U.S. Supreme Court McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4
Wheat. 316 316 (1819) McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF MARYLAND Syllabus Congress has power to incorporate a bank

															The Act of the 10th of April, 1816, ch. 44, to "incorporate the
subscribers to the Bank of the United States" is a law made in
pursuance of the Constitution.

															The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the
land.

															There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States
similar to the Articles of Confederation, which exclude incidental
or implied powers.

															If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the
Constitution, all the means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may
constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect.

															The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct
sovereign power or end of Government, but only the means of
carrying into effect other powers which are sovereign. Whenever it
becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers given
by the Constitution to the Government of the Union, it may be
exercised by that Government.

															If a certain means to carry into effect of any of the powers
expressly given by the Constitution to the Government of the Union
be an appropriate measure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the
degree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion,
not of judicial cognizance.

															The Bank of the United States has, constitutionally, a right to
establish its branches or offices of discount and deposit within
any state.

															The State within which such branch may be established cannot,
without violating the Constitution, tax that branch.

															The State governments have no right to tax any of the
constitutional means employed by the Government of the Union to
execute its constitutional powers.

															The States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burthen, or in any manner control the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into effect the
powers vested in the national Government.

															This principle does not extend to a tax paid by the real
property of the Bank of the United States in common with the other
real property in a particular state, nor to a tax imposed on the
proprietary interest which the citizens of that State may hold in
this institution, in common with other property of the same
description throughout the State.

															This was an action of debt, brought by the defendant in error,
John James, who sued as well for himself as for the State of
Maryland, in the County Court of Baltimore County, in the said
State, against the plaintiff in error, McCulloch, to recover
certain penalties, under the act of the Legislature of Maryland
hereafter mentioned. Judgment being rendered against the plaintiff
in error, upon the following statement of facts agreed and
submitted to the court by the parties, was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals of the State of Maryland, the highest court of law of said
State, and the cause was brought by writ of error to this
Court.

															It is admitted by the parties in this cause, by their counsel,
that there was passed, on the 10th day of April, 1816, by the
Congress of the United States, an act entitled, "an act to
incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States;" and
that there was passed on the 11th day of February, 1818, by the
General Assembly of Maryland, an act, entitled, "an act to impose a
tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature, " Page 17 U. S. 318 which said acts are made part of this Statement, and it is
agreed, may be read from the statute books in which they are
respectively printed. It is further admitted that the President,
directors and company of the Bank of the United States,
incorporated by the act of Congress aforesaid, did organize
themselves, and go into full operation, in the City of
Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, in pursuance of the
said act, and that they did on the ___ day of _____ 1817, establish
a branch of the said bank, or an office of discount and deposit, in
the City of Baltimore, in the State of Maryland, which has, from
that time until the first day of May 1818, ever since transacted
and carried on business as a bank, or office of discount and
deposit, and as a branch of the said Bank of the United States, by
issuing bank notes and discounting promissory notes, and performing
other operations usual and customary for banks to do and perform,
under the authority and by the direction of the said President,
directors and company of the Bank of the United States, established
at Philadelphia as aforesaid. It is further admitted that the said
President, directors and company of the said bank had no authority
to establish the said branch, or office of discount and deposit, at
the City of Baltimore, from the State of Maryland, otherwise than
the said State having adopted the Constitution of the United States
and composing one of the States of the Union. It is further
admitted that James William McCulloch, the defendant below, being
the cashier of the said branch, or office of discount and Page 17 U. S. 319 deposit did, on the several days set forth in the declaration in
this cause, issue the said respective bank notes therein described,
from the said branch or office, to a certain George Williams, in
the City of Baltimore, in part payment of a promissory note of the
said Williams, discounted by the said branch or office, which said
respective bank notes were not, nor was either of them, so issued
on stamped paper in the manner prescribed by the act of assembly
aforesaid. It is further admitted that the said President,
directors and company of the Bank of the United States, and the
said branch, or office of discount and deposit have not, nor has
either of them, paid in advance, or otherwise, the sum of $15,000,
to the Treasurer of the Western Shore, for the use of the State of
Maryland, before the issuing of the said notes, or any of them, nor
since those periods. And it is further admitted that the Treasurer
of the Western Shore of Maryland, under the direction of the
Governor and Council of the said State, was ready, and offered to
deliver to the said President, directors and company of the said
bank, and to the said branch, or office of discount and deposit,
stamped paper of the kind and denomination required and described
in the said act of assembly.

															The question submitted to the Court for their decision in this
case is as to the validity of the said act of the General Assembly
of Maryland on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress
aforesaid, or to one of them. Upon the foregoing statement of facts
and the pleadings in this cause (all errors in Page 17 U. S. 320 which are hereby agreed to be mutually released), if the Court
should be of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover,
then judgment, it is agreed, shall be entered for the plaintiffs
for $2,500 and costs of suit. B ut if the Court should be of
opinion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover upon the
statement and pleadings aforesaid, then judgment of non
pros shall be entered, with costs to the defendant.

															It is agreed that either party may appeal from the decision of
the County Court to the Court of Appeals, and from the decision of
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States,
according to the modes and usages of law, and have the same benefit
of this statement of facts in the same manner as could be had if a
jury had been sworn and impanneled in this cause and a special
verdict had been found, or these facts had appeared and been stated
in an exception taken to the opinion of the Court, and the Court's
direction to the jury thereon.

															Copy of the act of the Legislature of the State of Maryland,
referred to in the preceding Statement.

															" An act to impose a tax on all banks or branches
thereof, in the " " State of Maryland not chartered by the
legislature " "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland that if any
bank has established or shall, without authority from the State
first had and obtained establish any branch, office of discount
and Page 17 U. S. 321 deposit, or office of pay and receipt in any part of this State,
it shall not be lawful for the said branch, office of discount and
deposit, or office of pay and receipt to issue notes, in any
manner, of any other denomination than five, ten, twenty, fifty,
one hundred, five hundred and one thousand dollars, and no note
shall be issued except upon stamped paper of the following
denominations; that is to say, every five dollar note shall be upon
a stamp of ten cents; every ten dollar note, upon a stamp of twenty
cents; every twenty dollar note, upon a stamp of thirty cents;
every fifty dollar note, upon a stamp of fifty cents; every one
hundred dollar note, upon a stamp of one dollar; every five hundred
dollar note, upon a stamp of ten dollars; and every thousand dollar
note, upon a stamp of twenty dollars; which paper shall be
furnished by the Treasurer of the Western Shore, under the
direction of the Governor and Council, to be paid for upon
delivery; provided always that any institution of the above
description may relieve itself from the operation of the provisions
aforesaid by paying annually, in advance, to the Treasurer of the
Western Shore, for the use of State, the sum of $15,000."

															"And be it enacted that the President, cashier, each of the
directors and officers of every institution established or to be
established as aforesaid, offending against the provisions
aforesaid shall forfeit a sum of $500 for each and every offence,
and every person having any agency in circulating any note
aforesaid, not stamped as aforesaid directed, shall forfeit a sum
not exceeding $100, Page 17 U. S. 322 every penalty aforesaid to be recovered by indictment or action
of debt in the county court of the county where the offence shall
be committed, one-half to the informer and the other half to the
use of the State."

															"And be it enacted that this act shall be in full force and
effect from and after the first day of May next. " Page 17 U. S. 400 MARSHALL, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign
State, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of
the Union, and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of
an act which has been passed by the legislature of that State. The
Constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital
parts, is to be considered, the conflicting powers of the
Government of the Union and of its members, as marked in that
Constitution, are to be discussed, and an opinion given which may
essentially influence the great operations of the Government. No
tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its
importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its
decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a source
of Page 17 U. S. 401 hostile legislation, perhaps, of hostility of a still more
serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal
alone can the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United
States has the Constitution of our country devolved this important
duty.

															The first question made in the cause is -- has Congress power to
incorporate a bank?

															It has been truly said that this can scarcely be considered as
an open question entirely unprejudiced by the former proceedings of
the Nation respecting it. The principle now contested was
introduced at a very early period of our history, has been
recognised by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon
by the Judicial Department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law
of undoubted obligation.

															It will not be denied that a bold and daring usurpation might be
resisted after an acquiescence still longer and more complete than
this. But it is conceived that a doubtful question, one on which
human reason may pause and the human judgment be suspended, in the
decision of which the great principles of liberty are not
concerned, but the respective powers of those who are equally the
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted, if not put at
rest by the practice of the Government, ought to receive a
considerable impression from that practice. An exposition of the
Constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the
faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to
be lightly disregarded.

															The power now contested was exercised by the first Congress
elected under the present Constitution. Page 17 U. S. 402 The bill for incorporating the Bank of the United States did not
steal upon an unsuspecting legislature and pass unobserved. Its
principle was completely understood, and was opposed with equal
zeal and ability. After being resisted first in the fair and open
field of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as
much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and
being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as
intelligent as this country can boast, it became a law. The
original act was permitted to expire, but a short experience of the
embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the
Government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the
measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present
law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert
that a measure adopted under these circumstances was a bold and
plain usurpation to which the Constitution gave no countenance.
These observations belong to the cause; but they are not made under
the impression that, were the question entirely new, the law would
be found irreconcilable with the Constitution.

															In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of
the Constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from
the people, but as the act of sovereign and independent States. The
powers of the General Government, it has been said, are delegated
by the States, who alone are truly sovereign, and must be exercised
in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme
dominion. Page 17 U. S. 403 It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The
convention which framed the Constitution was indeed elected by the
State legislatures. But the instrument, when it came from their
hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation or pretensions to
it. It was reported to the then existing Congress of the United
States with a request that it might

															"be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each State
by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature,
for their assent and ratification."

															This mode of proceeding was adopted, and by the convention, by
Congress, and by the State legislatures, the instrument was
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in
which they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a
subject -- by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled
in their several States -- and where else should they have
assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of
breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of
compounding the American people into one common mass. Of
consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the
measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the
measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the
State governments.

															From these conventions the Constitution derives its whole
authority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is
"ordained and established" in the name of the people, and is
declared to be ordained,

															"in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquillity, and secure Page 17 U. S. 404 the blessings of liberty to themselves and to their
posterity."

															The assent of the States in their sovereign capacity is implied
in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject
it, and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and
could not be negatived, by the State Governments. The Constitution,
when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State
sovereignties.

															It has been said that the people had already surrendered all
their powers to the State sovereignties, and had nothing more to
give. But surely the question whether they may resume and modify
the powers granted to Government does not remain to be settled in
this country. Much more might the legitimacy of the General
Government be doubted had it been created by the States. The powers
delegated to the State sovereignties were to be exercised by
themselves, not by a distinct and independent sovereignty created
by themselves. To the formation of a league such as was the
Confederation, the State sovereignties were certainly competent.
But when, "in order to form a more perfect union," it was deemed
necessary to change this alliance into an effective Government,
possessing great and sovereign powers and acting directly on the
people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of
deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged
by all. The Government of the Union then (whatever may be the
influence of this fact on the case) is, Page 17 U. S. 405 emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form and
in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by
them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit.

															This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers granted
to it would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced by
all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necessary to urge; that
principle is now universally admitted. But the question respecting
the extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising,
and will probably continue to arise so long as our system shall
exist. In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the
General and State Governments must be brought into view, and the
supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition,
must be settled.

															If any one proposition could command the universal assent of
mankind, we might expect it would be this -- that the Government of
the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its
sphere of action. This would seem to result necessarily from its
nature. It is the Government of all; its powers are delegated by
all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any one State may
be willing to control its operations, no State is willing to allow
others to control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it
can act, must necessarily bind its component parts. But this
question is not left to mere reason; the people have, in express
terms, decided it by saying, Page 17 U. S. 406 "this Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which
shall be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of
the land," and by requiring that the members of the State
legislatures and the officers of the executive and judicial
departments of the States shall take the oath of fidelity to it.
The Government of the United States, then, though limited in its
powers, is supreme, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, "anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."

															Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing
a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the
instrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes
incidental or implied powers and which requires that everything
granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th
Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the
excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word
"expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated to
the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to
the States or to the people," thus leaving the question whether the
particular power which may become the subject of contest has been
delegated to the one Government, or prohibited to the other, to
depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. The men who
drew and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments
resulting from the insertion of this word in the Articles Page 17 U. S. 407 of Confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those
embarrassments. A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of
all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of
all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood
by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was
entertained by the framers of the American Constitution is not only
to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language. Why else were some of the limitations found in the 9th
section of the 1st article introduced? It is also in some degree
warranted by their having omitted to use any restrictive term which
might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation. In
considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are expounding.

															Although, among the enumerated powers of Government, we do not
find the word "bank" or "incorporation," we find the great powers,
to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to
declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and
navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no
inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation are intrusted
to its Government. It can never be pretended Page 17 U. S. 408 that these vast powers draw after them others of inferior
importance merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can never
be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended that a
Government intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution
of which the happiness and prosperity of the Nation so vitally
depends, must also be intrusted with ample means for their
execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the Nation
to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and
cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and
embarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate means.
Throughout this vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of
Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, revenue is to be
collected and expended, armies are to be marched and supported. The
exigencies of the Nation may require that the treasure raised in
the north should be transported to the south that raised in the
east, conveyed to the west, or that this order should be reversed.
Is that construction of the Constitution to be preferred which
would render these operations difficult, hazardous and expensive?
Can we adopt that construction (unless the words imperiously
require it) which would impute to the framers of that instrument,
when granting these powers for the public good, the intention of
impeding their exercise, by withholding a choice of means? If,
indeed, such be the mandate of the Constitution, we have only to
obey; but that instrument does not profess to enumerate the means
by which the powers it confers may be executed; nor does it
prohibit the creation of a corporation, Page 17 U. S. 409 if the existence of such a being be essential, to the beneficial
exercise of those powers. It is, then, the subject of fair inquiry
how far such means may be employed.

															It is not denied that the powers given to the Government imply
the ordinary means of execution. That, for example, of raising
revenue and applying it to national purposes is admitted to imply
the power of conveying money from place to place as the exigencies
of the Nation may require, and of employing the usual means of
conveyance. But it is denied that the Government has its choice of
means, or that it may employ the most convenient means if, to
employ them, it be necessary to erect a corporation. On what
foundation does this argument rest? O n this alone: the power of
creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty, and is
not expressly conferred on Congress. This is true. But all
legislative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original power of
giving the law on any subject whatever is a sovereign power, and if
the Government of the Union is restrained from creating a
corporation as a means for performing its functions, on the single
reason that the creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty,
if the sufficiency of this reason be acknowledged, there would be
some difficulty in sustaining the authority of Congress to pass
other laws for the accomplishment of the same objects. The
Government which has a right to do an act and has imposed on it the
duty of performing that act must, according to the dictates of
reason, be allowed Page 17 U. S. 410 to select the means, and those who contend that it may not
select any appropriate means that one particular mode of effecting
the object is excepted take upon themselves the burden of
establishing that exception.

															The creation of a corporation, it is said, appertains to
sovereignty. This is admitted. But to what portion of sovereignty
does it appertain? Does it belong to one more than to another? In
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the
Government of the Union and those of the States. They are each
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither
sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other. We
cannot comprehend that train of reasoning, which would maintain
that the extent of power granted by the people is to be ascertained
not by the nature and terms of the grant, but by its date. Some
State Constitutions were formed before, some since, that of the
United States. We cannot believe that their relation to each other
is in any degree dependent upon this circumstance. Their respective
powers must, we think, be precisely the same as if they had been
formed at the same time. Had they been formed at the same time, and
had the people conferred on the General Government the power
contained in the Constitution, and on the States the whole residuum
of power, would it have been asserted that the Government of the
Union was not sovereign, with respect to those objects which were
intrusted to it, in relation to which its laws were declared to be
supreme? If this could not have been asserted, we cannot well
comprehend the process of reasoning Page 17 U. S. 411 which maintains that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannot
be connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to the
General Government, so far as it is calculated to subserve the
legitimate objects of that Government. The power of creating a
corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the
power of making war or levying taxes or of regulating commerce, a
great substantive and independent power which cannot be implied as
incidental to other powers or used as a means of executing them. It
is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means
by which other objects are accomplished. No contributions are made
to charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is
created to administer the charity; no seminary of learning is
instituted in order to be incorporated, but the corporate character
is conferred to subserve the purposes of education. No city was
ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is
incorporated as affording the best means of being well governed.
The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake,
but for the purpose of effecting something else. No sufficient
reason is therefore perceived why it may not pass as incidental to
those powers which are expressly given if it be a direct mode of
executing them.

															But the Constitution of the United States has not left the right
of Congress to employ the necessary means for the execution of the
powers conferred on the Government to general reasoning. To its
enumeration of powers is added that of making

															"all Page 17 U. S. 412 laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any
department thereof."

															The counsel for the State of Maryland have urged various
arguments to prove that this clause, though in terms a grant of
power, is not so in effect, but is really restrictive of the
general right which might otherwise be implied of selecting means
for executing the enumerated powers. In support of this
proposition, they have found it necessary to contend that this
clause was inserted for the purpose of conferring on Congress the
power of making laws. That, without it, doubts might be entertained
whether Congress could exercise its powers in the form of
legislation.

															But could this be the object for which it was inserted? A
Government is created by the people having legislative, executive
and judicial powers. Its legislative powers are vested in a
Congress, which is to consist of a senate and house of
representatives. Each house may determine the rule of its
proceedings, and it is declared that every bill which shall have
passed both houses shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President of the United States. The 7th section describes the
course of proceedings by which a bill shall become a law, and then
the 8th section enumerates the powers of Congress. Could it be
necessary to say that a legislature should exercise legislative
powers, in the shape of legislation? After allowing each house to
prescribe Page 17 U. S. 413 its own course of proceeding, after describing the manner in
which a bill should become a law, would it have entered into the
mind of a single member of the convention that an express power to
make laws was necessary to enable the legislature to make them?
That a legislature, endowed with legislative powers, can legislate
is a proposition too self-evident to have been questioned.

															But the argument on which most reliance is placed is drawn from
that peculiar language of this clause. Congress is not empowered by
it to make all laws which may have relation to the powers conferred
on the Government, but such only as may be "necessary and proper"
for carrying them into execution. The word "necessary" is
considered as controlling the whole sentence, and as limiting the
right to pass laws for the execution of the granted powers to such
as are indispensable, and without which the power would be
nugatory. That it excludes the choice of means, and leaves to
Congress in each case that only which is most direct and
simple.

															Is it true that this is the sense in which the word "necessary"
is always used? Does it always import an absolute physical
necessity so strong that one thing to which another may be termed
necessary cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If
reference be had to its use in the common affairs of the world or
in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more
than that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to
another. To employ the means necessary to an end is generally
understood as employing any means calculated to Page 17 U. S. 414 produce the end, and not as being confined to those single means
without which the end would be entirely unattainable. Such is the
character of human language that no word conveys to the mind in all
situations one single definite idea, and nothing is more common
than to use words in a figurative sense. Almost all compositions
contain words which, taken in a their rigorous sense, would convey
a meaning different from that which is obviously intended. It is
essential to just construction that many words which import
something excessive should be understood in a more mitigated sense
-- in that sense which common usage justifies. The word "necessary"
is of this description. It has not a fixed character peculiar to
itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison, and is often
connected with other words which increase or diminish the
impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports. A thing may
be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably
necessary. To no mind would the same idea be conveyed by these
several phrases. The comment on the word is well illustrated by the
passage cited at the bar from the 10th section of the 1st article
of the Constitution. It is, we think, impossible to compare the
sentence which prohibits a State from laying "imposts, or duties on
imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws," with that which authorizes Congress
"to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution" the powers of the General Government without
feeling a conviction that the convention understood itself to
change materially Page 17 U. S. 415 the meaning of the word "necessary," by prefixing the word
"absolutely." This word, then, like others, is used in various
senses, and, in its construction, the subject, the context, the
intention of the person using them are all to be taken into
view.

															Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is
the execution of those great powers on which the welfare of a
Nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of
those who gave these powers to insure, so far as human prudence
could insure, their beneficial execution. This could not be done by
confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave
it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be
appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is
made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.
To have prescribed the means by which Government should, in all
future time, execute its powers would have been to change entirely
the character of the instrument and give it the properties of a
legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide by
immutable rules for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have
been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.
To have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those
alone without which the power given would be nugatory, would have
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its
legislation to circumstances. Page 17 U. S. 416 If we apply this principle of construction to any of the powers
of the Government, we shall find it so pernicious in its operation
that we shall be compelled to discard it. The powers vested in
Congress may certainly be carried into execution, without
prescribing an oath of office. The power to exact this security for
the faithful performance of duty is not given, nor is it
indispensably necessary. The different departments may be
established; taxes may be imposed and collected; armies and navies
may be raised and maintained; and money may be borrowed, without
requiring an oath of office. It might be argued with as much
plausibility as other incidental powers have been assailed that the
convention was not unmindful of this subject. The oath which might
be exacted -- that of fidelity to the Constitution -- is
prescribed, and no other can be required. Yet he would be charged
with insanity who should contend that the legislature might not
superadd to the oath directed by the Constitution such other oath
of office as its wisdom might suggest.

															So, with respect to the whole penal code of the United States,
whence arises the power to punish in cases not prescribed by the
Constitution? All admit that the Government may legitimately punish
any violation of its laws, and yet this is not among the enumerated
powers of Congress. The right to enforce the observance of law by
punishing its infraction might be denied with the more plausibility
because it is expressly given in some cases.

															Congress is empowered "to provide for the punishment Page 17 U. S. 417 of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States," and "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations." The
several powers of Congress may exist in a very imperfect State, to
be sure, but they may exist and be carried into execution, although
no punishment should be inflicted, in cases where the right to
punish is not expressly given.

															Take, for example, the power "to establish post-offices and
post-roads." This power is executed by the single act of making the
establishment. But from this has been inferred the power and duty
of carrying the mail along the post road from one post office to
another. And from this implied power has again been inferred the
right to punish those who steal letters from the post office, or
rob the mail. It may be said with some plausibility that the right
to carry the mail, and to punish those who rob it, is not
indispensably necessary to the establishment of a post office and
post road. This right is indeed essential to the beneficial
exercise of the power, but not indispensably necessary to its
existence. So, of the punishment of the crimes of stealing or
falsifying a record or process of a Court of the United States, or
of perjury in such Court. To punish these offences is certainly
conducive to the due administration of justice. But Courts may
exist, and may decide the causes brought before them, though such
crimes escape punishment.

															The baneful influence of this narrow construction on all the
operations of the Government, and the absolute Page 17 U. S. 418 impracticability of maintaining it without rendering the
Government incompetent to its great objects, might be illustrated
by numerous examples drawn from the Constitution and from our laws.
The good sense of the public has pronounced without hesitation that
the power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be
exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental
to his Constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into
execution all sovereign powers, and may be used although not
indispensably necessary. It is a right incidental to the power, and
conducive to its beneficial exercise.

															If this limited construction of the word "necessary" must be
abandoned in order to punish, whence is derived the rule which
would reinstate it when the Government would carry its powers into
execution by means not vindictive in their nature? If the word
"necessary" means "needful," "requisite," "essential," "conducive
to," in order to let in the power of punishment for the infraction
of law, why is it not equally comprehensive when required to
authorize the use of means which facilitate the execution of the
powers of Government, without the infliction of punishment?

															In ascertaining the sense in which the word "necessary" is used
in this clause of the Constitution, we may derive some aid from
that with which it it is associated. Congress shall have power "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry into
execution" the powers of the Government. If the word "necessary"
was used in that strict and rigorous sense for which the counsel
for the State of Page 17 U. S. 419 Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure from
the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in composition, to
add a word the only possible effect of which is to qualify that
strict and rigorous meaning, to present to the mind the idea of
some choice of means of legislation not strained and compressed
within the narrow limits for which gentlemen contend.

															But the argument which most conclusively demonstrates the error
of the construction contended for by the counsel for the State of
Maryland is founded on the intention of the convention as
manifested in the whole clause. To waste time and argument in
proving that, without it, Congress might carry its powers into
execution would be not much less idle than to hold a lighted taper
to the sun. As little can it be required to prove that, in the
absence of this clause, Congress would have some choice of means.
That it might employ those which, in its judgment, would most
advantageously effect the object to be accomplished. That any means
adapted to the end, any means which tended directly to the
execution of the Constitutional powers of the Government, were in
themselves Constitutional. This clause, as construed by the State
of Maryland, would abridge, and almost annihilate, this useful and
necessary right of the legislature to select its means. That this
could not be intended is, we should think, had it not been already
controverted, too apparent for controversy.

															We think so for the following reasons:

															1st. The clause is placed among the powers of Congress, not
among the limitations on those powers. Page 17 U. S. 420 2d. Its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish, the powers
vested in the Government. It purports to be an additional power,
not a restriction on those already granted. No reason has been or
can be assigned for thus concealing an intention to narrow the
discretion of the National Legislature under words which purport to
enlarge it. The framers of the Constitution wished its adoption,
and well knew that it would be endangered by its strength, not by
its weakness. Had they been capable of using language which would
convey to the eye one idea and, after deep reflection, impress on
the mind another, they would rather have disguised the grant of
power than its limitation. If, then, their intention had been, by
this clause, to restrain the free use of means which might
otherwise have been implied, that intention would have been
inserted in another place, and would have been expressed in terms
resembling these. "In carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all others," &c., "no laws shall be passed but such as are
necessary and proper." Had the intention been to make this clause
restrictive, it would unquestionably have been so in form, as well
as in effect.

															The result of the most careful and attentive consideration
bestowed upon this clause is that, if it does not enlarge, it
cannot be construed to restrain, the powers of Congress, or to
impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment
in the selection of measures to carry into execution the
Constitutional powers of the Government. If no other motive for its
insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire
to remove all doubts respecting Page 17 U. S. 421 the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers
which must be involved in the Constitution if that instrument be
not a splendid bauble.

															We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the Government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we
think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution which
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it in
the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the Constitution, are Constitutional. * That a corporation must be considered as a means not less usual,
not of higher dignity, not more requiring a particular
specification than other means has been sufficiently proved. If we
look to the origin of corporations, to the manner in which they
have been framed in that Government from which we have derived most
of our legal principles and ideas, or to the uses to which they
have been applied, we find no reason to suppose that a
Constitution, omitting, and wisely omitting, to enumerate all the
means for carrying into execution the great powers vested in
Government, ought to have specified this. Had it been intended to
grant this power as one which should be distinct and independent,
to be exercised in any case whatever, it Page 17 U. S. 422 would have found a place among the enumerated powers of the
Government. But being considered merely as a means, to be employed
only for the purpose of carrying into execution the given powers,
there could be no motive for particularly mentioning it.

															The propriety of this remark would seem to be generally
acknowledged by the universal acquiescence in the construction
which has been uniformly put on the 3d section of the 4th article
of the Constitution. The power to "make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States" is not more comprehensive than the power "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution" the powers of the Government. Yet all admit the
constitutionality of a Territorial Government, which is a corporate
body.

															If a corporation may be employed, indiscriminately with other
means, to carry into execution the powers of the Government, no
particular reason can be assigned for excluding the use of a bank,
if required for its fiscal operations. To use one must be within
the discretion of Congress if it be an appropriate mode of
executing the powers of Government. That it is a convenient, a
useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of its fiscal
operations is not now a subject of controversy. All those who have
been concerned in the administration of our finances have concurred
in representing its importance and necessity, and so strongly have
they been felt that Statesmen of the first class, whose previous
opinions Page 17 U. S. 423 against it had been confirmed by every circumstance which can
fix the human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the
exigencies of the nation. Under the Confederation, Congress,
justifying the measure by its necessity, transcended, perhaps, its
powers to obtain the advantage of a bank; and our own legislation
attests the universal conviction of the utility of this measure.
The time has passed away when it can be necessary to enter into any
discussion in order to prove the importance of this instrument as a
means to effect the legitimate objects of the Government.

															But were its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an
appropriate measure; and if it is, the decree of its necessity, as
has been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another place.
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under
the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the Government, it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring
such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really
calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the
Government, to undertake here to inquire into the decree of its
necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the
judicial department and to tread on legislative ground. This Court
disclaims all pretensions to such a power. Page 17 U. S. 424 After this declaration, it can scarcely be necessary to say that
the existence of State banks can have no possible influence on the
question. No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an
intention to create a dependence of the Government of the Union on
those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned
to it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alone
was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To
impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot
control, which another Government may furnish or withhold, would
render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain,
and create a dependence on other Governments which might disappoint
its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language
of the Constitution. But were it otherwise, the choice of means
implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State
banks, and Congress alone can make the election.

															After the most deliberate consideration, it is the unanimous and
decided opinion of this Court that the act to incorporate the Bank
of the United States is a law made in pursuance of the
Constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land.

															The branches, proceeding from the same stock and being conducive
to the complete accomplishment of the object, are equally
constitutional. It would have been unwise to locate them in the
charter, and it would be unnecessarily inconvenient to employ the
legislative power in making those subordinate arrangements. The
great duties of the bank are prescribed; those duties require
branches; and the bank itself Page 17 U. S. 425 may, we think, be safely trusted with the selection of places
where those branches shall be fixed, reserving always to the
Government the right to require that a branch shall be located
where it may be deemed necessary.

															It being the opinion of the Court that the act incorporating the
bank is constitutional, and that the power of establishing a branch
in the State of Maryland might be properly exercised by the bank
itself, we proceed to inquire:

															2. Whether the State of Maryland may, without violating the
Constitution, tax that branch?

															That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it
is retained by the States; that it is not abridged by the grant of
a similar power to the Government of the Union; that it is to be
concurrently exercised by the two Governments -- are truths which
have never been denied. But such is the paramount character of the
Constitution that its capacity to withdraw any subject from the
action of even this power is admitted. The States are expressly
forbidden to lay any duties on imports or exports except what may
be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws. If the
obligation of this prohibition must be conceded -- if it may
restrain a State from the exercise of its taxing power on imports
and exports -- the same paramount character would seem to restrain,
as it certainly may restrain, a State from such other exercise of
this power as is in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to,
the constitutional laws of the Union. A law absolutely repugnant to
another as entirely Page 17 U. S. 426 repeals that other as if express terms of repeal were used.

															On this ground, the counsel for the bank place its claim to be
exempted from the power of a State to tax its operations. There is
no express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained
on a principle which so entirely pervades the Constitution, is so
intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with
its web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being
separated from it without rending it into shreds.

															This great principle is that the Constitution and the laws made
in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the
Constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be
controlled by them. From this, which may be almost termed an axiom,
other propositions are deduced as corollaries, on the truth or
error of which, and on their application to this case, the cause
has been supposed to depend. These are, 1st. That a power to create
implies a power to preserve; 2d. That a power to destroy, if
wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with
these powers to create and to preserve; 3d. That, where this
repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control,
not yield to that over which it is supreme.

															These propositions, as abstract truths, would perhaps never be
controverted. Their application to this case, however, has been
denied, and both in maintaining the affirmative and the negative, a
splendor of eloquence, and strength of argument seldom if ever
surpassed have been displayed. Page 17 U. S. 427 The power of Congress to create and, of course, to continue the
bank was the subject of the preceding part of this opinion, and is
no longer to be considered as questionable.

															That the power of taxing it by the States may be exercised so as
to destroy it is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to
be an absolute power which acknowledges no other limits than those
expressly prescribed in the Constitution, and, like sovereign power
of every other description, is intrusted to the discretion of those
who use it. But the very terms of this argument admit that the
sovereignty of the State, in the article of taxation itself, is
subordinate to, and may be controlled by, the Constitution of the
United States. How far it has been controlled by that instrument
must be a question of construction. In making this construction, no
principle, not declared, can be admissible which would defeat the
legitimate operations of a supreme Government. It is of the very
essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within
its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate
governments as to exempt its own operations from their own
influence. This effect need not be stated in terms. It is so
involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in
it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. We
must, therefore, keep it in view while construing the
Constitution.

															The argument on the part of the State of Maryland is not that
the States may directly resist a law of Congress, but that they may
exercise their Page 17 U. S. 428 acknowledged powers upon it, and that the Constitution leaves
them this right, in the confidence that they will not abuse it.
Before we proceed to examine this argument and to subject it to
test of the Constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few
considerations on the nature and extent of this original right of
taxation, which is acknowledged to remain with the States. It is
admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is
essential to the very existence of Government, and may be
legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to
the utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it.
The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the
structure of the Government itself. In imposing a tax, the
legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a
sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

															The people of a State, therefore, give to their Government a
right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the
exigencies of Government cannot be limited, they prescribe no
limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the
interest of the legislator and on the influence of the constituent
over their representative to guard them against its abuse. But the
means employed by the Government of the Union have no such
security, nor is the right of a State to tax them sustained by the
same theory. Those means are not given by the people of a
particular State, not given by the constituents of the legislature
which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the
States They are given by all, Page 17 U. S. 429 for the benefit of all -- and, upon theory, should be subjected
to that Government only which belongs to all.

															It may be objected to this definition that the power of taxation
is not confined to the people and property of a State. It may be
exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction.

															This is true. But to what source do we trace this right? It is
obvious that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive
with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the
sovereign power of a State extends are objects of taxation, but
those over which it does not extend are, upon the soundest
principles, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be
pronounced self-evident.

															The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by
its own authority or is introduced by its permission, but does it
extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into
execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United
States? We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are
not given by the people of a single State. They are given by the
people of the United States, to a Government whose laws, made in
pursuance of the Constitution, are declared to be supreme.
Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a
sovereignty which will extend over them.

															If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State by the
extent of sovereignty which the people of a single State possess
and can confer on its Government, we have an intelligible standard,
applicable Page 17 U. S. 430 to every case to which the power may be applied. We have a
principle which leaves the power of taxing the people and property
of a State unimpaired; which leaves to a State the command of all
its resources, and which places beyond its reach all those powers
which are conferred by the people of the United States on the
Government of the Union, and all those means which are given for
the purpose of carrying those powers into execution. We have a
principle which is safe for the States and safe for the Union. We
are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from
interfering powers; from a repugnancy between a right in one
Government to pull down what there is an acknowledged right in
another to build up; from the incompatibility of a right in one
Government to destroy what there is a right in another to preserve.
We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the
judicial department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use
and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power. The attempt
to use it on the means employed by the Government of the Union, in
pursuance of the Constitution, is itself an abuse because it is the
usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot
give.

															We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original
right to tax the means employed by the Government of the Union, for
the execution of its powers. The right never existed, and the
question whether it has been surrendered cannot arise.

															But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume the
inquiry, whether this power can be exercised Page 17 U. S. 431 by the respective States, consistently with a fair construction
of the Constitution?

															That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the
power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create;
that there is a plain repugnance in conferring on one Government a
power to control the constitutional measures of another, which
other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be
supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to
be denied. But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the
magic of the word CONFIDENCE. Taxation, it is said, does not
necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of
destruction would be an abuse, to presume which would banish that
confidence which is essential to all Government.

															But is this a case of confidence? Would the people of any one
State trust those of another with a power to control the most
insignificant operations of their State Government? We know they
would not. Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any one
State should be willing to trust those of another with a power to
control the operations of a Government to which they have confided
their most important and most valuable interests? In the
Legislature of the Union alone are all represented. The Legislature
of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with
the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the
confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of
confidence, and we must consider it is as it really is. Page 17 U. S. 432 If we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland
contends, to the Constitution generally, we shall find it capable
of changing totally the character of that instrument. We shall find
it capable of arresting all the measures of the Government, and of
prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people have
declared their Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof
to be supreme, but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in
fact, to the States.

															If the States may tax one instrument, employed by the Government
in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other
instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may
tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom house;
they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed
by the Government to an excess which would defeat all the ends of
Government. This was not intended by the American people. They did
not design to make their Government dependent on the States.

															Gentlemen say they do not claim the right to extend State
taxation to these objects. They limit their pretensions to
property. But on what principle is this distinction made? Those who
make it have furnished no reason for it, and the principle for
which they contend denies it. They contend that the power of
taxation has no other limit than is found in the 10th section of
the 1st article of the Constitution; that, with respect to
everything else, the power of the States is supreme, and admits of
no control. If this be true, the distinction between property
and Page 17 U. S. 433 other subjects to which the power of taxation is applicable is
merely arbitrary, and can never be sustained. This is not all. If
the controlling power of the States be established, if their
supremacy as to taxation be acknowledged, what is to restrain their
exercising control in any shape they may please to give it? Their
sovereignty is not confined to taxation; that is not the only mode
in which it might be displayed. The question is, in truth, a
question of supremacy, and if the right of the States to tax the
means employed by the General Government be conceded, the
declaration that the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof shall be the supreme law of the land is empty and unmeaning
declamation.

															In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted,
and the opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been
justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the
Constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their
merit; but in applying their opinions to the cases which may arise
in the progress of our Government, a right to judge of their
correctness must be retained; and to understand the argument, we
must examine the proposition it maintains and the objections
against which it is directed. The subject of those numbers from
which passages have been cited is the unlimited power of taxation
which is vested in the General Government. The objection to this
unlimited power, which the argument seeks to remove, is stated with
fulness and clearness. It is

															"that an indefinite power of taxation in the latter (the
Government Page 17 U. S. 434 of the Union) might, and probably would, in time, deprive the
former (the Government of the States) of the means of providing for
their own necessities, and would subject them entirely to the mercy
of the National Legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become
the supreme law of the land; as it is to have power to pass all
laws that may be necessary for carrying into execution the
authorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the National
Government might, at any time, abolish the taxes imposed for State
objects upon the pretence of an interference with its own. It might
allege a necessity for doing this, in order to give efficacy to the
national revenues; and thus, all the resources of taxation might,
by degrees, become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire
exclusion and destruction of the State Governments."

															The objections to the Constitution which are noticed in these
numbers were to the undefined power of the Government to tax, not
to the incidental privilege of exempting its own measures from
State taxation. The consequences apprehended from this undefined
power were that it would absorb all the objects of taxation, "to
the exclusion and destruction of the State Governments." The
arguments of the Federalist are intended to prove the fallacy of
these apprehensions, not to prove that the Government was incapable
of executing any of its powers without exposing the means it
employed to the embarrassments of State taxation. Arguments urged
against these objections and these apprehensions are to be
understood as relating to the points they Page 17 U. S. 435 mean to prove. Had the authors of those excellent essays been
asked whether they contended for that construction of the
Constitution which would place within the reach of the States those
measures which the Government might adopt for the execution of its
powers, no man who has read their instructive pages will hesitate
to admit that their answer must have been in the negative.

															It has also been insisted that, as the power of taxation in the
General and State Governments is acknowledged to be concurrent,
every argument which would sustain the right of the General
Government to tax banks chartered by the States, will equally
sustain the right of the States to tax banks chartered by the
General Government.

															But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all
the States have created the General Government, and have conferred
upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the
States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress,
and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax
the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their
constituents, and these taxes must be uniform. But when a State
taxes the operations of the Government of the United States, it
acts upon institutions created not by their own constituents, but
by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the
measures of a Government created by others as well as themselves,
for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference
is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the
action of the whole on a Page 17 U. S. 436 part, and the action of a part on the whole -- between the laws
of a Government declared to be supreme, and those of a Government
which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.

															But if the full application of this argument could be admitted,
it might bring into question the right of Congress to tax the State
banks, and could not prove the rights of the States to tax the Bank
of the United States.

															The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate
consideration. The result is a conviction that the States have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in
any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the General Government. This is, we think, the unavoidable
consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has
declared.

															We are unanimously of opinion that the law passed by the
Legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United
States is unconstitutional and void.

															This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which
they originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the
real property of the bank, in common with the other real property
within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the
citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with
other property of the same description throughout the State. But
this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently,
a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the
Government Page 17 U. S. 437 of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must
be unconstitutional.

															JUDGMENT. This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of
the record of the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, and
was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is the opinion
of this Court that the act of the Legislature of Maryland is
contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and void, and
therefore that the said Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland
erred, in affirming the judgment of the Baltimore County Court, in
which judgment was rendered against James W. McCulloch; but that
the said Court of Appeals of Maryland ought to have reversed the
said judgment of the said Baltimore County Court, and ought to have
given judgment for the said appellant, McCulloch. It is, therefore,
adjudged and ordered that the said judgment of the said Court of
Appeals of the State of Maryland in this case be, and the same
hereby is, reversed and annulled. And this Court, proceeding to
render such judgment as the said Court of Appeals should have
rendered, it is further adjudged and ordered that the judgment of
the said Baltimore County Court be reversed and annulled, and that
judgment be entered in the said Baltimore County Court for the said
James W. McCulloch.

															* See Montague v. Richardson, 24 Conn. 348.

Summary: In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress has the power to incorporate a national bank and that the states cannot tax or otherwise impede the operations of the national government or its constitutional laws. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the national bank and asserted the supremacy of the federal government within its designated sphere, with state laws yielding when in conflict with federal laws. This decision established the concept of implied powers for the federal government and limited state power over federal institutions.