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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–196

															_________________

															ADAM SAMIA, aka SAL, aka ADAM SAMIC,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[June 23, 2023]

															Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Prosecutors have long tried criminal defendants
jointly in cases where the defendants are alleged to have engaged
in a common criminal scheme. However, when prosecutors seek to
introduce a nontestifying defendant’s confession implicating his
codefendants, a constitutional concern may arise. The Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” And, in Bruton v. United States , 391
U.S. 123 (1968), this Court “held that a defendant is deprived
of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying
codefendant’s confession naming him as a participant in the crime
is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed
to consider that confession only against the codefendant.” Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S.
200 , 201–202 (1987).

															Here, we must determine whether the
Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant’s confession where (1) the confession has been modified
to avoid directly identifying the nonconfessing codefendant

															and (2) the court offers a limiting instruction
that jurors may consider the confession only with respect to the
confessing codefendant. Considering longstanding historical
practice, the general presumption that jurors follow their
instructions, and the relevant precedents of this Court, we
conclude that it does not.

															I

															Petitioner Adam Samia traveled to the
Philippines in 2012 to work for crime lord Paul LeRoux. While
there, LeRoux tasked Samia, Joseph Hunter, and Carl Stillwell with
killing Catherine Lee, a local real-estate broker who LeRoux
believed had stolen money from him. Lee was found dead shortly
thereafter, shot twice in the face at close range.

															Later that year, LeRoux was arrested by the
U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and became a
cooperating witness for the Government. Hunter, Samia, and
Stillwell were arrested thereafter. During a search of Samia’s
home, law enforcement found a camera containing surveillance
photographs of Lee’s home as well as a key to the van in which Lee
had been murdered. And, during Stillwell’s arrest, law enforcement
found a cell phone containing thumbnail images of Lee’s dead body.
Later, during a postarrest interview with DEA agents, Stillwell
waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and gave a confession. Stillwell admitted that he
had been in the van when Lee was killed, but he claimed that he was
only the driver and that Samia had shot Lee.

															The Government charged all three men in a
multicount indictment. Samia and Stillwell were each charged with
conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, in violation of 18
U. S. C. §1958(a); murder-for-hire, in violation of
§1958(a); conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, in
violation of §956(a)(1); causing death with a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of §§924(c)(1)(A) and
(j); and conspiracy to launder money, in violation of §1956(h).
Hunter was charged with all but the money-laundering count.
Thereafter, the Government tried all three men jointly in the
Southern District of New York. While Hunter and Stillwell admitted
that they had participated in the murder, Samia maintained his
innocence.

															Prior to trial, the Government moved in
limine to admit Stillwell’s confession. But, because Stillwell
would not testify and the full confession inculpated Samia, the
Government proposed that an agent testify as to the content of
Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while
avoiding any obvious indications of redaction. The District Court
granted the Government’s motion but required further alterations to
ensure consistency with its understanding of this Court’s
Confrontation Clause precedents, including Bruton .[ 1 ]

															At trial, the Government’s theory of the case
was that Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as
real-estate buyers and visit properties with Lee. The Government
also sought to prove that Samia, Stillwell, and Lee were in a van
that Stillwell was driving when Samia shot Lee. During its case in
chief, in accordance with the court’s ruling on its motion in
limine , the Government presented testimony about Stillwell’s
confession through DEA Agent Eric Stouch. Stouch recounted the key
portion of Stillwell’s confession implicating Samia as follows:

															“Q. Did [Stillwell] say where [the victim]
was when she was killed?

															“A. Yes. He described a time when the other person he was with pulled the trigger on that woman in
a van that he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” App. 76 (emphasis
added).

															Other portions of Stouch’s testimony also used
the “other person” descriptor to refer to someone with whom
Stillwell had traveled and lived and who carried a particular
firearm. During Stouch’s testimony, the District Court instructed
the jury that his testimony was admissible only as to Stillwell and
should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. The District Court
later provided a similar limiting instruction before the jury began
its deliberations.

															The jury convicted Samia and his codefendants on
all counts, and the District Court subsequently denied Samia’s
post-trial motions. The District Court then sentenced Samia to life
plus 10 years’ imprisonment.

															Samia appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal,
and as relevant here, he argued that the admission of Stillwell’s
confession—even as altered and with a limiting instruction—was
constitutional error because other evidence and statements at trial
enabled the jury to immediately infer that the “other person”
described in the confession was Samia himself. He noted that,
during opening statements, the Government had asserted that
Stillwell drove the van while Samia “was in the passenger seat,”
and that Samia pulled out a gun, “turned around, aimed carefully
and shot [Lee].” Id ., at 52. He also pointed out that the
Government had stated that “Stillwell admitted to driving the car
while the man he was with turned around and shot [Lee].” Id ., at 58. So, even though Samia’s position in the van and
shooting of Lee were relevant to the Government’s theory of the
case with or without Stillwell’s confession, Samia argued that
those statements would allow the jury to infer that he was the
“other person” in Stillwell’s confession.

															Samia made the same argument with respect to
several pieces of trial evidence. For example, he pointed out that
the Government had elicited testimony that Samia and Stillwell
coordinated their travel to the Philippines and lived together
there. Samia noted that there was testimony that he had the type of
gun that was used to shoot Lee. And, he emphasized that, in its
closing argument, the Government argued to the jury that video
evidence showing Hunter speaking about hiring two men to murder Lee
was “admissible against all three defendants,” allowing the jury to
infer that Samia and Stillwell were co-conspirators. Id ., at
199. Finally, Samia argued that, while discussing Stillwell’s
confession, the prosecution had recounted how Stillwell “described
a time when the other person he was with [in the Philippines]
pulled the trigger on that woman in a van that Stillwell was
driving.” Ibid .

															The Second Circuit rejected Samia’s view,
holding that the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not
violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights. Applying Circuit
precedent, it pointed to the established practice of replacing a
defendant’s name with a neutral noun or pronoun in a nontestifying
codefendant’s confession. The Second Circuit also noted that its
inquiry considered the altered confession separate from the other
evidence that had been introduced at trial.

															We granted certiorari to determine whether the
admission of Stillwell’s altered confession, subject to a limiting
instruction, violated Samia’s rights under the Confrontation
Clause. 598 U. S. ___ (2022).

															II

															The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
guarantees the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.” As we have explained, this Clause
forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial” statements
unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had the
chance to cross-examine the witness previously. See Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S.
36 , 53–54 (2004). Because Stillwell’s formal, Mirandized
confession to authorities, which the Government sought to introduce
at trial, is testimonial, it falls within the Clause’s ambit. See id. , at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even
a narrow standard”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S.
305 , 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that “the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements
. . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, the Confrontation
Clause applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Crawford , 541 U. S., at 50. And, “[o]rdinarily, a
witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not
considered to be a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is
instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.” Richardson , 481 U. S., at 206. This general rule is
consistent with the text of the Clause, historical practice, and
the law’s reliance on limiting instructions in other contexts.

															A

															For most of our Nation’s history, longstanding
practice allowed a nontestifying codefendant’s confession to be
admitted in a joint trial so long as the jury was properly
instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant.
While some courts would omit the defendant’s name or substitute a
reference to “another person” (or the like), it is unclear whether
any courts considered such alterations to be necessary as a
categorical matter. In any event, the combination of such
alterations and an appropriate limiting instruction was generally
sufficient to permit the introduction of such confessions.

															One early treatise explained that, when “some
part of [a confession] concerns other prisoners who are tried on
the same indictment,” “all that can be done is to direct the jury
not to take into their consideration such parts as affect the other
prisoners.” S. Phillipps, Law of Evidence 82 (1816). Another noted
that, in English practice, where confessions were not admissible
against third persons, “the names of such persons were by most
judges ordered to be omitted,” but “by other judges the names were
ordered read and the jury instructed not to use the confession
against them.” 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2100, p. 2841, and
n. 5 (1904). “In the United States[,] the latter practice
[was] favored.” Id ., n. 5.

															Considerable authority supports this approach.
In Sparf v. United States , 156 U.S.
51 , 58 (1895), the Court held that, because codefendant
declarations “were not, in any view of the case, competent evidence
against” another defendant, the trial court should have admitted
them as evidence only against their respective declarants. Just one
year later, in United States v. Ball , 163 U.S.
662 , 672 (1896), a case involving a joint murder trial of three
defendants, the Court approved the use of a limiting instruction to
restrict the jury’s consideration of one defendant’s incriminatory
statements made after the killing had occurred. Citing Sparf , the Court emphasized that the trial judge had “said,
in the presence of the jury, that, of course, [the one defendant’s
declarations] would be only evidence against him.” 163 U. S.,
at 672. State practice was in accord, permitting the introduction
of nontestifying codefendants’ confessions subject only to a
limiting instruction. See, e.g. , State v. Workman , 15 S. C. 540, 545 (1881); Jones v. Commonwealth , 72 Va. 836, 839–840 (1878). And, though the
Federal Confrontation Clause did not apply to these proceedings,
state constitutions contained similar terms. See 5 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §1397, pp. 155–158, n. 1 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974)
(noting that virtually every state constitution during the relevant
period contained a provision substantially equivalent to the
Federal Confrontation Clause).

															Notably, none of the early treatises or cases to
which the parties have referred, or that we have discovered,
suggests that a confession naming a codefendant must in all cases be edited to refer to “another person” (or
something similar) such that the codefendant’s name is not included
in the confession. Accordingly, while it is unclear whether
alteration of any kind was necessary, historical practice suggests
at least that altering a nontestifying codefendant’s confession not
to name the defendant, coupled with a limiting instruction, was
enough to permit the introduction of such confessions at least as
an evidentiary matter.

															B

															This historical evidentiary practice is in
accord with the law’s broader assumption that jurors can be relied
upon to follow the trial judge’s instructions. Evidence at trial is
often admitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limiting
instruction. And, our legal system presumes that jurors will
“ ‘attend closely the particular language of [such]
instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make
sense of, and follow’ ” them. United States v. Olano , 507 U.S.
725 , 740 (1993).

															The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors
will follow instructions to consider a defendant’s prior conviction
only for purposes of a sentence enhancement and not in determining
whether he committed the criminal acts charged. Marshall v. Lonberger , 459 U.S.
422 , 438, and n. 6 (1983). This presumption works in
tandem with a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify
against himself, by ensuring that jurors do not draw an adverse
inference from his choice not to testify. Lakeside v. Oregon , 435 U.S.
333 , 338–341 (1978). It also applies to situations with
potentially life-and-death stakes for defendants: A limiting
instruction may be used to instruct jurors to consider mitigating
evidence for purposes of one defendant and not another at the
sentencing stage of a joint capital trial. Kansas v. Carr , 577 U.S. 108, 124–125 (2016).

															Of particular relevance here, the presumption
that jurors follow limiting instructions applies to statements that
are often substantially more credible and inculpatory than a
codefendant’s confession. For example, this Court has held that
statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility, provided the
jury is properly instructed not to consider them as evidence of
guilt. Harris v. New York , 401
U.S. 222 , 223–225 (1971). Such statements, elicited from the
defendant himself, are often some of the most compelling evidence
of guilt available to a jury. By contrast, jurors may cast a
critical eye on accomplice testimony—and, in particular,
self-serving accomplice testimony like Stillwell’s that accuses
another of the most culpable conduct.

															The presumption credits jurors by refusing to
assume that they are either “too ignorant to comprehend, or were
too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions” of the court. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy , 102
U.S. 451 , 459 (1880). Moreover, to disregard or to make
unnecessary exceptions to it “would make inroads into th[e] entire
complex code of . . . criminal evidentiary law, and would
threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.” Spencer v. Texas , 385 U.S.
554 , 562 (1967). As explained below, we have no reason to do so
here.

															III

															In Bruton v. United States , this
Court “recognized a narrow exception to” the presumption that
juries follow their instructions, holding “that a defendant is
deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the
facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is
introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. Richardson , 481 U. S., at 207. In Richardson v. Marsh , the Court “decline[d] to extend [ Bruton ]
further” to “confessions that do not name the defendant.” Id. , at 211. Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S.
185 , 194 (1998), later qualified Richardson by holding
that certain obviously redacted confessions might be “directly
accusatory,” and thus fall within Bruton ’s rule, even if
they did not specifically use a defendant’s name.

															Thus, the Court’s precedents distinguish between
confessions that directly implicate a defendant and those that do
so indirectly. Under these precedents, and consistent with the
longstanding historical practice discussed above, the introduction
here of Stillwell’s altered confession coupled with a limiting
instruction did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

															A

															1

															In Bruton , the Court considered the
joint trial of George Bruton and William Evans for armed postal
robbery. 391 U. S., at 124. During two pretrial
interrogations, Evans confessed to a postal inspector that he and
Bruton—whom he implicated by name—had committed the robbery. Ibid. The confession was introduced at trial, coupled with a
limiting instruction that it not be used against Bruton. Id ., at 124–125, and n. 1. This Court held that,
“because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating
extrajudicial statements in determining [Bruton]’s guilt, admission
of Evans’ confession in this joint trial violated [Bruton]’s right
of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment.” Id ., at 126.

															The Court acknowledged that a defendant is
“ ‘entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one’ ” and
conceded that “[i]t is not unreasonable to conclude that in many
. . . cases the jury can and will follow the trial
judge’s instructions to disregard [certain] information.” Id. , at 135 (quoting Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S.
604 , 619 (1953)). It even acknowledged that, “[i]f it were true
that the jury disregarded the reference to [Bruton], no question
would arise under the Confrontation Clause.” 391 U. S., at
126. Yet, the Court reasoned that “there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is
so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury
system cannot be ignored.” Id. , at 135 . Accordingly,
in the Court’s view, “the introduction of Evans’ confession posed a
substantial threat to [Bruton]’s right to confront the witnesses
against him.” Id. , at 137.

															2

															Later, in Richardson , the Court
declined to expand the Bruton rule to a redacted confession
that inculpated the defendant only when viewed in conjunction with
other evidence. There, Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and
Kareem Martin were each charged with assault and murder. 481
U. S., at 202. Marsh and Williams were tried jointly for the
crime. Ibid. And, at trial, the State introduced Williams’
confession, taken by police shortly after his arrest. Id., at 203. As introduced, however, “[t]he confession was redacted to
omit all reference to [Marsh]—indeed, to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in the
crime.” Ibid . The confession largely corroborated the
victim’s testimony and additionally described a conversation
between Williams and Martin as they drove to the scene of the
crime: “[A]ccording to Williams, Martin said that he would have to
kill the victims after the robbery.” Id. , at 204. Following
the confession’s admission, the trial judge instructed the jury not
to use it against Marsh in any way, an instruction reiterated in
the jury charge at the conclusion of trial. Id. , at 204–205.
In her testimony, however, Marsh volunteered that, during the drive
to the crime scene, she “ ‘knew that [Martin and Williams]
were talking’ but could not hear the conversation because ‘the
radio was on and the speaker was right in [her] ear.’ ” Id ., at 204 (alternations in original). Both Marsh and
Williams were convicted. Id ., at 205.

															In considering the introduction of Williams’
confession, this Court noted that, “[o]rdinarily, a witness whose
testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a
witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider
that testimony only against a codefendant,” emphasizing the “almost
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their
instructions.” Id. , at 206. It then explained that Bruton represented a “narrow exception to this principle.”
481 U. S., at 207. Whereas the confession in Bruton had
“ ‘expressly implicated’ the defendant and his accomplice,”
the confession in Richardson “was not incriminating on its
face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later
at trial.” 481 U. S., at 208 (citing Bruton , 391
U. S., at 124, n. 1). The former evidence, the Court
explained, is “more vivid” and thus “more difficult to thrust out
of mind.” 481 U. S., at 208. Additionally, in the case of
inferential incrimination, the Court posited that “the judge’s
instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from
entering onto the path of inference,” leaving “no incrimination to
forget.” Ibid. [ 2 ]

															3 Gray then confronted a question Richardson expressly left open: whether a confession altered
“by substituting for the defendant’s name in the confession a blank
space or the word ‘deleted’ ” violated the Confrontation
Clause. 523 U. S., at 188; see also Richardson , 481
U. S., at 211, n. 5. In Gray , the Court considered
Anthony Bell’s confession to Baltimore police, implicating himself,
Kevin Gray, and co-conspirator Jacquin Vanlandingham in a murder.
523 U. S., at 188. The prosecution sought to introduce the
confession at trial, and the trial judge required that it be
redacted to use the word “deleted” or “deletion” whenever Gray’s or
Vanlandingham’s names appeared. Ibid. At trial, the
prosecution had a police detective read the confession aloud to the
jury verbatim, substituting the words “deleted” or “deletion” for
Gray’s or Vanlandingham’s names.[ 3 ] Ibid. “Immediately after” the detective finished
reading the confession, “the prosecutor asked, ‘after he gave you
that information, you subsequently were able to arrest Mr. Kevin
Gray; is that correct?’ The officer responded, ‘That’s
correct.’ ” Id. , at 188–189. In instructing the jury at
the close of trial, the judge specified that Bell’s confession was
evidence only against Bell, admonishing the jury not to use the
confession as evidence against Gray. Id. , at 189. The jury
convicted Bell and Gray.

															This Court held that the confession was
inadmissible under Bruton . It first noted that, “unlike Richardson ’s redacted confession, [Bell’s] confession
refer[red] directly to the ‘existence’ of the nonconfessing
defendant.” 523 U. S., at 192. The Court then concluded that,
when a redacted confession “simply replace[s] a name with an
obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or
other similarly obvious indications of alteration,” the evidence
“so closely resemble[s] Bruton ’s unredacted statements that
. . . the law must require the same result.” Ibid. The Court reasoned that such “obvious blank[s]” would cause the
jurors to speculate as to whom the omitted individual may be,
“lift[ing their] eyes to [the nonconfessing defendant], sitting at
counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer,” as the
judge’s “instruction will provide an obvious reason for the blank.” Id. , at 193. It also reasoned that “statements redacted to
leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration” were
“directly accusatory,” “point[ing] directly to the defendant
. . . in a manner similar to Evans’ use of Bruton’s name
or to a testifying codefendant’s accusatory finger.” Id. , at
194.

															While the Court “concede[d] that Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton ’s rule
those statements that incriminate inferentially,” it explained that
“inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference, for
if it did, then Richardson would also place outside Bruton ’s scope confessions that use shortened first names,
nicknames, [and] descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired,
bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp.’ ” Id. , at 195. The
Court elaborated:

															“That being so, Richardson must
depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardson ’s inferences involved
statements that did not refer directly to the defendant himself and
which became incriminating ‘only when linked with evidence
introduced later at trial.’ 481 U. S., at 208. The inferences
at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously
refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which
involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately,
even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” Id. , at 196.

															Finally, the Court stressed that its holding,
which addressed only obviously redacted confessions, was
sufficiently narrow to avoid “unnecessarily lead[ing] prosecutors
to abandon the [relevant] confession or joint trial.” Id. ,
at 197.

															B

															Viewed together, the Court’s precedents
distinguish between confessions that directly implicate a defendant
and those that do so indirectly. Richardson explicitly
declined to extend Bruton ’s “narrow exception” to the
presumption that jurors follow their instructions beyond those
confessions that occupy the former category. 481 U. S., at
207. Gray qualified but confirmed this legal standard,
reiterating that the Bruton rule applies only to “directly
accusatory” incriminating statements, as distinct from those that
do “not refer directly to the defendant” and “bec[o]me
incriminating only when linked with evidence introduced later at
trial.” 523 U. S., at 194, 196 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, neither Bruton , Richardson ,
nor Gray provides license to flyspeck trial transcripts in
search of evidence that could give rise to a collateral inference
that the defendant had been named in an altered confession.

															Here, the District Court’s admission of
Stillwell’s confession, accompanied by a limiting instruction, did
not run afoul of this Court’s precedents. Stillwell’s confession
was redacted to avoid naming Samia, satisfying Bruton ’s
rule. And, it was not obviously redacted in a manner resembling the
confession in Gray ; the neutral references to some “other
person” were not akin to an obvious blank or the word “deleted.” In
fact, the redacted confession is strikingly similar to a
hypothetical modified confession we looked upon favorably in Gray , where we posited that, instead of saying “ ‘[m]e,
deleted, deleted, and a few other guys,’ ” the witness could
easily have said “ ‘[m]e and a few other guys.’ ” 523
U. S., at 196. Accordingly, it “fall[s] outside the narrow
exception [ Bruton ] created.” Richardson , 481
U. S., at 208.

															Moreover, it would not have been feasible to
further modify Stillwell’s confession to make it appear, as in Richardson , that he had acted alone. Stillwell was charged
with conspiracy and did not confess to shooting Lee. Consequently,
the evidence of coordination between Stillwell and Lee’s killer
(whether Samia or not) was necessary to prove an essential element
of the Government’s case. In addition, editing the statement to
exclude mention of the “other person” may have made it seem as
though Stillwell and Lee were alone in the van at the time Lee was
shot. Such a scenario may have led the jurors—who sat in judgment
of both Samia and Stillwell—to conclude that Stillwell was the
shooter, an obviously prejudicial result.

															IV

															As described above, expanding the Bruton rule in the way Samia proposes would be inconsistent
with longstanding practice and our precedents. It would also work
an unnecessary and imprudent change in law, resulting in precisely
the practical effects that the Court rejected in Richardson .
The Confrontation Clause rule that Samia proposes would require
federal and state trial courts to conduct extensive pretrial
hearings to determine whether the jury could infer from the
Government’s case in its entirety that the defendant had been named
in an altered confession. See Brief for Petitioner 16. That
approach would be burdensome and “far from foolproof,” 481
U. S., at 209, and we decline to endorse it.

															Indeed, it would be impractical to fully police
juror inferences in the way Samia seems to suggest; in a criminal
trial, all evidence that supports the prosecution’s theory of the
case is, to some extent, mutually reinforcing. Thus, the likely
practical consequence of Samia’s position would be to mandate
severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the
confession of a nontestifying codefendant in a joint trial. But, as
this Court has observed, that is “too high” a price to pay. Id. , at 210. Joint trials have long “play[ed] a vital role
in the criminal justice system,” preserving government resources
and allowing victims to avoid repeatedly reliving trauma. Id ., at 209; see also United States v. Marchant , 12 Wheat. 480, 482–483, 485 (1827) (Story, J.)
(recognizing the crucial role of joint trials). Further, joint
trials encourage consistent verdicts and enable more accurate
assessments of relative culpability. See Bruton , 391
U. S., at 143 (White, J., dissenting) (“[S]eparate trials are
apt to have varying consequences for legally indistinguishable
defendants”). Also, separate trials “randomly favo[r] the
last-tried defendants who have the advantage of knowing the
prosecution’s case beforehand.” Richardson , 481 U. S.,
at 210.

															Samia offers, as an alternative, that the
Government may choose to forgo use of the confession entirely,
thereby avoiding the need for severance. But, this ignores the fact
that confessions are “ ‘essential to society’s compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate
the law.’ ” Ibid . And, as described above, Samia’s
proposal is not compelled by the Confrontation Clause.

															*  *  *

															The Confrontation Clause ensures that
defendants have the opportunity to confront witnesses against them,
but it does not provide a freestanding guarantee against the risk
of potential prejudice that may arise inferentially in a joint
trial. Here, the Clause was not violated by the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly
inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting
instruction.

															We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 This Court has never
opined as to whether rewriting a confession may serve as a proper
method of redaction. See Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S.
200 , 203, n. 1 (1987). Because the parties do not argue
that the District Court’s imposition of further redactions was
inappropriate in this case, we do not consider the issue here
either. 2 The Court ended on a
cautionary note, explaining that the prosecutor had linked Marsh
with Williams’ confession in his closing argument. Thus, the Court
observed, “the prosecutor [had] sought to undo the effect of the
limiting instruction by urging the jury to use Williams’ confession
in evaluating [Marsh’s] case.” 481 U. S., at 211. If a claim
of error on this count were preserved, the Court suggested that
relief could be appropriate. Ibid . 3 The prosecution also
introduced a written copy of the confession with Gray’s and
Vanlandigham’s names omitted, “leaving in their place blank white
spaces separated by commas.” Gray , 523 U. S., at
189. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–196

															_________________

															ADAM SAMIA, aka SAL, aka ADAM SAMIC,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[June 23, 2023]

															Justice Barrett, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.

															I agree that the admission of Stillwell’s
modified confession, together with a limiting instruction, did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. But in my view, the historical
evidence described in Part II–A, ante , is beside the
point.

															First is a timing problem. The evidence is
largely from the late 19th and early 20th centuries—far too late to
inform the meaning of the Confrontation Clause “at the time of the
founding.” Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S.
36 , 54 (2004). The Court seems to agree, because it does not
suggest that the history is probative of original meaning. But nor
does it explain why this seemingly random time period matters. For
whatever reason (the parties only speculate), there appears to be
little founding-era evidence illustrating how courts handled the
admission of a codefendant’s confession. So why not simply say that
the history is inconclusive? And if we are going to pick up the
thread in 1878, why drop it in 1896? Ante , at 7. Are cases
from 1896 that much more important than cases from, say, the 1940s?
While the Court makes a claim about “longstanding practice” for
“most of our Nation’s history,” ante , at 6, it describes
only a snapshot.

															That brings me to my second problem: the
substance of the snapshot. The cited cases address the rules of
evidence rather than the Confrontation Clause. Ante , at 6–8.
On top of that, the two federal cases do not discuss the
effectiveness of limiting instructions, much less any need for
redaction. Sparf v. United States holds that the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule does not apply to
statements made after the conspiracy has ended. 156 U.S.
51 , 56 (1895). Emphasizing the trial court’s error in admitting
the statements against both defendants, the Court explained that
the trial court should have admitted them against the speaker and
excluded them against his codefendant. Id. , at 58. Neither
limiting instructions nor redaction came up. United States v. Ball is similarly tangential to Samia’s case. 163 U.S.
662 (1896). There, the Court held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in trying three codefendants together. Id. , at 672. As support for that point, the Court noted that
when the Government introduced the admissions of one defendant,
“the [trial] court at once said, in the presence of the jury, that,
of course, it would be only evidence against him, if he said
anything; and the court was not afterwards requested to make any
further ruling upon this point.” Ibid. The Court assumed in
passing that the limiting instruction was effective—but the
codefendants did not argue otherwise, and they did not ask the
court to alter the statements.

															The two state cases at least address (and
endorse) the use of a limiting instruction after the admission of a
codefendant’s confession. State v. Workman 15
S. C. 540, 545 (1881); Jones v. Commonwealth , 72
Va. 836, 839–840 (1878). One even holds that a trial court should
not alter a statement by redacting a codefendant’s name. Workman , 15 S. C., at 545. Like the federal cases,
though, the state cases make no mention of the confrontation right.
Same for the treatises cited by the Court. See S. Phillipps, Law of
Evidence *82–*83 (1816); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2100, p. 2841, and
n. 5 (1904). So for all we know, the cases cited by the Court and
the treatises proceed from the premise that an ordinary hearsay
rule, as opposed to a constitutional right, was on the line. That
weakens the importance of these sources, because courts might have
gone to greater lengths (for example, redaction) to ensure that a
jury did not consider a declaration whose admission would violate
the State or Federal Constitution. Bruton v. United
States , after all, grounds itself in the Sixth Amendment. 391 U.S.
123 , 126 (1968).

															At best, the evidence recounted in Part II–A
shows that, during a narrow historical period, some courts assumed
and others expressly held that a limiting instruction sufficiently
protected a codefendant from a declaration inadmissible on hearsay
grounds. In suggesting anything more, the Court overclaims. That is
unfortunate. While history is often important and sometimes
dispositive, we should be discriminating in its use. Otherwise, we
risk undermining the force of historical arguments when they matter
most. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–196

															_________________

															ADAM SAMIA, aka SAL, aka ADAM SAMIC,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[June 23, 2023]

															Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Sotomayor and
Justice Jackson join, dissenting.

															Imagine a criminal case involving two
defendants—John and Mary. John and Mary are arrested for robbing
Bill. Before trial, John confesses to the robbery in an interview
with police. But John does more than admit his own involvement; he
also points a finger at Mary. John says to the police: “Mary and I
went out Saturday night and robbed Bill.” Mary, on the other hand,
never confesses to the robbery. She maintains that she wasn’t
involved—in fact, that she never left her home on the night in
question. The government tries John and Mary together. At trial, it
introduces a copy of John’s confession into evidence, and has it
read to the jury by the interviewing officer. But John elects not
to take the stand, leaving Mary’s attorney without an opportunity
to cross-examine him about his confession.

															This Court’s precedent bars the government from
using John’s confession in that way. The Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to
be confronted with the witnesses against” her, which includes the
right to cross-examine those witnesses. See Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S.
400 , 404 (1965). So when two defendants are tried jointly, the
pretrial confession of one identifying the other as involved in the
crime cannot be admitted unless the confessing defendant takes the
stand. That is true, we held in Bruton v. United
States , 391 U.S.
123 (1968), regardless of whether a judge instructs the jury to
consider the evidence only against the confessor (John), and not
against his co-defendant (Mary). Even with that kind of
instruction, a “substantial risk” exists that the jury will
impermissibly rely on John’s confession when determining Mary’s
guilt. Id. , at 126.

															Suppose, though, that the government redacts the
confession to eliminate Mary’s name. Mary still sits in the
courtroom alongside John. But the version of the confession
admitted into evidence now includes a blank space where Mary’s name
belongs. And when the interviewing officer reads the confession to
the jury, he says “deleted” in place of Mary’s name. So instead of
“Mary and I went out Saturday night and robbed Bill,” what the jury
hears is “deleted and I went out Saturday night and robbed
Bill.”

															That confession, too, is inadmissible under our
precedent. Though the confession no longer identifies Mary by name,
the implication is obvious: A juror “need only lift his eyes to
[Mary], sitting at counsel table,” to realize to whom “deleted”
refers. Gray v. Maryland , 523
U.S. 185 , 193 (1998). The redacted confession thus presents the
same risk as the unredacted one—that the jury will consider it as
evidence against Mary even if instructed not to. Because the
confessions “so closely resemble” each other, we have held, “the
law must require the same result.” Id. , at 192.

															Now consider one last option. The government
again modifies the confession to avoid the express reference. But
this time, instead of swapping Mary’s name out for “deleted,” the
government replaces it with the words “a woman.” The line read to
the jury thus becomes: “A woman and I went out Saturday night and
robbed Bill.” In the face of precedent that would bar the
government from using either of the first two versions of John’s
confession, a judge must decide what to do about this one. Would
its admission, too, violate Mary’s right of confrontation?

															The answer should be obvious. A jury is still
going to recognize that John is talking about Mary—for who else
could the mystery “woman” be? This last version of the confession
thus presents the same risk as the first two: that jurors will rely
on John’s confession when assessing Mary’s guilt. Yet in today’s
decision, the Court draws a line of constitutional significance
between the first two examples and the third. Confessions that use
a defendant’s name or a symbol of omission—clear Confrontation
Clause violation. Confessions that replace a defendant’s name with
another placeholder—no Sixth Amendment problem, no matter how
obvious the reference to the defendant. In so elevating form over
substance, the majority permits an end-run around our precedent and
undermines a vital constitutional protection for the accused.

															I

															Start with Bruton , the foundation of
this Court’s precedent on the introduction of confessions at joint
trials. The government, we held in that case, cannot introduce a
confession by a non-testifying defendant that names a co-defendant
as an accomplice. Admitting the confession against the co-defendant
would violate her Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses.
See 391 U. S., at 126. And an instruction to the jury to
disregard the confession when assessing the co-defendant’s guilt
cannot remove the constitutional problem. That is because of the
effect that such a “powerfully incriminating extrajudicial
statement[ ]” is likely to have on a jury. Id. , at
135–136. In this context, “the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow [the instruction] is so great, and the consequences
of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. , at
135.

															The Bruton rule applies even when an
accusatory confession does not expressly name the co-defendant. Bruton , we have held, bars the use of confessions “that
replace[ ] a name with an obvious blank space or symbol or
word such as ‘deleted.’ ” Gray , 523 U. S., at 189.
(So the Bruton rule extends beyond the first John-and-Mary
hypothetical to the second.) And similarly, Bruton bars the
admission of “confessions that use shortened first names,
nicknames, [and] descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired,
bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp.’ ” Gray , 523
U. S., at 195; accord, ante , at 14. The Court assumed,
for example, that at a joint trial of four defendants—three Black,
one white— Bruton required the exclusion of two of the Black
defendants’ confessions because they referred to the “white guy” as
a participant in the crime. Harrington v. California , 395 U.S.
250 , 252–253 (1969); see Gray , 523 U. S., at 195.
Though confessions of that kind do not expressly name a
non-confessing defendant, they still point directly at him. See id. , at 194. They thus raise the same constitutional
concern—that jurors will consider the confession’s accusation in
evaluating the non-confessing defendant’s guilt.

															Until today, Bruton ’s application turned
on the effect a confession is likely to have on the jury, as a
comparison of two of our decisions shows. In Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S.
200 , 211 (1987), we approved the admission of a confession
“redacted to eliminate not only [a co-defendant’s] name, but any
reference to his or her existence.” Despite that complete
redaction, the confession served to incriminate the co-defendant
later in the trial, when her own testimony placed her in a car ride
that the confession described. See id. , at 206, 208. But we
thought that a confession that incriminated only “by connection”
with subsequent evidence was neither so “vivid” nor so
“powerful[ ]” as a confession that “incriminat[ed] on its
face.” Id. , at 208–209. For that reason, we thought, the
jury was more “likely [to] obey the instruction” to disregard the
confession as to the co-defendant. Id. , at 208. But we held
in Gray that the calculus is different when a confession
“refers directly to the ‘existence’ of the nonconfessing
defendant,” even though not by name. 523 U. S., at 192. Such a
confession itself points a finger at a co-defendant, so that the
jury can “immediately” and “vivid[ly]” grasp how it implicates her. Id. , at 196. The impact is so similar to naming the
defendant that “the law must require the same result.” Id. ,
at 192. In both situations, the confession’s “powerfully
incriminating” effect “creates a special, and vital, need for
cross-examination”—just as if “the codefendant pointed directly to
the defendant in the courtroom.” Id. , at 194.

															Consider against that backdrop the facts of this
case. Petitioner Adam Samia was tried jointly with two
co-defendants—Joseph Hunter and Carl David Stillwell—on charges
related to a murder committed in the Philippines. According to the
prosecution’s theory of the case, Paul LeRoux, the head of a
transnational criminal organization, ordered the killing; and
Hunter, one of LeRoux’s managers, hired Samia and Stillwell as
hitmen. Before trial, Stillwell confessed to federal agents that
both he and Samia were present at the murder, but told them that
Samia was the triggerman. On that version of events, Samia shot the
victim in a van that Stillwell was driving. App. 42–43, 45. At
trial, one of the agents testified about Stillwell’s confession,
replacing Samia’s name with placeholders like “somebody else” and
“the other person.” Id. , at 75. So, for example, when the
prosecutor asked the agent what Stillwell had said about his
arrival in the Philippines, the agent answered: “He stated that he
had met somebody else over there.” Ibid . And when asked
whether Stillwell had recounted the crime, the agent testified:
“Yes. He described a time when the other person he was with pulled
the trigger on that woman in a van that he and Mr. Stillwell was
driving.” Id. , at 76.

															From the jury’s perspective, the identity of the
triggerman would have been obvious. The jury knew from the start of
trial that there were just three defendants. It knew based on the
prosecutor’s opening statement that those defendants were on trial
for offenses related to a death in the Philippines. And it knew the
role that each defendant allegedly played in the crime: Hunter had
hired Stillwell and Samia as hitmen, and those two men carried out
the murder. In fact, the prosecutor began his opening statement
with the exact sequence of events Stillwell had described in his
interview: The prosecutor told jurors that Samia “shot [the victim]
twice in the face” while the victim “was riding in the backseat of
a van driven” by Stillwell. Id. , at 52. So when the federal
agent took the stand on day two of the trial, it didn’t make a lick
of difference that he didn’t identify the shooter by name, but
instead used placeholder terms. Any reasonable juror would have
realized immediately—and without reference to any other
evidence—that “the other person” who “pulled the trigger” was
Samia.

															That fact makes Stillwell’s confession
inadmissible under our Bruton precedent. The agent’s
testimony about the confession pointed a finger straight at Samia,
no less than if the agent had used Samia’s name or called him
“deleted.”

															II

															So how does the majority reach a contrary
result? The nomenclature it adopts isn’t the problem: In describing Bruton ’s scope, the majority distinguishes “between
confessions that directly implicate a defendant and those that do
so indirectly.” Ante , at 10, 14–15. That distinction roughly
tracks the one this Court has recognized between confessions that
themselves incriminate a co-defendant (directly implicate) and
those that become incriminating only when linked with
later-introduced evidence (indirectly implicate). See supra ,
at 4–5. But the majority distorts that distinction beyond
recognition when applying it to the facts of this case. In one
blink-and-you-miss-it paragraph of analysis, the majority holds
that Stillwell’s confession does not “directly” implicate Samia for
two reasons. It “was redacted to avoid naming Samia.” Ante ,
at 15. And the redaction was “not akin to an obvious blank or the
word ‘deleted.’ ” Ibid. That analysis altogether fails to capture what
our Bruton cases care about. This Court has already made
clear that the first fact relied on—that Stillwell’s confession did
not use Samia’s name—is not dispositive. See supra , at 3–4.
A confession redacted with a blank space, after all, also avoids
naming the defendant; yet Gray held that it falls within Bruton ’s scope. So today’s decision must rest on the second
feature of the confession: that the placeholder used ( e.g. ,
“the other person”) was neither a blank space nor the word
“deleted.” But that distinction makes nonsense of the Bruton rule. Bruton ’s application has always turned on a
confession’s inculpatory impact. See, e.g. , Cruz v. New York , 481 U.S.
186 , 193 (1987) (considering “the likelihood that [a limiting]
instruction will be disregarded” and “the probability that such
disregard will have a devastating effect”). And as the
John-and-Mary examples make clear, a confession that swaps in a
phrase like “the other person” for a defendant’s name may
incriminate just as powerfully as one that swaps in a blank space.
See supra , at 1–3. So the majority warps our Bruton precedent by categorically putting the two on opposite sides of the
constitutional line. As the Court remarked in another case about Bruton , “[t]he law cannot command respect” if we apply such
“inexplicable”—and indeed unprincipled—line-drawing to a
“constitutional imperative.” Cruz , 481 U. S., at
193.

															Contrary to the majority’s claim, Gray repudiates rather than supports the distinction adopted today. In
holding that Bruton ’s protections extend beyond confessions
with names to confessions with blanks, Gray explained that
what should matter is not a confession’s form but its effects. A
jury, Gray noted, “will often react similarly” to the two
kinds of confessions; the blank space (rather than name) is “not
likely [to] fool anyone.” 523 U. S., at 193. Ignoring Gray ’s forest for one tree, the majority points to a passage
in which the Court described how a confession in the case could
have been further redacted: Instead of saying “[m]e, deleted,
deleted, and a few other guys,” the witness could have said “[m]e
and a few other guys.” Id. , at 196. But on Gray ’s
particular facts, the latter version was unproblematic. The crime
was a gang assault involving six perpetrators, while only one other
person was on trial with the confessing defendant. The “[m]e and a
few other guys” phrase thus did not point a finger directly at the
co-defendant, as “the other person” phrase here did at Samia. The
more relevant reference discussed in Gray was to the “white
guy” in a trial with only one white defendant, as described above. Id. , at 195; see supra , at 4. Gray left no
doubt that the confession with that phrase should have been
excluded—and for the same reason as the confession with “deleted.”
When a modified confession has an “accusatory” effect “similar” to
one with names, the Court reasoned, the law “require[s] the same
result.” Id. , at 192, 194. Gray could not have cared
less whether the modification takes the form of a blank space or of
a different, but no less accusatory, placeholder.

															The practical concerns the majority cites in
support of its decision are equally flimsy. On the majority’s view,
a ruling for Samia would require courts to conduct “extensive
pretrial hearings” reviewing “the Government’s case in its
entirety.” Ante , at 16. But that charge is a strawman—and
one that Gray already knocked down. See 523 U. S., at
197. The Bruton rule—whether applying to confessions with
names, with blanks, or with other placeholders—demands only that a
court consider “in advance of trial” such matters as the content of
the confession, the number of defendants, and the prosecution’s
general theory of the case. Cruz , 481 U. S., at 193;
see Gray , 523 U. S., at 197; cf. Richardson , 481
U. S., at 209 (noting that a more demanding inquiry would be
needed if Bruton applied to confessions incriminating only
“by connection” with later-introduced evidence). Courts have long
considered those basic factors when applying Bruton .[ 1 ] And the
Government has proved unable to cite a single case—including in
Circuits applying Bruton to confessions like Stillwell’s—in
which doing so created “administrability” issues, much less “fewer
joint trials.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 93–96.[ 2 ] In any event, greater “convenience in the
administration of the law,” as Bruton noted, cannot come at
the expense “of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty.”
391 U. S., at 135. “That price,” we recognized then, “is too
high.” Ibid. With nothing else to support it, the majority
reaches for two props inconsistent with Bruton itself. One
is the “presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions.” Ante , at 8–9. The majority correctly describes that
presumption; it just forgets that the presumption does not apply
when the evidence at issue is an accusatory co-defendant
confession. Bruton could not have been clearer on the point:
“[W]e cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute
for [a defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination.” 391
U. S., at 137; see Gray , 523 U. S., at 192
(stating that co-defendant confessions are “so prejudicial that
limiting instructions cannot work”); Richardson , 481
U. S., at 208 (noting “the overwhelming probability of
[jurors’] inability” to follow instructions to disregard
co-defendant confessions); see supra , at 3. And the majority
does no better in invoking “historical evidentiary practice.” See ante , at 6–8. One point here is Justice Barrett’s: There
just isn’t much history helping the majority. See ante , at
1–3 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But
assume for a moment to the contrary: Suppose with the majority that
at some relevant time, courts conducting joint trials admitted
unredacted co-defendant confessions subject only to limiting
instructions. Ante , at 6–8. If that history controlled, Bruton itself would have been wrongly decided. The
majority’s real views thus come into focus. The point of its
opinion is not to distinguish the confession here from the one in Bruton . The point is to say why Bruton should go.

															*  *  *

															And so one might wonder after reading today’s
decision whether Bruton is the next precedent on this
Court’s chopping block. The one reason it may not be is that there
is now no need for formal overruling: Under this decision,
prosecutors can always circumvent Bruton ’s protections.
Consider once more John’s confession implicating Mary in a
robbery—a confession, I’ll now add, bearing a striking resemblance
to the one in Bruton . See 391 U. S., at 124 (“A postal
inspector testified that Evans orally confessed to him that Evans
and [Bruton] committed the armed robbery”). The Bruton rule
will still bar the prosecution from using the original version of
John’s confession, expressly naming Mary. So too the rule will
prevent the prosecution from swapping out Mary’s name for a blank
space or the word “deleted.” But no worries—the government now has
a functionally equivalent placeholder at its (Court-sanctioned)
disposal. It can simply replace Mary’s name with “a woman,” and the Bruton issue will go away. But contrary to today’s decision,
the serious Sixth Amendment problem remains. Now, defendants in
joint trials will not have the chance to confront some of the most
damaging witnesses against them. And a constitutional right once
guaranteeing that opportunity will no longer. It will become, in
joint trials, a shell of its former self. I respectfully
dissent. Notes 1 See, e.g. , United States v. Straker , 800 F.3d 570, 595–601 (CADC
2015); United States v. Hardwick , 544 F.3d 565, 573
(CA3 2008); United States v. Vega Molina , 407 F.3d 511 , 520–521 (CA1 2005); United States v. Williams , 429 F.3d 767 , 773–774 (CA8 2005); United States v. Hernandez , 330 F.3d 964 , 973–974 (CA7 2003). 2 Seriously, the
Government’s only proffered complaint when asked to expound on
administrability issues was with one appellate decision that took
“six double-column F. 3d pages” to review the trial court’s Bruton ruling. Tr. of Oral Arg. 96. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–196

															_________________

															ADAM SAMIA, aka SAL, aka ADAM SAMIC,
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[June 23, 2023]

															Justice Jackson, dissenting.

															I join Justice Kagan’s dissent in full, and
agree, in particular, with her insight that the majority’s
bottom-line view is that “ Bruton should go.” Ante , at
10. I am writing to emphasize that most of the force of the Court’s
argument (to the extent that it is at all forceful) comes from the
majority having improperly reframed the constitutional standard
that applies to the admission of incriminating testimonial
statements of a codefendant during a joint criminal trial.

															Under the majority’s approach, the default rule
is that a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminating confession is
admissible, so long as it is accompanied by a limiting instruction. Ante , at 6, 9, 17. Thus, for present purposes, the majority
repeatedly calls Bruton v. United States , 391 U.S.
123 (1968), a “ ‘narrow exception’ ” to this default
rule. Ante , at 9, 12, 15. And the thrust of the majority’s
holding is that the so-called Bruton exception is—and must
be—narrow: Bruton is a pesky deviation that requires the
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence (hence, the ease with
which the majority contemplates dispensing with that
precedent).

															That approach inverts the constitutional
principles that govern this case. Under our well-established Sixth
Amendment precedents, the Court’s analysis must, instead, start from the premise that the introduction of Stillwell’s
inculpatory confession during the joint trial threatened Samia’s
Confrontation Clause rights. The introduction of a “testimonial”
statement from an unavailable declarant violates the Confrontation
Clause unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S.
36 , 59, 68 (2004). And, here, there is no dispute that
Stillwell’s statement to law enforcement was testimonial, that
Stillwell was an unavailable declarant, and that Samia had no
opportunity to cross-examine Stillwell. Therefore, the default
presumption in this case should have been that Stillwell’s
confession was not admissible at his and Samia’s joint
trial, because the statement implicated Samia on its face, and
Samia could not cross-examine the declarant.[ 1 ]*

															When the Government attempted to nonetheless
introduce Stillwell’s inculpatory confession notwithstanding
Samia’s inability to cross-examine him, it sought an exception from the Confrontation Clause’s exclusion mandate.
Before today, this Court had never held that a limiting
instruction, combined with a redaction that merely replaces the
defendant’s name, sufficiently “cures” the constitutional problem.
In Bruton , the Court rejected the idea of an exception
entirely—it entertained permitting such an exception in light of a
limiting instruction given at trial, but the Court ultimately
declined to adopt one. 391 U. S., at 137 (“[I]n the context of
a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate
substitute for petitioner’s constitutional right of
cross-examination”). Then, in Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S.
185 (1998), the Government tried again to get an exception to
the Confrontation Clause—this time adding an obvious redaction of
the defendant’s name in the confession on top of the limiting
instruction—but this Court once again rebuffed such efforts. Id. , at 188. Indeed, the only prior case in which this Court
has permitted an exception to the baseline confrontation rule of
exclusion was one in which the confession at issue arguably was not
even “against” the defendant in the first place, as it did not
incriminate the accused in any way until the defendant herself
introduced evidence that rendered the confession inculpatory. Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S.
200 , 206, 208, 211 (1987).

															Collectively, our precedents properly recognize
the necessary narrowness of any exception to the default Bruton principle that the Government’s introduction of an
inculpatory confession during a joint trial poses a substantial
constitutional problem. Not anymore. With today’s ruling, the
majority fails to acknowledge what is the default rule and what is
the exception. And it thereby sets the stage for considerable
erosion of the Confrontation Clause right that Bruton protects.

															Properly understood, the Bruton question
actually raises two distinct issues: one about whether there is a
Confrontation Clause problem in the first place, and a second about
potential cures (like redactions and limiting instructions) for
that constitutional dilemma. The majority skips over the first
question today; its analysis essentially assumes that there is no
Sixth Amendment problem in the first place, which then allows for
an unwarranted expansion of what should be a narrow exception to
the default principle of exclusion. In other words, the Court has
now turned our Bruton cases on their head in a manner that
risks undermining a core Sixth Amendment right. Notes 1 *Contrary to the Government’s
suggestion (see Brief for United States 12, 32), a codefendant’s
confession implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights even if
it does “not directly accuse [the defendant] of wrongdoing,” but
“rather . . . is inculpatory only when taken together
with other evidence,” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S.
305 , 313 (2009). That conclusion follows from the text of the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right of the accused to
“confron[t]” “witnesses against him” (emphasis added), not
just those witnesses who “ ‘facially incriminat[e]’ ”
him, contra, ante , at 9–10.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a non-testifying co-defendant's confession can be admitted as evidence in a joint trial if it is modified to avoid directly identifying the defendant and accompanied by a limiting instruction to the jury. This expands on previous rulings in Bruton v. United States and Gray v. Maryland, which held that such confessions were generally inadmissible due to concerns over the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Court's decision considered historical practice, the presumption that jurors follow instructions, and relevant precedents.