OPINION OF KENNEDY, J. J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-1343 J. McINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD., PETITIONER v. ROBERT NICASTRO, individually and as administrator of the ESTATE OF
ROSEANNE NICASTRO

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of new
jersey

															[June 27, 2011]

															   Justice Kennedy announced the
judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which the Chief
Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join.

															   Whether a person or entity is
subject to the jurisdiction of a state court despite not having
been present in the State either at the time of suit or at the time
of the alleged injury, and despite not having consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction, is a question that arises with great
frequency in the routine course of litigation. The rules and
standards for determining when a State does or does not have
jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of
decades-old questions left open in Asahi Metal Industry
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. , 480 U. S. 102 (1987).

															    Here, the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
relying in part on Asahi , held that New Jersey’s courts
can exercise jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of a product
so long as the manufacturer “knows or reasonably should know that
its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution
system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the
fifty states.” Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America,
Ltd. , 201 N. J. 48, 76, 77, 987 A. 2d 575, 591, 592
(2010). Applying that test, the court concluded that a British
manufacturer of scrap metal machines was subject to jurisdiction in
New Jersey, even though at no time had it advertised in, sent goods
to, or in any relevant sense targeted the State.

															   That decision cannot be sustained. Although
the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with
care-ful attention to this Court’s cases and to its own pre-cedent,
the “stream of commerce” metaphor carried the decision far afield.
Due process protects the defendant’s right not to be coerced except
by lawful judicial power. As a general rule, the exercise of
judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant “purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.” Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U. S. 235 , 253
(1958). There may be exceptions, say, for instance, in cases
involving an intentional tort. But the general rule is applicable
in this products-liability case, and the so-called
“stream-of-commerce” doctrine cannot displace it.

															I

															   This case arises from a
products-liability suit filed in New Jersey state court. Robert
Nicastro seriously injured his hand while using a metal-shearing
machine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (J. McIntyre).
The accident occurred in New Jersey, but the machine was
manufactured in England, where J. McIntyre is incorporated and
operates. The question here is whether the New Jersey courts have
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre, notwithstanding the fact that the
company at no time either marketed goods in the State or shipped
them there. Nicastro was a plaintiff in the New Jersey trial court
and is the respondent here; J. McIntyre was a defendant and is now
the petitioner.

															   At oral argument in this Court,
Nicastro’s counsel stressed three primary facts in defense of New
Jersey’s as-sertion of jurisdiction over J. McIntyre. See Tr. of
Oral Arg. 29–30.

															   First, an independent company agreed to sell
J. McIntyre’s machines in the United States. J. McIntyre itself did
not sell its machines to buyers in this country beyond the U. S.
distributor, and there is no allegation that the distributor was
under J. McIntyre’s control.

															   Second, J. McIntyre officials attended annual
conventions for the scrap recycling industry to advertise J.
Mc-Intyre’s machines alongside the distributor. The conventions
took place in various States, but never in New Jersey.

															   Third, no more than four machines (the record
suggests only one, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a), including the
machine that caused the injuries that are the basis for this suit,
ended up in New Jersey.

															   In addition to these facts emphasized by
petitioner, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that J. McIntyre
held both United States and European patents on its recycling
technology. 201 N. J., at 55, 987 A. 2d, at 579. It also
noted that the U. S. distributor “structured [its] adver-tising and
sales efforts in accordance with” J. McIntyre’s “direction and
guidance whenever possible,” and that “at least some of the
machines were sold on consignment to” the distributor. Id. , at 55, 56, 987 A. 2d, at 579 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

															   In light of these facts, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that New Jersey courts could exercise
jurisdiction over petitioner without contravention of the Due
Process Clause. Jurisdiction was proper, in that court’s view,
because the injury occurred in New Jersey; because petitioner knew
or reasonably should have known “that its products are distributed
through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to those
products being sold in any of the fifty states”; and because
petitioner failed to “take some reasonable step to prevent the
distribution of its prod-ucts in this State.” Id. , at 77,
987 A. 2d, at 592.

															   Both the New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding
and its account of what it called “[t]he stream-of-commerce
doctrine of jurisdiction,” id. , at 80, 987 A. 2d, at
594, were incorrect, however. This Court’s Asahi decision
may be responsible in part for that court’s error regarding the
stream of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to
provide greater clarity.

															II

															   The Due Process Clause protects
an individual’s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property
only by the exercise of lawful power. Cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania , 382 U. S. 399 , 403
(1966) (The Clause “protect[s] a person against having the
Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the
valid laws of the land”). This is no less true with respect to the
power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process
than with respect to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of
conduct for those within its sphere. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Bet-ter Environment , 523 U. S. 83 , 94 (1998)
(“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law”). As a general rule,
neither statute nor judicial decree may bind strangers to the
State. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County
of Marin , 495
U. S. 604 , 608–609 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (invoking
“the phrase coram non judice, ‘before a person not a
judge’—meaning, in effect, that the proceeding in question was not
a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority
was not present, and could therefore not yield a judgment ”)

															   A court may subject a defendant
to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the sovereign “such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 , 316
(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer , 311 U. S. 457 , 463
(1940)). Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from
traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the
absence of authority into law. As a general rule, the sovereign’s
exercise of power requires some act by which the defendant
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws,” Hanson , 357 U. S., at 253,
though in some cases, as with an intentional tort, the defendant
might well fall within the State’s authority by reason of his
attempt to obstruct its laws. In products-liability cases like this
one, it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes
jurisdiction consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”

															   A person may submit to a State’s authority in
a number of ways. There is, of course, explicit consent. E.g. , In-surance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U. S. 694 , 703
(1982). Presence within a State at the time suit commences through
service of process is another example. See Burnham , supra . Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy,
incorporation or principal place of business for corporations—also
indicates general submission to a State’s powers. Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , post , p. __. Each of these examples reveals circumstances,
or a course of conduct, from which it is proper to infer an
intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit to the
laws of the forum State. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U. S. 462 , 476
(1985). These examples support exercise of the general jurisdiction
of the State’s courts and allow the State to resolve both matters
that originate within the State and those based on activities and
events elsewhere. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.
A. v. Hall , 466 U. S. 408 , 414, and
n. 9 (1984). By contrast, those who live or operate primarily
outside a State have a due process right not to be subjected to
judgment in its courts as a general matter.

															   There is also a more limited form of
submission to a State’s authority for disputes that “arise out of
or are con-nected with the activities within the state.” International Shoe Co. , supra , at 319. Where a
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws,” Hanson , supra , at 253, it submits to the judicial power of an
otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised
in connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the
State. In other words, submission through contact with and activity
directed at a sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction “in a
suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.” Helicopteros , supra , at 414, n. 8;
see also Goodyear , post , at 2.

															   The imprecision arising from Asahi ,
for the most part, results from its statement of the relation
between jurisdiction and the “stream of commerce.” The stream of
commerce, like other metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its
utility. It refers to the movement of goods from manufacturers
through distributors to consumers, yet beyond that descriptive
purpose its meaning is far from exact. This Court has stated that a
defendant’s placing goods into the stream of commerce “with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers within the
forum State” may indicate purposeful availment. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 , 298
(1980) (finding that expectation lacking). But that statement does
not amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction. It merely
observes that a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to
jurisdiction without entering the forum—itself an unexceptional
proposition—as where man-ufacturers or distributors “seek to serve”
a given State’s market. Id. , at 295. The principal inquiry
in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities
manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. In
other words, the defendant must “purposefully avai[l] it-self of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson , supra , at 253; Insurance Corp. , supra , at 704–705 (“[A]ctions of the defendant may amount
to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court”). Sometimes
a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than its agents.
The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of
jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted
the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant
might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.

															   In Asahi , an opinion by Justice
Brennan for four Justices outlined a different approach. It
discarded the central concept of sovereign authority in favor of
considerations of fairness and foreseeability. As that concurrence
contended, “jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product
into the stream of commerce [without more] is consistent with the
Due Process Clause,” for “[a]s long as a participant in this
process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise.” 480 U. S., at 117 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). It was the premise of the concurring
opinion that the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the
assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the opinion made
foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.

															   The standard set forth in Justice Brennan’s
concurrence was rejected in an opinion written by Justice O’Connor;
but the relevant part of that opinion, too, commanded the assent of
only four Justices, not a majority of the Court. That opinion
stated: “The ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State. The placement of a product into the stream of
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.” Id. , at 112 (emphasis
deleted; citations omitted).

															   Since Asahi was decided, the courts
have sought to rec-oncile the competing opinions. But Justice
Brennan’s con-currence, advocating a rule based on general notions
of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises
of lawful judicial power. This Court’s precedents make clear that
it is the defendant’s actions, not his expectations, that empower a
State’s courts to subject him to judgment.

															   The conclusion that jurisdiction is in the
first instance a question of authority rather than fairness
explains, for example, why the principal opinion in Burnham “conducted no independent inquiry into the
desirability or fairness” of the rule that service of process
within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise
foreign defendant. 495 U. S., at 621. As that opinion explained,
“[t]he view developed early that each State had the power to hale
before its courts any individual who could be found within its
borders.” Id. , at 610. Furthermore, were general fairness
considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful
availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial
procedures could otherwise protect the defendant’s interests, or
where the plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to
litigate in a foreign forum. That such considerations have not been
deemed controlling is instructive. See, e.g. , World-Wide Volkswagen , supra , at 294.

															   Two principles are implicit in the foregoing.
First, per-sonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a
de-fendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society
or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign,
so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment concerning that conduct. Personal jurisdiction, of course,
restricts “judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a
matter of individual liberty,” for due process protects the
individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power. Insurance Corp. , 456 U. S., at 702. But whether a judicial
judgment is lawful depends on whether the sovereign has authority
to render it.

															   The second principle is a corollary of the
first. Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a
defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States but not of any particular State. This
is consistent with the premises and unique genius of our
Constitution. Ours is “a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own
direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights
and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by
it.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U. S. 779 ,
838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For jurisdiction, a litigant
may have the requisite relationship with the United States
Government but not with the government of any individual State.
That would be an exceptional case, however. If the defendant is a
domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are available
and can exercise general jurisdiction. And if another State were to
assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the
federal balance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty
that is not subject to unlawful intrusion by other States.
Furthermore, foreign corporations will often target or concentrate
on particular States, subjecting them to specific jurisdiction in
those forums.

															   It must be remembered, however, that although
this case and Asahi both involve foreign manufacturers,
the undesirable consequences of Justice Brennan’s approach are no
less significant for domestic producers. The owner of a small
Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby distributor, for
example, who might then distribute them to grocers across the
country. If foreseeability were the controlling criterion, the
farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States’
courts without ever leaving town. And the issue of foreseeability
may itself be contested so that significant expenses are incurred
just on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules
should avoid these costs whenever possible.

															   The conclusion that the authority to subject a
defendant to judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent
with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi , does not by
itself resolve many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will
arise in particular cases. The defendant’s conduct and the economic
realities of the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ
across cases, and judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion,
clarify the contours of that principle.

															III

															   In this case, petitioner directed
marketing and sales efforts at the United States. It may be that,
assuming it were otherwise empowered to legislate on the subject,
the Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in
appropriate courts. That circumstance is not presented in this
case, however, and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
address here any constitutional concerns that might be attendant to
that exercise of power. See Asahi , 480 U. S., at 113, n.
Nor is it necessary to determine what substantive law might apply
were Congress to authorize jurisdiction in a federal court in New
Jersey. See Hanson , 357 U. S., at 254 (“The issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law”). A sovereign’s
legislative authority to regulate conduct may present
considerations different from those presented by its authority to
subject a defendant to judgment in its courts. Here the question
concerns the authority of a New Jersey state court to exercise
ju-risdiction, so it is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with New
Jersey, not with the United States, that alone are relevant.

															   Respondent has not established
that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New
Jersey. Recall that respondent’s claim of jurisdiction centers on
three facts: The distributor agreed to sell J. McIntyre’s machines
in the United States; J. McIntyre officials attended trade shows in
several States but not in New Jersey; and up to four machines ended
up in New Jersey. The British manufacturer had no office in New
Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned property there; and it
neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State.
Indeed, after discovery the trial court found that the “defendant
does not have a single contact with New Jersey short of the machine
in question ending up in this state.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 130a.
These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U. S. market, but
they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of
the New Jersey market.

															   It is notable that the New Jersey Supreme
Court appears to agree, for it could “not find that J. McIntyre had
a presence or minimum contacts in this State—in any jurisprudential
sense—that would justify a New Jersey court to exercise
jurisdiction in this case.” 201 N. J., at 61, 987 A. 2d,
at 582. The court nonetheless held that petitioner could be sued in
New Jersey based on a “stream-of-commerce theory of jurisdiction.” Ibid. As discussed, however, the stream-of-commerce
metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate of the Due Process
Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures. The
New Jersey Supreme Court also cited “significant policy reasons” to
justify its holding, including the State’s “strong interest in
protecting its citizens from defective products.” Id. , at
75, 987 A. 2d, at 590. That interest is doubtless strong, but
the Constitution commands restraint before discarding liberty in
the name of expediency.

															*  *  *

															   Due process protects petitioner’s
right to be subject only to lawful authority. At no time did
petitioner engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an
intent to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws. New
Jersey is without power to adjudge the rights and liabilities of J.
McIntyre, and its exercise of jurisdiction would violate due
process. The contrary judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court
is

															Reversed. BREYER, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-1343 J. McINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD., PETITIONER v. ROBERT NICASTRO, individually and as administrator of the ESTATE OF
ROSEANNE NICASTRO

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of new
jersey

															[June 27, 2011]

															   Justice Breyer, with whom Justice
Alito joins, concurring in the judgment.

															   The Supreme Court of New Jersey
adopted a broad understanding of the scope of personal jurisdiction
based on its view that “[t]he increasingly fast-paced globalization
of the world economy has removed national borders as barriers to
trade.” Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery
America, Ltd., 201 N. J. 48, 52, 987 A. 2d 575, 577
(2010). I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in
commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by
our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues.
So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability
without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.

															   In my view, the outcome of this case is
determined by our precedents. Based on the facts found by the New
Jersey courts, respondent Robert Nicastro failed to meet his burden
to demonstrate that it was constitutionally proper to exercise
jurisdiction over petitioner J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (British
Manufacturer), a British firm that manufactures scrap-metal
machines in Great Britain and sells them through an independent
distributor in the United States (American Distributor). On that
basis, I agree with the plurality that the contrary judgment of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey should be reversed.

															I

															   In asserting jurisdiction over
the British Manufacturer, the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied
most heavily on three primary facts as providing constitutionally
sufficient “contacts” with New Jersey, thereby making it funda-
mentally fair to hale the British Manufacturer before its courts:
(1) The American Distributor on one occasion sold and shipped one
machine to a New Jersey customer, namely, Mr. Nicastro’s employer,
Mr. Curcio; (2) the British Manufacturer permitted, indeed wanted,
its independent American Distributor to sell its machines to anyone
in America willing to buy them; and (3) representatives of the
British Manufacturer attended trade shows in “such cities as
Chicago, Las Vegas, New Orleans, Orlando, San Diego, and San
Francisco.” Id., at 54–55, 987 A. 2d, at 578–579. In
my view, these facts do not provide contacts between the British
firm and the State of New Jersey constitutionally sufficient to
support New Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case.

															   None of our precedents finds that
a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales
effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this Court’s previous
holdings suggest the contrary. The Court has held that a single
sale to a customer who takes an accident-causing product to a
different State (where the accident takes place) is not a
sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 (1980).
And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a
single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate
basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant,
even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce,
fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take place. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Solano Cty. , 480 U. S. 102 , 111, 112
(1987) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (requiring “something more” than
simply placing “a product into the stream of commerce,” even if
defendant is “awar[e]” that the stream “may or will sweep the
product into the forum State”); id., at 117 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (jurisdiction should
lie where a sale in a State is part of “the regular and anticipated
flow” of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only
an “edd[y],” i.e. , an isolated occurrence); id., at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(indicating that “the volume, the value, and the hazardous
character” of a good may affect the jurisdictional inquiry and
emphasizing Asahi’s “regular course of dealing”).

															   Here, the relevant facts found by the New
Jersey Supreme Court show no “regular … flow” or “regular course”
of sales in New Jersey; and there is no “something more,” such as
special state-related design, advertising, advice, marketing, or
anything else. Mr. Nicastro, who here bears the burden of proving
jurisdiction, has shown no specific effort by the British
Manufacturer to sell in New Jersey. He has introduced no list of
potential New Jersey customers who might, for example, have
regularly attended trade shows. And he has not otherwise shown that
the British Manufacturer “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities” within New Jersey, or that it
de-livered its goods in the stream of commerce “with the
expectation that they will be purchased” by New Jersey users. World-Wide Volkswagen, supra , at 297–298 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

															   There may well have been other facts that Mr.
Nicastro could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction. And
the dissent considers some of those facts. See post , at 3
(opinion of Ginsburg, J.) (describing the size and scope of New
Jersey’s scrap-metal business). But the plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing jurisdiction, and here I would take the facts
precisely as the New Jersey Supreme Court stated them. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee , 456
U. S. 694 , 709 (1982); Blakey v. Continental
Airlines, Inc. , 164 N. J. 38, 71, 751 A. 2d 538, 557
(2000); see 201 N. J., at 54–56, 987 A. 2d, at 578–579;
App. to Pet. for Cert. 128a–137a (trial court’s “reasoning and
finding(s)”).

															   Accordingly, on the record present here,
resolving this case requires no more than adhering to our
precedents.

															II

															   I would not go further. Because
the incident at issue in this case does not implicate modern
concerns, and because the factual record leaves many open
questions, this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad
pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.

															A

															   The plurality seems to state
strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant does not
“inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign” and cannot “be
said to have targeted the forum.” Ante , at 7. But what do
those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling
products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of
shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products
through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and
fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets its products
through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a
forum? Those issues have serious commercial consequences but are
totally absent in this case.

															B

															   But though I do not agree with
the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule, I am not
persuaded by the absolute approach adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court and urged by respondent and his amici . Under
that view, a producer is subject to jurisdiction for a
products-liability action so long as it “knows or reasonably should
know that its products are distributed through a nationwide
distribution system that might lead to those products
being sold in any of the fifty states.” 201 N. J., at 76–77,
987 A. 2d, at 592 (emphasis added). In the context of this
case, I cannot agree.

															   For one thing, to adopt this view
would abandon the heretofore accepted inquiry of whether, focusing
upon the relationship between “the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” it is fair, in light of the defendant’s
contacts with that forum , to subject the defendant to suit
there. Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U. S. 186 , 204
(1977) (emphasis added). It would ordinarily rest jurisdiction
instead upon no more than the occurrence of a product-based
accident in the forum State. But this Court has rejected the notion
that a defendant’s amenability to suit “travel[s] with the
chattel.” World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U. S., at 296.

															   For another, I cannot reconcile so automatic a
rule with the constitutional demand for “minimum contacts” and
“purposefu[l] avail[ment],” each of which rest upon a particular
notion of defendant-focused fairness. Id., at 291, 297
(internal quotation marks omitted). A rule like the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s would permit every State to assert jurisdiction in
a products-liability suit against any domestic manufacturer who
sells its products (made anywhere in the United States) to a
national distributor, no matter how large or small the
manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how
few the number of items that end up in the particular forum at
issue. What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer
which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to
sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case
of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells his
product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who
resells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant
State (Hawaii). I know too little about the range of these or
in-between possibilities to abandon in favor of the more absolute
rule what has previously been this Court’s less absolute
approach.

															   Further, the fact that the defendant is a
foreign, rather than a domestic, manufacturer makes the basic
fairness of an absolute rule yet more uncertain. I am again less
certain than is the New Jersey Supreme Court that the nature of
international commerce has changed so sig- nificantly as to require
a new approach to personal jurisdiction.

															   It may be that a larger firm can readily
“alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the
risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.” World-Wide Volkswagen , supra , at 297. But
manufacturers come in many shapes and sizes. It may be
fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a
Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer,
selling its products through international distributors, to respond
to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the
United States, even those in respect to which the foreign firm has
no connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly defective)
good. And a rule like the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests would
require every product manufacturer, large or small, selling to
American distributors to understand not only the tort law of every
State, but also the wide variance in the way courts within
different States apply that law. See, e.g., Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Tort Trials and
Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, p. 11 (reporting percentage
of plaintiff winners in tort trials among 46 populous counties,
ranging from 17.9% (Worcester, Mass.) to 69.1% (Milwaukee,
Wis.)).

															C

															   At a minimum, I would not work
such a change to the law in the way either the plurality or the New
Jersey Supreme Court suggests without a better understanding of the
relevant contemporary commercial circumstances. Insofar as such
considerations are relevant to any change in present law, they
might be presented in a case (unlike the present one) in which the
Solicitor General participates. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , O. T. 2010, No. 10–76, pp. 20–22 (Government
declining invitation at oral argument to give its views with
respect to issues in this case).

															   This case presents no such
occasion, and so I again re-iterate that I would adhere strictly to
our precedents and the limited facts found by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. And on those grounds, I do not think we can find
jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, though I agree with the
plurality as to the outcome of this case, I concur only in the
judgment of that opinion and not its reasoning. GINSBURG, J., DISSENTING J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 564 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-1343 J. McINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD., PETITIONER v. ROBERT NICASTRO, individually and as administrator of the ESTATE OF
ROSEANNE NICASTRO

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of new
jersey

															[June 27, 2011]

															   Justice Ginsburg, with whom
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.

															   A foreign industrialist seeks to
develop a market in the United States for machines it manufactures.
It hopes to derive substantial revenue from sales it makes to
United States purchasers. Where in the United States buyers reside
does not matter to this manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as
much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes no region or State
from the market it wishes to reach. But, all things considered, it
prefers to avoid products liability litigation in the United
States. To that end, it engages a U. S. distributor to ship its
machines stateside. Has it succeeded in escaping personal
jurisdiction in a State where one of its products is sold and
causes injury or even death to a local user?

															   Under this Court’s pathmarking
precedent in International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U. S. 310 (1945),
and subsequent decisions, one would expect the answer to be
unequivocally, “No.” But instead, six Justices of this Court, in
divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the
jurisdiction of our state courts, except perhaps in States where
its products are sold in sizeable quantities. Inconceivable as it
may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today “turn[s]
the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a
manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is
injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by
having independent distributors market it.” Weintraub, A Map Out of
the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U. C. Davis
L. Rev. 531, 555 (1995).

															I

															   On October 11, 2001, a three-ton
metal shearing machine severed four fingers on Robert Nicastro’s
right hand. Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America,
Ltd. , 201 N. J. 48, 53, 987 A. 2d 575, 577 (2010);
see App. 6a–8a (Complaint). Alleging that the machine was a
dangerous product defectively made, Nicastro sought compensation
from the machine’s manufacturer, J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd.
(McIntyre UK). Established in 1872 as a United Kingdom corporation,
and headquartered in Nottingham, England, McIntyre UK “designs,
develops and manufactures a com-plete range of equipment for metal
recycling.” Id. , at 22a, 33a. The company’s product line,
as advertised on McIntyre UK’s Web site, includes “metal shears,
balers, cable and can recycling equipment, furnaces, casting
equip-ment and … the world’s best aluminium dross process- ing and
cooling system.” Id ., at 31a. McIntyre UK holds both
United States and European patents on its technology. 201
N. J., at 55, 987 A. 2d, at 579; App. 36a.

															    The machine that injured
Nicastro, a “McIntyre Model 640 Shear,” sold in the United States
for $24,900 in 1995, id. , at 43a, and features a “massive
cutting capacity,” id. , at 44a. According to McIntyre UK’s
product brochure, the machine is “use[d] throughout the [w]orld.” Ibid . McIntyre UK represented in the brochure that, by
“incorporat[ing] off-the-shelf hydraulic parts from suppliers with
international sales outlets,” the 640 Shear’s design guarantees
serviceability “wherever [its customers] may be based.” Ibid. The instruction manual advises “owner[s] and
operators of a 640 Shear [to] make themselves aware of [applicable
health and safety regulations],” including “the American National
Standards Institute Regulations (USA) for the use of Scrap Metal
Processing Equipment.” Id., at 46a.

															   Nicastro operated the 640 Shear in the course
of his employment at Curcio Scrap Metal (CSM) in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey. Id. , at 7a, 43a. “New Jersey has long been a
hotbed of scrap-metal businesses … .” See Drake, The
Scrap-Heap Rollup Hits New Jersey, Business News New Jersey, June
1, 1998, p. 1. In 2008, New Jersey recycling facilities
processed 2,013,730 tons of scrap iron, steel, aluminum, and other
metals—more than any other State—outpacing Kentucky, its nearest
competitor, by nearly 30 percent. Von Haaren, Themelis, &
Goldstein, The State of Garbage in America, BioCycle, Oct. 2010,
p. 19.

															   CSM’s owner, Frank Curcio, “first heard of
[McIntyre UK’s] machine while attending an Institute of Scrap Metal
Industries [(ISRI)] convention in Las Vegas in 1994 or 1995, where
[McIntyre UK] was an exhibitor.” App. 78a. ISRI “presents the
world’s largest scrap recycling industry trade show each year.” Id ., at 47a. The event attracts “owners [and] managers of
scrap processing companies” and others “interested in seeing—and
purchasing—new equipment.” Id. , at 48a–49a. According to
ISRI, more than 3,000 potential buyers of scrap processing and
recycling equipment attend its annual conventions, “primarily
because th[e] exposition provides them with the most comprehensive
industry-related shopping experience concentrated in a single,
convenient location.” Id. , at 47a. Exhibitors who are ISRI
members pay $3,000 for 10’ x 10’ booth space. Id. , at
48a–49a.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   McIntyre UK representatives attended every
ISRI convention from 1990 through 2005. Id. , at 114a–115a.
These annual expositions were held in diverse venues across the
United States; in addition to Las Vegas, conventions were held
1990–2005 in New Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, and San Francisco. Ibid. McIntyre UK’s president, Michael Pownall, regularly
attended ISRI con-ventions. Ibid. He attended ISRI’s Las
Vegas conven- tion the year CSM’s owner first learned of, and saw,
the 640 Shear. Id. , at 78a–79a, 115a. McIntyre UK
exhibited its products at ISRI trade shows, the company
acknowledged, hoping to reach “anyone interested in the machine
from anywhere in the United States.” Id., at 161a.

															   Although McIntyre UK’s U. S. sales figures are
not in the record, it appears that for several years in the 1990’s,
earnings from sales of McIntyre UK products in the United States
“ha[d] been good” in comparison to “the rest of the world.” Id. , at 136a (Letter from Sally Johnson, McIntyre UK’s
Managing Director, to Gary and Mary Gaither, officers of McIntyre
UK’s exclusive distributor in the United States (Jan. 13, 1999)).
In response to interrogatories, McIntyre UK stated that its
commissioning engineer had installed the company’s equipment in
several States—Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Virginia, and Washington. Id. , at 119a.

															   From at least 1995 until 2001, McIntyre UK
retained an Ohio-based company, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.
(McIntyre America), “as its exclusive distributor for the en-tire
United States.” Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery
America, Ltd. , 399 N. J. Super. 539, 558, 945 A. 2d
92, 104 (App. 2008).[ Footnote
2 ] Though similarly named, the two companies were separate and
independent entities with “no commonality of ownership or
management.” Id., at 545, 945 A. 2d, at 95. In
invoices and other written communications, McIntyre America
described itself as McIntyre UK’s national distributor, “America’s
Link” to “Quality Metal Processing Equipment” from England. App.
43a, 78a.

															   In a November 23, 1999 letter to McIntyre
America, McIntyre UK’s president spoke plainly about the
manufacturer’s objective in authorizing the exclusive
distributorship: “All we wish to do is sell our products in the
[United] States—and get paid!” Id. , at 134a. Notably,
McIntyre America was concerned about U. S. litigation involving
McIntyre UK products, in which the distributor had been named as a
defendant. McIntyre UK counseled McIntyre America to respond
personally to the litigation, but reassured its distributor that
“the product was built and designed by McIntyre Machinery in the UK
and the buck stops here—if there’s something wrong with the
machine.” Id. , at 129a–130a. Answering jurisdictional
interrogatories, McIntyre UK stated that it had been named as a
defendant in lawsuits in Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and
West Virginia. Id. , at 98a, 108a. And in correspondence
with McIntyre America, McIntyre UK noted that the manufacturer had
products liability insurance coverage. Id. , at 129a.

															   Over the years, McIntyre America distributed
several McIntyre UK products to U. S. customers, including, in
addition to the 640 Shear, McIntyre UK’s “Niagara” and “Tardis”
systems, wire strippers, and can machines. Id. , at
123a–128a. In promoting McIntyre UK’s products at conventions and
demonstration sites and in trade journal advertisements, McIntyre
America looked to McIntyre UK for direction and guidance. Ibid. To achieve McIntyre UK’s objective, i.e. ,
“to sell [its] machines to customers throughout the United States,”
399 N. J. Super., at 548, 945 A. 2d, at 97, “the two
companies [were acting] closely in concert with each other,” ibid. McIntyre UK never instructed its distributor to
avoid certain States or regions of the country; rather, as just
noted, the manufacturer engaged McIntyre America to attract
customers “from anywhere in the United States.” App. 161a.

															   In sum, McIntyre UK’s regular attendance and
exhibitions at ISRI conventions was surely a purposeful step to
reach customers for its products “anywhere in the United States.”
At least as purposeful was McIntyre UK’s engagement of McIntyre
America as the conduit for sales of McIntyre UK’s machines to
buyers “throughout the United States.” Given McIntyre UK’s
endeavors to reach and profit from the United States market as a
whole, Nicastro’s suit, I would hold, has been brought in a forum
entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his claim. He alleges
that McIntyre UK’s shear machine was defectively designed or
manufactured and, as a result, caused injury to him at his
workplace. The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey workplace
not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U. S.
connections and distribution system that McIntyre UK deliberately
arranged.[ Footnote 3 ] On what
sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could the
place of Nicastro’s injury within the United States be deemed off
limits for his products liability claim against a foreign
manufacturer who targeted the United States (including all the
States that constitute the Nation) as the territory it sought to
develop?

															II

															   A few points on which there
should be no genuine debate bear statement at the outset. First,
all agree, Mc-Intyre UK surely is not subject to general
(all-purpose) jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that
foreign-country corporation is hardly “at home” in New Jersey. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , post , at 2–3, 9–13. The question, rather,
is one of specific jurisdiction, which turns on an “affiliatio[n]
between the forum and the underlying controversy.” Goodyear
Dunlop, post, at 2 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
1121, 1136 (1966) (hereinafter von Mehren & Trautman); internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Goodyear Dunlop, post, at 7–8.

															   Second, no issue of the fair and
reasonable allocation of adjudicatory authority among States of the
United States is present in this case. New Jersey’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous
product caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on
the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any sister State.
Indeed, among States of the United States, the State in which the
injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a
products liability tort claim. See World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U. S. 286 , 297
(1980) (if a manufacturer or distributor endeavors to develop a
market for a product in several States, it is reasonable “to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective [product] has there been the source of injury”); 28 U.
S. C. §1391(a)–(b) (in federal-court suits, whether resting on
diversity or federal-question jurisdiction, venue is proper in the
judicial district “in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred”).

															   Third, the constitutional limits on a state
court’s adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due
process, not state sovereignty. As the Court clarified in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee , 456
U. S. 694 (1982):

															“The restriction on state sovereign power described
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. … must be seen as
ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism
concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign
power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal
jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself
to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.” Id. ,
at 703, n. 10.

															See also Shaffer v. Heitner , 433 U. S. 186 ,
204, and n. 20 (1977) (recognizing that “the mutually
exclusive sovereignty of the States [is not] the central concern of
the inquiry into personal jurisdiction”). But see ante , at
7 (plurality opinion) (asserting that “sovereign authority,” not
“fairness,” is the “central concept” in determining personal
jurisdiction).

															   Finally, in International Shoe itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that
legal fictions, notably “presence” and “implied consent,” should be
discarded, for they conceal the actual bases on which jurisdiction
rests. See 326 U. S., at 316, 318; Hutchinson v. Chase
& Gilbert , 45 F. 2d 139, 141 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.)
(“nothing is gained by [resort to words that] concea[l] what we
do”). “[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation” determines whether due process permits the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, Shaf- fer , 433 U.
S., at 204, and “fictions of implied consent” or “corporate
presence” do not advance the proper inquiry, id. , at 202.
See also Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of
Marin , 495 U.
S. 604 , 618 (1990) (plurality opinion) ( International
Shoe “cast … aside” fictions of “consent” and “presence”).

															   Whatever the state of academic debate over the
role of consent in modern jurisdictional doctrines,[ Footnote 4 ] the plurality’s notion that
consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling
decisions of this Court. Quite the contrary, the Court has
explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with
the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious consent,
the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful. See, e.g. , Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U. S. 462 ,
472 (1985) (Due Process Clause permits “forum … to assert specific
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented
to suit there”); McGee v. International Life
Ins.Co. , 355 U. S. 220 , 222 (1957) (“[T]his
Court [has] abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’
as the standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power
over [out-of-state] corporations.”).[ Footnote 5 ]

															III

															   This case is illustrative of
marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common in
today’s commercial world.[ Footnote
6 ] A foreign-country manufacturer engages a U. S. company to
promote and distribute the manufacturer’s products, not in any
particular State, but anywhere and everywhere in the United States
the distributor can attract purchasers. The product proves
defective and injures a user in the State where the user lives or
works. Often, as here, the manufacturer will have liability
insurance covering personal injuries caused by its products. See
Cupp, Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev.
845, 870–871 (noting the ready availability of products liability
insurance for manufacturers and citing a study showing, “between
1986 and 1996, [such] insurance cost manufacturers, on average,
only sixteen cents for each $100 of product sales”); App.
129–130.

															   When industrial accidents happen,
a long-arm statute in the State where the injury occurs generally
permits assertion of jurisdiction, upon giving proper notice, over
the foreign manufacturer. For example, the State’s statute might
provide, as does New York’s long-arm statute, for the “exercise
[of] personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary … who …

															“commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state, … if he … expects or
should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state
and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce.” N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §302(a)(3)(ii) (West
2008).[ Footnote 7 ]

															Or, the State might simply provide, as New Jersey
does, for the exercise of jurisdiction “consistent with due process
of law.” N. J. Ct. Rule 4:4–4(b)(1) (2011).[ Footnote 8 ]

															   The modern approach to jurisdiction over
corporations and other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe , gave prime place to reason and
fairness. Is it not fair and reasonable, given the mode of trading
of which this case is an example, to require the international
seller to defend at the place its products cause injury?[ Footnote 9 ] Do not litigational
convenience[ Footnote 10 ] and
choice-of-law considerations [ Footnote 11 ] point in that direction? On what measure of
reason and fairness can it be considered undue to require McIntyre
UK to defend in New Jersey as an incident of its efforts to develop
a market for its industrial machines anywhere and everywhere in the
United States? [ Footnote
12 ] Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey
fair, i.e. , a reasonable cost of transacting business
internationally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to
Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he sustained
using McIntyre’s product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey?

															   McIntyre UK dealt with the United States as a
single market. Like most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned
not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but
rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States.
See Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants—Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 Ore. L. Rev. 431,
433 (1984) (hereinafter Hay). As a McIntyre UK officer wrote in an
e-mail to McIntyre America: “American law—who needs it?!” App.
129a–130a (e-mail dated April 26, 1999 from Sally Johnson to Mary
Gaither). If McIntyre UK is answerable in the United States at all,
is it not “perfectly appropriate to permit the exercise of that
jurisdiction … at the place of injury”? See Hay 435; Degnan &
Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of
Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L. J. 799,
813–815 (1988) (noting that “[i]n the international order,” the
State that counts is the United States, not its component
States,[ Footnote 13 ] and
that the fair place of suit within the United States is essentially
a question of venue).

															   In sum, McIntyre UK, by engaging McIntyre
America to promote and sell its machines in the United States,
“purposefully availed itself ” of the United States market
nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection
of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all
States in which its products were sold by its exclusive
distributor. “Th[e] ‘purposeful availment’ requirement,” this Court
has explained, simply “ensures that a defendant will not be haled
into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’
or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Burger King , 471 U. S., at 475.
Adjudicatory authority is appropriately exercised where “actions by
the defendant himself ” give rise to the affiliation with
the forum. Ibid. How could McIntyre UK not have intended,
by its actions targeting a national market, to sell products in the
fourth largest destination for imports among all States of the
United States and the largest scrap metal market? See supra , at 3, 10, n. 6. But see ante , at 11
(plurality opinion) (manufacturer’s purposeful efforts to sell its
products nationwide are “not … relevant” to the personal
jurisdiction inquiry). Courts, both state and
federal, confronting facts similar to those here, have rightly
rejected the conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products
across the USA may evade jurisdiction in any and all States,
including the State where its defective product is distributed and
causes injury. They have held, instead, that it would undermine
principles of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign
manufacturer from accountability in court at the place within the
United States where the manufacturer’s products caused injury. See, e.g. , Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods.,
Inc. , 993 F. 2d 528, 544 (CA6 1993); A. Uberti &
C. v. Leonardo , 181 Ariz. 565, 573, 892 P. 2d
1354, 1362 (1995).[ Footnote
14 ] IV A While this Court
has not considered in any prior case the now-prevalent pattern
presented here—a foreign-country manufacturer enlisting a U. S.
distributor to de-velop a market in the United States for the
manufacturer’s products—none of the Court’s decisions tug against
the judgment made by the New Jersey Supreme Court. McIntyre
contends otherwise, citing World-Wide Volkswagen , and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal.,
Solano Cty. , 480 U. S. 102 (1987). World-Wide
Volkswagen concerned a New York car dealership that sold
solely in the New York market, and a New York distributor who
supplied retailers in three States only: New York, Connecticut, and
New Jersey. 444 U. S., at 289. New York residents had purchased an
Audi from the New York dealer and were driving the new vehicle
through Oklahoma en route to Arizona. On the road in Oklahoma,
another car struck the Audi in the rear, causing a fire which
severely burned the Audi’s occupants. Id. , at 288.
Rejecting the Oklahoma courts’ assertion of jurisdiction over the
New York dealer and distributor, this Court observed that the
defendants had done nothing to serve the market for cars in
Oklahoma. Id. , at 295–298. Jurisdiction, the Court held,
could not be based on the customer’s unilateral act of
driving the vehicle to Oklahoma. Id. , at 298; see Asahi , 480 U. S., at 109 (opinion of O’Connor, J.)
( World-Wide Volkswagen “rejected the as- sertion that a consumer’s unilateral act of bringing the defendant’s
product into the forum State was a sufficient constitutional basis
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant”). Notably, the foreign
manufacturer of the Audi in World-Wide Volkswagen did not
object to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma courts and the U. S.
importer abandoned its initially stated objection. 444 U. S., at
288, and n. 3. And most relevant here, the Court’s opinion
indicates that an objection to jurisdiction by the manufacturer or
national distributor would have been unavailing. To reiterate, the
Court said in World-Wide Volkswagen that, when a
manufacturer or distributor aims to sell its product to customers
in several States, it is reasonable “to subject it to suit in [any]
one of those States if its allegedly defective [product] has there
been the source of injury.” Id. , at 297. Asahi arose out of a
motorcycle accident in California. Plaintiff, a California resident
injured in the accident, sued the Taiwanese manufacturer of the
motorcycle’s tire tubes, claiming that defects in its product
caused the accident. The tube manufacturer cross-claimed against
Asahi, the Japanese maker of the valve assembly, and Asahi
contested the California courts’ jurisdiction. By the time the case
reached this Court, the injured plaintiff had settled his case and
only the indemnity claim by the Taiwanese company against the
Japanese valve-assembly manufacturer remained. The decision was not a close
call. The Court had before it a foreign plaintiff, the Taiwanese
manufacturer, and a foreign defendant, the Japanese valve-assembly
maker, and the indemnification dispute concerned a transaction
between those parties that occurred abroad. All agreed on the
bottom line: The Japanese valve-assembly manufacturer was not
reasonably brought into the California courts to litigate a dispute
with another foreign party over a transaction that took place
outside the United States. Given the confines of the
controversy, the dueling opinions of Justice Brennan and Justice
O’Connor were hardly necessary. How the Court would have
“estimate[d] … the inconveniences,” see International
Shoe , 326 U. S., at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted),
had the injured Californian originally sued Asahi is a debatable
question. Would this Court have given the same weight to the
burdens on the foreign defendant had those been counterbalanced by
the burdens litigating in Japan imposed on the local California
plaintiff? Cf. Calder v. Jones , 465 U. S. 783 , 788
(1984) (a plaintiff’s contacts with the forum “may be so manifold
as to permit jurisdiction when it would not exist in their
absence”). In any event, Asahi, unlike
McIntyre UK, did not itself seek out customers in the United
States, it engaged no distributor to promote its wares here, it
appeared at no tradeshows in the United States, and, of course, it
had no Web site advertising its products to the world. Moreover,
Asahi was a component-part manufacturer with “little control over
the final destination of its products once they were delivered into
the stream of commerce.” A. Uberti , 181 Ariz., at 572, 892
P. 2d, at 1361. It was important to the Court in Asahi that “those who use Asahi components in their final
products, and sell those products in California, [would be] subject
to the application of California tort law.” 480 U. S., at 115
(majority opinion). To hold that Asahi controls this case
would, to put it bluntly, be dead wrong.[ Footnote 15 ] B The Court’s
judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a disadvantage in
comparison to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in the
world. Of particular note, within the European Union, in which the
United Kingdom is a participant, the jurisdiction New Jersey would
have exercised is not at all exceptional. The European Regulation
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
provides for the exercise of specific jurisdiction “in matters
relating to tort … in the courts for the place where the harmful
event occurred.” Council Reg. 44/2001, Art. 5, 2001 O. J. (L.
12) 4.[ Footnote 16 ] The
European Court of Justice has interpreted this prescription to
authorize jurisdiction either where the harmful act occurred or at
the place of injury. See Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier
B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace S. A. ,
1976 E. C. R. 1735, 1748–1749.[ Footnote 17 ] V The commentators
who gave names to what we now call “general jurisdiction” and
“specific jurisdiction” anticipated that when the latter achieves
its full growth, considerations of litigational convenience and the
respective situations of the parties would determine when it is
appropriate to subject a defendant to trial in the plaintiff’s
community. See von Mehren & Trautman 1166–1179. Litigational
considerations include “the convenience of witnesses and the ease
of ascertaining the governing law.” Id. , at 1168–1169. As
to the parties, courts would differently appraise two situations:
(1) cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro,
injured by the activity of a defendant engaged in interstate or
international trade; and (2) cases in which the defendant is a
natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal
involvements are largely home-based, i.e. , entities
without designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant
markets. See id. , at 1167–1169 .[ Footnote 18 ] As the attached appendix of
illustrative cases indicates, courts presented with von Mehren and
Trautman’s first scenario—a local plaintiff injured by the activity
of a manufacturer seeking to exploit a multistate or global
market—have repeatedly confirmed that jurisdiction is appropriately
exercised by courts of the place where the product was sold and
caused injury. *  *  * For the reasons
stated, I would hold McIntyre UK answerable in New Jersey for the
harm Nicastro suffered at his workplace in that State using
McIntyre UK’s shearing machine. While I dissent from the Court’s
judgment, I take heart that the plurality opinion does not speak
for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant step away from
the “notions of fair play and substantial justice” underlying International Shoe . 326 U. S., at 316 (internal quotation
marks omitted). APPENDIX Illustrative cases upholding
exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien or out-of-state
corporation that, through a distributor, targeted a national
market, including any and all States:[ Footnote 19 ] Clune v. Alimak AB , 233 F. 3d 538, 544 (CA8 2000)
(wrongful-death action against the Swedish manufacturer of a
construction hoist that allegedly caused a workplace death in
Missouri; holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in Missouri,
the Eighth Circuit stated: “Although we can imagine a case where a
foreign manufacturer selects discrete regional distributors for the
purpose of penetrating the markets in some states to the exclusion
of others, that situation is not before us.” In this case, the for-
eign manufacturer had “successfully employ[ed] one or two
distributors to cover the [entire] United States[,] intend[ing] to
reap the benefit of sales in every state where those distributors
market.” Were the court to conclude that the manufacturer “did not
intend its products to flow into Missouri,” the court “would be
bound to the conclusion that the [manufacturer] did not intend its
products to flow into any of the United
States.”). Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc. , 175 F. 3d 236, 242–244 (CA2
1999) (products liability action against the Japanese manufacturer
of an allegedly defective stamping press that caused a workplace
injury in New York; holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in
New York, the Second Circuit stated that an “exclusive sales rights
agreement” between the Japanese manufacturer and a Pennsylvania
distributor “contemplates that [the distributor] will sell [the
manufacturer’s] machines in North America and throughout the world,
serv[ing] as evidence of [the manufacturer’s] attempt to serve the
New York market, albeit indirectly”). Barone v. Rich
Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co. , 25 F. 3d 610,
613–615 (CA8 1994) (products liability suit against a Japanese
fireworks manufacturer for injuries sustained in Nebraska; Eighth
Circuit held the manufacturer amenable to suit in Nebraska,
although the manufacturer had no distributor or sales agents in
that State, did not advertise in Nebraska, and claimed it was
unaware that its distributors sold products there; Court of Appeals
stated: “In this age of NAFTA and GATT, one can expect further
globalization of commerce, and it is only reasonable for companies
that distribute allegedly defective products through regional
distributors in this country to anticipate being haled into court
by plaintiffs in their home states.”). Tobin v. Astra
Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc. , 993 F. 2d 528, 544 (CA6
1993) (products liability action against the Dutch pharmaceutical
manufacturer of a drug alleged to have caused Kentucky resident’s
heart disease; holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in
Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit reasoned: “[Defendant] argues that it
has done nothing in particular to purposefully avail itself of the
Kentucky market as distinguished from any other state in the union.
If we were to accept defendant’s argument on this point, a foreign
manufacturer could insulate itself from liability in each of the
fifty states simply by using an independent national distributor to
market its products.”). Hedrick v. Daiko
Shoji Co. , 715 F. 2d 1355, 1358 (CA9 1983) (products
liability suit arising from injuries plaintiff sustained in Oregon
caused by an allegedly defective wire-rope splice manufactured in
Japan; holding the Japanese manufacturer amenable to suit in
Oregon, the Ninth Cir-cuit noted that the manufacturer “performed a
forum-related act when it produced a splice that it knew was
destined for ocean-going vessels serving United States ports,
including those of Oregon”). Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc. , 616 F. 2d 191, 200 (CA5 1980)
(products liability action stemming from an injury plaintiff
sustained in Texas when using a cigarette lighter made in Japan;
holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in Texas, the Fifth
Circuit noted that the manufacturer “had every reason to believe
its product would be sold to a nation-wide market, that is, in any
or all states”). Stokes v. L.
Geismar, S.A. , 815 F. Supp. 904, 907 (ED Va. 1993),
aff ’d on other grounds, 16 F. 3d 411 (CA4 1994) (action
by worker injured in Virginia while using a rail-cutting saw
manufactured by a French corporation; holding the manufacturer
amenable to suit in Virginia, the District Court noted that there
was “no evidence of any attempt … to limit th[e] U. S. marketing
strategy to avoid Virginia or any other particular
state”). Felty v. Conaway
Processing Equipment Co. , 738 F. Supp. 917, 919–920 (ED Pa.
1990) (personal injury suit against the Dutch manufacturer of a
poultry processing machine that allegedly caused injury in
Pennsylvania; holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in
Pennsylvania, the District Court observed that the manufacturer
“clearly and purposefully used [distributors] to deal in the
international market for poultry processing equipment” and was
“well aware that its equipment was being sold for use in the United
States, including Pennsylvania”). Scanlan v. Norma
Projektil Fabrik , 345 F. Supp. 292, 293 (Mont. 1972)
(products liability action occasioned by defect in ammunition used
while hunting in Montana; plaintiff sued the Swedish ammunition
manufacturer; holding the manufacturer amenable to suit in Montana,
the District Court noted that the distributor intended “a
nationwide product distribution”). Ex parte DBI, Inc. ,
23 So. 3d 635, 654–655 (Ala. 2009) (wrongful-death action
arising out of an automobile accident in Alabama; plaintiff sued
the Korean manufacturer of an allegedly defective seatbelt; Supreme
Court of Alabama held the manufacturer amenable to suit in Alabama,
although the manufacturer had supplied its seatbelts to the car
maker in Korea and “maintain[ed] there [was] no evidence … showing
that it knew its products were being marketed in
Alabama”). A. Uberti & C. v. Leonardo , 181 Ariz. 565, 573, 892 P. 2d 1354, 1362
(1995) (wrongful-death action against the Italian manufacturer of
an allegedly defective handgun that caused child’s death in
Arizona; Arizona Supreme Court stated: “[F]or all this record
shows, Defendant never heard of Arizona. This raises the following
question: Having shown that the gun was knowingly designed for and
exported to exploit the market of the United States or western
United States, must Plaintiffs additionally show that Defendant had
the specific intent to market the gun in Arizona, or is it enough
to show that Defendant intended to market it in any state, group of
states, or all states? We conclude that only the latter is
necessary.”). Hill by Hill v. Showa Denko, K. K. , 188 W. Va. 654, 661, 425
S. E. 2d 609, 616 (1992) (products liability suit against the
Japanese manufacturer of a sleep aid alleged to have caused West
Virginia plaintiff’s blood disorder; holding the manufacturer
amenable to suit in West Virginia, that State’s Supreme Court noted
that the manufacturer had profited from sales in the United States
and considered it unfair to “requir[e] the plaintiff to travel to
Japan to litigate th[e] case”). Footnote
1 New Jersey is home to nearly
100 ISRI members. See Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries,
Inc., Member Directory, http://www.isri.org/
imis15_prod/core/directory.aspx (as visited June 24, 2011, and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Footnote
2 McIntyre America filed for
bankruptcy in 2001, is no longer operating, and has not
participated in this lawsuit. Brief for Petitioner 3. After “the
demise of … McIntyre America,” McIntyre UK authorized a Texas-based
company to serve as exclusive United States distributor of McIntyre
UK shears. App. 52a–53a. Footnote
3 McIntyre UK resisted
Nicastro’s efforts to determine whether other McIntyre machines had
been sold to New Jersey customers. See id., at 100a–101a.
McIntyre did allow that McIntyre America “may have resold products
it purchased from [McIntyre UK] to a buyer in New Jersey,” id. , at 117a, but said it kept no record of the ultimate
destination of machines it shipped to its distributor, ibid. A private investigator engaged by Nicastro found at
least one McIntyre UK machine, of unspecified type, in use in New
Jersey. Id. , at 140a–144a. But McIntyre UK objected that
the investigator’s report was “unsworn and based upon hearsay.”
Reply Brief 10. Moreover, McIntyre UK maintained, no evidence
showed that the machine the investigator found in New Jersey had
been “sold into [that State].” Ibid. Footnote
4 Compare Brilmayer, Rights,
Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L. J. 1277, 1304–1306
(1989) (hereinafter Brilmayer) (criticizing as circular
jurisdictional theories founded on “consent” or “[s]ubmission to
state authority”), Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in
the Box, 32 Boston College L. Rev. 529, 536–544 (1991) (same),
with Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 849, 884–885 (1989) (endorsing a
consent-based doctrine of personal jurisdiction), Epstein, Consent,
Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. Chi. Legal Forum
1, 2, 30–32 (urging that “the consent principle neatly explains the
dynamics of many of our jurisdictional doctrines,” but recognizing
that in tort cases, the victim ordinarily should be able to sue in
the place where the harm occurred). Footnote
5 But see ante , at 4–8
(plurality opinion) (maintaining that a forum may be fair and
reasonable, based on its links to the episode in suit, yet off
limits because the defendant has not submitted to the State’s
authority). The plurality’s notion that jurisdiction over foreign
corporations depends upon the defendant’s “submission,” ante , at 6, seems scarcely different from the
long-discredited fiction of implied consent. It bears emphasis that
a majority of this Court’s members do not share the plurality’s
view. Footnote
6 Last year, the United States
imported nearly 2 trillion dollars in foreign goods. Census Bureau,
U. S. International Trade in Goods and Services (Apr. 2011),
p. 1,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf
(as visited June 24, 2011, and in Clerk of Court’s case file).
Capital goods, such as the metal shear machine that injured
Nicastro, accounted for almost 450 billion dollars in imports for
2010. Id. , at 6. New Jersey is the fourth-largest
destination for manufactured commodities imported into the United
States, after California, Texas, and New York. Id. , FT–900
Supplement, p. 3. Footnote
7 This provision was modeled in
part on the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act. See
N. Y. Legislative Doc. 90, Judicial Conference of the State of
New York, 11th Annual Report 132–147 (1966). Connecticut’s long-arm
statute also uses the “derives substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce” formulation. See Conn. Gen. Stat.
§52–59b(a) (2011). Footnote
8 State long-arm provisions
allow the exercise of jurisdiction subject only to a due process
limitation in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. 4 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1068, pp. 577–578,
n. 12 (3d ed. 2002). Footnote
9 The plurality objects to a
jurisdictional approach “divorced from traditional practice.” Ante , at 5. But “the fundamental transformation of our
national economy,” this Court has recognized, warrants enlargement
of “the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents.” McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. , 355 U. S. 220 , 222–223
(1957). Footnote
10 See von Mehren & Trautman
1167 (“[C]onsiderations of litigational convenience, particularly
with respect to the taking of evidence, tend in accident cases to
point insistently to the community in which the accident
occurred.”). Footnote
11 Historically, “tort cases
were governed by the place where the last act giving rise to a
claim occurred—that is, the place of injury.” Brilmayer 1291–1292.
Even as many jurisdictions have modified the traditional rule of lex loci delicti , the location of injury continues to hold
sway in choice-of-law analysis in tort cases. See generally
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 719 (2009). Footnote
12 The plurality suggests that
the Due Process Clause might permit a federal district court in New
Jersey, sitting in diversity and applying New Jersey law, to
adjudicate McIntyre UK’s liability to Nicastro. See ante ,
at 10–11. In other words, McIntyre UK might be compelled to bear
the burden of traveling to New Jersey and defending itself there
under New Jersey’s products liability law, but would be entitled to
federal adjudication of Nicastro’s state-law claim. I see no basis
in the Due Process Clause for such a curious limitation. Footnote
13 “For purposes of
international law and foreign relations, the separate identities of
individual states of the Union are generally irrelevant.” Born,
Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga.
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 36 (1987). See also Hines v. Davidowitz , 312 U. S. 52 , 63 (1941)
(“For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but
for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign
nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States §421, Comment f, p. 307 (1986)
(“International law … does not concern itself with the allocation
of jurisdiction among domestic courts within a [nation,] for
example, between national and local courts in a federal
system.”). Footnote
14 For a more complete set of
examples, see Appendix, infra , at 20–24. Footnote
15 The plurality notes the low
volume of sales in New Jersey, ante , at 3, 11. A $24,900
shearing machine, however, is unlikely to sell in bulk worldwide,
much less in any given State. By dollar value, the price of a
single machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer
sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of flannel shirts, see Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc. , 717 F. 2d
1120 (CA7 1983), cigarette lighters, see Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc. , 616 F. 2d 191 (CA5 1980), or wire-rope
splices, see Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co. , 715
F. 2d 1355 (CA9 1983), the Court would presumably find the
defendant amenable to suit in that State. Footnote
16 The Regulation replaced the
“European” or “Brussels” Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, entered into in 1968
by the original Common Market member states. In the interim, the
Lugano Convention “extended the Brussels Convention scheme to
[European Free Trade Association] countries.” Clermont &
Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 474, 491,
n. 82 (2006). Footnote
17 For a concise comparison of
the European regime and this Court’s decisions, see Weintraub, A
Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U. C. Davis
L. Rev. 531, 550–554 (1995). Footnote
18 Assigning weight to the local
or international stage on which the parties operate would, to a
considerable extent, answer the concerns expressed by Justice
Breyer. See ante , at 5–7 (opinion concurring in
judgment). Footnote
19 The listed cases are by no
means exhaustive of decisions fitting this pattern. For additional
citations, see Brief for Public Citizen, Inc., as Amicus
Curiae 16, n. 5.

Summary: The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a foreign manufacturer cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state court in a product liability case unless the manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. In this case, the British manufacturer of a scrap metal machine was not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey, as it had not advertised in, sent goods to, or targeted the state in any relevant sense. This ruling clarifies the "stream of commerce" doctrine and emphasizes the defendant's right to due process and lawful judicial power.