U.S. Supreme Court Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935) Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan Nos. 135 and 260 Argued December 10, 11,
1934 Decided January 7,
1935 293
U.S. 388 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. Upon review of a decree affirming the validity of an
executive regulation, and refusing to enjoin its enforcement,
rendered in a suit begun and ended below after the regulation had
been withdrawn, the question of validity does not cease to be moot
because the regulation has since been reinstated and the Government
has declared its intention to enforce it from the time of
reinstatement. P. 293 U. S.
412 .

															2. A suit to enjoin the enforcement of executive regulations is
not made moot by amendments of the regulations, adopted pending the
litigation, which continue in force the requirements complained of
and present the same constitutional question as before. P. 293 U. S.
413 .

															3. Section 9 (c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act,
purporting to authorize the President to prohibit the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess
of the amounts permitted by state authority, attaches criminal
penalties to every violation of such an order, and persons who
would thus become subject to repeated penalties in carrying on
their business are entitled Page 293 U. S. 389 to invoke the equitable jurisdiction to restrain enforcement of
the order if found unconstitutional. P. 293 U. S.
414 .

															4. Assuming (not deciding) that Congress itself might have the
power sought to be delegated to the President by § 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act -- viz., the power to
interdict the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and petroleum products produced or withdrawn from storage
in excess of the amounts permitted by state authority -- the
attempted delegation is plainly void, because the power sought to
be delegated is legislative power, yet nowhere in the statute has
Congress declared or indicated any policy or standard to guide or
limit the President when acting under such delegation. Pp. 293 U. S. 414 et seq. The declarations of § 1 of Title I of this Act are simply an
introduction in broad outline, leaving the legislative policy as to
particular subjects to be declared and defined, if at all, by
subsequent sections. The Court can find nothing in § 1 or elsewhere
in the Act which limits or controls the authority sought to be
conferred by § 9(c). The effort by ingenious and diligent
construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of
authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the
functions of a legislature, rather than those of an executive or
administrative officer executing a declared legislative policy.

															5. The question whether the delegation is permitted by the
Constitution is not answered by the argument that it should be
assumed that the President has acted, or will act, for what he
believes to be the public good. The point is not one of motives,
but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is
not a substitute. P. 293 U. S.
420 .

															6. If Congress can vest such legislative power in the President,
it may vest it in any board or officer of its choice, and the power
vested may concern not merely the transportation of oil or of oil
produced in excess of what the States may allow; it may extend to
transportation in interstate commerce of any commodity, with or
without reference to state requirements; indeed, there would appear
to be no ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation
with respect to other subjects of legislation. P. 293 U. S.
420 .

															7. The principle forbidding Congress to abdicate, or to transfer
to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is
vested by Art. I, § 1, and Art. I, § 8, par. 18, of the
Constitution has been recognized by the Court in every case in
which the question has been raised . P. 293 U. S.
421 . Page 293 U. S. 390 8. Congress may lay down its policies and establish its
standards and leave to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules, within prescribed limits, and the determination
of facts to which the policy, as declared by Congress, shall apply,
but the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such
provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which
has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure
the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional
system is to be maintained. P. 293 U. S.
421 .

															9. The question is not as to the intrinsic importance of the
particular statute involved, but of the constitutional processes of
legislation which are an essential part of our system of
Government. P. 293 U. S.
430 .

															10. Both § 9(c) and the Executive Order made in pursuance of it
are in notable contrast with historic practice (as shown by many
statutes and proclamations) by which declarations of policy are
made by the Congress, and delegations are within the framework of
that policy and have relation to facts and conditions to be found
and stated by the President in the appropriate exercise of the
delegated authority. P. 293 U. S.
431 .

															11. If from the extremely broad description contained in § 1 of
the Act, and the widely different matters to which the section
refers, it were possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to
the President's action under § 9(c), it would still be necessary
for the President to comply with those conditions and to show such
compliance as the ground of his prohibition. P. 293 U. S.
431 .

															12. If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating
a legislative order of an executive officer, board or commission,
due process of law requires that it shall appear that the order is
within the authority of the officer, board or commission, and if
that authority depends on determinations of fact, those
determinations must be shown. P. 293 U. S.
432 .

															13. When the President is invested with legislative authority as
the delegate of Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he
necessarily acts under the constitutional restriction applicable to
such a delegation. P. 293 U. S.
433 .

															71 F.2d 1, 8, reversed.

															Certiorari was granted in these two cases to review decrees of
the court below which reversed decrees of the District Court
enjoining federal officers in Texas from Page 293 U. S. 391 enforcing certain executive orders and regulations. 5 F. Supp.
639 . Both bills challenged the constitutionality of § 9(c) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act and of orders made under it by
the President and of regulations made under the President's orders
by the Secretary of the Interior. In one of the cases, No. 260,
part of a Petroleum Code was attacked and defendant in ignorance of
the fact that it had been dropped when amendments of the Code were
promulgated before the beginning of the suit. The bill in that case
also challenged legislation and orders of the State curtailing the
production of oil, and joined the State Railroad Commission, its
members, and other state officials as defendants; but this part of
the case was severed and decided adversely to the plaintiffs by a
three-judge court. See 5 F. Supp.
633 , 634, 639. A detailed statement of both cases will be found
in the opinion. Page 293 U. S. 405 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															On July 11, 1933, the President, by Executive Order,
prohibited

															"the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or
order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or
other duly Page 293 U. S. 406 authorized agency of a State. [ Footnote 1 ]"

															This action was based on § 9(c) of title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 200, 15
U.S.C. Tit. 1, § 709(c). That section provides:

															"Sec. 9. . . ."

															"(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation
in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law
or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.
Any violation of any order of the President issued under the
provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to
exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or
both."

															On July 14, 1933, the President, by Executive Order, authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in
the President "for the purpose of enforcing Page 293 U. S. 407 Section 9(c) of said act and said order" of July 11, 1933,

															"including full authority to designate and appoint such agents
and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to
promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.
[ Footnote 2 ]"

															That order was made under § 10(a) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. § 710(a), authorizing the
President "to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes" of title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act and providing that

															"any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not
to exceed six months, or both."

															On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued
regulations to carry out the President's orders of July 11 and 14,
1933. These regulations were amended by orders Page 293 U. S. 408 of July 25, 1933, and August 21, 1933, prior to the commencement
of these suits. Regulation IV provided, in substance, that every
producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement under oath,
beginning August 15, 1933, with the Division of Investigations of
the Department of the Interior giving information with respect to
the residence and post office address of the producer, the location
of his producing properties and wells, the allowable production as
prescribed by state authority, the amount of daily production, all
deliveries of petroleum, and declaring that no part of the
petroleum or products produced and shipped had been produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state
authority. Regulation V required every purchaser, shipper (other
than a producer), and refiner of petroleum, including processors,
similarly to file a monthly statement under oath, giving
information as to residence and post office address, the place and
date of receipt, the parties from whom and the amount of petroleum
received and the amount held in storage, the disposition of the
petroleum, particulars as to deliveries, and declaring, to the best
of the affiant's information and belief, that none of the petroleum
so handled had been produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of
that allowed by state authority. Regulation VII provided that all
persons embraced within the terms of § 9(c) of the act and the
executive orders and regulations issued thereunder, should keep

															"available for inspection by the Division of Investigations of
the Department of the Interior adequate books and records of all
transactions involving the production and transportation of
petroleum and the products thereof."

															On August 19, 1933, the President, by Executive Order No. 6256,
stating that his action was taken under title 1 of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, approved a "Code of Page 293 U. S. 409 Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry." [ Footnote 3 ] By a further Executive Order of
August 28, 1933, the President designated the Secretary of the
Interior as Administrator, and the Department of the Interior as
the federal agency, to exercise on behalf of the President all the
powers vested in him under that act and code. Section 3(f) of title
1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act provides that, when a
code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the
President under that title,

															"any violation of any provision thereof in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall Page 293 U. S. 410 be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall
be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such
violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense."

															This "Petroleum Code" (in its original form and as officially
printed) provided in § 3 of article III relating to "Production"
for estimates of "required production of crude oil to balance
consumer demand for petroleum products" to be made at intervals by
the federal agency. This "required production" was to be "equitably
allocated" among the several states. These estimates and
allocations, when approved by the President, were to be deemed to
be "the net reasonable market demand," and the allocations were to
be recommended "as the operating schedules for the producing States
and for the industry." By § 4 of article III, the subdivision, with
respect to producing properties, of the production allocated to
each state, was to be made within the state. The second paragraph
of that section further provided:

															"If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any
State shall be made within a State any production by any person, as
person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of
any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair trade
practice and in violation of this code."

															By an Executive Order of September 13, 1933, No. 6284-a,
modifying certain provisions of the Petroleum Code, this second
paragraph of § 4 of article III was eliminated. It was reinstated
by Executive Order of September 25, 1934, No. 6855.

															These suits were brought in October, 1933.

															In No. 135, the Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil
refining plant in Texas, and its co-plaintiff, a producer having
oil and gas leases in Texas, sued to restrain the defendants, who
were federal officials, from enforcing Regulations IV, V, and VII
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior under § 9(c) of the
National Industrial Page 293 U. S. 411 Recovery Act. Plaintiffs attacked the validity of § 9(c) as an
unconstitutional delegation to the President of legislative power
and as transcending the authority of the Congress under the
commerce clause. The regulations, and the attempts to enforce them
by coming upon the properties of the plaintiffs, gauging their
tanks, digging up pipelines, and otherwise, were also assailed
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.

															In No. 260, the Amazon Petroleum Corporation and its
co-plaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas and owning separate
properties, sued to enjoin the Railroad Commission of that state,
its members and other state officers, and the other defendants who
were federal officials, from enforcing the state and federal
restrictions upon the production and disposition of oil. The bill
alleged that the legislation of the state and the orders of its
commission in curtailing production violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. As to the federal
requirements, the bill not only attacked § 9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, and the regulations of the Secretary of
the Interior thereunder, upon substantially the same grounds as
those set forth in the bill of the Panama Refining Company, but
also challenged the validity of provisions of the Petroleum Code.
While a number of these provisions were set out in the bill, the
contest on the trial related to the limitation of production
through the allocation of quotas pursuant to § 4 of article III of
the Code.

															As the case involved the constitutional validity of orders of
the state commission and an interlocutory injunction was sought, a
court of three judges was convened under § 266 of the Judicial Code
(28 U.S.C. § 380). That court decided that the cause of action
against the federal officials was not one within § 266, but was for
the consideration of the District Judge alone. The parties agreed
that the causes of action should be severed and that each cause Page 293 U. S. 412 should be submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it.
Hearing was had both on the applications for interlocutory
injunction and upon the merits. The court of three judges,
sustaining the state orders, denied injunction, and dismissed the
bill as against the state authorities. 5 F.
Supp. 633 , 634, 639.

															In both cases against the federal officials, that of the Panama Refining Company and that of the Amazon
Petroleum Corporation, heard by the District Judge, a
permanent injunction was granted. 5 F. Supp.
639 . In the case of the Amazon Petroleum Corporation, the court specifically enjoined the defendants from enforcing § 4
of article III of the Petroleum Code, both plaintiffs and
defendants and the court being unaware of the amendment of
September 13, 1933.

															The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decrees against the
federal officials and directed that the bills be dismissed. 71 F.2d
1, 8. The cases come here on writs of certiorari granted on October
8, 1934. First. The controversy with respect to the provision of
§ 4 of article III of the Petroleum Code was initiated and
proceeded in the courts below upon a false assumption. That
assumption was that this section still contained the paragraph
(eliminated by the Executive Order of September 13, 1933) by which
production in excess of assigned quotas was made an unfair practice
and a violation of the Code. Whatever the cause of the failure to
give appropriate public notice of the change in the section, with
the result that the persons affected, the prosecuting authorities,
and the courts, were alike ignorant of the alteration, the fact is
that the attack in this respect was upon a provision which did not
exist. The government's announcement that, by reason of the
elimination of this paragraph, the government

															"cannot, and therefore it does not intend to, prosecute
petitioners or other producers of oil in Texas, criminally or
otherwise, Page 293 U. S. 413 for exceeding, at any time prior to September 25, 1934, the
quotas of production assigned to them under the laws of Texas,"

															but that, if "petitioners, or other producers, produce in excess
of such quotas after September 25, 1934, the government intends to
prosecute them," cannot avail to import into the present case the
amended provision of that date. [ Footnote 4 ] The case is not one where a subsequent law is
applicable to a pending suit and controls its disposition.
[ Footnote 5 ] When this suit was
brought and when it was heard, there was no cause of action for the
injunction sought with respect to the provision of § 4 of article
III of the Code; as to that, there was no basis for real
controversy. See California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co., 149 U. S. 308 , 149 U. S. 314 ; United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.
S. 113 , 253 U. S. 116 ; Barker Co. v. Painters' Union, 281 U.
S. 462 . If the government undertakes to enforce the new
provision, the petitioners, as well as others, will have an
opportunity to present their grievance, which can then be
considered, as it should be, in the light of the facts as they will
then appear.

															For this reason, we pass to the other questions presented, and
we express no opinion as to the interpretation or validity of the
provisions of the Petroleum Code. Second. Regulations IV, V, and VII, issued by the
Secretary of the Interior prior to these suits, have since been
amended. But the amended regulations continue substantially Page 293 U. S. 414 the earlier requirements and expand them. They present the same
constitutional questions, and the cases as to these are not moot. Southern Pacific Company v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U. S. 433 , 219 U. S. 452 ; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 219 U. S. 498 , 219 U. S.
514 -516; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.
S. 135 , 273 U. S.
181 -182.

															The original regulations of July 15, 1933, as amended July 25,
1933, and August 21, 1933, were issued to enforce the Executive
Orders of July 11 and July 14, 1933. The Executive Order of July
11, 1933, was made under § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and the Executive Order of July 14, 1933, under § 10(a) of
that act, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate
regulations, was for the purpose of enforcing § 9(c) and the
Executive Order of July 11, 1933. The amended regulations have been
issued for the same purpose. The fundamental question as to these
regulations thus turns upon the validity of § 9(c) and the
executive orders to carry it out. Third. The statute provides that any violation of any
order of the President issued under § 9(c) shall be punishable by
fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six
months, or both. We think that these penalties would attach to each
violation, and, in this view, the plaintiffs were entitled to
invoke the equitable jurisdiction to restrain enforcement, if the
statute and the executive orders were found to be invalid. Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605 , 223 U. S.
620 -621; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.
S. 197 , 263 U. S.
214 -216; Hygrade Provision Company v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497 , 266 U. S.
499 -500. Fourth. Section 9(c) is assailed upon the ground that
it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The
section purports to authorize the President to pass a prohibitory
law. The subject to which this authority relates is defined. It is
the transportation in interstate and Page 293 U. S. 415 foreign commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are
produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted by state authority. Assuming for the present purpose,
without deciding, that the Congress has power to interdict the
transportation of that excess in interstate and foreign commerce,
the question whether that transportation shall be prohibited by law
is obviously one of legislative policy. Accordingly, we look to the
statute to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with
respect to that subject; whether the Congress has set up a standard
for the President's action; whether the Congress has required any
finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to enact
the prohibition.

															Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to
control the production of petroleum and petroleum products within a
state. It does not seek to lay down rules for the guidance of state
Legislatures or state officers. It leaves to the states and to
their constituted authorities the determination of what production
shall be permitted. It does not qualify the President's authority
by reference to the basis or extent of the state's limitation of
production. Section 9(c) does not state whether or in what
circumstances or under what conditions the President is to prohibit
the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products
produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no
criteria to govern the President's course. It does not require any
finding by the President as a condition of his action. The Congress
in § 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the transportation of the
excess production. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to
the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to
lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.
And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine
and imprisonment. Page 293 U. S. 416 We examine the context to ascertain if it furnishes a
declaration of policy or a standard of action, which can be deemed
to relate to the subject of § 9(c), and thus to imply what is not
there expressed. It is important to note that § 9 is headed "Oil
Regulation" -- that is, § 9 is the part of the National Industrial
Recovery Act which particularly deals with that subject matter. But
the other provisions of § 9 afford no ground for implying a
limitation of the broad grant of authority in § 9(c). Thus, § 9(a)
authorizes the President to initiate before the Interstate Commerce
Commission

															"proceedings necessary to prescribe regulations to control the
operations of oil pipelines and to fix reasonable, compensatory
rates for the transportation of petroleum and its products by
pipelines,"

															and the Interstate Commerce Commission is to grant preference
"to the hearings and determination of such cases." Section 9(b)
authorizes the President to institute proceedings

															"to divorce from any holding company any pipeline company
controlled by such holding company which pipeline company by unfair
practices or by exorbitant rates in the transportation of petroleum
or its products tends to create a monopoly."

															It will be observed that each of these provisions contains
restrictive clauses as to their respective subjects. Neither
relates to the subject of § 9(c).

															We turn to the other provisions of title 1 of the act. The first
section is a "declaration of policy." [ Footnote 6 ] It declares that a national emergency exists
which is

															"productive Page 293 U. S. 417 of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry,
which burdens interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public
welfare, and undermines the standards of living of the American
people."

															It is declared to be the policy of Congress "to remove
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce
which tend to diminish the amount thereof;" "to provide for the
general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the
purpose of cooperative action among trade groups;" "to induce and
maintain united action of labor and management under adequate
governmental sanctions and supervision;"

															"to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the
fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of
industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may
be temporarily required), to increase the consumption of industrial
and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce
and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and
otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural
resources."

															This general outline of policy contains nothing as to the
circumstances or conditions in which transportation of petroleum or
petroleum products should be prohibited-nothing as to the policy of
prohibiting or not prohibiting the transportation of production
exceeding what the Page 293 U. S. 418 states allow. The general policy declared is "to remove
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce."
As to production, the section lays down no policy of limitation. It
favors the fullest possible utilization of the present productive
capacity of industries. It speaks, parenthetically, of a possible
temporary restriction of production, but of what, or in what
circumstances, it gives no suggestion. The section also speaks in
general terms of the conservation of natural resources, but it
prescribes no policy for the achievement of that end. It is
manifest that this broad outline is simply an introduction of the
act, leaving the legislative policy as to particular subjects to be
declared and defined, if at all, by the subsequent sections.

															It is no answer to insist that deleterious consequences follow
the transportation of "hot oil" -- oil exceeding state allowances.
The Congress did not prohibit that transportation. The Congress did
not undertake to say that the transportation of "hot oil" was
injurious. The Congress did not say that transportation of that oil
was "unfair competition." The Congress did not declare in what
circumstances that transportation should be forbidden, or require
the President to make any determination as to any facts or
circumstances. Among the numerous and diverse objectives broadly
stated, the President was not required to choose. The President was
not required to ascertain and proclaim the conditions prevailing in
the industry which made the prohibition necessary. The Congress
left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be
dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent
construction to supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of
authorized action as essentially to commit to the President the
functions of a Legislature, rather than those of an executive or
administrative Page 293 U. S. 419 officer executing a declared legislative policy. We find nothing
in § 1 which limits or controls the authority conferred by §
9(c).

															We pass to the other sections of the act. Section 2 relates to
administrative agencies which may be constituted. Section provides
for the approval by the President of "codes" for trades or
industries. These are to be codes of "fair competition," and the
authority is based upon certain express conditions which require
findings by the President. Action under § 9(c) is not made to
depend on the formulation of a code under § 3. In fact, the
President's action under § 9(c) was taken more than a month before
a Petroleum Code was approved. Subdivision (e) of § 3 authorizes
the President, on his own motion or upon complaint, as stated, in
case any article is being imported into the United States "in
substantial quantities or increasing ratio to domestic production
of any competitive article," under such conditions as to endanger
the maintenance of a code or agreement under title 1, to cause an
immediate investigation by the Tariff Commission. The authority of
the President to act, after such investigation, is conditioned upon
a finding by him of the existence of the underlying facts, and he
may permit entry of the articles concerned upon such conditions and
with such limitations as he shall find it necessary to prescribe in
order that the entry shall not tend to render the Code or agreement
ineffective. Section 4 relates to agreements and licenses for the
purposes stated. Section 5 refers to the application of the
antitrust laws. Sections 6 and 7 impose limitations upon the
application of Title I, bearing upon trade associations and other
organizations and upon the relations between employers and
employees. Section 8 contains provisions with respect to the
application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933. Page 293 U. S. 420 None of these provisions can be deemed to prescribe any
limitation of the grant of authority in § 9(c). Fifth. The question whether such a delegation of
legislative power is permitted by the Constitution is not answered
by the argument that it should be assumed that the President has
acted, and will act, for what he believes to be the public good.
The point is not one of motives, but of constitutional authority,
for which the best of motives is not a substitute. While the
present controversy relates to a delegation to the President, the
basic question has a much wider application. If the Congress can
make a grant of legislative authority of the sort attempted by §
9(c), we find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the
Congress to the selection of the President as grantee. The Congress
may vest the power in the officer of its choice or in a board or
commission such as it may select or create for the purpose. Nor,
with respect to such a delegation, is the question concerned merely
with the transportation of oil, or of oil produced in excess of
what the state may allow. If legislative power may thus be vested
in the President or other grantee as to that excess of production,
we see no reason to doubt that it may similarly be vested with
respect to the transportation of oil without reference to the
state's requirements. That reference simply defines the subject of
the prohibition which the President is authorized to enact or not
to enact as he pleases. And, if that legislative power may be given
to the President or other grantee, it would seem to follow that
such power may similarly be conferred with respect to the
transportation of other commodities in interstate commerce with or
without reference to state action, thus giving to the grantee of
the power the determination of what is a wise policy as to that
transportation, and authority to permit or prohibit it, as the
person or board or commission so chosen may Page 293 U. S. 421 think desirable. In that view, there would appear to be no
ground for denying a similar prerogative of delegation with respect
to other subjects of legislation.

															The Constitution provides that

															"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."

															Article I, § 1. And the Congress is empowered "To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"
its general powers. Article I, § 8, par. 18. The Congress
manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others
the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions
involving a host of details with which the national Legislature
cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been regarded as
denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying
down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected
instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give
authorizations of that sort, we should have the anomaly of a
legislative power which, in many circumstances calling for its
exertion, would be but a futility. But the constant recognition of
the necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of
administrative authority which has been developed by means of them
cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to
delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained.

															The Court has had frequent occasion to refer to these
limitations and to review the course of Congressional action. At
the very outset, amid the disturbances due to war in Europe, when
the national safety was imperiled Page 293 U. S. 422 and our neutrality was disregarded, the Congress passed a series
of acts, as a part of which the President was authorized, in stated
circumstances, to lay and revoke embargoes, to give permits for the
exportation of arms and military stores, to remit and discontinue
the restraints and prohibitions imposed by acts suspending
commercial intercourse with certain countries, and to permit or
interdict the entrance into waters of the United States of armed
vessels belonging to foreign nations. [ Footnote 7 ] These early acts were not the subject of
judicial decision, and, apart from that, they afford no adequate
basis for a conclusion that the Congress assumed that it possessed
an unqualified power of delegation. They were inspired by the
vexations of American commerce through the hostile enterprises of
the belligerent powers, [ Footnote
8 ] they were directed to the effective execution of policies
repeatedly declared by the Congress, and they confided to the
President, for the purposes and under the conditions stated, an
authority which was cognate to the conduct by him of the foreign
relations of the government. [ Footnote 9 ] Page 293 U. S. 423 The first case relating to an authorization of this description
was that of The Aurora v. United
States , 7 Cranch 382, 11 U. S. 388 .
The cargo of that vessel had been condemned as having been imported
from Great Britain in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of March
1, 1809. 2 Stat. 528. That act expired on May 1, 1810, [ Footnote 10 ] when Congress passed
another Page 293 U. S. 424 act (2 Stat. 605, 606) providing that, in case either Great
Britain or France, before March 3, 1811,

															"shall . . . so revoke or modify her edicts as that they shall
cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, which
fact the President of the United States shall declare by
proclamation, and if the other nation shall not within three months
thereafter so revoke or modify her edicts in like manner"

															(§ 4), then, with respect to that nation, as stated, the
provisions of the act of 1809, after three months from that
proclamation, "shall . . . be revived and have full force and
effect." On November 2, 1810, the President issued his proclamation
declaring that France had so revoked or modified her edicts, and it
was contended that the provisions of the act of 1809, as to the
cargo in question, had thus been revived. The Court said that it
could see no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not
exercise its discretion in reviving the Act of 1809, "either
expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct." The
provision of that act declaring "that it should continue in force
to a certain time, and no longer," could not restrict the power of
the Legislature to extend its operation "without limitation upon
the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events." This was a
decision, said the Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.
S. 649 , 143 U. S.
683 ,

															"that it was competent for Congress to make the revival of an
act depend upon the proclamation of the President, showing the
ascertainment by him of the fact that the edicts of certain nations
had been so revoked or modified that they did not violate the
neutral commerce of the United States."

															In Field v. Clark, supra, the Court applied that ruling
to the case of "the suspension of an act upon a contingency to be
ascertained by the President, and made known by his proclamation."
The Court was dealing with § 3 of the Act of October 1, 1890, 26
Stat. 567, 612. Page 293 U. S. 425 That section provided that, "with a view to secure reciprocal
trade" with countries producing certain articles, "whenever, and so
often as the President shall be satisfied" that the government of
any country producing them imposed "duties or other exactions upon
the agricultural or other products of the United States" which, in
view of the free list established by the act, the President "may
deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the
power and it shall be his duty," to suspend the free introduction
of those articles by proclamation to that effect, and that, during
that suspension, the duties specified by the section should be
levied. The validity of the provision was challenged as a
delegation to the President of legislative power. The Court
reviewed the early acts to which we have referred, as well as later
statutes considered to be analogous. [ Footnote 11 ] While sustaining the provision, the Court
emphatically declared that the principle that "Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President" is "universally Page 293 U. S. 426 recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the constitution." The Court found
that the act before it was not inconsistent with that principle;
that it did not, "in any real sense, invest the President with the
power of legislation." As "the suspension was absolutely required
when the President ascertained the existence of a particular fact,"
it could not be said "that in ascertaining that fact, and in
issuing his proclamation, in obedience to the legislative will, he
exercised the function of making laws." "He was the mere agent of
the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare the event upon
which its expressed will was to take effect." Id., pp. 143 U. S. 692 , 143 U. S. 693 .
The Court referred with approval to the distinction pointed out by
the Supreme Court of Ohio in Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v.
Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88, between

															"the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law."

															Applying that principle, authorizations given by Congress to
selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the
existence of facts to which legislation is directed have constantly
been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give such
authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish
primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the
declared legislative policy; that is, as Chief Justice Marshall
expressed it, "to fill up the details" under the general provisions
made by the Legislature. Wayman v.
Southard , 10 Wheat. 1, 23 U. S. 43 . In Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 , 192 U. S. 496 ,
the Act of March 2, 1897 (29 Stat. 604, 605), was upheld, which
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation
of a board of experts, to "establish uniform standards of purity,
quality, and fitness Page 293 U. S. 427 for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United
States." The Court construed the statute as expressing

															"the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether
demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or
presumably so because of their inferior quality."

															The Congress, the Court said, thus fixed "a primary standard,"
and committed to the Secretary of the Treasury "the mere executive
duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the
statute."

															"Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably
practicable, and, from the necessities of the case, was compelled
to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the
result pointed out by the statute." See Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U.
S. 380 , 222 U. S.
394 .

															Another notable illustration is that of the authority given to
the Secretary of War to determine whether bridges and other
structures constitute unreasonable obstructions to navigation, and
to remove such obstructions. Act of March 3, 1899, § 18, 30 Stat.
1153, 1154. By that statute, the Congress declared "a general rule
and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what
particular cases came within the rule" as thus laid down. Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 , 204 U. S. 386 ; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.
S. 177 , 216 U. S. 193 ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.
S. 605 , 223 U. S. 638 .
Upon this principle rests the authority of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in the execution of the declared policy of the Congress
in enforcing reasonable rates, in preventing undue preferences and
unjust discriminations, in requiring suitable facilities for
transportation in interstate commerce, and in exercising other
powers held to have been validly conferred. St. Louis, I.M.
& S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281 , 210 U. S. 287 ; Inter-Mountain Rate Cases, 234 U.
S. 476 , 234 U. S. 486 ; Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 , 266 U. S. 130 ; New York Central Securities
Corporation Page 293 U. S. 428 v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 , 287 U. S. 24 -25.
Upon a similar ground the authority given to the President, in
appropriate relation to his functions as Commander-in-Chief, by the
Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1918
(40 Stat. 460), with respect to the disposition of enemy property,
was sustained. "The determination," said the Court,

															"of the terms of sales of enemy properties in the light of facts
and conditions from time to time arising in the progress of war was
not the making of a law; it was the application of the general rule
laid down by the act." United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S.
1 , 272 U. S. 12 .
[ Footnote 12 ]

															The provisions of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162, 1163),
providing for assignments of frequencies or wave lengths to various
stations, afford another instance. In granting licenses, the Radio
Commission is required to act "as public convenience, interest, or
necessity requires." In construing this provision, the Court found
that the statute itself declared the policy as to "equality of
radio broadcasting service, both of transmission and of reception,"
and that it conferred authority to make allocations and assignments
in order to secure, according to stated criteria, an equitable
adjustment in the distribution of facilities. [ Footnote 13 ] The standard set up was not so
indefinite "as to confer an unlimited power." Federal Radio
Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U.
S. 266 , 289 U. S. 279 , 289 U. S.
285 .

															So also, from the beginning of the government, the Congress has
conferred upon executive officers the power to make regulations --
"not for the government of their departments, but for administering
the laws which did govern." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 , 220 U. S. 517 .
Such regulations become, indeed, binding rules of conduct, Page 293 U. S. 429 but they are valid only as subordinate rules and when found to
be within the framework of the policy which the Legislature has
sufficiently defined. In the case of Grimaud, supra, a
regulation made by the Secretary of Agriculture requiring permits
for grazing sheep on a forest reserve of lands belonging to the
United States was involved. The Court referred to the various acts
for the establishment and management of forest reservations and the
authorization of rules which would "insure the objects of such
reservations," that is, "to regulate their occupancy and use, and
to preserve the forests thereon from destruction." The Court
observed that "it was impracticable for Congress to provide general
regulations for these various and varying details of management,"
and that, in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet local
conditions, Congress "was merely conferring administrative
functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative
power." Id., pp. 220 U. S.
515 -516. The Court quoted with approval the statement of
the principle in Field v. Clark, supra, that the Congress
cannot delegate legislative power, and upheld the regulation in
question as an administrative rule for the appropriate execution of
the policy laid down in the statute. See Wayman v. Southard,
supra; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 , 224 U. S.
214 -215; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 , 245 U. S. 389 ; McKinley v. United States, 249 U.
S. 397 .

															The applicable considerations were reviewed in Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 ,
where the Court dealt with the so-called "flexible tariff
provision" of the Act of September 21, 1922 (42 Stat. 858, 941,
942), and with the authority which it conferred upon the President.
The Court applied the same principle that permitted the Congress to
exercise its ratemaking power in interstate commerce, and found
that a similar provision was justified for the fixing of customs
duties; that is, as the Court said:

															"If Congress shall lay down by Page 293 U. S. 430 legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power. If it is thought wise to vary the customs duties according
to changing conditions of production at home and abroad, it may
authorize the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose, with the
advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission appointed under
Congressional authority."

															The Court sustained the provision upon the authority of Field v. Clark, supra, repeating with approval what was
there said, that "What the President was required to do was merely
in execution of the act of Congress." Id., pp. 276 U. S.
409 -411.

															Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the
Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which
there is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that §
9(c) goes beyond those limits. As to the transportation of oil
production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared
no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule.
There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and
conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or
prohibited.

															If § 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend that
anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the
Congress to delegate its lawmaking function. The reasoning of the
many decisions we have reviewed would be made vacuous, and their
distinctions nugatory. Instead of performing its lawmaking
function, the Congress could, at will and as to such subjects as it
chooses, transfer that function to the President or other officer
or to an administrative body. The question is not of the intrinsic
importance of the particular statute before us, but of the
constitutional processes of legislation which are an essential part
of our system of government. Page 293 U. S. 431 Sixth. There is another objection to the validity of
the prohibition laid down by the executive order under § 9(c). The
executive order contains no finding, no statement of the grounds of
the President's action in enacting the prohibition. Both § 9(c) and
the executive order are in notable contrast with historic practice
(as shown by many statutes and proclamations we have cited in the
margin [ Footnote 14 ]) by
which declarations of policy are made by the Congress and
delegations are within the framework of that policy and have
relation to facts and conditions to be found and stated by the
President in the appropriate exercise of the delegated authority.
If it could be said that from the four corners of the statute any
possible inference could be drawn of particular circumstances or
conditions which were to govern the exercise of the authority
conferred, the President could not act validly without having
regard to those circumstances and conditions. And findings by him
as to the existence of the required basis of his action would be
necessary to sustain that action, for otherwise the case would
still be one of an unfettered discretion as the qualification of
authority would be ineffectual. The point is pertinent in relation
to the first section of the National Industrial Recovery Act. We
have said that the first section is but a general introduction,
that it declares no policy and defines no standard with respect to
the transportation which is the subject of § 9(c). But if, from the
extremely broad description contained in that section and the
widely different matters to which the section refers, it were
possible to derive a statement of prerequisites to the President's
action under § 9(c), it would still be necessary for the President
to comply with those conditions and to show that compliance as the
ground of his prohibition. To hold Page 293 U. S. 432 that he is free to select as he chooses from the many and
various objects generally described in the first section, and then
to act without making any finding with respect to any object that
he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that
object, would be, in effect, to make the conditions inoperative and
to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative power.

															We are not dealing with action which, appropriately belonging to
the executive province, is not the subject of judicial review or
with the presumptions attaching to executive action. [ Footnote 15 ] To repeat, we are
concerned with the question of the delegation of legislative power.
If the citizen is to be punished for the crime of violating a
legislative order of an executive officer, or of a board or
commission, due process of law requires that it shall appear that
the order is within the authority of the officer, board, or
commission, and, if that authority depends on determinations of
fact, those determinations must be shown. As the Court said in Wichita Railroad & Light Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 260 U. S. 48 , 260 U. S.
59 :

															"In creating such an administrative agency, the Legislature, to
prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must
enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain rules of
decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and
necessary principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure
and rules enjoined, and show a substantial compliance therewith to
give validity to its action. When, therefore, such an
administrative agency is required as a condition precedent to an
order, to make a finding of facts, the validity of the order must
rest upon the needed finding. If it is lacking, the order is
ineffective. Page 293 U. S. 433 It is pressed on us that the lack of an express finding may be
supplied by implication and by reference to the averments of the
petition invoking the action of the Commission. We cannot agree to
this."

															Referring to the ruling in the Wichita Case, the Court
said in Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S.
44 :

															"We held that the order in that case, made after a hearing and
ordering a reduction, was void for lack of the express finding in
the order. We put this conclusion not only on the language of the
statute, but also on general principles of constitutional
government."

															We cannot regard the President as immune from the application of
these constitutional principles. When the President is invested
with legislative authority as the delegate of Congress in carrying
out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the constitutional
restriction applicable to such a delegation.

															We see no escape from the conclusion that the Executive Orders
of July 11, 1933, and July 14, 1933, and the regulations issued by
the Secretary of the Interior thereunder, are without
constitutional authority.

															The decrees of the Circuit Court of Appeals are reversed, and
the causes are remanded to the District Court, with direction to
modify its decrees in conformity with this opinion so as to grant
permanent injunctions, restraining the defendants from enforcing
those orders and regulations. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The full text of the Executive Order of July 11, 1933, is as
follows:

															" Executive Order" " Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced
or Withdrawn from Storage. "

															"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress
entitled 'An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to
foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of
certain useful public works, and for other purposes,' approved June
16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), the transportation in
interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State law
or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, is
hereby prohibited."

															"FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

															"The White House,"

															"July 11, 1933"

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Executive Order of July 14, 1933, is as follows:

															" Executive Order" " Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and Foreign
Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully Produced
or Withdrawn from Storage. "

															"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Act of Congress,
entitled 'An Act To encourage national industrial recovery, to
foster fair competition, and to provide for the construction of
certain useful public works, and for other purposes,' approved June
16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d Congress), in order to effectuate the
intent and purpose of the Congress as expressed in Section 9(c)
thereof, and for the purpose of securing the enforcement of my
order of July 11, 1933, issued pursuant to said act, I hereby
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers
vested in me, for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act
and said order, including full authority to designate and appoint
such agents and to set up such boards and agencies as he may see
fit, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary."

															"Franklin D. Roosevelt"

															"The White House,"

															"July 14, 1933"

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Executive Order of August 19, 1933, is as follows:

															" Executive Order" " Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum
Industry " "An application having been duly made, pursuant to and in full
compliance with the provisions of Title I of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, for my approval of
a Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry, and hearings
having been held thereon and the Administrator having rendered his
report together with his recommendations and findings with respect
thereto, and the Administrator having found that the said Code of
Fair Competition complies in all respects with the pertinent
provisions of Title I of said Act and that the requirements of
clauses (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of Section 3 of the said Act
have been met:"

															"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the
United States, pursuant to the authority vested in me by Title I of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, approved June 16, 1933, and
otherwise, do adopt and approve the report, recommendations and
findings of the Administrator, and do order that the said Code of
Fair Competition be, and it is hereby, approved."

															"Franklin D. Roosevelt"

															"Approval Recommended:"

															"Hugh S. Johnson"

															" Administrator "

															"The White House"

															"August 19, 1933"

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The government states that, although the second paragraph of
section 4 of article III was a part of the Code for a short period
prior to September 13, 1933, no legal basis exists for prosecution
for production in Texas during that period.

															[ Footnote 5 ] See United States v. The Schooner
Peggy , 1 Cranch, 103, 5 U. S. 109 -110; Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co., 183 U.
S. 115 , 183 U. S. 120 ; Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.
S. 290 , 224 U. S. 302 ; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503 , 224 U. S. 507 ; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca, 248 U. S.
9 , 248 U. S. 21 ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.
S. 443 , 254 U. S. 464 ; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.
S. 184 , 257 U. S. 201 ; Texas Company v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466 , 258 U. S.
474 .

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The text of section 1 is as follows:

															"Section 1. A national emergency productive of widespread
unemployment and disorganization of industry, which burdens
interstate and foreign commerce, affects the public welfare, and
undermines the standards of living of the American people, is
hereby declared to exist. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to
provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of
industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups,
to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under
adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate
unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to
avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily
required), to increase the consumption of industrial and
agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and
relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise
to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Acts of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372; March 3, 1795, 1 Stat. 444;
June 13, 1798, 1 Stat. 565, 566; February 9, 1799, 1 Stat. 613,
615; February 27, 1800, 2 Stat. 7, 9, 10; March 3, 1805, 2 Stat.
339, 341, 342; February 28, 1806, 2 Stat. 351, 352; April 22, 1808,
2 Stat. 490.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Marshall's Life of Washington, vol. 2, p. 319 et
seq. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Thus, prior to the Act of June 4, 1794 (1 Stat. 372), the
Congress had laid embargoes, for limited periods, upon vessels in
ports of the United States bound to foreign ports. Resolutions of
March 26, 1794, and April 18, 1794, 1 Stat. 400, 401. Fearing that
the national safety might be endangered, the President, by the Act
of June 4, 1794, was authorized to lay an embargo, with appropriate
regulations, whenever he found that "the public safety shall so
require," the authority not to be exercised while the Congress was
in session and the embargo to be limited in any case to 15 days
after the commencement of the next session. The Act of March 3,
1795 (1 Stat. 444), authorizing the President to permit the
exportation of arms, etc., was "in cases connected with the
security of the commercial interest of the United States, and for
public purposes only." By the Act of June 13, 1798 (1 Stat. 565),
commercial intercourse was suspended between the United States and
France and its dependencies. The act was to continue only until the
end of the next session of Congress, and it was provided (§ 5) that
if, before the next session, the government of France "shall
clearly disavow, and shall be found to refrain from the
aggressions, depredations and hostilities" against the vessels and
other property of citizens of the United States, and shall
acknowledge the neutrality of the United States, "it shall be
lawful for the President," "being well ascertained of the
premises," to remit and discontinue the prohibitions and restraints
imposed by the act, and to make proclamation accordingly. The Act
of February 9, 1799 (1 Stat. 613), further suspended commercial
intercourse between the United States and France and its
dependencies until March 3, 1800, and gave a similar authority (§
4) to the President to remit and discontinue the restraints and
prohibitions of the act, "if he shall deem it expedient and
consistent with the interest of the United States," either with
respect to the French Republic or to any place belonging to that
republic, "with which a commercial intercourse may safely be
renewed," and to revoke such order if he found that the interest of
the United States so required. The suspension of commercial
intercourse was renewed by the Act of February 27, 1800 (2 Stat. 7)
until March 3, 1801, with a similar provision as to the authority
of the President. The Act of March 3, 1805 (2 Stat. 339), related
to persons committing treason, felony, etc., within the
jurisdiction of the United States and taking refuge in foreign
armed vessels, and the authority to the President to permit or
prevent the entry of such vessels into the waters of the United
States (§ 4) was "in order to prevent insults to the authority of
the laws, whereby the peace of the United States with foreign
nations may be endangered." See also Act of April 22,
1808, 2 Stat. 490. See also Proclamations of President
Adams, "Works of John Adams," vol. IX, pp. 176, 177.

															[ Footnote 10 ] See Act of June 28, 1809, 2 Stat. 550.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Acts of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 224; March 3, 1817, 3 Stat. 361;
January 7, 1824, 4 Stat. 2; May 24, 1828, 4 Stat. 308; May 31,
1830, 4 Stat. 425; March 6, 1866, 14 Stat. 3; March 3, 1883, 22
Stat. 490; June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57; October 1, 1890, 26 Stat.
616; R.S. §§ 2493, 2494, 4219, 4228. Proclamations of Presidents: 3
Stat.App. 1; 4 Stat.App. 3, pp. 814-818; 9 Stat.App. 1001, 1004; 11
Stat.App. 795; 13 Stat.App. 739; 14 Stat.App. 818, 819; 16
Stat.App. 1127; 17 Stat.App. 954, 956, 957; 21 Stat. 800; 23 Stat.
841, 842, 844.

															For other analogous statutes, see Acts of December 17,
1813, 3 Stat. 88, 93; June 19, 1886, 24 Stat. 79, 82; March 3,
1887, 24 Stat. 475; August 30, 1890, 26 Stat. 414, 415; February
15, 1893, 27 Stat. 449, 452; March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 727, 733;
September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 799; June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 217,
225; August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. 276; October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 411,
422; March 4, 1919, 40 Stat. 1348, 1350; June 17, 1930, 46 Stat.
590, 704. Resolutions of March 14, 1912, 37 Stat. 630; January 31,
1922, 42 Stat. 361. Proclamations: 24 Stat. 1024, 1025, 1028, 1030;
27 Stat. 995, 1011; 38 Stat. 1960; 39 Stat. 1756; 40 Stat. 1683,
1689 et seq. [ Footnote 12 ] See also §§ 4(b) and 5(a) of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, 40 Stat. 411, 414, 415.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Act of March 28, 1928, amending § 9 of the Radio Act of 1927, 45
Stat. 373.

															[ Footnote 14 ] See Acts and Proclamations cited in note 11 supra. [ Footnote 15 ] See Philadelphia & Trenton R.
Co. v. Stimpson , 14 Pet. 448, 39 U. S. 458 ; Martin v. Mott , 12 Wheat. 19, 25 U. S. 30 , 25 U. S. 32 ; Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.
S. 163 , 250 U. S. 182 , 250 U. S. 184 ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S.
1 , 272 U. S. 14 -15; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 , 287 U. S.
399 .

															MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO, dissenting.

															With all that is said in the opinion of the court as to the Code
of Fair Competition adopted by the President August 16, 1933, for
the Governance of the Petroleum Industry, I am fully in accord. No
question is before us at this time as to the power of Congress to
regulate production. No question is here as to its competence to
clothe the President with a delegated power whereby a code of fair
competition may become invested with the force of Page 293 U. S. 434 law. The petitioners were never in jeopardy by force of such a
code or of regulations made thereunder. They were not in jeopardy
because there was neither statute nor regulation subjecting them to
pains or penalties if they set the Code at naught. One must deplore
the administrative methods that brought about uncertainty for a
time as to the terms of executive orders intended to be law. Even
so, the petitioners do not stand in need of an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of a nonexistent mandate.

															I am unable to assent to the conclusion that § 9(c) of the
National Recovery Act, a section delegating to the President a very
different power from any that is involved in the regulation of
production or in the promulgation of a code, is to be nullified
upon the ground that his discretion is too broad or for any other
reason. My point of difference with the majority of the court is
narrow. I concede that, to uphold the delegation, there is need to
discover in the terms of the act a standard reasonably clear
whereby discretion must be governed. I deny that such a standard is
lacking in respect of the prohibitions permitted by this section
when the act, with all its reasonable implications, is considered
as a whole. What the standard is becomes the pivotal inquiry.

															As to the nature of the act which the President is authorized to
perform, there is no need for implication. That, at least, is
definite beyond the possibility of challenge. He may prohibit the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and
the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess
of the amount permitted by any state law or valid regulation or
order prescribed thereunder. He is not left to roam at will among
all the possible subjects of interstate transportation, picking and
choosing as he pleases. I am far from asserting now that delegation
would be Page 293 U. S. 435 valid if accompanied by all that latitude of choice. In the
laying of his interdict, he is to confine himself to a particular
commodity, and to that commodity when produced or withdrawn from
storage in contravention of the policy and statutes of the states.
He has choice, though within limits, as to the occasion, but none
whatever as to the means. The means have been prescribed by
Congress. There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving
commission to inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them,
do anything he pleases. His act being thus defined, what else must
he ascertain in order to regulate his discretion and bring the
power into play? The answer is not given if we look to § 9(c) only,
but it comes to us by implication from a view of other sections
where the standards are defined. The prevailing opinion concedes
that a standard will be as effective if imported into § 9(c) by
reasonable implication as if put there in so many words. If we look
to the whole structure of the statute, the test is plainly this,
that the President is to forbid the transportation of the oil when
he believes, in the light of the conditions of the industry as
disclosed from time to time, that the prohibition will tend to
effectuate the declared policies of the act -- not merely his own
conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, but
the policies announced by § 1 in the forefront of the statute as an
index to the meaning of everything that follows. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Page 293 U. S. 436 Oil produced or transported in excess of a statutory quota is
known in the industry as "hot oil," and the record is replete with
evidence as to the effect of such production and transportation
upon the economic situation and upon national recovery. A declared
policy of Congress in the adoption of the act is "to eliminate
unfair competitive practices." Beyond question, an unfair
competitive practice exists when "hot oil" is transported in
interstate commerce with the result that law-abiding dealers must
compete with lawbreakers. Here is one of the standards set up in
the act to guide the President's discretion. Another declared
policy of Congress is "to conserve natural resources." Beyond
question, the disregard of statutory quotas is wasting the oil
fields in Texas and other states and putting in jeopardy of
exhaustion one of the treasures of the nation. All this is
developed in the record and in the arguments of counsel for the
government with a wealth of illustration. Here is a second
standard. Another declared policy of Congress is to "promote the
fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of
industries," and "except as may be temporarily required" to "avoid
undue restriction of production." Beyond question, prevailing
conditions in the oil industry have brought about the need for
temporary restriction in order to promote in the long run the
fullest productive capacity of business, in all its many Page 293 U. S. 437 branches, for the effect of present practices is to diminish
that capacity by demoralizing prices, and thus increasing
unemployment. The ascertainment of these facts at any time or place
was a task too intricate and special to be performed by Congress
itself through a general enactment in advance of the event. All
that Congress could safely do was to declare the act to be done and
the policies to be promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power
the ascertainment of the shifting facts that would determine the
relation between the doing of the act and the attainment of the
stated ends. That is what it did. It said to the President, in
substance: you are to consider whether the transportation of oil in
excess of the statutory quotas is offensive to one or more of the
policies enumerated in § 1, whether the effect of such conduct is
to promote unfair competition or to waste the natural resources or
to demoralize prices or to increase unemployment or to reduce the
purchasing power of the workers of the nation. If these standards
or some of them have been flouted, with the result of a substantial
obstruction to industrial recovery, you may then by a prohibitory
order, eradicate the mischief.

															I am not unmindful of the argument that the President has the
privilege of choice between one standard and another, acting or
failing to act according to an estimate of values that is
individual and personal. To describe his conduct thus is to ignore
the essence of his function. What he does is to inquire into the
industrial facts as they exist from time to time. Cf. Hampton
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 at
p. 276 U. S. 409 ; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498, quoted with approval in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , at
p. 143 U. S. 694 .
These being ascertained, he is not to prefer one standard to
another in any subjective attitude of mind, in any personal or
willful way. He is to study the facts objectively, the violation of
a standard Page 293 U. S. 438 impelling him to action or inaction according to its observed
effect upon industrial recovery -- the ultimate end, as appears by
the very heading of the title, to which all the other ends are
tributary and mediate. Nor is there any essential conflict among
the standards inter se, at all events when they are viewed
in relation to § 9(c) and the power there conferred. In its
immediacy, the exclusion of oil from the channels of transportation
is a restriction of interstate commerce, not a removal of
obstructions. This is self-evident, and, of course, was understood
by Congress when the discretionary power of exclusion was given to
its delegate. But what is restriction in its immediacy may in its
ultimate and larger consequences be expansion and development.
Congress was aware that, for the recovery of national wellbeing,
there might be need of temporary restriction upon production in one
industry or another. It said so in § 1. When it clothed the
President with power to impose such a restriction -- to prohibit
the flow of oil illegally produced -- it laid upon him a mandate to
inquire and determine whether the conditions in that particular
industry were such at any given time as to make restriction helpful
to the declared objectives of the act and to the ultimate
attainment of industrial recovery. If such a situation does not
present an instance of lawful delegation in a typical and classic
form ( Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.
S. 506 ; Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 ),
categories long established will have to be formulated anew.

															In what has been written, I have stated, but without developing
the argument, that, by reasonable implication, the power conferred
upon the President by § 9(c) is to be read as if coupled with the
words that he shall exercise the power whenever satisfied that, by
doing so, he will effectuate the policy of the statute as
theretofore declared. Two canons of interpretation, each familiar
to our law, Page 293 U. S. 439 leave no escape from that conclusion. One is that the meaning of
a statute is to be looked for not in any single section, but in all
the parts together, and in their relation to the end in view. Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U. S.
76 , 203 U. S. 89 ; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287 ; Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U.
S. 438 , 139 U. S.
443 -444. The other is that, when a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two interpretations, by one of which it is
unconstitutional and by the other valid, the court prefers the
meaning that preserves to the meaning that destroys. United
States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.
S. 366 , 213 U. S. 407 ; Knights Templars' Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.
S. 197 , 187 U. S. 205 .
Plainly, § 1, with its declaration of the will of Congress, is the
chart that has been furnished to the President to enable him to
shape his course among the reefs and shallows of this act. If there
could be doubt as to this when § 1 is viewed alone, the doubt would
be dispelled by the reiteration of the policy in the sections that
come later. In § 2, which relates to administrative agencies, in §
3, which relates to codes of fair competition, in § 4, which
relates to agreements and licenses, in § 6, which prescribes
limitations upon the application of the statute, and in § 10, which
permits the adoption of rules and regulations, authority is
conferred upon the President to do one or more acts as the delegate
of Congress when he is satisfied that thereby he will aid "in
effectuating the policy of this title" or in carrying out its
provisions. True, § 9, the one relating to petroleum, does not, by
express words of reference, embody the same standard, yet nothing
different can have been meant. What, indeed, is the alternative?
Either the statute means that the President is to adhere to the
declared policy of Congress or it means that he is to exercise a
merely arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates the act;
the other saps its life. A choice between them is not hard. Page 293 U. S. 440 I am persuaded that a reference, express or implied, to the
policy of Congress as declared in § 1, is a sufficient definition
of a standard to make the statute valid. Discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing. Field v. Clark, 143 U.
S. 649 , United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.
S. 506 , and Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 ,
state the applicable principle. Under these decisions, the
separation of powers between the Executive and Congress is not a
doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic rigor. There
must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of
adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government,
which cannot foresee today the developments of tomorrow in their
nearly infinite variety. The Interstate Commerce Commission,
probing the economic situation of the railroads of the country,
consolidating them into systems, shaping in numberless ways their
capacities and duties, and even making or unmaking the prosperity
of great communities ( Texas & Pacific Ry Co. v. United
States, 289 U. S. 627 ), is
a conspicuous illustration. See, e.g., 41 Stat. 479-482,
c. 91, §§ 405, 406, 407, 408, 42 Stat. 27, c. 20, 49 U.S.C. §§ 3,
4, 5. Cf. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.
S. 476 ; N.Y. Central Securities Co. v. United
States, 287 U. S. 12 , 287 U. S. 24 -25;
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, vol. 2, pp. 357, 365.
There could surely be no question as to the validity of an act
whereby carriers would be prohibited from transporting oil produced
in contravention of a statute if in the judgment of the Commission
the practice was demoralizing the market and bringing disorder and
insecurity into the national economy. What may be delegated to a
commission may be delegated to the President.

															"Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine
exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become
effective, because dependent on future conditions, and it may
leave Page 293 U. S. 441 the determination of such time to the decision of an
executive." Hampton & Co. v. United States, supra, at p. 276 U. S. 407 .
Only recently (1932), the whole subject was discussed with much
enlightenment in the Report by the Committee on Ministers' Powers
to the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain. See especially pages 23, 51. In the complex life of today, the business of
government could not go on without the delegation, in greater or
less degree, of the power to adapt the rule to the swiftly moving
facts.

															A striking illustration of this need is found in the very
industry affected by this section, the production of petroleum and
its transportation between the states. At the passage of the
National Recovery Act, no one could be certain how many of the
states would adopt valid quota laws, or how generally the laws
would be observed when adopted, or to what extent illegal practices
would affect honest competitors or the stability of prices or the
conservation of natural resources or the return of industrial
prosperity. Much would depend upon conditions as they shaped
themselves thereafter. Violations of the state laws might turn out
to be so infrequent that the honest competitor would suffer little,
if any, damage. The demand for oil might be so reduced that there
would be no serious risk of waste, depleting or imperiling the
resources of the nation. Apart from these possibilities, the
business might become stabilized through voluntary cooperation or
the adoption of a code or otherwise. Congress, not unnaturally, was
unwilling to attach to the state laws a sanction so extreme as the
cutting off of the privilege of interstate commerce unless the need
for such action had unmistakably developed. What was left to the
President was to ascertain the conditions prevailing in the
industry, and prohibit or fail to prohibit according to the effect
of those conditions upon the phases of the national policy relevant
thereto. Page 293 U. S. 442 From a host of precedents available, both legislative and
judicial, I cite a few as illustrations. By an act approved June 4,
1794, during the administration of Washington (1 Stat. 372; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 143 U. S.
683 ), Congress authorized the President, when Congress
was not in session, and for a prescribed period

															"whenever, in his opinion, the public safety shall so require,
to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports or the
United States, or upon the ships and vessels of the United States,
or the ships and vessels of any foreign nation, under such
regulations as the circumstances of the case may require, and to
continue or revoke the same whenever he shall think proper."

															By an act of 1799, February 9 (1 Stat. 613, 615), suspending
commercial intercourse with France and its dependencies,

															"it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, if
he shall deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the
United States, by his order, to remit, and discontinue, for the
time being, the restraints and prohibitions aforesaid; . . . and
also to revoke such order ( i.e., reestablish the
restraints), whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United
States shall require."

															By an act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), sustained in Field v. Clark, supra, the President was authorized to
suspend by proclamation the free introduction into this country of
enumerated articles when satisfied that a country producing them
imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other
products of the United States which he may deem to be reciprocally
unequal or unreasonable. By an act of September 21, 1922 (42 Stat.
858, 941, 945), sustained in Hampton & Co. v. United
States, supra, the President was empowered to increase or
decrease tariff duties so as to equalize the differences between
the costs of production at home and abroad, and empowered, by the
same means, to give redress for other acts of discrimination or
unfairness "when he finds that the public interest will be Page 293 U. S. 443 served thereby." Delegation was not confined to an inquiry into
the necessity or occasion for the change. It included the magnitude
of the change, the delegate thus defining the act to be performed.
By an act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 11, 35), amended in 1905 (33
Stat. 628), regulating the forest reservations of the nation, the
purpose of the reservations was declared to be "to improve and
protect the forest within the reservation," and to secure
"favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States." Without further guide or standard, the Secretary of
Agriculture was empowered to "make such rules and regulations and
establish such service as will insure the objects of such
reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to
preserve the forests thereon from destruction." The validity of
these provisions was upheld in United States v. Grimaud,
supra, as against the claim by one who violated the rules that
there had been an unlawful delegation. Many other precedents are
cited in the margin. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
They teach one lesson, and a clear one.

															There is no fear that the nation will drift from its ancient
moorings as the result of the narrow delegation of power permitted
by this section. What can be done under cover of that permission is
closely and clearly circumscribed both as to subject matter and
occasion. The statute was framed in the shadow of a national
disaster. A host of unforeseen contingencies would have to be faced
from day to day, and faced with a fullness of understanding Page 293 U. S. 444 unattainable by anyone except the man upon the scene. The
President was chosen to meet the instant need.

															A subsidiary question remains as to the form of the executive
order, which is copied in the margin. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The question is a subsidiary one, for,
unless the statute is invalid, another order with fuller findings
or recitals may correct the informalities of this one, if
informalities there are. But the order, to my thinking, is valid as
it stands. The President was not required either by the
Constitution or by any statute to state the reasons that had
induced him to exercise the granted power. It is enough that the
grant of power had been made, and that, pursuant to that grant, he
had signified the will to act. The will to act being declared, the
law presumes that the declaration was preceded by due inquiry and
that it was rooted in sufficient grounds. Such, for a hundred years
and more, has been the doctrine of this court. The act of February
28, 1795 (1 Stat. 424) authorized the President "whenever the
United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of
invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe," to call forth
such number of the militia of the states as he shall deem necessary
and to issue his Page 293 U. S. 445 orders to the appropriate officers for that purpose. Cf. Const. art. 1, cl. 15. When war threatened in the
summer of 1812, President Madison, acting under the authority of
that statute, directed Major General Dearborn to requisition from
New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut certain numbers of the
states' militia. American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1,
pp. 322-325. No finding of "imminent danger of invasion" was made
by the President in any express way, nor was such a finding made by
the Secretary of War or any other official. The form of the
requisitions to Massachusetts and Connecticut appears in the state
papers of the government (American State Papers, supra );
the form of those to New York was almost certainly the same.
Replevin was brought by a New York militia man who refused to obey
the orders, and whose property had been taken in payment of a fine
imposed by a court martial. The defendant, a deputy marshal,
defended on the ground that the orders were valid, and the
plaintiff demurred because there was no allegation that the
President had adjudged that there was imminent danger of an
invasion. The case came to this court. Martin v.
Mott , 12 Wheat. 19, 25 U. S. 32 . In
an opinion by Story, J., the court upheld the seizure.

															"The argument is [he wrote] that the power confided to the
President is a limited power, and can be exercised only in the
cases pointed out in the statute, and therefore, it is necessary to
aver the facts which bring the exercise within the purview of the
statute. In short, the same principles are sought to be applied to
the delegation and exercise of this power intrusted to the
executive of the nation for great political purposes as might be
applied to the humblest officer in the government, acting upon the
most narrow and special authority. It is the opinion of the Court
that this objection cannot be maintained. When the President
exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumption is,
that it is exercised in pursuance Page 293 U. S. 446 of law. Every public officer is presumed to act in obedience to
his duty until the contrary is shown, and, a fortiori, this presumption ought to be favor ably applied to the chief
magistrate of the Union. It is not necessary to aver, that the act
which he might rightfully do, was so done."

															A like presumption has been applied in other cases and in a
great variety of circumstances. Philadelphia
& Trenton R. Co. v. Stimpson , 14 Pet. 448, 39 U. S. 458 ,; Rankin v.
Hoyt , 4 How. 327, 45 U. S. 335 ; Carpenter v.
Rannels , 19 Wall. 138, 86 U. S. 146 ; The Confiscation
Cases , 20 Wall. 92, 87 U. S. 109 ; Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U. S.
91 , 147 U. S. 97 ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S.
1 , 272 U. S. 14 -15.
This does not mean that the individual is helpless in the face of
usurpation. A court will not revise the discretion of the
Executive, sitting in judgment on his order as if it were the
verdict of a jury. Martin v. Mott, supra. On the other
hand, we have said that his order may not stand if it is an act of
mere oppression, an arbitrary fiat that overleaps the bounds of
judgment. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.
S. 378 , 287 U. S.
399 -401. The complainants and others in their position
may show, if they can, that in no conceivable aspect was there
anything in the conditions of the oil industry in July, 1933, to
establish a connection between the prohibitory order and the
declared policies of the Congress. This is merely to say that the
standard must be such as to have at least a possible relation to
the act to be performed under the delegated power. One can hardly
suppose that a prohibitory order would survive a test in court if
the Executive were to assert a relation between the transportation
of petroleum and the maintenance of the gold standard or the
preservation of peace in Europe or the Orient. On the other hand,
there can be no challenge of such a mandate unless the possibility
of a rational nexus is lacking altogether. Page 293 U. S. 447 Here, in the case at hand, the relation between the order and
the standard is manifest upon the face of the transaction from
facts so notorious as to be within the range of our judicial
notice. There is significance in the fact that it is not challenged
even now.

															The President, when acting in the exercise of a delegated power,
is not a quasi -judicial officer, whose rulings are subject
to review upon certiorari or appeal ( Chicago Junction
Case, 264 U. S. 258 , 264 U. S. 265 ; cf. Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11 , 255 U. S. 20 ),
or an administrative agency supervised in the same way. Officers
and bodies such as those may be required by reviewing courts to
express their decision in formal and explicit findings to the end
that review may be intelligent. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 , 282 U. S. 215 ; Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Ry. Co. v. United
States, 282 U. S. 74 , 282 U. S. 86 ; United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., post, p.
454. Cf. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin
Telephone Co., 289 U. S. 67 . Such
is not the position or duty of the President. He is the Chief
Executive of the nation, exercising a power committed to him by
Congress and subject, in respect of the formal qualities of his
acts, to the restrictions, if any, accompanying the grant, but not
to any others. One will not find such restrictions either in the
statute itself or in the Constitution back of it. The Constitution
of the United States is not a code of civil practice.

															The prevailing opinion cites Wichita Railroad & Light
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Kansas, 260 U. S.
48 , and Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S.
32 , 264 U. S. 44 .
One dealt with a delegation to a public utilities commission of the
power to reduce existing rates if they were found to be
unreasonable; the other a delegation to the Secretary of Labor of
the power to deport aliens found after notice and a hearing to be
undesirable residents. In each, it was a Page 293 U. S. 448 specific requirement of the statute that the basic fact
conditioning action by the administrative agency be stated in a
finding and stated there expressly. If legislative power is
delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of
constitutional government that the condition be fulfilled. In
default of such fulfillment, there is in truth no delegation, and
hence no official action, but only the vain show of it. The analogy
is remote between power so conditioned and that in controversy
here.

															Discretionary action does not become subject to review because
the discretion is legislative, rather than executive. If the
reasons for the prohibition now in controversy had been stated in
the order, the jurisdiction of the courts would have been no
greater and no less. Investigation resulting in an order directed
against a particular person after notice and a hearing is not to be
confused with investigation preliminary and incidental to the
formulation of a rule. An embargo under the act of 1794 would have
been more than a nullity though there had been a failure to recite
that what was done was essential to the public safety or to
enumerate the reasons leading to that conclusion. If findings are
necessary as a preamble to general regulations, the requirement
must be looked for elsewhere than in the Constitution of the
nation.

															There are other questions as to the validity of § 9(c) in
matters unrelated to the delegation of power to the President, and
also questions as to the regulations adopted in behalf of the
President by the Secretary of the Interior. They are not considered
in the prevailing opinion. However, they have been well reviewed
and disposed of in the opinion of Sibley, J., writing for the court
below. It is unnecessary at this time to dwell upon them
further.

															The decree in each case should be affirmed.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															"Section 1. . . . It is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate and
foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to
provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of
industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups,
to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under
adequate governmental sanctions and supervision, to eliminate
unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible
utilization of the present productive capacity of industries, to
avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily
required), to increase the consumption of industrial and
agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and
relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise
to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."

															The act as a whole is entitled as one

															"To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair
competition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful
public works, and for other purposes,"

															and the heading of title I, which includes §§ 1 to 10, is
"Industrial Recovery."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															2 Stat. 411, December 19, 1806; 3 Stat. 224, March 3, 1815; 23
Stat. 31, 32, May 29, 1884; 25 Stat. 659, February 9, 1889; 38
Stat. 717, September 26, 1914; 41 Stat. 593, May 10, 1920; Williams v. United States, 138 U.
S. 514 ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.
S. 470 ; Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.
S. 476 ; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S.
32 . Cf. Emergency Banking Act of March 9, 1933,
48 Stat. 1; Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, 48 Stat.
51, 53, § 43.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Executive Order. Prohibition of Transportation in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce of Petroleum and the Products Thereof Unlawfully
Produced or Withdrawn from Storage. By virtue of the authority
vested in me by the Act of Congress entitled "An Act To encourage
national industrial recovery, to foster fair competition, and to
provide for the construction of certain useful public works, and
for other purposes," approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 67, 73d
Congress), the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or
withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or
order prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or
other duly authorized agency of a State, is hereby prohibited.
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The White House, July 11, 1933.

Summary: In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the US Supreme Court reviewed the validity of an executive order issued by President Roosevelt under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). The order prohibited the interstate transportation of petroleum and related products produced or stored in excess of state-allowed amounts. The Court found that while Congress may have had the power to delegate such authority to the President, the NIRA failed to provide any policy or standard to guide the President's actions. The Court declared the delegation of legislative power to the President unconstitutional and affirmed the lower court's decision to enjoin the enforcement of the order.