U.S. Supreme Court McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U.S. 203 (1948) Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Education of School District No. 71, Champaign County,
Illinois No. 90 Argued December 8,
1947 Decided March 8, 1948 333
U.S. 203 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS Syllabus With the permission of a board of education, granted under its
general supervisory powers over the use of public school buildings,
religious teachers, employed subject to the approval and
supervision of the superintendent of schools by a private religious
group including representatives of the Catholic, Protestant and
Jewish faiths, gave religious instruction in public school
buildings once each week. Pupils whose parents so requested were
excused from their secular classes during the periods of religious
instruction and were required to attend the religious classes; but
other pupils were not released from their public school duties,
which were compulsory under state law. A resident and taxpayer of
the school district whose child was enrolled in the public schools
sued in a state court for a writ of mandamus requiring the board of
education to terminate this practice. Held: 1. A judgment of the State Supreme Court sustaining denial of
the writ of mandamus on the ground that the state statutes granted
the board of education authority to establish such a program drew
into question "the validity of a statute" of the State within the
meaning of § 237 of the Judicial Code, and was appealable to this
Court. P. 333 U. S.
206 .

															2. As a resident and taxpayer of the school district and the
parent of a child required by state law to attend the school,
appellant had standing to maintain the suit. P. 333 U. S.
206 .

															3. Both state courts having ruled expressly on appellant's claim
that the state program violated the Federal Constitution, a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that appellant failed properly
to present that question in the State Supreme Court cannot be
sustained. P. 333 U. S.
207 .

															4. This utilization of the State's tax supported public school
system and its machinery for compulsory public school attendance to
enable sectarian groups to give religious instruction to public
school pupils in public school buildings violates the First
Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 333 U. S.
209 -212.

															396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161, reversed. Page 333 U. S. 204 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a denial of a petition
for a writ of mandamus requiring a board of education to terminate
the giving of religious instruction by private teachers in the
public schools. 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161. On appeal to this
Court, reversed and remanded, p. 333 U. S.
212 .

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case relates to the power of a state to utilize its tax
supported public school system in aid of religious Page 333 U. S. 205 instruction insofar as that power may be restricted by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

															The appellant, Vashti McCollum, began this action for mandamus
against the Champaign Board of Education in the Circuit Court of
Champaign County, Illinois. Her asserted interest was that of a
resident and taxpayer of Champaign and of a parent whose child was
then enrolled in the Champaign public schools. Illinois has a
compulsory education law which, with exceptions, requires parents
to send their children, aged seven to sixteen, to its tax-supported
public schools, where the children are to remain in attendance
during the hours when the schools are regularly in session. Parents
who violate this law commit a misdemeanor punishable by fine unless
the children attend private or parochial schools which meet
educational standards fixed by the State. District boards of
education are given general supervisory powers over the use of the
public school buildings within the school districts. Ill.Rev.Stat.
ch. 122, §§ 123, 301 (1943).

															Appellant's petition for mandamus alleged that religious
teachers, employed by private religious groups, were permitted to
come weekly into the school buildings during the regular hours set
apart for secular teaching, and then and there, for a period of
thirty minutes, substitute their religious teaching for the secular
education provided under the compulsory education law. The
petitioner charged that this joint public school religious group
program violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The prayer of her petition was that the Board
of Education be ordered to

															"adopt and enforce rules and regulations prohibiting all
instruction in and teaching of religious education in all public
schools in Champaign School District Number 71, . . . and in all
public school houses and buildings in said district when occupied
by public schools. " Page 333 U. S. 206 The board first moved to dismiss the petition on the ground
that, under Illinois law, appellant had no standing to maintain the
action. This motion was denied. An answer was then filed, which
admitted that regular weekly religious instruction was given during
school hours to those pupils whose parents consented, and that
those pupils were released temporarily from their regular secular
classes for the limited purpose of attending the religious classes.
The answer denied that this coordinated program of religious
instruction violated the State or Federal Constitution. Much
evidence was heard, findings of fact were made, after which the
petition for mandamus was denied on the ground that the school's
religious instruction program violated neither the federal nor
state constitutional provisions invoked by the appellant. On
appeal, the State Supreme Court affirmed. 396 Ill. 14 71 N.E.2d
161. Appellant appealed to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), and
we noted probable jurisdiction on June 2, 1947.

															The appellees press a motion to dismiss the appeal on several
grounds, the first of which is that the judgment of the State
Supreme Court does not draw in question the "validity of a statute
of any State" as required by 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). This contention
rests on the admitted fact that the challenged program of religious
instruction was not expressly authorized by statute. But the State
Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the program on the
ground that the Illinois statutes granted the board authority to
establish such a program. This holding is sufficient to show that
the validity of an Illinois statute was drawn in question within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 344(a). Hamilton v. Regents of U. of
Cal., 293 U. S. 245 , 293 U. S. 258 .
A second ground for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant
lacks standing to maintain the action, a ground which is also
without merit. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.
S. 433 , 307 U. S. 443 , 307 U. S. 445 , 307 U. S.
464 . Page 333 U. S. 207 A third ground for the motion is that the appellant failed
properly to present in the State Supreme Court her challenge that
the state program violated the Federal Constitution. But in view of
the express rulings of both state courts on this question, the
argument cannot be successfully maintained. The motion to dismiss
the appeal is denied.

															Although there are disputes between the parties as to various
inferences that may or may not properly be drawn from the evidence
concerning the religious program, the following facts are shown by
the record without dispute. [ Footnote 1 ] In 1940, interested members of the Jewish,
Roman Catholic, and a few of the Protestant faiths formed a
voluntary association called the Champaign Council on Religious
Education. They obtained permission from the Board of Education to
offer classes in religious instruction to public school pupils in
grades four to nine, inclusive. Classes were made up of pupils
whose parents signed printed cards requesting that their children
be permitted to attend; [ Footnote
2 ] they were held weekly, thirty minutes for Page 333 U. S. 208 the lower grades, forty-five minutes for the higher. The council
employed the religious teachers at no expense to the school
authorities, but the instructors were subject to the approval and
supervision of the superintendent of schools. [ Footnote 3 ] The classes were taught in three Page 333 U. S. 209 separate religious groups by Protestant teachers, [ Footnote 4 ] Catholic priests, and a Jewish
rabbi, although, for the past several years, there have apparently
been no classes instructed in the Jewish religion. Classes were
conducted in the regular classrooms of the school building.
Students who did not choose to take the religious instruction were
not released from public school duties; they were required to leave
their classrooms and go to some other place in the school building
for pursuit of their secular studies. On the other hand, students
who were released from secular study for the religious instructions
were required to be present at the religious classes. Reports of
their presence or absence were to be made to their secular
teachers. [ Footnote 5 ]

															The foregoing facts, without reference to others that appear in
the record, show the use of tax supported property for religious
instruction and the close cooperation between the school
authorities and the religious council in promoting religious
education. The operation of the State's compulsory education system
thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious
instruction carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils
compelled by law to go to school for secular education are
released Page 333 U. S. 210 in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they
attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a
utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school
system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 . There
we said:

															"Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. [ Footnote 6 ] Neither can force or influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will, or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. [ Footnote 7 ] Neither a state nor Page 333 U. S. 211 the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
separation between church and State.'" Id. at 330 U. S. 15 -16.
The majority in the Everson case, and the minority as
shown by quotations from the dissenting views in our notes 6 and | 6 and S. 203fn7|>7, agreed that the First Amendment's
language, properly interpreted, had erected a wall of separation
between Church and State. They disagreed as to the facts shown by
the record and as to the proper application of the First
Amendment's language to those facts.

															Recognizing that the Illinois program is barred by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments if we adhere to the views expressed both by
the majority and the minority in the Everson case, counsel
for the respondents challenge those views as dicta, and urge that
we reconsider and repudiate them. They argue that, historically,
the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government
preference of one religion over another, not an impartial
governmental assistance of all religions. In addition, they ask
that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the "establishment of
religion" clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition
against the States. After giving full consideration to the
arguments presented, we are unable to accept either of these
contentions.

															To hold that a state cannot, consistently with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, utilize its public school system to aid any
or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their
doctrines and ideals does not, as counsel urge, manifest a
governmental hostility to religion or religious teachings. A
manifestation of such hostility would be at war with our national
tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of the
free Page 333 U. S. 212 exercise of religion. For the First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its
respective sphere. Or, as we said in the Everson case, the
First Amendment has erected a wall between Church and State which
must be kept high and impregnable.

															Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school
buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The
State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it
helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of
the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not
separation of Church and State.

															The cause is reversed and remanded to the State Supreme Court
for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Appellant, taking issue with the facts found by the Illinois
courts, argues that the religious education program in question is
invalid under the Federal Constitution for any one of the following
reasons: (1) In actual practice certain Protestant groups have
obtained an overshadowing advantage in the propagation of their
faiths over other Protestant sects; (2) the religious education
program was voluntary in name only, because, in fact, subtle
pressures were brought to bear on the students to force them to
participate in it, and (3) the power given the school
superintendent to reject teachers selected by religious groups and
the power given the local Council on Religious Education to
determine which religious faiths should participate in the program
was a prior censorship of religion.

															In view of our decision, we find it unnecessary to consider
these arguments or the disputed facts upon which they depend.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Supreme Court described the request card system as
follows:

															". . . Admission to the classes was to be allowed only upon the
express written request of parents, and then only to classes
designated by the parents. . . . Cards were distributed to the
parents of elementary students by the public school teachers
requesting them to indicate whether they desired their children to
receive religious education. After being filled out, the cards were
returned to the teachers of religious education classes either by
the public school teachers or the children. . . ."

															On this subject, the trial court found that

															". . . those students who have obtained the written consent of
their parents therefor are released by the school authorities from
their secular work, and in the grade schools for a period of thirty
minutes' instruction in each week during said school hours, and
forty-five minutes during each week in the junior high school,
receive training in religious education. . . . Certain cards are
used for obtaining permission of parents for their children to take
said religious instruction courses, and they are made available
through the offices of the superintendent of schools and through
the hands of principals and teachers to the pupils of the school
district. Said cards are prepared at the cost of the council of
religious education. The handling and distribution of said cards
does not interfere with the duties or suspend the regular secular
work of the employees of the defendant. . . ."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The State Supreme Court said:

															"The record further discloses that the teachers conducting the
religious classes were not teachers in the public schools, but were
subject to the approval and supervision of the superintendent. . .
."

															The trial court found:

															"Before any faith or other group may obtain permission from the
defendant for the similar, free and equal use of rooms in the
public school buildings, said faith or group must make application
to the superintendent of schools of said School District Number 71,
who in turn will determine whether or not it is practical for said
group to teach in said school system."

															The president of the local school board testified:

															". . . The Protestants would have one group and the Catholics,
and would be given a room where they would have the class and we
would go along with the plan of the religious people. They were all
to be treated alike, with the understanding that the teachers they
would bring into the school were approved by the superintendent. .
. . The superintendent was the last word so far as the individual
was concerned. . . ."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															There were two teachers of the Protestant faith. One was a
Presbyterian, and had been a foreign missionary for that church.
The second testified as follows:

															"I am affiliated with the Christian church. I also work in the
Methodist Church, and I taught at the Presbyterian. I am married to
a Lutheran."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The director of the Champaign Council on Religious Education
testified:

															". . . If any pupil is absent, we turn in a slip just like any
teacher would to the superintendent's office. The slip is a piece
of paper with a number of hours in the school day and a square, and
the teacher of the particular room for the particular hour records
the absentees. It has their names and the grade and the section to
which they belong. It is the same sheet that the geography and
history teachers and all the other teachers use, and is furnished
by the school. . . ."

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The dissent, agreed to by four judges, said:

															"The problem then cannot be cast in terms of legal
discrimination or its absence. This would be true even though the
state, in giving aid, should treat all religious instruction alike.
. . . Again, it was the furnishing of 'contributions of money for
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves' that the fathers
outlawed. That consequence and effect are not removed by
multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for which support is
exacted. The Constitution requires, not comprehensive
identification of state with religion, but complete
separation." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 59 , 330 U. S. 60 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The dissenting judges said:

															"In view of this history, no further proof is needed that the
Amendment forbids any appropriation, large or small, from public
funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises. . . .
Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain,
appropriations only when it can be found that, in fact, they do not
aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious teaching or
observances, be the amount large or small." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 41 , 330 U. S.
52 -53.

															MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the following opinion, in
which MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE and MR. JUSTICE
BURTON join. * We dissented in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 ,
because, in our view, the Constitutional principle requiring
separation of Church and State compelled invalidation of the
ordinance sustained by the majority. Illinois has here authorized
the commingling of sectarian with secular instruction in the public
schools. The Constitution of the United States forbids this.

															This case, in the light of the Everson decision,
demonstrates anew that the mere formulation of a relevant
Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a
problem, not its answer. This is so because the meaning Page 333 U. S. 213 of a spacious conception like that of the separation of Church
from State is unfolded as appeal is made to the principle from case
to case. We are all agreed that the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct
of Government than merely to forbid an "established church." But
agreement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed
to erect a "wall of separation between church and State" does not
preclude a clash of views as to what the wall separates. Involved
is not only the Constitutional principle, but the implications of
judicial review in its enforcement. Accommodation of legislative
freedom and Constitutional limitations upon that freedom cannot be
achieved by a mere phrase. We cannot illuminatingly apply the "wall
of separation" metaphor until we have considered the relevant
history of religious education in America, the place of the
"released time" movement in that history, and its precise
manifestation in the case before us.

															To understand the particular program now before us as a
conscientious attempt to accommodate the allowable functions of
Government and the special concerns of the Church within the
framework of our Constitution and with due regard to the kind of
society for which it was designed, we must put this Champaign
program of 1940 in its historic setting. Traditionally, organized
education in the Western world was Church education. It could
hardly be otherwise when the education of children was primarily
study of the Word and the ways of God. Even in the Protestant
countries, where there was a less close identification of Church
and State, the basis of education was largely the Bible, and its
chief purpose inculcation of piety. To the extent that the State
intervened, it used its authority to further aims of the
Church.

															The emigrants who came to these shores brought this view of
education with them. Colonial schools certainly Page 333 U. S. 214 started with a religious orientation. When the common problems
of the early settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony revealed the
need for common schools, the object was the defeat of "one chief
project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge
of the Scriptures." The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 1648
edition (Cambridge 1929) 47. [ Footnote
2/1 ]

															The evolution of colonial education, largely in the service of
religion, into the public school system of today is the story of
changing conceptions regarding the American democratic society, of
the functions of State-maintained education in such a society, and
of the role therein of the free exercise of religion by the people.
The modern public school derived from a philosophy of freedom
reflected in the First Amendment. It is appropriate to recall that
the Remonstrance of James Madison, an event basic in the history of
religious liberty, was called forth by a proposal which involved
support to religious education. See MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE's
opinion in the Everson case, supra, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 337 .
As the momentum for popular education increased and, in turn,
evoked strong claims for State support of religious education,
contests not unlike that which in Virginia had produced Madison's
Remonstrance appeared in various forms in other States. New York
and Massachusetts provide famous chapters in the history that
established dissociation of religious teaching from
State-maintained schools. In New York, the rise of the common
schools led, despite fierce sectarian Opposition, to the barring of
tax funds to church schools, and later to any school in which
sectarian doctrine was Page 333 U. S. 215 taught. [ Footnote 2/2 ] In
Massachusetts, largely through the efforts of Horace Mann, all
sectarian teachings were barred from the common school to save it
from being rent by denominational conflict. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The upshot of these controversies, often
long and fierce, is fairly summarized by saying that long before
the Fourteenth Amendment subjected the States to new limitations,
the prohibition of furtherance by the State of religious
instruction became the guiding principle, in law and feeling, of
the American people. In sustaining Stephen Girard's will, this
Court referred to the inevitable conflicts engendered by matters
"connected with religious polity," and particularly "in a country
composed of such a variety of religious sects as our country." Vidal v. Girard's
Executors , 2 How. 127, 43 U. S. 198 .
That was more than one hundred years ago.

															Separation in the field of education, then, was not imposed upon
unwilling States by force of superior law. In this respect, the
Fourteenth Amendment merely reflected a principle then dominant in
our national life. To the extent that the Constitution thus made it
binding upon the States, the basis of the restriction is the whole
experience of our people. Zealous watchfulness against fusion of
secular and religious activities by Government itself, through any
of its instruments but especially through its educational agencies,
was the democratic response of the American community to the
particular needs of a young and growing nation, unique in the
composition of its Page 333 U. S. 216 people. [ Footnote 2/4 ] A totally
different situation elsewhere, as illustrated, for instance, by the
English provisions for religious education in State-maintained
schools, only serves to illustrate that free societies are not cast
in one mould. See the Education Act of 1944, 7 and 8 Geo.
VI, c. 31. Different institutions evolve from different historic
circumstances.

															It is pertinent to remind that the establishment of this
principle of Separation in the field of education was not due to
any decline in the religious beliefs of the people. Horace Mann was
a devout Christian, and the deep religious feeling of James Madison
is stamped upon the Remonstrance. The secular public school did not
imply indifference to the basic role of religion in the life of the
people, nor rejection of religious education as a means of
fostering it. The claims of religion were not minimized by refusing
to make the public schools agencies for their assertion. The
nonsectarian or secular public school was the means of reconciling
freedom in general with religious freedom. The sharp confinement of
the public schools to secular education was a recognition of the
need of a democratic society to educate its children, insofar as
the State undertook to do so, in an atmosphere free from pressures
in a realm in which pressures are most resisted and where conflicts
are most easily and most bitterly engendered. Designed to serve as
perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people, the public school must keep
scrupulously Page 333 U. S. 217 free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation
of the community from divisive conflicts, of Government from
irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of religion from
censorship and coercion, however subtly exercised, requires strict
confinement of the State to instruction other than religious,
leaving to the individual's church and home indoctrination in the
faith of his choice.

															This development of the public school as a symbol of our secular
unity was not a sudden achievement, nor attained without violent
conflict. [ Footnote 2/5 ] While, in
small communities of comparatively homogeneous religious beliefs,
the need for absolute separation presented no urgencies, elsewhere
the growth of the secular school encountered the resistance of
feeling strongly engaged against it. But the inevitability of such
attempts is the very reason for Constitutional provisions primarily
concerned with the protection of minority groups. And such sects
are shifting groups, varying from time to time and place to place,
thus representing in their totality the common interest of the
nation.

															Enough has been said to indicate that we are dealing not with a
full-blown principle, nor one having the definiteness of a
surveyor's metes and bounds. But, by 1875, the separation of public
education from Church entanglements, of the State from the teaching
of religion, was firmly established in the consciousness of the
nation. In Page 333 U. S. 218 that year, President Grant made his famous remarks to the
Convention of the Army of the Tennessee:

															"Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar
appropriated for their support shall be appropriated to the support
of any sectarian schools. Resolve that neither the State nor
nation, nor both combined, shall support institutions of learning
other than those sufficient to afford every child growing up in the
land the opportunity of a good common school education, unmixed
with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas. Leave the matter of
religion to the family altar, the church and the private school,
supported entirely by private contributions. Keep the church and
the state forever separate."

															"The President's Speech at Des Moines," 22 Catholic World 433,
434-35 (1876).

															So strong was this conviction, that, rather than rest on the
comprehensive prohibitions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
President Grant urged that there be written into the United States
Constitution particular elaborations, including a specific
prohibition against the use of public funds for sectarian
education, [ Footnote 2/6 ] such as
had Page 333 U. S. 219 been written into many State constitutions. [ Footnote 2/7 ] By 1894, in urging the adoption of
such a provision in the New York Constitution, Elihu Root was able
to summarize a century of the nation's history:

															"It is not a question of religion, or of creed, or of party; it
is a question of declaring and maintaining the great American
principle of eternal separation between Church and State."

															Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship, 137, 140.
[ Footnote 2/8 ] The extent to
which Page 333 U. S. 220 this principle was deemed a presupposition of our Constitutional
system is strikingly illustrated by the fact that every State
admitted into the Union since 1876 was compelled by Congress to
write into its constitution a requirement that it maintain a school
system "free from sectarian control." [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Prohibition of the commingling of sectarian and secular
instruction in the public school is, of course, only half the
story. A religious people was naturally concerned about the part of
the child's education entrusted "to the family altar, the church,
and the private school." The promotion of religious education took
many forms. Laboring under financial difficulties and exercising
only persuasive authority, various denominations felt handicapped
in their task of religious education. Abortive Page 333 U. S. 221 attempts were therefore frequently made to obtain public funds
for religious schools. [ Footnote
2/10 ] But the major efforts of religious inculcation were a
recognition of the principle of Separation by the establishment of
church schools privately supported. Parochial schools were
maintained by various denominations. These, however, were often
beset by serious handicaps, financial and otherwise, so that the
religious aims which they represented found other directions. There
were experiments with vacation schools, with Saturday, as well as
Sunday, schools. [ Footnote 2/11 ]
They all fell short of their purpose. It was urged that, by
appearing to make religion a "one day a week" matter, the Page 333 U. S. 222 Sunday school, which acquired national acceptance, tended to
relegate the child's religious education, and thereby his religion,
to a minor role not unlike the enforced piano lesson.

															Out of these inadequate efforts evolved the week-day church
school, held on one or more afternoons a week after the close of
the public school. But children continued to be children; they
wanted to play when school was out, particularly when other
children were free to do so. Church leaders decided that, if the
week-day church school was to succeed, a way had to be found to
give the child his religious education during what the child
conceived to be his "business hours."

															The initiation of the movement [ Footnote 2/12 ] may fairly be attributed to Dr. George
U. Wenner. The underlying assumption of his proposal, made at the
Interfaith Conference on Federation held in New York City in 1905,
was that the public school unduly monopolized the child's time, and
that the churches were entitled to their share of it. [ Footnote 2/13 ] This, the schools should
"release." Accordingly, the Federation, citing the example of the
Third Republic of France, [ Footnote
2/14 ] urged that, upon the request of their parents, Page 333 U. S. 223 children be excused from public school on Wednesday afternoon,
so that the churches could provide "Sunday school on Wednesday."
This was to be carried out on church premises under church
authority. Those not desiring to attend church schools would
continue their normal classes. Lest these public school classes
unfairly compete with the church education, it was requested that
the school authorities refrain from scheduling courses or
activities of compelling interest or importance.

															The proposal aroused considerable opposition, and it took
another decade for a "released time" scheme to become part of a
public school system. Gary, Indiana, inaugurated the movement. At a
time when industrial Page 333 U. S. 224 expansion strained the communal facilities of the city,
Superintendent of Schools Wirt suggested a fuller use of the school
buildings. Building on theories which had become more or less
current, he also urged that education was more than instruction in
a classroom. The school was only one of several educational
agencies. The library, the playground, the home, the church, all
have their function in the child's proper unfolding. Accordingly,
Wirt's plan sought to rotate the schedules of the children during
the school day so that some were in class, others were in the
library, still others in the playground. And some, he suggested to
the leading ministers of the City, might be released to attend
religious classes if the churches of the City cooperated and
provided them. They did, in 1914, and thus was "released time"
begun. The religious teaching was held on church premises, and the
public schools had no hand in the conduct of these church schools.
They did not supervise the choice of instructors or the subject
matter taught. Nor did they assume responsibility for the
attendance, conduct or achievement of the child in a church school,
and he received no credit for it. The period of attendance in the
religious schools would otherwise have been a play period for the
child, with the result that the arrangement did not cut into public
school instruction or truly affect the activities or feelings of
the children who did not attend the church schools. [ Footnote 2/15 ]

															From such a beginning, "released time" has attained substantial
proportions. In 1914-15, under the Gary program, 619 pupils left
the public schools for the church schools during one period a week.
According to responsible figures, almost 2,000,000 in some 2,200
communities Page 333 U. S. 225 participated in "released time" programs during 1947. [ Footnote 2/16 ] A movement of such scope
indicates the importance of the problem to which the "released
time" programs are directed. But to the extent that aspects of
these programs are open to Constitutional objection, the more
extensively the movement operates, the more ominous the breaches in
the wall of separation.

															Of course, "released time" as a generalized conception,
undefined by differentiating particularities, is not an issue for
Constitutional adjudication. Local programs differ from each other
in many and crucial respects. Some "released time" classes are
under separate denominational auspices, others are conducted
jointly by several denominations, often embracing all the religious
affiliations of a community. Some classes in religion teach a
limited sectarianism; others emphasize democracy, unity and
spiritual values not anchored in a particular creed. Insofar as
these are manifestations merely of the free exercise of religion,
they are quite outside the scope of judicial concern, except
insofar as the Court may be called upon to protect the right of
religious freedom. It is only when challenge is made to the share
that the public schools have in the execution of a particular
"released time" program that close judicial scrutiny is demanded of
the exact relation between the religious instruction and the public
educational system in the specific situation before the Court.
[ Footnote 2/17 ] Page 333 U. S. 226 The substantial differences among arrangements lumped together
as "released time" emphasize the importance of detailed analysis of
the facts to which the Constitutional test of Separation is to be
applied. How does "released time" operate in Champaign? Public
school teachers distribute to their pupils cards supplied by church
groups, so that the parents may indicate whether they desire
religious instruction for their children. For those desiring it,
religious classes are conducted in the regular classrooms of the
public schools by teachers of religion paid by the churches and
appointed by them, but, as the State court found, "subject to the
approval and supervision of the superintendent." The courses do not
profess to give secular instruction in subjects concerning
religion. Their candid purpose is sectarian teaching. While a child
can go to any of the religious classes offered, a particular sect
wishing a teacher for its devotees requires the permission of the
school superintendent, "who, in turn, will determine whether or not
it is practical for said group to teach in said school Page 333 U. S. 227 system." If no provision is made for religious instruction in
the particular faith of a child, or if for other reasons the child
is not enrolled in any of the offered classes, he is required to
attend a regular school class, or a study period during which he is
often left to his own devices. Reports of attendance in the
religious classes are submitted by the religious instructor to the
school authorities, and the child who fails to attend is presumably
deemed a truant.

															Religious education so conducted on school time and property is
patently woven into the working scheme of the school. The Champaign
arrangement thus presents powerful elements of inherent pressure by
the school system in the interest of religious sects. The fact that
this power has not been used to discriminate is beside the point.
Separation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of
Government and of religious sects, not merely to treat them all
equally. That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the
constraint; it does not eliminate the operation of influence by the
school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school's
domain. The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an
outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious
pressure upon children to attend. [ Footnote 2/18 ] Again, while the Champaign school
population represents only a fraction of the more than two hundred
and fifty sects of the nation, not even all the practicing sects in
Champaign are willing or able to provide religious instruction. The
children belonging to these nonparticipating sects will thus have
inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school should
be the training ground for habits of community, or they will have
religious instruction in a faith which is not that of Page 333 U. S. 228 their parents. As a result, the public school system of
Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets of
some faiths, and, in the process, sharpens the consciousness of
religious differences, at least among some of the children
committed to its care. These are consequences not amenable to
statistics. But they are precisely the consequences against which
the Constitution was directed when it prohibited the Government
common to all from becoming embroiled, however innocently, in the
destructive religious conflicts of which the history of even this
country records some dark pages. [ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Mention should not be omitted that the integration of religious
instruction within the school system as practiced in Champaign is
supported by arguments drawn from educational theories as diverse
as those derived from Catholic conceptions and from the writings of
John Dewey. [ Footnote 2/20 ]
Movements like "released time" are seldom Page 333 U. S. 229 single in origin or aim. Nor can the intrusion of religious
instruction into the public school system of Champaign be minimized
by saying that it absorbs less than an hour a week; in fact, that
affords evidence of Page 333 U. S. 230 a design constitutionally objectionable. If it were merely a
question of enabling a child to obtain religious instruction with a
receptive mind, the thirty or forty-five minutes could readily be
found on Saturday or Sunday. If that were all, Champaign might have
drawn upon the French system, known in its American manifestation
as "dismissed time," whereby one school day is shortened to allow
all children to go where they please, leaving those who so desire
to go to a religious school. [ Footnote 2/21 ] The momentum of the whole school
atmosphere and school planning is presumably put behind religious
instruction, as given in Champaign, precisely in order to secure
for the religious Page 333 U. S. 231 instruction such momentum and planning. To speak of "released
time" as being only half or three quarters of an hour is to draw a
thread from a fabric.

															We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not
before us which, though colloquially characterized as "released
time," present situations differing in aspects that may well be
constitutionally crucial. Different forms which "released time" has
taken during more than thirty years of growth include programs
which, like that before us, could not withstand the test of the
Constitution; others may be found unexceptionable. We do not now
attempt to weigh in the Constitutional scale every separate detail
or various combination of factors which may establish a valid
"released time" program. We find that the basic Constitutional
principle of absolute Separation was violated when the State of
Illinois, speaking through its Supreme Court, sustained the school
authorities of Champaign in sponsoring and effectively furthering
religious beliefs by its educational arrangement.

															Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks
of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily overstepped.
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what
the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. "The great American
principle of eternal separation" -- Elihu Root's phrase bears
repetition -- is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional
system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our
diversities. It is the Court's duty to enforce this principle in
its full integrity. Page 333 U. S. 232 We renew our conviction that

															"we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith
that complete separation between the state and religion is best for
the state and best for religion." Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 59 . If
nowhere else, in the relation between Church and State, "good
fences make good neighbors."

															* MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE and MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurred also in
the Court's opinion.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															For an exposition of the religious origins of American
education, see S.W. Brown, The Secularization of American
Education (1912) cc. I, II; Knight, Education in the United States
(2d rev. ed. 1941) cc. III, V; Cubberley, Public Education in the
United States (1934) cc. II, III.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See Boese, Public Education in the City of New York
(1869) c. XIV; Hall, Religious Education in the Public Schools of
the State and City of New York (1914) cc. VI, VII; Palmer, The New
York Public School (1905) cc. VI, VII, X, XII. And see New
York Laws 1842, c. 150, § 14, amended, New York Laws 1844, c. 320,
§ 12.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															S. M. Smith, The Relation of the State to Religious Education in
Massachusetts (1926) c. VII; Culver, Horace Mann and Religion in
the Massachusetts Public Schools (1929).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															It has been suggested that secular education in this country is
the inevitable "product of the utter impossibility of
harmonizing multiform creeds.'" T.W.M. Marshall, Secular
Education in England and the United States, 1 American
Catholic Quarterly Review 28, 308. It is precisely because of this
"utter impossibility" that the fathers put into the Constitution
the principle of complete "hands off" for a people as religiously
heterogeneous as ours. [ Footnote 2/5 ] See Cubberley, Public Education in the United States
(1934) pp. 230 et seq.; Zollmann, The Relation of
Church and State, in Lotz and Crawford, Studies in Religious
Education (1931) 403, 418 et seq.; Payson Smith, The
Public Schools and Religious Education, in Religion and
Education (Sperr, Editor, 1945) pp. 32 et seq.; also
Mahoney, The Relation of the State to Religious Education in Early
New York 1633-1825 (1941) c. VI; McLaughlin, A History of State
Legislation Affecting Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in
the United States, 180-1945 (1946) c. I, and see 333
U.S. 203 fn2/10|>note 10, infra. [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															President Grant's Annual Message to Congress, December 7, 1875,
4 Cong.Rec. 1, 5 et seq.; Ames, The Proposed Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States during the First Century of
its History, H.R.Doc. No. 353, Pt. 2, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., pp
277-278. In addition to the first proposal, "The Blaine Amendment,"
five others to similar effect are cited by Ames. The reason for the
failure of these attempts seems to have been in part that the
"provisions of the State constitutions are in almost all instances
adequate on this subject, and no amendment is likely to be
secured." Id. In the form in which it passed the House of Representatives, the
Blaine Amendment read as follows:

															"No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any
office or public trust under any State. No public property, and no
public revenue of, nor any loan of credit by or under the authority
of, the United States, or any State, Territory, District, or
municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to, or made or used
for, the support of any school, educational or other institution,
under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creed or
tenets of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or
denomination shall be taught. And no such particular creed or
tenets shall be read or taught in any school or institution
supported in whole or in part by such revenue or loan of credit,
and no such appropriation or loan of credit shall be made to any
religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or
to promote its interests or tenets. This article shall not be
construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or
institution, and it shall not have the effect to impair rights of
property already vested. . . ."

															H.Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (1876).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See Constitutions of the States and United States, III
Report of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee
(1938) Index, pp. 1766-67.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															It is worthy of interest that another famous American lawyer,
and indeed one of the most distinguished of American judges,
Jeremiah S. Black, expressed similar views nearly forty years
before Mr. Root:

															"The manifest object of the men who framed the institutions of
this country was to have a State without religion, and a Church without politics -- that is to say, they meant that
one should never be used as an engine for any purpose of the other.
. . . Our fathers seem to have been perfectly sincere in their
belief that the members of the Church would be more patriotic, and
the citizens of the State more religious, by keeping their
respective functions entirely separate. For that reason, they built
up a wall of complete and perfect partition between the two."

															From Religious Liberty (1856) in Black, Essays and Speeches
(1886) 51, 53; cf. Brigance, Jeremiah Sullivan Black
(1934). While Jeremiah S. Black and Elihu Root had many things in
common, there were also important differences between them, perhaps
best illustrated by the fact that one became Secretary of State to
President Buchanan, the other to Theodore Roosevelt. That two men,
with such different political alignment, should have shared identic
views on a matter so basic to the wellbeing of our American
democracy affords striking proof of the respect to be accorded to
that principle.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															25 Stat. 676, 677, applicable to North Dakota, South Dakota,
Montana and Washington, required that the constitutional
conventions of those States

															"provide, by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of said States . . . for the
establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools, which
shall be open to all the children of said States, and free from
sectarian control. . . ."

															The same provision was contained in the Enabling Act for Utah,
28 Stat. 107, 108; Oklahoma, 34 Stat. 267, 270; New Mexico and
Arizona, 36 Stat. 557, 559, 570. Idaho and Wyoming were admitted
after adoption of their constitutions; that of Wyoming contained an
irrevocable ordinance in the same terms. Wyoming Constitution,
1889, Ordinances, § 5. The Constitution of Idaho, while it
contained no irrevocable ordinance, had a provision even more
explicit in its establishment of separation. Idaho Constitution,
1889, art. IX, § 5.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See, e.g., the New York experience, including, inter alia, the famous Hughes controversy of 1840-42, the
conflict culminating in the Constitutional Convention of 1894, and
the attempts to restore aid to parochial schools by revision of the
New York City Charter, in 1901, and at the State Constitutional
Convention of 1938. See McLaughlin, A History of State
Legislation Affecting Private Elementary and Secondary Schools in
the United States, 1870-1945 (1946) pp. 119-25; Mahoney; The
Relation of the State to Religious Education in Early New York
1633-1825 (1941) c. VI; Hall, Religious Education in the Public
Schools of the State and the City of New York (1914) pp. 46-47;
Boese, Public Education in the City of New York (1&69) c. XIV; compare New York Laws 1901, vol. 3, § 1152, p. 492, with amendment, id. p. 668; see Nicholas
Murray Butler, Religion and Education (Editorial) in 22 Educational
Review 101, June, 1901; New York Times, April 8, 1901, p. 1, col.
1; April 9, 1901, p. 2, col. 5; April 19, 1901, p. 2, col. 2; April
21, 1901, p. 1, col. 3; Editorial, April 22, 1901, p. 6, col.
1. Compare S. 2499, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., providing for
Federal aid to education, and the controversy engendered over the
inclusion in the aid program of sectarian schools, fully discussed
in, e.g., "The Nation's Schools," January through June,
1947.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															For surveys of the development of private religious education, see, e.g., A. A. Brown, A History of Religious Education
in Recent Times (1923); Athearn, Religious Education and American
Democracy (1917); Burns and Kohlbrenner, A History of Catholic
Education in the United States (1937); Lotz and Crawford, Studies
in Religious Education (1931) Parts I and IV.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															Reference should be made to Jacob Gould Schurman, who, in 1903,
proposed a plan bearing close resemblance to that of Champaign. See Symposium, 75 The Outlook 635, 636, November 14, 1903;
Crooker, Religious Freedom in American Education (1903) pp. 39 et seq. [ Footnote 2/13 ]

															For the text of the resolution, a brief in its support, as well
as an exposition of some of the opposition it inspired, see Wenner's book, Religious Education and the Public
School (rev. ed.1913).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															The French example is cited not only by Wenner, but also by
Nicholas Murray Butler, who thought released time was "restoring
the American system in the state of New York." The Place of
Religious Instruction in Our Educational System, 7 Vital
Speeches 167, 168 (Nov. 28, 1940); see also Report of the
President of Columbia University, 1934, pp.22-24. It is important
to note, however, that the French practice must be viewed as the
result of the struggle to emancipate the French schools from
control by the Church. The leaders of this revolution, men like
Paul Bert, Ferdinand Buisson, and Jules Ferry, agreed to this
measure as one part of a great step towards, rather than a retreat
from, the principle of Separation. The history of these events is
described in Muzzey, State, Church, and School in France, The School Review, March through June, 1911.

															In effect, moreover, the French practice differs in crucial
respects from both the Wenner proposal and the Champaign system.
The law of 1882 provided that

															"Public elementary schools will be closed one day a week in
addition to Sunday in order to permit parents, if they so desire,
to have their children given religious instruction outside of
school buildings."

															Law No. 11,696, March 28, 1882, Bulletin des Lois, No. 690. This
then approximates that aspect of released time generally known as
"dismissed time." No children went to school on that day, and the
public school was therefore not an alternative used to impel the
children towards the religious school. The religious education was
given "outside of school buildings."

															The Vichy Government attempted to introduce a program of
religious instruction within the public school system remarkably
similar to that in effect in Champaign. The proposal was defeated
by intense opposition, which included the protest of the French
clergy, who apparently feared State control of the Church. See Schwartz, Religious Instruction under Petain, 58
Christian Century 1170, Sept. 24, 1941.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Of the many expositions of the Gary plan, see, e.g., A.
A. Brown, The Week-Day Church Schools of Gary, Indiana, 11
Religious Education 5 (1916); Wirt, The Gary Public Schools and
the Churches, id. at 221 (1916).

															[ Footnote 2/16 ] See the 1947 Yearbook, International Council of
Religious Education, p. 76; also New York Times, September 21,
1947, p. 22, col. 1.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															Respects in which programs differ include, for example, the
amount of supervision by the public school of attendance and
performance in the religious class, of the course of study, of the
selection of teachers; methods of enrolment and dismissal from the
secular classes; the amount of school time devoted to operation of
the program; the extent to which school property and administrative
machinery are involved; the effect on the public school program of
the introduction of "released time"; the proportion of students who
seek to be excused; the effect of the program on nonparticipants;
the amount and nature of the publicity for the program in the
public schools.

															The studies of detail in "released time" programs are
voluminous. Most of these may be found in the issues of such
periodicals as The International Journal of Religious Education,
Religious Education, and Christian Century. For some of the more
comprehensive studies found elsewhere, see Davis, Weekday
Classes in Religious Education, U.S. Office of Education Bulletin
1941, No. 3; Gorham, A Study of the Status of Weekday Church
Schools in the United States (1934); Lotz, The Weekday Church
School, in Lotz and Crawford, Studies in Religious Education (1931)
c. XII; Forsyth, Week-Day Church Schools (1930); Settle, The
Weekday Church School, Educational Bulletin No. 601 of The
International Council of Religious Education (1930); Shaver,
Present-Day Trends in Religious Education (1928) cc. VII, VIII;
Gove, Religious Education on Public School Time (1926).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															It deserves notice that, in discussing with the relator her
son's inability to get along with his classmates, one of his
teachers suggested that "allowing him to take the religious
education course might help him to become a member of the
group."

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															The divergent views expressed in the briefs submitted here on
behalf of various religious organizations, as amici
curiae, in themselves suggest that the movement has been a
divisive and not an irenic influence in the community: The American
Unitarian Association; The General Conference of Seventh Day
Adventists; The Joint Conference Committee on Public Relations set
up by the Southern Baptist Convention, The Northern Baptist
Convention, The National Baptist Convention Inc., and the National
Baptist Convention; The Protestant Council of the City of New York,
and The Synagogue Council of America and National Community
Relations Advisory Council.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ]

															There is a prolific literature on the educational, social and
religious merits of the "released time" movement. In support of
"released time," the following may be mentioned: The International
Council of Religious Education, and particularly the writings of
Dr. Erwin L. Shaver, for some years Director of its Department of
Weekday Religious Education, in publications of the Council and in
numerous issues of The International Journal of Religious Education
( e.g., They Reach One-Third, Dec., 1943, p. 11; Weekday Religious Education Today, Jan., 1944, p. 6), and
Religious Education ( e.g., Survey of Week-Day Religious
Education, Feb., 1922, p. 51; The Movement for Weekday
Religious Education, Jan.-Feb., 1946, p. 6); see also Information Service, Federal Council of Churches of Christ, May 29,
1943. See also Cutton, Answering the Arguments, The International Journal of Religious Education, June, 1930, p. 9,
and Released Time, id. Sept., 1942, p. 12; Hauser,
" Hands off the Public School? ", Religious Education,
Mar.-Apr., 1942, p. 99; Collins, Release Time for Religious
Instruction, National Catholic Education Association Bulletin,
May, 1945, pp. 21, 27-28; Weigle, Public Education and
Religion, Religious Education, Apr.-June, 1940, p. 67;
Nicholas Murray Butler, The Place of Religious Instruction in
Our Educational System, 7 Vital Speeches 167 (Nov. 28, 1940);
Howlett, Released Time for Religious Education in New York
City, 64 Education 523, May, 1944; Blair, A Case for the
Weekday Church School, 7 Frontiers of Democracy 75, Dec. 15,
1940; cf. Allred, Legal Aspects of Release Time (National
Catholic Welfare Conference, 1947). Favorable views are also cited
in the studies in note 17, supra. Many not opposed to
"released time" have declared it "hardly enough" or "pitifully
inadequate." E.g., Fleming, God in Our Public Schools (2d
ed.1944) pp. 80-86; Howlett, Released Time for Religious
Education in New York City, Religious Education, Mar.-Apr.,
1942, p. 104; Cavert, Points of Tension Between Church and
State in America Today, in Church and State in the Modern
World (1937) 161, 168; F. E. Johnson, The Church and Society (1935)
125; Hubner, Professional Attitudes toward Religion in the Public
Schools of the United States Since 1900 (1944) 108-109, 113; cf. Ryan, A Protestant Experiment in Religious
Education, The Catholic World, June, 1922; Elliott, Are
Weekday Church Schools the Solution?, The International
Journal of Religious Education, Nov., 1940, p. 8; Elliott, Report of the Discussion, Religious Education, July Sept.,
1940, p. 158.

															For opposing views, see V. T. Thayer, Religion in
Public Education (1947) cc. VII, VIII; Moehlman, The Church as
Educator (1947) c. X; Chave, A Functional Approach to Religious
Education (1947) 104-107; A. W. Johnson, The Legal Status of
Church-State Relationships in the United States (1934) 129-130;
Newman, The Sectarian Invasion of Our Public Schools (1925). See also Payson Smith, The Public Schools and
Religious Education, in Religion and Education (Sperry,
Editor, 1945) 32, 42-47; Herrick, Religion in the Public Schools of
America, 46 Elementary School Journal 119, Nov., 1945; Kallen,
Churchmen's Claims on the Public School, The Nation's Schools, May,
1942, p. 49; June, 1942, p. 52. And cf. John Dewey, Religion in Our Schools (1908), reprinted in 2 Characters
and Events (1929) 504, 508, 514. "Released time" was introduced in
the public schools of the City of New York over the opposition of
organizations like the Public Education Association and the United
Parents Associations.

															The arguments and sources pro and con are collected in Hubner,
Professional Attitudes toward Religion in the Public Schools in the
United States since 1900 (1944) 94 et seq. And see the
symposia, Teaching Religion in a Democracy, The
International Journal of Religious Education, Nov., 1940, pp.6-16; The Aims of Week-Day Religious Education, Religious
Education, Feb., 1922, p. 11; Released Time in New York City,
id. Jan.-Feb., 1943, p. 15; Progress in Weekday Religious
Education, id. Jan.-Feb., 1946, p. 6; Can Our Public
Schools Do More about Religion?, 125 Journal of Education 245,
Nov., 1942, id. at 273, Dec., 1942; Religious
Instruction on School Time, 7 Frontiers of Democracy 72-77,
Dec. 15, 1940, and the articles in 64 Education 519 et
seq., May, 1944.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ] See 333
U.S. 203 fn2/14|>note 14, supra. Indications are
that "dismissed time" is used in an inconsiderable number of the
communities employing released time. Davis, Weekday Classes in
Religious Education, U.S. Office of Education Bulletin 1941, No. 3,
p. 22; Shaver, The Movement for Weekday Religious
Education, Religious Education, Jan.-Feb., 1946, pp.6, 9.

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring.

															I join the opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, and concur in the
result reached by the Court, but with these reservations: I think
it is doubtful whether the facts of this case establish
jurisdiction in this Court, but, in any event, that we should place
some bounds on the demands for interference with local schools that
we are empowered or willing to entertain. I make these reservations
a matter of record in view of the number of litigations likely to
be started as a result of this decision.

															A Federal Court may interfere with local school authorities only
when they invade either a personal liberty or a property right
protected by the Federal Constitution. Ordinarily this will come
about in either of two ways: First. When a person is required to submit to some
religious rite or instruction or is deprived or threatened with
deprivation of his freedom for resisting such unconstitutional
requirement. We may then set him free or enjoin his prosecution.
Typical of such cases was West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 .
There, penalties were threatened against both parent and child for
refusal of the latter to perform a compulsory ritual which offended
his convictions. We intervened to shield them against the penalty.
But here, complainant's son may join religious classes if he
chooses and if his parents so request, or he may stay out of them.
The complaint is that, when others join and he does not, it sets
him apart as a dissenter, which is humiliating. Page 333 U. S. 233 Even admitting this to be true, it may be doubted whether the
Constitution, which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can
be construed also to protect one from the embarrassment that always
attends nonconformity, whether in religion, politics, behavior or
dress. Since no legal compulsion is applied to complainant's son
himself, and no penalty is imposed or threatened from which we may
relieve him, we can hardly base jurisdiction on this ground. Second. Where a complainant is deprived of property by
being taxed for unconstitutional purposes, such as directly or
indirectly to support a religious establishment. We can protect a
taxpayer against such a levy. This was the Everson Case, 330 U. S. 1 , as I
saw it then and see it now. It was complained in that case that the
school treasurer drew a check on public funds to reimburse parents
for a child's bus fare if he went to a Catholic parochial school or
a public school, but not if he went to any other private or
denominational school. Reference to the record in that case will
show that the School District was not operating busses, so it was
not a question of allowing Catholic children to ride publicly owned
busses along with others in the interests of their safety, health
or morals. The child had to travel to and from parochial school on
commercial busses like other paying passengers and all other school
children, and he was exposed to the same dangers. If it could, in
fairness, have been said that the expenditure was a measure for the
protection of the safety, health or morals of youngsters, it would
not merely have been constitutional to grant it; it would have been
unconstitutional to refuse it to any child merely because he was a
Catholic. But, in the Everson Case, there was a direct,
substantial and measurable burden on the complainant as a taxpayer
to raise funds that were used to subsidize transportation to
parochial schools. Hence, we Page 333 U. S. 234 had jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of the levy
and to protect against it if a majority had agreed that the subsidy
for transportation was unconstitutional.

															In this case, however, any cost of this plan to the taxpayers is
incalculable and negligible. It can be argued, perhaps, that
religious classes add some wear and tear on public buildings, and
that they should be charged with some expense for heat and light,
even though the sessions devoted to religious instruction do not
add to the length of the school day. But the cost is neither
substantial nor measurable, and no one seriously can say that the
complainant's tax bill has been proved to be increased because of
this plan. I think it is doubtful whether the taxpayer in this case
has shown any substantial property injury.

															If, however, jurisdiction is found to exist, it is important
that we circumscribe our decision with some care. What is asked is
not a defensive use of judicial power to set aside a tax levy or
reverse a conviction, or to enjoin threats of prosecution or
taxation. The relief demanded in this case is the extraordinary
writ of mandamus to tell the local Board of Education what it must
do. The prayer for relief is that a writ issue against the Board of
Education

															"ordering it to immediately adopt and enforce rules and
regulations prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of
religious education in all public schools . . . and in all public
school houses and buildings in said district when occupied by
public schools."

															The plaintiff, as she has every right to be, is an avowed
atheist. What she has asked of the courts is that they not only end
the "released time" plan, but also ban every form of teaching which
suggests or recognizes that there is a God. She would ban all
teaching of the Scriptures. She especially mentions as an example
of invasion of her rights "having pupils learn and recite such
statements as, The Lord is my Shepherd, I shall not want.'" And
she objects to teaching that the King James version of the Bible
"is Page 333 U. S.
235 called the Christian's Guide Book, the Holy Writ and the
Word of God," and many other similar matters. This Court is
directing the Illinois courts generally to sustain plaintiff's
complaint without exception of any of these grounds of complaint,
without discriminating between them and without laying down any
standards to define the limits of the effect of our
decision. To me, the sweep and detail of these complaints is a danger
signal which warns of the kind of local controversy we will be
required to arbitrate if we do not place appropriate limitation on
our decision and exact strict compliance with jurisdictional
requirements. Authorities list 256 separate and substantial
religious bodies to exist in the continental United States. Each of
them, through the suit of some discontented but unpenalized and
untaxed representative, has as good a right as this plaintiff to
demand that the courts compel the schools to sift out of their
teaching everything inconsistent with its doctrines. If we are to
eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these warring
sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave
public education in shreds. Nothing but educational confusion and a
discrediting of the public school system can result from subjecting
it to constant law suits.

															While we may and should end such formal and explicit instruction
as the Champaign plan, and can at all times prohibit teaching of
creed and catechism and ceremonial, and can forbid forthright
proselyting in the schools, I think it remains to be demonstrated
whether it is possible, even if desirable, to comply with such
demands as plaintiff's completely to isolate and cast out of
secular education all that some people may reasonably regard as
religious instruction. Perhaps subjects such as mathematics,
physics or chemistry are, or can be, completely secularized. But it
would not seem practical to teach either practice or appreciation
of the arts if we are to forbid exposure Page 333 U. S. 236 of youth to any religious influences. Music without sacred
music, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without the
scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even from a
secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal of religion in
these guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon. Even such
a "science" as biology raises the issue between evolution and
creation as an explanation of our presence on this planet.
Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible and
other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious ends would
be pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an
indispensable, part of preparation for a worldly life to know the
roles that religion and religions have played in the tragic story
of mankind. The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly
everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which
gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences,
derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity -- both Catholic and
Protestant -- and other faiths accepted by a large part of the
world's peoples. One can hardly respect a system of education that
would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents of
religious thought that move the world society for a part in which
he is being prepared.

															But how one can teach, with satisfaction or even with justice to
all faiths, such subjects as the story of the Reformation, the
Inquisition, or even the New England effort to found "a Church
without a Bishop and a State without a King," is more than I know.
It is too much to expect that mortals will teach subjects about
which their contemporaries have passionate controversies with the
detachment they may summon to teaching about remote subjects such
as Confucius or Mohammed. When instruction turns to proselyting and
imparting knowledge becomes evangelism is, except in the crudest
cases, a subtle inquiry. Page 333 U. S. 237 The opinions in this case show that public educational
authorities have evolved a considerable variety of practices in
dealing with the religious problem. Neighborhoods differ in racial,
religious and cultural compositions. It must be expected that they
will adopt different customs which will give emphasis to different
values and will induce different experiments. And it must be
expected that, no matter what practice prevails, there will be many
discontented and possibly belligerent minorities. We must leave
some flexibility to meet local conditions, some chance to progress
by trial and error. While I agree that the religious classes
involved here go beyond permissible limits, I also think the
complaint demands more than plaintiff is entitled to have granted.
So far as I can see, this Court does not tell the State court where
it may stop, nor does it set up any standards by which the State
court may determine that question for itself.

															The task of separating the secular from the religious in
education is one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy. To lay down
a sweeping constitutional doctrine as demanded by complainant and
apparently approved by the Court, applicable alike to all school
boards of the nation,

															"to immediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations
prohibiting all instruction in and teaching of religious education
in all public schools,"

															is to decree a uniform, rigid and, if we are consistent, an
unchanging standard for countless school boards representing and
serving highly localized groups which not only differ from each
other, but which themselves, from time to time, change attitudes.
It seems to me that to do so is to allow zeal for our own ideas of
what is good in public instruction to induce us to accept the role
of a super board of education for every school district in the
nation.

															It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can
find in the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide
where the secular ends and the sectarian Page 333 U. S. 238 begins in education. Nor can we find guidance in any other legal
source. It is a matter on which we can find no law but our own
prepossessions. If, with no surer legal guidance, we are to take up
and decide every variation of this controversy, raised by persons
not subject to penalty or tax but who are dissatisfied with the way
schools are dealing with the problem, we are likely to have much
business of the sort. And, more importantly, we are likely to make
the legal "wall of separation between church and state" as winding
as the famous serpentine wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the
University he founded.

															MR. JUSTICE REED, dissenting.

															The decisions reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Illinois interpret the prohibition of the First Amendment against
the establishment of religion, made effective as to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment, to forbid pupils of the public schools
electing, with the approval of their parents, courses in religious
education. The courses are given, under the school laws of Illinois
as approved by the Supreme Court of that state, by lay or clerical
teachers supplied and directed by an interdenominational, local
council of religious education. [ Footnote 3/1 ] The classes are held in the respective
school buildings of the pupils at study or released time periods so
as to avoid conflict with recitations. The teachers and supplies
are paid for by the interdenominational group. [ Footnote 3/2 ] As I am Page 333 U. S. 239 convinced that this interpretation of the First Amendment is
erroneous, I feel impelled to express the reasons for my
disagreement. By directing attention to the many instances of close
association of church and state in American society, and by
recalling that many of these relations are so much a part of our
tradition and culture that they are accepted without more, this
dissent may help in an appraisal of the meaning of the clause of
the First Amendment concerning the establishment of religion and of
the reasons which lead to the approval or disapproval of the
judgment below.

															The reasons for the reversal of the Illinois judgment, as they
appear in the respective opinions, may be summarized by the
following excerpts. The opinion of the Court, after stating the
facts, says:

															"The foregoing facts, without reference to others that appear in
the record, show the use of tax-supported property for religious
instruction and the close cooperation between the school
authorities and the religious council in promoting religious
education. . . . And it falls squarely under the ban of the First
Amendment (made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth) as we
interpreted it in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 ."

															Another opinion phrases it thus:

															"We do not now attempt to weigh in the Constitutional scale
every separate detail or various combination of factors which may
establish a valid 'released time' program. We find that the basic
Constitutional principle of absolute separation was violated when
the State of Illinois, speaking through its Supreme Court,
sustained the school authorities of Champaign in sponsoring and
effectively furthering religious beliefs by its educational
arrangement."

															These expressions in the decisions seem to Page 333 U. S. 240 leave open for further litigation variations from the Champaign
plan. Actually, however, future cases must run the gauntlet not
only of the judgment entered, but of the accompanying words of the
opinions. I find it difficult to extract from the opinions any
conclusion as to what it is in the Champaign plan that is
unconstitutional. Is it the use of school buildings for religious
instruction; the release of pupils by the schools for religious
instruction during school hours; the so-called assistance by
teachers in handing out the request cards to pupils, in keeping
lists of them for release and records of their attendance; or the
action of the principals in arranging an opportunity for the
classes and the appearance of the Council's instructors? None of
the reversing opinions say whether the purpose of the Champaign
plan for religious instruction during school hours is
unconstitutional, or whether it is some ingredient used in or
omitted from the formula that makes the plan unconstitutional.

															From the tenor of the opinions, I conclude that their teachings
are that any use of a pupil's school time, whether that use is on
or off the school grounds, with the necessary school regulations to
facilitate attendance, falls under the ban. I reach this conclusion
notwithstanding one sentence of indefinite meaning in the second
opinion:

															"We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not
before us which, though colloquially characterized as 'released
time,' present situations differing in aspects that may well be
constitutionally crucial."

															The use of the words "cooperation," "fusion," "complete
hands-off," "integrate" and "integrated" to describe the relations
between the school and the Council in the plan evidences this. So
does the interpretation of the word "aid." The criticized "momentum
of the whole school atmosphere," "feeling of separatism" engendered
in the nonparticipating Page 333 U. S. 241 sects, "obvious pressure . . . to attend," and "divisiveness"
lead to the stated conclusion. From the holding and the language of
the opinions, I can only deduce that religious instruction of
public school children during school hours is prohibited. The
history of American education is against such an interpretation of
the First Amendment.

															The opinions do not say in words that the condemned practice of
religious education is a law respecting an establishment of
religion contrary to the First Amendment. The practice is accepted
as a state law by all. I take it that, when the opinion of the
Court says that

															"The operation of the state's compulsory education system thus
assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction
carried on by separate religious sects,"

															and concludes

															"This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax
established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith,"

															the intention of its author is to rule that this practice is a
law "respecting an establishment of religion." That was the basis
of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 . It seems obvious that the action of the School Board
in permitting religious education in certain grades of the schools
by all faiths did not prohibit the free exercise of religion. Even
assuming that certain children who did not elect to take
instruction are embarrassed to remain outside of the classes, one
can hardly speak of that embarrassment as a prohibition against the
free exercise of religion. As no issue of prohibition upon the free
exercise of religion is before us, we need only examine the School
Board's action to see if it constitutes an establishment of
religion.

															The facts, as stated in the reversing opinions, are adequately
set out if we interpret the abstract words used in the light of the
concrete incidents of the record. It is Page 333 U. S. 242 correct to say that the parents "consented" to the religious
instruction of the children, if we understand "consent" to mean the
signing of a card like the one in the margin. [ Footnote 3/3 ] It is correct to say that
"instructors were subject to the approval and supervision of the
superintendent of schools," if it is understood that there were no
definitive written rules and that the practice was as is shown in
the excerpts from the findings below. [ Footnote 3/4 ] The substance of the Page 333 U. S. 243 religious education course is determined by the members of the
various churches on the council, not by the superintendent.
[ Footnote 3/5 ] The evidence and
findings set out in the two preceding notes convince me that the
"approval and supervision" referred to above are not of the
teachers and the course of studies, but of the orderly presentation
of the courses to those students who may elect the instruction. The
teaching largely covered Biblical incidents. [ Footnote 3/6 ] The religious teachers and their
teachings, in every real sense, Page 333 U. S. 244 were financed and regulated by the Council of Religious
Education, not the School Board.

															The phrase "an establishment of religion" may have been intended
by Congress to be aimed only at a state church. When the First
Amendment was pending in Congress in substantially its present
form,

															"Mr. Madison said he apprehended the meaning of the words to be
that Congress should not establish a religion and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience. [ Footnote 3/7 ]"

															Passing years, however, have brought about acceptance of a
broader meaning, although never until today, I believe, has this
Court widened its interpretation to any such degree as holding that
recognition of the interest of our nation in religion, through the
granting, to qualified representatives of the principal faiths, of
opportunity to present religion as an optional, extracurricular
subject during released school time in public school buildings, was
equivalent to an establishment of religion. A reading of the
general statements of eminent statesmen of former days, referred to
in the opinions in this case and in Everson v. Board of
Education, supra, will show that circumstances such as those
in this case were far from the minds of the authors. The words and
spirit of those statements may be wholeheartedly accepted without
in the least impugning the judgment of the State of Illinois.
[ Footnote 3/8 ] Page 333 U. S. 245 Mr. Jefferson, as one of the founders of the University of
Virginia, a school which, from its establishment in 1819, has been
wholly governed, managed and controlled by the State of Virginia,
[ Footnote 3/9 ] was faced with the
same problem that is before this Court today: the question of the
Constitutional limitation upon religious education in public
schools. In his annual report as Rector, to the President and
Directors of the Literary Fund, dated October 7, 1822, approved by
the Visitors of the University of whom Mr. Madison was one,
[ Footnote 3/10 ] Mr. Jefferson set
forth his views at some length. [ Footnote 3/11 ] These suggestions of Mr. Jefferson
were Page 333 U. S. 246 adopted [ Footnote 3/12 ] and
ch. II, § 1, of the Regulations of the University of October 4,
1824, provided that

															"Should the religious sects of this State, or any of them,
according to the invitation held out to them, establish within, or
adjacent to, the precincts of the University, schools for
instruction in the religion of their sect, the students of the
University will be free, and expected to attend religious worship
at the establishment of their respective sects, in the morning, and
in time to meet their school in the University at its stated hour.
[ Footnote 3/13 ] " Page 333 U. S. 247 Thus, the "wall of separation between church and State" that Mr.
Jefferson built at the University which he founded did not exclude
religious education from that school. The difference between the
generality of his statements on the separation of church and state
and the specificity of his conclusions on education are
considerable. A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of
speech.

															Mr. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, [ Footnote 3/14 ]
relied upon by the dissenting Justices in Everson, is not
applicable here. [ Footnote 3/15 ]
Mr. Madison was one of the principal opponents in the Virginia
General Assembly of A Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion. The monies raised by the
taxing section [ Footnote 3/16 ] of
that bill were to be appropriated

															"by the Vestries, Elders, or Directors of each religious
society, . . . to a provision for a Minister or Teacher Page 333 U. S. 248 of the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing places of
divine worship, and to none other use whatsoever. . . ."

															The conclusive legislative struggle over this act took place in
the fall of 1785, before the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The Remonstrance had been issued before the General Assembly
convened, and was instrumental in the final defeat of the act,
which died in committee. Throughout the Remonstrance, Mr.
Madison speaks of the "establishment" sought to be effected by the
act. It is clear from its historical setting and its language that
the Remonstrance was a protest against an effort by Virginia to
support Christian sects by taxation. Issues similar to those raised
by the instant case were not discussed. Thus, Mr. Madison's
approval of Mr. Jefferson's report as Rector gives, in my opinion,
a clearer indication of his views on the constitutionality of
religious education in public schools than his general statements
on a different subject.

															This Court summarized the amendment's accepted reach into the
religious field, as I understand its scope, in Everson v. Board
of Education, supra. The Court's opinion quotes the gist of
the Court's reasoning in Everson. I agree, as there
stated, that none of our governmental entities can "set up a
church." I agree that they cannot "aid" all or any religions or
prefer one "over another." But "aid" must be understood as a
purposeful assistance directly to the church itself or to some
religious group or organization doing religious work of such a
character that it may fairly be said to be performing
ecclesiastical functions. "Prefer" must give an advantage to one
"over another." I agree that pupils cannot "be released in part
from their legal duty" of school attendance upon condition that
they attend religious classes. But, as Illinois has held that it is
within the discretion of the School Board to permit absence from
school for religious instruction, Page 333 U. S. 249 no legal duty of school attendance is violated. 396 Ill. 14, 71
N.E.2d 161. If the sentence in the Court's opinion concerning the
pupils' release from legal duty is intended to mean that the
Constitution forbids a school to excuse a pupil from secular
control during school hours to attend voluntarily a class in
religious education, whether in or out of school buildings, I
disagree. Of course, no tax can be levied to support organizations
intended "to teach or practice religion." I agree, too, that the
state cannot influence one toward religion against his will, or
punish him for his beliefs. Champaign's religious education course
does none of these things.

															It seems clear to me that the "aid" referred to by the Court in
the Everson case could not have been those incidental
advantages that religious bodies, with other groups similarly
situated, obtain as a by-product of organized society. This
explains the well known fact that all churches receive "aid" from
government in the form of freedom from taxation. The Everson decision itself justified the transportation of
children to church schools by New Jersey for safety reasons. It
accords with Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of
Education, 281 U. S. 370 ,
where this Court upheld a free textbook statute of Louisiana
against a charge that it aided private schools on the ground that
the books were for the education of the children, not to aid
religious schools. Likewise, the National School Lunch Act aids all
school children attending tax exempt schools. [ Footnote 3/17 ] In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 ,
this Court held proper the payment of money by the Federal
Government to build an addition to a hospital, chartered by
individuals who were members of a Roman Catholic sisterhood and
operated under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. This was
done over the objection that it aided the establishment Page 333 U. S. 250 of religion. [ Footnote 3/18 ]
While obviously in these instances the respective churches, in a
certain sense, were aided, this Court has never held that such
"aid" was in violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendment.

															Well recognized and long-established practices support the
validity of the Illinois statute here in question. That statute, as
construed in this case, is comparable to those in many states.
[ Footnote 3/19 ] All differ to
some extent. New York may be taken as a fair example. [ Footnote 3/20 ] In many states, the
program Page 333 U. S. 251 is under the supervision of a religious council composed of
delegates who are themselves communicants of various faiths.
[ Footnote 3/21 ] As is shown by Bradfield v. Roberts, supra, the fact that the members of
the council have religious affiliations is not significant. In
some, instruction Page 333 U. S. 252 is given outside of the school buildings; in others, within
these buildings. Metropolitan centers like New York usually would
have available quarters convenient to schools. Unless smaller
cities and rural communities use the school building at times that
do not interfere with recitations, they may be compelled to give up
religious education. I understand that pupils not taking religious
education usually are given other work of a secular nature within
the schools. [ Footnote 3/22 ]
Since all these states use the facilities of the schools to aid the
religious education to some extent, their desire to permit
religious education to school children is thwarted by this Court's
judgment. [ Footnote 3/23 ] Under
it, as I understand its language, children cannot be released or
dismissed from school to attend classes in religion while other
children must remain to pursue secular education. Teachers cannot
keep the records as to which pupils are to be dismissed and which
retained. To do so is said to be an "aid" in establishing religion;
the use of public money for religion.

															Cases running into the scores have been in the state courts of
last resort that involved religion and the schools. Except where
the exercises with religious significance partook of the ceremonial
practice of sects or groups, their Page 333 U. S. 253 constitutionality has been generally upheld. [ Footnote 3/24 ] Illinois itself promptly struck
down as violative of its own constitution required exercises
partaking of a religious ceremony. People ex rel. Ring v. Board
of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251. In that case,
compulsory religious exercises -- a reading from the King James
Bible, the Lord's Prayer and the singing of hymns -- were forbidden
as "worship services." In this case, the Supreme Court of Illinois
pointed out that, in the Ring case, the activities in the
school were ceremonial and compulsory; in this, voluntary and
educational. 396 Ill. 14, 221, 71 N.E.2d 161, 164.

															The practices of the federal government offer many examples of
this kind of "aid" by the state to religion. The Congress of the
United States has a chaplain for each House who daily invokes
divine blessings and guidance for Page 333 U. S. 254 the proceedings. [ Footnote
3/25 ] The armed forces have commissioned chaplains from early
days. [ Footnote 3/26 ] They
conduct the public services in accordance with the liturgical
requirements of their respective faiths, ashore and afloat,
employing for the purpose property belonging to the United States
and dedicated to the services of religion. [ Footnote 3/27 ] Under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act
of 1944, eligible veterans may receive training at government
expense for the ministry in denominational schools. [ Footnote 3/28 ] The schools of the
District of Columbia have opening exercises which "include a
reading from the Bible without note or comment, and the Lord's
prayer." [ Footnote 3/29 ]

															In the United States Naval Academy and the United States
Military Academy, schools wholly supported and completely
controlled by the federal government, there are a number of
religious activities. Chaplains are attached to both schools.
Attendance at church services on Sunday is compulsory at both the
Military and Naval Academies. [ Footnote 3/30 ] At West Point, the Protestant services
are Page 333 U. S. 255 held in the Cadet Chapel, the Catholic in the Catholic Chapel,
and the Jewish in the Old Cadet Chapel; at Annapolis, only
Protestant services are held on the reservation, midshipmen of
other religious persuasions attend the churches of the city of
Annapolis. These facts indicate that both schools, since their
earliest beginnings, have maintained and enforced a pattern of
participation in formal worship.

															With the general statements in the opinions concerning the
constitutional requirement that the nation and the states, by
virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, [ Footnote 3/31 ] may "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion," I am in agreement. But, in the light of
the meaning given to those words by the precedents, customs, and
practices which I have detailed above, I cannot agree with the
Court's conclusion that, when pupils compelled by law to go to
school for secular education are released from school so as to
attend the religious classes, churches are unconstitutionally
aided. Whatever may be the wisdom of the arrangement as to the use
of the school buildings made with the Champaign Council of
Religious Education, it is clear to me that past practice shows
such cooperation between the schools and a nonecclesiastical body
is not forbidden by the First Amendment. When actual church
services have always been permitted on government property, the
mere use of the school buildings by a nonsectarian group for
religious education ought not to be condemned as an establishment
of religion. For a nonsectarian organization to give the type of
instruction here offered cannot be said to violate our rule as to
the establishment of religion by the state. The prohibition of
enactments respecting the establishment of religion do Page 333 U. S. 256 not bar every friendly gesture between church and state. It is
not an absolute prohibition against every conceivable situation
where the two may work together, any more than the other provisions
of the First Amendment -- free speech, free press -- are absolutes.
[ Footnote 3/32 ] If abuses occur,
such as the use of the instruction hour for sectarian purposes, I
have no doubt, in view of the Ring case, that Illinois
will promptly correct them. If they are of a kind that tend to the
establishment of a church or interfere with the free exercise of
religion, this Court is open for a review of any erroneous
decision. This Court cannot be too cautious in upsetting practices
embedded in our society by many years of experience. A state is
entitled to have great leeway in its legislation when dealing with
the important social problems of its population. [ Footnote 3/33 ] A definite violation of legislative
limits must be established. The Constitution should not be
stretched to forbid national customs in the way courts act to reach
arrangements to avoid federal taxation. [ Footnote 3/34 ] Devotion to the great principle of
religious liberty should not lead us into a rigid interpretation of
the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted habits of
our people. This is an instance where, for me, the history of past
practices is determinative of the meaning of a constitutional
clause, not a decorous introduction to the study of its text. The
judgment should be affirmed.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The trial court found that:

															"'The Champaign Council of Religious Education' [is] a voluntary
association made up of the representatives of the Jewish, Roman
Catholic and Protestant faiths in the school district."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															There is no extra cost to the state, but, as a theoretical
accounting problem, it may be correct to charge to the classes
their comparable proportion of the state expense for buildings,
operation and teachers. In connection with the classes, the
teachers need only keep a record of the pupils who attend.
Increased custodial requirements are likewise nominal. It is
customary to use school buildings for community activities when not
needed for school purposes. See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 122, §
123.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															" CHAMPAIGN COUNCIL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION" " 1945-1946" " Parent's Request Card" "Please permit _______________ in Grade ___ at ____________
School to attend a class in Religious Education one period a week
under the Auspices of the Champaign Council of Religious
Education."

															"(Check which) Date _________ ____ ( ) Interdenominational"

															"( ) Protestant"

															"( ) Roman Catholic"

															"( ) Jewish"

															"Signed ______________________"

															"(Parent Name)"

															"Parent's Church ___________________"

															"Telephone No. _________ Address _______________________"

															"A fee of 25 cents a semester is charged each pupil to help
cover the cost of material used."

															"If you wish your child to receive religious instruction, please
sign this card and return to the school."

															"Mae Chapin, Director"

															Mae Chapin, the Director, was not a school employee.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															"The superintendent testified that Jehovah's Witnesses or any
other sect would be allowed to teach provided their teachers had
proper educational qualifications, so that bad grammar, for
instance, would not be taught to the pupils. A similar situation
developed with reference to the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran
Church. The evidence tends to show that, during the course of the
trial, that group indicated it would affiliate with the Council of
Religious Education."

															"Before any faith or other group may obtain permission from the
defendant for the similar, free and equal use of rooms in the
public school buildings said faith or group must make application
to the superintendent of schools of said School District Number 71,
who, in turn, will determine whether or not it is practical for
said group to teach in said school system."

															"The court feels from all the facts in the record that an honest
attempt has been made and is being made to permit religious
instruction to be given by qualified outside teachers of any sect
to people of their own faith in the manner above outlined. The
evidence shows that no sect or religious group has ever been denied
the right to use the schools in this manner."

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															A finding reads:

															"The curriculum of studies in the Protestant classes is
determined by a committee of the Protestant members of the council
of religious education after consultation with representatives of
all the different faiths included in said council. The Jewish
classes, of course, would deny the divinity of Jesus Christ. The
teaching in the Catholic classes, of course, explains to Catholic
pupils the teaching of the Catholic religion, and are not shared by
other students who are Protestants or Jews. The teachings in the
Protestant classes would undoubtedly, from the evidence, teach some
doctrines that would not be accepted by the other two
religions."

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															It was found:

															"The testimony shows that sectarian differences between the
sects are not taught or emphasized in the actual teaching as it is
conducted in the schools. The testimony of the religious education
teachers, the secular teachers who testified, and the many
children, mostly from Protestant families, who either took or did
not take religious education courses, is to the effect that
religious education classes have fostered tolerance, rather than
intolerance."

															The Supreme Court of Illinois said: "The religious education
courses do not go to the extent of being worship services, and do
not include prayers or the singing of hymns." 396 Ill. 14, 21, 71
N.E.2d 161, 164.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Annals of Congress 730.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															For example, Mr. Jefferson's striking phrase as to the "wall of
separation between church and State" appears in a letter
acknowledging "The affectionate sentiments of esteem and
approbation" included in a testimonial to himself. In its context,
it reads as follows:

															"Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus
building a wall of separation between church and State."

															8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington ed., 1861)
113.

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Acts of the Assembly of 1818-19 (1819) 15; Phillips v. The
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472,
474 75, 34 S.E. 66, 67.

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial edition, 1904)
408, 409.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ] Id., pp. 414-417:

															"It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in
religious opinion and duties was meant to be precluded by the
public authorities, as indifferent to the interests of society. On
the contrary, the relations which exist between man and his Maker,
and the duties resulting from those relations, are the most
interesting and important to every human being, and the most
incumbent on his study and investigation. The want of instruction
in the various creeds of religious faith existing among our
citizens presents, therefore, a chasm in a general institution of
the useful sciences. . . . A remedy, however, has been suggested of
promising aspect which, while it excludes the public authorities
from the domain of religious freedom, will give to the sectarian
schools of divinity the full benefit the public provisions made for
instruction in the other branches of science. . . . It has
therefore been in contemplation, and suggested by some pious
individuals, who perceive the advantages of associating other
studies with those of religion, to establish their religious
schools on the confines of the University so as to give to their
students ready and convenient access and attendance on the
scientific lectures of the University and to maintain, by that
means, those destined for the religious professions on as high a
standing of science, and of personal weight and respectability, as
may be obtained by others from the benefits of the University. Such
establishments would offer the further and greater advantage of
enabling the students of the University to attend religious
exercises with the professor of their particular sect, either in
the rooms of the building still to be erected, and destined to that
purpose under impartial regulations, as proposed in the same report
of the commissioners, or in the lecturing room of such professor. .
. . Such an arrangement as would complete the circle of the useful
sciences embraced by this institution, and would fill the chasm now
existing, on principles which would leave inviolate the
constitutional freedom of religion, the most inalienable and sacred
of all human rights, over which the people and authorities of this
state, individually and publicly, have ever manifested the most
watchful jealousy; and could this jealousy be now alarmed, in the
opinion of the legislature, by what is here suggested, the idea
will be relinquished on any surmise of disapprobation which they
might think proper to express."

															Mr. Jefferson commented upon the report on November 2, 1822, in
a letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, as follows:

															"And by bringing the sects together, and mixing them with the
mass of other students, we shall soften their asperities,
liberalize and neutralize their prejudices, and make the general
religion a religion of peace, reason, and morality."

															12 Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, (Fed. ed., 1905),
272.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															3 Randall, Life of Thomas Jefferson (1858) 471.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															19 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Memorial edition, 1904)
449.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															The texts of the Memorial and Remonstrance and the bill
against which it was aimed, to-wit, A Bill Establishing a
Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, are set
forth in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 28 ,
63-74.

															[ Footnote 3/15 ] See generally the dissent of MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, 330 U. S. 330 U.S.
1, 330 U. S. 28 .

															[ Footnote 3/16 ]

															330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
72 -73:

															" Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That
for the support of Christian teachers, percentum on the amount, or
in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property within this
Commonwealth, is hereby assessed, and shall be paid by every person
chargeable with the said tax at the time the same shall become due,
and the Sheriffs of the several Counties shall have power to levy
and collect the same in the same manner and under the like
restrictions and limitations, as are or may be prescribed by the
laws for raising the Revenues of this State."

															" And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the
Sheriff or Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to
what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the
same shall direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account
thereof in his books. . . ."

															[ Footnote 3/17 ]

															60 Stat. 230, ch. 281, §§ 4, 11(d)(3).

															[ Footnote 3/18 ] See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.
S. 366 , 245 U. S. 390 ; Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 .

															[ Footnote 3/19 ]

															Ed.Code of Cal. (Deering, 1944) § 8286; 6 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns,
1933) 1945 Supp. § 28-505a; 1 Code of Iowa ch. 299, § 299.2 (1946);
Ky.Rev.Stat. (1946) § 158.220; 1 Rev.Stat. of Maine (1944) ch. 37,
§ 131; 2 Ann.Laws of Mass. (1945) ch. 76, § 1; Minn.Stat. (1945) §
132.05; N.Y. Education Law § 3210(1); 8 Ore.Comp.Laws Ann. (1940) §
111-3014; 24 Pa.Stat.Ann. (Purdon, 1930) 1947 Supp. § 1563; 1 Code
of S.D. (1939) § 15.3202; 1 Code of W.Va. (1943) § 1847.

															[ Footnote 3/20 ]

															Education Law § 3210(1) provides that:

															"a. A minor required by the provisions of part one of this
article to attend upon instruction shall attend regularly as
prescribed where he resides or is employed, for the entire time the
appropriate public schools or classes are in session and shall be
subordinate and orderly while so attending."

															"b. Absence for religious observance and education shall be
permitted under rules that the commissioner shall establish."

															Acting under the authority of the New York law, the State
Commissioner of Education issued, on July 4, 1940, these
regulations:

															"1 Absence of a pupil from school during school hours for
religious observance and education to be had outside the school
building and grounds will be excused upon the request in writing
signed by the parent or guardian of the pupil."

															"2 The courses in religious observance and education must be
maintained and operated by or under the control of a duly
constituted religious body or of duly constituted religious
bodies."

															"3 Pupils must be registered for the courses and a copy of the
registration filed with the local public school authorities."

															"4 Reports of attendance of pupils upon such courses shall be
filed with the principal or teacher at the end of each week."

															"5 Such absence shall be for not more than one hour each week at
the close of a session at a time to be fixed by the local school
authorities."

															"6 In the event that more than one school for religious
observance and education is maintained in any district, the hour
for absence for each particular public school in such district
shall be the same for all such religious schools."

															On November 13, 1940, rules to govern the released time program
of the New York City schools were adopted by the Board of Education
of the City of New York. Under these rules, the practice of the
religious education program is this: classes in religious education
are to be held outside of school buildings; establishment of the
program rests in the initiative of the church and home; enrollment
is voluntary, and accomplished by this technique: the church
distributes cards to the parents, and these are filled out and
presented to the school; records of enrollment and arrangements for
release are handled by school authorities; discipline is the
responsibility of the church, and children who do not attend are
kept at school and given other work. See Rules of the
Board of Education of the City of New York adopted Nov. 13, 1940; Public Education Association, Released Time for Religious
Education in New York City's Schools (1943); id. (1945).

															Constitutional approval by the New York Court of Appeals of
these practices was given before the passage of Education Law §
3210(1). People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156
N.E. 663.

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															The New York City program is supervised by The Greater New York
Coordinating Committee on Released Time, a group of laymen drawn
from Jews, Protestants and Roman Catholics. This Committee is an
example of a broad national effort to bring about religious
education of children through cooperative action of schools and
groups of members of various religious denominations. The methods
vary in different states and cities, but are basically like the
work of the New York City Committee. See Brief Sketches of
Weekday Church Schools, Department of Weekday Religious
Education, International Council of Religious Education, Chicago,
Illinois (1944).

															[ Footnote 3/22 ] See 333
U.S. 203 fn3/20|>note 20 supra. [ Footnote 3/23 ]

															The use of school buildings is not unusual. See Davis, Weekday Classes in Religious Education, U.S. Office of
Education (Bulletin 1941, No. 3) 27; National Education
Association, The State and Sectarian Education, Research Bulletin
(Feb.1946) 36. The International Council of Religious Education
advises that church buildings be used if possible. Shaver, Remember the Weekday, International Council of Religious
Education (1946).

															"Today, approximately two thousand communities in all but two
states provide religious education in cooperation with the public
schools for more than a million and a half of pupils."

															Shaver, The Movement for Weekday Religious Education, Religious
Education (Jan.-Feb.1946), p. 7.

															[ Footnote 3/24 ]

															Many uses of religious material in the public schools in a
manner that has some religious significance have been sanctioned by
state courts. These practices have been permitted: reading
selections from the King James Bible without comment; reading the
Bible and repeating the Lord's Prayer; teaching the Ten
Commandments; saying prayers, and using textbooks based upon the
Bible and emphasizing its fundamental teachings. When conducted in
a sectarian manner, reading from the Bible and singing hymns in the
school's morning exercise have been prohibited, as has using the
Bible as a textbook. There is a conflict of authority on the
question of the constitutionality of wearing religious garb while
teaching in the public schools. It has been held to be
constitutional for school authorities to prohibit the reading of
the Bible in the public schools. There is a conflict of authority
on the constitutionality of the use of public school buildings for
religious services held outside of school hours. The
constitutionality, under state constitutions, of furnishing free
textbooks and free transportation to parochial school children is
in conflict. See Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d
930; Findley v. City of Conneaut, 12 Ohio Supp. 161. The
earlier cases are collected in 5 A.L.R. 866 and 141 A.L.R.
1144.

															[ Footnote 3/25 ]

															Rules of the House of Representatives (1943) Rule VII; Senate
Manual (1947) 6, fn. 2.

															[ Footnote 3/26 ]

															3 Stat. 297 (1816).

															[ Footnote 3/27 ]

															Army Reg., No. 60-5 (1944); U.S. Navy Reg. (1920), ch. 1, § 2
and ch. 34, §§ 1-2.

															[ Footnote 3/28 ]

															58 Stat. 289.

															[ Footnote 3/29 ]

															Board of Education Rules, ch. VI, § 4.

															[ Footnote 3/30 ]

															Reg. for the U.S. Corps of Cadets (1947) 47:

															"Attendance at chapel is part of a cadet's training; no cadet
will be exempted. Each cadet will receive religious training in one
of the three principal faiths: Catholic, Protestant, or
Jewish."

															U.S. Naval Academy Reg., Art. 4301(b):

															"Midshipmen shall attend church services on Sundays at the Naval
Academy Chapel or at one of the regularly established churches in
the city of Annapolis."

															Morning prayers are also required at Annapolis. U.S. Naval
Academy Reg., Art. 4301(a): "Daily, except on Sundays, a Chaplain
will conduct prayers in the mess hall, immediately before
breakfast." Protestant and Catholic Chaplains take their turn in
leading these prayers.

															[ Footnote 3/31 ]

															The principles of the First Amendment were absorbed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pennecamp v. Florida, 328 U.
S. 331 , 328 U. S.
335 .

															[ Footnote 3/32 ] See Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357 , 274 U. S. 371 ; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 , 98 U. S. 166 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 , 312 U. S. 574 , 312 U. S. 576 ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.
S. 568 , 315 U. S. 571 ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 .

															[ Footnote 3/33 ] Cf. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U. S.
28 .

															[ Footnote 3/34 ] Higgins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473 ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 ; Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 ; Lusthaus v. Comm'r, 327 U. S. 293 .

Summary: In McCollum v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a school board's practice of allowing religious instruction in public schools by private religious teachers, with students required to attend based on their parents' requests, violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which prohibits the government from establishing or promoting a particular religion. The Court held that using the public school system and compulsory attendance laws to facilitate religious instruction by sectarian groups in public school buildings was unconstitutional. This decision affirmed the separation of church and state in public education.