U.S. Supreme Court Head Money Cases, 112
U.S. 580 (1884) Head Money Cases Argued November 19, 20,
1884 Decided December 8,
1884 112
U.S. 580 I N ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK Syllabus The act of Congress of August 8, 1882, "to regulate
immigration," which imposes upon the owners of steam or sailing
vessels who shall bring passengers from a foreign port into a port
of the United States, a duty of fifty Page 112 U. S. 581 cents for every such passenger not a citizen of this country, is
a valid exercise of the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations.

															Though the previous cases in this court on that subject related
to State statutes only, they held those statutes void on the ground
that authority to enact them was vested exclusively in Congress by
the Constitution, and necessarily decided that, when Congress did
pass such a statute, which it has done in this case, it would be
valid.

															The contribution levied on the ship owner by this statue is
designed to mitigate the evils incident to immigration from abroad
by raising a fund for that purpose, and it is not, in the sense of
the Constitution, a tax subject to the limitations imposed by that
instrument on the general taxing power of Congress.

															A tax is uniform, within the meaning of the constitutional
provision on that subject, when it operates with the same effect in
all places where the subject of it is found, and is not wanting in
such uniformity because the thing taxed is not equally distributed
in all parts of the United States.

															A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations, and
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor and the
interest of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail,
its infraction becomes the subject of international reclamation and
negotiation, which may lead to war to enforce them. With this,
judicial courts have nothing to do.

															But a treaty may also confer private rights on citizens or
subjects of the contracting powers which are of a nature to be
enforced in n court of justice, and which, in cases otherwise
cognizable in such courts, furnish rules of decision. The
Constitution of the United States makes the treaty, while in force,
a part of the supreme law of the land in all courts where such
rights are to be tried.

															But in this respect, so far as the provisions of a treaty can
become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of the
country, they are subject to such acts as Congress may pass for
their enforcement, modification, or repeal.

															These suits were brought to recover back sums collected at
various times as duties on immigrants arriving in the United
States, under the provision of the act of August 3, 1882, 23 Stat.
21,

															"that there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of fifty
cents for each and every passenger not a citizen of the United
States, who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port
to any port within the United States."

															Protests were filed against each payment, and all other steps
required as foundations for the actions were taken. In the Edye
Case, there was a trial, jury being waived, a finding of facts, a
judgment, and exceptions. 18 Fed.Rep. 13. In the Cunard Cases,
judgment was entered in favor of the collector Page 112 U. S. 582 on demurrer to the complaints. The causes were brought here on
writs of error. Page 112 U. S. 586 MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

															These cases all involve the same questions of law, and have been
argued before this court together.

															The case at the head of the list presents all the facts in the
form of an agreed statement signed by counsel, and it therefore
brings the questions before us very fully. The other two were
decided by the Circuit Court on demurrer to the declaration.

															They will be disposed of here in one opinion, which will have
reference to the case as made by the record in Edye &
Another v. Robertson. The suit is brought to recover from Robertson the sum of money
received by him, as collector of the port of New York, from
plaintiffs on account of their landing in that port passengers from
foreign ports, not citizens of the United States, at the rate of
fifty cents for each of such passengers, under the act of Congress
of August 3, 1882, entitled " An Act to regulate immigration."

															The petition of plaintiffs and the agreed facts, which are Page 112 U. S. 587 also made the finding of the court to which the case was
submitted without a jury, are the same with regard to each of many
arrivals of vessels of the plaintiffs, except as to the name of the
vessel and the number and age of the passengers. The statement as
to the arrival first named, which is here given, will be sufficient
for them all for the purposes of this opinion.

															The following are admitted to be the facts in this action:

															"I. That the plaintiffs are partners in trade in the city of New
York under the firm name of Funch, Edye & Co., and carry on the
business of transporting passengers and freight upon the high seas
between Holland and the United States of America as consignees and
agents."

															"That on the 2d day of October, 1882, there arrived, consigned
to the plaintiffs, the Dutch ship Leerdam, owned by certain
citizens or subjects of the Kingdom of Holland and belonging to the
nationality of Holland, at the port of New York. She had sailed
from the foreign port of Rotterdam, in Holland, bound to New York,
and carried 382 persons not citizens of tile United States."

															"That, among said 382 persons, 20 were severally under the age
of one year, and 9 were severally between the ages of one year and
eight years."

															"That, upon the arrival of said steamship Leerdam within the
collection district of New York, the master thereof gave, in
pursuance to section nine of the passenger act of 1882, and
delivered to the custom house officer, who first came on board the
vessel and made demand therefor, a correct list, signed by the
master, of all the passengers taken on board of said Leerdam at
said Rotterdam, specifying separately the names of the cabin
passengers, their age, sex, calling, and the country of which they
are citizens, and also the name, age, sex, calling, and native
country of each emigrant passenger or passengers other than cabin
passengers, and their intended destination or location, and in all
other respects complying with said ninth section, and a duplicate
of the aforesaid list of passengers, verified by the oath of the
master, was, with the manifest of the cargo, delivered by the
master to the defendant as collector Page 112 U. S. 588 of customs of the port of New York on the entry of said
vessel."

															"That it appears from the said list of passengers and duplicate
that the said 382 persons were each and every one subjects of
Holland or other foreign powers in treaty of peace, amity, and
commerce with the United States."

															"That the said passenger manifest also states the total number
of passengers, and shows that 20 of them were under one year of
age, and 59 between the ages of one year and eight years."

															"That said collector, before allowing complete entry of said
vessel, as collector decided, on the 12th day of October, 1882,
that the plaintiffs must pay a duty of one hundred and ninety-one
dollars for said passengers, being fifty cents for each of said 382
passengers."

															"That, by the regulations of the Treasury Department, the
nonpayment of said 191 dollars would have permitted the defendant
to refuse the complete entry of the vessel, or to refuse to give
her a clearance from the port of New York to her home port, and
such imposition would have created an apparent lien on said vessel
for said sum of 191 dollars."

															"On the defendants' making such demand, the plaintiffs paid the
same and protested against the payment thereof."

															"That a copy of the protest in regard to said Leerdam is annexed
to the complaint, marked No. 1, and is a correct copy of the
protest."

															"That, on the same day, the plaintiffs duly appealed to the
Secretary of the Treasury from such decision of the collector, and
that the paper marked Appeal No. 2, annexed to the complaint, is a
copy of said appeal."

															"On the 18th of October, 1882, the Secretary of the Treasury
sustained the action of the defendant, and this action is brought
within ninety days after the rendering of such decision."

															"That the payment set forth in the complaint herein was levied
and collected by defendant, and the same was paid under and in
pursuance of an act of Congress, entitled 'An Act to regulate
Immigration,' approved August 3, 1882. " Page 112 U. S. 589 On the facts as thus agreed and as found by the Circuit Court, a
judgment was rendered in favor of defendant, which we are called
upon to review.

															There is no complaint by plaintiffs that the defendant violated
this act in any respect but one, namely, that it did not authorize
him to demand anything for the twenty children under one year old,
and for the fifty-nine who were between the ages of one year and
eight years.

															The supposed exception of this class of passengers does not
arise out of any language found in this act to regulate
immigration, nor any policy on which it is founded, but it is based
by counsel on a provision of an act approved one day earlier than
this, entitled "An Act to regulate the carriage of passengers by
sea." This provision limits the number of passengers which the
vessel may carry by the number of cubic feet of space in which they
are to be carried, and it declares that, in making this
calculation, children of the ages mentioned need not be counted. In
reference to the space they will occupy, this principle is
reasonable. But, as regards the purpose of the immigration act to
raise a fund for the sick, the poor, and the helpless immigrants,
children are as likely to require its aid as adults, probably more
so. They are certainly within the definition of the word passenger
when otherwise within the purview of the act. They are certainly
within the definition of the word "passenger" when otherwise within
the purview of the act. This branch of the case requires no further
consideration.

															The other errors assigned, however numerous or in whatever
language presented, all rest on the proposition that the act of
Congress requiring the collector to demand and receive from the
master, owner, or consignee of each vessel arriving from a foreign
port fifty cents for every passenger whom he brings into a port of
the United States who is not a citizen, is without warrant in the
Constitution, and is void.

															The substance of the act is found in its first section,
namely:

															" An Act to Regulate Immigration" " Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there
shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents Page 112 U. S. 590 for each and every passenger, not a citizen of the United
States, who shall come by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port
to any port within the United States. The said duty shall be paid
to the collector of customs of the port to which such passenger
shall come, or if there be no collector at such port, then to the
collector of customs nearest thereto, by the master, owner, agent,
or consignee of every such vessel, within twenty-four hours after
the entry thereof into such port. The money thus collected shall be
paid into the United States Treasury, and shall constitute a fund
to be called the immigrant fund, and shall be used, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to defray the expense
of regulating immigration under this act, and for the care of
immigrants arriving in the United States, for the relief of such as
are in distress, and for the general purposes and expenses of
carrying this act into effect."

															22 Stat. 214.

															The act further authorizes the Secretary to use the aid of any
State organization or officer for carrying into effect the
beneficent objects of this law by distributing the fund in
accordance with the purpose for which it was raised, not exceeding
in any port the sum received from it, under rules and regulations
to be prescribed by him. It directs that such officers shall go on
board vessels arriving from abroad, and if, on examination, they
shall find any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge,
they shall report to the collector, and such person shall not be
permitted to land.

															It is also enacted that convicts, except for political offences,
shall be returned to the nations to which they belong. And the
Secretary is directed to prepare rules for the protection of the
immigrant who needs it, and for the return of those who are not
permitted to land.

															This act of Congress is similar in its essential features to
many statutes enacted by States of the Union for the protection of
their own citizens and for the good of the immigrants who land at
seaports within their borders.

															That the purpose of these statutes is humane, is highly
beneficial to the poor and helpless immigrant, and is essential
to Page 112 U. S. 591 the protection of the people in whose midst they are deposited
by the steamships, is beyond dispute. That the power to pass such
laws should exist in some legislative body in this country is
equally clear. This court has decided distinctly and frequently,
and always after a full hearing from able counsel, that it does not
belong to the States. That decision did not rest in any case on the
ground that the State and its people were not deeply interested in
the existence and enforcement of such laws, and were not capable of
enforcing them if they had the power to enact them, but on the
ground that the Constitution, in the division of powers which it
declares between the States and the general government, has
conferred this power on the latter to the exclusion of the former.
We are now asked to decide that it does not exist in Congress,
which is to hold that it does not exist at all -- that the framers
of the Constitution have so worded that remarkable instrument that
the ships of all nations, including our own, can, without restraint
or regulation, deposit here, if they find it to their interest to
do so, the entire European population of criminals, paupers, and
diseased persons without making any provision to preserve them from
starvation and its concomitant sufferings even for the first few
days after they have left the vessel.

															This court is not only asked to decide this, but it is asked to
overrule its decision, several times made with unanimity, that the
power does reside in Congress, is conferred upon that body by the
express language of the Constitution, and the attention of Congress
directed to the duty which arises from that language to pass the
very law which is here in question.

															That these statutes are regulations of commerce -- of commerce
with foreign nations -- is conceded in the argument in this case,
and that they constitute a regulation of that class which belongs
exclusively to Congress is held in all the cases in this court. It
is upon these propositions that the court has decided in all these
cases that the State laws are void. Let us examine those decisions
for a moment.

															In the Passenger Cases, so called, the report of which
occupies the pages of 7 Howard from page 48 U. S. 283 to 48 U. S. 573 ,
mostly with opinions of the judges, the order of the court is
that

															"it is the Page 112 U. S. 592 opinion of this court that the statute law of New York, by which
the health commissioner of the city of New York is declared
entitled to demand and receive from the master of every vessel from
a foreign port that should arrive in the port of said city the sum
of one dollar for each steerage passenger brought in such vessel,
is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
therefore void."

															An examination of the opinions of the judges shows that, if the
majority agreed upon any one reason for this order, it was because
the law was a regulation of commerce, the power over which that
Constitution had placed exclusively in Congress. The same
examination will show that several judges denied this because they
held that this power belonged to the class which the States might
exercise until it was assumed by Congress. It is very clear that,
if any such act of Congress had existed then as the one now before
us, the decision of the court would have been nearer to
unanimity.

															In the case of Henderson v. The Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259 , the
whole subject is reviewed, and, in the light of the division in
this court in the Passenger Cases, it is considered, on
principle, as if for the first time. In that case, after the
statute of New York had been modified in such a manner as was
supposed to remove the objections held good against it in the Passenger Cases, the question of its constitutional
validity was again brought before this court, when it was held void
by the unanimous judgment of all its members. And this was upon the
distinct ground that it was a regulation of commerce solely within
the power of Congress.

															"As already indicated," says the court,

															"the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on
which the principal reliance is placed to make void the statute of
New York is that which gives to Congress the right 'to regulate
commerce with foreign nations.'"

															The court then, referring to the transportation of passengers
from European ports to those of the United States, says:

															"It has become a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of
vast interest to this country as well as to the immigrants who come
among us, to find a welcome and a home within our borders. . .
. Page 112 U. S. 593 Is the regulation of this great system a regulation of commerce?
Can it be doubted that a law which prescribes the terms on which
vessels shall engage in it is a law regulating this branch of
commerce?"

															The court adds:

															"We are of opinion that this whole subject has been confided to
Congress by the Constitution; that Congress can more appropriately
and with more acceptance exercise it than any other body known to
our law, State or national; that, by providing a system of laws in
these matters, applicable to all ports and to all vessels, a
serious question, which has long been matter of contest and
complaint, may be effectually and satisfactorily settled."

															And, for this reason, the statute of New York was held void.

															In the case of the Commissioners of Immigration v. North
German Lloyd, 92 U. S. 259 , a
similar statute of Louisiana was held void for the same reason. And
in the case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S.
275 , decided at the same term, the statute of California
on the same subject was also held void because, in the language of
the headnote to the report, it "invades the right of Congress to
regulate commerce with foreign nations."

															In the case of People v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59 , where
the State of New York, having again modified her statute, it was
again held void, the court said:

															"It has been so repeatedly decided by this court that such a tax
as this is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, confided
by the Constitution to the exclusive control of Congress"

															(referring to the cases just cited), "that there is little to
say beyond affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, which was
based on those decisions "

															It cannot be said that these cases do not govern the present,
though there was not then before us any act of Congress whose
validity was in question, for the decisions rest upon the ground
that the State statutes were void only because Congress, and not
the States, was authorized by the Constitution to pass them, and
for the reason that Congress could enact such laws, and for that
reason alone were the acts of the State held void. It was,
therefore, of the essence of the decision which held the Page 112 U. S. 594 State statutes invalid, that a similar statute by Congress would
be valid.

															We are not disposed to reconsider those cases, or to resort to
other reasons for holding that they were well decided. Nor do we
feel that further argument in support of them is needed.

															But counsel for plaintiffs, assuming that Congress, in the
enactment of this law, is exercising the taxing power conferred by
the first clause of section of article I of the Constitution, and
can derive no aid in support of its action from any other grant of
power in that instrument, argues that all the restraints and
qualifications found there in regard to any form of taxation are
limitations upon the exercise of the power in this case. The clause
is in the following language:

															"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and the general welfare of the United States; but all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."

															In this view, it is objected that the tax is not levied to
provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States, and that it is not uniform throughout the United
States.

															The uniformity here prescribed has reference to the various
localities in which the tax is intended to operate. "It shall be
uniform throughout the United States." Is the tax on tobacco void
because, in many of the States, no tobacco is raised or
manufactured? Is the tax on distilled spirits void because a few
States pay three-fourths of the revenue arising from it?

															The tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject of it is found. The tax in
this case, which, as far as it can be called a tax, is an excise
duty on the business of bringing passengers from foreign countries
into this, by ocean navigation, is uniform and operates precisely
alike in every port of the United States where such passengers can
be landed. It is said that the statute violates the rule of
uniformity and the provision of the Constitution that

															"no preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or
revenue to the ports of one State over those of Page 112 U. S. 595 another"

															because it does not apply to passengers arriving in this country
by railroad or other inland mode of conveyance. But the law applies
to all ports alike, and evidently gives no preference to one over
another, but is uniform in its operation in all ports of the United
States. It may be added that the evil to be remedied by this
legislation has no existence on our inland borders, and immigration
in that quarter needed no such regulation. Perfect uniformity and
perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human
mind can view it, is a baseless dream, as this court has said more
than once. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S.
575 , 92 U. S. 612 .
Here, there is substantial uniformity within the meaning and
purpose of the Constitution.

															If it were necessary to prove that the imposition of this
contribution on owners of ships is made for the general welfare of
the United States, it would not be difficult to show that it is so,
and particularly that it is among the means which Congress may deem
necessary and proper for that purpose, and beyond this we are not
permitted to inquire.

															But the true answer to all these objections is that the power
exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The burden
imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of
the regulation of commerce -- of that branch of foreign commerce
which is involved in immigration. The title of the act, "An Act to
regulate immigration," is well chosen. It describes, as well as any
short sentence can describe it, the real purpose and effect of the
statute. Its provisions, from beginning to end, relate to the
subject of immigration, and they are aptly designed to mitigate the
evils inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to this
country, as those evils affect both the immigrant and the people
among whom he is suddenly brought and left to his own
resources.

															It is true, not much is said about protecting the ship owner.
But he is the man who reaps the profit from the transaction, who
has the means to protect himself, and knows well how to do it, and
whose obligations in the premises need the aid of the statute for
their enforcement. The sum demanded of him is not, therefore,
strictly speaking, a tax or duty within the Page 112 U. S. 596 meaning of the Constitution. The money thus raised, though paid
into the Treasury, is appropriated in advance to the uses of the
statute, and does not go to the general support of the government.
It constitutes a fund raised from those who are engaged in the
transportation of these passengers, and who make profit out of it,
for the temporary care of the passengers whom they bring among us
and for the protection of the citizens among whom they are
landed.

															If this is an expedient regulation of commerce by Congress, and
the end to be attained is one falling within that power, the act is
not void, because, within a loose and more extended sense than was
used in the Constitution, it is called a tax. In the case of Veazie Bank v.
Fenno , 8 Wall. 533, 75 U. S. 549 ,
the enormous tax of eight percent per annum on the circulation of
State banks, which was designed and did have the effect to drive
all such circulation out of existence, was upheld because it was a
means properly adopted by Congress to protect the currency which it
had created, namely, the legal tender notes and the notes of the
national banks. It was not subject, therefore, to the rules which
would invalidate an ordinary, tax pure and simple.

															So also, in the case of the Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 , the
city of Keokuk, having by ordinance imposed a wharfage fee or tax
for the use of a wharf owned by the city, the amount of which was
regulated by the tonnage of the vessel, this was held not to be a
tonnage tax within the meaning of the constitutional provision that
"no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage." The reason of this is that, though it was a burden, or
tax, in some sense, and measured by the tonnage of the vessel, it
was but a charge for services rendered, or for conveniences
furnished by the city, and was not a tonnage tax within the meaning
of the Constitution. This principle was reaffirmed in the case of Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423 .

															We are clearly of opinion that, in the exercise of its power to
regulate immigration, and in the very act of exercising that power,
it was competent for Congress to impose this contribution on the
ship owner engaged in that business. Page 112 U. S. 597 Another objection to the validity of this act of Congress is
that it violates provisions contained in numerous treaties of our
government with friendly nations, and several of the articles of
these treaties are annexed to the careful brief of counsel. We are
not satisfied that this act of Congress violates any of these
treaties on any just construction of them. Though laws similar to
this have long been enforced by the State of New York, in the great
metropolis of foreign trade where four-fifths of these passengers
have been landed, no complaint has been made by any foreign nation
to ours of the violation of treaty obligations by the enforcement
of those laws.

															But we do not place the defence of the act of Congress against
this objection upon that suggestion.

															We are of opinion that, so far as the provisions in that act may
be found to be in conflict with any treaty with a foreign nation,
they must prevail in all the judicial courts of this country. We
had supposed that the question here raised was set at rest in this
court by the decision in the case of The
Cherokee Tobacco , 11 Wall. 616. It is true, as
suggested by counsel, that three judges of the court did not sit in
the case, and two others dissented. But six judges took part in the
decision, and the two who dissented placed that dissent upon the
ground that Congress did not intend that the tax on tobacco should
extend to the Cherokee tribe. They referred to the existence of the
treaty which would be violated if the statute was so construed as
persuasive against such a construction, but they nowhere intimated
that, if the statute was correctly construed by the court, it was
void because it conflicted with the treaty, which they would have
done if they had held that view. On the point now in controversy,
it was therefore the opinion of all the judges who heard the case. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.
S. 621 -623.

															The precise question involved here, namely, a supposed conflict
between an act of Congress imposing a customs duty and a treaty
with Russia on that subject, in force when the act was passed, came
before the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts in 1855.
It received the consideration of that eminent jurist Mr. Justice
Curtis of this court, who, in a very learned Page 112 U. S. 598 opinion, exhausted the sources of argument on the subject,
holding that, if there were such conflict, the act of Congress must
prevail in a judicial forum. Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis
454. And Mr. Justice Field, in a very recent case in the Ninth
Circuit, that of Ah Lung, 18 Fed.Rep. 28, on a writ of
habeas corpus, has delivered an opinion sustaining the same
doctrine in reference to a statute regulating the immigration of
Chinamen into this country. In the Clinton Bridge Case, Woolworth 150, 156, the writer of this opinion expressed the same
views as did Judge Woodruff, on full consideration, in Ropes v.
Clinch, 8 Blatchford 304, and Judge Wallace, in the same
circuit, in Bartram v. Robertson, 15 Fed.Rep. 212.

															It is very difficult to understand how any different doctrine
can be sustained.

															A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these
fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses
to seek redress, which may, in the end, be enforced by actual war.
It is obvious that, with all this, the judicial courts have nothing
to do, and can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain
provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits
of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law and
which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the
courts of the country. An illustration of this character is found
in treaties which regulate the mutual rights of citizens and
subjects of the contracting nations in regard to rights of property
by descent or inheritance when the individuals concerned are
aliens. The Constitution of the United States places such
provisions as these in the same category as other laws of Congress
by its declaration that

															"this Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and
all treaties made or which shall be made under authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land."

															A treaty, then, is a law of the land, as an act of Congress is
whenever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private Page 112 U. S. 599 citizen or subject may be determined. And when such rights are
of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice, that court
resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it
as it would to a statute.

															But, even in this aspect of the case, there is nothing in this
law which makes it irrepealable or unchangeable. The Constitution
gives it no superiority over an act of Congress in this respect,
which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date. Nor is
there anything in its essential character, or in the branches of
the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this
superior sanctity.

															A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are
made by the President, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives. The addition of the latter body to the other two
in making a law certainly does not render it less entitled to
respect in the matter of its repeal or modification than a treaty
made by the other two. If there be any difference in this regard,
it would seem to be in favor of an act in which all three of the
bodies participate. And such is, in fact, the case in a declaration
of war, which must be made by Congress and which, when made,
usually suspends or destroys existing treaties between the nations
thus at war.

															In short, we are of opinion that, so far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to
such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification,
or repeal.

															Other objections are made to this statute. Some of these relate
not to the power of Congress to pass the act, but to the expediency
or justice of the measure, of which Congress, and not the courts,
are the sole judges -- such as its unequal operation on persons not
paupers or criminals and its effect in compelling the ultimate
payment of the sum demanded for each passenger by that passenger
himself. Also that the money is to be drawn from the Treasury
without an appropriation by Congress. The act itself makes the
appropriation, and, even if this be not warranted by the
Constitution, it does not make void the demand for contribution,
which may yet be appropriated Page 112 U. S. 600 by Congress, if that be necessary, by another statute.

															It is enough to say that, Congress having the power to pass a
law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country
with foreign nations, we see nothing in the statute by which it has
here exercised that power forbidden by any other part of the
Constitution.

															The judgment of the Circuit Court in all the cases is Affirmed.

Summary: The Head Money Cases (1884) centered on an 1882 act of Congress that imposed a duty of 50 cents on ship owners for every passenger they brought into US ports from foreign ports who was not a US citizen. The Supreme Court upheld the act as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The Court further ruled that the contribution levied by the statute was not a tax in the constitutional sense and did not violate treaty provisions. While treaties are part of the supreme law of the land, they are subject to acts of Congress for their enforcement, modification, or repeal. The Court affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, finding that Congress had the power to regulate immigration as part of its authority over foreign commerce.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the United States Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme
Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal
errors.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–1078

															_________________

															WARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS v. SHERMAN NEALY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[May 9, 2024]

															Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The Copyright Act’s statute of limitations
provides that a copyright owner must bring an infringement claim
within three years of its accrual. See 17 U. S. C.
§507(b). In this case, we assume without deciding that a claim is
timely under that provision if brought within three years of when
the plaintiff discovered an infringement, no matter when the
infringement happened. We then consider whether a claim satisfying
that rule is subject to another time-based limit—this one,
preventing the recovery of damages for any infringement that
occurred more than three years before a lawsuit’s filing. We hold
that no such limit on damages exists. The Copyright Act entitles a
copyright owner to recover damages for any timely claim.

															I

															This dispute had its start in a decades-old,
short-lived music venture. In 1983, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler
formed Music Specialist, Inc. That company recorded and released
one album and several singles, including the works at issue. But
the collaboration dissolved a few years later. And Nealy soon
afterward went to prison for drug-related offenses. He served one
prison term from 1989 to 2008, and another from 2012 to 2015.

															Meanwhile, Butler (unbeknownst to Nealy) entered
into an agreement with Warner Chappell Music, Inc. to license works
from the Music Specialist catalog. And Warner Chappell found quite
a few takers. One Music Specialist work (“Jam the Box”) was
interpolated into Flo Rida’s hit song “In the Ayer,” which sold
millions of copies and reached No. 9 on the Billboard chart. Use of
that song was in turn licensed to several popular television shows,
including “So You Think You Can Dance.” Other Music Specialist
songs found their way into recordings by the Black Eyed Peas and
Kid Sister.

															In 2018, following his second prison stint,
Nealy sued Warner Chappell for copyright infringement. Nealy
alleged that he held the copyrights to Music Specialist’s songs and
that Warner Chappell’s licensing activities infringed his rights.
The infringing activity, Nealy claimed, dated back to 2008—so ten
years before he brought suit. Nealy sought damages and profits for
the alleged misconduct, as the Copyright Act authorizes. See
§504.

															For his claims to proceed, Nealy had to show
they were timely. Under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff must file
suit “within three years after the claim accrued.” §507(b). On one
understanding of that limitations provision, a copyright claim
“accrue[s]” when “an infringing act occurs.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. , 572 U.S.
663 , 670 (2014). So a plaintiff can complain about
infringements going back only three years from the time he filed
suit. If that rule governed, many of Nealy’s claims would be
untimely, because they alleged infringements occurring as much as
ten years earlier. But under an alternative view of the Act’s
limitations provision, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff
discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the
infringing act. Ibid. , n. 4. That so-called discovery
rule, used in the Circuit where Nealy sued, enables a diligent
plaintiff to raise claims about even very old infringements if he
discovered them within the prior three years. Nealy urged that all
his claims were timely under that rule because he did not learn of
Warner Chappell’s infringing conduct until 2016—just after he got
out of prison and less than three years before he sued.

															In the District Court, though, Nealy ran into a
different timing objection, related not to his ability to bring
suit but to his recovery of damages. Warner Chappell accepted that
the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. But
it argued that even if Nealy could sue under that rule for
infringements going back ten years, he could recover damages or
profits for only those occurring in the last three. The District
Court agreed. Relying on a decision from the Second Circuit, the
court held that even when claims for old infringements are timely,
monetary relief is “limited” to “the three years prior to the
filing” of the action. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a (citing Sohm v. Scholastic Inc. , 959 F.3d 39, 51–52 (CA2
2020)). So Nealy could bring claims for infringing acts beyond that
three-year period, but could not recover any money for them.
Appreciating the impact of that ruling, the District Court
certified it for interlocutory appeal. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
36a; 28 U. S. C. §1292(b).

															The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a
timely claim. The court “assume[d] for the purposes of answering”
the certified question that all of Nealy’s claims were “timely
under the discovery rule.” 60 F. 4th 1325, 1331 (2023). And on
that assumption, the court ruled, he could recover full damages.
Allying itself with the Ninth rather than the Second Circuit, the
court held that a plaintiff with a timely claim under the discovery
rule may obtain “retrospective relief for [an] infringement” even
if it “occurr[ed] more than three years before the lawsuit’s
filing.” Ibid. (citing Starz Entertainment v. MGM , 39 F. 4th 1236, 1244 (CA9 2022)). “[T]he plain
text of the Copyright Act,” the Eleventh Circuit stated, “does not
support the existence of a separate damages bar for an otherwise
timely copyright claim.” 60 F. 4th, at 1334. And imposing such
a bar, the court reasoned, “would gut the discovery rule by
eliminating any meaningful relief ” for the very claims it is
designed to preserve. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 600 U. S. ___
(2023), to resolve the Circuit split noted above, and we now affirm
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.

															II

															The question on which this Court granted
certiorari is “[w]hether, under the discovery accrual rule applied
by the circuit courts,” a copyright plaintiff “can recover damages
for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the
filing of a lawsuit.” Ibid. That question, which the Court
substituted for Warner Chappell’s, incorporates an assumption: that
the discovery rule governs the timeliness of copyright claims. We
have never decided whether that assumption is valid— i.e. ,
whether a copyright claim accrues when a plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered an infringement, rather than when the
infringement happened. See Petrella , 572 U. S., at 670,
n. 4. But that issue is not properly presented here, because
Warner Chappell never challenged the Eleventh Circuit’s use of the
discovery rule below. See supra , at 3; cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S.
709 , 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of
first view”). And as noted above, a division exists among the many
Courts of Appeals applying a copyright discovery rule (11 at last
count) about whether to superimpose a three-year limit on damages.
See supra , at 3–4; Petrella , 572 U. S., at 670,
n. 4; Pet. for Cert. 4. We therefore confined our review to
that disputed remedial issue, excluding consideration of the
discovery rule and asking only whether a plaintiff with a timely
claim under the rule can get damages going back more than three
years.[ 1 ]

															The text of the Copyright Act answers that
question in favor of copyright plaintiffs. The Act’s statute of
limitations provides in full: “No civil action shall be maintained
under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.” §507(b); see supra , at
2. That provision establishes a three-year period for filing suit,
beginning to run when a claim accrues—here, we assume, upon its
discovery. And that clock is a singular one. The “time-to-sue
prescription,” as we have called it, establishes no separate
three-year period for recovering damages, this one running from the
date of infringement. Petrella , 572 U. S., at 686. If
any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s
remedial sections. But those provisions likewise do not aid a
long-ago infringer. They state without qualification that an
infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s
actual damages and the infringer’s profits. See §504(a)–(c). There
is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner
possessing a timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages,
no matter when the infringement occurred.

															The Second Circuit’s contrary view, on top of
having no textual support, is essentially self-defeating. With one
hand, that court recognizes a discovery rule, thus enabling some
copyright owners to sue for infringing acts occurring more than
three years earlier. And with the other hand, the court takes away
the value in what it has conferred, by preventing the recovery of
damages for those older infringements. As the court below noted,
the three-year damages bar thus “gut[s]” or “silently eliminate[s]”
the discovery rule. 60 F. 4th, at 1333–1334; see supra ,
at 4. Or said another way, the damages bar makes the discovery rule
functionally equivalent to its opposite number—an accrual rule
based on the timing of an infringement.[ 2 ] As noted above, we do not resolve today which of those
two rules should govern a copyright claim’s timeliness. See supra , at 4. But we reject applying a judicially invented
damages limit to convert one of them into the other.

															And we have never before proposed that course.
The Second Circuit thought otherwise, relying on language in our Petrella decision to support a three-year damages cap. Sohm , 959 F. 3d, at 51–52. There we noted, as the
Second Circuit emphasized, that the Copyright Act’s statute of
limitations allows plaintiffs “to gain retrospective relief running
only three years back from” the filing of a suit. 572 U. S.,
at 672; see id., at 677. Taken out of context, that line
might seem to address the issue here. But in making that statement,
we merely described how the limitations provision works when a
plaintiff has no timely claims for infringing acts more than three
years old. That was the situation in Petrella . Because the
plaintiff had long known of the defendant’s infringing conduct, she
could not avail herself of the discovery rule. Rather, she sued
only for infringements that occurred in the three years before her
suit. The defendant argued that she could not recover for even that
much under the doctrine of laches, which protects against
unreasonable delay in filing suit. We rejected that doctrine’s
application, explaining that the Act’s limitations provision
already “takes account of delay” by—here is the language
again—allowing the plaintiff “to gain retrospective relief running
only three years back from” her suit’s filing. Id. , at 672,
677. But we did not go beyond the case’s facts to say that even if
the limitations provision allows a claim for an earlier
infringement, the plaintiff may not obtain monetary relief. To the
contrary: The plaintiff in Petrella could get damages
“running only three years back” from filing because she could sue
for infringements occurring only within that timeframe.

															Nealy is in a different situation. He has
invoked the discovery rule to bring claims for infringing acts
occurring more than three years before he filed suit. And as we
have explained, we took this case on the assumption that such
claims may be timely under the Act’s limitations provision. See supra , at 4. If Nealy’s claims are thus timely, he may
obtain damages for them. The Copyright Act contains no separate
time-based limit on monetary recovery.

															Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Disregarding the limit in
the reformulated question, Warner Chappell’s briefing in this Court
focuses almost entirely on the discovery rule itself. Compare Brief
for Petitioners 15–41 and Reply Brief 1–18 (disputing the discovery
rule), with Brief for Petitioners 41–44 and Reply Brief 19–21
(assuming the discovery rule’s existence). That choice is
especially surprising given that Warner Chappell’s own petition for
certiorari raised the broader discovery-rule issue only in a
footnote, which acknowledged that the issue was not raised below
and is not the subject of a Circuit split. See Pet. for Cert. 14,
n. But even supposing Warner Chappell’s petition had urged us to
opine on the discovery rule, our reformulation of the question
presented should have put an end to such arguments. “The Court
decides which questions to consider through well-established
procedures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter
these questions or to devise additional questions at the last
minute would thwart this system.” Taylor v. Freeland
& Kronz , 503 U.S.
638 , 646 (1992). 2 Scholars have speculated
about “exceptional case[s]” in which a copy-right plaintiff could
get some benefit out of a discovery rule even when combined with a
three-year damages bar. 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright
§12.05[B][2][c][ii] (2023). Suffice to say that assuming those
cases exist at all, they are as rare as hen’s teeth. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–1078

															_________________

															WARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS v. SHERMAN NEALY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[May 9, 2024]

															Justice Gorsuch, with whom Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito join, dissenting.

															The Court discusses how a discovery rule of
accrual should operate under the Copyright Act. But in doing so it
sidesteps the logically antecedent question whether the Act has
room for such a rule. Rather than address that question, the Court
takes care to emphasize that its resolution must await a future
case. The trouble is, the Act almost certainly does not tolerate a
discovery rule. And that fact promises soon enough to make anything
we might say today about the rule’s operational details a dead
letter.

															“[O]rdinarily,” this Court has said, a claim
“accrues when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of
action.” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. , 572 U.S.
663 , 670 (2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). “In other words, the limitations period generally begins
to run at the point when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain
relief.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We call
this the “incident of injury rule.” Ibid ., n. 4. And we
interpret statutes with that “ ‘standard rule’ ” in mind. Rotkiske v. Klemm , 589 U.S. 8, 13 (2019).

															What of the discovery rule? It “starts the
limitations period when the plaintiff discovers, or with due
diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis
for the claim.” Petrella , 572 U. S., at 670, n. 4
(internal quotation marks omitted) . We have said, however,
that the rule is not “applicable across all contexts.” TRW
Inc. v. Andrews , 534 U.S.
19 , 27 (2001). Far from it: Unless the statute at hand directs
otherwise, we proceed consistent with traditional equitable
practice and ordinarily apply the discovery rule only “in cases of
fraud or concealment.” Ibid . We have long warned lower
courts, too, against taking any more “expansive approach to the
discovery rule.” Rotkiske , 589 U. S., at 14; see TRW
Inc. , 534 U. S., at 27–28.

															There is little reason to suppose the Copyright
Act’s provisions at issue in this case contemplate any departure
from the usual rules. Section 507(b) provides that “[n]o civil
action shall be maintained . . . unless it is commenced
within three years after the claim accrued.” As the Court observed
in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. , standard
language like that calls for the application of the standard
incident of injury rule: “A copyright claim thus arises or
‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs,” not at some later date.
572 U. S., at 670. What this should mean for the case before
us seems equally evident: Because everyone agrees Sherman Nealy
filed suit more than three years after many of Warner Chappell’s
alleged infringing acts, see ante , at 2, some (if not all)
of his claims are untimely. Everyone agrees, too, that he has not
alleged any fraud or concealment that would entitle him to
equitable tolling. See Brief for Petitioners 39; Brief for
Respondents 50–51. The discovery rule thus has no role to play
here—or, indeed, in the mine run of copyright cases.

															In one sense, the Court’s decision to pass over
this complication may be understandable. After all, none of the
parties before us questioned the application of a discovery rule in
proceedings below, but joined issue only over how it should work.
See ante , at 5, n. 1. And the Court may, as it does,
resolve the parties’ dispute while leaving for another day the
antecedent question whether a discovery rule exists under the Act.
See ante , at 4–5.

															But if that is a permissible course, it does not
strike me as the most sensible one. Nothing requires us to play
along with these particular parties and expound on the details of a
rule of law that they may assume but very likely does not exist.
Respectfully, rather than devote our time to this case, I would
have dismissed it as improvidently granted and awaited another
squarely presenting the question whether the Copyright Act
authorizes the discovery rule. Better, in my view, to answer a
question that does matter than one that almost certainly does
not.

Summary: The Supreme Court held that the Copyright Act's statute of limitations allows copyright owners to seek damages for any infringement claim brought within three years of its accrual, regardless of when the infringement occurred. The Court did not decide on the applicability of a "discovery rule," which starts the limitations period when the plaintiff discovers the infringement, as it was not questioned by the parties in this case.