U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406
U.S. 742 (1972) United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp. No. 71-227 Argued March 27, 1972 Decided June 7, 1972 406
U.S. 742 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA Syllabus 1. Two "car service rues" promulgated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), requiring generally that unloaded freight cars be
returned in the direction of the owning railroad, are "reasonable"
under the Esch Car Service Act of 1917 in view of the ICC's
finding, for which there is substantial record support, of a
national freight car shortage, and its conclusion that the shortage
could be alleviated by mandatory observance of the rule, which
would give the railroads greater use of their cars and provide an
incentive for the purchase of new equipment. Pp. 744-755.

															2. The ICC proceeding in this case was governed by, and fully
complied with, § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp.
756758.

															325 F. Supp. 352, reversed.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

															MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In 1969, the Interstate Commerce Commission promulgated two "car
service rules" that would have the Page 406 U. S. 743 general effect of requiring that freight cars, after being
unloaded, be returned in the direction of the lines of the road
owning the cars. Several railroads and shippers instituted two
separate suits under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2325 to enjoin enforcement
of these rules. In Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United
States, 327 F. Supp. 1076 (MD Fla.1971), the action of the
Commission was sustained by a three-judge court, but, in the case
now before us, a similar court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania held the Commission's order invalid. 325 F. Supp. 352
(WD Pa.1971). We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U.S. 937, and,
for the reasons hereinafter stated, we conclude that the
Commission's action here challenged was within the scope of the
authority conferred upon it by Congress and conformed to procedural
requirements.

															The country's railroads long ago abandoned the custom of
shifting freight between the cars of connecting roads, and adopted
the practice of shipping the same loaded car over connecting lines
to its ultimate destination. The freight cars of the Nation thus
became, in essence, a single common pool, used by all roads. This
practice necessarily required some arrangements for eventual return
of a freight car to the lines of the road which owned it, and, in
1902, the railroads, through their trade association, dealt with
this and related problems in a code of car service rules with which
the roads agreed among themselves to comply. The effect of the
Commission's order now under review is to promulgate two of these
rules [ Footnote 1 ] as the
Commission's own, with the result that sanctions attach to their
violation by the railroads. Page 406 U. S. 744 Because of critical freight-car shortages experienced during
World War I, Congress enacted the Esch Car Service Act of 1917,
which empowered the Commission to establish reasonable rules and
practices with respect to car service by railroads. 40 Stat. 101,
49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a). The pertinent language of that Act
provides:

															"The Commission may . . . establish reasonable rules,
regulations, and practices with respect to car service by common
carriers by railroad subject to this chapter . . ."

															No party to this proceeding has questioned that the rules
promulgated by the Commission are "rules, regulations, and
practices with respect to car service," and therefore the issue
before us is whether these rules are "reasonable" as that term is
used in the Esch Act. The court below concluded, and the appellees
here contend, that, for a number of reasons, the rules in question
do not meet the statutory requirement of reasonableness. Appellees
also contend that the findings of the Commission Page 406 U. S. 745 are insufficient under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The record of proceedings before the Commission establishes that
the Commission has been increasingly concerned with recurring
shortages of freight cars available to serve the Nation's shippers.
It found that shortages of varying duration and severity occur both
as an annual phenomenon at peak loading periods and also during
times of national emergency. The result of these shortages has been
that roads were unable to promptly supply freight cars to shippers
who had need of them.

															Underlying these chronic shortages of available freight cars,
the Commission found, was an inadequate supply of freight cars
owned by the Nation's railroads. The Commission concluded that one
of the principal factors causing this inadequate supply of freight
cars was the operation of the national car-pool system. In
practice, this system resulted in freight cars' being on lines
other than those of the owning road for long periods of time, since
the rules providing for the return of unloaded freight cars in the
direction of the lines of the owning road were observed, more often
than not, in the breach. Since the owning road was deprived of the
use of its own freight cars for extended periods of time, the
Commission found, there was very little incentive for it to acquire
new freight cars. In addition, since a road which owned a supply of
freight cars inadequate to serve its own on-line shippers could
generally, by hook or by crook, arrange to utilize cars owned by
other roads, the national car-pool system significantly reduced the
normal incentive for a railroad to acquire sufficient equipment to
serve its customers. The rules promulgated by the Commission are
intended to make those railroads whose undersupply of freight cars
contributes to the national shortage more directly feel the Page 406 U. S. 746 pinch resulting from the shortage that they have helped to
cause. By thus requiring each road to face up to any inadequacies
in its ownership of freight cars, the rules are intended, in the
long run, to correct the nationwide short supply of freight cars
that the Commission has found to exist.

															Central to the justification for the Commission's promulgation
of these rules is its finding that there was a nationwide shortage
of freight car ownership. The court below assumed the correctness
of that finding, and we conclude that it was supported by
substantial evidence.

															Shortly after the Second World War, the Commission conducted an
investigation into the adequacy of freight car supply and
utilization by the Nation's railroads. The Commission in that
proceeding concluded that there was "an inadequacy in freight car
ownership by rail carriers as a group." Recognizing that this
inadequacy was caused at least in part by the inability of the
railroads to acquire new equipment, first during an era of wartime
demand and then during an era of post-war boom, the Commission at
that time imposed no obligation on the railroads except to require
them to file with it their rules and regulations with respect to
car service.

															In 1963, the Commission began this investigation into the
adequacy of car ownership, distribution, and utilization. At the
conclusion of the investigatory phase of the proceeding in 1964,
the Commission determined that there was a shortage of freight cars
in general service. 323 I.C.C. 48 (1964). Formal notification of
proposed rulemaking was then issued, and a questionnaire was
submitted to the various railroads for the purpose of compiling
data on car ownership and use. After these data were gathered,
railroads, shippers, and other interested parties were permitted to
file verified statements providing further factual material and to
adduce Page 406 U. S. 747 legal arguments. The Commission, through its Bureau of
Operations, presented to the Hearing Examiner tabular collations of
the freight car ownership and use data, and suggested a formula by
which a railroad might compute the sufficiency of its freight car
ownership. The Bureau also proposed that the entire Code of Car
Service Rules adopted by the Association of American Railroads be
promulgated by the Commission for mandatory observance.

															Many railroads and shippers opposed mandatory enforcement of the
rules. Some roads and shippers appeared in favor of at least some
mandatory enforcement of the rules, arguing that, unless some
compulsion were used in enforcing them, cars purchased by a
railroad for use by its shippers would continue to be detained for
inordinately long periods of time by other roads.

															After 50 days of hearings, the Trial Examiner issued his report,
recommending against mandatory enforcement of the car service
rules. Although the Commission, prior to referring the matter to
him, had previously made a definitive finding that a shortage of
freight cars existed, the Examiner's report stated that there was
no competent evidence in the record developed before him upon which
such a determination could be made. The Examiner assigned several
reasons for recommending against mandatory enforcement of the
rules.

															The Commission issued a comprehensive opinion disagreeing with
the trial examiner in many respects, and ordering that two of the
car service rules be promulgated as rules of the Commission with
sanctions attaching to noncompliance. Finding that "[t]he
continuing relocation of cars on owner's lines is of major
importance to the maintenance of an adequate car supply," [ Footnote 2 ] the Commission Page 406 U. S. 748 concluded that the inconveniences feared by the shippers were
outweighed by the long-term benefit that would accrue from the
mandatory enforcement of the two car service rules.

															After its first order adopting the two rules was issued, the
Commission considered claims that there was need for some procedure
for exceptions to the mandatory enforcement of the rules. A
supplemental order that established another rule that permitted the
railroads to seek exception from the Commission's Bureau of
Operations, in order to alleviate inequities and hardships.
[ Footnote 3 ]

															The court below held that the rules were not "reasonable," as
that term is used in the Esch Act, for three reasons. First,
although there was a general finding of a nationwide freight car
shortage, the court said that a specific shortage on owner lines
should have been found in order to justify the promulgation of
these rules. Second, it said there should have been a finding as to
the financial effects upon the railroads and shippers who would be
affected by the rules. Finally, it supported its conclusion that
the rules were not "reasonable" by the fact that, even though
violation of the rules could be enforced by monetary penalties, the
Commission nonetheless conceded that obtaining complete compliance
with them would be impossible.

															The standard of judicial review for actions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in general, Western Chemical Co. v. United
States, 271 U. S. 268 (1926), Page 406 U. S. 749 and for actions taken by the Commission under the authority of
the Esch Act in particular, Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564 (1927), is well established by prior decisions of this Court. We do
not weigh the evidence introduced before the Commission; we do not
inquire into the wisdom of the regulations that the Commission
promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by
which the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that
the latter are rationally supported. In judicially reviewing these
particular rules promulgated by the Commission, we must be alert to
the differing standard governing review of the Commission's
exercise of its rulemaking authority, on the one hand, and that
governing its adjudicatory function, on the other:

															"In the cases cited, the Commission was determining the relative
rights of the several carriers in a joint rate. It was making a
partition, and it performed a function quasi -judicial in
its nature. In the case at bar, the function exercised by the
Commission is wholly legislative. Its authority to legislate is
limited to establishing a reasonable rule. But, in establishing a
rule of general application, it is not a condition of its validity
that there be adduced evidence of its appropriateness in respect to
every railroad to which it will be applicable. In this connection,
the Commission, like other legislators, may reason from the
particular to the general." Assigned Car Cases, supra, at 274 U. S.
583 .

															The finding of the Commission as to a nationwide shortage of
freight cars was based primarily on data submitted by the railroads
themselves covering the years 1955 through 1964. Over this 10-year
period, total freight car ownership of Class I railroads dropped
12.4%, and aggregate carrying capacity of those railroads dropped
5%. Over the same period, revenue tons originated Page 406 U. S. 750 dropped 2.9%. The decline in ownership of plain boxcars, as
opposed to more sophisticated types of cars, was even more
dramatic; ownership of cars over the 10-year period in question
dropped 22.1%, while aggregate carrying capacity of such cars
dropped 18.9%. Testimony of witnesses for the National Industrial
Traffic League, the Western Wood Products Association, the American
Plywood Association, and the Vulcan Materials Association also
supported the finding of a car shortage. These statistics, taken
together with the Commission's post-war determination of a car
shortage, portray a gradually worsening ratio of carrying capacity
to revenue tons originated.

															The Commission further found that freight car shortages, in the
sense that a particular road was unable to promptly supply freight
cars to particular shippers who needed them, have occurred
chronically, both during peak loading seasons each year and during
times of national emergency. It is quite true, as appellees
suggest, that inability of the roads to supply cars to shippers at
particular times is not conclusive evidence that there is a
national shortage of freight car ownership. Conceivably, freight
car ownership could be adequate, yet poor utilization of the supply
could result in shortages. Nonetheless, the Commission may fairly
rely on these chronic shortages in availability of freight cars as
one factor upon which to base its conclusion that there was an
overall shortage of ownership of freight cars.

															The Commission also found that a surprisingly low percentage of
freight cars was actually on the tracks of the roads owning the
cars at any given time, and that this percentage had been
decreasing during the period in question. In March, 1966, less than
30% of the railroads' plain boxcars were on the line of their
owner, and, during the preceding year, that percentage Page 406 U. S. 751 remained mostly in the low thirties. The Commission summarized
the factual situation it found in these words:

															"From the evidence adduced and the data collected, it is obvious
that an adequate freight car supply is as much a problem today as
it was during the period considered in our last proceeding in 1947.
Car service which involves a shortage of approximately one out of
every ten cars ordered or even one out of every fifteen cars
ordered demands that every available means be marshalled to
eliminate such deficiencies."

															335 I.C.C. at 285.

															One of the means marshaled by the Commission to eliminate such
deficiencies was the promulgation of the two rules under attack
here. The thrust of these rules is to require that freight cars,
after unloading, be dispatched in the direction of the lines of the
owning road.

															Thus, the Commission concluded after investigation that the
railroads were frequently unable to supply shippers with freight
cars. It reasoned from this fact, and from statistics showing a
significantly more rapid decline in aggregate carrying capacity
than in revenue tons originated, that an underlying and important
cause of the unavailability of boxcars to shippers was that the
Nation's railroads simply did not jointly own a sufficient number
of freight cars to adequately serve shippers of goods over their
lines. Because of the existence of the national pool of freight
cars, whereby roads may service on-line shippers with foreign cars,
it was difficult, if not impossible, to relate inadequate ownership
statistically to any particular road or roads. The Commission
therefore chose to make mandatory two of the car service rules that
would have the effect of aligning more closely than at present the
ownership of freight cars on the part of the road with the
availability of those freight cars to the owning Page 406 U. S. 752 road for use of its on-line shippers. The result of these rules,
over the long-term, the Commission reasoned, would be to bring home
to those roads which themselves had an inadequate supply of cars to
serve their on-line shippers that fact, and also, without doubt, to
supply incentive to such roads to augment their supply of freight
cars in order to adequately serve their on-line shippers. The
national supply of freight cars would thereby be augmented, and the
railroads, as a result, would be better able to supply the needs of
shippers.

															Appellees' fundamental substantive contention is that the
short-term consequences of the enforcement of these rules will so
seriously disrupt established industry practices as to outweigh any
possible long-term benefits in service that might accrue from them,
and that, therefore, the rules are not "reasonable" as that term is
used in the Esch Act. [ Footnote
4 ] While, of course, conceding that the railroads themselves
originally promulgated the rules for voluntary compliance,
appellees argue that, because the rules have been observed largely
in the breach, usages and practices have grown up that permit far
more efficient utilization of the existing fleet of freight cars
than would be permitted if the two rules in question were enforced
by the Commission. Appellees state that, in reliance on the
existence of a national pool of freight cars, and on the consequent
availability to shippers of cars not owned by the line originating
the shipment, manufacturing plants have been located and
enlarged. Page 406 U. S. 753 They claim that enforcement of the rules now would seriously
hamper the movement of freight traffic from these and other
shipping points.

															It may be conceded that the immediate effect of the Commission's
order will be to disrupt some established practices with respect to
the handling and routing of freight cars, and, on occasion, to
cause serious inconvenience to shippers and railroads alike. If the
Commission were thrusting these regulations upon an admittedly
smoothly functioning transportation industry, well supplied with
necessary rolling stock and adequately serving all shippers, the
rationality of its action might well be open to question.

															But such is not the case. The Commission's finding that there
are recurring periods of significant length when there is not an
adequate freight car supply to service shippers is supported by
substantial evidence. While the flexible system of routing freight
cars presently in existence may well have short-term advantages
both for some shippers and some roads, the Commission could quite
reasonably conclude that it has long-term drawbacks as well. The
otherwise adverse effect on a road's ability to serve shippers that
would result from its owning too few cars is cushioned; the
beneficial effect on a road's ability to serve shippers that would
result from its owning a sufficient supply of cars is dissipated.
The Commission undoubtedly felt that rules designed only to most
efficiently utilize the existing inadequate fleet of freight cars
would have little or no effect on the nationwide shortage of such
cars. Indeed, the appellees stress the concession by the Commission
that these rules

															"are not designed to improve the utilization of freight cars,
except insofar as return loading is compatible with the primary
objective of increasing availability of cars to the owner."

															335 I.C.C. at 294.

															But only if we were to hold that Congress, in enacting Page 406 U. S. 754 the Esch Car Service Act, intended that the only criterion that
the Commission might consider in establishing "reasonable rules,
regulations, and practices with respect to car service" was the
optimum utilization of an existing fleet of freight cars, however
numerically inadequate that fleet might be, could this argument be
sustained. Neither the language that Congress used nor the
legislative history of the Act supports such a narrow reading of
its grant of authority to the Commission. On the record before it,
the Commission was justified in deciding that the railroads and the
shippers were afflicted with an economic illness that might have to
get worse before it got better. Existing practices respecting car
service tended to destroy any incentive on the part of railroads to
acquire new cars, and the resulting failure to acquire new
equipment contributed to an overall nationwide shortage of freight
cars that prevented the railroad industry from adequately serving
shippers. Car service rules that would tend to restore incentive to
the various roads to augment their supply of freight cars, even at
the temporary expense of optimum utilization of the existing fleet
of freight cars, conform under these circumstances to the statutory
requirement of reasonableness.

															Appellees support their claim that the Commission's promulgation
of these rules is not "reasonable" under the Esch Act on two
grounds not directly related to the rules' claimed adverse effect
on the ability of the roads to serve shippers. They attack the
absence of a Commission finding as to the financial ability of
roads inadequately supplied with freight cars to purchase new ones,
and they cite the conceded impossibility of obtaining complete
compliance with the rules as additional evidence of their
unreasonableness.

															The Commission's order does not require any road to purchase any
freight cars. It abridges to some extent Page 406 U. S. 755 the existing practice among railroads of treating the freight
cars that they own as a pool, and, for that reason, may ultimately
cause roads that do not have an adequate supply of freight cars to
serve on-line shippers to be less able to serve such shippers than
they are now. If, as a result of this fact, such roads are placed
under economic and competitive pressure to acquire additional
freight cars, there is certainly no principle of law we know of
that would require the Commission to permit them to avoid this
economic pressure by continuing to borrow freight cars acquired and
owned by other lines.

															The Commission, acceding to the arguments of shippers and
railroads on rehearing, agreed that mandatory total compliance with
the rules promulgated would be impossible in view of the tremendous
number of units involved, and, accordingly a procedure by which
exceptions might be applied for was established. How the provision
for exceptions will be administered in practice is a matter about
which we could only speculate at present. It is well established
that an agency's authority to proceed in a complex area such as car
service regulation by means of rules of general application entails
a concomitant authority to provide exemption procedures in order to
allow for special circumstances. Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U. S. 747 , 390 U. S.
784 -786 (1968). What bearing any of these factors might
have on an action under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1(17) for the
collection of penalties for a violation of the rules in question is
a question best decided in such a proceeding. The fact that
violation of a rule promulgated under the Esch Car Service Act may
be the basis for a proceeding to collect a penalty does not either
expand or contract the statutory definition of "reasonable" found
in that Act.

															What we have said thus far is enough to indicate our view that
there is sufficient relationship between the Page 406 U. S. 756 Commission's conclusions and the factual bases in the record
upon which it relied to substantively support this exercise of its
authority under the Esch Act. Appellees press on us an additional
claim that the Commission failed to comply with the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act, S U.S.C. § 551 et seq., citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U. S. 156 (1962), and Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U. S. 645 (1954). Burlington Truck Lines is clearly inapposite,
however, since, in that case, the Court was dealing with
adjudication, not rulemaking. In criticizing the Commission's
action there, the Court said that "the Administrative Procedure Act
will not permit us to accept such adjudicatory practice," 371 U.S.
at 371 U. S. 167 .
In Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, supra, the
Court reviewed the Commission's action not under the Administrative
Procedure Act, but on the basis of its prior cases establishing the
standard for judicial review of agency action. Commenting that,

															"[i]n dealing with technical and complex matters like these, the
Commission must necessarily have wide discretion in formulating
appropriate solutions,"

															the Court went on to conclude that the Commission "has not
adequately explained its departure from prior norms, and has not
sufficiently spelled out the legal basis of its decision." 347 U.S.
at 347 U. S.
652 -653. For the reasons previously stated, we find no
such infirmities here.

															This Court has held that the Administrative Procedure Act
applies to proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. United States, 361 U. S. 173 , 361 U. S. 192 (1959). Appellees claim that the Commission's procedure here
departed from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 of the Act.
Those sections, however, govern a rulemaking proceeding only when 5
U.S.C. § 553 so requires. The latter section, dealing generally
with rulemaking, Page 406 U. S. 757 makes applicable the provisions of §§ 556 and 557 only "[w]hen
rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing. . . ." The Esch Act, authorizing
the Commission

															"after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own initiative
without complaint, [to] establish reasonable rules, regulations,
and practices with respect to car service . . . ,"

															49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a), does not require that such rules "be made
on the record." 5 U.S.C. § 553. That distinction is determinative
for this case. "A good deal of significance lies in the fact that
some statutes do expressly require determinations on the record." 2
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.08, p. 225 (1958).
Sections 556 and 557 need be applied "only where the agency
statute, in addition to providing a hearing, prescribes explicitly
that it be on the record.'" Siegel v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 314, 400 F.2d 778, 785 (1968); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc. v. Dillon, 120
U.S.App.D.C. 112, 115 n. 9, 344 F.2d 497, 500 n. 9 (1965). Cf.
First National Bank v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 96 U.S.App.D.C.194, 225 F.2d 33 (1955). We do not suggest that only
the precise words "on the record" in the applicable statute will
suffice to make §§ 556 and 557 applicable to rulemaking
proceedings, but we do hold that the language of the Esch Car
Service Act is insufficient to invoke these sections. Because the proceedings under review were an exercise of
legislative rulemaking power, rather than adjudicatory hearings, as
in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U. S.
33 (1950), and Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 301 U. S. 292 (1937), and because 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) does not require a
determination "on the record," the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556
and 557 were inapplicable. Page 406 U. S. 758 This proceeding, therefore, was governed by the provisions of 5
U.S.C. § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, requiring
basically that notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in
the Federal Register, that, after notice, the agency give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking
through appropriate submissions, and that, after consideration of
the record so made, the agency shall incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
[ Footnote 5 ] The "Findings" and
"Conclusions" embodied in the Commission's report fully comply with
these requirements, and nothing more was required by the
Administrative Procedure Act.

															We conclude that the Commission's action in promulgating these
rules was substantively authorized by the Esch Act and procedurally
acceptable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The judgment of
the District Court must therefore be Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															"Rule 1. Foreign cars, empty at a junction with the home road,
must be: "

															"(a) Loaded at that junction to or via home rails, or,"

															"(b) Delivered empty at that junction to home road, except in
instances where Rule 6 has been invoked, or unless otherwise agreed
by roads involved."

															"Rule 2. Foreign empty cars other than those covered in Rule 1
shall be: "

															"(a) Loaded to or via owner's rails."

															"(b) Loaded to a destination closer to owner's rails than is the
loading station or delivered empty to a short line or switch
loading road for such loading. (Car Selection Chart is designed to
aid in so selecting cars for loading.)"

															"(c) Delivered empty to the home road at any junction subject to
Rule 6."

															"(d) Delivered empty to the road from which originally received
under load, at the junction where received, except that,
when handled in road haul service, cars of direct connection
ownership may not be delivered empty to a road which does not have
a direct connection with the car owner."

															"(e) Returned empty to the delivering road when handled only in
switching service."

															Jurisdictional Statement 64.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															335 I.C.C. 264, 293 (1969).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"Rule 19 -- Exceptions"

															"Exceptions to the rules (prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission for mandatory observance) for the purpose of further
improving car supply and utilization, increasing availability of
cars to their owners, improving the efficiency of railroad
operation, or alleviating inequities or hardships, may be
authorized by the Director or Assistant Director of the Bureau of
Operations, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D.C."

															Jurisdictional Statement 172.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Three separate briefs have been filed here in support of
appellees, each of which understandably presents the case for
affirmance in slightly differing form, and no one of which
completely adopts the reasoning of the District Court. We have not
found it necessary in deciding the case to deal with each separate
argument in support of affirmance, since we believe all of them to
be generally subsumed under those claims with which we deal.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) likewise requires the Commission to conduct
a hearing before promulgating rules.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that the Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) "car service rules," which required unloaded freight cars to be returned to the owning railroad, were reasonable under the Esch Car Service Act of 1917 due to the national freight car shortage. The Court also found that the ICC's proceeding complied with the Administrative Procedure Act. The judgment of the District Court was reversed.