City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

															Syllabus

															CITY OF CHICAGO ET AL. v. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND ET AL.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT No. 92-1639. Argued January 19, 1994-Decided May 2, 1994 Respondent Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sued petitioners,
the city of Chicago and its mayor, alleging that they were
violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)
and implementing regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) by using landfills not licensed to accept hazardous wastes as
disposal sites for the toxic municipal waste combustion (MWC) ash
that is left as a residue when the city's resource recovery
incinerator burns household waste and nonhazardous industrial waste
to produce energy. Although it was uncontested that, with respect
to the ash, petitioners had not adhered to any of the RCRA Subtitle
C requirements addressing hazardous wastes, the District Court
granted them summary judgment on the ground that § 3001(i) of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, a provision within RCRA, excluded the ash
from those requirements. The Court of Appeals disagreed and
reversed, but, while certiorari was pending in this Court, the EPA
issued a memorandum directing its personnel, in accordance with the
agency's view of § 3001(i), to treat MWC ash as exempt from
Subtitle C regulation. On remand following this Court's vacation of
the judgment, the Court of Appeals reinstated its previous opinion,
holding that, because the statute's plain language is dispositive,
the EPA memorandum did not affect its analysis.

															Held: Section 3001(i) does not exempt the MWC ash generated by
petitioners' facility from Subtitle C regulation as hazardous
waste. Although a pre-§3001(i) EPA regulation provided a "waste
stream" exemption covering household waste from generation through
treatment to final disposal of residues, petitioners' facility
would not have come within that exemption because it burned
something in addition to household waste; the facility would have
been considered a Subtitle C hazardous waste generator, but not a
(more stringently regulated) Subtitle C hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facility, since all the waste it took in was
nonhazardous. Section 3001(i) cannot be interpreted as extending
the pre-existing waste-stream exemption to the product of a
combined household/nonhazardous-industrial treatment facility such
as petitioners'. Although the section is entitled "Clarification of
household waste exclusion," its plain language-"A resource 329 recovery facility ... shall not be deemed to be treating,
storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for
the purposes of [Subtitle C] regulation ... if ... such facility
... receives and burns only ... household waste ... and
[nonhazardous industrial] waste ... "- establishes that its
exemption is limited to the facility itself, not the ash that the
facility generates. The statutory text's prominent omission of any
reference to generation, not the single reference thereto in the
legislative history, is the authoritative expression of the law.
The enacted text requires rejection of the Government's plea for
deference to the EPA's interpretation, which goes beyond the scope
of whatever ambiguity §3001(i) contains. Pp.331-339. 985 F.2d
303 , affirmed.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and BLACKMUN, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 340.

															Lawrence Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioners.

															With him on the briefs were Susan S. Sher, Benna Ruth Solomon,
and Mardell Nereim.

															Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Flint, Deputy
Solicitor General Wallace, David C. Shilton, M. Alice Thurston,
Gerald H. Yamada, and Lisa K. Friedman.

															Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents. *

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State
of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Jerry Boone,
Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and
James A. Sevinsky and Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant Attorneys
General; for Barron County, Wisconsin, et al. by Philip G.
Sunderland, Max Rothal, Pamela K. Akin, Stephen O. Nunn, Cynthea L.
Perry, Howard J. Wein, Charles H. Younger, John D. Pirich,
David P. Bobzien, Felshaw King, Mary Anne Wood, Michael F. X.
Gillin, Ruth C. Balkin, Patrick T. Boulden, and Barry S. Shanoff;
for the City of Spokane, Washington, et al. by Craig S. Trueblood;
for the County of Westchester, New York, by Carol L. Van Scoyoc;
for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda, David R.
Berz, and David B. Hird; for the Washington Legal Foundation et 330 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We are called upon to decide whether, pursuant to § 3001(i) of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA)), as added, 98 Stat. 3252, 42 U. S. C. §
6921(i), the ash generated by a resource recovery facility's
incineration of municipal solid waste is exempt from regulation as
a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA.

															I

															Since 1971, petitioner city of Chicago has owned and operated a
municipal incinerator, the Northwest Waste-toEnergy Facility, that
burns solid waste and recovers energy, leaving a residue of
municipal waste combustion (MWC) ash. The facility burns
approximately 350,000 tons of solid waste each year and produces
energy that is both used within the facility and sold to other
entities. The city has disposed of the combustion residue-llO,OOO
to 140,000 tons of MWC ash per year-at landfills that are not
licensed to accept hazardous wastes.

															In 1988, respondent Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) filed a
complaint against petitioners, the city of Chicago and its mayor,
under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, 42 U. S. C. § 6972,
alleging that they were violating provisions of RCRA and of
implementing regulations issued by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EP A). Respondent alleged that the MWC ash generated by the
facility was toxic enough to qualify as a "hazardous waste" under
EPA's regulations, 40 CFR pt. 261 (1993). It was uncontested that,
with respect to the ash, petitioners had not adhered to any of the
requirements of Subtitle C, the portion of RCRA addressing
hazardous wastes. Petitioners contended that

															al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Kurt J. Olson; and
for Wheelabrator Technologies Inc., et al. by Harold Himmelman,
David M. Friedland, and Mark P. Paul. 331 RCRA § 3001(i), 42 U. S. C. § 6921(i), excluded the MWC ash from
those requirements. The District Court agreed with that contention,
see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419,
424 (1989), and subsequently granted petitioners' motion for
summary judgment.

															The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the "ash
generated from the incinerators of municipal resource recovery
facilities is subject to regulation as a hazardous waste under
Subtitle C of RCRA." Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, 948 F.2d
345 , 352 (CA7 1991). The city petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, and we invited the Solicitor General to present the
views of the United States. Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc., 504 U. S. 906 (1992). On September 18, 1992, while that
invitation was outstanding, the Administrator of EPA issued a
memorandum to EPA Regional Administrators, directing them, in
accordance with the agency's view of § 3001(i), to treat MWC ash as
exempt from hazardous waste regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA.
Thereafter, we granted the city's petition, vacated the decision,
and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit for further consideration in light of the memorandum.
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 506 U. S. 982 (1992).

															On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its previous opinion,
holding that, because the statute's plain language is dispositive,
the EPA memorandum did not affect its analysis. 985 F.2d
303 , 304 (CA7 1993). Petitioners filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which we granted. 509 U. S. 903 (1993).

															II

															RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EP A
to regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave, in accordance
with the rigorous safeguards and waste management procedures of
Subtitle C, 42 U. S. C. §§ 69216934. (Nonhazardous wastes are
regulated much more loosely under Subtitle D, 42 U. S. C. §§
6941-6949.) Under 332 the relevant provisions of Subtitle C, EPA has promulgated
standards governing hazardous waste generators and transporters,
see 42 U. S. C. §§ 6922 and 6923, and owners and operators of
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
(TSDF's), see §6924. Pursuant to §6922, EPA has directed hazardous
waste generators to comply with handling, recordkeeping, storage,
and monitoring requirements, see 40 CFR pt. 262 (1993). TSDF's,
however, are subject to much more stringent regulation than either
generators or transporters, including a 4- to 5-year permitting
process, see 42 U. S. C. § 6925; 40 CFR pt. 270 (1993); U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, The Nation's Hazardous Waste Management Program at a
Crossroads, The RCRA Implementation Study 49-50 (July 1990),
burdensome financial assurance requirements, stringent design and
location standards, and, perhaps most onerous of all,
responsibility to take corrective action for releases of hazardous
substances and to ensure safe closure of each facility, see 42 U.
S. C. § 6924; 40 CFR pt. 264 (1993). "[The] corrective action
requirement is one of the major reasons that generators and
transporters work diligently to manage their wastes so as to avoid
the need to obtain interim status or a TSD permit." 3 Environmental
Law Practice Guide § 29.06[3][d] (M. Gerrard ed. 1993) (hereinafter
Practice Guide).

															RCRA does not identify which wastes are hazardous and therefore
subject to Subtitle C regulation; it leaves that designation to
EPA. 42 U. S. C. §6921(a). When EPA's hazardous waste designations
for solid wastes appeared in 1980, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, they
contained certain exceptions from normal coverage, including an
exclusion for "household waste," defined as "any waste material ...
derived from households (including single and multiple residences,
hotels and motels)," id., at 33120, codified as amended at
40 CFR § 261.4(b)(1) (1993). Although most household waste is
harmless, a small portion-such as cleaning fluids 333 and batteries-would have qualified as hazardous waste. The
regulation declared, however, that "[h]ousehold waste, including
household waste that has been collected, transported, stored,
treated, disposed, recovered (e. g., refusederived fuel) or reused"
is not hazardous waste. Ibid. Moreover, the preamble to the 1980
regulations stated that "residues remaining after treatment (e. g. incineration, thermal treatment) [of household waste]
are not subject to regulation as a hazardous waste." 45 Fed. Reg.
33099. By reason of these provisions, an incinerator that burned
only household waste would not be considered a Subtitle C TSDF,
since it processed only nonhazardous (i. e., household) waste, and
it would not be considered a Subtitle C generator of hazardous
waste and would be free to dispose of its ash in a Subtitle D
landfill.

															The 1980 regulations thus provided what is known as a "waste
stream" exemption for household waste, ibid., i. e., an exemption
covering that category of waste from generation through treatment
to final disposal of residues. The regulation did not, however,
exempt MWC ash from Subtitle C coverage if the incinerator that
produced the ash burned anything in addition to household waste,
such as what petitioners' facility burns: nonhazardous industrial
waste. Thus, a facility like petitioners' would qualify as a
Subtitle C hazardous waste generator if the MWC ash it produced was
sufficiently toxic, see 40 CFR §§ 261.3, 261.24 (1993)-though it
would still not qualify as a Subtitle C TSDF, since all the waste
it took in would be characterized as nonhazardous. (An ash can be
hazardous, even though the product from which it is generated is
not, because in the new medium the contaminants are more
concentrated and more readily leachable, see 40 CFR §§ 261.3,
261.24, and pt. 261, App. II (1993).)

															Four years after these regulations were issued, Congress enacted
the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-616,
98 Stat. 3221, which added to RCRA 334 the "Clarification of Household Waste Exclusion" as § 3001(i), §
223, 98 Stat. 3252. The essence of our task in this case is to
determine whether, under that provision, the MWC ash generated by
petitioners' facility-a facility that would have been considered a
Subtitle C generator under the 1980 regulations-is subject to
regulation as hazardous waste under Subtitle C. We conclude that it
is.

															Section 3001(i), 42 U. S. C. § 6921(i), entitled
"Clarification

															of household waste exclusion," provides: "A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass
burning of municipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be
treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous
wastes for the purposes of regulation under this subchapter,
if- "(1) such facility-

															"(A) receives and burns only- "(i) household waste (from single and multiple dwellings,
hotels, motels, and other residential sources), and "(ii) solid
waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not contain
hazardous waste identified or listed under this section, and "(B) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or listed under
this section, and "(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established
contractual requirements or other appropriate notification or
inspection procedures to assure that hazardous wastes are not
received at or burned in such facility." The plain meaning of this language is that so long as a facility
recovers energy by incineration of the appropriate wastes, it (the
facility) is not subject to Subtitle C regulation as a facility
that treats, stores, disposes of, or manages hazardous waste. The
provision quite clearly does not contain any exclusion for
the ash itself Indeed, the waste the facility produces (as opposed
to that which it receives) is not even 335 mentioned. There is thus no express support for petitioners'
claim of a waste-stream exemption.1

															Petitioners contend, however, that the practical effect of the
statutory language is to exempt the ash by virtue of exempting the
facility. If, they argue, the facility is not deemed to be
treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste, then the ash
that it treats, stores, or disposes of must itself be considered
nonhazardous. There are several problems with this argument. First,
as we have explained, the only exemption provided by the terms of
the statute is for the facility. It is the facility, not the ash,
that "shall not be deemed" to be subject to regulation under
Subtitle C. Un like the preamble to the 1980 regulations,
which had been in existence for four years by the time § 3001(i)
was enacted, § 3001(i) does not explicitly exempt MWC ash generated
by a resource recovery facility from regulation as a hazardous
waste. In light of that difference, and given the statute's express
declaration of national policy that "[w]aste that is ... generated
should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the
present and future threat to human health and the environment," 42
U. S. C. § 6902(b), we cannot interpret the statute to permit MWC
ash sufficiently toxic to qualify as hazardous to be disposed of in
ordinary landfills.

															Moreover, as the Court of Appeals observed, the statutory
language does not even exempt the facility in its capacity as

															1 The dissent is able to describe the provision as exempting the
ash itself only by resorting to what might be called imaginative
use of ellipsis: "even though the material being treated and
disposed of contains hazardous components before, during, and after
its treatment[,J that material 'shall not be deemed to be ...
hazardous.''' Post, at 346. In the full text, quoted above, the
subject of the phrase "shall not be deemed ... hazardous" is not
the material, but the resource recovery facility, and the complete
phrase, including (italicized) the ellipsis, reads "shall not be
deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing
hazardous wastes." Deeming a facility not to be engaged in these
activities with respect to hazardous wastes is of course quite
different from deeming the output of that facility not to be
hazardous. 336 a generator of hazardous waste. RCRA defines "generation" as
"the act or process of producing hazardous waste." 42 U. s. C. §
6903(6). There can be no question that the creation of ash by
incinerating municipal waste constitutes "generation" of hazardous
waste (assuming, of course, that the ash qualifies as hazardous
under 42 U. s. C. § 6921 and its implementing regulations, 40 CFR
pt. 261 (1993)). Yet although § 3001(i) states that the exempted
facility "shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing
of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes," it significantly omits
from the catalog the word "generating." Petitioners say that
because the activities listed as exempt encompass the full scope of
the facility's operation, the failure to mention the activity of
generating is insignificant. But the statute itself refutes this.
Each of the three specific terms used in § 3001(i)"treating,"
"storing," and "disposing of"-is separately defined by RCRA, and
none covers the production of hazardous waste.2 The fourth and less
specific term ("otherwise managing") is also defined, to mean
"collection, source separation, storage, transportation,
processing, treatment, recovery, and disposal," 42 U. s. C. §
6903(7)-just about every hazardous waste-related activity except
generation. We

															2 "Treatment" means "any method, technique, or process,
including neutralization, designed to change the physical,
chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous
waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable
for storage, or reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity
or processing designed to change the physical form or chemical
composition of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous." 42
U. S. C. § 6903(34).

															"Storage" means "the containment of hazardous waste, either on a
temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not
to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste." § 6903(33).

															"Disposal" means "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,
spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste
into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous
waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be
emitted into the air or discharged into any waters." § 6903(3). 337 think it follows from the carefully constructed text of §
3001(i) that while a resource recovery facility's management
activities are excluded from Subtitle C regulation, its generation
of toxic ash is not.

															Petitioners appeal to the legislative history of § 3001(i),
which includes, in the Senate Committee Report, the statement that
"[a]ll waste management activities of such a facility, including
the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of
waste shall be covered by the exclusion." S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 61
(1983) (emphasis added). But it is the statute, and not the
Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law,
and the statute prominently omits reference to generation. As the
Court of Appeals cogently put it: "Why should we, then, rely upon a
single word in a committee report that did not result in
legislation? Simply put, we shouldn't." 948 F. 2d, at 351.3
Petitioners point out that the activity by which they "treat"
municipal waste is the very same activity by which they "generate"
MWC ash, to wit, incineration. But there is nothing extraordinary
about an activity's being exempt for some purposes and nonexempt
for others. The incineration here is exempt from TSDF regulation,
but subject to regulation as hazardous waste generation. (As we
have noted, see supra, at 331-332, the latter is much less
onerous.)

															Our interpretation is confirmed by comparing § 3001(i) with
another statutory exemption in RCRA. In the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, § 124(b), 100
Stat. 1689, Congress amended 42 U. S. C. § 6921 to provide that an
"owner and operator of equipment used to recover methane from a
landfill shall not be deemed to be managing, generating,
transporting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous or
liquid wastes within

															3 Nothing in the dissent's somewhat lengthier discourse on §
3001(i)'s legislative history, see post, at 343-345, convinces us
that the statute's omission of the term "generation" is a
scrivener's error. 338 the meaning of" Subtitle C. This provision, in contrast to §
3001(i), provides a complete exemption by including the term
"generating" in its list of covered activities. "[I]t is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely" when it
"includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another," Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200 , 208 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with respondents that
this provision "shows that Congress knew how to draft a waste
stream exemption in RCRA when it wanted to." Brief for Respondents
18.

															Petitioners contend that our interpretation of § 3001(i) turns
the provision into an "empty gesture," Brief for Petitioners 23,
since even under the pre-existing regime an incinerator burning
household waste and nonhazardous industrial waste was exempt from
the Subtitle C TSDF provisions. If § 3001(i) did not extend the
waste-stream exemption to the product of such a combined household/
nonhazardous-industrial treatment facility, petitioners argue, it
did nothing at all. But it is not nothing to codify a household
waste exemption that had previously been subject to agency
revision; nor is it nothing (though petitioners may value it as
less than nothing) to restrict the exemption that the agency
previously provided-which is what the provision here achieved, by
withholding all waste-stream exemption for waste processed by
resource recovery facilities, even for the waste stream passing
through an exclusively household waste facility.4

															4We express no opinion as to the validity of EPA's household
waste regulation as applied to resource recovery facilities before
the effective date of § 3001(i). Furthermore, since the statute in
question addresses only resource recovery facilities, not household
waste in general, we are unable to reach any conclusions concerning
the validity of EPA's regulatory scheme for household wastes not
processed by resource recovery facilities. 339 We also do not agree with petitioners' contention that our
construction renders § 3001(i) ineffective for its intended purpose
of promoting household/nonhazardous-industrial resource recovery
facilities, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 6902(a)(1), (10), (11), by
subjecting them "to the potentially enormous expense of managing
ash residue as a hazardous waste." Brief for Petitioners 20. It is
simply not true that a facility which is (as our interpretation
says these facilities are) a hazardous waste "generator" is also
deemed to be "managing" hazardous waste under RCRA. Section 3001(i)
clearly exempts these facilities from Subtitle C TSDF regulations,
thus enabling them to avoid the "full brunt of EP A's enforcement
efforts under RCRA." Practice Guide § 29.05[1].

															***

															RCRA's twin goals of encouraging resource recovery and
protecting against contamination sometimes conflict. It is not
unusual for legislation to contain diverse purposes that must be
reconciled, and the most reliable guide for that task is the
enacted text. Here that requires us to reject the Solicitor
General's plea for deference to the EP A's interpretation, cf.
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 ,
843-844 (1984), which goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity §
3001(i) contains. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86 , 109 (1993).
Section 3001(i) simply cannot be read to contain the cost-saving
waste-stream exemption petitioners seek. 5

															For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit is

															Affirmed.

															5 In view of our construction of § 3001(i), we need not consider
whether an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the
Administrator's in this case is entitled to any less deference
under Chevron than an interpretation adopted by rule published in
the Federal Register, or by adjudication. 340 JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
dissenting.

															The statutory provision in question is a 1984 amendment entitled
"Clarification of Household Waste Exclusion." 1 To understand that
clarification, we must first examine the "waste exclusion" that the
amendment clarified and, more particularly, the ambiguity that
needed clarification. I therefore begin with a discussion of the
relevant pre-1984 law. I then examine the text of the statute as
amended and explain why the apparent tension between the broad
definition of the term "hazardous waste generation" in the 1976 Act
and the more specific exclusion for the activity of incinerating
household wastes (and mixtures of household and other nonhazardous
wastes) in the 1984 amendment should be resolved by giving effect
to the later enactment.

															I

															When Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA), it delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EP A) vast regulatory authority over the mountains of garbage that
our society generates. The statute directed the EP A to classify
waste as hazardous or nonhazardous and to establish regulatory
controls over the disposition of the two categories of waste
pursuant to Subtitles C and D of RCRA. 42 U. S. C. § 6921(a); see
ante, at 331-332. To that end, the EPA in 1980 promulgated detailed
regulations establishing a federal hazardous waste management
system pursuant to Subtitle C.

															Generally, though not always, the EP A regulations assume that
waste is properly characterized as hazardous or nonhazardous when
it first becomes waste. Based on that charac-

															1 Section 223 of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984 amended § 3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976. See 98 Stat. 3252; 42 U. S. C. § 6921(i). The text of the
provision is quoted ante, at 334. 341 terization, the waste is regulated under either Subtitle C or D.
Household waste is regarded as nonhazardous when it is first
discarded and, as long as it is not mixed with hazardous waste, it
retains that characterization during and after its treatment and
disposal. Even though it contains some materials that would be
classified as hazardous in other contexts, and even though its
treatment may produce a residue that contains a higher
concentration of hazardous matter than when the garbage was
originally discarded, such waste is regulated as nonhazardous waste
under Subtitle D. See ante, at 332-333. Thus, an incinerator that
burns nothing but household waste might "generate" tons of
hazardous residue, but as a statutory matter it still is deemed to
be processing nonhazardous waste and is regulated as a Subtitle D,
rather than Subtitle C, facility.

															Section 261.4(b)(1) of the EPA's 1980 regulations first
established the household waste exclusion. See 45 Fed. Reg. 33120
(1980). The relevant text of that regulation simply provided that
solid wastes derived from households (including single and multiple
residences, hotels, and motels) were "not hazardous wastes."2 The
regulation itself said nothing about the status of the residue that
remains after the incineration of such household waste. An
accompanying comment, however, unambiguously explained that
"residues remaining after treatment (e. g. incineration,
thermal treatment) are not subject to regulation as hazardous
waste." Id., at 33099. Thus, the administrative history of the
1980

															2 The full text of 40 CFR § 261.4(b)(1) (1993) reads as
follows:

															"(b) Solid Wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following
solid wastes are not hazardous wastes:

															"(1) Household waste, including household waste that has been
collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e. g., refusederived fuel) or reused. 'Household waste'
means any waste material (including garbage, trash and sanitary
wastes in septic tanks) derived from households (including single
and multiple residences, hotels and motels)." 342 regulation, rather than its text, revealed why a municipal
incinerator burning household waste was not treated as a generator
of hazardous waste.

															The EP A's explanatory comment contained an important warning:
If household waste was "mixed with other hazardous wastes," the
entire mixture would be deemed hazardous.3 Yet neither the comment
nor the regulation itself identified the consequences of mixing
household waste with other wastes that are entirely
nonhazardous. 4 Presumably such a mixture would contain a
lower percentage of hazardous material than pure household waste,
and therefore should also be classified as nonhazardous-assumptions
that are not inconsistent with the EP A's warning that mixing
household waste "with other hazardous wastes" would terminate the
household waste exemption. The EP A's failure to comment expressly
on the significance of adding 100 percent nonhazardous commercial
or industrial waste nevertheless warranted further
clarification.

															Congress enacted that clarification in 1984. Elaborating upon
the EPA's warning in 1980, the text of the 1984 amendment-§ 3001(i)
of RCRA, 42 U. s. C. § 6921(i)-made clear that a facility treating
a mixture of household waste and "solid waste from commercial or
industrial sources that does not contain hazardous waste," §
6921(i)(1)(A)(ii), shall not be

															3 "When household waste is mixed with other hazardous wastes,
however, the entire mixture will be deemed hazardous in accord with
§ 261.3(a)(2)(ii) of these regulations except when they are mixed
with hazardous wastes produced by small quantity generators (see §
261.5). While household waste may not be hazardous per se, it is
like any other solid waste. Thus a mixture of household and
hazardous (except those just noted) wastes is also regulated as a
hazardous waste under these regulations." 45 Fed. Reg. 33099
(1980).

															4 In this regard, because the regulations left unexplained the
ramifications of mixing household waste with nonhousehold waste
that is not hazardous, the Court errs by asserting unqualifiedly
that the Chicago incinerator "would have been considered a Subtitle
C generator under the 1980 regulations." Ante, at 334. 343 deemed to be treating hazardous waste. In other words, the
addition of nonhazardous waste derived from other sources does not
extinguish the household waste exclusion.

															The parallel between the 1980 regulation and the 1984 statutory
amendment is striking. In 1980 the EPA referred to the exclusion of
household waste "in all phases of its management." 5 Similarly, the
1984 statute lists all phases of the incinerator's management when
it states that a facility recovering energy from the mass burning
of a mixture of household waste and other solid waste that does not
contain hazardous waste "shall not be deemed to be treating,
storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes." See
42 U. S. C. § 6921(i). Even though that text only refers to the
exemption of the facility that burns the waste, the title of the
section significantly characterizes it as a waste exclusion.
Moreover, the title's description of the amendment as a
"clarification" identifies an intent to codify its counterpart in
the 1980 regulation.

															The Report of the Senate Committee that recommended the
enactment of § 3001(i) demonstrates that the sponsors of the
legislation understood it to have the same meaning as the 1980 EPA
regulation that it "clarified." That Report, which is worth setting
out in some detail, first notes that the reported bill adds the
amendment to § 3001 "to clarify the coverage of the household waste
exclusion with respect to resource recovery facilities recovering
energy through the mass burning of municipal solid waste." S. Rep.
No. 98-284, p. 61 (1983). The EPA had promulgated the exclusion "in
its hazardous waste management regulations established to exclude
waste streams generated by consumers at the household level and by
sources whose wastes are sufficiently simi-

															5 "Since household waste is excluded in all phases of its
management, residues remaining after treatment (e. g.
incineration, thermal treatment) are not subject to regulation as
hazardous waste." 45 Fed. Reg. 33099 (1980). 344 lar in both quantity and quality to those of households." Ibid.
The Report explains that resource recovery facilities frequently
take in household wastes that are mixed with other nonhazardous
waste streams from a variety of commercial and industrial sources,
and emphasizes the importance of encouraging commercially viable
resource recovery facilities. Ibid. To that end, "[n]ew section
[3001(i)] clarifies the original intent to include within the
household waste exclusion activities of a resource recovery
facility which recovers energy from the mass burning of household
waste and non-hazardous waste from other sources." Ibid. The Report
further explains: "All waste management activities of such a facility, including
the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of
waste shall be covered by the exclusion, if the limitations in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of [the amendment] are met. First, such
facilities must receive and burn only household waste and solid
waste from other sources which does not contain hazardous waste
identified or listed under section 300l. "Second, such facilities cannot accept hazardous wastes
identified or listed under section 3001 from commercial or
industrial sources, and must establish contractual requirements or
other notification or inspection procedures to assure that such
wastes are not received or burned. This provision requires
precautionary measures or procedures which can be shown to be
effective safeguards against the unintended acceptance of hazardous
waste. If such measures are in place, a resource recovery facility
whose activities would normally be covered by the household waste
exclusion should not be penalized for the occasional, inadvertent
receipt and burning of hazardous material from such commercial or
industrial sources. Facilities must monitor the waste they receive
and, if necessary, revise the precautionary 345 measures they establish to assure against the receipt of such
hazardous waste." Ibid. These comments referred to the Senate bill that became law after
a majority of the Senate followed the Committee's recommendation
"that the bill (as amended) do pass." Id., at 1.6 Given this
commentary, it is quite unrealistic to assume that the omission of
the word "generating" from the particularized description of
management activities in the statute was intended to render the
statutory description any less inclusive than either the 1980
regulation or the Committee Report. It is even more unrealistic to
assume that legislators voting on the 1984 amendment would have
detected any difference between the statutory text and the
Committee's summary just because the term "generating" does not
appear in the 1984 amendment. A commonsense reading of the
statutory text in the light of the Committee Report and against the
background of the 1980 regulation reveals an obvious purpose to
preserve, not to change, the existing rule.7

															6 The Conference Committee adopted the Senate amendment
verbatim.

															Its Report stated: "The Senate amendment clarifies that an
energy recovery facility is exempt from hazardous waste
requirements if it burns only residential and non-hazardous
commercial wastes and establishes procedures to assure hazardous
wastes will not be burned at the facility." H. R. Com. Rep. No.
98-1133, p. 106 (1984).

															7 The majority's refusal to attach significance to "'a single
word in a committee report,'" ante, at 337, reveals either a
misunderstanding of, or a lack of respect for, the function of
legislative committees. The purpose of a committee report is to
provide the Members of Congress who have not taken part in the
committee's deliberations with a summary of the provisions of the
bill and the reasons for the committee's recommendation that the
bill should become law. The report obviously does not have the
force of law. Yet when the text of a bill is not changed after it
leaves the committee, the Members are entitled to assume that the
report fairly summarizes the proposed legislation. What makes this
Report significant is not the single word "generation," but the
unmistakable intent to maintain an existing rule of law. The
omission of the single word "generating" from the statute has no
more significance than the omission of the same word from the text
of the 1980 regulation. 346 II

															The relevant statutory text is not as unambiguous as the Court
asserts. There is substantial tension between the broad definition
of the term "hazardous waste generation" in § 1004(6) of RCRA and
the household waste exclusion codified by the 1984 amendment: Both
provisions can be read to describe the same activity. The former
"means the act or process of producing hazardous waste." 90 Stat.
2799; 42 U. S. C. § 6903(6). Read literally, that definition is
broad enough to encompass the burning of pure household waste that
produces some hazardous residue. The only statutory escape from
that conclusion is the 1984 amendment that provides an exemption
for the activity of burning household waste. Yet that exemption
does not distinguish between pure household waste, on the one hand,
and a mixture of household and other nonhazardous wastes, on the
other. It either exempts both the pure stream and the mixture, or
it exempts neither.

															Indeed, commercial and industrial waste is by definition
nonhazardous: In order for it to fall within the exclusion created
by the 1984 amendment, it must not contain hazardous components. As
a consequence, the only aspect of this waste stream that would
ordinarily be regulated by Subtitle C of RCRA is the ash residue.
EP A could reasonably conclude, therefore, that to give any content
to the statute with respect to this component of the waste stream,
the incinerator ash must be exempted from Subtitle C
regulation.

															The exemption states that a facility burning solid waste "shall
not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise
managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation under this
subchapter" if two conditions are satisfied. See ante, at 334. As
long as the two conditions are met-even though the material being
treated and disposed of contains hazardous components before,
during, and after its treatment-that material "shall not be deemed
to be ... hazardous." By characterizing both the input and the
out- 347 put as not hazardous, the 1984 amendment excludes the activity
from the definition of hazardous waste generation that would
otherwise apply. For it is obvious that the same activity cannot
both subject a facility to regulation because its residue is
hazardous and exempt the facility from regulation because the
statute deems the same residue to be nonhazardous.8

															Thus, if we are to be guided only by the literal meaning of the
statutory text, we must either give effect to the broad definition
of hazardous waste generation and subject all municipal
incinerators that generate hazardous ash to Subtitle C regulation
(including those that burn pure household waste) or give effect to
the exclusion that applies equally to pure household waste and
mixtures that include other nonhazardous wastes. For several
reasons the latter is the proper choice. It effectuates the
narrower and more recently enacted provision rather than the
earlier more general definition. It respects the title of the 1984
amendment by treating what follows as a "clarification" rather than
a repeal or a modification. It avoids the Court's rather surprising
(and uninvited) decision to invalidate the household waste
exclusion that the EPA adopted in 1980,9 on which

															8 The Court characterizes my reading of the text as "imaginative
use of ellipsis," ante, at 335, n. 1, because the subject of the
predicate "shall not be deemed to be ... hazardous" is the recovery
facility rather than the residue that is disposed of after the
waste is burned. That is true, but the reason the facility is
exempted is because it is not "deemed to be ... disposing of ...
hazardous wastes." Thus it is the statutorily deemed nonhazardous
character of the object of the sentence-wastes-that effectively
exempts from Subtitle C regulation the activity and the facility
engaged in that activity. If, as the statute provides, a facility
is not deemed to be disposing of hazardous wastes when it disposes
of the output of the facility, it must be true that the output is
deemed nonhazardous.

															9 Although the first nine pages of the Court's opinion give the
reader the impression that the 1980 regulatory exclusion for pure
household waste was valid, the Court ultimately acknowledges that
its construction of the statute has the effect of "withholding all
waste-stream exemption for waste processed by resource recovery
facilities, even for the waste 348 municipalities throughout the Nation have reasonably relied for
over a decade.lO It explains why the legislative history fails to
mention an intent to impose significant new burdens on the
operation of municipal incinerators. Finally, it is the
construction that the EP A has adopted and that reasonable jurists
have accepted.ll

															The majority's decision today may represent sound policy.

															Requiring cities to spend the necessary funds to dispose of
their incinerator residues in accordance with the strict
requirements of Subtitle C will provide additional protections to
the environment. It is also true, however, that the conservation of
scarce landfill space and the encouragement of the recovery of
energy and valuable materials in municipal wastes were major
concerns motivating RCRA's enactment. Whether those purposes will
be disserved by regulating municipal incinerators under Subtitle C
and, if so, whether environmental benefits may nevertheless justify
the costs of such additional regulation are questions of policy
that we are not competent to resolve. Those questions are precisely
the kind that Congress has directed the EP A to answer. The

															stream passing through an exclusively household waste facility."
Ante, at 338. Of course, it is not the 1984 amendment that casts
doubt on the validity of the regulation, see ante, at 338, n. 4,
but the Court's rigid reading of § 1004(6)'s definition of the term
"hazardous waste generation" that has achieved that result. Since
that definition has been in RCRA since 1976, the Court utterly
fails to explain how the 1984 amendment made any change in the
law.

															10 At oral argument Government counsel advised us that the
Chicago incinerator is one of about 150 comparable facilities in
the country and that the EPA has never contended that the
acceptance of nonhazardous commercial waste subjected any of them
to regulation under Subtitle C. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.

															11 See specially Judge Haight's comprehensive opinion in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Wheelabrator Technologies,
Inc., 725 F. Supp. 758 (SDNY 1989), aff'd, 931
F.2d 211 (CA2 1991). That decision is cited with
approval by Circuit Judge Ripple, 985 F.2d
303 , 305 (CA7 1993) (dissenting opinion); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, 948 F.2d
345 , 352 (CA7 1991) (dissenting opinion), in this
litigation. 349 EPA's position, first adopted unambiguously in 1980 and still
maintained today,12 was and remains a correct and permissible
interpretation of the EPA's broad congressional mandate.

															Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

															12 Although there has been some ambivalence in the EPA's views
since 1985, see 725 F. Supp., at 766-768, there is no ambiguity or
equivocation in either its original or its present interpretation
of RCRA.

Summary: The City of Chicago and its mayor were sued by the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) for violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) by disposing of toxic municipal waste combustion (MWC) ash in landfills not licensed to accept hazardous waste. The District Court ruled in favor of Chicago, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that MWC ash was subject to Subtitle C hazardous waste regulations. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, finding that while Chicago's facility burned both household and non-hazardous industrial waste, it was not a hazardous waste generator under Subtitle C and thus exempt from its regulations. The EPA's interpretation of RCRA supported this exemption, and the Court's decision considered the legislative history and potential policy implications.