U.S. Supreme Court Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908) Londoner v. Denver No. 157 Argued March 6, 9,
1908 Decided June 1, 1908 210
U.S. 373 ERROR TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO Syllabus The legislature of a state may authorize municipal improvements
without any petition of landowners to be assessed therefor, and
proceedings of a municipality in accordance with charter provisions
and without hearings authorizing an improvement do not deny due
process of law to landowners who are afforded a hearing upon the
assessment itself.

															The decision of a state court that a city council properly
determined that the board of public works had acted within its
jurisdiction under the city charter does not involve a federal
question reviewable by this Court.

															Where the state court has construed a state statute so as to
bring it into harmony with the federal and state constitutions,
nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment gives this Court power to
review the decision on the ground that the state court exercised
legislative power in construing the statute in that manner, and
thereby violated that Amendment.

															There are few constitutional restrictions on the power of the
states to assess, apportion, and collect taxes, and in the
enforcement of such restrictions, this Court has regard to
substance, and not form, but where the legislature commits the
determination of the tax to a subordinate body, due process of law
requires that the taxpayer he afforded a hearing of which he must
have notice, and this requirement is not satisfied by the mere
right to file objections, and where, as in Colorado, the taxpayer
has no right to object to an assessment in court, due process of
law a guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment require that he have
the opportunity to support his objections by argument and proof at
some time and place.

															The denial of due process of law by municipal authorities while
acting as a board of equalization amounts to a denial by the
state.

															33 Colo. 104 reversed.

															The facts are stated in the opinion. Page 210 U. S. 374 MR. JUSTICE MOODY delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The plaintiffs in error began this proceeding in a state court
of Colorado to relieve lands owned by them from an assessment of a
tax for the cost of paving a street upon which the lands abutted.
The relief sought was granted by the trial court, but its action
was reversed by the supreme court of the state, which ordered
judgment for the defendants. 33 Colo. 104, 80 P. 117. The case is
here on writ of error. The supreme court held that the tax was
assessed in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the state,
and its decision of that question is conclusive.

															The assignments of error relied upon are as follows:

															"First. The Supreme Court of Colorado erred in holding and
deciding that the portion of proviso 'eighth' of § 3 of article 7
of 'An Act to Revise and Amend the Charter of the City of Denver,
Colorado, Signed and Approved by the Governor of Colorado, April 3,
1893' (commonly called the Denver City Charter of 1893), which
provided,"

															"And the finding of the city council by ordinance that any
improvements provided for in this article were duly ordered after
notice duly given, or that a petition or remonstrance was or was
not filed as above provided, or was or was not subscribed by the
required number of owners aforesaid, shall be conclusive in every
court or other tribunal,"

															"as construed by the Supreme Court of Colorado, was valid and
conclusive as against these appellees. The validity of so much of
said section as is above quoted was drawn in question and denied by
appellees in said cause on the ground of its being repugnant to the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and in contravention
thereof."

															"Second. The Supreme Court of Colorado further erred in assuming
that said city council ever made a finding by ordinance in
accordance with said proviso 'eighth.'"

															" * * * *" "Fifth. The Supreme Court of Colorado more particularly erred in
holding and deciding that the city authorities, in Page 210 U. S. 375 following the procedure in this Eighth Avenue Paving District,
No. 1, of the City of Denver, Colorado, in the manner in which the
record, evidence, and decree of the trial court affirmatively shows
that they did, constituted due process of law as to these several
appellees (now plaintiffs in error) as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."

															"Ninth. The Supreme Court of Colorado erred in upholding
sections 29, 30, and 31, and each thereof, of article 7 of 'An Act
to Revise and Amend the Charter of the City of Denver, Colorado,
Signed and Approved by the Governor of Colorado April 3d 1893'
(commonly called the Denver City Charter of 1893), and not holding
it special legislation and a denial of the equal protection of the
laws and taking of liberty and property of these several plaintiffs
in error without due process of law, in violation of both the state
and federal Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment thereof."

															"Tenth. The Supreme Court of Colorado erred in upholding each of
the several assessments against the corner lots, and particularly
those lots belonging to said Wolfe Londoner and Dennis Sheedy,
because each thereof was assessed for the paving and other
improvements in this district alone for more than the several lots
so assessed were ever actually worth, and far in excess of any
special benefits received from the alleged improvements."

															These assignments will be passed upon in the order in which they
seem to arise in the consideration of the whole case.

															The tax complained of was assessed under the provisions of the
Charter of the City of Denver, which confers upon the city the
power to make local improvements and to assess the cost upon
property specially benefited. It does not seem necessary to set
forth fully the elaborate provisions of the charter regulating the
exercise of this power, except where they call for special
examination. The board of public works, upon the petition of a
majority of the owners of the frontage to be assessed, may order
the paving of a street. The board must, however, first adopt
specifications, mark out a district of assessment, Page 210 U. S. 376 cause a map to be made and an estimate of the cost, with the
approximate amount to be assessed upon each lot of land. Before
action, notice by publication and an opportunity to be heard to any
person interested must be given by the board.

															The board may then order the improvement, but must recommend to
the city council a form of ordinance authorizing it, and
establishing an assessment district, which is not amendable by the
council. The council may then, in its discretion, pass or refuse to
pass the ordinance. If the ordinance is passed, the contract for
the work is made by the mayor. The charter provides that

															"the finding of the city council, by ordinance, that any
improvements provided for in this article were duly ordered after
notice duly given, or that a petition or remonstrance was or was
not filed as above provided, or was or was not subscribed by the
required number of owners aforesaid, shall be conclusive in every
court or other tribunal."

															The charter then provides for the assessment of the cost in the
following sections:

															"SEC. 29. Upon completion of any local improvement, or, in the
case of sewers, upon completion from time to time of any part or
parts thereof, affording complete drainage for any part or parts of
the district, and acceptance thereof by the board of public works,
or whenever the total cost of any such improvement, or of any such
part or parts of any sewer, can be definitely ascertained, the
board of public works shall prepare a statement therein, showing
the whole cost of the improvement, or such parts thereof, including
six percent additional for costs of collection and other
incidentals, and interest to the next succeeding date upon which
general taxes, or the first installment thereof, are, by the laws
of this state, made payable, and apportioning the same upon each
lot or tract of land to be assessed for the same, as hereinabove
provided, and shall cause the same to be certified by the president
and filed in the office of the city clerk."

															"SEC. 30. The city clerk shall thereupon, by advertisement for
ten days in some newspaper of general circulation, published Page 210 U. S. 377 in the City of Denver, notify the owners of the real estate to
be assessed that said improvements have been, or are about to be,
completed and accepted, therein specifying the whole cost of the
improvements and the share so apportioned to each lot or tract of
land, and that any complaints or objections that may be made in
writing, by the owners, to the city council and filed with the city
clerk within thirty days from the first publication of such notice,
will be heard and determined by the city council before the passage
of any ordinance assessing the cost of said improvements."

															"SEC. 31. After the period specified in said notice, the city
council, sitting as a board of equalization, shall hear and
determine all such complaints and objections, and may recommend to
the board of public works any modification of the apportionments
made by said board; the board may thereupon make such modifications
and changes as to them may seem equitable and just, or may confirm
the first apportionment, and shall notify the city council of their
final decision, and the city council shall thereupon by ordinance
assess the cost of said improvements against all the real estate in
said district respectively in the proportions above mentioned."

															It appears from the charter that, in the execution of the power
to make local improvements and assess the cost upon the property
specially benefited, the main steps to be taken by the city
authorities are plainly marked and separated: 1. The board of
public works must transmit to the city council a resolution
ordering the work to be done and the form of an ordinance
authorizing it and creating an assessment district. This it can do
only upon certain conditions, one of which is that there shall
first be filed a petition asking the improvement, signed by the
owners of the majority of the frontage to be assessed. 2. The
passage of that ordinance by the city council, which is given
authority to determine conclusively whether the action of the board
was duly taken. 3. The assessment of the cost upon the landowners
after due notice and opportunity for hearing. Page 210 U. S. 378 In the case before us, the board took the first step by
transmitting to the council the resolution to do the work and the
form of an ordinance authorizing it. It is contended, however, that
there was wanting an essential condition of the jurisdiction of the
board -- namely, such a petition from the owners as the law
requires. The trial court found this contention to be true. But, as
has been seen, the charter gave the city council the authority to
determine conclusively that the improvements were duly ordered by
the board after due notice and a proper petition. In the exercise
of this authority, the city council, in the ordinance directing the
improvement to be made, adjudged, in effect, that a proper petition
had been filed. That ordinance, after reciting a compliance by the
board with the charter in other respects, and that

															"certain petitions for said improvements were first presented to
the said board, subscribed by the owners of a majority of the
frontage to be assessed for said improvements, as by the city
charter required,"

															enacted

															"That, upon consideration of the premises, by city council doth
find that, in their action and proceedings in relation to said
Eighth Avenue Paving District Number 1, the said board of public
works has fully complied with the requirements of the city charter
relating thereto."

															The state supreme court held that the determination of the city
council was conclusive that a proper petition was filed, and that
decision must be accepted by us as the law of the state. The only
question for this Court is whether the charter provision
authorizing such a finding, without notice to the landowners,
denies to them due process of law. We think it does not. The
proceedings, from the beginning up to and including the passage of
the ordinance authorizing the work, did not include any assessment
or necessitate any assessment, although they laid the foundation
for an assessment, which might or might not subsequently be made.
Clearly all this might validly be done without hearing to the
landowners, provided a hearing upon the assessment itself is
afforded. Voigt v. Detroit, 184 U.
S. 115 ; Goodrich v. Detroit, 184 U.
S. 432 . The Page 210 U. S. 379 legislature might have authorized the making of improvements by
the city council without any petition. If it chose to exact a
petition as a security for wise and just action, it could, so far
as the federal Constitution is concerned, accompany that condition
with a provision that the council, with or without notice, should
determine finally whether it had been performed. This disposes of
the first assignment of error, which is overruled. The second
assignment is that the court erred in deciding that the city
council had determined that the board of public works had complied
with the conditions of its jurisdiction to order the work done. It
is enough to say that this is not a federal question.

															We see nothing in the sixth assignment of error. It is
apparently based upon the proposition that, in construing a law of
the state in a manner which the plaintiffs in error think was
clearly erroneous, the supreme court of the state exercised
legislative power, and thereby violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
We are puzzled to find any other answer to this proposition than to
say that it is founded upon a misconception of the opinion of the
court and of the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint
in this assignment is not that the court gave a construction to the
law which brought it into conflict with the federal Constitution,
but that, in construing the law so as to bring it into harmony with
the federal and state constitutions, the court so far neglected its
obvious meaning as to make the judgment an exercise of legislative
power. We know of nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment which gives
us authority to consider a question of this kind. We think it
fitting, however, to say that we see nothing extraordinary in the
method of interpretation followed by the court, or in its results.
Whether we should or not have arrived at the same conclusions is
not of consequence.

															The ninth assignment questions the constitutionality of that
part of the law which authorizes the assessment of benefits. It
seems desirable, for the proper disposition of this and the next
assignment, to state the construction which the supreme Page 210 U. S. 380 court gave to the charter. This may be found in the judgment
under review and two cases decided with it. Denver v.
Kennedy, 33 Colo. 80; Denver v. Dumars, 33 Colo. 94.
From these cases it appears that the lien upon the adjoining land
arises out of the assessment; after the cost of the work and the
provisional apportionment is certified to the city council, the
landowners affected are afforded an opportunity to be heard upon
the validity and amount of the assessment by the council, sitting
as a board of equalization; if any further notice than the notice
to file complaints and objections is required, the city authorities
have the implied power to give it; the hearing must be before the
assessment is made; this hearing, provided for by § 31, is one
where the board of equalization "shall hear the parties complaining
and such testimony as they may offer in support of their complaints
and objections as would be competent and relevant," 33 Colo. 97,
and that the full hearing before the board of equalization excludes
the courts from entertaining any objections which are cognizable by
this board. The statute itself therefore is clear of all
constitutional faults. It remains to see how it was administered in
the case at bar.

															The fifth assignment, though general, vague, and obscure, fairly
raises, we think, the question whether the assessment was made
without notice and opportunity for hearing to those affected by it,
thereby denying to them due process of law. The trial court found
as a fact that no opportunity for hearing was afforded, and the
supreme court did not disturb this finding. The record discloses
what was actually done, and there seems to be no dispute about it.
After the improvement was completed, the board of public works, in
compliance with § 29 of the charter, certified to the city clerk a
statement of the cost, and an apportionment of it to the lots of
land to be assessed. Thereupon, the city clerk, in compliance with
§ 30, published a notice, stating, inter alia, that the
written complaints or objections of the owners, if filed within
thirty days, would be "heard and determined by the city council
before the passage Page 210 U. S. 381 of any ordinance assessing the cost." Those interested therefore
were informed that, if they reduced their complaints and objections
to writing, and filed them within thirty days, those complaints and
objections would be heard, and would be heard before any assessment
was made. The notice given in this case, although following the
words of the statute, did not fix the time for hearing, and
apparently there were no stated sittings of the council acting as a
board of equalization. But the notice purported only to fix the
time for filing the complaints and objections, and to inform those
who should file them that they would be heard before action. The
statute expressly required no other notice, but it was sustained in
the court below on the authority of Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30 ,
because there was an implied power in the city council give notice
of the time for hearing. We think that the court rightly conceived
the meaning of that case, and that the statute could be sustained
only upon the theory drawn from it. Resting upon the assurance that
they would be heard, the plaintiffs in error filed within the
thirty days the following paper:

															"Denver, Colorado, January 13, 1900"

															"To the Honorable Board of Public Works and the Honorable Mayor
and City Council of the City of Denver:"

															"The undersigned, by Joshua Grozier, their attorney, do hereby
most earnestly and strenuously protest and object to the passage of
the contemplated or any assessing ordinance against the property in
Eighth Avenue Paving District No. 1, so called, for each of the
following reasons, to-wit:"

															"1st. That said assessment and all and each of the proceedings
leading up to the same were and are illegal, voidable, and void,
and the attempted assessment, if made, will be void and
uncollectible."

															"2nd. That said assessment and the cost of said pretended
improvement should be collected, if at all, as a general tax
against the city at large, and not as a special assessment. " Page 210 U. S. 382 "3d. That property in said city not assessed is benefited by the
said pretended improvement, and certain property assessed is not
benefited by said pretended improvement, and other property
assessed is not benefited by said pretended improvement to the
extent of the assessment; that the individual pieces of property in
said district are not benefited to the extent assessed against them
and each of them respectively; that the assessment is arbitrary,
and property assessed in an equal amount is not benefited equally;
that the boundaries of said pretended district were arbitrarily
created without regard to the benefits or any other method of
assessment known to law; that said assessment is outrageously
large."

															"4th. That each of the laws and each section thereof under which
the proceedings in said pretended district were attempted to be had
do not confer the authority for such proceedings; that the 1893
city charter was not properly passed, and is not a law of the State
of Colorado, by reason of not properly or at all passing the
legislature; that each of the provisions of said charter under
which said proceedings were attempted are unconstitutional and
violative of fundamental principles of law, the Constitution of the
United States, and the state constitution, or some one or more of
the provisions of one or more of the same."

															"5th. Because the pretended notice of assessment is invalid, and
was not published in accordance with the law, and is in fact no
notice at all, because there was and is no valid ordinance creating
said district, because each notice required by the 1893 city
charter to be given, where it was attempted to give such notice,
was insufficient, and was not properly given or properly
published."

															"6th. Because of noncompliance by the contractor with his
contract, and failure to complete the work in accordance with the
contract; because the contract for said work was let without right
or authority; because said pretended district is incomplete and the
work under said contract has not been completed in accordance with
said contract; because items too Page 210 U. S. 383 numerous to mention, which were not a proper charge in the said
assessment, are included therein."

															"7th. Because the work was done under pretended grants of
authority contained in pretended laws, which laws were violative of
the Constitution and fundamental laws of the state and Union."

															"8th. Because the city had no jurisdiction in the premises. No
petition subscribed by the owners of a majority of the frontage in
the district to be assessed for said improvements was ever obtained
or presented."

															"9th. Because of delay by the board of public works in
attempting to let the contract, and because the said pretended
improvement was never properly nor sufficiently petitioned for;
because the contracts were not let nor the work done in accordance
with the petitions, if any, for the work, and because the city had
no jurisdiction in the premises."

															"10th. Because, before ordering the pretended improvement, full
details and specifications for the same, permitting and encouraging
competition, and determining the number of installments and time
within which the costs shall be payable, the rate of interest on
unpaid installments, and the district of lands to be assessed,
together with a map showing the approximate amounts to be assessed,
were not adopted by the board of public works before the letting of
the contract for the work and furnishing of material; because
advertisement for 20 days in two daily newspapers of general
circulation, giving notice to the owners of real estate in the
district of the kind of improvements proposed, the number of
installments and time in which payable, rate of interest and extent
of the district, probable cost, and time when a resolution ordering
the improvement would be considered, was not made, either properly
or at all, and, if ever attempted to be made, was not made
according to law or as required by the law or charter."

															"11th. Because the attempted advertisements for bids on the
contract attempted to be let were not properly published, and were
published and let, and the proceedings had, if at all, Page 210 U. S. 384 in such a way as to be prejudicial to the competition of bidders
and to deter bidders, and the completion of the contracts, after
being attempted to be let, was permitted to lag in such a manner as
not to comply with the contract, charter, or laws, and the power to
let the contract attempted to be let was not within the power of
the parties attempting to let the same; because the city council is
or was, by some of the proceedings, deprived of legislative
discretion, and the board of public works and other pretended
bodies given such discretion, which discretion they delegated to
others having no right or power to exercise the same, and executive
functions were conferred on bodies having no right, power, or
authority to exercise the same, and taken away from others to whom
such power was attempted to be granted or given, or who should
properly exercise the same; that judicial power was attempted to be
conferred on the board of public works, so called, and the city
council, and other bodies or pretended bodies not judicial or quasi -judicial in character, having no right, power, or
authority to exercise the same, and the courts attempted to be
deprived thereof."

															"Wherefore, because of the foregoing and numerous other good and
sufficient reasons, the undersigned object and protest against the
passage of the said proposed assessing ordinance."

															This certainly was a complaint against an objection to the
proposed assessment. Instead of affording the plaintiffs in error
an opportunity to be heard upon its allegations, the city council,
without notice to them, met as a board of equalization, not in a
stated, but in a specially called, session and, without any
hearing, adopted the following resolution:

															"Whereas, complaints have been filed by the various persons and
firms as the owners of real estate included within the Eighth
Avenue Paving District No. 1, of the City of Denver, against the
proposed assessments on said property for the cost of said paving,
the names and description of the real estate respectively owned by
such persons being more particularly described in the various
complaints filed with the city clerk; and"

															"Whereas, no complaint or objection has been filed or made Page 210 U. S. 385 against the apportionment of said assessment made by the board
of public works of the City of Denver, but the complaints and
objections filed deny wholly the right of the city to assess any
district or portion of the assessable property of the City of
Denver; therefore, be it"

															"Resolved, by the City Council of the City of Denver, sitting as
a board of equalization, that the apportionments of said assessment
made by said board of public works be, and the same are hereby,
confirmed and approved."

															Subsequently, without further notice or hearing, the city
council enacted the ordinance of assessment whose validity is to be
determined in this case. The facts out of which the question on
this assignment arises may be compressed into small compass. The
first step in the assessment proceedings was by the certificate of
the board of public works of the cost of the improvement and a
preliminary apportionment of it. The last step was the enactment of
the assessment ordinance. From beginning to end of the proceedings,
the landowners, although allowed to formulate and file complaints
and objections, were not afforded an opportunity to be heard upon
them. Upon these facts, was there a denial by the State of the due
process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States?

															In the assessment, apportionment, and collection of taxes upon
property within their jurisdiction, the Constitution of the United
States imposes few restrictions upon the states. In the enforcement
of such restrictions as the Constitution does impose, this Court
has regarded substance, and not form. But where the legislature of
a state, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to some
subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount,
and upon whom it shall be levied, and of making its assessment and
apportionment, due process of law requires that at some stage of
the proceedings, before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the
taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must
have notice, either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing
the time and place Page 210 U. S. 386 of the hearing. Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 ; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U.
S. 321 ; Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v.
Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 , 159 U. S. 537 ; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316 ; Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S. 255 ; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310 ; Security Trust Co. v. Lexington, 203 U.
S. 323 ; Central of Georgia v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 . It
must be remembered that the law of Colorado denies the landowner
the right to object in the courts to the assessment, upon the
ground that the objections are cognizable only by the board of
equalization.

															If it is enough that, under such circumstances, an opportunity
is given to submit in writing all objections to and complaints of
the tax to the board, then there was a hearing afforded in the case
at bar. But we think that something more than that, even in
proceedings for taxation, is required by due process of law. Many
requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be
dispensed with in proceedings of this nature. But even here, a
hearing, in its very essence, demands that he who is entitled to it
shall have the right to support his allegations by argument,
however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal. Pittsburgh &c. Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U.
S. 421 , 154 U. S. 426 ; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.
S. 112 , 164 U. S. 171 et seq. It is apparent that such a hearing was denied to the plaintiffs
in error. The denial was by the city council, which, while acting
as a board of equalization, represents the state. Raymond v.
Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 . The
assessment was therefore void, and the plaintiffs in error were
entitled to a decree discharging their lands from a lien on account
of it. It is not now necessary to consider the tenth assignment of
error. Judgment reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE HOLMES dissent.

Summary: The Supreme Court held that landowners must be given a hearing to contest tax assessments against their property, and this requirement is not met by simply allowing them to submit written objections. Due process demands that landowners have the right to present their case and provide supporting arguments and evidence. In this case, the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the denial of a proper hearing by the city council, acting as a board of equalization, resulted in a void assessment.


U.S. Supreme Court Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965) Cox v. Louisiana No. 24 Argued October 21,
1964 Decided January 18,
1965 379
U.S. 536 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
LOUISIANA Syllabus Appellant was the leader of a civil rights demonstration in
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, of 2,000 Negro students protesting
segregation and the arrest and imprisonment the previous day of
other Negro students who had participated in a protest against
racial segregation. The group assembled a few blocks from the
courthouse, where appellant identified himself to officers as the
group's leader and explained the purpose of the demonstration.
Following his refusal to disband the group, appellant led it in an
orderly march toward the courthouse. In the vicinity of the
courthouse, officers stopped appellant who, after explaining the
purpose and program of the demonstration, was told by the Police
Chief that he could hold the meeting so long as he confined it to
the west side of the street. Appellant directed the group to the
west sidewalk, across the street from the courthouse and 101 feet
from its steps. There, the group, standing five feet deep and
occupying almost the entire block but not obstructing the street,
displayed signs and sang songs which evoked response from the
students in the courthouse jail. Appellant addressed the group. The
Sheriff, construing as inflammatory appellant's concluding
exhortation to the students to "sit in" at uptown lunch counters,
ordered dispersal of the group which, not being directly
forthcoming, was effected by tear gas. Appellant was arrested the
next day and was convicted of peace disturbance, obstructing public
passages, and courthouse picketing. The Louisiana Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, two of which (peace disturbance and
obstructing public passages) are involved in this case; the third
(courthouse picketing) being involved in No. 49, post at 379 U. S. 559 . Held: 1. In arresting and convicting appellant under the circumstances
disclosed by this record, Louisiana deprived him of his rights of
free speech and free assembly in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 ; Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U. S.
44 , followed. Pp. 379 U. S.
544 -551.

															2. The breach of the peace statute is unconstitutionally vague
in its overly broad scope, for Louisiana has defined "breach of the
peace" as "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest,
to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet"; yet one of the very
functions of free speech is to invite dispute. Terminiello
v. Chicago , Page 379 U. S. 537 337 U. S. 1 ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 ,
followed. Pp. 379 U. S.
551 -552.

															3. The practice in Baton Rouge of allowing local officials
unfettered discretion in regulating the use of streets for peaceful
parades and meetings notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in
the statute against obstructing public passages abridged
appellant's freedom of speech and assembly in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 379 U. S.
553 -558.

															(a) The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the obstructing public
passages statute as applying to public assemblies which do not have
the specific purpose of obstructing traffic. P. 379 U. S.
553 .

															(b) A State has the right to impose nondiscriminatory
restrictions on travel on city streets. P. 379 U. S.
554 .

															(c) The rights of free speech and assembly do not mean that
everyone may address a group at any public place at any time. Pp. 379 U. S.
554 -555.

															(d) Communication of ideas by picketing and marching on streets
is not afforded the same kind of protection under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as is pure speech. P. 379 U. S.
555 .

															(e) Although the statute, on its face, precludes all street
assemblies and parades, the Baton Rouge authorities have not so
enforced it, but, in their uncontrolled discretion, have permitted
parades and street meetings. Pp. 379 U. S.
555 -557.

															(f) The lodging of such broad discretion in public officials
sanctions suppression of free expression and facilitates denial of
equal protection. Pp. 379 U. S.
557 -558.

															244 La. 1087, 156 So. 2d
448 , reversed.

															MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Appellant, the Reverend Mr. B. Elton Cox, the leader of a civil
rights demonstration, was arrested and charged Page 379 U. S. 538 with four offenses under Louisiana law -- criminal conspiracy,
disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing
before a courthouse. In a consolidated trial before a judge without
a jury, and on the same set of facts, he was acquitted of criminal
conspiracy, but convicted of the other three offenses. He was
sentenced to serve four months in jail and pay a $200 fine for
disturbing the peace, to serve five months in jail and pay a $500
fine for obstructing public passages, and to serve one year in jail
and pay a $5,000 fine for picketing before a courthouse. The
sentences were cumulative.

															In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme
Court reviewed the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public
passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing"
conviction on appeal. The Louisiana court, in two judgments,
affirmed all three convictions. 244 La. 1087, 156 So. 2d
448 ; 245 La. 303, 158 So. 2d 172. Appellant filed two separate
appeals to this Court from these judgments contending that the
three statutes under which he was convicted were unconstitutional
on their face and as applied. We noted probable jurisdiction of
both appeals, 377 U.S. 921. This case, No. 24, involves the
convictions for disturbing the peace and obstructing public
passages, and No. 49 concerns the conviction for picketing before a
courthouse. I THE FACTS On December 14, 1961, 23 students from Southern University, a
Negro college, were arrested in downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
for picketing stores that maintained segregated lunch counters.
This picketing, urging a boycott of those stores, was part of a
general protest movement against racial segregation, directed by
the local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality, a civil
rights Page 379 U. S. 539 organization. The appellant, an ordained Congregational
minister, the Reverend Mr. B. Elton Cox, a Field Secretary of CORE,
was an advisor to this movement. On the evening of December 14,
appellant and Ronnie Moore, student president of the local CORE
chapter, spoke at a mass meeting at the college. The students
resolved to demonstrate the next day in front of the courthouse in
protest of segregation and the arrest and imprisonment of the
picketers who were being held in the parish jail located on the
upper floor of the courthouse building.

															The next morning, about 2,000 students left the campus, which
was located approximately five miles from downtown Baton Rouge.
Most of them had to walk into the city, since the drivers of their
busses were arrested. Moore was also arrested at the entrance to
the campus while parked in a car equipped with a loudspeaker, and
charged with violation of an anti-noise statute. Because Moore was
immediately taken off to jail and the vice-president of the CORE
chapter was already in jail for picketing, Cox felt it his duty to
take over the demonstration and see that it was carried out as
planned. He quickly drove to the city "to pick up this leadership
and keep things orderly."

															When Cox arrived, 1,500 of the 2,000 students were assembling at
the site of the old State Capitol building, two and one-half blocks
from the courthouse. Cox walked up and down cautioning the students
to keep to one side of the sidewalk while getting ready for their
march to the courthouse. The students circled the block in a file
two or three abreast occupying about half of the sidewalk. The
police had learned of the proposed demonstration the night before
from news media and other sources. Captain Font of the City Police
Department and Chief Kling of the Sheriff's office, two
high-ranking subordinate officials, approached the group and spoke
to Cox at the northeast corner of the capitol Page 379 U. S. 540 grounds. Cox identified himself as the group's leader, and,
according to Font and Kling, he explained that the students were
demonstrating to protest "the illegal arrest of some of their
people who were being held in jail." The version of Cox and his
witnesses throughout was that they came not "to protest just the
arrest, but . . . [also] to protest the evil of discrimination."
Kling asked Cox to disband the group and "take them back from
whence they came." Cox did not acquiesce in this request, but told
the officers that they would march by the courthouse, say prayers,
sing hymns, and conduct a peaceful program of protest. The officer
repeated his request to disband, and Cox again refused. Kling and
Font then returned to their car in order to report by radio to the
Sheriff and Chief of Police, who were in the immediate vicinity;
while this was going on, the students, led by Cox, began their walk
toward the courthouse.

															They walked in an orderly and peaceful file, two or three
abreast, one block east, stopping on the way for a red traffic
light. In the center of this block, they were joined by another
group of students. The augmented group, now totaling about 2,000,
[ Footnote 1 ] turned the corner
and proceeded south, coming to a halt in the next block opposite
the courthouse.

															As Cox, still at the head of the group, approached the vicinity
of the courthouse, he was stopped by Captain Font and Inspector
Trigg and brought to Police Chief Wingate White, who was standing
in the middle of St. Louis Street. The Chief then inquired as to
the purpose of the demonstration. Cox, reading from a prepared
paper, outlined his program to White, stating that it would include
a singing of the Star Spangled Banner Page 379 U. S. 541 and a "freedom song," recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the
Pledge of Allegiance, and a short speech. White testified that he
told Cox that "he must confine" the demonstration "to the west side
of the street." White added,

															"This, of course, was not -- I didn't mean it in the import that
I was giving him any permission to do it, but I was presented with
a situation that was accomplished, and I had to make a
decision."

															Cox testified that the officials agreed to permit the meeting.
James Erwin, news director of radio station WIBR, a witness for the
State, was present and overheard the conversation. He testified
that

															"My understanding was that they would be allowed to demonstrate
if they stayed on the west side of the street and stayed within the
recognized time, [ Footnote
2 ]"

															and that this was "agreed to" by White. [ Footnote 3 ]

															The students were then directed by Cox to the west sidewalk,
across the street from the courthouse, 101 feet from its steps.
They were lined up on this sidewalk about five deep and spread
almost the entire length of the block. The group did not obstruct
the street. It was close to noon and, being lunch time, a small
crowd of 100 to 300 curious white people, mostly courthouse
personnel, gathered on the east sidewalk and courthouse steps,
about 100 feet from the demonstrators. Seventy-five to eighty
policemen, including city and state patrolmen and members of the
Sheriff's staff, as well as members of the fire department and a
fire truck were stationed in the street between the two groups.
Rain fell throughout the demonstration Page 379 U. S. 542 Several of the students took from beneath their coats picket
signs similar to those which had been used the day before. These
signs bore legends such as "Don't buy discrimination for
Christmas," "Sacrifice for Christ, don't buy," and named stores
which were proclaimed "unfair." They then sang "God Bless America,"
pledged allegiance to the flag, prayed briefly, and sang one or two
hymns, including "We Shall Overcome." The 23 students, who were
locked in jail cells in the courthouse building out of the sight of
the demonstrators, responded by themselves singing; this in turn
was greeted with cheers and applause by the demonstrators.
Appellant gave a speech, described by a State's witness as
follows:

															"He said that, in effect, that it was a protest against the
illegal arrest of some of their members, and that other people were
allowed to picket . . . and he said that they were not going to
commit any violence, [ Footnote
4 ] that, if anyone spit on them, they would not spit back on
the person that did it. [ Footnote
5 ]"

															Cox then said:

															"All right. It's lunch time. Let's go eat. There are twelve
stores we are protesting. A number of these stores have twenty
counters; they accept your money from nineteen. They won't accept
it from the Page 379 U. S. 543 twentieth counter. This is an act of racial discrimination.
These stores are open to the public. You are members of the public.
We pay taxes to the Federal Government, and you who live here pay
taxes to the State. [ Footnote
6 ]"

															In apparent reaction to these last remarks, there was what state
witnesses described as "muttering" and "grumbling" by the white
onlookers. [ Footnote 7 ]

															The Sheriff, deeming, as he testified, Cox's appeal to the
students to sit in at the lunch counters to be "inflammatory," then
took a power microphone and said,

															"Now, you have been allowed to demonstrate. Up until now, your
demonstration has been more or less peaceful, but what you are
doing now is a direct violation of the law, a disturbance of the
peace, and it has got to be broken up immediately."

															The testimony as to what then happened is disputed. Some of the
State's witnesses testified that Cox said, "don't move"; others
stated that he made a "gesture of defiance." It is clear from the
record, however, that Cox and the demonstrators did not then and
there break up the demonstration. Two of the Sheriff's deputies
immediately started across the street and told the group, "You have
heard what the Sheriff said, now, do what he said." A state witness
testified that they Page 379 U. S. 544 put their hands on the shoulders of some of the students "as
though to shove them away."

															Almost immediately thereafter -- within a time estimated
variously at two to five minutes -- one of the policemen exploded a
tear gas shell at the crowd. This was followed by several other
shells. The demonstrators quickly dispersed, running back towards
the State Capitol and the downtown area; Cox tried to calm them as
they ran and was himself one of the last to leave.

															No Negroes participating in the demonstration were arrested on
that day. The only person then arrested was a young white man, not
a part of the demonstration, who was arrested "because he was
causing a disturbance." The next day, appellant was arrested and
charged with the four offenses above described. II THE BREACH OF THE PEACE CONVICTION Appellant was convicted of violating a Louisiana "disturbing the
peace" statute, which provides:

															"Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of the peace may be occasioned
thereby . . . crowds or congregates with others . . . in or upon .
. . a public street or public highway, or upon a public sidewalk,
or any other public place or building . . . and who fails or
refuses to disperse and move on . . . when ordered so to do by any
law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in which
such act or acts are committed, or by any law enforcement officer
of the state of Louisiana, or any other authorized person . . .
shall be guilty of disturbing the peace."

															La.Rev.Stat. § 14:103.1 (Cum.Supp. 1962). It is clear to us
that, on the facts of this case, which are strikingly similar to
those present in Edwards v.
South Page 379 U. S. 545 Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 , and Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U. S.
44 , Louisiana infringed appellant's rights of free
speech and free assembly by convicting him under this statute. As
in Edwards, we do not find it necessary to pass upon
appellant's contention that there was a complete absence of
evidence so that his conviction deprived him of liberty without due
process of law. Cf. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.
S. 199 . We hold that Louisiana may not constitutionally
punish appellant under this statute for engaging in the type of
conduct which this record reveals, and also that the statute as
authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court is
unconstitutionally broad in scope.

															The Louisiana courts have held that appellant's conduct
constituted a breach of the peace under state law, and, as in Edwards, "we may accept their decision as binding upon us
to that extent," Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 372 U. S. 235 ;
but our independent examination of the record, which we are
required to make, [ Footnote 8 ]
shows no conduct which the State had a right to prohibit as a
breach of the peace.

															Appellant led a group of young college students who wished "to
protest segregation" and discrimination against Negroes and the
arrest of 23 fellow students. They assembled peaceably at the State
Capitol building Page 379 U. S. 546 and marched to the courthouse where they sang, prayed and
listened to a speech. A reading of the record reveals agreement on
the part of the State's witnesses that Cox had the demonstration
"very well controlled," and, until the end of Cox's speech, the
group was perfectly "orderly." Sheriff Clemmons testified that the
crowd's activities were not "objectionable" before that time. They
became objectionable, according to the Sheriff himself, when Cox,
concluding his speech, urged the students to go uptown and sit in
at lunch counters. The Sheriff testified that the sole aspect of
the program to which he objected was

															"[t]he inflammatory manner in which he [Cox] addressed that
crowd and told them to go on up town, go to four places on the
protest list, sit down and if they don't feed you, sit there for
one hour."

															Yet this part of Cox's speech obviously did not deprive the
demonstration of its protected character under the Constitution as
free speech and assembly. See Edwards v. South Carolina, supra;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 ; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 , 368 U. S. 185 (concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN). The State argues,
however, that, while the demonstrators started out to be orderly,
the loud cheering and clapping by the students in response to the
singing from the jail converted the peaceful assembly into a
riotous one. [ Footnote 9 ] The
record, however, does not support this assertion. It is true that
the students, in response to the singing Page 379 U. S. 547 of their fellows who were in custody, cheered and applauded.
However, the meeting was an out-door meeting, and a key state
witness testified that, while the singing was loud, it was not
disorderly. There is, moreover, no indication that the mood of the
students was ever hostile, aggressive, or unfriendly. Our
conclusion that the entire meeting, from the beginning until its
dispersal by tear gas was, orderly [ Footnote 10 ] and not riotous is confirmed by a film of
the events taken by a television news photographer, which was
offered in evidence as a state exhibit. We have viewed the film,
and it reveals that the students, though they undoubtedly cheered
and clapped, were well behaved throughout. My Brother BLACK,
concurring in this opinion and dissenting in No. 49, post, agrees "that Page 379 U. S. 548 the record does not show boisterous or violent conduct or
indecent language on the part of the . . ." students. Post at 379 U. S. 583 .
The singing and cheering do not seem to us to differ significantly
from the constitutionally protected activity of the demonstrators
in Edwards, [ Footnote
11 ] who loudly sang "while stamping their feet and clapping
their hands." Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 372 U. S. 233 .
[ Footnote 12 ] Page 379 U. S. 549 Our conclusion that the record does not support the contention
that the students' cheering, clapping and singing constituted a
breach of the peace is confirmed by the fact that these were not
relied on as a basis for conviction by the trial judge, who,
rather, stated as his reason for convicting Cox of disturbing the
peace that

															"[i]t must be Page 379 U. S. 550 recognized to be inherently dangerous and a breach of the peace
to bring 1,500 people, colored people, down in the predominantly
white business district in the City of Baton Rouge and congregate
across the street from the courthouse and sing songs as described
to me by the defendant as the CORE national anthem carrying lines
such as 'black and white together' and to urge those 1,500 people
to descend upon our lunch counters and sit there until they are
served. That has to be an inherent breach of the peace, and our
statute 14:103.1 has made it so."

															Finally, the State contends that the conviction should be
sustained because of fear expressed by some of the state witnesses
that "violence was about to erupt" because of the demonstration. It
is virtually undisputed, however, that the students themselves were
not violent, and threatened no violence. The fear of violence seems
to have been based upon the reaction of the group of white citizens
looking on from across the street. One state witness testified that
"he felt the situation was getting out of hand" as, on the
courthouse side of St. Louis Street, "were small knots or groups of
white citizens who were muttering words, who seemed a little bit
agitated." A police officer stated that the reaction of the white
crowd was not violent, but "was rumblings." Others felt the
atmosphere became "tense" because of "mutterings," "grumbling," and
"jeering" from the white group. There is no indication, however,
that any member of the white group threatened violence. And this
small crowd, estimated at between 100 and 300, was separated from
the students by "seventy-five to eighty" armed policemen, including
"every available shift of the City Police," the "Sheriff's Office
in full complement," and "additional help from the State Police,"
along with a "fire truck and the Fire Department." As Inspector
Trigg testified, they could have handled the crowd Page 379 U. S. 551 This situation, like that in Edwards, is "a far cry
from the situation in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.
S. 315 ." See Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 372 U. S. 236 .
Nor is there any evidence here of "fighting words." See
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 .
Here again, as in Edwards, this evidence

															"showed no more than that the opinions which . . . [the
students] were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to
the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and
necessitate police protection." Edwards v. South Carolina, supra, at 372 U. S. 237 .
Conceding this was so, the "compelling answer . . . is that
constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility
to their assertion or exercise." Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 , 373 U. S.
535 .

															There is an additional reason why this conviction cannot be
sustained. The statute at issue in this case, as authoritatively
interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is unconstitutionally
vague in its overly broad scope. The statutory crime consists of
two elements: (1) congregating with others "with intent to provoke
a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of
the peace may be occasioned," and (2) a refusal to move on after
having been ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer. While
the second part of this offense is narrow and specific, the first
element is not. The Louisiana Supreme Court in this case defined
the term "breach of the peace" as "to agitate, to arouse from a
state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet."
244 La. at 1105, 156 So. 2d at 455. In Edwards, defendants
had been convicted of a common law crime similarly defined by the
South Carolina Supreme Court. Both definitions would allow persons
to be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views.
Yet, a

															"function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with Page 379 U. S. 552 conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is
often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions, and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech . . . is .
. . protected against censorship or punishment. . . . There is no
room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by
legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S.
1 , 337 U. S. 5 . In Terminiello, convictions were not allowed to stand,
because the trial judge charged that speech of the defendants could
be punished as a breach of the peace

															"'if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests
the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing
alarm.'" Id. at 337 U. S. 3 . The
Louisiana statute, as interpreted by the Louisiana court, is at
least as likely to allow conviction for innocent speech as was the
charge of the trial judge in Terminiello. Therefore, as in Terminiello and Edwards, the conviction under
this statute must be reversed, as the statute is unconstitutional
in that it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are
constitutionally protected free speech and assembly. Maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenet of
our constitutional democracy. As Chief Justice Hughes stated in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 , 283 U. S.
369 :

															"A statute which, upon its face and as authoritatively
construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment
of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of
liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."

															For all these reasons, we hold that appellant's freedoms of
speech and assembly, secured to him by the First Amendment, as
applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, were denied by
his conviction for disturbing the peace. The conviction on this
charge cannot stand Page 379 U. S. 553 III THE OBSTRUCTING PUBLIC PASSAGES CONVICTION We now turn to the issue of the validity of appellant's
conviction for violating the Louisiana statute, La.Rev.Stat. §
14:100.1 (Cum.Supp. 1962), which provides:

															" Obstructing Public Passages " "No person shall willfully obstruct the free, convenient and
normal use of any public sidewalk, street, highway, bridge, alley,
road, or other passageway, or the entrance, corridor or passage of
any public building, structure, watercraft or ferry, by impeding,
hindering, stifling, retarding or restraining traffic or passage
thereon or therein."

															"Providing however nothing herein contained shall apply to a
bona fide legitimate labor organization or to any of its legal
activities such as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted activity
in the interest of its members for the purpose of accomplishing or
securing more favorable wage standards, hours of employment and
working conditions."

															Appellant was convicted under this statute not for leading the
march to the vicinity of the courthouse, which the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated to have been "orderly," 244 La. at 1096, 156
So. 2d at 451, but for leading the meeting on the sidewalk across
the street from the courthouse. Id. at 1094, 1106-1107,
156 So. 2d at 451, 455. In upholding appellant's conviction under
this statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court thus construed the
statute so as to apply to public assemblies which do not have as
their specific purpose the obstruction of traffic. There is no
doubt from the record in this case that this far sidewalk was
obstructed, and thus, as so construed, appellant violated the
statute.

															Appellant, however, contends that, as so construed and applied
in this case, the statute is an unconstitutional Page 379 U. S. 554 infringement on freedom of speech and assembly. This contention,
on the facts here presented, raises an issue with which this Court
has dealt in many decisions, that is, the right of a State or
municipality to regulate the use of city streets and other
facilities to assure the safety and convenience of the people in
their use and the concomitant right of the people of free speech
and assembly. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.
S. 444 ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.
S. 496 ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.
S. 147 ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.
S. 569 ; Largent v. Texas, 318 U.
S. 418 ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.
S. 558 ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.
77 ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 ; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.
S. 290 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.
S. 395 .

															From these decisions, certain clear principles emerge. The
rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our
democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions
or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and
at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy. The
control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental
responsibility to insure this necessary order. A restriction in
that relation, designed to promote the public convenience in the
interest of all, and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory
application, cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of
some civil right which, in other circumstances, would be entitled
to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar
red light because this was thought to be a means of social protest.
Nor could one, contrary to traffic regulations, insist upon a
street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a
form of freedom of speech or assembly. Governmental authorities
have Page 379 U. S. 555 the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and
available for movement. A group of demonstrators could not insist
upon the right to cordon off street, or entrance to a public or
private building, and allow no one to pass who did not agree to
listen to their exhortations. See Lovell v. Griffin,
supra, at 303 U. S. 451 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, at 312 U. S. 574 ; Schneider v. State, supra, at 308 U. S.
160 -161; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 310 U. S.
306 -307; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U. S. 490 ; Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra, at 345 U. S.
405 -408; see also Edwards v. South Carolina,
supra, at 372 U. S.
236 .

															We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to
those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling,
marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these
amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech. See the discussion and cases cited in No. 49, post at 379 U. S. 563 .
We reaffirm the statement of the Court in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., supra, at 336 U. S. 502 ,
that

															"it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed."

															We have no occasion in this case to consider the
constitutionality of the uniform, consistent, and nondiscriminatory
application of a statute forbidding all access to streets and other
public facilities for parades and meetings. [ Footnote 13 ] Although the statute here involved
on its face Page 379 U. S. 556 precludes all street assemblies and parades, [ Footnote 14 ] it has not been so applied and
enforced by the Baton Rouge authorities. City officials who
testified for the State clearly indicated that certain meetings and
parades are permitted in Baton Rouge, even though they have the
effect of obstructing traffic, provided prior approval is obtained.
This was confirmed in oral argument before this Court by counsel
for the State. He stated that parades and meetings are permitted,
based on "arrangements . . . made with officials." The statute
itself provides no standards for the determination of local
officials as to which assemblies to permit or which to prohibit.
Nor are there any administrative regulations on this subject which
have been called to our attention. [ Footnote 15 ] From all Page 379 U. S. 557 the evidence before us, it appears that the authorities in Baton
Rouge permit or prohibit parades or street meetings in their
completely uncontrolled discretion.

															The situation is thus the same as if the statute itself
expressly provided that there could only be peaceful parades or
demonstrations in the unbridled discretion of the local officials.
The pervasive restraint on freedom of discussion by the practice of
the authorities under the statute is not any less effective than a
statute expressly permitting such selective enforcement. A long
line of cases in this Court makes it clear that a State or
municipality cannot

															"require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first
to police authorities for their consideration and approval, with a
discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others may
not, be . . . disseminate[d]. . . ." Schneider v. State, supra, at 308 U. S. 164 . See Lovell v. Griffin, supra; Hague v. CIO, supra; Largent v.
Texas, supra; Saia v. New York, supra; Niemotko v. Maryland, supra;
Kunz v. New York, supra. This Court has recognized that the lodging of such broad
discretion in a public official allows him to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not. This thus
sanctions a device for the suppression of the communication of
ideas and permits the official to act as a censor. See Saia v.
New York, supra, at 334 U. S. 562 .
Also inherent in such a system allowing parades or meetings only
with the prior permission of an official is the obvious danger to
the right of a person or group not to be denied equal protection of
the laws. See Niemotko v. Maryland, supra, at 340 U. S. 272 , 340 U. S. 284 ; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 . It
is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to
determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which
will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or
groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad
discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the Page 379 U. S. 558 equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an
extremely broad prohibitory statute.

															It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited
discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning
the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for
public assemblies may be vested in administrative officials,
provided that such limited discretion is

															"exercised with 'uniformity of method of treatment upon the
facts of each application, free from improper or inappropriate
considerations and from unfair discrimination' . . . [and with] a
'systematic, consistent and just order of treatment, with reference
to the convenience of public use of the highways. . . .'" Cox v. New Hampshire, supra, at 312 U. S. 576 . See Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra. But here it is clear that the practice in Baton Rouge allowing
unfettered discretion in local officials in the regulation of the
use of the streets for peaceful parades and meetings is an
unwarranted abridgment of appellant's freedom of speech and
assembly secured to him by the First Amendment, as applied to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It follows, therefore, that
appellant's conviction for violating the statute as so applied and
enforced must be reversed.

															For the reasons discussed above the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana is reversed. Reversed. [For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, see post, p. 379 U. S.
575 .]

															[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, see post, p. 379 U. S.
585 .]

															[For opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, see post, p. 379 U. S.
591 .]

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Estimates of the crowd's size varied from 1,500 to 3,800. Two
thousand seems to have been the consensus, and was the figure
accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, 244 La. at 1095, 156 So.
2d at 451.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															There were varying versions in the record as to the time the
demonstration would take. The State's version was that Cox asked
for seven minutes. Cox's version was that he said his speech would
take seven minutes, but that the whole program would take between
17 and 25 minutes.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The "permission" granted the students to demonstrate is
discussed at greater length in No. 49, where its legal effect is
considered.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															A few days before, Cox had participated with some of the
demonstrators in a "direct nonviolent clinic" sponsored by CORE and
held at St. Mark's Church.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Sheriff Clemmons had no objection to this part of the speech. He
testified on cross-examination as follows:

															"Q. Did you have any objection to that part of his talk?"

															"A. None whatever. If he would have done what he said, there
would have been no trouble at all. The whole thing would have been
over and done with."

															"Q. Did you have any objection to them being assembled on that
side of the street while he was making that speech, sir?"

															"A. I had no objection to it."

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Sheriff Clemmons objected strongly to these words. He testified
on cross-examination as follows:

															"Q. Now, what part of his speech became objectionable to him
being assembled there?"

															"A. The inflammatory manner in which he addressed that crowd and
told them to go on up town, go to four places on the protest list,
sit down and if they don't feed you, sit there for one hour."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The exact sequence of these events is unclear from the record,
being described differently not only by the State and the defense,
but also by the state witnesses themselves. It seems reasonably
certain, however, that the response to the singing from the jail,
the end of Cox's speech, and the "muttering" and "grumbling" of the
white onlookers all took place at approximately the same time.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Because a claim of constitutionally protected right is involved,
it "remains our duty in a case such as this to make an independent
examination of the whole record." Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 , 372 U. S. 235 ; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199 , 361 U. S. 205 ,
n. 5; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.
S. 331 , 328 U. S. 335 ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 , 274 U. S.
385 -386. In the area of First Amendment freedoms as well
as areas involving other constitutionally protected rights,

															"we cannot avoid our responsibilities by permitting ourselves to
be completely bound by state court determination of any issue
essential to decision of a claim of federal right, else federal law
could be frustrated by distorted fact finding." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 , 373 U. S.
515 -516; Stein v. New York, 346 U.
S. 156 , 346 U. S.
181 .

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The cheering and shouting were described differently by
different witnesses, but the most extravagant descriptions were the
following: "a jumbled roar like people cheering at a football
game," "loud cheering and spontaneous clapping and screaming and a
great hullabaloo," "a great outburst," a cheer of "conquest . . .
much wilder than a football game," "a loud reaction, not
disorderly, loud," "a shout, a roar," and an emotional response "in
jubilation and exhortation." Appellant agreed that some of the
group "became emotional" and "tears flowed from young ladies'
eyes."

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															There is much testimony that the demonstrators were well
controlled and basically orderly throughout. G. Dupre Litton, an
attorney and witness for the State, testified,

															"I would say that it was an orderly demonstration. It was too
large a group, in my opinion, to congregate at that place at that
particular time, which is nothing but my opinion . . . but
generally . . . it was orderly."

															Robert Durham, a news photographer for WBRZ, a state witness,
testified that, although the demonstration was not "quiet and
peaceful," it was basically "orderly." James Erwin, news director
of WIBR, a witness for the State, testified as follows:

															"Q. Was the demonstration generally orderly?"

															"A. Yes, Reverend Cox had it very well controlled."

															On the other hand, there is some evidence to the contrary: Erwin
also stated:

															"Q. Was it orderly up to the point of throwing the tear
gas?"

															"A. No, there was one minor outburst after he called for the
sit-ins, and then a minor reaction, and then a loud reaction, not
disorderly, loud. . . . A loud reaction when the singing occurred
upstairs."

															And James Dumigan, a police officer, thought that the
demonstrators showed a certain disorder by "hollering loud,
clapping their hands." But this latter evidence is surely not
sufficient, particularly in face of the film, to lead us to
conclude that the cheering was so disorderly as to be beyond that
held constitutionally protected in Edwards v. South Carolina,
supra. [ Footnote 11 ]

															Moreover, there are not significantly more demonstrators here
than in Field v. South Carolina, supra, which involved
more than 1,000 students.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Witnesses who concluded that a breach of the peace was
threatened or had occurred based their conclusions not upon the
shouting or cheering, but upon the fact that the group was
demonstrating at all, upon Cox's suggestion that the group sit in,
or upon the reaction of the white onlookers across the street. Rush
Biossat, a state witness, testified that, while appellant "didn't
say anything of a violent nature," there was "emotional upset," "a
feeling of disturbance in the air," and "agitation"; he thought,
however, that all this was caused by Cox's remarks about "black and
white together." James Erwin, a state witness, and news director of
WIBR, testified that there was "considerable stirring" and a
"restiveness," but among the white group. He also stated that the
reaction of the white group to Cox's speech "was electrifying."
"You could hear grumbling from the small groups of white people,
some total of two hundred fifty, perhaps . . . and there was a
definite feeling of ill will that had sprung up." He was afraid
that "violence was about to erupt", but also thought that Cox had
his group under control, and did not want violence. G. L. Johnston,
a police officer and a witness for the State, felt that the
disorderly part of the demonstration was Cox's suggestion that the
group sit in. Vay Carpenter, and Mary O'Brien, legal secretaries
and witnesses for the State, thought that the mood of the crowd
changed at the time of Cox's speech, and became "tense." They
thought this was because of the sit-in suggestion. Chief Kling of
the Sheriff's office, testifying for the State, said that the
situation became one "that was explosive, and one that had gotten
to the point where it had to be handled or it would have gotten out
of hand"; however, he based his opinion upon "the mere presence of
these people in downtown Baton Rouge . . . in such great numbers."
Police Captain Font also testified for the State that the situation
was "explosive"; he based this opinion on

															"how they came, such a large group like that, just coming out of
nowhere, just coming, filling the streets, filling the sidewalks.
We are prepared -- we have traffic officers. We can handle traffic
situations if we are advised that we are going to have a traffic
situation, if the sidewalk is going to be blocked, if the street is
going to be blocked, but we wasn't advised of it. They just came
and blocked it."

															He added that he feared "bloodshed," but based this fear
upon

															"when the Sheriff requested them to move, they didn't move; when
they cheered in a conquest type of tone; their displaying of the
signs; the deliberate agitation that twenty-five people had been
arrested the day before, and then they turned right around and just
agitated the next day in the same prescribed manner."

															He also felt that the students displayed their signs in a way
which was "agitating." Inspector Trigg testified for the State
that,

															"from their actions, I figured they were going to try to storm
the Courthouse and take over the jail and try to get the prisoners
that they had come down here to protest."

															However, Trigg based his conclusions upon the students' having
marched down from the Capitol and paraded in front of the
courthouse; he thought they were "violent" because

															"they continued to march around this Courthouse, and they
continued to march down here and do things that disrupts our way of
living down here."

															Sheriff Clemmons testified that the assembly "became
objectionable" at the time of Cox's speech. The Sheriff objected
to

															"the inflammatory manner in which he addressed that crowd and
told them to go on up town, go to four places on the protest list,
sit down and if they don't feed you, sit there for one hour. Prior
to that, though, out from under these coats, some signs of --
picketing signs. I don't know what's coming out of there next. It
could be anything under a coat. It became inflammatory, and when he
gestured, go on up town and take charge of these places . . . of
business. That is what they were trying to do is take charge of
this Courthouse."

															A close reading of the record seems to reveal next to no
evidence that anyone thought that the shouting and cheering were
what constituted the threatened breach of the peace.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															It has been argued that, in the exercise of its regulatory power
over streets and other public facilities, a State or municipality
could reserve the streets completely for traffic and other
facilities for rest and relaxation of the citizenry. See Kovacs
v. Cooper, supra, at 336 U. S. 98 (opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson); Kunz v. New York, supra, at 340 U. S. 298 (Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting). The contrary, however, has been
indicated, at least to the point that some open area must be
preserved for out-door assemblies. See Hague v. CIO,
supra, at 307 U. S.
515 -516 (opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts); Kunz v.
New York, supra, at 340 U. S. 293 ; Niemotko v. Maryland, supra, at 340 U. S. 283 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring). See generally, Poulos v.
New Hampshire, supra, at 345 U. S. 403 ; Niemotko v. Maryland, supra, at 340 U. S.
272 -273.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															With the express exception, of course, of labor picketing. This
exception points up the fact that the statute reaches beyond mere
traffic regulation to restrictions on expression.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Although cited by neither party, research has disclosed the
existence of a local ordinance of Baton Rouge, Baton Rouge City
Code, Tit. 11, § 210 (19.57), which prohibits "parade[s] . . .
along any street except in accordance with a permit issued by the
chief of police. . . ." A similar ordinance was in existence in Fields v. South Carolina, supra. As in Fields ,
this ordinance is irrelevant to the conviction in this case, as not
only was appellant not charged with its violation, but the
existence of the ordinance was never referred to by the State in
any of the courts involved in the case, including this one, and
neither the Louisiana trial court nor the Supreme Court relied on
the ordinance in sustaining appellant's convictions under the three
statutes here involved. Moreover, since the ordinance apparently
sets forth no standards for the determination of the Chief of
Police as to which parades to permit or which to prohibit, obvious
constitutional problems would arise if appellant had been convicted
for parading in violation of it. See the discussion in
text above; Lovell v. Griffin, supra, at 303 U. S.
452 -453; Hague v. CIO, supra, at 307 U. S. 518 ; Saia v. New York, supra, at 334 U. S.
559 -560.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, a civil rights leader, and overturned his convictions for peace disturbance and obstructing public passages. The Court held that Louisiana violated the appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and assembly by arresting and convicting him for leading a peaceful protest against racial segregation. The Court also found that Louisiana's breach of the peace statute was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.