U.S. Supreme Court Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. 871 (1990) Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation No. 89-640 Argued April 16, 1990 Decided June 27, 1990 497
U.S. 871 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The National Wildlife Federation (hereinafter respondent) filed
this action in the District Court against petitioners, the Director
of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and other federal parties,
alleging that, in various respects, they had violated the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) in the course of
administering the BLM's "land withdrawal review program," and that
the complained-of actions should be set aside because they were
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law" within the meaning of § 10(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under the
program, petitioners make various types of decisions affecting the
status of public lands and their availability for private uses such
as mining, a number of which decisions were listed in an appendix
to the complaint. The court granted petitioners' motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, holding that
respondent lacked standing to seek judicial review of petitioners'
actions under the APA, § 702. The court ruled that affidavits by
two of respondent's members, Peterson and Erman, claiming use of
public lands "in the vicinity" of lands covered by two of the
listed decisions, were insufficient to confer standing as to those
particular decisions, and that, even if they had been adequate for
that limited purpose, they could not support respondent's attempted
APA challenge to each of the 1,250 or so individual actions
effected under the program. The court rejected as untimely four
more member affidavits pertaining to standing, which were submitted
after argument on the summary judgment motion and in purported
response to the District Court's postargument request for
additional briefing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the Peterson and Erman affidavits were sufficient in themselves,
that it was an abuse of discretion not to consider the four
additional affidavits, and that standing to challenge the
individual decisions conferred standing to challenge all such
decisions. Held: 1. The Peterson and Erman affidavits are insufficient to
establish respondent's § 702 entitlement to judicial review as "[a]
person . . . Page 497 U. S. 872 adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." Pp. 497 U. S.
882 -889.

															(a) To establish a right to relief under § 702, respondent must
satisfy two requirements. First, it must show that it has been
affected by some "agency action," as defined in § 551(13). See § 701(b)(2). Since neither the FLPMA nor NEPA provides
a private right of action, the "agency action" in question must
also be "final agency action" under § 704. Second, respondent must
prove that it is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by that action
"within the meaning of a relevant statute," which requires a
showing that the injury complained of falls within the "zone of
interests" sought to be protected by the FLPMA and NEPA. Cf.
Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.
S. 388 , 479 U. S.
396 -397. Pp. 497 U. S.
882 -883.

															(b) When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiff has failed to establish a right to relief under
702, the burden is on the plaintiff, under Rule 56(e), to set forth
specific facts (even though they may be controverted by the
defendant) showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Cf.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 , 477 U. S. 322 .
Where no such showing is made, the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 477 U. S. 323 .
Pp. 497 U. S.
883 -885.

															(c) The specific facts alleged in the two affidavits do not
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether respondent has a right
to relief under § 702. It may be assumed that the allegedly
affected interests set forth in the affidavits -- "recreational use
and aesthetic enjoyment" -- are sufficiently related to
respondent's purposes that respondent meets § 702's requirements if
any of its members do. Moreover, each affidavit can be read to
complain of a particular "agency action" within § 551's meaning;
and whatever "adverse effect" or "aggrievement" is established by
the affidavits meets the "zone of interests" test, since
"recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" are among the sorts of
interests that the FLPMA and NEPA are designed to protect. However,
there has been no showing that those interests of Peterson and
Erman were actually "affected" by petitioners' actions, since
the affidavits alleged only that the affiants used unspecified
lands "in the vicinity of" immense tracts of territory, only on
some portions of which, the record shows, mining activity has
occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the complained-of
actions. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the District
Court had to presume specific facts sufficient to support the
general allegations of injury to the affiants, since such facts are
essential to sustaining the complaint and, under Rule 56(e), had to
be set forth by respondent. United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.
S. 669 , distinguished. Pp. 497 U.S. 885 -889. Page 497 U. S. 873 2. Respondent's four additional member affidavits did not
establish its right to § 702 review. Pp. 497 U. S.
890 -898.

															(a) The affidavits are insufficient to enable respondent to
challenge the entirety of petitioners' "land withdrawal review
program." That term does not refer to a single BLM order or
regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM
orders and regulations, but is simply the name by which petitioners
have occasionally referred to certain continuing (and thus
constantly changing) BLM operations regarding public lands, which
currently extend to about 1,250 individual decisions and presumably
will include more actions in the future. Thus, the program is not
an identifiable "agency action" within § 702's meaning, much less a
"final agency action" under § 704. Absent an explicit congressional
authorization to correct the administrative process on a systemic
level, agency action is not ordinarily considered "ripe" for
judicial review under the APA until the scope of the controversy
has been reduced to manageable proportions, and its factual
components fleshed out, by concrete action that harms or threatens
to harm the complainant. It may well be, due to the scope of the
"program," that the individual BLM actions identified in the
affidavits will not be "ripe" for challenge until some further
agency action or inaction more immediately harming respondent
occurs. But it is entirely certain that the flaws in the entire
"program" cannot be laid before the courts for wholesale correction
under the APA simply because one of them that is ripe for review
adversely affects one of respondent's members. Respondent must seek
such programmatic improvements from the BLM or Congress. Pp. 497 U. S.
890 -894.

															(b) The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to admit the supplemental affidavits. Since the affidavits were
filed in response to the court's briefing order following the
summary judgment hearing, they were untimely under, inter
alia, Rule 6(d), which provides that "opposing affidavits may
be served not later than 1 day before the hearing." Although Rule
6(b) allows a court, "in its discretion," to extend any filing
deadline "for cause shown," a post-deadline extension must be "upon
motion made," and is permissible only where the failure to meet the
deadline "was the result of excusable neglect." Here, respondent
made no motion for extension, nor any showing of "cause." Moreover,
the failure to timely file did not result from "excusable neglect,"
since the court's order setting the hearing on the summary judgment
motion put respondent on notice that its right to sue was at issue,
and that (absent proper motion) the time for filing additional
evidentiary materials was, at the latest, the day before the
hearing. Even if the court could have overcome these obstacles to
admit the affidavits, it was not compelled, in exercising
its discretion, to do so. Pp. 497 U. S.
894 -898. Page 497 U. S. 874 3. Respondent is not entitled to seek § 702 review of
petitioners' actions in its own right. The brief affidavit
submitted to the District Court to show that respondent's ability
to fulfill its informational and advocacy functions was "adversely
affected" by petitioners' alleged failure to provide adequate
information and opportunities for public participation with respect
to the land withdrawal review program fails to identify any
particular "agency action" that was the source of respondent's
alleged injuries, since that program is not an identifiable action
or event. Thus, the affidavit does not set forth the specific facts
necessary to survive a Rule 56 motion. Pp. 497 U. S.
898 -899.

															278 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 878 F.2d 422, reversed.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 497 U. S.
900 . Page 497 U. S. 875 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In this, case we must decide whether respondent, the National
Wildlife Federation (hereinafter respondent), is a proper party to
challenge actions of the Federal Government relating to certain
public lands. I Respondent filed this action in 1985 in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners the
United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the
Interior, and the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
an agency within the Department. In its amended complaint,
respondent alleged that petitioners had violated the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 90 Stat. 2744, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et
seq., and § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 706, in the course of administering what the complaint
called the "land withdrawal review program" of the BLM. Some
background information concerning that program is necessary to an
understanding of this dispute.

															In various enactments, Congress empowered United States citizens
to acquire title to, and rights in, vast portions of federally
owned land. See, e.g., Rev.Stat. § 2319, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq. (Mining Law of 1872); 41 Stat. 437, as amended, 30
U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (Mineral Leasing Act of 1920).
Congress also provided means, however, for the Executive to remove
public lands from the operation of these statutes. The Pickett Act,
36 Stat. 847, 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1970 ed.), repealed, 90
Stat. 2792 (1976), authorized the President

															"at any time in his discretion, temporarily [to] withdraw from
settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the Page 497 U. S. 876 public lands of the United States . . . and reserve the same for
water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other
public purposes. . . ."

															Acting under this and under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch.
865, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315f, which gave the
Secretary of the Interior authority to "classify" public lands as
suitable for either disposal or federal retention and management,
President Franklin Roosevelt withdrew all unreserved public land
from disposal until such time as they were classified. Exec.Order
No. 6910, Nov. 26, 1934; Exec.Order No. 6964, Feb. 5, 1935. In
1936, Congress amended § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act to authorize
the Secretary of the Interior "to examine and classify any lands"
withdrawn by these orders and by other authority as "more valuable
or suitable" for other uses

															"and to open such lands to entry, selection, or location for
disposal in accordance with such classification under applicable
public land laws."

															49 Stat.1976, 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1982 ed.). The amendment also
directed that

															"[s]uch lands shall not be subject to disposition, settlement,
or occupation until after the same have been classified and opened
to entry." Ibid. The 1964 classification and multiple use Act, 78
Stat. 986, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1970 ed.) (expired 1970), gave
the Secretary further authority to classify lands for the purpose
of either disposal or retention by the Federal Government.

															Management of the public lands under these various laws became
chaotic. The Public Land Law Review Commission, established by
Congress in 1964 to study the matter, 78 Stat. 982, determined in
1970 that "virtually all" of the country's public domain, see Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the
Nation's Land 52 (1970) -- about one-third of the land within the
United States, see id. at 19 -- had been withdrawn or
classified for retention; that it was difficult to determine "the
extent of existing Executive withdrawals and the degree to which
withdrawals overlap each other," id. at 52; and that there
were inadequate records to show the purposes Page 497 U. S. 877 of withdrawals and the permissible public uses. Ibid. Accordingly, it recommended that

															"Congress should provide for a careful review of (1) all
Executive withdrawals and reservations, and (2) BLM retention and
disposal classifications under the Classification and Multiple Use
Act of 1964." Ibid. In 1976, Congress passed the FLPMA, which repealed many of the
miscellaneous laws governing disposal of public land, 43 U.S.C. §
1701 et seq. (1982 ed.), and established a policy in favor
of retaining public lands for multiple use management. It directed
the Secretary to "prepare and maintain on a continuing basis an
inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values,"
§ 1711(a), required land use planning for public lands, and
established criteria to be used for that purpose, § 1712. It
provided that existing classifications of public lands were subject
to review in the land use planning process, and that the Secretary
could "modify or terminate any such classification consistent with
such land use plans." § 1712(d). It also authorized the Secretary
to "make, modify, extend or revoke" withdrawals. § 1714(a). Finally
it directed the Secretary, within 15 years, to review withdrawals
in existence in 1976 in 11 western States, § 1714 (1)(1), and
to

															"determine whether, and for how long, the continuation of the
existing withdrawal of the lands would be, in his judgment,
consistent with the statutory objectives of the programs for which
the lands were dedicated and of the other relevant programs,"

															§ 1714(1)(2). The activities undertaken by the BLM to comply
with these various provisions constitute what respondent's amended
complaint styles the BLM's "land withdrawal review program," which
is the subject of the current litigation.

															Pursuant to the directives of the FLPMA, the petitioners engage
in a number of different types of administrative action with
respect to the various tracts of public land within the United
States. First, the BLM conducts the review and recommends the
determinations required by § 1714(1) with Page 497 U. S. 878 respect to withdrawals in 11 western States. The law requires
the Secretary to

															"report his recommendations to the President, together with
statements of concurrence or nonconcurrence submitted by the heads
of the departments or agencies which administer the lands;"

															the President must in turn submit this report to the Congress,
together with his recommendation "for action by the Secretary, or
for legislation." § 1714(1)(2). The Secretary has submitted a
number of reports to the President in accordance with this
provision.

															Second, the Secretary revokes some withdrawals under § 204(a) of
the Act, which the Office of the Solicitor has interpreted to give
the Secretary the power to process proposals for revocation of
withdrawals made during the "ordinary course of business." U.S.
Dept. of the Interior, Memorandum from the Office of the Solicitor,
Oct. 30, 1980. These revocations are initiated in one of three
manners: an agency or department holding a portion of withdrawn
land that it no longer needs may file a notice of intention to
relinquish the lands with the BLM. Any member of the public may
file a petition requesting revocation. And in the case of lands
held by the BLM, the BLM itself may initiate the revocation
proposal. App. 56-57. Withdrawal revocations may be made for
several reasons. Some are effected in order to permit sale of the
land; some for record-clearing purposes, where the withdrawal
designation has been superseded by congressional action or overlaps
with another withdrawal designation; some in order to restore the
land to multiple use management pursuant to § 102(a)(7) of the
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (1982 ed.). App. 142-145.

															Third, the Secretary engages in the ongoing process of
classifying public lands, either for multiple-use management, 43
CFR pt. 2420 (1988), for disposal, pt. 2430, or for other uses.
Classification decisions may be initiated by petition, pt. 2450, or
by the BLM itself, pt. 2460. Regulations promulgated Page 497 U. S. 879 by the Secretary prescribe the procedures to be followed in the
case of each type of classification determination. II In its complaint, respondent averred generally that the
reclassification of some withdrawn lands and the return of others
to the public domain would open the lands up to mining activities,
thereby destroying their natural beauty. Respondent alleged that
petitioners, in the course of administering the Nation's public
lands, had violated the FLPMA by failing to

															"develop, maintain, and, when appropriate, revise land use plans
which provide by tracts or areas for the use of the public
lands,"

															43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982 ed.); failing to submit
recommendations as to withdrawals in the 11 western States to the
President, § 1714(1); failing to consider multiple uses for the
disputed lands, § 1732(a), focusing inordinately on such uses as
mineral exploitation and development; and failing to provide public
notice of decisions, §§ 1701(a)(5), 1712(c)(9), 1712(f), and
1739(e). Respondent also claimed that petitioners had violated
NEPA, which requires federal agencies to

															"include in every recommendation or report on . . . major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on .
. . the environmental impact of the proposed action."

															42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982 ed.). Finally, respondent alleged
that all of the above actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," and should
therefore be set aside pursuant to § 10(e) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
706. Appended to the amended complaint was a schedule of specific
land status determinations, which the complaint stated had been
"taken by defendants since January 1, 1981"; each was identified by
a listing in the Federal Register.

															In December, 1985, the District Court granted respondent's
motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting petitioners
from

															"[m]odifying, terminating or altering any withdrawal,
classification, or other designation governing the protection Page 497 U. S. 880 of lands in the public domain that was in effect on January 1,
1981,"

															and from "[t]aking any action inconsistent" with any such
withdrawal, classification, or designation. App. to Pet. for Cert.
185a. In a subsequent order, the court denied petitioners' motion
under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss
the complaint for failure to demonstrate standing to challenge
petitioners' actions under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 183a. The Court of Appeals affirmed both orders. National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 266 U.S.App.D.C.
241, 835 F.2d 305 (1987). As to the motion to dismiss, the Court of
Appeals found sufficient to survive the motion the general
allegation in the amended complaint that respondent's members used
environmental resources that would be damaged by petitioners'
actions. See id. at 248, 835 F.2d at 312. It held that
this allegation, fairly read along with the balance of the
complaint, both identified particular land-status actions that
respondent sought to challenge -- since at least some of the
actions complained of were listed in the complaint's appendix of
Federal Register references -- and asserted harm to respondent's
members attributable to those particular actions. Id. at
249, 835 F.2d at 313. To support the latter point, the Court of
Appeals pointed to the affidavits of two of respondent's members,
Peggy Kay Peterson and Richard Erman, which claimed use of land "in
the vicinity" of the land covered by two of the listed actions.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, there was

															"concrete indication that [respondent's] members use specific
lands covered by the agency's Program and will be adversely
affected by the agency's actions,"

															and the complaint was "sufficiently specific for purposes of a
motion to dismiss." Ibid. On petitions for rehearing, the
Court of Appeals stood by its denial of the motion to dismiss, and
directed the parties and the District Court "to proceed with this
litigation with dispatch." National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 269 U.S.App.D.C. 271, 272, 844 F.2d 889, 890
(1988). Page 497 U. S. 881 Back before the District Court, petitioners again claimed, this
time by means of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which motion had been outstanding
during the proceedings before the Court of Appeals), that
respondent had no standing to seek judicial review of petitioners'
actions under the APA. After argument on this motion, and in
purported response to the court's postargument request for
additional briefing, respondent submitted four additional member
affidavits pertaining to the issue of standing. The District Court
rejected them as untimely, vacated the injunction, and granted the
Rule 56 motion to dismiss. It noted that neither its earlier
decision nor the Court of Appeals' affirmance controlled the
question, since both pertained to a motion under Rule 12(b). It
found the Peterson and Erman affidavits insufficient to withstand
the Rule 56 motion, even as to judicial review of the particular
classification decisions to which they pertained. And even if they
had been adequate for that limited purpose, the court said, they
could not support respondent's attempted APA challenge to "each of
the 1250 or so individual classification terminations and
withdrawal revocations" effected under the land withdrawal review
program. National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 699 F.
Supp. 327 , 332 (DC 1988).

															This time the Court of Appeals reversed. National Wildlife
Federation v. Burford, 278 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 878 F.2d 422
(1989). It both found the Peterson and Erman affidavits sufficient
in themselves, and held that it was an abuse of discretion not to
consider the four additional affidavits as well. [ Footnote 1 ] The Court of Appeals also
concluded that Page 497 U. S. 882 standing to challenge individual classification and withdrawal
decisions conferred standing to challenge all such decisions under
the land withdrawal review program. We granted certiorari. 493 U.S.
1042 (1990). III A We first address respondent's claim that the Peterson and Erman
affidavits alone suffice to establish respondent's right to
judicial review of petitioners' actions. Respondent does not
contend that either the FLPMA or NEPA provides a private right of
action for violations of its provisions. Rather, respondent claims
a right to judicial review under § 10(a) of the APA, which
provides:

															"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."

															5 U.S.C. § 702.

															This provision contains two separate requirements. First, the
person claiming a right to sue must identify some "agency action"
that affects him in the specified fashion; it is judicial review
"thereof" to which he is entitled. The meaning of "agency action"
for purposes of § 702 is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), see 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) ("For the purpose of this chapter
. . . agency action' ha[s] the meanin[g] given . . . by section
551 of this title"), which defines the term as "the whole or a part
of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act," 5 U.S.C. §
551(13). When, as here, review is sought not pursuant to specific
authorization in the substantive statute, but only under the
general review provisions of the APA, the "agency action" in
question must be "final agency action." See 5 U.S.C. § 704
("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review" (emphasis added)). Page 497 U. S. 883 Second, the party seeking review under § 702 must show that he
has "suffer[ed] legal wrong" because of the challenged agency
action, or is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by that action
"within the meaning of a relevant statute." Respondent does not
assert that it has suffered "legal wrong," so we need only discuss
the meaning of "adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the
meaning of a relevant statute." As an original matter, it might be
thought that one cannot be "adversely affected or aggrieved within
the meaning" of a statute unless the statute in question uses those
terms (or terms like them) -- as some pre-APA statutes in fact did
when conferring rights of judicial review. See, e.g., Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 402(b)(2), 48 Stat. 1093, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1982 ed.). We have long since
rejected that interpretation, however, which would have made the
judicial review provision of the APA no more than a restatement of
preexisting law. Rather, we have said that, to be "adversely
affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning" of a statute, the
plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his
aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the
"zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutory
provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. See Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U.
S. 388 , 479 U. S.
396 -397 (1987). Thus, for example, the failure of an
agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring "on the
record" hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the
company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency's
proceedings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to
protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings, and not
those of the reporters, that company would not be "adversely
affected within the meaning" of the statute. B Because this case comes to us on petitioners' motion for summary
judgment, we must assess the record under the Page 497 U. S. 884 standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 56(c) states that a party is entitled to summary
judgment in his favor

															"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

															Rule 56(e) further provides:

															"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the
adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the
adverse party."

															As we stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.
S. 317 (1986),

															"the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 477 U. S. 322 .
Where no such showing is made,

															"[t]he moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which
she has the burden of proof." Id. at 477 U. S.
323 .

															These standards are fully applicable when a defendant moves for
summary judgment, in a suit brought under § 702, on the ground that
the plaintiff has failed to show that he is "adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." The burden is on the party seeking review under § 702 to
set forth specific facts (even though they may be controverted by
the Government) showing that he has satisfied its terms. Sierra Club v.
Morton , Page 497 U. S. 885 405 U. S. 727 , 405 U. S. 740 (1972). Celotex made clear that Rule 56 does not require
the moving party to negate the elements of the nonmoving party's
case; to the contrary,

															"regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary
judgment motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be
granted so long as whatever is before the district court
demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment,
as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."

															477 U.S. at 477 U. S.
323 . C We turn, then, to whether the specific facts alleged in the two
affidavits considered by the District Court raised a genuine issue
of fact as to whether an "agency action" taken by petitioners
caused respondent to be "adversely affected or aggrieved . . .
within the meaning of a relevant statute." We assume, since it has
been uncontested, that the allegedly affected interests set forth
in the affidavits -- "recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment" --
are sufficiently related to the purposes of respondent association
that respondent meets the requirements of § 702 if any of its
members do. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333 (1977).

															As for the "agency action" requirement, we think that each of
the affidavits can be read, as the Court of Appeals believed, to
complain of a particular "agency action" as that term is defined in
§ 551. The parties agree that the Peterson affidavit, judging from
the geographic area it describes, must refer to that one of the BLM
orders listed in the appendix to the complaint that appears at 49
Fed.Reg.19904-19905 (1984), an order captioned W-6228 and dated
April 30, 1984, terminating the withdrawal classification of some
4,500 acres of land in that area. See, e.g., Brief for
Petitioners 8-10. The parties also appear to agree, on the basis of
similar deduction, that the Erman affidavit refers to the BLM order
listed in the appendix that appears at 47 Fed.Reg. 7232-7233 Page 497 U. S. 886 (1982), an order captioned Public Land Order 6156 and dated
February 18, 1982.

															We also think that whatever "adverse effect" or "aggrievement"
is established by the affidavits was "within the meaning of the
relevant statute" -- i.e., met the "zone of interests"
test. The relevant statute, of course, is the statute whose
violation is the gravamen of the complaint -- both the FLPMA and
NEPA. We have no doubt that "recreational use and aesthetic
enjoyment" are among the sorts of interests those statutes
were specifically designed to protect. The only issue, then, is
whether the facts alleged in the affidavits showed that those
interests of Peterson and Erman were actually
affected.

															The Peterson affidavit averred:

															"My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands,
particularly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain,
Wyoming, have been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by
the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In
particular, the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming has been
opened to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an
action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat
potential of these lands."

															App. to Pet. for Cert.191a. Erman's affidavit was substantially
the same as Peterson's, with respect to all except the area
involved; he claimed use of land "in the vicinity of Grand Canyon
National Park, the Arizona Strip (Kanab Plateau), and the Kanab
National Forest." Id. at 187a.

															The District Court found the Peterson affidavit inadequate for
the following reasons:

															"Peterson . . . claims that she uses federal lands in the
vicinity of the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming for
recreational purposes and for aesthetic enjoyment, and that her
recreational and aesthetic enjoyment Page 497 U. S. 887 has been and continues to be adversely affected as the result of
the decision of BLM to open it to the staking of mining claims and
oil and gas leasing. . . . This decision [W-6228] opened up to
mining approximately 4500 acres within a two million acre area, the
balance of which, with the exception of 2000 acres, has always been
open to mineral leasing and mining. . . . There is no showing that
Peterson's recreational use and enjoyment extends to the particular
4500 acres covered by the decision to terminate classification to
the remainder of the two million acres affected by the termination.
All she claims is that she uses lands 'in the vicinity.' The
affidavit, on its face, contains only a bare allegation of injury,
and fails to show specific facts supporting the affiant's
allegation."

															699 F. Supp. at 331 (emphasis in original).

															The District Court found the Erman affidavit "similarly
flawed."

															"The magnitude of Erman's claimed injury stretches the
imagination. . . . [T]he Arizona Strip consists of all lands in
Arizona north and west of the Colorado River on approximately 5.5
million acres, an area one-eighth the size of the State of Arizona.
Furthermore, virtually the entire Strip is, and for many years has
been, open to uranium and other metalliferous mining. The
revocation of withdrawal [in Public Land Order 6156] concerned only
non-metalliferous mining in the western one-third of the Arizona
Strip, an area possessing no potential for nonmetalliferous
mining." Id. at 332.

															The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court's
assessment as to the Peterson affidavit (and thus found it
unnecessary to consider the Erman affidavit) for the following
reason:

															"If Peterson was not referring to lands in this 4500-acre
affected area, her allegation of impairment to her use and
enjoyment would be meaningless, or perjurious. . . . Page 497 U. S. 888 [T]he trial court overlooks the fact that, unless Peterson's
language is read to refer to the lands affected by the Program, the
affidavit is, at best, a meaningless document."

															"At a minimum, Peterson's affidavit is ambiguous regarding
whether the adversely affected lands are the ones she uses. When
presented with ambiguity on a motion for summary judgment, a
District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in
favor of the non-moving party. . . . This means that the District
Court was obliged to resolve any factual ambiguity in favor of NWF,
and would have had to assume, for the purposes of summary judgment,
that Peterson used the 4500 affected acres."

															278 U.S.App.D.C. at 329, 878 F.2d at 431.

															That is not the law. In ruling upon a Rule 56 motion, "a
District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in
favor of the nonmoving party" only in the sense that, where the
facts specifically averred by that party contradict facts
specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be denied. That
is a world apart from "assuming" that general averments embrace the
"specific facts" needed to sustain the complaint. As set forth
above, Rule 56(e) provides that judgment "shall be entered" against
the nonmoving party unless affidavits or other evidence "set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
The object of this provision is not to replace conclusory
allegations of the complaint or answer with conclusory allegations
of an affidavit. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242 , 477 U. S. 249 (1986) ("[T]he plaintiff could not rest on his allegations of a
conspiracy to get to a jury without any significant probative
evidence tending to support the complaint'"), quoting First
National Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.
S. 253 , 391 U. S. 290 (1968). Rather, the purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who
believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact
essential to the other side's case to demand at least one Page 497 U. S. 889 sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of
litigation continues.

															At the margins, there is some room for debate as to how
"specific" must be the "specific facts" that Rule 56(e) requires in
a particular case. But where the fact in question is the one put in
issue by the § 702 challenge here -- whether one of respondent's
members has been, or is threatened to be, "adversely affected or
aggrieved" by Government action -- Rule 56(e) is assuredly not
satisfied by averments which state only that one of respondent's
members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory,
on some portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably
will occur by virtue of the governmental action. It will not do to
"presume" the missing facts because, without them, the affidavits
would not establish the injury that they generally allege. That
converts the operation of Rule 56 to a circular promenade:
plaintiff's complaint makes general allegation of injury; defendant
contests through Rule 56 existence of specific facts to support
injury; plaintiff responds with affidavit containing general
allegation of injury, which must be deemed to constitute averment
of requisite specific facts, since otherwise allegation of injury
would be unsupported (which is precisely what defendant claims it
is).

															Respondent places great reliance, as did the Court of Appeals,
upon our decision in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.
S. 669 (1973). The SCRAP opinion, whose
expansive expression of what would suffice for § 702 review under
its particular facts, has never since been emulated by this Court,
is of no relevance here, since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment, but a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss on the
pleadings. The latter, unlike the former, presumes that general
allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to
support the claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41 , 355 U. S. 45 -46
(1957). Page 497 U. S. 890 IV We turn next to the Court of Appeals' alternative holding that
the four additional member affidavits proffered by respondent in
response to the District Court's briefing order established its
right to § 702 review of agency action. A It is impossible that the affidavits would suffice, as the Court
of Appeals held, to enable respondent to challenge the entirety of
petitioners' so-called "land withdrawal review program." That is
not an "agency action" within the meaning of § 702, much less a
"final agency action" within the meaning of § 704. The term "land
withdrawal review program" (which as far as we know is not derived
from any authoritative text) does not refer to a single BLM order
or regulation, or even to a completed universe of particular BLM
orders and regulations. It is simply the name by which petitioners
have occasionally referred to the continuing (and thus constantly
changing) operations of the BLM in reviewing withdrawal revocation
applications and the classifications of public lands and developing
land use plans as required by the FLPMA. It is no more an
identifiable "agency action" -- much less a "final agency action"
-- than a "weapons procurement program" of the Department of
Defense or a "drug interdiction program" of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. As the District Court explained, the "land
withdrawal review program" extends to, currently at least, "1250 or
so individual classification terminations and withdrawal
revocations." 699 F. Supp. at 332. [ Footnote 2 ] Page 497 U. S. 891 Respondent alleges that violation of the law is rampant within
this program -- failure to revise land use plans in proper fashion,
failure to submit certain recommendations to Congress, failure to
consider multiple use, inordinate focus upon mineral exploitation,
failure to provide required public notice, failure to provide
adequate environmental impact statements. Perhaps so. But
respondent cannot seek wholesale improvement of this program by
court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the
halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements are normally
made. Under the terms of the APA, respondent must direct its attack
against some particular "agency action" that causes it harm. Some
statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the "agency action,"
and thus to be the object of judicial review directly, even before
the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt.
Absent such a provision, however, a regulation is not ordinarily
considered the type of agency action "ripe" for judicial review
under the APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced
to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed
out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the
claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm
him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which,
as a practical matter, requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct
immediately. Such agency action is "ripe" for review at once,
whether or not explicit statutory review apart from the APA is
provided. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.
S. 136 , 387 U. S.
152 -154 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn.,
Inc., 387 U. S. 167 , 387 U. S.
171 -173 (1967). Cf. 387 U. S. S.
892� Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner,@ 387 U.
S. 158 , 387 U. S.
164 -166 (1967).)

															In the present case, the individual actions of the BLM
identified in the six affidavits can be regarded as rules of
general applicability (a "rule" is defined in the APA as agency
action of "general or particular applicability and future
effect, " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (emphasis added)) announcing, with
respect to vast expanses of territory that they cover, the agency's
intent to grant requisite permission for certain activities, to
decline to interfere with other activities, and to take other
particular action if requested. It may well be, then, that even
those individual actions will not be ripe for challenge until some
further agency action or inaction more immediately harming the
plaintiff occurs. [ Footnote 3 ]
But it is at least entirely Page 497 U. S. 893 certain that the flaws in the entire "program" -- consisting
principally of the many individual actions referenced in the
complaint, and presumably actions yet to be taken as well -- cannot
be laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the APA,
simply because one of them that is ripe for review adversely
affects one of respondent's members. [ Footnote 4 ] Page 497 U. S. 894 The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably
frustrating to an organization such as respondent, which has as its
objective across-the-board protection of our Nation's wildlife and
the streams and forests that support it. But this is the
traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the
courts. Except where Congress explicitly provides for our
correction of the administrative process at a higher level of
generality, we intervene in the administration of the laws only
when, and to the extent that, a specific "final agency action" has
an actual or immediately threatened effect. Toilet Goods
Assn., 387 U.S. at 387 U. S.
164 -166. Such an intervention may ultimately have the
effect of requiring a regulation, a series of regulations, or even
a whole "program" to be revised by the agency in order to avoid the
unlawful result that the court discerns. But it is assuredly not as
swift or as immediately far-reaching a corrective process as those
interested in systemic improvement would desire. Until confided to
us, however, more sweeping actions are for the other branches. B The Court of Appeals' reliance upon the supplemental affidavits
was wrong for a second reason: the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to admit them. Petitioners filed their
motion for summary judgment in September, 1986; respondent filed an
opposition, but did not submit any new evidentiary materials at
that time. On June 27, 1988, after the case had made its way for
the first time through the Court of Appeals, the District Court
announced that it would hold a hearing on July 22 on "the
outstanding motions for summary judgment," which included
petitioners' motion challenging respondent's § 702 standing. The
hearing was held and, as noted earlier, the District Court issued
an order directing respondent to file "a supplemental memorandum
regarding Page 497 U. S. 895 the issue of its standing to proceed." Record, Doc. No. 274.
Although that plainly did not call for the submission of new
evidentiary materials, it was in purported response to this order,
on August 22, 1988, that respondent submitted (along with the
requested legal memorandum) the additional affidavits. The only
explanation for the submission (if it can be called an explanation)
was contained in a footnote to the memorandum, which simply stated
that

															"NWF now has submitted declarations on behalf of other members
of NWF who have been injured by the challenged actions of federal
defendants."

															Record, Doc. No. 278, p. 18, n. 21. In its November 4, 1988,
ruling granting petitioners' motion, the District Court rejected
the additional affidavits as "untimely and in violation of [the
court's briefing] Order." 699 F. Supp. at 328, n. 3.

															Respondent's evidentiary submission was indeed untimely, both
under Rule 56, which requires affidavits in opposition to a summary
judgment motion to be served "prior to the day of the hearing,"
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and under Rule 6(d), which states more
generally that,

															"[w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit, . . . opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing,
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time."

															Rule 6(b) sets out the proper approach in the case of late
filings:

															"When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order
of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the
period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect. . . ."

															This provision not only specifically confers the "discretion"
relevant to the present issue, but also provides the mechanism Page 497 U. S. 896 by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised. First,
any extension of a time limitation must be "for cause shown."
Second, although extensions before expiration of the time period
may be "with or without motion or notice," any post -deadline extension must be "upon motion made," and is
permissible only where the failure to meet the deadline "was the
result of excusable neglect." Thus, in order to receive the
affidavits here, the District Court would have had to regard the
very filing of the late document as the "motion made" to file it;
[ Footnote 5 ] it would have had
to interpret "cause Page 497 U. S. 897 shown" to mean merely "cause," since respondent made no
"showing" of cause at all; and finally, it would have had to find
as a substantive matter that there was indeed "cause" for the late
filing, and that the failure to file on time "was the result of
excusable neglect."

															This last substantive obstacle is the greatest of all. The Court
of Appeals presumably thought it was overcome because "the papers
on which the trial court relied were two years old by the time it
requested supplemental memoranda" and because

															"there was no indication prior to the trial court's request that
[respondent] should have doubted the adequacy of the affidavits it
had already submitted."

															278 U.S.App.D.C. at 331, 878 F.2d at 433. We do not understand
the relevance of the first point; the passage of so long a time as
two years suggests, if anything, that respondent had more than the
usual amount of time to prepare its response to the motion, and was
more than moderately remiss in waiting until after the last moment.
As to the suggestion of unfair surprise: a litigant is never
justified in assuming that the court has made up its mind until the
court expresses itself to that effect, and a litigant's failure to
buttress its position because of confidence in the strength of that
position is always indulged in at the litigant's own risk. In any
case, whatever erroneous expectations respondent may have had were
surely dispelled by the District Court's order in June, 1988,
announcing that the hearing on petitioners' motion would be held
one month later. At least when that order issued, respondent was on
notice that its right to sue was at issue, and that (absent proper
motion) the time for filing any additional evidentiary materials
was, at the latest, the day before the hearing. Page 497 U. S. 898 Perhaps it is true that the District Court could have overcome
all the obstacles we have described -- apparent lack of a motion,
of a showing, and of excusable neglect -- to admit the affidavits
at issue here. But the proposition that it was compelled to receive
them -- that it was an abuse of discretion to reject them -- cannot
be accepted. V Respondent's final argument is that we should remand this case
for the Court of Appeals to decide whether respondent may seek §
702 review of petitioners' actions in its own right, rather than
derivatively through its members. Specifically, it points to
allegations in the amended complaint that petitioners unlawfully
failed to publish regulations, to invite public participation, and
to prepare an environmental impact statement with respect to the
"land withdrawal review program" as a whole. In order to show that
it is a "person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved" by these
failures, it submitted to the District Court a brief affidavit (two
pages in the record) by one of its vice-presidents, Lynn A.
Greenwalt, who stated that respondent's mission is to "inform its
members and the general public about conservation issues" and to
advocate improvements in laws and administrative practices
"pertaining to the protection and enhancement of federal lands,"
App. to Pet. for Cert.193a-194a; and that its ability to perform
this mission has been impaired by petitioners' failure

															"to provide adequate information and opportunities for public
participation with respect to the Land Withdrawal Review
Program." Id. at 194a. The District Court found this affidavit
insufficient to establish respondent's right to seek judicial
review, since it was "conclusory and completely devoid of specific
facts." 699 F. Supp. at 330. The Court of Appeals, having reversed
the District Court on the grounds discussed above, did not address
the issue.

															We agree with the District Court's disposition. Even assuming
that the affidavit set forth "specific facts," Fed.R.Civ.P. Page 497 U. S. 899 56(e), adequate to show injury to respondent through the
deprivation of information; and even assuming that providing
information to organizations such as respondent was one of the
objectives of the statutes allegedly violated, so that respondent
is "aggrieved within the meaning" of those statutes; nonetheless,
the Greenwalt affidavit fails to identify any particular "agency
action" that was the source of these injuries. The only sentences
addressed to that point are as follows:

															"NWF's ability to meet these obligations to its members has been
significantly impaired by the failure of the Bureau of Land
Management and the Department of the Interior to provide adequate
information and opportunities for public participation with respect
to the Land Withdrawal Review Program. These interests of NWF have
been injured by the actions of the Bureau and the Department, and
would be irreparably harmed by the continued failure to provide
meaningful opportunities for public input and access to information
regarding the Land Withdrawal Review Program."

															App. to Pet. for Cert.194a. As is evident, this is even more
deficient than the Peterson and Erman affidavits, which contained
geographical descriptions whereby at least an action as general as
a particular classification decision could be identified as the
source of the grievance. As we discussed earlier, the "land
withdrawal review program" is not an identifiable action or event.
With regard to alleged deficiencies in providing information and
permitting public participation, as with regard to the other
illegalities alleged in the complaint, respondent cannot demand a
general judicial review of the BLM's day-to-day operations. The
Greenwalt affidavit, like the others, does not set forth the
specific facts necessary to survive a Rule 56 motion. Page 497 U. S. 900 * * * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is reversed. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															As an additional basis for its conclusion, the Court of Appeals
held that the earlier panel's finding that the Peterson and Erman
affidavits were sufficient to establish respondent's right to sue
was the "law of the case." We do not address this conclusion, as
the earlier panel's ruling does not, of course, bind this Court. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436 , 225 U. S. 444 (1912).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Contrary to the apparent understanding of the dissent, we do not
contend that no "land withdrawal review program" exists, any more
than we would contend that no weapons procurement program exists.
We merely assert that it is not an identifiable "final agency
action" for purposes of the APA. If there is, in fact, some
specific order or regulation applying some particular measure
across the board to all individual classification terminations and
withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final
and has become ripe for review in the manner we discuss
subsequently in text, it can of course be challenged under the APA
by a person adversely affected -- and the entire "land withdrawal
review program," insofar as the content of that particular action
is concerned, would thereby be affected. But that is quite
different from permitting a generic challenge to all aspects of the
"land withdrawal review program," as though that itself constituted
a final agency action.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Under the Secretary's regulations, any person seeking to conduct
mining operations that will "cause a cumulative surface
disturbance" of five acres or more must first obtain approval of a
plan of operations. 43 CFR § 3809.1-4 (1988). Mining operations
that cause surface disturbance of less than 5 acres do not require
prior approval, but prior notice must be given to the district
office of the BLM. § 3809.1-3. Neither approval nor notification is
required only with respect to "casual use operations," § 3809.1-2,
defined as "activities ordinarily resulting in only negligible
disturbance of the Federal lands and resources," § 3809.0-5.
(Activities are considered "casual" if "they do not involve the use
of mechanized earth moving equipment or explosives or do not
involve the use of motorized vehicles in areas designated as closed
to off-road vehicles. . . ." Ibid. ) Thus, before any
mining use ordinarily involving more than "negligible disturbance"
can take place, there must occur either agency action in response
to a submitted plan or agency inaction in response to a submitted
notice.

															In one of the four new affidavits, Peggy Peterson, one of the
original affiants, states that a corporation has filed a mine
permit application with the BLM covering a portion of the land to
which her original affidavit pertained. App. to Brief in Opposition
for Respondent National Wildlife Federation 16. If that permit is
granted, there is no doubt that agency action ripe for review will
have occurred; nor any doubt that, in the course of an otherwise
proper court challenge, affiant Peterson, and through her
respondent, would be able to call into question the validity of the
classification order authorizing the permit. However, before the
grant of such a permit, or (when it will suffice) the filing of a
notice to engage in mining activities, or (when only "negligible
disturbance" will occur) actual mining of the land, it is
impossible to tell where or whether mining activities will occur.
Indeed, it is often impossible to tell from a classification order
alone whether mining activities will even be permissible. As
explained in the uncontested affidavit of the BLM's Assistant
Director of Land Resources:

															"The lands may be subject to another withdrawal of comparable
scope, or they may be subject to classification segregations
tantamount to such a withdrawal. In that case, the lands would not
be opened to the operation of the public land laws, so that the
removal of one of the withdrawals has no practical effect. Another
reason why there may not be any change is that, before the
revocation occurred, the lands may have been transferred into
private ownership. Consequently, the withdrawal revocation amounts
to nothing more than a paper transaction. . . . In the alternative,
a revoked withdrawal may open the lands to the operation of the
public land and mineral laws. . . . Some withdrawal revocations are
made without prior knowledge as to what subsequent disposition may
be made of the lands. After the lands are opened, they might be
transferred out of federal ownership by sale, exchange, or some
other discretionary mode of disposal, not anticipated when the
withdrawal was revoked. These subsequent discretionary actions
require separate and independent decisionmaking that, obviously,
are divorced from the prior revocation decision. Environmental and
other management concerns and public participation are taken into
account in relation to the post-revocation decisionmaking."

															Affidavit of Frank Edwards, Aug. 18, 1985, App. 61-62.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Nothing in this is contrary to our opinion in Automobile
Workers v. Brock, 477 U. S. 274 (1986), cited by the Court of Appeals. That opinion did not
discuss, and the respondent Secretary of Labor did not rely upon,
the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 702 and our ripeness jurisprudence
in cases such as Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U.
S. 167 (1967); and Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v.
Gardner, 387 U. S. 158 (1967). The only challenge made and decided, with respect to the
individuals' right to sue, relied upon 19 U.S.C. § 2311(d) (1982
ed.), which, according to the Secretary of Labor, made
entertainment of that suit

															"'contrary to Congress's incorporation of the state system into
the administration of the Trade Act, and an affront to the
integrity and authority of the state courts.'"

															477 U.S. at 477 U. S. 283 ,
quoting Brief for Respondent in Automobile Workers, No.
84-1777, p. 16.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The dissent asserts that a footnote in respondent's reply
memorandum to the District Court was a "motion" within the meaning
of Rule 6(b)(2), and was so obviously so that the District Court
committed reversible error in failing to construe it that way. Post at 497 U. S.
909 -910, n. 10. We cannot agree. Rule 6(b) establishes a
clear distinction between "requests" and "motions," and the one
cannot be converted into the other without violating its provisions
-- or at least cannot be converted on the basis of such lax
criteria that conversion would be not only marginally permissible,
but positively mandatory in the present case. Rule 6(b)(1) allows a
court ("for cause shown" and "in its discretion") to grant a
"request" for an extension of time, whether the request is made
"with or without motion or notice," provided the request
is made before the time for filing expires. After the time
for filing has expired, however, the court (again "for cause shown"
and "in its discretion") may extend the time only "upon motion." To
treat all post-deadline "requests" as "motions" (if indeed any of
them can be treated that way) would eliminate the distinction
between pre-deadline and post-deadline filings that the Rule
painstakingly draws. Surely the post-deadline "request," to be even permissibly treated as a "motion," must contain a high
degree of formality and precision, putting the opposing party on
notice that a motion is at issue, and that he therefore ought to
respond. The request here had not much of either characteristic. As
for formality, it was not even made in a separate filing or in a
separate appearance before the court, but was contained in a single
sentence at the end of the first paragraph of one of the 18
single-spaced footnotes in a 20-page memorandum of law. Our
district judges must read footnotes with new care if they are to be
reversed for failing to recognize motions buried in this fashion.
And as for precision, the request not only did not ask for any particular extension of time (7 days, 30 days), it did not
specifically ask for an extension of time at all, but
merely said that respondent "should be given adequate opportunity
to supplement the record." Even this, moreover, was not requested
(much less moved for) unconditionally, but only "[i]f the court
intends to reverse its prior ruling [regarding NWF standing]."
Record, Doc. No. 294, p. 17, n. 16. We think it quite impossible to
agree with the dissent that the District Judge not only might treat this request as a motion, but that he was
compelled to do so.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															In my view, the affidavits of Peggy Kay Peterson and Richard
Loren Erman, in conjunction with other record evidence before the
District Court on the motions for summary judgment, were sufficient
to establish the standing of the National Wildlife Federation
(Federation or NWF) to bring this suit. I also conclude that the
District Court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
supplemental affidavits filed after the hearing on the parties'
cross-motions for summary judgment. I therefore would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. I The Federation's asserted injury in this case rested upon its
claim that the Government actions challenged here would lead to
increased mining on public lands; that the mining would result in
damage to the environment; and that the recreational opportunities
of NWF's members would consequently be diminished. Abundant record
evidence supported the Federation's assertion that, on lands newly
opened for mining, mining in fact would occur. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Similarly, the record furnishes ample
support for NWF's contention that mining activities can be expected
to cause severe environmental Page 497 U. S. 901 damage to the affected lands. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The District Court held, however, that the
Federation had not adequately identified particular members who
were harmed by the consequences of the Government's actions.
Although two of NWF's members expressly averred that their
recreational activities had been impaired, the District Court
concluded that these affiants had not identified with sufficient
precision the particular sites on which their injuries occurred.
The majority, like the District Court, holds that the averments of
Peterson and Erman were insufficiently specific to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. Although these affidavits were not
models of precision, I believe that they were adequate at least to
create a genuine issue of fact as to the organization's injury. Page 497 U. S. 902 As the Court points out, the showing (whether as to standing or
the merits) required to overcome a motion for summary judgment is
more extensive than that required in the context of a motion to
dismiss. The principal difference is that, in the former context, evidence is required, while in the latter setting the
litigant may rest upon the allegations of his complaint. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 , 477 U. S. 324 (1986) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) "requires the
nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings"). In addition, Rule
56(e) requires that the party opposing summary judgment "must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial" (emphasis added). Thus, Courts of Appeals have
reiterated that "conclusory" allegations unsupported by "specific"
evidence will be insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact.
[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The requirement that evidence be submitted is satisfied here:
the Federation has offered the sworn statements of two of its
members. There remains the question whether the allegations in
these affidavits were sufficiently precise to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 56(e). The line of demarcation between
"specific" and "conclusory" allegations is hardly a bright one.
But, to my mind, the allegations contained in the Peterson and
Erman affidavits, in the context of the record as a whole, were
adequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment. These affidavits,
as the majority acknowledges, were at least sufficiently precise to
enable Bureau of Land Management (BLM) officials to identify the
particular termination orders to which the affiants referred. See ante at 497 U.S.
885 -886. And the affiants averred that their

															"recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands . . .
have been and continue to be adversely affected in fact by the
unlawful Page 497 U. S. 903 actions of the Bureau and the Department."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. 188a (Erman affidavit), 191a (Peterson
affidavit). The question, it should be emphasized, is not whether
the NWF has proved that it has standing to bring this action, but
simply whether the materials before the District Court established
"that there is a genuine issue for trial," see Rule 56(e),
concerning the Federation's standing. In light of the principle
that,

															"[o]n summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the
underlying facts contained in [evidentiary] materials must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion," United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.
S. 654 , 369 U. S. 655 (1962), I believe that the evidence before the District Court
raised a genuine factual issue as to NWF's standing to sue.

															No contrary conclusion is compelled by the fact that Peterson
alleged that she uses federal lands "in the vicinity of South
Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming," App. to Pet. for Cert.191a, rather
than averring that she uses the precise tract that was recently
opened to mining. The agency itself has repeatedly referred to the
"South Pass-Green Mountain area" in describing the region newly
opened to mining. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
Peterson's assertion that her use and enjoyment of federal lands
have been adversely affected by the agency's decision to permit
more extensive mining is, as the Court of Appeals stated, National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278 U.S.App.D.C.
320, 329, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (1989), "meaningless, or perjurious" if
the lands she uses do not include those harmed by mining undertaken
pursuant to termination order W-6228. [ Footnote 2/5 ] To read particular assertions within the
affidavit in light of the document as a whole is, as the majority
might put it, "a world apart" from "presuming" facts that are
neither stated nor implied simply because, without them, the Page 497 U. S. 904 plaintiff would lack standing. The Peterson and Erman affidavits
doubtless could have been more artfully drafted, but they
definitely were sufficient to withstand the federal parties'
summary judgment motion. II I also conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in
refusing to consider the supplemental affidavits filed by NWF after
the hearing on the summary judgment motion. [ Footnote 2/6 ] The court's decision abruptly derailed the
Federation's lawsuit after three years of proceedings involving
massive time and expense. The District Court and Court of Appeals
both had concluded that NWF's claims were sufficiently substantial
to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction. Whatever the
ultimate merits of the Federation's claims, litigation of this
magnitude should not be aborted on technical grounds if that result
legitimately can be avoided. The majority's approach reflects an
insufficient appreciation both of the realities of complex
litigation and of the admonition that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "shall be construed to secure Page 497 U. S. 905 the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action." Rule 1.

															That a requirement is "technical" does not, of course, mean that
it need not be obeyed. And an appeal to the "spirit" of the Federal
Rules is an insufficient basis for ignoring the import of their
text. If the Rules imposed an absolute deadline for the submission
of evidentiary materials, the District Court could not be faulted
for strictly enforcing that deadline, even though the result in a
particular case might be unfortunate. But, as the Court
acknowledges, the Rules expressly permit the District Court to
exercise discretion in deciding whether affidavits in opposition to
a summary judgment motion may be submitted after the hearing.
[ Footnote 2/7 ] Once the District
Court's power to accept untimely affidavits is recognized,
the question whether that power should be exercised in a particular
instance must be answered by reference to the explanation for the
litigant's omission and the purposes the Rules are designed to
serve. In my view, NWF showed adequate cause for its failure to
file the supplemental affidavits prior to the hearing. Moreover,
the organization's untimely filing in no way disserved the purposes
of Rule 56(c), and the federal parties suffered no prejudice as a
consequence of the Page 497 U. S. 906 delay. Under these circumstances, I believe that the District
Court's refusal to consider these submissions constituted an abuse
of discretion.

															The Federal Rules require that affidavits in opposition to a
motion ordinarily must be served at least one day prior to the
hearing; the Rules provide, however, that the affidavits may be
filed at a later time "where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect." Rule 6(b); see 497
U.S. 871 fn2/7|>n. 7, supra. Prior to the July 22,
1988, hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,
NWF had been assured repeatedly that its prior submissions were
sufficient to establish its standing to sue. In its memorandum
opinion granting the Federation's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the District Court stated: "We continue to find
irreparable injury to plaintiff, and reaffirm plaintiff's standing
to bring this action." National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 280 , 281 (DC 1986).

															Later that year, the federal parties sought additional discovery
on the question of standing. NWF sought to quash discovery, arguing
that

															"[t]he Court should bar any additional discovery on this issue
because (1) it has already found that plaintiff has standing; (2)
plaintiff has already produced affidavits which demonstrate
standing, and therefore any additional discovery would be
unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, burdensome and expensive
within the meaning of Rule 26(c)(1); and (3) contrary to the
government defendants' apparent theory, plaintiff need not
demonstrate injury as to each and every action that is part of the
program."

															Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion To Quash and for a Protective Order 5-6 (July 1, 1986). In
the alternative, NWF argued that, if additional discovery on
standing was to be ordered, it should be confined to the
requirement that a limited number of additional affidavits be
submitted. Id. at 22. The District Court, on July 14,
1986, granted in full the Federation's motion to quash, and
ordered

															"that no further discovery of plaintiff or Page 497 U. S. 907 its members, officers, employees, agents, servants, or attorneys
shall be permitted until subsequent order of this court, if
any."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. 170a-171a. When the District Court's
grant of a preliminary injunction was subjected to appellate
review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Peterson and Erman
affidavits

															"provide a concrete indication that the Federation's members use
specific lands covered by the agency's Program, and will be
adversely affected by the agency's actions." National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 266
U.S.App.D.C. 241, 249, 835 F.2d 305, 313 (1987). [ Footnote 2/8 ] The majority's statement that "a
litigant is never justified in assuming that the court has made up
its mind until the court expresses itself to that effect," ante at 497 U. S. 897 ,
is therefore simply irrelevant to the present case: the District
Court and the Court of Appeals repeatedly had indicated that the
Federation had offered sufficient evidence of its standing.

															Nor did the District Court's order of June 27, 1988, scheduling
a motion hearing for the following July 22, place NWF on notice
that its claim of standing might be reconsidered. That order made
clear that the hearing would consider the summary judgment motions
of both the federal parties and Page 497 U. S. 908 the Federation. The principal submission of the federal parties
relevant to the hearing was the Defendants' Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in
support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and/or for
Dissolution of the Preliminary Injunction Issued on February 10,
1986; that memorandum was filed on September 12, 1986. This 86-page
memorandum included only 9 1/2 pages devoted to standing, and half
of that discussion set forth the federal parties claim that no
broad programmatic challenge could succeed even if the Peterson and
Erman affidavits adequately alleged injury from Government
decisions as to particular tracts of land. Moreover, even the
attack on the Peterson and Erman affidavits did not purport to show
that summary judgment for the federal parties should be entered on
the ground that the Federation lacked standing. Rather, the federal
parties argued principally that summary judgment for NWF
would be inappropriate, because a genuine factual dispute existed
as to the Federation's standing to sue. See Defendants'
Memorandum, at 45-47. In fact, the 86-page memorandum included only two sentences arguing that the federal parties should be
awarded summary judgment on standing grounds. Id. at
11-12, 8. The District Court's decision to schedule a hearing on
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment provided no hint
that previous assurances concerning standing were open to
reconsideration. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Certainly the Federation could have submitted
additional evidentiary materials in support of its claim of
standing, even though it had no reason to believe that further
submissions were necessary. But it would hardly enhance the
efficiency Page 497 U. S. 909 of the adjudicative process to encourage litigants to reargue
questions previously settled in their favor. In my view, NWF
established sufficient cause for its failure to submit the
supplemental affidavits prior to the hearing. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Page 497 U. S. 910 Moreover, the District Court's refusal to consider the
additional submissions in this case did not significantly advance
the interests that Rule 56(c) is designed to serve. The Rule
requires that affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must be served "prior to the day of hearing." The Courts
of Appeals consistently have recognized, however, that

															"Rule 56 does not necessarily contemplate an oral hearing.
Rather, 10-day advance notice to the adverse party that the motion
and all materials in support of or in opposition to the motion will
be taken under advisement by the trial court as of a certain day
satisfies the notice and hearing Page 497 U. S. 911 dictates of Rule 56." Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d 516, 519 (CA11 1983).
[ Footnote 2/11 ] Rule 56(c)'s
requirement that a summary judgment motion be filed 10 days in
advance of a scheduled hearing serves to ensure that the nonmoving
party is afforded adequate notice of the motion. Similarly, the
requirement that opposing affidavits be submitted prior to the day
of the hearing reflects the fact that the district court may rule
on the summary judgment motion at the hearing or at any time
thereafter; submission of affidavits prior to that day is thus
essential if the moving party is to be assured the opportunity to
respond at a time when a response is meaningful. The requirement
also allows the district court to establish a deadline by which
time all evidence and arguments must be submitted; thereafter, the
court may deliberate with the assurance that no subsequent filings
will alter the terms of the dispute.

															These are pressing concerns when the hearing on a summary
judgment motion represents the parties' last opportunity to set
forth their legal arguments. In the present case, however, the
District Court concluded the July 22, 1988, hearing by requesting
supplemental briefing on the issue of standing. [ Footnote 2/12 ] NWF's supplemental affidavits,
filed on August 22 as an attachment to its legal memorandum, were
submitted at a time when the federal parties had ample opportunity
to respond. (Indeed, the opportunity to respond here -- 10 days --
was far greater than would have been the case if NWF had filed
(timely) affidavits the day before the hearing and no Page 497 U. S. 912 supplemental briefing had been allowed.) The affidavits,
moreover, were filed well before the time when the case was to be
taken under advisement. The record in this case is voluminous,
currently filling six large boxes; consideration of five more
affidavits would not have added significantly to the complexity of
the issues before the District Court. Under these circumstances,
submission of the supplemental affidavits neither disserved the
purposes of the Rule nor prejudiced the federal parties in any
respect.

															The District Court discussed none of these factors in explaining
its refusal to consider the supplemental affidavits. Indeed, the
District Court offered no justification at all for its action
beyond the assertion that the affidavits were untimely. [ Footnote 2/13 ] Similarly, the Court today
fails to assess the District Court's action by reference to the
excuse for NWF's untimely filing or the absence of prejudice to the
federal parties. The District Court and today's majority fail to
recognize the guiding principle of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the principle that procedural rules should be construed
pragmatically, so as to ensure the just and efficient resolution of
legal disputes. Some provisions of the Rules strip the District
Courts of discretion, and the courts have no choice but to enforce
these requirements with scrupulous precision. [ Footnote 2/14 ] But where the Rules expressly
confer a range of Page 497 U. S. 913 discretion, a district court may abuse its authority by refusing
to take account of equitable concerns, even where its action
violates no express command. In my view, such an abuse of
discretion occurred here. III In Part IV-A, ante at 497 U. S.
890 -894, the majority sets forth a long and abstract
discussion of the scope of relief that might have been awarded had
the Federation made a sufficient showing of injury from
environmental damage to a particular tract of land. Since the
majority concludes in other portions of its opinion that the
Federation lacks standing to challenge any of the land use
decisions at issue here, it is not clear to me why the Court
engages in the hypothetical inquiry contained in Part IV-A. In any
event, I agree with much of the Court's discussion, at least in its
general outline. The Administrative Procedure Act permits suit to
be brought by any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action." 5 U.S.C. § 702. In some cases the "agency action" will
consist of a rule of broad applicability; and if the plaintiff
prevails, the result is that the rule is invalidated, not simply
that the court forbids its application to a particular individual.
Under these circumstances, a single plaintiff, so long as he is
injured by the rule, may obtain "programmatic" relief that affects
the rights of parties not before the court. On the other hand, if a
generally lawful policy is applied in an illegal manner on a
particular occasion, one who is injured is not thereby entitled to
challenge other applications of the rule.

															Application of these principles to the instant case does not
turn on whether, or how often, the Bureau's land-management
policies have been described as a "program." [ Footnote 2/15 ] In one sense, Page 497 U. S. 914 of course, there is no question that a "program" exists.
Everyone associated with this lawsuit recognizes that the BLM, over
the past decade, has attempted to develop and implement a
comprehensive scheme for the termination of classifications and
withdrawals. The real issue is whether the actions and omissions
that NWF contends are illegal are themselves part of a plan or
policy. For example: if the agency had published a regulation
stating that an environmental impact statement (EIS) should never
be developed prior to the termination of a classification or
withdrawal, NWF could challenge the regulation (which would
constitute an "agency action"). If the reviewing court then held
that the statute required a pretermination EIS, the relief
(invalidation of the rule) would directly affect tracts other than
the ones used by individual affiants. At the other extreme, if the
applicable BLM regulation stated that an EIS must be developed, and
NWF alleged that the administrator in charge of South Pass/Green
Mountain had inexplicably failed to develop one, NWF should not be
allowed (on the basis of the Peterson affidavit) to challenge a
termination in Florida on the ground that an administrator there
made the same mistake.

															The majority, quoting the District Court, characterizes the
Bureau's land management program as " 1250 or so individual
classification terminations and withdrawal revocations.'" Ante at 497 U. S. 890 ; see National Wildlife Federation v.
Burford, 699 F.
Supp. 327 , 332 (DC 1988). The majority offers no argument in
support of this conclusory assertion, and I am far from certain
that the characterization is an accurate one. Since this issue
bears on the scope of the relief ultimately to be awarded should
the plaintiff prevail, rather than on the jurisdiction Page 497 U. S. 915 of the District Court to entertain the suit, I would allow the
District Court to address the question on remand. [ Footnote 2/16 ] IV Since I conclude that the Peterson and Erman affidavits provided
sufficient evidence of NWF's standing to withstand a motion for
summary judgment, and that the District Court abused its discretion
by refusing to consider the Federation's supplemental affidavits, I
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I respectfully
dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Prior to the District Court's entry of the preliminary
injunction, 406 mining claims had been staked in the South
Pass-Green Mountain area alone. App. 119. An exhibit filed by the
federal parties indicated that over 7,200 claims had been filed in
12 Western States. Exh. 1 to Affidavit of Joseph Martyak (Apr. 1 1,
1986) .

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															A Bureau of Land Management (BLM) draft of a Resource Management
Plan/Environmental Impact Statement for the Lander, Wyo., Resource
Area stated:

															"In the Green Mountain Management Unit . . . significant
long-term impacts to elk and mule deer herds could occur from
habitat losses caused by oil and gas activities over the next 60
years. . . . In the South Pass Management Unit, significant
acreages of lodgepole pine forest and aspen conifer woodland
habitat types could be disturbed, which would cause significant
long-term impacts to moose and elk. . . . If gold mining activities
continued to erode these high-value habitats, trout fisheries, the
Lander moose herd, the beaver pond ecosystems, and the populations
of many other wildlife species would suffer significant cumulative
negative effects."

															Draft RMP/EIS, pp. 226-228 (Exh. 3 to Defendant-Intervenors'
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Stay
Pending Appeal (May 14, 1986)).

															A BLM Mineral Report issued June 17, 1982, concluded that mining
and associated activities

															"could have an adverse impact on crucial moose habitat, deer
habitat, some elk habitat, and a variety of small game and bird
species. Improvements at campgrounds, as well as land in the
immediate vicinity, could either be damaged or destroyed. These
activities could make it difficult for the BLM to manage the forest
production and harvesting in the South Pass area. Historical and
cultural resources which have and have not been identified could be
either damaged or destroyed."

															Defendant-Intervenors' Exh. 7 (attached as Appendix 1 to
Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Statement of Points and
Authorities in Support of Its Standing To Proceed (Aug. 22,
1988)).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See, e.g., May v. Department of Air Force, 777 F.2d
1012, 1016 (CA5 1985); First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (CA7 1985); Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 (CA3 1985); Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216
(CA5 1985).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See, e.g., App. 123-139 (Declaration of Jack Kelly).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The areas harmed or threatened by mining and associated
activities may extend well beyond the precise location where mining
occurs. See 497
U.S. 871 fn2/2|>n. 2, supra. [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Five supplemental affidavits were filed. The first was submitted
by Peggy Kay Peterson, in clarification of her earlier affidavit:
"A substantial portion of the lands which I use . . . are identical
to those lands" newly opened to mining in the South Pass-Green
Mountain area. Peterson Supplemental Affidavit, App. in No. 88-5397
(CADC), p. 356. Ms. Peterson also asserted that

															"U.S. Energy Corporation has filed a mine permit application
with the Bureau and Department (U.S. Energy Application, TFN 2
4/86), which includes a proposal to mine a significant portion of
the federal lands which I use for recreational purposes and
aesthetic enjoyment." Id. at 355-356. The other affiants were NWF members
David Doran, Merlin McColm, Stephen Blomeke, and Will Ouellette.
These individuals identified termination orders that had opened to
mining particular tracts of land used by the affiants for
recreation and aesthetic enjoyment.

															The federal parties do not concede that the supplemental
affidavits established with certainty the Federation's standing;
they contend that further discovery might show the affiants'
allegations to be untrue. The federal parties do concede, however,
that the supplemental affidavits were not facially deficient. Tr.
of Oral Arg.19.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Rule 56(c) provides that, when a motion for summary judgment is
filed, the "adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits." Under Rule 56(e), the district court "may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits." Rule 6(d)
states:

															"When a motion is supported by affidavit, . . . opposing
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before the hearing,
unless the court permits them to be served at some other time."

															The district court's authority to permit service "at some other
time" is governed in turn by Rule 6(b), which provides that, when
an act is required to be performed by a specified time, the
district court may,

															"Upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect." See 4A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1165, p. 475 (2d ed.1987) (Rule 6(b) "gives the court
extensive flexibility to modify the fixed time periods found
throughout the rules, whether the enlargement is sought before or
after the actual termination of the allotted time").

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The Court of Appeals' discussion of standing occurred in the
context of a motion to dismiss and therefore, by itself, might not
assure NWF that it had made a sufficient showing to withstand a
motion for summary judgment. But the Court of Appeals, like the
District Court before it, also held that the Federation's showing
of injury, as reflected in the Peterson and Erman affidavits,
provided an adequate basis for a preliminary injunction. As the
second Court of Appeals panel concluded,

															"the burden of establishing irreparable harm to support a
request for a preliminary injunction is, if anything, at least as
great as the burden of resisting a summary judgment motion on the
ground that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate 'injury-in-fact.'" National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 278
U.S.App.D.C. 320, 330, 878 F.2d 422, 432 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
When the first panel affirmed the District Court's entry of a
preliminary injunction, Judge Williams' separate opinion,
concurring and dissenting, stated that

															"the specificity required for standing allegations to secure a
preliminary injunction will normally be no less than that required
on a motion for summary judgment."

															266 U.S.App.D.C. at 264, 835 F.2d at 328.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															At the hearing itself, Fred R. Disheroon, the federal parties'
attorney, argued at length on other points before turning to the
issue of standing. He began that portion of his argument by
observing that

															"perhaps the court doesn't want to hear me argue standing, but I
think it is imperative that I address that in the context of this
case."

															Tr. of Motions Hearing 13 (July 2, 1988).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															The supplemental affidavits were submitted as an attachment to
the supplemental legal memorandum on standing requested by the
District Court. At the time of their submission, NWF stated only
that

															"NWF now has submitted declarations on behalf of other members
of NWF who have been injured by the challenged actions of federal
defendants."

															Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Statement of Points and
Authorities in Support of Its Standing To Proceed 18, n. 21 (Aug.
22, 1988). However, in its reply memorandum on the issue, NWF
addressed the contention of the federal parties and the
defendant-intervenor that the affidavits should be ignored as
untimely filed. NWF stated that

															"plaintiff heretofore, has relied on the court's previous
rulings on NWF's standing. In its motion for a protective order
against additional discovery, NWF argued that its standing had
already been proven on the basis of the affidavits of Mr.
Greenwalt, Ms. Peterson, and Mr. Erman. The court agreed, and
entered the requested protective order. If the court intends to
reverse its prior ruling, then NWF respectfully requests that it
should be given adequate opportunity to supplement the record."

															Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Its Standing To Proceed 17, n. 16 (Sept. 14, 1988). The
Federation also noted that Circuit precedent permitted the filing
of supplemental affidavits on standing issues, even on appeal. Ibid., citing National Wildlife Federation v.
Hodel, 268 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 24, 839 F.2d 694, 703 (1988). NWF
offered the further explanation that

															"Ms. Peterson has supplemented her affidavit to include new
information regarding a mine application which has been filed by
U.S. Energy Corporation that includes a proposal to mine lands
within the area of South Pass/Green Mountain previously closed to
mining. For the record, NWF initially was told by officials of the
Bureau of Land Management that the U.S. Energy mine application did
not include any lands covered by the court's preliminary
injunction. Otherwise, NWF would have supplemented Ms. Peterson's
affidavit earlier."

															Reply Memorandum, at 12-13, n. 13.

															Along with its Reply Memorandum, NWF submitted an additional
filing entitled Plaintiff National Wildlife Federation's Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors' Motion To Strike
Plaintiff's Supplementation of the Record (Sept. 14, 1988). That
filing stated:

															"For the reasons stated in [the reply memorandum] at page 17, n.
16, plaintiff requests that defendant-intervenors' motion to strike
be denied."

															(In light of this separate submission, addressed solely to the
question whether the supplemental affidavits should be considered,
and expressly referring to n. 16 of the reply memorandum, it is
difficult to fathom the Court's assertion that NWF's request was
"buried" in the Federation's filings. See ante at 497 U. S.
896 -897, n. 5.) This separate filing, in conjunction
with the reply memorandum, satisfied Rule 6(b)'s requirement that
the request for enlargement of time be made "upon motion." Though
neither of these filings was expressly denominated a "motion," they
met the requirements of Rule 7(b): they were submitted in writing,
were signed by counsel, "state[d] with particularity the grounds
therefor," and unambiguously "set forth the relief . . . sought." See Campos v. LeFevre, 825 F.2d 671, 676 (CA2 1987) ("[N]o
particular form of words is necessary to render a filing a motion.' Any submission signed by a party that may fairly be
read as a request to the district court to exercise its
discretionary powers . . . should suffice"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1014 (1988); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 86 (CA3
1978) ("Rule 7(b) requires no more than that . . . a motion `state
with particularity the grounds' upon which it is based. Plainly, an
affidavit which is filed to obtain an order disqualifying a judge
satisfies the requirements of Rule 7(b). . . . The . . . failure to
type in the word `motion' above the word `affidavit' in no way
detracts from the notice which the affidavit gave of the nature of
the application"). Cf. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 419
(CA7) ("The Federal Rules are to be construed liberally, so that
erroneous nomenclature in a motion does not bind a party at his
peril"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (CA9 1983) ("The
court will construe [a motion], however styled, to be the type
proper for the relief requested"); 2A J. Moore & J. Lucas,
Moore's Federal Practice � 7.05, pp. 7-16 to 7-17 (1989) ("[I]t is
the motion's substance, and not merely its linguistic form, that
determines its nature and legal effect"). [ Footnote 2/11 ] Accord, Allied Chemical Corp. v. Mackay, 695 F.2d 854,
856 (CA5 1983) ("Rule 56(c) does not require an oral hearing in
open court. Rather, it contemplates notice to the party opposing
the motion and an adequate opportunity to respond to the movant's
arguments"); Bratt v. International Business Machines
Corp., 785 F.2d 352, 363 (CA1 1986).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The District Court subsequently established a schedule for the
supplemental briefing. NWF was requested to file its opening
memorandum by August 22, 1988; the Government and intervenors were
to file memoranda in opposition by September 1; and NWF's reply was
due by September 14. Order of July 27, 1988.

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															The District Court mentioned these affidavits in a single
footnote:

															"Plaintiff, in addition to its memorandum filed August 22, 1988,
has submitted additional evidentiary material, including
declarations from four of its members. These submissions are
untimely, and in violation of our Order. We decline to consider
them. See Federal Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff's
Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Its Standing to
Proceed, at 1 n. 1." National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 699 F.
Supp. 327 , 328-329, n. 3 (DC 1988).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															Rule 6(b), for example, which generally gives the district court
broad authority to grant enlargements of time, establishes the
limitation that the court

															"may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b)
and (c)(2), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b), and 74(a), except to
the extent and under the conditions stated in them."

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															The term "withdrawal review program" repeatedly has been used in
BLM documents. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Exhs. 1, 3, 10, 11,
15, 18, 19 (filed July 15, 1985). At oral argument on the
cross-motions for summary judgment, counsel for the federal parties
acknowledged: "It is true, BLM referred to this review process as a
land withdrawal review program." Tr. of Motion Hearing 40 (July 22,
1988). Counsel went on to say, "but I suggest that using a word,
calling it a program, doesn't make a program in the sense that it
is being challenged here." Ibid. That assertion, though
inelegant, seems essentially correct: an agency's terminology is
not decisive in determining whether an alleged illegality is
systemic or site-specific.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															The majority also suggests that the agency actions challenged in
this suit may not be ripe for review. See ante at 497 U. S.
891 -893. Since the issue of ripeness has not been
briefed or argued in this Court, nor passed on by the courts below,
I need not address it. I do note, however, that, at the outset of
this case, the federal parties made precisely the opposite
argument, asserting that a preliminary injunction should be denied
on the ground that NWF's claims were barred by laches. The federal
parties contended:

															"The Federation offers no explanation why, despite its detailed
knowledge of BLM's revocation and termination activities, it has
waited so long to institute litigation."

															Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunction 26 (Aug. 22, 1985).

															I also decline to address the adequacy of the affidavit
submitted by Lynn Greenwalt, since the Court of Appeals did not
pass on that issue.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation case:

The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) filed a lawsuit against the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and other federal parties, alleging violations of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the National Environmental Policy Act in their administration of the BLM's land withdrawal review program. The NWF claimed that the decisions made under this program affected the status of public lands and their availability for private use, such as mining.

The District Court granted the BLM's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the NWF lacked the standing to seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the NWF had standing based on affidavits from its members claiming use of the lands affected by the BLM's decisions.

The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that the NWF did not have standing to challenge all of the BLM's decisions under the APA. The Court found that the NWF must show that it had been affected by "agency action" and that the interests of its members were within the "zone of interests" protected by the statutes in question. The Court also clarified that a general interest in the BLM's compliance with the law was not enough to confer standing.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower courts to determine which, if any, specific decisions by the BLM had caused harm to the interests of the NWF's members, and thus conferred standing for those particular challenges.