as a threshold matter, that it is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district is this: unless minority voters possess the potential to elect representatives in the absence of the
challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been
injured by that structure or practice. The single-member district
is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure
minority group potential to elect, because it is the smallest
political unit from which representatives are elected. Thus, if the
minority group is spread evenly throughout a multimember district,
or if, although geographically compact, the minority group is so
small in relation to the surrounding white population that it could
not constitute a majority in a single-member district, these
minority voters cannot maintain that they would have been able to
elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the
multimember electoral structure. As two commentators have
explained:

															"To demonstrate [that minority voters are injured by at-large
elections], the minority voters must be sufficiently concentrated
and politically cohesive that a putative districting plan would
result in districts in which members of a racial minority would
constitute a majority of the voters, whose clear electoral choices
are in fact defeated by at-large voting. If minority voters'
residences are substantially integrated throughout the
jurisdiction, the at-large district cannot be blamed for the defeat
of minority-supported candidates. . . . [This standard] thus would
only protect racial minority votes from diminution proximately
caused by the districting plan; it would not assure racial
minorities proportional representation. "

															Blacksher & Menefee 55-56 (footnotes omitted; emphasis
added).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The terms "racially polarized voting" and "racial bloc voting"
are used interchangeably throughout this opinion.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The 1982 reapportionment plan left essentially undisturbed the
1971 plan for five of the original six contested multimember
districts. House District 39 alone was slightly modified. Brief for
Appellees 8.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															The District Court found both methods standard in the literature
for the analysis of racially polarized voting. 590 F. Supp. at 367,
n. 28, 368, n. 32. See also Engstrom & McDonald,
Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation: Political
Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 Urb.Law. 369 (Summer 1985);
Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello, The "Totality of Circumstances
Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act:
A Social Science Perspective, 7 Law & Policy 199 (Apr.1985)
(hereinafter Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															The court used the term "racial polarization" to describe this
correlation. It adopted Dr. Grofman's definition -- "racial
polarization" exists where there is "a consistent relationship
between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter
votes," Tr. 160, or, to put it differently, where "black voters and
white voters vote differently." Id. at 203. We, too, adopt
this definition of "racial bloc" or "racially polarized" voting. See infra at 478 U. S.
55 -58.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															The court found that the data reflected positive relationships,
and that the correlations did not happen by chance. 590 F. Supp. at
368, and n. 30. See also D. Barnes & J. Conley,
Statistical Evidence in Litigation 32-34 (1986); Fisher, Multiple
Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 702, 716-720
(1980); Grofman, Migalski, & Noviello 206.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															The two exceptions were the 1982 State House elections in
Districts 21 and 23. 590 F. Supp. at 368, n. 31.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															This list of factors is illustrative, not comprehensive.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															The number of elections that must be studied in order to
determine whether voting is polarized will vary according to
pertinent circumstances. One important circumstance is the number
of elections in which the minority group has sponsored candidates.
Where a minority group has never been able to sponsor a candidate,
courts must rely on other factors that tend to prove unequal access
to the electoral process. Similarly, where a minority group has
begun to sponsor candidates just recently, the fact that statistics
from only one or a few elections are available for examination does
not foreclose a vote dilution claim.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															This list of special circumstances is illustrative, not
exclusive.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															The trial court did not actually employ the term "legally
significant." At times, it seems to have used "substantive
significance" as Dr. Grofman did, to describe polarization severe
enough to result in the selection of different candidates in
racially separate electorates. At other times, however, the court
used the term "substantively significant" to refer to its ultimate
determination that racially polarized voting in these districts is
sufficiently severe to be relevant to a § 2 claim.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															In stating that 81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black
candidates in the primary election and that two-thirds of white
voters did not vote for black candidates in general elections, the
District Court aggregated data from all six challenged multimember
districts, apparently for ease of reporting. The inquiry into the
existence of vote dilution caused by submergence in a multimember
district is district-specific. When considering several separate
vote dilution claims in a single case, courts must not rely on data aggregated from all the challenged districts
in concluding that racially polarized voting exists in each
district. In the instant case, however, it is clear from the trial
court's tabulated findings and from the exhibits that were before
it, 1 App. Exs. 2-10, that the court relied on data that were
specific to each individual district in concluding that each
district experienced legally significant racially polarized
voting.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															For example, the court found that incumbency aided a successful
black candidate in the 1978 primary in Senate District 22. The
court also noted that, in House District 23, a black candidate who
gained election in 1978, 1980, and 1982, ran uncontested in the
1978 general election and in both the primary and general elections
in 1980. In 1982, there was no Republican opposition, a fact the
trial court interpreted to mean that the general election was, for
all practical purposes, unopposed. Moreover, in the 1982 primary,
there were only two white candidates for three seats, so that one
black candidate had to succeed. Even under this condition, the
court remarked, 63% of white voters still refused to vote for the
black incumbent -- who was the choice of 90% of the blacks. In
House District 21, where a black won election to the six-member
delegation in 1980 and 1982, the court found that, in the relevant
primaries, approximately 60% to 70% of white voters did not vote for the black candidate, whereas approximately
80% of blacks did. The court additionally observed that, although
winning the Democratic primary in this district is historically
tantamount to election, 55% of whites declined to vote for the
Democratic black candidate in the general election.

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															The court noted that, in the 1982 primary held in House District
36, out of a field of eight, the successful black candidate was
ranked first by black voters, but seventh by whites. Similarly, the
court found that the two blacks who won seats in the five-member
delegation from House District 39 were ranked first and second by
black voters, but seventh and eighth by white voters.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															Appellants argue that plaintiffs must establish that race was
the primary determinant of voter behavior as part of their prima facie showing of polarized voting; the United States
suggests that plaintiffs make out a prima facie case
merely by showing a correlation between race and the selection of
certain candidates, but that defendants should be able to rebut by
showing that factors other than race were the principal causes of
voters' choices. We reject both arguments.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															The Fifth Circuit cases on which North Carolina and the United
States rely for their position are equally ambiguous. See Lee
County Branch of NAACP v. Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1482 (1984); Jones v. Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 234 (1984) (Higginbotham,
J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															It is true, as we have recognized previously, that racial
hostility may often fuel racial bloc voting. United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 , 430 U. S. 166 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 458 U. S. 623 .
But, as we explain in this decision, the actual motivation of the
voter has no relevance to a vote dilution claim. This is not to
suggest that racial bloc voting is race-neutral; because voter
behavior correlates with race, obviously it is not. It should be
remembered, though, as one commentator has observed, that "[t]he
absence of racial animus is but one element of race neutrality."
Note, Geometry and Geography 208.

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															The Senate Report rejected the argument that the words "on
account of race," contained in § 2(a), create any requirement of
purposeful discrimination.

															"[I]t is patently [clear] that Congress has used the words 'on
account of race or color' in the Act to mean 'with respect to' race
or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial
discrimination."

															S.Rep. at 27-28, n. 109.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															The relevant results of the 1982 General Assembly election are
as follows. House District 21, in which blacks make up 21.8% of the
population, elected one black to the six-person House delegation.
House District 23, in which blacks constitute 36.3% of the
population, elected one black to the three-person House delegation.
In House District 36, where blacks constitute 26.5% of the
population, one black was elected to the eight-member delegation.
In House District 39, where 25.1% of the population is black, two
blacks were elected to the five-member delegation. In Senate
District 22, where blacks constitute 24.3% of the population, no
black was elected to the Senate in 1982.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															The United States points out that, under a substantially
identical predecessor to the challenged plan, see n 15, supra, House District
21 elected a black to its six-member delegation in 1980, House
District 39 elected a black to its five-member delegation in 1974
and 1976, and Senate District 22 had a black Senator between 1975
and 1980.

															[ Footnote 37 ] See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1307 ("[W]e
cannot endorse the view that the success of black candidates at the
polls necessarily forecloses the possibility of dilution of the
black vote. Such success might, on occasion, be attributable to the
work of politicians, who, apprehending that the support of a black
candidate would be politically expedient, campaign to insure his
election. Or such success might be attributable to political
support motivated by different considerations -- namely that
election of a black candidate will thwart successful challenges to
electoral schemes on dilution grounds. In either situation, a
candidate could be elected despite the relative political
backwardness of black residents in the electoral district").

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															We have no occasion in this case to decide what types of special
circumstances could satisfactorily demonstrate that sustained
success does not accurately reflect the minority's ability to elect
its preferred representatives.

															| 478 U.S.
30 app A| APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J. bwm: Senate District 22 Primary General White Black White Black 1978 (Alexander) 47 87 41 94

															1980 (Alexander) 23 78 n/a n/a

															1982 (Polk) 32 83 33 94 House District 21 Primary General White Black White Black 1978 (Blue) 21 76 n/a n/a

															1980 (Blue) 31 81 44 90

															1982 (Blue) 39 82 45 91 House District 23 Primary General White Black White Black 1978 Senate Barns (Repub.) n/a n/a 17 5 1978 House Clement 10 89 n/a n/a

															Spaulding 16 92 37 89 1980 House Spaulding n/a n/a 49 90 1982 House Clement 26 32 n/a n/a

															Spaulding 37 90 43 89 House District 36 Primary General White Black White Black 1980 (Maxwell) 22 71 28 92

															1982 (Berry) 50 79 42 92

															1982 (Richardson) 39 71 29 88 House District 39 Primary General White Black White Black 1978 House Kennedy, H. 28 76 32 93

															Norman 8 29 n/a n/a

															Ross 17 53 n/a n/a

															Sumter (Repub.) n/a n/a 33 25 House District 39 Primary General White Black White Black 1980 House Kennedy, A. 40 86 32 96

															Norman 18 36 n/a n/a 1980 Senate Small 12 61 n/a n/a 1982 House Hauser 25 80 42 87

															Kennedy, A. 36 87 46 94

															ewm:

															590 F. Supp. at 369-371. Page 478 U. S. 82 | 478 U.S.
30 app B| APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF BRENNAN, J. Black Candidates Elected From 7 Originally Contested
Districts

															District Prior to

															(No. Seats) 1972 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982

															House 8 (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

															House 21 (6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

															House 23 (3) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1

															House 36 (8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

															House 39 (5) 0 0 1 1 0 0 2

															Senate 2 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

															Senate 22 (4) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 See Brief for Appellees, table printed between pages 8
and 9; App. 93-94.

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I join Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V of the Court's
opinion, and agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion as to Part IV-B.
I disagree with Part III-C of JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion. Page 478 U. S. 83 JUSTICE BRENNAN states in Part III-C that the crucial factor in
identifying polarized voting is the race of the voter, and that the
race of the candidate is irrelevant. Under this test, there is
polarized voting if the majority of white voters vote for different
candidates than the majority of the blacks, regardless of the race
of the candidates. I do not agree. Suppose an eight-member
multimember district that is 60% white and 40% black, the blacks
being geographically located so that two safe black single-member
districts could be drawn. Suppose further that there are six white
and two black Democrats running against six white and two black
Republicans. Under JUSTICE BRENNAN's test, there would be polarized
voting, and a likely § 2 violation, if all the Republicans,
including the two blacks, are elected, and 80% of the blacks in the
predominantly black areas vote Democratic. I take it that there
would also be a violation in a single-member district that is 60%
black, but enough of the blacks vote with the whites to elect a
black candidate who is not the choice of the majority of black
voters. This is interest-group politics, rather than a rule hedging
against racial discrimination. I doubt that this is what Congress
had in mind in amending § 2 as it did, and it seems quite at odds
with the discussion in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.
S. 124 , 403 U. S.
149 -160 (1971). Furthermore, on the facts of this case,
there is no need to draw the voter/candidate distinction. The
District Court did not and reached the correct result except, in my
view, with respect to District 23.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL,
and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment.

															In this case, we are called upon to construe § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended June 29, 1982. Amended § 2
is intended to codify the "results" test employed in Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971), and White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973), and to reject the "intent" test
propounded in the plurality opinion in Mobile v.
Bolden , 446 Page 478 U. S. 84 U.S. 55 (1980). S.Rep. No. 97-417, pp. 27-28 (1982) (hereinafter
S.Rep.). Whereas Bolden required members of a racial
minority who alleged impairment of their voting strength to prove
that the challenged electoral system was created or maintained with
a discriminatory purpose and led to discriminatory results, under
the results test, "plaintiffs may choose to establish
discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory
purpose." S.Rep. at 28. At the same time, however, § 2
unequivocally disclaims the creation of a right to proportional
representation. This disclaimer was essential to the compromise
that resulted in passage of the amendment. See id. at
193-194 (additional views of Sen. Dole).

															In construing this compromise legislation, we must make every
effort to be faithful to the balance Congress struck. This is not
an easy task. We know that Congress intended to allow vote dilution
claims to be brought under § 2, but we also know that Congress did
not intend to create a right to proportional representation for
minority voters. There is an inherent tension between what Congress
wished to do and what it wished to avoid, because any theory of
vote dilution must necessarily rely to some extent on a measure of
minority voting strength that makes some reference to the
proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large.
In addition, several important aspects of the "results" test had
received little attention in this Court's cases or in the decisions
of the Courts of Appeals employing that test on which Congress also
relied. See id. at 32. Specifically, the legal meaning to
be given to the concepts of "racial bloc voting" and "minority
voting strength" had been left largely unaddressed by the courts
when § 2 was amended.

															The Court attempts to resolve all these difficulties today.
First, the Court supplies definitions of racial bloc voting and
minority voting strength that will apparently be applicable in all
cases, and that will dictate the structure of vote dilution
litigation. Second, the Court adopts a test, based on the Page 478 U. S. 85 level of minority electoral success, for determining when an
electoral scheme has sufficiently diminished minority voting
strength to constitute vote dilution. Third, although the Court
does not acknowledge it expressly, the combination of the Court's
definition of minority voting strength and its test for vote
dilution results in the creation of a right to a form of
proportional representation in favor of all geographically and
politically cohesive minority groups that are large enough to
constitute majorities if concentrated within one or more
single-member districts. In so doing, the Court has disregarded the
balance struck by Congress in amending § 2, and has failed to apply
the results test as described by this Court in Whitcomb and White. I In order to explain my disagreement with the Court's
interpretation of § 2, it is useful to illustrate the impact that
alternative districting plans or types of districts typically have
on the likelihood that a minority group will be able to elect
candidates it prefers, and then to set out the critical elements of
a vote dilution claim as they emerge in the Court's opinion.

															Consider a town of 1,000 voters that is governed by a council of
four representatives, in which 30% of the voters are black, and in
which the black voters are concentrated in one section of the city
and tend to vote as a bloc. It would be possible to draw four
single-member districts, in one of which blacks would constitute an
overwhelming majority. The black voters in this district would be
assured of electing a representative of their choice, while any
remaining black voters in the other districts would be submerged in
large white majorities. This option would give the minority group
roughly proportional representation.

															Alternatively, it would usually be possible to draw four
single-member districts in two of which black voters
constituted much narrower majorities of about 60%. The black Page 478 U. S. 86 voters in these districts would often be able to elect the
representative of their choice in each of these two districts, but
if even 20% of the black voters supported the candidate favored by
the white minority in those districts, the candidates preferred by
the majority of black voters might lose. This option would,
depending on the circumstances of a particular election, sometimes
give the minority group more than proportional representation, but
would increase the risk that the group would not achieve even
roughly proportional representation.

															It would also usually be possible to draw four single-member
districts in each of which black voters constituted a minority. In
the extreme case, black voters would constitute 30% of the voters
in each district. Unless approximately 30% of the white voters in
this extreme case backed the minority candidate, black voters in
such a district would be unable to elect the candidate of their
choice in an election between only two candidates, even if they
unanimously supported him. This option would make it difficult for
black voters to elect candidates of their choice even with
significant white support, and all but impossible without such
support.

															Finally, it would be possible to elect all four representatives
in a single at-large election in which each voter could vote for
four candidates. Under this scheme, white voters could elect all
the representatives even if black voters turned out in large
numbers and voted for one and only one candidate. To illustrate, if
only four white candidates ran, and each received approximately
equal support from white voters, each would receive about 700
votes, whereas black voters could cast no more than 300 votes for
any one candidate. If, on the other hand, eight white candidates
ran, and white votes were distributed less evenly, so that the five
least favored white candidates received fewer than 300 votes while
three others received 400 or more, it would be feasible for blacks
to elect one representative with 300 votes, even without
substantial white support. If even 25% of the white voters Page 478 U. S. 87 backed a particular minority candidate, and black voters voted
only for that candidate, the candidate would receive a total of 475
votes, which would ensure victory unless white voters also
concentrated their votes on four of the eight remaining candidates,
so that each received the support of almost 70% of white voters. As
these variations show, the at-large or multimember district has an
inherent tendency to submerge the votes of the minority. The
minority group's prospects for electoral success under such a
district heavily depend on a variety of factors such as voter
turnout, how many candidates run, how evenly white support is
spread, how much white support is given to a candidate or
candidates preferred by the minority group, and the extent to which
minority voters engage in "bullet voting" (which occurs when voters
refrain from casting all their votes to avoid the risk that, by
voting for their lower-ranked choices, they may give those
candidates enough votes to defeat their higher-ranked choices, see ante at 478 U. S. 38 -39,
n. 5).

															There is no difference in principle between the varying effects
of the alternatives outlined above and the varying effects of
alternative single-district plans and multimember districts. The
type of districting selected and the way in which district lines
are drawn can have a powerful effect on the likelihood that members
of a geographically and politically cohesive minority group will be
able to elect candidates of their choice.

															Although § 2 does not speak in terms of "vote dilution," I agree
with the Court that proof of vote dilution can establish a
violation of § 2 as amended. The phrase "vote dilution," in the
legal sense, simply refers to the impermissible discriminatory
effect that a multimember or other districting plan has when it
operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial
groups." White, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765 . See also Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 , 379 U. S. 439 (1965). This definition, however, conceals some very formidable
difficulties. Is the "voting strength" of a racial group to be
assessed solely Page 478 U. S. 88 with reference to its prospects for electoral success, or should
courts look at other avenues of political influence open to the
racial group? Insofar as minority voting strength is assessed with
reference to electoral success, how should undiluted minority
voting strength be measured? How much of an impairment of minority
voting strength is necessary to prove a violation of § 2? What
constitutes racial bloc voting, and how is it proved? What weight
is to be given to evidence of actual electoral success by minority
candidates in the face of evidence of racial bloc voting?

															The Court resolves the first question summarily: minority voting
strength is to be assessed solely in terms of the minority group's
ability to elect candidates it prefers. Ante at 478 U.S. 48 -49, n. 15.
Under this approach, the essence of a vote dilution claim is that
the State has created single-member or multimember districts that
unacceptably impair the minority group's ability to elect the
candidates its members prefer.

															In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember
district or single-member district has diluted the minority group's
voting strength to a degree that violates § 2, however, it is also
necessary to construct a measure of "undiluted" minority voting
strength. "[T]he phrase [vote dilution] itself suggests a norm with
respect to which the fact of dilution may be ascertained." Mississippi Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U. S. 1002 ,
1012 (1984) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from summary affirmance).
Put simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has made
it harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer,
a court must have an idea in mind of how hard it "should" be for
minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an
acceptable system.

															Several possible measures of "undiluted" minority voting
strength suggest themselves. First, a court could simply use
proportionality as its guide: if the minority group constituted 30%
of the voters in a given area, the court would regard the minority
group as having the potential to elect 30% Page 478 U. S. 89 of the representatives in that area. Second, a court could posit
some alternative districting plan as a "normal" or "fair" electoral
scheme, and attempt to calculate how many candidates preferred by
the minority group would probably be elected under that scheme.
There are, as we have seen, a variety of ways in which even
single-member districts could be drawn, and each will present the
minority group with its own array of electoral risks and benefits;
the court might, therefore, consider a range of acceptable plans in
attempting to estimate "undiluted" minority voting strength by this
method. Third, the court could attempt to arrive at a plan that
would maximize feasible minority electoral success, and use this
degree of predicted success as its measure of "undiluted" minority
voting strength. If a court were to employ this third alternative,
it would often face hard choices about what would truly "maximize"
minority electoral success. An example is the scenario described
above, in which a minority group could be concentrated in one
completely safe district or divided among two districts in each of
which its members would constitute a somewhat precarious
majority.

															The Court today has adopted a variant of the third approach,
to-wit, undiluted minority voting strength means the maximum
feasible minority voting strength. In explaining the elements of a
vote dilution claim, the Court first states that

															"the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district." Ante at 478 U. S. 50 . If
not, apparently the minority group has no cognizable claim that its
ability to elect the representatives of its choice has been
impaired. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Second,
"the minority group must be able Page 478 U. S. 90 to show that it is politically cohesive," that is, that a
significant proportion of the minority group supports the same
candidates. Ante at 478 U. S. 51 .
Third, the Court requires the minority group to

															"demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances . . .
-- usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Ibid. If these three requirements are met,

															"the minority group demonstrates that submergence in a white
multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen
representatives." Ibid. That is to say, the minority group has proved
vote dilution in violation of § 2.

															The Court's definition of the elements of a vote dilution claim
is simple and invariable: a court should calculate minority voting
strength by assuming that the minority group is concentrated in a
single-member district in which it constitutes a voting majority.
Where the minority group is not large enough, geographically
concentrated enough, or politically cohesive enough for this to be
possible, the minority group's claim fails. Where the minority
group meets these requirements, the representatives that it could
elect in the hypothetical district or districts in which it
constitutes a Page 478 U. S. 91 majority will serve as the measure of its undiluted voting
strength. Whatever plan the State actually adopts must be assessed
in terms of the effect it has on this undiluted voting strength. If
this is indeed the single, universal standard for evaluating
undiluted minority voting strength for vote dilution purposes, the
standard is applicable whether what is challenged is a multimember
district or a particular single-member districting scheme.

															The Court's statement of the elements of a vote dilution claim
also supplies an answer to another question posed above: how
much of an impairment of undiluted minority voting strength is
necessary to prove vote dilution. The Court requires the minority
group that satisfies the threshold requirements of size and
cohesiveness to prove that it will usually be unable to
elect as many representatives of its choice under the challenged
districting scheme as its undiluted voting strength would permit.
This requirement, then, constitutes the true test of vote dilution.
Again, no reason appears why this test would not be applicable to a
vote dilution claim challenging single-member, as well as
multimember, districts.

															This measure of vote dilution, taken in conjunction with the
Court's standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength,
creates what amounts to a right to usual, roughly proportional representation on the part of sizable, compact,
cohesive minority groups. If, under a particular multimember or
single-member district plan, qualified minority groups usually
cannot elect the representatives they would be likely to elect
under the most favorable single-member districting plan, then § 2
is violated. Unless minority success under the challenged electoral
system regularly approximates this rough version of proportional
representation, that system dilutes minority voting strength and
violates § 2.

															To appreciate the implications of this approach, it is useful to
return to the illustration of a town with four council
representatives given above. Under the Court's approach, if the Page 478 U. S. 92 black voters who constitute 30% of the town's voting population
do not usually succeed in electing one representative of their
choice, then, regardless of whether the town employs at-large
elections or is divided into four single-member districts, its
electoral system violates § 2. Moreover, if the town had a black
voting population of 40%, on the Court's reasoning, the black
minority, so long as it was geographically and politically
cohesive, would be entitled usually to elect two of the four
representatives, since it would normally be possible to create two
districts in which black voters constituted safe majorities of
approximately 80%.

															To be sure, the Court also requires that plaintiffs prove that
racial bloc voting by the white majority interacts with the
challenged districting plan so as usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate. In fact, however, this requirement adds little
that is not already contained in the Court's requirements that the
minority group be politically cohesive, and that its preferred
candidates usually lose. As the Court acknowledges, under its
approach,

															"in general, a white bloc vote that normally will defeat the
combined strength of minority support plus white crossover'
votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc
voting." Ante at 56. But this is to define legally significant
bloc voting by the racial majority in terms of the extent of the
racial minority's electoral success. If the minority can prove that
it could constitute a majority in a single-member district, that it
supported certain candidates, and that those candidates have not
usually been elected, then a finding that there is "legally
significant white bloc voting" will necessarily follow. Otherwise,
by definition, those candidates would usually have won, rather than
lost.

															As shaped by the Court today, then, the basic contours of a vote
dilution claim require no reference to most of the " Zimmer factors" that were developed by the Fifth Circuit to implement White's results test, and which were highlighted in the
Senate Report. S.Rep. at 28-29; see Zimmer v.
McKeithen, Page 478 U. S. 93 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) (en banc), aff'd, sub nom. East Carroll
Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.
S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). If a minority group is
politically and geographically cohesive and large enough to
constitute a voting majority in one or more single-member
districts, then, unless white voters usually support the minority's
preferred candidates in sufficient numbers to enable the minority
group to elect as many of those candidates as it could elect in
such hypothetical districts, it will routinely follow that a vote
dilution claim can be made out, and the multimember district will
be invalidated. There is simply no need for plaintiffs to establish
"the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or
political subdivision," ante at 478 U. S. 44 ,
or

															"the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used
voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group," ante at 478 U. S. 45 , or
"the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate
slating processes," ibid., or

															"the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of
past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and
health," ibid., or "the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in
political campaigns," ibid., or that "elected officials
are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group." Ibid. Of course, these other factors may
be supportive of such a claim, because they may strengthen a
court's confidence that minority voters will be unable to overcome
the relative disadvantage at which they are placed by a particular
districting plan, or suggest a more general lack of opportunity to
participate in the political process. But the fact remains that
electoral success has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as
the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements of a
vote dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly proportional
representation within the framework of single-member districts. Page 478 U. S. 94 II In my view, the Court's test for measuring minority voting
strength and its test for vote dilution, operating in tandem, come
closer to an absolute requirement of proportional representation
than Congress intended when it codified the results test in § 2. It
is not necessary or appropriate to decide in this case whether § 2
requires a uniform measure of undiluted minority voting strength in
every case, nor have appellants challenged the standard employed by
the District Court for assessing undiluted minority voting
strength.

															In this case, the District Court seems to have taken an approach
quite similar to the Court's in making its preliminary assessment
of undiluted minority voting strength:

															"At the time of the creation of these multi-member districts,
there were concentrations of black citizens within the boundaries
of each that were sufficient in numbers and contiguity to
constitute effective voting majorities in single-member districts
lying wholly within the boundaries of the multi-member districts,
which single-member districts would satisfy all constitutional
requirements of population and geographical configuration." Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345 , 358-359 (EDNC 1984). The Court goes well beyond
simply sustaining the District Court's decision to employ this
measure of undiluted minority voting strength as a reasonable one
that is consistent with § 2. In my view, we should refrain from
deciding in this case whether a court must invariably posit as its
measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength single-member
districts in which minority group members constitute a majority.
There is substantial doubt that Congress intended "undiluted
minority voting strength" to mean "maximum feasible minority voting
strength." Even if that is the appropriate definition in some
circumstances, there is no indication that Congress intended to
mandate a single, universally applicable Page 478 U. S. 95 standard for measuring undiluted minority voting strength,
regardless of local conditions and regardless of the extent of past
discrimination against minority voters in a particular State or
political subdivision. Since appellants have not raised the issue,
I would assume that what the District Court did here was
permissible under § 2, and leave open the broader question whether
§ 2 requires this approach.

															What appellants do contest is the propriety of the
District Court's standard for vote dilution. Appellants claim that
the District Court held that,

															"[a]lthough blacks had achieved considerable success in winning
state legislative seats in the challenged districts, their failure
to consistently attain the number of seats that numbers alone
would presumptively give them ( i.e., in proportion to
their presence in the population),"

															standing alone, constituted a violation of § 2. Brief for
Appellants 20 (emphasis in original). This holding, appellants
argue, clearly contravenes § 2's proviso that

															"nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of
a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in
the population."

															42 U.S.C. § 1973.

															I believe appellants' characterization of the District Court's
holding is incorrect. In my view, the District Court concluded that
there was a severe diminution in the prospects for black electoral
success in each of the challenged districts, as compared to
single-member districts in which blacks could constitute a
majority, and that this severe diminution was, in large part,
attributable to the interaction of the multimember form of the
district with persistent racial bloc voting on the part of the
white majorities in those districts. See 590 F. Supp. at
372. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The District
Court attached great weight Page 478 U. S. 96 to this circumstance as one part of its ultimate finding
that

															"the creation of each of the multi-member districts challenged
in this action results in the black registered voters of that
district being submerged as a voting minority in the district, and
thereby having less opportunity than do other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." Id. at 374. But the District Court's extensive opinion
clearly relies as well on a variety of the other Zimmer factors, as the Court's thorough summary of the District Court's
findings indicates. See ante at 478 U. S.
38 -41.

															If the District Court had held that the challenged multimember
districts violated § 2 solely because blacks had not consistently
attained seats in proportion to their presence in the population,
its holding would clearly have been inconsistent with § 2's
disclaimer of a right to proportional representation. Surely
Congress did not intend to say, on the one hand, that members of a
protected class have no right to proportional representation, and
on the other, that any consistent failure to achieve proportional
representation, without more, violates § 2. A requirement that
minority representation usually be proportional to the minority
group's proportion in the population is not quite the same as a
right to strict proportional representation, but it comes so close
to such a right as to be inconsistent with § 2's disclaimer, and
with the results test that is codified in § 2. In the words of
Senator Dole, the architect of the compromise that resulted in
passage of the amendments to § 2:

															"The language of the subsection explicitly rejects, as did White and its progeny, the notion that members of a
protected class have a right to be elected in numbers equal to
their proportion of the population. The extent to which members of
a protected class have been elected under the challenged practice
or structure is just one factor, among the totality of
circumstances to be considered, Page 478 U. S. 97 and is not dispositive."

															S.Rep. at 194 (additional views of Sen. Dole).

															On the same reasoning, I would reject the Court's test for vote
dilution. The Court measures undiluted minority voting strength by
reference to the possibility of creating single-member districts in
which the minority group would constitute a majority, rather than
by looking to raw proportionality alone. The Court's standard for
vote dilution, when combined with its test for undiluted minority
voting strength, makes actionable every deviation from usual, rough
proportionality in representation for any cohesive minority group
as to which this degree of proportionality is feasible within the
framework of single-member districts. Requiring that every minority
group that could possibly constitute a majority in a single-member
district be assigned to such a district would approach a
requirement of proportional representation as nearly as is possible
within the framework of single-member districts. Since the Court's
analysis entitles every such minority group usually to elect as
many representatives under a multimember district as it could elect
under the most favorable single-member district scheme, it follows
that the Court is requiring a form of proportional representation.
This approach is inconsistent with the results test and with § 2's
disclaimer of a right to proportional representation.

															In enacting § 2, Congress codified the "results" test this Court
had employed, as an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in White and Whitcomb. The factors developed by the
Fifth Circuit and relied on by the Senate Report simply fill in the
contours of the "results" test as described in those decisions, and
do not purport to redefine or alter the ultimate showing of
discriminatory effect required by Whitcomb and White. In my view, therefore, it is to Whitcomb and White that we should look in the first instance in
determining how great an impairment of minority voting strength is
required to establish vote dilution in violation of § 2. Page 478 U. S. 98 The "results" test as reflected in Whitcomb and White requires an inquiry into the extent of the minority
group's opportunities to participate in the political processes. See White, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 766 .
While electoral success is a central part of the vote dilution
inquiry, White held that, to prove vote dilution, "it is
not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against
has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting
potential," id. at 412 U. S.
765 -766, and Whitcomb flatly rejected the
proposition that

															"any group with distinctive interests must be represented in
legislative halls if Page 478 U. S. 99 it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and
represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to
constitute a single member district."

															403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 156 .
To the contrary, the results test as described in White requires plaintiffs to establish

															"that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in question --
that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in
the district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice."

															412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 766 .
By showing both "a history of disproportionate results" and "strong
indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair
representation," the plaintiffs in White met this
standard, which, as emphasized just today, requires

															"a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere
lack of proportional representation to support a finding of
unconstitutional vote dilution." Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S. 131 (plurality opinion).

															When Congress amended § 2, it intended to adopt this "results"
test, while abandoning the additional showing of discriminatory
intent required by Bolden. The vote dilution analysis
adopted by the Court today clearly bears little resemblance to the
"results" test that emerged in Whitcomb and White. The Court's test for vote dilution, combined with
its standard for evaluating "voting potential," White,
supra, at 412 U. S. 766 ,
means that any racial minority with distinctive interests must
usually

															"be represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to
command at least one seat and represents a minority living in an
area sufficiently compact to constitute"

															a voting majority in "a single member district." Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 156 .
Nothing in Whitcomb, White, or the language and
legislative history of § 2 supports the Court's creation of this
right to usual, roughly proportional representation on the part of
every geographically compact, politically cohesive minority group
that is large enough to form a majority in one or more
single-member districts.

															I would adhere to the approach outlined in Whitcomb and White and followed, with some elaboration, in Zimmer and other cases in the Courts of Appeals prior to Bolden. Under that approach, a court should consider all
relevant factors bearing on whether the minority group has

															"less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."

															42 U.S.C. § 1973 (emphasis added). The court should not focus
solely on the minority group's ability to elect representatives of
its choice. Whatever measure of undiluted minority voting strength
the court employs in connection with evaluating the presence or
absence of minority electoral success, it should also bear in mind
that "the power to influence the political process is not limited
to winning elections." Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S. 132 .
Of course, the relative lack of minority electoral success under a
challenged plan, when compared with the success that would be
predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength
the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote
dilution. Moreover, the minority group may, in fact, lack access to
or influence upon representatives it did not support as candidates. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, post at 478 U. S.
169 -170 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Nonetheless, a reviewing court should be required to find
more than simply that the minority group does not usually attain an
undiluted measure of electoral success. The court must find that
even substantial minority success will be highly infrequent Page 478 U. S. 100 under the challenged plan before it may conclude, on this basis
alone, that the plan operates "to cancel out or minimize the voting
strength of [the] racial grou[p]." White, supra, at 412 U. S.
765 . III Only three Justices of the Court join Part III-C of JUSTICE
BRENNAN's opinion, which addresses the validity of the statistical
evidence on which the District Court relied in finding racially
polarized voting in each of the challenged districts. Insofar as
statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is
admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically
cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree
that defendants cannot rebut this showing by offering evidence that
the divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by
causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence in the
interests of minority and white voters. I do not agree, however,
that such evidence can never affect the overall vote dilution
inquiry. Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group
in a particular election was rejected by white voters for reasons
other than those which made that candidate the preferred choice of
the minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the
question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently
defeat minority candidates. Such evidence would suggest that
another candidate, equally preferred by the minority group, might
be able to attract greater white support in future elections.

															I believe Congress also intended that explanations of the
reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would be
probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without
decisive minority support would be willing to take the minority's
interests into account. In a community that is polarized along
racial lines, racial hostility may bar these and other indirect
avenues of political influence to a much greater extent than in a
community where racial animosity is absent although the interests
of racial groups diverge. Indeed, the Page 478 U. S. 101 Senate Report clearly stated that one factor that could have
probative value in § 2 cases was

															"whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group."

															S.Rep. at 29. The overall vote dilution inquiry neither requires
nor permits an arbitrary rule against consideration of all evidence
concerning voting preferences other than statistical evidence of
racial voting patterns. Such a rule would give no effect whatever
to the Senate Report's repeated emphasis on "intensive racial
politics," on "racial political considerations," and on whether
"racial politics . . . dominate the electoral process" as one
aspect of the "racial bloc voting" that Congress deemed relevant to
showing a § 2 violation. Id. at 33-34. Similarly, I agree
with JUSTICE WHITE that JUSTICE BRENNAN's conclusion that the race
of the candidate is always irrelevant in identifying racially
polarized voting conflicts with Whitcomb, and is not
necessary to the disposition of this case. Ante at 83
(concurring).

															In this case, as the Court grudgingly acknowledges, the District
Court clearly erred in aggregating data from all of the
challenged districts, and then relying on the fact that on average,
81.7% of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the
primary elections selected for study. Ante at 478 U. S. 59 -60,
n. 28. Although Senate District 22 encompasses House District 36,
with that exception the districts at issue in this case are
distributed throughout the State of North Carolina. White calls for "an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of
the . . . multimember district," 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
769 -770, and racial voting statistics from one district
are ordinarily irrelevant in assessing the totality of the
circumstances in another district. In view of the specific evidence
from each district that the District Court also considered,
however, I cannot say that its conclusion that there was severe
racial bloc voting was clearly erroneous with regard to any of the
challenged districts. Except in House District 23, where racial
bloc voting did not prevent sustained and virtually Page 478 U. S. 102 proportional minority electoral success, I would accordingly
leave undisturbed the District Court's decision to give great
weight to racial bloc voting in each of the challenged
districts. IV Having made usual, roughly proportional success the sole focus
of its vote dilution analysis, the Court goes on to hold that proof
that an occasional minority candidate has been elected does not
foreclose a § 2 claim. But JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE
WHITE, concludes that "persistent proportional representation" will
foreclose a § 2 claim unless the plaintiffs prove that this
"sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority group's
ability to elect its preferred representatives." Ante at 478 U. S. 77 . I
agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that consistent and sustained success by
candidates preferred by minority voters is presumptively
inconsistent with the existence of a § 2 violation. Moreover, I
agree that this case presents no occasion for determining what
would constitute proof that such success did not accurately reflect
the minority group's actual voting strength in a challenged
district or districts.

															In my view, the District Court erred in assessing the extent of
black electoral success in House District 39 and Senate District
22, as well as in House District 23, where the Court acknowledges
error. As the evidence summarized by the Court in table form shows, ante at 82, 478 U.S.
30 app B|>Appendix B, the degree of black electoral success
differed widely in the seven originally contested districts. In
House District 8 and Senate District 2, neither of which is
contested in this Court, no black candidate had ever been elected
to the offices in question. In House District 21 and House District
36, the only instances of black electoral success came in the two
most recent elections, one of which took place during the pendency
of this litigation. By contrast, in House District 39 and Senate
District 22, black successes, although intermittent, dated back to
1974, and a black candidate had been elected in each Page 478 U. S. 103 of these districts in three of the last five elections. Finally,
in House District 23 a black candidate had been elected in each of
the last six elections.

															The District Court, drawing no distinctions among these
districts for purposes of its findings, concluded that

															"[t]he overall results achieved to date at all levels of
elective office are minimal in relation to the percentage of blacks
in the total population."

															590 F. Supp. at 367. The District Court clearly erred to the
extent that it considered electoral success in the aggregate,
rather than in each of the challenged districts, since, as the
Court states, "[t]he inquiry into the existence of vote dilution .
. . is district-specific." Ante at 478 U. S. 59 , n.
28. The Court asserts that the District Court was free to regard
the results of the 1982 elections with suspicion, and to decide

															"on the basis of all the relevant circumstances to accord
greater weight to blacks' relative lack of success over the course
of several recent elections," ante at 76, but the Court does not explain how this
technique would apply in Senate District 22, where a black
candidate was elected in three consecutive elections from 1974 to
1978, but no black candidate was elected in 1982, or in House
District 39, where black candidates were elected in 1974 and 1976,
as well as in 1982. Contrary to what the District Court thought, see 590 F. Supp. at 367, these pre-1982 successes, which
were proportional or nearly proportional to black population in
these three multimember districts, certainly lend some support for a finding that black voters in these districts enjoy an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.

															Despite this error, I agree with the Court's conclusion that,
except in House District 23, minority electoral success was not
sufficiently frequent to compel a finding of equal opportunity to
participate and elect. The District Court found that,

															"in each of the challenged districts, racial polarization in
voting presently exists to a substantial or severe degree, and . .
. in each district it presently operates to Page 478 U. S. 104 minimize the voting strength of black voters." Id. at 372. I cannot say that this finding was clearly
erroneous with respect to House District 39 or Senate District 22,
particularly when taken together with the District Court's findings
concerning the other Zimmer factors, and hence that
court's ultimate conclusion of vote dilution in these districts is
adequately supported.

															This finding, however, is clearly erroneous with respect to
House District 23. Blacks constitute 36.3% of the population in
that district and 28.6% of the registered voters. In each of the
six elections since 1970, one of the three representatives from
this district has been a black. There is no finding, or any reason
even to suspect, that the successful black candidates in District
23 did not, in fact, represent the interests of black voters, and
the District Court did not find that black success in previous
elections was aberrant. Zimmer's caveat against necessarily foreclosing a vote dilution claim on the basis of isolated black
successes, 485 F.2d at 1307; see S.Rep. at 29, n. 115,
cannot be pressed this far. Indeed, the 23 Court of Appeals
decisions on which the Senate Report relied, and which are the best
evidence of the scope of this caveat, contain no example of
minority electoral success that even remotely approximates the
consistent, decade-long pattern in District 23. See, e.g.,
Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (CA5 1973) (no black
candidates elected); Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (CA5
1975) (one black candidate elected), vacated on other
grounds, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).

															I do not propose that consistent and virtually proportional
minority electoral success should always, as a matter of law, bar
finding a § 2 violation. But, as a general rule, such success is
entitled to great weight in evaluating whether a challenged
electoral mechanism has, on the totality of the circumstances,
operated to deny black voters an equal opportunity to participate
in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. With respect to House District 23, the District Court's
failure to accord black electoral success such Page 478 U. S. 105 weight was clearly erroneous, and the District Court identified
no reason for not giving this degree of success preclusive effect.
Accordingly, I agree with JUSTICE BRENNAN that appellees failed to
establish a violation of § 2 in District 23. V When members of a racial minority challenge a multimember
district on the grounds that it dilutes their voting strength, I
agree with the Court that they must show that they possess such
strength and that the multimember district impairs it. A court must
therefore appraise the minority group's undiluted voting strength
in order to assess the effects of the multimember district. I would
reserve the question of the proper method or methods for making
this assessment. But once such an assessment is made, in my view
the evaluation of an alleged impairment of voting strength requires
consideration of the minority group's access to the political
processes generally, not solely consideration of the chances that
its preferred candidates will actually be elected. Proof that white
voters withhold their support from minority-preferred candidates to
an extent that consistently ensures their defeat is entitled to
significant weight in plaintiffs' favor. However, if plaintiffs
direct their proof solely towards the minority group's prospects
for electoral success, they must show that substantial minority
success will be highly infrequent under the challenged plan in
order to establish that the plan operates to "cancel out or
minimize" their voting strength. White, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
765 .

															Compromise is essential to much if not most major federal
legislation, and confidence that the federal courts will enforce
such compromises is indispensable to their creation. I believe that
the Court today strikes a different balance than Congress intended
to when it codified the results test and disclaimed any right to
proportional representation under § 2. For that reason, I join the
Court's judgment, but not its opinion. Page 478 U. S. 106 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															I express no view as to whether the ability of a minority group
to constitute a majority in a single-member district should
constitute a threshold requirement for a claim that the use of
multimember districts impairs the ability of minority voters to
participate in the political processes and to elect representatives
of their choice. Because the plaintiffs in this case would meet
that requirement, if indeed it exists, I need not decide whether it
is imposed by § 2. I note, however, the artificiality of the
Court's distinction between claims that a minority group's "ability
to elect the representatives of [its] choice" has been
impaired and claims that "its ability to influence elections" has been impaired. Ante at 478 U. S. 46 -47,
n. 12. It is true that a minority group that could constitute a
majority in a single-member district ordinarily has the potential
ability to elect representatives without white support, and that a
minority that could not constitute such a majority ordinarily does
not. But the Court recognizes that, when the candidates preferred
by a minority group are elected in a multimember district, the
minority group has elected those candidates, even if white
support was indispensable to these victories. On the same
reasoning, if a minority group that is not large enough to
constitute a voting majority in a single-member district can show
that white support would probably be forthcoming in some such
district to an extent that would enable the election of the
candidates its members prefer, that minority group would appear to
have demonstrated that, at least under this measure of its voting
strength, it would be able to elect some candidates of its
choice.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															At times, the District Court seems to have looked to simple
proportionality, rather than to hypothetical single-member
districts in which black voters would constitute a majority. See, e.g., 590 F. Supp. at 367. Nowhere in its opinion,
however, did the District Court state that § 2 requires that
minority groups consistently attain the level of electoral success
that would correspond with their proportion of the total or voting
population.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															In my opinion, the findings of the District Court, which the
Court fairly summarizes, ante at 478 U. S. 37 -41, 478 U. S. 52 -54,
and n. 23, 478 U. S. 59 -61,
and nn. 28 and 29, adequately support the District Court's judgment
concerning House District 23 as well as the balance of that
judgment.

															I, of course, agree that the election of one black candidate in
each election since 1972 provides significant support for the
State's position. The notion that this evidence creates some sort
of a conclusive, legal presumption, ante at 478 U. S. 75 -76,
is not, however, supported by the language of the statute or by its
legislative history. [ Footnote 3/1 ]
I therefore cannot agree with the Court's view that the District
Court committed error by failing to apply a rule of law that
emerges today without statutory support. The evidence of candidate
success in District 23 is merely one part of an extremely large
record which the District Court carefully considered before making
its ultimate findings of fact, all of which should be upheld under
a normal application of the "clearly erroneous" standard that the
Court traditionally applies. [ Footnote
3/2 ]

															The Court identifies the reason why the success of one black
candidate in the elections in 1978, 1980, and 1982 is not Page 478 U. S. 107 inconsistent with the District Court's ultimate finding
concerning House District 23. [ Footnote
3/3 ] The fact that one black candidate was also elected in the
1972, 1974, and 1976 elections, ante at 478 U. S. 82 ,
Appendix B, is not sufficient, in my opinion, to overcome the
additional findings that apply to House District 23, as well as to
other districts in the State for each of those years. The Court
accurately summarizes those findings:

															"The District Court in this case carefully considered the
totality of the circumstances and found that in each district
racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in
voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health
services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial
prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme
to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically
cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the
political process and to elect candidates of their choice. It found
that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in these
districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982
elections, perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its
conclusion." Ante at 478 U. S.
80 .

															To paraphrase the Court's conclusion about the other districts, ibid., I cannot say that the District Court, composed of
local judges who are well acquainted with the political realities
of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember
electoral structure has caused black voters in House District 23 to
have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of
their choice. [ Footnote 3/4 ]
Accordingly, I concur Page 478 U. S. 108 in the Court's opinion except Part IV-B and except insofar as it
explains why it reverses the judgment respecting House District
23.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See ante at 478 U. S. 75 ("Section 2(b) provides that [t]he extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office . . . is one
circumstance which may be considered.' 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). . . .
However, the Senate Report expressly states that `the election of a
few minority candidates does not "necessarily foreclose the
possibility of dilution of the black vote,"' noting that, if it
did, `the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade
[§ 2] by manipulating the election of a "safe" minority candidate.'
. . . The Senate Committee decided, instead, to "`require an
independent consideration of the record"'") (internal citations
omitted). [ Footnote 3/2 ] See ante at 478 U. S. 79 ("[T]he application of the clearly erroneous standard to ultimate
findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial
court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political
reality without endangering the rule of law").

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See ante at 478 U. S. 52 -54,
and n. 23, 478 U. S. 60 , n.
29, 478 U. S.
75 -76.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Even under the Court's analysis, the decision simply to reverse
-- without a remand -- is mystifying. It is also extremely unfair.
First, the Court does not give appellees an opportunity to address
the new legal standard that the Court finds decisive. Second, the
Court does not even bother to explain the contours of that
standard, and why it was not satisfied in this case. Cf.
ante at 478 U. S. 77 , n.
38 ("We have no occasion in this case to decide what types of
special circumstances could satisfactorily demonstrate that
sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority's
ability to elect its preferred representatives"). Finally, though
couched as a conclusion about a "matter of law," ante at 478 U. S. 77 ,
the Court's abrupt entry of judgment for appellants on District 23
reflects an unwillingness to give the District Court the respect it
is due, particularly when, as in this case, the District Court has
a demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the entire context that
Congress directed it to consider.

Summary: In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to North Carolina's legislative redistricting plan on the basis that it impaired Black citizens' ability to elect representatives of their choice, in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Court held that minority voters must prove that the use of a multimember electoral structure minimizes or cancels out their ability to elect their preferred candidates. The Court applied a "totality of circumstances" test and considered factors such as the success of Black candidates and the extent to which members of a protected class have been elected. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's decision, with specific conclusions varying among the districts in question.