U.S. Supreme Court FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364 (1984) Federal Communications Commission
v. League of Women Voters of
California No. 82-912 Argued January 16,
1984 Decided July 2, 1984 468
U.S. 364 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA Syllabus The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (Act) established the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit corporation,
to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio
stations in support of station operations and educational
programming. Section 399 of the Act forbids any noncommercial
educational station that receives a grant from the CPB to "engage
in editorializing." Appellees (Pacifica Foundation, a nonprofit
corporation that owns and operates several noncommercial
educational broadcasting stations that receive grants from the CPB,
the League of Women Voters of California, and an individual
listener and viewer of public broadcasting) brought an action in
Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of § 399.
The District Court granted summary judgment in appellees' favor,
holding that § 399 violates the First Amendment. Held: Section 399's ban on editorializing violates the
First Amendment. Pp. 468 U. S.
374 -402.

															(a) Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has power
to regulate the use of the broadcast medium. In the exercise of
this power, Congress may seek to assure that the public receives
through this medium a balanced presentation of information and
views on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be
addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands
of the owners and operators of broadcasting stations. At the same
time, since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent
form of communicative activity, the First Amendment must inform and
give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory
power. Thus, although the broadcasting industry operates under
restrictions not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these
restrictions has generally been to secure the public's First
Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on
diverse matters of public concern. As a result, the absolute
freedom to advocate one's own positions without also presenting
opposing viewpoints -- a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspaper
publishers -- is denied to broadcasters. Such restrictions have
been upheld Page 468 U. S. 365 by this Court only when they were narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and
balanced coverage of public issues. Pp. 468 U. S.
374 -381.

															(b) The restriction imposed by § 399 is specifically directed at
a form of speech -- the expression of editorial opinions -- that
lies at the heart of First Amendment protection, and is defined
solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech.
Section 399 singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them
the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public
importance. Pp. 468 U. S.
381 -384.

															(c) Section 399's broad ban on all editorializing by every
station that receives CPB funds far exceeds what is necessary to
protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent
the public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting
stations represent the official view of government. The ban
impermissibly sweeps within it a wide range of speech by wholly
private stations on topics that do not take a directly partisan
stand or that have nothing whatever to do with federal, state, or
local government. Pp. 468 U. S.
386 -395.

															(d) The patent overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of §
399's ban also undermines the likelihood of a genuine governmental
interest in preventing private groups from propagating their own
views via public broadcasting. Section 399 does not prevent the use
of noncommercial stations for the presentation of partisan views on
controversial matters; instead, it merely bars a station from
specifically labeling such issues as its own or those of its
management. Pp. 468 U. S.
396 -399.

															(e) Section 399 cannot be justified on the basis of Congress'
spending power as simply determining that Congress will not
subsidize public broadcasting station editorials. Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.
S. 540 , distinguished. Since a noncommercial educational
station that receives only 1% of its income from CPB grants is
barred absolutely from editorializing, such a station has no way of
limiting the use of its federal funds to noneditorial activities,
and, more importantly, it is barred from using even private funds
to finance its editorial activity. Pp. 468 U. S.
399 -401. 547 F.
Supp. 379 , affirmed.

															BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 468 U. S. 402 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
and WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 468 U. S. 402 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 468 U. S.
408 . Page 468 U. S. 366 JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Moved to action by a widely felt need to sponsor independent
sources of broadcast programming as an alternative to commercial
broadcasting, Congress set out in 1967 to support and promote the
development of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. A
keystone of Congress' program was the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967, Pub.L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. § 390 et
seq., which established the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse
federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in
support of station operations and educational programming. Section
399 of that Act, as amended by the Public Broadcasting Amendments
Act of 1981, Pub.L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, forbids any "noncommercial
educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the
Corporation" to "engage in editorializing." 47 U.S.C. § 399. In
this case, we are called upon to decide whether Congress, by
imposing that restriction, has passed a "law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press" in violation of the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Page 468 U. S. 367 I A The history of noncommercial educational broadcasting in the
United States is as old as broadcasting itself. [ Footnote 1 ] In its first efforts to regulate
broadcasting, Congress made no special provision for noncommercial,
educational broadcasting stations. Under the Radio Act of 1927 and
the Communications Act of 1934, such stations were subject to the
same licensing requirements as their commercial counterparts. As
commercial broadcasting rapidly expanded during the 1930's,
however, the percentage of broadcast licenses held by noncommercial
stations began to shrink. In 1939, recognizing the potential effect
of these commercial pressures on educational stations, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) decided to reserve
certain frequencies for educational radio, 47 CFR §§ 4.131-4.133
(1939), and in 1945, the Commission allocated 20 frequencies on the
new FM spectrum exclusively for educational use, FCC, Report of
Proposed Allocations 77 (1945). Similarly, in 1952, with the advent
of television, the FCC reserved certain television channels solely
for educational stations. Television Assignments, 41
F.C.C. 148 (1952). Helped in part by these allocations, a wide
variety of noncommercial stations, some funded by state and local
governments and others by private donations and foundation grants,
developed during this period. [ Footnote 2 ]

															It was not until 1962, however, that Congress provided any
direct financial assistance to noncommercial, educational
broadcasting. This first step was taken with the passage of Page 468 U. S. 368 the Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-447, 76 Stat.
64, which authorized the former Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to distribute $32 million in matching grants over
a 5-year period for the construction of noncommercial television
facilities.

															Impetus for expanded federal involvement came in 1967 when the
Carnegie Corporation sponsored a special commission to review the
state of educational broadcasting. Finding that the prospects for
an expanded public broadcasting system rested on "the vigor of its
local stations," but that these stations were hobbled by chronic
underfinancing, the Carnegie Commission called upon the Federal
Government to supplement existing state, local, and private
financing so that educational broadcasting could realize its full
potential as a true alternative to commercial broadcasting. Carnegie I, at 33-34, 36-37. [ Footnote 3 ] In fashioning a legislative proposal to carry
out this vision, the Commission recommended the creation of a
nonprofit, nongovernmental "Corporation for Public Television" to
provide support for noncommercial broadcasting, including funding
for new program production, local station operations, and the
establishment of satellite interconnection facilities to permit
nationwide distribution of educational programs to all local
stations that wished to receive and use them. Id. at
37-38.

															The Commission's report met with widespread approval, and its
proposals became the blueprint for the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967, which established the basic framework of the public
broadcasting system of today. Titles I and III of Page 468 U. S. 369 the Act authorized over $38 million for continued HEW
construction grants and for the study of instructional television.
Title II created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB or
Corporation), a nonprofit, private corporation governed by a
15-person, bipartisan Board of Directors appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. [ Footnote 4 ] The Corporation was given power to fund
"the production of . . . educational television or radio programs
for national or regional distribution," 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(B)
(1976 ed.), to make grants to local broadcasting stations that
would "aid in financing local educational . . . programming costs
of such stations," § 396(g)(2)(C), and to assist in the
establishment and development of national interconnection
facilities. § 396(g)(2)(E). [ Footnote 5 ] Aside from conferring these powers on the
Corporation, Congress also adopted other measures designed both to
ensure the autonomy of the Corporation and to protect the local
stations from governmental interference and control. For example,
all federal agencies, officers, and employees were prohibited from
"exercis[ing] any direction, supervision or control" over the
Corporation or local stations, § 398, and the Corporation itself
was forbidden to "own or operate any television or radio broadcast
station," § 396(g)(3), and was further required to

															"carry out its purposes and functions . . . in ways that will
most effectively assure the maximum freedom . . . from Page 468 U. S. 370 interference with or control of program content"

															of the local stations. § 396(g)(1)(D). B Appellee Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that
owns and operates several noncommercial educational broadcasting
stations in five major metropolitan areas. [ Footnote 6 ] Its licensees have received and are
presently receiving grants from the Corporation, and are therefore
prohibited from editorializing by the terms of § 399, as originally
enacted and as recently amended. [ Footnote 7 ] In April, 1979, appellees brought this suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California challenging the constitutionality of former § 399. In
October, 1979, the Department of Justice informed Page 468 U. S. 371 both Houses of Congress and the District Court that it had
decided not to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
[ Footnote 8 ] The Senate then
adopted a resolution directing its counsel to intervene as amicus curiae in support of § 399. Counsel appeared and
subsequently obtained dismissal of the lawsuit for want of a
justiciable controversy because the Government had decided not to
enforce the statute. While appellees' appeal from this disposition
was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, the Department of Justice, under a new administration,
announced that it would defend the statute. The Court of Appeals
then remanded the case to the District Court; the District Court
permitted the Senate counsel to withdraw from the litigation, and,
finding that a concrete controversy was now presented, vacated its
earlier order of dismissal. While the suit was pending before the
District Court, Congress, as already mentioned, see n 7, supra, amended §
399 by confining the ban on editorializing to noncommercial
stations that receive Corporation grants and by separately
prohibiting all noncommercial stations from making political
endorsements, irrespective of whether they receive federal funds.
Subsequently, appellees amended their complaint to reflect this
change, challenging only the ban on editorializing. [ Footnote 9 ] Page 468 U. S. 372 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of
appellees, holding that § 399's ban on editorializing violated the
First Amendment. 547 F.
Supp. 379 (1982). The court rejected the Federal Communication
Commission's contention that

															"§ 399 serves a compelling government interest in ensuring that
funded noncommercial broadcasters do not become propaganda organs
for the government." Id. at 384-385. Noting the diverse sources of funding
for noncommercial stations, the protections built into the Public
Broadcasting Act to ensure that noncommercial broadcasters remain
free of governmental influence, and the requirements of the FCC's
fairness doctrine which are designed to guard against one-sided
presentation of controversial issues, the District Court concluded
that the asserted fear of Government control was not sufficiently
compelling to warrant § 399's restriction on speech. Id. at 386. The court also rejected the contention that the restriction
on editorializing as necessary to ensure that Government funding of
noncommercial broadcast stations does not interfere with the
balanced presentation of opinion on those stations. Id. at
387. The FCC appealed from the District Court judgment Page 468 U. S. 373 directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We
postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the
merits, 460 U.S. 1010 (1983), [ Footnote 10 ] and we now affirm. Page 468 U. S. 374 II We begin by considering the appropriate standard of review. The
District Court acknowledged that our decisions Page 468 U. S. 375 have generally applied a different First Amendment standard for
broadcast regulation than in other areas, but after finding that no
special characteristic of the broadcast media justified application
of a less stringent standard in this case, it held that § 399 could
survive constitutional scrutiny only if it served a "compelling"
governmental interest. 547 F. Supp. at 384. Claiming that the court
drew the wrong lessons from our prior decisions concerning
broadcast regulation, the Government contends that a less demanding
standard is required. It argues that Congress may, consistently
with the First Amendment, exercise broad power to regulate
broadcast speech because the medium of broadcasting is subject to
the "special characteristic" of spectrum scarcity -- a
characteristic not shared by other media -- which calls for more
exacting regulation. This power, in the Government's view, includes
authority to restrict the ability of all broadcasters, both
commercial and noncommercial, to editorialize. Brief for Appellant
31. Moreover, given the unique role of noncommercial broadcasting
as a source of "programming excellence and diversity that the
commercial sector could not or would not produce," id. at
33, Congress was entitled to impose special restrictions such as §
399 upon these stations. The Government concludes by urging that §
399 is an appropriate and essential means of furthering "important"
governmental interests, id. at 34, 35, 39, which leaves
open the possibility that a wide variety of views on matters of
public importance can be expressed through the medium of
noncommercial educational broadcasting.

															At first glance, of course, it would appear that the District
Court applied the correct standard. Section 399 plainly operates to
restrict the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public
importance, and, as we have repeatedly explained, communication of
this kind is entitled to the most Page 468 U. S. 376 exacting degree of First Amendment protection. E.g.,
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 , 460 U. S. 585 (1983); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 , 435 U. S.
776 -777 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 , 424 U. S. 14 (1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88 , 310 U. S.
101 -102 (1940). Were a similar ban on editorializing
applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not hesitate to
strike it down as violative of the First Amendment. E.g., Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966). But, as the Government correctly notes, because broadcast
regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not
followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other
media, and have never gone so far as to demand that such
regulations serve "compelling" governmental interests. At the same
time, we think the Government's argument loses sight of concerns
that are important in this area, and thus misapprehends the
essential meaning of our prior decisions concerning the reach of
Congress' authority to regulate broadcast communication.

															The fundamental principles that guide our evaluation of
broadcast regulation are by now well established. First, we have
long recognized that Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, has power to regulate the use of this scarce and valuable
national resource. The distinctive feature of Congress' efforts in
this area has been to ensure through the regulatory oversight of
the FCC that only those who satisfy the "public interest,
convenience, and necessity" are granted a license to use radio and
television broadcast frequencies. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a). [ Footnote 11 ] Page 468 U. S. 377 Second, Congress may, in the exercise of this power, seek to
assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced
presentation of information on issues of public importance that
otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left
entirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting
stations. Although such governmental regulation has never been
allowed with respect to the print media, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), we have recognized that "differences in the characteristics
of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,d 395 U. S. 367 , 395 U. S. 386 (1969). The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new
medium of broadcasting that, in our view, has required some
adjustment in First Amendment analysis is that "[b]roadcast
frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be portioned out
among applicants." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S.
94 , 412 U. S. 101 (1973). Thus, our cases have taught that, given spectrum scarcity,
those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense
as fiduciaries for the public by presenting

															"those views and voices which are representative of [their]
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from
the airwaves." Red Lion, supra, at 395 U. S. 389 .
As we observed in that case, because

															"[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, . . . the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences [through the medium of broadcasting] Page 468 U. S. 378 is crucial here [and it] may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 390 .
Finally, although the Government's interest in ensuring balanced
coverage of public issues is plainly both important and
substantial, we have, at the same time, made clear that
broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of
communicative activity. As a result, the First Amendment must
inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its
regulatory power in this area. Unlike common carriers, broadcasters
are "entitled under the First Amendment to exercise the widest
journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].'" CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367 , 453 U. S. 395 (1981) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, supra, at 412 U. S. 110 ). See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.
S. 689 , 440 U. S. 703 (1979). Indeed, if the public's interest in receiving a balanced
presentation of views is to be fully served, we must necessarily
rely in large part upon the editorial initiative and judgment of
the broadcasters who bear the public trust. See Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
supra, at 412 U. S.
124 -127. Our prior cases illustrate these principles. In Red
Lion, for example, we upheld the FCC's "fairness doctrine" --
which requires broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public
issues and to ensure that this coverage fairly and accurately
reflects the opposing views -- because the doctrine advanced the
substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced
presentations of views in this limited medium, and yet posed no
threat that a "broadcaster [would be denied permission] to carry a
particular program or to publish his own views." 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 396 .
[ Footnote 12 ] Similarly, in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, the Page 468 U. S. 379 Court upheld the right of access for federal candidates imposed
by § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act both because that
provision

															"makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by
enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to
receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the
democratic process," id. at 453 U. S. 396 ,
and because it defined a sufficiently " limited right of reasonable' access" so that "the discretion of broadcasters to
present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of
programming" was not impaired. Id. at 453 U. S.
396 -397 (emphasis in original). Finally, in Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,
supra, the Court affirmed the FCC's refusal to require
broadcast licensees to accept all paid political advertisements.
Although it was argued that such a requirement would serve the
public's First Amendment interest in receiving additional views on
public issues, the Court rejected this approach, finding that such
a requirement would tend to transform broadcasters into common
carriers, and would intrude unnecessarily upon the editorial
discretion of broadcasters. Id. at 412 U. S.
123 -125. The FCC's ruling, therefore, helped to advance
the important purposes of the Communications Act, grounded in the
First Amendment, of preserving the right of broadcasters to
exercise "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their]
public obligations," and of guarding against "the risk of an
enlargement Page 468 U. S. 380 of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion
of public issues." Id. at 412 U. S. 110 , 412 U. S. 126 .
[ Footnote 13 ]

															Thus, although the broadcasting industry plainly operates under
restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these
restrictions has generally been to secure the public's First
Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on
diverse matters of public concern. As a result of these
restrictions, of course, the absolute freedom to advocate one's own
positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints -- a freedom
enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers and soapbox orators
-- is denied to broadcasters. But, as our cases attest, these
restrictions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial
governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced
coverage of public issues, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 377 . See also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 453 U. S.
396 -397; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
110 -111; Red Lion, supra, at 395 U. S. 396 .
Making that Page 468 U. S. 381 judgment requires a critical examination of the interests of the
public and broadcasters in light of the particular circumstances of
each case. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.
S. 726 (1978). III We turn now to consider whether the restraint imposed by § 399
satisfies the requirements established by our prior cases for
permissible broadcast regulation. Before assessing the Government's
proffered justifications for the statute, however, two central
features of the ban against editorializing must be examined, since
they help to illuminate the importance of the First Amendment
interests at stake in this case. A First, the restriction imposed by § 399 is specifically directed
at a form of speech -- namely, the expression of editorial opinion
-- that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. In
construing the reach of the statute, the FCC has explained
that,

															"although the use of noncommercial educational broadcast
facilities by licensees, their management or those speaking on
their behalf for the propagation of the licensee's own views on
public issues is therefore not to be permitted, such prohibition
should not be construed to inhibit any other presentations
on controversial issues of public importance." Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973)
(emphasis added). The Commission's interpretation of § 399 simply
highlights the fact that what the statute forecloses is the
expression of editorial opinion on "controversial issues of public
importance." As we recently reiterated in NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886 (1982), "expression on public issues has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.'" Id. at 458 U. S. 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S. 467 (1980)). And we have emphasized: "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to Page 468 U. S. 382 discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern
without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. . . .
Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 310 U. S.
101 -102.

															The editorial has traditionally played precisely this role by
informing and arousing the public, and by criticizing and cajoling
those who hold government office in order to help launch new
solutions to the problems of the time. Preserving the free
expression of editorial opinion, therefore, is part and parcel of
"a profound national commitment . . . that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S. 270 (1964). As we recognized in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.
S. 214 (1966), the special place of the editorial in our
First Amendment jurisprudence simply reflects the fact that the
press, of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.
S. 131 , 334 U. S. 166 (1948), carries out a historic, dual responsibility in our society
of reporting information and of bringing critical judgment to bear
on public affairs. Indeed, the pivotal importance of editorializing
as a means of satisfying the public's interest in receiving a wide
variety of ideas and views through the medium of broadcasting has
long been recognized by the FCC; the Commission has, for the past
35 years, actively encouraged commercial broadcast licensees to
include editorials on public affairs in their programming.
[ Footnote 14 ] Page 468 U. S. 383 Because § 399 appears to restrict precisely that form of speech
which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to
protect -- speech that is "indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth" -- we must be especially careful in
weighing the interests that are asserted in support of this
restriction and in assessing the precision with which the ban is
crafted. Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357 , 274 U. S. 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

															Second, the scope of § 399's ban is defined solely on the basis
of the content of the suppressed speech. A wide variety of
noneditorial speech "by licensees, their management or those
speaking on their behalf," Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45
F.C.C.2d at 302, is plainly not prohibited by § 399. Examples of
such permissible forms of speech include daily announcements of the
station's program schedule or over-the-air appeals for
contributions from listeners. Consequently, in order to determine
whether a particular statement by station management constitutes an
"editorial" proscribed by § 399, enforcement authorities must
necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed to
determine whether the views expressed concern "controversial issues
of public importance." Ibid. AS JUSTICE STEVENS observed in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.
S. 530 (1980), however:

															"A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing Page 468 U. S. 384 more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point
of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest
example of a 'law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.' A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to
address a selected audience on 'controversial issues of public
policy' is plainly such a regulation." Id. at 447 U. S. 546 (opinion concurring in judgment); accord, id. at 447 U. S.
537 -540 (majority opinion). Section 399 is just such a
regulation, for it singles out noncommercial broadcasters and
denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters
of public importance. Thus, in enacting § 399, Congress appears to
have sought, in much the same way that the New York Public Service
Commission had attempted through the regulation of utility company
bill inserts struck down in Consolidated Edison, to limit
discussion of controversial topics, and thus to shape the agenda
for public debate. Since, as we observed in Consolidated
Edison, "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation
extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also
to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic," id. at 447 U. S. 537 ,
we must be particularly wary in assessing § 399 to determine
whether it reflects an impermissible attempt "to allow a government
[to] control . . . the search for political truth." Id. at 447 U. S. 538 .
[ Footnote 15 ] B In seeking to defend the prohibition on editorializing imposed
by § 399, the Government urges that the statute was aimed at
preventing two principal threats to the overall success of the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. According to this argument, the
ban was necessary, first, to protect noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations from being coerced, as a result of federal
financing, into becoming vehicles Page 468 U. S. 385 for Government propagandizing or the objects of governmental
influence; and, second, to keep these stations from becoming
convenient targets for capture by private interest groups wishing
to express their own partisan viewpoints. [ Footnote 16 ] By seeking to safeguard the
public's right to a balanced presentation of public issues through
the prevention of either governmental or private bias, these
objectives are, of course, broadly consistent with the goals
identified in our earlier broadcast regulation cases. But, in sharp
contrast to the restrictions upheld in Red Lion or in CBS, Inc.
v. FCC, which left room for editorial discretion and simply
required broadcast editors to grant others access to the
microphone, § 399 directly prohibits the broadcaster from speaking
out on public issues even in a balanced and fair manner. The
Government insists, however, that the hazards posed in the
"special" circumstances of noncommercial Page 468 U. S. 386 educational broadcasting are so great that § 399 is an
indispensable means of preserving the public's First Amendment
interests. We disagree. (1) When Congress first decided to provide financial support for the
expansion and development of noncommercial educational stations,
all concerned agreed that this step posed some risk that these
traditionally independent stations might be pressured into becoming
forums devoted solely to programming and views that were acceptable
to the Federal Government. That Congress was alert to these dangers
cannot be doubted. It sought through the Public Broadcasting Act to
fashion a system that would provide local stations with sufficient
funds to foster their growth and development while preserving their
tradition of autonomy and community-orientation. [ Footnote 17 ] A cardinal objective of the
Act was the establishment Page 468 U. S. 387 of a private corporation that would

															"facilitate the development of educational radio and television
broadcasting and . . . afford maximum protection to such
broadcasting from extraneous interference and control."

															47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (1976 ed.).

															The intended role of § 399 in achieving these purposes, however,
is not as clear. The provision finds no antecedent in the Carnegie
report, which generally provided the model for most other aspects
of the Act. It was not part of the administration's original
legislative proposal. And it was not included in the original
version of the Act passed by the Senate. The provision found its
way into the Act only as a result of an amendment in the House.
Indeed, it appears that, as the House Committee Report frankly
admits, § 399 was added not because Congress thought it was
essential to preserving the autonomy and vitality of local
stations, but rather "[o]ut of an abundance of caution." H.R.Rep.
No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1967). [ Footnote 18 ] Page 468 U. S. 388 More importantly, an examination of both the overall legislative
scheme established by the 1967 Act and the character of public
broadcasting demonstrates that the interest asserted by the
Government is not substantially advanced by § 399. First, to the
extent that federal financial support creates a risk that stations
will lose their independence through the bewitching power of
governmental largesse, the elaborate structure established by the
Public Broadcasting Act Page 468 U. S. 389 already operates to insulate local stations from governmental
interference. Congress not only mandated that the new Corporation
for Public Broadcasting would have a private, bipartisan structure, see §§ 396(c)-(f), but also imposed a variety of important
limitations on its powers. The Corporation was prohibited from
owning or operating any station, § 396(g)(3), it was required to
adhere strictly to a standard of "objectivity and balance" in
disbursing federal funds to local stations, § 396(g)(1)(A), and it
was prohibited from contributing to or otherwise supporting any
candidate for office, § 396(f)(3).

															The Act also established a second layer of protections which
serve to protect the stations from governmental coercion and
interference. Thus, in addition to requiring the Corporation to
operate so as to "assure the maximum freedom [of local stations]
from interference with or control of program content or other
activities," § 396(g)(1)(D), the Act expressly forbids

															"any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over
educational television or radio broadcasting, or over the
Corporation or any of its grantees or contractors. . . ,"

															§ 398(a) (1976 ed.). Subsequent amendments to the Act have
confirmed Congress' commitment to the principle that, because local
stations are the "bedrock of the system," their independence from
governmental interference and control must be fully guaranteed.
These amendments have provided long-term appropriations authority
for public broadcasting, rather than allowing funding to depend
upon yearly appropriations, see § 396(k)(1)(C), as
amended, Pub.L. 97-35, Title XII, § 1227, 95 Stat. 727; have
strictly defined the percentage of appropriated funds that must be
disbursed by the Corporation to local stations, § 396(k)(3)
(A)-(B); and have defined objective criteria under which local
television and radio stations receive basic grants from the
Corporation to be used at the discretion of the station. §§
396(k)(6)(A)-(B), 396(k)(7). The principal thrust of the
amendments, therefore, has been to assure long-term Page 468 U. S. 390 appropriations for the Corporation and, more importantly, to
insist that it pass specified portions of these funds directly
through to local stations to give them greater autonomy in defining
the uses to which those funds should be put. Thus, in sharp
contrast to § 399, the unifying theme of these various statutory
provisions is that they substantially reduce the risk of
governmental interference with the editorial judgments of local
stations without restricting those stations' ability to speak on
matters of public concern. [ Footnote 19 ]

															Even if these statutory protections were thought insufficient to
the task, however, suppressing the particular category of speech
restricted by § 399 is simply not likely, given the character of
the public broadcasting system, to reduce substantially the risk
that the Federal Government will seek to influence or put pressure
on local stations. An underlying supposition of the Government's
argument in this regard is that individual noncommercial stations
are likely to speak so forcefully on particular issues that
Congress, the ultimate source of the stations' federal funding,
will be tempted to retaliate against these individual stations by
restricting appropriations for all of public broadcasting. But, as
the District Court recognized, the character of public
broadcasting Page 468 U. S. 391 suggests that such a risk is speculative, at best. There are
literally hundreds of public radio and television stations in
communities scattered throughout the United States and its
territories, see CPB, 1983-84 Public Broadcasting
Directory 20-50, 66-86 (Sept.1983). Given that central fact, it
seems reasonable to infer that the editorial voices of these
stations will prove to be as distinctive, varied, and idiosyncratic
as the various communities they represent. More importantly, the
editorial focus of any particular station can fairly be expected to
focus largely on issues affecting only its community. [ Footnote 20 ] Accordingly, absent
some showing by the Government to the contrary, the risk that local
editorializing will place all of public broadcasting in jeopardy is
not sufficiently pressing to warrant § 399's broad suppression of
speech.

															Indeed, what is far more likely than local station editorials to
pose the kinds of dangers hypothesized by the Government are the
wide variety of programs addressing controversial issues produced,
often with substantial CPB funding, for national distribution to
local stations. Such programs truly have the potential to reach a
large audience and, because of the critical commentary they
contain, to have the kind of genuine national impact that might
trigger a congressional response or kindle governmental resentment.
The ban imposed by § 399, however, is plainly not directed at the
potentially controversial content of such programs; it is, instead,
leveled solely at the expression of editorial opinion by local
station management, a form of expression that is far more likely to
be aimed at a smaller local audience, to have less Page 468 U. S. 392 national impact, and to be confined to local issues. In
contrast, the Act imposes no substantive restrictions, other than
normal requirements of balance and fairness, on those who produce
nationally distributed programs. Indeed, the Act is designed in
part to encourage and sponsor the production of such programs, and
to allow each station to decide for itself whether to accept such
programs for local broadcast. [ Footnote 21 ]

															Furthermore, the manifest imprecision of the ban imposed by §
399 reveals that its proscription is not sufficiently tailored to
the harms it seeks to prevent to justify its substantial
interference with broadcasters' speech. Section Page 468 U. S. 393 399 includes within its grip a potentially infinite variety of
speech, most of which would not be related in any way to
governmental affairs, political candidacies, or elections. Indeed,
the breadth of editorial commentary is as wide as human imagination
permits. But the Government never explains how, say, an editorial
by local station management urging improvements in a town's parks
or museums will so infuriate Congress or other federal officials
that the future of public broadcasting will be imperiled unless
such editorials are suppressed. Nor is it explained how the
suppression of editorials alone serves to reduce the risk of
governmental retaliation and interference when it is clear that
station management is fully able to broadcast controversial views
so long as such views are not labeled as its own. See
infra, at 468 U. S. 396 ,
and n. 25.

															The Government appears to recognize these flaws in § 399,
because it focuses instead on the suggestion that the source of
governmental influence may well be state and local governments,
many of which have established public broadcasting commissions that
own and operate local noncommercial educational stations. [ Footnote 22 ] The ban on
editorializing is all the more necessary with respect to these
stations, the argument runs, because the management of such
stations will be especially likely to broadcast only editorials
that are favorable to the state or local authorities that hold the
purse strings. The Government's argument, however, proves too much.
First, § 399's ban applies to the many private noncommercial
community organizations that own and operate stations that Page 468 U. S. 394 are not controlled in any way by state or local government.
Second, the legislative history of the Public Broadcasting Act
clearly indicates that Congress was concerned with "assur[ing]
complete freedom from any Federal Government influence. "
The Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 before the
Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (emphasis
added). [ Footnote 23 ]
Consistently with this concern, Congress refused to create any
federally owned stations, and it expressly forbade the CPB to own
or operate any television or radio stations, § 396(g)(3). By
contrast, although Congress was clearly aware in 1967 that many
noncommercial educational stations were owned by state and local
governments, it did not hesitate to extend federal assistance to
such stations, it imposed no special requirements to restrict state
or local control over these stations, and, indeed, it ensured
through the structure of the Act that these stations would be as
insulated from federal interference as the wholly private stations.
[ Footnote 24 ] Page 468 U. S. 395 Finally, although the Government certainly has a substantial
interest in ensuring that the audiences of noncommercial stations
will not be led to think that the broadcaster's editorials reflect
the official view of the Government, this interest can be fully
satisfied by less restrictive means that are readily available. To
address this important concern, Congress could simply require
public broadcasting stations to broadcast a disclaimer every time
they editorialize which would state that the editorial represents
only the view of the station's management, and does not in any way
represent the views of the Federal Government or any of the
station's other sources of funding. Such a disclaimer -- similar to
those often used in commercial and noncommercial programming of a
controversial nature -- would effectively and directly communicate
to the audience that the editorial reflected only the views of the
station, rather than those of the Government. Furthermore, such
disclaimers would have the virtue of clarifying the responses that
might be made under the fairness doctrine by opponents of the
station's position, since those opponents would know with certainty
that they were responding only to the station's views, and not in
any sense to the Government's position.

															In sum, § 399's broad ban on all editorializing by every station
that receives CPB funds far exceeds what is necessary to protect
against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the
public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting
stations represent the official view of government. The regulation
impermissibly sweeps within its prohibition a wide range of speech
by wholly private stations on topics that do not take a directly
partisan stand or that have nothing whatever to do with federal,
state, or local government. Page 468 U. S. 396 (2) Assuming that the Government's second asserted interest in
preventing noncommercial stations from becoming a "privileged
outlet for the political and ideological opinions of station owners
and managers," Brief for Appellant 34, is legitimate, the
substantiality of this asserted interest is dubious. The patent
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of § 399's ban "undermines
the likelihood of a genuine [governmental] interest" in preventing
private groups from propagating their own views via public
broadcasting. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 793 .
If it is true, as the Government contends, that noncommercial
stations remain free, despite § 399, to broadcast a wide variety of
controversial views through their power to control program
selection, to select which persons will be interviewed, and to
determine how news reports will be presented, Brief for Appellant
41, then it seems doubtful that § 399 can fairly be said to advance
any genuinely substantial governmental interest in keeping
controversial or partisan opinions from being aired by
noncommercial stations. Indeed, since the very same opinions that
cannot be expressed by the station's management may be aired so
long as they are communicated by a commentator or by a guest
appearing at the invitation of the station during an interview, ibid.; see also Accuracy in Media, 45 F.C.C.2d at 302, §
399 clearly "provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.
S. 557 , 447 U. S. 564 (1980). Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 45 ; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 435 U. S. 793 .
[ Footnote 25 ] Page 468 U. S. 397 In short, § 399 does not prevent the use of noncommercial
stations for the presentation of partisan views on controversial
matters; instead, it merely bars a station from specifically
communicating such views on its own behalf or on behalf of its
management. If the vigorous expression of controversial opinions
is, as the Government assures us, affirmatively encouraged by the
Act, and if local licensees are permitted under the Act to exercise
editorial control over the selection of programs, controversial or
otherwise, that are aired on their stations, then § 399
accomplishes only one thing -- the suppression of editorial speech
by station management. It does virtually nothing, however, to
reduce the risk that public stations will serve solely as outlets
for expression of narrow partisan views. What we said in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee applies, therefore, with equal force here: the
"sacrifice [of] First Amendment protections for so speculative a
gain is not warranted. . . ." 412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
127 .

															Finally, the public's interest in preventing public broadcasting
stations from becoming forums for lopsided presentations of narrow
partisan positions is already secured by Page 468 U. S. 398 a variety of other regulatory means that intrude far less
drastically upon the "journalistic freedom" of noncommercial
broadcasters. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 110 .
The requirements of the FCC's fairness doctrine, for instance,
which apply to commercial and noncommercial stations alike, ensure
that such editorializing would maintain a reasonably balanced and
fair presentation of controversial issues. Thus, even if the
management of a noncommercial educational station were inclined to
seek to further only its own partisan views when editorializing, it
simply could not do so. Indeed, in considering the
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, the Court in Red Lion considered precisely the same justification
invoked by the Government today in support of § 399: that without
some requirement of fairness and balance,

															"station owners . . . would have unfettered power . . . to
communicate only their own views on public issues . . . and to
permit on the air only those with whom they agreed."

															395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 392 .
The solution to this problem offered by § 399, however, is
precisely the opposite of the remedy prescribed by the FCC and
endorsed by the Court in Red Lion. Rather than requiring
noncommercial broadcasters who express editorial opinions on
controversial subjects to permit more speech on such
subjects to ensure that the public's First Amendment interest in
receiving a balanced account of the issue is met, § 399 simply
silences all editorial speech by such broadcasters. Since the
breadth of § 399 extends so far beyond what is necessary to
accomplish the goals identified by the Government, it fails to
satisfy the First Amendment standards that we have applied in this
area.

															We therefore hold that, even if some of the hazards at which §
399 was aimed are sufficiently substantial, the restriction is not
crafted with sufficient precision to remedy those dangers that may
exist to justify the significant abridgment of speech worked by the
provision's broad ban on editorializing. The Page 468 U. S. 399 statute is not narrowly tailored to address any of the
Government's suggested goals. Moreover, the public's "paramount
right" to be fully and broadly informed on matters of public
importance through the medium of noncommercial educational
broadcasting is not well served by the restriction, for its effect
is plainly to diminish, rather than augment, "the volume and
quality of coverage" of controversial issues. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 393 .
Nor do we see any reason to deny noncommercial broadcasters the
right to address matters of public concern on the basis of merely
speculative fears of adverse public or governmental reactions to
such speech. IV Although the Government did not present the argument in any form
to the District Court, [ Footnote
26 ] it now seeks belatedly to justify § 399 on the basis of
Congress' spending power. Relying upon our recent decision in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U. S. 540 (1983), the Government argues that, by prohibiting noncommercial
educational stations that receive CPB grants from editorializing,
Congress has, in the proper exercise of its spending power, simply
determined that it "will not subsidize public broadcasting station
editorials." Brief for Appellant 42. In Taxation With
Representation, the Court found that Congress could, in the
exercise of its spending power, reasonably refuse to subsidize the
lobbying activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by
prohibiting such organizations from using tax-deductible
contributions to support their lobbying efforts. In so holding,
however, we explained that such organizations remained free "to
receive [tax-]deductible Page 468 U. S. 400 contributions to support nonlobbying activit[ies]." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 545 .
Thus, a charitable organization could create, under § 501(C)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(C)(3), an affiliate to
conduct its nonlobbying activities using tax-deductible
contributions, and, at the same time, establish, under § 501(C)(4),
a separate affiliate to pursue its lobbying efforts without such
contributions. 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 544 ; see also id. at 461 U. S.
552 -553 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Given that statutory
alternative, the Court concluded that

															"Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or
regulated any First Amendment activity; [it] has simply chosen not
to pay or TWR's lobbying." Id. at 461 U. S.
546 .

															In this case, however, unlike the situation faced by the
charitable organization in Taxation With Representation, a
noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its
overall income from CPB grants is barred absolutely from all
editorializing. Therefore, in contrast to the appellee in Taxation With Representation, such a station is not able
to segregate its activities according to the source of its funding.
The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to
all noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is
barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its
editorial activity.

															Of course, if Congress were to adopt a revised version of § 399
that permitted noncommercial educational broadcasting stations to
establish "affiliate" organizations which could then use the
station's facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such a
statutory mechanism would plainly be valid under the reasoning of Taxation With Representation. Under such a statute, public
broadcasting stations would be free, in the same way that the
charitable organization in Taxation With Representation was free, to make known its views on matters of public importance
through its nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without
losing federal grants for its noneditorializing broadcast
activities. Cf. id. Page 468 U. S. 401 at 461 U. S. 544 .
But in the absence of such authority, we must reject the
Government's contention that our decision in Taxation With
Representation is controlling here. [ Footnote 27 ] Page 468 U. S. 402 V In conclusion, we emphasize that our disposition of this case
rests upon a narrow proposition. We do not hold that the Congress
or the FCC is without power to regulate the content, timing, or
character of speech by noncommercial educational broadcasting
stations. Rather, we hold only that the specific interests sought
to be advanced by § 399's ban on editorializing are either not
sufficiently substantial or are not served in a sufficiently
limited manner to justify the substantial abridgment of important
journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously protects.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ] See S. Frost, Education's Own Stations 464 (1937).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															For a review of the history of public broadcasting, see Carnegie Commission on Educational Television, Public Television: A
Program for Action 21-29 (1967) ( Carnegie I ); Carnegie
Commission on the Future of Public Broadcasting, A Public Trust
33-34 (1979) ( Carnegie II ). See also S.Rep. No.
93-123, pp. 2-6 (1973).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Although its recommendations were later applied by Congress to
noncommercial educational radio as well, the Commission's report
addressed solely the problems and prospects of what it called
"public television." This term was coined by the authors of the
report not to distinguish noncommercial, educational broadcasting
from "private" commercial broadcasting, but rather to identify a
larger view of the potential of noncommercial broadcasting
comprising not only "instructional" programming but also
educational, political, and cultural programming broadly defined. See Carnegie I at 1.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The structure of the Board was modified in 1981 to provide for
10, rather than 15 members. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c), as amended by
Pub.L. 97-35, Title XII, § 1225(a)(1), 95 Stat. 726.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															In accordance with the Act, an interconnection system was
formally developed in 1969 when the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS) was created. Today, PBS is a private, nonprofit membership
corporation governed by a Board of Directors elected by its
membership, which consists of the licensees of noncommercial,
educational television stations located throughout the United
States. See Brief for PBS et al. as Amici
Curiae 1. National Public Radio (NPR) was established in 1970,
and performs an analogous service for public radio stations.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In addition to Pacifica Foundation, appellees include the League
of Women Voters of California, and Congressman Henry Waxman, who is
a regular listener and viewer of public broadcasting.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															As first enacted in 1967, § 399 provided:

															"No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may engage in
editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate for political
office."

															Pub.L. 90-129, Title II, § 201(8), 81 Stat. 368.

															Although the statutory language remained the same, this
provision was redesignated as § 399(a) in 1973, when subsection
(b), requiring public stations to "retain an audio recording of
each of its broadcasts of any program in which any issue of public
importance is discussed," was added. Pub.L. 93-84, § 2, 87 Stat.
219. Because appellees filed their complaint in 1979, their suit
was initially directed at § 399(a). Subsection (b) was found
unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Community Service Broadcasting of
Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 192 U.S.App.D.C. 448, 593 F.2d 1102
(1978), and was deleted by Congress in 1981. Pub.L. 97-35, Title
XII, § 1229, 95 Stat. 730.

															Also as part of those 1981 amendments, Congress revised and
redesignated former § 399(a) by confining the ban on editorializing
to stations receiving CPB grants and by separately prohibiting
political endorsements by all stations; § 399 in its current form
provides in full:

															"No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which
receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C of this part
may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational
broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for public
office."

															47 U.S.C. § 399.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															As then Attorney General Civiletti explained:

															"After careful consideration, we have concluded that Section
[399] violates the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom of the press by restricting the ability of public
broadcasting stations to comment on matters of public interest. . .
."

															"The Department of Justice is, of course, fully mindful of its
duty to support the laws enacted by Congress. Here, however, the
Department has determined, after careful study and deliberation,
that reasonable arguments cannot be advanced to defend the
challenged statute."

															Letter from Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to Senate
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (Oct. 11, 1979), App. 13-14.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In their amended complaint, appellees did not challenge the
provision in § 399 prohibiting all noncommercial educational
broadcasting stations from "support[ing] or oppos[ing] any
candidate for public office." Neither party suggests that the two
sentences of § 399 are so inseverable that we may not consider the
constitutionality of one without also reviewing the other. Indeed,
as the Federal Communications Commission explained before the
District Court,

															"[n]ew section 399 does more than reinforce the severability of
the two provisions by setting them forth in separate
sentences,"

															it also confines the ban on editorializing to stations that
receive CPB grants while extending a separate ban on political
endorsements to all public stations. Defendant's Supplemental
Memorandum on Amendment of Section 399, p. 4 (Sept. 15, 1981). We
therefore express no view of the constitutionality of the second
sentence in § 399. Cf. First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 , 435 U. S. 788 ,
n. 26 (1978) (noting that "our consideration of a corporation's
right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no
comparable right in the quite different context of participation in
a political campaign for election to public office" -- a separate
restriction not challenged in that case).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Relying on our recent decision in Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56 (1982)
(per curiam), appellees contend that we lack jurisdiction because
the FCC filed its notice of appeal while a motion to amend the
District Court's judgment was still pending. Our decision in Griggs, however, rested squarely on the plain language of
new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4), which specifically
provides:

															"A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [a Rule
59(e) motion] shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the
order disposing of the motion. . . ." See 459 U.S. at 459 U. S. 61 .
Because this case comes to us directly from the District Court via
28 U.S.C. § 1252, the question whether the FCC's notice of appeal
was effective to vest this Court with appellate jurisdiction turns
not on Rule 4(a)(4), but rather on our own Rule 11.3. The express
language of Rule 4(a)(4) found dispositive in Griggs has
no direct equivalent in our Rule 11.3, which simply provides
that,

															"if a petition for rehearing is timely filed by any party . . .
, the time for filing the notice of appeal . . . runs from the date
of the denial of rehearing or the entry of a subsequent
judgment."

															By its terms, therefore, our Rule does not determine whether a
notice of appeal filed during the pendency of a motion to amend is
ineffective to vest appellate jurisdiction in this Court. We have
observed, however, that the filing of a petition for rehearing or a
motion to amend or alter the judgment "suspend[s] the finality of
the [original] judgment," thereby extending the time for filing a
notice of appeal "until [the lower court's] denial of the motion .
. . restores" that finality. Communist Party of Indiana v.
Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 441 , 414 U. S. 445 (1974). At the same time, we have emphasized that the rule
requiring suspension of a judgment's finality for purposes of
appeal during the pendency of a postjudgment motion for
reconsideration applies only when such a motion actually seeks an
"alteration of the rights adjudicated" in the court's first
judgment. Department of Banking of Nebraska v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264 , 317 U. S. 266 (1942) (per curiam); see also FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 344 U. S. 206 , 211
(1952) ("mere fact that a judgment previously entered is reentered
or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which
review must be sought").

															The FCC has brought this appeal pursuant to § 1252, which
permits direct appeal to this Court from "an interlocutory or a
final judgment . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional."
Section 1252 departs significantly from the general congressional
policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court and
reflects instead Congress' "unambiguou[s] mandat[e]" that we afford
immediate direct review of all decisions that call into doubt the
constitutionality of Acts of Congress. McLucas v.
DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21 , 421 U. S. 31 (1975). It is clear that the motion filed by the FCC following the
entry of the District Court's August 6 order was directed not at
the court's judgment holding § 399 unconstitutional, but rather at
the wholly collateral issue of whether appellees were entitled to
recover attorney's fees and costs. Prior to the court's decision,
the question of attorney's fees had never been briefed or discussed
by the parties; nevertheless, the court, acting sua
sponte, included in its August 6 order an award of"reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs" to appellees. Recognizing that the
court's order had been entered in the absence of any application
for fees and without benefit of briefing, the FCC sought, through
its postjudgment motion, to restore the status quo ante with respect to the question of fees in order to allow time for
full briefing. The District Court, in an order entered November 1,
did precisely that by striking the award of attorney's fees from
the August 6 order, and taking the question of fees under
advisement.

															As we recognized in White v. New Hampshire Dept. of
Employment Security, 455 U. S. 445 (1982), an "award [of attorney's fees] is uniquely separable from
the cause of action" that is settled by a court's judgment on the
merits, and therefore a postjudgment request for attorney's fees is
not considered a motion to amend or alter the judgment under Rule
59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 455 U. S. 452 .
Since, as appellees concede, the FCC's motion in this case related
solely to the "uniquely separable" question of attorney's fees and
was in no way directed at the District Court's judgment "holding an
Act of Congress unconstitutional," 28 U.S.C. § 1252, it is true
here, as it was in Department of Banking v. Pink, supra, that the District Court was not asked to "alter its adjudication of
the rights of the parties," and consequently the finality of the
judgment which the FCC seeks to have reviewed "was never
suspended." Id. at 317 U. S. 266 .
Accordingly, we think the time for filing the FCC's notice of
appeal was properly calculated from the date the District Court's
initial judgment was rendered, and its notice is therefore timely
within 28 U.S.C. § 2101(a). A different result would frustrate the
clear purpose of § 1252 to permit "prompt determination by the
court of last resort of disputed questions of the constitutionality
of acts of the Congress." H.R.Rep. No. 212, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 (1937), since an appeal from a judgment "holding an Act of
Congress unconstitutional" would be delayed by collateral issues
having no bearing whatever on the judgment from which the appeal is
taken.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775 , 436 U. S.
799 -800 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S.
94 , 412 U. S.
101 -102 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U. S. 367 , 395 U. S.
387 -390 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U. S. 190 , 319 U. S. 216 (1943); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond &
Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 , 289 U. S. 282 (1933).

															The prevailing rationale for broadcast regulation based on
spectrum scarcity has come under increasing criticism in recent
years. Critics, including the incumbent Chairman of the FCC, charge
that, with the advent of cable and satellite television technology,
communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that
the scarcity doctrine is obsolete. See, e.g., Fowler &
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 Texas
L.Rev. 207, 221-226 (1982). We are not prepared, however, to
reconsider out longstanding approach without some signal from
Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced
so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may
be required.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															We note that the FCC, observing that

															"[i]f any substantial possibility exists that the [fairness
doctrine] rules have impeded, rather than furthered, First
Amendment objectives, repeal may be warranted on that ground
alone,"

															has tentatively concluded that the rules, by effectively
chilling speech, do not serve the public interest, and has
therefore proposed to repeal them. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In
re Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political
Editorial Rules, 48 Fed.Reg. 28298, 28301 (1983). Of course, the
Commission may, in the exercise of its discretion, decide to modify
or abandon these rules, and we express no view on the legality of
either course. As we recognized in Red Lion, however, were
it to be shown by the Commission that the fairness doctrine "[has]
the net effect of reducing, rather than enhancing," speech, we
would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our
decision in that case. 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
393 .

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															This Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), upholding an exercise of the Commission's authority to
regulate broadcasts containing "indecent" language as applied to a
particular afternoon broadcast of a George Carlin monologue, is
consistent with the approach taken in our other broadcast cases.
There, the Court focused on certain physical characteristics of
broadcasting -- specifically, that the medium's uniquely pervasive
presence renders impossible any prior warning for those listeners
who may be offended by indecent language, and, second, that the
ease with which children may gain access to the medium, especially
during daytime hours, creates a substantial risk that they may be
exposed to such offensive expression without parental supervision. Id. at 438 U. S.
748 -749. The governmental interest in reduction of those
risks through Commission regulation of the timing and character of
such "indecent broadcasting" was thought sufficiently substantial
to outweigh the broadcaster's First Amendment interest in
controlling the presentation of its programming. Id. at 438 U. S. 750 .
In this case, by contrast, we are faced not with indecent
expression, but rather with expression that is at the core of First
Amendment protections, and no claim is made by the Government that
the expression of editorial opinion by noncommercial stations will
create a substantial "nuisance" of the kind addressed in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation. [ Footnote 14 ]

															In 1949, finding that

															"programs in which the licensee's personal opinions are
expressed are [not] intrinsically more or less subject to abuse
than any other program devoted to public issues,"

															the FCC concluded that overt licensee editorializing, so long
as

															"it is exercised in conformity with the paramount right of the
public to hear a reasonably balanced presentation of all
responsible viewpoints,"

															is "consistent with the licensee's duty to operate in the public
interest." Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13
F.C.C. 1246, 1253, 1258 (1949). At the time, of course, this
decision applied with equal force to both noncommercial educational
licensees and commercial stations. The FCC has since underscored
its view that editorializing by broadcast licensees serves the
public interest by identifying editorial programming as one of 14
"major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest,
needs and desires of the community." FCC Programming Statement, 25
Fed.Reg. 7295 (1960). The Commission has regularly enforced this
policy by considering a licensee's editorializing practices in
license renewal proceedings. See, e.g., Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 402, 444 F.2d
841, 860 (1970); Evening Star Broadcasting Co., 27
F.C.C.2d 316, 332 (1971); RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d
149, 219 (1969).

															[ Footnote 15 ] See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 , 463 U. S. 65 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S.
462 -463 (1980); First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 435 U. S. 784 -785; Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , 408 U. S. 95 -96
(1972).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															The Government also contends that § 399 is intended to prevent
the use of taxpayer moneys to promote private views with which
taxpayers may disagree. This argument is readily answered by our
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 , 424 U. S. 90 -93
(1976) (per curiam). As we explained in that case, virtually every
congressional appropriation will, to some extent, involve a use of
public money as to which some taxpayers may object. Id. at 424 U. S. 91 -92.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that those taxpayers have a
constitutionally protected right to enjoin such expenditures. Nor
can this interest be invoked to justify a congressional decision to
suppress speech. And, unlike Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977), this is not a case in which an individual taxpayer is
forced in his daily life to identify with particular views
expressed by educational broadcasting stations. Even if this were a
serious interest, it is belied by the underinclusiveness of § 399.
The Government concedes -- indeed it insists -- that all sorts of
controversial speech are subsidized by the 1967 Act, and yet, out
of all of this potentially objectionable speech, only the
expression of editorial opinion by local stations is selected for
suppression. If angry taxpayers were really the central, animating
concern of Congress when it passed the 1967 Act, then § 399 does
not go far enough in suppressing controversial speech in this
medium. That the provision is so unrelated to this asserted purpose
suggests that the Government's interest is not substantial. Cf.
Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 424 U. S. 45 ; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 435 U. S.
793 .

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The Senate Report concerning the Act, for example,
explained:

															"There is general agreement that, for the time being, Federal
financial assistance is required to provide the resources necessary
for quality programs. It is also recognized that this assistance
should in no way involve the Government in programming or program
judgments. An independent entity supported by Federal funds is
required to provide programs free of political pressures. The
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit private
corporation, . . . provides such an entity."

															S.Rep. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967).

															"Your committee has heard considerable discussion about the fear
of Government control or interference in programming if [the Act]
is enacted. We wish to state in the strongest terms possible that
it is our intention that local stations be absolutely free to
determine for themselves what they should or should not
broadcast." Id. at 11. See also The Public Television Act
of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 before the Subcommittee on
Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 9 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).

															The House Report echoed the same concerns:

															"Every witness who discussed the operation of the Corporation
agreed that funds for programs should not be provided directly by
the Federal Government. It was generally agreed that a nonprofit
Corporation, directed by a Board of Directors, none of whom will be
Government employees, will provide the most effective insulation
from Government control or influence over the expenditure of
funds."

															H.R.Rep. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1967).

															"[L]ocal stations shall retain both the opportunity and
responsibility for broadcasting programs they feel best serve their
communities. Similarly, the local station alone will make the
decision whether or not to participate in any interconnection
arrangements. . . ." Id. at 18.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The legislative history surrounding § 399 also suggests that a
variety of reasons lay behind the decision to include it as part of
the Act. Although some supporters of § 399 plainly were concerned
that permitting editorializing might create a risk that
noncommercial stations would be subjected to undue governmental
influence, and thereby become vehicles for governmental propaganda, see 113 Cong.Rec. 26383 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Staggers),
other supporters of the provision appear to have been more
concerned with preventing the possibility that these stations would
criticize Government officials. Representative Springer, the
provision's chief sponsor and the ranking minority member of the
House Committee that reported out the bill containing § 399,
explained that his concerns were due at least in part to the fact
that "[t]here are some of us who have very strong feelings because
they have been editorialized against." Hearings on H.R. 6736 and S.
1160 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., 641 (1967) (House Hearings). See
also 113 Cong.Rec. 26391 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Joelson).
Indeed, during hearings on the bill, the Committee heard a variety
of views on the question of editorializing by noncommercial
educational stations. Some witnesses felt that editorials of any
kind would be inappropriate, see, e.g., House Hearings at
513-514 (remarks of William Harley, President, National Association
of Educational Broadcasters), while others took a different view,
explaining that, although specific endorsements of political
candidates would be inappropriate, editorials concerning civic
affairs and other matters of public concern would be an important
part of responsible educational broadcasting, see, e.g.,
id. at 391-392 (remarks of McGeorge Bundy, President, Ford
Foundation); id. at 640-642 (remarks of Dr. Samuel Gould,
Joint Council on Educational Telecommunications). After the House
passed H.R. 6736, the Senate, disagreeing with the addition of §
399, requested a Conference and only receded from its
disagreement

															"when it was explained that the prohibition . . . was limited to
providing that no noncommercial educational broadcast station may
broadcast editorials representing the opinion of the management of
such station . . . [and that] these provisions are not intended to
preclude balanced, fair, and objective presentations of
controversial issues. . . ."

															H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1967).

															Of course, as the Government points out, Congress has
consistently retained the basic proscription on editorializing in §
399, despite periodic reconsiderations and modifications of the Act
in 1973, 1978, and 1981. Brief for Appellant 25-27; see
also n 7, supra. A reviewing court may not easily set aside such a considered
congressional judgment. At the same time,

															"[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial
inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake. . . . Were it
otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be
subject to legislative definition and the function of the First
Amendment as a check on legislative power would be nullified." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.
S. 829 , 435 U. S.
843 -844 (1978).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Furthermore, the risk that federal coercion or influence will be
brought to bear against local stations as a result of federal
financing is considerably attenuated by the fact that CPB grants
account for only a portion of total public broadcasting income.
CPB, Public Broadcasting Income: Fiscal Year 1982, Table 2 (Final
Report, Dec.1983) (noting that federal funds account for 23.4% of
total income for all public broadcasting stations). The vast
majority of financial support comes instead from state and local
governments, as well as a wide variety of private sources,
including foundations, businesses, and individual contributions;
indeed, as the CPB recently noted, "[t]he diversity of support in
America for public broadcasting is remarkable," CPB, 1982 Annual
Report 2 (1982). Given this diversity of funding sources and the
decentralized manner in which funds are secured, the threat that
improper federal influence will be exerted over local stations is
not so pressing as to require the total suppression of editorial
speech by these stations.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															This likelihood is enhanced with respect to public stations
because they are required to establish community advisory boards
which must reasonably reflect the "diverse needs and interests of
the communities served by such station[s]." § 396(k)(9)(A). For a
review of sample topics of broadcast editorializing, see Fang & Whelan, Survey of Television Editorials and Ombudsman
Segments, 17 J. Broadcasting 363 (1973); see also E.
Routt, Dimensions of Broadcast Editorializing (1974).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															Congressional experience with the Act following its passage in
1967 has reaffirmed its commitment to preserving broad editorial
discretion for local stations in determining the content of their
schedules and programming. This experience also suggests that those
critical reactions to public broadcasting that have occurred have
focused not on the exercise of such editorial judgments by local
stations, but rather on controversial programming produced for
national distribution, which has included critical commentary on
public affairs. In 1972, claiming that the centralization of
program production was usurping the role of local stations,
then-President Nixon vetoed a bill establishing 2-year
appropriations authority for CPB funding. See Carnegie II,
at 41-43. In addition, the administration was critical of certain
of the best known nationally distributed public affairs programs,
such as "Bill Moyer's Journal" and "Washington Week in Review,"
which were regarded by some as too controversial. See Canby, The First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications
for Public Broadcasting, 52 Texas L.Rev. 1123, 1156-1157 (1974).
These events prompted Congress to undertake its first thorough
review of the public broadcasting system since the enactment of the
Public Broadcasting Act. See S.Rep. No. 93-123, p. 12
(1973). The result of that review was a firm congressional
commitment to developing long-range financing for public
broadcasting to "provide adequate insulation against Government
interference," id. at 14, and to ensuring an

															"increase [in] both the percentage and amount of unrestricted
support available to public television stations . . . [in order to
ensure] strong local programming made possible by a predictable
level of community service [ i.e., unrestricted]
grants."

															H.R.Rep. No. 93-324, pp. 7, 9 (1973). These themes have been
carried forward in subsequent amendments to the Act, see Pub.L. 95-567, § 307, 92 Stat. 2415, and Pub.L. 97-35, § 1227, 95
Stat. 727.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															As the Government points out in its brief, at least two-thirds
of the public television broadcasting stations in operation are
licensed to (a) state public broadcasting authorities or
commissions, in which commission members are often appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the state legislature, (b)
state universities or educational commissions, or (c) local school
boards or municipal authorities. Brief for Appellant 20, nn. 43,
44; see also CPB, 1983-84 CPB Public Broadcasting
Directory 5-8, 66-86 (Sept.1983).

															[ Footnote 23 ] See also Hearings on S. 1160, at 93 (remarks of FCC
Chairman Hyde); Special Message to the Congress: "Education and
Health in America," 1 Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon B.
Johnson, Feb. 28, 1967, p. 250 (1967) ("Noncommercial television
and radio in America, even though supported by federal funds, must
be absolutely free from any federal government interference over
programming"); see also 113 Cong.Rec. 26384 (1967)
(remarks of Rep. Staggers); H.R.Rep. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 18-19 (1967); S.Rep. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8, 11
(1967).

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															We note in this regard that, in 1977, the administration,
observing that § 399's ban appeared to "mak[e] sense for stations
licensed to a State or local government instrumentalit[ies]" but
not for nongovernmental licensees, proposed that the statute be
amended to permit editorializing by all stations not licensed to
governmental entities. President's Message on Public Broadcasting
(Oct. 6, 1977), reprinted in H.R.Rep. No. 95-1178, p. 9 (1978). The
House, however, went further and passed H.R. 12605, which, among
other things, amended § 399 by deleting entirely the ban on
editorializing, while retaining the ban on political endorsements.
124 Cong.Rec.19937 (1978); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-1178, supra, at 31. The Senate then passed an amended version of
H.R. 12605, which retained § 399 in its original form. 124
Cong.Rec. 30081 (1978). At conference, the House receded from its
disagreement, and § 399 was retained. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 95-1774, p.
35 (1978). Whether a prohibition on editorializing restricted to
the licensees of state and local governmental entities would pass
constitutional muster is a question we need not decide.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															When it determined in 1949 that broadcast editorializing served
the public interest, the FCC recognized precisely this fact:

															"It is clear that the licensee's authority to determine the
specific programs to be broadcast over his station gives him an
opportunity . . . to insure that his personal viewpoint on any
particular issue is presented in his station's broadcasts, whether
or not these views are expressly identified with the licensee." Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. at
1252. The Commission nonetheless rejected the contention that overt
advocacy by licensees would be contrary to the public interest.
Instead, the FCC found that

															"these fears are largely misdirected . . . ; they stem from a
confusion of the question of overt advocacy in the name of the
licensee, with the broader issue of insuring that the station's
broadcasts devoted to the consideration of public issues will
provide the listening public with a fair and balanced presentation
of differing viewpoints on such issues. . . . If it be true that
station good will and licensee prestige, where it exists, may give
added weight to opinion expressed by the licensee, it does not
follow that such opinion should be excluded from the air. . . . Assurance off-airness must, in the final analysis, be achieved
not by the exclusion of particular views because of the source of
the views, . . . but by making the microphone available, for
the presentation of contrary views. . . ." Id. at 1253-1254 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 26 ] See Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (July 22,
1981); Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum on Amendment of Section
399 (Sept. 15, 1981); Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (Oct. 13, 1981).

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST's effort to prop up his position by relying on
our decisions upholding certain provisions of the Hatch Act, 5
U.S.C. § 7324 et seq., only reveals his misunderstanding
of what is at issue in this case. For example, in both United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947), and CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.
S. 548 (1973), the Court has upheld § 9(a) of the Hatch
Act -- a provision that differs from § 399 in three fundamental
respects: first, the statute only prohibits Government employees
from "active participation in political management and political
campaigns," and, accordingly, "[e]xpressions, public or private, on
public affairs, personalities and matters of public interest" are
not proscribed, id. at 413 U. S. 556 ;
second, the constitutionality of that restriction is grounded in
the Government's substantial and important interest in ensuring
effective job performance by its own employees, id. at 413 U. S.
564 -565; and, finally, these restrictions evolved over a
century of governmental experience with less restrictive
alternatives that proved to be inadequate to maintain the effective
operation of government, id. at 413 U. S.
557 -563. Here, by contrast, the editorializing ban in §
399 directly suppresses not only political endorsements, but all
editorial expression on matters of public importance; it applies to
independent, nongovernmental entities rather than to the
Government's own employees; and, it is not grounded in any prior
governmental experience with less restrictive means.

															More importantly, in neither of those cases did the Court even
consider that the restrictions could be justified simply because
these employees were receiving Government funds, nor did it find
that a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny was required simply
because Government funds were involved.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST's reliance upon Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U. S. 127 (1947), see post at 468 U. S.
405 -406, is also misplaced. There, a principal issue
addressed by the Court was Oklahoma's claim that § 12 of the Hatch
Act invaded the State's sovereignty in violation of the Tenth
Amendment, because it authorized the Civil Service Commission to
withhold federal funds from States whose officers violated the Act.
As the Court noted,

															"[t]he coercive effect of the authorization to withhold sums
allocated to a state is relied upon as an interference with the
reserved powers of the state." Id. at 468 U. S. 142 .
After citing Mitchell, supra, for the proposition that the
Act did not impermissibly interfere with an employee's freedom of
expression in political matters, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 142 ,
the Court explained:

															"While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power
to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials,
it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments
to states shall be disbursed. The Tenth Amendment does not
forbid the exercise of this power in the way that Congress has
proceeded in this case. " Id. at 330 U. S. 143 (emphasis added). Thus, it was only in the context of rejecting
Oklahoma's Tenth Amendment claim that the Court used the language
cited by the dissent. Just as in Mitchell and Letter
Carriers, therefore, the Court never intimated in Oklahoma
v. CSC that the mere presence of Government funds was a
sufficient reason to uphold the Hatch Act's restrictions on
employee freedoms on the basis of relaxed First Amendment
standards.

															JUSTICE WHITE: Believing that the editorializing and candidate
endorsement proscription stand or fall together, and being
confident that Congress may condition use of its funds on
abstaining from political endorsements, I join JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
dissenting opinion.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE WHITE
join, dissenting.

															All but three paragraphs of the Court's lengthy opinion in this
case are devoted to the development of a scenario in which the
Government appears as the "Big Bad Wolf," and appellee Pacifica as
"Little Red Riding Hood." In the Court's scenario the Big Bad Wolf
cruelly forbids Little Red Page 468 U. S. 403 Riding Hood to take to her grandmother some of the food that she
is carrying in her basket. Only three paragraphs are used to
delineate a truer picture of the litigants, wherein it appears that
some of the food in the basket was given to Little Red Riding Hood
by the Big Bad Wolf himself, and that the Big Bad Wolf had told
Little Red Riding Hood in advance that, if she accepted his food,
she would have to abide by his conditions. Congress, in enacting §
399 of the Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. § 399, has simply
determined that public funds shall not be used to subsidize
noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations which engage in
"editorializing" or which support or oppose any political
candidate. I do not believe that anything in the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution prevents Congress from choosing to
spend public moneys in that manner. Perhaps a more appropriate
analogy than that of Little Red Riding Hood and the Big Bad Wolf is
that of Faust and Mephistopheles; Pacifica, well aware of § 399's
condition on its receipt of public money, nonetheless accepted the
public money, and now seeks to avoid the conditions which Congress
legitimately has attached to receipt of that funding.

															While noncommercial, educational broadcasting has a long history
in this country, its success was spotty at best until the Federal
Government came to its assistance some 45 years ago. Beginning in
the late 1930's, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
reserved certain frequencies, first for educational radio, 47 CFR
§§ 4.131-4.133 (1939), and then for educational television, Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952). But even
with that assistance, by 1962 there were only 50 educational
television stations on the air, and two-thirds of the population
had no access to educational television. S.Rep. No. 67, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., 3 (1961). In that year, Congress passed the Educational
Television Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64, which
appropriated $32 million over a period of five years to aid the
construction of educational stations, and by 1967, 126 such
stations were operating. Page 468 U. S. 404 Congress' vision was that public broadcasting would be a forum
for the educational, cultural, and public affairs broadcasting
which commercial stations had been unable or unwilling to furnish.
In order to further that vision, in 1967, Congress passed the
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub.L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47
U.S.C. § 390 et seq., of which § 399 is a part, which
created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit,
Government-chartered corporation governed by a Board of Directors
appointed by the President. Although Congress could have chosen to
create a federally owned broadcasting network, instead it chose a
Government funding program whereby CPB would make grants to
stations owned by others, fund the production of programs, and
assist in the establishment and development of interconnection
systems.

															Congress' intent was that CPB's subsidies would ensure that

															"programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence,
and innovation, which are obtained from diverse sources, will be
made available to public telecommunications entities, with strict
adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of
programs of a controversial nature."

															47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A). Understandably Congress did not leave
its creature CPB free to roam at large in the broadcasting world,
but instead imposed certain restrictions, in keeping with Congress'
purposes in passing the Act, on CPB's authorization to grant funds.
For example, Congress required that stations receiving CPB grants
be government entities or nonprofit organizations, 47 U.S.C. §§
397(6), (7), and it prohibited them from selling air time for any
purpose whatever -- including selling time for political or public
affairs presentations. §§ 397(7), 399a; see 47 CFR §§
73.503(d), 73.621(e) (1983). Furthermore, in order to prevent
recipient stations from serving as outlets for the political and
ideological views of station owners and managers, Congress also
insisted in § 399 that subsidized educational stations not engage
in editorializing or endorsing or opposing political
candidates. Page 468 U. S. 405 The Court's three-paragraph discussion of why § 399, repeatedly
reexamined and retained by Congress, violates the First Amendment
is to me utterly unpersuasive. Congress has rationally determined
that the bulk of the taxpayers whose moneys provide the funds for
grants by the CPB would prefer not to see the management of local
educational stations promulgate its own private views on the air at
taxpayer expense. Accordingly Congress simply has decided not to
subsidize stations which engage in that activity.

															Last Term, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington, 461 U. S. 540 (1983), we upheld a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which
deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt
status and its right to receive tax-deductible contributions if it
engages in lobbying. We squarely rejected the contention that
Congress' decision not to subsidize lobbying violates the First
Amendment, even though we recognized that the right to lobby is
constitutionally protected. In so holding, we reiterated that "a
legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a
fundamental right does not infringe the right." Id. at 461 U. S. 549 .
We also rejected the notion that, because Congress chooses to
subsidize some speech but not other speech, its exercise of its
spending powers is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 461 U. S.
547 -548.

															Relying primarily on the reasoning of the concurrence, rather
than of the majority, opinion in Taxation with
Representation, the Court today seeks to avoid the thrust of
that opinion by pointing out that a public broadcasting station is
barred from editorializing with its nonfederal funds even though it
may receive only a minor fraction of its income from CPB grants.
The Court reasons that § 399 does not operate simply to restrict
the use of federal funds to purposes defined by Congress; instead,
it goes further by prohibiting any station that receives "only 1%
of its overall income from CPB grants" from using "even wholly
private funds to finance its editorial activity." Ante at 468 U. S.
400 . Page 468 U. S. 406 But to me, there is no distinction between § 399 and the statute
which we upheld in Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.
S. 127 (1947). Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act totally
prohibits any local or state employee who is employed in any
activity which receives partial or total financing from the United
States from taking part in any political activities. One might just
as readily denounce such congressional action as prohibiting
employees of a state or local government receiving even a minor
fraction of that government's income from federal assistance from
exercising their First Amendment right to speak. But, not
surprisingly, this Court upheld the Hatch Act provision in Oklahoma v. CSC, supra, succinctly stating:

															"While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power
to regulate, local political activities, as such, of state
officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money
allotments to states shall be disbursed." Id. at 143. * See also CSC
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 (1947) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on the
Hatch Act provisions applicable to federal employees).

															The Court seems to believe that Congress actually subsidizes
editorializing only if a station uses federal money specifically to
cover the expenses that the Court believes can be isolated as
editorializing expenses. But to me, the Court's approach ignores
economic reality. CPB's unrestricted grants are used for salaries,
training, equipment, promotion, etc. -- financial expenditures
which benefit all aspects of a station's programming, including
management's editorials. Page 468 U. S. 407 Given the impossibility of compartmentalizing programming
expenses in any meaningful way, it seems clear to me that the only
effective means for preventing the use of public moneys to
subsidize the airing of management's views is for Congress to ban a
subsidized station from all on-the-air editorializing. Under the
Court's view, if Congress decided to withhold a 100% subsidy from a
station which editorializes, that decision would be constitutional
under the principle affirmed in our Taxation With
Representation decision. Surely, on these facts, the
distinction between the Government's power to withhold a 100%
subsidy, on the one hand, and the 20-30% subsidy involved here, 547 F.
Supp. 379 , 385 (CD Cal.1982), on the other hand, is simply
trivialization.

															This is not to say that the Government may attach any condition
to its largess; it is only to say that, when the Government is
simply exercising its power to allocate its own public funds, we
need only find that the condition imposed has a rational
relationship to Congress' purpose in providing the subsidy, and
that it is not primarily " "aimed at the suppression of
dangerous ideas."'" Cammarano v. United States, 358 U. S. 498 , 358 U. S. 513 (1959), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.
S. 513 , 357 U. S. 519 (1958), in turn quoting American Communications Assn. v.
Douds, 339 U. S. 382 , 339 U. S. 402 (1950). In this case, Congress' prohibition is directly related to
its purpose in providing subsidies for public broadcasting, and it
is plainly rational for Congress to have determined that taxpayer
moneys should not be used to subsidize management's views or to pay
for management's exercise of partisan politics. Indeed, it is
entirely rational for Congress to have wished to avoid the
appearance of Government sponsorship of a particular view or a
particular political candidate. Furthermore, Congress' prohibition
is strictly neutral. In no sense can it be said that Congress has
prohibited only editorial views of one particular ideological bent.
Nor has it prevented public stations from airing programs,
documentaries, interviews, etc. dealing with controversial
subjects, so long as management Page 468 U. S. 408 itself does not expressly endorse a particular viewpoint. And
Congress has not prevented station management from communicating
its own views on those subjects through any medium other than
subsidized public broadcasting.

															For the foregoing reasons I find this case entirely different
from the so-called "unconstitutional condition" cases, wherein the
Court has stated that the government

															"may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests -- especially his interest
in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 , 408 U. S. 597 (1972). In those cases, the suppressed speech was not
content-neutral in the same sense as here, and in those cases,
there is, at best, only a strained argument that the legislative
purpose of the condition imposed was to avoid subsidizing the
prohibited speech. Speiser v. Randall, supra, is
illustrative of the difference. In that case, California's decision
to deny its property tax exemption to veterans who would not
declare that they would not work to overthrow the government was
plainly directed at suppressing what California regarded as speech
of a dangerous content. And the condition imposed was so unrelated
to the benefit to be conferred that it is difficult to argue that
California's property tax exemption actually subsidized the
dangerous speech.

															Here, in my view, Congress has rationally concluded that the
bulk of taxpayers whose moneys provide the funds for grants by the
CPB would prefer not to see the management of public stations
engage in editorializing or the endorsing or opposing of political
candidates. Because Congress' decision to enact § 399 is a rational
exercise of its spending powers, and strictly neutral, I would hold
that nothing in the First Amendment makes it unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District
Court.

															* The Court takes pains to show that the argument rejected in Oklahoma v. CSC was a Tenth Amendment argument. Ante at 468 U. S.
401 -402, n. 27. Without belaboring the point, in my view
a fair reading of the opinion is that the Court used the quoted
language in that case to refer to a First Amendment argument
similar to this one, as well as to a Tenth Amendment argument.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with
great care. An artist is likely to paint a flattering portrait of
his patron. The child who wants a new toy Page 468 U. S. 409 does not preface his request with a comment on how fat his
mother is. Newspaper publishers have been known to listen to their
advertising managers. Elected officials may remember how their
elections were financed. By enacting the statutory provision that
the Court invalidates today, a sophisticated group of legislators
expressed a concern about the potential impact of Government funds
on pervasive and powerful organs of mass communication. One need
not have heard the raucous voice of Adolf Hitler over Radio Berlin
to appreciate the importance of that concern.

															AS JUSTICE WHITE correctly notes, the statutory prohibitions
against editorializing and candidate endorsements rest on the same
foundation. In my opinion, that foundation is far stronger than
merely "a rational basis," and it is not weakened by the fact that
it is buttressed by other provisions that are also designed to
avoid the insidious evils of government propaganda favoring
particular points of view. The quality of the interest in
maintaining government neutrality in the free market of ideas -- of
avoiding subtle forms of censorship and propaganda -- outweigh the
impact on expression that results from this statute. Indeed, by
simply terminating or reducing funding, Congress could curtail much
more expression with no risk whatever of a constitutional
transgression.

															In order to explain my assessment of the case, it is necessary
first to supplement the majority's description of the impact of the
statute on free expression, and then to comment on the
justification for that impact. I The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Appellee League of
Women Voters of California, a nonprofit organization, wants to
enlist the "editorial support" of educational broadcasters in
support of its causes. App. 8. Appellee Henry Waxman, a regular
listener and viewer of educational stations, desires to hear the
"editorial opinions" of educational Page 468 U. S. 410 stations. Id. at 9. Appellee Pacifica, a nonprofit
educational corporation which operates five educational radio
stations -- the broadcasts from which reach 20 percent of the
Nation's population -- wants to

															"broadcast its views on various important public issues, and . .
. clearly label those views as being editorials broadcast on behalf
of the Pacifica management." Id. at 9-10.

															In short, Pacifica wants to broadcast its views to Waxman via
its radio stations; Waxman wants to listen to those views on his
radio; and the League of Women Voters wants a chance to convince
Pacifica to take positions its members favor in its radio
broadcasts.

															All of these wants could be realized but for the fact that
Pacifica receives public funds to finance its broadcasts. Because
the Government subsidizes its broadcasts, a federal statute
prohibits Pacifica from broadcasting its views -- labeled as such
-- via the radio stations it operates. That statute now
provides:

															"No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which
receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C of this part
may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational
broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for public
office."

															47 U.S.C. § 399. [ Footnote
2/1 ]

															Although appellees originally challenged the validity of the
entire statute, in their amended complaint, they limited their
attack to the prohibition against editorializing. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In its analysis Page 468 U. S. 411 of the case, the Court assumes that the ban on political
endorsements is severable from the first section, and that it may
be constitutional. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
In view of the fact that the major Page 468 U. S. 412 difference between the ban on political endorsements is based on
the content of the speech, it is apparent that the entire rationale
of the Court's opinion rests on the premise that it may be
permissible to predicate a statutory restriction on candidate
endorsements on the difference between the content of that kind of
speech and the content of other expressions of editorial
opinion.

															The Court does not tell us whether speech that endorses
political candidates is more or less worthy of protection than
other forms of editorializing, but it does iterate and reiterate
the point that "the expression of editorial opinion" is a special
kind of communication that "is entitled to the most exacting degree
of First Amendment protection." Ante at 468 U. S.
375 -376; see also ante at 468 U. S. 380 n. 13, 468 U. S. 381 , 468 U. S. 382 , 468 U. S. 383 ,
and 468 U. S. 384 .
[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Neither the fact that the statute regulates only one kind of
speech nor the fact that editorial opinion has traditionally been
an important kind of speech is sufficient to identify the character
or the significance of the statute's impact on speech. Three
additional points are relevant. First, the statute does not
prohibit Pacifica from expressing its opinion through any avenue
except the radio stations for which it receives federal financial
support. It eliminates the subsidized channel of communication as a
forum for Pacifica itself, and thereby deprives Pacifica of an
advantage it would otherwise have over other speakers, but it does
not exclude Pacifica from the marketplace for ideas. Second, the
statute does not curtail the expression of opinion by individual
commentators Page 468 U. S. 413 who participate in Pacifica's programs. The only comment that is
prohibited is a statement that Pacifica agrees or disagrees with
the opinions that others may express on its programs. Third, and of
greatest significance for me, the statutory restriction is
completely neutral in its operation -- it prohibits all editorials
without any distinction's being drawn concerning the subject matter
or the point of view that might be expressed. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 468 U. S. 414 II The statute does not violate the fundamental principle that the
citizen's right to speak may not be conditioned upon the
sovereign's agreement with what the speaker intends to say.
[ Footnote 2/6 ] On the contrary, the
statute was enacted in order to protect that very principle -- to
avoid the risk that some speakers will be rewarded or penalized for
saying things that appeal to -- or are offensive to -- the
sovereign. [ Footnote 2/7 ] The
interests the statute Page 468 U. S. 415 is designed to protect are interests that underlie the First
Amendment itself.

															In my judgment, the interest in keeping the Federal Government
out of the propaganda arena is of overriding importance. That
interest is of special importance in the field of electronic
communication, not only because that medium is so powerful and
persuasive, but also because it is the one form of communication
that is licensed by the Federal Government. [ Footnote 2/8 ] When the Government already has great
potential Page 468 U. S. 416 power over the electronic media, it is surely legitimate to
enact statutory safeguards to make sure that it does not cross the
threshold that separates neutral regulation from the subsidy of
partisan opinion.

															The Court does not question the validity of the basic interests
served by § 399. See ante at 468 U. S. 386 .
Instead, it suggests that the statute does not substantially serve
those interests, because the Public Broadcasting Act operates in
many other respects to insulate local stations from governmental
interference. See ante at 468 U. S.
388 -390. In my view, that is an indication of nothing
more than the strength of the governmental interest involved here
-- Congress enacted many safeguards because the evil to be avoided
was so grave. Organs of official propaganda are antithetical to
this Nation's heritage, and Congress understandably acted with
great caution in this area. [ Footnote
2/9 ] It is no answer to say that the other statutory
provisions

															"substantially reduce the risk of governmental interference with
the editorial judgments of local stations without restricting those
stations' ability to speak on matters of public concern." Ante at 468 U. S. 390 .
The other safeguards protect the stations from interference with
judgments that they will necessarily make in selecting programming,
but those judgments are relatively amorphous. No safeguard is
foolproof, and the fact that funds are dispensed according to
largely "objective" criteria certainly is no guarantee. Individuals
must always make judgments in allocating funds, and pressure can be
exerted in subtle ways, as well as through outright
fund-cutoffs.

															Members of Congress, not members of the Judiciary, live in the
world of politics. When they conclude that there is a real danger
of political considerations' influencing the dispensing of this
money, and that this provision is necessary to insulate grantees
from political pressures in addition to the other safeguards, that
judgment is entitled to our respect. Page 468 U. S. 417 The magnitude of the present danger that the statute is designed
to avoid is admittedly a matter about which reasonable judges may
disagree. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
Moreover, I would agree that the risk would be greater if other
statutory safeguards were removed. It remains true, however, that
Congress has the power to prevent the use of public funds to
subsidize the expression of partisan points of view, or to suppress
the propagation of dissenting opinions. No matter how great or how
small the immediate risk may be, there surely is more than a
theoretical possibility that future grantees might be influenced by
the ever present tie of the political purse strings, even if those
strings are never actually pulled. "[O]ne who knows that he may
dissent knows also that he somehow consents when he does not
dissent." H. Arendt, Crises of the Republic 88 (1972), citing 1 A.
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 419 (1945). [ Footnote 2/11 ] Page 468 U. S. 418 III The Court describes the scope of § 399's ban as being "defined
solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech," ante at 468 U. S. 383 ,
and analogizes this case to the regulation of speech we condemned
in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U. S. 530 (1980). This description reveals how the Court manipulates labels
without perceiving the critical differences behind the two
cases.

															In Consolidated Edison, the class of speakers that was
affected by New York's prohibition consisted of regulated public
utilities that had been expressing their opinion on the issue of
nuclear power by means of written statements inserted in their
customers' monthly bills. Although the scope of the prohibition was
phrased in general terms and applied to a selected group of
speakers, it was obviously directed at spokesmen for a particular
point of view. The justification for the restriction was phrased in
terms of the potential offensiveness of the utilities' messages to
their audiences. It was a classic case of a viewpoint-based
prohibition.

															In this case, however, although the regulation applies only to a
defined class of noncommercial broadcast licensees, it is common
ground that these licensees represent heterogenous points of view.
[ Footnote 2/12 ] There is simply
no sensible basis for considering this regulation a viewpoint
restriction -- or, to use the Court's favorite phrase, to condemn
it as "content-based" -- because it applies equally to station
owners of all shades of opinion. Moreover, the justification for
the prohibition is not based on the "offensiveness" of the messages
in the sense that that term was used in Consolidated
Edison. Here, it is true that taxpayers might find it
offensive if their tax moneys were being used to subsidize the
expression of editorial Page 468 U. S. 419 opinion with which they disagree, but it is the fact of the
subsidy -- not just the expression of the opinion -- that
legitimates this justification. Furthermore, and of greater
importance, the principal justification for this prohibition is the
overriding interest in forestalling the creation of propaganda
organs for the Government. I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															As originally enacted in 1967, the statute provided:

															"No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may engage in
editorializing or may support or oppose any candidate for political
office."

															Pub.L. 90-129, Title II, § 201(8), 81 Stat. 368.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Appellees' abandonment of their attack on the ban on political
endorsements merits some comment. At one level, it is perplexing,
given that we have stated that such political expression is at the
very core of the First Amendment's protection, see, e.g., Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45 (1982); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.
S. 265 , 401 U. S. 272 (1971), and given that Pacifica cannot escape the ban on political
endorsements simply by declining to accept Government funds. Viewed
solely from the perspective of the First Amendment interests at
stake, therefore, it would appear that the ban on candidate
endorsements is more suspect than the ban on editorializing.

															In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 (1964), we expressly recognized the

															"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. . .
." Id. at 376 U. S. 270 .
Appellee Pacifica, which originally asserted a desire to endorse
political candidates, apparently has now decided that it does not
want to engage in a "wide-open" debate on public issues -- it no
longer asserts the right to make "vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials" over
its radio stations which are, in fact, funded by Government
officials.

															In any event, if these particular litigants abandoned their
attack on the seemingly more suspect political endorsement ban for
tactical reasons, that fact is an indication of the strength of the
same basic governmental interest which forms the foundation of the
provision which they continue to challenge.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Court actually raises the wrong severability issue. The
serious question in this regard is whether the entire public
funding scheme is severable from the prohibition on editorializing
and political endorsements. The legislative history of the statute
indicates the strength of the congressional aversion to these
practices. The basic notion of providing Government subsidies to
these domestic organs for the dissemination of information --
"educational" stations -- was viewed as extremely troubling. The
line between education and indoctrination is a subtle one, and it
is one Congress did not want these publicly funded stations to
cross. The fact that the House Committee Report stated in passing
that the provision was added out of "an abundance of caution,"
merely shows that Congress deemed an abundance of caution
necessary. The majority may view the congressional concerns --
potential governmental censorship, giving louder voices to a
privileged few station owners, and the use of taxpayer funds to
subsidize expression of viewpoints with which the taxpayers may not
agree -- as insufficiently weighty to justify the statute, but
Congress clearly thought they were weighty enough.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Thus, once again the Court embraces the obvious proposition that
some speech is more worthy of protection than other speech -- that
the right to express editorial opinion may be worth fighting to
preserve even though the right to hear less worthy speech may not
-- a proposition that several Members of today's majority could
only interpret "as an aberration" in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 , 427 U. S. 87 (1976) (dissenting opinion) ("The fact that the offensive'
speech here may not address `important' topics -- `ideas of social
and political significance,' in the Court's terminology, [427 U.S.
at 427 U. S. 61 ] --
does not mean that it is less worthy of constitutional
protection"). [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Section 399's ban on editorializing is a content-based
restriction on speech, but not in the sense that the majority
implies. The majority speaks of "editorial opinion" as if it were
some sort of special species of opinion, limited to issues of
public importance. See, e.g., ante at 468 U. S.
375 -376. The majority confuses the typical content of
editorials with the meaning of editorial itself. An editorial is,
of course, a statement of the management's opinion on any topic
imaginable. The Court asserts that what the statute "forecloses is
the expression of editorial opinion on controversial issues of
public importance.'" Ante at 468 U. S. 381 .
The statute is not so limited. The content which is prohibited is
that the station is not permitted to state its opinion with respect
to any matter. In short, it may not be an on-the-air advocate if it
accepts Government funds for its broadcasts. The prohibition on
editorializing is not directed at any particular message a station
might wish to convey, cf. Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 , 431 U. S. 96 -97
(1977); see generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357 , 274 U. S. 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Unlike the Court, I am not
troubled by the fact that the stations are allowed to make "daily
announcements of the station's program schedule or over-the-air
appeals for contributions from listeners " ante at 468 U. S. 383 ,
for it is quite plain that this statute is not directed at
curtailing expression of particular points of view on controversial
issues; it is designed to assure to the extent possible that the
station does not become a vehicle for Government
propaganda. Paradoxically, § 399 is later attacked by the majority as
essentially being underinclusive because it does not prohibit
"controversial" national programming that is often aired with
substantial federal funding. Here the Court recognizes that the ban
imposed by § 399 "is plainly not directed at the potentially
controversial content of such programs," ante at 468 U. S. 391 ,
which only demonstrates that it is not directed at the substance of
communication at all. Next, § 399's ban on editorializing is
attacked by the majority on overinclusive grounds -- because it is
content-neutral -- since it prohibits a

															"potentially infinite variety of speech, most of which would not
be related in any way to governmental affairs, political
candidacies, or elections." Ante at 468 U. S. 393 .
Hence, while earlier the majority attacked § 399 as being
content-based, it is now attacked as being non-content-based,
applying to expressions of opinion -- such as "urging improvements
in a town's parks or museums," ibid. -- which does not
pose, in the Court's view at least, a realistic danger of
governmental interference because of its content.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"The general principle that has emerged from this line of cases
is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense
of others. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S.
60 , 463 U. S. 65 , 463 U. S.
72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U. S. 530 , 447 U. S.
535 -536 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S.
455 , 447 U. S. 462 -463 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S.
50 , 427 U. S. 63 -65, 427 U. S.
67 -68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 , 408 U. S.
95 -96 (1972)." City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 , 466 U. S. 804 (1984).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															It is ironic indeed that the majority states that it must be
particularly wary in assessing § 399 "to determine whether it
reflects an impermissible attempt to allow a government [to]
control . . . the search for political truth,'" ante at 468 U. S. 384 (citation omitted), given that the very object of § 399 is to
prevent the Government from controlling the search for political
truth. Indeed, the Court recognizes that, when Congress decided to
provide financial support to educational stations, "all concerned agreed that this step posed some risk that these
traditionally independent stations might be pressured into becoming
forums devoted solely to programming and views that were acceptable
to the Federal Government." Ante at 468 U. S.
386 .

															Moreover, the statute will also protect the listener's interest
in not having his tax payments used to finance the advocacy of
causes he opposes. The majority gives extremely short shrift to the
Government's interest in minimizing the use of taxpayer moneys to
promote private views with which the taxpayers may disagree. The
Court briefly observes that the taxpayers do not have a
constitutionally protected right to enjoin such expenditures, and
then leaps to the conclusion that, given the fact the funding
scheme itself is not unconstitutional, this interest cannot be used
to support the statute at issue here. Ante at 468 U. S. 385 ,
n. 16. The conclusion manifestly does not follow from the premise,
and this interest is plainly legitimate and significant.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															We have consistently adhered to the following guiding principles
applicable to First Amendment claims in the area of broadcasting,
and they bear repeating at some length:

															"Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to
posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast
comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish. . . ."

															". . . No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to
monopolize a radio frequency. . . . "

															"By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned,
those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses
are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to
monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow
citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents
the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency
with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by
necessity, be barred from the airwaves."

															"[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee. . . . It is the right of the public
to receive . . . ideas . . . which is crucial here." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.
S. 367 , 395 U. S.
388 -390 (1969).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] Cf. 22 U.S.C. § 1461 (prohibiting the International
Communication Agency -- successor to the United States Information
Agency -- from disseminating information in the United States).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															The majority argues that the Government's concededly substantial
interest in ensuring that audiences of educational stations will
not perceive the station to be a Government propaganda organ can be
fully satisfied by requiring such stations to broadcast a
disclaimer each time they editorialize, stating that the editorial
"does not in any way represent the views of the Federal Government.
. . ." Ante at 468 U. S. 395 .
This solution would be laughable were it not so Orwellian: the
answer to the fact that there is a real danger that the editorials
are really Government propaganda is for the Government to require
the station to tell the audience that it is not propaganda at
all!

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The "fairness doctrine" is no answer to the concern that
Government-funded organs of mass communication will, overall, take
a pro-Government slant in editorializing, and thereby create a
distortion in the marketplace of ideas. First, the "fairness
doctrine" is itself enforced by the Government. Second, that
doctrine does not guarantee other speakers access to the microphone
if they disagree with editorial opinion expressed by the station on
public policy issues. No other voice need be heard if the
Government determines that the station's editorial "fairly"
presented the substance of "the" opposing view. Moreover, as
appellees argue, editorials from an institution which the public
may hold in high regard may carry added weight in the marketplace
of ideas. See Brief for Appellees 15. That fact, however,
magnifies the evil sought to be avoided, for the danger is that
pro-Government views that are not actually shared by that
institution will be parroted to curry favor with its
benefactor.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															That does not necessarily mean, however,

															"that the editorial voices of these stations will prove to be as
distinctive, varied, and idiosyncratic as the various communities
they represent," ante at 468 U. S. 391 ,
given the potential effects of Government funding, see
supra at 468 U. S.
416 -417, and 468
U.S. 364 fn2/11|>n. 11.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a ban on non-commercial educational stations receiving federal funds from editorializing violates the First Amendment. The Court found that while Congress has the power to regulate broadcasting under the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech for broadcasters. The Court also noted that the restriction on editorializing was content-based and singled out non-commercial broadcasters, which raised concerns about government interference in the marketplace of ideas. The Court prioritized the right of viewers and listeners to receive a balanced presentation of views over the government's interest in preventing stations from becoming government propaganda organs.