U.S. Supreme Court Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U.S. 523 (1987) Connecticut v.
Barrett No. 85-899 Argued December 9,
1986 Decided January 27,
1987 479
U.S. 523 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CONNECTICUT Syllabus Respondent, while in custody on suspicion of sexual assault, was
three times advised by the police of his Miranda rights. On each
occasion, after signing and dating an acknowledgment that he had
been given those rights, respondent indicated to the police that he
would not make a written statement, but that he was willing to talk
about the incident that led to his arrest. On the second and third
such occasions, he added that he would not make a written statement
outside the presence of counsel, and then orally admitted his
involvement in the sexual assault. One of the police officers
reduced to writing his recollection of respondent's last such
statement, and the confession was introduced into evidence at
respondent's trial. The trial court refused to suppress the
confession, finding that respondent had fully understood the Miranda warnings and had voluntarily waived his right to
counsel. Respondent's conviction of sexual assault, inter
alia, was reversed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, which
held that his expressed desire for counsel before making a written
statement constituted an invocation of his right to counsel for all
purposes, that he had not waived that right by initiating further
discussion with the police, and that, therefore, the incriminating
statement was improperly admitted into evidence under Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 . Held: The Constitution did not require suppression of
respondent's incriminating statement. Pp. 479 U. S.
527 -530.

															(a) Respondent's statements to the police made clear his
willingness to talk about the sexual assault, and, there being no
evidence that he was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled" into
speaking to the police, the trial court properly found that his
decision to do so constituted a voluntary waiver of his right to
counsel. Although the Miranda rules were designed to
protect defendants from being compelled by the government to make
statements, they also give defendants the right to choose between
speech and silence. Pp. 479 U. S.
527 -529.

															(b) Respondent's invocation of his right to counsel was limited
by its terms to the making of written statements, and did not
prohibit all further discussion with police. Requests for counsel
must be given broad, all-inclusive effect only when the defendant's
words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are
ambiguous. Here, respondent Page 479 U. S. 524 clearly and unequivocally expressed his willingness to speak to
police about the sexual assault. Pp. 479 U. S.
529 -530.

															(c) The distinction drawn by respondent between oral and written
statements did not indicate an understanding so incomplete as to
render his limited invocation of the right to counsel effective for
all purposes. To so hold would contravene his testimony, and the
trial court's finding, that he fully understood his Miranda warnings, including the warning that anything he
said to police could be used against him. A defendant's ignorance
of the full consequences of his decisions does not vitiate their
voluntariness. P. 479 U. S.
530 .

															197 Conn.60, 496 A.2d 1044, reversed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 479 U. S. 530 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined, post, p. 479 U. S.
536 . Page 479 U. S. 525 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Respondent William Barrett was convicted after a jury trial of
sexual assault, unlawful restraint, and possession of a controlled
substance. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the convictions.
It held that incriminating statements made by Barrett should have
been suppressed under our decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), because Barrett, though stating his willingness to speak to
police, had indicated that he would not make a written statement
outside the presence of counsel. 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044
(1985). We granted certiorari to consider the federal
constitutional issues presented by this holding. 476 U.S. 1114
(1986). We reverse.

															In the early morning of October 24, 1980, Barrett was
transported from New Haven, Connecticut, to Wallingford, where he
was a suspect in a sexual assault that had occurred the previous
evening. Upon arrival at the Wallingford police station, Officer
Peter Cameron advised Barrett of his rights, and Barrett signed and
dated an acknowledgment that he had received the warnings required
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Barrett stated that "he would not give the police any
written statements, but he had no problem in talking about the
incident." App. 12A.

															Approximately 30 minutes later, Barrett was questioned by
Officer Cameron and Officer John Genovese. Before this questioning,
he was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a
card acknowledging that he had been read the rights. Respondent
stated that he understood his rights, and told the officers that he
would not give a written statement unless his attorney was present,
but had "no problem" talking about the incident. Id. at
21A. Barrett then gave an oral statement admitting his involvement
in the sexual assault.

															After discovering that a tape recorder used to preserve the
statement had malfunctioned, the police conducted a second Page 479 U. S. 526 interview. For the third time, Barrett was advised of his Miranda rights by the Wallingford police, and once again
stated that "he was willing to talk about [the incident] verbally,
but he did not want to put anything in writing until his attorney
came." Id. at 44A. He then repeated to the police his
confession regarding the previous evening's events.

															When the officers discovered that their tape recorder had again
failed to record the statement, Officer Cameron reduced to writing
his recollection of respondent's statement.

															The trial court, after a suppression hearing, held that the
confession was admissible. It found that respondent not only
indicated that he understood the warnings, but also

															"offered the statements that he did not need anything explained
to him, because he understood. So it was not merely a passive
acquiescence. . . ." Id. at 70A. Barrett's decision to make no written
statement without his attorney

															"indicate[d] to the Court that he certainly understood from
having his rights read to him that . . . he was under no obligation
to give any statement." Ibid. The court held that Barrett had voluntarily
waived his right to counsel and thus allowed testimony at trial as
to the content of Barrett's statement. Barrett took the stand in
his own defense and testified that he had understood his rights as
they were read to him. Id. at 130A. He was convicted and
sentenced to a prison term of 9 to 18 years.

															The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that respondent had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to
make written statements without the presence of his attorney. In
the court's view, Barrett's expressed desire for counsel before
making a written statement served as an invocation of the right for
all purposes:

															"The fact that the defendant attached his request for counsel to
the making of a written statement does not affect the outcome of .
. . our inquiry. No particular form of words has ever been required
to trigger an individual's fifth amendment protections; nor have
requests for Page 479 U. S. 527 counsel been narrowly construed. The defendant's refusal to give
a written statement without his attorney present was a clear
request for the assistance of counsel to protect his rights in his
dealings with the police. Such a request continues to be
constitutionally effective despite the defendant's willingness to
make oral statements. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant
did invoke his right to counsel under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments."

															197 Conn. at 57, 495 A.2d at 1049 (citations omitted). This
invocation, the court believed, brought the case within what it
called the "bright-line rule for establishing a waiver of this
right." Id. at 58, 495 A.2d at 1049. That rule requires a
finding that the suspect "(a) initiated further discussions with
the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he
had invoked." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S.
91 , 469 U. S. 95 (1984) (per curiam). See also Edwards, supra, at 451 U. S. 485 , 451 U. S. 486 ,
n. 9. Because Barrett had not initiated further discussions with
police, the court found his statement improperly admitted.

															We think that the Connecticut Supreme Court erred in holding
that the United States Constitution required suppression of
Barrett's statement. Barrett made clear to police his willingness
to talk about the crime for which he was a suspect. The trial court
found that this decision was a voluntary waiver of his rights, and
there is no evidence that Barrett was "threatened, tricked, or
cajoled" into this waiver. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 476 .
The Connecticut Supreme Court nevertheless held as a matter of law
[ Footnote 1 ] that
respondent's Page 479 U. S. 528 limited invocation of his right to counsel prohibited all
interrogation absent initiation of further discussion by Barrett.
Nothing in our decisions, however, or in the rationale of Miranda, requires authorities to ignore the tenor or sense
of a defendant's response to these warnings.

															The fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in Miranda was "to assure that the individual's right to
choose between speech and silence remains unfettered
throughout the interrogation process." Id. at 384 U. S. 469 (emphasis added). See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.
S. 412 , 475 U. S. 426 (1986) (" Miranda attempted to reconcile [competing]
concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some
control over the course of the interrogation") (emphasis in
original); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298 , 470 U. S. 308 (1985) ("Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own
volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the
authorities") (emphasis added). To this end, the Miranda Court adopted prophylactic rules designed to insulate the exercise
of Fifth Amendment rights from the government "compulsion, subtle
or otherwise," that "operates on the individual to overcome free
choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once
invoked." Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S. 474 . See also Smith, supra, at 469 U. S. 98 ; Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039 , 462 U. S.
1044 (1983). One such rule requires that, once the
accused "states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present." Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S. 474 . See also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 484 .
It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further
questioning -- like other aspects of Miranda -- is not
itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on coerced
confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its
prophylactic purpose. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 , 467 U. S. 654 (1984). By prohibiting further interrogation after the invocation
of these rights, we erect an auxiliary barrier against police
coercion. Page 479 U. S. 529 But we know of no constitutional objective that would be served
by suppression in this case. It is undisputed that Barrett desired
the presence of counsel before making a written statement. Had the
police obtained such a statement without meeting the waiver
standards of Edwards, it would clearly be inadmissible.
[ Footnote 2 ] Barrett's limited
requests for counsel, however, were accompanied by affirmative
announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities. The
fact that officials took the opportunity provided by Barrett to
obtain an oral confession is quite consistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose
between speech and silence, and Barrett chose to speak.

															The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision to the contrary rested
on the view that requests for counsel are not to be narrowly
construed. 197 Conn. at 67, 495 A.2d at 1049. In support of this
premise, respondent observes that our prior decisions have given
broad effect to requests for counsel that were less than
all-inclusive. See Bradshaw, supra, at 1041-1042 ("I do
want an attorney before it goes very much further"); Edwards,
supra, at 451 U. S. 479 ("I want an attorney before making a deal"). We do not denigrate
the

															"settled approach to questions of waiver [that] requires us to
give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's
request for counsel," Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 , 475 U. S. 633 (1986), when we observe that this approach does little to aid
respondent's cause. Interpretation is only required where the
defendant's words, understood as ordinary people would understand
them, are ambiguous. Here, however, Barrett made clear his
intentions, and they were honored by police. [ Footnote 3 ] To conclude that respondent invoked
his right to Page 479 U. S. 530 counsel for all purposes requires not a broad interpretation of
an ambiguous statement, but a disregard of the ordinary meaning of
respondent's statement.

															We also reject the contention that the distinction drawn by
Barrett between oral and written statements indicates an
understanding of the consequences so incomplete that we should deem
his limited invocation of the right to counsel effective for all
purposes. This suggestion ignores Barrett's testimony -- and the
finding of the trial court not questioned by the Connecticut
Supreme Court -- that respondent fully understood the Miranda warnings. These warnings, of course, made clear to
Barrett that "[i]f you talk to any police officers, anything you
say can and will be used against you in court." App. at 48A. The
fact that some might find Barrett's decision illogical [ Footnote 4 ] is irrelevant, for we have
never "embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full
consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness." Elstad, supra, at 470 U. S. 316 ; Colorado v. Spring, post p. 479 U. S. 564 .

															For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Connecticut Supreme
Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The Connecticut Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the
trial court "impliedly found that the defendant had requested
counsel." 197 Conn.50, 66, 496 A.2d 1044, 1048 (1985). This
statement does not suggest, however, that the request for counsel
was in fact all-inclusive, and the Supreme Court expressly noted
the trial court's finding that defendant had refused to give a
written statement without his attorney present. Id. at 56,
n. 6, 496 A.2d at 1048, n. 6. The holding that Barrett had invoked
his right to counsel, then, rests on a legal conclusion about the
effect of his limited invocation, rather than on a factual
finding.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Because the attempts to record Barrett's statements were
unsuccessful, we have no occasion to consider whether the result
would be different if police had taped the statements and used the
recording against Barrett.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Since we reject the claim that Barrett's statements represent an
ambiguous or equivocal response to the Miranda warnings,
there is no need for us to address the question left open in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S. 91 , 469 U. S. 96 , n.
3 (1984) (per curiam).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															We do not suggest that the distinction drawn by Barrett is in
fact illogical, for there may be several strategic reasons why a
defendant willing to speak to the police would still refuse to
write out his answers to questions, or to sign a transcript of his
answers prepared by the police, a statement that may be used
against him.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.

															I concur in the judgment that the Constitution does not require
the suppression of Barrett's statements to the police, but for
reasons different from those set forth in the opinion of the Court.
Barrett's contemporaneous waiver of his right to silence and
limited invocation of his right to counsel (for the Page 479 U. S. 531 purpose of making a written statement) suggested that he did not
understand that anything he said could be used against
him. However, the State eliminated this apparent ambiguity when it
demonstrated that Barrett's waiver of his right to silence was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Barrett testified at trial
that he understood his Miranda rights, i.e., he
knew that he need not talk to the police without a lawyer present,
and that anything he said could be used against him. Under these
circumstances, the waiver of the right to silence and the limited
invocation of the right to counsel were valid. I In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), the Court held that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive, and that a defendant must
receive detailed warnings that he or she has the rights to remain
silent and to receive assistance of counsel before and during
questioning. A statement obtained from a defendant during custodial
interrogation is admissible only if the State carries its "heavy
burden" of establishing that a defendant has executed a valid
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
counsel. Id. at 384 U. S. 475 .
To do so, the State must demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 , 304 U. S. 464 (1938); see Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S.
475 -479. In making this determination, courts must
examine "the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused." Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, at 304 U. S.
464 .

															The language and tenor of the Miranda opinion suggested
that the Court would require that a waiver of the rights at stake
be "specifically made." See 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 470 .
While the Court retreated from that position in North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369 , 441 U. S. 373 (1979), I continue to believe that the Court should require the
police to obtain an " affirmative waiver'" of Miranda rights before proceeding with interrogation. Page 479 U. S. 532 See id. at 441 U. S. 377 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.
S. 506 , 369 U. S. 516 (1962)).

															In this case, Barrett affirmatively waived his Miranda rights. Unlike the defendant in Butler, Barrett orally
expressed his willingness to talk with the police and willingly signed a form indicating that he understood his rights.
The police obtained an explicit oral waiver of the right to
silence. Furthermore, the officer who administered the Miranda warnings to Barrett testified that the latter
understood his rights "[c]ompletely":

															"I asked [Barrett] several times during my administration of
those rights if, in fact, he understood them; if there were points
he wanted me to clarify, and he indicated to me, no, he understood
everything fairly well."

															Tr. 452. At trial, one issue was whether Barrett voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights,
and Barrett himself testified that he understood his rights as they
were read to him. Id. at 879-880. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Had the State been without Barrett's testimony at trial, where
he was represented by counsel, I could not reach this conclusion.
Barrett's statement to police -- that he would talk to them, but
allow nothing in writing without counsel -- created doubt about
whether he actually understood that anything he said could
be used against him. In other words, the statement is not, on its
face, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to silence.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] As a general matter,
I believe Page 479 U. S. 533 that this odd juxtaposition (a willingness to talk and an
unwillingness to have anything preserved) militates against finding
a knowing or intelligent waiver of the right to silence. See
Butler, supra, at 441 U. S. 378 ("[T]here is no reason to believe that [the defendant's] oral
statements, which followed a refusal to sign a written waiver form,
were intended to signify relinquishment of his rights"). [ Footnote 2/3 ] But Barrett's testimony
revealed that he understood that he had rights to remain silent and
to have an attorney present, and that anything he said could be
used against him; nevertheless he chose to speak.

															In sum, the State has carried its "heavy burden" of
demonstrating waiver. It has shown that Barrett received the Miranda warnings, that he had the capacity to understand
them, [ Footnote 2/4 ] and in
fact understood them, and that he expressly Page 479 U. S. 534 waived his right to silence, saying that he "had no problem in
talking about the incident." Tr. 452; see also id. at
461-462, 490-491, 674. In my view, each of these findings was
essential to the conclusion that a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of the Miranda rights occurred. II Barrett argues that his refusal to make a written statement
without an attorney present constituted an invocation of the right
to counsel for all purposes, and that any further interrogation
after this mention of his desire for an attorney was impermissible
under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 (1981). It is settled that any plain reference,
however glancing, to a need or a desire for representation must
result in the cessation of questioning. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 384 U. S.
444 -445 (questioning must cease when the accused
"indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking"); Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U. S. 91 (1984)
(per curiam).

															I believe that a partial invocation of the right to counsel,
without more, invariably will be ambiguous. It gives rise to doubts
about the defendant's precise wishes regarding representation, and
about his or her understanding of the nature and scope of the right
to counsel. Thus, the police may not infer from a partial
invocation of the right to counsel alone that the
defendant has waived any of his or her rights not specifically
invoked.

															However, circumstances may clarify an otherwise ambiguous
situation. If the partial invocation is accompanied by an explicit
waiver of the right to silence that is voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent, it may lose its ambiguity. [ Footnote 2/5 ] It may become Page 479 U. S. 535 clear that the portion of the right to counsel that was not
invoked was in fact waived when, for example, a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right to silence necessarily includes a
waiver of the right to have counsel present at questioning. This is
such a case. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Here
Barrett's limited invocation was not ambiguous: It was accompanied
by an express waiver of his right to silence, the validity of which
was plainly established by his subsequent trial testimony. The
accompaniment of Barrett's reference to his limited desire for
counsel with an explicit waiver of his right to silence rendered
permissible the authorities' use of his statements. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court. Page 479 U. S. 536 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The trial judge denied Barrett's motion to suppress the
statements made following administration of the Miranda warnings, holding:

															"[T]he Court concludes from the evidence it heard that [Barrett]
indicated he understood perfectly what was being read to him. Not
only did he indicate that he understood, he offered the statements
that he did not need anything explained to him, because he
understood. So it was not merely a passive acquiescence, and his
agreement that he understood, he did go on to explain that he did
not need anything explained to him because he perfectly
understood."

															App. 70A.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court states that " a defendant's ignorance of the full
consequences of his decisions'" would not "`vitiat[e] their
voluntariness.'" Ante at 479 U. S. 530 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298 , 470 U. S. 316 (1985)). I do not accept that a defendant could voluntarily,
knowingly, or intelligently waive a right that he or she does not
understand to exist. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 277 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds today that an
individual can effectively waive this right [to be secure against
an unreasonable search] even though he is totally ignorant of the
fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of privacy
would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our
citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as
precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of
its existence"); ibid. (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("I
would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends
upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But today the
Court reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish
a constitutional right -- the right to be free of unreasonable
searches -- without knowing that he has the alternative of refusing
to accede to a police request to search"). [ Footnote 2/3 ] See also 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure § 6.9(f), pp. 634-636 (1984 ed.) ("[T]he Butler facts
certainly suggest that the defendant misperceived the effect of a
waiver which was oral rather than written. Under such
circumstances, there is much to be said for the view that the
police are under an obligation to clear up misunderstandings of
this nature which are apparent to any reasonable observer. Short of
this, it certainly makes sense to conclude that the defendant's
conduct should significantly increase the prosecution's burden to
overcome the presumption against waiver of the Miranda rights").

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															It is undisputed that the defendant here, unlike the defendant
in Butler, had the capacity to understand his rights: the
police ascertained that Barrett had a 12th-grade education, Tr.
458, while in Butler there was a dispute over whether the
defendant could read. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369 , 441 U. S. 378 (1979).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In order for a valid waiver and partial invocation of the right
to counsel to occur, the accused must effect them
contemporaneously. In Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S.
91 (1984) (per curiam), the Court considered a
defendant's plain request for counsel that had been closely
followed by statements rendering equivocal or ambiguous his first
request. The State Supreme Court determined that the defendant's
statements, considered as a totality, were ambiguous, and therefore
did not invoke his right to counsel. We held that

															"an accused's post-request responses to further
interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the
clarity of the initial request itself." Id. at 469 U. S. 100 .
Thus, if the initial request for counsel is clear, as it was here,
the police may not create ambiguity in a defendant's desire by
continuing to question him or her about it.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See also United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949
(CA5 1984) (The defendant stated "without the slightest ambiguity
that he would then and there answer some questions, but not others"
and "clearly indicated that he wished his attorney to work out a
cooperative deal with the government in the future." The Court of
Appeals found that these combined statements "did not invoke any
present right to counsel").

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															It is undisputed that,

															"[h]ad the police obtained [a written] statement without meeting
the waiver standards of Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U. S.
477 (1981)], it would clearly be inadmissible." Ante at 479 U. S. 529 .
Barrett's invocation of his rights demonstrates that he opposed any
immediate preservation of statements made without counsel. If the
attempt to tape Barrett's statements had succeeded, the recording
would have been inadmissible.

															In addition, the police attempted to persuade Barrett to waive
the right he had asserted not to make a written statement without
the assistance of counsel, not once, but twice, absent any
indication from Barrett that he had changed his mind on this point.
Tr. 689 ("Sergeant Genovese at the first [questioning] and
Lieutenant Howard at the second inquired whether or not he had
changed his mind [about reducing his statements to writing]"); see also id. at 521. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. at 451 U. S.
484 -485, we held that, once an accused invokes the right
to counsel, he or she is not subject to further custodial
interrogation

															"until counsel has been made available to him [or her], unless
the accused . . . initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police."

															Here the police failed to respect Barrett's limited assertion of
his right to counsel. Had a written statement been obtained as a
result of these persistent efforts to change Barrett's mind, it
would have been inadmissible.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															The Court's disposition of this case raises two troublesome
questions.

															First, why did the Court decide to exercise its discretion to
grant review in this case? The facts of the case are surely unique.
They do not give rise to any issue of general or recurring
significance. There is no conflict among the state or federal
courts on how the narrow question presented should be resolved. It
is merely a case in which one State Supreme Court arguably granted
more protection to a citizen accused of crime than the Federal
Constitution requires. [ Footnote
3/1 ] The State "asks us to rule that the state court
interpreted federal rights too broadly and overprotected' the
citizen." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032 , 463 U. S.
1068 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). If this is a
sufficient reason for adding a case to our already overcrowded
docket, we will need, not one, but several newly fashioned
"intercircuit tribunals" to keep abreast of our work. Second, why was respondent's request for the assistance of
counsel any less ambiguous than the request in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981)? In that case, the defendant said that he wanted an attorney
" before making a deal.'" Id. at 451 U. S. 479 .
He also said he would talk to the police "`but I don't want it on
tape.'" Ibid. The police interrogation complied with the
everyday meaning of both of those conditions; it occurred before
Edwards made any "deal" -- indeed, he never made a deal -- and no
tape recording of the session was made. The Court nevertheless
found the interrogation objectionable. In this case, respondent
requested an attorney before signing a written statement. Why the
police's compliance with the literal terms of that request makes
the request -- as opposed to the subsequent waiver [ Footnote 3/2 ] -- any less of a request for the
assistance of counsel than Edwards' is not adequately explained in
the Court's opinion. In all events, the Court does not purport to
change the governing rule of law that judges must "give a broad,
rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for
counsel." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.
S. 625 , 475 U. S. 633 (1986). I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															"The central contention of the Petitioner in this action is that
the Connecticut Supreme Court unduly expanded the protections
accorded criminal defendants under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States [C]onstitution when it determined that this defendant
involuntarily waived his right to assistance of counsel at his
interrogation. This result was possible only through use of a
prophylactic rule which ignored the circumstances of this
case."

															Pet. for Cert. 5.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															In this case, the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted the
trial court's ruling as embodying a factual finding that respondent
had requested the assistance of counsel, but thereafter waived his
right to counsel. It agreed with that factual determination, but
held that the subsequent waiver was ineffective as a matter of law.
197 Conn.50, 60, 495 A.2d 1044, 1050 (1985).

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's incriminating statement did not need to be suppressed as he had voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The defendant clearly expressed his willingness to speak to the police about the sexual assault and was not coerced in any way. His request for counsel was limited to the making of written statements and did not prohibit all discussion with the police. The Court distinguished this case from Edwards v. Arizona, highlighting that the defendant's request for counsel in that case was ambiguous, whereas the respondent's request in this case was clear and unequivocal.