U.S. Supreme Court Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 3
Dall. 171 171 (1796) Hylton v. United
States 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA Syllabus The act of Congress of 6 June 1794, laying "a tax on carriages
for the conveyance of persons, kept for the use of the owner," is a
constitutional law, and is within the authority granted to Congress
by the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution.

															This was a writ of error directed to the Circuit Court for the
District of Virginia, and upon the return of the record the
following proceedings appeared. An action of debt had been
instituted to May Term, 1795, by the attorney of the district in
the name of the United States against Daniel Hylton to recover the
penalty imposed by the Act of Congress of 5 June, 1794, for not
entering and paying the duty on a number of carriages for the
conveyance of persons which he kept for his own use. The defendant
pleaded nil debet, whereupon issue was joined. But the
parties, waiving the right of trial by jury, mutually submitted the
controversy to the court on a case which stated

															"That the defendant, on 5 June, 1794, and therefrom to the last
day of September following, owned, possessed, and kept, 125
chariots for the conveyance of persons, and no more; that the
chariots were kept exclusively for the defendant's own private use,
and not to let out to hire or for the conveyance of persons for Page 3 U. S. 172 hire, and that the defendant had notice according to the act of
Congress entitled 'An act laying duties upon carriages for the
conveyance of persons,' but that he omitted and refused to make an
entry of the said chariots and to pay the duties thereupon as in
and by the said recited law is required, alleging that the said law
was unconstitutional and void. If the court adjudged the defendant
to be liable to pay the tax and fine for not doing so and for not
entering the carriages, then judgment shall be entered for the
plaintiff for $2,000 dollars, to be discharged by the payment of
$16, the amount of the duty and penalty; otherwise that judgment be
entered for the defendant."

															After argument, the court (consisting of Wilson & Justices)
delivered their opinions, but being equally divided, the defendant,
by agreement of the parties, confessed judgment, as a foundation
for the present writ of error, which (as well as the original
proceeding) was brought merely to try the constitutionality of the
tax. Page 3 U. S. 175 PATERSON, JUSTICE.

															By the second section of the first article of the Constitution
of the United States it is ordained that representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the states according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for
a term of years, and including Indians not taxed, three fifths of
all other persons.

															The eighth section of the said article declares that Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform
throughout the United States.

															The ninth section of the same article provides that no
capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion
to the census or enumeration before directed to be taken.

															Congress passed a law on 5 June, 1794, entitled, "An act laying
duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons." Page 3 U. S. 176 Daniel Lawrence Hilton, on 5 June, 1794, and therefrom to the
last day of September next following, owned, possessed, and kept
one hundred and twenty-five chariots for the conveyance of persons,
but exclusively for his own separate use, and not to let out to
hire, or for the conveyance of persons for hire.

															The question is whether a tax upon carriages be a direct tax? If
it be a direct tax, it is unconstitutional, because it has been
laid pursuant to the rule of uniformity, and not to the rule of
apportionment. In behalf of the plaintiff in error, it has been
urged that a tax on carriages does not come within the description
of a duty, impost, or excise, and therefore is a direct tax. It
has, on the other hand, been contended that as a tax on carriages
is not a direct tax, it must fall within one of the classifications
just enumerated, and particularly must be a duty or excise. The
argument on both sides turns in a circle; it is not a duty, impost,
or excise, and therefore must be a direct tax; it is not tax, and
therefore must be a duty or excise. What is the natural and common,
or technical and appropriate, meaning of the words "duty" and
"excise" it is not easy to ascertain. They present no clear and
precise idea to the mind. Different persons will annex different
significations to the terms. It was, however, obviously the
intention of the framers of the Constitution that Congress should
possess full power over every species of taxable property, except
exports. The term "taxes" is generic, and was made use of to vest
in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation. The general
division of taxes is into direct and indirect. Although the latter
term is not to be found in the Constitution, yet the former
necessarily implies it. "Indirect" stands opposed to "direct."
There may perhaps be an indirect tax on a particular article that
cannot be comprehended within the description of duties or imposts
or excises; in such case, it will be comprised under the general
denomination of "taxes." For the term "tax" is the genus, and
includes

															1. Direct taxes.

															2. Duties, imposts, and excises.

															3. All other classes of an indirect kind, and not within any of
the classifications enumerated under the preceding heads.

															The question occurs how is such tax to be laid, uniformly or
proportionately? The rule of uniformity will apply, because it is
an indirect tax, and direct taxes only are to be apportioned. What
are direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution? The
Constitution declares that a capitation tax is a direct tax, and
both in theory and practice a tax on land is deemed to be a direct
tax. In this way, the terms "direct taxes" and "capitation and
other direct tax" are satisfied. It is not necessary Page 3 U. S. 177 to determine whether a tax on the product of land be a direct or
indirect tax. Perhaps the immediate product of land, in its
original and crude state, ought to be considered as the land
itself; it makes part of it or else the provision made against
taxing exports would be easily eluded. Land, independently of its
produce, is of no value. When the produce is converted into a
manufacture, it assumes a new shape; its nature is altered; its
original state is changed; it becomes quite another subject, and
will be differently considered. Whether direct taxes, in the sense
of the Constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax
and tax on land is a questionable point. If Congress, for instance,
should tax, in the aggregate or mass, things that generally pervade
all the states in the Union, then perhaps the rule of apportionment
would be the most proper, especially if an assessment was to
intervene. This appears by the practice of some of the states to
have been considered as a direct tax. Whether it be so under the
Constitution of the United States is a matter of some difficulty,
but as it is not before the Court, it would be improper to give any
decisive opinion upon it. I never entertained a doubt that the
principal, I will not say, the only, objects that the framers of
the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of
apportionment were a capitation tax and a tax on land. Local
considerations and the particular circumstances and relative
situation of the states naturally lead to this view of the subject.
The provision was made in favor of the southern states. They
possessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of
territory, thinly settled and not very productive. A majority of
the states had but few slaves, and several of them a limited
territory, well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The
southern states, if no provision had been introduced in the
Constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other
states. Congress in such case might tax slaves at discretion or
arbitrarily, and land in every part of the Union after the same
rate or measure: so much a head in the first instance, and so much
an acre in the second. To guard them against imposition in these
particulars was the reason of introducing the clause in the
Constitution which directs that representatives and direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the states according to their respective
numbers.

															On the part of the plaintiff in error it has been contended that
the rule of apportionment is to be favored rather than the rule of
uniformity, and of course that the instrument is to receive such a
construction as will extend the former and restrict the latter. I
am not of that opinion. The Constitution has been considered as an
accommodating system; it was the Page 3 U. S. 178 effect of mutual sacrifices and concessions; it was the work of
compromise. The rule of apportionment is of this nature; it is
radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid reasoning. Why
should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented more
than any other property? The rule therefore ought not to be
extended by construction.

															Again, numbers do not afford a just estimate or rule of wealth.
It is indeed a very uncertain and incompetent sign of opulence.
There is another reason against the extension of the principle laid
down in the Constitution.

															The counsel on the part of the plaintiff in error have further
urged that an equal participation of the expense or burden by the
several states in the Union was the primary object which the
framers of the Constitution had in view, and that this object will
be effected by the principle of apportionment, which is an
operation upon states, and not on individuals, for each state will
be debited for the amount of its quota of the tax and credited for
its payments. This brings it to the old system of requisitions. An
equal rule is doubtless the best. But how is this to be applied to
states or to individuals? The latter are the objects of taxation,
without reference to states, except in the case of direct taxes.
The fiscal power is exerted certainly, equally, and effectually on
individuals; it cannot be exerted on states. The history of the
United Netherlands and of our own country will evince the truth of
this position. The government of the United States could not go on
under the confederation, because Congress was obliged to proceed in
the line of requisition. Congress could not, under the old
confederation, raise money by taxes, be the public exigencies ever
so pressing and great. It had no coercive authority -- if it had it
must have been exercised against the delinquent states, which would
be ineffectual or terminate in a separation. Requisitions were a
dead letter unless the state legislatures could be brought into
action, and when they were, the sums raised were very
disproportional. Unequal contributions or payments engendered
discontent and fomented state jealousy. Whenever it shall be
thought necessary or expedient to lay a direct tax on land, where
the object is one and the same, it is to be apprehended that it
will be a fund not much more productive than that of requisition
under the former government.

															Let us put the case. A given sum is to be raised from the landed
property in the United States. It is easy to apportion this sum or
to assign to each state its quota. The Constitution gives the rule.
Suppose the proportion of North Carolina to be $80,000. This sum is
to be laid on the landed property in the state, but by what rule,
and by whom? Shall every acre pay Page 3 U. S. 179 the same sum, without regard to its quality, value, situation,
or productiveness? This would be manifestly unjust. Do the laws of
the different states furnish sufficient data for the purpose of
forming one common rule, comprehending the quality, situation, and
value of the lands? In some of the states there has been no land
tax for several years, and where there has been, the mode of laying
the tax is so various and the diversity in the land is so great
that no common principle can be deduced and carried into practice.
Do the laws of each state furnish data from whence to extract a
rule whose operation shall be equal and certain in the same state?
Even this is doubtful. Besides, subdivisions will be necessary; the
apportionment of the state, and perhaps of a particular part of the
state, is again to be apportioned among counties, townships,
parishes, or districts. If the lands be classed, then a specific
value must be annexed to each class. And there a question arises
how often are classifications and assessments to be made? Annually,
triennially, septennially? The oftener they are made, the greater
will be the expense, and the seldomer they are made, the greater
will be the inequality and injustice. In the process of the
operation, a number of persons will be necessary to class, to
value, and assess the land, and after all the guards and provisions
that can be devised, we must ultimately rely upon the discretion of
the officers in the exercise of their functions. Tribunals of
appeal must also be instituted to hear and decide upon unjust
valuations or the assessors will act ad libitum without
check or control.

															The work, it is to be feared, will be operose and unproductive
and full of inequality, injustice, and oppression. Let us, however,
hope that a system of land taxation may be so corrected and matured
by practice as to become easy and equal in its operation and
productive and beneficial in its effects. But to return. A tax on
carriages, if apportioned, would be oppressive and pernicious. How
would it work? In some states there are many carriages and in
others but few. Shall the whole sum fall on one or two individuals
in a state who may happen to own and possess carriages? The thing
would be absurd and inequitable. In answer to this objection, it
has been observed that the sum, and not the tax, is to be
apportioned, and that Congress may select in the different states
different articles or objects from whence to raise the apportioned
sum. The idea is novel. What, shall land be taxed in one state,
slaves in another, carriages in a third, and horses in a fourth, or
shall several of these be thrown together in order to levy and make
the quoted sum? The scheme is fanciful. It would not work well, and
perhaps is utterly impracticable. It is easy to discern that great
and perhaps insurmountable obstacles must arise in forming the
subordinate Page 3 U. S. 180 arrangements necessary to carry the system into effect; when
formed, the operation would be slow and expensive, unequal and
unjust. If a tax upon land, where the object is simple and uniform
throughout the states, is scarcely practicable, what shall we say
of a tax attempted to be apportioned among, and raised and
collected from, a number of dissimilar objects. The difficulty will
increase with the number and variety of the things proposed for
taxation. We shall be obliged to resort to intricate and endless
valuations and assessments in which everything will be arbitrary
and nothing certain. There will be no rule to walk by. The rule of
uniformity, on the contrary, implies certainty, and leaves nothing
to the will and pleasure of the assessor. In such case the object
and the sum coincide, the rule and the thing unite, and of course
there can be no imposition.

															The truth is that the articles taxed in one state should be
taxed in another; in this way the spirit of jealousy is appeased
and tranquility preserved; in this way the pressure on industry
will be equal in the several states, and the relation between the
different subjects of taxation duly preserved. Apportionment is an
operation on states, and involves valuations and assessments which
are arbitrary and should not be resorted to but in case of
necessity. Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals,
without the intervention of assessments or any regard to states,
and is at once easy, certain, and efficacious. All taxes on
expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is
of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax. Indirect taxes are
circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of individuals, who
generally live according to their income. In many cases of this
nature the individual may be said to tax himself. I shall close the
discourse with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of
Nations.

															"The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their
revenue by any capitation seems to have given occasion to the
invention of taxes upon consumable commodities; the state, not
knowing how to tax directly and proportionally the revenue of its
subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense,
which it is supposed in most cases will be neatly in proportion to
their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable
commodities upon which it is laid out."

															Vol. 3, p. 331.

															"Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be
taxed in two different ways: the consumer may either pay an annual
sum on account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind or
the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the
dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The
consumable goods, which Page 3 U. S. 181 last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether,
are most properly taxed in the one way, those of which the
consumption is immediate or more speedy in the other; the coach tax
and plate tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the
greater part of the other duties of excise and customs of the
latter."

															Vol. 3, p. 341.

															I am therefore of opinion, that the judgment rendered in the
Circuit Court of Virginia ought to be affirmed.

															IREDELL, JUSTICE.

															I agree in opinion with my brothers, who have already expressed
theirs, that the tax in question, is agreeable to the Constitution,
and the reasons which have satisfied me can be delivered in a very
few words, since I think the Constitution itself affords a clear
guide to decide the controversy.

															The Congress possess the power of taxing all taxable objects,
without limitation, with the particular exception of a duty on
exports.

															There are two restrictions only on the exercise of this
authority:

															1. All direct taxes must be apportioned.

															2. All duties, imposts, and excises must be uniform.

															If the carriage tax be a direct tax within the meaning of the
Constitution, it must be apportioned.

															If it be a duty, impost, or excise within the meaning of the
Constitution, it must be uniform.

															If it can be considered as a tax neither direct within the
meaning of the Constitution nor comprehended within the term "duty,
impost or excise," there is no provision in the Constitution one
way or another, and then it must be left to such an operation of
the power as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally
in all instances, without saying whether they should be apportioned
or uniform, and in that case I should presume the tax ought to be
uniform, because the present Constitution was particularly intended
to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases
specified. And this is the leading distinction between the articles
of Confederation and the present Constitution.

															As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the
Constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be
apportioned.

															If this cannot be apportioned, it is therefore not a direct tax
in the sense of the Constitution.

															That this tax cannot be apportioned is evident. Suppose $10
contemplated as a tax on each chariot, or post chaise, in the
United States, and the number of both in all the United States be
computed at 105, the number of Representatives in Congress. Page 3 U. S. 182 This would produce in the whole $1,050.

															The share of Virginia being 19/105 parts, would be $190.

															The share of Connecticut being 7/105 parts, would be $70.

															Then suppose Virginia had 50 carriages, Connecticut 2.

															The share of Virginia being $190, this must of course be
collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore
be collected from each carriage $3.80.

															The share of Connecticut being $70, each carriage would pay
$35.

															If any state had no carriages, there could be no apportionment
at all. This mode is too manifestly absurd to be supported, and has
not even been attempted in debate.

															But two expedients have been proposed of a very extraordinary
nature, to evade the difficulty.

															1. To raise the money a tax on carriages would produce not by
laying a tax on each carriage uniformly, but by selecting different
articles in different states, so that the amount paid in each state
may be equal to the sum due upon a principle of apportionment. One
state might pay by a tax on carriages, another by a tax on slaves,
etc.

															I should have thought this merely an exercise of ingenuity if it
had not been pressed with some earnestness, and as this was done by
gentlemen of high respectability in their possession, it deserves a
serious answer, though it is very difficult to give such a one.

															1. This is not an apportionment of a tax on Carriages, but of
the money a tax on carriages might be supposed to produce, which is
quite a different thing.

															2. It admits that Congress cannot lay a uniform tax on all
carriages in the Union in any mode, but that it may on carriages in
one or more states. It may therefore lay a tax on carriages in 14
states, but not in the 15th.

															3. If Congress, according to this new decree, may select
carriages as a proper object in one or more states but omit them in
others, I presume it may omit them in all and select other
articles.

															Suppose, then, a tax on carriages would produce $100,000, and a
tax on horses a like sum -- $100,000 -- and $100,000 were to be
apportioned according to that mode. Gentlemen might amuse
themselves with calling this a tax on carriages or a tax on horses
while not a Page 3 U. S. 183 single carriage nor a single horse was taxed throughout the
Union.

															4. Such an arbitrary method of taxing different states
differently is a suggestion altogether new, and would lead, if
practiced, to such dangerous consequences that it will require very
powerful arguments to show that that method of taxing would be in
any manner compatible with the Constitution, with which at present
I deem it utterly irreconcilable, it being altogether destructive
of the notion of a common interest, upon which the very principles
of the Constitution are founded so far as the condition of the
United States will admit.

															The second expedient proposed was that of taxing carriages,
among other things, in a general assessment. This amounts to saying
that Congress may lay a tax on carriages, but that it may not do it
unless it blends it with other subjects of taxation. For this no
reason or authority has been given, and in addition to other
suggestions offered by the counsel on that side, affords an
irrefragable proof that when positions plainly so untenable are
offered to counteract the principle contended for by the opposite
counsel, the principle itself is a right one; for no one can doubt
that if better reasons could have been offered, they would not have
escaped the sagacity and learning of the gentlemen who offered
them.

															There is no necessity or propriety in determining what is or is
not a direct or indirect tax in all cases.

															Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee.
Perhaps a direct tax in the sense of the Constitution can mean
nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil --
something capable of apportionment under all such
circumstances.

															A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description.

															The latter is to be considered so particularly, under the
present Constitution, on account of the slaves in the southern
states, who give a ratio in the representation in the proportion of
3 to 5.

															Either of these is capable of apportionment.

															In regard to other articles there may possibly be considerable
doubt.

															It is sufficient on the present occasion for the Court to be
satisfied that this is not a direct tax contemplated by the
Constitution in order to affirm the present judgment, since if it
cannot be apportioned, it must necessarily be uniform.

															I am clearly of opinion this is not a direct tax in the sense of
the Constitution, and therefore that the judgment ought to be
affirmed.

															WILSON, JUSTICE.

															As there were only four judges, including myself, who attended
the argument of this cause, I Page 3 U. S. 184 should have thought it proper to join in the decision, though I
had before expressed a judicial opinion on the subject in the
Circuit Court of Virginia, did not the unanimity of the other three
judges relieve me from the necessity. I shall now, however, only
add that my sentiments in favor of the constitutionality of the tax
in question have not been changed.

															CUSHING, JUSTICE.

															As I have been prevented by indisposition from attending to the
argument, it would be improper to give an opinion on the merits of
the cause.

															By the Court. Let the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed.

Summary: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a tax on carriages for conveying people, kept for the owner's use. The Court ruled that this tax was not a direct tax under the Constitution and did not need to be apportioned among the states.