U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84 (1985) United States v.
Locke No. 83-1394 Argued November 6,
1984 Decided April 1, 1985 471 U.S.
84 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA Syllabus Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA) establishes a federal recording system that is
designed to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to provide
federal land managers with up-to-date information that allows them
to make informed land management decisions. Section 314(b) requires
that mining claims located prior to FLPMA's enactment be initially
recorded with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within three
years of the enactment, and § 314(a) requires that the claimant, in
the year of initial recording and "prior to December 31" of every
year after that, file with state officials and the BLM a notice of
intention to hold a claim, an affidavit of assessment work
performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form. Section
314(c) provides that failure to comply with either of these
requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an
abandonment" of the claim. Appellees, who had purchased mining
claims before 1976, complied with the initial recording requirement
but failed to meet on time their first annual filing requirement,
not filing with the BLM until December 31. Subsequently, the BLM
notified appellees that their claims had been declared abandoned
and void due to their tardy filing. After an unsuccessful
administrative appeal, appellees filed an action in Federal
District Court, alleging that § 314(c) effected an unconstitutional
taking of their property without just compensation and denied them
due process. The District Court issued summary judgment in
appellees' favor, holding that § 314(c) created an impermissible
irrebuttable presumption that claimants who fail to make a timely
filing intended to abandon their claims. Alternatively, the court
held that the 1-day late filing "substantially complied" with §
314(a) and the implementing regulations. Held: 1. Section 314(a)'s plain language -- "prior to December 31" --
read in conjunction with BLM regulations makes clear that the
annual filings must be made on or before December 30. Thus, the BLM
did not act ultra vires in concluding that appellees'
filing was untimely. Pp. 471 U. S.
93 -96.

															2. Congress intended in § 314(c) to extinguish those claims for
which timely filings were not made. Specific evidence of intent to
abandon is made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on
time, in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. Pp. 471 U. S.
97 -100. Page 471 U. S. 85 3. The annual filing deadline cannot be complied with,
substantially or otherwise, by filing late -- even by one day. Pp. 471 U. S.
100 -102.

															4. Section 314(c) is not unconstitutional. Pp. 471 U. S.
103 -110.

															(a) Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting
the filing requirement, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment
in § 314(c), and in applying the requirement and sanction to claims
located before FLPMA was enacted. Pp. 471 U. S.
104 -107.

															(b) Appellees' property loss was one they could have avoided
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time, not
Congress' action, that caused their property rights to be
extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take" private
property when an individual's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations can continue to be realized as long as he complies
with reasonable regulations. Pp. 107-108.

															(c) FLPMA provides appellees with all the process that is their
constitutional due. The Act's recording provisions clearly afford
those within the Act's reach a reasonable opportunity both to
familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to
comply with those requirements. As the Act constitutes purely
economic regulation, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was
preferable to place a substantial portion of the burden on
claimants to make the national recording system work. Pp.
108-110. 573 F.
Supp. 472 , reversed and remanded.

															MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.
110. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 112.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 117. Page 471 U. S. 86 JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The primary question presented by this appeal is whether the
Constitution prevents Congress from providing that holders of
unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the annual filing
requirements of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1744, shall forfeit their claims. I From the enactment of the general mining laws in the 19th
century until 1976, those who sought to make their living by
locating and developing minerals on federal lands were virtually
unconstrained by the fetters of federal control. The general mining
laws, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq., still in effect today, allow
United States citizens to go onto unappropriated, unreserved public
land to prospect for and develop certain minerals. "Discovery" of a
mineral deposit, followed by the minimal procedures required to
formally "locate" the deposit, gives an individual the right of
exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes, 30 U.S.C. §
26; as long as $100 of assessment work is performed annually, the
individual may continue to extract and sell minerals from the claim
without paying any royalty to the United States, 30 U.S.C. § 28.
For a nominal sum, and after certain statutory conditions are
fulfilled, an individual may patent the claim, thereby purchasing
from the Federal Government the land and minerals and obtaining
ultimate title to them. Patenting, however, is not required, and an
unpatented mining claim remains a fully recognized possessory
interest. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.
S. 334 , 371 U. S. 335 (1963).

															By the 1960's, it had become clear that this 19th-century laissez-faire regime had created virtual chaos with
respect to the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that more
than Page 471 U. S. 87 6 million unpatented mining claims existed on public lands other
than the national forests; in addition, more than half the land in
the National Forest System was thought to be covered by such
claims. S.Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975). Many of these claims had
been dormant for decades, and many were invalid for other reasons,
but in the absence of a federal recording system, no simple way
existed for determining which public lands were subject to mining
locations, and whether those locations were valid or invalid. Ibid. As a result, federal land managers had to proceed
slowly and cautiously in taking any action affecting federal land
lest the federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully
disturbed. Each time the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed a
sale or other conveyance of federal land, a title search in the
county recorder's office was necessary; if an outstanding mining
claim was found, no matter how stale or apparently abandoned,
formal administrative adjudication was required to determine the
validity of the claim. [ Footnote
1 ]

															After more than a decade of studying this problem in the context
of a broader inquiry into the proper management of the public lands
in the modern era, Congress in 1976 enacted FLPMA, Pub.L. 94-579,
90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ).
Section 314 of the Act establishes a federal recording system that
is designed both to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to
provide federal land managers with up-to-date information that
allows them to make informed land management decisions. [ Footnote 2 ] For claims located before
FLPMA's enactment, [ Footnote 3 ]
the federal recording system imposes two general requirements. Page 471 U. S. 88 First, the claims must initially be registered with the BLM by
filing, within three years of FLPMA's enactment, a copy of the
official record of the notice or certificate Page 471 U. S. 89 of location. 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(b), 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b).
Second, in the year of the initial recording, and "prior to
December 31" of every year after that, the claimant must file with
state officials and with BLM a notice of intention to hold the
claim, an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim, or a
detailed reporting form. 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(a), 43 U.S.C. §
1744(a). Section 314(c) of the Act provides that failure to comply
with either of these requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner."
43 U.S.C. § 1744(c).

															The second of these requirements -- the annual filing obligation
-- has created the dispute underlying this appeal. Appellees, four
individuals engaged "in the business of operating mining properties
in Nevada," [ Footnote 4 ]
purchased in 1960 and 1966 10 unpatented mining claims on public
lands near Ely, Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel
and building material: the claims are valued at several million
dollars, [ Footnote 5 ] and, in
the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appellees' gross income
totaled more than $1 million. [ Footnote 6 ] Throughout the period during which they owned
the claims, appellees complied with annual state law filing and
assessment work requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied
FLPMA's initial recording requirement by properly filing with BLM a
notice of location, thereby putting their claims on record for
purposes of FLPMA.

															At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on time
their first annual obligation to file with the Federal Government.
After allegedly receiving misleading information from a BLM
employee, [ Footnote 7 ]
appellees waited until December 31 Page 471 U. S. 90 to submit to BLM the annual notice of intent to hold or proof of
assessment work performed required under § 314(a) of FLPMA, 43
U.S.C. § 1744(a). As noted above, that section requires these
documents to be filed annually "prior to December 31." Had
appellees checked, they further would have discovered that BLM
regulations made quite clear that claimants were required to make
the annual filings in the proper BLM office "on or before December
30 of each calendar year." 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a) (1980) (current
version at 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(b)(1) (1984)). Thus, appellees' filing
was one day too late.

															This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when they
received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office informing them
that their claims had been declared abandoned and void due to their
tardy filing. In many cases, loss of a claim in this way would have
minimal practical effect; the Page 471 U. S. 91 claimant could simply locate the same claim again and then
rerecord it with BLM. In this case, however, relocation of
appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees'
predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Common
Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 611; that Act prospectively
barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by appellees'
claims. Appellees' mineral deposits thus escheated to the
Government.

															After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the
present action in the United States District Court for the District
of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, that §
314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their property
without just compensation and denied them due process. On summary
judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) did indeed deprive
appellees of the process to which they were constitutionally due. 573 F.
Supp. 472 (1983). The District Court reasoned that § 314(c)
created an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that claimants
who failed to make a timely filing intended to abandon their
claims. Rather than relying on this presumption, the Government was
obliged, in the District Court's view, to provide individualized
notice to claimants that their claims were in danger of being lost,
followed by a post-filing-deadline hearing at which the claimants
could demonstrate that they had not, in fact, abandoned a claim.
Alternatively, the District Court held that the 1-day late filing
"substantially complied" with the Act and regulations.

															Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in a civil suit to which the United States was a
party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. 467
U.S. 1225 (1984). [ Footnote 8 ]
We now reverse. Page 471 U. S. 92 II Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 brings before this Court not
merely the constitutional question decided below, but the entire
case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S.
21 , 421 U. S. 31 (1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S.
17 , 362 U. S. 27 , n.
7 (1960). The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions
actually decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court. United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23 , 445 U. S. 27 -28
(1980). [ Footnote 9 ] These
principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.
S. 728 , 465 U. S.
741 -744 (1984); Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U. S. 361 , 415 U. S.
366 -367 (1974); cf. United States v. Congress of
Industrial Organizations, 335 U. S. 106 , 335 U. S. 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal Appeals Act); see
generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus, we turn first to the
nonconstitutional questions pressed below. Page 471 U. S. 93 III A Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the § 314(a)
requirement of a filing "prior to December 31 of each year" should
be construed to require a filing "on or before December 31." Thus,
appellees argued, their December 31 filing had in fact complied
with the statute, and the BLM had acted ultra vires in
voiding their claims.

															Although the District Court did not address this argument, the
argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature that we
choose to address it even in the absence of lower court analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, supra. It is clear to
us that the plain language of the statute simply cannot sustain the
gloss appellees would put on it. As even counsel for appellees
conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) "is a statement that Congress
wanted it filed by December 30th. I think that is a clear
statement. . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; see also id. at 37
("A literal reading of the statute would require a December 30th
filing . . ."). While we will not allow a literal reading of a
statute to produce a result "demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters," Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U. S. 564 , 458 U. S. 571 (1982), with respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of
Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those
words. To attempt to decide whether some date other than the one
set out in the statute is the date actually "intended" by Congress
is to set sail on an aimless journey, for the purpose of a filing
deadline would be just as well served by nearly any date a court
might choose as by the date Congress has in fact set out in the
statute. "Actual purpose is sometimes unknown," United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.
S. 166 , 449 U. S. 180 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring), and such is the case with filing
deadlines; as might be expected, nothing in the legislative history
suggests why Congress chose December 30 over December 31, Page 471 U. S. 94 or over September 1 (the end of the assessment year for mining
claims, 30 U.S.C. § 28), as the last day on which the required
filings could be made. But "[d]eadlines are inherently arbitrary,"
while fixed dates "are often essential to accomplish necessary
results." United States v. Boyle, 469 U.
S. 241 , 469 U. S. 249 (1984). Faced with the inherent arbitrariness of filing deadlines,
we must, at least in a civil case, apply by its terms the date
fixed by the statute. Cf. United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 449 U. S. 179 .
[ Footnote 10 ]

															Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear since the
enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31" means what it says.
As the current version of the filing regulations states:

															"The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on Federal
lands . . . shall have filed or caused to have been filed on or
before December 30 of each calendar year . . . evidence of
annual assessment work performed during the previous assessment
year or a notice of intention to hold the mining claim."

															43 CFR § 3833.2-1(b)(1) (1984) (emphasis added). See
also 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR § 3833.21(a)
(1981) (same); 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a) (1980) (same); 43 CFR §
3833.2-1(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1978) ("prior
to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1977) ("prior to" Dec. 31).
Leading mining treatises similarly Page 471 U. S. 95 inform claimants that

															"[i]t is important to note that the filing of a notice of
intention or evidence of assessment work must be done prior to December 31 of each year, i.e., on or
before December 30."

															2 American Law of Mining § 7.23D, P. 150.2 (SUPP.1983) (emphasis
in original); see also 23 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, who were businessmen
involved in the running of a major mining operation for more than
20 years, had any questions about whether a December 31 filing
complied with the statute, it was incumbent upon them, as it is
upon other businessmen, see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the regulations or to have consulted an attorney
for legal advice. Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than
the submission of a last-minute filing, would surely have led
appellees to the conclusion that December 30 was the last day on
which they could file safely.

															In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed by
congressional reliance on the words "prior to December 31." See
post p. 471 U. S. 117 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the fact that Congress might have
acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve
that which Congress is perceived to have failed to do.

															"There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has
affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.
S. 618 , 436 U. S. 625 (1978). Nor is the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the
clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes
those words lead to a harsh result. See Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77 , 451 U. S. 98 (1981). On the contrary, deference to the supremacy of the
Legislature, as well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote
on the language of a bill, generally requires us to assume that
"the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S.
1 , 369 U. S. 9 (1962).

															"Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a
possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to Page 471 U. S. 96 be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances." American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S.
63 , 456 U. S. 75 (1982) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 , 430 U. S. 26 (1977)). When even after taking this step nothing in the
legislative history remotely suggests a congressional intent
contrary to Congress' chosen words, and neither appellees nor the
dissenters have pointed to anything that so suggests, any further
steps take the courts out of the realm of interpretation and place
them in the domain of legislation. The phrase "prior to" may be
clumsy, but its meaning is clear. [ Footnote 11 ] Under these circumstances, we are obligated
to apply the "prior to December 31" language by its terms. See,
e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, supra, at 456 U. S. 68 ; Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102 , 447 U. S. 108 (1980).

															The agency's regulations clarify and confirm the import of the
statutory language by making clear that the annual filings must be
made on or before December 30. These regulations provide a
conclusive answer to appellees' claim, for where the language of a
filing deadline is plain and the agency's construction completely
consistent with that language, the agency's construction simply
cannot be found "sufficiently unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27 , 454 U. S. 39 (1981).

															We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of
disingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question. Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.
S. 373 , 289 U. S. 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). [ Footnote
12 ] We therefore hold that BLM did not act ultra vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. Page 471 U. S. 97 B Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing
requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclusively
to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim." We must next
consider whether this provision expresses a congressional intent to
extinguish all claims for which filings have not been made, or only
those claims for which filings have not been made and for
which the claimants have a specific intent to abandon the claim.
The District Court adopted the latter interpretation, and on that
basis concluded that § 314(c) created a constitutionally
impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment. The District
Court reasoned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss of a
claim turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior hearing
and findings on the claimant's intent were constitutionally
required before the claim of a nonfiling claimant could be
extinguished.

															In concluding that Congress was concerned with the specific
intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed Page 471 U. S. 98 to make the required filings, the District Court began from the
fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the term
"abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The District Court
then noted correctly that the common law of mining traditionally
has drawn a distinction between "abandonment" of a claim, which
occurs only upon a showing of the claimant's intent to relinquish
the claim, and "forfeiture" of a claim, for which only
noncompliance with the requirements of law must be shown. See,
e.g., 2 American Law of Mining § 8.2, pp.195-196 (1983)
(relied upon by the District Court). Given that Congress had not
expressly stated in the statute any intent to depart from the
term-of-art meaning of "abandonment" at common law, the District
Court concluded that § 314(c) was intended to incorporate the
traditional common law distinction between abandonment and
forfeiture. Thus, reasoned the District Court, Congress did not
intend to cause a forfeiture of claims for which the required
filings had not been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's
actual intent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the
failure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a
specific intent to abandon his property.

															This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand
analysis. While reference to common law conceptions is often a
helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined statutory
terms, see, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.
S. 322 , 453 U. S. 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S.
1 , 221 U. S. 59 (1911), this principle is a guide to legislative intent, not a
talisman of it, and the principle is not to be applied in defiance
of a statute's overriding purposes and logic. Although § 314(c) is
couched in terms of a conclusive presumption of "abandonment,"
there can be little doubt that Congress intended § 314(c) to cause
a forfeiture of all claims for which the filing requirements of §§
314(a) and 314(b) had not been met.

															To begin with, the Senate version of § 314(c) provided that any
claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively presumed Page 471 U. S. 99 to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., § 311 (1975). [ Footnote
13 ] The Committee Report accompanying S. 507 repeatedly
indicated that failure to comply with the filing requirements would
make a claim "void." See S.Rep. No. 94-583, pp. 65, 66
(1975). The House legislation and Reports merely repeat the
statutory language without offering any explanation of it, but it
is clear from the Conference Committee Report that the undisputed
intent of the Senate to make "void" those claims for which proper
filings were not timely made was the intent of both Chambers. The
Report stated: "Both the Senate bill and House amendments provided
for recordation of mining claims and for extinguishment of
abandoned claims." H.R.Rep. No. 94-1724, p. 62 (1976) (emphasis
added).

															In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give
effect to the "deemed conclusively" language of § 314(c). If the
failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant to prove
that he intends to keep the claim, nothing "conclusive" is achieved
by § 314(c). The District Court sought to avoid this conclusion by
holding that § 314(c) does extinguish automatically those claims
for which initial recordings, as opposed to annual
filings, have not been made; the District Court attempted to
justify its distinction between initial recordings and annual
filings on the ground that the dominant purpose of § 314(c) was to
avoid forcing BLM to the "awesome task of searching every local
title record" to establish initially a federal recording system.
573 F. Supp. at 477. Once this purpose had been satisfied by an
initial recording, the primary purposes of the "deemed
conclusively" language, in the District Court's view, had been met.
But the clear language of § 314(c) admits of no distinction
between Page 471 U. S. 100 initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either
"shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment." And
the District Court's analysis of the purposes of § 314(c) is also
misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a purpose
similar to that of the initial recording requirement; millions of
claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and the presence of an
annual filing obligation allows BLM to keep the system established
in § 314 up to date on a yearly basis. To put the burden on BLM to
keep this system current through its own inquiry into the status of
recorded claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led
Congress initially to make the federal recording system
self-executing. The purposes of a self-executing recording system
are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially, by both
the annual filing obligation and the initial recording requirement,
and the District Court was not empowered to thwart these purposes
or the clear language of § 314(c) by concluding that § 314(c) was
actually concerned with only initial recordings.

															For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in § 314(c) to
extinguish those claims for which timely filings were not made.
Specific evidence of intent to abandon is simply made irrelevant by
§ 314(c); the failure to file on time, in and of itself, causes a
claim to be lost. See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643
F.2d 618, 628 (CA9 1981). C A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn to
the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying primarily
on Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S.
48 (1970), the District Court held that, even if the
statute required a filing on or before December 30, appellees had
"substantially complied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept
this view of the statute.

															The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by filing
sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the Page 471 U. S. 101 least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting
principle. If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing
deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall just
on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing deadline
is to have any content, the deadline must be enforced. "Any less
rigid standard would risk encouraging a lax attitude toward filing
dates," United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 469 U. S. 249 .
A filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or
otherwise, by filing late even by one day. Hickel v. Oil Shale
Corp., supra, does not support a contrary conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not hold, that failure
to meet the annual assessment work requirements of the general
mining laws, 30 U.S.C. § 28, which require that "not less than $100
worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each
year," would not render a claim automatically void. Instead, if an
individual complied substantially but not fully with the
requirement, he might, under some circumstances, be able to retain
possession of his claim.

															These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven
to mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under any
federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the physical
requirement that a certain amount of work be performed each year is
significantly different from the complete failure to file on time
documents that federal law commands be filed. In addition, the
general mining laws at issue in Hickel do not clearly
provide that a claim will be lost for failure to meet the
assessment work requirements. Thus, it was open to the Court to
conclude in Hickel that Congress had intended to make the
assessment work requirement merely an indicium of a claimant's
specific intent to retain a Page 471 U. S. 102 claim. Full compliance with the assessment work requirements
would establish conclusively an intent to keep the claim, but less
than full compliance would not by force of law operate to deprive
the claimant of his claim. Instead, less than full compliance would
subject the mine owner to a case-by-case determination of whether
he nonetheless intended to keep his claim. See Hickel,
supra, at 400 U. S.
56 -57.

															In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads automatically
to loss of the claim. See 471 U. S. supra. Thus, Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain
whether the individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and
there is no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is
indicative of the claimant's intent -- intent is simply irrelevant
if the required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion
of substantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory
scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners no
greater latitude with filing deadlines than other individuals have.
[ Footnote 14 ] Page 471 U. S. 103 IV Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion
necessarily falls with our conclusion that § 314(c) automatically
deems forfeited those claims for which the required filings are not
timely made. The District Court's invalidation of the statute
rested heavily on the view that § 314(c) creates an "irrebuttable
presumption that mining claims are abandoned if the miner fails to
timely file" the required documents -- that the statute presumes a
failure to file to signify a specific intent to abandon the claim.
But, as we have just held, § 314(c) presumes nothing about a
claimant's actual intent; the statute simply and conclusively deems
such claims to be forfeited. As a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) is
not subject to the individualized hearing requirement of such
irrebuttable presumption cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), or Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 (1974), for there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting § 314(c),
Congress was in any way concerned with whether a particular
claimant's tardy filing or failure to file indicated an actual
intent to abandon the claim.

															There are suggestions in the District Court's opinion that, even
understood as a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) might be
unconstitutional. We therefore go on to consider whether automatic
forfeiture of a claim for failure to make annual filings is
constitutionally permissible. The framework for analysis of this
question, in both its substantive and procedural dimensions, is set
forth by our recent decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Shot, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). There we upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed
mineral interest that had not been used for a period of 20 years
automatically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of
the property, unless the mineral owner filed a statement of Page 471 U. S. 104 claim in the county recorder's office within 2 years of the
statute's passage. A Under Texaco, we must first address the question of
affirmative legislative power: whether Congress is authorized to
"provide that property rights of this character shall be
extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative action
required by the" statute. Id. at 454 U. S. 525 .
Even with respect to vested property rights, a legislature
generally has the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the
way in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties. As long as
the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restriction designed
to further legitimate legislative objectives, the legislature acts
within its powers in imposing such new constraints or duties. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Turner v. New York, 168 U. S.
90 , 168 U. S. 94 (1897); Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514 , 108 U. S. 517 (1883); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
628 (1877). "[L]egislation readjusting rights and
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled
expectations." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 , 428 U. S. 16 (1976) (citations omitted).

															This power to qualify existing property rights is particularly
broad with respect to the "character" of the property rights at
issue here. Although owners of unpatented mining claims hold fully
recognized possessory interests in their claims, see Best v.
Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334 , 371 U. S. 335 (1963), we have recognized that these interests are a "unique form
of property." Ibid. The United States, as owner of the
underlying fee title to the public domain, maintains broad powers
over the terms and conditions upon which the public lands can be
used, leased, and acquired. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U. S. 529 , 426 U. S. 539 (1976).

															"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no higher
quality and no more immune from attack and investigation Page 471 U. S. 105 than are unpatented claims under the homestead and kindred laws.
If valid, it gives to the claimant certain exclusive possessory
rights, and so do homestead and desert claims. But no right arises
from an invalid claim of any kind. All must conform to the law
under which they are initiated; otherwise, they work an unlawful
private appropriation in derogation of the rights of the
public." Cameron v. United States, 252 U.
S. 450 , 252 U. S. 460 (1920). Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regulatory power
over those interests. Cf. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400 , 459 U. S. 413 (1983). In addition, the property right here is the right to a flow
of income from production of the claim. Similar vested economic
rights are held subject to the Government's substantial power to
regulate for the public good the conditions under which business is
carried out and to redistribute the benefits and burdens of
economic life. See, e.g., National Railroad Passenger
Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 470 U.
S. 451 , 470 U. S.
468 -469 (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
supra; see generally Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.
S. 300 , 254 U. S. 315 (1920) ("[I]n the interest of the community, [government may] limit
one [right] that others may be enjoyed").

															Against this background, there can be no doubt that Congress
could condition initial receipt of an unpatented mining claim upon
an agreement to perform annual assessment work and make annual
filings. That this requirement was applied to claims already
located by the time FLPMA was enacted, and thus applies to vested
claims, does not alter the analysis, for any "retroactive
application of [FLPMA] is supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means." Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.
S. 717 , 467 U. S. 729 (1984). The purposes of applying FLPMA's filing provisions to
claims located before the Act was passed -- to rid federal lands of
stale mining claims and to Page 471 U. S. 106 provide for centralized collection by federal land managers of
comprehensive and up-to-date information on the status of recorded
but unpatented mining claims -- are clearly legitimate. In
addition, § 314(c) is a reasonable, if severe, means of furthering
these goals; sanctioning with loss of their claims those claimants
who fail to file provides a powerful motivation to comply with the
filing requirement, while automatic invalidation for noncompliance
enables federal land managers to know with certainty and ease
whether a claim is currently valid. Finally, the restriction
attached to the continued retention of a mining claim imposes the
most minimal of burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper
once a year indicating that the required assessment work has been
performed or that they intend to hold the claim. [ Footnote 15 ] Indeed, Page 471 U. S. 107 appellees could have fully protected their interests against the
effect of the statute by taking the minimal additional step of
patenting the claims. As a result, Congress was well within its
affirmative powers in enacting the filing requirement, in imposing
the penalty of extinguishment set forth in § 314(c), and in
applying the requirement and sanction to claims located before
FLPMA was passed. B We look next to the substantive effect of § 314(c) to determine
whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting it because it
works an impermissible intrusion on constitutionally protected
rights. With respect to the regulation of private property, any
such protection must come from the Fifth Amendment's proscription
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
On this point, however, Texaco is controlling: "this Court
has never required [Congress] to compensate the owner for the
consequences of his own neglect." 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 530 .
Appellees failed to inform themselves of the proper filing deadline
and failed to file in timely fashion the documents required by
federal law. Their property loss was one appellees could have
avoided with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time
-- not the action of Congress -- that caused the property right to
be extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not "take"
private property when an individual's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations can continue to be realized as long as he complies
with reasonable regulatory restrictions the legislature has
imposed. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.
S. 272 , 276 U. S.
279 -280 (1928); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. at 95 U. S.
632 -633; cf. 30 U. S. Barney's
Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 30 U. S.
465 Page 471 U. S. 108 (1831) ("What right has any one to complain, when a reasonable
time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in asserting
his rights?"). C Finally, the Act provides appellees with all the process that is
their constitutional due. In altering substantive rights through
enactment of rules of general applicability, a legislature
generally provides constitutionally adequate process simply by
enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the extent the statute
regulates private conduct, affording those within the statute's
reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with
the general requirements imposed and to comply with those
requirements. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 532 ; see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.
S. 233 , 321 U. S. 243 (1944); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.
S. 276 , 268 U. S. 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt that the Act's recording
provisions meet these minimal requirements. Although FLPMA was
enacted in 1976, owners of existing claims, such as appellees, were
not required to make an initial recording until October, 1979. This
3-year period, during which individuals could become familiar with
the requirements of the new law, surpasses the 2-year grace period
we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of mineral
interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific annual filing
obligation at issue in this case is not triggered until the year
after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, every claimant
in appellees' position already has filed once before the annual
filing obligations come due. That these claimants already have made
one filing under the Act indicates that they know, or must be
presumed to know, of the existence of the Act and of their need to
inquire into its demands. [ Footnote 16 ] The Page 471 U. S. 109 requirement of an annual filing thus was not so unlikely to come
to the attention of those in the position of appellees as to render
unconstitutional the notice provided by the 3-year grace period.
[ Footnote 17 ]

															Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards laid down
in Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory restraints
on existing property rights, the District Court seemed to believe
that individualized notice of the filing deadlines was nonetheless
constitutionally required. The District Court felt that such a
requirement would not be "overly burdensome" to the Government, and
would be of great benefit to mining claimants. The District Court
may well be right that such an individualized notice scheme would
be a sound means of administering the Act. [ Footnote 18 ] But in the regulation of private
property rights, the Constitution offers the courts no warrant to
inquire into whether some other scheme might be more rational or
desirable than the one chosen by Congress; as long as the
legislative scheme is a rational way of reaching Congress'
objectives, the efficacy of alternative routes is for Congress
alone to consider.

															"It is enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of
[developing a national recording system] rationally; whether a
[different notice scheme] would have been wiser or more practical
under the circumstances is not a question of constitutional
dimension." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 19 .
Because we deal here with purely economic legislation, Congress was
entitled to conclude that it was preferable Page 471 U. S. 110 to place a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to
make the national recording system work. See ibid.; Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The District Court therefore erred in invoking the
Constitution to supplant the valid administrative scheme
established by Congress. The judgment below is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ] See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A
Study of Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L.Rev. 185, 193,
215-219.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The text of 43 U.S.C. § 1744 provides, in relevant part, as
follows:

															"Recordation of Mining Claims"

															"(a) Filing requirements"

															"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located
prior to October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, and prior to December 31 of each year
thereafter, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection. . . ."

															"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or
certificate is recorded either a notice of intention to hold the
mining claim (including but not limited to such notices as are
provided by law to be filed when there has been a suspension or
deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of assessment
work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by section
28-1 of title 30, relating thereto."

															"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the instrument filed or
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a
description of the location of the mining claim sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground."

															"(b) Additional filing requirements"

															"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill
or tunnel site located prior to October 21, 1976, shall, within the
three-year period following October 21, 1976, file in the office of
the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the official
record of the notice of location or certificate of location,
including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the
ground. The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or
mill or tunnel site located after October 21, 1976, shall, within
ninety days after the date of location of such claim, file in the
office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the
official record of the notice of location or certificate of
location, including a description of the location of the mining
claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands
on the ground."

															"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or
untimely filing"

															"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections
(a) and (b) of this subsection shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel
site by the owner; but it shall not be considered a failure to file
if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under
other Federal laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if
the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not
all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															A somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after
October 21, 1976, the date the Act took effect.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Complaint 112.

															[ Footnote 5 ] Id. 1115.

															[ Footnote 6 ] 573 F.
Supp. 472 , 474 (1983). From 1960 to 1980, total gross income
from the claims exceeded $4 million. Ibid. [ Footnote 7 ]

															An affidavit submitted to the District Court by one of
appellees' employees stated that BLM officials in Ely had told the
employee that the filing could be made at the BLM Reno office "on
or before December 31, 1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 113. The
1978 version of a BLM question and answer pamphlet erroneously
stated that the annual filings had to be made "on or before
December 31" of each year. Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands
9-10 (1978). Later versions have corrected this error to bring the
pamphlet into accord with the BLM regulations that require the
filings to be made "on or before December 30."

															JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE POWELL seek to make much of this
pamphlet and of the uncontroverted evidence that appellees were
told a December 31 filing would comply with the statute. See
post at 471 U. S. 117 , 471 U. S. 122 , 471 U. S. 128 .
However, at the time appellees filed in 1980, BLM regulations and
the then-current pamphlets made clear that the filing was required
"on or before December 30." Thus, the dissenters' reliance on this
pamphlet would seem better directed to the claim that the United
States was equitably estopped from forfeiting appellees' claims,
given the advice of the BLM agent and the objective basis the 1978
pamphlet provides for crediting the claim that such advice was
given. The District Court did not consider this estoppel claim.
Without expressing any view as to whether, as a matter of law,
appellees could prevail on such a theory, see Heckler v.
Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we leave any further treatment of this issue, including
fuller development of the record, to the District Court on
remand.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional
and statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under
28 U.S.C. § 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the
unconstitutionality of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of
decision below in a civil suit to which the United States is a
party, appeal lies directly to this Court. United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.
S. 533 , 307 U. S. 541 (1939).

															Another District Court in the West similarly has declared §
314(c) unconstitutional with respect to invalidation of claims
based on failure to meet the initial recordation requirements of §
314(a) in timelier fashion. Rogers v. United
States, 575 F. Supp.
4 (Mont.1982).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by
the lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with
instructions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v.
Miller, 425 U. S. 231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves
without benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v.
Clark. The choice between these options depends on the extent
to which lower court factfinding and analysis of the
nonconstitutional questions will be necessary or useful to our
disposition of those questions.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses
of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385 , 455 U. S.
392 -398 (1982). Whether this general principle applies
to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual
care and diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing
deadline or to learn of its existence. See United States v.
Boyle, 469 U. S. 241 , 469 U. S. 253 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an explicit provision in the Internal Revenue
Code that provided a reasonable-cause exception to the Code's
filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no analogous provision.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Legislative drafting books are filled with suggestions that the
phrase "prior to" be replaced with the word "before," see,
e.g., R. Dickerson, Materials on Legal Drafting 293 (1981),
but we have seen no suggestion that "prior to" be replaced with "on
or before" -- a phrase with obviously different substantive
content.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															We note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions
that require action "prior to" some date, including at least 14
provisions that contemplate action "prior to December 31." See 7 U.S.C. § 609(b)(5); 12 U.S.C. § 1709(o)(1)(E); 12
U.S.C. § 1823(g); 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(5)(A); 22 U.S.C. § 3784(c);
26 U.S.C. § 503(d)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(B); 42 U.S.C. §
415(a)(7)(E)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp. III); 42 U.S.C. § 1962(d)7(b); 42
U.S.C. § 5614(b)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. §
7521(b)(2); 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a); 50 U.S.C.App. § 1741(b)(1). Dozens
of state statutes and local ordinances undoubtedly incorporate
similar "prior to December 31" deadlines. In addition, legislatures
know how to make explicit an intent to allow action on December 31
when they employ a December 31 date in a statute. See,
e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 609(b)(2); 22 U.S.C. §§ 3303 (b)(3)(B) and
(c); 43 U.S.C. § 256a.

															It is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters
are meant to apply to all of these provisions or only to some of
them; if the latter, we are given little guidance as to how a court
is to go about the rather eclectic task of choosing which "prior to
December 31" deadlines it can interpret "flexibly." Understandably
enough, the dissenters seek to disavow any intent to call all these
"prior to December 31" deadlines into question, and assure us that this is a "unique case," post at 471 U.
S. n. 4 (POWELL, J., dissenting), involving a "unique
factual matrix," post at 471 U. S. 128 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The only thing we can find unique about
this particular December 31 deadline is that the dissenters are
willing to go through such tortured reasoning to evade it.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual
filings, but this factor is not significant in light of the actions
of the Conference Committee; the clear structure of the Senate bill
was to impose the sanction of claim extinguishment on those who
failed to make whatever filings federal law required.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or
before December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on
the following January 19. 43 CFR § 3833.0-5(m) (1983). Appellees
and the dissenters attempt to transform this regulation into a
blank check generally authorizing "substantial compliance" with the
filing requirements. We disagree for two reasons. First, the
regulation was not in effect when appellees filed in 1980; it
therefore cannot now be relied on to validate a purported
"substantial compliance" in 1980. Second, that an agency has
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as
timely filed a document postmarked on the statutory filing date
does not require the agency to accept all documents hand-delivered
any time before January 19. The agency rationally could decide that
either of the options in this sort of situation -- requiring
mailings to be received by the same date that hand-deliveries must
be made or requiring mailings to be postmarked by that date -- is a
sound way of administering the statute.

															JUSTICE SEVENS further suggests that BLM would have been well
within its authority to promulgate regulations construing the
statute to allow for December 31 filings. Assuming the correctness
of this suggestion, the fact that two interpretations of a statute
are equally reasonable suggests to us that the agency's
interpretation is sufficiently reasonable as to be acceptable. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27 , 454 U. S. 39 (1981).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Appellees suggest that Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), further requires that the restriction imposed be
substantively reasonable in the sense that it adequately relate to
some common law conception of the nature of the property right
involved. Thus, appellees point to the fact that, in Texaco, failure to file could produce a forfeiture only
if, in addition, the mineral interest had lain dormant for 20
years; according to appellees, conjunction of a 20-year dormancy
period with failure to file a statement of claim sufficiently
indicated abandonment, as that term is understood at common law, to
justify the statute.

															Common law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to
retain his property until the common law would recognize it as
abandoned. Legislatures can enact substantive rules of law that
treat property as forfeited under conditions that the common law
would not consider sufficient to indicate abandonment. See Hawkins v. Barney's
Lessee , 5 Pet. 457, 30 U. S. 467 (1831) ("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his
rights or property? It is clear that the subject is one over which
every community is at liberty to make a rule for itself"). As long
as proper notice of these rules exists, and the burdens they impose
are not so wholly disproportionate to the burdens other individuals
face in a highly regulated society that some people are being
forced "alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U. S. 40 , 364 U. S. 49 (1960), the burden imposed is a reasonable restriction on the
property right. Here Congress has chosen to redefine the way in
which an unpatented mining claim can be lost through imposition of
a filing requirement that serves valid public objectives, imposes
the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes effect
only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to
comply and a reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing
requirement meets these standards is sufficient, under Texaco, to make it a reasonable restriction on the
continued retention of the property right.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a
statutory change must be given because a statute is

															"sufficiently unusual in character, and triggered in
circumstances so commonplace, that an average citizen would have no
reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a heightened
awareness of one's legal obligations." Texaco, 454 U.S. at 454 U. S. 547 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative
fact of whether the required filings were actually made, and
appellees availed themselves of this process by appealing, to the
Department of Interior Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that
extinguished their claims for failure to make a timely filing.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the
last several years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to
claimants several months before the end of the year; according to
the Government, these notices state: "[Y]ou must file on or before
12/30 [of the relevant year]. Failure to file timely with the
proper BLM office will render your claim abandoned." Brief for
Appellants 31-32, n. 22.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.

															I agree that the District Court erred in holding that § 314(c)
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43
U.S.C. § 1744(c), violates due process by creating an "irrebuttable
presumption" of abandonment. Whatever the force of Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), beyond the facts underlying that case, I believe that §
314(c) comports with due process under the analysis of our later
decision in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.
S. 749 (1975). Because I also believe that the statute
does not otherwise violate the Fifth Amendment, and that the
District Court erred in its alternative holding that substantial
compliance satisfies the filing requirements of § 314 and
corresponding regulations, I agree that the judgment below must be
reversed. Nonetheless, I share many of the concerns expressed in
the dissenting opinions of JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS. If
the facts are as alleged by appellees, allowing the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) to extinguish active mining claims that appellees
have owned and worked for more than 20 years would seem both unfair
and inconsistent with the purposes underlying FLPMA.

															The Government has not disputed that appellees sought in good
faith to comply with the statutory deadline. Appellees contend
that, in order to meet the requirements of § 314, they contacted
the BLM and were informed by agency personnel Page 471 U. S. 111 that they could file the required materials on December 31,
1980. Appellees apparently relied on this advice and hand-delivered
the appropriate documents to the local BLM office on that date. The
BLM accepted the documents for filing, but some three months later
sent appellees a notice stating that their mining claims were
"abandoned and void" because the filing was made on, rather than
prior to, December 31, 1980. Although BLM regulations clarify the
filing deadlines contained in § 314, the existence of those
regulations does not imply that appellees were unjustified in their
confusion concerning the deadlines or in their reliance on the
advice provided by BLM's local office. The BLM itself in 1978
issued an explanatory pamphlet stating that the annual filings were
to be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Ante at 471 U. S. 89 -90,
n. 7. Moreover, the BLM evidently has come to understand the need
to clarify the nature of the annual filing requirement, because it
now sends reminder notices every year to holders of recorded mining
claims warning them that the deadline is approaching and that
filings must be made on or before December 30.

															The unusual facts alleged by appellees suggest that the BLM's
actions might estop the Government from relying on § 314(c) to
obliterate a property interest that has provided a family's
livelihood for decades. The Court properly notes that the estoppel
issue was not addressed by the District Court, and will be open on
remand. Ante at 471 U. S. 89 -90,
n. 7. In this regard, I merely note that, in my view, our previous
decisions do not preclude application of estoppel in this context.
In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County,
Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we expressly declined to adopt "a flat rule that estoppel
may not in any circumstances run against the Government." Id. at 467 U. S. 60 .
Such a rule was unnecessary to the decision in that case, and we
noted our reluctance to hold that

															"there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring
that the Government can enforce the law free from estoppel might be
outweighed by the countervailing Page 471 U. S. 112 interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor,
and reliability in their dealings with their Government." Id. at 471 U. S. 60 -61
(footnote omitted).

															Although "it is well settled that the Government may not be
estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," id. at 471 U. S. 60 (footnote omitted), we have never held that the Government can
extinguish a vested property interest that has been legally held
and actively maintained for more than 20 years merely because the
private owners relied on advice from agency personnel concerning a
poorly worded statutory deadline and consequently missed a filing
deadline by one day. Thus, if the District Court ultimately
determines that appellees reasonably relied on communications from
the BLM in making their annual filing on December 31, 1980, our
previous decisions would not necessarily bar application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the fact that the
Court reverses the decision of the District Court does not
establish that appellees must ultimately forfeit their mining
claims.

															JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

															I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. I write
separately only because, under the special circumstances of this
case, I do not believe it necessary to decide what Congress
actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in believing that
Congress intended to require filings on or before the
next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more reasonably, by
the end of the calendar year itself, the statutory deadline is too
uncertain to satisfy constitutional requirements. It simply fails
to give property holders clear and definite notice of what they
must do to protect their existing property interests.

															As the Court acknowledges, ante at 471 U. S. 86 ,
the Government since the 19th century has encouraged its citizens
to discover and develop certain minerals on the public lands. Under
the general mining laws, 30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq., an
individual who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive
possession Page 471 U. S. 113 of the land for mining purposes, and may extract and sell
minerals he finds there without paying a royalty to the Federal
Government. § 26. After making a valuable mineral discovery, the
claimant may hold the claim so long as he performs $100 worth of
assessment work each year. § 28. If he performs certain additional
conditions, the claimant may patent the claim for a nominal sum and
thereby obtain further rights over the land and minerals. See § 29. Until recently, there were no federal
recordation requirements.

															Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created as to
property rights on public lands, Congress enacted § 314 of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2769, 43
U.S.C. § 1744. [ Footnote 2/1 ] This
provision required existing claimholders to record their claims in
order to retain them. More specifically, it required that "within
the three-year period following October 21, 1976, and prior to
December 31 of each year thereafter," § 1744(a), claimholders file
with Page 471 U. S. 114 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of
intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment work,
or a special form, §§ 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to make either
the initial or a subsequent yearly filing was to "be deemed
conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim. . .
." § 1744(c).

															Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of 10 unpatented mining claims
on federal land in Nevada. Appellees' predecessors located these
claims in 1952 and 1954, and appellees have, since they purchased
the claims in 1960, earned their livelihood by producing gravel and
other building materials from them. From 1960 to the present, they
have produced approximately $4 million worth of materials. During
the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and other
materials worth more than $1 million. In no sense were their claims
stale.

															The Lockes fully complied with § 314's initial recordation
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October 19,
1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the subsequent
yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent their daughter,
who worked in their business office, to the Ely, Nevada, office of
the BLM. There she inquired into how and when they should file the
assessment notice and was told, among other things, that the
documents should be filed at the Reno office "on or before December
31, 1980." 573 F.
Supp. 472 , 474 (Nev.1983). Following this advice, the Lockes
hand-delivered their documents at the Reno office on that date. On
April 4, 1981, they received notice from the BLM that their mining
claims were "abandoned and void," App. to Juris. Statement 22a,
because they had filed on, rather than prior to, December 31.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] It is this 1-day
difference Page 471 U. S. 115 in good faith interpretation of the statutory deadline that
gives rise to the present controversy.

															JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circumstances
that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress drafted § 314
and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that (i) the section
does not clearly describe what must be filed, let alone when it
must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the deadline in its
implementing regulations, 43 CFR § 3833.2-1(a)(1) (1984), indicates
that the BLM itself considered the statutory deadline confusing;
(iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM recognized this possible
confusion, even it had described the section in a pamphlet
distributed to miners in 1978 as requiring filing "on or before
December 31 "; (iv) BLM, charged with enforcing the section, has
interpreted it quite flexibly; and (v) irrationally requiring
property holders to file by one day before the end of the year,
rather than by the end of the year itself, creates "a trap for the
unwary," post at 471 U. S. 123 .
As JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the last,
suggest not only that Congress drafted § 314 inartfully but also
that Congress may actually have intended to require filing "on or
before," not "prior to," December 31. This is certainly the more
reasonable interpretation of congressional intent, and is
consistent with all the policies of the Act.

															I do not believe, however, that given the special circumstances
of this case, we need determine what Congress actually intended. As
the Court today recognizes, the Takings Clause imposes some
limitations on the Government's power to impose forfeitures. Ante at 471 U. S.
103 -108. In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.
S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most important
of these limitations when we stated that "the State has the power
to condition the permanent retention of [a] Page 471 U. S. 116 property right on the performance of reasonable conditions.
. . . " Id. at 454 U. S. 526 (emphasis added); accord, 28 U. S. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 28 U. S. 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where the
[forfeiture] provisio[n] . . . may be so unreasonable as to amount
to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of the court
. . ."). Furthermore, conditions, like those here, imposed after a
property interest is created, must also meet due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S.
1 , 428 U. S. 16 -17
(1976). These standards require, among other things, that there be
no question as to what actions an individual must take to protect
his interests. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 454 U. S.
532 -533. Together, the Takings and Due Process Clauses
prevent the Government from depriving an individual of property
rights arbitrarily. In the present case, there is no claim that a
yearly filing requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim
arises from the fact that the language "prior to December 31"
creates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing
period ends. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Given
the natural tendency to interpret this phrase as "by the end of the
calendar year," rather than "on or before the next-to-the-last day
of the calendar year," I believe this uncertainty violated the
standard of certainty Page 471 U. S. 117 and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The statement
in at least one of the Government's own publications that filing
was required "on or before December 31," Department of the
Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands 10 (1978),
supports this conclusion. Terminating a property interest because a
property holder reasonably believed that, under the statute, he had
an additional day to satisfy any filing requirements is no less
arbitrary than terminating it for failure to satisfy these same
conditions in an unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55 , 185 U. S. 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S.
628 , 95 U. S.
632 -633 (1877). Although the latter may rest on
impossibility, the former rests on good faith performance a day
late of what easily could have been performed the day before.
Neither serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture
of property rights to the State.

															I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than did § 314
when he must fulfill any recording requirements imposed after a
property interest is created. Given the statutory uncertainty here,
I would find a forfeiture imposed for filing on December 31 to be
invalid. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															I accordingly dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Section 314(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety:

															"Recordation of Mining Claims"

															"(a) Filing requirements"

															"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located
prior to October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, and prior to December 31 of each year
thereafter, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection. The owner of an unpatented lode or placer
mining claim located after October 21, 1976, shall, prior to
December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection:"

															"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or
certificate is recorded either a notice of intention to hold the
mining claim (including but not limited to such notices as are
provided by law to be filed when there has been a suspension or
deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of assessment
work performed thereon, on [ sic ] a detailed report
provided by section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto."

															"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the instrument filed or
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a
description of the location of the mining claim sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The notice from the BLM also stated that,

															"[s]ubject to valid intervening rights of third parties or the
United States void or abandoned claims or sites may be relocated
and, based on the new location date, the appropriate instruments
may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the
regulations."

															App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however,
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common
Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., had
withdrawn deposits of common building materials from coverage of
the general mining laws. To them, forfeiture meant not relocation
and refiling, but rather irrevocable loss of their claims -- the
source of their livelihood.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Court believes it is "obligated to apply the prior to
December 31' language by its terms" because "its meaning is clear." Ante at 471 U. S. 96 .
Such clarity, however, is not to be found in the words themselves.
Courts, for example, have used these same words in similar contexts
clearly to mean "by the end of the year," e.g., AMF Inc. v.
Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1108, 1115 (CA1 1983); Bay State
Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 1, 2 (CA1 1982), or have
contrasted them with other phrases such as "[f]rom January 1," NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm'n of
New York Harbor, 732 F.2d 292, 295, and n. 6 (CA2), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984), or "after December 31," Peabody Coal Co. v. Lowis, 708 F.2d 266, 267, n. 3 (CA7
1983), in ways that strongly suggest this meaning. Various
administrative agencies have also followed this same usage in
promulgating their regulations. E.g., 24 CFR § 570.423(b)
(1984); 31 CFR § 515.560(i) (1984); 40 CFR § 52.1174
(1984). [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Parties, of course, ordinarily are bound to the consequences of
their failing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true,
for example, as to statutes of limitations and other filing
deadlines clearly specified. Because of the special circumstances
JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitutional concerns
identified above, this case is unique.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.

															The Court's opinion is contrary to the intent of Congress,
engages in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, and unjustly
creates a trap for unwary property owners. First, the choice of the
language "prior to December 31," when read in Page 471 U. S. 118 context in 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a) [ Footnote 3/1 ] is, at least, ambiguous, and, at best,

															"the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps
caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress Page 471 U. S. 119 is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should.
[ Footnote 3/2 ]"

															In my view, Congress actually intended to authorize an annual
filing at any time prior to the close of business on December 31st,
that is, prior to the end of the calendar year to which the filing
pertains. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Second,
even if Congress irrationally intended that the applicable deadline
for a calendar year should end one day before the end of
the calendar year that has been recognized since the amendment of
the Julian Calendar in 8 B.C., it is clear that appellees have
substantially complied with the requirements of the statute, in
large part because the Bureau of Land Management has issued
interpreting regulations that recognize substantial Page 471 U. S. 120 compliance. Further, the Court today violates not only the
long-followed principle that a court should

															"not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided, [ Footnote
3/4 ]"

															but also the principle that a court should "not decide a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to
dispose of the case." [ Footnote
3/5 ] I Congress enacted § 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act to establish for federal land planners and managers a federal
recording system designed to cope with the problem of stale claims,
and to provide "an easy way of discovering which Federal lands are
subject to either valid or invalid mining claim locations."
[ Footnote 3/6 ] I submit that the
appellees' actions in this case did not diminish the importance of
these congressional purposes; to the contrary, their actions were
entirely consistent with the statutory purposes, despite the
confusion created by the "inartful draftsmanship" of the statutory
language. [ Footnote 3/7 ]

															A careful reading of § 314 discloses at least three respects in
which its text cannot possibly reflect the actual intent of
Congress. First, the description of what must be filed in the
initial filing and subsequent annual filings is quite obviously
garbled. Read literally, § 314(a)(2) seems to require that a Page 471 U. S. 121 notice of intent to hold the claim and an affidavit of
assessment work performed on the claim must be filed "on a detailed
report provided by § 28-1 of Title 30." One must substitute the
word "or" for the word "on" to make any sense at all out of this
provision. This error should cause us to pause before concluding
that Congress commanded blind allegiance to the remainder of the
literal text of § 314.

															Second, the express language of the statute is unambiguous in
describing the place where the second annual filing shall be made.
If the statute is read inflexibly, the owner must "file in the
office of the Bureau" the required documents. [ Footnote 3/8 ] Yet the regulations that the Bureau
itself has drafted, quite reasonably, construe the statute to allow
filing in a mailbox, provided that the document is actually
received by the Bureau prior to the close of business on January
19th of the year following the year in which the statute requires
the filing to be made. [ Footnote
3/9 ] A notice mailed on December 30, 1982, and received by the
Bureau on January 19, 1983, was filed "in the office of the Bureau"
during 1982 within the meaning of the statute, but one that is
hand-delivered to the office on December 31, 1982, cannot be
accepted as a 1982 "filing."

															The Court finds comfort in the fact that the implementing
regulations have eliminated the risk of injustice. Ante at 471 U. S. 94 .
But if one must rely on those regulations, it should be apparent
that the meaning of the statute itself is not all that obvious. Page 471 U. S. 122 To begin with, the regulations do not use the language "prior to
December 31"; instead, they use "on or before December 30 of each
year." [ Footnote 3/10 ] The
Bureau's drafting of the regulations using this latter phrase
indicates that the meaning of the statute itself is not quite as
"plain," ante at 471 U. S. 93 , as
the Court assumes; if the language were plain, it is doubtful that
the Bureau would have found it necessary to change the language at
all. Moreover, the Bureau, under the aegis of the Department of the
Interior, once issued a pamphlet entitled "Staking a Mining Claim
on Federal Lands" that contained the following information:

															"Owners of claims or sites located on or before Oct. 21, 1976,
have until Oct. 22, 1979, to file evidence of assessment work
performed the preceding year or to file a notice of intent to hold
the claim or site. Once the claim or site is recorded with BLM, these documents must be filed on or before December 31 of each
subsequent year. " Id. at 9-10 (1978) (emphasis added). "Plain language," ante at 471 U. S. 93 ,
indeed.

															There is a more important reason why the implementing
regulations cannot be supportive of the result the Court reaches
today: the Bureau's own deviation from the statutory language in
its mail-filing regulation. See 471 U.S.
84 fn3/9|>n. 9, supra. If the Bureau had issued
regulations expressly stating that a Page 471 U. S. 123 December 31 filing would be considered timely -- just as it has
stated that a mail filing received on January 19 is timely -- it is
inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of its
regulation. It appears, however, that the Bureau has more power to
interpret an awkwardly drafted statute in an enlightened manner
consistent with Congress' intent than does this Court. [ Footnote 3/11 ]

															In light of the foregoing, I cannot believe that Congress
intended the words "prior to December 31 of each year" to be given
the literal reading the Court adopts today. The statutory scheme
requires periodic filings on a calendar-year basis. The end of the
calendar year is, of course, correctly described either as "prior
to the close of business on December 31," or "on or before December
31," but it is surely understandable that the author of § 314 might
inadvertently use the words "prior to December 31" when he meant to
refer to the end of the calendar year. As the facts of this case
demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can be made in good
faith. The risk of such an error is, of course, the greatest when
the reference is to the end of the calendar year. That it was in
fact an error seems rather clear to me, because no one has
suggested any rational basis for omitting just one day from the
period in which an annual filing may be made, and I would not
presume that Congress deliberately created a trap for the unwary by
such an omission. Page 471 U. S. 124 It would be fully consistent with the intent of Congress to
treat any filing received during the 1980 calendar year as a timely
filing for that year. Such an interpretation certainly does not
interfere with Congress' intent to establish a federal recording
system designed to cope with the problem of stale mining claims on
federal lands. The system is established, and apparently,
functioning. [ Footnote 3/12 ]
Moreover, the claims here were active; the Bureau was well aware
that the appellees intended to hold and to operate their
claims.

															Additionally, a sensible construction of the statute does not
interfere with Congress' intention to provide "an easy way of
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or Page 471 U. S. 125 invalid mining claim locations." [ Footnote 3/13 ] The Bureau in this case was well aware
of the existence and production of appellees' mining claims; only
by blinking reality could the Bureau reach the decision that it
did. It is undisputed that the appellees made the first 1980 filing
on August 29, 1980, and made the second required filing on December
31, 1980; the Bureau did not declare the mining claims "abandoned
and void" until April 4, 1981. Thus, appellees lost their entire
livelihood for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of
Congress, and because of the hypertechnical construction of a
poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow
"filings" far beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but then
interprets inflexibly in others. [ Footnote 3/14 ] Appellants acknowledge that

															"[i]t may well be that Congress wished to require filing by the
end of the calendar year and that the earlier deadline resulted
from careless draftsmanship."

															Brief for Appellants 42, n. 31. I have no doubt that Congress
would have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that
filing take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention
had been focused on this precise issue. Cf. DelCostello v.
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151 , 462 U. S. 158 (1983). [ Footnote 3/15 ] Page 471 U. S. 126 II After concluding its constitutional analysis, the District Court
also held that

															"the standard to be applied to assessment notice requirements is
substantial compliance. Measured against this, the Lockes have
satisfied their statutory duties under Section 1744 by filing their
notices one day late. [ Footnote
3/16 ]"

															The District Court grounded its holding on this Court's analysis
in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S.
48 (1970).

															In Hickel, the Court construed 30 U.S.C. § 28, which
reads:

															"On each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872, and until
a patent has been issued therefor, not less than $100 worth of
labor shall be performed or improvements Page 471 U. S. 127 made during each year. . . . [U]pon a failure to comply with
these conditions, the claim or mine upon which such failure
occurred shall be open to relocation in the same manner as if no
location of the same had ever been made, provided that the
original locators, their heirs, assigns, or legal representatives,
have not resumed work upon the claim after failure and before such
location."

															(Emphasis added.) Recognizing that a claimant's "possessory
title" should not be disturbed on "flimsy or insubstantial
grounds," 400 U.S. at 471 U. S. 57 ,
the Court wrote:

															"We agree . . . that every default in assessment work does not
cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however, might be the
equivalent of abandonment; and we now hold that token assessment
work, or assessment work that does not substantially satisfy the
requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the
claims within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold
otherwise would help defeat the policy that made the United States,
as the prospective recipient of royalties, a beneficiary of these
oil shale claims. We cannot support [ Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S.
306 (1930),] and [ Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado
Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639 (1935)], on so
broad a ground. Rather, their dicta to the contrary, we conclude
that they must be confined to situations where there had been
substantial compliance with the assessment work requirements. . .
." Ibid. Hickel thus demonstrates that the District Court was
correct that substantial compliance analysis was appropriate in
this case, and that appellees substantially complied with the
statute. Appellees earned their livelihood since 1960 by mining the
10 unpatented mining claims now in dispute. [ Footnote 3/17 ] They paid income taxes, and property and
production taxes to the State of Nevada, which appears as an amicus in support Page 471 U. S. 128 of appellees. The statute, passed in 1976, required appellees to
register their mining claims "in the office where the location
notice or certificate is recorded" and "in the office of the
Bureau" by October 21, 1979; it is not disputed that appellees met
the statute's two initial filing requirements. [ Footnote 3/18 ] Moreover, the statute required,
within three years of October 21, 1976, that appellees file "in the
office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the
official record of the notice of location or certificate of
location." [ Footnote 3/19 ]
Appellees also met this third requirement, thus completely
informing the Bureau of the existence, the sizes, the locations,
and the ownership of appellees' active mining claims. After the
three initial filing requirements, the statute required that
appellees make two separate annual filings: (1) an initial filing
with the county recorder; and (2) a copy of the official record of
the first filing filed with the Bureau. Appellees made the first of
these filings for the 1980 calendar year on August 29, 1980.
Because 1980 was generally the first year that claimants --
including appellees -- had to comply with the annual filing
requirements that the new legislation mandated, the Bureau began
the practice of mailing reminder notices about the filing due in
the Bureau's office. Appellants acknowledge that appellees did not
receive a reminder notice. [ Footnote
3/20 ] Nevertheless, appellees responsibly inquired about the
date of filing with the Bureau for the 1980 calendar year; it is
undisputed that Bureau personnel informed them that the filing was
due "on or before December 31, 1980." [ Footnote 3/21 ] On December 31, 1980, appellees made a
700-mile round trip from Ely to Reno, Nevada, to hand-deliver their
filings to the Bureau. The Bureau accepted the filings on that
date. [ Footnote 3/22 ]

															In my view, this unique factual matrix unequivocally contradicts
the statutory presumption of an intent to abandon by Page 471 U. S. 129 reason of a late filing. In sum, this case presents an ambiguous
statute, which, if strictly construed, will destroy valuable rights
of appellees, property owners who have complied with all local and
federal statutory filing requirements apart from a 1-day "late"
filing caused by the Bureau's own failure to mail a reminder notice
necessary because of the statute's ambiguity and caused by the
Bureau's information to appellees that the date on which the filing
occurred would be acceptable. Further, long before the Bureau
declared a technical "abandonment," it was in complete possession
of all information necessary to assess the activity, locations, and
ownership of appellees' mining claims, and it possessed all
information needed to carry out its statutory functions. Finally,
the Bureau has not claimed that the filing is contrary to the
congressional purposes behind the statute, that the filing affected
the Bureau's land use planning functions in any manner, or that it
interfered "in any measurable way" with the Bureau's need to obtain
information. A showing of substantial compliance necessitates a
significant burden of proof; appellees, whose active mining claims
will be destroyed contrary to Congress' intent, have convinced me
that they have substantially complied with the statute.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The full text of 43 U.S.C. § 1744 reads as follows:

															"Recordation of Mining Claims"

															"(a) Filing requirements"

															"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located
prior to October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period
following October 21, 1976, and prior to December 31 of each year
thereafter, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and (2)
of this subsection. The owner of an unpatented lode or placer
mining claim located after October 21, 1976, shall, prior to
December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs
(1) and (2) of this subsection:"

															"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or
certificate is recorded either a notice of intention to hold the
mining claim (including but not limited to such notices as are
provided by law to be filed when there has been a suspension or
deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of assessment
work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by section
28-1 of title 30, relating thereto."

															"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the
Secretary a copy of the official record of the instrument filed or
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, including a
description of the location of the mining claim sufficient to
locate the claimed lands on the ground."

															"(b) Additional filing requirements"

															"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill
or tunnel site located prior to October 21, 1976, shall, within the
three-year period following October 21, 1976, file in the office of
the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the official
record of the notice of location or certificate of location,
including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the
ground. The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or
mill or tunnel site located after October 21, 1976, shall, within
ninety days after the date of location of such claim, file in the
office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the
official record of the notice of location or certificate of
location, including a description of the location of the mining
claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands
on the ground."

															"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or
untimely filing"

															"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections
(a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel
site by the owner; but it shall not be considered a failure to file
if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under
other Federal laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if
the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not
all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site."

															"(d) Validity of claims, waiver of assessment, etc., as
unaffected"

															"Such recordation or application by itself shall not render
valid any claim which would not be otherwise valid under applicable
law. Nothing in this section shall be construed as a waiver of the
assessment and other requirements of such law."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73 , 430 U. S. 97 (1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															This view was expressed at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute in July, 1977:

															"It is plain that Congress intended the filing requirement to
expire with the last day of the year, but inartful draftsmanship
requires all filings under Subsection 314(a) of the Act to be made
on or before December 30th. Such is the result of the unfortunate
use of the words 'prior to December 31.' And since December 31st
bears no relationship to the assessment year, which ends at noon on
September 1st of each year, the statutory requirement that the
locator shall file the necessary documents on or before December
30th of each year following the calendar year in which a claim was
located means that, where a claim is located after noon on
September 1st in any calendar year, the locator must file in the
next full calendar year a notice of intention to hold, because no
assessment work requirement has yet arisen."

															Sherwood, Mining-claim Recordation and Prospecting under The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 23 Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute 1, 25 (1977) (footnotes omitted).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] United States v. Clark, 445 U. S.
23 , 445 U. S. 27 (1980).

															[ Footnote 3/5 ] Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S.
48 , 466 U. S. 51 (1984) (per curiam); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															S.Rep. No. 94-583, P. 65 (1975). The Court agrees regarding the
first purpose, but inexplicably and without citation concludes that
another purpose of § 314 is "to provide federal land managers with
up-to-date information that allows them to make informed management
decisions." Ante at 471 U. S. 87 .
This latter statutory "purpose" is not mentioned in the legislative
history; rather, it is a variation of a "purpose," equally without
citation, offered by appellants. See Brief for Appellants
45, 47.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ] See 471 U.S.
84 fn3/3|>n. 3, supra. [ Footnote 3/8 ] See 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a)(2).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Title 43 CFR § 3833.0-5(m) (1984) provides:

															"'Filed or file' means being received and date stamped by the
proper BLM office. For the purpose of complying with § 3833.2-1 of
this title, 'timely filed' means being filed within the time period
prescribed by law, or received by January 19th after the period
prescribed by law in an envelope bearing a clearly dated postmark
affixed by the United States Postal Service within the period
prescribed by law. This 20-day period does not apply to a notice of
location filed pursuant to § 3833.1-2 of this title. ( See § 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the last day falls on a date the
office is closed.)"

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															43 CFR § 3833.2-1(b)(1) (1984). It is undisputed that the
regulations did not come to the attention of the appellees. To
justify the forfeiture in this case on the ground that appellees
are chargeable with constructive notice of the contents of the
Federal Register is no more acceptable to me today than it would
have been to Justice Jackson in 1947.

															"To my mind, it is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who
insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains or even
knows that there is such a publication. If he were to peruse this
voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time to time
in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that
affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he
would never get time to plant any crops." Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380 , 332 U. S. 387 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															The Court, ante at 471 U. S.
102 -103, n. 14, criticizes my citation of the BLM
regulations to demonstrate that the agency has itself departed from
the "plain" statutory language by allowing mail filings to be
received by January 19th. In the same breath, the Court
acknowledges that the agency is not bound by the "plain" language
in "administering the statute." Ibid. The mail-delivery
deadline makes it clear that the Court's judicially created
"up-to-date" statutory purpose is utterly lacking in foundation.
The agency's adoption of the January 19 deadline illustrates that
it does not need the information by December 30; that it is not
bound by the language of the provision; and that substantial
compliance does not interfere with the agency's statutory functions
or with the intent of Congress.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															Several amici have filed materials listing numerous
cases in which it is asserted that the Bureau is using every
technical construction of the statute to suck up active mining
claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not watched closely, will suck
up jewelry or loose money. See Brief for Mountain States
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2 (claiming that an
"overwhelming number of mining claims have been lost to the
pitfalls of section 314"), 3 (claiming that from 1977 to 1984,
"unpatented mining claimants lost almost 20,000 active locations
due to the technical rigors and conclusive presumption of section
314"); App. 1-86 (listing cases); Brief for Alaska Miners
Association, California Mining Association, Nevada Mining
Association, Miners Advocacy Council, and Placer Miners Association
as Amici Curiae, Exhibit A (letter from Bureau's Utah
State Office stating that well over 1,400 claims were invalidated
from 1979-1983 because § 1744(a)(1) filings were made on December
31), Exhibit B (letter from Bureau's Billings, Montana Office
stating that 198 claims were invalidated from 1979-1983 because §
1744(a)(1) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit C (letter
from Bureau's Wyoming State Office stating that 11 claims were
invalidated in 1980-1982 because § 1744(a)(2) filings were made on
December 31), Exhibit D (letter from Bureau's Arizona State Office
stating that "approximately 500 claims have been invalidated due to
filing an affidavit one day late"); Brief for Mobil Oil Corporation
as Amicus Curiae 2-4 (claiming to be in a situation
similar to the appellees'). According to the Bureau's own
calculations, thousands of active mining claims have been
terminated because filings made on December 31 were considered
untimely. These representations confirm the picture painted by amici of a federal bureaucracy virtually running amok, and
surely operating contrary to the intent of Congress, by terminating
the valuable property rights of hardworking, productive citizens of
our country.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															S.Rep. No. 94-583, P. 65 (1975).

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															The Court suggests that appellees' failure to file by December
30 "caused the property right to be extinguished." Ante at 471 U. S. 107 .
However, the Court, on the one hand, carefully avoids mentioning
the 3-month period that elapsed after December 31 before the Bureau
declared the appellees' mining claims abandoned, and, on the other
hand, describes the Bureau as needing "up-to-date information that
allows them to make informed land management decisions." Ante at 471 U. S. 87 , 471 U. S.
107 .

															[ Footnote 3/15 ]

															The Court, ante at 471 U. S. 96 -97,
n. 12, lists several provisions in the United States Code as
supportive of its position that "prior to December 31" is somehow
less ambiguous because of its occasional use in various statutory
provisions. It then states that it "is unclear whether the
arguments advanced by the dissenters are meant to apply to all of
the provisions, or only to some of them." Ibid. However,
the provisions cited for support illustrate the lack of
justification for the Court's approach, and highlight the
uniqueness of the provision in this case. Eleven of the provisions
refer to a one-time specific date; the provision at issue here
requires specific action on a continual annual basis, thus
involving a much greater risk of creating a trap for the unwary.
Further, each of the specific dates mentioned in the 11 provisions
is long past; thus, contrary to the Court's premise, this decision
would have no effect on them, because they require no future
action. See 7 U.S.C. § 609(b)(5) ("prior to December 31,
1937"); 12 U.S.C. § 1709)(o)(1)(E) ("prior to December 31, 1976");
12 U.S.C. § 1823(g) ("prior to December 31, 1950"); 12 U.S.C. §
1841(a)(5)(A) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 26 U.S.C. § 503(d)(1)
("prior to December 31, 1955"); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(5)(B) ("prior
to December 31, 1974"); 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(E)(ii) (1982 ed.,
Supp. III) ("prior to December 31, 1983"); 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-17(b)
("prior to December 31, 1969"); 42 U.S.C. § 5614 (b)(5) ("after the
first year following October 3, 1977, prior to December 31"); 42
U.S.C. § 7502(a)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1982"); 42 U.S.C. §
7521(b)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 50 U.S.C.App. §
1741(b)(1) ("prior to December 31, 1946"). The remaining provision
cited as authority by the Court, 22 U.S.C. § 3784(c), states that
the Panama Canal and certain other property "shall not be
transferred to the Republic of Panama prior to December 31, 1999."
The legislative history indicates that that language was added to
make

															"clear that the President is not authorized to accelerate the
final transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, as provided by the
Panama Canal Treaty of 1977."

															H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 96-473, p. 61 (1979). The Panama Canal Treaty
of 1977, Art. II, indicates that it "shall terminate at noon,
Panama time, December 31, 1999." Therefore, the language of §
3784(c) was tailored to a unique treaty provision.

															[ Footnote 3/16 ] 573 F.
Supp. 472 , 479 (Nev.1983).

															[ Footnote 3/17 ] Id. at 474.

															[ Footnote 3/18 ] Ibid. .

															[ Footnote 3/19 ]

															43 U.S.C. § 1744(b).

															[ Footnote 3/20 ]

															Reply Brief for Appellants 13, n. 12.

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															Affidavit of Laura C. Locke � 3.

															[ Footnote 3/22 ]

															Brief for Appellants 45.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that the annual filing deadline for mining claims must be met by December 30, and failure to comply results in the claim being lost, regardless of the claimant's intent. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the filing requirement, which was within Congress's powers.