U.S. Supreme Court INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210 (1984) Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Delgado No. 82-1271 Argued January 11,
1984 Decided April 17,
1984 466
U.S. 210 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Acting pursuant to warrants issued on a showing of probable
cause that numerous unidentified illegal aliens were employed at a
garment factory, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
conducted two "factory surveys" of the workforce in search of
illegal aliens. A third factory survey was conducted with the
employer's consent at another garment factory. During each survey,
which lasted from one to two hours, INS agents positioned
themselves near the factory exits, while other agents moved
systematically through the factory, approaching employees and,
after identifying themselves, asking the employees from one to
three questions relating to their citizenship. If an employee gave
a credible reply that he was a United States citizen or produced
his immigration papers, the agent moved on to another employee.
During the survey, employees continued with their work and were
free to walk around within the factory. Respondent employees -- who
were United States citizens or permanent resident aliens and who
had been questioned during the surveys -- and their union filed
actions, consolidated in Federal District Court, alleging that the
factory surveys violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted
summary judgment for the INS, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the surveys constituted a seizure of the entire
workforces, and that the INS could not question an individual
employee unless its agents had a reasonable suspicion that the
employee was an illegal alien. Held: The factory surveys did not result in the seizure
of the entire workforces, and the individual questioning of the
respondent employees by INS agents concerning their citizenship did
not amount to a detention or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 466 U. S.
215 -221.

															(a) Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for
identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a
Fourth Amendment seizure. Unless the circumstances of the encounter
are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person
would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not
responded, such questioning does not result in a detention under
the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 466 U. S.
216 -217.

															(b) The entire workforces of the factories were not seized for
the duration of the surveys here, even though INS agents were
placed near Page 466 U. S. 211 the exits of the factory sites. The record indicates that the
agents' conduct consisted simply of questioning employees and
arresting those they had probable cause to believe were unlawfully
present in the factory. This conduct should not have given
respondents, or any other citizens or aliens lawfully present in
the factories, any reason to believe that they would be detained if
they gave truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they
simply refused to answer. If mere questioning did not constitute a
seizure when it occurred inside the factory, it was no more a
seizure when it occurred at the exits. Pp. 466 U. S.
217 -219.

															(c) Since there was no seizure of the workforces by virtue of
the method of conducting the surveys, the issue of individual
questioning could be presented only if one of the respondent
employees had, in fact, been seized or detained, but their
deposition testimony showed that none was. They may only litigate
what happened to them, and their description of the encounters with
the INS agents showed that the encounters were classic consensual
encounters, rather than Fourth Amendment seizures. Pp. 466 U. S.
219 -221.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 466 U. S. 221 .
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 466 U. S. 221 .
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 466 U. S.
225 .

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In the course of enforcing the immigration laws, petitioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) enters employers'
worksites to determine whether any illegal aliens Page 466 U. S. 212 may be present as employees. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the "factory surveys" involved in this case
amounted to a seizure of the entire workforces, and further held
that the INS could not question individual employees during any of
these surveys unless its agents had a reasonable suspicion that the
employee to be questioned was an illegal alien. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO v. Sureck, 681 F.2d
624 (1982). We conclude that these factory surveys did not result
in the seizure of the entire workforces, and that the individual
questioning of the respondents in this case by INS agents
concerning their citizenship did not amount to a detention or
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

															Acting pursuant to two warrants, in January and September, 1977,
the INS conducted a survey of the workforce at Southern California
Davis Pleating Co. (Davis Pleating) in search of illegal aliens.
The warrants were issued on a showing of probable cause by the INS
that numerous illegal aliens were employed at Davis Pleating,
although neither of the search warrants identified any particular
illegal aliens by name. A third factory survey was conducted with
the employer's consent in October, 1977, at Mr. Pleat, another
garment factory.

															At the beginning of the surveys, several agents positioned
themselves near the buildings' exits, while other agents dispersed
throughout the factory to question most, but not all, employees at
their work stations. The agents displayed badges, carried
walkie-talkies, and were armed, although at no point during any of
the surveys was a weapon ever drawn. Moving systematically through
the factory, the agents approached employees and, after identifying
themselves, asked them from one to three questions relating to
their citizenship. If the employee gave a credible reply that he
was a United States citizen, the questioning ended, and the agent
moved on to another employee. If the employee gave an
unsatisfactory Page 466 U. S. 213 response or admitted that he was an alien, the employee was
asked to produce his immigration papers. During the survey,
employees continued with their work, and were free to walk around
within the factory.

															Respondents are four employees questioned in one of the three
surveys. [ Footnote 1 ] In 1978,
respondents and their union representative, the International
Ladies Garment Workers' Union, filed two actions, later
consolidated, in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California challenging the constitutionality of INS
factory surveys and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Respondents argued that the factory surveys violated their Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures
and the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.

															The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the
union from the action for lack of standing, App. to Pet. for Cert.
58a-60a. In a series of cross-motions for partial summary judgment,
the District Court ruled that respondents had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their workplaces which conferred standing
on them to challenge entry by the INS pursuant to a warrant or
owner's consent. Id. at 49a-52a, 53a-55a, 56a-57a. In its
final ruling, the District Court addressed respondents' request for
injunctive relief directed at preventing the INS from questioning
them personally during any future surveys. The District Court, with
no material facts in dispute, found that each of the four
respondents was asked a question or questions by an INS agent
during one of the factory surveys. Id. at 46a. Reasoning
from this Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968), that law enforcement officers may ask
questions of anyone, the Page 466 U. S. 214 District Court ruled that none of the respondents had been
detained under the Fourth Amendment during the factory surveys,
either when they were questioned or otherwise. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 47a. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment in favor of the
INS. [ Footnote 2 ]

															The Court of Appeals reversed. Applying the standard first
enunciated by a Member of this Court in United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.), the Court of Appeals concluded
that the entire workforces were seized for the duration of each
survey, which lasted from one to two hours, because the stationing
of agents at the doors to the buildings meant that "a reasonable
worker would have believed that he was not free to leave.'" 681
F.2d at 634 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d
934, 939 (CA9 1981)). Although the Court of Appeals conceded that
the INS had statutory authority to question any alien or person
believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the
United States, see 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), it
further held that, under the Fourth Amendment, individual employees
could be questioned only on the basis of a reasonable suspicion
that a particular employee being questioned was an alien illegally
in the country. 681 F.2d at 639-645. A reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to believe that a number of illegal aliens were
working at a particular factory site was insufficient to justify
questioning any individual employee. Id. at 643.
Consequently, it also held that the individual questioning of
respondents violated the Fourth Amendment, because there had been
no such reasonable suspicion or probable cause as to any of them.
[ Footnote 3 ] Page 466 U. S. 215 We granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 461 U.S. 904 (1983), because it has serious implications
for the enforcement of the immigration laws and presents a conflict
with the decision reached by the Third Circuit in Babula v.
INS, 665 F.2d 293 (1981).

															The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the
police and citizens, but is designed "to prevent arbitrary and
oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals." United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 , 428 U. S. 554 (1976). Given the diversity of encounters between police officers
and citizens, however, the Court has been cautious in defining the
limits imposed by the Fourth Amendment on encounters between the
police and citizens. As we have noted elsewhere:

															"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred." Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 392 U. S. 19 , n.
16. While applying such a test is relatively straightforward in a
situation resembling a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 , 442 U. S.
212 -216 (1979), the protection against unreasonable
seizures also extends to "seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of traditional arrest." United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 878 (1975). What has evolved from our cases is a determination that an
initially consensual encounter between a police officer and a
citizen can be transformed into a seizure or detention within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "if, in view of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenall,
supra, at 446 U. S. 554 (footnote omitted); see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 , 460 U. S. 502 (1983) (plurality opinion). Page 466 U. S. 216 Although we have yet to rule directly on whether mere
questioning of an individual by a police official, without more,
can amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, our recent
decision in Royer, supra, plainly implies that
interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for
identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a
Fourth Amendment seizure. In Royer, when Drug Enforcement
Administration agents found that the respondent matched a drug
courier profile, the agents approached the defendant and asked him
for his airplane ticket and driver's license, which the agents then
examined. A majority of the Court believed that the request and
examination of the documents were "permissible in themselves." Id. at 460 U. S. 501 (plurality opinion); see id. at 460 U. S. 523 ,
n. 3 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). In contrast, a much different
situation prevailed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S.
47 (1979), when two policemen physically detained the
defendant to determine his identity, after the defendant refused
the officers' request to identify himself. The Court held that,
absent some reasonable suspicion of misconduct, the detention of
the defendant to determine his identity violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 443 U. S. 52 .
What is apparent from Royer and Brown is that
police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth
Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond to a police
request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told
they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual
nature of the response. Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S.
231 -234 (1973). Unless the circumstances of the
encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not
responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a
detention under the Fourth Amendment. But if the person refuses to
answer and the police take additional steps -- such as those taken
in Brown -- to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment
imposes Page 466 U. S. 217 some minimal level of objective justification to validate the
detention or seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 446 U. S. 554 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21 .

															The Court of Appeals held that "the manner in which the factory
surveys were conducted in this case constituted a seizure of the
workforce" under the Fourth Amendment. 681 F.2d at 634. While the
element of surprise and the systematic questioning of individual
workers by several INS agents contributed to the court's holding,
the pivotal factor in its decision was the stationing of INS agents
near the exits of the factory buildings. According to the Court of
Appeals, the stationing of agents near the doors meant that
"departures were not to be contemplated," and thus, workers were
"not free to leave." Ibid. In support of the decision
below, respondents argue that the INS created an intimidating
psychological environment when it intruded unexpectedly into the
workplace with such a show of officers. [ Footnote 4 ] Besides the stationing of agents near the
exits, respondents add that the length of the survey and the
failure to inform workers they were free to leave resulted in a
Fourth Amendment seizure of the entire workforce. [ Footnote 5 ] Page 466 U. S. 218 We reject the claim that the entire workforces of the two
factories were seized for the duration of the surveys when the INS
placed agents near the exits of the factory sites. Ordinarily, when
people are at work their freedom to move about has been
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement
officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their
employers. The record indicates that, when these surveys were
initiated, the employees were about their ordinary business,
operating machinery and performing other job assignments. While the
surveys did cause some disruption, including the efforts of some
workers to hide, the record also indicates that workers were not
prevented by the agents from moving about the factories.

															Respondents argue, however, that the stationing of agents near
the factory doors showed the INS's intent to prevent people from
leaving. But there is nothing in the record indicating that this is
what the agents at the doors actually did. The obvious purpose of
the agents' presence at the factory doors was to insure that all
persons in the factories were questioned. The record indicates that
the INS agents' conduct in this case consisted simply of
questioning employees and arresting those they had probable cause
to believe were unlawfully present in the factory. This conduct
should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would
be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions put to
them or if they simply refused to answer. If mere questioning does
not constitute a seizure when it occurs inside the factory, it is
no more a seizure when it occurs at the exits. [ Footnote 6 ] Page 466 U. S. 219 A similar conclusion holds true for all other citizens or aliens
lawfully present inside the factory buildings during the surveys.
The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable threat of
detention to these workers while they walked throughout the
factories on job assignments. Likewise, the mere possibility that
they would be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings
should not have resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of
them that they would be seized or detained in any meaningful way.
Since most workers could have had no reasonable fear that they
would be detained upon leaving, we conclude that the workforces as
a whole were not seized. [ Footnote
7 ]

															The Court of Appeals also held that "detentive questioning" of
individuals could be conducted only if INS agents could
articulate

															"objective facts providing investigators with a reasonable
suspicion that each questioned person, so detained, is an alien
illegally in this country."

															681 F.2d at 638. Under our analysis, however, since there was no
seizure of the workforces by virtue of the method of conducting the
factory surveys, the only way the issue of individual questioning
could be presented would be if one of the named respondents had in
fact been seized or detained. Reviewing the deposition testimony of
respondents, we conclude that none were.

															The questioning of each respondent by INS agents seems to have
been nothing more than a brief encounter. None of the three Davis
Pleating employees were questioned during the January survey.
During the September survey at Davis Pleating, respondent Delgado
was discussing the survey with another employee when two INS agents
approached him and asked him where he was from and from what city.
When Delgado informed them that he came from Mayaguez, Puerto Page 466 U. S. 220 Rico, the agent made an innocuous observation to his partner and
left. App. 94. Respondent Correa's experience in the September
survey was similar. Walking from one part of the factory to
another, Correa was stopped by an INS agent and asked where she was
born. When she replied "Huntington Park, [California]," the agent
walked away and Correa continued about her business. Id. at 115. Respondent Labonte, the third Davis Pleating employee, was
tapped on the shoulder and asked in Spanish, "Where are your
papers?" Id. at 138. Labonte responded that she had her
papers and, without any further request from the INS agents, showed
the papers to the agents, who then left. Finally, respondent
Miramontes, the sole Mr. Pleat employee involved in this case,
encountered an agent en route from an office to her worksite.
Questioned concerning her citizenship, Miramontes replied that she
was a resident alien, and on the agent's request, produced her work
permit. The agent then left. Id. at 120-121.

															Respondents argue that the manner in which the surveys were
conducted and the attendant disruption caused by the surveys
created a psychological environment which made them reasonably
afraid they were not free to leave. Consequently, when respondents
were approached by INS agents and questioned concerning their
citizenship and right to work, they were effectively detained under
the Fourth Amendment, since they reasonably feared that refusing to
answer would have resulted in their arrest. But it was obvious from
the beginning of the surveys that the INS agents were only
questioning people. Persons such as respondents who simply went
about their business in the workplace were not detained in any way;
nothing more occurred than that a question was put to them. While
persons who attempted to flee or evade the agents may eventually
have been detained for questioning, see id. at 50, 81-84,
91-93, respondents did not do so, and were not in fact detained.
The manner in which respondents were questioned, given its obvious
purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that
respondents Page 466 U. S. 221 were not free to continue working or to move about the factory.
Respondents may only litigate what happened to them, and our review
of their description of the encounters with the INS agents
satisfies us that the encounters were classic consensual
encounters, rather than Fourth Amendment seizures. See Florida
v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.
S. 544 (1980).

															Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Respondents Herman Delgado, Ramona Correa, and Francisca Labonte
worked at Davis Pleating, while Marie Miramontes, the fourth
respondent, was employed by Mr. Pleat. Both Delgado and Correa are
United States citizens, while Labonte and Miramontes are permanent
resident aliens.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The District Court never ruled directly on respondents' Fifth
Amendment claim, apparently reasoning that, since respondents'
Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated, their Fifth
Amendment right had also not been violated. The Court of Appeals
also never ruled on respondents' Fifth Amendment claim, and we
decline to do so.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court did not abuse
its discretion in denying class certification. In light of its
disposition of respondents' Fourth Amendment claims, the Court of
Appeals declined to resolve the union's appeal from the District
Court's determination that the union lacked standing to raise its
members' Fourth Amendment claims. 681 F.2d at 645, n. 24.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Although the issue was the subject of substantial discussion at
oral argument, the INS does not contest that respondents have
standing to bring this case. They allege the existence of an
ongoing policy which violated the Fourth Amendment and which will
be applied to their workplace in the future. Cf. Allee v.
Medrano, 416 U. S. 802 (1974). Part of their argument is clearly based on the INS's
detention of illegal aliens found working at the two factories.
Respondents, however, can only premise their right to injunctive
relief on their individual encounters with INS agents during the
factory surveys. See infra at 466 U. S.
221 .

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Contrary to respondents' assertion, it also makes no difference
in this case that the encounters took place inside a factory, a
location usually not accessible to the public. The INS officers
were lawfully present pursuant to consent or a warrant, and other
people were in the area during the INS agents' questioning. Thus,
the same considerations attending contacts between the police and
citizens in public places should apply to the questions presented
to the individual respondents here.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In her deposition, respondent Miramontes described an incident
that occurred during the October factory survey at Mr. Pleat, in
which an INS agent stationed by an exit attempted to prevent a
worker, presumably an illegal alien, from leaving the premises
after the survey started. The worker walked out the door, and when
an agent tried to stop him, the worker pushed the agent aside and
ran away. App. 125-126. An ambiguous, isolated incident such as
this fails to provide any basis on which to conclude that
respondents have shown an INS policy entitling them to injunctive
relief. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.
S. 362 (1976); cf. Allee v. Medrano, supra; Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (1939).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Respondents Delgado and Labonte both left the building during
the INS survey, Delgado to load a truck and Labonte to observe INS
activities outside the building. App. 98, 136. Neither of them
stated in their depositions that the INS agents in any way
restrained them from leaving the building, or even addressed any
questions to them upon leaving.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

															A trial has not yet been held in this case. The District Court
entered summary judgment against respondents, and the Court of
Appeals, in reversing, did not remand the case for trial, but
rather directed the District Court to enter summary judgment for
respondents and a permanent injunction against petitioners. As the
case comes to us, therefore, we must construe the record most
favorably to petitioners, and resolve all issues of fact in their
favor. Because I agree that this record is insufficient to
establish that there is no genuine issue of fact on the question
whether any of the respondents could have reasonably believed that
he or she had been detained in some meaningful way, I join the
opinion of the Court.

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the result.

															While the Court's opinion is persuasive, I find the question of
whether the factory surveys conducted in this case resulted in any
Fourth Amendment "seizures" to be a close one. The question turns
on a difficult characterization of fact and law: whether a
reasonable person in respondents' position would have believed he
was free to refuse to answer the questions put to him by INS
officers and leave the factory. I believe that the Court need not
decide the question, however, because it is clear that any
"seizure" that my have taken place was permissible under the
reasoning of our decision in United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976). Page 466 U. S. 222 In that case, we held that stopping automobiles for brief
questioning at permanent traffic checkpoints away from the Mexican
border is consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and need not be
authorized by a warrant. [ Footnote
2/1 ] We assumed that the stops constituted "seizures" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 428 U. S. 546 , n.
1, 428 U. S. 556 ,
but upheld them as reasonable. As in prior cases involving the
apprehension of aliens illegally in the United States, we weighed
the public interest in the practice at issue against the Fourth
Amendment interest of the individual. See id. at 428 U. S. 555 .
Noting the importance of routine checkpoint stops to controlling
the flow of illegal aliens into the interior of the country, we
found that the Government had a substantial interest in the
practice. On the other hand, the intrusion on individual motorists
was minimal: the stops were brief, usually involving only a
question or two and possibly the production of documents. Moreover,
they were public and regularized law enforcement activities vesting
limited discretion in officers in the field. Weighing these
considerations, we held that the stops and questioning at issue, as
well as referrals to a slightly longer secondary inspection, might
be made "in the absence of any individualized suspicion" that a
particular car contained illegal aliens, id. at 428 U. S.
562 .

															This case is similar. The Government's interest in using factory
surveys is as great, if not greater. According to an affidavit by
the INS's Assistant District Director in Los Angeles contained in
the record in this case, the surveys account for one-half to
three-quarters of the illegal aliens identified and arrested away
from the border every day in the Los Angeles District. App. 47.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] In that District
alone, over Page 466 U. S. 223 20,000 illegal aliens were arrested in the course of factory
surveys in one year. Id. at 44. The surveys in this case
resulted in the arrest of between 20% and 50% of the employees at
each of the factories. [ Footnote
2/3 ]

															We have noted before the dimensions of the immigration problem
in this country. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S.
878 -879 (1975); Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 428 U. S.
551 -553. Recent estimates of the number of illegal
aliens in this country range between 2 and 12 million, although the
consensus appears to be that the number at any one time is between
3 and 6 million. [ Footnote 2/4 ] One
of the main reasons they come-- perhaps the main reason --
is to seek employment. See App. 43; Martinez-Fuerte,
supra, at 428 U. S. 551 ;
Select Committee at 25, 38. Factory surveys strike directly at this
cause, enabling the INS, with relatively few agents, to diminish
the incentive for the dangerous passage across the border and to
apprehend large numbers of those who come. Clearly, the Government
interest in this enforcement technique is enormous. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 466 U. S. 224 The intrusion into the Fourth Amendment interests of the
employees, on the other hand, is about the same as it was in Martinez-Fuerte. The objective intrusion is actually less:
there, cars often were stopped for up to five minutes, while here
employees could continue their work as the survey progressed. They
were diverted briefly to answer a few questions or to display their
registration cards. It is true that the initial entry into the
plant in a factory survey is a surprise to the workers, but the
obviously authorized character of the operation, the clear purpose
of seeking illegal aliens, and the systematic and public nature of
the survey serve to minimize any concern or fright on the part of
lawful employees. Moreover, the employees' expectation of privacy
in the plant setting here, like that in an automobile, certainly is
far less than the traditional expectation of privacy in one's
residence. Therefore, for the same reasons that we upheld the
checkpoint stops in Martinez-Fuerte without any
individualized suspicion, I would find the factory surveys here to
be reasonable. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Page 466 U. S. 225 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															This case presents no question as to whether a warrant was
required for the entry by the INS officers into the plants. As the
majority notes, the INS obtained either a warrant or consent from
the factory owners before entering the plants to conduct the
surveys.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Solicitor General informs us that the figure in text refers
to 1977. For the country as a whole, the INS estimates from its
internal records that factory surveys accounted in 1982 for
approximately 60% of all illegal aliens apprehended by the INS in
nonborder locations. Brief for Petitioners 3-4, and n. 3.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															During the course of the the first survey at Davis Pleating, 78
illegal aliens were arrested out of a workforce of approximately
300. The second survey nine months later resulted in the arrest of
39 illegal aliens out of about 200 employees. The survey at Mr.
Pleat resulted in the arrest of 45 illegal aliens out of
approximately 90 employees. App. 51.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															House Select Committee on Population, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Legal and Illegal Immigration to the United States 2, 16-17 (Comm.
Print 1978) (hereinafter Select Committee); see also
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 878 (the INS in 1974 suggested that the number of illegal aliens might
be as high as 10 to 12 million).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Despite the vast expenditures by the INS and other agencies to
prevent illegal immigration and apprehend aliens illegally in the
United States, and despite laws making it a crime for them to be
here, our law irrationally continues to permit United States
employers to hire them. Many employers actively recruit low-paid
illegal immigrant labor, encouraging -- with Government tolerance
-- illegal entry into the United States. See Select
Committee, at 25. This incongruity in our immigration statutes is
not calculated to increase respect for the rule of law.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The Court in Martinez-Fuerte also held that no
particularized reason was necessary to refer motorists to the
secondary inspection area for a slightly more intrusive "seizure."
428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
563 -564. Similarly, I would hold in this case that, in
the context of an overall survey of a factory, no particularized
suspicion is needed to justify the choice of those employees who
are subjected to the minimal intrusion of the questioning here. The
dissent's claim that INS agents have greater discretion to decide
whom to question in factory surveys than they do at traffic
checkpoints, post at 466 U. S.
237 -238, neglects the virtually unlimited discretion to
refer cars to the secondary inspection area that we approved in Martinez-Fuerte. The dissent also suggests that a warrant requirement for factory
surveys, and certain unspecified improvements, would make the
surveys constitutional. Post at 466 U. S. 239 .
I note only that the Court in Martinez-Fuerte declined to
impose a warrant requirement on the location of traffic
checkpoints, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
564 -566, and that the respondents here do not argue for
such a requirement or for changes in the "duration and manner" of
the surveys. I would not address the warrant question until it is
fully briefed by both sides.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

															As part of its ongoing efforts to enforce the immigration laws,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducts "surveys"
of those workplaces that it has reason to believe employ large
numbers of undocumented aliens who may be subject to deportation.
This case presents the question whether the INS's method of
carrying out these "factory surveys" [ Footnote 3/1 ] violates the rights of the affected
factory workers to be secure against unreasonable seizures of one's
person as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Answering that
question, the Court today holds, first, that the INS surveys
involved here did not result in the seizure of the entire factory
workforce for the complete duration of the surveys, ante at 466 U. S.
218 -219, and, second, that the individual questioning of
respondents by INS agents concerning their citizenship did not
constitute seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ante at 466 U. S.
219 -221. Although I generally agree with the Court's
first conclusion, [ Footnote 3/2 ] I
am convinced that a fair application of our prior decisions to the
facts of this case Page 466 U. S. 226 compels the conclusion that respondents were unreasonably seized
by INS agents in the course of these factory surveys.

															At first blush, the Court's opinion appears unremarkable. But
what is striking about today's decision is its studied air of
unreality. Indeed, it is only through a considerable feat of
legerdemain that the Court is able to arrive at the conclusion that
the respondents were not seized. The success of the Court's sleight
of hand turns on the proposition that the interrogations of
respondents by the INS were merely brief, "consensual encounters," ante at 466 U. S. 221 ,
that posed no threat to respondents' personal security and freedom.
The record, however, tells a far different story. I Contrary to the Court's suggestion, see ante at 466 U. S. 216 ,
we have repeatedly considered whether and, if so, under what
circumstances, questioning of an individual by law enforcement
officers may amount to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.
S. 721 (1969); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.
S. 143 (1972); Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S.
47 (1979); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 (1983). Of course, as these decisions recognize,
the question does not admit of any simple answer. The difficulty
springs from the inherent tension between our commitment to
safeguarding the precious, and all too fragile, right to go about
one's business free from unwarranted government interference and
our recognition that the police must be allowed some latitude in
gathering information from those individuals who are willing to
cooperate. Given these difficulties, it is perhaps understandable
that our efforts to strike an appropriate balance have not produced
uniform results. Nevertheless, the outline of what appears to be
the appropriate inquiry has been traced over the years with some
clarity. Page 466 U. S. 227 The Court launched its examination of this issue in Terry v.
Ohio, supra, by explaining that

															"the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do
not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime -- 'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be
recognized that, whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person. " Id. at 392 U. S. 16 (emphasis added). Such a seizure, the Court noted, may be evidenced
by either "physical force or show of authority" indicating that the
individual's liberty has been restrained. Id. at 392 U. S. 19 , n.
16. The essential teaching of the Court's decision in Terry -- that an individual's right to personal security
and freedom must be respected even in encounters with the police
that fall short of full arrest -- has been consistently reaffirmed.
In Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S.
726 -727, for example, the Court confirmed that
investigatory detentions implicate the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and further explained that,

															"while the police have the right to request citizens to answer
voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes, they have no
right to compel them to answer." Id. at 394 U. S. 727 ,
n. 6. Similarly, in Brown v. Texas, supra, we overturned a
conviction for refusing to stop and identify oneself to police,
because, in making the stop, the police lacked any "reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual [was]
involved in criminal activity." Id. at 394 U. S. 51 .
The animating principle underlying this unanimous decision was that
the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's personal security and
privacy from unreasonable interference by the police, even when
that interference amounts to no more than a brief stop and
questioning concerning one's identity.

															Although it was joined at the time by only one other Member of
this Court, Part II-A of Justice Stewart's opinion in United
States v. Mendenhall, supra, offered a helpful, preliminary
distillation of the lessons of these cases. Noting Page 466 U. S. 228 first that,

															"as long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion
upon that person's liberty or privacy,"

															Justice Stewart explained that

															"a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave." Id. at 394 U. S. 554 .
The opinion also suggested that such circumstances might
include

															"the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Ibid. A majority of the Court has since adopted that formula as the
appropriate standard for determining when inquiries made by the
police cross the boundary separating merely consensual encounters
from forcible stops to investigate a suspected crime. See
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 502 ,
(plurality opinion); id. at 460 U. S.
511 -512 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); id. at 460 U. S. 514 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). This rule properly looks not to the
subjective impressions of the person questioned, but rather to the
objective characteristics of the encounter which may suggest
whether or not a reasonable person would believe that he remained
free during the course of the questioning to disregard the
questions and walk away. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure § 9.2, p. 52 (1978). The governing principles that should
guide us in this difficult area were summarized in the Royer plurality opinion:

															"[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment
by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another
public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some
questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to
listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his
voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the
officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more,
convert Page 466 U. S. 229 the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective
justification. The person approached, however, need not answer any
question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained
even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing
so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more,
furnish those grounds. "

															460 U.S. at 460 U. S.
497 -498 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

															Applying these principles to the facts of this case, I have no
difficulty concluding that respondents were seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they were accosted by the INS
agents and questioned concerning their right to remain in the
United States. Although none of the respondents was physically
restrained by the INS agents during the questioning, it is
nonetheless plain beyond cavil that the manner in which the INS
conducted these surveys demonstrated a "show of authority" of
sufficient size and force to overbear the will of any reasonable
person. Faced with such tactics, a reasonable person could not help
but feel compelled to stop and provide answers to the INS agents'
questions. The Court's efforts to avoid this conclusion are rooted
more in fantasy than in the record of this case. The Court goes
astray, in my view, chiefly because it insists upon considering
each interrogation in isolation, as if respondents had been
questioned by the INS in a setting similar to an encounter between
a single police officer and a lone passerby that might occur on a
street corner. Obviously, once the Court begins with such an
unrealistic view of the facts, it is only a short step to the
equally fanciful conclusion that respondents acted voluntarily when
they stopped and answered the agents' questions.

															The surrounding circumstances in this case are far different
from an isolated encounter between the police and a passerby on the
street. Each of the respondents testified at length about the
widespread disturbance among the workers Page 466 U. S. 230 that was sparked by the INS surveys and the intimidating
atmosphere created by the INS's investigative tactics. First, as
the respondents explained, the surveys were carried out by surprise
by relatively large numbers of agents, generally from 15 to 25, who
moved systematically through the rows of workers who were seated at
their work stations. See App. 77-78, 81-85, 102-103,
122-123. Second, as the INS agents discovered persons whom they
suspected of being illegal aliens, they would handcuff these
persons and lead them away to waiting vans outside the factory. See id. at 88, 140-141. Third, all of the factory exits
were conspicuously guarded by INS agents, stationed there to
prevent anyone from leaving while the survey was being conducted. See id. at 48, 82, 125-126, 144-145, 158. Finally, as the
INS agents moved through the rows of workers, they would show their
badges and direct pointed questions at the workers. In light of
these circumstances, it is simply fantastic to conclude that a
reasonable person could ignore all that was occurring throughout
the factory and, when the INS agents reached him, have the temerity
to believe that he was at liberty to refuse to answer their
questions and walk away.

															Indeed, the experiences recounted by respondents clearly
demonstrate that they did not feel free either to ignore the INS
agents or to refuse to answer the questions posed to them. For
example, respondent Delgado, a naturalized American citizen,
explained that he was standing near his work station when two INS
agents approached him, identified themselves as immigration
officers, showed him their badges, and asked him to state where he
was born. Id. at 95. Delgado, of course, had seen all that
was going on around him up to that point, and naturally he
responded. As a final reminder of who controlled the situation, one
INS agent remarked as they were leaving Delgado that they would be
coming back to check him out again because he spoke English too
well. Id. at 94. Respondent Miramontes described her
encounter with the INS in similar terms:

															"He Page 466 U. S. 231 told me he was from Immigration, so when I showed him the [work
permit] papers, I saw his badge. If I hadn't [seen his badge],
I wouldn't have shown them to him. " Id. at 121 (emphasis added). She further testified that
she was frightened during this interview because "normally you get
nervous when you see everybody is scared, everybody is nervous." Ibid. Respondent Labontes testified that, while she was
sitting at her machine, an immigration officer came up to her from
behind, tapped her on the left shoulder, and asked "Where are your
papers?" Explaining her response to this demand, she testified: "I
turned, and at the same time I didn't wish to identify
myself. When I saw [the INS agents], I said, Yes, yes, I
have my papers.'" Id. at 138 (emphasis added). In sum, it is clear from this testimony that respondents felt
constrained to answer the questions posed by the INS agents, even
though they did not wish to do so. That such a feeling of
constraint was reasonable should be beyond question in light of the
surrounding circumstances. Indeed, the respondents' testimony
paints a frightening picture of people subjected to wholesale
interrogation under conditions designed not to respect personal
security and privacy, but rather to elicit prompt answers from
completely intimidated workers. Nothing could be clearer than that
these tactics amounted to seizures of respondents under the Fourth
Amendment. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Page 466 U. S. 232 II The Court's eagerness to conclude that these interrogations did
not represent seizures is to some extent understandable, of course,
because such a conclusion permits the Court to avoid the imposing
task of justifying these seizures on the basis of reasonable,
objective criteria as required by the Fourth Amendment.

															The reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies
to all seizures of the person, including those that involve only a
brief detention short of traditional arrest. But because the
intrusion upon an individual's personal security and privacy is
limited in cases of this sort, we have explained that brief
detentions may be justified on "facts that do not amount to the
probable cause required for an arrest." United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 880 (1975). Nevertheless, our prior decisions also make clear that
investigatory stops of the kind at issue here "must be justified by
some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity." United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 , 449 U. S. 417 (1981). As the Court stated in Terry, the

															"demand for specificity in the information upon which police
action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence."

															392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 21 , n.
18. Repeatedly, we have insisted that police may not detain and
interrogate an individual unless they have reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the person is involved in some unlawful activity.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, for instance,
the Court held that

															"[Border Patrol] officers on roving patrol may stop vehicles
only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in
the country." Id. at 422 U. S. 884 . See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.
S. 692 , 452 U. S.
699 -700 (1981); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 , 444 U. S. 92 -93
(1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 51 -52; Delaware Page 466 U. S. 233 v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 440 U. S. 661 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 407 U. S.
146 -149; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S.
726 -728; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 16 -19.
This requirement of particularized suspicion provides the chief
protection of lawful citizens against unwarranted governmental
interference with their personal security and privacy.

															In this case, the individual seizures of respondents by the INS
agents clearly were neither "based on specific, objective facts
indicating that society's legitimate interests require[d] the
seizure" nor "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas, supra, at 443 U. S. 51 . It
is undisputed that the vast majority of the undocumented aliens
discovered in the surveyed factories had illegally immigrated from
Mexico. Nevertheless, the INS agents involved in this case
apparently were instructed, in the words of the INS Assistant
District Director in charge of the operations, to interrogate
"virtually all persons employed by a company." App. 49. See
also id. at 443 U. S. 77 , 443 U. S. 85 -86, 443 U. S.
151 -152, 443 U. S. 155 .
Consequently, all workers, irrespective of whether they were
American citizens, permanent resident aliens, or deportable aliens,
were subjected to questioning by INS agents concerning their right
to remain in the country. By their own admission, the INS agents
did not selectively question persons in these surveys on the basis
of any reasonable suspicion that the persons were illegal aliens. See id. at 443 U. S. 55 , 443 U. S. 155 .
That the INS policy is so indiscriminate should not be surprising,
however, since many of the employees in the surveyed factories who
are lawful residents of the United States may have been born in
Mexico, have a Latin appearance, or speak Spanish while at work. See id. at 443 U. S. 57 , 443 U. S. 73 .
What this means, of course, is that the many lawful workers who
constitute the clear majority at the surveyed workplaces are
subjected to surprise questioning under intimidating circumstances
by INS agents who have no reasonable basis for suspecting that they
have Page 466 U. S. 234 done anything wrong. To say that such an indiscriminate policy
of mass interrogation is constitutional makes a mockery of the
words of the Fourth Amendment.

															Furthermore, even if the INS agents had pursued a firm policy of
stopping and interrogating only those persons whom they reasonably
suspected of being aliens, they would still have failed,
given the particular circumstances of this case, to safeguard
adequately the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The first,
and in my view insurmountable, problem with such a policy is that,
viewed realistically, it poses such grave problems of execution
that, in practice, it affords virtually no protection to lawful
American citizens working in these factories. This is so because,
as the Court recognized in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 422 U. S. 886 ,
there is no reliable way to distinguish with a reasonable degree of
accuracy between native-born and naturalized citizens of Mexican
ancestry on the one hand, and aliens of Mexican ancestry on the
other. [ Footnote 3/4 ] See
also Developments, Immigration Policy and the Rights of
Aliens, 96 Harv.L.Rev. 1286, 1374-1375 (1983). Indeed, the record
in this case clearly demonstrates this danger, since respondents
Correa and Delgado, although both American citizens, were subjected
to questioning during the INS surveys. Page 466 U. S. 235 Moreover, the mere fact that a person is believed to be an alien
provides no immediate grounds for suspecting any illegal activity.
Congress, of course, possesses broad power to regulate the
admission and exclusion of aliens, see Kliendeinst v.
Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 , 408 U. S. 766 (1972); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 , 430 U. S. 792 (1977), and resident aliens surely may be required to register with
the INS and to carry proper identification, see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1302, 1304(e). Nonetheless, as we held in Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
883 -884, when the Executive Branch seeks to enforce such
congressional policies, it may not employ enforcement techniques
that threaten the constitutional rights of American citizens. In
contexts such as these factory surveys, where it is virtually
impossible to distinguish fairly between citizens and aliens, the
threat to vital civil rights of American citizens would soon become
intolerable if we simply permitted the INS to question persons
solely on account of suspected alienage. Cf. id. at 422 U. S.
884 -886. Therefore, in order to protect both American
citizens and lawful resident aliens, who are also protected by the
Fourth Amendment, see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 , 413 U. S. 273 (1973), the INS must tailor its enforcement efforts to focus only
on those workers who are reasonably suspected of being illegal
aliens. [ Footnote 3/5 ] Page 466 U. S. 236 Relying upon United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976), however, JUSTICE POWELL would hold that the interrogation
of respondents represented a "reasonable" seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, even though the INS agents lacked any particularized
suspicion of illegal alienage to support the questioning, ante at 466 U. S. 224 .
In my view, reliance on that decision is misplaced. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held that, when the intrusion
upon protected privacy interests is extremely limited, the INS, in
order to serve the pressing governmental interest in immigration
enforcement, may briefly detain travelers at fixed checkpoints for
questioning solely on the basis of "apparent Mexican ancestry." 428
U.S. at 428 U. S. 563 .
In so holding, the Court was careful to distinguish its earlier
decision in Brignoni-Ponce, supra, which held that Border
Patrol agents conducting roving patrols may not stop and question
motorists solely on the basis of apparent Mexican ancestry, and may
instead make such stops only when their observations lead them
"reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens
who are illegally in the country." Id. at 422 U. S. 881 .
The "crucial distinction" between the roving patrols and the fixed
checkpoints, as the Court later observed in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 440 U. S. 656 ,
was "the lesser intrusion upon the motorist's Fourth Amendment
interests" caused by the checkpoint operations. Thus, as the Court
explained in Martinez-Fuerte: "This objective intrusion -- the stop itself, the questioning,
and the visual inspection -- also existed in roving patrol stops.
But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the
subjective intrusion -- the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers -- is appreciably less in the case of
a checkpoint stop."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 558 .
[ Footnote 3/6 ] Page 466 U. S. 237 The limited departure from Terry's general requirement
of particularized suspicion permitted in Martinez-Fuerte turned, therefore, largely on the fact that the intrusion upon
motorists resulting from the checkpoint operations was extremely
modest. In this case, by contrast, there are no equivalent
guarantees that the privacy of lawful workers will not be
substantially invaded by the factory surveys, or that the workers
will not be frightened by the INS tactics. Indeed, the opposite is
true. First, unlike the fixed checkpoints that were upheld in Martinez-Fuerte in part because their location was known
to motorists in advance, the INS factory surveys are sprung upon
unsuspecting workers completely by surprise. Respondents testified
that the sudden arrival of large numbers of INS agents created
widespread fear and anxiety among most workers. See App.
89, 107, 116, 120-121, 129-130. Respondent Miramontes, for
instance, explained that she was afraid during the surveys
"[b]ecause if I leave and they think I don't have no papers and
they shoot me or something. They see me leaving and they think I'm
guilty." Id. at 127. [ Footnote
3/7 ] In Marinez-Fuerte, there was absolutely no
evidence of widespread fear and anxiety similar to that adduced in
this case.

															Second, the degree of unfettered discretionary judgment
exercised by the individual INS agents during the factory surveys
is considerably greater than in the fixed checkpoint operations.
The power of individual INS agents to decide who they will stop and
question and who they will pass over contributes significantly to
the feeling of uncertainty and Page 466 U. S. 238 anxiety of the workers. See App. 86, 90, 129-130.
Unlike the fixed checkpoint operation, there can be no reliable
sense among the affected workers that the survey will be conducted
in an orderly and predictable manner. Third, although the workplace
obviously is not as private as the home, it is, at the same time,
not without an element of privacy that is greater than in an
automobile. All motorists expect that, while on the highway, they
are subject to general police surveillance as part of the regular
and expectable enforcement of traffic laws. For the average
employee, however, the workplace encloses a small, recognizable
community that is a locus of friendships, gossip, common effort,
and shared experience. While at work, therefore, the average
employee will not have the same sense of anonymity that is felt
when one is driving on the public highways; instead, an employee
will be known by coworkers and will recognize other employees as
his or her fellows. This experience, common enough among all who
work, forms the basis for a legitimate, albeit modest, expectation
of privacy that cannot be indiscriminately invaded by government
agents. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.
S. 364 , 392 U. S.
368 -369 (1968) (employee has reasonable expectation of
privacy in office space shared with other workers). The mere fact
that the employer has consented to the entry of the INS onto his
property does not mean that the workers' expectation of privacy
evaporates.

															Finally, there is no historical precedent for these kinds of
surveys that would make them expectable or predictable. As the
Court noted in Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 43 U. S. 560 -561,
n. 14, road checkpoints are supported to some extent by a long
history of acceptance that diminishes substantially the concern and
fear that such practices would elicit in the average motorist. But
factory surveys of the kind conducted by the INS are wholly
unprecedented, and their novelty can therefore be expected to
engender a high degree of resentment and anxiety. In sum, although
the governmental interest is obviously as substantial here as it
was in Martinez- Page 466 U. S. 239 Fuerte, the degree of intrusion upon the privacy rights
of lawful workers is significantly greater. Accordingly, the
quantum of suspicion required to justify such an intrusion must be
correspondingly greater.

															In my view, therefore, the only acceptable alternatives that
would adequately safeguard Fourth Amendment values in this context
are for the INS either (a) to adopt a firm policy of stopping and
questioning only those workers who are reasonably suspected of
being illegal aliens, or (b) to develop a factory survey program
that is predictably and reliably less intrusive than the current
scheme under review. The first alternative would satisfy the
requirement of particularized suspicion enunciated in Terry -- a principle that must control here because the
specific conditions that permitted exception to that requirement in Martinez-Fuerte are simply not present. The second
alternative would seek to redesign the factory survey techniques
used by the INS in order to bring them more closely into line with
the characteristics found in Martinez-Fuerte. Such a
scheme might require the INS, before conducting a survey of all
workers in a particular plant, to secure an administrative warrant
based upon a showing that reasonable grounds exist for believing
that a substantial number of workers employed at the factory are
undocumented aliens subject to deportation, and that there are no
practical alternatives to conducting such a survey. Cf. Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). In addition, the surveys could be further tailored in
duration and manner so as to be substantially less intrusive. III No one doubts that the presence of large numbers of undocumented
aliens in this country creates law enforcement problems of titanic
proportions for the INS. Nor does anyone question that this agency
must be afforded considerable latitude in meeting its delegated
enforcement responsibilities. I am afraid, however, that the Court
has become so Page 466 U. S. 240 mesmerized by the magnitude of the problem that it has too
easily allowed Fourth Amendment freedoms to be sacrificed. Before
we discard all efforts to respect the commands of the Fourth
Amendment in this troubling area, however, it is worth remembering
that the difficulties faced by the INS today are partly of our own
making.

															The INS methods under review in this case are, in my view, more
the product of expedience than of prudent law enforcement policy.
The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes a quota-based
system for regulating the admission of immigrants to this country
which is designed to operate primarily at our borders. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153, 1221-1225. See generally Developments, 96 Harv.L.Rev. at 1334-1369. With respect to Mexican
immigration, however, this system has almost completely broken
down. This breakdown is due in part, of course, to the considerable
practical problems of patroling a 2,000-mile border; it is,
however, also the result of our failure to commit sufficient
resources to the border patrol effort. See Administration's Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1981)
(statement of Attorney General Smith); see also Developments, 96 Harv.L.Rev. at 1439. Furthermore, the Act
expressly exempts American businesses that employ undocumented
aliens from all criminal sanctions, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), thereby
adding to the already powerful incentives for aliens to cross our
borders illegally in search of employment. [ Footnote 3/8 ] Page 466 U. S. 241 In the face of these facts, it seems anomalous to insist that
the INS must now be permitted virtually unconstrained discretion to
conduct wide-ranging searches for undocumented aliens at otherwise
lawful places of employment in the interior of the United States.
What this position amounts to, I submit, is an admission that,
since we have allowed border enforcement to collapse, and since we
are unwilling to require American employers to share any of the
blame, we must, as a matter of expediency, visit all of the burdens
of this jury-rigged enforcement scheme on the privacy interests of
completely lawful citizens and resident aliens who are subjected to
these factory raids solely because they happen to work alongside
some undocumented aliens. [ Footnote
3/9 ] The average American, as we have long recognized, see
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 154 (1925), expects some interference with his or her liberty when
seeking to cross the Nation's borders, but until today's decision,
no one would ever have expected the same treatment while lawfully
at work in the country's interior. Because the conditions which
spawned such expedient solutions are in no sense the fault of
these Page 466 U. S. 242 lawful workers, the Court, as the guardian of their
constitutional rights, should attend to this problem with greater
sensitivity before simply pronouncing the Fourth Amendment a dead
letter in the context of immigration enforcement. The answer to
these problems, I suggest, does not lie in abandoning our
commitment to protecting the cherished rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment, but rather may be found by reexamining our immigration
policy.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The enforcement activities of the INS are divided between
"border patrol" operations conducted along the border and its
functional equivalents and "area control" operations conducted in
the interior of the United States. The INS's area control
operations are, in turn, divided into traffic control operations
(such as maintaining fixed checkpoints on major highways) and
factory surveys of the kind at issue in this case.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															It seems to me that the Court correctly finds that there was no
single continuing seizure of the entire workforce from the moment
that the INS agents first secured the factory exits until the
completion of the survey. I join the Court's judgment in this
respect, because it is apparent that, in all three factory surveys
under review, most of the employees were generally free while the
survey was being conducted to continue working without interruption
and to move about the workplace. Having said that, however, I
should emphasize that I find the evidence concerning the conduct of
the factory-wide survey highly relevant to determining whether the
individual respondents were seized. See infra at 466 U. S.
229 -231.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Although respondents insist that the circumstances of these
interrogations were sufficiently coercive to constitute a "seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment, they do not contend that these
interviews were conducted under conditions that might be labeled
"custodial"; they do not argue, therefore, that the questioning by
INS agents posed any threat to the privilege against
self-incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment. Cf.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider whether INS
agents should be required to warn respondents of the possible
incriminating consequences of providing answers to the agents'
questions.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															As we explained in Brignoni-Ponce: "Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the
physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even
in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are
aliens."

															422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
886 .

															Indeed, the proposition that INS agents, even those who have
considerable experience in the field, will be able fairly and
accurately to distinguish between Spanish-speaking persons of
Mexican ancestry who are either native-born or naturalized citizens
and Spanish-speaking persons of Mexican ancestry who are aliens is
both implausible and subject to discriminatory abuse. The
protection of fundamental constitutional rights should not depend
upon such unconstrained administrative discretion, for, as we have
often observed, "[w]hen . . . a stop is not based on objective
criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices
exceeds tolerable limits." Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S.
47 , 443 U. S. 52 (1979).

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															Of course, as the Government points out, see Brief for
Petitioners 35-38, § 287(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act provides that INS officers may, without a warrant, "interrogate
any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be
or to remain in the United States." 66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. §
1357(a)(1). We have held, however, that broad statutory authority
of this kind does not license the INS to employ unconstitutional
enforcement methods. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. at 413 U. S.
272 -273. Because of that concern, the Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873 (1975), expressly left open the question whether
INS officers "may stop persons reasonably believed to be aliens
when there is no reason to believe they are illegally in the
country." Id. at 422 U. S. 884 ,
n. 9. In my view, given the particular constitutional dangers posed
by the INS's present method of carrying out factory surveys, the
exercise of the authority granted by § 287(a)(1) must be limited to
interrogations of only those persons reasonably believed to be in
the country illegally.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															Indeed, in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court repeatedly
emphasized that, in contrast to the roving patrol stops, the fixed
checkpoint operations are less likely to frighten motorists. This
was so because "[m]otorists using these highways are not taken by
surprise as they know . . . the location of the checkpoints and
will not be stopped elsewhere," and because the operations "both
appear to and actually involve less discretionary enforcement
activity." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
559 .

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] See also United States Commission on Civil Rights, The
Tarnished Golden Door: Civil Rights Issues in Immigration 90-91
(1980) (noting that "[t]estimony received by the Commission
indicates that . . . INS area control operations do cause confusion
and pandemonium among all factory employees, thereby disrupting a
factory's operations and decreasing production").

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															The enormous law enforcement problems resulting from this
combination of practical difficulties in patrolling this border and
the incentives for illegal aliens to secure employment have been
noted by the Congress, see Hearings on Oversight of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship and International Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); and also
by a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, see United States Immigration Policy and the National
Interest, Final Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy 46, 61-62, 72-73 (1981).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															In this regard, the views expressed in JUSTICE WHITE's
concurring opinion in United State v. Ortiz, 422 U.
S. 891 , 422 U. S. 915 (1975), are particularly pertinent:

															"The entire [immigration enforcement] system, however, has been
notably unsuccessful in deterring or stemming this heavy flow [of
illegal immigration]; and its costs, including added burdens on the
courts, have been substantial. Perhaps the Judiciary should not
strain to accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to
the needs of a system which, at best, can demonstrate only minimal
effectiveness as long as it is lawful for business firms and others
to employ aliens who are illegally in the country. This problem,
which ordinary law enforcement has not been able to solve,
essentially poses questions of national policy, and is chiefly the
business of Congress and the Executive Branch, rather than the
courts."

Summary: In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, the US Supreme Court ruled that factory surveys conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to question employees about their citizenship did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the employees. The Court held that the surveys did not result in the seizure of the entire workforce and that individual questioning by INS agents did not amount to a detention or seizure. The Court stated that unless the circumstances of an encounter with law enforcement are intimidating enough to make a reasonable person feel they are not free to leave, such questioning does not violate the Fourth Amendment.