U.S. Supreme Court Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 321 (1987) Arizona v. Hicks No. 86-1027 Argued December 8, 1986 Decided March 3, 1987 480
U.S. 321 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA Syllabus A bullet fired through the floor of respondent's apartment
injured a man on the floor below. Police entered the apartment to
search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons, and
there seized three weapons and discovered a stocking-cap mask.
While there, one of the policemen noticed two sets of expensive
stereo components and, suspecting that they were stolen, read and
recorded their serial numbers -- moving some of them, including a
turntable, to do so -- and phoned in the numbers to headquarters.
Upon learning that the turntable had been taken in an armed
robbery, he seized it immediately. Respondent was subsequently
indicted for the robbery, but the state trial court granted his
motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized, and the
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying upon a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 ,
that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation," the Court of Appeals held
that the policeman's obtaining the serial numbers violated the
Fourth Amendment because it was unrelated to the shooting, the
exigent circumstance that justified the initial entry and search.
Both state courts rejected the contention that the policeman's
actions were justified under the "plain view" doctrine. Held: 1. The policeman's actions come within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment. The mere recording of the serial numbers did not
constitute a "seizure," since it did not meaningfully interfere
with respondent's possessory interest in either the numbers or the
stereo equipment. However, the moving of the equipment was a
"search" separate and apart from the search that was the lawful
objective of entering the apartment. The fact that the search
uncovered nothing of great personal value to respondent is
irrelevant. Pp. 480 U. S.
324 -325.

															2. The "plain view" doctrine does not render the search
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S.
325 -329.

															(a) The policeman's action directed to the stereo equipment was
not ipso facto unreasonable simply because it was
unrelated to the justification for entering the apartment. That
lack of relationship always exists when the "plain view" doctrine
applies. In saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation," Mincey was simply addressing the scope of the primary Page 480 U. S. 322 search itself, and was not overruling the "plain view" doctrine
by implication. Pp. 480 U. S.
325 -326.

															(b) However, the search was invalid because, as the State
concedes, the policeman had only a "reasonable suspicion" -- i.e., less than probable cause to believe -- that the
stereo equipment was stolen. Probable cause is required to invoke
the "plain view" doctrine as it applies to seizures. It would be
illogical to hold that an object is seizable on lesser grounds,
during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed
to obtain a warrant for it if it had been known to be on the
premises. Probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was
also necessary to support the search here, whether legal authority
to move the equipment could be found only as the inevitable
concomitant of the authority to seize it or also as a consequence
of some independent power to search objects in plain view. Pp. 480 U. S.
326 -328.

															3. The policeman's action cannot be upheld on the ground that it
was not a "full-blown search," but was only a "cursory inspection"
that could be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable
cause. A truly cursory inspection -- one that involves merely
looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it
-- is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore
does not even require reasonable suspicion. This Court is unwilling
to create a subcategory of "cursory" searches under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S.
328 -329.

															146 Ariz. 533, 707 P.2d 331, affirmed.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 480 U. S. 329 .
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 330 .
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 480 U. S.
333 . Page 480 U. S. 323 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971), we said that, in certain circumstances, a
warrantless seizure by police of an item that comes within plain
view during their lawful search of a private area may be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 403 U. S.
465 -471 (plurality opinion); id. at 465 U. S.
505 -506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 465 U. S.
521 -522 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). We
granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986), in the present case to
decide whether this "plain view" doctrine may be invoked when the
police have less than probable cause to believe that the item in
question is evidence of a crime or is contraband. I On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of
respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the
apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered respondent's
apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for
weapons. They found and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off
rifle, and in the course of their search also discovered a
stocking-cap mask.

															One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of
expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the
squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. Suspecting
that they were stolen, he read and recorded their serial numbers --
moving some of the components, including a Bang and Olufsen
turntable, in order to do so -- which he then reported by phone to
his headquarters. On being advised that the turntable had been
taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately. It was later
determined that some of the other serial numbers matched those on
other stereo equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a
warrant Page 480 U. S. 324 was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.

															The state trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress
the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona
affirmed. It was conceded that the initial entry and search,
although warrantless, were justified by the exigent circumstance of
the shooting. The Court of Appeals viewed the obtaining of the
serial numbers, however, as an additional search, unrelated to that
exigency. Relying upon a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justify its initiation,'" id. at 437 U. S. 393 (citation omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police
conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence
derived from that conduct to be excluded. 146 Ariz. 533, 534-535,
707 P.2d 331, 332-333 (1985). Both courts -- the trial court
explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary implication --
rejected the State's contention that Officer Nelson's actions were
justified under the "plain view" doctrine of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, supra. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and
the State filed this petition. II As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's
actions constituted neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the mere recording
of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure,
that was the first step in a process by which respondent was
eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself,
however, it did not "meaningfully interfere" with respondent's
possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment,
and therefore did not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U. S. 463 , 472 U. S. 469 (1985).

															Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did
constitute a "search" separate and apart from the search for Page 480 U. S. 325 the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective
of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts of
the turntable that came into view during the latter search would
not have constituted an independent search, because it would have
produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765 , 463 U. S. 771 (1983). But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of
the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of
respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that
validated the entry. This is why, contrary to JUSTICE POWELL's
suggestion, post at 480 U. S. 333 ,
the "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain
view and `moving' it even a few inches" is much more than trivial
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to respondent
-- serial numbers rather than (what might conceivably have been
hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable. III The remaining question is whether the search was "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment.

															On this aspect of the case, we reject, at the outset, the
apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that, because the
officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was unrelated to
the justification for their entry into respondent's apartment, it
was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack of relationship
always exists with regard to action validated under the "plain
view" doctrine; where action is taken for the purpose justifying
the entry, invocation of the doctrine is superfluous. Mincey v.
Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrantless search must be
"strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation," 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 393 (citation omitted), was addressing only the scope of the
primary Page 480 U. S. 326 search itself, and was not overruling by implication the many
cases acknowledging that the "plain view" doctrine can legitimate
action beyond that scope.

															We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of
this case. "It is well established that, under certain
circumstances, the police may seize evidence in plain view
without a warrant," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 465 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include
situations

															"[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within
plain view of such [evidence] is supported . . . by one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement," ibid., such as the exigent circumstances intrusion
here. It would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be
seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for
closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that the search here
was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would have sustained a
seizure of the equipment.

															There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson had
probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. The State
has conceded, however, that he had only a "reasonable suspicion,"
by which it means something less than probable cause. See Brief for Petitioner 18-19. * We have not
ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in order
to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. Dicta in Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S. 587 (1980), suggested that the standard of probable cause must be met,
but our later opinions in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.
S. 730 (1983), explicitly regarded the issue as
unresolved, see id. at 460 U. S. 742 ,
n. 7 (plurality opinion); id. at 460 U. S. 746 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

															We now hold that probable cause is required. To say otherwise
would be to cut the "plain view" doctrine loose from its
theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that doctrine
consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the Page 480 U. S. 327 home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding authority to
make warrantless seizures in public places of such objects as
weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 445 U. S.
586 -587. And the practical justification for that
extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of
the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it
would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk
-- to themselves or to preservation of the evidence -- of going to
obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 403 U. S. 468 (plurality opinion). Dispensing with the need for a warrant is
worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, i.e., the
standard of probable cause. No reason is apparent why an object
should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated
search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a warrant
for that same object if it had been known to be on the
premises.

															We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justified
on less than probable cause. We have held that it can -- where, for
example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational
necessities render it the only practicable means of detecting
certain types of crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehicle suspected to be
transporting illegal aliens); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 , 462 U. S. 709 ,
and n. 9 (1983) (dictum) (seizure of suspected drug dealer's
luggage at airport to permit exposure to specially trained dog). No
special operational necessities are relied on here, however -- but
rather the mere fact that the items in question came lawfully
within the officer's plain view. That alone cannot supplant the
requirement of probable cause.

															The same considerations preclude us from holding that, even
though probable cause would have been necessary for a seizure, the search of objects in plain view that
occurred here Page 480 U. S. 328 could be sustained on lesser grounds. A dwellingplace search, no
less than a dwellingplace seizure, requires probable cause, and
there is no reason in theory or practicality why application of the
"plain view" doctrine would supplant that requirement. Although the
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against
unreasonable searches is quite different from that protected by its
injunction against unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown,
supra, at 460 U. S.
747 -748 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), neither
the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires
only lesser protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical
distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of
justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police
action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular
circumstances before us here. Indeed, to treat searches more
liberally would especially erode the plurality's warning in Coolidge that

															"the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges."

															403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 466 .
In short, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be
found only as an inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize
it, or also as a consequence of some independent power to search
certain objects in plain view, probable cause to believe the
equipment was stolen was required.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent suggests that we uphold the action
here on the ground that it was a "cursory inspection," rather than
a "full-blown search," and could therefore be justified by
reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. As already noted, a
truly cursory inspection -- one that involves merely looking at
what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it -- is not a
"search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even
require reasonable suspicion. We are unwilling to send police and
judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a
creature of uncertain description that is neither a "plain view"
inspection nor Page 480 U. S. 329 yet a "full-blown search." Nothing in the prior opinions of this
Court supports such a distinction, not even the dictum from Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.
S. 557 , 394 U. S. 571 (1969), whose reference to a "mere inspection" describes, in our
view, close observation of what lies in plain sight.

															JUSTICE POWELL's dissent reasonably asks what it is we would
have had Officer Nelson do in these circumstances. Post at 480 U. S. 332 .
The answer depends, of course, upon whether he had probable cause
to conduct a search, a question that was not preserved in this
case. If he had, then he should have done precisely what he did. If
not, then he should have followed up his suspicions, if possible,
by means other than a search -- just as he would have had to do if,
while walking along the street, he had noticed the same suspicious
stereo equipment sitting inside a house a few feet away from him,
beneath an open window. It may well be that, in such circumstances,
no effective means short of a search exist. But there is nothing
new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates
the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.
Our disagreement with the dissenters pertains to where the proper
balance should be struck; we choose to adhere to the textual and
traditional standard of probable cause.

															The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search
violated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have admitted
the evidence thus obtained under the "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. That was not the question on which certiorari
was granted, and we decline to consider it.

															For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of
Arizona is Affirmed. * Contrary to the suggestion in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, post at 480 U. S. 339 ,
this concession precludes our considering whether the probable
cause standard was satisfied in this case.

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I write only to emphasize that this case does not present, and
we have no occasion to address, the so-called "inadvertent Page 480 U. S. 330 discovery" prong of the plain view exception to the Warrant
Clause. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S.
469 -471 (1971) (plurality opinion). This "requirement"
of the plain view doctrine has never been accepted by a judgment
supported by a majority of this Court, and I therefore do not
accept JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent's assertion that evidence seized
in plain view must have been inadvertently discovered in order to
satisfy the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See post at 480 U. S. 334 .
I join the majority opinion today without regard to the
inadvertence of the officers' discovery of the stereo components'
serial numbers. The police officers conducted a search of
respondent's stereo equipment absent probable cause that the
equipment was stolen. It is for this reason that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals of Arizona must be affirmed.

															JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, dissenting.

															I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and write briefly
to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate consequences of the
Court's decision.

															Today the Court holds for the first time that the requirement of
probable cause operates as a separate limitation on the application
of the plain view doctrine. [ Footnote 1 ] The
plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Page 480 U. S. 331 required only that it be

															"immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges." Id. at 403 U. S. 466 (citation omitted). There was no general exploratory search in this
case, and I would not approve such a search. All the pertinent
objects were in plain view, and could be identified as objects
frequently stolen. There was no looking into closets, opening of
drawers or trunks, or other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR
properly emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Post at 480 U. S. 338 .
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an object in
plain view is lawful, ante at 480 U. S. 328 ,
but "moving" or "disturbing" the object to investigate a reasonable
suspicion is not, ante at 480 U. S. 324 , 480 U. S. 328 .
The facts of this case well illustrate the unreasonableness of this
distinction.

															The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue were
stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, articulable
facts. Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the absence of
probable cause. The police lawfully entered respondent's apartment
under exigent circumstances that arose when a bullet fired through
the floor of the apartment struck a man in the apartment below.
What they saw in the apartment hardly suggested that it was
occupied by law-abiding citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol
lay in plain view on the living room floor. During a concededly
lawful search, the officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a
.22-caliber, sawed-off rifle, and a stocking-cap mask. The
apartment was littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The
officers also observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a
type that frequently was stolen. [ Footnote 2 ] Page 480 U. S. 332 It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in these
circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that he lacked
probable cause, he could not have obtained a warrant to seize the
stereo components. Neither could he have remained on the premises
and forcibly prevented their removal. Officer Nelson's testimony
indicates that he was able to read some of the serial numbers
without moving the components. [ Footnote 3 ] To
read the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen turntable, however, he
had to "turn it around or turn it upside down." Id. at 19.
Officer Nelson noted the serial numbers on the stereo components
and telephoned the National Crime Information Center to check them
against the Center's computerized listing of stolen property. The
computer confirmed his suspicion that at least the Bang and Olufsen
turntable had been stolen. On the basis of this information, the
officers obtained a warrant to seize the turntable and other stereo
components that also proved to be stolen.

															The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of the
turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the serial numbers
did not constitute a seizure." Ante at 480 U. S. 324 .
Thus, if the computer had identified as stolen property a component
with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been
admissible. But the Court further holds that "Officer Nelson's
moving of the equipment . . . did constitute a 'search.' . . ." Ibid. It perceives a constitutional distinction between
reading a serial number on an object and moving or picking up an
identical object to see its serial number. To make its position
unmistakably clear, the Court concludes that a "search is a search,
even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable." Ante at 480 U. S. 325 .
With Page 480 U. S. 333 all respect, this distinction between "looking" at a suspicious
object in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes
the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote 4 ] The Court's
new rule will cause uncertainty, and could deter conscientious
police officers from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to
convict guilty persons. Apart from the importance of rationality in
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision may
handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests.
Accordingly, I dissent.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															In Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the plurality opinion expressly declined to

															"address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of suspicion
lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure.
. . ." Id. at 460 U. S. 742 ,
n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in the plurality's view,
requires only facts sufficient to

															"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' . . . that
certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a
belief be correct or more likely true than false." Id. at 460 U. S. 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 (1925)). See also Texas v. Brown, supra, at 460 U. S. 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment) (leaving open the question
whether probable cause is required to inspect objects in plain
view). As the Court recognizes, ante at 480 U. S. 326 ,
the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 , 445 U. S. 587 (1980), are dicta.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson
explained that his suspicion was

															"based on 12 years' worth of police experience. I have worked in
different burglary crimes throughout that period of time and . . .
I'm just very familiar with people converting stolen stereos and
TV's into their own use."

															App. 28-29.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of about a
foot between the back of one set of stereo equipment and the wall. Id. at 20. Presumably this opening was large enough to
permit Officer Nelson to view serial numbers on the backs of the
components without moving them.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have identifying
numbers, including expensive watches and cameras, and also credit
cards. Assume for example that an officer reasonably suspects that
two identical watches, both in plain view, have been stolen. Under
the Court's decision, if one watch is lying face up and the other
lying face down, reading the serial number on one of the watches
would not be a search. But turning over the other watch to read its
serial number would be a search. Moreover, the officer's ability to
read a serial number may depend on its location in a room and light
conditions at a particular time. Would there be a constitutional
difference if an officer, on the basis of a reasonable suspicion,
used a pocket flashlight or turned on a light to read a number,
rather than moving the object to a point where a serial number was
clearly visible?

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE POWELL
join, dissenting.

															The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question.
The Court asks whether the police must have probable cause before
either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown
search of that object, and concludes that they must. I agree. In my
view, however, this case presents a different question: whether
police must have probable cause before conducting a cursory
inspection of an item in plain view. Because I conclude that such
an inspection is reasonable if the police are aware of facts or
circumstances that justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is
evidence of a crime, I would reverse the judgment of the Arizona
Court of Appeals, and therefore dissent. Page 480 U. S. 334 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart summarized three
requirements that the plurality thought must be satisfied for a
plain view search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make
an initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they
can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover
incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it must be
"immediately apparent" to the police that the items they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to
seizure. As another plurality observed in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 460 U. S. 737 (1983), these three requirements have never been expressly adopted
by a majority of this Court, but

															"as the considered opinion of four Members of this Court [the Coolidge plurality] should obviously be the point of
reference for further discussion of the issue."

															There is no dispute in this case that the first two requirements
have been satisfied. The officers were lawfully in the apartment
pursuant to exigent circumstances, and the discovery of the stereo
was inadvertent -- the officers did not " know in advance the
location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,' relying on
the plain view doctrine only as a pretext." Ibid. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 403 U. S.
470 ). Instead, the dispute in this case focuses on the
application of the "immediately apparent" requirement; at issue is
whether a police officer's reasonable suspicion is adequate to
justify a cursory examination of an item in plain view. The purpose of the "immediately apparent" requirement is to
prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 467 .
If an officer could indiscriminately search every item in plain
view, a search justified by a limited purpose -- such as exigent
circumstances -- could be used to eviscerate the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. In order to prevent such a general search,
therefore, we require that the relevance of the item be
"immediately apparent." As Justice Stewart explained: Page 480 U. S. 335 "Of course, the extension of the original justification [for
being present] is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent
to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. Cf. 394 U. S. Georgia, [ 394 U.S.
557 ], 394 U. S. 571 -572 [(1969)]
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)." Id. at 403 U. S.
466 -467.

															Thus, I agree with the Court that, even under the plain view
doctrine, probable cause is required before the police seize an
item, or conduct a full-blown search of evidence in plain view. Ante at 480 U. S.
326 -328. Such a requirement of probable cause will
prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing general searches.
This is not to say, however, that even a mere inspection of a
suspicious item must be supported by probable cause. When a police
officer makes a cursory inspection of a suspicious item in plain
view in order to determine whether it is indeed evidence of a
crime, there is no "exploratory rummaging." Only those items that
the police officer "reasonably suspects" as evidence of a crime may
be inspected, and perhaps more importantly, the scope of such an
inspection is quite limited. In short, if police officers have a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that an object they come across
during the course of a lawful search is evidence of crime, in my
view they may make a cursory examination of the object to verify
their suspicion. If the officers wish to go beyond such a cursory
examination of the object, however, they must have probable
cause.

															This distinction between a full-blown search and seizure of an
item and a mere inspection of the item was first suggested by
Justice Stewart. In his concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), which is cited in Coolidge, Justice Stewart
observed that the federal agents there had acted within the scope
of a lawful warrant in opening the drawers of the defendant's desk.
When they found in one of the drawers not the gambling material
described in the warrant Page 480 U. S. 336 but movie films, they proceeded to exhibit the films on the
defendant's projector, and thereafter arrested the defendant for
possession of obscene matter. Justice Stewart agreed with the
majority that the film had to be suppressed, but in doing so he
suggested that a less intrusive inspection of evidence in plain
view would present a different case:

															"This is not a case where agents, in the course of a lawful
search, came upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal
evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the
contents of the films could not be determined by mere
inspection. " Id. at 394 U. S. 571 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

															Following Justice Stewart's suggestion, the overwhelming
majority of both state and federal courts have held that probable
cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item in plain
view. As Professor LaFave summarizes the view of these courts,

															"the minimal additional intrusion which results from an
inspection or examination of an object in plain view is reasonable
if the officer was first aware of some facts and circumstances
which justify a reasonable suspicion (not probable cause, in the
traditional sense) that the object is or contains a fruit,
instrumentality, or evidence of crime."

															2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.7(b), p. 717 (2d ed. 1987); see also id. at 345 ("It is generally assumed that there
is nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for the
purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or other
identifying characteristics to be found on the surface"). Thus,
while courts require probable cause for more extensive examination,
cursory inspections -- including picking up or moving objects for a
better view -- require only a reasonable suspicion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police
may inspect an item found in plain view to determine whether it is
evidence of crime if they have a reasonable suspicion to believe
that the item is evidence); United States v. Hillyard, 677
F.2d 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982) (police may give suspicious documents
brief perusal if they have a "reasonable suspicion"); United
States v. Wright, 667 Page 480 U. S. 337 F.2d 793, 798 (CA9 1982) ("[A]n officer may conduct such an
examination if he at least has a reasonable suspicion' to
believe that the discovered item is evidence"); United States
v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ("Police officers are
not required to ignore the significance of items in plain view even
when the full import of the objects cannot be positively
ascertained without some examination"); United States v.
Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257-1258, and n. 8 (CA2 1979) (Friendly,
J.) (same). Indeed, several state courts have applied a reasonable suspicion
standard in factual circumstances almost identical to this case. See, e.g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis.2d 443, 343 N.W.2d
391 (1984) (officer, upon seeing television, could check serial
numbers); State v. Riedinger, 374
N.W.2d 866 (ND 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs,
could check serial number of microwave oven); People v.
Dorris, 110 Ill.App.3d 660, 442 N.E.2d 951 (1982) (police may
note account number of deposit slip because, when the police have a
reasonable suspicion that an item in plain view is stolen property,
the minimal additional intrusion of checking external
identification numbers is proper); State v. Proctor, 12
Wash. App. 274, 529 P.2d 472 (1974) (upholding police notation of
serial numbers on calculators); People v. Eddington, 23
Mich.App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970) (upholding examination of
heels of shoes), rev'd on other grounds, 387 Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d
297 (1972).

															This distinction between searches based on their relative
intrusiveness -- and its subsequent adoption by a consensus of
American courts -- is entirely consistent with our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. We have long recognized that searches can vary in
intrusiveness, and that some brief searches

															"may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests
that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a
[search] based only on specific articulable facts"

															that the item in question is contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v.
Place , 462 U. S. 696 , 462 U. S.
706 Page 480 U. S. 338 (1983). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.
S. 648 , 440 U. S. 654 (1979), we held that the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice should be judged by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests. Thus,

															"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U. S. 325 , 469 U. S. 341 (1986). The governmental interests considered include crime
prevention and detection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 22 (1968). The test is whether these law enforcement interests are
sufficiently "substantial," not, as the Court would have it,
whether

															"operational necessities render [a standard less than probable
cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types of
crimes." Ante at 480 U. S. 327 . See United States v. Place, supra, at 462 U. S.
704 .

															In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy
interests strongly supports a reasonable suspicion standard for the
cursory examination of items in plain view. The additional
intrusion caused by an inspection of an item in plain view for its
serial number is minuscule. Indeed, the intrusion in this case was
even more transitory and less intrusive than the seizure of luggage
from a suspected drug dealer in United States v. Place,
supra, and the "severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security" in Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S.
24 -25.

															Weighed against this minimal additional invasion of privacy are
rather major gains in law enforcement. The use of identification
numbers in tracing stolen property is a powerful law enforcement
tool. Serial numbers are far more helpful and accurate in detecting
stolen property than simple police recollection of the evidence. Cf. New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106 , 475 U. S. 111 (1986) (observing importance of vehicle identification numbers).
Given the prevalence of mass-produced Page 480 U. S. 339 goods in our national economy, a serial number is often the only
sure method of detecting stolen property. The balance of
governmental and private interests strongly supports the view,
accepted by a majority of courts, that a standard of reasonable
suspicion meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

															Unfortunately, in its desire to establish a "bright-line" test,
the Court has taken a step that ignores a substantial body of
precedent and that places serious roadblocks to reasonable law
enforcement practices. Indeed, in this case no warrant to search
the stereo equipment for its serial number could have been obtained
by the officers based on reasonable suspicion alone, and, in the
Court's view, the officers may not even move the stereo turntable
to examine its serial number. The theoretical advantages of the
"search is a search" approach adopted by the Court today are simply
too remote to justify the tangible and severe damage it inflicts on
legitimate and effective law enforcement.

															Even if probable cause were the appropriate standard, I have
little doubt that it was satisfied here. When police officers,
during the course of a search inquiring into grievously unlawful
activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off rifle and a
stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two sets of stereo
equipment that are both inordinately expensive in relation to their
surroundings and known to be favored targets of larcenous activity,
the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause has been
satisfied. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 742 (plurality opinion).

															Because the Court today ignores the existence of probable cause,
and in doing so upsets a widely accepted body of precedent on the
standard of reasonableness for the cursory examination of evidence
in plain view, I respectfully dissent.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Arizona v. Hicks (1987):

Issue: Whether a police officer's moving of stereo equipment to record serial numbers during a warrantless search of a home, which was justified by exigent circumstances, violated the Fourth Amendment.

Holding: Yes, the officer's actions violated the Fourth Amendment. While recording serial numbers did not constitute a "seizure," the act of moving the equipment constituted a separate "search" unrelated to the initial lawful objective of the search. The "plain view" doctrine did not apply because the officer only had a "reasonable suspicion" rather than probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen. Therefore, the search was invalid.

Impact: The case sets a precedent for when the "plain view" doctrine can be applied during a warrantless search and clarifies that probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, is required for such searches.