U.S. Supreme Court Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986) Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett No. 85-198 Argued April 1, 1986 Decided June 25, 1986 477
U.S. 317 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus In September, 1980, respondent administratrix filed this
wrongful death action in Federal District Court, alleging that her
husband's death in 1979 resulted from his exposure to asbestos
products manufactured or distributed by the defendants, who
included petitioner corporation. In September, 1981, petitioner
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, during
discovery, respondent failed to produce any evidence to support her
allegation that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
products. In response, respondent produced documents tending to
show such exposure, but petitioner argued that the documents were
inadmissible hearsay, and thus could not be considered in
opposition to the summary judgment motion. In July, 1982, the court
granted the motion because there was no showing of exposure to
petitioner's products, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that summary judgment in petitioner's favor was precluded because
of petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending
to negate such exposure, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) and the decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress
& Co., 398 U. S. 144 . Held: 1. The Court of Appeals' position is inconsistent with the
standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c), which
provides that summary judgment is proper

															"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

															Pp. 477 U. S.
322 -326.

															(a) The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to
any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed
to Page 477 U. S. 318 make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case
with respect to which it has the burden of proof. Pp. 477 U. S.
322 -323.

															(b) There is no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other
similar materials negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary,
Rule 56(c), which refers to the affidavits, "if any," suggests the
absence of such a requirement, and Rules 56(a) and (b) provide that
claimants and defending parties may move for summary judgment "with
or without supporting affidavits." Rule 56(e), which relates to the
form and use of affidavits and other materials, does not require
that the moving party's motion always be supported by affidavits to
show initially the absence of a genuine issue for trial. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, explained. Pp. 477 U. S.
323 -326.

															(c) No serious claim can be made that respondent was
"railroaded" by a premature motion for summary judgment, since the
motion was not filed until one year after the action was commenced,
and since the parties had conducted discovery. Moreover, any
potential problem with such premature motions can be adequately
dealt with under Rule 56(f). P. 477 U. S.
326 .

															2. The questions whether an adequate showing of exposure to
petitioner's products was in fact made by respondent in opposition
to the motion, and whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible
evidence, would be sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof
at trial, should be determined by the Court of Appeals in the first
instance. Pp. 477 U. S.
326 -327.

															244 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181, reversed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 328 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 477 U. S. 329 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 477 U. S.
337 . Page 477 U. S. 319 JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the motion of petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary
judgment against respondent Catrett because the latter was unable
to produce evidence in support of her allegation in her wrongful
death complaint that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that
petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending to
negate such exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its
favor. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244
U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view conflicted with
that of the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic
Products, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986). [ Footnote 1 ] We granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U.S. 944 (1985), and now
reverse the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit.

															Respondent commenced this lawsuit in September, 1980, alleging
that the death in 1979 of her husband, Louis H. Catrett, resulted
from his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured or
distributed by 15 named corporations. Respondent's complaint
sounded in negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.
Two of the defendants filed motions challenging the District
Court's in personam jurisdiction, and the remaining 13,
including petitioner, filed motions for summary judgment.
Petitioner's motion, which was first filed in September, 1981,
argued that summary judgment was proper because respondent had

															"failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product . . . was
the proximate cause of the injuries alleged within the
jurisdictional Page 477 U. S. 320 limits of [the District] Court."

															In particular, petitioner noted that respondent had failed to
identify, in answering interrogatories specifically requesting such
information, any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's
exposure to petitioner's asbestos products. In response to
petitioner's summary judgment motion, respondent then produced
three documents which she claimed "demonstrate that there is a
genuine material factual dispute" as to whether the decedent had
ever been exposed to petitioner's asbestos products. The three
documents included a transcript of a deposition of the decedent, a
letter from an official of one of the decedent's former employers
whom petitioner planned to call as a trial witness, and a letter
from an insurance company to respondent's attorney, all tending to
establish that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
asbestos products in Chicago during 1970-1971. Petitioner, in turn,
argued that the three documents were inadmissible hearsay, and thus
could not be considered in opposition to the summary judgment
motion.

															In July, 1982, almost two years after the commencement of the
lawsuit, the District Court granted all of the motions filed by the
various defendants. The court explained that it was granting
petitioner's summary judgment motion because

															"there [was] no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the
defendant Celotex's product in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere within the statutory period."

															App. 217. [ Footnote 2 ]
Respondent Page 477 U. S. 321 appealed only the grant of summary judgment in favor of
petitioner, and a divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. The majority of the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner's summary judgment motion was rendered "fatally
defective" by the fact that petitioner "made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to
support its motion." 244 U.S.App.D.C. at 163, 756 F.2d at 184
(emphasis in original). According to the majority, Rule 56(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [ Footnote 3 ] and this Court's decision in Adickes v. S.
H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S. 159 (1970), establish that

															"the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the
burden of responding only after the moving party has met
its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact."

															244 U.S.App.D.C. at 163, 756 Page 477 U. S. 322 F.2d at 184 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The
majority therefore declined to consider petitioner's argument that
none of the evidence produced by respondent in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment would have been admissible at trial. Ibid. The dissenting judge argued that

															"[t]he majority errs in supposing that a party seeking summary
judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even
in cases where there is not a triable, factual dispute." Id. at 167, 756 F.2d at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting).
According to the dissenting judge, the majority's decision
"undermines the traditional authority of trial judges to grant
summary judgment in meritless cases." Id. at 166, 756 F.2d
at 187.

															We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of
Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set
forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[ Footnote 4 ] Under Rule 56(c),
summary judgment is proper

															"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

															In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, Page 477 U. S. 323 there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which
she has the burden of proof. "[T]h[e] standard [for granting
summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). . . ." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., ante at 477 U. S.
250 .

															Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But
unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the
opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the
affidavits, if any " (emphasis added), suggests the absence
of such a requirement. And if there were any doubt about the
meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such doubt is clearly removed
by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment " with
or without supporting affidavits " (emphasis added). The import
of these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving
party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the
motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before
the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of
the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported Page 477 U. S. 324 claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a
way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Respondent argues, however, that Rule 56(e), by its terms,
places on the nonmoving party the burden of coming forward with
rebuttal affidavits, or other specified kinds of materials, only in
response to a motion for summary judgment "made and supported as
provided in this rule." According to respondent's argument, since
petitioner did not "support" its motion with affidavits, summary
judgment was improper in this case. But as we have already
explained, a motion for summary judgment may be made pursuant to
Rule 56 "with or without supporting affidavits." In cases like the
instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion
may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file."
Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be
"made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e)
therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings
and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

															We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in
a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment. Obviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party
to depose her own witnesses. Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary
judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary
materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings
themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect
the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have
referred. Page 477 U. S. 325 The Court of Appeals in this case felt itself constrained,
however, by language in our decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress
& Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970). There we held that summary judgment had been improperly
entered in favor of the defendant restaurant in an action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the course of its opinion, the Adickes Court said that

															"both the commentary on and the background of the 1963 amendment
conclusively show that it was not intended to modify the burden of
the moving party . . . to show initially the absence of a genuine
issue concerning any material fact." Id. at 398 U. S. 159 .
We think that this statement is accurate in a literal sense, since
we fully agree with the Adickes Court that the 1963
amendment to Rule 56(e) was not designed to modify the burden of
making the showing generally required by Rule 56(c). It also
appears to us that, on the basis of the showing before the Court in Adickes, the motion for summary judgment in that case
should have been denied. But we do not think the Adickes language quoted above should be construed to mean that the burden
is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden
of proof. Instead, as we have explained, the burden on the moving
party may be discharged by "showing" -- that is, pointing out to
the district court -- that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case.

															The last two sentences of Rule 56(e) were added, as this Court
indicated in Adickes, to disapprove a line of cases
allowing a party opposing summary judgment to resist a properly
made motion by reference only to its pleadings. While the Adickes Court was undoubtedly correct in concluding that
these two sentences were not intended to reduce the burden of the
moving party, it is also obvious that they were not adopted to add to that burden. Yet that is exactly the result which
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals would produce; in effect, an
amendment to Rule 56(e) designed to Page 477 U. S. 326 facilitate the granting of motions for summary judgment
would be interpreted to make it more difficult to grant
such motions. Nothing in the two sentences themselves requires this
result, for the reasons we have previously indicated, and we now
put to rest any inference that they do so.

															Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that district courts are
widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that
she had to come forward with all of her evidence. See 244
U.S.App.D.C. at 167-168, 756 F.2d at 189 (Bork, J., dissenting);
10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2720, pp. 28-29 (1983). It would surely defy common
sense to hold that the District Court could have entered summary
judgment sua sponte in favor of petitioner in the instant
case, but that petitioner's filing of a motion requesting such a
disposition precluded the District Court from ordering it.

															Respondent commenced this action in September, 1980, and
petitioner's motion was filed in September, 1981. The parties had
conducted discovery, and no serious claim can be made that
respondent was in any sense "railroaded" by a premature motion for
summary judgment. Any potential problem with such premature motions
can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f), [ Footnote 6 ] which allows a summary judgment motion
to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be continued, if the
nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full
discovery.

															In this Court, respondent's brief and oral argument have been
devoted as much to the proposition that an adequate showing of
exposure to petitioner's asbestos products was Page 477 U. S. 327 made as to the proposition that no such showing should have been
required. But the Court of Appeals declined to address either the
adequacy of the showing made by respondent in opposition to
petitioner's motion for summary judgment or the question whether
such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof at trial. We think
the Court of Appeals, with its superior knowledge of local law, is
better suited than we are to make these determinations in the first
instance.

															The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years
authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the
lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. l; see Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467
(1984). Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the
Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a
defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient
claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to
trial, with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources. But with the advent of "notice pleading," the
motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its
place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in
fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial,
that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. Page 477 U. S. 328 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Since our grant of certiorari in this case, the Fifth Circuit
has rendered a decision squarely rejecting the position adopted
here by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (1986).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, argues that the District Court
granted summary judgment only because respondent presented no
evidence that the decedent was exposed to Celotex asbestos products in the District of Columbia. See post at 477 U. S.
338 -339. According to JUSTICE STEVENS, we should affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court,
on the "narrower ground" that respondent "made an adequate showing"
that the decedent was exposed to Celotex asbestos products in
Chicago during 1970-1971. See ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS' position is factually incorrect. The District
Court expressly stated that respondent had made no showing of
exposure to Celotex asbestos products "in the District of Columbia or elsewhere. " App. 217 (emphasis added). Unlike JUSTICE
STEVENS, we assume that the District Court meant what it said. The
majority of the Court of Appeals addressed the very issue raised by
JUSTICE STEVENS, and decided that

															"[t]he District Court's grant of summary judgment must therefore
have been based on its conclusion that there was 'no showing that
the plaintiff was exposed to defendant Celotex's product in the
District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory
period.'" Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S.App.D.C.
160, 162, n. 3, 756 F.2d 181, 183, n. 3 (1985) (emphasis in
original). In other words, no judge involved in this case to date
shares JUSTICE STEVENS' view of the District Court's decision.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Rule 56(e) provides:

															"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Rule 56(c) provides:

															"The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages."

															[ Footnote 5 ] See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745, 752 (1974); Currie, Thoughts
on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 72, 79
(1977).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Rule 56(f) provides:

															"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just."

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the
moving defendant must always support his motion with evidence or
affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute about a
material fact. I also agree that the movant may rely on
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to
demonstrate that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case,
and hence that there can be no factual dispute. But the movant must
discharge the burden the Rules place upon him: it is not enough to
move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way
or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence
to prove his case.

															A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his
witnesses or evidence unless required to do so under the discovery
Rules or by court order. Of course, he must respond if required to
do so; but he need not also depose his witnesses or obtain their
affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion asserting only that
he has failed to produce any support for his case. It is the
defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the
suit.

															Petitioner Celotex does not dispute that, if respondent has
named a witness to support her claim, summary judgment should not
be granted without Celotex somehow showing that the named witness'
possible testimony raises no genuine issue of material fact. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 43, 45. It asserts, however, that respondent has failed
on request to produce any basis for her case. Respondent, on the
other hand, does not contend that she was not obligated to reveal
her witnesses and evidence, but insists that she has revealed
enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Because the Court
of Appeals found it unnecessary to address this aspect Page 477 U. S. 329 of the case, I agree that the case should be remanded for
further proceedings.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

															This case requires the Court to determine whether Celotex
satisfied its initial burden of production in moving for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked evidence to
establish an essential element of her case at trial. I do not
disagree with the Court's legal analysis. The Court clearly rejects
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the defendant must provide
affirmative evidence disproving the plaintiff's case. Beyond this,
however, the Court has not clearly explained what is required of a
moving party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the
nonmoving party cannot prove its case. [ Footnote 2/1 ] This lack of clarity is unfortunate:
district courts must routinely decide summary judgment motions, and
the Court's opinion will very likely create confusion. For this
reason, even if I agreed with the Court's result, I would have
written separately to explain more clearly the law in this area.
However, because I believe that Celotex did not meet its burden of
production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, I respectfully
dissent from the Court's judgment. Page 477 U. S. 330 I Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c). The burden of establishing the
nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for
summary judgment. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2727, p. 121 (2d ed.1983) (hereinafter
Wright) (citing cases); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker,
Moore's Federal Practice � 56.15[3] (2d ed.1985) (hereinafter
Moore) (citing cases). See also ante at 477 U. S. 323 ; ante at 477 U. S. 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). This burden has two distinct components:
an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving
party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of
persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See 10A Wright § 2727. The court need not decide whether the moving
party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion [ Footnote 2/2 ] unless and until the court
finds that the moving party has discharged its initial Page 477 U. S. 331 burden of production. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S.
157 -161 (1970); 1963 Advisory Committee's Notes on
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(e), 28 U.S.C.App. p. 626.

															The burden of production imposed by Rule 56 requires the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to
summary judgment. 10A Wright § 2727. The manner in which this
showing can be made depends upon which party will bear the burden
of persuasion on the challenged claim at trial. If the moving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must
support its motion with credible evidence -- using any of the
materials specified in Rule 56(c) -- that would entitle it to a
directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Ibid. Such
an affirmative showing shifts the burden of production to the party
opposing the motion, and requires that party either to produce
evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a "genuine
issue" for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting additional
time for discovery. Ibid.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 56(e),
(f).

															If the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving
party, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's
burden of production in either of two ways. First, the moving party
may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element
of the nonmoving party's claim. Second, the moving party may
demonstrate to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. See 10A Wright § 2727, pp. 130-131; Louis,
Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale
L.J. 745, 750 (1974) (hereinafter Louis). If the nonmoving party
cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial
would be useless, and the moving party is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
ante at 477 U. S.
249 .

															Where the moving party adopts this second option and seeks
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party -- who will
bear the burden of persuasion at trial -- has Page 477 U. S. 332 no evidence, the mechanics of discharging Rule 56's burden of
production are somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory assertion
that the nonmoving party has no evidence is insufficient. See
ante at 477 U. S. 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). Such a "burden" of production is no burden
at all, and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be
converted into a tool for harassment. See Louis 750-751.
Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence
must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. Ante at 477 U. S. 323 .
This may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's
witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence.
If there is literally no evidence in the record, the moving party
may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court the admissions,
interrogatories, and other exchanges between the parties that are
in the record. Either way, however, the moving party must
affirmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record
to support a judgment for the nonmoving party.

															If the moving party has not fully discharged this initial burden
of production, its motion for summary judgment must be denied, and
the court need not consider whether the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuasion. Accordingly, the nonmoving party may
defeat a motion for summary judgment that asserts that the
nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the court's attention to
supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or
ignored by the moving party. In that event, the moving party must
respond by making an attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of this
evidence, for it is only by attacking all the record evidence
allegedly supporting the nonmoving party that a party seeking
summary judgment satisfies Rule 56's burden of production.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Thus, if the record
disclosed that the moving Page 477 U. S. 333 party had overlooked a witness who would provide relevant
testimony for the nonmoving party at trial, the court could not
find that the moving party had discharged its initial burden of
production unless the moving party sought to demonstrate the
inadequacy of this witness' testimony. Absent such a demonstration,
summary judgment would have to be denied on the ground that the
moving party had failed to meet its burden of production under Rule
56.

															The result in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, is fully consistent with these principles. In that case, petitioner
was refused service in respondent's lunchroom, and then was
arrested for vagrancy by a local policeman as she left. Petitioner
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the refusal
of service and subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy
between respondent and the police; as proof of this conspiracy,
petitioner's complaint alleged that the arresting officer was in
respondent's store at the time service was refused. Respondent
subsequently moved for summary judgment on the ground that there
was no actual evidence in the record from which a jury could draw
an inference of conspiracy. In response, petitioner pointed to a
statement from her own deposition and an unsworn statement by a
Kress employee, both already in the record and both ignored by
respondent, that the policeman who arrested petitioner was in the
store at the time she was refused service. We agreed that

															"[i]f a policeman were present, . . . it would be open to a
jury, in light of the sequence that fol Page 477 U. S. 334 lowed, to infer from the circumstances that the policeman and
Kress employee had a 'meeting of the minds,' and thus reached an
understanding that petitioner should be refused service."

															398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 158 .
Consequently, we held that it was error to grant summary judgment
"on the basis of this record," because respondent had "failed to
fulfill its initial burden" of demonstrating that there was no
evidence that there was a policeman in the store. Id. at 398 U. S.
157 -158.

															The opinion in Adickes has sometimes been read to hold
that summary judgment was inappropriate because the respondent had
not submitted affirmative evidence to negate the possibility that
there was a policeman in the store. See Brief for
Respondent 20, n. 30 (citing cases). The Court of Appeals
apparently read Adickes this way, and therefore required
Celotex to submit evidence establishing that plaintiff's decedent
had not been exposed to Celotex asbestos. I agree with the Court
that this reading of Adickes was erroneous, and that
Celotex could seek summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff
could not prove exposure to Celotex asbestos at trial. However,
Celotex was still required to satisfy its initial burden of
production. II I do not read the Court's opinion to say anything inconsistent
with or different than the preceding discussion. My disagreement
with the Court concerns the application of these principles to the
facts of this case.

															Defendant Celotex sought summary judgment on the ground that
plaintiff had "failed to produce" any evidence that her decedent
had ever been exposed to Celotex asbestos. [ Footnote 2/4 ] App. 170. Celotex supported this motion
with a Page 477 U. S. 335 two-page "Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No
Genuine Issue" and a three-page "Memorandum of Points and
Authorities" which asserted that the plaintiff had failed to
identify any evidence in responding to two sets of interrogatories
propounded by Celotex, and that therefore the record was "totally
devoid" of evidence to support plaintiff's claim. See id. at 171-176.

															Approximately three months earlier, Celotex had filed an
essentially identical motion. Plaintiff responded to this earlier
motion by producing three pieces of evidence which she claimed
"[a]t the very least . . . demonstrate that there is a genuine
factual dispute for trial," id. at 143: (1) a letter from
an insurance representative of another defendant describing
asbestos products to which plaintiff's decedent had been exposed, id. at 160; (2) a letter from T. R. Hoff, a former
supervisor of decedent, describing asbestos products to which
decedent had been exposed, id. at 162; and (3) a copy of
decedent's deposition from earlier workmen's compensation
proceedings, id. at 164. Plaintiff also apparently
indicated Page 477 U. S. 336 at that time that she intended to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at
trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7, 27-29.

															Celotex subsequently withdrew its first motion for summary
judgment. See App. 167. [ Footnote 2/5 ] However, as a result of this motion, when
Celotex filed its second summary judgment motion, the record did
contain evidence -- including at least one witness -- supporting
plaintiff's claim. Indeed, counsel for Celotex admitted to this
Court at oral argument that Celotex was aware of this evidence and
of plaintiff's intention to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at trial
when the second summary judgment motion was filed. Tr. of Oral Arg.
5-7. Moreover, plaintiff's response to Celotex' second motion
pointed to this evidence -- noting that it had already been
provided to counsel for Celotex in connection with the first motion
-- and argued that Celotex had failed to "meet its burden of
proving that there is no genuine factual dispute for trial." App.
188.

															On these facts, there is simply no question that Celotex failed
to discharge its initial burden of production. Having chosen to
base its motion on the argument that there was no evidence in the
record to support plaintiff's claim, Celotex was not free to ignore
supporting evidence that the record clearly contained. Rather,
Celotex was required, as an initial matter, to attack the adequacy
of this evidence. Celotex' failure to fulfill this simple
requirement constituted a failure to discharge its initial burden
of production under Rule 56, and thereby rendered summary judgment
improper. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Page 477 U. S. 337 This case is indistinguishable from Adickes. Here, as
there, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the record contained no evidence to support an essential element of
the plaintiff's claim. Here, as there, the plaintiff responded by
drawing the court's attention to evidence that was already in the
record and that had been ignored by the moving party. Consequently,
here, as there, summary judgment should be denied on the ground
that the moving party failed to satisfy its initial burden of
production. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															It is also unclear what the Court of Appeals is supposed to do
in this case on remand. JUSTICE WHITE -- who has provided the
Court's fifth vote -- plainly believes that the Court of Appeals
should reevaluate whether the defendant met its initial burden of
production. However, the decision to reverse, rather than to vacate
the judgment below, implies that the Court of Appeals should assume
that Celotex has met its initial burden of production and ask only
whether the plaintiff responded adequately, and, if so, whether the
defendant has met its ultimate burden of persuasion that no genuine
issue exists for trial. Absent some clearer expression from the
Court to the contrary, JUSTICE WHITE's understanding would seem to
be controlling. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.
S. 188 , 430 U. S. 193 (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The burden of persuasion imposed on a moving party by Rule 56 is
a stringent one. 6 Moore � 56.15[3], p. 56-466; 10A Wright § 2727,
p. 124. Summary judgment should not be granted unless it is clear
that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
ante at 477 U. S. 255 ,
and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial
should be resolved against the moving party, Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S.
158 -159 (1970). In determining whether a moving party
has met its burden of persuasion, the court is obliged to take
account of the entire setting of the case, and must consider all
papers of record as well as any materials prepared for the motion.
10A Wright § 2721, p. 44; see, e.g., Stepanischen v. Merchants
Despatch Transportation Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930 (CA1 1983); Higgenbotham v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653,
656 (CA5 1979). As explained by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986),

															"[i]f . . . there is any evidence in the record from any source
from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party's] favor
may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary
judgment. . . ."

															723 F.2d at 258.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Once the moving party has attacked whatever record evidence --
if any -- the nonmoving party purports to rely upon, the burden of
production shifts to the nonmoving party, who must either (1)
rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party's papers,
(2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine
issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an
affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided
in Rule 56(f). See 10A Wright § 2727, pp. 138-143. Summary
judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond
in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party
responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine
issue of material fact for trial. See, e.g., First National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.
S. 253 , 391 U. S. 289 (1968).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that the District Court granted summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
exposure in the District of Columbia. He contends that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals reversing the District Court's judgment
should be affirmed on the "narrow ground" that it was "palpably
erroneous" to grant summary judgment on this basis. Post at 477 U. S. 339 (dissenting). The Court replies that what the District Court said
was that plaintiff had failed to show exposure in the District of
Columbia "or elsewhere." Ante at 477 U. S. 320 ,
n. 2. In my view, it does not really matter which reading is
correct in this case. For, contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' claim,
deciding this case on the ground that Celotex failed to meet its
burden of production under Rule 56 does not involve an "abstract
exercise in Rule construction." Post at 477 U. S. 339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). To the contrary, the principles
governing a movant's burden of proof are straightforward and well
established, and deciding the case on this basis does not require a
new construction of Rule 56 at all; it simply entails applying
established law to the particular facts of this case. The choice to
reverse because of "palpable erro[r]" with respect to the burden of
a moving party under Rule 56 is thus no more "abstract" than the
choice to reverse because of such error with respect to the
elements of a tort claim. Indeed, given that the issue of the
moving party's burden under Rule 56 was the basis of the Court of
Appeals' decision, the question upon which certiorari was granted,
and the issue briefed by the parties and argued to the Court, it
would seem to be the preferable ground for deciding the case.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Celotex apparently withdrew this motion because, contrary to the
assertion made in the first summary judgment motion, its second set
of interrogatories had not been served on the plaintiff.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															If the plaintiff had answered Celotex' second set of
interrogatories with the evidence in her response to the first
summary judgment motion, and Celotex had ignored those
interrogatories and based its second summary judgment motion on the
first set of interrogatories only, Celotex obviously could not
claim to have discharged its Rule 56 burden of production. This
result should not be different simply because the evidence
plaintiff relied upon to support her claim was acquired by Celotex
other than in plaintiff's answers to interrogatories.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Although JUSTICE WHITE agrees that,

															"if [plaintiff] has named a witness to support her claim,
summary judgment should not be granted without Celotex somehow
showing that the named witness' possible testimony raises no
genuine issue of material fact,"

															he would remand "[b]ecause the Court of Appeals found it
unnecessary to address this aspect of the case." Ante at 477 U. S.
328 -329 (concurring). However, Celotex has admitted that
plaintiff had disclosed her intent to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at
trial before Celotex filed its second motion for summary judgment.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. Under the circumstances, then, remanding is a
waste of time.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															As the Court points out, ante at 477 U. S.
319 -320, petitioner's motion for summary judgment was
based on the proposition that respondent could not prevail unless
she proved that her deceased husband had been exposed to
petitioner's products "within the jurisdictional limits" of the
District of Columbia. [ Footnote
3/1 ] Page 477 U. S. 338 Respondent made an adequate showing -- albeit possibly not in
admissible form [ Footnote 3/2 ] --
that her husband had been exposed to petitioner's product in
Illinois. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Although
the basis of the motion and the argument had been the lack of
exposure in the District of Columbia, the District Court
stated at the end of the argument:

															"The Court will grant the defendant Celotex's motion for summary
judgment, there being no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to
the defendant Celotex's product in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere within the statutory period. App. 217 (emphasis
added). The District Court offered no additional explanation and no
written opinion. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that
Celotex had not met its burden; the court noted the incongruity of
the District Court's opinion in the context of the motion and
argument, but did not rest on that basis because of the 'or
elsewhere' language. [ Footnote
3/4 ]"

															Taken in the context of the motion for summary judgment on the
basis of no exposure in the District of Columbia, the Page 477 U. S. 339 District Court's decision to grant summary judgment was palpably
erroneous. The court's bench reference to "or elsewhere" neither
validated that decision nor raised the complex question addressed
by this Court today. In light of the District Court's plain error,
therefore, it is perfectly clear that, even after this Court's
abstract exercise in Rule construction, we should nonetheless
affirm the reversal of summary judgment on that narrow ground.
[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See Motion of Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary
Judgment, App. 170 ("Defendant Celotex Corporation, pursuant to
Rule 56 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moves this
Court for an Order granting Summary Judgment on the ground that
plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that any product designed,
manufactured or distributed by Celotex Corporation was the
proximate cause of the injuries alleged within the
jurisdictional limits of this Court ") (emphasis added);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of
Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary Judgment, id. at
175 (Plaintiff "must demonstrate some link between a Celotex
Corporation product claimed to be the cause of the decedent's
illness and the decedent himself. The record is totally devoid of
any such evidence within the jurisdictional confines of this
Court ") (emphasis added); Transcript of Argument in Support of
Motion of Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary Judgment, id. at 211 ("Our position is . . . there has been no
product identification of any Celotex products . . . that have been
used in the District of Columbia to which the decedent was
exposed") (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] But cf. ante at 477 U. S. 324 ("We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in
a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment").

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See App. 160 (letter from Aetna Life Insurance Co.)
(referring to the "asbestos that Mr. Catrett came into contact with
while working for Anning-Johnson Company" and noting that the
"manufacturer of this product" was purchased by Celotex); id. at 162 (lettter from Anning-Johnson Co.) (confirming
that Catrett worked for the company and supervised the installation
of asbestos produced by the company that Celotex ultimately
purchased); id. at 164, 164c (deposition of Catrett)
(description of his work with asbestos "in Chicago").

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d
181, 185, n. 14 (1985) ("[T]he discussion at the time the motion
was granted actually spoke to venue. It was only the phrase or
elsewhere,' appearing with no prior discussion, in the judge's oral
ruling at the close of argument that made the grant of summary
judgment even conceivably proper"). [ Footnote 3/5 ] Cf. 477
U.S. 317 fn3/2|>n. 2, supra. The Court's statement
that the case should be remanded because the Court of Appeals has a
"superior knowledge of local law," ante at 477 U. S. 327 ,
is bewildering because there is no question of local law to be
decided. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.
S. 341 , 426 U. S.
345 -347 (1976).

															The Court's decision to remand when a sufficient ground for
affirmance is available does reveal, however, the Court's
increasing tendency to adopt a presumption of reversal. See,
e.g., New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.
S. 868 , 475 U. S. 884 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v.
Worthinston, 475 U. S. 709 , 475 U. S. 715 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U. S. 796 , 475 U. S. 800 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v.
Goldhammer, 474 U. S. 28 , 474 U. S. 81 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). As a matter of efficient judicial
administration and of respect for the state and federal courts, I
believe the presumption should be precisely the opposite.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett:

The case revolves around a wrongful death action filed by the respondent, alleging that her husband's death was caused by exposure to asbestos products manufactured or distributed by the defendants, including Celotex Corporation. The respondent failed to provide evidence of her husband's exposure to Celotex's products during discovery. Despite the respondent's later production of documents suggesting such exposure, the court granted Celotex's motion for summary judgment due to a lack of evidence.

The Supreme Court's key holding is that the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the summary judgment was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). According to Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute over material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court clarified that the moving party is not required to support its motion with evidence negating the opponent's claim but instead carries the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

In this case, Celotex met its burden by pointing out the respondent's lack of evidence to support her allegation of product exposure, an essential element of her case. The Court concluded that the respondent's failure to establish this critical element rendered all other facts immaterial, warranting summary judgment in favor of Celotex.