NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087

															_________________

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., APPELLANTS

															21–1086 v. EVAN MILLIGAN, et al.

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the northern district of alabama

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., PETITIONERS

															21–1087 v. MARCUS CASTER, et al.

															on writ of certiorari before judgment to the
united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 8, 2023]

															Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court, except as to Part III–B–1.[ 1 ]*

															In January 2022, a three-judge District Court
sitting in Alabama preliminarily enjoined the State from using the
districting plan it had recently adopted for the 2022 congressional
elections, finding that the plan likely violated Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. This Court stayed
the District Court’s order pending further review. 595 U. S.
___ (2022). After conducting that review, we now affirm.

															I

															A

															Shortly after the Civil War, Congress passed
and the States ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, providing that
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 15, §1.
In the century that followed, however, the Amendment proved little
more than a parchment promise. Jim Crow laws like literacy tests,
poll taxes, and “good-morals” requirements abounded, South Carolina v. Katzenbach , 383 U.S.
301 , 312–313 (1966), “render[ing] the right to vote illusory
for blacks,” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder , 557 U.S.
193 , 220–221 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Congress stood up to little of it; “[t]he
first century of congressional enforcement of the [Fifteenth]
Amendment . . . can only be regarded as a failure.” Id. , at 197 (majority opinion).

															That changed in 1965. Spurred by the Civil
Rights movement, Congress enacted and President Johnson signed into
law the Voting Rights Act. 79Stat. 437, as amended, 52
U. S. C. §10301 et seq. The Act “create[d]
stringent new remedies for voting discrimination,” attempting to
forever “banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting.” Katzenbach , 383 U. S., at 308. By 1981, in only sixteen
years’ time, many considered the VRA “the most successful civil
rights statute in the history of the Nation.” S. Rep. No. 97–417,
p. 111 (1982) (Senate Report).

															These cases concern Section 2 of that Act. In
its original form, “§2 closely tracked the language of the
[Fifteenth] Amendment” and, as a result, had little independent
force. Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee , 594
U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 3).[ 2 ] Our leading case on §2 at the time was City
of Mobile v. Bolden , which involved a claim by black
voters that the City’s at-large election system effectively
excluded them from participating in the election of city
commissioners. 446 U.S.
55 (1980). The commission had three seats, black voters
comprised one-third of the City’s population, but no
black-preferred candidate had ever won election.

															The Court ruled against the plaintiffs. The
Fifteenth Amendment—and thus §2—prohibits States from acting with a
“racially discriminatory motivation” or an “invidious purpose” to
discriminate. Id. , at 61–65 (plurality opinion). But it does
not prohibit laws that are discriminatory only in effect. Ibid. The Mobile plaintiffs could “register and vote
without hindrance”—“their freedom to vote ha[d] not been denied or
abridged by anyone.” Id. , at 65. The fact that they happened
to lose frequently was beside the point. Nothing the City had done
“purposeful[ly] exclu[ded]” them “from participati[ng] in the
election process.” Id. , at 64.

															Almost immediately after it was decided, Mobile “produced an avalanche of criticism, both in the
media and within the civil rights community.” T. Boyd & S.
Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A
Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1355 (1983)
(Boyd & Markman). The New York Times wrote that the decision
represented “the biggest step backwards in civil rights to come
from the Nixon Court.” N. Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1980, p. A22. And
the Washington Post described Mobile as a “major defeat for
blacks and other minorities fighting electoral schemes that exclude
them from office.” Washington Post, Apr. 23, 1980, p. A5. By
focusing on discriminatory intent and ignoring disparate effect,
critics argued, the Court had abrogated “the standard used by the
courts to determine whether [racial] discrimination existed
. . . : Whether such discrimination existed.” It’s
Results That Count, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 3, 1982,
p. 8–A.

															But Mobile had its defenders, too. In
their view, abandoning the intent test in favor of an effects test
would inevitably require a focus on proportionality —wherever
a minority group won fewer seats in the legislature than its share
of the population, the charge could be made that the State law had
a discriminatory effect. That, after all, was the type of claim
brought in Mobile . But mandating racial proportionality in
elections was regarded by many as intolerable. Doing so, wrote
Senator Orrin Hatch in the Washington Star, would be “strongly
resented by the American public.” Washington Star, Sept. 30, 1980,
p. A–9. The Wall Street Journal offered similar criticism. An
effects test would generate “more, not less, racial and ethnic
polarization.” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 19, 1982, p. 28.

															This sharp debate arrived at Congress’s doorstep
in 1981. The question whether to broaden §2 or keep it as is, said
Hatch—by then Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee before which §2
would be debated—“involve[d] one of the most substantial
constitutional issues ever to come before this body.” 2 Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 1
(1982).

															Proceedings in Congress mirrored the
disagreement that had developed around the country. In April 1981,
Congressman Peter W. Rodino, Jr.—longtime chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee—introduced a bill to amend the VRA, proposing
that the words “to deny or abridge” in §2 be replaced with the
phrase “ in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement.” H. R. 3112, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (as
introduced) (emphasis added). This was the effects test that Mobile ’s detractors sought.

															But those wary of proportionality were not far
behind. Senator Hatch argued that the effects test “was
intelligible only to the extent that it approximated a standard of
proportional representation by race.” Boyd & Markman 1392. The
Attorney General had the same concern. The effects test “would be
triggered whenever election results did not mirror the population
mix of a particular community,” he wrote, producing “essentially a
quota system for electoral politics.” N. Y. Times, Mar. 27,
1982, p. 23.

															The impasse was not resolved until late April
1982, when Senator Bob Dole proposed a compromise. Boyd &
Markman 1414. Section 2 would include the effects test that many
desired but also a robust disclaimer against proportionality.
Seeking to navigate any tension between the two, the Dole Amendment
borrowed language from a Fourteenth Amendment case of ours, White v. Regester , 412 U.S.
755 (1973), which many in Congress believed would allow courts
to consider effects but avoid proportionality. The standard for
liability in voting cases, White explained, was whether “the
political processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in question—[in] that
its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the
district to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice.” Id. , at 766.

															The Dole compromise won bipartisan support and,
on June 18, the Senate passed the 1982 amendments by an
overwhelming margin, 85–8. Eleven days later, President Reagan
signed the Act into law. The amended §2 reads as follows:

															“(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color
. . . as provided in subsection (b).

															“(b) A violation of subsection (a) is
established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens . . . in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or
political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided , That nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.” 52 U. S. C.
§10301.

															B

															For the first 115 years following
Reconstruction, the State of Alabama elected no black
Representatives to Congress. See Singleton v. Merrill , 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 947 (ND Ala. 2022)
( per curiam ). In 1992, several plaintiffs sued
the State, alleging that it had been impermissibly diluting the
votes of black Alabamians in violation of §2. See Wesch v. Hunt , 785 F. Supp. 1491 , 1493 (SD Ala.). The lawsuit produced a
majority-black district in Alabama for the first time in decades. Id. , at 1499. And that fall, Birmingham lawyer Earl Hillard
became the first black Representative from Alabama since 1877. 582
F. Supp. 3d, at 947.

															Alabama’s congressional map has “remained
remarkably similar” after Wesch . Brief for Appellants in
No. 21–1086 etc., p. 9 (Brief for Alabama). The map
contains seven congressional districts, each with a single
representative. See Supp. App. 205–211; 582 F. Supp. 3d, at
951. District 1 encompasses the Gulf Coast region in the southwest;
District 2—known as the Wiregrass region—occupies the southeast;
District 3 covers the eastern-central part of the State; Districts
4 and 5 stretch width-wise across the north, with the latter
layered atop the former; District 6 is right in the State’s middle;
and District 7 spans the central west. Id. , at 951.

															In 2020, the decennial census revealed that
Alabama’s population had grown by 5.1%. See 1 App. 86. A group of
plaintiffs led by Alabama legislator Bobby Singleton sued the
State, arguing that the existing congressional map was
malapportioned and racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 938–939. While
litigation was proceeding, the Alabama Legislature’s Committee on
Reapportionment began creating a new districting map. Ibid. Although the prior decade’s population growth did not change the
number of seats that Alabama would receive in the House, the growth
had been unevenly distributed across the State, and the existing
map was thus out of date.

															To solve the problem, the State turned to
experienced mapmaker Randy Hinaman, who had created several
districting maps that Alabama used over the past 30 years. Id. , at 947–948. The starting point for Hinaman was the
then-existing 2011 congressional map, itself a product of the 2001
map that Hinaman had also created. Civ. No. 21–1530 (ND Ala.), ECF
Doc. 70–2, pp. 40, 93–94; see also 582 F. Supp. 3d, at
950. Hinaman worked to adjust the 2011 map in accordance with the
redistricting guidelines set by the legislature’s Reapportionment
Committee. Id. , at 948–950; 1 App. 275. Those guidelines
prioritized population equality, contiguity, compactness, and
avoiding dilution of minority voting strength. 582 F. Supp.
3d, at 1035–1036. They also encouraged, as a secondary matter,
avoiding incumbent pairings, respecting communities of interest,
minimizing the number of counties in each district, and preserving
cores of existing districts. Id. , at 1036–1037.

															The resulting map Hinaman drew largely resembled
the 2011 map, again producing only one district in which black
voters constituted a majority of the voting age population. Supp.
App. 205–211. The Alabama Legislature enacted Hinaman’s map under
the name HB1. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 935, 950–951. Governor Ivey
signed HB1 into law on November 4, 2021. Id. , at 950.

															C

															Three groups of plaintiffs brought suit
seeking to stop Alabama’s Secretary of State from conducting
congressional elections under HB1. The first group was led by Dr.
Marcus Caster, a resident of Washington County, who challenged HB1
as invalid under §2. Id. , at 934–935, 980. The second group,
led by Montgomery County resident Evan Milligan, brought claims
under §2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. , at 939–940, 966. Finally, the Singleton plaintiffs, who had previously sued to enjoin
Alabama’s 2011 congressional map, amended their complaint to
challenge HB1 as an impermissible racial gerrymander under the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. , at 938–939.

															A three-judge District Court was convened,
comprised of Circuit Judge Marcus and District Judges Manasco and
Moorer. The Singleton and Milligan actions were
consolidated before the three-judge Court for purposes of
preliminary injunction proceedings, while Caster proceeded
before Judge Manasco on a parallel track. 582 F. Supp. 3d, at
934–935. A preliminary injunction hearing began on January 4, 2022,
and concluded on January 12. Id. , at 943. In that time, the
three-judge District Court received live testimony from 17
witnesses, reviewed more than 1000 pages of briefing and upwards of
350 exhibits, and considered arguments from the 43 different
lawyers who had appeared in the litigation. Id. , at 935–936.
After reviewing that extensive record, the Court concluded in a
227-page opinion that the question whether HB1 likely violated §2
was not “a close one.” It did. Id. , at 1026. The Court thus
preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using HB1 in forthcoming
elections. Id. , at 936.[ 3 ]

															Four days later, on January 28, Alabama moved in
this Court for a stay of the District Court’s injunction. This
Court granted a stay and scheduled the cases for argument, noting
probable jurisdiction in Milligan and granting certiorari
before judgment in Caster . 595 U. S. ___ (2022).

															II

															The District Court found that plaintiffs
demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that
HB1 violates §2. We affirm that determination.

															A

															For the past forty years, we have evaluated
claims brought under §2 using the three-part framework developed in
our decision Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S.
30 (1986). Gingles concerned a challenge to North
Carolina’s multimember districting scheme, which allegedly diluted
the vote of its black citizens. Id. , at 34–36. The case
presented the first opportunity since the 1982 amendments to
address how the new §2 would operate. Gingles began by describing what §2
guards against. “The essence of a §2 claim,” the Court explained,
“is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters.” Id. , at
47. That occurs where an “electoral structure operates to minimize
or cancel out” minority voters’ “ability to elect their preferred
candidates.” Id. , at 48. Such a risk is greatest “where
minority and majority voters consistently prefer different
candidates” and where minority voters are submerged in a majority
voting population that “regularly defeat[s]” their choices. Ibid. To succeed in proving a §2 violation under Gingles , plaintiffs must satisfy three “preconditions.” Id. , at 50. First, the “minority group must be sufficiently
large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a
reasonably configured district.” Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n , 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
( per curiam ) (slip op., at 3) (citing Gingles , 478
U. S., at 46–51). A district will be reasonably configured,
our cases explain, if it comports with traditional districting
criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact. See Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama , 575 U.S.
254, 272 (2015). “Second, the minority group must be able to show
that it is politically cohesive.” Gingles , 478
U. S . , at 51. And third, “the minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate.” Ibid. Finally, a plaintiff who demonstrates the
three preconditions must also show, under the “totality of
circumstances,” that the political process is not “equally open” to
minority voters. Id. , at 45–46; see also id. , at
36–38 (identifying several factors relevant to the totality of
circumstances inquiry, including “the extent of any history of
official discrimination in the state . . . that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process”).

															Each Gingles precondition serves a
different purpose. The first, focused on geographical compactness
and numerosity, is “needed to establish that the minority has the
potential to elect a representative of its own choice in some
single-member district.” Growe v. Emison , 507 U.S.
25 , 40 (1993). The second, concerning the political
cohesiveness of the minority group, shows that a representative of
its choice would in fact be elected. See ibid. The third
precondition, focused on racially polarized voting, “establish[es]
that the challenged districting thwarts a distinctive minority
vote” at least plausibly on account of race. Ibid. And
finally, the totality of circumstances inquiry recognizes that
application of the Gingles factors is “peculiarly dependent
upon the facts of each case.” 478 U. S., at 79. Before courts
can find a violation of §2, therefore, they must conduct “an
intensely local appraisal” of the electoral mechanism at issue, as
well as a “searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present
reality.’ ” Ibid. Gingles has governed our Voting Rights
Act jurisprudence since it was decided 37 years ago. Congress has
never disturbed our understanding of §2 as Gingles construed
it. And we have applied Gingles in one §2 case after
another, to different kinds of electoral systems and to different
jurisdictions in States all over the country. See Voinovich v. Quilter , 507 U.S.
146 (1993) (Ohio); Growe , 507 U. S., at 25
(Minnesota); Johnson v. De Grandy , 512 U.S.
997 (1994) (Florida); Holder v. Hall , 512 U.S.
874 (1994) (Georgia); Abrams v. Johnson , 521 U.S.
74 (1997) (Georgia); League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry , 548 U.S.
399 , 423 (2006) ( LULAC ) (Texas); Bartlett v. Strickland , 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion) (North Carolina); Cooper v. Harris , 581 U.S. 285 (2017) (North Carolina); Abbott v. Perez , 585 U. S. ___ (2018) (Texas); Wisconsin
Legislature , 595 U. S. ___ (Wisconsin).

															B

															As noted, the District Court concluded that
plaintiffs’ §2 claim was likely to succeed under Gingles .
582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1026. Based on our review of the record,
we agree.

															With respect to the first Gingles precondition, the District Court correctly found that black voters
could constitute a majority in a second district that was
“reasonably configured.” 1 App. to Emergency Application for Stay
in No. 21–1086 etc., p. 253 (MSA). The plaintiffs adduced eleven
illustrative maps—that is, example districting maps that Alabama
could enact—each of which contained two majority-black districts
that comported with traditional districting criteria. With respect
to compactness, for example, the District Court explained that the
maps submitted by one of plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Moon Duchin,
“perform[ed] generally better on average than” did HB1. 582
F. Supp. 3d, at 1009. A map offered by another of plaintiffs’
experts, Bill Cooper, produced districts roughly as compact as the
existing plan. Ibid. And none of plaintiffs’ maps contained
any “tentacles, appendages, bizarre shapes, or any other obvious
irregularities that would make it difficult to find” them
sufficiently compact. Id. , at 1011. Plaintiffs’ maps also
satisfied other traditional districting criteria. They contained
equal populations, were contiguous, and respected existing
political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, and towns. Id. , at 1011, 1016. Indeed, some of plaintiffs’ proposed
maps split the same number of county lines as (or even fewer county lines than) the State’s map. Id. , at 1011–1012. We
agree with the District Court, therefore, that plaintiffs’
illustrative maps “strongly suggest[ed] that Black voters in
Alabama” could constitute a majority in a second, reasonably
configured, district. Id. , at 1010.

															The State nevertheless argues that plaintiffs’
maps were not reasonably configured because they failed to keep
together a traditional community of interest within Alabama. See, e.g. , id. , at 1012. A “community of interest,”
according to Alabama’s districting guidelines, is an “area with
recognized similarities of interests, including but not limited to
ethnic, racial, economic, tribal, social, geographic, or historical
identities.” Ibid. Alabama argues that the Gulf Coast region
in the southwest of the State is such a community of interest, and
that plaintiffs’ maps erred by separating it into two different
districts. Ibid. We do not find the State’s argument persuasive.
Only two witnesses testified that the Gulf Coast was a community of
interest. Id. , at 1015. The testimony provided by one of
those witnesses was “partial, selectively informed, and poorly
supported.” Ibid. The other witness, meanwhile, justified
keeping the Gulf Coast together “simply” to preserve “political
advantage[ ]”: “You start splitting counties,” he testified,
“and that county loses its influence. That’s why I don’t want
Mobile County to be split.” Id. , at 990, 1015. The District
Court understandably found this testimony insufficient to sustain
Alabama’s “overdrawn argument that there can be no legitimate
reason to split” the Gulf Coast region. Id. , at 1015.

															Even if the Gulf Coast did constitute a
community of interest, moreover, the District Court found that
plaintiffs’ maps would still be reasonably configured because they
joined together a different community of interest called the Black
Belt. Id. , at 1012–1014. Named for its fertile soil, the
Black Belt contains a high proportion of black voters, who “share a
rural geography, concentrated poverty, unequal access to government
services, . . . lack of adequate healthcare,” and a
lineal connection to “the many enslaved people brought there to
work in the antebellum period.” Id. , at 1012–1013; see also
1 App. 299–304. The District Court concluded—correctly, under our
precedent—that it did not have to conduct a “beauty
contest[ ]” between plaintiffs’ maps and the State’s. There
would be a split community of interest in both. 582 F. Supp.
3d, at 1012 (quoting Bush v. Vera , 517 U.S.
952 , 977–978 (1996) (plurality opinion)).

															The State also makes a related argument based on
“core retention”—a term that refers to the proportion of districts
that remain when a State transitions from one districting plan to
another. See, e.g. , Brief for Alabama 25, 61. Here, by
largely mirroring Alabama’s 2011 districting plan, HB1 performs
well on the core retention metric. Plaintiffs’ illustrative plans,
by contrast, naturally fare worse because they change where the
2011 district lines were drawn. See e.g. , Supp. App.
164–173. But this Court has never held that a State’s adherence to
a previously used districting plan can defeat a §2 claim. If that
were the rule, a State could immunize from challenge a new racially
discriminatory redistricting plan simply by claiming that it
resembled an old racially discriminatory plan. That is not the law:
§2 does not permit a State to provide some voters “less opportunity
. . . to participate in the political process” just
because the State has done it before. 52 U. S. C.
§10301(b).

															As to the second and third Gingles preconditions, the District Court determined that there was “no
serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor
that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as
a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate.” 582
F. Supp. 3d, at 1016 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court noted that, “on average, Black voters supported their
candidates of choice with 92.3% of the vote” while “white voters
supported Black-preferred candidates with 15.4% of the vote.” Id. , at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs’
experts described the evidence of racially polarized voting in
Alabama as “intens[e],” “very strong,” and “very clear.” Ibid. Even Alabama’s expert conceded “that the candidates
preferred by white voters in the areas that he looked at regularly
defeat the candidates preferred by Black voters.” Id. , at
1018.

															Finally, the District Court concluded that
plaintiffs had carried their burden at the totality of
circumstances stage. The Court observed that elections in Alabama
were racially polarized; that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually
zero success in statewide elections”; that political campaigns in
Alabama had been “characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals”;
and that “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and
voting-related discrimination is undeniable and well documented.” Id. , at 1018–1024.

															We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s
careful factual findings, which are subject to clear error review
and have gone unchallenged by Alabama in any event. See Cooper , 581 U. S., at 309. Nor is there a basis to
upset the District Court’s legal conclusions. The Court faithfully
applied our precedents and correctly determined that, under
existing law, HB1 violated §2.

															III

															The heart of these cases is not about the law
as it exists. It is about Alabama’s attempt to remake our §2
jurisprudence anew.

															The centerpiece of the State’s effort is what it
calls the “race-neutral benchmark.” The theory behind it is this:
Using modern computer technology, mapmakers can now generate
millions of possible districting maps for a given State. The maps
can be designed to comply with traditional districting criteria but
to not consider race. The mapmaker can determine how many
majority-minority districts exist in each map, and can then
calculate the median or average number of majority-minority
districts in the entire multimillion-map set. That number is called
the race-neutral benchmark.

															The State contends that this benchmark should
serve as the point of comparison in §2 cases. The benchmark, the
State says, was derived from maps that were “race-blind”—maps that
cannot have “deni[ed] or abridge[d]” anyone’s right to vote “on
account of race” because they never took race into “account” in the
first place. 52 U. S. C. §10301(a). Courts in §2 cases
should therefore compare the number of majority-minority districts
in the State’s plan to the benchmark. If those numbers are
similar—if the State’s map “resembles” the benchmark in this
way—then, Alabama argues, the State’s map also cannot have
“deni[ed] or abridge[d]” anyone’s right to vote “on account of
race.” Ibid. Alabama contends that its approach should be
adopted for two reasons. First, the State argues that a
race-neutral benchmark best matches the text of the Voting Rights
Act. Section 2 requires that the political processes be “equally
open.” §10301(b). What that means, the State asserts, is that the
State’s map cannot impose “obstacles or burdens that block or
seriously hinder voting on account of race.” Brief for Alabama 43.
These obstacles do not exist, in the State’s view, where its map
resembles a map that never took race into “account.” Ibid. Second, Alabama argues that the Gingles framework ends up
requiring racial proportionality in districting. According to the
State, Gingles demands that where “another majority-black
district could be drawn, it must be drawn.” Brief for Alabama 71
(emphasis deleted). And that sort of proportionality, Alabama
continues, is inconsistent with the compromise that Congress
struck, with the text of §2, and with the Constitution’s
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting.

															To apply the race-neutral benchmark in practice,
Alabama would require §2 plaintiffs to make at least three
showings. First, the illustrative plan that plaintiffs adduce for
the first Gingles precondition cannot have been “based” on
race. Brief for Alabama 56. Second, plaintiffs must show at the
totality of circumstances stage that the State’s enacted plan
diverges from the average plan that would be drawn without taking
race into account. And finally, plaintiffs must ultimately prove
that any deviation between the State’s plan and a race-neutral plan
is explainable “only” by race—not, for example, by “the State’s
naturally occurring geography and demography.” Id. , at
46.

															As we explain below, we find Alabama’s new
approach to §2 compelling neither in theory nor in practice. We
accordingly decline to recast our §2 case law as Alabama
requests.

															A

															1

															Section 2 prohibits States from imposing any
“standard, practice, or procedure . . . in a manner which
results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
. . . to vote on account of race or color.” 52
U. S. C. §10301(a). What that means, §2 goes on to
explain, is that the political processes in the State must be
“equally open,” such that minority voters do not “have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.” §10301(b).

															We have understood the language of §2 against
the background of the hard-fought compromise that Congress struck.
To that end, we have reiterated that §2 turns on the presence of
discriminatory effects, not discriminatory intent. See, e.g. , Chisom v. Roemer , 501 U.S.
380 , 403–404 (1991). And we have explained that “[i]t is
patently clear that Congress has used the words ‘on account of race
or color’ in the Act to mean ‘with respect to’ race or color, and
not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination.” Gingles , 478 U. S., at 71, n. 34 (plurality opinion)
(some alterations omitted). Individuals thus lack an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process when a State’s
electoral structure operates in a manner that “minimize[s] or
cancel[s] out the[ir] voting strength.” Id. , at 47. That
occurs where an individual is disabled from “enter[ing] into the
political process in a reliable and meaningful manner” “in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise.” White , 412 U. S., at 767, 770. A district is not
equally open, in other words, when minority voters face—unlike
their majority peers—bloc voting along racial lines, arising
against the backdrop of substantial racial discrimination within
the State, that renders a minority vote unequal to a vote by a
nonminority voter.

															The State’s reading of §2, by contrast, runs
headlong into our precedent. Alabama asserts that a State’s map
does not “abridge[ ]” a person’s right to vote “on account of
race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral
alternatives. See Brief for Alabama 54–56. But our cases have
consistently focused, for purposes of litigation, on the specific
illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces. Deviation from that map
shows it is possible that the State’s map has a disparate
effect on account of race. The remainder of the Gingles test
helps determine whether that possibility is reality by looking to
polarized voting preferences and the frequency of racially
discriminatory actions taken by the State, past and present.

															A State’s liability under §2, moreover, must be
determined “based on the totality of circumstances.” 52
U. S. C. §10301(b). Yet Alabama suggests there is only
one “circumstance[ ]” that matters—how the State’s map stacks
up relative to the benchmark. That single-minded view of §2 cannot
be squared with the VRA’s demand that courts employ a more refined
approach. And we decline to adopt an interpretation of §2 that
would “revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry
that has been the baseline of our §2 jurisprudence” for nearly
forty years. Bartlett , 556 U. S., at 16 (plurality
opinion); see also Wisconsin Legislature , 595 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 7) (faulting lower court for “improperly
reduc[ing] Gingles ’ totality-of-circumstances analysis to a
single factor”); De Grandy , 512 U. S., at 1018 (“An
inflexible rule would run counter to the textual command of §2,
that the presence or absence of a violation be assessed ‘based on
the totality of circumstances.’ ”).[ 4 ]

															2

															Alabama also argues that the race-neutral
benchmark is required because our existing §2 jurisprudence
inevitably demands racial proportionality in districting, contrary
to the last sentence of §2(b). But properly applied, the Gingles framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on
proportionality, as our decisions have frequently demonstrated.

															In Shaw v. Reno , for example, we
considered the permissibility of a second majority-minority
district in North Carolina, which at the time had 12 seats in the
U. S. House of Representatives and a 20% black voting age
population. 509 U.S.
630 , 633–634 (1993). The second majority-minority district
North Carolina drew was “160 miles long and, for much of its
length, no wider than the [interstate] corridor.” Id. , at
635. The district wound “in snakelike fashion through tobacco
country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it
gobble[d] in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.” Id. ,
at 635–636. Indeed, the district was drawn so imaginatively that
one state legislator remarked: “[I]f you drove down the interstate
with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the
district.” Id. , at 636.

															Though North Carolina believed the additional
district was required by §2, we rejected that conclusion, finding
instead that those challenging the map stated a claim of
impermissible racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. , at 655, 658. In so holding, we relied on the
fact that the proposed district was not reasonably compact. Id. , at 647. North Carolina had “concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by
disregarding traditional districting principles such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And “[a] reapportionment plan that
includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise separated by geographical and political
boundaries ,” we said, raised serious constitutional concerns. Ibid. (emphasis added).

															The same theme emerged in our 1995 decision Miller v. Johnson , where we upheld a district court’s
finding that one of Georgia’s ten congressional districts was the
product of an impermissible racial gerrymander. 515 U.S.
900 , 906, 910–911. At the time, Georgia’s black voting age
population was 27%, but there was only one majority-minority
district. Id. , at 906. To comply with the VRA, Georgia
thought it necessary to create two more majority-minority
districts—achieving proportionality. Id. , at 920–921. But
like North Carolina in Shaw , Georgia could not create the
districts without flouting traditional criteria. One district
“centered around four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that
ha[d] absolutely nothing to do with each other, and stretch[ed] the
district hundreds of miles across rural counties and narrow swamp
corridors.” 515 U. S., at 908. “Geographically,” we said of
the map, “it is a monstrosity.” Id. , at 909.

															In Bush v. Vera , a plurality of
the Court again explained how traditional districting criteria
limited any tendency of the VRA to compel proportionality. The case
concerned Texas’s creation of three additional majority-minority
districts. 517 U. S., at 957. Though the districts brought the
State closer to proportional representation, we nevertheless held
that they constituted racial gerrymanders in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. That was because the districts had “no
integrity in terms of traditional, neutral redistricting criteria.” Id. , at 960. One of the majority-black districts consisted
“of narrow and bizarrely shaped tentacles.” Id. , at 965. The
proposed majority-Hispanic district resembled “a sacred Mayan bird”
with “[s]pindly legs reach[ing] south” and a “plumed head ris[ing]
northward.” Id. , at 974.

															The point of all this is a simple one. Forcing
proportional representation is unlawful and inconsistent with this
Court’s approach to implementing §2. The numbers bear the point out
well. At the congressional level, the fraction of districts in
which black-preferred candidates are likely to win “is currently
below the Black share of the eligible voter population in every
state but three.” Brief for Professors Jowei Chen et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (Chen Brief ). Only one State in the
country, meanwhile, “has attained a proportional share” of
districts in which Hispanic-preferred candidates are likely to
prevail. Id. , at 3–4. That is because as residential
segregation decreases—as it has “sharply” done since the
1970s—satisfying traditional districting criteria such as the
compactness requirement “becomes more difficult.” T. Crum,
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 Duke L. J. 261,
279, and n. 105 (2020).

															Indeed, as amici supporting the appellees
emphasize, §2 litigation in recent years has rarely been successful
for just that reason. See Chen Brief 3–4. Since 2010, plaintiffs
nationwide have apparently succeeded in fewer than ten §2 suits. Id. , at 7. And “the only state legislative or
congressional districts that were redrawn because of successful
Section 2 challenges were a handful of state house districts near
Milwaukee and Houston.” Id. , at 7–8. By contrast,
“[n]umerous lower courts” have upheld districting maps “where, due
to minority populations’ geographic diffusion, plaintiffs couldn’t
design an additional majority-minority district” or satisfy the
compactness requirement. Id. , at 15–16 (collecting cases).
The same has been true of recent litigation in this Court. See Abbott , 585 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 33–34)
(finding a Texas district did not violate §2 because “the geography
and demographics of south and west Texas do not permit the creation
of any more than the seven Latino . . . districts that
exist under the current plan”).[ 5 ]

															Reapportionment, we have repeatedly observed,
“is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State[s],” not the
federal courts. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 21). Properly
applied, the Gingles factors help ensure that remains the
case. As respondents themselves emphasize, §2 “never require[s]
adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting
principles.” Brief for Respondents in No. 21–1087, p. 3. Its
exacting requirements, instead, limit judicial intervention to
“those instances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive
role [of race] in the electoral process . . . den[ies]
minority voters equal opportunity to participate.” Senate Report
33–34.

															B

															Although we are content to reject Alabama’s
invitation to change existing law on the ground that the State
misunderstands §2 and our decisions implementing it, we also
address how the race-neutral benchmark would operate in practice.
Alabama’s approach fares poorly on that score, which further
counsels against our adopting it.

															1

															The first change to existing law that Alabama
would require is prohibiting the illustrative maps that plaintiffs
submit to satisfy the first Gingles precondition from being
“based” on race. Brief for Alabama 56. Although Alabama is not
entirely clear whether, under its view, plaintiffs’ illustrative
plans must not take race into account at all or whether they must
just not “prioritize” race, ibid. , we see no reason to
impose such a new rule.

															When it comes to considering race in the context
of districting, we have made clear that there is a difference
“between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated
by them.” Miller , 515 U. S., at 916; see also North
Carolina v. Covington , 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018)
( per curiam ) (slip op., at 8). The former is
permissible; the latter is usually not. That is because
“[r]edistricting legislatures will . . . almost always be
aware of racial demographics,” Miller , 515 U. S., at
916, but such “race consciousness does not lead inevitably to
impermissible race discrimination,” Shaw , 509 U. S., at
646 . Section 2 itself “demands consideration of race.” Abbott , 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). The
question whether additional majority- minority districts can
be drawn, after all, involves a “quintessentially race-conscious
calculus.” De Grandy , 512 U. S., at 1020.

															At the same time, however, race may not be “the
predominant factor in drawing district lines unless [there is] a
compelling reason.” Cooper , 581 U. S., at 291. Race
predominates in the drawing of district lines, our cases explain,
when “race-neutral considerations [come] into play only after the
race-based decision had been made.” Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections , 580 U.S. 178, 189 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That may occur where “race for
its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing one map over
others.” Id. , at 190.

															While the line between racial predominance and
racial consciousness can be difficult to discern, see Miller , 515 U. S., at 916, it was not breached here.
The Caster plaintiffs relied on illustrative maps produced
by expert Bill Cooper. See 2 App. 591–592. Cooper testified that
while it was necessary for him to consider race, he also
took several other factors into account, such as compactness,
contiguity, and population equality. Ibid. Cooper testified
that he gave all these factors “equal weighting.” Id. , at
594. And when asked squarely whether race predominated in his
development of the illustrative plans, Cooper responded: “No. It
was a consideration. This is a Section 2 lawsuit, after all. But it
did not predominate or dominate.” Id. , at 595.

															The District Court agreed. It found “Cooper’s
testimony highly credible” and commended Cooper for “work[ing] hard
to give ‘equal weight[ ]’ to all traditional redistricting
criteria.” 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1005–1006; see also id. ,
at 978–979. The court also explained that Alabama’s evidence of
racial predominance in Cooper’s maps was exceedingly thin.
Alabama’s expert, Thomas Bryan, “testified that he never reviewed
the exhibits to Mr. Cooper’s report” and “that he never reviewed”
one of the illustrative plans that Cooper submitted. Id. , at
1006. Bryan further testified that he could offer no “conclusions
or opinions as to the apparent basis of any individual line drawing
decisions in Cooper’s illustrative plans.” 2 App. 740. By his own
admission, Bryan’s analysis of any race predominance in Cooper’s
maps “was pretty light.” Id. , at 739. The District Court did
not err in finding that race did not predominate in Cooper’s maps
in light of the evidence before it.[ 6 ]

															The dissent contends that race nevertheless
predominated in both Cooper’s and Duchin’s maps because they were
designed to hit “ ‘express racial target[s]’ ”—namely,
two “50%-plus majority-black districts.” Post , at 15
(opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting Bethune-Hill , 580
U. S., at 192). This argument fails in multiple ways. First,
the dissent’s reliance on Bethune-Hill is mistaken. In that
case, this Court was unwilling to conclude that a State’s maps were
produced in a racially predominant manner. Instead, we remanded for
the lower court to conduct the predominance analysis itself,
explaining that “the use of an express racial target” was just one
factor among others that the court would have to consider as part
of “[a] holistic analysis.” Id. , at 192. Justice Thomas
dissented in relevant part, contending that because “the
legislature sought to achieve a [black voting-age population] of at
least 55%,” race necessarily predominated in its decisionmaking. Id. , at 198 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part). But the Court did not join in that view, and Justice Thomas
again dissents along the same lines today.

															The second flaw in the dissent’s proposed
approach is its inescapable consequence: Gingles must be
overruled. According to the dissent, racial predominance plagues every single illustrative map ever adduced at the
first step of Gingles . For all those maps were created with
an express target in mind—they were created to show, as our cases
require, that an additional majority-minority district could be
drawn. That is the whole point of the enterprise. The upshot of the
approach the dissent urges is not to change how Gingles is
applied, but to reject its framework outright.

															The contention that mapmakers must be entirely
“blind” to race has no footing in our §2 case law. The line that we
have long drawn is between consciousness and predominance.
Plaintiffs adduced at least one illustrative map that comported
with our precedents. They were required to do no more to satisfy
the first step of Gingles .

															2

															The next condition Alabama would graft onto §2
is a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at the totality of
circumstances stage, that the State’s enacted plan contains fewer
majority-minority districts than the race-neutral benchmark. Brief
for Alabama 43. If it does not, then §2 should drop out of the
picture. Id. , at 44.

															Alabama argues that is what should have happened
here. It notes that one of plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Duchin, used an
algorithm to create “2 million districting plans for Alabama
. . . without taking race into account in any way in the
generation process.” 2 App. 710. Of these two million “race-blind”
plans, none contained two majority-black districts while many plans
did not contain any. Ibid. Alabama also points to a
“race-neutral” computer simulation conducted by another one of
plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Kosuke Imai, which produced 30,000
potential maps. Brief for Alabama 55. As with Dr. Duchin’s maps,
none of the maps that Dr. Imai created contained two majority-black
districts. See 2 App. 571–572. Alabama thus contends that because
HB1 sufficiently “resembles” the “race-neutral” maps created by Dr.
Duchin and Dr. Imai—all of the maps lack two majority-black
districts—HB1 does not violate §2. Brief for Alabama 54.

															Alabama’s reliance on the maps created by Dr.
Duchin and Dr. Imai is misplaced. For one, neither Duchin’s nor
Imai’s maps accurately represented the districting process in
Alabama. Dr. Duchin’s maps were based on old census data—from 2010
instead of 2020—and ignored certain traditional districting
criteria, such as keeping together communities of interest,
political subdivisions, or municipalities.[ 7 ] And Dr. Imai’s 30,000 maps failed to incorporate
Alabama’s own districting guidelines, including keeping together
communities of interest and preserving municipal boundaries. See
Supp. App. 58–59.[ 8 ]

															But even if the maps created by Dr. Duchin and
Dr. Imai were adequate comparators, we could not adopt the
map-comparison test that Alabama proposes. The test is flawed in
its fundamentals. Districting involves myriad
considerations—compactness, contiguity, political subdivisions,
natural geographic boundaries, county lines, pairing of incumbents,
communities of interest, and population equality. See Miller , 515 U. S., at 916. Yet “[q]uantifying,
measuring, prioritizing, and reconciling these criteria” requires
map drawers to “make difficult, contestable choices.” Brief for
Computational Redistricting Experts as Amici Curiae 8
(Redistricting Brief ). And “[i]t is easy to imagine how
different criteria could move the median map toward different
. . . distributions,” meaning that “the same map could be
[lawful] or not depending solely on what the mapmakers said they
set out to do.” Rucho v. Common Cause , 588 U. S.
___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 27–28). For example, “the
scientific literature contains dozens of competing metrics” on the
issue of compactness. Redistricting Brief 8. Which one of these
metrics should be used? What happens when the maps they produce
yield different benchmark results? How are courts to decide?

															Alabama does not say; it offers no rule or
standard for determining which of these choices are better than
others. Nothing in §2 provides an answer either. In 1982, the
computerized mapmaking software that Alabama contends plaintiffs
must use to demonstrate an (unspecified) level of deviation did not
even exist. See, e.g. , J. Chen & N. Stephanopoulos, The
Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights, 130 Yale L. J. 862,
881–882 (2021) (Chen & Stephanopoulos). And neither the text of
§2 nor the fraught debate that produced it suggests that “equal
access” to the fundamental right of voting turns on computer
simulations that are technically complicated, expensive to produce,
and available to “[o]nly a small cadre of university researchers
[that] have the resources and expertise to run” them. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 28 (citing Chen &
Stephanopoulos 882–884).[ 9 ]

															One final point bears mentioning. Throughout
these cases, Alabama has repeatedly emphasized that HB1 cannot have
violated §2 because none of plaintiffs’ two million odd maps
contained more than one majority-minority district. See, e.g. , Brief for Alabama 1, 23, 30, 31, 54–56, 70, 79. The
point is that two million is a very big number and that sheer
volume matters. But as elsewhere, Alabama misconceives the math
project that it expects courts to oversee. A brief submitted by
three computational redistricting experts explains that the number
of possible districting maps in Alabama is at least in the
“trillion trillions.” Redistricting Brief 6, n. 7. Another
publication reports that the number of potential maps may be orders
of magnitude higher: “the universe of all possible connected,
population-balanced districting plans that satisfy the state’s
requirements,” it explains, “is likely in the range of googols.”
Duchin & Spencer 768. Two million maps, in other words, is not
many maps at all. And Alabama’s insistent reliance on that number,
however powerful it may sound in the abstract, is thus close to
irrelevant in practice. What would the next million maps show? The
next billion? The first trillion of the trillion trillions?
Answerless questions all. See, e.g. , Redistricting Brief 2
(“[I]t is computationally intractable, and thus effectively
impossible, to generate a complete enumeration of all potential
districting plans. [Even] algorithms that attempt to create a
manageable sample of that astronomically large universe do not
consistently identify an average or median map.”); Duchin &
Spencer 768 (“[A] comprehensive survey of [all districting plans
within a State] is impossible.”).

															Section 2 cannot require courts to judge a
contest of computers when there is no reliable way to determine who
wins, or even where the finish line is.

															3

															Alabama’s final contention with respect to the
race-neutral benchmark is that it requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate that any deviations between the State’s enacted plan
and race-neutral alternatives “can be explained only by
racial discrimination.” Brief for Alabama 44 (emphasis added).

															We again find little merit in Alabama’s
proposal. As we have already explained, our precedents and the
legislative compromise struck in the 1982 amendments clearly
rejected treating discriminatory intent as a requirement for
liability under §2. See, e.g. , Chisom , 501
U. S., at 403–404; Shaw , 509 U. S., at 641; Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U.S.
471 , 481–482 (1997). Yet Alabama’s proposal is even more demanding than the intent test Congress jettisoned. Demonstrating
discriminatory intent, we have long held, “does not require a
plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purpose[ ].” Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. , 429 U.S.
252 , 265 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Reno , 520
U. S., at 488. Alabama’s proposed approach stands in sharp
contrast to all this, injecting into the effects test of §2 an
evidentiary standard that even our purposeful discrimination cases
eschew.

															C

															Alabama finally asserts that the Court should
outright stop applying §2 in cases like these because the text of
§2 does not apply to single-member redistricting and because §2 is
unconstitutional as the District Court applied it here. We disagree
on both counts.

															Alabama first argues that §2 does not apply to
single-member redistricting. Echoing Justice Thomas’s concurrence
in Holder v. Hall , Alabama reads §2’s reference to
“standard, practice, or procedure” to mean only the “methods for
conducting a part of the voting process that might . . .
be used to interfere with a citizen’s ability to cast his vote.”
512 U. S., at 917–918 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Examples of covered activities would include “registration
requirements, . . . the locations of polling places, the
times polls are open, the use of paper ballots as opposed to voting
machines, and other similar aspects of the voting process.” Id. , at 922. But not “a single-member districting system or
the selection of one set of districting lines over another.” Id. , at 923.

															This understanding of §2 cannot be reconciled
with our precedent. As recounted above, we have applied §2 to
States’ districting maps in an unbroken line of decisions
stretching four decades. See supra , at 11; see also Brnovich , 594 U. S., at ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 7,
n. 5) (collecting cases). In doing so, we have unanimously
held that §2 and Gingles “[c]ertainly . . . apply”
to claims challenging single-member districts. Growe , 507
U. S., at 40. And we have even invalidated portions of a
State’s single-district map under §2. See LULAC , 548
U. S., at 427–429.[ 10 ]
Alabama’s approach would require “abandoning” this precedent,
“overruling the interpretation of §2” as set out in nearly a dozen
of our cases. Holder , 512 U. S., at 944 (opinion of
Thomas, J.).

															We decline to take that step. Congress is
undoubtedly aware of our construing §2 to apply to districting
challenges. It can change that if it likes. But until and unless it
does, statutory stare decisis counsels our staying the
course. See, e.g. , Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,
LLC , 576 U.S. 446, 456 (2015).[ 11 ]

															The statutory text in any event supports the
conclusion that §2 applies to single-member districts. Alabama’s
own proffered definition of a “procedure is the manner or method of
proceeding in a process or course of action.” Brief for Alabama 51
(internal quotation marks omitted). But the manner of proceeding in
the act of voting entails determining in which districts voters
will vote. The fact that the term “procedure” is preceded by the
phrase “qualification or prerequisite to voting,” 52
U. S. C. §10301(a), does not change its meaning. It is
hard to imagine many more fundamental “prerequisites” to voting
than determining where to cast your ballot or who you are eligible
to vote for. Perhaps for that reason, even Alabama does not bear
the courage of its conviction on this point. It refuses to argue
that §2 is inapplicable to multimember districting, though its
textual arguments apply with equal force in that context.

															The dissent, by contrast, goes where even
Alabama does not dare, arguing that §2 is wholly inapplicable to
districting because it “focuses on ballot access and counting”
only. Post , at 2 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But the statutory
text upon which the dissent relies supports the exact opposite
conclusion. The relevant section provides that “[t]he terms ‘vote’
or ‘voting’ shall include all action necessary to make a vote
effective .” Ibid. (quoting 52 U. S. C.
§10310(c)(1); emphasis added). Those actions “includ[e], but [are]
not limited to, . . . action[s] required by law
prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot
counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes
cast.” §10310(c)(1). It would be anomalous to read the broad
language of the statute—“all action necessary,” “including but not
limited to”—to have the crabbed reach that Justice Thomas posits.
And we have already discussed why determining where to cast a
ballot constitutes a “prerequisite” to voting, as the statute
requires.

															The dissent also contends that “applying §2 to
districting rests on systematic neglect of . . . the
ballot-access focus of the 1960s’ voting-rights struggles.” Post , at 3 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But history did not stop
in 1960. As we have explained, Congress adopted the amended §2 in
response to the 1980 decision City of Mobile , a case about districting . And—as the dissent itself
acknowledges—“Congress drew §2(b)’s current operative language”
from the 1973 decision White v. Regester , post , at 4, n. 3 (opinion of Thomas, J.), a case that was
also about districting (in fact, a case that invalidated two
multimember districts in Texas and ordered them redrawn into
single-member districts, 412 U. S., at 765). This was not lost
on anyone when §2 was amended. Indeed, it was the precise reason
that the contentious debates over proportionality raged—debates
that would have made little sense if §2 covered only poll taxes and
the like, as the dissent contends.

															We also reject Alabama’s argument that §2 as
applied to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment. According to Alabama, that Amendment permits Congress to
legislate against only purposeful discrimination by States. See
Brief for Alabama 73. But we held over 40 years ago “that, even if
§1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposeful
discrimination, the prior decisions of this Court foreclose any
argument that Congress may not, pursuant to §2 [of the Fifteenth
Amendment] outlaw voting practices that are discriminatory in
effect.” City of Rome v. United States , 446 U.S.
156 , 173 (1980). The VRA’s “ban on electoral changes that are
discriminatory in effect,” we emphasized, “is an appropriate method
of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. ,
at 177. As City of Rome recognized, we had reached the very
same conclusion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach , a
decision issued right after the VRA was first enacted. 383
U. S., at 308–309, 329–337; see also Brnovich , 594
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).

															Alabama further argues that, even if the
Fifteenth Amendment authorizes the effects test of §2, that
Amendment does not authorize race-based redistricting as a remedy
for §2 violations. But for the last four decades, this Court and
the lower federal courts have repeatedly applied the effects test
of §2 as interpreted in Gingles and, under certain
circumstances, have authorized race-based redistricting as a remedy
for state districting maps that violate §2. See, e.g. , supra, at 11; cf. Mississippi Republican Executive
Committee v. Brooks , 469 U.S.
1002 (1984). In light of that precedent, including City of
Rome , we are not persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that §2 as
interpreted in Gingles exceeds the remedial authority of
Congress.

															The concern that §2 may impermissibly elevate
race in the allocation of political power within the States is, of
course, not new. See, e.g. , Shaw , 509 U. S., at
657 (“Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters.”). Our opinion today does not diminish or disregard
these concerns. It simply holds that a faithful application of our
precedents and a fair reading of the record before us do not bear
them out here.

															*  *  *

															The judgments of the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama in the Caster case, and of the
three-judge District Court in the Milligan case, are
affirmed.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 *Justice Kavanaugh joins all
but Part III–B–1 of this opinion. 2 As originally enacted, §2
provided that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.” 42 U. S. C. §1973 (1970 ed.). 3 Judge Manasco, presiding
in Caster , also preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using
HB1. Her opinion was based on the same evidentiary record as was
before the three-judge Court, and it adopted in full that Court’s
“recitation of the evidence, legal analysis, findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” 1 App. to Emergency Application for Stay in
No. 2:21–cv–1536, p. 4; see also 582 F. Supp. 3d, at
942–943, and n. 4. Any reference to the “District Court” in
this opinion applies to the Caster Court as well as to the
three-judge Court. 4 The principal dissent
complains that “what the District Court did here is essentially no
different from what many courts have done for decades under this
Court’s superintendence.” Post , at 47 (opinion of Thomas,
J.). That is not such a bad definition of stare
decisis . 5 Despite this all, the
dissent argues that courts have apparently been “methodically
carving the country into racially designated electoral districts”
for decades. Post , at 48 (opinion of Thomas, J.). And that,
the dissent inveighs, “should inspire us to repentance.” Ibid. But proportional representation of minority voters is
absent from nearly every corner of this country despite §2 being in
effect for over 40 years. And in case after case, we have rejected
districting plans that would bring States closer to proportionality
when those plans violate traditional districting criteria. See supra , at 19–21. It seems it is the dissent that is
“quixotically joust[ing] with an imaginary adversary.” Post ,
at 47 (opinion of Thomas, J.). 6 The dissent claims that
Cooper “treated ‘the minority population in and of itself ’ as
the paramount community of interest in his plans.” Post , at
14 (opinion of Thomas, J.) (quoting 2 App. 601). But Cooper
testified that he was “aware that the minority population in and of
itself can be a community of interest.” Id., at 601
(emphasis added). Cooper then explained that the relevant community
of interest here—the Black Belt—was a “ historical feature”
of the State, not a demographic one. Ibid. (emphasis added).
The Black Belt, he emphasized, was defined by its “historical
boundaries”—namely, the group of “rural counties plus Montgomery
County in the central part of the state.” Ibid. The District
Court treated the Black Belt as a community of interest for the
same reason. The dissent also protests that Cooper’s “plans
prioritized race over neutral districting criteria.” Post ,
at 14 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But as the District Court found, and
as Alabama does not contest, Cooper’s maps satisfied other
traditional criteria, such as compactness, contiguity, equal
populations, and respect for political subdivisions. 7 Dr. Duchin created her
two million map sample as part of an academic article that she
helped author, not for her work on this case, and the article was
neither entered into evidence below nor made part of the record
here. See 2 App. 710; see also M. Duchin & D. Spencer, Models,
Race, and the Law, 130 Yale L. J. Forum 744, 763–764 (2021) (Duchin
& Spencer). 8 The principal dissent
decrees that Dr. Duchin’s and Dr. Imai’s maps are “surely
probative,” forgiving the former’s use of stale census data as well
as both mapmakers’ collective failure to incorporate many
traditional districting guidelines. Post , at 23–24, and
n. 14 (opinion of Thomas, J.); see also post , at 15,
n. 9, 16. In doing so, that dissent ignores Dr. Duchin’s
testimony that—when using the correct census data—the “randomized
algorithms” she employed “found plans with two majority-black
districts in literally thousands of different ways.” MSA 316–317.
The principal dissent and the dissent by Justice Alito also ignore
Duchin’s testimony that “it is certainly possible” to draw the
illustrative maps she produced in a race-blind manner. 2 App. 713.
In that way, even the race-blind standard that the dissents urge
would be satisfied here. See post , at 21 (opinion of Thomas,
J.); post , at 6 (opinion of Alito, J.). So too could that
standard be satisfied in every §2 case; after all, as Duchin
explained, any map produced in a deliberately race-predominant
manner would necessarily emerge at some point in a random,
race-neutral process. 2 App. 713. And although Justice Alito voices
support for an “old-school approach” to §2, even that approach
cannot be squared with his understanding of Gingles . Post , at 6. The very reason a plaintiff adduces a map at the
first step of Gingles is precisely because of its racial composition—that is, because it creates an additional
majority-minority district that does not then exist. 9 None of this is to
suggest that algorithmic mapmaking is categorically irrelevant in
voting rights cases. Instead, we note only that, in light of the
difficulties discussed above, courts should exercise caution before
treating results produced by algorithms as all but dispositive of a
§2 claim. And in evaluating algorithmic evidence more generally in
this context, courts should be attentive to the concerns we have
discussed. 10 The
dissent suggests that Growe does not support the proposition
that §2 applies to single-member redistricting. Post , at 4–5
(opinion of Thomas, J.). The Court has understood Growe much
differently. See, e.g. , Abrams v. Johnson , 521 U.S.
74 , 90 (1997) (“Our decision in [ Gingles ] set out the
basic framework for establishing a vote dilution claim against
at-large, multimembers districts; we have since extended the
framework to single-member districts.” (citing Growe , 507
U. S., at 40–41)); Johnson v. De Grandy , 512 U.S.
997 , 1006 (1994) (“In Growe , we held that a claim of
vote dilution in a single-member district requires proof meeting the same three threshold conditions for a dilution challenge
to a multimember district . . . .”); Bartlett v. Strickland , 556 U.S.
1 , 12 (plurality opinion) (“The Court later held that the three Gingles requirements apply equally in §2 cases involving
single-member districts . . . .” (citing Growe , 507 U. S., at 40–41)). 11 Justice Alito argues that “[t]he Gingles framework should be [re]interpreted” in light of
changing methods in statutory interpretation. Post , at 10
(dissenting opinion). But as we have explained, Gingles effectuates the delicate legislative bargain that §2 embodies. And
statutory stare decisis counsels strongly in favor of not
“undo[ing] . . . the compromise that was reached between
the House and Senate when §2 was amended in 1982.” Brnovich ,
594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087

															_________________

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., APPELLANTS

															21–1086 v. EVAN MILLIGAN, et al.

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the northern district of alabama

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., PETITIONERS

															21–1087 v. MARCUS CASTER, et al.

															on writ of certiorari before judgment to the
united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 8, 2023]

															Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in all but Part
III–B–1.

															I agree with the Court that Alabama’s
redistricting plan violates §2 of the Voting Rights Act as
interpreted in Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S.
30 (1986). I write separately to emphasize four points. First , the upshot of Alabama’s argument
is that the Court should overrule Gingles . But the stare
decisis standard for this Court to overrule a statutory
precedent, as distinct from a constitutional precedent, is
comparatively strict. Unlike with constitutional precedents,
Congress and the President may enact new legislation to alter
statutory precedents such as Gingles . In the past 37 years,
however, Congress and the President have not disturbed Gingles , even as they have made other changes to the Voting
Rights Act. Although statutory stare decisis is not
absolute, “the Court has ordinarily left the updating or correction
of erroneous statutory precedents to the legislative process.” Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 4); see also, e.g. , Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC , 576
U.S. 446, 456 (2015); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union , 491 U.S.
164 , 172–173 (1989); Flood v. Kuhn , 407 U.S.
258 , 283–284 (1972); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co. , 285 U.S.
393 , 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).[ 1 ] Second , Alabama contends that Gingles inevitably requires a proportional number of
majority-minority districts, which in turn contravenes the
proportionality disclaimer in §2(b) of the Voting Rights Act. 52
U. S. C. §10301(b). But Alabama’s premise is wrong. As
the Court’s precedents make clear, Gingles does not mandate
a proportional number of majority-minority districts. Gingles requires the creation of a majority-minority
district only when, among other things, (i) a State’s redistricting
map cracks or packs a large and “geographically compact” minority
population and (ii) a plaintiff ’s proposed alternative map
and proposed majority-minority district are “reasonably
configured”—namely, by respecting compactness principles and other
traditional districting criteria such as county, city, and town
lines. See, e.g. , Cooper v. Harris , 581 U.S.
285, 301–302 (2017); Voinovich v. Quilter , 507 U.S.
146 , 153–154 (1993); ante , at 10–12, 18–22.

															If Gingles demanded a proportional number
of majority-minority districts, States would be forced to group
together geographically dispersed minority voters into unusually
shaped districts, without concern for traditional districting
criteria such as county, city, and town lines. But Gingles and this Court’s later decisions have flatly rejected that
approach. See, e.g. , Abbott v. Perez , 585
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 33–34); Bush v. Vera , 517 U.S.
952 , 979 (1996) (plurality opinion); Gingles , 478
U. S., at 50; see also Miller v. Johnson , 515 U.S.
900 , 917–920 (1995); Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S.
630 , 644–649 (1993); ante , at 18–22.[ 2 ] Third , Alabama argues that courts should
rely on race-blind computer simulations of redistricting maps to
assess whether a State’s plan abridges the right to vote on account
of race. It is true that computer simulations might help detect the
presence or absence of intentional discrimination. For
example, if all of the computer simulations generated only one
majority-minority district, it might be difficult to say that a
State had intentionally discriminated on the basis of race by
failing to draw a second majority-minority district.

															But as this Court has long recognized—and as all
Members of this Court today agree—the text of §2 establishes an
effects test, not an intent test. See ante , at 17; post , at 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting); post , at 16
(Alito, J., dissenting). And the effects test, as applied by Gingles to redistricting, requires in certain circumstances
that courts account for the race of voters so as to prevent the
cracking or packing—whether intentional or not—of large and
geographically compact minority populations. See Abbott , 585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); Johnson v. De
Grandy , 512 U.S.
997 , 1006–1007, 1020 (1994); Voinovich , 507 U. S.,
at 153–154; see generally Brnovich v. Democratic National
Committee , 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 22)
(“§2 does not demand proof of discriminatory purpose”); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U.S.
471 , 482 (1997) (Congress “clearly expressed its desire that §2 not have an intent component”); Holder v. Hall , 512 U.S.
874 , 923–924 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (§2
adopts a “ ‘results’ test, rather than an ‘intent’ test”); Chisom v. Roemer , 501 U.S.
380 , 394, 404 (1991) (“proof of intent is no longer required to
prove a §2 violation” as “Congress made clear that a violation of
§2 could be established by proof of discriminatory results alone”); Gingles , 478 U. S., at 71, n. 34 (plurality opinion)
(§2 does not require “ ‘purpose of racial
discrimination’ ”). Fourth , Alabama asserts that §2, as
construed by Gingles to require race-based redistricting in
certain circumstances, exceeds Congress’s remedial or preventive
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. As the
Court explains, the constitutional argument presented by Alabama is
not persuasive in light of the Court’s precedents. See ante ,
at 33–34; see also City of Rome v. United States , 446 U.S.
156 , 177–178 (1980). Justice Thomas notes, however, that even
if Congress in 1982 could constitutionally authorize race-based
redistricting under §2 for some period of time, the authority to
conduct race-based redistricting cannot extend indefinitely into
the future. See post , at 44–45 (dissenting opinion). But
Alabama did not raise that temporal argument in this Court, and I
therefore would not consider it at this time.

															For those reasons, I vote to affirm, and I
concur in all but Part III–B–1 of the Court’s opinion. Notes 1 Unlike ordinary statutory
precedents, the “Court’s precedents applying common-law statutes
and pronouncing the Court’s own interpretive methods and principles
typically do not fall within that category of stringent statutory stare decisis .” Ramos , 590 U. S., at ___,
n. 2 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (slip op., at 5, n. 2);
see also, e.g. , Kisor v. Wilkie , 588
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
judgment) (slip op., at 34–36); id. , at ___–___ (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1–2); Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. , 551 U.S.
877 , 899–907 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S.
500 , 510–516 (2006). 2 To ensure that Gingles does not improperly morph into a proportionality
mandate, courts must rigorously apply the “geographically compact”
and “reasonably configured” requirements. See ante , at 22
(§2 requirements under Gingles are “exacting”). In this
case, for example, it is important that at least some of the
plaintiffs’ proposed alternative maps respect county lines at least
as well as Alabama’s redistricting plan. See ante , at
12. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087

															_________________

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., APPELLANTS

															21–1086 v. EVAN MILLIGAN, et al.

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the northern district of alabama

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., PETITIONERS

															21–1087 v. MARCUS CASTER, et al.

															on writ of certiorari before judgment to the
united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 8, 2023]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins, with whom Justice Barrett joins as to Parts II and III, and
with whom Justice Alito joins as to Parts II–A and II–B,
dissenting.

															These cases “are yet another installment in the
‘disastrous misadventure’ of this Court’s voting rights
jurisprudence.” Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama , 575 U.S. 254, 294 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Holder v. Hall , 512
U.S. 874 , 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment)).
What distinguishes them is the uncommon clarity with which they lay
bare the gulf between our “color-blind” Constitution, Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S.
537 , 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and “the consciously
segregated districting system currently being constructed in the
name of the Voting Rights Act.” Holder , 512 U. S., at
907 (opinion of Thomas, J.). The question presented is whether §2
of the Act, as amended, requires the State of Alabama to
intentionally redraw its longstanding congressional districts so
that black voters can control a number of seats roughly
proportional to the black share of the State’s population. Section
2 demands no such thing, and, if it did, the Constitution would not
permit it.

															I

															At the outset, I would resolve these cases in
a way that would not require the Federal Judiciary to decide the
correct racial apportionment of Alabama’s congressional seats.
Under the statutory text, a §2 challenge must target a “voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure.” 52 U. S. C. §10301(a). I have long been
convinced that those words reach only “enactments that regulate
citizens’ access to the ballot or the processes for counting a
ballot”; they “do not include a State’s . . . choice of
one districting scheme over another.” Holder , 512
U. S., at 945 (opinion of Thomas, J.). “Thus, §2 cannot
provide a basis for invalidating any district.” Abbott v. Perez , 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 1).

															While I will not repeat all the arguments that
led me to this conclusion nearly three decades ago, see Holder , 512 U. S., at 914–930 (opinion concurring in
judgment), the Court’s belated appeal to the statutory text is not
persuasive. See ante , at 31–32. Whatever words like
“practice” and “procedure” are capable of meaning in a vacuum, the
prohibitions of §2 apply to practices and procedures that
affect “voting” and “the right . . . to vote.” §10301(a).
“Vote” and “voting” are defined terms under the Act, and the Act’s
definition plainly focuses on ballot access and counting:

															“The terms ‘vote’ or ‘voting’ shall
include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any
primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited
to, registration, listing pursuant to this chapter, or other action
required by law prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and
having such ballot counted properly and included in the appropriate
totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for public or party
office and propositions for which votes are received in an
election.” §10310(c)(1).

															In enacting the original Voting Rights Act in
1965, Congress copied this definition almost verbatim from Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1960—a law designed to protect access to
the ballot in jurisdictions with patterns or practices of denying
such access based on race, and which cannot be construed to
authorize so-called vote-dilution claims. See 74Stat. 91–92
(codified in relevant part at 52 U. S. C. §10101(e)).
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which cross-referenced the
1960 Act’s definition of “vote,” likewise protects ballot access
alone and cannot be read to address vote dilution. See 78Stat. 241
(codified in relevant part at 52 U. S. C. §10101(a)).
Tellingly, the 1964 Act also used the words “standard, practice, or
procedure” to refer specifically to voting qualifications for
individuals and the actions of state and local officials in
administering such requirements.[ 1 ] Our entire enterprise of applying §2 to districting
rests on systematic neglect of these statutory antecedents and,
more broadly, of the ballot-access focus of the 1960s’
voting-rights struggles. See, e.g. , Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee , 594 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (slip op., at 2) (describing the “notorious methods” by
which, prior to the

															Voting Rights Act, States and localities
deprived black Americans of the ballot: “poll taxes, literacy
tests, property qualifications, white primaries, and grandfather
clauses” (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).[ 2 ]

															Moreover, the majority drastically overstates
the stare decisis support for applying §2 to single-member
districting plans like the one at issue here.[ 3 ] As the majority implicitly acknowledges, this
Court has only applied §2 to invalidate one single-member district
in one case. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry , 548 U.S.
399 , 447 (2006) ( LULAC ) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). And no
party in that case argued that the plaintiffs’ vote-dilution claim
was not cognizable. As for Growe v. Emison , 507 U.S.
25 (1993), it held only that the threshold preconditions for
challenging multimember and at-large plans must limit challenges to
single-member districts with at least the same force, as
“[i]t would be peculiar [if] a vote-dilution challenge to the (more
dangerous) multimember district require[d] a higher threshold
showing than a vote-fragmentation challenge to a single-member
district.” Id. , at 40. Growe did not consider (or,
thus, reject) an argument that §2 does not apply to single-member
districts.

															In any event, stare decisis should be no
barrier to reconsidering a line of cases that “was based on a
flawed method of statutory construction from its inception,” has
proved incapable of principled application after nearly four
decades of experience, and puts federal courts in the business of
“methodically carving the country into racially designated
electoral districts.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 945
(opinion of Thomas, J.). This Court has “never applied stare
decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier
decisions determining the meaning of statutes,” and it should not
do so here. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Servs. , 436 U.S.
658 , 695 (1978). Stare decisis did not save “separate
but equal,” despite its repeated reaffirmation in this Court and
the pervasive reliance States had placed upon it for decades. See, e.g. , Brief for Appellees in Brown v. Board of
Education , O. T. 1953, No. 1, pp. 18–30. It should
not rescue modern-day forms of de jure racial
balkanization—which, as these cases show, is exactly where our §2
vote-dilution jurisprudence has led.[ 4 ]

															II

															Even if §2 applies here, however, Alabama
should prevail. The District Court found that Alabama’s
congressional districting map “dilutes” black residents’ votes
because, while it is possible to draw two majority-black
districts, Alabama’s map only has one.[ 5 ] But the critical question in all vote-dilution cases
is: “Diluted relative to what benchmark?” Gonzalez v. Aurora , 535 F.3d 594, 598 (CA7 2008) (Easterbrook,
C. J.). Neither the District Court nor the majority has any
defensible answer. The text of §2 and the logic of vote-dilution
claims require a meaningfully race-neutral benchmark, and no
race-neutral benchmark can justify the District Court’s finding of
vote dilution in these cases. The only benchmark that can justify
it—and the one that the District Court demonstrably applied—is the
decidedly nonneutral benchmark of proportional allocation of
political power based on race.

															A

															As we have long recognized, “the very concept
of vote dilution implies—and, indeed, necessitates—the existence of
an ‘undiluted’ practice against which the fact of dilution may be
measured.” Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U.S.
471 , 480 (1997). In a challenge to a districting plan, a court
must be able to compare a State’s enacted plan with “a
hypothetical, undiluted plan,” ibid. , ascertained by an
“objective and workable standard.” Holder , 512 U. S.,
at 881 (plurality opinion); see also id. , at 887 (opinion of
O’Connor, J.) (noting the “general agreement” on this point).

															To be sure, it is no easy task to identify an
objective, “undiluted” benchmark against which to judge a
districting plan. As we recently held in the analogous context of
partisan gerrymandering, “federal courts are not equipped to
apportion political power as a matter of fairness.” Rucho v. Common Cause , 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at
17). Yet §2 vote-dilution cases require nothing less. If §2
prohibited only intentional racial discrimination, there would be
no difficulty in finding a clear and workable rule of decision. But
the “results test” that Congress wrote into §2 to supersede Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S.
55 (1980), eschews intent as the criterion of liability. See Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U. S., at 482.
Accordingly, a §2 vote-dilution claim does not simply “as[k]
. . . for the elimination of a racial classification.” Rucho , 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21). It asks,
instead, “for a fair share of political power and influence, with
all the justiciability conundrums that entails.” Ibid. Nevertheless, if §2 applies to single-member districts, we must
accept that some “objective and workable standard for choosing a
reasonable benchmark” exists; otherwise, single-member districts
“cannot be challenged as dilutive under §2.” Holder , 512
U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion).

															Given the diverse circumstances of different
jurisdictions, it would be fanciful to expect a one-size-fits-all
definition of the appropriate benchmark. Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S.
30 , 79 (1986) (explaining that the vote-dilution inquiry “is
peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case and requires an
intensely local appraisal” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). One overriding principle, however, should be obvious. A
proper districting benchmark must be race neutral : It must
not assume, a priori , that an acceptable plan should
include any particular number or proportion of minority-controlled
districts.

															I begin with §2’s text. As relevant here, §2(a)
prohibits a State from “impos[ing] or appl[ying]” any electoral
rule “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”
§10301(a). Section 2(b) then provides that §2(a) is violated

															“if, based on the totality of
circumstances, . . . the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State . . . are not equally
open to participation by members of [a protected class] in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State
. . Provided , That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”
§10301(b).

															As we held two Terms ago in Brnovich , the
“equal openness” requirement is “the core” and “touchstone” of
§2(b),

															with “equal opportunity” serving an ancillary
function.[ 6 ] 594 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 15). Relying significantly on §2(b)’s disclaimer
of a right to proportional representation, we also held that §2
does not enact a “freewheeling disparate-impact regime.” Id. , at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at 22, and n. 14). Brnovich further stressed the value of “benchmarks with
which . . . challenged [electoral] rule[s] can be
compared,” id. , at ___ (slip op., at 17), and that “a
meaningful comparison is essential” in judging the significance of
any challenged scheme’s racially disparate impact. Id. , at
___ (slip op., at 18). To the extent §2 applies to districting
plans, then, it requires that they be “equally open to
participation” by voters of all races, but it is not a pure
disparate-impact statute and does not guarantee proportional
representation.

															In its main argument here, Alabama simply
carries these principles to their logical conclusion: Any
vote-dilution benchmark must be race neutral. See Brief for
Appellants 32–46. Whatever “equal openness” means in the context of
single-member districting, no “meaningful comparison” is possible
using a benchmark that builds in a presumption in favor of
minority-controlled districts. Indeed, any benchmark other than a
race-neutral one would render the vote-dilution inquiry
fundamentally circular, allowing courts to conclude that a
districting plan “dilutes” a minority’s voting strength “on account
of race” merely because it does not measure up to an ideal already
defined in racial terms. Such a question-begging standard would not
answer our precedents’ demand for an “ objective ,”
“reasonable benchmark.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 881
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Nor could any nonneutral
benchmark be reconciled with Brnovich ’s rejection of a
disparate-impact regime or the text’s disclaimer of a right to
proportional representation. 594 U. S., at ___, and n. 14
(slip op., at 22, and n. 14).

															There is yet another compelling reason to insist
on a race-neutral benchmark. “The Constitution abhors
classifications based on race.” Grutter v. Bollinger , 539 U.S.
306 , 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Redistricting is no exception. “Just as the State may
not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the
basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf courses, beaches,
and schools,” the State also “may not separate its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race.” Miller v. Johnson , 515
U.S. 900 , 911 (1995) (citations omitted). “[D]istricting maps
that sort voters on the basis of race ‘ “are by their very
nature odious.” ’ ” Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n , 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
( per curiam ) (slip op., at 2) (quoting Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S.
630 , 643 (1993) ( Shaw I )). Accordingly, our precedents
apply strict scrutiny whenever race was “the predominant factor
motivating [the placement of] a significant number of voters within
or without a particular district,” Miller , 515 U. S.,
at 916, or, put another way, whenever “[r]ace was the criterion
that . . . could not be compromised” in a district’s
formation. Shaw v. Hunt , 517
U.S. 899 , 907 (1996) ( Shaw II ).

															Because “[r]acial gerrymandering, even for
remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions”
and undermine “the goal of a political system in which race no
longer matters,” Shaw I , 509 U. S., at 657, our cases
have long recognized the need to interpret §2 to avoid
“unnecessarily infus[ing] race into virtually every redistricting”
plan. LULAC , 548 U. S., at 446 (opinion of Kennedy,
J.); accord, Bartlett v. Strickland , 556 U.S.
1 , 21 (2009) (plurality opinion). Plainly, however, that
“infusion” is the inevitable result of any race-based benchmark.
Any interpretation of §2 that permits courts to condemn enacted
districting plans as dilutive relative to a nonneutral benchmark
“would result in a substantial increase in the number of mandatory
districts drawn with race as ‘the predominant factor motivating the
legislature’s decision,’ ” thus “ ‘raising serious
constitutional questions.’ ” Id. , at 21–22 (first
quoting Miller , 515 U. S., at 916, then quoting LULAC , 548 U. S., at 446). To avoid setting §2 on a
collision course with the Constitution, courts must apply a
race-neutral benchmark in assessing any claim that a districting
plan unlawfully dilutes a racial minority’s voting strength.

															B

															The plaintiffs in these cases seek a
“proportional allocation of political power according to race.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 936 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
According to the 2020 census, black Alabamians account for 27.16%
of the State’s total population and 25.9% of its voting-age
population, both figures slightly less than two-sevenths. Of
Alabama’s seven existing congressional districts, one, District 7,
is majority-black.[ 7 ] These
cases were brought to compel “the creation of two majority-minority congressional districts”—roughly proportional
control. 1 App. 135 (emphasis added); see also id. , at 314
(“Plaintiffs seek an order . . . ordering a congressional
redistricting plan that includes two majority-Black congressional
districts”).

															Remarkably, the majority fails to acknowledge
that two minority-controlled districts would mean proportionality,
or even that black Alabamians are about two-sevenths of the State.
Yet that context is critical to the issues before us, not least
because it explains the extent of the racial sorting the
plaintiffs’ goal would require. “[A]s a matter of mathematics,”
single-member districting “tends to deal out representation far
short of proportionality to virtually all minorities, from
environmentalists in Alaska to Republicans in Massachusetts.” M.
Duchin & D. Spencer, Models, Race, and the Law, 130 Yale
L. J. Forum 744, 752 (2021) (Duchin & Spencer). As such,
creating two majority-black districts would require Alabama to
aggressively “sort voters on the basis of race.” Wisconsin
Legislature , 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2).

															The plaintiffs’ 11 illustrative maps make that
clear. All 11 maps refashion existing District 2 into a
majority-black district while preserving the current black majority
in District 7. They all follow the same approach: Starting with
majority-black areas of populous Montgomery County, they

															expand District 2 east and west to encompass
predominantly majority-black areas throughout the rural “Black
Belt.” In the process, the plans are careful to leave enough of the
Black Belt for District 7 to maintain its black majority. Then—and
critically—the plans have District 2 extend a southwestern tendril
into Mobile County to capture a dense, high-population
majority-black cluster in urban Mobile.[ 8 ] See Supp. App. 184, 186, 188, 190, 193, 195, 197, 199,
201, 203; see also id. , at 149.

															Those black Mobilians currently reside in the
urban heart of District 1. For 50 years, District 1 has occupied
the southwestern pocket of Alabama, consisting of the State’s two
populous Gulf Coast counties (Mobile and Baldwin) as well as some
less populous areas to the immediate north and east. See id. , at 205–211. It is indisputable that the Gulf Coast
region is the sort of community of interest that the Alabama
Legislature might reasonably think a congressional district should
be built around. It contains Alabama’s only coastline, its fourth
largest city, and the Port of Mobile. Its physical geography runs
north along the Alabama and Mobile Rivers, whose paths District 1
follows. Its economy is tied to the Gulf—to shipping, shipbuilding,
tourism, and commercial fishing. See Brief for Coastal Alabama
Partnership as Amicus Curiae 13–15.

															But, for the plaintiffs to secure their
majority-black District 2, this longstanding, compact, and
eminently sensible district must be radically transformed. In the
Gulf Coast region, the newly drawn District 1 would retain only the
majority-white areas that District 2 did not absorb on its path to
Mobile’s large majority-black population. To make up the lost
population, District 1 would have to extend eastward through
largely majority-white rural counties along the length of Alabama’s
border with the Florida panhandle. The plaintiffs do not assert
that white residents on the Gulf Coast have anything special in
common with white residents in those communities, and the District
Court made no such finding. The plaintiffs’ maps would thus reduce
District 1 to the leftover white communities of the southern fringe
of the State, its shape and constituents defined almost entirely by
the need to make District 2 majority-black while also retaining a
majority-black District 7.

															The plaintiffs’ mapmaking experts left little
doubt that their plans prioritized race over neutral districting
criteria. Dr. Moon Duchin, who devised four of the plans, testified
that achieving “two majority-black districts” was a “nonnegotiable
principl[e]” in her eyes, a status shared only by our precedents’
“population balance” requirement. 2 App. 634; see also id. ,
at 665, 678. Only “after” those two “nonnegotiable[s]” were
satisfied did Dr. Duchin then give lower priority to “contiguity”
and “compactness.” Id. , at 634. The architect of the other
seven maps, William Cooper, considered “minority voting strengt[h]”
a “traditional redistricting principl[e]” in its own right, id. , at 591, and treated “the minority population in and of
itself ” as the paramount community of interest in his plans, id. , at 601.

															Statistical evidence also underscored the
illustrative maps’ extreme racial sorting. Another of the
plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Kosuke Imai, computer generated 10,000
districting plans using a race-blind algorithm programmed to
observe several objective districting criteria. Supp. App. 58–59.
None of those plans contained even one majority-black district. Id. , at 61. Dr. Imai generated another 20,000 plans using
the same algorithm, but with the additional constraint that they
must contain at least one majority- black district; none of those
plans contained a second majority-black district, or even a second
district with a black voting-age population above 40%. Id. ,
at 54, 67, 71–72. In a similar vein, Dr. Duchin testified about an
academic study in which she had randomly “generated 2 million
districting plans for Alabama” using a race-neutral algorithm that
gave priority to compactness and contiguity. 2 App. 710; see Duchin
& Spencer 765. She “found some [plans] with one majority-black
district, but never found a second . . . majority-black
district in 2 million attempts.” 2 App. 710. “[T]hat it is hard to
draw two majority-black districts by accident,” Dr. Duchin
explained, “show[ed] the importance of doing so on purpose.” Id. , at 714.[ 9 ]

															The plurality of Justices who join Part III–B–I
of The Chief Justice’s opinion appear to agree that the plaintiffs
could not prove the first precondition of their statewide
vote-dilution claim—that black Alabamians could constitute a
majority in two “reasonably configured” districts, Wisconsin
Legislature , 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3)—by drawing
an illustrative map in which race was predominant. See ante ,
at 25. That should be the end of these cases, as the illustrative
maps here are palpable racial gerrymanders. The plaintiffs’ experts
clearly applied “express racial target[s]” by setting out to create
50%-plus majority-black districts in both Districts 2 and 7. Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections , 580
U.S. 178, 192 (2017). And it is impossible to conceive of the
State adopting the illustrative maps without pursuing the same
racially motivated goals. Again, the maps’ key design features are:
(1) making District 2 majority-black by connecting black residents
in one metropolitan area (Montgomery) with parts of the rural Black
Belt and black residents in another metropolitan area (Mobile); (2)
leaving enough of the Black Belt’s majority-black rural areas for
District 7 to maintain its majority-black status; and (3) reducing
District 1 to the white remainder of the southern third of the
State.

															If the State did this, we would call it a racial
gerrymander, and rightly so. We would have no difficulty
recognizing race as “the predominant factor motivating [the
placement of] significant number[s] of voters within or without”
Districts 1, 2, and 7. Miller , 515 U. S., at 916. The
“stark splits in the racial composition of populations moved into
and out of ” Districts 1 and 2 would make that obvious. Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at 192. So would the manifest
absence of any nonracial justification for the new District 1. And
so would the State’s clear intent to ensure that both Districts 2 and 7 hit their preordained racial targets. See ibid. (noting that “pursu[it of] a common redistricting
policy toward multiple districts” may show predominance). That the
plan delivered proportional control for a particular minority—a
statistical anomaly that over 2 million race-blind simulations did
not yield and 20,000 race-conscious simulations did not even
approximate—would be still further confirmation.

															The State could not justify such a plan simply
by arguing that it was less bizarre to the naked eye than other,
more elaborate racial gerrymanders we have encountered. See ante , at 19–20 (discussing cases). As we held in Miller , visual “bizarreness” is not “a necessary element of
the constitutional wrong,” only “persuasive circumstantial
evidence.” 515 U. S., at 912–913.[ 10 ]

															Nor could such a plan be explained by supposed
respect for the Black Belt. For present purposes, I accept the
District Court’s finding that the Black Belt is a significant
community of interest. But the entire black population of the Black
Belt—some 300,000 black residents, see Supp. App. 33—is too small
to provide a majority in a single congressional district,
let alone two.[ 11 ] The black
residents needed to populate majority-black versions of Districts 2
and 7 are overwhelmingly concentrated in the urban counties of
Jefferson ( i.e. , the Birmingham metropolitan area, with
about 290,000 black residents), Mobile (about 152,000 black
residents), and Montgomery (about 134,000 black residents). Id. , at 83. Of the three, only Montgomery County is in the
Black Belt. The plaintiffs’ maps, therefore, cannot and do not
achieve their goal of two majority-black districts by “join[ing]
together” the Black Belt, as the majority seems wrongly to believe. Ante , at 13. Rather, their majority-black districts are
anchored by three separate high-density clusters of black residents
in three separate metropolitan areas, two of them outside the Black
Belt. The Black Belt’s largely rural remainder is then divided between the two districts to the extent needed to
fill out their population numbers with black majorities in both.
Respect for the Black Belt as a community of interest cannot
explain this approach. The only explanation is the plaintiffs’
express racial target: two majority-black districts and statewide
proportionality.

															The District Court nonetheless found that race
did not predominate in the plaintiffs’ illustrative maps because
Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper “prioritized race only as necessary
. . . to draw two reasonably compact majority-Black
congressional districts,” as opposed to “maximiz[ing] the number of
majority-Black districts, or the BVAP [black voting-age population]
in any particular majority-Black district.” Singleton v. Merrill , 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 1029–1030 (ND Ala. 2022)
( per curiam ). This reasoning shows a profound
misunderstanding of our racial-gerrymandering precedents. As
explained above, what triggers strict scrutiny is the intentional
use of a racial classification in placing “a significant number of
voters within or without a particular district.” Miller , 515
U. S., at 916. Thus, any plan whose predominant purpose
is to achieve a nonnegotiable, predetermined racial target in a
nonnegotiable, predetermined number of districts is a racial
gerrymander subject to strict scrutiny. The precise fraction used
as the racial target, and the number of districts it is applied to,
are irrelevant.

															In affirming the District Court’s
nonpredominance finding, the plurality glosses over these plain
legal errors,[ 12 ] and it
entirely ignores Dr. Duchin’s plans—presumably because her own
explanation of her method sounds too much like textbook racial
predominance. Compare 2 App. 634 (“[A]fter . . . what I
took to be nonnegotiable principles of population balance and seeking two majority-black districts , after that ,
I took contiguity as a requirement and compactness as paramount”
(emphasis added)) and id. , at 635 (“I took . . .
county integrity to take precedence over the level of [black
voting-age population] once that level was past 50 percent ”
(emphasis added)), with Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at 189
(explaining that race predominates when it “ ‘was the
criterion that . . . could not be compromised,’ and
race-neutral considerations ‘came into play only after the
race-based decision had been made’ ” (quoting Shaw II ,
517 U. S., at 907)), and Miller , 515 U. S., at 916
(explaining that race predominates when “the [mapmaker]
subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles
. . . to racial considerations”). The plurality thus
affirms the District Court’s finding only in part and with regard
to Mr. Cooper’s plans alone.

															In doing so, the plurality acts as if the only
relevant evidence were Mr. Cooper’s testimony about his own mental
state and the State’s expert’s analysis of Mr. Cooper’s maps. See ante , at 23–24. Such a blinkered view of the issue is
unjustifiable. All 11 illustrative maps follow the same approach to
creating two majority-black districts. The essential design
features of Mr. Cooper’s maps are indistinguishable from Dr.
Duchin’s, and it is those very design features that would require
race to predominate. None of the plaintiffs’ maps could possibly be
drawn by a mapmaker who was merely “aware of,” rather than
motivated by, “racial demographics.” Miller , 515 U. S.,
at 916. They could only ever be drawn by a mapmaker whose
predominant motive was hitting the “express racial target” of two
majority-black districts. Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at
192.[ 13 ]

															The plurality endeavors in vain to blunt the
force of this obvious fact. See ante , at 24–25. Contrary to
the plurality’s apparent understanding, nothing in Bethune-Hill suggests that “an express racial target” is not
highly probative evidence of racial predominance. 580 U. S.,
at 192 (placing “express racial target[s]” alongside “stark splits
in the racial composition of [redistricted] populations” as
“relevant districtwide evidence”). That the Bethune-Hill majority “decline[d]” to act as a “ ‘court of . . .
first view,’ ” instead leaving the ultimate issue of
predominance for remand, cannot be transmuted into such an
implausible holding or, in truth, any holding at all. Id. ,
at 193.

															The plurality is also mistaken that my
predominance analysis would doom every illustrative map a §2
plaintiff “ever adduced.” Ante , at 25 (emphasis deleted).
Rather, it would mean only that—because §2 requires a race-neutral
benchmark—plaintiffs cannot satisfy their threshold burden of
showing a reasonably configured alternative plan with a proposal
that could only be viewed as a racial gerrymander if enacted by the
State. This rule would not bar a showing, in an appropriate case,
that a State could create an additional majority-minority district
through a reasonable redistricting process in which race did not
predominate. It would, on the other hand, screen out efforts to use
§2 to push racially proportional districting to the limits of what
a State’s geography and demography make possible—the approach taken
by the illustrative maps here.

															C

															The foregoing analysis should be enough to
resolve these cases: If the plaintiffs have not shown that Alabama
could create two majority-black districts without resorting to a
racial gerrymander, they cannot have shown that Alabama’s
one-majority-black-district map “dilutes” black Alabamians’ voting
strength relative to any meaningfully race-neutral benchmark. The
inverse, however, is not true: Even if it were possible to regard
the illustrative maps as not requiring racial predominance, it
would not necessarily follow that a two-majority-black-district map
was an appropriate benchmark. All that might follow is that the
illustrative maps were reasonably configured—in other words, that
they were consistent with some reasonable application of
traditional districting criteria in which race did not predominate.
See LULAC , 548 U. S., at 433. But, in virtually all
jurisdictions, there are countless possible districting schemes
that could be considered reasonable in that sense. The mere fact
that a plaintiff ’s illustrative map is one of them
cannot justify making it the benchmark against which other plans
should be judged. Cf. Rucho , 588 U. S., at ___–___
(slip op., at 19–20) (explaining the lack of judicially manageable
standards for evaluating the relative fairness of different
applications of traditional districting criteria).

															That conceptual gap—between “reasonable” and
“benchmark”—is highly relevant here. Suppose, for argument’s sake,
that Alabama reasonably could decide to create two
majority-black districts by (1) connecting Montgomery’s black
residents with Mobile’s black residents, (2) dividing up the rural
parts of the Black Belt between that district and another district
with its population core in the majority-black parts of the
Birmingham area, and (3) accepting the extreme disruption to
District 1 and the Gulf Coast that this approach would require. The
plaintiffs prefer that approach because it allows the creation of
two majority-black districts, which they think Alabama should have.
But even if that approach were reasonable, there is hardly any
compelling race-neutral reason to elevate such a plan to a benchmark against which all other plans must be measured.
Nothing in Alabama’s geography or demography makes it clearly the
best way, or even a particularly attractive way, to draw three of
seven equally populous districts. The State has obvious legitimate,
race-neutral reasons to prefer its own map—most notably, its
interest in “preserving the cores of prior districts” and the Gulf
Coast community of interest in District 1. Karcher v. Daggett , 462 U.S.
725 , 740 (1983). And even discounting those interests
would not yield a race-neutral case for treating the plaintiffs’
approach as a suitable benchmark: Absent core retention, there is
no apparent race-neutral reason to insist that District 7 remain a
majority-black district uniting Birmingham’s majority-black
neighborhoods with majority-black rural areas in the Black
Belt.

															Finally, it is surely probative that over 2
million race-neutral simulations did not yield a single plan with
two majority-black districts, and even 20,000 simulations with a
one-majority-black-district floor did not yield a second district
with a black voting-age population over 40%. If any plan with two
majority-black districts would be an “out-out-out-outlier” within
the likely universe of race-neutral districting plans, Rucho , 588 U. S., at ___ (Kagan, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 19), it is hard to see how the mere possibility of drawing
two majority-black districts could show that a one-district map
diluted black Alabamians’ votes relative to any appropriate
benchmark.[ 14 ]

															D

															Given all this, by what benchmark did the
District Court find that Alabama’s enacted plan was dilutive? The
answer is as simple as it is unlawful: The District Court applied a
benchmark of proportional control based on race. To be sure, that
benchmark was camouflaged by the elaborate vote-dilution framework
we have inherited from Gingles . But nothing else in that
framework or in the District Court’s reasoning supplies an
alternative benchmark capable of explaining the District Court’s
bottom line: that Alabama’s one-majority-black-district map dilutes
black voters’ fair share of political power.

															Under Gingles , the majority explains,
there are three “preconditions” to a vote-dilution claim: (1) the
relevant “minority group must be sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably
configured district”; (2) the minority group must be “politically
cohesive”; and (3) the majority group must “vot[e] sufficiently as
a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate[s].” Ante , at 10 (alterations and internal
quotation marks omitted). If these preconditions are satisfied, Gingles instructs courts to “consider the totality of the
circumstances and to determine, based upon a searching practical
evaluation of the past and present reality, whether the political
process is equally open to minority voters.” 478 U. S., at 79
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

															The majority gives the impression that, in
applying this framework, the District Court merely followed a set
of well-settled, determinate legal principles. But it is widely
acknowledged that “ Gingles and its progeny have engendered
considerable disagreement and uncertainty regarding the nature and
contours of a vote dilution claim,” with commentators “noting the
lack of any ‘authoritative resolution of the basic questions one
would need to answer to make sense of [§2’s] results test.’ ” Merrill v. Milligan , 595 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2022) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting from grant of applications for
stays) (slip op., at 1–2) (quoting C. Elmendorf, Making Sense of
Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common
Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377, 389 (2012)). If there is
any “area of law notorious for its many unsolved puzzles,” this is
it. J. Chen & N. Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future of
Voting Rights, 130 Yale L. J. 862, 871 (2021); see also Duchin
& Spencer 758 (“Vote dilution on the basis of group membership
is a crucial instance of the lack of a prescribed ideal”).

															The source of this confusion is fundamental:
Quite simply, we have never succeeded in translating the Gingles framework into an objective and workable method of
identifying the undiluted benchmark. The second and third
preconditions are all but irrelevant to the task. They essentially
collapse into one question: Is voting racially polarized such that
minority-preferred candidates consistently lose to
majority-preferred ones? See Gingles , 478 U. S., at 51.
Even if the answer is yes, that tells a court nothing about “how
hard it ‘should’ be for minority voters to elect their preferred
candidates under an acceptable system.” Id. , at 88
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Perhaps an acceptable
system is one in which the minority simply cannot elect its
preferred candidates; it is, after all, a minority. Rejecting that
outcome as “dilutive” requires a value judgment relative to a
benchmark that polarization alone cannot provide.

															The first Gingles precondition is only
marginally more useful. True, the benchmark in a redistricting
challenge must be “a hypothetical, undiluted plan,” Bossier
Parish School Bd. , 520 U. S., at 480, and the first
precondition at least requires plaintiffs to identify some hypothetical alternative plan. Yet that alternative plan need only
be “reasonably configured,” and—as explained above—to say that a
plan is reasonable is a far cry from establishing an
objective standard of fairness.

															That leaves only the Gingles framework’s
final stage: the totality-of-circumstances determination whether a
State’s “political process is equally open to minority voters.” 478
U. S., at 79. But this formulation is mere verbiage unless one
knows what an “equally open” system should look like—in other
words, what the benchmark is. And, our cases offer no substantive
guidance on how to identify the undiluted benchmark at the totality
stage. The best they have to offer is a grab bag of amorphous
“factors”—widely known as the Senate factors, after the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to
§2—that Gingles said “typically may be relevant to a §2
claim.” See id. , at 44–45. Those factors, however, amount to
no more than “a list of possible considerations that might be
consulted by a court attempting to develop a gestalt view of
the political and racial climate in a jurisdiction.” Holder ,
512 U. S., at 938 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Such a gestalt view is far removed from the necessary benchmark of
a hypothetical, undiluted districting plan.

															To see this, one need only consider the District
Court’s use of the Senate factors here. See 582 F. Supp. 3d,
at 1018–1024. The court began its totality-stage analysis by
reiterating what nobody disputes: that voting in Alabama is
racially polarized, with black voters overwhelmingly preferring
Democrats and white voters largely preferring Republicans. To rebut
the State’s argument that this pattern is attributable to politics,
not race per se , the court noted that Donald Trump (who
is white) prevailed over Ben Carson (who is black) in the 2016
Republican Presidential primary. Next, the court observed that
black candidates rarely win statewide elections in Alabama and that
black state legislators overwhelmingly come from majority-minority
districts. The court then reviewed Alabama’s history of racial
discrimination, noted other voting-rights cases in which the State
was found liable, and cataloged socioeconomic disparities between
black and white Alabamians in everything from car ownership to
health insurance coverage. The court attributed these disparities
“at least in part” to the State’s history of discrimination and
found that they hinder black residents from participating in
politics today, notwithstanding the fact that black and white
Alabamians register and turn out to vote at similar rates. Id. , at 1021–1022. Last, the court interpreted a handful of
comments by three white politicians as “racial campaign appeals.” Id. , at 1023–1024.

															In reviewing this march through the Senate
factors, it is impossible to discern any overarching standard or
central question, only what might be called an impressionistic
moral audit of Alabama’s racial past and present. Nor is it
possible to determine any logical nexus between this audit and the
remedy ordered: a congressional districting plan in which black
Alabamians can control more than one seat. Given the District
Court’s finding that two reasonably configured majority-black
districts could be drawn, would Alabama’s one-district map have
been acceptable if Ben Carson had won the 2016 primary, or if a
greater number of black Alabamians owned cars?

															The idea that such factors could explain the
District Court’s judgment line is absurd. The plaintiffs’ claims
pose one simple question: What is the “right” number of Alabama’s
congressional seats that black voters who support Democrats
“should” control? Neither the Senate factors nor the Gingles framework as a whole offers any principled answer.

															In reality, the limits of the Gingles preconditions and the aimlessness of the totality-of-circumstances
inquiry left the District Court only one obvious and readily
administrable option: a benchmark of “allocation of seats in direct
proportion to the minority group’s percentage in the population.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 937 (opinion of Thomas, J.).
True, as disussed above, that benchmark is impossible to square
with what the majority calls §2(b)’s “robust disclaimer against
proportionality,” ante , at 5, and it runs headlong into
grave constitutional problems. See Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 , 551 U.S.
701 , 730 (2007) (plurality opinion). Nonetheless, the intuitive
pull of proportionality is undeniable. “Once one accepts the
proposition that the effectiveness of votes is measured in terms of
the control of seats, the core of any vote dilution claim” “is
inherently based on ratios between the numbers of the minority in
the population and the numbers of seats controlled,” and there is
no more logical ratio than direct proportionality. Holder ,
512 U. S., at 902 (opinion of Thomas, J.). Combine that
intuitive appeal with the “lack of any better alternative”
identified in our case law to date, id. , at 937, and we
should not be surprised to learn that proportionality generally
explains the results of §2 cases after the Gingles preconditions are satisfied. See E. Katz, M. Aisenbrey, A. Baldwin,
E. Cheuse, & A. Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination in
Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
Since 1982, 39 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 643, 730–732 (2006)
(surveying lower court cases and finding a near-perfect correlation
between proportionality findings and liability results).

															Thus, in the absence of an alternative
benchmark, the vote-dilution inquiry has a strong and demonstrated
tendency to collapse into a rough two-part test: (1) Does the
challenged districting plan give the relevant minority group
control of a proportional share of seats? (2) If not, has the
plaintiff shown that some reasonably configured districting plan
could better approximate proportional control? In this approach,
proportionality is the ultimate benchmark, and the first Gingles precondition becomes a proxy for whether that
benchmark is reasonably attainable in practice.

															Beneath all the trappings of the Gingles framework, that two-part test describes how the District Court
applied §2 here. The gravitational force of proportionality is
obvious throughout its opinion. At the front end, the District
Court even built proportionality into its understanding of Gingles ’ first precondition, finding the plaintiffs’
illustrative maps to be reasonably configured in part because they “provide[d] a number of majority-Black
districts . . . roughly proportional to the Black
percentage of the population.” 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1016. At
the back end, the District Court concluded its “totality” analysis
by revisiting proportionality and finding that it “weigh[ed]
decidedly in favor of the plaintiffs.” Id. , at 1025. While
the District Court disclaimed giving overriding significance to
proportionality, the fact remains that nothing else in its
reasoning provides a logical nexus to its finding of a districting
wrong and a need for a districting remedy. Finally, as if to leave
no doubt about its implicit benchmark, the court admonished the
State that “any remedial plan will need to include two districts in
which Black voters either comprise a voting-age majority or
something quite close.” Id. , at 1033. In sum, the District
Court’s thinly disguised benchmark was proportionality: Black
Alabamians are about two-sevenths of the State’s population, so
they should control two of the State’s seven congressional
seats.

															That was error—perhaps an understandable error
given the limitations of the Gingles framework, but error
nonetheless. As explained earlier, any principled application of §2
to cases such as these requires a meaningfully race-neutral
benchmark. The benchmark cannot be an a priori thumb on
the scale for racially proportional control.

															E

															The majority opinion does not acknowledge the
District Court’s express proportionality-based reasoning. That
omission is of a piece with its earlier noted failures to
acknowledge the well-known indeterminacy of the Gingles framework, that black Alabamians are about two-sevenths of the
State’s population, and that the plaintiffs here are thus seeking
statewide proportionality. Through this pattern of omissions, the
majority obscures the burning question in these cases. The District
Court’s vote-dilution finding can be justified only by a racially
loaded benchmark—specifically, a benchmark of proportional control
based on race. Is that the benchmark the statute demands? The
majority fails to confront this question head on, and it studiously
avoids mentioning anything that would require it to do so.

															The same nonresponsiveness infects the
majority’s analysis, which is largely devoted to rebutting an
argument nobody makes. Contrary to the majority’s telling, Alabama
does not equate the “race-neutral benchmark” with “the median or
average number of majority-minority districts” in a large
computer-generated set of race-blind districting plans. Ante , at 15. The State’s argument for a race-neutral
benchmark is rooted in the text of §2, the logic of vote- dilution
claims, and the constitutional problems with any nonneutral
benchmark. See Brief for Appellants 32–46. It then relies on the
computer evidence in these cases, among other facts, to argue that
the plaintiffs have not shown dilution relative to any race-neutral
benchmark. See id. , at 54–56. But the idea that
“race-neutral benchmark” means the composite average of many
computer-generated plans is the majority’s alone.

															After thus straw-manning Alabama’s arguments at
the outset, the majority muddles its own response. In a perfunctory
footnote, it disclaims any holding that “algorithmic map making”
evidence “is categorically irrelevant” in §2 cases. Ante , at
28, n. 8. That conclusion, however, is the obvious implication
of the majority’s reasoning and rhetoric. See ante , at 27
(decrying a “map-comparison test” as “flawed in its fundamentals”
even if it involves concededly “adequate comparators”); see also ante , at 17–18 (stating that the “focu[s]” of §2 analysis is
“on the specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces,”
leaving unstated the implication that other algorithmically
generated maps are irrelevant). The majority in effect, if not in
word, thus forecloses any meaningful use of computer evidence to
help locate the undiluted benchmark.

															There are two critical problems with this fiat.
The first, which the majority seems to recognize yet fails to
resolve, is that excluding such computer evidence from view cannot
be reconciled with §2’s command to consider “the totality of
circumstances.”[ 15 ]
Second—and more fundamentally—the reasons that the majority gives
for downplaying the relevance of computer evidence would more
logically support a holding that there is no judicially manageable
way of applying §2’s results test to single-member districts. The
majority waxes about the “myriad considerations” that go into
districting, the “difficult, contestable choices” those
considerations require, and how “[n]othing in §2 provides an
answer” to the question of how well any given algorithm
approximates the correct benchmark. Ante , at 27–28 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In the end, it concludes, “Section 2
cannot require courts to judge a contest of computers” in which
“there is no reliable way to determine who wins, or even where the
finish line is.” Ante , at 29.

															The majority fails to recognize that whether vote-dilution claims require an undiluted benchmark
is not up for debate. If §2 applies to single-member districting
plans, courts cannot dispense with an undiluted benchmark for
comparison, ascertained by an objective and workable method. Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U. S., at 480; Holder , 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion). Of
course, I would be the last person to deny that defining the
undiluted benchmark is difficult. See id. , at 892 (opinion
of Thomas, J.) (arguing that it “immerse[s] the federal courts in a
hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory”). But
the “myriad considerations” and “[a]nswerless questions” the
majority frets about, ante , at 27, 29, are inherent in the
very enterprise of applying §2 to single-member districts.
Everything the majority says about the difficulty of defining the
undiluted benchmark with computer evidence applies with
equal or greater force to the task of defining it without such evidence. At their core, the majority’s workability concerns
are an isolated demand for rigor against the backdrop of a legal
regime that has long been “ ‘inherently standardless,’ ”
and must remain so until the Court either discovers a principled
and objective method of identifying the undiluted benchmark, Holder , 512 U. S., at 885 (plurality opinion), or
abandons this enterprise altogether, see id. , at 945
(opinion of Thomas, J.).

															Ultimately, the majority has very little to say
about the appropriate benchmark. What little it does say suggests
that the majority sees no real alternative to the District Court’s
proportional-control benchmark, though it appears unwilling to say
so outright. For example, in a nod to the statutory text and its
“equal openness” requirement, the majority asserts that “[a]
district is not equally open . . . when minority voters
face—unlike their majority peers—bloc voting along racial lines,
arising against the backdrop of substantial racial discrimination
within the State, that renders a minority vote unequal to a vote by
a nonminority voter.” Ante , at 17. But again, we have held
that dilution cannot be shown without an objective, undiluted
benchmark, and this verbiage offers no guidance for how to
determine it.[ 16 ] Later, the
majority asserts that “the Gingles framework itself imposes
meaningful constraints on proportionality.” Ante , at 18–19.
But the only constraint on proportionality the majority articulates
is that it is often difficult to achieve —which, quite
obviously, is no principled limitation at all. Ante , at
20–22.

															Thus, the end result of the majority’s reasoning
is no different from the District Court’s: The ultimate benchmark
is a racially proportional allocation of seats, and the main
question on which liability turns is whether a closer approximation
to proportionality is possible under any reasonable application of
traditional districting criteria.[ 17 ] This approach, moreover, is consistent with how the
majority describes the role of plaintiffs’ illustrative maps, as
well as an unjustified practical asymmetry to which its rejection
of computer evidence gives rise. Courts are to “focu[s]
. . . on the specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff
adduces,” ante , at 17–18, by which the majority means that
courts should not “focu[s]” on statistical evidence showing
those maps to be outliers. Thus, plaintiffs may use an algorithm to
generate any number of maps that meet specified districting
criteria and a preferred racial target; then, they need only
produce one of those maps to “sho[w] it is possible that the
State’s map” is dilutive . Ante , at 18 (emphasis in
original). But the State may not use algorithmic evidence to
suggest that the plaintiffs’ map is an unsuitable benchmark for
comparison—not even, apparently, if it can prove that the
illustrative map is an outlier among “billion[s]” or “trillion[s]”
of concededly “adequate comparators.” Ante , at 27, 29; see
also ante , at 29 (rejecting sampling algorithms). This
arbitrary restriction amounts to a thumb on the scale for §2
plaintiffs—an unearned presumption that any “reasonable” map they
put forward constitutes a benchmark against which the State’s map
can be deemed dilutive. And, once the comparison is framed in that
way, the only workable rule of decision is proportionality. See Holder , 512 U. S., at 941–943 (opinion of Thomas,
J.).

															By affirming the District Court, the majority
thus approves its benchmark of proportional control limited only by
feasibility, and it entrenches the most perverse tendencies of our
vote-dilution jurisprudence. It guarantees that courts will
continue to approach vote-dilution claims just as the District
Court here did: with no principled way of determining how many
seats a minority “should” control and with a strong temptation to
bless every incremental step toward a racially proportional
allocation that plaintiffs can pass off as consistent with any
reasonable map.

															III

															As noted earlier, the Court has long
recognized the need to avoid interpretations of §2 that
“ ‘would unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every
redistricting, raising serious constitutional questions.’ ” Bartlett , 556 U. S., at 21 (plurality opinion) (quoting LULAC , 548 U. S., at 446 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)).
Today, however, by approving the plaintiffs’ racially gerrymandered
maps as reasonably configured, refusing to ground §2 vote-dilution
claims in a race-neutral benchmark, and affirming a vote-dilution
finding that can only be justified by a benchmark of proportional
control, the majority holds, in substance, that race belongs in
virtually every redistricting. It thus drives headlong into the
very constitutional problems that the Court has long sought to
avoid. The result of this collision is unmistakable: If the
District Court’s application of §2 was correct as a statutory
matter, §2 is unconstitutional as applied here.

															Because the Constitution “restricts
consideration of race and the [Voting Rights Act] demands
consideration of race,” Abbott , 585 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 4), strict scrutiny is implicated wherever, as here, §2 is
applied to require a State to adopt or reject any districting plan
on the basis of race. See Bartlett , 556 U. S., at 21–22
(plurality opinion). At this point, it is necessary to confront
directly one of the more confused notions inhabiting our
redistricting jurisprudence. In several cases, we have “assumed”
that compliance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act could be a
compelling state interest, before proceeding to reject race-predominant plans or districts as insufficiently tailored to
that asserted interest. See, e.g. , Wisconsin
Legislature , 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); Cooper v. Harris , 581 U.S. 285, 292 (2017); Shaw
II , 517 U. S., at 915; Miller , 515 U. S., at
921. But we have never applied this assumption to uphold a
districting plan that would otherwise violate the Constitution, and
the slightest reflection on first principles should make clear why
it would be problematic to do so.[ 18 ] The Constitution is supreme over statutes, not vice
versa. Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803).
Therefore, if complying with a federal statute would require a
State to engage in unconstitutional racial discrimination, the
proper conclusion is not that the statute excuses the State’s
discrimination, but that the statute is invalid.

															If Congress has any power at all to require
States to sort voters into congressional districts based on race,
that power must flow from its authority to “enforce” the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments “by appropriate legislation.” Amdt. 14,
§5; Amdt. 15, §2. Since Congress in 1982 replaced intent with
effects as the criterion of liability, however, “a violation of §2
is no longer a fortiori a violation of ” either
Amendment. Bossier Parish School Bd. , 520 U. S., at
482. Thus, §2 can be justified only under Congress’ power to “enact
reasonably prophylactic legislation to deter constitutional harm.” Allen v. Cooper , 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip
op., at 11) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see City of Boerne v. Flores , 521
U.S. 507 , 517–529 (1997). Because Congress’ prophylactic-
enforcement authority is “remedial, rather than substantive,”
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.”[ 19 ] Id. , at
520. Congress’ chosen means, moreover, must “ ‘consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.’ ” Shelby
County v. Holder , 570 U.S.
529 , 555 (2013) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland , 4
Wheat. 316, 421 (1819)); accord, Miller , 515 U. S., at
927.

															Here, as with everything else in our
vote-dilution jurisprudence, the task of sound analysis is
encumbered by the lack of clear principles defining §2 liability in
districting. It is awkward to examine the “congruence” and
“proportionality” of a statutory rule whose very meaning exists in
a perpetual state of uncertainty. The majority makes clear,
however, that the primary factual predicate of a vote-dilution
claim is “bloc voting along racial lines” that results in
majority-preferred candidates defeating minority-preferred ones. Ante , at 17; accord, Gingles , 478 U. S., at 48
(“The theoretical basis for [vote-dilution claims] is that where
minority and majority voters consistently prefer different
candidates, the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority,
will regularly defeat the choices of minority voters”). And, as I
have shown, the remedial logic with which the District Court’s
construction of §2 addresses that “wrong” rests on a
proportional-control benchmark limited only by feasibility. Thus,
the relevant statutory rule may be approximately stated as follows:
If voting is racially polarized in a jurisdiction, and if there
exists any more or less reasonably configured districting plan that
would enable the minority group to constitute a majority in a
number of districts roughly proportional to its share of the
population, then the jurisdiction must ensure that its districting
plan includes that number of majority-minority districts “or
something quite close.”[ 20 ]
582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1033. Thus construed and applied, §2 is
not congruent and proportional to any provisions of the
Reconstruction Amendments.

															To determine the congruence and proportionality
of a measure, we must begin by “identify[ing] with some precision
the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Board of
Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett , 531 U.S.
356 , 365 (2001). The Reconstruction Amendments “forbi[d], so
far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination
. . . against any citizen because of his race,” ensuring
that “[a]ll citizens are equal before the law.” Gibson v. Mississippi , 162 U.S.
565 , 591 (1896) (Harlan, J.). They dictate “that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller , 515
U. S., at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted). These
principles are why the Constitution presumptively forbids
race-predominant districting, “even for remedial purposes.” Shaw
I , 509 U. S., at 657.

															These same principles foreclose a construction
of the Amendments that would entitle members of racial minorities, qua racial minorities, to have their preferred candidates
win elections. Nor do the Amendments limit the rights of members of
a racial majority to support their preferred
candidates—regardless of whether minorities prefer different
candidates and of whether “the majority, by virtue of its numerical
superiority,” regularly prevails. Gingles , 478 U. S.,
at 48. Nor, finally, do the Amendments establish a norm of
proportional control of elected offices on the basis of race. See Parents Involved , 551 U. S., at 730–731 (plurality
opinion); Shaw I , 509 U. S., at 657. And these notions
are not merely foreign to the Amendments. Rather, they are radically inconsistent with the Amendments’ command that
government treat citizens as individuals and their “goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters.” Ibid. Those notions are, however, the values at the
heart of §2 as construed by the District Court and the majority. As
applied here, the statute effectively considers it a legal wrong by
the State if white Alabamians vote for candidates from one
political party at high enough rates, provided that black
Alabamians vote for candidates from the other party at a still
higher rate. And the statute remedies that wrong by requiring the
State to engage in race-based redistricting in the direction of
proportional control.

															I am not certain that Congress’ enforcement
power could ever justify a statute so at odds “ ‘with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.’ ” Shelby
County , 570 U. S., at 555. If it could, it must be because
Congress “identified a history and pattern” of actual
constitutional violations that, for some reason, required
extraordinary prophylactic remedies. Garrett , 531
U. S., at 368. But the legislative record of the 1982
amendments is devoid of any showing that might justify §2’s blunt
approximation of a “racial register for allocating representation
on the basis of race.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 908
(opinion of Thomas, J.). To be sure, the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report that accompanied the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act
“listed many examples of what the Committee took to be unconstitutional vote dilution.” Brnovich , 594 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 6) (emphasis added). But the Report also
showed the Committee’s fundamental lack of “concern with whether”
those examples reflected the “intentional” discrimination required
“to raise a constitutional issue.” Allen , 589 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 15). The Committee’s “principal reason” for
rejecting discriminatory purpose was simply that it preferred an
alternative legal standard; it thought Mobile ’s intent test
was “the wrong question,” and that courts should instead ask
whether a State’s election laws offered minorities “a fair
opportunity to participate” in the political process. S. Rep.
No. 97–417, p. 36.

															As applied here, the amended §2 thus falls on
the wrong side of “the line between measures that remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law.” City of Boerne , 521
U. S., at 519. It replaces the constitutional right against
intentionally discriminatory districting with an amorphous
race-based right to a “fair” distribution of political power, a
“right” that cannot be implemented without requiring the very evils
the Constitution forbids.

															If that alone were not fatal, §2’s “reach and
scope” further belie any congruence and proportionality between its
districting-related commands, on the one hand, and actionable
constitutional wrongs, on the other. Id. , at 532. Its
“[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of
government” and in every electoral system. Ibid. It “has no
termination date or termination mechanism.” Ibid. Thus, the
amended §2 is not spatially or temporally “limited to those cases
in which constitutional violations [are] most likely.” Id. ,
at 533. Nor does the statute limit its reach to “attac[k] a
particular type” of electoral mechanism “with a long history as a
‘notorious means to deny and abridge voting rights on racial
grounds.’ ” Ibid. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach , 383
U.S. 301 , 355 (1966) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)).
In view of this “indiscriminate scope,” “it simply cannot be said
that ‘many of [the districting plans] affected by the congressional
enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional.’ ” Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank , 527 U.S.
627 , 647 (1999) (quoting City of Boerne , 521 U. S.,
at 532).

															Of course, under the logically unbounded
totality-of-circumstances inquiry, a court applying §2 can always
embroider its vote-dilution determination with findings about past
or present unconstitutional discrimination. But this possibility
does nothing to heal either the fundamental contradictions between
§2 and the Constitution or its extreme overbreadth relative to
actual constitutional wrongs. “A generalized assertion of past
discrimination” cannot justify race-based redistricting, “because
it provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the
precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.” Shaw II ,
517 U. S., at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted). To
justify a statute tending toward the proportional allocation of
political power by race throughout the Nation, it cannot be enough
that a court can recite some indefinite quantum of discrimination
in the relevant jurisdiction. If it were, courts “could uphold
[race-based] remedies that are ageless in their reach into the
past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future.” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed. , 476
U.S. 267 , 276 (1986) (plurality opinion). That logic “would
effectively assure that race will always be relevant in
[redistricting], and that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely
from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human
being’s race will never be achieved.” Parents Involved , 551
U. S., at 730 (plurality opinion) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).

															For an example of these baleful results, we need
look no further than the congressional districts at issue here. In
1992, Alabama and a group of §2 plaintiffs, whom a federal court
chose to regard as the representatives “of all African-American
citizens of the State of Alabama,” stipulated that the State’s
black population was “ ‘sufficiently compact and contiguous to
comprise a single member significant majority (65% or more) African
American Congressional district,’ ” and that,
“ ‘[c]onsequently,’ ” such a “ ‘district should be
created.’ ” Wesch v. Hunt , 785
F. Supp. 1491 , 1493, 1498 (SD Ala.). Accepting that
stipulation, the court reworked District 7 into an irregularly
shaped supermajority-black district—one that scooped up populous
clusters of black voters in the disparate urban centers of
Birmingham and Montgomery to connect them across a swath of largely
majority-black rural areas—without even “decid[ing] whether the
creation of a majority African-American district [was] mandated by
either §2 or the Constitution.” Id. , at 1499; see n. 7, supra . It did not occur to the court that the Constitution
might forbid such an extreme racial gerrymander, as it quite
obviously did. But, once District 7 had come into being as a racial
gerrymander thought necessary to satisfy §2, it became an
all-but-immovable fixture of Alabama’s districting scheme.

															Now, 30 years later, the plaintiffs here demand
that Alabama carve up not two but three of its main urban centers
on the basis of race, and that it configure those urban centers’
black neighborhoods with the outlying majority-black rural areas so
that black voters can control not one but two of the State’s seven
districts. The Federal Judiciary now upholds their
demand—overriding the State’s undoubted interest in preserving the
core of its existing districts, its plainly reasonable desire to
maintain the Gulf Coast region as a cohesive political unit, and
its persuasive arguments that a race-neutral districting process
would not produce anything like the districts the plaintiffs seek.
Our reasons for doing so boil down to these: that the plaintiffs’
proposed districts are more or less within the vast universe of
reasonable districting outcomes; that Alabama’s white voters do not
support the black minority’s preferred candidates; that Alabama’s
racial climate, taken as a rarefied whole, crosses some indefinable
line justifying our interference; and, last but certainly not
least, that black Alabamians are about two-sevenths of the State’s
overall population.

															By applying §2 in this way to claims of this
kind, we encourage a conception of politics as a struggle for power
between “competing racial factions.” Shaw I , 509 U. S.,
at 657. We indulge the pernicious tendency of assigning Americans
to “creditor” and “debtor race[s],” even to the point of
redistributing political power on that basis. Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña , 515
U.S. 200 , 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). We ensure that the race-based
redistricting we impose on Alabama now will bear divisive
consequences long into the future, just as the initial creation of
District 7 segregated Jefferson County for decades and minted the
template for crafting black “political homelands” in Alabama. Holder , 512 U. S., at 905 (opinion of Thomas, J.). We
place States in the impossible position of having to weigh just how
much racial sorting is necessary to avoid the “competing hazards”
of violating §2 and violating the Constitution. Abbott , 585
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have even put ourselves in the ridiculous position of
“assuming” that compliance with a statute can excuse disobedience
to the Constitution. Worst of all, by making it clear that there
are political dividends to be gained in the discovery of new ways
to sort voters along racial lines, we prolong immeasurably the day
when the “sordid business” of “divvying us up by race” is no more. LULAC , 548 U. S., at 511 (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting
in part). To the extent §2 requires any of this, it is
unconstitutional.

															The majority deflects this conclusion by
appealing to two of our older Voting Rights Act cases, City of
Rome v. United States , 446 U.S.
156 (1980), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach , 383 U.S.
301 , that did not address §2 at all and, indeed, predate
Congress’ adoption of the results test. Ante , at 33–34. That
maneuver is untenable. Katzenbach upheld §5’s preclearance
requirements, §4(b)’s original coverage formula, and other related
provisions aimed at “a small number of States and political
subdivisions” where “systematic resistance to the Fifteenth
Amendment” had long been flagrant. 383 U. S., at 328; see also id. , at 315–317 (describing the limited issues presented).
Fourteen years later, City of Rome upheld the 1975 Act
extending §5’s preclearance provisions for another seven years. See
446 U. S., at 172–173. The majority’s reliance on these cases
to validate a statutory rule not there at issue could make sense
only if we assessed the congruence and proportionality of the
Voting Rights Act’s rules wholesale, without considering their
individual features, or if Katzenbach and City of
Rome meant that Congress has plenary power to enact whatever
rules it chooses to characterize as combating “discriminatory
. . . effect[s].” Ante , at 33 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Neither proposition makes any conceptual sense or
is consistent with our cases. See, e.g. , Shelby
County , 570 U. S., at 550–557 (holding the 2006
preclearance coverage formula unconstitutional); Northwest
Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder , 557 U.S.
193 , 203 (2009) (emphasizing the distinctness of §§2 and 5); City of Boerne , 521 U. S., at 533 (discussing City
of Rome as a paradigm case of congruence-and-proportionality
review of remedial legislation); Miller , 515 U. S., at
927 (stressing that construing §5 to require “that States engage in
presumptively unconstitutional race-based districting” would raise
“troubling and difficult constitutional questions,” notwithstanding City of Rome ).

															In fact, the majority’s cases confirm the very
limits on Congress’ enforcement powers that are fatal to the
District Court’s construction of §2. City of Rome , for
example, immediately after one of the sentences quoted by the
majority, explained the remedial rationale for its approval of the
1975 preclearance extension: “Congress could rationally have
concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with
a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in
voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination , it was
proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.” 446
U. S., at 177 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The next
section of City of Rome then separately examined and upheld
the reasonableness of the extension’s 7-year time period. See id. , at 181–182. City of Rome thus stands for
precisely the propositions for which City of Boerne cited
it: Congress may adopt “[p]reventive measures . . . when
there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional,” 521 U. S., at 532, particularly when it
employs “termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious
predicates” that “tend to ensure Congress’ means are proportionate
to ends legitimate,” id. , at 533; see also id. , at
532–533 (analyzing Katzenbach in similar terms); Shelby
County , 570 U. S., at 535, 545–546 (same). Again, however,
the amended §2 lacks any such salutary limiting principles; it is
unbounded in time, place, and subject matter, and its
districting-related commands have no nexus to any likely
constitutional wrongs.

															In short, as construed by the District Court, §2
does not remedy or deter unconstitutional discrimination in
districting in any way, shape, or form. On the contrary, it requires it, hijacking the districting process to pursue a
goal that has no legitimate claim under our constitutional system:
the proportional allocation of political power on the basis of
race. Such a statute “cannot be considered remedial, preventive
legislation,” and the race-based redistricting it would command
cannot be upheld under the Constitution. City of Boerne , 521
U. S., at 532.[ 21 ]

															IV

															These cases are not close. The plaintiffs did
not prove that Alabama’s districting plan “impose[s] or applie[s]”
any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure” that effects “a denial or abridgement of
the[ir] right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”
§10301(a). Nor did they prove that Alabama’s congressional
districts “are not equally open to participation” by black
Alabamians. §10301(b). The plaintiffs did not even prove that it is
possible to achieve two majority-black districts without resorting
to a racial gerrymander. The most that they can be said to have
shown is that sophisticated mapmakers can proportionally allocate
Alabama’s congressional districts based on race in a way that
exceeds the Federal Judiciary’s ability to recognize as a racial
gerrymander with the naked eye. The District Court held that this
showing, plus racially polarized voting and its gestalt view
of Alabama’s racial climate, was enough to require the State to
redraw its districting plan on the basis of race. If that is the
benchmark for vote dilution under §2, then §2 is nothing more than
a racial entitlement to roughly proportional control of elective
offices—limited only by feasibility—wherever different racial
groups consistently prefer different candidates.

															If that is what §2 means, the Court should hold
that it is unconstitutional. If that is not what it means, but §2
applies to districting, then the Court should hold that
vote-dilution challenges require a race-neutral benchmark that
bears no resemblance to unconstitutional racial registers. On the
other hand, if the Court believes that finding a race-neutral
benchmark is as impossible as much of its rhetoric suggests, it
should hold that §2 cannot be applied to single-member districting
plans for want of an “objective and workable standard for choosing
a reasonable benchmark.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 881
(plurality opinion). Better yet, it could adopt the correct
interpretation of §2 and hold that a single-member districting plan
is not a “voting qualification,” a “prerequsite to voting,” or a
“standard, practice, or procedure,” as the Act uses those terms.
One way or another, the District Court should be reversed.

															The majority goes to great lengths to decline
all of these options and, in doing so, to fossilize all of the
worst aspects of our long-deplorable vote-dilution jurisprudence.
The majority recites Gingles ’ shopworn phrases as if their
meaning were self-evident, and as if it were not common knowledge
that they have spawned intractable difficulties of definition and
application. It goes out of its way to reaffirm §2’s applicability
to single-member districting plans both as a purported original
matter and on highly exaggerated stare decisis grounds. It
virtually ignores Alabama’s primary argument—that, whatever the
benchmark is, it must be race neutral—choosing, instead, to
quixotically joust with an imaginary adversary. In the process, it
uses special pleading to close the door on the hope cherished by
some thoughtful observers, see Gonzalez , 535 F. 3d, at
599–600, that computational redistricting methods might offer a
principled, race-neutral way out of the thicket Gingles carried us into. Finally, it dismisses grave constitutional
questions with an insupportably broad holding based on demonstrably
inapposite cases.[ 22 ]

															I find it difficult to understand these
maneuvers except as proceeding from a perception that what the
District Court did here is essentially no different from what many
courts have done for decades under this Court’s superintendence,
joined with a sentiment that it would be unthinkable to disturb
that approach to the Voting Rights Act in any way. I share the
perception, but I cannot understand the sentiment. It is true that,
“under our direction, federal courts [have been] engaged in
methodically carving the country into racially designated electoral
districts” for decades now. Holder , 512 U. S., at 945
(opinion of Thomas, J.). But that fact should inspire us to
repentance, not resignation. I am even more convinced of the
opinion that I formed 29 years ago:

															“In my view, our current practice should
not continue. Not for another Term, not until the next case, not
for another day. The disastrous implications of the policies we
have adopted under the Act are too grave; the dissembling in our
approach to the Act too damaging to the credibility of the Federal
Judiciary. The ‘inherent tension’—indeed, I would call it an
irreconcilable conflict—between the standards we have adopted for
evaluating vote dilution claims and the text of the Voting Rights
Act would itself be sufficient in my view to warrant overruling the
interpretation of §2 set out in Gingles . When that obvious
conflict is combined with the destructive effects our expansive
reading of the Act has had in involving the Federal Judiciary in
the project of dividing the Nation into racially segregated
electoral districts, I can see no reasonable alternative to
abandoning our current unfortunate understanding of the Act.” Id. , at 944.

															I respectfully dissent. Notes 1 “No person acting under
color of law shall . . . in determining whether any
individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any
election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from
the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or
laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or
similar political subdivision who have been found by State
officials to be qualified to vote.” 52 U. S. C.
§10101(a)(2)(A). 2 The majority suggests
that districting lines are a “ ‘prerequisite to voting’ ”
because they “determin[e] where” voters “cast [their] ballot[s].” Ante , at 32. But, of course, a voter’s polling place is a
separate matter from the district to which he is assigned, and
communities are often moved between districts without changing
where their residents go to vote. The majority’s other example
(“who [voters] are eligible to vote for,” ibid. ) is so far a
stretch from the Act’s focus on voting qualifications and voter
action that it speaks for itself. 3 The majority chides
Alabama for declining to specifically argue that §2 is inapplicable
to multimember and at-large districting plans. But these cases are
about a single-member districting plan, and it is hardly uncommon
for parties to limit their arguments to the question presented.
Further, while I do not myself believe that the text of §2 applies
to multimember or at-large plans, the idea that such plans might be
especially problematic from a vote-dilution standpoint is hardly
foreign to the Court’s precedents, see Johnson v. De
Grandy , 512 U.S.
997 , 1012 (1994); Growe v. Emison , 507 U.S.
25 , 40 (1993); cf. Holder v. Hall , 512 U.S.
874 , 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (explaining that single-member districts
may provide the benchmark when multimember or at-large systems are
challenged, but suggesting no benchmark for challenges to
single-member districts), or to the historical evolution of
vote-dilution claims. Neither the case from which the 1982 Congress
drew §2(b)’s current operative language, see White v. Regester , 412 U.S.
755 , 766 (1973), nor the one it was responding to, Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S.
55 (1980), involved single-member districts. 4 Justice Kavanaugh’s
partial concurrence emphasizes the supposedly enhanced stare
decisis force of statutory-interpretation precedents. See ante , at 1–2. This emphasis is puzzling in several respects.
As an initial matter, I can perceive no conceptual “basis for
applying a heightened version of stare decisis to
statutory-interpretation decisions”; rather, “our judicial duty is
to apply the law to the facts of the case, regardless of how easy
it is for the law to change.” Gamble v. United
States , 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(slip op., at 14). Nor does that approach appear to have any
historical foundation in judicial practice atthe founding or for
more than a century thereafter. See T. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 708–732 (1999). But, even putting
those problems aside, any appeal to heightened statutory stare
decisis is particularly misplaced in this context. As the
remainder of this dissent explains in depth, the Court’s §2
precedents differ from “ordinary statutory precedents” in two vital
ways. Ante , at 2, n. 1 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). The
first is their profound tension with the Constitution’s hostility
to racial classifications, a tension that Justice Kavanaugh
acknowledges and that makes every §2 question the reverse side of a
corresponding constitutional question. See ante , at 4. The
second is that, to whatever extent §2 applies to districting, it
can only “be understood as a delegation of authority to the courts
to develop a common law of racially fair elections.” C. Elmendorf,
Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional
Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 377,
383 (2012). It would be absurd to maintain that this Court’s
“notoriously unclear and confusing” §2 case law follows, in any
straightforward way, from the statutory text’s high-flown language
about the equal openness of political processes. Merrill v. Milligan , 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in grant of applications for stays) (slip op., at
6). 5 Like the majority, I
refer to both courts below as “the District Court” without
distinction. 6 While Brnovich involved a time-place-and-manner voting rule, not a vote-dilution
challenge to a districting plan, its analysis logically must apply
to vote-dilution cases if the text of §2 covers such claims at
all. 7 District 7 owes its
majority-black status to a 1992 court order. See Wesch v. Hunt , 785
F. Supp. 1491 , 1493–1494, 1496–1497, 1501–1502 (SD Ala.),
aff ’d sub nom. Camp v. Wesch , 504 U.S.
902 (1992). At the time, the Justice Department’s approach to
preclearance under §5 of the Act followed the “so-called
‘max-black’ policy,” which “required States, including Alabama, to
create supermajority-black voting districts or face denial of
preclearance.” Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama , 575 U.S. 254, 298 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Although Wesch was a §2 case and the court-imposed plan that
resulted was not subject to preclearance, see 785 F. Supp., at
1499–1500, there can be little doubt that a similar ethos dominated
that litigation, in which all parties stipulated to the
desirability of a 65%-plus majority-black district. See id. , at 1498–1499. To satisfy that dubious need, the Wesch court aggressively adjusted the northeast and
southeast corners of the previous District 7. In the northeast,
where District 7 once encompassed all of Tuscaloosa County and the
more or less rectangular portion of Jefferson County not included
in District 6, the 1992 plan drew a long, thin “finger” that
traversed the southeastern third of Tuscaloosa County to reach deep
into theheart of urban Birmingham. See Supp. App. 207–208. Of the
Jefferson County residents captured by the “finger,” 75.48% were
black. Wesch , 785 F. Supp., at 1569. In the southeast,
District 7 swallowed a jigsaw-shaped portion of Montgomery County,
the residents of which were 80.18% black. Id. , at 1575.
Three years later, in Miller v. Johnson , 515 U.S.
900 , 923–927 (1995), we rejected the “max-black” policy as
unwarranted by §5 and inconsistent with the Constitution. But “much
damage to the States’ congressional and legislative district maps
had already been done,” including in Alabama. Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus , 575 U. S., at 299 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). 8 I have included an
Appendix, infra , illustrating the plaintiffs’ 11 proposed
maps. The first 10 images display the “black-only” voting-age
population of census-designated voting districts in relation to the
maps’ hypothetical district lines. The record does not contain a
similar illustration for the 11th map, but a simple visual
comparison with the other maps suffices. 9 The majority notes that
this study used demographic data from the 2010 census, not the 2020
one. That is irrelevant, since the black population share in
Alabama changed little (from 26.8% to 27.16%) between the two
censuses. To think that this minor increase might have changed Dr.
Duchin’s results would be to entirely miss her point: that
proportional representation for any minority, unless
achieved “by design,” is a statistical anomaly in almost all
single-member-districting systems. Duchin & Spencer
764. 10 Of
course, bizarreness is in the eye of the beholder, and, while
labels like “ ‘tentacles’ ” or “ ‘appendages’ ”
have no ultimate legal significance, it is far from clear that they
do not apply here. See ante , at 12. The tendrils with which
the various versions of illustrative District 2 wouldcapture black
Mobilians are visually striking and are easily recognized as a
racial grab against the backdrop of the State’s demography. The
District 7 “finger,” which encircles the black population of the
Birmingham metropolitan area in order to separate them from their
white neighbors and link them with black rural areas in the west of
the State, also stands out to the naked eye. The District Court
disregarded the “finger” because it has been present in every
districting plan since 1992, including the State’s latest enacted
plan. Singleton v. Merrill , 582 F. Supp. 3d 924,
1011 (ND Ala. 2022) ( per curiam ). But that reasoning
would allow plaintiffs to bootstrap one racial gerrymander as a
reason for permitting a second. Because the question is not before
us, I express no opinion on whether existing District 7 is
constitutional as enacted by the State. It is indisputable,
however, that race predominated in the original creation of the
district, see n. 7, supra , and it is plain that the
primary race-neutral justification for the district today must be
the State’s legitimate interest in “preserving the cores of prior
districts” and the fact that the areas constituting District 7’s
core have been grouped together for decades. Karcher v. Daggett , 462 U.S.
725 , 740 (1983); see also id. , at 758 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (explaining that residents of a political unit “often
develop a community of interest”). The plaintiffs’ maps, however,
necessarily would require the State to assign little weight to core
retention with respect to other districts. There could then be no
principled race-neutral justification for prioritizing core
retention only when it preserved an existing majority-black
district, while discarding it when it stood in the way of creating
a new one. 11 The
equal-population baseline for Alabama’s seven districts is 717,154
persons per district. 12 The
plurality’s somewhat elliptical discussion of “the line between
racial predominance and racial consciousness,” ante , at 23,
suggests that it may have fallen into a similar error. To the
extent the plurality supposes that, under our precedents, a State
may purposefully sort voters based on race to some indefinite
extent without crossing the line into predominance, it is wrong,
and its predominance analysis would water down decades of
racial-gerrymandering jurisprudence. Our constitutional precedents’
line between racial awareness and racial predominance simply tracks
the distinction between awareness of consequences, on the one hand,
and discriminatory purpose , on the other. See Miller ,
515 U. S., at 916 (“ ‘Discriminatory purpose implies more
than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that thedecisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action atleast in part “because of,” not merely “in spite
of,” its adverse effects’ ” (alterations and some internal
quotation marks omitted)); accord, Shaw I , 509 U.S.
630 , 646 (1993). And our statements that §2 “demands
consideration of race,” Abbott v. Perez , 585
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 4), and uses a
“race-conscious calculus,” De Grandy , 512 U. S., at
1020, did not imply that a State can ever purposefully sort voters
on a race-predominant basis without triggering strict
scrutiny. 13 The
plurality’s reasoning does not withstand scrutiny even on its own
terms. Like Dr. Duchin, Mr. Cooper found it “necessary to consider
race” to construct two majority-black districts, 2 App. 591, and he
frankly acknowledged “reconfigur[ing]” the southern part of the
State “to create the second African-American majority district,” id. , at 610. Further, his conclusory statement that race did
not “predominate” in his plans, id. , at 595, must be
interpreted in light of the rest of his testimony and the record as
a whole. Mr. Cooper recognized communities of interest as a
traditional districting principle, but he applied that principle in
a nakedly race-focused manner, explaining that “the minority
population in and of itself ” was the community of interest
that was “top of mind as [he] was drawing the plan[s].” Id. ,
at 601. As noted, he also testified that he considered “minority
voting strengt[h]” to be a “traditional redistricting principl[e]”
in its own right. Id. , at 591. His testimony therefore
buttresses, rather than undermines, the conclusion already obvious
from the maps themselves: Only a mapmaker pursuing a fixed racial
target would produce them. 14 The
majority points to limitations of Dr. Duchin’s and Dr. Imai’s
algorithms that do not undermine the strong inference from their
results to the conclusion that no two-majority-black-district plan
could be an appropriate proxy for the undiluted benchmark. Ante , at 26, 28–29. I have already explained why the fact
that Dr. Duchin’s study used 2010 census data is irrelevant. See
n. 9, supra . As for the algorithms’ inability to
incorporate all possible districting considerations, the absence of
additional constraints cannot explain their failure to
produce any maps hitting the plaintiffs’ preferred racial target.
Next, while it is true that the number of possible districting
plans is extremely large, that does not mean it is impossible to
generate a statistically significant sample. Here, for instance,
Dr. Imai explained that “10,000 simulated plans” was sufficient to
“yield statistically precise conclusions” and that any higher
number would “not materially affect” the results. Supp. App. 60.
Finally, the majority notes Dr. Duchin’s testimony that her
“exploratory algorithms” found “thousands” of possible
two-majority-black-district maps. 2 App. 622; see ante , at
27, n. 7. Setting aside that Dr. Duchin never provided the
denominator of which those “thousands” were the numerator, it is no
wonder that the algorithms in question generated such maps; as
Dr.Duchin explained, she programmed them with “an algorithmic
preference” for “plans in which there would be a second
majority-minority district.” 2 App. 709. Thus, all that those
algorithmic results prove is that it is possible to draw two
majority-black districts in Alabama if one sets out to do so,
especially with the help of sophisticated mapmaking software. What
is still lacking is any justification for treating a
two-majority-black-district map as a proxy for the undiluted
benchmark. 15 The
majority lodges a similar accusation against the State’s arguments
(or what it takes to be the State’s arguments). See ante , at
18 (“Alabama suggests there is only one ‘circumstance’ that
matters—how the State’s map stacks up relative to the benchmark”
(alteration omitted)). But its rebuke is misplaced. The “totality
of circumstances” means that courts must consider all circumstances
relevant to anissue. It does not mean that they are forbidden to
attempt to define the substantive standard that governs that issue.
In arguing that a vote-dilution claim requires judging a State’s
plan relative to an undiluted benchmark to be drawn from the
totality of circumstances—including, where probative, the results
of districting simulations—the State argues little more than what
we have long acknowledged. See Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Bd. , 520 U.S.
471 , 480 (1997). 16 To
the extent it is any sort of answer to the benchmark question, it
tends inevitably toward proportionality. By equating a voting
minority’s inability to win elections with a vote that has been
“render[ed] . . . unequal,” ante , at 17, the
majority assumes “that members of [a] minority are denied a fully
effective use of the franchise unless they are able to control
seats in an elected body.” Holder , 512 U. S., at 899
(opinion of Thomas, J.). That is precisely the assumption that
leads to the proportional-control benchmark. See id. , at
902, 937. 17 Indeed, the majority’s attempt to
deflect this analysis only confirms its accuracy. The majority
stresses that its understanding of Gingles permits the
rejection of “plans that would bring States closer to
proportionality when those plans violate traditional districting
criteria .” Ante , at 21, n. 4 (emphasis added).
Justice Kavanaugh, similarly, defends Gingles against the
charge of “mandat[ing] a proportional number ofmajority-minority
districts” by emphasizing that it requires only the creation of
majority-minority districts that are compact and reasonably
configured. Ante , at 2 (opinion concurring in part). All of
this precisely tracks my point: As construed by the District Court
and the majority, §2 mandates an ever closer approach to
proportional control that stops only when a court decides that a
further step in that direction would no longer be consistent with
any reasonable application of traditional districting
criteria. 18 In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections , 580
U.S. 178 (2017), the Court upheld a race-predominant district based
on the assumed compelling interest of complying with §5 of the
Voting Rights Act. Id. , at 193–196. There, the Court was
explicit that it was still merely “assum[ing], without deciding,”
that the asserted interest was compelling, as the plaintiffs “d[id]
not dispute that compliance with §5 was a compelling interest at
the relevant time.” Id. , at 193. 19 While
our congruence-and-proportionality cases have focused primarily on
the Fourteenth Amendment, they make clear that the same principles
govern “Congress’ parallel power to enforce the provisions of the
Fifteenth Amendment.” City of Boerne , 521 U. S., at
518. 20 This
formulation does not specifically account for the District Court’s
findings under the Senate factors, which, as I have explained, lack
any traceable logical connection to the finding of a districting
wrong or the need for a districting remedy. 21 Justice Kavanaugh, at least,
recognizes that §2’s constitutional footing is problematic, for he
agrees that “race-based redistricting cannot extend indefinitely
into the future.” Ante , at 4 (opinion concurring in part).
Nonetheless, Justice Kavanaugh votes to sustain a system of
institutionalized racial discrimination in districting—under the
aegis of a statute that applies nationwide and has no expiration
date—and thus to prolong the “lasting harm to our society” caused
by the use of racial classifications in the allocation of political
power. Shaw I , 509 U. S., at 657. I cannot agree with
that approach. The Constitution no more tolerates this
discrimination today than it will tolerate it
tomorrow. 22 The
Court does not address whether §2 contains a private right of
action, an issue that was argued below but was not raised in this
Court. See Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee ,
594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 1). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 21–1086 and 21–1087

															_________________

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., APPELLANTS

															21–1086 v. EVAN MILLIGAN, et al.

															on appeal from the united states district
court for the northern district of alabama

															WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE,
et al., PETITIONERS

															21–1087 v. MARCUS CASTER, et al.

															on writ of certiorari before judgment to the
united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[June 8, 2023]

															Justice Alito, with whom Justice Gorsuch
joins, dissenting.

															Based on a flawed understanding of the framework
adopted in Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S.
30 (1986), the Court now holds that the congressional
districting map adopted by the Alabama Legislature violates §2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Like the Court, I am happy to apply Gingles in these cases. But I would interpret that precedent
in a way that heeds what §2 actually says, and I would take
constitutional requirements into account. When the Gingles framework is viewed in this way, it is apparent that the decisions
below must be vacated.

															I

															A Gingles marked the Court’s first
encounter with the amended version of §2 that Congress enacted in
1982, and the Court’s opinion set out an elaborate framework that
has since been used to analyze a variety of §2 claims. Under that
framework, a plaintiff must satisfy three “preconditions.” Id. , at 50. As summarized in more recent opinions, they are
as follows:

															“First, [the] ‘minority group’ [whose
interest the plaintiff represents] must be ‘sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority’ in some reasonably
configured legislative district. Second, the minority group must be
‘politically cohesive.’ And third, a district’s white majority must
‘vote[ ] sufficiently as a bloc’ to usually ‘defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate.’ ” Cooper v. Harris , 581 U.S. 285, 301–302 (2017) (citations
omitted).

															See also Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n , 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
( per curiam ) (slip op., at 3); Merrill v. Milligan , 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting from grant of applications for stays) (slip op., at
3–4).

															If a §2 plaintiff can satisfy all these
preconditions, the court must then decide whether, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff ’s right to vote
was diluted. See Gingles , 478 U. S., at 46–48, 79. And
to aid in that inquiry, Gingles approved consideration of a
long list of factors set out in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
Majority Report on the 1982 VRA amendments. Id. , at 44–45
(citing S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 28–30 (1982)).

															B

															My fundamental disagreement with the Court
concerns the first Gingles precondition. In cases like
these, where the claim is that §2 requires the creation of an
additional majority-minority district, the first precondition means
that the plaintiff must produce an additional illustrative
majority-minority district that is “reasonably configured.” Cooper , 581 U. S., at 301; Wisconsin
Legislature , 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); see also Gingles , 478 U. S., at 50.

															The Court’s basic error is that it
misunderstands what it means for a district to be “reasonably
configured.” Our cases make it clear that “reasonably configured”
is not a synonym for “compact.” We have explained that the first
precondition also takes into account other traditional districting
criteria like attempting to avoid the splitting of political
subdivisions and “communities of interest.” League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry , 548 U.S.
399 , 433–434 (2006) ( LULAC ).

															To its credit, the Court recognizes that
compactness is not enough and that a district is not reasonably
configured if it flouts other “traditional districting criteria.” Ante , at 10. At various points in its opinion it names quite
a few: minimizing the splitting of counties and other political
subdivisions, keeping “communities of interest” together where
possible, and avoiding the creation of new districts that require
two incumbents to run against each other. Ante , at 12,
26–27. In addition, the Court acknowledges that a district is not
“reasonably configured” if it does not comport with the Equal
Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote requirement. Ante ,
at 27. But the Court fails to explain why compliance with
“traditional districting criteria” matters under §2 or why the only
relevant equal protection principle is the one-person, one-vote
requirement. If the Court had attempted to answer these questions,
the defect in its understanding of the first Gingles precondition would be unmistakable.

															To explain this, I begin with what is probably
the most frequently mentioned traditional districting criterion and
ask why it should matter under §2 whether a proposed
majority-minority district is “compact.” Neither the Voting Rights
Act (VRA) nor the Constitution imposes a compactness requirement.
The Court notes that we have struck down bizarrely shaped
districts, ante , at 19–20, but we did not do that for
esthetic reasons. Compactness in and of itself is not a legal
requirement—or even necessarily an esthetic one. (Some may find
fancifully shaped districts more pleasing to the eye than boring
squares.)

															The same is true of departures from other
traditional districting criteria. Again, nothing in the
Constitution or the VRA demands compliance with these criteria. If
a whimsical state legislature cavalierly disregards county and
municipal lines and communities of interest, draws weirdly shaped
districts, departs radically from a prior map solely for the
purpose of change, and forces many incumbents to run against each
other, neither the Constitution nor the VRA would make any of that
illegal per se . Bizarrely shaped districts and other marked
departures from traditional districting criteria matter because
mapmakers usually heed these criteria, and when it is evident that
they have not done so, there is reason to suspect that something
untoward—specifically, unconstitutional racial gerrymandering—is
afoot. See, e.g. , Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S.
630 , 643–644 (1993); Bush v. Vera , 517 U.S.
952 , 979 (1996) (plurality opinion); cf. LULAC , 548
U. S., at 433–435.

															Conspicuous violations of traditional
districting criteria constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of unconstitutionality. And when it is shown that the
configuration of a district is attributable predominantly to race,
that is more than circumstantial evidence that the district is
unlawful. That is direct evidence of illegality because, as
we have often held, race may not “predominate” in the drawing of
district lines. See, e.g. , Cooper , 581 U. S., at
292; Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections ,
580 U.S. 178, 191–192 (2017); Shaw v. Hunt , 517 U.S.
899 , 906–907 (1996) ( Shaw II ); Miller v. Johnson , 515 U.S.
900 , 920 (1995).[ 1 ]

															Because non-predominance is a longstanding and
vital feature of districting law, it must be honored in a Gingles plaintiff ’s illustrative district. If race
predominated in the creation of such a district, the plaintiff has
failed to satisfy both our precedent, which requires “reasonably
configured” districts, and the terms of §2, which demand equal
openness. Two Terms ago, we engaged in a close analysis of the text
of §2 and explained that its “key requirement” is that the
political processes leading to nomination or election must be
“ ‘equally open to participation’ by members of a protected
class.” Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee ,
594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 6, 15) (quoting 52
U. S. C. §10301(b); emphasis deleted). “[E]qual
openness,” we stressed, must be our “touchstone” in interpreting
and applying that provision. 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
15).

															When the race of one group is the predominant
factor in the creation of a district, that district goes beyond
making the electoral process equally open to the members of the
group in question. It gives the members of that group an advantage
that §2 does not require and that the Constitution may forbid. And
because the creation of majority- minority districts is something
of a zero-sum endeavor, giving an advantage to one minority group
may disadvantage others.

															C

															What all this means is that a §2 plaintiff who
claims that a districting map violates §2 because it fails to
include an additional majority-minority district must show at the
outset that such a district can be created without making race the
predominant factor in its creation. The plaintiff bears both the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion on this issue,
see Voinovich v. Quilter , 507
U.S. 146 , 155–156 (1993); White v. Regester , 412 U.S.
755 , 766 (1973), but a plaintiff can satisfy the former burden
simply by adducing evidence—in any acceptable form—that race did
not predominate.

															A plaintiff need not offer computer-related
evidence. Once upon a time, legislative maps were drawn without
using a computer, and nothing prevents a §2 plaintiff from taking
this old-school approach in creating an illustrative district. See, e.g. , M. Altman, K. McDonald, & M. McDonald, From
Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in
Redistricting, 23 Soc. Sci. Computer Rev. 334, 335–336 (2005). In
that event, the plaintiff can simply call upon the mapmaker to
testify about the process he or she used and the role, if any, that
race played in that process. The defendant may seek to refute that
testimony in any way that the rules of civil procedure and evidence
allow.

															If, as will often be the case today, a §2
plaintiff ’s mapmaker uses a computer program, the expert can
testify about the weight, if any, that the program gives to race.
The plaintiff will presumably argue that any role assigned to race
was not predominant, and the defendant can contest this by
cross-examining the plaintiff ’s expert, seeking the actual
program in discovery, and calling its own expert to testify about
the program’s treatment of race. After this, the trial court will
be in a position to determine whether the program gave race a
“predominant” role.

															This is an entirely workable scheme. It does not
obligate either party to offer computer evidence, and it minimizes
the likelihood of a clash between what §2 requires and what the
Constitution forbids. We have long assumed that §2 is consistent
with the Constitution. See, e.g. , Cooper , 581
U. S., at 301 (assuming States have a compelling interest in
complying with §2); Shaw II , 517 U. S., at 915 (same); Vera , 517 U. S., at 977 (plurality opinion) (same). But
that cannot mean that every conceivable interpretation of §2 is
constitutional, and I do not understand the majority’s analysis of
Alabama’s constitutional claim to suggest otherwise. Ante ,
at 33–34; ante , at 4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
part).

															Our cases make it perfectly clear that using
race as a “predominant factor” in drawing legislative districts is
unconstitutional unless the stringent requirements of strict
scrutiny can be satisfied,[ 2 ]
and therefore if §2 can be found to require the adoption of an
additional majority-minority district that was created under a
process that assigned race a “predominant” role, §2 and the
Constitution would be headed for a collision.

															II

															When the meaning of a “reasonably configured”
district is properly understood, it is apparent that the decisions
below must be vacated and that the cases must be remanded for the
application of the proper test. In its analysis of whether the
plaintiffs satisfied the first Gingles precondition, the
District Court gave much attention to some traditional districting
criteria—specifically, compactness and avoiding the splitting of
political subdivisions and communities of interest—but it failed to
consider whether the plaintiffs had shown that their illustrative
districts were created without giving race a “predominant role.” Singleton v. Merrill , 582 F. Supp. 3d 924,
1008–1016 (ND Ala. 2022). For this reason, the District Court’s §2
analysis was deficient.

															It is true that the District Court addressed the
question of race-predominance when it discussed and rejected the
State’s argument that the plaintiffs’ maps violated the Equal
Protection Clause, but the court’s understanding of predominance
was deeply flawed. The court began this part of its opinion with
this revealing statement:

															“Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper [plaintiffs’
experts] testified that they prioritized race only for the
purpose of determining and to the extent necessary to determine
whether it was possible for the Milligan plaintiffs and the Caster plaintiffs to state a Section Two claim. As soon as
they determined the answer to that question, they assigned greater
weight to other traditional redistricting criteria.” Id. , at
1029–1030 (emphasis added).

															This statement overlooks the obvious point that
by “prioritiz[ing] race” at the outset, Dr. Duchin and Mr. Cooper
gave race a predominant role.

															The next step in the District Court’s analysis
was even more troubling. The court wrote, “Dr. Duchin’s testimony
that she considered two majority-Black districts as ‘non-
negotiable’ does not” show that race played a predominant role in
her districting process. Id ., at 1030. But if achieving a
certain objective is “non-negotiable,” then achieving that
objective will necessarily play a predominant role. Suppose that a
couple are relocating to the Washington, D. C., metropolitan
area, and suppose that one says to the other, “I’m flexible about
where we live, but it has to be in Maryland. That’s
non-negotiable.” Could anyone say that finding a home in Maryland
was not a “predominant” factor in the couple’s search? Or suppose
that a person looking for a flight tells a travel agent, “It has to
be non-stop. That’s non-negotiable.” Could it be said that the
number of stops between the city of origin and the destination was
not a “predominant” factor in the search for a good flight? The
obvious answer to both these questions is no, and the same is true
about the role of race in the creation of a new district. If it is
“non-negotiable” that the district be majority black, then race is
given a predominant role.

															The District Court wrapped up this portion of
its opinion with a passage that highlighted its misunderstanding of
the first Gingles precondition. The court thought that a §2
plaintiff cannot proffer a reasonably configured majority-minority
district without first attempting to see if it is possible to
create such a district—that is, by first making the identification
of such a district “non-negotiable.” Ibid . But that is
simply not so. A plaintiff ’s expert can first create maps
using only criteria that do not give race a predominant role and
then determine how many contain the desired number of
majority-minority districts.

															One final observation about the District Court’s
opinion is in order. The opinion gives substantial weight to the
disparity between the percentage of majority-black House districts
in the legislature’s plan (14%) and the percentage of black
voting-age Alabamians (27%), while the percentage in the
plaintiffs’ plan (29%) came closer to that 27% mark. See, e.g. , id. , at 946, 1016, 1018, 1025–1026; see also id. , at 958–959, 969, 976, 982, 991–992, 996–997. Section 2
of the VRA, however, states expressly that no group has a right to
representation “in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.” 52 U. S. C. §10301(b). This provision was a
critical component of the compromise that led to the adoption of
the 1982 amendments, as the Court unanimously agreed two Terms ago.
See Brnovich , 594 U. S., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op.,
at 22, and n. 14); id. , at ___, n. 6 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 19, n. 6). The District Court’s
reasoning contravened this statutory proviso. See ante , at
11–12, 28–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

															III

															The Court spends much of its opinion attacking
what it takes to be the argument that Alabama has advanced in this
litigation. I will not debate whether the Court’s characterization
of that argument is entirely correct, but as applied to the
analysis I have just set out, the Court’s criticisms miss the
mark.

															A

															The major theme of this part of the Court’s
opinion is that Alabama’s argument, in effect, is that
“ Gingles must be overruled.” Ante , at 25. But as I
wrote at the beginning of this opinion, I would decide these cases
under the Gingles framework. We should recognize, however,
that the Gingles framework is not the same thing as a
statutory provision, and it is a mistake to regard it as such. National Pork Producers Council v. Ross , 598
U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 9) (“[T]he language of an
opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with
language of a statute” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp. , 442 U.S.
330 , 341 (1979))). In applying that framework today, we should
keep in mind subsequent developments in our case law.

															One important development has been a sharpening
of the methodology used in interpreting statutes. Gingles was decided at a time when the Court’s statutory interpretation
decisions sometimes paid less attention to the actual text of the
statute than to its legislative history, and Gingles falls
into that category. The Court quoted §2 but then moved briskly to
the Senate Report. See 478 U. S., at 36–37, 43, and n. 7.
Today, our statutory interpretation decisions focus squarely on the
statutory text. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of
Defense , 583 U.S. 109, 127 (2018); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust , 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016); cf. Brnovich , 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). And as
we held in Brnovich , “[t]he key requirement” set out in the
text of §2 is that a State’s electoral process must be
“ ‘equally open’ ” to members of all racial groups. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 15). The Gingles framework
should be interpreted in a way that gives effect to this
standard.

															Another development that we should not ignore
concerns our case law on racial predominance. Post- Gingles decisions like Miller , 515 U. S., at 920, Shaw
II , 517 U. S., at 906–907, and Vera , 517
U. S., at 979 (plurality opinion), made it clear that it is
unconstitutional to use race as a “predominant” factor in
legislative districting. “[W]hen statutory language is susceptible
of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation
that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an
alternative that avoids those problems.” Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2).
This same principle logically applies with even greater force when
we interpret language in one of our prior opinions. It therefore
goes without question that we should apply the Gingles framework in a way that does not set up a confrontation between §2
and the Constitution, and understanding the first Gingles precondition in the way I have outlined achieves that
result.[ 3 ]

															B

															The Court’s subsidiary criticisms of Alabama’s
arguments are likewise inapplicable to my analysis. The Court
suggests that the “centerpiece” of Alabama’s argument regarding the
role race can permissibly play in a plaintiff ’s illustrative
map seeks the imposition of “a new rule.” Ante , at 15, 22.
But I would require only what our cases already demand: that all
legislative districts be produced without giving race a
“predominant” role.[ 4 ]

															The Court maintains that Alabama’s benchmark
scheme would be unworkable because of the huge number of different
race-neutral maps that could be drawn. As the Court notes, there
are apparently numerous “competing metrics on the issue of
compactness” alone, and each race-neutral computer program may
assign different values to each traditional districting criterion. Ante , at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															My analysis does not create such problems. If a
§2 plaintiff chooses to use a computer program to create an
illustrative district, the court need ask only whether that
program assigned race a predominant role.

															The Court argues that Alabama’s focus on
race-neutral maps cannot be squared with a totality-of-the-
circumstances test because “Alabama suggests there is only one
‘circumstance[ ]’ that matters—how the State’s map stacks up
relative to the benchmark” maps. Ante , at 18. My analysis,
however, simply follows the Gingles framework, under which a
court must first determine whether a §2 plaintiff has satisfied
three “preconditions” before moving on to consider the remainder of
relevant circumstances. See Growe v. Emison , 507 U.S.
25 , 40–41 (1993) (unless plaintiffs establish all three
preconditions, there “neither has been a wrong nor can be a
remedy”).

															IV

															As noted, I would vacate and remand for the
District Court to apply the correct understanding of Gingles in the first instance. Such a remand would require the District
Court to determine whether the plaintiffs have shown that their
illustrative maps did not give race a predominant role, and I will
therefore comment briefly on my understanding of the relevant
evidence in the record as it now stands.

															A

															In my view, there is strong evidence that race
played a predominant role in the production of the plaintiffs’
illustrative maps and that it is most unlikely that a map with more
than one majority-black district could be created without giving
race such a role. An expert hired by the Milligan plaintiffs, Dr. Kosuke Imai, used a computer algorithm to create
30,000 potential maps, none of which contained two majority-black
districts. See 2 App. 571–572; Supp. App. 59, 72. In fact, in
20,000 of those simulations, Dr. Imai intentionally created one
majority-minority district, and yet even with one majority-minority
district guaranteed as a baseline, none of those 20,000 attempts
produced a second one. See 2 App. 571–572; Supp. App. 72.

															Similarly, Dr. Moon Duchin, another expert hired
by the Milligan plaintiffs, opined that “it is hard to draw
two majority-black districts by accident.” 2 App. 714. Dr. Duchin
also referred to a study where she generated two million maps of
potential district configurations in Alabama, none of which
contained a second majority-minority district. Id. , at 710.
And the first team of trained mapmakers that plaintiff Milligan
consulted was literally unable to draw a
two-majority-black-district map, even when they tried. Id. ,
at 511–512. Milligan concluded at the time that the feat was
impossible. Id. , at 512.

															The majority quibbles about the strength of this
evidence, protesting that Dr. Imai’s studies failed to include as
controls certain redistricting criteria and that Dr. Duchin’s
two-million-map study was based on 2010 census data, see ante , at 26–27, and nn. 6–7, but this is unconvincing for
several reasons. It is plaintiffs’ burden to produce evidence and
satisfy the Gingles preconditions, so if their experts’ maps
were deficient, that is no strike against Alabama. And the racial
demographics of the State changed little between 2010 and 2020,
Supp. App. 82, which is presumably why Dr. Duchin herself raised
the older study in answering questions about her work in this
litigation, see 2 App. 710. If it was impossible to draw two such
districts in 2010, it surely at least requires a great deal of
intentional effort now.

															The Court suggests that little can be inferred
from Dr. Duchin’s two-million-map study because two million maps
are not that many in comparison to the “trillion trillion” maps
that are possible. See ante , at 28–29, and n. 9. In making
this argument, the Court relies entirely on an amicus brief
submitted by three computational redistricting experts in support
of the appellees. See Brief for Computational Redistricting Experts
2, 6, n. 7. These experts’ argument concerns a complicated
statistical issue, and I think it is unwise for the Court to make
their argument part of our case law based solely on this brief. By
the time this amicus brief was submitted, the appellants had
already filed their main brief, and it was too late for any experts
with contrary views to submit an amicus brief in support of
appellants. Computer simulations are widely used today to make
predictions about many important matters, and I would not place
stringent limits on their use in VRA litigation without being quite
sure of our ground. If the cases were remanded, the parties could
take up this issue if they wished and call experts to support their
positions on the extent to which the two million maps in the study
are or can be probative of the full universe of maps.

															In sum, based on my understanding of the current
record, I am doubtful that the plaintiffs could get by the first Gingles precondition, but I would let the District Court
sort this matter out on remand.

															B

															Despite the strong evidence that two
majority-minority districts cannot be drawn without singular
emphasis on race, a plurality nonetheless concludes that race did
not predominate in the drawing of the plaintiffs’ illustrative
maps. See ante , at 22–25. Their conclusion, however, rests
on a faulty view of what non-predominance means.

															The plurality’s position seems to be that race
does not predominate in the creation of a districting map so long
as the map does not violate other traditional districting criteria
such as compactness, contiguity, equally populated districts,
minimizing county splits, etc. Ibid . But this conclusion is
irreconcilable with our cases. In Miller , for instance, we
acknowledged that the particular district at issue was not
“shape[d] . . . bizarre[ly] on its face,” but we
nonetheless held that race predominated because of the
legislature’s “overriding desire to assign black populations” in a
way that would create an additional “majority-black district.” 515
U. S., at 917.

															Later cases drove home the point that conformity
with traditional districting principles does not necessarily mean
that a district was created without giving race a predominant role.
In Cooper , we held that once it was shown that race was
“ ‘the overriding reason’ ” for the selection of a
particular map, “a further showing of ‘inconsistency between the
enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria’ is unnecessary
to a finding of racial predominance.” 581 U. S., at 301,
n. 3 (quoting Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at 190). We
noted that the contrary argument was “foreclosed almost as soon as
it was raised in this Court.” Cooper , 581 U. S., at
301, n. 3; see also Vera , 517 U. S., at 966 (plurality
opinion) (race may still predominate even if “traditional
districting principle[s] do correlate to some extent with the
district’s layout”). “Traditional redistricting principles
. . . are numerous and malleable. . . . By
deploying those factors in various combinations and permutations, a
[mapmaker] could construct a plethora of potential maps that look
consistent with traditional, race-neutral principles.” Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at 190. Here, a plurality
allows plaintiffs to do precisely what we warned against in Bethune-Hill .

															The plurality’s analysis of predominance
contravenes our precedents in another way. We have been sensitive
to the gravity of “ ‘trapp[ing]’ ” States “ ‘between
the competing hazards of liability’ ” imposed by the
Constitution and the VRA. Id. , at 196 (quoting Vera ,
517 U. S., at 977). The VRA’s demand that States not
unintentionally “dilute” the votes of particular groups must be
reconciled with the Constitution’s demand that States generally
avoid intentional augmentation of the political power of any one
racial group (and thus the diminution of the power of other
groups). The plurality’s predominance analysis shreds that
prudential concern. If a private plaintiff can demonstrate §2
liability based on the production of a map that the State has every
reason to believe it could not constitutionally draw, we have left
“state legislatures too little breathing room” and virtually
guaranteed that they will be on the losing end of a federal court’s
judgment. Bethune-Hill , 580 U. S., at 196.

															*  *  *

															The Court’s treatment of Gingles is
inconsistent with the text of §2, our precedents on racial
predominance, and the fundamental principle that States are almost
always prohibited from basing decisions on race. Today’s decision
unnecessarily sets the VRA on a perilous and unfortunate path. I
respectfully dissent. Notes 1 Alabama’s districting
guidelines explicitly incorporate this non-predominance
requirement. See Singleton v. Merrill , 582
F. Supp. 3d 924, 1036 (ND Ala. 2022 ). 2 Although our cases have
posited that racial predominance may be acceptable if strict
scrutiny is satisfied, the Court does not contend that it is
satisfied here. 3 The second and third Gingles preconditions, which concern racially polarized
voting, cannot contribute to avoiding a clash between §2 and the
Constitution over racial predominance in the drawing of lines.
Those preconditions do not concern the drawing of lines in
plaintiffs’ maps, and in any event, because voting in much of the
South is racially polarized, they are almost always satisfied
anyway. Alabama does not contest that they are satisfied
here. 4 The Court appears to
contend that it does not matter if race predominated in the drawing
of these maps because the maps could have been drawn without
race predominating. See ante , at 26–27, n. 7. But of
course, many policies could be selected for race-neutral
reasons. They nonetheless must be assessed under the relevant
standard for intentional reliance on race if their imposition was
in fact motivated by race. See, e.g. , Hunter v. Underwood , 471 U.S.
222 , 227–231 (1985); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. , 429 U.S.
252 , 264–266 (1977); Washington v. Davis , 426 U.S.
229 , 241–248 (1976).

Summary: The Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision to block Alabama's congressional districting map, finding that it likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting the voting power of Black voters. The Court's decision centered on the interpretation of racial predominance and the potential for racial gerrymandering, with the majority opinion arguing for a broader interpretation to protect minority voting rights, while the dissenting opinion expressed concern over states' ability to create fair maps without considering race.