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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–965

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2018]

															Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.

															Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
foreign nationals seeking entry into the United States undergo a
vetting process to ensure that they satisfy the numerous
requirements for admission. The Act also vests the President with
authority to restrict the entry of aliens when- ever he finds that
their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States.” 8 U. S. C. §1182(f). Relying on that delegation,
the President concluded that it was necessary to impose entry
restrictions on nationals of countries that do not share adequate
information for an informed entry determination, or that otherwise
present national security risks. Presidential Proclamation No.
9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017) (Proclamation). The plaintiffs in
this litigation, respondents here, challenged the application of
those entry restrictions to certain aliens abroad. We now decide
whether the President had authority under the Act to issue the
Proclamation, and whether the entry policy violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

															I

															A

															Shortly after taking office, President Trump
signed Executive Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States. 82 Fed. Reg. 8977
(2017) (EO–1). EO–1 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
conduct a review to examine the adequacy of information provided by
foreign governments about their nationals seeking to enter the
United States. §3(a). Pending that review, the order suspended for
90 days the entry of foreign nationals from seven countries—Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—that had been
previously identified by Congress or prior administrations as
posing heightened terrorism risks. §3(c). The District Court for
the Western District of Washington entered a temporary restraining
order blocking the entry restrictions, and the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit denied the Government’s request to stay that
order. Washington v. Trump , 847 F. 3d 1151
(2017) ( per curiam ).

															In response, the President revoked EO–1,
replacing it with Executive Order No. 13780, which again directed a
worldwide review. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017) (EO–2). Citing
investigative burdens on agencies and the need to diminish the risk
that dangerous individuals would enter without adequate vetting,
EO–2 also temporarily restricted the entry (with case-by-case
waivers) of foreign nationals from six of the countries covered by
EO–1: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. §§2(c), 3(a).
The order explained that those countries had been selected because
each “is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been significantly
compromised by terrorist organizations, or contains active conflict
zones.” §1(d). The entry restriction was to stay in effect for 90
days, pending completion of the worldwide review.

															These interim measures were immediately
challenged in court. The District Courts for the Districts of
Maryland and Hawaii entered nationwide preliminary injunctions
barring enforcement of the entry suspension, and the respective
Courts of Appeals upheld those injunctions, albeit on different
grounds. International Refugee Assistance Project ( IRAP ) v. Trump , 857 F. 3d 554 (CA4 2017); Hawaii v. Trump , 859 F. 3d 741 (CA9 2017)
( per curiam ). This Court granted certiorari and stayed the
injunctions—allowing the entry suspension to go into effect—with
respect to foreign nationals who lacked a “credible claim of a bona
fide relationship” with a person or entity in the United States. Trump v. IRAP , 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) ( per
curiam ) (slip op., at 12). The temporary restrictions in EO–2
expired before this Court took any action, and we vacated the lower
court decisions as moot. Trump v. IRAP , 583
U. S. ___ (2017); Trump v. Hawaii , 583
U. S. ___ (2017).

															On September 24, 2017, after completion of the
worldwide review, the President issued the Proclamation before
us—Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. The
Proclamation (as its title indicates) sought to improve vetting
procedures by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information
needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present
“public safety threats.” §1(a). To further that purpose, the
Proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight
foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information
about their nationals the President deemed inadequate.

															The Proclamation described how foreign states
were selected for inclusion based on the review undertaken pursuant
to EO–2. As part of that review, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and
several intelligence agencies, developed a “baseline” for the
information required from foreign governments to confirm the
identity of individuals seeking entry into the United States, and
to determine whether those individuals pose a security threat.
§1(c). The baseline included three components. The first,
“identity-management information,” focused on whether a foreign
government ensures the integrity of travel documents by issuing
electronic passports, reporting lost or stolen passports, and
making available additional identity-related information. Second,
the agencies considered the extent to which the country discloses
information on criminal history and suspected terrorist links,
provides travel document exemplars, and facilitates the U. S.
Government’s receipt of information about airline passengers and
crews traveling to the United States. Finally, the agencies weighed
various indicators of national security risk, including whether the
foreign state is a known or potential terrorist safe haven and
whether it regularly declines to receive returning nationals
following final orders of removal from the United States. Ibid. DHS collected and evaluated data regarding all
foreign governments. §1(d). It identified 16 countries as having
deficient information-sharing practices and presenting national
security concerns, and another 31 countries as “at risk” of
similarly failing to meet the baseline. §1(e). The State Department
then undertook diplomatic efforts over a 50-day period to encourage
all foreign governments to improve their practices. §1(f ). As
a result of that effort, numerous countries provided DHS with
travel document exemplars and agreed to share information on known
or suspected terrorists. Ibid. Following the 50-day period, the Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security concluded that eight countries—Chad,
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and
Yemen—remained deficient in terms of their risk profile and
willingness to provide requested information. The Acting Secretary
recommended that the President impose entry restrictions on certain
nationals from all of those countries except Iraq. §§1(g), (h). She
also concluded that although Somalia generally satisfied the
information-sharing component of the baseline standards, its
“identity-management deficiencies” and “significant terrorist
presence” presented special circumstances justifying additional
limitations. She therefore recommended entry limitations for
certain nationals of that country. §1(i). As for Iraq, the Acting
Secretary found that entry limitations on its nationals were not
warranted given the close cooperative relationship between the
U. S. and Iraqi Governments and Iraq’s commitment to combating
ISIS. §1(g).

															After consulting with multiple Cabinet members
and other officials, the President adopted the Acting Secretary’s
recommendations and issued the Proclamation. Invoking his authority
under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f ) and 1185(a), the
President determined that certain entry restrictions were necessary
to “prevent the entry of those foreign nationals about whom the
United States Government lacks sufficient information”; “elicit
improved identity- management and information-sharing protocols and
practices from foreign governments”; and otherwise “advance [the]
foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives”
of the United States. Proclamation §1(h). The President explained
that these restrictions would be the “most likely to encourage
cooperation” while “protect[ing] the United States until such time
as improvements occur.” Ibid. The Proclamation imposed a range of restrictions
that vary based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of the
eight countries. Ibid. For countries that do not cooperate
with the United States in identifying security risks (Iran, North
Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry of all
nationals, except for Iranians seeking nonimmigrant student and
exchange-visitor visas. §§2(b)(ii), (d)(ii), (e)(ii). For countries
that have information-sharing deficiencies but are nonetheless
“valuable counterterrorism partner[s]” (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), it
restricts entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and
nonimmigrant business or tourist visas. §§2(a)(i), (c)(i), (g)(i).
Because Somalia generally satisfies the baseline standards but was
found to present special risk factors, the Proclamation suspends
entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and requires additional
scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas. §2(h)(ii). And
for Venezuela, which refuses to cooperate in information sharing
but for which alternative means are available to identify its
nationals, the Proclamation limits entry only of certain government
officials and their family members on nonimmigrant business or
tourist visas. §2(f )(ii).

															The Proclamation exempts lawful permanent
residents and foreign nationals who have been granted asylum.
§3(b). It also provides for case-by-case waivers when a foreign
national demonstrates undue hardship, and that his entry is in the
national interest and would not pose a threat to public safety.
§3(c)(i); see also §3(c)(iv) (listing examples of when a waiver
might be appropriate, such as if the foreign national seeks to
reside with a close family member, obtain urgent medical care, or
pursue significant business obligations). The Proclamation further
directs DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether entry
restrictions should be modified or continued, and to report to the
President every 180 days. §4. Upon completion of the first such
review period, the President, on the recommendation of the
Secretary of Homeland Security, determined that Chad had
sufficiently improved its practices, and he accordingly lifted
restrictions on its nationals. Presidential Proclamation No. 9723,
83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (2018).

															B

															Plaintiffs in this case are the State of
Hawaii, three individuals (Dr. Ismail Elshikh, John Doe #1, and
John Doe #2), and the Muslim Association of Hawaii. The State
operates the University of Hawaii system, which recruits students
and faculty from the designated countries. The three individual
plaintiffs are U. S. citizens or lawful permanent residents
who have relatives from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for
immigrant or nonimmigrant visas. The Association is a nonprofit
organization that operates a mosque in Hawaii.

															Plaintiffs challenged the Proclamation—except as
applied to North Korea and Venezuela—on several grounds. As
relevant here, they argued that the Proclamation contravenes
provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66Stat.
187, as amended. Plaintiffs further claimed that the Proclamation
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, because
it was motivated not by concerns pertaining to national security
but by animus toward Islam.

															The District Court granted a nationwide
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the entry
restrictions. The court concluded that the Proclamation violated
two provisions of the INA: §1182(f ), because the President
did not make sufficient findings that the entry of the covered
foreign nationals would be detrimental to the national interest,
and §1152(a)(1)(A), because the policy discriminates against
immigrant visa applicants on the basis of nationality. 265
F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1155–1159 (Haw. 2017). The Government
requested expedited briefing and sought a stay pending appeal. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a partial stay,
permitting enforcement of the Proclamation with respect to foreign
nationals who lack a bona fide relationship with the United States.
This Court then stayed the injunction in full pending disposition
of the Government’s appeal. 583 U. S. ___ (2017).

															The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court first
held that the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under
§1182(f ). In its view, that provision authorizes only a
“temporary” suspension of entry in response to “exigencies” that
“Congress would be ill-equipped to address.” 878 F. 3d 662,
684, 688 (2017). The court further reasoned that the Proclamation
“conflicts with the INA’s finely reticulated regulatory scheme” by
addressing “matters of immigration already passed upon by
Congress.” Id. , at 685, 690. The Ninth Circuit then turned
to §1152(a)(1)(A) and determined that the entry restrictions also
contravene the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in
the issuance of immigrant visas. The court did not reach
plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.

															We granted certiorari. 583 U. S. ___
(2018).

															II

															Before addressing the merits of plaintiffs’
statutory claims, we consider whether we have authority to do so.
The Government argues that plaintiffs’ challenge to the
Proclamation under the INA is not justiciable. Relying on the
doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the Government contends that
because aliens have no “claim of right” to enter the United States,
and because exclusion of aliens is “a fundamental act of
sovereignty” by the political branches, review of an exclusion
decision “is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy , 338 U. S. 537, 542–543 (1950). According
to the Government, that principle barring review is reflected in
the INA, which sets forth a comprehensive framework for review of
orders of removal, but authorizes judicial review only for aliens
physically present in the United States. See Brief for Petitioners
19–20 (citing 8 U. S. C. §1252).

															The justiciability of plaintiffs’ challenge
under the INA presents a difficult question. The Government made
similar arguments that no judicial review was available in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. , 509 U. S.
155 (1993). The Court in that case, however, went on to consider on
the merits a statutory claim like the one before us without
addressing the issue of reviewability. The Government does not
argue that the doctrine of consular nonreview- ability goes to the
Court’s jurisdiction, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, nor does it point to
any provision of the INA that expressly strips the Court of
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, see Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center , 568 U. S. 145, 153
(2013) (requiring Congress to “clearly state[ ]” that a
statutory provision is jurisdictional). As a result, we may assume
without deciding that plaintiffs’ statutory claims are reviewable,
notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or any other statutory
nonreviewability issue, and we proceed on that basis.

															III

															The INA establishes numerous grounds on which
an alien abroad may be inadmissible to the United States and
ineligible for a visa. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C.
§§1182(a)(1) (health-related grounds), (a)(2) (criminal history),
(a)(3)(B) (terrorist activities), (a)(3)(C) (foreign policy
grounds). Congress has also delegated to the President authority to
suspend or restrict the entry of aliens in certain circumstances.
The principal source of that authority, §1182(f ), enables the
President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of
aliens” whenever he “finds” that their entry “would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States.”[ 1 ]

															Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation is not a
valid exercise of the President’s authority under the INA. In their
view, §1182(f ) confers only a residual power to temporarily
halt the entry of a discrete group of aliens engaged in harmful
conduct. They also assert that the Proclamation violates another
provision of the INA— 8 U. S. C. §1152(a)(1)(A)—because
it discriminates on the basis of nationality in the issuance of
immigrant visas.

															By its plain language, §1182(f ) grants the
President broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the
United States. The President lawfully exercised that discretion
based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency
review—that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the
national interest. And plaintiffs’ attempts to identify a conflict
with other provisions in the INA, and their appeal to the statute’s
purposes and legislative history, fail to overcome the clear
statutory language.

															A

															The text of §1182(f ) states:

															“Whenever the President finds that the
entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United
States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem
necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens
as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”

															By its terms, §1182(f ) exudes deference to
the President in every clause. It entrusts to the President the
decisions whether and when to suspend entry (“[w]henever [he] finds
that the entry” of aliens “would be detrimental” to the national
interest); whose entry to suspend (“all aliens or any class of
aliens”); for how long (“for such period as he shall deem
necessary”); and on what conditions (“any restrictions he may deem
to be appropriate”). It is therefore unsurprising that we have
previously observed that §1182(f ) vests the President with
“ample power” to impose entry restrictions in addition to those
elsewhere enumerated in the INA. Sale , 509 U. S., at
187 (finding it “perfectly clear” that the President could
“establish a naval blockade” to prevent illegal migrants from
entering the United States); see also Abourezk v. Reagan , 785 F. 2d 1043, 1049, n. 2 (CADC 1986)
(describing the “sweeping proclamation power” in §1182(f ) as
enabling the President to supplement the other grounds of
inadmissibility in the INA).

															The Proclamation falls well within this
comprehensive delegation. The sole prerequisite set forth in
§1182(f ) is that the President “find[ ]” that the entry
of the covered aliens “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.” The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that
requirement here. He first ordered DHS and other agencies to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s
compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. The
President then issued a Proclamation setting forth extensive
findings describing how deficiencies in the practices of select
foreign governments—several of which are state sponsors of
terrorism—deprive the Government of “sufficient information to
assess the risks [those countries’ nationals] pose to the United
States.” Proclamation §1(h)(i). Based on that review, the President
found that it was in the national interest to restrict entry of
aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information—both to
protect national security and public safety, and to induce
improvement by their home countries. The Proclamation therefore
“craft[ed] . . . country-specific restrictions that would
be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s
distinct circumstances,” while securing the Nation “until such time
as improvements occur.” Ibid. [ 2 ]

															Plaintiffs believe that these findings are
insufficient. They argue, as an initial matter, that the
Proclamation fails to provide a persuasive rationale for why
nationality alone renders the covered foreign nationals a security
risk. And they further discount the President’s stated concern
about deficient vetting because the Proclamation allows many aliens
from the designated countries to enter on nonimmigrant visas.

															Such arguments are grounded on the premise that
§1182(f ) not only requires the President to make a
finding that entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States,” but also to explain that finding with sufficient
detail to enable judicial review. That premise is questionable. See Webster v. Doe , 486 U. S. 592, 600 (1988)
(concluding that a statute authorizing the CIA Director to
terminate an employee when the Director “shall deem such
termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States” forecloses “any meaningful judicial standard of review”).
But even assuming that some form of review is appropriate,
plaintiffs’ attacks on the sufficiency of the President’s findings
cannot be sustained. The 12-page Proclamation—which thoroughly
describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations
underlying the President’s chosen restrictions—is more detailed
than any prior order a President has issued under §1182(f ).
Contrast Presidential Proclamation No. 6958, 3 CFR 133 (1996)
(President Clinton) (explaining in one sentence why suspending
entry of members of the Sudanese government and armed forces “is in
the foreign policy interests of the United States”); Presidential
Proclamation No. 4865, 3 CFR 50–51 (1981) (President Reagan)
(explaining in five sentences why measures to curtail “the
continuing illegal migration by sea of large numbers of
undocumented aliens into the southeastern United States” are
“necessary”).

															Moreover, plaintiffs’ request for a searching
inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President’s justifications
is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference
traditionally accorded the President in this sphere. “Whether the
President’s chosen method” of addressing perceived risks is
justified from a policy perspective is “irrelevant to the scope of
his [§1182(f )] authority.” Sale , 509 U. S., at
187–188. And when the President adopts “a preventive measure
. . . in the context of international affairs and
national security,” he is “not required to conclusively link all of
the pieces in the puzzle before [courts] grant weight to [his]
empirical conclusions.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project , 561 U. S. 1, 35 (2010).

															The Proclamation also comports with the
remaining textual limits in §1182(f ). We agree with
plaintiffs that the word “suspend” often connotes a “defer[ral]
till later,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2303
(1966). But that does not mean that the President is required to
prescribe in advance a fixed end date for the entry restrictions.
Section 1182(f ) authorizes the President to suspend entry
“for such period as he shall deem necessary.” It follows that when
a President suspends entry in response to a diplomatic dispute or
policy concern, he may link the duration of those restrictions,
implicitly or explicitly, to the resolution of the triggering
condition. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 5829, 3
CFR 88 (1988) (President Reagan) (suspending the entry of certain
Panamanian nationals “until such time as . . . democracy
has been restored in Panama”); Presidential Proclamation No. 8693,
3 CFR 86–87 (2011) (President Obama) (suspending the entry of
individuals subject to a travel restriction under United Nations
Security Council resolutions “until such time as the Secretary of
State determines that [the suspension] is no longer necessary”). In
fact, not one of the 43 suspension orders issued prior to this
litigation has specified a precise end date.

															Like its predecessors, the Proclamation makes
clear that its “conditional restrictions” will remain in force only
so long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequacies and
risks” within the covered nations. Proclamation Preamble, and
§1(h); see ibid. (explaining that the aim is to
“relax[ ] or remove[ ]” the entry restrictions “as soon
as possible”). To that end, the Proclamation establishes an ongoing
process to engage covered nations and assess every 180 days whether
the entry restrictions should be modified or terminated. §§4(a),
(b). Indeed, after the initial review period, the President
determined that Chad had made sufficient improvements to its
identity-management protocols, and he accordingly lifted the entry
suspension on its nationals. See Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed.
Reg. 15937.

															Finally, the Proclamation properly identifies a
“class of aliens”—nationals of select countries—whose entry is
suspended. Plaintiffs argue that “class” must refer to a
well-defined group of individuals who share a common
“characteristic” apart from nationality. Brief for Respondents 42.
But the text of §1182(f ), of course, does not say that, and
the word “class” comfortably encompasses a group of people linked
by nationality. Plaintiffs also contend that the class cannot be
“overbroad.” Brief for Respondents 42. But that simply amounts to
an unspoken tailoring requirement found nowhere in Congress’s grant
of authority to suspend entry of not only “any class of aliens” but
“all aliens.”

															In short, the language of §1182(f ) is
clear, and the Proclamation does not exceed any textual limit on
the President’s authority.

															B

															Confronted with this “facially broad grant of
power,” 878 F. 3d, at 688, plaintiffs focus their attention on
statutory structure and legislative purpose. They seek support in,
first, the immigration scheme reflected in the INA as a whole, and,
second, the legislative history of §1182(f ) and historical
practice. Neither argument justifies departing from the clear text
of the statute.

															1

															Plaintiffs’ structural argument starts with
the premise that §1182(f ) does not give the President
authority to countermand Congress’s considered policy judgments.
The President, they say, may supplement the INA, but he cannot
supplant it. And in their view, the Proclamation falls in the
latter category because Congress has already specified a two-part
solution to the problem of aliens seeking entry from countries that
do not share sufficient information with the United States. First,
Congress designed an individualized vetting system that places the
burden on the alien to prove his admissibility. See §1361. Second,
instead of banning the entry of nationals from particular
countries, Congress sought to encourage information sharing through
a Visa Waiver Program offering fast-track admission for countries
that cooperate with the United States. See §1187.

															We may assume that §1182(f ) does not allow
the President to expressly override particular provisions of the
INA. But plaintiffs have not identified any conflict between the
statute and the Proclamation that would implicitly bar the
President from addressing deficiencies in the Nation’s vetting
system.

															To the contrary, the Proclamation supports
Congress’s individualized approach for determining admissibility.
The INA sets forth various inadmissibility grounds based on
connections to terrorism and criminal history, but those provisions
can only work when the consular officer has sufficient (and
sufficiently reliable) information to make that determination. The
Proclamation promotes the effectiveness of the vetting process by
helping to ensure the availability of such information.

															Plaintiffs suggest that the entry restrictions
are unnecessary because consular officers can simply deny visas in
individual cases when an alien fails to carry his burden of proving
admissibility—for example, by failing to produce certified records
regarding his criminal history. Brief for Respondents 48. But that
misses the point: A critical finding of the Proclamation is that
the failure of certain countries to provide reliable information
prevents the Government from accurately determining whether an
alien is inadmissible or poses a threat. Proclamation §1(h). Unless
consular officers are expected to apply categorical rules and deny
entry from those countries across the board, fraudulent or
unreliable documentation may thwart their review in individual
cases. And at any rate, the INA certainly does not require that systemic problems such as the lack of reliable information be
addressed only in a progression of case-by-case admissibility
determinations. One of the key objectives of the Proclamation is to
encourage foreign governments to improve their practices, thus
facilitating the Government’s vetting process overall. Ibid. Nor is there a conflict between the Proclamation
and the Visa Waiver Program. The Program allows travel without a
visa for short-term visitors from 38 countries that have entered
into a “rigorous security partnership” with the United States. DHS,
U. S. Visa Waiver Program (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.dhs.gov/visa-waiver-program (as last visited June 25,
2018). Eligibility for that partnership involves “broad and
consequential assessments of [the country’s] foreign security
standards and operations.” Ibid. A foreign government must
(among other things) undergo a comprehensive evaluation of its
“counterterrorism, law enforcement, immigration enforcement,
passport security, and border management capabilities,” often
including “operational site inspections of airports, seaports, land
borders, and passport production and issuance facilities.” Ibid. Congress’s decision to authorize a benefit for
“many of America’s closest allies,” ibid. , did not
implicitly foreclose the Executive from imposing tighter
restrictions on nationals of certain high-risk countries. The Visa
Waiver Program creates a special exemption for citizens of
countries that maintain exemplary security standards and offer
“reciprocal [travel] privileges” to United States citizens. 8
U. S. C. §1187(a)(2)(A). But in establishing a select
partnership covering less than 20% of the countries in the world,
Congress did not address what requirements should govern the entry
of nationals from the vast majority of countries that fall short of
that gold standard—particularly those nations presenting heightened
terrorism concerns. Nor did Congress attempt to determine—as the
multi-agency review process did—whether those high-risk countries
provide a minimum baseline of information to adequately vet their
nationals. Once again, this is not a situation where “Congress has
stepped into the space and solved the exact problem.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 53.

															Although plaintiffs claim that their reading
preserves for the President a flexible power to “supplement” the
INA, their understanding of the President’s authority is remarkably
cramped: He may suspend entry by classes of aliens “similar in
nature” to the existing categories of inadmissibility—but not too
similar—or only in response to “some exigent circumstance” that
Congress did not already touch on in the INA. Brief for Respondents
31, 36, 50; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 57 (“Presidents have wide
berth in this area . . . if there’s any sort of
emergency.”). In any event, no Congress that wanted to confer on
the President only a residual authority to address emergency
situations would ever use language of the sort in §1182(f ).
Fairly read, the provision vests authority in the President to
impose additional limitations on entry beyond the grounds for
exclusion set forth in the INA—including in response to
circumstances that might affect the vetting system or other
“interests of the United States.”

															Because plaintiffs do not point to any
contradiction with another provision of the INA, the President has
not exceeded his authority under §1182(f ).

															2

															Plaintiffs seek to locate additional
limitations on the scope of §1182(f ) in the statutory
background and legislative history. Given the clarity of the text,
we need not consider such extra-textual evidence. See State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby ,
580 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 9). At any rate,
plaintiffs’ evidence supports the plain meaning of the
provision.

															Drawing on legislative debates over
§1182(f ), plaintiffs suggest that the President’s suspension
power should be limited to exigencies where it would be difficult
for Congress to react promptly. Precursor provisions enacted during
the First and Second World Wars confined the President’s exclusion
authority to times of “war” and “national emergency.” See Act of
May 22, 1918, §1(a), 40Stat. 559; Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210,
§1, 55Stat. 252. When Congress enacted §1182(f ) in 1952,
plaintiffs note, it borrowed “nearly verbatim” from those
predecessor statutes, and one of the bill’s sponsors affirmed that
the provision would apply only during a time of crisis. According
to plaintiffs, it therefore follows that Congress sought to
delegate only a similarly tailored suspension power in
§1182(f ). Brief for Respondents 39–40.

															If anything, the drafting history suggests the
opposite. In borrowing “nearly verbatim” from the pre-existing
statute, Congress made one critical alteration—it removed the
national emergency standard that plaintiffs now seek to reintroduce
in another form. Weighing Congress’s conscious departure from its
wartime statutes against an isolated floor statement, the departure
is far more probative. See NLRB v. SW General, Inc. ,
580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 16) (“[F]loor
statements by individual legislators rank among the least
illuminating forms of legislative history.”). When Congress wishes
to condition an exercise of executive authority on the President’s
finding of an exigency or crisis, it knows how to say just that.
See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §824 o –1(b); 42
U. S. C. §5192; 50 U. S. C. §§1701, 1702. Here,
Congress instead chose to condition the President’s exercise of the
suspension authority on a different finding: that the entry of an
alien or class of aliens would be “detrimental to the interests of
the United States.”

															Plaintiffs also strive to infer limitations from
executive practice. By their count, every previous suspension order
under §1182(f ) can be slotted into one of two categories. The
vast majority targeted discrete groups of foreign nationals
engaging in conduct “deemed harmful by the immigration laws.” And
the remaining entry restrictions that focused on entire
nationalities—namely, President Carter’s response to the Iran
hostage crisis and President Reagan’s suspension of immigration
from Cuba—were, in their view, designed as a response to diplomatic
emergencies “that the immigration laws do not address.” Brief for
Respondents 40–41.

															Even if we were willing to confine expansive
language in light of its past applications, the historical evidence
is more equivocal than plaintiffs acknowledge. Presidents have
repeatedly suspended entry not because the covered nationals
themselves engaged in harmful acts but instead to retaliate for
conduct by their governments that conflicted with U. S.
foreign policy interests. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13662,
3 CFR 233 (2014) (President Obama) (suspending entry of Russian
nationals working in the financial services, energy, mining,
engineering, or defense sectors, in light of the Russian
Federation’s “annexation of Crimea and its use of force in
Ukraine”); Presidential Proclamation No. 6958, 3 CFR 133 (1997)
(President Clinton) (suspending entry of Sudanese governmental and
military personnel, citing “foreign policy interests of the United
States” based on Sudan’s refusal to comply with United Nations
resolution). And while some of these reprisals were directed at
subsets of aliens from the countries at issue, others broadly
suspended entry on the basis of nationality due to ongoing
diplomatic disputes. For example, President Reagan invoked
§1182(f ) to suspend entry “as immigrants” by almost all Cuban
nationals, to apply pressure on the Cuban Government. Presidential
Proclamation No. 5517, 3 CFR 102 (1986). Plaintiffs try to fit this
latter order within their carve-out for emergency action, but the
proclamation was based in part on Cuba’s decision to breach an
immigration agreement some 15 months earlier.

															More significantly, plaintiffs’ argument about
historical practice is a double-edged sword. The more ad hoc their
account of executive action—to fit the history into their
theory—the harder it becomes to see such a refined delegation in a
statute that grants the President sweeping authority to decide
whether to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, and for how
long.

															C

															Plaintiffs’ final statutory argument is that
the President’s entry suspension violates §1152(a)(1)(A), which
provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the
person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of
residence.” They contend that we should interpret the provision as
prohibiting nationality-based discrimination throughout the entire immigration process, despite the reference in
§1152(a)(1)(A) to the act of visa issuance alone. Specifically,
plaintiffs argue that §1152(a)(1)(A) applies to the predicate
question of a visa applicant’s eligibility for admission and the
subsequent question whether the holder of a visa may in fact enter
the country. Any other conclusion, they say, would allow the
President to circumvent the protections against discrimination
enshrined in §1152(a)(1)(A).

															As an initial matter, this argument challenges
only the validity of the entry restrictions on immigrant travel. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) is expressly limited to the issuance
of “immigrant visa[s]” while §1182(f ) allows the Presi- dent
to suspend entry of “immigrants or nonimmigrants.” At a minimum,
then, plaintiffs’ reading would not affect any of the limitations
on nonimmigrant travel in the Proclamation.

															In any event, we reject plaintiffs’
interpretation because it ignores the basic distinction between
admissibility determinations and visa issuance that runs throughout
the INA.[ 3 ] Section 1182
defines the pool of individuals who are admissible to the United
States. Its restrictions come into play at two points in the
process of gaining entry (or admission)[ 4 ] into the United States. First, any alien who is
inadmissible under §1182 (based on, for example, health risks,
criminal history, or foreign policy consequences) is screened out
as “ineligible to receive a visa.” 8 U. S. C. §1201(g).
Second, even if a consular officer issues a visa, entry into the
United States is not guaranteed. As every visa application
explains, a visa does not entitle an alien to enter the United
States “if, upon arrival,” an immigration officer determines that
the applicant is “inadmissible under this chapter, or any other
provision of law”—including §1182(f ). §1201(h).

															Sections 1182(f ) and 1152(a)(1)(A) thus
operate in different spheres: Section 1182 defines the universe of
aliens who are admissible into the United States (and therefore
eligible to receive a visa). Once §1182 sets the boundaries of
admissibility into the United States, §1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits
discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on
nationality and other traits. The distinction between
admissibility—to which §1152(a)(1)(A) does not apply—and visa
issuance—to which it does—is apparent from the text of the
provision, which specifies only that its protections apply to the
“issuance” of “immigrant visa[s],” without mentioning admissibility
or entry. Had Congress instead intended in §1152(a)(1)(A) to
constrain the President’s power to determine who may enter the
country, it could easily have chosen language directed to that end.
See, e.g., §§1182(a)(3)(C)(ii), (iii) (providing that
certain aliens “ shall not be excludable or subject to
restrictions or conditions on entry . . . because of
the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or
associations” (emphasis added)). “The fact that [Congress] did not
adopt [a] readily available and apparent alternative strongly
supports” the conclusion that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the
President’s delegated authority under §1182(f ). Knight v. Commissioner , 552 U. S. 181, 188 (2008).

															Common sense and historical practice confirm as
much. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) has never been treated as a constraint
on the criteria for admissibility in §1182. Presidents have
repeatedly exercised their authority to suspend entry on the basis
of nationality. As noted, President Reagan relied on §1182(f )
to suspend entry “as immigrants by all Cuban nationals,” subject to
exceptions. Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg. 30470 (1986).
Likewise, President Carter invoked §1185(a)(1) to deny and revoke
visas to all Iranian nationals. See Exec. Order No. 12172, 3 CFR
461 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12206, 3 CFR 249 (1980);
Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter, Sanctions Against
Iran, Vol. 1, Apr. 7, 1980, pp. 611–612 (1980); see also n. 1, supra .

															On plaintiffs’ reading, those orders were beyond
the President’s authority. The entry restrictions in the
Proclamation on North Korea (which plaintiffs do not challenge in
this litigation) would also be unlawful. Nor would the President be
permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in
response to an epidemic confined to a single region, or a verified
terrorist threat involving nationals of a specific foreign nation,
or even if the United States were on the brink of war.

															In a reprise of their §1182(f ) argument,
plaintiffs attempt to soften their position by falling back on an
implicit exception for Presidential actions that are “closely
drawn” to address “specific fast-breaking exigencies.” Brief for
Respondents 60–61. Yet the absence of any textual basis for such an
exception more likely indicates that Congress did not intend for
§1152(a)(1)(A) to limit the President’s flexible authority to
suspend entry based on foreign policy interests. In addition,
plaintiffs’ proposed exigency test would require courts, rather
than the President, to determine whether a foreign government’s
conduct rises to the level that would trigger a supposed implicit
exception to a federal statute. See Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. , 525 U. S. 471, 491 (1999)
(explaining that even if the Executive “disclose[d] its
. . . reasons for deeming nationals of a particular
country a special threat,” courts would be “unable to assess their
adequacy”). The text of §1152(a)(1)(A) offers no standards that
would enable courts to assess, for example, whether the situation
in North Korea justifies entry restrictions while the terrorist
threat in Yemen does not.

															*  *  *

															The Proclamation is squarely within the scope
of Presidential authority under the INA. Indeed, neither dissent
even attempts any serious argument to the contrary, despite the
fact that plaintiffs’ primary contention below and in their
briefing before this Court was that the Proclamation violated the
statute.

															IV

															A

															We now turn to plaintiffs’ claim that the
Proclamation was issued for the unconstitutional purpose of
excluding Muslims. Because we have an obligation to assure
ourselves of jurisdiction under Article III, we begin by addressing
the question whether plaintiffs have standing to bring their
constitutional challenge.

															Federal courts have authority under the
Constitution to decide legal questions only in the course of
resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, §2. One of the
essential elements of a legal case or controversy is that the
plaintiff have standing to sue. Standing requires more than just a
“keen interest in the issue.” Hollingsworth v. Perry ,
570 U. S. 693, 700 (2013). It requires allegations—and,
eventually, proof—that the plaintiff “personal[ly]” suffered a
concrete and particularized injury in connection with the conduct
about which he complains. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578
U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 7). In a case arising from
an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, a plaintiff must
show, as in other cases, that he is “directly affected by the laws
and practices against which [his] complaints are directed.” School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp , 374
U. S. 203, 224, n. 9 (1963). That is an issue here because the
entry restrictions apply not to plaintiffs themselves but to others
seeking to enter the United States.

															Plaintiffs first argue that they have standing
on the ground that the Proclamation “establishes a disfavored
faith” and violates “their own right to be free from federal
[religious] establishments.” Brief for Respondents 27–28 (emphasis
deleted). They describe such injury as “spirit- ual and dignitary.” Id. , at 29.

															We need not decide whether the claimed dignitary
interest establishes an adequate ground for standing. The three
individual plaintiffs assert another, more concrete injury: the
alleged real-world effect that the Proclamation has had in keeping
them separated from certain relatives who seek to enter the
country. See ibid. ; Town of Chester v. Laroe
Estates, Inc. , 581 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at
5–6) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form
of relief requested in the complaint.”). We agree that a person’s
interest in being united with his relatives is sufficiently
concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III
injury in fact. This Court has previously considered the merits of
claims asserted by United States citizens regarding violations of
their personal rights allegedly caused by the Government’s
exclusion of particular foreign nationals. See Kerry v. Din , 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (plurality opinion)
(slip op., at 15); id. , at ___ (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (slip op., at 1); Kleindienst v. Mandel ,
408 U. S. 753, 762 (1972). Likewise, one of our prior stay
orders in this litigation recognized that an American individual
who has “a bona fide relationship with a particular person seeking
to enter the country . . . can legitimately claim
concrete hardship if that person is excluded.” Trump v. IRAP , 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13).

															The Government responds that plaintiffs’
Establishment Clause claims are not justiciable because the Clause
does not give them a legally protected interest in the admission of
particular foreign nationals. But that argument—which depends upon
the scope of plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause rights—concerns the
merits rather than the justiciability of plaintiffs’ claims. We
therefore conclude that the individual plaintiffs have Article III
standing to challenge the exclusion of their relatives under the
Establishment Clause.

															B

															The First Amendment provides, in part, that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Our cases
recognize that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause
is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another.” Larson v. Valente , 456 U. S. 228,
244 (1982). Plaintiffs believe that the Proclamation violates this
prohibition by singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment. The
entry suspension, they contend, operates as a “religious
gerrymander,” in part because most of the countries covered by the
Proclamation have Muslim-majority populations. And in their view,
deviations from the information-sharing baseline criteria suggest
that the results of the multi-agency review were “foreordained.”
Relying on Establishment Clause precedents concerning laws and
policies applied domestically, plaintiffs allege that the primary
purpose of the Proclamation was religious animus and that the
President’s stated concerns about vetting protocols and national
security were but pretexts for discriminating against Muslims.
Brief for Respondents 69–73.

															At the heart of plaintiffs’ case is a series of
statements by the President and his advisers casting doubt on the
official objective of the Proclamation. For example, while a
candidate on the campaign trail, the President published a
“Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” that called for a
“total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States
until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going
on.” App. 158. That statement remained on his campaign website
until May 2017. Id., at 130–131. Then-candidate Trump also
stated that “Islam hates us” and asserted that the United States
was “having problems with Muslims coming into the country.” Id., at 120–121, 159. Shortly after being elected, when
asked whether violence in Europe had affected his plans to “ban
Muslim immigration,” the President replied, “You know my plans. All
along, I’ve been proven to be right.” Id., at 123.

															One week after his inauguration, the President
issued EO–1. In a television interview, one of the President’s
campaign advisers explained that when the President “first
announced it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put
a commission together. Show me the right way to do it
legally.’ ” Id., at 125. The adviser said he assembled
a group of Members of Congress and lawyers that “focused on,
instead of religion, danger. . . . [The order] is
based on places where there [is] substantial evidence that people
are sending terrorists into our country.” Id., at 229.

															Plaintiffs also note that after issuing EO–2 to
replace EO–1, the President expressed regret that his prior order
had been “watered down” and called for a “much tougher version” of
his “Travel Ban.” Shortly before the release of the Proclamation,
he stated that the “travel ban . . . should be far
larger, tougher, and more specific,” but “stupidly that would not
be politically correct.” Id., at 132–133. More recently, on
November 29, 2017, the President retweeted links to three
anti-Muslim propaganda videos. In response to questions about those
videos, the President’s deputy press secretary denied that the
President thinks Muslims are a threat to the United States,
explaining that “the President has been talking about these
security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the White
House” and “has addressed these issues with the travel order that
he issued earlier this year and the companion proclamation.” IRAP v. Trump , 883 F.3d 233, 267 (CA4 2018).

															The President of the United States possesses an
extraordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their
behalf. Our Presidents have frequently used that power to espouse
the principles of religious freedom and tolerance on which this
Nation was founded. In 1790 George Washington reassured the Hebrew
Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island that “happily the Government
of the United States . . . gives to bigotry no sanction,
to persecution no assistance [and] requires only that they who live
under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens.” 6
Papers of George Washington 285 (D. Twohig ed. 1996). President
Eisenhower, at the opening of the Islamic Center of Washington,
similarly pledged to a Muslim audience that “America would fight
with her whole strength for your right to have here your own
church,” declaring that “[t]his concept is indeed a part of
America.” Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
June 28, 1957, p. 509 (1957). And just days after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush returned to the same
Islamic Center to implore his fellow Americans—Muslims and
non-Muslims alike—to remember during their time of grief that
“[t]he face of terror is not the true faith of Islam,” and that
America is “a great country because we share the same values of
respect and dignity and human worth.” Public Papers of the
Presidents, George W. Bush, Vol. 2, Sept. 17, 2001, p. 1121 (2001).
Yet it cannot be denied that the Federal Government and the
Presidents who have carried its laws into effect have—from the
Nation’s earliest days—performed unevenly in living up to those
inspiring words.

															Plaintiffs argue that this President’s words
strike at fundamental standards of respect and tolerance, in
violation of our constitutional tradition. But the issue before us
is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the
significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential
directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core
of executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not only
the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of
the Presidency itself.

															The case before us differs in numerous respects
from the conventional Establishment Clause claim. Unlike the
typical suit involving religious displays or school prayer,
plaintiffs seek to invalidate a national security directive
regulating the entry of aliens abroad. Their claim accordingly
raises a number of delicate issues regarding the scope of the
constitutional right and the manner of proof. The Proclamation,
moreover, is facially neutral toward religion. Plaintiffs therefore
ask the Court to probe the sincerity of the stated justifications
for the policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which
were made before the President took the oath of office. These
various aspects of plaintiffs’ challenge inform our standard of
review.

															C

															For more than a century, this Court has
recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is
a “fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell , 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977); see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy , 342 U. S. 580,
588–589 (1952) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to
the conduct of foreign relations [and] the war power.”). Because
decisions in these matters may implicate “relations with foreign
powers,” or involve “classifications defined in the light of
changing political and economic circumstances,” such judgments “are
frequently of a character more appropriate to either the
Legislature or the Executive.” Mathews v. Diaz , 426
U. S. 67, 81 (1976).

															Nonetheless, although foreign nationals seeking
admission have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has
engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a
visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U. S.
citizen. In Kleindienst v. Mandel , the Attorney
General denied admission to a Belgian journalist and self-described
“revolutionary Marxist,” Ernest Mandel, who had been invited to
speak at a conference at Stanford University. 408 U. S., at
756–757. The professors who wished to hear Mandel speak challenged
that decision under the First Amendment, and we acknowledged that
their constitutional “right to receive information” was implicated. Id. , at 764–765. But we limited our review to whether the
Executive gave a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for its
action. Id. , at 769. Given the authority of the political
branches over admission, we held that “when the Executive exercises
this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially
legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
its justification” against the asserted constitutional interests of
U. S. citizens. Id. , at 770.

															The principal dissent suggests that Mandel has no bearing on this case, post, at 14, and
n. 5 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.) (hereinafter the dissent), but
our opinions have reaffirmed and applied its deferential standard
of review across different contexts and constitutional claims. In Din , Justice Kennedy reiterated that “respect for the
political branches’ broad power over the creation and
administration of the immigration system” meant that the Government
need provide only a statutory citation to explain a visa denial.
576 U. S., at ___ (opinion concurring in judgment) (slip op.,
at 6). Likewise in Fiallo , we applied Mandel to a
“broad congressional policy” giving immigration preferences to
mothers of illegitimate children. 430 U. S., at 795. Even
though the statute created a “categorical” entry classification
that discriminated on the basis of sex and legitimacy, post, at 14, n. 5, the Court concluded that “it is not the judicial
role in cases of this sort to probe and test the justifications” of
immigration policies. 430 U. S., at 799 (citing Mandel ,
408 U. S., at 770). Lower courts have similarly applied Mandel to broad executive action. See Rajah v. Mukasey , 544 F.3d 427, 433, 438–439 (CA2 2008) (upholding
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System instituted after
September 11, 2001). Mandel ’s narrow standard of review “has
particular force” in admission and immigration cases that overlap
with “the area of national security.” Din , 576 U. S.,
at ___ (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3). For
one, “[j]udicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises
concerns for the separation of powers” by intruding on the
President’s constitutional responsibilities in the area of foreign
affairs. Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U. S. ___, ___
(2017) (slip op., at 19) (internal quotation marks omitted). For
another, “when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing
inferences” on questions of national security, “the lack of
competence on the part of the courts is marked.” Humanitarian
Law Project , 561 U. S., at 34.

															The upshot of our cases in this context is
clear: “Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility” of the President “to respond to changing world
conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution,” and
our inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly
constrained. Mathews , 426 U. S., at 81–82. We need not
define the precise contours of that inquiry in this case. A
conventional application of Mandel , asking only whether the
policy is facially legitimate and bona fide, would put an end to
our review. But the Government has suggested that it may be
appropriate here for the inquiry to extend beyond the facial
neutrality of the order. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 16–17, 25–27
(describing Mandel as “the starting point” of the analysis).
For our purposes today, we assume that we may look behind the face
of the Proclamation to the extent of applying rational basis
review. That standard of review considers whether the entry policy
is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to
protect the country and improve vetting processes. See Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz , 449 U. S. 166, 179 (1980).
As a result, we may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but
will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood
to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional
grounds.[ 5 ]

															D

															Given the standard of review, it should come
as no surprise that the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as
illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny. On the few occasions
where we have done so, a common thread has been that the laws at
issue lack any purpose other than a “bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group.” Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno , 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973).
In one case, we invalidated a local zoning ordinance that required
a special permit for group homes for the intellectually disabled,
but not for other facilities such as fraternity houses or
hospitals. We did so on the ground that the city’s stated concerns
about (among other things) “legal responsibility” and “crowded
conditions” rested on “an irrational prejudice” against the
intellectually dis- abled. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. , 473 U. S. 432, 448–450 (1985) (internal
quotation marks omitted). And in another case, this Court
overturned a state constitutional amendment that denied gays and
lesbians access to the protection of antidiscrimination laws. The
amendment, we held, was “divorced from any factual context from
which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state
interests,” and “its sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it” that the initiative seemed “inexplicable by
anything but animus.” Romer v. Evans , 517 U. S.
620, 632, 635 (1996).

															The Proclamation does not fit this pattern. It
cannot be said that it is impossible to “discern a relationship to
legitimate state interests” or that the policy is “inexplicable by
anything but animus.” Indeed, the dissent can only attempt to argue
otherwise by refusing to apply anything resembling rational basis
review. But because there is persuasive evidence that the entry
suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security
concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept
that independent justification.

															The Proclamation is expressly premised on
legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be
adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their
practices. The text says nothing about religion. Plaintiffs and the
dissent nonetheless emphasize that five of the seven nations
currently included in the Proclamation have Muslim-majority
populations. Yet that fact alone does not support an inference of
religious hostility, given that the policy covers just 8% of the
world’s Muslim population and is limited to countries that were
previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as
posing national security risks. See 8 U. S. C.
§1187(a)(12)(A) (identifying Syria and state sponsors of terrorism
such as Iran as “countr[ies] or area[s] of concern” for purposes of
administering the Visa Waiver Program); Dept. of Homeland Security,
DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver
Program (Feb. 18, 2016) (designating Libya, Somalia, and Yemen as
additional countries of concern); see also Rajah , 544 F. 3d,
at 433, n. 3 (describing how nonimmigrant aliens from Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Syria, and Yemen were covered by the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System).

															The Proclamation, moreover, reflects the results
of a worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet
officials and their agencies. Plaintiffs seek to discredit the
findings of the review, pointing to deviations from the review’s
baseline criteria resulting in the inclusion of Somalia and
omission of Iraq. But as the Proclamation explains, in each case
the determinations were justified by the distinct conditions in
each country. Although Somalia generally satisfies the
information-sharing component of the baseline criteria, it “stands
apart . . . in the degree to which [it] lacks command and
control of its territory.” Proclamation §2(h)(i). As for Iraq, the
Secretary of Homeland Security determined that entry restrictions
were not warranted in light of the close cooperative relationship
between the U. S. and Iraqi Governments and the country’s key
role in combating terrorism in the region. §1(g). It is, in any
event, difficult to see how exempting one of the largest
predominantly Muslim countries in the region from coverage under
the Proclamation can be cited as evidence of animus toward
Muslims.

															The dissent likewise doubts the thoroughness of
the multi-agency review because a recent Freedom of Information Act
request shows that the final DHS report “was a mere 17 pages.” Post, at 19. Yet a simple page count offers little insight
into the actual substance of the final report, much less
predecisional materials underlying it. See 5 U. S. C.
§552(b)(5) (exempting deliberative materials from FOIA
disclosure).

															More fundamentally, plaintiffs and the dissent
challenge the entry suspension based on their perception of its
effectiveness and wisdom. They suggest that the policy is overbroad
and does little to serve national security interests. But we cannot
substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive
judgments on such matters, all of which “are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy.” Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp. , 333 U. S. 103,
111 (1948); see also Regan v. Wald , 468 U. S.
222, 242–243 (1984) (declining invitation to conduct an
“independent foreign policy analysis”). While we of course “do not
defer to the Government’s reading of the First Amendment,” the
Executive’s evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled to
appropriate weight, particularly in the context of litigation
involving “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and
foreign affairs.” Humanitarian Law Project , 561 U. S.,
at 33–34.[ 6 ]

															Three additional features of the entry policy
support the Government’s claim of a legitimate national security
interest. First, since the President introduced entry restrictions
in January 2017, three Muslim-majority countries—Iraq, Sudan, and
Chad—have been removed from the list of covered countries. The
Proclamation emphasizes that its “conditional restrictions” will
remain in force only so long as necessary to “address” the
identified “inadequacies and risks,” Proclamation Preamble, and
§1(h), and establishes an ongoing process to engage covered nations
and assess every 180 days whether the entry restrictions should be
terminated, §§4(a), (b). In fact, in announcing the termination of
restrictions on nationals of Chad, the President also described
Libya’s ongoing engagement with the State Department and the steps
Libya is taking “to improve its practices.” Proclamation No. 9723,
83 Fed. Reg. 15939.

															Second, for those countries that remain subject
to entry restrictions, the Proclamation includes significant
exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals. The policy
permits nationals from nearly every covered country to travel to
the United States on a variety of nonimmigrant visas. See, e.g., §§2(b)–(c), (g), (h) (permitting student and exchange
visitors from Iran, while restricting only business and tourist
nonimmigrant entry for nationals of Libya and Yemen, and imposing
no restrictions on nonimmigrant entry for Somali nationals). These
carveouts for nonimmigrant visas are substantial: Over the last
three fiscal years—before the Proclamation was in effect—the
majority of visas issued to nationals from the covered countries
were nonimmigrant visas. Brief for Petitioners 57. The Proclamation
also exempts permanent resi- dents and individuals who have been
granted asylum. §§3(b)(i), (vi).

															Third, the Proclamation creates a waiver program
open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants
or nonimmigrants. According to the Proclamation, consular officers
are to consider in each admissibility determination whether the
alien demonstrates that (1) denying entry would cause undue
hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to public safety; and
(3) entry would be in the interest of the United States. §3(c)(i);
see also §3(c)(iv) (listing examples of when a waiver might be
appropriate, such as if the foreign national seeks to reside with a
close family member, obtain urgent medical care, or pursue
significant business obligations). On its face, this program is
similar to the humanitarian exceptions set forth in President
Carter’s order during the Iran hostage crisis. See Exec. Order No.
12206, 3 CFR 249; Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy Carter,
Sanctions Against Iran, at 611–612 (1980) (outlining exceptions).
The Proclamation also directs DHS and the State Department to issue
guidance elaborating upon the circumstances that would justify a
waiver.[ 7 ]

															Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States , 323 U. S. 214 (1944). Whatever
rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible
relocation of U. S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and
explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and
outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt
to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy
denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. See post, at 26–28. The entry suspension is an act that is well
within executive authority and could have been taken by any other
President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this
particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid
Proclamation.

															The dissent’s reference to Korematsu ,
however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is
already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be
clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” 323 U. S.,
at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

															*  *  *

															Under these circumstances, the Government has
set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive
rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness of the
policy. We simply hold today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated
a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional
claim.

															V

															Because plaintiffs have not shown that they
are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, we reverse the
grant of the preliminary injunction as an abuse of discretion. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,
555 U. S. 7, 32 (2008). The case now returns to the lower
courts for such further proceedings as may be appropriate. Our
disposition of the case makes it unnecessary to consider the
propriety of the nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the
District Court.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 The President also
invoked his power under 8 U. S. C. §1185(a)(1), which
grants the President authority to adopt “reasonable rules,
regulations, and orders” governing entry or removal of aliens,
“subject to such limitations and exceptions as [he] may prescribe.”
Because this provision “substantially overlap[s]” with
§1182(f ), we agree with the Government that we “need not
resolve . . . the precise relationship between the two
statutes” in evaluating the validity of the Proclamation. Brief for
Petitioners 32–33. 2 The Proclamation states
that it does not disclose every ground for the country-specific
restrictions because “[d]escribing all of those reasons publicly
. . . would cause serious damage to the national security
of the United States, and many such descriptions are classified.”
§1(j). 3 The Act is rife with
examples distinguishing between the two concepts. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(4) (“The term ‘application for
admission’ has reference to the application for admission into the
United States and not to the application for the issuance of an
immigrant or nonimmigrant visa.”); §1182(a) (“ineligible to receive
visas and ineligible to be admitted”); §1182(a)(3)(D)(iii)
(“establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when
applying for a visa . . . or to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General when applying for admission”); §1182(h)(1)(A)(i)
(“alien’s application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of
status”); §1187 (permitting entry without a visa); §1361
(establishing burden of proof for when a person “makes application
for a visa . . . , or makes application for admission, or
otherwise attempts to enter the United States”). 4 The concepts of entry and
admission—but not issuance of a visa—are used interchangeably in
the INA. See §1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission” as the “lawful
entry of the alien into the United States”). 5 The dissent finds
“perplexing” the application of rational basis review in this
context. Post, at 15. But what is far more problematic is
the dissent’s assumption that courts should review immigration
policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military actions under
the de novo “reasonable observer” inquiry
applicable to cases involving holiday displays and graduation
ceremonies. The dissent criticizes application of a more
constrained standard of review as “throw[ing] the Establishment
Clause out the window.” Post, at 16, n. 6. But as the
numerous precedents cited in this section make clear, such a
circumscribed inquiry applies to any constitutional claim
concerning the entry of foreign nationals. See Part IV–C, supra . The dissent can cite no authority for its proposition
that the more free-ranging inquiry it proposes is appropriate in
the national security and foreign affairs context. 6 The dissent recycles much
of plaintiffs’ §1182(f ) argument to assert that “Congress has
already erected a statutory scheme that fulfills” the President’s
stated concern about deficient vetting. Post, at 19–21. But
for the reasons set forth earlier, Congress has not in any sense
“stepped into the space and solved the exact problem.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 53. Neither the existing inadmissibility grounds nor the
narrow Visa Waiver Program address the failure of certain high-risk
countries to provide a minimum baseline of reliable information.
See Part III–B–1, supra . 7 Justice Breyer focuses on
only one aspect of our consideration—the waiver program and other
exemptions in the Proclamation. Citing selective statistics,
anecdotal evidence, and a declaration from unre-lated litigation,
Justice Breyer suggests that not enough individuals are receiving
waivers or exemptions. Post, at 4–8 (dissenting opinion).
Yet even if such an inquiry were appropriate under rational basis
review, the evidence he cites provides “but a piece of the
picture,” post, at 6, and does not affect our
analysis. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–965

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2018]

															Justice Kennedy, concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion in full.

															There may be some common ground between the
opinions in this case, in that the Court does acknowledge that in
some instances, governmental action may be subject to judicial
review to determine whether or not it is “inexplicable by anything
but animus,” Romer v. Evans , 517 U. S. 620, 632
(1996), which in this case would be animosity to a religion.
Whether judicial proceedings may properly continue in this case, in
light of the substantial deference that is and must be accorded to
the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, and in light of
today’s decision, is a matter to be addressed in the first instance
on remand. And even if further proceedings are permitted, it would
be necessary to determine that any discovery and other preliminary
matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign affairs power
of the Executive.

															In all events, it is appropriate to make this
further observation. There are numerous instances in which the
statements and actions of Government officials are not subject to
judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those
officials are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it
proclaims and protects. The oath that all officials take to adhere
to the Constitution is not confined to those spheres in which the
Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials say
or do. Indeed, the very fact that an official may have broad
discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all
the more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution
and to its meaning and its promise.

															The First Amendment prohibits the establishment
of religion and promises the free exercise of religion. From these
safeguards, and from the guarantee of freedom of speech, it follows
there is freedom of belief and expression. It is an urgent
necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional guarantees
and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign
affairs. An anxious world must know that our Government remains
committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to
preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and
lasts. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–965

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2018]

															Thomas, J., concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion, which highlights
just a few of the many problems with the plaintiffs’ claims. There
are several more. Section 1182(f) does not set forth any judicially
enforceable limits that constrain the President. See Webster v. Doe , 486 U. S. 592, 600 (1988). Nor could it, since
the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from
the country. See United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy , 338 U. S. 537,
542–543 (1950); accord, Sessions v. Dimaya , 584
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 13–14). Further, the Establishment Clause does not create an
individual right to be free from all laws that a “reasonable
observer” views as religious or antireligious. See Town of
Greece v. Galloway , 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip
op., at 6); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow ,
542 U. S. 1, 52–53 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment). The plaintiffs cannot raise any other First Amendment
claim, since the alleged religious discrimination in this case was
directed at aliens abroad. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990). And, even
on its own terms, the plaintiffs’ proffered evidence of anti-Muslim
discrimination is unpersuasive.

															Merits aside, I write separately to address the
remedy that the plaintiffs sought and obtained in this case. The
District Court imposed an injunction that barred the Government
from enforcing the President’s Proclamation against anyone, not
just the plaintiffs. Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch
from applying a law or policy against anyone—often called
“universal” or “nationwide” injunctions—have become increasingly
common.[ 1 ] District courts,
including the one here, have begun imposing universal injunctions
without considering their authority to grant such sweeping relief.
These injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court
system—preventing legal questions from percolating through the
federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making every case a
national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.

															I am skeptical that district courts have the
authority to enter universal injunctions. These injunctions did not
emerge until a century and a half after the founding. And they
appear to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable
relief and the power of Article III courts. If their popularity
continues, this Court must address their legality.

															I

															If district courts have any authority to issue
universal injunctions, that authority must come from a statute or
the Constitution. See Missouri v. Jenkins , 515
U. S. 70

															124 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). No
statute expressly grants district courts the power to issue
universal injunctions.[ 2 ] So
the only possible bases for these injunctions are a generic statute
that authorizes equitable relief or the courts’ inherent
constitutional authority. Neither of those sources would permit a
form of injunctive relief that is “[in]consistent with our history
and traditions.” Ibid .

															A

															This Court has never treated general statutory
grants of equitable authority as giving federal courts a
freewheeling power to fashion new forms of equitable remedies.
Rather, it has read such statutes as constrained by “the body of
law which had been transplanted to this country from the English
Court of Chancery” in 1789. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York , 326 U. S. 99, 105 (1945). As Justice Story
explained, this Court’s “settled doctrine” under such statutes is
that “the remedies in equity are to be administered . . .
according to the practice of courts of equity in [England].” Boyle v. Zacharie & Turner , 6 Pet. 648, 658
(1832). More recently, this Court reiterated that broad statutory
grants of equitable authority give federal courts “ ‘an
authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the
system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the
separation of the two countries.’ ” Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. , 527
U. S. 308, 318 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Atlas Life Ins.
Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc. , 306 U. S. 563, 568
(1939)).

															B

															The same is true of the courts’ inherent
constitutional authority to grant equitable relief, assuming any
such authority exists. See Jenkins , 515 U. S., at 124
(Thomas, J., concurring). This authority is also limited by the
traditional rules of equity that existed at the founding.

															The scope of the federal courts’ equitable
authority under the Constitution was a point of contention at the
founding, and the “more limited construction” of that power
prevailed. Id., at 126. The founding generation viewed
equity “with suspicion.” Id. , at 128. Several
anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution’s extension of the
federal judicial power to “Case[s] in . . . Equity,”
Art. III, §2, as “giv[ing] the judge a discretionary power.”
Letters from The Federal Farmer No. XV (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 315, 322 (H. Storing ed. 1981). That
discretionary power, the anti-Federalists alleged, would allow
courts to “explain the constitution according to the reasoning
spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.”
Essays of Brutus No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788), in id., at 417,
419–420. The Federalists responded to this concern by emphasizing
the limited nature of equity. Hamilton explained that the judiciary
would be “bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(Federalist). Although the purpose of a court of equity was “to
give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general
rules,” “the principles by which that relief is governed are now
reduced to a regular system.” Id. No. 83 at 505 (emphasis
deleted).

															The Federalists’ explanation was consistent with
how equity worked in 18th-century England. English courts of equity
applied established rules not only when they decided the merits,
but also when they fashioned remedies. Like other aspects of
equity, “the system of relief administered by a court of equity”
had been reduced “into a regular science.” 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 440–441 (1768) (Blackstone). As
early as 1768, Blackstone could state that the “remedy a suitor is
entitled to expect” could be determined “as readily and with as
much precision, in a court of equity as in a court of law.” Id., at 441. Although courts of equity exercised remedial
“discretion,” that discretion allowed them to deny or tailor a
remedy despite a demonstrated violation of a right, not to expand a
remedy beyond its traditional scope. See G. Keeton, An Introduction
to Equity 117–118 (1938).

															In short, whether the authority comes from a
statute or the Constitution, district courts’ authority to provide
equitable relief is meaningfully constrained. This author- ity must
comply with longstanding principles of equity that predate this
country’s founding.

															II

															Universal injunctions do not seem to comply
with those principles. These injunctions are a recent development,
emerging for the first time in the 1960s and dramatically
increasing in popularity only very recently. And they appear to
conflict with several traditional rules of equity, as well as the
original understanding of the judicial role.

															Equity originated in England as a means for the
Crown to dispense justice by exercising its sovereign authority.
See Adams, The Origins of English Equity, 16 Colum. L. Rev.
87, 91 (1916). Petitions for equitable relief were referred to the
Chancellor, who oversaw cases in equity. See 1 S. Symon’s,
Pomeroy’s, Equity Jurisprudence §33 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy); G.
McDowell, Equity and the Constitution 24 (1982). The Chancellor’s
equitable jurisdiction was based on the “reserve of justice in the
king.” F. Maitland, Equity 3 (2d ed. 1936); see also 1 Pomeroy §33,
at 38 (describing the Chancellor’s equitable authority as an
“extraordinary jurisdiction—that of Grace —by delegation”
from the King). Equity allowed the sovereign to afford
discretionary relief to parties where relief would not have been
available under the “rigors of the common law.” Jenkins , supra , at 127 (opinion of Thomas, J.).

															The English system of equity did not contemplate
universal injunctions. As an agent of the King, the Chancellor had
no authority to enjoin him. See Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425
(2017) (Bray). The Chancellor could not give “any relief against
the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make any decree
disposing of or affecting his property; not even in cases where he
is a royal trustee.” 3 Blackstone 428. The Attorney General could
be sued in Chancery, but not in cases that “ ‘immediately
concerned’ ” the interests of the Crown. Bray 425 (citing 1 E.
Daniell, The Practice of the High Court of Chancery 138 (2d ed.
1845)). American courts inherited this tradition. See J. Story,
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings §69 (1838) (Story).

															Moreover, as a general rule, American courts of
equity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case. If
their injunctions advantaged nonparties, that benefit was merely
incidental. Injunctions barring public nuisances were an example.
While these injunctions benefited third parties, that benefit was
merely a consequence of providing relief to the plaintiff.
Woolhandler & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?
102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 702 (2004) (Woolhandler & Nelson);
see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co. , 13 How. 518, 564 (1852) (explaining that a private “injury
makes [a public nuisance] a private nuisance to the injured
party”).

															True, one of the recognized bases for an
exercise of equitable power was the avoidance of “multiplicity of
suits.” Bray 426; accord, 1 Pomeroy §243. Courts would employ
“bills of peace” to consider and resolve a number of suits in a
single proceeding. Id ., §246. And some authorities stated
that these suits could be filed by one plaintiff on behalf of a
number of others. Id ., §251. But the “general rule” was that
“all persons materially interested . . . in the
subject-matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it
. . . , however numerous they may be, so that there may
be a complete decree, which shall bind them all.” Story §72, at 61
(emphasis added). And, in all events, these “proto-class action[s]”
were limited to a small group of similarly situated plaintiffs
having some right in common. Bray 426–427; see also Story §120, at
100 (explaining that such suits were “always” based on “a common
interest or a common right”).

															American courts’ tradition of providing
equitable relief only to parties was consistent with their view of
the nature of judicial power. For most of our history, courts
understood judicial power as “fundamentall[y] the power to render
judgments in individual cases.” Murphy v. National
Collegiate Athletic Assn. , 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3). They did not believe
that courts could make federal policy, and they did not view
judicial review in terms of “striking down” laws or regulations.
See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). Misuses of judicial
power, Hamilton reassured the people of New York, could not
threaten “the general liberty of the people” because courts, at
most, adjudicate the rights of “individual[s].” Federalist No. 78,
at 466.

															The judiciary’s limited role was also reflected
in this Court’s decisions about who could sue to vindicate certain
rights. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U. S.
___, ___–___ (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–4). A
plaintiff could not bring a suit vindicating public
rights— i.e., rights held by the community at large—without a
showing of some specific injury to himself. Id., at ___–___
(slip op., at 3–4). And a plaintiff could not sue to vindicate the
private rights of someone else. See Woolhandler & Nelson
715–716. Such claims were considered to be beyond the authority of
courts. Id., at 711–717.

															This Court has long respected these traditional
limits on equity and judicial power. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald , 165 U. S. 107, 115 (1897) (rejecting an
injunction based on the theory that the plaintiff “so represents
[a] class” whose rights were infringed by a statute as “too
conjectural to furnish a safe basis upon which a court of equity
ought to grant an injunction”). Take, for example, this Court’s
decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon , 262 U. S.
447 (1923). There, a taxpayer sought to enjoin the enforcement of
an appropriation statute. The Court noted that this kind of dispute
“is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.” Id., at 487. A general interest in enjoining implementation
of an illegal law, this Court explained, provides “no basis
. . . for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court
of equity.” Ibid. Courts can review the constitutionality of
an act only when “a justiciable issue” requires it to decide
whether to “disregard an unconstitutional enactment.” Id., at 488. If the statute is unconstitutional, then courts enjoin “not
the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official.” Ibid. Courts cannot issue an injunction based on a mere
allegation “that officials of the executive department of the
government are executing and will execute an act of Congress
asserted to be unconstitutional.” Ibid. “To do so would be
not to decide a judicial controversy.” Id., at 488–489.

															By the latter half of the 20th century, however,
some jurists began to conceive of the judicial role in terms of
resolving general questions of legality, instead of addressing
those questions only insofar as they are necessary to resolve
individual cases and controversies. See Bray 451. That is when what
appears to be “the first [universal] injunction in the United
States” emerged. Bray 438. In Wirtz v. Baldor Elec . Co ., 337 F. 2d 518 (CADC 1963), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed a lawsuit
challenging the Secretary of Labor’s determination of the
prevailing minimum wage for a particular industry. Id. , at
520. The D. C. Circuit concluded that the Secretary’s
determination was unsupported, but remanded for the District Court
to assess whether any of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
it. Id., at 521–535. The D. C. Circuit also addressed
the question of remedy, explaining that if a plaintiff had standing
to sue then “the District Court should enjoin . . . the
Secretary’s determination with respect to the entire
industry .” Id., at 535 (emphasis added). To justify this
broad relief, the D. C. Circuit explained that executive
officers should honor judicial decisions “in all cases of
essentially the same character.” Id., at 534. And it noted
that, once a court has decided an issue, it “would ordinarily give
the same relief to any individual who comes to it with an
essentially similar cause of action.” Ibid. The D. C.
Circuit added that the case was “clearly a proceeding in which
those who have standing are here to vindicate the public interest
in having congressional enactments prop- erly interpreted and
applied.” Id., at 534–535.

															Universal injunctions remained rare in the
decades following Wirtz . See Bray 440–445. But recently,
they have exploded in popularity. See id., at 457–459. Some
scholars have criticized the trend. See generally id., at
457–465; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the
Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B. U. L. Rev.
615, 633–653 (2017); Morley, De Facto Class Actions?
Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights,
Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 Harv. J. L.
& Pub. Pol’y 487, 521–538 (2016).

															No persuasive defense has yet been offered for
the practice. Defenders of these injunctions contend that they
ensure that individuals who did not challenge a law are treated the
same as plaintiffs who did, and that universal injunctions give the
judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch. See Amdur
& Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131
Harv. L. Rev. Forum 49, 51, 54 (2017); Malveaux, Class
Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 Harv.
L. Rev. Forum 56, 57, 60–62 (2017). But these arguments do not
explain how these injunctions are consistent with the historical
limits on equity and judicial power. They at best “boi[l] down to a
policy judgment” about how powers ought to be allocated among our
three branches of government. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Assn. , 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 23). But the people already made that
choice when they ratified the Constitution.

															*  *  *

															In sum, universal injunctions are legally and
historically dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them,
this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so. Notes 1 “Nationwide injunctions”
is perhaps the more common term. But I use the term “universal
injunctions” in this opinion because it is more precise. These
injunctions are distinctive because they prohibit the Government
from enforcing a policy with respect to anyone, including
nonparties—not because they have wide geographic breadth. An
injunction that was properly limited to the plaintiffs in the case
would not be invalid simply because it governed the defendant’s
conduct nationwide. 2 Even if Congress someday
enacted a statute that clearly and expressly authorized universal
injunctions, courts would need to consider whether that statute
complies with the limits that Article III places on the authority
of federal courts. See infra , at 7–8. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–965

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2018]

															Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Kagan joins,
dissenting.

															The question before us is whether Proclamation
No. 9645 is lawful. If its promulgation or content was
significantly affected by religious animus against Muslims, it
would violate the relevant statute or the First Amendment itself.
See 8 U. S. C. §1182(f) (requiring “find[ings]” that
persons denied entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States”); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U. S. 520 (1993) ( First Amendment); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm’n , 584 U. S. ___ (2018) (same); post, at 2–4
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). If, however, its sole ratio
decidendi was one of national security, then it would be
unlikely to violate either the statute or the Constitution. Which
is it? Members of the Court principally disagree about the answer
to this question, i.e., about whether or the extent to which
religious animus played a significant role in the Proclamation’s
promulgation or content.

															In my view, the Proclamation’s elaborate system
of exemptions and waivers can and should help us answer this
question. That system provides for case-by-case consideration of
persons who may qualify for visas despite the Proclamation’s
general ban. Those persons include lawful permanent residents,
asylum seekers, refugees, students, children, and numerous others.
There are likely many such persons, perhaps in the thousands. And I
believe it appropriate to take account of their
Proclamation-granted status when considering the Proclamation’s
lawfulness. The Solicitor General asked us to consider the
Proclamation “as” it is “written” and “as” it is “applied,” waivers
and exemptions included. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. He warned us against
considering the Proclamation’s lawfulness “on the hypothetical
situation that [the Proclamation] is what it isn’t,” ibid., while telling us that its waiver and exemption provisions mean what
they say: The Proclamation does not exclude individuals from the
United States “if they meet the criteria” for a waiver or
exemption. Id., at 33.

															On the one hand, if the Government is applying
the exemption and waiver provisions as written, then its argument
for the Proclamation’s lawfulness is strengthened. For one thing,
the Proclamation then resembles more closely the two important
Presidential precedents on point, President Carter’s Iran order and
President Reagan’s Cuba proclamation, both of which contained
similar categories of persons authorized to obtain case-by-case
exemptions. Ante, at 36–37; Exec. Order No. 12172, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67947 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12206, 45 Fed.
Reg. 24101 (1980); Presidential Proclamation No. 5517, 51 Fed. Reg.
30470 (1986). For another thing, the Proclamation then follows more
closely the basic statutory scheme, which provides for strict
case-by-case scrutiny of applications. It would deviate from that
system, not across the board, but where circumstances may require
that deviation.

															Further, since the case-by-case exemptions and
waivers apply without regard to the individual’s religion,
application of that system would help make clear that the
Proclamation does not deny visas to numerous Muslim individuals
(from those countries) who do not pose a security threat. And that
fact would help to rebut the First Amendment claim that the
Proclamation rests upon anti-Muslim bias rather than security need.
Finally, of course, the very fact that Muslims from those countries
would enter the United States (under Proclamation-provided
exemptions and waivers) would help to show the same thing.

															On the other hand, if the Government is not applying the system of exemptions and waivers that the
Proclamation contains, then its argument for the Proclamation’s
lawfulness becomes significantly weaker. For one thing, the
relevant precedents—those of Presidents Carter and Reagan—would
bear far less resemblance to the present Proclamation. Indeed, one
might ask, if those two Presidents thought a case-by-case exemption
system appropriate, what is different about present circumstances
that would justify that system’s absence?

															For another thing, the relevant statute requires
that there be “find[ings]” that the grant of visas to excluded
persons would be “detrimental to the interests of the United
States.” §1182(f ). Yet there would be no such findings in
respect to those for whom the Proclamation itself provides
case-by-case examination (followed by the grant of a visa in
appropriate cases).

															And, perhaps most importantly, if the Government
is not applying the Proclamation’s exemption and waiver system, the
claim that the Proclamation is a “Muslim ban,” rather than a
“security-based” ban, becomes much stronger. How could the
Government successfully claim that the Proclamation rests on
security needs if it is excluding Muslims who satisfy the
Proclamation’s own terms? At the same time, denying visas to
Muslims who meet the Proclamation’s own security terms would
support the view that the Government excludes them for reasons
based upon their religion.

															Unfortunately there is evidence that supports
the second possibility, i.e., that the Government is not
applying the Proclamation as written. The Proclamation provides
that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security
“shall coordinate to adopt guidance” for consular officers to
follow when deciding whether to grant a waiver. §3(c)(ii). Yet, to
my knowledge, no guidance has issued. The only potentially relevant
document I have found consists of a set of State Department answers
to certain Frequently Asked Questions, but this document simply
restates the Proclamation in plain language for visa applicants. It
does not provide guidance for consular officers as to how they are
to exercise their discretion. See Dept. of State, FAQs on the
Presidential Proclamation, https://
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-
resources/presidential-proclamation-archive/2017-12-04-Presidential-Proclamation.html
(all Internet materials as last visited June 25, 2018).

															An examination of publicly available statistics
also provides cause for concern. The State Department reported that
during the Proclamation’s first month, two waivers were approved
out of 6,555 eligible applicants. Letter from M. Waters, Assistant
Secretary Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Van Hollen (Feb. 22, 2018).
In its reply brief, the Government claims that number increased
from 2 to 430 during the first four months of implementation. Reply
Brief 17. That number, 430, however, when compared with the number
of pre-Proclamation visitors, accounts for a miniscule percentage
of those likely eligible for visas, in such categories as persons
requiring medical treatment, academic visitors, students, family
members, and others belonging to groups that, when considered as a
group (rather than case by case), would not seem to pose security
threats. Amici have suggested that there are
numerous applicants who could meet the waiver criteria. For
instance, the Proclamation anticipates waivers for those with
“significant business or professional obligations” in the United
States, §3(c)(iv)(C), and amici identify many scholars who
would seem to qualify. Brief for Colleges and Universities as Amici Curiae 25–27; Brief for American Council on Education
et al. as Amici Curiae 20 (identifying more than 2,100
scholars from covered countries); see also Brief for Massachusetts
Technology Leadership Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 14–15
(identifying technology and business leaders from covered
countries). The Proclamation also anticipates waivers for those
with a “close family member ( e.g., a spouse, child, or
parent)” in the United States, §3(c)(iv)(D), and amici identify many such individuals affected by the Proclamation. Brief
for Labor Organizations as Amici Curiae 15–18 (identifying
children and other relatives of U. S. citizens). The Pars Equality
Center identified 1,000 individuals—including parents and children
of U. S. citizens—who sought and were denied entry under the
Proclamation, hundreds of whom seem to meet the waiver criteria.
See Brief for Pars Equality Center et al. as Amici Curiae 12–28.

															Other data suggest the same. The Proclamation
does not apply to asylum seekers or refugees. §§3(b)(vi), 6(e). Yet
few refugees have been admitted since the Proclamation took effect.
While more than 15,000 Syrian refugees arrived in the United States
in 2016, only 13 have arrived since January 2018. Dept. of State,
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Interactive
Reporting, Refugee Processing Center, http://ireports.wrapsnet.org.
Similarly few refugees have been admitted since January from Iran
(3), Libya (1), Yemen (0), and Somalia (122). Ibid. The Proclamation also exempts individuals
applying for several types of nonimmigrant visas: lawful permanent
residents, parolees, those with certain travel documents, dual
nationals of noncovered countries, and representatives of
governments or international organizations. §§3(b)(i)–(v). It
places no restrictions on the vast majority of student and exchange
visitors, covering only those from Syria, which provided 8 percent
of student and exchange visitors from the five countries in 2016.
§§2(b)–(h); see Dept. of State, Report of the Visa Office 2016,
Table XVII Nonimmigrant Visas Issued Fiscal Year 2016 (Visa Report
2016 Table XVII). Visitors from Somalia are eligible for any type
of nonimmigrant visa, subject to “additional scrutiny.” §2(h)(ii).
If nonimmigrant visa applications under the Proclamation resemble
those in 2016, 16 percent of visa applicants would be eligible for
exemptions. See Visa Report 2016 Table XVII.

															In practice, however, only 258 student visas
were issued to applicants from Iran (189), Libya (29), Yemen (40),
and Somalia (0) in the first three months of 2018. See Dept. of
State, Nonimmigrant Visa Issuances by Nationality, Jan., Feb., and
Mar. 2018. This is less than a quarter of the volume needed to be
on track for 2016 student visa levels. And only 40 nonimmigrant
visas have been issued to Somali nationals, a decrease of 65
percent from 2016. Ibid. ; see Visa Report 2016 Table XVII.
While this is but a piece of the picture, it does not provide
grounds for confidence.

															Anecdotal evidence further heightens these
concerns. For example, one amicus identified a child with
cerebral palsy in Yemen. The war had prevented her from receiving
her medication, she could no longer move or speak, and her doctors
said she would not survive in Yemen. Her visa application was
denied. Her family received a form with a check mark in the box
unambiguously confirming that “ ‘a waiver will not be granted
in your case.’ ” Letter from L. Blatt to S. Harris, Clerk of
Court (May 1, 2018). But after the child’s case was highlighted in
an amicus brief before this Court, the family received an
update from the consular officer who had initially denied the
waiver. It turns out, according to the officer, that she had all
along determined that the waiver criteria were met. But, the
officer explained, she could not relay that information at the time
because the waiver required review from a supervisor, who had since
approved it. The officer said that the family’s case was now in
administrative processing and that she was attaching a
“ ‘revised refusal letter indicating the approval of the
waiver.’ ” Ibid. The new form did not actually approve
the waiver (in fact, the form contains no box saying “granted”).
But a different box was now checked, reading: “ ‘The consular
officer is reviewing your eligibility for a waiver under the
Proclamation. . . . This can be a lengthy process,
and until the consular officer can make an individualized
determination of [the relevant] factors, your visa application will
remain refused under Section 212(f) [of the Proclamation].’ ” Ibid. One is left to wonder why this second box, indicating
continuing review, had not been checked at the outset if in fact
the child’s case had remained under consideration all along. Though
this is but one incident and the child was admitted after
considerable international attention in this case, it provides yet
more reason to believe that waivers are not being processed in an
ordinary way.

															Finally, in a pending case in the Eastern
District of New York, a consular official has filed a sworn
affidavit asserting that he and other officials do not, in fact,
have discretion to grant waivers. According to the affidavit,
consular officers “were not allowed to exercise that discretion”
and “the waiver [process] is merely ‘window dressing.’ ” See
Decl. of Christopher Richardson, Alharbi v. Miller ,
No. 1:18-cv-2435 (June 1, 2018), pp. 3–4. Another report similarly
indicates that the U. S. Embassy in Djibouti, which processes
visa applications for citizens of Yemen, received instructions to
grant waivers “only in rare cases of imminent danger,” with one
consular officer reportedly telling an applicant that
“ ‘[e]ven for infants, we would need to see some evidence of a
congenital heart defect or another medical issue of that degree of
difficulty that . . . would likely lead to the
child’s developmental harm or death.’ ” Center for
Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law School,
Window Dressing the Muslim Ban: Reports of Waivers and Mass Denials
from Yemeni-American Families Stuck in Limbo 18 (2018).

															Declarations, anecdotal evidence, facts, and
numbers taken from amicus briefs are not judicial
factfindings. The Government has not had an opportunity to respond,
and a court has not had an opportunity to decide. But, given the
importance of the decision in this case, the need for assurance
that the Proclamation does not rest upon a “Muslim ban,” and the
assistance in deciding the issue that answers to the “exemption and
waiver” questions may provide, I would send this case back to the
District Court for further proceedings. And, I would leave the
injunction in effect while the matter is litigated. Regardless, the
Court’s decision today leaves the District Court free to explore
these issues on remand.

															If this Court must decide the question without
this further litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of
antireligious bias, including statements on a website taken down
only after the President issued the two executive orders preceding
the Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, a sufficient basis to set the
Proclamation aside. And for these reasons, I respectfully
dissent. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–965

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, et al., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2018]

															Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg
joins, dissenting.

															The United States of America is a Nation built
upon the promise of religious liberty. Our Founders honored that
core promise by embedding the principle of religious neutrality in
the First Amendment. The Court’s decision today fails to safeguard
that fundamental principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy first
advertised openly and unequivocally as a “total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” because the policy
now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns. But
this repackaging does little to cleanse Presidential Proclamation
No. 9645 of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s
words have created. Based on the evidence in the record, a
reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was
motivated by anti-Muslim animus. That alone suffices to show that
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their
Establishment Clause claim. The majority holds otherwise by
ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning
a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts
upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United
States citizens. Because that troubling result runs contrary to the
Constitution and our precedent, I dissent.

															I

															Plaintiffs challenge the Proclamation on
various grounds, both statutory and constitutional. Ordinarily,
when a case can be decided on purely statutory grounds, we strive
to follow a “prudential rule of avoiding constitutional questions.” Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist. , 509
U. S. 1, 8 (1993). But that rule of thumb is far from
categorical, and it has limited application where, as here, the
constitutional question proves far simpler than the statutory one.
Whatever the merits of plaintiffs’ complex statutory claims, the
Proclamation must be enjoined for a more fundamental reason: It
runs afoul of the Establishment Clause’s guarantee of religious
neutrality.

															A

															The Establishment Clause forbids government
policies “respecting an establishment of religion.” U. S.
Const., Amdt. 1. The “clearest command” of the Establishment Clause
is that the Government cannot favor or disfavor one religion over
another. Larson v. Valente , 456 U. S. 228, 244
(1982); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah ,
508 U. S. 520, 532 (1993) (“[T]he First Amendment forbids an
official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion”); Edwards v. Aguillard , 482 U. S. 578, 593 (1987)
(“The Establishment Clause . . . forbids alike the
preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of
theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lynch v. Donnelly , 465 U. S. 668, 673 (1984) (noting that the
Establishment Clause “forbids hostility toward any [religion],”
because “such hostility would bring us into ‘war with our national
tradition as embodied in the First Amendmen[t]’ ”); Epperson v. Arkansas , 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)
(“[T]he State may not adopt programs or practices . . .
which aid or oppose any religion. This prohibition is absolute”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Consistent with
that clear command, this Court has long acknowledged that
governmental actions that favor one religion “inevitabl[y]” foster
“the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who [hold]
contrary beliefs.” Engel v. Vitale , 370 U. S.
421, 431 (1962). That is so, this Court has held, because such acts
send messages to members of minority faiths “ ‘that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community.’ ” Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe , 530
U. S. 290, 309 (2000). To guard against this serious harm, the
Framers mandated a strict “principle of denominational neutrality.” Larson , 456 U. S., at 246; Board of Ed. of Kiryas
Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet , 512 U. S. 687,
703 (1994) (recognizing the role of courts in “safeguarding a
principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government
should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to
irreligion”).

															“When the government acts with the ostensible
and predominant purpose” of disfavoring a particular religion, “it
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official
religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the
government’s ostensible object is to take sides.” McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. , 545
U. S. 844, 860 (2005). To determine whether plaintiffs have
proved an Establishment Clause violation, the Court asks whether a
reasonable observer would view the government action as enacted for
the purpose of disfavoring a religion. See id. , at 862, 866;
accord, Town of Greece v. Galloway , 572 U. S.
___, ___ (2014) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 19).

															In answering that question, this Court has
generally considered the text of the government policy, its
operation, and any available evidence regarding “the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and
the legislative or administrative history, including
contemporaneous statements made by” the decisionmaker. Lukumi , 508 U. S., at 540 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); McCreary , 545 U. S., at 862 (courts must evaluate
“text, legislative history, and implementation
. . . , or comparable official act” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). At the same time, however, courts must
take care not to engage in “any judicial psychoanalysis of a
drafter’s heart of hearts.” Id. , at 862.

															B

															1

															Although the majority briefly recounts a few
of the statements and background events that form the basis of
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge, ante, at 27–28, that
highly abridged account does not tell even half of the story. See
Brief for The Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 5–31 (outlining President Trump’s public
statements expressing animus toward Islam). The full record paints
a far more harrowing picture, from which a reasonable observer
would readily conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by
hostility and animus toward the Muslim faith.

															During his Presidential campaign, then-candidate
Donald Trump pledged that, if elected, he would ban Muslims from
entering the United States. Specifically, on December 7, 2015, he
issued a formal statement “calling for a total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” App. 119. That
statement, which remained on his campaign website until May 2017
(several months into his Presidency), read in full:

															“Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our
country’s representatives can figure out what is going on.
According to Pew Research, among others, there is great hatred
towards Americans by large segments of the Muslim population. Most
recently, a poll from the Center for Security Policy released data
showing ‘25% of those polled agreed that violence against Americans
here in the United States is justified as a part of the global
jihad’ and 51% of those polled ‘agreed that Muslims in America
should have the choice of being governed according to Shariah.’
Shariah authorizes such atrocities as murder against nonbelievers
who won’t convert, beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose
great harm to Americans, especially women.

															“Mr. Trum[p] stated, ‘Without looking at the
various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond
comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to
determine. Until we are able to determine and understand this
problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our country cannot be
the victims of the horrendous attacks by people that believe only
in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect of human life. If
I win the election for President, we are going to Make America
Great Again.’—Donald J. Trump.” Id. , at 158; see also id. , at 130–131.

															On December 8, 2015, Trump justified his
proposal during a television interview by noting that President
Franklin D. Roosevelt “did the same thing” with respect to the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Id. ,
at 120. In January 2016, during a Republican primary debate, Trump
was asked whether he wanted to “rethink [ his] position” on
“banning Muslims from entering the country.” Ibid. He
answered, “No.” Ibid. A month later, at a rally in South
Carolina, Trump told an apocryphal story about United States
General John J. Pershing killing a large group of Muslim insurgents
in the Philippines with bullets dipped in pigs’ blood in the early
1900’s. Id. , at 163–164. In March 2016, he expressed his
belief that “Islam hates us. . . . [W]e can’t allow
people coming into this country who have this hatred of the United
States . . . [a]nd of people that are not Muslim.” Id., at 120–121. That same month, Trump asserted that
“[w]e’re having problems with the Muslims, and we’re having
problems with Muslims coming into the country.” Id. , at 121.
He therefore called for surveillance of mosques in the United
States, blaming terrorist attacks on Muslims’ lack of
“assimilation” and their commitment to “sharia law.” Ibid. ; id. , at 164. A day later, he opined that Muslims “do not
respect us at all” and “don’t respect a lot of the things that are
happening throughout not only our country, but they don’t respect
other things.” Ibid. As Trump’s presidential campaign progressed, he
began to describe his policy proposal in slightly different terms.
In June 2016, for instance, he characterized the policy proposal as
a suspension of immigration from countries “where there’s a proven
history of terrorism.” Id. , at 121. He also described the
proposal as rooted in the need to stop “importing radical Islamic
terrorism to the West through a failed immigration system.” Id. , at 121–122. Asked in July 2016 whether he was
“pull[ing] back from” his pledged Muslim ban, Trump responded, “I
actually don’t think it’s a rollback. In fact, you could say it’s
an expansion.” Id., at 122–123. He then explained that he
used different terminology because “[p]eople were so upset when
[he] used the word Muslim.” Id., at 123.

															A month before the 2016 election, Trump
reiterated that his proposed “Muslim ban” had “morphed into a[n]
extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” Ibid. Then, on December 21, 2016, President-elect Trump was asked whether
he would “rethink” his previous “plans to create a Muslim registry
or ban Muslim immigration.” Ibid. He replied: “You know my
plans. All along, I’ve proven to be right.” Ibid. On January 27, 2017, one week after taking
office, President Trump signed Executive Order No. 13769, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8977 (2017) (EO–1), entitled “Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States.” As he signed it,
President Trump read the title, looked up, and said “We all know
what that means.” App. 124. That same day, President Trump
explained to the media that, under EO–1, Christians would be given
prior- ity for entry as refugees into the United States. In
particu- lar, he bemoaned the fact that in the past, “[i]f you were
a Muslim [refugee from Syria] you could come in, but if you were a
Christian, it was almost impossible.” Id., at 125.
Considering that past policy “very unfair,” President Trump
explained that EO–1 was designed “to help” the Christians in Syria. Ibid. The following day, one of President Trump’s key
advisers candidly drew the connection between EO–1 and the “Muslim
ban” that the President had pledged to implement if elected. Ibid. According to that adviser, “[W]hen [Donald Trump]
first announced it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He
said, ‘Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it
legally.’ ” Ibid. On February 3, 2017, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington enjoined the
enforcement of EO–1. See Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL
462040, *3. The Ninth Circuit denied the Government’s request to
stay that injunction. Washington v. Trump , 847
F. 3d 1151, 1169 (2017) ( per curiam ). Rather than
appeal the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Government declined to
continue defending EO–1 in court and instead announced that the
President intended to issue a new executive order to replace
EO–1.

															On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued that
new executive order, which, like its predecessor, imposed temporary
entry and refugee bans. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13209 (EO–2). One of the President’s senior advisers publicly
explained that EO–2 would “have the same basic policy outcome” as
EO–1, and that any changes would address “very technical issues
that were brought up by the court.” App. 127. After EO–2 was
issued, the White House Press Secretary told reporters that, by
issuing EO–2, President Trump “continue[d] to deliver on
. . . his most significant campaign promises.” Id. , at 130. That statement was consistent with President
Trump’s own declaration that “I keep my campaign promises, and our
citizens will be very happy when they see the result.” Id. ,
at 127–128.

															Before EO–2 took effect, federal District Courts
in Hawaii and Maryland enjoined the order’s travel and refugee
bans. See Hawaii v. Trump , 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227,
1239 (Haw. 2017); International Refugee Assistance Project ( IRAP ) v. Trump , 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (Md.
2017). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits upheld those injunctions in
substantial part. IRAP v. Trump , 857 F. 3d 554,
606 (CA4 2017) (en banc); Hawaii v. Trump , 859
F. 3d 741, 789 (CA9 2017) ( per curiam ). In June 2017,
this Court granted the Government’s petition for certiorari and
issued a per curiam opinion partially staying the District
Courts’ injunctions pending further review. In particular, the
Court allowed EO–2’s travel ban to take effect except as to
“foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide
relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” Trump v. IRAP , 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip
op., at 12).

															While litigation over EO–2 was ongoing,
President Trump repeatedly made statements alluding to a desire to
keep Muslims out of the country. For instance, he said at a rally
of his supporters that EO–2 was just a “watered down version of the
first one” and had been “tailor[ed]” at the behest of “the
lawyers.” App. 131. He further added that he would prefer “to go
back to the first [executive order] and go all the way” and
reiterated his belief that it was “very hard” for Muslims to
assimilate into Western culture. Id. , at 131–132. During a
rally in April 2017, President Trump recited the lyrics to a song
called “The Snake,” a song about a woman who nurses a sick snake
back to health but then is attacked by the snake, as a warning
about Syrian refugees entering the country. Id. , at 132,
163. And in June 2017, the President stated on Twitter that the
Justice Department had submitted a “watered down, politically
correct version” of the “original Travel Ban” “to
S[upreme] C[ourt].”[ 1 ] Id. , at 132. The President went on to tweet: “People, the
lawyers and the courts can call it whatever they want, but I am
calling it what we need and what it is, a TRAVEL BAN!” Id. ,
at 132–133. He added: “That’s right, we need a TRAVEL BAN for
certain DANGEROUS countries, not some politically correct term that
won’t help us protect our people!” Id. , at 133. Then, on
August 17, 2017, President Trump issued yet another tweet about
Islam, once more referencing the story about General Pershing’s
massacre of Muslims in the Philippines: “Study what General
Pershing . . . did to terrorists when caught. There was
no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!” IRAP v. Trump , 883 F. 3d 233, 267 (CA4 2018) ( IRAP II )
(en banc) (alterations in original).

															In September 2017, President Trump tweeted that
“[t]he travel ban into the United States should be far larger,
tougher and more specific—but stupidly, that would not be
politically correct!” App. 133. Later that month, on September 24,
2017, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation No. 9645, 82
Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017) (Proclamation), which restricts entry of
certain nationals from six Muslim-majority countries. On November
29, 2017, President Trump “retweeted” three anti-Muslim videos,
entitled “Muslim Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary!”, “Islamist mob
pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to death!”, and “Muslim
migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!”[ 2 ] IRAP II , 883 F. 3d, at 267. Those
videos were initially tweeted by a British political party whose
mission is to oppose “all alien and destructive politic[al] or
religious doctrines, including . . . Islam.” Ibid. When asked about these videos, the White House Deputy Press
Secretary connected them to the Proclamation, responding that the
“President has been talking about these security issues for years
now, from the campaign trail to the White House” and “has addressed
these issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year
and the companion proclamation.” Ibid. 2

															As the majority correctly notes, “the issue
before us is not whether to denounce” these offensive statements. Ante, at 29. Rather, the dispositive and narrow question
here is whether a reasonable observer, presented with all “openly
available data,” the text and “historical context” of the
Proclamation, and the “specific sequence of events” leading to it,
would conclude that the primary purpose of the Proclamation is to
disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding them from the
country. See McCreary , 545 U. S., at 862–863. The
answer is unquestionably yes.

															Taking all the relevant evidence together, a
reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven
primarily by anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government’s
asserted national-security justifications. Even before being sworn
into office, then-candidate Trump stated that “Islam hates us,”
App. 399, warned that “[w]e’re having problems with the Muslims,
and we’re having problems with Muslims coming into the country,” id. , at 121, promised to enact a “total and complete
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” id., at
119, and instructed one of his advisers to find a “lega[l ]”
way to enact a Muslim ban, id. , at 125.[ 3 ] The President continued to make similar
statements well after his inauguration, as detailed above, see supra , at 6–10.

															Moreover, despite several opportunities to do
so, President Trump has never disavowed any of his prior statements
about Islam.[ 4 ] Instead, he has
continued to make remarks that a reasonable observer would view as
an unrelenting attack on the Muslim religion and its followers.
Given President Trump’s failure to correct the reasonable
perception of his apparent hostility toward the Islamic faith, it
is unsurprising that the President’s lawyers have, at every step in
the lower courts, failed in their attempts to launder the
Proclamation of its discriminatory taint. See United States v. Fordice , 505 U. S. 717, 746–747 (1992) (“[G]iven an
initially tainted policy, it is eminently reasonable to make the
[Government] bear the risk of nonpersuasion with respect to intent
at some future time, both because the [Government] has created the
dispute through its own prior unlawful conduct, and because
discriminatory intent does tend to persist through time” (citation
omitted)). Notably, the Court recently found less pervasive
official expressions of hostility and the failure to disavow them
to be constitutionally significant. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n , 584 U. S.
___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 18) (“The official expressions of
hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’
comments—comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by
the State at any point in the proceedings that led to the
affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free
Exercise Clause requires”). It should find the same here.

															Ultimately, what began as a policy explicitly
“calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the
United States” has since morphed into a “Proclamation” putatively
based on national-security concerns. But this new window dressing
cannot conceal an unassailable fact: the words of the President and
his advisers create the strong perception that the Proclamation is
contaminated by impermissible discriminatory animus against Islam
and its followers.

															II

															Rather than defend the President’s problematic
statements, the Government urges this Court to set them aside and
defer to the President on issues related to immigration and
national security. The majority accepts that invitation and
incorrectly applies a watered-down legal standard in an effort to
short circuit plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.

															The majority begins its constitutional analysis
by noting that this Court, at times, “has engaged in a
circumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly
burdens the constitutional rights of a U. S. citizen.” Ante, at 30 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408
U. S. 753 (1972)). As the majority notes, Mandel held
that when the Executive Branch provides “a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason” for denying a visa, “courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
its justification.” Id. , at 770. In his controlling
concurrence in Kerry v. Din , 576 U. S. ___
(2015), Justice Kennedy applied Mandel ’s holding and
elaborated that courts can “ ‘look behind’ the Government’s
exclusion of” a foreign national if there is “an affirmative
showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer who denied
[the] visa.” Din , 576 U. S., at ___ (opinion concurring
in judgment) (slip op., at 5). The extent to which Mandel and Din apply at all to this case is unsettled, and there is
good reason to think they do not.[ 5 ] Indeed, even the Government agreed at oral argument
that where the Court confronts a situation involving “all kinds of
denigrating comments about” a particular religion and a subsequent
policy that is designed with the purpose of disfavoring that
religion but that “dot[s] all the i’s and . . . cross[es]
all the t’s,” Mandel would not “pu[t] an end to judicial
review of that set of facts.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.

															In light of the Government’s suggestion “that it
may be appropriate here for the inquiry to extend beyond the facial
neutrality of the order,” the majority rightly declines to apply Mandel ’s “narrow standard of review” and “assume[s] that we
may look behind the face of the Proclamation.” Ante, at
31–32 . In doing so, however, the Court, without explanation
or precedential support, limits its review of the Proclamation to
rational-basis scrutiny. Ibid. That approach is perplexing,
given that in other Establishment Clause cases, including those
involving claims of religious animus or discrimination, this Court
has applied a more stringent standard of review. See, e.g., McCreary , 545 U. S., at 860–863; Larson , 456
U. S., at 246; Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church , 393
U. S. 440, 449–452 (1969); see also Colorado Christian
Univ. v. Weaver , 534 F. 3d 1245, 1266 (CA10 2008)
(McConnell, J.) (noting that, under Supreme Court precedent, laws
“involving discrimination on the basis of religion, including
interdenominational discrimination, are subject to heightened
scrutiny whether they arise under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause” (citations
omitted)).[ 6 ] As explained
above, the Proclamation is plainly unconstitutional under that
heightened standard. See supra, at 10–13.

															But even under rational-basis review, the
Proclamation must fall. That is so because the Proclamation is
“ ‘divorced from any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests,’ and ‘its
sheer breadth [is] so discontinuous with the reasons offered for
it’ ” that the policy is “ ‘inexplicable by anything but
animus.’ ” Ante, at 33 (quoting Romer v. Evans , 517 U. S. 620, 632, 635 (1996)); see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. , 473
U. S. 432, 448 (1985) (recognizing that classifications
predicated on discriminatory animus can never be legitimate because
the Government has no legitimate interest in exploiting “mere
negative attitudes, or fear” toward a disfavored group). The
President’s statements, which the majority utterly fails to address
in its legal analysis, strongly support the conclusion that the
Proclamation was issued to express hostility toward Muslims and
exclude them from the country. Given the overwhelming record
evidence of anti-Muslim animus, it sim- ply cannot be said that the
Proclamation has a legitimate basis. IRAP II , 883 F. 3d, at
352 (Harris, J., concurring) (explaining that the Proclamation
contravenes the bedrock principle “that the government may not act
on the basis of animus toward a disfavored religious
minority” (emphasis in original)).

															The majority insists that the Proclamation
furthers two interrelated national-security interests: “preventing
entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing
other nations to improve their practices.” Ante, at 34. But
the Court offers insufficient support for its view “that the entry
suspension has a legitimate grounding in [those] national security
concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility.” Ibid. ;
see also ante , at 33–38, and n. 7. In- deed, even a
cursory review of the Government’s asserted national-security
rationale reveals that the Proclamation is nothing more than a
“ ‘religious gerrymander.’ ” Lukumi , 508
U. S., at 535.

															The majority first emphasizes that the
Proclamation “says nothing about religion.” Ante, at 34.
Even so, the Proclamation, just like its predecessors,
overwhelmingly targets Muslim-majority nations. Given the record
here, including all the President’s statements linking the
Proclamation to his apparent hostility toward Muslims, it is of no
moment that the Proclamation also includes minor restrictions on
two non-Muslim majority countries, North Korea and Venezuela, or
that the Government has removed a few Muslim-majority countries
from the list of covered countries since EO–1 was issued.
Consideration of the entire record supports the conclusion that the
inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela, and the removal of other
countries, simply reflect subtle efforts to start “talking
territory instead of Muslim,” App. 123, precisely so the Executive
Branch could evade criticism or legal consequences for the
Proclamation’s otherwise clear targeting of Muslims. The
Proclamation’s effect on North Korea and Venezuela, for example, is
insubstantial, if not entirely symbolic. A prior sanctions order
already restricts entry of North Korean nationals, see Exec. Order
No. 13810, 82 Fed. Reg. 44705 (2017), and the Proclamation targets
only a handful of Venezuelan government officials and their
immediate family members, 82 Fed. Reg. 45166. As such, the
President’s inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does little to
mitigate the anti-Muslim animus that permeates the
Proclamation.

															The majority next contends that the Proclamation
“reflects the results of a worldwide review process under- taken by
multiple Cabinet officials.” Ante, at 34. At the out- set,
there is some evidence that at least one of the individuals
involved in that process may have exhibited bias against Muslims.
As noted by one group of amici , the Trump administration
appointed Frank Wuco to help enforce the President’s travel bans
and lead the multi- agency review process. See Brief for Plaintiffs
in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump as Amici Cu- riae 13–14, and n. 10. According to amici , Wuco has purportedly made several suspect public
statements about Islam: He has “publicly declared that it was a
‘great idea’ to ‘stop the visa application process into this
country from Muslim nations in a blanket type of policy,’ ”
“that Muslim populations ‘living under other-than-Muslim rule’ will
‘necessarily’ turn to violence, that Islam prescribes ‘violence and
warfare against unbelievers,’ and that Muslims ‘by-and-large
. . . resist assimilation.’ ” Id., at 14.

															But, even setting aside those comments, the
worldwide review does little to break the clear connection between
the Proclamation and the President’s anti-Muslim statements. For
“[n]o matter how many officials affix their names to it, the
Proclamation rests on a rotten foundation.” Brief for
Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 7 (filed Apr. 2,
2018); see supra , at 4–10. The President campaigned on a
promise to implement a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims”
entering the country, translated that campaign promise into a
concrete policy, and made several statements linking that policy
(in its various forms) to anti-Muslim animus.

															Ignoring all this, the majority empowers the
President to hide behind an administrative review process that the
Government refuses to disclose to the public. See IRAP II ,
883 F. 3d, at 268 (“[T]he Government chose not to make the
review publicly available” even in redacted form); IRAP v. Trump , No. 17–2231 (CA4), Doc. 126 (Letter from S. Swingle,
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants, to P. Connor, Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Nov. 24,
2017)) (resisting Fourth Circuit’s request that the Government
supplement the record with the reports referenced in the
Proclamation). Furthermore, evidence of which we can take judicial
notice indicates that the multiagency review process could not have
been very thorough. Ongoing litigation under the Freedom of
Information Act shows that the September 2017 report the Government
produced after its review process was a mere 17 pages. See Brennan Center for Justice v. United States Dept. of
State , No. 17–cv–7520 (SDNY), Doc. No. 31–1, pp. 2–3. That the
Government’s analysis of the vetting practices of hundreds of
countries boiled down to such a short document raises serious
questions about the legitimacy of the President’s proclaimed
national-security rationale.

															Beyond that, Congress has already addressed the
national-security concerns supposedly undergirding the Proclamation
through an “extensive and complex” framework governing “immigration
and alien status.” Arizona v. United States , 567
U. S. 387, 395 (2012).[ 7 ]
The Immigration and Nationality Act sets forth, in painstaking
detail, a reticulated scheme regulating the admission of
individuals to the United States. Generally, admission to the
United States requires a valid visa or other travel document. 8
U. S. C. §§1181, 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I),
1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II). To obtain a visa, an applicant must produce
“certified cop[ies]” of documents proving her identity, background,
and criminal history. §§1202(b), 1202(d). An applicant also must
undergo an in-person interview with a State Department consular
officer. §§1201(a)(1), 1202(h)(1), 22 CFR §§42.62(a)–(b) (2017);
see also 8 U. S. C. §§1202(h)(2)(D), 1202(h)(2)(F)
(requiring in-person interview if the individual “is a national of
a country officially designated by the Secretary of State as a
state sponsor of terrorism” or is “a member of a group or section
that . . . poses a security threat to the United
States”). “Any alien who . . . has engaged in a terrorist
activity,” “incited terrorist activity,” or been a representative,
member, or endorser of a terrorist organization, or who “is likely
to engage after entry in any terrorist activity,” §1182(a)(3)(B),
or who has committed one or more of the many crimes enumerated in
the statute is inadmissible and therefore ineligible to receive a
visa. See §1182(a)(2)(A) (crime of moral turpitude or drug
offense); §1182(a)(2)(C) (drug trafficking or benefiting from a
relative who recently trafficked drugs); §1182(a)(2)(D)
(prostitution or “unlawful commercialized vice”); §1182(a)(2)(H)
(human trafficking); §1182(a)(3) (“Security and related
grounds”).

															In addition to vetting rigorously any
individuals seeking admission to the United States, the Government
also rigorously vets the information-sharing and
identity-management systems of other countries, as evidenced by the
Visa Waiver Program, which permits certain nationals from a select
group of countries to skip the ordinary visa-application process.
See §1187. To determine which countries are eligible for the Visa
Waiver Program, the Government considers whether they can satisfy
numerous criteria— e.g., using electronic, fraud-resistant
passports, §1187(a)(3)(B), 24-hour reporting of lost or stolen
passports, §1187(c)(2)(D), and not providing a safe haven for
terrorists, §1187(a)(12)(D)(iii). The Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, also must
determine that a country’s inclusion in the program will not
compromise “the law enforcement and security interests of the
United States.” §1187(c)(2)(C). Eligibility for the program is
reassessed on an annual basis. See §1187(a)(12)(D)(iii),
1187(c)(12)(A). As a result of a recent review, for example, the
Executive decided in 2016 to remove from the program dual nationals
of Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Sudan. See Brief for Former National
Security Officials as Amici Curiae 27.

															Put simply, Congress has already erected a
statutory scheme that fulfills the putative national-security
interests the Government now puts forth to justify the
Proclamation. Tellingly, the Government remains wholly unable to
articulate any credible national-security interest that would go
unaddressed by the current statutory scheme absent the
Proclamation. The Government also offers no evidence that this
current vetting scheme, which involves a highly searching
consideration of individuals required to obtain visas for entry
into the United States and a highly searching consideration of
which countries are eligible for inclusion in the Visa Waiver
Program, is inadequate to achieve the Proclamation’s proclaimed
objectives of “preventing entry of nationals who cannot be
adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their
[vetting and information-sharing] practices.” Ante, at
34.

															For many of these reasons, several former
national-security officials from both political parties—including
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger III, former Central
Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan, and former Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper—have advised that the
Proclamation and its predecessor orders “do not advance the
national-security or foreign policy interests of the United States,
and in fact do serious harm to those interests.” Brief for Former
National Security Officials as Amici Curiae 15 (boldface
deleted).

															Moreover, the Proclamation purports to mitigate
national-security risks by excluding nationals of countries that
provide insufficient information to vet their nationals. 82 Fed.
Reg. 45164. Yet, as plaintiffs explain, the Proclamation broadly
denies immigrant visas to all nationals of those countries,
including those whose admission would likely not implicate these
information deficiencies ( e.g., infants, or nationals of
countries included in the Proclamation who are long-term residents
of and traveling from a country not covered by the Proclamation).
See Brief for Respondents 72. In addition, the Proclamation permits
certain nationals from the countries named in the Proclamation to
obtain nonimmigrant visas, which undermines the Government’s
assertion that it does not already have the capacity and sufficient
information to vet these individuals adequately. See 82 Fed. Reg.
45165–45169.

															Equally unavailing is the majority’s reliance on
the Proclamation’s waiver program. Ante, at 37, and
n. 7. As several amici thoroughly explain, there is
reason to suspect that the Proclamation’s waiver program is nothing
more than a sham. See Brief for Pars Equality Center et al. as Amici Curiae 11, 13–28 (explaining that “waivers under the
Proclamation are vanishingly rare” and reporting numerous stories
of deserving applicants denied waivers). The remote possibility of
obtaining a waiver pursuant to an ad hoc, discretionary, and
seemingly arbitrary process scarcely demonstrates that the
Proclamation is rooted in a genuine concern for national security.
See ante, at 3–8 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (outlining
evidence suggesting “that the Government is not applying the
Proclamation as written,” that “waivers are not being processed in
an ordinary way,” and that consular and other officials “do not, in
fact, have discretion to grant waivers”).

															In sum, none of the features of the Proclamation
highlighted by the majority supports the Government’s claim that
the Proclamation is genuinely and primarily rooted in a legitimate
national-security interest. What the unrebutted evidence actually
shows is that a reasonable observer would conclude, quite easily,
that the primary purpose and function of the Proclamation is to
disfavor Islam by banning Muslims from entering our country.

															III

															As the foregoing analysis makes clear,
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their
Establishment Clause claim. To obtain a preliminary injunction,
how- ever, plaintiffs must also show that they are “likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” that
“the balance of equities tips in [their] favor,” and that “an
injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008).
Plaintiffs readily clear those remaining hurdles.

															First, plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of
irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. As the District
Court found, plaintiffs have adduced substantial evidence showing
that the Proclamation will result in “a multitude of harms that are
not compensable with monetary dam- ages and that are
irreparable—among them, prolonged separation from family members,
constraints to recruiting and retaining students and faculty
members to foster diversity and quality within the University
community, and the diminished membership of the [Muslim]
Association.” 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1159 (Haw. 2017).

															Second, plaintiffs have demonstrated that the
balance of the equities tips in their favor. Against plaintiffs’
concrete allegations of serious harm, the Government advances only
nebulous national-security concerns. Although national security is
unquestionably an issue of paramount public importance, it is not
“a talisman” that the Government can use “to ward off inconvenient
claims—a ‘label’ used to ‘cover a multitude of sins.’ ” Ziglar v. Abbasi , 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017)
(slip op., at 20). That is especially true here, because, as noted,
the Government’s other statutory tools, including the existing
rigorous individualized vetting process, already address the
Proclamation’s purported national-security concerns. See supra, at 19–22.

															Finally, plaintiffs and their amici have
convincingly established that “an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter , 555 U. S., at 20. As explained by
the scores of amici who have filed briefs in support of
plaintiffs, the Proclamation has deleterious effects on our higher
education system;[ 8 ] national
security;[ 9 ]
healthcare;[ 10 ] artistic
culture;[ 11 ] and the
Nation’s technology industry and overall economy.[ 12 ] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed, in part, the District Court’s preliminary
injunction.[ 13 ]

															IV

															The First Amendment stands as a bulwark
against official religious prejudice and embodies our Nation’s deep
commitment to religious plurality and tolerance. That
constitutional promise is why, “[f ]or centuries now, people
have come to this country from every corner of the world to share
in the blessing of religious freedom.” Town of Greece v. Galloway , 572 U. S., at ___ (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 1). Instead of vindicating those principles, today’s
decision tosses them aside. In holding that the First Amendment
gives way to an executive policy that a reasonable observer would
view as motivated by animus against Muslims, the majority opinion
upends this Court’s precedent, repeats tragic mistakes of the past,
and denies countless individuals the fundamental right of religious
liberty.

															Just weeks ago, the Court rendered its decision
in Masterpiece Cakeshop , 584 U. S. ___, which applied
the bedrock principles of religious neutrality and tolerance in
considering a First Amendment challenge to government action. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (“The Constitution ‘commits
government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight
suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity
to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause
to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the
rights it secures’ ” (quoting Lukumi , 508 U. S.,
at 547)); Masterpiece , 584 U. S., at ___ (Kagan, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 1) (“[S]tate actors cannot show hostility
to religious views; rather, they must give those views ‘neutral and
respectful consideration’ ”). Those principles should apply
equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a
government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a
decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious freedom.
But unlike in Masterpiece , where a state civil rights
commission was found to have acted without “the neutrality that the
Free Exercise Clause requires,” id., at ___ (slip op., at
17), the government actors in this case will not be held
accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s guarantee of
religious neutrality and tolerance. Unlike in Masterpiece ,
where the majority considered the state commissioners’ statements
about religion to be persuasive evidence of unconstitutional
government action, id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–14), the
majority here completely sets aside the President’s charged
statements about Muslims as irrelevant. That holding erodes the
foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court
elsewhere has so emphatically protected, and it tells members of
minority religions in our country “ ‘that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political commu- nity.’ ” Santa Fe , 530 U. S., at 309.

															Today’s holding is all the more troubling given
the stark parallels between the reasoning of this case and that of Korematsu v. United States , 323 U. S. 214
(1944) . See Brief for Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae . In Korematsu , the Court gave “a pass
[to] an odious, gravely injurious racial classification” authorized
by an executive order. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña , 515 U. S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). As here, the Government invoked an ill-defined
national-security threat to justify an exclusionary policy of
sweeping proportion. See Brief for Japanese American Citizens
League as Amicus Curiae 12–14. As here, the exclusion order
was rooted in dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia , a
particular group’s supposed inability to assimilate and desire to
harm the United States. See Korematsu , 323 U. S., at
236–240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). As here, the Government was
unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies’ views of the
alleged security concerns to the very citizens it purported to
protect. Compare Korematsu v. United States , 584
F. Supp. 1406, 1418–1419 (ND Cal. 1984) (discussing
information the Government knowingly omitted from report presented
to the courts justifying the executive order); Brief for Japanese
American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae 17–19, with IRAP II , 883 F. 3d, at 268; Brief for Karen Korematsu
et al. as Amici Curiae 35–36, and n. 5 (noting
that the Government “has gone to great lengths to shield [the
Secretary of Homeland Security’s] report from view”). And as here,
there was strong evidence that impermissible hostility and animus
moti- vated the Government’s policy.

															Although a majority of the Court in Korematsu was willing to uphold the Government’s actions
based on a barren invocation of national security, dissenting
Justices warned of that decision’s harm to our constitutional
fabric. Justice Murphy recognized that there is a need for great
deference to the Executive Branch in the context of national
security, but cautioned that “it is essential that there be
definite limits to [the government’s] discretion,” as
“[i]ndividuals must not be left impoverished of their
constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has
neither substance nor support.” 323 U. S., at 234 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Jackson lamented that the Court’s decision
upholding the Government’s policy would prove to be “a far more
subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself,”
for although the executive order was not likely to be long lasting,
the Court’s willingness to tolerate it would endure. Id., at
245–246.

															In the intervening years since Korematsu ,
our Nation has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind. See, e.g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U. S. C.
App. §4211 et seq. (setting forth remedies to
individuals affected by the executive order at issue in Korematsu ); Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 U. S. C.
§4001(a) (forbidding the imprisonment or detention by the United
States of any citizen absent an Act of Congress). Today, the Court
takes the important step of finally overruling Korematsu ,
denouncing it as “gravely wrong the day it was decided.” Ante, at 38 (citing Korematsu , 323 U. S., at 248
(Jackson, J., dissenting)). This formal repudiation of a shameful
precedent is laud- able and long overdue. But it does not make the
majority’s decision here acceptable or right. By blindly accepting
the Government’s misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory
policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group, all in the
name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court
redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and
merely replaces one “gravely wrong” decision with another. Ante, at 38.

															Our Constitution demands, and our country
deserves, a Judiciary willing to hold the coordinate branches to
account when they defy our most sacred legal commitments. Because
the Court’s decision today has failed in that respect, with
profound regret, I dissent. Notes 1 According to the White
House, President Trump’s statements on Twitter are “official
statements.” App. 133. 2 The content of these
videos is highly inflammatory, and their titles are arguably
misleading. For instance, the person depicted in the video entitled
“Muslim migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!” was reportedly not
a “migrant,” and his religion is not publicly known. See Brief for
Plaintiffs in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump as Amici Curiae 12, n. 4; P. Baker &
E. Sullivan, Trump Shares Inflammatory Anti-Muslim Videos, and
Britain’s Leader Condemns Them, N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2017
(“[A]ccording to local officials, both boys are Dutch”),
https: // www.nytimes.com / 2017 / 11 / 29 / us / politics / trump-anti-muslim-videos-jayda-fransen.html
(all Internet materials as last visited June 25,
2018). 3 The Government urges us
to disregard the President’s campaign statements. Brief for
Petitioners 66–67. But nothing in our precedent supports that
blinkered approach. To the contrary, courts must con-sider “the
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific
series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in
question, and the legislative or administrative history.” Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U. S.
520, 540 (1993) (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Moreover, President Trump
and his advisers have repeatedly acknowledged that the Proclamation
and its predecessors are an outgrowth of the President’s campaign
statements. For example, just last November, the Deputy White House
Press Secretary reminded the media that the Proclamation addresses
“issues” the President has been talking about “for years,”
including on “the campaign trail.” IRAP II , 883 F. 3d
233, 267 (CA4 2018). In any case, as the Fourth Circuit correctly
recognized, even without relying on any of the President’s campaign
statements, a reasonable observer would conclude that the
Proclamation was enacted for the impermissible purpose of
disfavoring Muslims. Id. , at 266, 268. 4 At oral argument, the
Solicitor General asserted that President Trump “made crystal-clear
on September 25 that he had no intention of imposing the Muslim
ban” and “has praised Islam as one of the great countries
[ sic ] of the world.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 81. Because the record
contained no evidence of any such statement made on September 25th,
however, the Solicitor General clarified after oral argument that
he actually intended to refer to President Trump’s statement during
a television interview on January 25, 2017. Letter from N.
Francisco, Solicitor General, to S. Harris, Clerk of Court (May 1,
2018); Reply Brief 28, n. 8. During that interview, the President
was asked whether EO–1 was “the Muslim ban,” and answered, “no it’s
not the Muslim ban.” See Transcript: ABC News anchor David Muir
interviews President Trump, ABC News, Jan. 25, 2017,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-abc-news-anchor-david-muir-interviews-president / story ? id =45047602.
But that lone assertion hardly qualifies as a disavowal of the
President’s comments about Islam—some of which were spoken after
January 25, 2017. Moreover, it strains credulity to say that
President Trump’s January 25th statement makes “crystal-clear” that
he never intended to impose a Muslim ban given that, until May
2017, the President’s website displayed the statement regarding his
campaign promise to ban Muslims from entering the
country. 5 Mandel and Din are readily distinguishable from this case for a number
of reasons. First, Mandel and Din each involved a
constitutional challenge to an Executive Branch decision to exclude
a single foreign national under a specific statutory ground of
inadmissibility. Mandel , 408 U. S., at 767; Din ,
576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). Here, by contrast,
President Trump is not exercising his discretionary authority to
determine the admission or exclusion of a particular foreign
national. He promulgated an executive order affecting millions of
individuals on a categorical basis. Second, Mandel and Din did not purport to establish the framework for
adjudicating cases (like this one) involving claims that the
Executive Branch violated the Establishment Clause by acting
pursuant to an unconstitutional purpose. Applying Mandel ’s
narrow standard of review to such a claim would run contrary to
this Court’s repeated admonition that “[f ]acial neutrality is
not determinative” in the Establishment Clause context. Lukumi , 508 U. S., at 534. Likewise, the majority’s
passing invocation of Fiallo v. Bell , 430 U. S.
787 (1977), is misplaced. Fiallo , unlike this case,
addressed a constitutional challenge to a statute enacted by
Congress, not an order of the President. Id., at 791. Fiallo ’s application of Mandel says little about
whether Mandel ’s narrow standard of review applies to the
unilateral executive proclamation promulgated under the
circumstances of this case. Finally, even assuming that Mandel and Din apply here, they would not preclude us
from looking behind the face of the Proclamation because plaintiffs
have made “an affirmative showing of bad faith,” Din , 576
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5), by the President who, among
other things, instructed his subordinates to find a “lega[l]” way
to enact a Muslim ban, App. 125; see supra, at
4–10. 6 The majority chides as
“problematic” the importation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
“in the national security and foreign affairs context.” Ante , at 32–33, n. 5. As the majority sees it, this
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents do not apply to cases
involving “immigration policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military
actions.” Ante, at 32, n. 5. But just because the Court
has not confronted the precise situation at hand does not render
these cases (or the principles they announced) inapplicable.
Moreover, the majority’s complaint regarding the lack of direct
authority is a puzzling charge, given that the majority itself
fails to cite any “authority for its proposition” that a more
probing review is inappropriate in a case like this one, where
United States citizens allege that the Executive has violated the
Establishment Clause by issuing a sweeping executive order
motivated by animus. Ante , at 33 n. 5; see supra, at 14, and n. 5. In any event, even if there is
no prior case directly on point, it is clear from our precedent
that “[w]hatever power the United States Constitution envisions for
the Executive” in the context of national security and foreign
affairs, “it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches
when individual liberties are at stake.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U. S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality
opinion). This Court’s Establishment Clause precedents require
that, if a reasonable observer would understand an executive action
to be driven by discriminatory animus, the action be invalidated.
See McCreary , 545 U. S., at 860. That
reasonable-observer inquiry includes consideration of the
Government’s asserted justifications for its actions. The
Government’s invocation of a national-security justification,
however, does not mean that the Court should close its eyes to
other relevant information. Deference is different from
unquestioning acceptance. Thus, what is “far more problematic” in
this case is the majority’s apparent willingness to throw the
Establishment Clause out the window and forgo any meaningful
constitutional review at the mere mention of a national-security
concern. Ante, at 32, n. 5. 7 It is important to note,
particularly given the nature of this case, that many consider
“using the term ‘alien’ to refer to other human beings” to be
“offensive and demeaning.” Flores v. United States
Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , 718 F.3d 548, 551–552,
n. 1 (CA6 2013). I use the term here only where necessary “to
be consistent with the statutory language” that Congress has chosen
and “to avoid any confusion in replacing a legal term of art with a
more appropriate term.” Ibid. 8 See Brief for American
Council on Education et al. as Amici Curiae ; Brief
for Colleges and Universities as Amici Curiae ; Brief for New
York University as Amicus Curiae . 9 See Brief for Retired
Generals and Admirals of the U. S. Armed Forces as Amici
Curiae ; Brief for Former National Security Officials as Amici Curiae . 10 See
Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges as Amicus
Curiae . 11 See
Brief for Association of Art Museum Directors et al. as Amici
Curiae . 12 See
Brief for U. S. Companies as Amici Curiae ; Brief for
Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae . 13 Because the majority concludes that
plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on the
merits, it takes no position on “the propriety of the nationwide
scope of the injunction issued by the District Court.” Ante, at 39. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting
nationwide relief. Given the nature of the Establishment Clause
violation and the unique circumstances of this case, the imposition
of a nationwide injunction was “ ‘necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs.’ ” Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. , 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994);
see Califano v. Yamasaki , 442 U. S. 682, 702
(1979) (“[T]he scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent
of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the
plaintiff class”).

Summary: The Supreme Court upheld President Trump's travel ban, which restricted entry for nationals from seven countries with predominantly Muslim populations. The Court ruled that the President had the authority to impose such restrictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that the policy did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, despite claims of discriminatory animus. The Court considered national security justifications and context, including previous administrations' actions, in its decision. The Court also addressed the use of the term "alien" and the scope of nationwide injunctions in such cases.