U.S. Supreme Court California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565 (1991) California v. Acevedo No. 89-1690 Argued Jan . 8, 1991 Decided May 30, 1991 500
U.S. 565 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT Syllabus Police observed respondent Acevedo leave an apartment, known to
contain marijuana, with a brown paper bag the size of marijuana
packages they had seen earlier. He placed the bag in his car's
trunk, and, as he drove away, they stopped the car, opened the
trunk and the bag, and found marijuana. Acevedo's motion to
suppress the marijuana was denied, and he pleaded guilty to
possession of marijuana for sale. The California Court of Appeal
held that the marijuana should have been suppressed. Finding that
the officers had probable cause to believe that the bag contained
drugs but lacked probable cause to suspect that the car, itself,
otherwise contained contraband, the court concluded that the case
was controlled by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , which held that police could seize movable luggage or
other closed containers, but could not open them without a warrant,
since, inter alia, a person has a heightened privacy
expectation in such containers. Held: Police, in a search extending only to a container
within an automobile, may search the container without a warrant
where they have probable cause to believe that it holds contraband
or evidence. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 -- which held that a warrantless search of an
automobile based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained evidence of crime in the light of an exigency arising out
of the vehicle's likely disappearance did not contravene the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause -- provides one rule to govern all
automobile searches. Pp. 500 U. S.
569 -581.

															(a) Separate doctrines have permitted the warrantless search of
an automobile to include a search of closed containers found inside
the car when there is probable cause to search the vehicle, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , but
prohibited the warrantless search of a closed container located in
a moving vehicle when there is probable cause to search only the
container, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 . Pp. 500 U. S.
569 -572.

															(b) The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude
this Court from eliminating the warrant requirement of Sanders, which was specifically undermined in Ross. The Chadwick-Sanders rule affords minimal
protection to privacy interests. Police, knowing that they may open
a bag only if they are searching the entire car, may search more
extensively Page 500 U. S. 566 than they otherwise would in order to establish the probable
cause Ross requires. Cf. United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 . And
they may seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search
warrant or search it without a warrant as a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Moreover, the search of a paper bag intrudes far
less on individual privacy than does the incursion sanctioned in Carroll, where prohibition agents slashed a car's
upholstery. The Chadwick-Sanders rule also is the
antithesis of a clear and unequivocal guideline and, thus, has
confused courts and police officers and impeded effective law
enforcement. United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 ; Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U.
S. 146 , distinguished. Pp. 500 U. S.
572 -579.

															(c) This holding neither extends the Carroll doctrine
nor broadens the scope of permissible automobile searches. In the
instant case, the probable cause the police had to believe that the
bag in the car's trunk contained marijuana now allows a warrantless
search of the bag, but the record reveals no probable cause to
search the entire vehicle. P. 500 U. S.
579 -580. 216 Cal. App.
3d 586 , 265 Cal. Rptr.
23 , reversed and remanded.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 500 U. S. 581 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 500 U. S. 585 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined, post, p. 500 U. S.
585 .

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case requires us once again to consider the so-called
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment and its application to the search of a closed container
in the trunk of a car. I On October 28, 1987, Officer Coleman of the Santa Ana, Cal.,
Police Department received a telephone call from a federal Page 500 U. S. 567 drug enforcement agent in Hawaii. The agent informed Coleman
that he had seized a package containing marijuana which was to have
been delivered to the Federal Express Office in Santa Ana and which
was addressed to J.R. Daza at 805 West Stevens Avenue in that city.
The agent arranged to send the package to Coleman instead. Coleman
then was to take the package to the Federal Express office and
arrest the person who arrived to claim it.

															Coleman received the package on October 29, verified its
contents, and took it to the Senior Operations Manager at the
Federal Express office. At about 10:30 a.m. on October 30, a man,
who identified himself as Jamie Daza, arrived to claim the package.
He accepted it and drove to his apartment on West Stevens. He
carried the package into the apartment.

															At 11:45 a.m., officers observed Daza leave the apartment and
drop the box and paper that had contained the marijuana into a
trash bin. Coleman at that point left the scene to get a search
warrant. About 12:05 p.m., the officers saw Richard St. George
leave the apartment carrying a blue knapsack which appeared to be
half full. The officers stopped him as he was driving off, searched
the knapsack, and found 1 1/2 pounds of marijuana.

															At 12:30 p.m., respondent Charles Steven Acevedo arrived. He
entered Daza's apartment, stayed for about 10 minutes, and
reappeared carrying a brown paper bag that looked full. The
officers noticed that the bag was the size of one of the wrapped
marijuana packages sent from Hawaii. Acevedo walked to a silver
Honda in the parking lot. He placed the bag in the trunk of the car
and started to drive away. Fearing the loss of evidence, officers
in a marked police car stopped him. They opened the trunk and the
bag, and found marijuana. [ Footnote
1 ] Page 500 U. S. 568 Respondent was charged in state court with possession of
marijuana for sale, in violation of Cal.Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 11359 (West Supp.1987). App. 2. He moved to suppress the
marijuana found in the car. The motion was denied. He then pleaded
guilty, but appealed the denial of the suppression motion.

															The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, concluded that
the marijuana found in the paper bag in the car's trunk should have
been suppressed. People v. Acevedo, 216 Cal. App.
3d 586 , 265 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1990). The court concluded that the officers had probable
cause to believe that the paper bag contained drugs, but lacked
probable cause to suspect that Acevedo's car, itself, otherwise
contained contraband. Because the officers' probable cause was
directed specifically at the bag, the court held that the case was
controlled by United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 (1977), rather than by United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). Although the court agreed that the officers could seize the
paper bag, it held that, under Chadwick, they could not
open the bag without first obtaining a warrant for that purpose.
The court then recognized "the anomalous nature" of the dichotomy
between the rule in Chadwick and the rule in Ross. 216 Cal. App. 3d at 592, 265 Cal. Rptr. at 27. That
dichotomy dictates that, if there is probable cause to search a
car, then the entire car -- including any closed container found
therein -- may be searched without a warrant, but if there is
probable cause only as to a container in the car, the container may
be held, but not searched, until a warrant is obtained.

															The Supreme Court of California denied the State's petition for
review. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33. On May 14, 1990, JUSTICE
O'CONNOR stayed enforcement of the Court of Appeal's judgment
pending the disposition of the State's petition for certiorari,
and, if that petition were granted, the issuance of the mandate of
this Court.

															We granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 807 (1990), to reexamine the law
applicable to a closed container in an automobile, a Page 500 U. S. 569 subject that has troubled courts and law enforcement officers
since it was first considered in Chadwick. II The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Contemporaneously with the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the First Congress, and, later,
the Second and Fourth Congresses, distinguished between the need
for a warrant to search for contraband concealed in "a dwelling
house or similar place" and the need for a warrant to search for
contraband concealed in a movable vessel. See Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 151 (1925). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 , 116 U. S.
623 -624 (1886). In Carroll, this Court
established an exception to the warrant requirement for moving
vehicles, for it recognized

															"a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."

															267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 153 .
It therefore held that a warrantless search of an automobile based
upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence
of crime in the light of an exigency arising out of the likely
disappearance of the vehicle did not contravene the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 267 U. S.
158 -159.

															The Court refined the exigency requirement in Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), when it held that the existence of exigent circumstances
was to be determined at the time the automobile is seized. The car
search at issue in Page 500 U. S. 570 Chambers took place at the police station, where the
vehicle was immobilized, some time after the driver had been
arrested. Given probable cause and exigent circumstances at the
time the vehicle was first stopped, the Court held that the later
warrantless search at the station passed constitutional muster. The
validity of the later search derived from the ruling in Carroll that an immediate search without a warrant at the
moment of seizure would have been permissible. See
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 51 . The Court reasoned in Chambers that the police could search later whenever they could have
searched earlier, had they so chosen. Id. at 399 U. S. 51 -52.
Following Chambers, if the police have probable cause to
justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public roadway,
they may conduct either an immediate or a delayed search of the
vehicle.

															In United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 , decided in 1982, we held that a warrantless
search of an automobile under the Carroll doctrine could
include a search of a container or package found inside the car
when such a search was supported by probable cause. The warrantless
search of Ross' car occurred after an informant told the police
that he had seen Ross complete a drug transaction using drugs
stored in the trunk of his car. The police stopped the car,
searched it, and discovered in the trunk a brown paper bag
containing drugs. We decided that the search of Ross' car was not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment:

															"The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no
narrower -- and no broader -- than the scope of a search authorized
by a warrant supported by probable cause." Id. at 456 U. S. 823 .
Thus,

															"[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and
its contents that may conceal the object of the search." Id. at 456 U. S. 825 .
In Ross, therefore, we clarified the scope of the Carroll doctrine as properly including a "probing search"
of compartments and containers within the automobile so long as the
search is supported by probable cause. Id. at 456 U. S.
800 . Page 500 U. S. 571 In addition to this clarification, Ross distinguished
the Carroll doctrine from the separate rule that governed
the search of closed containers. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 817 .
The Court had announced this separate rule, unique to luggage and
other closed packages, bags, and containers, in United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977).
In Chadwick, federal narcotics agents had probable cause
to believe that a 200-pound double-locked footlocker contained
marijuana. The agents tracked the locker as the defendants removed
it from a train and carried it through the station to a waiting
car. As soon as the defendants lifted the locker into the trunk of
the car, the agents arrested them, seized the locker, and searched
it. In this Court, the United States did not contend that the
locker's brief contact with the automobile's trunk sufficed to make
the Carroll doctrine applicable. Rather, the United States
urged that the search of movable luggage could be considered
analogous to the search of an automobile. 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
11 -12.

															The Court rejected this argument because, it reasoned, a person
expects more privacy in his luggage and personal effects than he
does in his automobile. Id. at 433 U. S. 13 .
Moreover, it concluded that, as "may often not be the case when
automobiles are seized," secure storage facilities are usually
available when the police seize luggage. Id. at 433 U. S. 13 , n.
7.

															In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 (1979), the Court extended Chadwick's rule to apply to a suitcase actually being transported in the trunk
of a car. In Sanders, the police had probable cause to
believe a suitcase contained marijuana. They watched as the
defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and was driven
away. The police pursued the taxi for several blocks, stopped it,
found the suitcase in the trunk, and searched it. Although the
Court had applied the Carroll doctrine to searches of
integral parts of the automobile itself, (indeed, in Carroll, contraband whiskey was in the upholstery of the
seats, see 267 U.S. at 267 U. S.
136 ), it did not extend the doctrine to the warrantless
search of personal luggage Page 500 U. S. 572 "merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped
by the police." 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 765 .
Again, the Sanders majority stressed the heightened
privacy expectation in personal luggage, and concluded that the
presence of luggage in an automobile did not diminish the owner's
expectation of privacy in his personal items. Id. at 442 U. S.
764 -765. Cf. California v. Carney, 471 U.
S. 386 (1985).

															In Ross, the Court endeavored to distinguish between Carroll, which governed the Ross automobile
search, and Chadwick, which governed the Sanders
automobile search. It held that the Carroll doctrine
covered searches of automobiles when the police had probable cause
to search an entire vehicle, but that the Chadwick doctrine governed searches of luggage when the officers had
probable cause to search only a container within the vehicle. Thus,
in a Ross situation, the police could conduct a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment without obtaining a warrant,
whereas in a Sanders situation, the police had to obtain a
warrant before they searched.

															JUSTICE STEVENS is correct, of course, that Ross involved the scope of an automobile search. See post at 500 U. S. 592 . Ross held that closed containers encountered by the police
during a warrantless search of a car pursuant to the automobile
exception could also be searched. Thus, this Court in Ross took the critical step of saying that closed containers in cars
could be searched without a warrant because of their presence
within the automobile. Despite the protection that Sanders purported to extend to closed containers, the privacy interest in
those closed containers yielded to the broad scope of an automobile
search. III The facts in this case closely resemble the facts in Ross. In Ross, the police had probable cause to
believe that drugs were stored in the trunk of a particular car. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 800 .
Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the police had
probable cause to believe that respondent was Page 500 U. S. 573 carrying marijuana in a bag in his car's trunk. [ Footnote 2 ] 216 Cal. App. 3d at 590, 265 Cal.
Rptr. at 25. Furthermore, for what it is worth, in Ross, as here, the drugs in the trunk were contained in a brown paper
bag.

															This Court in Ross rejected Chadwick's distinction between containers and cars. It concluded that the
expectation of privacy in one's vehicle is equal to one's
expectation of privacy in the container, and noted that "the
privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no
less than those in a movable container." 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 823 .
It also recognized that it was arguable that the same exigent
circumstances that permit a warrantless search of an automobile
would justify the warrantless search of a movable container. Id. at 456 U. S. 809 .
In deference to the rule of Chadwick and Sanders, however, the Court put that question to one side. Id. at 456 U. S.
809 -810. It concluded that the time and expense of the
warrant process would be misdirected if the police could search
every cubic inch of an automobile until they discovered a paper
sack, at which point the Fourth Amendment required them to take the
sack to a magistrate for permission to look inside. We now must
decide the question deferred in Ross: whether the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant to open the sack
in a movable vehicle simply because they lack probable cause to
search the entire car. We conclude that it does not. IV Dissenters in Ross asked why the suitcase in Sanders was

															"more private, less difficult for police to seize and store, or
in Page 500 U. S. 574 any other relevant respect more properly subject to the warrant
requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable
cause search of an entire automobile?" Id. 456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
839 -840. We now agree that a container found after a
general search of the automobile and a container found in a car
after a limited search for the container are equally easy for the
police to store and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we
see no principled distinction in terms of either the privacy
expectation or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag
found by the police in Ross and the paper bag found by the
police here. Furthermore, by attempting to distinguish between a
container for which the police are specifically searching and a
container which they come across in a car, we have provided only
minimal protection for privacy, and have impeded effective law
enforcement.

															The line between probable cause to search a vehicle and probable
cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always clear, and
separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched may
enable the police to broaden their power to make warrantless
searches and disserve privacy interests. We noted this in Ross in the context of a search of an entire vehicle.
Recognizing that, under Carroll, the "entire vehicle
itself . . . could be searched without a warrant," we concluded
that

															"prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in
which the object of the search is most likely to be found, and
instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle, would
actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests."

															456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 821 ,
n. 28. At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be
less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of
certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply
contains drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if
they are actually searching the entire car, they may search more
extensively Page 500 U. S. 575 than they otherwise would in order to establish the general
probable cause required by Ross. Such a situation is not far-fetched. In United States v.
Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985), customs agents saw two trucks drive to a private airstrip
and approach two small planes. The agents drew near the trucks,
smelled marijuana, and then saw in the backs of the trucks packages
wrapped in a manner that marijuana smugglers customarily employed.
The agents took the trucks to headquarters and searched the
packages without a warrant. Id. at 469 U. S. 481 .
Relying on Chadwick, the defendants argued that the search
was unlawful. Id. at 469 U. S. 482 .
The defendants contended that Ross was inapplicable
because the agents lacked probable cause to search anything but the
packages themselves, and supported this contention by noting that a
search of the entire vehicle never occurred. Id. at 469 U. S. 483 .
We rejected that argument, and found Chadwick and Sanders inapposite because the agents had probable cause
to search the entire body of each truck, although they had chosen
not to do so. Id. at 469 U. S.
482 -483. We cannot see the benefit of a rule that
requires law enforcement officers to conduct a more intrusive
search in order to justify a less intrusive

															To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects
privacy, its protection is minimal. Law enforcement officers may
seize a container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 13 .

															"Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize
the property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases." Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 770 (dissenting opinion). And the police often will be able to search
containers without a warrant, despite the Chadwick-Sanders rule, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. In New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court said: Page 500 U. S. 576 "[W]e hold that, when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile."

															"It follows from this conclusion that the police may also
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment." Id. at 453 U. S. 460 (footnote omitted). Under Belton, the same probable cause
to believe that a container holds drugs will allow the police to
arrest the person transporting the container and search it.

															Finally, the search of a paper bag intrudes far less on
individual privacy than does the incursion sanctioned long ago in Carroll. In that case, prohibition agents slashed the
upholstery of the automobile. This Court nonetheless found their
search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. If destroying
the interior of an automobile is not unreasonable, we cannot
conclude that looking inside a closed container is. In light of the
minimal protection to privacy afforded by the Chadwick-Sanders rule, and our serious doubt whether that
rule substantially serves privacy interests, we now hold that the
Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an
automobile search that extends only to a container within the
vehicle. V The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only has failed to
protect privacy, but it has also confused courts and police
officers and impeded effective law enforcement. The conflict
between the Carroll doctrine cases and the Chadwick-Sanders line has been criticized in academic
commentary. See, e.g., Gardner, Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in
a Post- Ross World, 62 Neb.L.Rev. 1 (1983); Latzer,
Searching Cars and Their Contents, 18 Crim.L.Bull. 381 (1982);
Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases: The Court Does Little to
Clarify the "Labyrinth" of Judicial Uncertainty, Page 500 U. S. 577 in 3 The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-1981, p. 69
(1982). One leading authority on the Fourth Amendment, after
comparing Chadwick and Sanders with Carroll and its progeny, observed:

															"These two lines of authority cannot be completely reconciled,
and thus how one comes out in the container-in-the-car situation
depends upon which line of authority is used as a point of
departure."

															3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure 53 (2d ed.1987).

															The discrepancy between the two rules has led to confusion for
law enforcement officers. For example, when an officer, who has
developed probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains drugs,
begins to search the vehicle and immediately discovers a closed
container, which rule applies? The defendant will argue that the
fact that the officer first chose to search the container indicates
that his probable cause extended only to the container and that Chadwick and Sanders therefore require a warrant.
On the other hand, the fact that the officer first chose to search
in the most obvious location should not restrict the propriety of
the search. The Chadwick rule, as applied in Sanders, has devolved into an anomaly such that the more
likely the police are to discover drugs in a container, the less
authority they have to search it. We have noted the virtue of
providing " "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law
enforcement profession.'" Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U. S. 146 , 498 U. S. 151 (1990) quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.
S. 675 , 486 U. S. 682 (1988). The Chadwick-Sanders rule is the antithesis of a
"`clear and unequivocal' guideline." JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the decisions of this Court evince a
lack of confusion about the automobile exception. See post at 500 U. S. 594 .
The first case cited by the dissent, United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), however, did not involve an automobile at all. We
considered in Place the temporary detention of luggage in
an airport. Not only was no automobile involved, but the defendant,
Place, was waiting Page 500 U. S. 578 at the airport to board his plane, rather than preparing to
leave the airport in a car. Any similarity to Sanders, in
which the defendant was leaving the airport in a car, is remote, at
best. Place had nothing to do with the automobile
exception, and is inapposite.

															Nor does JUSTICE STEVENS's citation to Oklahoma v.
Castleberry, 471 U. S. 146 (1985), support its contention. Castleberry presented the
same question about the application of the automobile exception to
the search of a closed container that we face here. In Castleberry, we affirmed by an equally divided court. That
result illustrates this Court's continued struggle with the scope
of the automobile exception, rather than the absence of confusion
in applying it.

															JUSTICE STEVENS also argues that law enforcement has not been
impeded because the Court has decided 29 Fourth Amendment cases
since Ross in favor of the government. See post at 500 U. S. 600 .
In each of these cases, the government appeared as the petitioner.
The dissent fails to explain how the loss of 29 cases below, not to
mention the many others which this Court did not hear, did not
interfere with law enforcement. The fact that the state courts and
the federal courts of appeals have been reversed in their Fourth
Amendment holdings 29 times since 1982 further demonstrates the
extent to which our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has confused the
courts.

															Most important, with the exception of Johns, supra, and Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the Fourth Amendment cases cited by the dissent do not
concern automobiles or the automobile exception . From Carroll through Ross, this Court has explained
that automobile searches differ from other searches. The dissent
fails to acknowledge this basic principle, and so misconstrues and
misapplies our Fourth Amendment case law.

															The Chadwick dissenters predicted that the container
rule would have "the perverse result of allowing fortuitous
circumstances to control the outcome" of various searches. 433 Page 500 U. S. 579 U.S. at 433 U. S. 22 . The
rule also was so confusing that, within two years after Chadwick, this Court found it necessary to expound on the
meaning of that decision and explain its application to luggage in
general. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
761 -764. Again, dissenters bemoaned the "inherent
opaqueness" of the difference between the Carroll and Chadwick principles, and noted "the confusion to be
created for all concerned." Id. at 442 U. S. 771 . See also Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , 453 U. S.
425 -426 (1981) (listing cases decided by Federal Courts
of Appeals since Chadwick had been announced). Three years
after Sanders, we returned in Ross to "this
troubled area," 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 817 ,
in order to assert that Sanders had not cut back on Carroll. Although we have recognized firmly that the doctrine of stare decisis serves profoundly important purposes in our
legal system, this Court has overruled a prior case on the
comparatively rare occasion when it has bred confusion or been a
derelict or led to anomalous results. See, e.g., Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 , 430 U. S.
288 -289 (1977). Sanders was explicitly
undermined in Ross, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 824 ,
and the existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that
uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is
better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches
and eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set
forth in Sanders. VI The interpretation of the Carroll doctrine set forth in Ross now applies to all searches of containers found in an
automobile. In other words, the police may search without a warrant
if their search is supported by probable cause. The Court in Ross put it this way:

															"The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile . . . is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is
secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object Page 500 U. S. 580 of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found."

															456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 824 .
It went on to note:

															"Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk
of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search
of the entire cab." Ibid. We reaffirm that principle. In the case before
us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag in
the automobile's trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now
allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the
record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to
believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the
automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been
without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.

															Our holding today neither extends the Carroll doctrine
nor broadens the scope of the permissible automobile search
delineated in Carroll, Chambers, and Ross. It
remains a

															"cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment --
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 437 U. S. 390 (1978), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). We held in Ross: "The exception
recognized in Carroll is unquestionably one that is specifically established and well delineated.'" 456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
825 . Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the
search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container
and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an
automobile. The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not turn
on such coincidences. We therefore interpret Carroll as
providing one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police
may search an automobile and the containers within it where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is
contained. Page 500 U. S. 581 The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and
the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															When Officer Coleman returned with a warrant, the apartment was
searched and bags of marijuana were found there. We are here
concerned, of course, only with what was discovered in the
automobile.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Although respondent now challenges this holding, we decline to
second-guess the California courts, which have found probable
cause. Respondent did not raise the probable cause question in his
Brief in Opposition, nor did he cross-petition for resolution of
the issue. He also did not raise the point in a cross-petition to
the Supreme Court of California. We therefore do not consider the
issue here. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545 , 494 U. S. 551 ,
n. 3 (1990); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.
S. 458 , 461 U. S.
468 -469, n. 12 (1983).

															JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment.

															I agree with the dissent that it is anomalous for a briefcase to
be protected by the "general requirement" of a prior warrant when
it is being carried along the street, but for that same briefcase
to become unprotected as soon as it is carried into an automobile.
On the other hand, I agree with the Court that it would be
anomalous for a locked compartment in an automobile to be
unprotected by the "general requirement" of a prior warrant, but
for an unlocked briefcase within the automobile to be protected. I
join in the judgment of the Court because I think its holding is
more faithful to the text and tradition of the Fourth Amendment,
and if these anomalies in our jurisprudence are ever to be
eliminated, that is the direction in which we should travel.

															The Fourth Amendment does not, by its terms, require a prior
warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and
seizures that are "unreasonable." What it explicitly states
regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance,
rather than requirement of their use. See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binney 316, 318 (Pa.1814). For the warrant was a means of
insulating officials from personal liability assessed by colonial
juries. An officer who searched or seized without a warrant did so
at his own risk; he would be liable for trespass, including
exemplary damages, unless the jury found that his action was
"reasonable." Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale
L.J. 1131, 1178-1180 (1991); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng.Rep.
768 (K.B.1763). If, however, the officer acted pursuant to a proper
warrant, he would be absolutely immune. See Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263 (N.Y.1813); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 288 (1769).
By restricting the issuance of warrants, Page 500 U. S. 582 the Framers endeavored to preserve the jury's role in regulating
searches and seizures. Amar, supra; Posner, Rethinking the
Fourth Amendment, 1981 S.Ct.Rev. 49, 7273; see also T.
Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 41 (1969).

															Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the
requirement of a warrant, it is, of course, textually possible to
consider that implicit within the requirement of reasonableness.
For some years after the (still continuing) explosion in Fourth
Amendment litigation that followed our announcement of the
exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 (1914), our jurisprudence lurched back and forth
between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to
reasonableness alone. (The opinions preferring a warrant involved
searches of structures.) Compare Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947) with Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 (1948); compare Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 (1948) with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 (1950). See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). By the late 1960's, the preference for a warrant had won
out, at least rhetorically. See Chimel; Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971).

															The victory was illusory. Even before today's decision, the
"warrant requirement" had become so riddled with exceptions that it
was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged
nearly 20 such exceptions, including

															"searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . .
border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated
businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to
nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat
boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory
searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es]. . . ."

															Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich.L.Rev.
1468, 1473-1474 (1985) (footnotes omitted). Since then, we have
added at least two more. California v.
Carney , 471 Page 500 U. S. 583 U.S. 386 (1985) (searches of mobile homes); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 (1987) (searches of offices of government employees). Our intricate
body of law regarding "reasonable expectation of privacy" has been
developed largely as a means of creating these exceptions, enabling
a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment "search," and
therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement. Cf.
id. at 480 U. S. 729 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).

															Unlike the dissent, therefore, I do not regard today's holding
as some momentous departure, but rather as merely the continuation
of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us for years.
Cases like United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 (1979), have taken the "preference for a warrant"
seriously, while cases like United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925), have not . There can be no clarity in
this area unless we make up our minds, and unless the principles we
express comport with the actions we take.

															In my view, the path out of this confusion should be sought by
returning to the first principle that the "reasonableness"
requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the
common law afforded. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
ante at 500 U. S. 60 (1991) (SCALIA, J., dissenting); People v. Chiagles, 237
N.Y. 193, 195, 142 N.E. 583 (1923) (Cardozo, J.). Cf.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621 (1991). I have no difficulty with the proposition that that
includes the requirement of a warrant, where the common law
required a warrant; and it may even be that changes in the
surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the common law
rule that reasonable, good faith belief was no defense to absolute
liability for trespass, Little v.
Barreme , 2 Cranch 170 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.); see generally Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale
L.J. 1425, 1486-1487 (1987)), may make a warrant indispensable to
reasonableness where it once was not. But the supposed "general Page 500 U. S. 584 rule" that a warrant is always required does not appear to have
any basis in the common law, see, e.g., Carroll, supra, 267 U.S. at 267 U. S.
150 -153; Gelston v.
Hoyt , 3 Wheat. 246, 16 U. S.
310 -311 (1818) (Story, J.); Wakely, supra, and
confuses, rather than facilitates, any attempt to develop rules of
reasonableness in light of changed legal circumstances, as the
anomaly eliminated and the anomaly created by today's holding both
demonstrate.

															And there are more anomalies still. Under our precedents (as at
common law), a person may be arrested outside the home on the basis
of probable cause, without an arrest warrant. United States v.
Watson, 423 U. S. 411 , 423 U. S.
418 -421 (1976); Rohan v. Sawin, 59 Mass. 281
(1851). Upon arrest, the person, as well as the area within his
grasp, may be searched for evidence related to the crime. Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 395 U. S.
762 -763 (1969); People v. Chiagles, supra, (collecting authority). Under these principles, if a known drug
dealer is carrying a briefcase reasonably believed to contain
marijuana (the unauthorized possession of which is a crime), the
police may arrest him and search his person on the basis of
probable cause alone. And, under our precedents, upon arrival at
the station house, the police may inventory his possessions,
including the briefcase, even if there is no reason to suspect that
they contain contraband. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983). According to our current law, however, the police may not,
on the basis of the same probable cause, take the less intrusive
step of stopping the individual on the street and demanding to see
the contents of his briefcase. That makes no sense a
priori, and, in the absence of any common law tradition
supporting such a distinction, I see no reason to continue it. * * * * I would reverse the judgment in the present case, not because a
closed container carried inside a car becomes subject to the
"automobile" exception to the general warrant requirement, Page 500 U. S. 585 but because the search of a closed container, outside a
privately owned building, with probable cause to believe that the
container contains contraband, and when it in fact does contain
contraband, is not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment
reasonableness depends upon a warrant. For that reason I concur in
the judgment of the Court.

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															Agreeing as I do with most of JUSTICE STEVENS' opinion and with
the result he reaches, I dissent and would affirm the judgment
below.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															At the end of its opinion, the Court pays lip service to the
proposition that should provide the basis for a correct analysis of
the legal question presented by this case: It is

															""a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment --
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.'" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 , 437 U. S. 390 (1978), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)." Ante at 500 U. S.
580 .

															Relying on arguments that conservative judges have repeatedly
rejected in past cases, the Court today -- despite its disclaimer
to the contrary, ibid. -- enlarges the scope of the
automobile exception to this "cardinal principle," which
undergirded our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prior to the
retirement of the author of the landmark opinion in United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977).
As a preface to my response to the Court's arguments, it is
appropriate to restate the basis for the warrant requirement, the
significance of the Chadwick case, and the reasons why the
limitations on the automobile exception that were articulated in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982), represent a fair accommodation Page 500 U. S. 586 between the basic rule requiring prior judicial approval of
searches and the automobile exception. I The Fourth Amendment is a restraint on Executive power. The
Amendment constitutes the Framers' direct constitutional response
to the unreasonable law enforcement practices employed by agents of
the British Crown. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 232 U. S.
389 -391 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S.
624 -625 (1886); 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 3-5 (2d
ed.1987). Over the years -- particularly in the period immediately
after World War II and particularly in opinions authored by Justice
Jackson after his service as a special prosecutor at the Nuremburg
trials -- the Court has recognized the importance of this restraint
as a bulwark against police practices that prevail in totalitarian
regimes. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.
S. 581 , 332 U. S. 595 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 17 (1948).

															This history is, however, only part of the explanation for the
warrant requirement. The requirement also reflects the sound policy
judgment that, absent exceptional circumstances, the decision to
invade the privacy of an individual's personal effects should be
made by a neutral magistrate, rather than an agent of the
Executive. In his opinion for the Court in Johnson v. United
States, id. at 333 U. S. 13 -14,
Justice Jackson explained:

															"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."

															Our decisions have always acknowledged that the warrant
requirement imposes a burden on law enforcement. And our Page 500 U. S. 587 cases have not questioned that trained professionals normally
make reliable assessments of the existence of probable cause to
conduct a search. We have repeatedly held, however, that these
factors are outweighed by the individual interest in privacy that
is protected by advance judicial approval. The Fourth Amendment
dictates that the privacy interest is paramount, no matter how
marginal the risk of error might be if the legality of warrantless
searches were judged only after the fact.

															In the concluding paragraph of his opinion in Chadwick, Chief Justice Burger made the point this way:

															"Even though on this record the issuance of a warrant by a
judicial officer was reasonably predictable, a line must be drawn.
In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for an
immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point
where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive
dominion of police authority. Respondents were therefore entitled
to the protection of the Warrant Clause with the evaluation of a
neutral magistrate, before their privacy interests in the contents
of [their luggage] were invaded."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
15 -16.

															In Chadwick, the Department of Justice had mounted a
frontal attack on the warrant requirement. The Government's
principal contention was that "the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause
protects only interests traditionally identified with the home." Id. at 433 U. S. 6 . We
categorically rejected that contention, relying on the history and
text of the amendment, [ Footnote
2/1 ] the policy underlying the warrant requirement, [ Footnote 2/2 ] Page 500 U. S. 588 and a line of cases spanning over a century of our
jurisprudence. [ Footnote 2/3 ] We
also rejected the Government's alternative argument that the
rationale of our automobile search cases demonstrated the
reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches of luggage.

															We concluded that neither of the justifications for the
automobile exception could support a similar exception for luggage.
We first held that the privacy interest in luggage is
"substantially greater than in an automobile." Id. at 433 U. S. 13 .
Unlike automobiles and their contents, we reasoned,

															"[l]uggage contents are not open to public view, except as a
condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is
luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a
continuing basis." Ibid. Indeed, luggage is specifically intended to
safeguard the privacy of personal effects, unlike an automobile,
"whose primary function is transportation." Ibid. We then held that the mobility of luggage did not justify
creating an additional exception to the Warrant Clause. Unlike an
automobile, luggage can easily be seized and detained pending
judicial approval of a search. Once the police have Page 500 U. S. 589 luggage

															"under their exclusive control, there [i]s not the slightest
danger that the [luggage] or its contents could [be] removed before
a valid search warrant could be obtained. . . . With the [luggage]
safely immobilized, it [i]s unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a
warrant."

															(Footnote omitted.) Ibid. Two Terms after Chadwick, we decided a case in which
the relevant facts were identical to those before the Court today.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979), the police had probable cause to search a green suitcase
that had been placed in the trunk of a taxicab at the Little Rock
Airport. Several blocks from the airport, they stopped the cab,
arrested the passengers, seized the suitcase and, without obtaining
a warrant, opened and searched it.

															The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the search was
unconstitutional. Relying on Chadwick, the state court had
no difficulty in concluding that there was "nothing in this set of
circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion of
impracticability in obtaining a search warrant." Sanders v.
State, 262 Ark. 595, 600, 559 S.W.2d
704 , 706 (1977). Over the dissent of JUSTICE BLACKMUN and
then-JUSTICE REHNQUIST, both of whom had also dissented in Chadwick, this Court affirmed. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Powell noted that the seizure of the green suitcase
was entirely proper, [ Footnote 2/4 ]
but that the State nevertheless had the burden of justifying the
warrantless search, [ Footnote 2/5 ]
and that it had "failed to Page 500 U. S. 590 carry its burden of demonstrating the need for warrantless
searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles." 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
763 .

															Chief Justice Burger wrote separately to identify the
distinction between cases in which police have probable cause to
believe contraband is located somewhere in a vehicle -- the typical
automobile exception case -- and cases, like Chadwick and Sanders, in which they had probable cause to search a
particular container before it was placed in the car. He wrote:

															"Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that
respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana before it was
placed in the trunk of the taxicab, their duty to obtain a search
warrant before opening it is clear under United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). The essence of
our holding in Chadwick is that there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the contents of a trunk or suitcase
accompanying or being carried by a person; that expectation of
privacy is not diminished simply because the owner's arrest occurs
in a public place. Whether arrested in a hotel lobby, an airport, a
railroad terminal, or on a public street, as here, the owner has
the right to expect that the contents of his luggage will not,
without his consent, be exposed on demand of the police. . . ."

															"The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated references
to the 'automobile' from which respondent's suitcase was seized at
the time of his arrest, however, might lead the reader to believe
-- as the dissenters apparently do -- that this case involves the
'automobile' exception to the warrant requirement. See
ante [442 U.S.] at 442 U. S. 762 -765, and n.
14. It does not. Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage
being transported by respondent at Page 500 U. S. 591 the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was being
carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
766 -767 (Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment).

															Chief Justice Burger thus carefully explained that Sanders, which the Court overrules today,

															"simply d[id] not present the question of whether a warrant is
required before opening luggage when the police have probable cause
to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle,
but when they do not know whether, for example, it is
inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment,
or concealed in some part of the car's structure." Id. at 442 U. S. 767 .
We confronted that question in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															We held in Ross that

															"the scope of the warrantless search authorized by [the
automobile] exception is no broader and no narrower than a
magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant." See id. at 456 U. S. 825 .
The inherent mobility of the vehicle justified the immediate search
without a warrant, but did not affect the scope of the search. See id. at 456 U. S. 822 .
Thus, the search could encompass containers, which might or might
not conceal the object of the search, as well as the remainder of
the vehicle. See id. at 456 U. S.
821 .

															Our conclusion was supported not only by prior cases defining
the proper scope of searches authorized by warrant, as well as
cases involving the automobile exception, but also by practical
considerations that apply to searches in which the police have only
generalized probable cause to believe that contraband is somewhere
in a vehicle. We explained that, in such instances,

															"prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in
which the object of the search is most likely to be found, and
instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle, would
actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests. " Page 500 U. S. 592 Id. at 456 U. S. 821 ,
n. 28. Indeed, because "the police could never be certain that the
contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the
vehicle," the most likely result would be that "the vehicle would
need to be secured while a warrant was obtained." Ibid. These concerns that justified our holding in Ross are
not implicated in cases like Chadwick and Sanders in which the police have probable cause to search a particular container, rather than the entire vehicle. Because the police can seize the container which is the
object of their search, they have no need either to search or to
seize the entire vehicle. Indeed, as even the Court today
recognizes, they have no authority to do so. See 456 U.S.
at 456 U. S. 824 ; ante at 500 U. S.
580 .

															In reaching our conclusion in Ross, we therefore did
not retreat at all from the holding in either Chadwick or Sanders. Instead, we expressly endorsed the reasoning in
Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion in Sanders. 456
U.S. at 456 U. S.
813 -814. [ Footnote 2/7 ]
We explained repeatedly that Ross involved the scope of
the warrantless search authorized by the automobile exception, id. at 456 U. S. 800 , 456 U. S. 809 , 456 U. S. 817 , 456 U. S. 825 ,
and, unlike Chadwick and Sanders, did not involve
the applicability of the exception to closed containers. 456 U.S.
at 456 U. S.
809 -817.

															Thus, we recognized in Ross that Chadwick and Sanders had not created a special rule for container
searches, but Page 500 U. S. 593 rather had merely applied the cardinal principle that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless
justified by an exception to the general rule. See 456
U.S. at 456 U. S.
811 -812. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Ross dealt with the scope of the automobile exception; Chadwick and Sanders were cases in which the
exception simply did not apply. II In its opinion today, the Court recognizes that the police did
not have probable cause to search respondent's vehicle, and that a
search of anything but the paper bag that respondent had carried
from Daza's apartment and placed in the trunk of his car would have
been unconstitutional. Ante at 500 U. S. 580 .
Moreover, as I read the opinion, the Court assumes that the police
could not have made a warrantless inspection of the bag before it
was placed in the car. See ibid. Finally, the Court also
does not question the fact that, under our prior cases, it would
have been lawful for the police to seize the container and detain
it (and respondent) until they obtained a search warrant. Ante at 500 U. S. 575 .
Thus, all of the relevant facts that governed our decisions in Chadwick and Sanders are present here, whereas
the relevant fact that justified the vehicle search in Ross is not present.

															The Court does not attempt to identify any exigent circumstances
that would justify its refusal to apply the general rule against
warrantless searches. Instead, it advances these three arguments:
First, the rules identified in the foregoing cases are confusing
and anomalous. Ante at 500 U. S.
576 -579. Second, the rules do not protect any
significant interest in privacy. Ante at 500 U. S.
573 -576. And third, the rules impede effective Page 500 U. S. 594 law enforcement. Ante at 500 U. S.
576 -577. None of these arguments withstands
scrutiny. The "Confusion" In the nine years since Ross was decided, the Court has
considered three cases in which the police had probable cause to
search a particular container, and one in which they had probable
cause to search two vehicles. The decisions in all four of those
cases were perfectly straightforward and provide no evidence of
confusion in the state or lower federal courts.

															In United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 (1983), we held that, although reasonable
suspicion justifies the temporary detention of an airline
passenger's luggage, the seizure in that particular case was
unreasonable because of the prolonged delay in ascertaining the
existence of probable cause. In the course of our opinion, we noted
that the then-recent decision in Ross had not modified the
holding in Sanders. 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 701 ,
n. 3. We also relied on Chadwick for our conclusion that
the temporary seizure of luggage is substantially less intrusive
than a search of its contents. 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
706 -707.

															In Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U.
S. 146 (1985), police officers had probable cause to
believe the defendant carried narcotics in blue suitcases in the
trunk of his car. After arresting him, they opened the trunk,
seized the suitcases, and searched them without a warrant. The
state court held that the search was invalid, explaining:

															"If the officer has probable cause to believe there is
contraband somewhere in the car, but he does not know exactly
where, he may search the entire car, as well as any containers
found therein. See United States v. Ross, 456 U. S.
798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132 (1925). If, on the other hand, the officer only has
probable cause to believe there is contraband in a Page 500 U. S. 595 specific container in the car, he must detain the container and
delay his search until a search warrant is obtained. See United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977)." Castleberry v. State, 678
P.2d 720 , 724 (Okla.1984). This Court affirmed by an
equally-divided court. 471 U. S. 146 (1985).

															In the case the Court decides today, the California Court of
Appeal also had no difficulty applying the critical distinction.
Relying on Chadwick, it explained that

															"the officers had probable cause to believe marijuana would be
found only in a brown lunch bag and nowhere else in the car. We are
compelled to hold they should have obtained a search warrant before
opening it." 216 Cal. App.
3d 586 , 592, 265 Cal. Rptr.
23 , 27 (1990).

															In the case in which the police had probable cause to search two
vehicles, United States v. Johns, 469 U.
S. 478 (1985), [ Footnote
2/9 ] we rejected the respondent's reliance on Chadwick with a straightforward explanation of why that case, unlike Ross, did not involve an exception to the warrant
requirement. We first expressed our agreement with the Court of
Appeals that the Customs officers who had conducted the search
had Page 500 U. S. 596 probable cause to search the vehicles. Id. at 469 U. S. 482 .
We then explained:

															"Under the circumstances of this case, respondents' reliance on Chadwick is misplaced. . . . Chadwick . . . did
not involve the exception to the warrant requirement recognized in Carroll v. United States, supra, because the police had no
probable cause to believe that the automobile, as contrasted to the
footlocker, contained contraband. See 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 11 -12. This point is
underscored by our decision in Ross, which held that,
notwithstanding Chadwick, police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of containers discovered in the course of a
lawful vehicle search. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
810 -814. Given our conclusion that the Customs officers
had probable cause to believe that the pickup trucks contained
contraband, Chadwick is simply inapposite. See 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 817 ."

															469 U.S. at 469 U. S.
482 -483.

															The decided cases thus provide no support for the Court's
concern about "confusion." The Court instead relies primarily on
predictions that were made by JUSTICE BLACKMUN in his dissenting
opinions in Chadwick and Sanders. [ Footnote 2/10 ] The Court, however, cites
no evidence that these predictions have, in fact, materialized, or
that anyone else has been unable to understand the "inherent
opaqueness," ante at 500 U. S. 579 ,
of this uncomplicated issue. The only support offered by the Court,
other than the unsubstantiated allegations of prior dissents, is
three law review comments and a sentence from Professor LaFave's
treatise. None of the law review pieces Page 500 U. S. 597 criticizes the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders. [ Footnote 2/11 ]
The sentence from Professor LaFave's treatise, at most, indicates
that, as is often the case, there may be some factual situations at
the margin of the relevant rules that are difficult to decide.
Moreover, to the extent Professor LaFave criticizes our
jurisprudence in this area, he is critical of Ross, rather
than Chadwick or Sanders. And he ultimately
concludes that even Ross was correctly decided. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 55-56 (2d
ed.1987).

															The Court summarizes the alleged "anomaly" created by the
coexistence of Ross, Chadwick, and Sanders with
the statement that "the more likely the police are to discover
drugs in a container, the less authority they have to search it." Ante at 500 U. S. 577 .
This juxtaposition is only anomalous, however, if one accepts the
flawed premise that the degree to which the police are likely to
discover contraband is correlated with their authority to search without a warrant. Yet even proof beyond a reasonable
doubt will not justify a warrantless search that is not supported
by one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. And, even when
the police have a warrant or an exception applies, once the police
possess probable cause, the extent to which they are more or less
certain of the contents of a container has no bearing on their
authority to search it. Page 500 U. S. 598 To the extent there was any "anomaly" in our prior
jurisprudence, the Court has "cured" it at the expense of creating
a more serious paradox. For surely it is anomalous to prohibit a
search of a briefcase while the owner is carrying it exposed on a
public street, yet to permit a search once the owner has placed the
briefcase in the locked trunk of his car. One's privacy interest in
one's luggage can certainly not be diminished by one's removing it
from a public thoroughfare and placing it -- out of sight -- in a
privately owned vehicle. Nor is the danger that evidence will
escape increased if the luggage is in a car, rather than on the
street. In either location, if the police have probable cause, they
are authorized to seize the luggage and to detain it until they
obtain judicial approval for a search. Any line demarking an
exception to the warrant requirement will appear blurred at the
edges, but the Court has certainly erred if it believes that, by
erasing one line and drawing another, it has drawn a clearer
boundary. The Privacy Argument The Court's statement that Chadwick and Sanders provide only "minimal protection to privacy," ante at 500 U. S. 576 ,
is also unpersuasive. Every citizen clearly has an interest in the
privacy of the contents of his or her luggage, briefcase, handbag
or any other container that conceals private papers and effects
from public scrutiny. That privacy interest has been recognized
repeatedly in cases spanning more than a century. See, e.g.,
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 433
U. S. 6 -11; United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 , 397 U. S. 251 (1970); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727 , 96 U. S. 733 (1878).

															Under the Court's holding today, the privacy interest that
protects the contents of a suitcase or a briefcase from a
warrantless search when it is in public view simply vanishes when
its owner climbs into a taxicab. Unquestionably the rejection of
the Sanders line of cases by today's decision will result
in a significant loss of individual privacy. Page 500 U. S. 599 To support its argument that today's holding works only a
minimal intrusion on privacy, the Court suggests that,

															"[i]f the police know that they may open a bag only if they are
actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively
than they otherwise would in order to establish the general
probable cause required by Ross. " Ante at 500 U. S.
574 -575. As I have already noted, see 500
U.S. 565 fn2/9|>n. 9, supra, this fear is
unexplained and inexplicable. Neither evidence uncovered in the
course of a search nor the scope of the search conducted can be
used to provide post hoc justification for a search
unsupported by probable cause at its inception.

															The Court also justifies its claim that its holding inflicts
only minor damage by suggesting that, under New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), the police could have arrested respondent and searched his
bag if respondent had placed the bag in the passenger compartment
of the automobile, instead of the trunk. In Belton, however, the justification for stopping the car and arresting the
driver had nothing to do with the subsequent search, which was
based on the potential danger to the arresting officer. The holding
in Belton was supportable under a straightforward
application of the automobile exception. See Robbins v.
California, 453 U. S. 420 , 453 U. S.
449 -453 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). I would not
extend Belton's holding to this case, in which the
container -- which was protected from a warrantless search before
it was placed in the car -- provided the only justification for the
arrest. Even accepting Belton's application to a case like
this one, however, the Court's logic extends its holding to a
container placed in the trunk of a vehicle, rather than in the
passenger compartment. And the Court makes this extension without
any justification whatsoever other than convenience to law
enforcement. The Burden on Law Enforcement The Court's suggestion that Chadwick and Sanders have created a significant burden on effective law
enforcement Page 500 U. S. 600 is unsupported, inaccurate, and, in any event, an insufficient
reason for creating a new exception to the warrant requirement.

															Despite repeated claims that Chadwick and Sanders have "impeded effective law enforcement," ante at 500 U. S. 574 , 500 U. S. 576 ,
the Court cites no authority for its contentions. Moreover, all
evidence that does exist points to the contrary conclusion. In the
years since Ross was decided, the Court has heard argument
in 30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics. [ Footnote 2/12 ] In all but one, the government was
the petitioner. [ Footnote 2/13 ]
All save two involved a search or seizure without a warrant or with
a defective warrant. [ Footnote
2/14 ] And, in all except three, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the search or seizure. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Page 500 U. S. 601 In the meantime, the flow of narcotics cases through the courts
has steadily and dramatically increased. [ Footnote 2/16 ] See Annual Report of the
Attorney General of the United States 21 (1989). No impartial
observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of
the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court
makes today will support the conclusion that this Court has become
a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime.

															Even if the warrant requirement does inconvenience the police to
some extent, that fact does not distinguish this constitutional
requirement from any other procedural protection secured by the
Bill of Rights. It is merely a part of the price that our society
must pay in order to preserve its freedom. Thus, in a unanimous
opinion that relied on both Johnson and Chadwick, Justice Stewart wrote:

															"Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more
efficient can never, by itself, justify disregard of the Fourth
Amendment. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, [403
U.S.] at 403 U. S. 481 . The
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were
unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home
and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum
simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. See United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 433 U. S.
6 -11." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 437 U. S.
393 . Page 500 U. S. 602 It is too early to know how much freedom America has lost today.
The magnitude of the loss is, however, not nearly as significant as
the Court's willingness to inflict it without even a colorable
basis for its rejection of prior law.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															"Although the searches and seizures which deeply concerned the
colonists, and which were foremost in the minds of the Framers,
were those involving invasions of the home, it would be a mistake
to conclude, as the Government contends, that the Warrant Clause
was therefore intended to guard only against intrusions into the
home. First, the Warrant Clause does not, in terms, distinguish
between searches conducted in private homes and other searches.
There is also a strong historical connection between the Warrant
Clause and the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment, which draws
no distinctions among 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' in
safeguarding against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 8 (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															"The judicial warrant has a significant role to play, in that it
provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a
more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S.
14 (1948). Once a lawful search has begun, it is also
far more likely that it will not exceed proper bounds when it is
done pursuant to a judicial authorization 'particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
Further, a warrant assures the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to
search." Id. 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 9 .

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See id. at 433 U. S. 10 -11.
The earliest case cited by Chief Justice Burger was Justice Field's
opinion in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727 , 96 U. S. 733 (1878).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															"Having probable cause to believe that contraband was being
driven away in the taxi, the police were justified in stopping the
vehicle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they
suspected contained contraband. See Chambers v. Maroney,
supra, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 52 . At oral
argument, respondent conceded that the stopping of the taxi and the
seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 44-46." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
761 -762.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															"[B]ecause each exception to the warrant requirement invariably
impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, the few situations in which a search may be conducted in
the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated, and 'the
burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.' United Sates v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 , 342 U. S.
51 (1951)." Id. 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
759 -760.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															In framing the question for decision, we stated: "Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in this case, police
officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle."
456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
817 .

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Moreover, we quoted the following paragraph from Justice
Powell's opinion in the intervening case of Robbins v.
California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981):

															"[W]hen the police have probable cause to search an automobile,
rather than only to search a particular container that fortuitously
is located in it, the exigencies that allow the police to search
the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless
search of every container found therein. See post at 453 U.
S. 13. (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This analysis is
entirely consistent with the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an 'automobile case,' because
the police there had probable cause to search the double-locked
footlocker and the suitcase, respectively, before either came near
an automobile." Id. at 453 U. S. 435 ,
quoted in United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 , 456 U. S. 816 (1982).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Although the Court today purports to acknowledge that the
warrant requirement is the general rule, ante at 500 U. S. 569 ,
it nonetheless inexplicably persists in referring to Chadwick and Sanders as announcing a "separate
rule, unique to luggage and other closed packages, bags, and
containers." Ante at 500 U. S. 571 .
Equally inexplicable is the Court's contention that, in overruling Sanders, it has not "extend[ed] the Carroll doctrine" that created the automobile exception. Ante at 500 U. S.
580 .

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															In its discussion of the Johns case, the Court makes
the puzzling statement that it

															"cannot see the benefit of a rule that requires law enforcement
officers to conduct a more intrusive search in order to justify a
less intrusive one." See ante at 500 U. S. 575 .
I assume that the Court does not mean to suggest that evidence
found during the course of a search may provide the probable cause
that justifies the search. Our cases have unequivocally rejected
this bootstrap justification for a search which was not lawful when
it commenced. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 332 U. S. 595 (1948); Byars v. United States, 273 U. S.
28 , 273 U. S. 29 -30
(1927). Perhaps the Court fears that defendants will attempt
similar post hoc reasoning and argue that, when the police
have searched only a container, rather than the whole car, they
must have had probable cause only to search the container. If so,
the Court's fear is unwarranted, for Johns itself
foreclosed this argument. See 469 U.S. at 469 U. S.
482 -483.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See ante at 500 U. S.
578 -579 (referring to the undocumented prediction made
by JUSTICE BLACKMUN, joined by JUSTICE REHNQUIST, in dissent in Chadwick ); ante at 500 U. S. 579 (referring to the fact that the dissenters had "bemoaned the inherent opaqueness' of the difference between the Carroll and Chadwick principles and noted `the
confusion to be created for all concerned'"). [ Footnote 2/11 ]

															One of the three pieces, Kamisar, The "Automobile Search" Cases:
The Court Does Little to Clarify the "Labyrinth" of Judicial
Uncertainty, in 3 J. Choper, Y. Kamisar, & L. Tribe, The
Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-1981 (1982), was
written prior to the decision in Ross. Moreover, rather
than criticizing Chadwick and Sanders, the
article expressly endorses Justice Brennan's refutation of the
arguments advanced by JUSTICE BLACKMUN in his dissent in Chadwick. See id. at 83-85. The other two
articles were written shortly after Ross, and both
criticize Ross rather than Chadwick or Sanders. Se Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles
and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in a
Post- Ross World, 62 Neb.L.Rev. 1 (1983); Latzer, Searching
Cars and Their Contents, 18 Crim.L.Bull. 381 (1982).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ] Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.
S. 177 (1990); Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S.
1 (1990); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U. S. 602 (1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.
S. 656 (1989); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.
S. 445 (1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 (1988); California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S.
35 (1988); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.
S. 294 (1987); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 (1987); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.
S. 367 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 (1986); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U. S. 531 (1985); California v. Carney, 471 U.
S. 386 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U.
S. 478 (1985); New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U. S. 325 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, together with Maine
v. Thornton, 466 U. S. 170 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.
S. 109 (1984); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.
S. 579 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.
S. 730 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.
S. 656 (1989).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ] See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S.
79 (1987); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ] See Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1 (1990); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															The number of defendants charged with drug law violations who
were convicted in federal courts increased 134% between 1980 and
1986. The corresponding increase in convictions for nondrug
offenses was 27%. Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Drug
Law Violators, 1980-86, p. 1 (June 1988). The percentage of drug
cases dismissed by district courts declined from 22.2% in 1980 to
13.8% in 1989. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal
Criminal Case Processing, 1980-87, Addendum for 1988 and
Preliminary 1989, p. 12 (Nov.1990).

Summary: Police may search a container within a car without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it holds contraband or evidence, regardless of whether they have probable cause to search the entire vehicle. This decision eliminates the previous distinction between warrantless searches of closed containers within a car and warrantless searches of closed containers located in a moving vehicle.