U.S. Supreme Court City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980) City of Mobile v.
Bolden No. 77-1844 Argued March 19, 1979 Reargued October 29,
1979 Decided April 22,
1980 446 U.S.
55 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Mobile, Ala., is governed by a Commission consisting of three
members elected at large who jointly exercise all legislative,
executive, and administrative power in the city. Appellees brought
a class action in Federal District Court against the city and the
incumbent Commissioners on behalf of all Negro citizens of the
city, alleging, inter alia, that the practice of electing
the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting
strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Although finding that Negroes in Mobile "register and
vote without hindrance," the District Court nevertheless held that
the at-large electoral system violated the Fifteenth Amendment and
invidiously discriminated against Negroes in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered that the
Commission be disestablished and replaced by a Mayor and a Council
elected from single-member districts. The Court of Appeals
affirmed. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded. Pp. 446 U. S. 61 -80; 446 U. S. 80 -83; 446 U. S.
83 -94.

															571 F.2d 238, reversed and remanded.

															MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concluded:

															1. Mobile's at-large electoral system does not violate the
rights of the city's Negro voters in contravention of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary
ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. The Amendment does
not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected, but
prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by
government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." Here, having found that Negroes
in Mobile register and vote without hindrance, the courts below
erred in believing that appellants invaded the protection of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 446 U. S.
61 -65.

															2. Nor does Mobile's at-large electoral system violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 446 U. S.
65 -80. Page 446 U. S. 56 (a) Only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. And this principle
applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as
it does to other claims of racial discrimination. Pp. 446 U. S.
66 -68.

															(b) Disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to establish
a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution. Where the
character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from
race, as would nearly always be true where, as here, an entire
system of local governance is brought into question,
disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must
look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory
purpose. Pp. 446 U. S.
68 -70.

															(c) Even assuming that an at-large municipal electoral system
such as Mobile's is constitutionally indistinguishable from the
election of a few members of a state legislature in multimember
districts, it is clear that the evidence in this case fell far
short of showing that appellants "conceived or operated [a]
purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 , 403 U. S. 149 .
Pp. 446 U. S.
70 -74.

															(d) The Equal Protection Clause does not require proportional
representation as an imperative of political organization. While
the Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections
on an equal basis with other qualified voters, this right does not
protect any "political group," however defined, from electoral
defeat. Since Mobile is a unitary electoral district and the
Commission elections are conducted at large, there can be no claim
that the "one person, one vote" principle has been violated, and
therefore nobody's vote has been "diluted" in the sense in which
that word was used in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 . Pp. 446 U. S.
75 -80.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concluded that the relief afforded
appellees by the District Court was not commensurate with the sound
exercise of judicial discretion. The court at least should have
considered alternative remedial orders to converting Mobile's
government to a mayor-council system, and, in failing to do so, the
court appears to have been overly concerned with eliminating
at-large elections per se, rather than with structuring an
electoral system that provided an opportunity for black voters to
participate in the city's government on an equal footing with
whites. Pp. 446 U. S.
80 -83.

															MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that the proper standard for
adjudging the constitutionality of a political structure, such as
Mobile's, that treats all individuals as equals but adversely
affects the political strength of an identifiable minority group,
is the same whether the minority is identified by a racial, ethnic,
religious, or economic characteristic; that Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ,
suggests that the standard asks Page 446 U. S. 57 (1) whether the political structure is manifestly not the
product of a routine or traditional decision, (2) whether it has a
significant adverse impact on a minority group, and (3) whether it
is unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either
totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the
political strength of the minority; and that the standard focuses
on the objective effects of the political decision, rather than the
subjective motivation of the decisionmaker. Under this standard,
the choice to retain Mobile's commission form of government must be
accepted as constitutionally permissible even though the choice may
well be the product of mixed motivation, some of which is
invidious. Pp. 446 U. S.
83 -94.

															STEWART, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an
opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 446 U. S. 80 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 446 U. S. 83 .
BRENNAN, J., post, p. 446 U. S. 94 ,
WHITE, J., post, p. 446 U. S. 94 ,
and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 446 U. S. 103 ,
filed dissenting opinions. Page 446 U. S. 58 MR. JUSTICE STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined.

															The city of Mobile, Ala., has, since 1911, been governed by a
City Commission consisting of three members elected by the voters
of the city at large. The question in this case is whether this
at-large system of municipal elections violates the rights of
Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of federal statutory or
constitutional law.

															The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action on behalf of
all Negro citizens of Mobile. [ Footnote 1 ] Named as defendants were the city and its
three incumbent Commissioners, who are the appellants before this
Court. The complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City
Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of
Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
[ Footnote 2 ] of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial,
the District Court found that the constitutional rights of the
appellees had been violated, entered a judgment in their favor, and
ordered that the City Commission be disestablished and replaced by
a municipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council
with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.
Supp. 384 . [ Footnote 3 ] The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in its entirety, 571 F.2d
238, agreeing that Mobile's at-large elections operated to
discriminate against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, id. at 245, and finding that the
remedy formulated by the District Court was Page 446 U. S. 59 appropriate. An appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted
probable jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 815. The case was originally argued
in the 1978 Term, and was reargued in the present Term. I In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may adopt is
governed by state law. Until 1911, cities not covered by specific
legislation were limited to governing themselves through a mayor
and city council. [ Footnote 4 ]
In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large
municipality to adopt a commission form of government. [ Footnote 5 ] Mobile established its City
Commission in the same year, and has maintained that basic system
of municipal government ever since.

															The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative,
executive, and administrative power in the municipality. They are
required after election to designate one of their number as Mayor,
a largely ceremonial office, but no formal provision is made for
allocating specific executive or administrative duties among the
three. [ Footnote 6 ] As required
by the state law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile
City Commission runs for election in the city at large for a term
of four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be
elected Page 446 U. S. 60 only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic
electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of
municipalities and other local governmental units throughout the
Nation. [ Footnote 7 ] II Although required by general principles of judicial
administration to do so, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101 , 323 U. S. 105 ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claim -- that
the Mobile electoral system violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that claim, however, clearly
discloses that it adds nothing to the appellees' complaint.

															Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:

															"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color."

															79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Assuming, for
present purposes, that there exists a private right of action to
enforce this statutory provision, [ Footnote 8 ] it is apparent that the language of § 2 no
more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment,
[ Footnote 9 ] and the sparse
legislative history Page 446 U. S. 61 of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.

															Section 2 was an uncontroversial provision in proposed
legislation whose other provisions engendered protracted dispute.
The House Report on the bill simply recited that § 2

															"grants . . . a right to be free from enactment or enforcement
of voting qualifications . . . or practices which deny or abridge
the right to vote on account of race or color."

															H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1965). See
also S.Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 19-20
(1965). The view that this section simply restated the prohibitions
already contained in the Fifteenth Amendment was expressed without
contradiction during the Senate hearings. Senator Dirksen indicated
at one point that all States, whether or not covered by the
preclearance provisions of § 5 of the proposed legislation, were
prohibited from discriminating against Negro voters by § 2, which
he termed "almost a rephrasing of the 15th [A]mendment." Attorney
General Katzenbach agreed. See Voting Rights: Hearings on
S. 1564 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 208 (1965).

															In view of the section's language and its sparse but clear
legislative history, it is evident that this statutory provision
adds nothing to the appellees' Fifteenth Amendment claim. We turn,
therefore, to a consideration of the validity of the judgment of
the Court of Appeals with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment. III The Court's early decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment
established that it imposes but one limitation on the powers of the
States. It forbids them to discriminate against Negroes in matters
having to do with voting. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 , 110 U. S. 665 ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 , 103 U. S.
389 -390; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , 92 U. S.
555 -556; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S.
214 . The Amendment's Page 446 U. S. 62 command and effect are wholly negative. "The Fifteenth Amendment
does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one," but has

															"invested the citizens of the United States with a new
constitutional right which is within the protecting power of
Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the
exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." Id. at 92 U. S.
217 -218.

															Our decisions, moreover, have made clear that action by a State
that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 ,
this Court struck down a "grandfather" clause in a state
constitution exempting from the requirement that voters be literate
any person or the descendants of any person who had been entitled
to vote before January 1, 1866. It was asserted by way of defense
that the provision was immune from successful challenge, since a
law could not be found unconstitutional either "by attributing to
the legislative authority an occult motive" or

															"because of conclusions concerning its operation in practical
execution and resulting discrimination arising . . . from
inequalities naturally inhering in those who must come within the
standard in order to enjoy the right to vote." Id. at 238 U. S. 359 .
Despite this argument, the Court did not hesitate to hold the
grandfather clause unconstitutional, because it was not "possible
to discover any basis in reason for the standard thus fixed other
than the purpose" to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 238 U. S.
365 .

															The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle that
racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a
Fifteenth Amendment violation. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 , the
Court held that allegations of a racially motivated gerrymander of
municipal boundaries stated a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment.
The constitutional infirmity of the state law in that case,
according to the allegations of the complaint, was that, in drawing
the Page 446 U. S. 63 municipal boundaries, the legislature was

															"solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by
fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their
preexisting municipal vote." Id. at 364 U. S. 341 .
The Court made clear that, in the absence of such an invidious
purpose, a State is constitutionally free to redraw political
boundaries in any manner it chooses. Id. at 364 U. S. 347 .
[ Footnote 10 ]

															In Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 , the Court upheld by like reasoning a state
congressional reapportionment statute against claims that district
lines had been racially gerrymandered, because the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the legislature "was either motivated by
racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial
lines"; or that the statute "was the product of a state contrivance
to segregate on the basis of race or place of origin." Id. at 376 U. S. 56 , 376 U. S. 58 .
[ Footnote 11 ] See also
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S.
45 ; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268 , 307 U. S.
275 -277.

															While other of the Court's Fifteenth Amendment decisions have
dealt with different issues, none has questioned the necessity of
showing purposeful discrimination in order to show a Fifteenth
Amendment violation. The cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 , and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 ,
for Page 446 U. S. 64 example, dealt with the question whether a State was so involved
with racially discriminatory voting practices as to invoke the
Amendment's protection. Although their facts differed somewhat, the
question in both cases was whether the State was sufficiently
implicated in the conduct of racially exclusionary primary
elections to make that discrimination an abridgment of the right to
vote by a State. Since the Texas Democratic Party primary in Smith v. Allwright was regulated by statute, and only
party nominees chosen in a primary were placed on the ballot for
the general election, the Court concluded that the state Democratic
Party had become the agency of the State, and that the State
thereby had "endorse[d], adopt[ed] and enforce[d] the
discrimination against Negroes, practiced by a party." 321 U.S. at 446 U. S.
664 . Terry v. Adams, supra, posed a more difficult question
of state involvement. The primary election challenged in that case
was conducted by a county political organization, the Jaybird
Association, that was neither authorized nor regulated under state
law. The candidates chosen in the Jaybird primary, however,
invariably won in the subsequent Democratic primary and in the
general election, and the Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment
had been violated. Although the several supporting opinions
differed in their formulation of this conclusion, there was
agreement that the State was involved in the purposeful exclusion
of Negroes from participation in the election process.

															The appellees have argued in this Court that Smith v.
Allwright and Terry v. Adams support the conclusion
that the at-large system of elections in Mobile is
unconstitutional, reasoning that the effect of racially polarized
voting in Mobile is the same as that of a racially exclusionary
primary. The only characteristic, however, of the exclusionary
primaries that offended the Fifteenth Amendment was that Negroes
were not permitted to vote in them. The difficult question was
whether the "State ha[d] had a hand in" the patent
discrimination Page 446 U. S. 65 practiced by a nominally private organization. Terry v.
Adams, supra at 345 U. S. 473 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

															The answer to the appellees' argument is that, as the District
Court expressly found, their freedom to vote has not been denied or
abridged by anyone. The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the
right to have Negro candidates elected, and neither Smith v.
Allwright nor Terry v. Adams contains any implication
to the contrary. That Amendment prohibits only purposefully
discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to
vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." Having found that Negroes in Mobile "register and vote
without hindrance," the District Court and Court of Appeals were in
error in believing that the appellants invaded the protection of
that Amendment in the present case. IV The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that
Mobile's at-large electoral system violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There remains for
consideration, therefore, the validity of its judgment on that
score. A The claim that at-large electoral schemes unconstitutionally
deny to some persons the equal protection of the laws has been
advanced in numerous cases before this Court. That contention has
been raised most often with regard to multimember constituencies
within a state legislative apportionment system. The constitutional
objection to multimember districts is not and cannot be that, as
such, they depart from apportionment on a population basis in
violation of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 , and its progeny. Rather, the focus in such cases
has been on the lack of representation multimember districts afford
various elements of the voting population in a system of
representative legislative democracy.

															"Criticism [of multimember districts] is rooted in their
winner- Page 446 U. S. 66 take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities . . . .
a general preference for legislatures reflecting community
interests as closely as possible and disenchantment with political
parties and elections as devices to settle policy differences
between contending interests." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 , 403 U. S.
158 -159.

															Despite repeated constitutional attacks upon multimember
legislative districts, the Court has consistently held that they
are not unconstitutional per se, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 ; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.
S. 120 ; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S.
73 ; Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 . [ Footnote
12 ] We have recognized, however, that such legislative
apportionments could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their
purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities. See White v.
Regester, supra; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Burns v. Richardson,
supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. To prove such a purpose, it
is not enough to show that the group allegedly discriminated
against has not elected representatives in proportion to its
numbers. White v. Regester, supra at 412 U. S.
765 -766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
149 -150. A plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan
was "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further
racial . . . discrimination," id. at 403 U. S.
149 .

															This burden of proof is simply one aspect of the basic principle
that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 ; Page 446 U. S. 67 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 ; Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.
S. 256 . The Court explicitly indicated in Washington
v. Davis that this principle applies to claims of racial
discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of
racial discrimination. Indeed, the Court's opinion in that case
viewed Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 , as an apt illustration of the principle that an
illicit purpose must be proved before a constitutional violation
can be found. The Court said:

															"The rule is the same in other contexts. Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), upheld a New
York congressional apportionment statute against claims that
district lines had been racially gerrymandered. The challenged
districts were made up predominantly of whites or of minority
races, and their boundaries were irregularly drawn. The challengers
did not prevail, because they failed to prove that the New York
Legislature 'was either motivated by racial considerations or in
fact drew the districts on racial lines;' the plaintiffs had not
shown that the statute 'was the product of a state contrivance to
segregate on the basis of race or place of origin.' Id. at 376 U. S. 56 , 58. The
dissenters were in agreement that the issue was whether the
'boundaries . . . were purposefully drawn on racial lines.' Id. at 376 U. S. 67 ." Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S. 240 .
More recently, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., supra, the Court again relied on Wright v.
Rockefeller to illustrate the principle that "[p]roof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 265 .
Although dicta may be drawn from a few of the Court's earlier
opinions suggesting that disproportionate effects alone may
establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution, the
fact is that such a view is not supported by any decision of Page 446 U. S. 68 this Court. [ Footnote 13 ]
More importantly, such a view is not consistent with the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause as it has been understood in a variety
of other contexts involving alleged racial discrimination. Washington v. Davis, supra, (employment); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra, (zoning); Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U. S. 189 , 413 U. S. 208 (public schools); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.
S. 398 , 325 U. S.
403 -404 (jury selection).

															In only one case has the Court sustained a claim that
multimember legislative districts unconstitutionally diluted the
voting strength of a discrete group. That case was White v.
Regester. There the Court upheld a constitutional challenge by
Negroes and Mexican-Americans to parts of a legislative
reapportionment plan adopted by the State of Texas. The plaintiffs
alleged that the multimember districts for the two counties in
which they resided minimized the effect of their votes in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court held that the plaintiffs
had been able to

															"produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading Page 446 U. S. 69 to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group[s] in question."

															412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 766 , 412 U. S. 767 .
In so holding, the Court relied upon evidence in the record that
included a long history of official discrimination against
minorities as well as indifference to their needs and interests on
the part of white elected officials. The Court also found in each
county additional factors that restricted the access of minority
groups to the political process. In one county, Negroes effectively
were excluded from the process of slating candidates for the
Democratic Party, while the plaintiffs in the other county were
Mexican-Americans who "suffer[ed] a cultural and language barrier"
that made "participation in community processes extremely
difficult, particularly . . . with respect to the political life"
of the county. Id. at 412 U. S. 768 (footnote omitted). White v. Regester is thus consistent with

															"the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality
of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose," Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 240 .
The Court stated the constitutional question in White to
be whether the "multimember districts [were] being used
invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of
racial groups," 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765 (emphasis added), strongly indicating that only a purposeful
dilution of the plaintiffs' vote would offend the Equal Protection
Clause. [ Footnote 14 ] Page 446 U. S. 70 Moreover, much of the evidence on which the Court relied in that
case was relevant only for the reason that "official action will
not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a
racially disproportionate impact." Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S.
264 -265. Of course, "[t]he impact of the official action
-- whether it bears more heavily on one race than another,' Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S. 242 -- may provide an important starting point." Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra at 429 U. S. 266 .
But where the character of a law is readily explainable on grounds
apart from race, as would nearly always be true where, as here, an
entire system of local governance is brought into question,
disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must
look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory
purpose. See ibid.; Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S.
242 . We may assume, for present purposes, that an at-large election
of city officials with all the legislative, executive, and
administrative power of the municipal government is
constitutionally indistinguishable from the election of a few
members of a state legislative body in multimember districts --
although this may be a rash assumption. [ Footnote 15 ] But even making this assumption, it is
clear that the evidence in the present case fell far short of
showing that the appellants "conceived or operated [a] purposeful
devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination." Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
149 . Page 446 U. S. 71 The District Court assessed the appellees' claims in light of
the standard that had been articulated by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v.McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297.
That case, coming before Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 , was quite evidently decided upon the
misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory
purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause -- that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. See 485 F.2d at 1304-1305, and n. 16. [ Footnote 16 ]

															In light of the criteria identified in Zimmer, the
District Court based its conclusion of unconstitutionality
primarily on the fact that no Negro had ever been elected to the
City Commission, apparently because of the pervasiveness of
racially polarized voting in Mobile. The trial court also found
that city officials had not been as responsive to the interests of
Negroes as to those of white persons. On the basis of these
findings, the court concluded that the political processes in
Mobile were not equally open to Negroes, despite its seemingly
inconsistent findings that there were no inhibitions against
Negroes' becoming candidates, and that, in fact, Negroes had
registered and voted without hindrance. 423 F. Supp. at 387.
Finally, with little additional discussion, the District Court held
that Mobile's at-large electoral system was invidiously
discriminating against Negroes in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. [ Footnote 17 ] Page 446 U. S. 72 In affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment reaches only purposeful discrimination, [ Footnote 18 ] but held that one way a
plaintiff may establish this illicit purpose is by adducing
evidence that satisfies the criteria of its decision in Zimmer
v. McKeithen, supra. Thus, because the appellees had proved an
"aggregate" of the Zimmer factors, the Court of Appeals
concluded that a discriminatory purpose Page 446 U. S. 73 had been proved. That approach, however, is inconsistent with
out decisions in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights, supra. Although the presence of the
indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some criteria is
not, of itself, sufficient proof of such a purpose. The so-called Zimmer criteria upon which the District Court and the
Court of Appeals relied were most assuredly insufficient to prove
an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present
case.

															First, the two courts found it highly significant that no Negro
had been elected to the Mobile City Commission. From this fact,
they concluded that the processes leading to nomination and
election were not open equally to Negroes. But the District Court's
findings of fact, unquestioned on appeal, make clear that Negroes
register and vote in Mobile "without hindrance," and that there are
no official obstacles in the way of Negroes who wish to become
candidates for election to the Commission. Indeed, it was
undisputed that the only active "slating" organization in the city
is comprised of Negroes. It may be that Negro candidates have been
defeated, but that fact alone does not work a constitutional
deprivation. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 160; see
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, n. 15. [ Footnote 19 ]

															Second, the District Court relied in part on its finding that
the persons who were elected to the Commission discriminated
against Negroes in municipal employment and in dispensing public
services. If that is the case, those discriminated against may be
entitled to relief under the Constitution, albeit of a sort quite
different from that sought in the present case. The Equal
Protection Clause proscribes purposeful discrimination because of
race by any unit of state government, whatever Page 446 U. S. 74 the method of its election. But evidence of discrimination by
white officials in Mobile is relevant only as the most tenuous and
circumstantial evidence of the constitutional invalidity of the
electoral system under which they attained their offices. [ Footnote 20 ]

															Third, the District Court and the Court of Appeals supported
their conclusion by drawing upon the substantial history of
official racial discrimination in Alabama. But past discrimination
cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action
that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether
a discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case. More
distant instances of official discrimination in other cases are of
limited help in resolving that question.

															Finally, the District Court and the Court of Appeals pointed to
the mechanics of the at-large electoral system itself as proof that
the votes of Negroes were being invidiously canceled out. But those
features of that electoral system, such as the majority vote
requirement, tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as
we noted in White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 . They are far from proof that the at-large
electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination against Negro
voters. [ Footnote 21 ] Page 446 U. S. 75 B We turn finally to the arguments advanced in 446 U.
S. JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion. The theory of
this dissenting opinion -- a theory much more extreme than that
espoused by the District Court or the Court of Appeal, appears to
be that every "political group," or at least every such group that
is in the minority, has a federal constitutional right to elect
candidates in proportion to its numbers. [ Footnote 22 ] Moreover, a political group's "right" to
have its candidates elected is said to be a "fundamental interest,"
the infringement of which may be established without proof that a
State has acted with the purpose of impairing anybody's access to
the political process. This dissenting opinion finds the "right"
infringed in the present case because no Negro has been elected to
the Mobile City Commission.

															Whatever appeal the dissenting opinion's view may have as a
matter of political theory, it is not the law. The Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not Page 446 U. S. 76 require proportional representation as an imperative of
political organization. The entitlement that the dissenting opinion
assumes to exist simply is not to be found in the Constitution of
the United States.

															It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental
right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is
presumptively unconstitutional. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 634 , 394 U. S. 638 ; id. at 394 U. S.
642 -644 (concurring opinion). See also San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S.
1 , 411 U. S. 17 , 411 U. S. 30 -32.
But plainly "[i]t is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws," id. at 411 U. S. 33 . See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 , 405 U. S. 74 ; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S. 485 .
Accordingly, where a state law does not impair a right or liberty
protected by the Constitution, there is no occasion to depart from
"the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislat[ion] . . .
involving questions of economic and social policy," San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 411 U. S. 33 .
[ Footnote 23 ] MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL's dissenting opinion would discard these fixed principles
in favor of a judicial inventiveness that would go "far toward
making this Court a super-legislature.'" Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra, at 394 U. S. 655 , 394 U. S. 661 (Harlan, J., dissenting). We are not free to do so. More than 100 years ago, the Court unanimously held that "the
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of
suffrage upon anyone. . . ." Minor v.
Happersett , 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 178 . See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 50 -51.
It is for the States

															"to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage
may be Page 446 U. S. 77 exercised . . . , absent, of course, the discrimination which
the Constitution condemns," ibid. It is true, as the dissenting opinion states,
that the Equal Protection Clause confers a substantive right to
participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 , 405 U. S. 336 ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 377 U.S. 576 . But this right to equal
participation in the electoral process does not protect any
"political group," however defined, from electoral defeat.
[ Footnote 24 ]

															The dissenting opinion erroneously discovers the asserted
entitlement to group representation within the "one person, one
vote" principle of Reynolds v. Sims, supra, and its
progeny. [ Footnote 25 ] Those
cases established that the Equal Protection Page 446 U. S. 78 Clause guarantees the right of each voter to "have his vote
weighted equally with those of all other citizens." 377 U.S. at 377 U.S. 576 . The Court
recognized that a voter's right to "have an equally effective
voice" in the election of representatives is impaired where
representation is not apportioned substantially on a population
basis. In such cases, the votes of persons in more populous
districts carry less weight than do those of persons in smaller
districts. There can be, of course, no claim that the "one person,
one vote" principle has been violated in this case, because the
city of Mobile is a unitary electoral district and the Commission
elections are conducted at large. It is therefore obvious that
nobody's vote has been "diluted" in the sense in which that word
was used in the Reynolds case.

															The dissenting opinion places an extraordinary interpretation on
these decisions, an interpretation not justified by Reynolds v.
Sims itself or by any other decision of this Court. It is, of
course, true that the right of a person to vote on an equal basis
with other voters draws much of its significance from the political
associations that its exercise reflects, but it is an altogether
different matter to conclude that political groups themselves have
an independent constitutional claim to representation. [ Footnote 26 ] And the Court's
decisions hold squarely Page 446 U. S. 79 that they do not. See United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U. S. 144 , 430 U. S.
166 -167; id. at 430 U. S.
179 -180 (opinion concurring in judgment); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 765 -766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
at 403 U. S.
149 -150, 403 U. S.
153 -154, 403 U. S.
156 -157.

															The fact is that the Court has sternly set its face against the
claim, however phrased, that the Constitution somehow guarantees
proportional representation. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, the trial court had found that a multimember state legislative
district had invidiously deprived Negroes and poor persons of
rights guaranteed them by the Constitution, notwithstanding the
absence of any evidence whatever of discrimination against them.
Reversing the trial court, this Court said:

															"The District Court's holding, although, on the facts of this
case, limited to guaranteeing one racial group representation, is
not easily contained. It is expressive of the more general
proposition that any group with distinctive interests must be
represented in legislative halls if it is numerous enough to
command at least one seat and represents Page 446 U. S. 80 a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute
a single-member district. This approach would make it difficult to
reject claims of Democrats, Republicans, or members of any
political organization in Marion County who live in what would be
safe districts in a single-member district system, but who, in one
year or another, or year after year, are submerged in a one-sided
multi-member district vote. There are also union-oriented workers,
the university community, religious or ethnic groups occupying
identifiable areas of our heterogeneous cities and urban areas.
Indeed, it would be difficult for a great many, if not most,
multi-member districts to survive analysis under the District
Court's view unless combined with some voting arrangement such as
proportional representation or cumulative voting aimed at providing
representation for minority parties or interests. At the very
least, affirmance of the District Court would spawn endless
litigation concerning the multimember district systems now widely
employed in this country." Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 403 U. S.
156 -157 (footnotes omitted). V The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Approximately 35.4% of the residents of Mobile are Negro.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The complaint also
contained claims based on the First and Thirteenth Amendments and
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. II).
Those claims have not been pressed in this Court.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The District Court has stayed its orders pending disposition of
the present appeal.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Ala.Code § 11-43 (1975).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Act No. 281, 1911 Ala. Acts, p. 330.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In 1965, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 823, 1965
Ala.Acts, p. 1539, § 2 of which designated specific administrative
tasks to be performed by each Commissioner and provided that the
title of Mayor be rotated among the three. After the present
lawsuit was commenced, the city of Mobile belatedly submitted Act
No. 823 to the Attorney General of the United States under § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The Attorney
General objected to the legislation on the ground that the city had
not shown that § 2 of the Act would not have the effect of
abridging the right of Negroes to vote. No suit has been brought in
the District Court for the District of Columbia to seek clearance
under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act and, accordingly, § 2 of Act No.
823 is in abeyance.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															According to the 1979 Municipal Year Book, most municipalities
of over 25,000 people conducted at-large elections of their city
commissioners or council members as of 1977. Id. at 999.
It is reasonable to suppose that an even larger majority of other
municipalities did so.

															[ Footnote 8 ] Cf. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.
S. 544 . But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11 ; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.
S. 560 .

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:

															"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The Court has repeatedly cited Gomillion v. Lightfoot for the principle that an invidious purpose must be adduced to
support a claim of unconstitutionality. See Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.
S. 256 , 442 U. S. 272 ; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 , 429 U. S. 265 ,
266; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 , 426 U. S.
240 .

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL has elsewhere described the fair import of
the Gomillion and Wright cases

															"In the two Fifteenth Amendment redistricting cases, Wright
v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), the Court
suggested that legislative purpose alone is determinative, although
language in both cases may be isolated that seems to approve some
inquiry into effect insofar as it elucidates purpose." Beer v. United States, 425 U.
S. 130 , 425 U. S. 148 ,
n. 4 (dissenting opinion).

															The Court in the Wright case also rejected claims made
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra at 446 U. S.
67 .

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															We have made clear, however, that a court, in formulating an
apportionment plan as an exercise of its equity powers should, as a
general rule, not permit multimember legislative districts.

															"[S]ingle-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered
legislative reapportionment plans unless the court can articulate a
'singular combination of unique factors' that justifies a different
result. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 , 410 U. S.
333 ." Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407 , 431 U. S.
415 .

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL reads the Court's
opinion in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 , to say that a claim of vote dilution under the
Equal Protection Clause could rest on either discriminatory purpose
or effect. Post at 446 U. S. 108 .
In fact, the Court explicitly reserved this question and expressed
no view concerning it. That case involved solely a claim, which the
Court rejected, that a state legislative apportionment statute
creating some multimember districts was constitutionally infirm on
its face. Although the Court recognized that "designedly or
otherwise," multimember districting schemes might, under the
circumstances of a particular case, minimize the voting strength of
a racial group, an issue as to the constitutionality of such an
arrangement "[was] not presented by the record," and " our
holding ha[d] no bearing on that wholly separate question.'" 379
U.S. at 379 U. S.
439 . The phrase "designedly or otherwise," in which this dissenting
opinion places so much stock, was repeated, also in dictum, in Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 , 384 U. S. 88 .
But the constitutional challenge to the multimember constituencies
failed in that case because the plaintiffs demonstrated neither
discriminatory purpose nor effect. Id. at 384 U. S. 88 -90,
and nn. 15 and 16.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.
S. 735 , a case decided the same day as White v.
Regester, the Court interpreted both White and the
earlier vote dilution cases as turning on the existence of
discriminatory purpose:

															"State legislative districts may be equal or substantially equal
in population and still be vulnerable under the Fourteenth
Amendment. A districting statute otherwise acceptable, may be
invalid because it fences out a racial group so as to deprive them
of their preexisting municipal vote. Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). A
districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly
acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed 'to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population.' Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S.
433 , 379 U. S. 439 (1965). See White v. Regester, post, at 412 U. S.
755 ; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S.
124 (1971); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 184 , n. 2; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
88 -89."

															412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 751 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 15 ] See Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U. S. 535 , 437 U. S. 550 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). It is noteworthy that a system of
at-large city elections in place of elections of city officials by
the voters of small geographic wards was universally heralded not
many years ago as a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt
municipal government. See, e.g., E. Banfield & J.
Wilson, City Politics 151 (1963). Cf. M. Seasongood, Local
Government in the United States (1933); L. Steffens, The Shame of
the Cities (1904).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Zimmer v. McKeithen on grounds other than those relied on
by that court and explicitly "without approval of the
constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals." East
Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.
S. 636 , 424 U. S. 638 (per curiam).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The only indication given by the District Court of an inference
that there existed an invidious purpose was the following
statement:

															"It is not a long step from the systematic exclusion of blacks
from juries, which is itself such an 'unequal application of the
law . . . as to show intentional discrimination,' Akins v.
Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S.
404 , . . . to [the] present purpose to dilute the black
vote as evidenced in this case. There is a 'current' condition of
dilution of the black vote resulting from intentional state
legislative inaction which is as effective as the intentional state
action referred to in Keyes \[v. School District No. 1, Denver
Colo. , 413 U. S. 189 ]."

															423 F. Supp. at 398.

															What the District Court may have meant by this statement is
uncertain. In any event, the analogy to the racially exclusionary
jury cases appears mistaken. Those cases typically have involved a
consistent pattern of discrete official actions that demonstrated
almost to a mathematical certainty that Negroes were being excluded
from juries because of their race. See Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U. S. 482 , 430 U. S.
495 -497, and n. 17; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 , 332 U. S.
466 -467; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.
S. 354 , 306 U. S. 359 ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 , 294 U. S.
591 .

															If the District Court meant by its statement that the existence
of the at-large electoral system was, like the systematic exclusion
of Negroes from juries, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
its inference is contradicted by the history of the adoption of
that system in Mobile. Alternatively, if the District Court meant
that the state legislature may be presumed to have "intended" that
there would be no Negro Commissioners, simply because that was a
foreseeable consequence of at-large voting, it applied an incorrect
legal standard.

															"'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . . . It implies
that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 279 (footnotes omitted) .

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The Court of Appeals expressed the view that the District
Court's finding of discrimination in light of the Zimmer criteria was "buttressed" by the fact that the Attorney General had
interposed an objection under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
to the state statute designating the functions of each
Commissioner. 571 F.2d 238, 246 (CA5). See n 6, supra. [ Footnote 19 ]

															There have been only three Negro candidates for the City
Commission, all in 1973. According to the District Court, the Negro
candidates "were young, inexperienced, and mounted extremely
limited campaigns," and received only "modest support from the
black community. . . ." 423 F. Supp. at 388.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															Among the difficulties with the District Court's view of the
evidence was its failure to identify the state officials whose
intent it considered relevant in assessing the invidiousness of
Mobile's system of government. To the extent that the inquiry
should properly focus on the state legislature, see n 21, infra, the
actions of unrelated governmental officials would be, of course, of
questionable relevance.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															According to the District Court., voters in the city of Mobile
are represented in the state legislature by three state senators,
any one of whom can veto proposed local legislation under the
existing courtesy rule. Likewise, a majority of Mobile's 11-member
House delegation can prevent a local bill from reaching the floor
for debate. Unanimous approval of a local measure by the city
delegation, on the other hand, virtually assures passage. 423 F.
Supp. at 397.

															There was evidence in this case that several proposals that
would have altered the form of Mobile's municipal government have
been defeated in the state legislature, including at least one that
would have permitted Mobile to govern itself through a Mayor and
City Council with members elected from individual districts within
the city. Whether it may be possible ultimately to prove that
Mobile's present governmental and electoral system has been
retained for a racially discriminatory purpose, we are in no
position now to say.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															The dissenting opinion seeks to disclaim this description of its
theory by suggesting that a claim of vote dilution may require, in
addition to proof of electoral defeat, some evidence of "historical
and social factors" indicating that the group in question is
without political influence. Post at 446 U. S.
111 -112, n. 7, 446 U. S.
122 -124. Putting to the side the evident fact that these
gauzy sociological considerations have no constitutional basis, it
remains far from certain that they could, in any principled manner,
exclude the claims of any discrete political group that happens,
for whatever reason, to elect fewer of its candidates than
arithmetic indicates it might. Indeed, the putative limits are
bound to prove illusory if the express purpose informing their
application would be, as the dissent assumes, to redress the
"inequitable distribution of political influence." Post at 446 U. S.
122 .

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															The presumption of constitutional validity that underlies the
settled mode of reviewing legislation disappears, of course, if the
law under consideration creates classes that, in a constitutional
sense, are inherently "suspect." See McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U. S. 184 ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.
S. 303 . Cf. Lockport v. Citizens for Community
Action, 430 U. S. 259 .

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The basic fallacy in the dissenting opinion's theory is
illustrated by analogy to a defendant's right under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to a trial by a jury of his peers in a
criminal case. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.
S. 145 . That right, expressly conferred by the
Constitution, is certainly "fundamental" as that word is used in
the dissenting opinion. Moreover, under the Equal Protection
Clause, a defendant has a right to require that the State not
exclude from the jury members of his race. See Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 493 .
But "[f]airness in selection has never been held to require
proportional representation of races upon a jury," Akins v.
Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S. 403 ;
nor has the defendant any "right to demand that members of his race
be included," Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.
S. 625 , 405 U. S. 628 .
The absence from a jury of persons belonging to racial or other
cognizable groups offends the Constitution only "if it results from
purposeful discrimination." Castaneda v. Partida, supra at 430 U. S. 493 . See Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; see also Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S.
239 -240. Thus, the fact that there is a constitutional
right to a system of jury selection that is not purposefully
exclusionary does not entail a right to a jury of any particular
racial composition. Likewise, the fact that the Equal Protection
Clause confers a right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other qualified voters does not entail a right to have
one's candidates prevail.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															The dissenting opinion also relies upon several decisions of
this Court that have held constitutionally invalid various voter
eligibility requirements: Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 (length of residence requirement); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U. S. 419 (exclusion of residents of federal property); Kramer v. Union
School District, 395 U. S. 621 (property or status requirement); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (poll tax requirement). But there is in this case no attack
whatever upon any of the voter eligibility requirements in Mobile.
Nor do the cited cases contain implicit support for the position of
the dissenting opinion. They stand simply for the proposition
that,

															"if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some
bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the
franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest." Kramer v. Union School District, supra at 395 U. S. 627 .
It is difficult to perceive any similarity between the excluded
person's right to equal electoral participation in the cited cases
and the right asserted by the dissenting opinion in the present
case, aside from the fact that they both in some way involve
voting.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															It is difficult to perceive how the implications of the
dissenting opinion's theory of group representation could
rationally be cabined. Indeed, certain preliminary practical
questions immediately come to mind: can only members of a minority
of the voting population in a particular municipality be members of
a "political group"? How large must a "group" be to be a "political
group"? Can any "group" call itself a "political group"? If not,
who is to say which "groups" are "political groups"? Can a
qualified voter belong to more than one "political group"? Can
there be more than one "political group" among white voters
( e.g., Irish-American, Italian-American, Polish-American,
Jews, Catholics, Protestants)? Can there be more than one
"political group" among nonwhite voters? Do the answers to any of
these questions depend upon the particular demographic composition
of a given city? Upon the total size of its voting population? Upon
the size of its governing body? Upon its form of government? Upon
its history? Its geographic location? The fact that even these
preliminary questions may be largely unanswerable suggests some of
the conceptual and practical fallacies in the constitutional theory
espoused by the dissenting opinion, putting to one side the total
absence of support for that theory in the Constitution itself.

															MR JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the result.

															Assuming that proof of intent is a prerequisite to appellees'
prevailing on their constitutional claim of vote dilution, I am
inclined to agree with MR. JUSTICE WHITE that, in this case, "the
findings of the District Court amply support an inference of
purposeful discrimination," post at 446 U. S. 103 .
I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal, however, because I
believe that the relief afforded appellees by the District Court
was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial
discretion. Page 446 U. S. 81 It seems to me that the city of Mobile, and its citizenry, have
a substantial interest in maintaining the commission form of
government that has been in effect there for nearly 70 years. The
District Court recognized that its remedial order, changing the
form of the city's government to a mayor-council system, "raised
serious constitutional issues." 423 F.
Supp. 384 , 404 (SD Ala.1976). Nonetheless, the court was
"unable to see how the impermissibly unconstitutional dilution can
be effectively corrected by any other approach." Id. at
403.

															The Court of Appeals approved the remedial measures adopted by
the District Court, and did so essentially on three factors: (1)
this Court's preference for single-member districting in
court-ordered legislative reapportionment, absent special
circumstances, see, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.
S. 407 , 431 U. S. 415 (1977); (2) appellants' noncooperation with the District Court's
request for the submission of proposed municipal government plans
that called for single-member districts for councilmen, under a
mayor-council system of government; and (3) the temporary nature of
the relief afforded by the District Court, the city or State being
free to adopt a "constitutional replacement" for the District
Court's plan in the future. 571 F.2d 238, 247 (CA5 1978).

															Contrary to the Court of Appeals, I believe that special
circumstances are presented when a District Court "reapportions" a
municipal government by altering its basic structures. See
also the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, ante at 446 U. S. 70 ,
and n. 15. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S.
1 , 420 U. S. 20 , n.
14 (1975); Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187 (1972). I also believe that the city's failure to submit a proposed
plan to the District Court was excused by the fact that the only
proposals the court was interested in receiving were variations on
a mayor-council plan utilizing single-member districts. Finally,
although the District Court's order may have been temporary, it was
unlikely that the courts below would have approved any attempt by
Mobile to return to the commission form of government. And even Page 446 U. S. 82 a temporary alteration of a long-established form of municipal
government is a drastic measure for a court to take.

															Contrary to the District Court, I do not believe that, in order
to remedy the unconstitutional vote dilution it found, it was
necessary to convert Mobile's city government to a mayor-council
system. In my view, the District Court at least should have
considered alternative remedial orders that would have maintained
some of the basic elements of the commission system Mobile long ago
had selected -- joint exercise of legislative and executive power,
and city-wide representation. In the first place, I see no reason
for the court to have separated legislative and executive power in
the city of Mobile by creating the office of mayor. In the second
place, the court could have, and in my view should have, considered
expanding the size of the Mobile City Commission and providing for
the election of at least some commissioners at large. Alternative
plans might have retained at-large elections for all commissioners
while imposing district residency requirements that would have
insured the election of a commission that was a cross-section of
all of Mobile's neighborhoods, or a plurality-win system that would
have provided the potential for the effective use of single-shot
voting by black voters. See City of Rome v. United States,
post at 446 U. S. 184 ,
n.19. In failing to consider such alternative plans, it appears to
me that the District Court was perhaps overly concerned with the
elimination of at-large elections per se, rather than with
structuring an electoral system that provided an opportunity for
black voters in Mobile to participate in the city's government on
an equal footing with whites.

															In the past, this Court has emphasized that a district court's
remedial power "may be exercised only on the basis of a
constitutional violation," and that "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy." Swann v. Board of
Education, 402 U. S. 1 , 402 U. S. 16 (1971). I am not convinced that any violation of federal
constitutional rights established by appellees required the
District Court to dismantle Mobile's Page 446 U. S. 83 commission form of government and replace it with a
mayor-council system. Accordingly, I too would reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for reconsideration of
an appropriate remedy.

															MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

															At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the city of
Mobile's commission form of government. Black citizens in Mobile,
who constitute a minority of that city's registered voters,
challenged the at-large nature of the elections for the three
positions of City Commissioner, contending that the system
"dilutes" their votes in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While I
agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART that no violation of respondents'
constitutional rights has been demonstrated, my analysis of the
issue proceeds along somewhat different lines.

															In my view, there is a fundamental distinction between state
action that inhibits an individual's right to vote and state action
that affects the political strength of various groups that compete
for leadership in a democratically governed community. That
distinction divides so-called vote dilution practices into two
different categories "governed by entirely different constitutional
considerations," see Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 , 376 U. S. 58 (Harlan, J., concurring).

															In the first category are practices such as poll taxes or
literacy tests that deny individuals access to the ballot.
Districting practices that make an individual's vote in a heavily
populated district less significant than an individual's vote in a
smaller district also belong in that category. See Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186 ; Reynolds v.
Sims , 377 U. S. 533 .
[ Footnote 2/1 ] Such Page 446 U. S. 84 practices must be tested by the strictest of constitutional
standards, whether challenged under the Fifteenth Amendment or
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 , 405 U. S.
337 .

															This case does not fit within the first category. The District
Court found that black citizens in Mobile "register and vote
without hindrance," [ Footnote 2/2 ]
and there is no claim that any individual's vote is worth less than
any other's. Rather, this case draws into question a political
structure that treats all individuals as equals, but adversely
affects the political strength of a racially identifiable group.
Although I am satisfied that such a structure may be challenged
under the Fifteenth Amendment as well as under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [ Footnote 2/3 ] I believe that, under Page 446 U. S. 85 either provision, it must be judged by a standard that allows
the political process to function effectively.

															My conclusion that the Fifteenth Amendment applies to a case
such as this rests on this Court's opinion in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 .
That case established that the Fifteenth Amendment does not simply
guarantee the individual's right to vote; it also limits the
States' power to draw political boundaries. Although Gomillion involved a districting structure that completely
excluded the members of one race from participation in the city's
elections, [ Footnote 2/4 ] it does
not stand for the proposition that no racial group can prevail on a
Fifteenth Amendment claim unless it proves that an electoral system
has the effect of making its members' right to vote, in MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL's words, "nothing more than the right to cast meaningless
ballots." Post at 446 U. S. 104 . I agree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL that
the Fifteenth Amendment need not and should not be so narrowly
construed. I do not agree, however, with his view that every
"showing of discriminatory impact" on a historically and socially
disadvantaged Page 446 U. S. 86 racial group, post at 446 U. S. 104 , 446 U. S. 111 ,
n. 7, is sufficient to invalidate a districting plan. [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Neither Gomillion nor any other case decided by this
Court establishes a constitutional right to proportional
representation for racial minorities. [ Footnote 2/6 ] What Gomillion holds is that a
sufficiently "uncouth" or irrational racial gerrymander violates
the Fifteenth Amendment. As Mr. Justice Whittaker's concurrence in
that case demonstrates, the same result is compelled by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 364
U.S. at 364 U. S. 349 .
The fact that the "gerrymander" condemned in Gomillion was
equally vulnerable under both Amendments indicates that the
essential holding of that case is applicable, not merely to
gerrymanders directed against racial minorities, but to those aimed
at religious, ethnic, economic, and political groups as well.
Whatever the proper standard for identifying an unconstitutional
gerrymander may be, I have long been persuaded that it must apply
equally to all forms of political gerrymandering -- not just to
racial gerrymandering. See Cousins v. City Council Page 446 U. S. 87 of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 848-852 (CA7 1972) (Stevens,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															This conclusion follows, I believe, from the very nature of a
gerrymander. By definition, gerrymandering involves drawing
district boundaries (or using multimember districts or at-large
elections) in order to maximize the voting strength of those loyal
to the dominant political faction and to minimize the strength of
those opposed to it. [ Footnote 2/8 ]
466 F.2d at 847. In seeking the desired result, legislators
necessarily make judgments about the probability that the members
of certain identifiable groups, whether racial, ethnic, economic,
or religious, will vote in the same way. The success of the
gerrymander from the legislators' point of view, as well as its
impact on the Page 446 U. S. 88 disadvantaged group, depends on the accuracy of those
predictions.

															A prediction based on a racial characteristic is not necessarily
more reliable than a prediction based on some other group
characteristic. Nor, since a legislator's ultimate purpose in
making the prediction is political in character, is it necessarily
more invidious or benign than a prediction based on other group
characteristics. [ Footnote 2/9 ] In
the line-drawing process, racial, religious, ethnic, and economic
gerrymanders are all species of political gerrymanders.

															From the standpoint of the groups of voters that are affected by
the line-drawing process, it is also important to recognize that it
is the group's interest in gaining or maintaining political power
that is at stake. The mere fact that a number of citizens share a
common ethnic, racial, or religious background does not create the
need for protection against gerrymandering. It is only when their
common interests are strong enough to be manifested in political
action that the need arises. For the political strength of a group
is not a function of its ethnic, racial, or religious composition;
rather, it is a function of numbers -- specifically the number of
persons who will vote in the same way. In the long run, there is no
more certainty that individual members of racial groups will vote
alike than that members of other identifiable groups will do so.
And surely there is no national interest in creating an incentive
to define political groups by racial characteristics. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Page 446 U. S. 89 But if the Constitution were interpreted to give more favorable
treatment to a racial minority alleging an unconstitutional
impairment of its political strength than it gives to other
identifiable groups making the same claim, such an incentive would
inevitably result.

															My conclusion that the same standard should be applied to racial
groups as is applied to other groups leads me also to Page 446 U. S. 90 conclude that the standard cannot condemn every adverse impact
on one or more political groups without spawning more dilution
litigation than the judiciary can manage. Difficult as the issues
engendered by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186 , may have been, nothing comparable to the
mathematical yardstick used in apportionment cases is available to
identify the difference between permissible and impermissible
adverse impacts on the voting strength of political groups.

															In its prior cases, the Court has phrased the standard as being
whether the districting practices in question "unconstitutionally
operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or
political elements." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.
S. 124 , 403 U. S. 144 .
In Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd.
v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 , the
Fifth Circuit attempted to outline the types of proof that would
satisfy this rather amorphous test. Today, the plurality rejects
the Zimmer analysis, holding that the primary, if not the
sole, focus of the inquiry must be on the intent of the political
body responsible for making the districting decision. While I agree
that the Zimmer analysis should be rejected, I do not
believe that it is appropriate to focus on the subjective intent of
the decisionmakers.

															In my view, the proper standard is suggested by three
characteristics of the gerrymander condemned in Gomillion: (1) the 28-sided configuration was, in the Court's word, "uncouth,"
that is to say, it was manifestly not the product of a routine or a
traditional political decision; (2) it had a significant adverse
impact on a minority group; and (3) it was unsupported by any
neutral justification, and thus was either totally irrational or
entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of
the minority. These characteristics suggest that a proper test
should focus on the objective effects of the political decision,
rather than the subjective motivation of the decisionmaker. See United States v.
O'Brien , 391 U.S. Page 446 U. S. 91 367, 391 U. S. 384 .
[ Footnote 2/11 ] In this case, if
the commission form of government in Mobile were extraordinary, or
if it were nothing more than a vestige of history, with no greater
justification than the grotesque figure in Gomillion, it
would surely violate the Constitution. That conclusion would follow
simply from its adverse impact on black voters, plus the absence of
any legitimate justification for the system, without reference to
the subjective intent of the political body that has refused to
alter it.

															Conversely, I am also persuaded that a political decision that
affects group voting rights may be valid even if it can be proved
that irrational or invidious factors have played some part in its
enactment or retention. [ Footnote
2/12 ] The standard for testing the acceptability of such a
decision must take into account the fact that the responsibility
for drawing political boundaries is generally committed to the
legislative process, and that the process inevitably involves a
series of compromises among different group interests. If the
process is to work, it must reflect an awareness of group interests
and it must tolerate some attempts to advantage or to disadvantage
particular segments of the voting populace. Indeed, the same "group
interest" may simultaneously support and oppose a particular
boundary change. [ Footnote 2/13 ]
The standard cannot, therefore, be so Page 446 U. S. 92 strict that any evidence of a purpose to disadvantage a bloc of
voters will justify a finding of "invidious discrimination";
otherwise, the facts of political life would deny legislatures the
right to perform the districting function. Accordingly, a political
decision that is supported by valid and articulable justifications
cannot be invalid simply because some participants in the
decisionmaking process were motivated by a purpose to disadvantage
a minority group.

															The decision to retain the commission form of government in
Mobile, Ala., is such a decision. I am persuaded that some support
for its retention comes, directly or indirectly, from members of
the white majority who are motivated by a desire to make it more
difficult for members of the black minority to serve in positions
of responsibility in city government. I deplore that motivation,
and wish that neither it nor any other irrational prejudice played
any part in our political processes. But I do not believe otherwise
legitimate political choices can be invalidated simply because an
irrational or invidious purpose played some part in the
decisionmaking process.

															As MR. JUSTICE STEWART points out, Mobile's basic election
system is the same as that followed by literally thousands of
municipalities and other governmental units throughout the Nation. Ante at 446 U. S. 60 .
[ Footnote 2/14 ] The fact that
these at-large systems Page 446 U. S. 93 characteristically place one or more minority groups at a
significant disadvantage in the struggle for political power cannot
invalidate all such systems. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. at 403 U. S.
156 -160. Nor can it be the law that such systems are
valid when there is no evidence that they were instituted or
maintained for discriminatory reasons, but that they may be
selectively condemned on the basis of the subjective motivation of
some of their supporters. A contrary view "would spawn endless
litigation concerning the multi-member district systems now widely
employed in this country," id. at 403 U. S. 157 ,
and would entangle the judiciary in voracious political thicket.
[ Footnote 2/15 ] Page 446 U. S. 94 In sum, I believe we must accept the choice to retain Mobile's
commission form of government as constitutionally permissible even
though that choice may well be the product of mixed motivation,
some of which is invidious. For these reasons I concur in the
judgment of reversal.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court quoted Mr. Justice
Douglas' statement that the right to vote "includes the right to
have the vote counted at full value without dilution or discount .
. . ," 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 555 ,
n. 29, as well as the comment in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 , 376 U. S. 8 , that
" one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
much as another's.'" 377 U.S. at 377 U. S.
559 . [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															This finding distinguishes this case from White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 . In White, the Court held that, in order to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment violation, a group alleging vote dilution
must

															"produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open
to participation by the group in question -- that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice." Id. at 412 U. S. 766 .
The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of black and
Mexican-American voters on the basis of the District Court's
express findings that black voters had been " effectively
excluded from participation in the Democratic primary selection
process,'" id. at 412 U. S. 767 , and that "' . . . cultural incompatibility . . . , conjoined with the
poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures in
the nation ha[d] operated to effectively deny Mexican-Americans
access to the political processes in Texas even longer than the
Blacks were formally denied access by the white primary.'" Id. at 412 U. S.
768 .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Thus, I disagree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART's conclusion for the
plurality that the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to practices
that directly affect access to the ballot, and hence is totally
inapplicable to the case at bar. Ante at 446 U. S. 65 . I
also find it difficult to understand why, given this position, he
reaches out to decide that discriminatory purpose must be
demonstrated in a proper Fifteenth Amendment case. Ante at 446 U. S.
61 -64.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															"The petitioners here complain that affirmative legislative
action deprives them of their votes and the consequent advantages
that the ballot affords. When a legislature thus singles out a
readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special
discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment. In
no case involving unequal weight in voting distribution that has
come before the Court did the decision sanction a differentiation
on racial lines whereby approval was given to unequivocal
withdrawal of the vote solely from colored citizens."

															" * * * *" "According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature
has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental
inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more accurate to say that
it has deprived the petitioners of the municipal franchise and
consequent rights, and, to that end, it has incidentally changed
the city's boundaries. While in form this is merely an act
redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are established,
the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and
geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored
citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights."

															364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 346 , 364 U. S.
347 .

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															I also disagree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL to the extent that he
implies that the votes cast in an at-large election by members of a
racial minority can never be anything more than "meaningless
ballots." I have no doubt that analyses of Presidential, senatorial
and other statewide elections would demonstrate that ethnic and
racial minorities have often had a critical impact on the choice of
candidates and the outcome of elections. There is no reason to
believe that the same political forces cannot operate in smaller
election districts, regardless of the depth of conviction or
emotion that may separate the partisans of different points of
view.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															And this is true regardless of the apparent need of a particular
group for proportional representation because of its historically
disadvantaged position in the community. See Cousins v. City
Council of Chicago, 466 F.2d 830, 852 (CA7 1972) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893. This does not
mean, of course, that a legislature is constitutionally prohibited
from according some measure of proportional representation to a
minority group, see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 .

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															This view is consistent with the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
cases in which it has indicated that attacks on apportionment
schemes on racial, political, or economic grounds should all be
judged by the same constitutional standard. See, e.g., Whitcomb
v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 , 403 U. S. 149 (districts that are "conceived or operated as purposeful devices to
further racial or economic discrimination" are prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment) (emphasis supplied); Fortson v.
Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 , 379 U. S. 439 (an apportionment scheme would be invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment if it "operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population")
(emphasis supplied) .

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Gerrymanders may also be used to preserve the current balance of
power between political parties, see, e.g., Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 , or
to preserve the safe districts of incumbents, cf. Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 . In Gaffney, the Court pointed out:

															"[I]t requires no special genius to recognize the political
consequences of drawing a district line along one street, rather
than another. I t is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable,
that the location and shape of districts may well determine the
political complexion of the area. District lines are rarely neutral
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be
predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a
close race likely. Redistricting may pit incumbents against one
another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced
legislator. The reality is that districting inevitably has and is
intended to have substantial political consequences."

															412 U.S. at 412 U. S.
753 .

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Thus, for example, there is little qualitative difference
between the motivation behind a religious gerrymander designed to
gain votes on the abortion issue and a racial gerrymander designed
to gain votes on an economic issue.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															As Mr. Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent in Wright v.
Rockefeller: "Racial electoral registers, like religious ones, have no place
in a society that honors the Lincoln tradition -- 'of the people,
by the people, for the people.' Here, the individual is important,
not his race, his creed, or his color. The principle of equality is
at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a
Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented
by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and
so on. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S.
368 , 372 U. S. 379 . The racial
electoral register system weights votes along one racial line more
heavily than it does other votes. That system, by whatever name it
is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing
differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in
the constitutional sense. Of course race, like religion, plays an
important role in the choices which individual voters make from
among various candidates. But government has no business designing
electoral districts along racial or religious lines."

															" * * * *" "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the
multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks
to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate
to race or to religion, rather than to political issues, are
generated; communities seek not the best representative, but the
best racial or religious partisan. Since that system is at war with
the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here."

															376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 66 -67.
See also my dissent in Cousins, supra: "In my opinion, an interpretation of the Constitution which
afforded one kind of political protection to blacks and another
kind to members of other identifiable groups would itself be
invidious. Respect for the citizenry in the black community compels
acceptance of the fact that, in the long run, there is no more
certainty that these individuals will vote alike than will
individual members of any other ethnic, economic, or social group.
The probability of parallel voting fluctuates as the blend of
political issues affecting the outcome of an election changes from
time to time to emphasize one issue, or a few, rather than others,
as dominant. The facts that a political group has its own history,
has suffered its own special injustices, and has its own congeries
of special political interests, do not make one such group
different from any other in the eyes of the law. The members of
each go to the polls with equal dignity and with an equal right to
be protected from invidious discrimination."

															466 F.2d at 852.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															In O'Brien, the Court described Gomillion as
standing

															"not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper
basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the
inevitable effect of a statute, on its face, may render it
unconstitutional."

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															"It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of
alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of
the decisionmaker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise
legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the
deliberation of a participant in the decisional process. A law
conscripting clerics should not be invalidated because an atheist
voted for it." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 , 426 U. S. 253 (STEVENS, J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															For example, if 55% of the voters in an area comprising two
districts belong to group A, their interests in electing two
representatives would be best served by evenly dividing the voters
in two districts, but their interests in making sure that they
elect at least one representative would be served by concentrating
a larger majority in one district. See Cousins v. City Council
of Chicago, 466 F.2d at 855, n. 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 , where the maintenance of racially separate
congressional districts was challenged by one group of blacks and
supported by another group having the dominant power in the
black-controlled district.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															I emphasize this point because, in my opinion, there is a
significant difference between a state-wide legislative plan that
"happens" to use multimember districts only in those areas where
they disadvantage discrete minority groups and the use of a
generally acceptable municipal form of government that involves the
election of commissioners by the voters at large. While it is
manifest that there is a substantial neutral justification for a
municipality's choice of a commission form of government, it is by
no means obvious that an occasional multimember district in a State
which typically uses single-member districts can be adequately
explained on neutral grounds. Nothing in the Court's opinion in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 ,
describes any purported neutral explanation for the multimember
districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties. In this connection, it
should be remembered that Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.
S. 120 , did not uphold the constitutionality of a "crazy
quilt" of single-member and multimember districts; rather, in that
case, this Court merely upheld the findings by the District Court
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their allegations that the
districting plan constituted such a crazy quilt.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Rejection of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views in the specific
controversy presented by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186 , does not refute the basic wisdom of his call for
judicially manageable standards in this area:

															"Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the
Court's 'judicial Power' not only presages the futility of judicial
intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces by
which the relation between population and representation has, time
out of mind, been, and now is, determined. It may well impair the
Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the
Land' in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly
entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce.
The Court's authority -- possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword -- ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's
complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
entanglements, and by abstention from injecting itself into the
clash of political forces in political settlements." Id. at 369 U.S.
267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. * I dissent because I agree with MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL that proof
of discriminatory impact is sufficient in these cases. I also
dissent because, even accepting the plurality's premise that
discriminatory purpose must be shown, I agree with MR. JUSTICE
MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE WHITE that the appellees have clearly met
that burden.

															* [This opinion applies also to No. 7357, Williams et al. v.
Brown et al., post, p. 236.]

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), this Court unanimously held the use of multimember
districts for the election of state legislators in two counties in
Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because, based on a careful assessment of the totality of
the circumstances, they were found to exclude Negroes and
Mexican-Americans from effective participation in the political
processes in the counties. Without questioning the vitality of
White v. Regester and our other decisions dealing with challenges
to multimember districts by racial or ethnic groups, the Court
today inexplicably rejects a similar holding based on meticulous
factual findings and scrupulous application of the principles of
these cases by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court's decision is flatly inconsistent with White v.
Regester, and it cannot be understood to flow from our
recognition, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 (1976), that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
only purposeful discrimination. Both the District Court and the Page 446 U. S. 95 Court of Appeals properly found that an invidious discriminatory
purpose could be inferred from the totality of facts in this case.
The Court's cryptic rejection of their conclusions ignores the
principles that an invidious discriminatory purpose can be inferred
from objective factors of the kind relied on in White v.
Regester, and that the trial courts are in a special position
to make such intensely local appraisals. I Prior to our decision in White v. Regester, we upheld a
number of multimember districting schemes against constitutional
challenges, but we consistently recognized that such apportionment
schemes could constitute invidious discrimination

															"where the circumstances of a particular case may 'operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population.'" Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 , 403 U. S. 143 (1971), quoting from Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 , 379 U. S. 439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S.
73 , 384 U. S. 88 (1966). In Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, we noted that the
fact that the number of members of a particular group who were
legislators was not in proportion to the population of the group
did not prove invidious discrimination absent evidence and findings
that the members of the group had less opportunity than did other
persons "to participate in the political processes and to elect
legislators of their choice." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
149 .

															Relying on this principle, in White v. Regester, we
unanimously upheld a District Court's conclusion that the use of
multimember districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties in Texas
violated the Equal Protection Clause in the face of findings that
they excluded Negroes and Mexican-Americans from effective
participation in the political processes. With respect to the
exclusion of Negroes in Dallas County,

															"the District Court first referred to the history of official
racial discrimination in Texas, which at times touched the right of
Negroes to register and vote and to participate in the
democratic Page 446 U. S. 96 processes."

															412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 766 .
The District Court also referred to Texas' majority vote
requirement and "place" rule, "neither in themselves improper nor
invidious," but which "enhanced the opportunity for racial
discrimination" by reducing legislative elections from the
multimember district to "a head-to-head contest for each position." Ibid. We deemed more fundamental the District Court's
findings that only two Negro state representatives had been elected
from Dallas County since Reconstruction, and that these were the
only two Negroes ever slated by an organization that effectively
controlled Democratic Party candidate slating. Id. at 412 U. S.
766 -767. We also noted the District Court's findings
that the Democratic Party slating organization was insensitive to
the needs and aspirations of the Negro community and that, at
times, it had employed racial campaign tactics to defeat candidates
supported by the black community. Based on this evidence, the
District Court concluded that the black community generally was
"not permitted to enter into the political process in a reliable
and meaningful manner." Id. at 412 U. S. 767 .
We held that

															"[t]hese findings and conclusions are sufficient to sustain the
District Court's judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember
district and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb
them." Ibid. With respect to the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from the
political process in Bexar County, the District Court referred to
the continuing effects of a long history of invidious
discrimination against Mexican-Americans in education, employment,
economics, health, politics, and other fields. Id. at 412 U. S. 768 .
The impact of this discrimination, coupled with a cultural and
language barrier, made Mexican-American participation in the
political life of Bexar County extremely difficult. Only five
Mexican-Americans had represented Bexar County in the Texas
Legislature since 1880, and the county's legislative delegation
"was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-American interests." Id. at 412 U. S.
769 .

															"Based on the totality of the circumstances, the District Court
evolved its Page 446 U. S. 97 ultimate assessment of the multimember district, overlaid, as it
was, on the cultural and economic realities of the Mexican-American
community in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the
county." Ibid. "[F]rom its own special vantage point," the
District Court concluded that the multimember district invidiously
excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation in the
election of state representatives. We affirmed, noting that we
were

															"not inclined to overturn these findings, representing as they
do a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the
design and impact of the Bexar County multimember district in the
light of past and present reality, political and otherwise." Id. at 412 U. S.
769 -770. II In the instant case, the District Court and the Court of Appeals
faithfully applied the principles of White v. Regester in
assessing whether the maintenance of a system of at-large elections
for the selection of Mobile City Commissioners denied Mobile
Negroes their Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights.
Scrupulously adhering to our admonition that

															"[t]he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support
findings that the political processes leading to nomination and
election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question," id. at 412 U. S. 766 ,
the District Court conducted a detailed factual inquiry into the
openness of the candidate selection process to black. The court
noted that "Mobile blacks were subjected to massive official and
private racial discrimination until the Voting Rights Act of 1965,"
and that "[t]he pervasive effects of past discrimination still
substantially affec[t] black political participation." 423 F.
Supp. 384 , 387 (SD Ala.1976). Although the District Court noted
that, "[s]ince the Voting Rights Act of 1965, blacks register and
vote without hindrance," the court found that "local political
processes are not equally open" to blacks. Despite the fact that
Negroes constitute more than 35% of the population of Mobile, no
Negro has ever been elected to the Mobile Page 446 U. S. 98 City Commission. The plaintiffs introduced extensive evidence of
severe racial polarization in voting patterns during the 1960's and
1970's with "white voting for white and black for black if a white
is opposed to a black," resulting in the defeat of the black
candidate, or, if two whites are running, the defeat of the white
candidate most identified with blacks. Id. at 388.
Regression analyses covering every City Commission race in 1965,
1969, and 1973, both the primary and general election of the county
commission in 1968 and 1972, selected school board races in 1962,
1966, 1970, 1972, and 1974, city referendums in 1963 and 1973, and
a countywide legislative race in 1969 confirmed the existence of
severe bloc voting. Id. at 388-389. Nearly every active
candidate for public office testified that, because of racial
polarization "it is highly unlikely that anytime in the foreseeable
future, under the at-large system, . . . a black can be elected
against a white." Id. at 388. After single-member
districts were created in Mobile County for state legislative
elections, "three blacks of the present fourteen member Mobile
County delegation have been elected." Id. at 389. Based on
the foregoing evidence, the District Court found

															"that the structure of the at-large election of city
commissioners, combined with strong racial polarization of Mobile's
electorate, continues to effectively discourage qualified black
citizens from seeking office or being elected, thereby denying
blacks equal access to the slating or candidate selection
process." Ibid. The District Court also reviewed extensive evidence that the
City Commissioners elected under the at-large system have not been
responsive to the needs of the Negro community. The court found
that city officials have been unresponsive to the interests of
Mobile Negroes in municipal employment, appointments to boards and
committees, and the provision of municipal services in part because
of "the political fear of a white backlash vote when black
citizens' needs are at stake." Id. at 392. The court also
found that there is no clear-cut state policy preference for
at-large elections, and that past discrimination Page 446 U. S. 99 affecting the ability of Negroes to register and to vote "has
helped preclude the effective participation of blacks in the
election system today." Id. at 393. The adverse impact of
the at-large election system on minorities was found to be enhanced
by the large size of the city-wide election district, the majority
vote requirement, the provision that candidates run for positions
by place or number, and the lack of any provision for at-large
candidates to run from particular geographical subdistricts.

															After concluding its extensive findings of fact, the District
Court addressed the question of the effect of Washington v.
Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), on the White v. Regester standards. The court
concluded that the requirement that a facially neutral statute
involve purposeful discrimination before a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause can be established was not inconsistent with White v. Regester in light of the recognition in Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S.
241 -242, that the discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
discriminatory impact of the statute. 423 F. Supp. at 398. After
noting that,

															"whenever a redistricting bill of any type is proposed by a
county delegation member, a major concern has centered around how
many, if any, blacks would be elected," id. at 397, the District Court concluded that there was
"a present purpose to dilute the black vote . . . resulting from
intentional state legislative inaction. . . ." Id. at 398. Based on an "exhaustive analysis of the
evidence in the record," the court held that "[t]he plaintiffs have
met the burden cast in White and Whitcomb, " and
that "the multi-member at-large election of Mobile City
Commissioners . . . results in an unconstitutional dilution of
black voting strength." Id. at 402.

															The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment in
one of four consolidated "dilution" cases decided on the same day. Bolden v. Mobile, 571 F.2d 238 (CA5 1978); Nevett v.
Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (CA5 1978) ( Nevett II ); Blacks United for lasting leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, 571 Page 446 U. S. 100 F.2d 248 (CA5 1978); Thomasville Branch of NAACP v. Thomas
County, Georgia, 571 F.2d 257 (CA5 1978). In the lead case of Nevett II, supra, the Court of Appeals held that, under Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.
S. 252 (1977), "a showing of racially motivated
discrimination is a necessary element" for a successful claim of
unconstitutional voting dilution under either the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment. 571 F.2d at 219. The court concluded that the
standards for proving unconstitutional voting dilution outlined in White v. Regester were consistent with the requirement
that purposeful discrimination be shown because they focus on
factors that go beyond a simple showing that minorities are not
represented in proportion to their numbers in the general
population. 571 F.2d at 219-220, n. 13, 222-224.

															In its decision in the instant case, the Court of Appeals
reviewed the District Court's findings of fact, found them not to
be clearly erroneous, and held that they

															"compel the inference that [Mobile's at-large] system has been
maintained with the purpose of diluting the black vote, thus
supplying the element of intent necessary to establish a violation
of the fourteenth amendment, Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S.
252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
229 . . . (1976), and the fifteenth amendment, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 . . . (1964)." Id. at 245. The court observed that the District
Court's "finding that the legislature was acutely conscious of the
racial consequences of its districting policies," coupled with the
attempt to assign different functions to each of the three City
Commissioners "to lock in the at-large feature of the scheme,"
constituted "direct evidence of the intent behind the maintenance
of the at-large plan." Id. at 246. The Court of Appeals
concluded that

															"the district court has properly conducted the 'sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available' that a court must undertake in '[d]etermining
whether invidious discriminatory Page 446 U. S. 101 purpose was a motivating factor' in the maintenance or enactment
of a districting plan." Ibid., quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., supra at 429 U. S.
266 . III A plurality of the Court today agrees with the courts below that
maintenance of Mobile's at-large system for election of City
Commissioners violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only
if it is motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose. The
plurality also apparently reaffirms the vitality of White v.
Regester and Whitcomb v. Chavis, which established
the standards for determining whether at-large election systems are
unconstitutionally discriminatory. The plurality nonetheless casts
aside the meticulous application of the principles of these cases
by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals by concluding
that the evidence they relied upon "fell far short of showing"
purposeful discrimination.

															The plurality erroneously suggests that the District Court erred
by considering the factors articulated by the Court of Appeals in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA5 1973), to
determine whether purposeful discrimination has been shown. This
remarkable suggestion ignores the facts that Zimmer articulated the very factors deemed relevant by White v.
Regester and Whitcomb v. Chavis -- a lack of minority
access to the candidate selection process, unresponsiveness of
elected officials to minority interests, a history of
discrimination, majority vote requirements, provisions that
candidates run for positions by place or number, the lack of any
provision for at-large candidates to run from particular
geographical subdistricts -- and that both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals considered these factors with the recognition
that they are relevant only with respect to the question whether
purposeful discrimination can be inferred.

															Although the plurality does acknowledge that "the presence of
the indicia relied on in Zimmer may afford some
evidence Page 446 U. S. 102 of a discriminatory purpose," it concludes that the evidence
relied upon by the court below was "most assuredly insufficient to
prove an unconstitutionally discriminatory purpose in the present
case." The plurality apparently bases this conclusion on the fact
that there are no official obstacles barring Negroes from
registering, voting, and running for office, coupled with its
conclusion that none of the factors relied upon by the courts below
would, alone, be sufficient to support an inference of purposeful
discrimination. The absence of official obstacles to registration,
voting, and running for office heretofore has never been deemed to
insulate an electoral system from attack under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. In White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973), there was no evidence that Negroes faced
official obstacles to registration, voting, and running for office,
yet we upheld a finding that they had been excluded from effective
participation in the political process in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because a multimember districting scheme, in the
context of racial voting at the polls, was being used invidiously
to prevent Negroes from being elected to public office. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.
S. 461 (1953), we invalidated electoral systems under
the Fifteenth Amendment not because they erected official obstacles
in the path of Negroes registering, voting, or running for office,
but because they were used effectively to deprive the Negro vote of
any value. Thus, even though Mobile's Negro community may register
and vote without hindrance, the system of at-large election of City
Commissioners may violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
if it is used purposefully to exclude Negroes from the political
process.

															In conducting "an intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact" of the at-large election scheme, White v. Regester,
supra, at 412 U. S. 769 ,
the District Court's decision was fully consistent with our
recognition in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 242 ,
that

															"an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts, Page 446 U. S. 103 including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another."

															Although the totality of the facts relied upon by the District
Court to support is inference of purposeful discrimination is even
more compelling than that present in White v. Regester, the plurality today rejects the inference of purposeful
discrimination, apparently because each of the factors relied upon
by the courts below is, alone, insufficient to support the
inference. The plurality states that the "fact [that Negro
candidates have been defeated], alone, does not work a
constitutional deprivation," that evidence of the unresponsiveness
of elected officials "is relevant only as the most tenuous and
circumstantial evidence," that "the substantial history of official
racial discrimination . . [is] of limited help," and that the
features of the electoral system that enhance the disadvantages
faced by a voting minority "are far from proof that the at-large
electoral scheme represents purposeful discrimination." By viewing
each of the factors relied upon below in isolation, and ignoring
the fact that racial bloc voting at the polls makes it impossible
to elect a black commissioner under the at-large system, the
plurality rejects the "totality of the circumstances" approach we
endorsed in White v. Regester, supra at 412 U. S.
766 -770, Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S.
241 -242, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 266 ,
and leaves the courts below adrift on uncharted seas with respect
to how to proceed on remand.

															Because I believe that the findings of the District Court amply
support an inference of purposeful discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, I respectfully
dissent.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.*

															The American ideal of political equality, conceived in the
earliest days of our colonial existence and fostered by the Page 446 U. S. 104 egalitarian language of the Declaration of Independence, could
not forever tolerate the limitation of the right to vote to white
propertied males. Our Constitution has been amended six times in
the movement toward a democracy for more than the few, [ Footnote 3/1 ] and this Court has
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to provide that "a citizen has
a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction," Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 405 U. S. 336 (1972). The Court's decision today is in a different spirit.
Indeed, a plurality of the Court concludes that, in the absence of
proof of intentional discrimination by the State, the right to vote
provides the politically powerless with nothing more than the right
to cast meaningless ballots. The District Court in both of these
cases found that the challenged multimember districting schemes
unconstitutionally diluted the Negro vote. These factual findings
were upheld by the Court of Appeals, and the plurality does not
question them. Instead, the plurality concludes that districting
schemes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is
proved that they were enacted or maintained for the purpose of
minimizing or canceling out the voting potential of a racial
minority. The plurality would require plaintiffs in vote-dilution
cases to meet the stringent burden of establishing discriminatory
intent within the meaning of Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); and Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979). In my view, our vote dilution decisions require only a
showing of discriminatory impact to justify the invalidation of a
multimember districting scheme, and, because they are premised on
the fundamental interest in voting protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the discriminatory impact standard adopted by them is
unaffected by Washington v. Davis, supra, and its progeny.
Furthermore, an intent requirement Page 446 U. S. 105 is inconsistent with the protection against denial or abridgment
of the vote on account of race embodied in the Fifteenth Amendment
and in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. [ Footnote
3/2 ] Even if, however, proof of discriminatory intent were
necessary to support a vote-dilution claim, I would impose upon the
plaintiffs a standard of proof less rigid than that provided by Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, supra. I The Court does not dispute the proposition that multimember
districting can have the effect of submerging electoral minorities
and over-representing electoral majorities. [ Footnote 3/3 ] It is Page 446 U. S. 106 for this reason that we developed a strong preference for
single-member districting in court-ordered reapportionment plans. See ante at 446 U. S. 66 , n.
12. Furthermore, and more important for present purposes, we
decided a series of vote-dilution cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment that were designed to protect electoral minorities from
precisely the combination of electoral laws and historical and
social factors found in the present cases. [ Footnote 3/4 ] In my view, the plurality's treatment
of Page 446 U. S. 107 these cases is fanciful. Although we have held that multimember
districts are not unconstitutional per se, see ante at 446 U. S. 66 ,
there is simply no basis for the plurality's conclusion that, Page 446 U. S. 108 under our prior cases, proof of discriminatory intent is a
necessary condition for the invalidation of multimember
districting. A In Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965), the first vote-dilution case to reach this Court, we stated
explicitly that such a claim could rest on either discriminatory
purpose or effect:

															"It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a
multimember constituency apportionment scheme, under the
circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of
the voting population." Id. at 379 U. S. 439 (emphasis added). We reiterated these words in Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966), interpreted them as the correct test to apply to
vote-dilution claims, and described the standard as one involving
"invidious effect," id. at 384 U. S. 88 . We
then held that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of
proof:

															"[T]he demonstration that a particular multi-member scheme effects an invidious result must appear from evidence in
the record. . . . That demonstration was not made here. In relying
on conjecture as to the effects of multi-member districting, rather
than demonstrated fact, the court acted in a manner more
appropriate to the body responsible for drawing up the districting
plan. Speculations do not supply evidence that the multi-member
districting was designed to have, or had, the invidious
effect necessary to a judgment of the unconstitutionality of the
districting." Id. at 384 U. S. 88 -89
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It could not be plainer that
the Court in Burns considered Page 446 U. S. 109 discriminatory effect a sufficient condition for invalidating a
multimember districting plan.

															In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.
S. 124 (1971),we again repeated and applied the Fortson standard, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 143 , 403 U. S. 144 ,
but determined that the Negro community's lack of success at the
polls was the result of partisan politics, not racial vote
dilution. Id. at 403 U. S.
150 -155. The Court stressed that both the Democratic and
Republican Parties had nominated Negroes, and several had been
elected. Negro candidates lost only when their entire party slate
went down to defeat. Id. at 403 U. S. 150 ,
nn. 29-30, 403 U. S.
152 -153. In addition, the Court was impressed that there
was no finding that officials had been unresponsive to Negro
concerns. Id. at 403 U. S. 152 ,
n. 32, 403 U. S. 155 .
[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															More recently, in White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973), we invalidated the challenged multimember
districting plans because their characteristics, when combined with
historical and social factors, had the discriminatory effect of
denying Page 446 U. S. 110 the plaintiff Negroes and Mexican-Americans equal access to the
political process. Id. at 412 U. S.
765 -770. We stated that

															"it is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated
against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting
potential. The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support
findings that the political processes leading to nomination and
election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question -- that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes
and to elect legislators of their choice." Id. at 412 U. S.
765 -766. We held that the three-judge District Court had
properly applied this standard in invalidating the multimember
districting schemes in the Texas counties of Dallas and Bexar. The
District Court had determined that the characteristics of the
challenged electoral systems -- multimember districts, a majority
vote requirement for nomination in a primary election, and a rule
mandating that a candidate running for a position in a multimember
district must run for a specified "place" on the ticket -- though
"neither in themselves improper nor invidious," reduced the
electoral influence of Negroes and Mexican-Americans. Id. at 412 U. S. 766 .
[ Footnote 3/6 ] The District Court
identified a number of social and historical factors that, when
combined with the Texas electoral structure, resulted in vote
dilution: (1) a history of official racial discrimination in Texas,
including discrimination inhibiting the registration, casting of
ballots, and political participation of Negroes; (2) proof that
minorities were still suffering the effects of past discrimination;
(3) a history of gross underrepresentation of minority interests;
(4) proof of official insensitivity to the needs of minority
citizens, whose votes were not needed by those in power; (5) the
recent use of racial campaign tactics; and (6) a cultural and
language barrier inhibiting the participation of Page 446 U. S. 111 Mexican-Americans. Id. at 412 U. S.
766 -770. Based "on the totality of the circumstances,"
we affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the use of
multimember districts excluded the plaintiffs "from effective
participation in political life." Id. at 412 U. S. 769 .
[ Footnote 3/7 ] Page 446 U. S. 112 It is apparent that a showing of discriminatory intent in the
creation or maintenance of multimember districts is as unnecessary
after White as it was under our earlier vote-dilution
decisions. Under this line of cases, an electoral districting plan
is invalid if it has the effect of affording an electoral minority
"less opportunity than . . . other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice," id. at 412 U. S. 766 .
It is also apparent that the Court in White considered
equal access to the political process as meaning more than merely
allowing the minority the opportunity to vote. White stands for the proposition that an electoral system may not
relegate an electoral minority to political impotence by
diminishing the importance of its vote. The plurality's approach
requiring proof of discriminatory purpose in the present cases is,
then, squarely contrary to White and its predecessors. [ Footnote 3/8 ] B The plurality fails to apply the discriminatory effect standard
of White v. Regester because that approach conflicts with
what the plurality takes to be an elementary principle of law.
"[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination," announces the Page 446 U. S. 113 plurality, "can there be a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante at 446 U. S. 66 .
That proposition is plainly overbroad. It fails to distinguish
between two distinct lines of equal protection decisions: those
involving suspect classifications, and those involving fundamental
rights.

															We have long recognized that, under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications based on race are "constitutionally suspect," Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 , 347 U. S. 499 (1954), and are subject to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 , 323 U. S. 216 (1944), regardless of whether they infringe on an independently
protected constitutional right. Cf. University of California
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). Under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 (1976), a showing of discriminatory purpose is
necessary to impose strict scrutiny on facially neutral
classifications having a racially discriminatory impact. Perhaps
because the plaintiffs in the present cases are Negro, the
plurality assumes that their vote-dilution claims are premised on
the suspect-classification branch of our equal protection cases,
and that, under Washington v. Davis, supra, they are
required to prove discriminatory intent. That assumption fails to
recognize that our vote-dilution decisions are rooted in a
different strand of equal protection jurisprudence.

															Under the Equal Protection Clause, if a classification "impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, . . . strict judicial scrutiny" is required, San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S.
1 , 411 U. S. 17 (1973), regardless of whether the infringement was intentional.
[ Footnote 3/9 ] As I will explain,
our cases Page 446 U. S. 114 recognize a fundamental right to equal electoral participation
that encompasses protection against vote dilution. Proof of
discriminatory purpose is, therefore, not required to support a
claim of vote dilution. [ Footnote
3/10 ] The plurality's erroneous conclusion to the contrary is
the result of a failure to recognize the central distinction
between White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973), and Washington v. Davis, supra: the former involved an infringement of a constitutionally protected
right, while the latter dealt with a claim of racially
discriminatory distribution of an interest to which no citizen has
a constitutional entitlement. [ Footnote 3/11 ] Page 446 U. S. 115 Nearly a century ago, the Court recognized the elementary
proposition upon which our structure of civil rights is based:
"[T]he political franchise of voting is . . . a fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , 118 U. S. 370 (1886). We reiterated that theme in our landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , 377 U. S.
561 -562 (1964), and stated that, because

															"the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society[,] . . . any alleged infringement of the right
of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously
scrutinized." Ibid. We realized that

															"the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution
of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Id. at 376 U. S. 555 .
Accordingly, we recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
protects "[t]he right of a citizen to equal representation and to
have his vote weighted equally with those of all other citizens." Id. at 376 U. S. 576 . See also Wesberry Page 446 U. S. 116 v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 , 376 U. S. 17 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 , 372 U. S.
379 -380 (1963). [ Footnote
3/12 ] Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny [ Footnote 3/13 ] focused solely on the
discriminatory effects of malapportionment. They recognize that,
when population figures for the representational districts of a
legislature are not similar, the votes of citizens in larger
districts do not carry as much weight in the legislature as do
votes cast by citizens in smaller districts. The equal protection
problem attacked by the "one person, one vote" principle is, then,
one of vote dilution: under Reynolds, each citizen must
have an "equally effective voice" in the election of
representatives. Reynolds v. Sims, supra at 377 U.S. 565 . In the present cases, the
alleged vote dilution, though caused by the combined effects of the
electoral structure and social and historical factors, rather than
by unequal population distribution, is analytically the same
concept: the unjustified abridgment of a fundamental right.
[ Footnote 3/14 ] It follows, then,
that a showing of discriminatory Page 446 U. S. 117 intent is just as unnecessary under the vote-dilution approach
adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 (1965), and applied in White v. Regester,
supra, as it is under our reapportionment cases. [ Footnote 3/15 ] Page 446 U. S. 118 Indeed, our vote-dilution cases have explicitly acknowledged
that they are premised on the infringement of a fundamental right,
not on the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racial
discrimination. Our first vote-dilution decision, Fortson v.
Dorsey, supra, involved a 1962 Georgia reapportionment statute
that allocated the 54 seats of the Georgia Senate among the State's
159 counties. Thirty-three of the senatorial districts were made up
of from one to eight counties each, and were single-member
districts. The remaining 21 districts were allotted among the 7
most populous counties, with each county containing at least 2
districts and electing all of its senators by county-wide vote. The
plaintiffs, who were registered voters residing in two of the
multidistrict counties, [ Footnote
3/16 ] argued that the apportionment plan, on its face, violated
the Equal Protection Clause because county-wide voting in the seven
multidistrict counties denied their residents a vote equal to that
of voters residing in single-member constituencies. [ Footnote 3/17 ] Page 446 U. S. 119 We were unconvinced that the plan operated to dilute any
Georgian's vote, and therefore upheld the facial validity of the
scheme. We cautioned, however, that the Equal Protection Clause
would not tolerate a multimember districting plan that, "designedly
or otherwise, . . operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."
379 U.S. at 379 U. S. 439 (emphasis added).

															The approach to vote dilution adopted in Fortson plainly consisted of a fundamental rights analysis. If the Court
had believed that the equal protection problem with alleged vote
dilution was one of racial discrimination, and not abridgment of
the right to vote, it would not have accorded standing to the
plaintiffs, who were simply registered voters of Georgia alleging
that the state apportionment plan, as a theoretical matter, diluted
their voting strength because of where they lived. To the contrary,
we did not question their standing, and held against them solely
because we found unpersuasive their claim on the merits. The Court
did not reach this result by inadvertence; rather, we explicitly
recognized that we had adopted a fundamental rights approach when
we stated that the Equal Protection Clause protected the voting
strength of political, as well as racial, groups.

															Until today, this Court had never deviated from this principle.
We reiterated that our vote-dilution doctrine protects political
groups in addition to racial groups in Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 88 ,
where we allowed a general class of qualified voters to assert such
a vote-dilution claim. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.
S. 124 (1971), we again explicitly recognized that
political groups could raise such claims, id. at 403 U. S. 143 , 403 U. S. 144 .
In White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), Page 446 U. S. 120 the plaintiffs were Negroes and Mexican-Americans, and
accordingly the Court had no reason to discuss whether nonminority
plaintiffs could assert claims of vote dilution. [ Footnote 3/18 ] In a companion case to White, however, we again recognized that "political
elements" were protected against vote dilution. Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 , 412 U. S. 751 (1973). Two years later, in Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per curiam), we accorded standing to urban dwellers
alleging vote dilution as to the election of the county commission
and stated that multimember districting is unconstitutional if it
"in fact operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population." Id. at 421 U. S. 480 (emphasis added). And in United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), the plurality opinion of MR JUSTICE WHITE stated that
districting plans were subject to attack if they diluted the vote
of " racial or political groups. " Id. at 430 U. S. 167 (emphasis in original). [ Footnote
3/19 ]

															Our vote-dilution decisions, then, involve the fundamental
interest branch, rather than the antidiscrimination branch, of our
jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause. They recognize a
substantive constitutional right to participate on an equal basis
in the electoral process that cannot be denied or diminished for
any reason, racial or otherwise, lacking quite substantial
justification. They are premised on a rationale wholly apart from
that underlying Washington v. Davis, 426 U.
S. 229 (1976). That decision involved application of a
different equal protection principle, the prohibition on racial
discrimination in the governmental distribution of interests Page 446 U. S. 121 to which citizens have no constitutional entitlement. [ Footnote 3/20 ] Whatever may be the merits
of applying motivational analysis to the allocation of
constitutionally gratuitous benefits, that approach is completely
misplaced where, as here, it is applied to the distribution of a
constitutionally protected interest. [ Footnote 3/21 ] Page 446 U. S. 122 Washington v. Davis, then, in no way alters the
discriminatory impact test developed in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965), and applied in White v. Regester, supra, to
evaluate claims of dilution of the fundamental right to vote. In my
view, that test is now, and always has been, the proper method of
safeguarding against inequitable distribution of political
influence.

															The plurality's response is that my approach amounts to nothing
less than a constitutional requirement of proportional
representation for groups. See ante at 446 U. S. 75 -80.
That assertion amounts to nothing more than a red herring: I
explicitly reject the notion that the Constitution contains any
such requirement. See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/7|>n. 7, supra. The constitutional protection
against vote dilution found in our prior cases does not extend to
those situations in which a group has merely failed to elect
representatives in proportion to its share of the population. To
prove unconstitutional vote dilution, the group is also required to
carry the far more onerous burden of demonstrating that it has been
effectively fenced out of the political process. See ibid. Typical of the plurality's mischaracterization of my position is
its assertion that I would provide protection against vote dilution
for "every political group,' or at least every such group that
is in the minority." Ante at 446 U. S. 75 .
The vote-dilution doctrine can logically apply only to groups whose
electoral discreteness and insularity allow dominant political
factions to ignore them. See nn. 446 U.S.
55 fn3/7|>7 and 446 U.S.
55 fn3/19|>19, supra. In short, the distinction
between a requirement of proportional representation and the
discriminatory effect test I espouse is by no means a difficult
one, and it is hard for me to understand why the plurality insists
on ignoring it. The plaintiffs in No. 77-1844 proved that no Negro had ever been
elected to the Mobile City Commission, despite the fact that
Negroes constitute about one-third of the electorate, and that the
persistence of severe racial bloc voting made it highly Page 446 U. S. 123 unlikely that any Negro could be elected at large in the
foreseeable future. 423 F.
Supp. 384 , 387-389 (SD Ala 1976). Contrary to the plurality's
contention, see ante at 446 U. S. 75 -76,
however, I do not find unconstitutional vote dilution in this case
simply because of that showing. The plaintiffs convinced the
District Court that Mobile Negroes were unable to use alternative
avenues of political influence. They showed that Mobile Negroes
still suffered pervasive present effects of massive historical
official and private discrimination, and that the City Commission
had been quite unresponsive to the needs of the minority community.
The City of Mobile has been guilty of such pervasive racial
discrimination in hiring employees that extensive intervention by
the Federal District Court has been required. 423 F. Supp. at 389,
400. Negroes are grossly underrepresented on city boards and
committees. Id. at 389-390. The city's distribution of
public services is racially discriminatory. Id. at
390-391. City officials and police were largely unmoved by Negro
complaints about police brutality and a "mock lynching." Id. at 392. The District Court concluded that

															"[t]his sluggish and timid response is another manifestation of
the low priority given to the needs of the black citizens and of
the [commissioners'] political fear of a white backlash vote when
black citizens' needs are at stake." Ibid. See also the dissenting opinion of my
Brother WHITE, ante p. 446 U. S.
94 .

															A requirement of proportional representation would indeed
transform this Court into a "super-legislature," ante at 446 U. S. 76 ,
and would create the risk that some groups would receive an
undeserved windfall of political influence. In contrast, the
protection against vote dilution recognized by our prior cases
serves as a minimally intrusive guarantee of political survival for
a discrete political minority that is effectively locked out of
governmental decisionmaking processes. [ Footnote 3/22 ] So understood, Page 446 U. S. 124 the doctrine hardly " create[s] substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws,'" ibid., quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 33 .
Rather, the doctrine is a simple reflection of the basic principle
that the Equal Protection Clause protects "[t]he right of a citizen
to equal representation and to have his vote weighted equally with
those of all other citizens." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
at 377 U.S. 576 . [ Footnote 3/23 ] Page 446 U. S. 125 II Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides:

															"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

															Today the plurality gives short shrift to the argument that
proof of discriminatory intent is not a necessary condition to
relief under this Amendment. See ante at 446 U. S. 61 -65.
[ Footnote 3/24 ] I have examined
this issue in another context and reached the contrary result. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 , 425 U. S.
146 -149, and nn. 3-5 (1976) (dissenting opinion). I
continue to believe Page 446 U. S. 126 that "a showing of purpose or of effect is alone sufficient to
demonstrate unconstitutionality," id. at 425 U. S. 149 ,
n. 5, and wish to explicate further why I find this standard
appropriate for Fifteenth Amendment claims. First, however, it is
necessary to address the plurality's apparent suggestion that the
Fifteenth Amendment protects against only denial, and not dilution,
of the vote. [ Footnote 3/25 ] A The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer an absolute right to
vote. See ante at 446 U. S. 62 . By providing that the right to vote cannot
be discriminatorily "denied or abridged," however, the Amendment
assuredly strikes down the diminution, as well as the outright
denial, of the exercise of the franchise. An interpretation holding
that the Amendment reaches only complete abrogation of the vote
would render the Amendment essentially useless, since it is no
difficult task to imagine schemes in which the Negro's marking of
the ballot is a meaningless exercise.

															The Court has long understood that the right to vote encompasses
protection against vote dilution. "[T]he right to have one's vote
counted" is of the same importance as "the right to put a ballot in
a box." United States v. Mosley, 238 U.
S. 383 , 238 U. S. 386 (1915). See United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299 (1941); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S.
58 (1900); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.
S. 651 (1884). The right to vote is protected against
the diluting effect of ballot-box stuffing. United States v.
Saylor, 322 U. S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.
S. 371 (1880). Indeed, this Court has explicitly
recognized that the Fifteenth Amendment protects against vote
dilution. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.
S. 461 (1953), and Smith v.
Allwright , 321 U.S. Page 446 U. S. 127 649 (1944), the Negro plaintiffs did not question their access
to the ballot for general elections. Instead, they argued, and the
Court recognized, that the value of their votes had been diluted by
their exclusion from participation in primary elections and in the
slating of candidates by political parties. The Court's struggles
with the concept of "state action" in those decisions were
necessarily premised on the understanding that vote dilution was a
claim cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 (1964), recognized that an allegation of vote
dilution resulting from the drawing of district lines stated a
claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs in that case
argued that congressional districting in New York violated the
Fifteenth Amendment because district lines had been drawn in a
racially discriminatory fashion. Each plaintiff had access to the
ballot; their complaint was that, because of intentional
discrimination they resided in a district with population
characteristics that had the effect of diluting the weight of their
votes. The Court treated this claim as cognizable under the
Fifteenth Amendment. More recently, in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), we again treated an allegation of vote dilution arising
from a redistricting scheme as stating a claim under the Fifteenth
Amendment. See id. at 430 U. S. 155 , 430 U. S.
161 -162, 430 U. S.
165 -168 (opinion of WHITE, J.). Indeed, in that case,
MR. JUSTICE STEWART found no Fifteenth Amendment violation, in
part, because the plaintiffs had failed to prove

															"that the redistricting scheme was employed . . . to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or
otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons
to participate in the political process." Id. at 430 U. S. 179 (STEWART, J., joined by POWELL, J., concurring in judgment)
(citing, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.
S. 755 (1973); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 (1965); Wright v. Rockefeller, supra ). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.
S. 339 (1960). Page 446 U. S. 128 It is plain, then, that the Fifteenth Amendment shares the
concept of vote dilution developed in such Fourteenth Amendment
decisions as Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 (1964), and Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. In
fact, under the Court's unified view of the protections of the
right to vote accorded by disparate portions of the Constitution,
the concept of vote dilution is a core principle of the Seventeenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, as well as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth:

															"The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or
abridging a Negro's right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment does
the same for women. If a State in a state-wide election weighted
the male vote more heavily than the female vote, or the white vote
more heavily than the Negro vote, none could successfully contend
that that discrimination was allowable. See Terry v.
Adams, 345 U. S. 461 . . . . Once the
geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is
designated, all who participate in the election are to have an
equal vote -- whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home
may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

															" * * * *" "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing --
one person, one vote." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 379 , 372 U. S.
381 .

															The plurality's suggestion that the Fifteenth Amendment reaches
only outright denial of the ballot is wholly inconsistent not only
with our prior decisions, but also with the gloss the plurality
would place upon the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against vote
dilution. As I explained in 446 U. S. supra, I strongly disagree with the plurality's conclusion
that our Page 446 U. S. 129 Fourteenth Amendment vote-dilution decisions have been based
upon the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of racial
discrimination. Be that as it may, the plurality, at least, does
not dispute that the Fourteenth Amendment's language -- that "[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws" -- protects against dilution, as well
as outright denial, of the right to vote on racial grounds, even
though the Amendment does not mention any right to vote, and speaks
only of the denial, and not the diminution, of rights. Yet when the
plurality construes the language of the Fifteenth Amendment --
which explicitly acknowledges the right to vote and prohibits its
denial or abridgment on account of race -- it seemingly would
accord protection against only the absolute abrogation of the
ballot.

															An interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment limiting its
prohibitions to the outright denial of the ballot would convert the
words of the Amendment into language illusory in symbol, and hollow
in substance. Surely today's decision should not be read as
endorsing that interpretation. [ Footnote 3/26 ] B The plurality concludes that our prior decisions establish the
principle that proof of discriminatory intent is a necessary
element of a Fifteenth Amendment claim. [ Footnote 3/27 ] In contrast, I Page 446 U. S. 130 continue to adhere to my conclusion in Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S. 148 ,
n. 4 (dissenting opinion), that

															"[t]he Court's decisions relating to the relevance of purpose
and/or effect analysis in testing the constitutionality of
legislative enactments are somewhat less than a seamless web."

															As I there explained, at various times, the Court's decisions
have seemed to adopt three inconsistent approaches: (1) that
purpose alone is the test for unconstitutionality; (2) that effect
alone is the test; and (3) that purpose or effect, either alone or
in combination, is sufficient to show unconstitutionality. Ibid. In my view, our Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence on
the necessity of proof of discriminatory purpose is no less
unsettled than was our approach to the importance of such proof in
Fourteenth Amendment racial discrimination cases prior to Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976). What is called for in the present cases is a fresh
consideration -- similar to our inquiry in Washington v. Davis,
supra, with regard to Fourteenth Amendment discrimination
claims -- of whether proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary
to establish a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. I will first
justify my conclusion that our Fifteenth Amendment precedents do
not control the outcome of this issue, and then turn to an
examination of how the question should be resolved. 1 The plurality cites Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.
S. 339 (1960); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964); Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U. S.
45 (1959); and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268 (1939), as holding that proof of discriminatory
purpose is necessary to support a Fifteenth Amendment claim. To me,
these decisions indicate confusion, not resolution of this issue.
As the plurality suggests, ante at 446 U. S. 62 ,
the Court in Guinn v. United States, supra, did examine
the purpose of a "grandfather clause" in the course of invalidating
it. Yet, 24 years later, in Lane v. Wilson, supra at 307 U. S. 277 , the
Court Page 446 U. S. 131 struck down a more sophisticated exclusionary scheme because it
"operated unfairly" against Negroes. In accord with the prevailing
doctrine of the time, see Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 , 283 U. S. 455 ,
and n. 7 (1931), the Court in Lane seemingly did not
question the motives of public officials.

															In upholding the use of a literacy test for voters in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., supra, the Court
apparently concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove either
discriminatory purpose or effect. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
supra, can be read as turning on proof of discriminatory
motive, but the Court also stressed that the challenged redrawing
of municipal boundaries had the "essential inevitable effect" of
removing Negro voters from the city, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 341 ,
and that

															"the inescapable human effect of this essay in geometry and
geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only colored
citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights," id. at 364 U. S. 347 .
Finally, in Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, the plaintiffs
alleged only purposeful discriminatory redistricting, and therefore
the Court had no reason to consider whether proof of discriminatory
effect would satisfy the Fifteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 3/28 ]

															The plurality ignores cases suggesting that discriminatory
purpose is not necessary to support a Fifteenth Amendment claim. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953), a case in which no majority opinion was issued, three
Justices approvingly discussed two decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit [ Footnote 3/29 ] holding

															"that no election machinery could be sustained if its purpose or effect was to deny Negroes on account of their race an
effective voice in the governmental affairs of their country,
state, or community." Id. at 345 U. S. 466 (opinion of Black, J., joined by Douglas and Burton, JJ.) (emphasis
added). More recently, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to
a federal statute providing Page 446 U. S. 132 criminal penalties for knowing destruction of a Selective
Service registration certificate, the Court, in United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 391 U. S. 383 (1968), stated that

															"[i]t is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this
Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on
the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."

															The Court in O'Brien, supra at 391 U. S. 385 ,
interpreted Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, as turning on
the discriminatory effect, and not the alleged discriminatory
purpose, of the challenged redrawing of municipal boundaries. Three
years later, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.
S. 217 , 403 U. S.
224 -225 (1971), the Court relied on O'Brien to
support its refusal to inquire whether a city had closed its
swimming pools to avoid racial integration. As in O'Brien, the Court in Palmer, supra at 403 U. S. 225 ,
interpreted Gomillion v. Lightfoot as focusing "on the
actual effect" of the municipal boundary change, and not upon what
motivated the city to redraw its borders. See also Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 , 407 U. S.
461 -462 (1972).

															In holding that racial discrimination claims under the Equal
Protection Clause must be supported by proof of discriminatory
intent, the Court in Washington v. Davis, supra, signaled
some movement away from the doctrine that such proof is irrelevant
to constitutional adjudication. Although the Court, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S.
242 -244, and n. 11, attempted mightily to distinguish Palmer v. Thompson, supra, its decision was, in fact,
based upon a judgment that, in light of modern circumstances, the
Equal Protection Clause's ban on racial discrimination in the
distribution of constitutional gratuities should be interpreted as
prohibiting only intentional official discrimination. [ Footnote 3/30 ]

															These vacillations in our approach to the relevance of
discriminatory purpose belie the plurality's determination that our
prior decisions require such proof to support Fifteenth Amendment
claims. To the contrary, the Court today is in Page 446 U. S. 133 the same unsettled position with regard to the Fifteenth
Amendment as it was four years ago in Washington v. Davis,
supra, regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of
racial discrimination. The absence of old answers mandates a new
inquiry. 2 The Court in Washington v. Davis required a showing of
discriminatory purpose to support racial discrimination claims
largely because it feared that a standard based solely on
disproportionate impact would unduly interfere with the far-ranging
governmental distribution of constitutional gratuities. [ Footnote 3/31 ] Underlying the Court's
decision was a determination that, since the Constitution does not
entitle any person to such governmental benefits, courts should
accord discretion to those officials who decide how the government
shall allocate its scarce resources. If the plaintiff proved only
that governmental distribution of constitutional gratuities had a
disproportionate effect on a racial minority, the Court was willing
to presume that the officials who approved the allocation scheme
either had made an honest error or had foreseen that the decision
would have a discriminatory impact, and had found persuasive,
legitimate reasons for imposing it nonetheless. These assumptions
about the good faith of officials allowed the Court to conclude
that, standing alone, a showing that a governmental policy had a
racially discriminatory impact did not indicate that the affected
minority had suffered the stigma, frustration, and unjust treatment
prohibited Page 446 U. S. 134 under the suspect classification branch of our equal protection
jurisprudence.

															Such judicial deference to official decisionmaking has no place
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 1 of that Amendment differs
from the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on racial
discrimination in two crucial respects: it explicitly recognizes
the right to vote free of hindrances related to race, and it sweeps
no further. In my view, these distinctions justify the conclusion
that proof of racially discriminatory impact should be sufficient
to support a claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. The right to vote
is of such fundamental importance in the constitutional scheme that
the Fifteenth Amendment's command that it shall not be "abridged"
on account of race must be interpreted as providing that the votes
of citizens of all races shall be of substantially equal weight.
Furthermore, a disproportionate impact test under the Fifteenth
Amendment would not lead to constant judicial intrusion into the
process of official decisionmaking. Rather, the standard would
reach only those decisions having a discriminatory effect upon the
minority's vote. The Fifteenth Amendment cannot tolerate that kind
of decision, even if made in good faith, because the Amendment
grants racial minorities the full enjoyment of the right to vote,
not simply protection against the unfairness of intentional vote
dilution along racial lines. [ Footnote 3/32 ]

															In addition, it is beyond dispute that a standard based solely
upon the motives of official decisionmakers creates significant
problems of proof for plaintiffs and forces the inquiring court to
undertake an unguided, tortuous look into the minds of officials in
the hope of guessing why certain policies were adopted and others
rejected. See Palmer v. Thompson, Page 446 U. S. 135 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
224 -225; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S.
382 -386; cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colo., 413 U. S. 189 , 413 U. S. 224 , 413 U. S. 227 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). An
approach based on motivation creates the risk that officials will
be able to adopt policies that are the products of discriminatory
intent so long as they sufficiently mask their motives through the
use of subtlety and illusion. Washington v. Davis is
premised on the notion that this risk is insufficient to overcome
the deference the judiciary must accord to governmental decisions
about the distribution of constitutional gratuities. That risk
becomes intolerable, however, when the precious right to vote
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment is concerned.

															I continue to believe, then, that under the Fifteenth Amendment,
an

															"[e]valuation of the purpose of a legislative enactment is just
too ambiguous a task to be the sole tool of constitutional
analysis. . . . [A] demonstration of effect ordinarily should
suffice. If, of course, purpose may conclusively be shown, it too
should be sufficient to demonstrate a statute's
unconstitutionality." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. at 425 U. S.
149 -150, n. 5 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The
plurality's refusal in this case even to consider this approach
bespeaks an indifference to the plight of minorities who, through
no fault of their own, have suffered diminution of the right
preservative of all other rights. [ Footnote 3/33 ] Page 446 U. S. 136 III If it is assumed that proof of discriminatory intent is
necessary to support the vote-dilution claims in these cases, the
question becomes what evidence will satisfy this requirement.
[ Footnote 3/34 ]

															The plurality assumes, without any analysis, that these cases
are appropriate for the application of the rigid test developed in Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 279 ,
requiring that

															"the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed particular
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."

															In my view, the Feeney standard creates a burden of
proof far too extreme to apply in vote-dilution cases. [ Footnote 3/35 ] Page 446 U. S. 137 This Court has acknowledged that the evidentiary inquiry
involving discriminatory intent must necessarily vary depending
upon the factual context. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S.
264 -268; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 253 (STEVENS, J., concurring). One useful evidentiary tool, long
recognized by the common law, is the presumption that "[e]very man
must be taken to contemplate the probable consequences of the act
he does." Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East. 277, 280, 103
Eng.Rep. 579, 580-581 (K.B. 1808). The Court in Feeney,
supra, at 442 U. S. 279 ,
n. 25, acknowledged that proof of foreseeability of discriminatory
consequences could raise a "strong inference that the adverse
effects were desired," but refused to treat this presumption as
conclusive in cases alleging discriminatory distribution of
constitutional gratuities.

															I would apply the common law foreseeability presumption to the
present cases. The plaintiffs surely proved that maintenance of the
challenged multimember districting would have the foreseeable
effect of perpetuating the submerged electoral influence of
Negroes, and that this discriminatory effect could be corrected by
implementation of a single-member districting plan. [ Footnote 3/36 ] Because the foreseeable
disproportionate impact was so severe, the burden of proof should
have shifted to the defendants, and they should have been required
to show that they refused to modify the districting schemes in
spite of, not because of, their severe discriminatory effect. See Feeney, supra at 442 U. S. 284 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Reallocation of the burden of proof is
especially appropriate in these cases, where the challenged state
action infringes the exercise of a fundamental right. The
defendants would carry their burden of proof only if they showed
that they considered submergence Page 446 U. S. 138 of the Negro vote a detriment, not a benefit, of the multimember
systems, that they accorded minority citizens the same respect
given to whites, and that they nevertheless decided to maintain the
systems for legitimate reasons. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Board of
Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 , 429 U. S. 287 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
supra at 429 U. S.
270 -271, n. 21.

															This approach recognizes that

															"[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent will be
objective evidence of what actually happened, rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of governmental
action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective
decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation." Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S. 253 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Furthermore, if proof of discriminatory
purpose is to be required in these cases, this standard would
comport with my view that the degree to which the government must
justify a decision depends upon the importance of the interests
infringed by it. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S.
109 -110 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 3/37 ] Page 446 U. S. 139 The plurality also fails to recognize that the maintenance of
multimember districts in the face of foreseeable discriminatory
consequences strongly suggests that officials are blinded by
"racially selective sympathy and indifference." [ Footnote 3/38 ] Like outright racial hostility,
selective racial indifference reflects a belief that the concerns
of the minority are not worthy of the same degree of attention paid
to problems perceived by whites. When an interest as fundamental as
voting is diminished along racial lines, a requirement that
discriminatory purpose must be proved should be satisfied by a
showing that official action was produced by this type of pervasive
bias. In the present cases, the plaintiffs presented strong
evidence of such bias: they showed that Mobile officials
historically discriminated against Negroes, that there are
pervasive present effects of this past discrimination, and that
officials have not been responsive to the needs of the minority
community. It takes only the smallest of inferential leaps to
conclude that the decisions to maintain multimember districting
having obvious discriminatory effects represent, at the very least,
selective racial sympathy and indifference resulting in the
frustration of minority desires, the stigmatization of the minority
as second-class citizens, and the perpetuation of inhumanity.
[ Footnote 3/39 ] Page 446 U. S. 140 IV The American approach to government is premised on the theory
that, when citizens have the unfettered right to vote, Page 446 U. S. 141 public officials will make decisions by the democratic
accommodation of competing beliefs, not by deference to the
mandates of the powerful. The American approach to civil rights is
premised on the complementary theory that the unfettered right to
vote is preservative of all other rights. The theoretical
foundations for these approaches are shattered where, as in the
present cases, the right to vote is granted in form, but denied in
substance.

															It is time to realize that manipulating doctrines and drawing
improper distinctions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, as well as under Congress' remedial legislation
enforcing those Amendments, make this Court an accessory to the
perpetuation of racial discrimination. The plurality's requirement
of proof of intentional discrimination, so inappropriate in today's
cases, may represent an attempt to bury the legitimate concerns of
the minority beneath the soil of a doctrine almost as impermeable
as it is serious. If so, the superficial tranquility created by
such measures can be but short-lived. If this Court refuses to
honor our long-recognized principle that the Constitution
"nullifies sophisticated, as well as simple-minded, modes of
discrimination," Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. at 307 U. S. 275 ,
it cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political
channels of seeking redress. I dissent.

															* This opinion applies also to No. 78-357, Williams et al.
v. Brown et al., post, p. 236.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															U.S.Const., Amdts. 15, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															I agree with the plurality, see ante at 446 U. S. 60 -61,
that the prohibition on denial or infringement of the right to vote
contained in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973,
contains the same standard as the Fifteenth Amendment. I disagree
with the plurality's construction of that Amendment, however. See 446 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The Court does not quarrel with the generalization that, in many
instances, an electoral minority will fare worse under multimember
districting than under single-member districting. Multimember
districting greatly enhances the opportunity of the majority
political faction to elect all representatives of the district. In
contrast, if the multimember district is divided into several
single-member districts, an electoral minority will have a better
chance to elect a candidate of its choice, or at least to exert
greater political influence. It is obvious that the greater the
degree to which the electoral minority is homogeneous and insular,
and the greater the degree that bloc voting occurs along
majority-minority lines, the greater will be the extent to which
the minority's voting power is diluted by multimember districting. See E. Banfield & J. Wilson, City Politics 91-96,
303-308 (1963); R. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation 12,
476-484, 503-527 (1968); Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Large
Elections : The Dilution Problem, 10 Ga.L.Rev. 353, 35860 (1976);
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26
Vand.L.Rev. 523, 553-555 (1973); Comment, Effective Representation
and Multimember Districts, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 1577, 1577-1579 (170).
Recent empirical studies have documented the validity of this
generalization. See Berry & Dye, The Discriminatory
Effects of At-Large Elections, 7 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 85, 113-122
(1979); Jones, The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black
Political Representation, 11 Urb.Aff.Q. 345 (1976); Karnig, Black
Resources and City Council Representation, 41 J.Pol. 134 (1979);
Karnig, Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of
District Elections and Socioeconomic Factors, 12 Urb.Aff.Q. 223
(1976); Sloan, "Good Government" and the Politics of Race, 17
Soc.Prob. 161 (1969); The Impact of Municipal Reformism: A
Symposium, 59 Soc.Sci.Q. 117 (1978).

															The electoral schemes in these cases involve majority-vote,
numbered-post, and staggered-term requirements. See Bolden v.
City of Mobile, 423 F.
Supp. 384 , 386-387 (SD Ala.1976); Brown v.
Moore, 428
F. Supp. 1123 , 1126-1127 (SD Ala.1976). These electoral rules
exacerbate the vote-dilutive effects of multimember districting. A
requirement that a candidate must win by a majority of the vote
forces a minority candidate who wins a plurality of votes in the
general election to engage in a runoff election with his nearest
competitor. If the competitor is a member of the dominant political
faction, the minority candidate stands little chance of winning in
the second election. A requirement that each candidate must run for
a particular "place" or "post" creates head-to-head contests that
minority candidates cannot survive. When a number of positions on a
governmental body are to be chosen in the same election, members of
a minority will increase the likelihood of election of a favorite
candidate by voting only for him. If the remainder of the
electorate splits its votes among the other candidates, the
minority's candidate might well be elected by the minority's
"single-shot voting." If the terms of the officeholders are
staggered, the opportunity for single-shot voting is decreased. See City of Rome v. United States, post, p. 446 U. S. 156 ; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (CA5 1973) (en
banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v. Marshall 424 U. S. 636 (1976) (per curiam); Bonapfel, supra; Derfner, supra. [ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The plurality notes that at-large elections were instituted in
cities as a reform measure to correct corruption and inefficiency
in municipal government, and suggests that it "may be a rash
assumption" to apply vote-dilution concepts to a municipal
government elected in that fashion. See ante at 446 U. S. 70 ,
and n. 15. To the contrary, local governments are not exempt from
the constitutional requirement to adopt representational
districting ensuring that the votes of each citizen will have equal
weight. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.
S. 474 (1968). Indeed, in Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130 , 425 U. S. 142 ,
n. 14 (1976), and Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.
S. 182 , 403 U. S. 184 ,
n. 2 (1971), we assumed that our vote-dilution doctrine applied to
local governments.

															Furthermore, though municipalities must be accorded some
discretion in arranging their affairs, see Abate v. Mundt,
supra, there is all the more reason to scrutinize assertions
that municipal, rather than state, multimember districting dilutes
the vote of an electoral minority:

															"In statewide elections, it is possible that a large minority
group in one multi-member district will be unable to elect any
legislators, while in another multi-member district where the same
group is a slight majority, they will elect the entire slate of
legislators. Thus, the multi-member electoral system may hinder a
group in one district, but prove an advantage in another. In
at-large elections in cities, this is not possible. There is no way
to balance out the discrimination against a particular minority
group, because the entire city is one huge election district. The
minority's loss is absolute."

															Berry & Dye, supra, n. 3, at 87. That at-large
elections were instituted as part of a "reform" movement in no way
ameliorates these harsh effects. Moreover, in some instances, the
efficiency and breadth of perspective supposedly resulting from a
reform structure of municipal government are achieved at a high
cost. In a white-majority city in which severe racial bloc voting
is common, the city-wide view allegedly inculcated in city
commissioners by at-large elections need not extend beyond the
white community, and the efficiency of the commission form of
government can be achieved simply by ignoring the concerns of the
powerless minority.

															It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that municipal at-large
elections provide an inherently superior representational scheme. See also 446 U.S.
55 fn3/3|>n. 3, supra; Chapman v.
Meier, 372 F.
Supp. 371 , 388-392 (ND 1974) (three-judge court) (Bright, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 420 U. S. 1 (1975).
It goes without saying that a municipality has the freedom to
design its own governance system. When that system is subjected to
constitutional attack, however, the question is whether it was
enacted or maintained with a discriminatory purpose or has a
discriminatory effect, not whether it comports with one or another
of the competing notions about "good government."

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															As the plurality notes, see ante at 446 U. S. 66 , we
indicated in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 149 ,
that multimember districts were unconstitutional if they were
"conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or
economic discrimination." The Court in Whitcomb did not,
however, suggest that discriminatory purpose was a necessary
condition for the invalidation of multimember districting. Our
decision in Whitcomb, supra at 403 U. S. 143 ,
acknowledged the continuing validity of the discriminatory impact
test adopted in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433 , 379 U. S. 439 (1965), and restated it as requiring plaintiffs to prove that
"multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to
dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political
elements." Whitcomb, supra at 403 U. S. 144 (emphasis added). Abate v. Mundt, supra, decided the same day as Whitcomb, provides further evidence that Whitcomb did not alter the discriminatory effects standard developed in
earlier cases. In Abate, supra at 403 U. S. 184 ,
n. 2, we rejected the argument that a multimember districting
scheme had a vote-dilutive effect because

															"[pletitioners] . . . have not shown that these multimember
districts, by themselves, operate to impair the voting strength of
particular racial or political elements . . . , see Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 , 384 U. S.
88 (1966)."

															[ Footnote 3/6 ] See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/3|>n. 3, supra. [ Footnote 3/7 ] White v. Regester makes clear the distinction between
the concepts of vote dilution and proportional representation. We
have held that, in order to prove an allegation of vote dilution,
the plaintiffs must show more than simply that they have been
unable to elect candidates of their choice. See 412 U.S.
at 412 U. S.
765 -766; Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra at 403 U. S.
149 -150, 403 U. S. 153 .
The Constitution, therefore, does not contain any requirement of
proportional representation. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.
S. 735 (1973). When all that is proved is mere lack of
success at the polls, the Court will not presume that members of a
political minority have suffered an impermissible dilution of
political power. Rather, it is assumed that these persons have
means available to them through which they can have some effect on
governmental decisionmaking. For example, many of these persons
might belong to a variety of other political, social, and economic
groups that have some impact on officials. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that officials will not
be improperly influenced by such factors as the race or place of
residence of persons seeking governmental action. Furthermore,
political factions out of office often serve as watchdogs on the
performance of the government, bind together into coalitions having
enhanced influence, and have the respectability necessary to affect
public policy.

															Unconstitutional vote dilution occurs only when a discrete
political minority whose voting strength is diminished by a
districting scheme proves that historical and social factors render
it largely incapable of effectively utilizing alternative avenues
of influencing public policy. See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/19|>n.19, infra. In these circumstances, the
only means of breaking down the barriers encasing the political
arena is to structure the electoral districting so that the
minority has a fair opportunity to elect candidates of its
choice.

															The test for unconstitutional vote dilution, then, looks only to
the discriminatory effects of the combination of an electoral
structure and historical and social factors. At the same time, it
requires electoral minorities to prove far more than mere lack of
success at the polls.

															We have also spoken of dilution of voting power in cases arising
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et
seq. Under § 5 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, a state or
local government covered by the Act may not enact new electoral
procedures having the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color. We have interpreted this
provision as prohibiting any retrogression in Negro voting power. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 , 425 U. S. 141 (1976). In some cases, we have labeled such retrogression a
"dilution" of the minority vote. See, e.g., City of Rome v.
United States, post, p. 446 U. S. 156 .
Vote dilution under § 5, then, involves a standard different from
that applied in cases such as White v. Regester, supra, in
which diminution of the vote violating the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment is alleged.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															The plurality's approach is also inconsistent with our statement
in Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.
S. 477 , 421 U. S. 480 (1975) (per curiam), that multimember districting violates the
Equal Protection Clause if it "in fact operates impermissibly to
dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting
population." See also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 17 .

															[ Footnote 3/9 ] See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963); and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S.
12 (1956) (right to fair access to criminal process).
Under the rubric of the fundamental right of privacy, we have
recognized that individuals have freedom from unjustified
governmental interference with personal decisions involving
marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.
S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); contraception, Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.
S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.
S. 113 (1973); family relationships, Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); and childrearing and education, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923). See also Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															As the present cases illustrate, a requirement of proof of
discriminatory intent seriously jeopardizes the free exercise of
the fundamental right to vote. Although the right to vote is
indistinguishable for present purposes from the other fundamental
rights our cases have recognized, see 446 U.S.
55 fn3/9|>n. 9, supra, surely the plurality would
not require proof of discriminatory purpose in those cases. The
plurality fails to articulate why the right to vote should receive
such singular treatment. Furthermore, the plurality refuses to
recognize the disutility of requiring proof of discriminatory
purpose in fundamental rights cases. For example, it would make no
sense to require such a showing when the question is whether a
state statute regulating abortion violates the right of personal
choice recognized in Roe v. Wade, supra. The only logical
inquiry is whether, regardless of the legislature's motive, the
statute has the effect of infringing that right. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976).

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															Judge Wisdom of the Court of Appeals below recognized this
distinction in a companion case, see Nevett v. Sides, 571
F.2d 209, 231-234 (CA5 1978) (specially concurring opinion). See also Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose
Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis,
Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12
Harv.Civ.Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 725, 758, n. 175 (1977); Note,
Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional
Standard After Washington v. Davis, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 694,
722-726 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Gerrymanders,
45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 845, 869-877 (1978). Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), involved alleged racial discrimination in public
employment. By describing interests such as public employment as
constitutional gratuities, I do not, of course, mean to suggest
that their deprivation is immune from constitutional scrutiny.
Indeed, our decisions have referred to the importance of
employment, see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S.
88 , 426 U. S. 116 (1976); Meyer v. Nebraska, supra at 262 U. S. 399 ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 , 239 U. S. 41 (1915), and we have explicitly recognized that, in some
circumstances, public employment falls within the categories of
liberty and property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, see, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.
S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). The Court has not held, however, that a citizen has a
constitutional right to public employment.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															We have not, however, held that the Fourteenth Amendment
contains an absolute right to vote. As we explained in Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972):

															"In decision after decision, this Court has made clear that a
citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in
elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the
jurisdiction. [Citing cases.] This 'equal right to vote' . . . is
not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter
qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other
ways. . . . But as a general matter,"

															"before that right [to vote] can be restricted, the purpose of
the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by
it must meet close constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 405 U. S. 336 (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.
S. 419 , 398 U. S. 426 , 398 U. S. 422 (1970)).

															[ Footnote 3/13 ] Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.
S. 474 (1968), applied the equal representation standard
of Reynolds v. Sims to local governments. See also
e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407 (1977); Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U. S. 259 (1977); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U. S.
50 (1970).

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															In attempting to limit Reynolds v. Sims to its facts, see ante at 446 U. S. 77 -79,
the plurality confuses the nature of the constitutional right
recognized in that decision with the means by which that right can
be violated. Reynolds held that, under the Equal
Protection Clause, each citizen must be accorded an essentially
equal voice in the election of representatives. The Court
determined that unequal population distribution in a multidistrict
representational scheme was one readily ascertainable means by
which this right was abridged. The Court certainly did not suggest,
however, that violations of the right to effective political
participation mattered only if they were caused by
malapportionment. The plurality's assertion to the contrary in this
case apparently would require it to read Reynolds as
recognizing fair apportionment as an end in itself, rather than as
simply a means to protect against vote dilution.

															[ Footnote 3/15 ]

															Proof of discriminatory purpose has been equally unnecessary in
our decisions assessing whether various impediments to electoral
participation are inconsistent with the fundamental interest in
voting. In the seminal case, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966), we invalidated a $1.50 poll tax imposed as a precondition
to voting. Relying on our decision two years earlier in Reynolds v. Sims, see Harper, supra at 383 U. S.
667 -668, 383 U. S. 670 ,
we determined that "the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned," 383 U.S. at 383 U. S. 670 .
We analyzed the right to vote under the familiar standard that,

															"where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or
restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined." Ibid. In accord with Harper, we have applied
heightened scrutiny in assessing the imposition of filing fees, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 (1974); limitations on who may participate in elections involving
specialized governmental entities, e.g., Kramer v. Union School
District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); durational residency requirements, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, supra; enrollment time limitations for voting in
party primary elections, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973); and restrictions on candidate access to the ballot, e.g., Illinois Elections Bd v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173 (1979).

															To be sure, we have approved some limitations on the right to
vote. Compare, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water
District, 410 U. S. 719 (1973), with Kramer v. Union School District, supra. We
have never, however, required a showing of discriminatory purpose
to support a claim of infringement of this fundamental interest. To
the contrary, the Court has accepted at face value the purposes
articulated for a qualification of this right, and has invalidated
such a limitation under the Equal Protection Clause only if its
purpose either lacked sufficient substantiality when compared to
the individual interests affected or could have been achieved by
less restrictive means. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra at 405 U. S. 335 , 405 U. S. 337 , 405 U. S.
343 -360.

															The approach adopted in this line of cases has been synthesized
with the one-person, one-vote doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims in the following fashion:

															"It has been established in recent years that the Equal
Protection Clause confers the substantive right to participate on
an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has
adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any
segment of the State's population." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 59 , n.
2 (1973) (STEWART, J., concurring) (citing Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Kramer v. Union School District, supra; Dunn v.
Blumstein, supra ). It is plain that this standard requires no
showing of discriminatory purpose to trigger strict scrutiny of
state interference with the right to vote.

															[ Footnote 3/16 ] See Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F.
Supp. 259 , 261 (ND Ga.1964) (three-judge court), rev'd, 379 U. S. 433 (1965).

															[ Footnote 3/17 ]

															Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that county-wide voting
in the multidistrict counties could, as a matter of mathematics,
result in the nullification of the unanimous choice of the voters
of one district. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. at 379 U. S.
436 -437.

															[ Footnote 3/18 ]

															The same is true of our most recent case discussing vote
dilution, Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.
S. 535 (1978).

															[ Footnote 3/19 ]

															In contrast to a racial group, however, a political group will
bear a rather substantial burden of showing that it is sufficiently
discrete to suffer vote dilution. See Dallas County v.
Reese, 421 U. S. 477 (1975) (per curiam) (allowing city dwellers to attack a county-wide
multimember district). See generally Comment, Effective
Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 Mich.L.Rev. 1577,
1594-1596 (1970).

															[ Footnote 3/20 ]

															The dispute in Washington v. Davis concerned alleged
racial discrimination in public employment, an interest to which no
one has a constitutional right, see 446 U.S.
55 fn3/11|>n. 11, supra. In that decision, the Court
held only that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose." 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 240 (emphasis added). The Court's decisions following Washington v.
Davis have also involved alleged discrimination in the
allocation of interests falling short of constitutional rights. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.
S. 256 (1979) (alleged sex discrimination in public
employment); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (alleged racial discrimination in zoning). As explained in Feeney, supra, "[w]hen some other independent right is not at stake . . . and
when there is no 'reason to infer antipathy,' . . . it is presumed
that 'even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process.'"

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 272 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S.
93 , 440 U. S. 97 (1979)).

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															Professor Ely has recognized this distinction:

															"The danger I see is . . . that the Court, in its new-found
enthusiasm for motivation analysis, will seek to export it to
fields where it has no business. It therefore cannot be emphasized
too strongly that analysis of motivation is appropriate only to
claims of improper discrimination in the distribution of goods that
are constitutionally gratuitous (that is, benefits to which people
are not entitled as a matter of substantive constitutional right).
. . . However, where what is denied is something to which the
complainant has a substantive constitutional right -- either
because it is granted by the terms of the Constitution or because
it is essential to the effective functioning of a democratic
government -- the reasons it was denied are irrelevant. It
may become important in court what justifications counsel for the
state can articulate in support of its denial or
nonprovision, but the reasons that actually inspired the denial
never can: to have a right to something is to have a claim on it
irrespective of why it is denied. It would be a tragedy of the
first order were the Court to expand its burgeoning awareness of
the relevance of motivation into the thoroughly mistaken notion
that a denial of a constitutional right does not count as such
unless it was intentional."

															Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 San
Diego L.Rev. 1155, 1160-1161 (1978) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted).

															[ Footnote 3/22 ]

															It is at this point that my view most diverges from the position
expressed by my Brother STEVENS, ante. p. 446 U. S. 83 . He
would strictly scrutinize state action having an adverse impact on
an individual's right to vote. In contrast, he would apply a less
stringent standard to state action diluting the political influence
of a group. See ante at 446 U. S. 83 -85.
The facts of the present cases, however, demonstrate that severe
and persistent racial bloc voting, when coupled with the inability
of the minority effectively to participate in the political arena
by alternative means, can effectively disable the individual Negro,
as well as the minority community as a whole. In these
circumstances, MR. JUSTICE STEVENS' distinction between the rights
of individuals and the political strength of groups becomes
illusory.

															[ Footnote 3/23 ]

															The foregoing disposes of any contention that, merely by citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 240 ,
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S. 264 ,
intended to bring vote-dilution cases within the discriminatory
purpose requirement. Wright v. Rockefeller, supra, was a
racial gerrymander case, and the plaintiffs had alleged only that
they were the victims of an intentional scheme to draw districting
lines discriminatorily. In focusing solely on whether the
plaintiffs had proved intentional discrimination, the Court in Wright v. Rockefeller was merely limiting the scope of its
inquiry to the issue raised by the plaintiffs. If Wright v.
Rockefeller had been brought after this Court had decided our
vote-dilution decisions, the plaintiffs perhaps would have
recognized that, in addition to a claim of intentional racial
gerrymandering, they could allege an equally sufficient cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause -- that the districting
lines had the effect of diluting their vote. Wright v. Rockefeller, then, treated proof of
discriminatory purpose as a sufficient condition to trigger strict
scrutiny of a districting scheme, but had no occasion to consider
whether such proof was necessary to invoke that standard. Its
citations in Washington v. Davis, supra, and Arlington
Heights; supra, were useful to show the relevancy, but not the
necessity, of evidence of discriminatory intent. These citations
are in no way inconsistent with my view that proof of
discriminatory purpose is not a necessary condition to the
invalidation of multimember districts that dilute the vote of
racial or political elements.

															In addition, any argument that, merely by citing Wright v.
Rockefeller, the Court in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights intended to apply the discriminatory
intent requirement to vote-dilution claims is premised on two
unpalatable assumptions. First, because the discussion of Wright v. Rockefeller was unnecessary to the resolution of
the issues in both of those decisions, the argument assumes that
the Court in both cases decided important issues in brief dicta.
Second, the argument assumes that the Court twice intended covertly
to overrule the discriminatory effects test applied in White v.
Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), without even citing White. Neither assumption is
tenable.

															[ Footnote 3/24 ]

															It is important to recognize that only the four Members of the
plurality are committed to this view. In addition to my Brother
BRENNAN and myself, my Brother STEVENS expressly states that proof
of discriminatory effect can be a sufficient condition to support
the invalidation of districting, see ante at 446 U. S. 90 . My
Brother WHITE finds the proof of discriminatory purpose in these
cases sufficient to support the decisions of the Courts of Appeals,
and, accordingly, he does not reach the issue whether proof of
discriminatory impact, standing alone, would suffice under the
Fifteenth Amendment. My Brother BLACKMUN also expresses no view on
this issue, since he too finds the proof of discriminatory intent
sufficient to support the findings of violations of the
Constitution.

															[ Footnote 3/25 ]

															The plurality states that,

															"[h]aving found that Negroes in Mobile 'register and vote
without hindrance,' the District Court and Court of Appeals were in
error in believing that the appellants invaded the protection of
that Amendment in the present case." Ante at 446 U. S.
65 .

															[ Footnote 3/26 ]

															Indeed, five Members of the Court decline the opportunity to
ascribe to this view. In addition to my Brother BRENNAN and myself,
my Brother STEVENS expressly states that the Fifteenth Amendment
protects against diminution as well as denial of the ballot, see ante at 446 U.S.
84 , and n. 3. The dissenting opinion of my Brother WHITE and
the separate opinion of my Brother BLACKMUN indicate that they
share this view.

															[ Footnote 3/27 ]

															The plurality does not attempt to support this proposition by
relying on the history surrounding the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment. I agree that we should resolve the issue of the
relevancy of proof of discriminatory purpose and effect by
examining our prior decisions and by considering the
appropriateness of alternative standards in light of contemporary
circumstances. That was, of course, the approach used in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), to evaluate that issue with regard to Fourteenth Amendment
racial discrimination claims.

															[ Footnote 3/28 ] See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/23|>n. 23, supra. [ Footnote 3/29 ] Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948), and Boskin v. Brown, 174
F.2d 391 (1949).

															[ Footnote 3/30 ] See nn. 446 U.S.
55 fn3/20|>20, 446 U.S.
55 fn3/21|>21, supra, and accompanying text.

															[ Footnote 3/31 ]

															The Court stated

															"A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is
nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in
practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be
far-reaching, and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to
the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white."

															426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 248 . See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/20|>n. 20, supra. [ Footnote 3/32 ]

															Even if a municipal policy is shown to dilute the right to vote,
however, the policy will not be struck down if the city shows that
it serves highly important local interests and is closely tailored
to effectuate only those interests. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972). Cf. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.
S. 182 (1971).

															[ Footnote 3/33 ]

															In my view, the standard of White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), see 446 U.S.
55 fn3/7|>n. 7, supra, and accompanying text, is the
proper test under both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments for
determining whether a districting scheme has the unconstitutional
effect of diluting the Negro vote. It is plain that the District
Court in both of the cases before us made the "intensely local
appraisal" necessary under White, supra at 412 U. S. 769 ,
and correctly decided that the at-large electoral schemes for the
Mobile City Commission and County School Board violated the White standard. As I earlier note with respect to No.
77-1844, see supra at 446 U. S.
122 -123, the District Court determined: (1) that Mobile
Negroes still suffered pervasive present effects of massive
historical official and private discrimination; (2) that the City
Commission and County School Board had been quite unresponsive to
the needs of the minority community; (3) that no Negro had ever
been elected to either body, despite the fact that Negroes
constitute about one-third of the electorate; (4) that the
persistence of severe racial bloc voting made it highly unlikely
that any Negro could be elected at large to either body in the
foreseeable future; and (5) that no state policy favored at-large
elections, and the local preference for that scheme was outweighed
by the fact that the unconstitutional vote dilution could be
corrected only by the imposition of single-member districts. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F.
Supp. 384 (SD Ala.1976); Brown v.
Moore, 428 F.
Supp. 1123 (SD Ala.1976). The Court of Appeals affirmed these
findings in all respects. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571
F.2d 238 (CA5 1978); Brown v. Moore, 575 F.2d 298 (CA5
1978). See also the dissenting opinion of my Brother
WHITE, ante p. 446 U. S.
94 .

															[ Footnote 3/34 ]

															The statutes providing for at-large election of the members of
the two governmental bodies involved in these cases, see 446 U.S.
55 fn3/33|>n. 33, supra, have been in effect since
the days when Mobile Negroes were totally disenfranchised by the
Alabama Constitution of 1901. The District Court in both cases
found, therefore, that the at-large schemes could not have been
adopted for discriminatory purposes. Bolden v. City of
Mobile, 423 F. Supp. at 386, 397; Brown v. Moore, 428
F. Supp. at 1126-1127, 1138. The issue is, then, whether officials
have maintained these electoral systems for discriminatory
purposes. Cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. at 429 U. S.
257 -258, 420 U. S.
267 -271, and n. 17.

															[ Footnote 3/35 ]

															As the dissenting opinion of my Brother WHITE demonstrates,
however, the facts of these cases compel a finding of
unconstitutional vote dilution even under the plurality's
standard.

															[ Footnote 3/36 ]

															Indeed, the District Court in the present cases concluded that
the evidence supported the plaintiffs' position that
unconstitutional vote dilution was the natural and foreseeable
consequence of the maintenance of the challenged multimember
districting. Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. at 1138; Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. at 397-398.

															[ Footnote 3/37 ]

															MR. JUSTICE STEVENS acknowledges that both discriminatory intent
and discriminatory effect are present in No. 77-1844. See
ante at 446 U. S. 92 -94.
Nonetheless, he finds no constitutional violation, apparently
because he believes that the electoral structure of Mobile conforms
to a commonly used scheme, the discriminatory impact is, in his
view, not extraordinary, and the structure is supported by
sufficient noninvidious justifications so that it is neither wholly
irrational nor entirely motivated by discriminatory animus. To him,
racially motivated decisions in this setting are an inherent part
of the political process, and do not involve invidious
discrimination.

															The facts of the present cases, however, indicate that, in
Mobile, considerations of race are far more powerful and pernicious
than are considerations of other divisive aspects of the
electorate. See supra at 446 U. S.
122 -123. In Mobile, as elsewhere, "the experience of
Negroes . . . has been different in kind, not just in degree, from
that of other ethnic groups." University of California Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , 438 U. S. 400 (1978) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). An approach that accepts
intentional discrimination against Negroes as merely an aspect of
"politics as usual" strikes at the very hearts of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.

															[ Footnote 3/38 ]

															Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term -- Foreword: In Defense of
the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 7 (1976). See also Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember
Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Washington v.
Davis, 76 Mich.L.Rev. 694, 716-719 (1978).

															[ Footnote 3/39 ]

															The plurality, ante at 446 U. S. 74 -75,
n. 21, indicates that, on remand, the lower courts are to examine
the evidence in these cases under the discriminatory intent
standard of Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979), and may conclude that this test is met by proof of the
refusal of Mobile's state legislative delegation to stimulate the
passage of legislation changing Mobile's city government into a
mayor-council system in which council members are elected from
single-member districts. The plurality concludes, then, only that
the District Court and the Court of Appeals in each of the present
cases evaluated the evidence under an improper legal standard, and
not that the evidence fails to support a claim under Feeney,
supra. When the lower courts examine these cases under the Feeney standard, they should, of course, recognize the
relevancy of the plaintiffs' evidence that vote dilution was a
foreseeable and natural consequence of the maintenance of the
challenged multimember districting, and that officials have
apparently exhibited selective racial sympathy and indifference. Cf. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U.
S. 526 (1979); Columbus Board of Education v.
Penick, 443 U. S. 449 (1979).

															Finally, it is important not to confuse the differing views the
plurality and I have on the elements of proving unconstitutional
vote dilution. The plurality concludes that proof of intentional
discrimination, as defined in Feeney, supra, is necessary
to support such a claim. The plurality finds this requirement
consistent with the statement in White v. Regester, 412
U.S. at 412 U. S. 766 ,
that unconstitutional vote dilution does not occur simply because a
minority has not been able to elect representatives in proportion
to its voting potential. The extra necessary element, according to
the plurality, is a showing of discriminatory intent. In the
plurality's view, the evidence presented in White going
beyond mere proof of underrepresentation of the minority properly
supported an inference that the multimember districting scheme in
question was tainted with a discriminatory purpose.

															The plurality's approach should be satisfied, then, by proof
that an electoral scheme enacted with a discriminatory purpose
effected a retrogression in the minority's voting power. Cf.
Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 , 425 U. S. 141 (1976). The standard should also be satisfied by proof that a
scheme maintained for a discriminatory purpose has the effect of
submerging minority electoral influence below the level it would
have under a reasonable alternative scheme.

															The plurality does not address the question whether proof of
discriminatory effect is necessary to support a vote-dilution
claim. It is clear from the above, however, that, if the Court at
some point creates such a requirement, it would be satisfied by
proof of mere disproportionate impact. Such a requirement would be
far less stringent than the burden of proof required under the
rather rigid discriminatory effects test I find in White v.
Regester, supra. See 446 U.S.
55 fn3/7|>n. 7, supra, and accompanying text.

Summary:
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that found Mobile, Alabama's at-large electoral system for city commissioners violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by diluting the voting strength of African Americans.

The Court held that proof of purposeful discrimination is necessary to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Racially discriminatory motivation is also required for a Fifteenth Amendment violation.

The Court found that African Americans in Mobile registered and voted without hindrance, and that disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to prove a constitutional violation. The Court remanded the case for the lower courts to evaluate the evidence under the correct legal standard.