U.S. Supreme Court New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985) New Jersey v. T.L.O. No. 83-712 Argued March 28, 1984 Reargued October 2,
1984 Decided January 15,
1985 469
U.S. 325 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW JERSEY Syllabus A teacher at a New Jersey high school, upon discovering
respondent, then a 14-year-old freshman, and her companion smoking
cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule, took
them to the Principal's office, where they met with the Assistant
Vice Principal. When respondent, in response to the Assistant Vice
Principal's questioning, denied that she had been smoking and
claimed that she did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal
demanded to see her purse. Upon opening the purse, he found a pack
of cigarettes and also noticed a package of cigarette rolling
papers that are commonly associated with the use of marihuana. He
then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly and found some
marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of
money, an index card containing a list of students who owed
respondent money, and two letters that implicated her in marihuana
dealing. Thereafter, the State brought delinquency charges against
respondent in the Juvenile Court, which, after denying respondent's
motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse, held that the
Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials, but that
the search in question was a reasonable one, and adjudged
respondent to be a delinquent. The Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there
had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the
adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered the suppression of the
evidence found in respondent's purse, holding that the search of
the purse was unreasonable. Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials, and is not limited to searches carried out by law
enforcement officers. Nor are school officials exempt from the
Amendment's dictates by virtue of the special nature of their
authority over schoolchildren. In carrying out searches and other
functions pursuant to disciplinary policies mandated by state
statutes, school officials act as representatives of the State, not
merely as surrogates for the parents of students, and they cannot
claim the parents immunity from the Fourth Amendment's strictures.
Pp. 469 U. S.
333 -337. Page 469 U. S. 326 2. Schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy. They
may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate,
noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they
have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items by
bringing them onto school grounds. But striking the balance between
schoolchildren's legitimate expectations of privacy and the
school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in
which learning can take place requires some easing of the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily
subject. Thus, school officials need not obtain a warrant before
searching a student who is under their authority. Moreover, school
officials need not be held subject to the requirement that searches
be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the
search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality
of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a
determination of whether the search was justified at its inception
and whether, as conducted, it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place. Under ordinary circumstances, the search of a student by a
school official will be justified at its inception where there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school. And such a search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search, and not excessively
intrusive in light of the student's age and sex and the nature of
the infraction. Pp. 469 U. S.
337 -343.

															3. Under the above standard, the search in this case was not
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, the initial
search for cigarettes was reasonable. The report to the Assistant
Vice Principal that respondent had been smoking warranted a
reasonable suspicion that she had cigarettes in her purse, and thus
the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if
found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation of the
no-smoking rule. Second, the discovery of the rolling papers then
gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that respondent was carrying
marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse, and this suspicion
justified the further exploration that turned up more evidence of
drug-related activities. Pp. 469 U. S.
343 -347.

															94 N.J. 331, 463
A.2d 934 , reversed.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part 469 U. S. MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 469 U. S.
348 . Page 469 U. S. 327 BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 469 U. S. 351 .
BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 469 U. S. 353 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, and in Part I of which
BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 469 U. S.
370 .

															JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari in this case to examine the
appropriateness of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for searches
carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public school
authorities. Our consideration of the proper application of the
Fourth Amendment to the public schools, however, has led us to
conclude that the search that gave rise to Page 469 U. S. 328 the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, we here address only the questions of the proper
standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by public
school officials and the application of that standard to the facts
of this case. I On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in
Middlesex County, N.J. discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory.
One of the two girls was the respondent T.L.O, who at that time was
a 14-year-old high school freshman. Because smoking in the lavatory
was a violation of a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to
the Principal's office, where they met with Assistant Vice
Principal Theodore Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr.
Choplick, T.L.O's companion admitted that she had violated the
rule. T.L.O, however, denied that she had been smoking in the
lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.

															Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O to come into his private office and
demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack of
cigarettes, which he removed from the purse and held before T.L.O
as he accused her of having lied to him. As he reached into the
purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package of
cigarette rolling papers. In his experience, possession of rolling
papers by high school students was closely associated with the use
of marihuana. Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse
might yield further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to
search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount of
marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial
quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card that appeared
to be a list of students who owed T.L.O money, and two letters that
implicated T.L.O in marihuana dealing.

															Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O's mother and the police, and turned
the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At Page 469 U. S. 329 the request of the police, T.L.O's mother took her daughter to
police headquarters, where T.L.O confessed that she had been
selling marihuana at the high school. On the basis of the
confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick, the State
brought delinquency charges against T.L.O in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. [ Footnote 1 ] Contending that Mr. Choplick's search
of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T.L.O moved to suppress
the evidence found in her purse as well as her confession, which,
she argued, was tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. The
Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. State ex rel.
T.L.O., 178 N.J.Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that the
Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by school
officials, it held that

															"a school official may properly conduct a search of a student's
person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has
been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to
maintain school discipline or enforce school policies." Id. at 341, 428 A.2d at 1333 (emphasis in
original).

															Applying this standard, the court concluded that the search
conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one. The initial
decision to open the purse was justified by Mr. Choplick's
well-founded suspicion that T.L.O had violated the rule forbidding
smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse Page 469 U. S. 330 was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view,
and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search to
determine the nature and extent of T.L.O's drug-related activities. Id. at 343, 428 A.2d at 1334. Having denied the motion to
suppress, the court on March 23, 1981, found T.L.O. to be a
delinquent and on January 8, 1982, sentenced her to a year's
probation.

															On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a
divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding that
there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated the
adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determination
whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth
Amendment rights before confessing. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J.Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982). T.L.O. appealed the Fourth Amendment
ruling, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment
of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression of the
evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94
N.J. 331, 463 A.2d
934 (1983).

															The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that
the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
officials. The court also rejected the State of New Jersey's
argument that the exclusionary rule should not be employed to
prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully
seized by school officials. Declining to consider whether applying
the rule to the fruits of searches by school officials would have
any deterrent value, the court held simply that the precedents of
this Court establish that "if an official search violates
constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal
proceedings." Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 939 (footnote
omitted).

															With respect to the question of the legality of the search
before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a
warrantless search by a school official does not violate the Fourth
Amendment so long as the official

															"has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses
evidence of illegal Page 469 U. S. 331 activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline
and order." Id. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-942. However, the court,
with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed with the Juvenile
Court's conclusion that the search of the purse was reasonable.
According to the majority, the contents of T.L.O.'s purse had no
bearing on the accusation against T.L.O., for possession of
cigarettes (as opposed to smoking them in the lavatory) did not
violate school rules, and a mere desire for evidence that would
impeach T.L.O.'s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not
justify the search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that
T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, Mr.
Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished him with
any specific information that there were cigarettes in the purse.
Finally, leaving aside the question whether Mr. Choplick was
justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of
drug use that he saw inside did not justify the extensive
"rummaging" through T.L.O.'s papers and effects that followed. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-943.

															We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari.
464 U.S. 991 (1983). Although the State had argued in the Supreme
Court of New Jersey that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, the petition for certiorari raised
only the question whether the exclusionary rule should operate to
bar consideration in juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence
unlawfully seized by a school official without the involvement of
law enforcement officers. When this case was first argued last
Term, the State conceded for the purpose of argument that the
standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining
the legality of school searches was appropriate and that the court
had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that
the remedial purposes of the exclusionary rule were not well served
by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not
primarily engaged in law enforcement. Page 469 U. S. 332 Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue of
the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful
school searches, our doubts regarding the wisdom of deciding that
question in isolation from the broader question of what limits, if
any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school
authorities prompted us to order reargument on that question.
[ Footnote 2 ] Having heard
argument on Page 469 U. S. 333 the legality of the search of T.L.O.'s purse, we are satisfied
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote 3 ] II In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated
the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question
whether that Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.
We hold that it does. Page 469 U. S. 334 It is now beyond dispute that

															"the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 213 (1960); accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25 (1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students against
encroachment by public school officials:

															"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of
Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S. 637 (1943).

															These two propositions -- that the Fourth Amendment applies to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the actions
of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on
state action by the Fourteenth Amendment -- might appear sufficient
to answer the suggestion that the Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument,
however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the
Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to
regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement
officers; accordingly, although public school officials are
concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them.
[ Footnote 4 ] Page 469 U. S. 335 It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth
Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of the
pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or "writs of
assistance" to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the
Crown. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 7 -8
(1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 , 116 U. S.
624 -629 (1886). But this Court has never limited the
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to
operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long
spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed
upon "governmental action" -- that is, "upon the activities of
sovereign authority." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.
S. 465 , 256 U. S. 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable
to the activities of civil as well as criminal authorities:
building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 , 387 U. S. 528 (1967), Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 , 436 U. S.
312 -313 (1978), and even firemen entering privately
owned premises to battle a fire, see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499 , 436 U. S. 506 (1978), are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. As we observed in Camara v. Municipal Court,
supra, "[t]he basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials."

															387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 528 .
Because the individual's interest in privacy and personal security
"suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate
violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or
regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 436 U. S.
312 -313, it would be "anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 387 U. S.
530 . Page 469 U. S. 336 Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts have
concluded that school officials are exempt from the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special nature of their authority
over schoolchildren. See, e.g., R.C.M. v. State, 660
S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983). Teachers and school administrators, it
is said, act in loco parentis in their dealings with
students: their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and
is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and the
teachings of this Court. We have held school officials subject to
the commands of the First Amendment, see Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.
S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.
S. 565 (1975). If school authorities are state actors
for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they
should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public
authority when conducting searches of their students. More
generally, the Court has recognized that "the concept of parental
delegation" as a source of school authority is not entirely
"consonant with compulsory education laws." Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651 , 430 U. S. 662 (1977). Today's public school officials do not merely exercise
authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents;
rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational
and disciplinary policies. See, e.g., the opinion in State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. at 343, 463 A.2d at 934,
940, describing the New Jersey statutes regulating school
disciplinary policies and establishing the authority of school
officials over their students. In carrying out searches and other
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials
act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for
the parents, and they Page 469 U. S. 337 cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment. III To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted
by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the
standards governing such searches. Although the underlying command
of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be
reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which
a search takes place. The determination of the standard of
reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires
"balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 387 U. S.
536 -537. On one side of the balance are arrayed the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods
to deal with breaches of public order.

															We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a
substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 24 -25
(1967). We have also recognized that searches of closed items of
personal luggage are intrusions on protected privacy interests, for
"the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every
container that conceals its contents from plain view." United
States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , 456 U. S.
822 -823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of a
closed purse or other bag carried on her person, [ Footnote 5 ] no less Page 469 U. S. 338 than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.

															Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective
expectations of privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise
"illegitimate." See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.
S. 517 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 (1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an
expectation of privacy must be one that society is "prepared to
recognize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at 468 U. S. 526 .
The State of New Jersey has argued that, because of the pervasive
supervision to which children in the schools are necessarily
subject, a child has virtually no legitimate expectation of privacy
in articles of personal property "unnecessarily" carried into a
school. This argument has two factual premises: (1) the fundamental
incompatibility of expectations of privacy with the maintenance of
a sound educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of
the child in bringing any items of personal property into the
school. Both premises are severely flawed.

															Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of
maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situation
is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no legitimate
expectations of privacy. We have recently recognized that the need
to maintain order in a prison is such that prisoners retain no
legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells, but it goes
almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild
stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh
facts of criminal conviction and incarceration." Ingraham v.
Wright, supra, at 430 U. S. 669 .
We are not Page 469 U. S. 339 yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be
equated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

															Nor does the State's suggestion that children have no legitimate
need to bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored
in reality. Students at a minimum must bring to school not only the
supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, and the
necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students
may carry on their persons or in purses or wallets such
nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters,
and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate
reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in
connection with extracurricular or recreational activities. In
short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a
variety of legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason
to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy
in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.

															Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the
substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining
order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years,
school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use
and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and
Welfare, Violent Schools -- Safe Schools: The Safe School Study
Report to the Congress (1978). Even in schools that have been
spared the most severe disciplinary problems, the preservation of
order and a proper educational environment requires close
supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules
against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken
by an adult. "Events calling for discipline are frequent
occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S. 580 .
Accordingly, we have recognized Page 469 U. S. 340 that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a
certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,
and we have respected the value of preserving the informality of
the student-teacher relationship. See id. at 419 U. S.
582 -583; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S.
680 -682.

															How, then, should we strike the balance between the
schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's
equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which
learning can take place? It is evident that the school setting
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by
public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement,
in particular, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of
an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly
interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just as we have in
other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden
of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. at 387 U. S.
532 -533, we hold today that school officials need not
obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their
authority.

															The school setting also requires some modification of the level
of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.
Ordinarily, a search -- even one that may permissibly be carried
out without a warrant -- must be based upon "probable cause" to
believe that a violation of the law has occurred. See, e.g.,
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266 , 413 U. S. 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.
40 , 392 U. S. 62 -66
(1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement
of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment
is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although

															"both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain
limited circumstances neither is required." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 413 U. S. 277 (POWELL, Page 469 U. S. 341 J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized
the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that,
although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of probable cause. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 881 (195); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.
S. 648 , 440 U. S.
654 -655 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 387 U. S.
534 -539. Where a careful balancing of governmental and
private interests suggests that the public interest is best served
by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short
of probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a
standard.

															We join the majority of courts that have examined this issue
[ Footnote 6 ] in concluding that
the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with
the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to
the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe
that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the
law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a
twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether the . . . action
was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
at 392 U. S. 20 ;
second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official [ Footnote
7 ] will be Page 469 U. S. 342 "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of
the school. [ Footnote 8 ] Such a
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction. [ Footnote 9 ]

															This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts
of school authorities to maintain order in their schools Page 469 U. S. 343 nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the
niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their
conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense. At
the same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the
interests of students will be invaded no more than is necessary to
achieve the legitimate end of preserving order in the schools. IV There remains the question of the legality of the search in this
case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds" standard applied
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its consideration of this
question is not substantially different from the standard that we
have adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey
court's application of that standard to strike down the search of
T.L.O.'s purse reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of
reasonableness. Our review of the facts surrounding the search
leads us to conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable
for Fourth Amendment purposes. [ Footnote 10 ]

															The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two
separate searches, with the first -- the search for cigarettes --
providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second Page 469 U. S. 344 -- the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of the
second search that are at issue here, the validity of the search
for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial
search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to
suspect that T.L.O. possessed marihuana had the first search not
taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for cigarettes that
we first turn our attention.

															The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its
holding that the search for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the
court observed that possession of cigarettes was not in itself
illegal or a violation of school rules. Because the contents of
T.L.O.'s purse would therefore have "no direct bearing on the
infraction" of which she was accused (smoking in a lavatory where
smoking was prohibited), there was no reason to search her purse.
[ Footnote 11 ] Second, even
assuming that a search of T.L.O.'s purse might under some
circumstances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against
T.L.O., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this
particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect that T.L.O.
had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according Page 469 U. S. 345 to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N.J. at 347,
463 A.2d at 942.

															Both these conclusions are implausible. T.L.O. had been accused
of smoking, and had denied the accusation in the strongest possible
terms when she stated that she did not smoke at all. Surely it
cannot be said that under these circumstances, T.L.O.'s possession
of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to
her response to those charges. T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes,
once it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she
had been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to
the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes
would not prove that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor
would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her
claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally
recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not
conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have

															"any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."

															Fed.Rule Evid. 401. The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of
cigarettes to the question whether she had been smoking and to the
credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary
"nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under
investigation. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 , 387 U. S.
306 -307 (1967). Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a
reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse, the
search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if
found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid. Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr.
Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain
cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported
that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report gave
Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes
with her; and Page 469 U. S. 346 if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in
which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there were
cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch,'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 27 ;
rather, it was the sort of "common-sense conclusio[n] about human
behavior" upon which "practical people" -- including government
officials -- are entitled to rely. United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 , 449 U. S. 418 (1981). Of course, even if the teacher's report were true, T.L.O. might not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she
might have borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been
sharing a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of
reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty:
"sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. . . ." Hill v.
California, 401 U. S. 797 , 401 U. S. 804 (1971). Because the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes
in her purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that
other hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher's
accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted
unreasonably when he examined T.L.O.'s purse to see if it contained
cigarettes. [ Footnote
12 ] Page 469 U. S. 347 Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open T.L.O.'s
purse was reasonable brings us to the question of the further
search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes was located. The
suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was
provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package of rolling papers in
the purse as he removed the pack of cigarettes. Although T.L.O.
does not dispute the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that
the rolling papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does
contend that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted
exceeded permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters
that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing. This argument, too, is
unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana
as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified
further exploration of T.L.O.'s purse, which turned up more
evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number of plastic
bags of the type commonly used to store marihuana, a small quantity
of marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a
separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a search of
that compartment revealed an index card containing a list of
"people who owe me money" as well as two letters, the inference
that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial
enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to
determine whether they contained any further evidence. In short, we
cannot conclude that the search for marihuana was unreasonable in
any respect.

															Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of
marihuana dealing by T.L.O. was reasonable, the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision to exclude that evidence Page 469 U. S. 348 from T.L.O.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth
Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															T.L.O. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking
cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for
possession of marihuana. On T.L.O.'s motion, the Superior Court of
New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on
the ground that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. (T.L.O.) v. Piscataway Bd. of Ed., No.
C.2865-79 (Super.Ct. N.J. Ch.Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of
Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the Chancery
Division.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															State and federal courts considering these questions have
struggled to accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe
environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some
courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving
full force to one or the other side of the balance. Thus, in a
number of cases courts have held that school officials conducting
in-school searches of students are private parties acting in
loco parentis and are therefore not subject to the constraints
of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., D. R. C. v.
State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska App.1982); In re G., 11 Cal.
App. 3d 1193 , 90 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 509 , 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R.C.M. v. State, 660
S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715
(Tex.Civ.App.1970). At least one court has held, on the other hand,
that the Fourth Amendment applies in full to in-school searches by
school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause
is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So.
2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So.
2d 900 (La.1976); others have held or suggested that the
probable cause standard is applicable at least where the police are
involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288 , 292 (SD Ill.1977); Picha v.
Wielgos, 410 F.
Supp. 1214 , 1219-1221 (ND Ill.1976); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 498, 216 S.E.2d
586 , 594 (1975); or where the search is highly intrusive, See M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979).

															The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the
Fourth Amendment in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, but
the special needs of the school environment require assessment of
the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than
that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld
warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they are
supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover
evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a
violation of the law. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, No.
83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); Bilorey v. Brown, 738 F.2d
1462 (CA9 1984); Hortol v. Goose Creek Independent School
Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v.
Lund, 438 F. Supp.
47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham Community
Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d
777 , 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v.
Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super.1971); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d
1383 (Fla.App.1983); State v. Young, supra; In re J.A. 85
Ill.App.3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62
Mich.App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M.
347, 540 P.2d
827 (App.1975); People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315
N.E.2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d
75 , 558 P.2d
781 (1977); In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d
343 (App.1979).

															Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split
over whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The
Georgia courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies
to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e.g.,
State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga.App. 437, 224 S.E.2d
51 (1976). Other jurisdictions have applied the rule to exclude
the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and
delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v.
D., supra. [ Footnote 3 ]

															In holding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that the
exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches
conducted by school authorities. The question whether evidence
should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete
inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusionary rule is the
appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither question is logically
antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question
is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus, our determination that
the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth
Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the
applicability of the exclusionary rule.

															[ Footnote 4 ] Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.
S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to
punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does not
apply to the punishment of schoolchildren by public school
officials).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															We do not address the question, not presented by this case,
whether a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
lockers, desks, or other school property provided for the storage
of school supplies. Nor do we express any opinion on the standards
of any governing searches of such areas by school officials or by
other public authorities acting at the request of school officials.
Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (CA10 1981)
("Inasmuch as the school had assumed joint control of the locker it
cannot be successfully maintained that the school did not have a
right to inspect it"), and People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d
522, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969) (school administrators have power to
consent to search of a student's locker), with State v.
Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, 348, 463
A.2d 934 , 943 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of
this case the student had an expectation of privacy in the contents
of his locker. . . . For the four years of high school, the school
locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores the kind
of personal effects' protected by the Fourth
Amendment"). [ Footnote 6 ] See cases cited in n. 2 supra. [ Footnote 7 ]

															We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities
acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present
the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality
of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at
the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion
on that question. Cf. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F.
Supp. 1214 , 1219-1221 (ND.Ill. 1976) (holding probable cause
standard applicable to searches involving the police).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an
essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for
searches by school authorities. In other contexts, however, we have
held that although

															"some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a
prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure[,] . . . the
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
suspicion." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S.
560 -561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion
are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests
implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are
available "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official in
the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.
S. 648 , 440 U. S.
654 -655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of
T.L.O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she
had violated school rules, see infra, at 469 U. S.
343 -347, we need not consider the circumstances that
might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported
by individualized suspicion. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as
an endorsement of JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that some rules
regarding student conduct are by nature too "trivial" to justify a
search based upon reasonable suspicion. See post at 469 U. S.
377 -382. We are unwilling to adopt a standard under
which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's
evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The
maintenance of discipline in the schools requires not only that
students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs
and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students
conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school
authorities. We have

															"repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U. S. 503 , 393 U. S. 507 (1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct
presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that
such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper
educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule
violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts
should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain
from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to
the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are
not.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Of course, New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard
under its own Constitution or statutes. In that case, its courts
would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they
invalidate a search.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that
enforcement of the school's smoking regulations was not
sufficiently related to the goal of maintaining discipline or order
in the school to justify a search under the standard adopted by the
New Jersey court. See post at 469 U. S.
382 -384. We do not agree that this is an accurate
characterization of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. The New
Jersey court did not hold that the school's smoking rules were
unrelated to the goal of maintaining discipline or order, nor did
it suggest that a search that would produce evidence bearing
directly on an accusation that a student had violated the smoking
rules would be impermissible under the court's reasonable-suspicion
standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search of
T.L.O.'s purse was likely to produce would not have a sufficiently
direct bearing on the infraction to justify a search -- a
conclusion with which we cannot agree for the reasons set forth infra, at 469 U. S. 345 .
JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision rested on the perceived triviality of the smoking
infraction appears to be a reflection of his own views rather than
those of the New Jersey court.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															T.L.O. contends that even if it was reasonable for Mr. Choplick
to open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was not reasonable for
him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he
found them. Had he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she
asserts, he would not have observed the rolling papers that
suggested the presence of marihuana, and the search for marihuana
could not have taken place. T.L.O.'s argument is based on the fact
that the cigarettes were not "contraband," as no school rule
forbade her to have them. Thus, according to T.L.O., the cigarettes
were not subject to seizure or confiscation by school authorities,
and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take them out of T.L.O.'s
purse regardless of whether he was entitled to peer into the purse
to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation has no
place in an inquiry addressed to the issue of reasonableness. If
Mr. Choplick could permissibly search T.L.O.'s purse for
cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural
reaction to finding them -- picking them up -- could be a
constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse
nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick
violate the Fourth Amendment.

															JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.

															I agree with the Court's decision, and generally with its
opinion. I would place greater emphasis, however, on the special
characteristics of elementary and secondary schools that make it
unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections
granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.

															In any realistic sense, students within the school environment
have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally. They spend the school hours in close association with
each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods.
The students in a particular class often know each other and their
teachers quite well. Of necessity, teachers have a degree of
familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is
unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and
child. It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the
same subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally.
But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume that children
in school -- no less than adults -- have privacy interests that
society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.

															However one may characterize their privacy expectations,
students properly are afforded some constitutional protections. In
an often quoted statement, the Court said that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U. S. 503 , 393 U. S. 506 (1969). The Court also has "emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the states and of school officials . .
. Page 469 U. S. 349 to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id. at 393 U. S. 507 . See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S. 104 (1968). The Court has balanced the interests of the student against
the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing
qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies to
which students and adults are entitled.

															In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court recognized a constitutional right to due process,
and yet was careful to limit the exercise of this right by a
student who challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process
found to be "due" was notice and a hearing described as
"rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the disciplinarian . .
. informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct with the student
minutes after it has occurred." Id. at 419 U. S.
581 -582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.
S. 651 (1977), we declined to extend the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit the use of corporal punishment of
schoolchildren as authorized by Florida law. We emphasized in that
opinion that familiar constraints in the school, and also in the
community, provide substantial protection against the violation of
constitutional rights by school authorities.

															"[A]t the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to
return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the
support of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and
other pupils who may witness and protest any instances of
mistreatment." Id. at 430 U. S. 670 .
The Ingraham Court further pointed out that the "openness
of the public school and its supervision by the community afford
significant safeguards" against the violation of constitutional
rights. Ibid. The special relationship between teacher and student also
distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law
enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects.
These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal
activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to
facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial.
Rarely does this type of adversarial Page 469 U. S. 350 relationship exist between school authorities and pupils.
[ Footnote 2/1 ] Instead, there is a
commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The
attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility
for the student's welfare as well as for his education.

															The primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court
states, is the education and training of young people. A State has
a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this
responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.
And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect
pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect
teachers themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct
in recent years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be
unreasonable and at odds with history to argue that the full
panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force and
effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal
laws. [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															In sum, although I join the Court's opinion and its holding,
[ Footnote 2/3 ] my emphasis is
somewhat different. Page 469 U. S. 351 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Unlike police officers, school authorities have no law
enforcement responsibility or indeed any obligation to be familiar
with the criminal laws. Of course, as illustrated by this case,
school authorities have a layman's familiarity with the types of
crimes that occur frequently in our schools: the distribution and
use of drugs, theft, and even violence against teachers as well as
fellow students.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															As noted above, decisions of this Court have never held to the
contrary. The law recognizes a host of distinctions between the
rights and duties of children and those of adults. See Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 , 419 U. S. 591 (1975) (POWELL, J., dissenting.)

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Court's holding is that "when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that [a] search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of
the school," a search of the student's person or belongings is
justified. Ante at 469 U. S. 342 .
This is in accord with the Court's summary of the views of a
majority of the state and federal courts that have addressed this
issue. See ante at 469 U. S.
332 -333, n. 2.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.

															I join the judgment of the Court and agree with much that is
said in its opinion. I write separately, however, because I believe
the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis of whether a school
search must be based upon probable cause. The Court correctly
states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable
cause requirement "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and
private interests suggests that the public interest is best served"
by a lesser standard. Ante at 469 U. S. 341 .
I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than
strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause
Clause, only when we were confronted with "a special law
enforcement need for greater flexibility." Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491 , 460 U. S. 514 (1983) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). I pointed out in United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983):

															"While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from
unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave the
reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment of courts or
government officers; the Framers of the Amendment balanced the
interests involved and decided that a [search] is reasonable only
if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. See
Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 460 U. S.
744 -745 (1983) (POWELL, J., concurring); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 , 339 U. S.
70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)." Id. at 462 U. S. 722 (opinion concurring in judgment). See also Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 , 442 U. S.
213 -214 (1979); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U. S. 297 , 407 U. S.
315 -316 (1972). Only in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of
the Framers. Page 469 U. S. 352 Thus, for example, in determining that police can conduct a
limited "stop and frisk" upon less than probable cause, this Court
relied upon the fact that "as a practical matter" the stop and
frisk could not be subjected to a warrant and probable cause
requirement, because a law enforcement officer must be able to take
immediate steps to assure himself that the person he has stopped to
question is not armed with a weapon that could be used against him. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 20 -21, 392 U. S. 23 -24
(1968). Similarly, this Court's holding that a roving Border Patrol
may stop a car and briefly question its occupants upon less than
probable cause was based in part upon "the absence of practical
alternatives for policing the border." United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 881 (1975). See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032 , 463 U. S.
1049 , n. 14 (1983); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 , 428 U. S. 557 (1976); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S. 537 (1967).

															The Court's implication that the balancing test is the rule
rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is
unnecessary in this case. The elementary and secondary school
setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a
departure from the balance struck by the Framers. As JUSTICE POWELL
notes, "[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students." Ante at 469 U. S. 350 .
Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A
single teacher often must watch over a large number of students,
and, as any parent knows, children at certain ages are inclined to
test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct and to imitate the
misbehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with
quickly. Every adult remembers from his own schooldays the havoc a
water pistol or peashooter can wreak until it is taken away. Thus,
the Court has recognized that "[e]vents calling for discipline are
frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective
action." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 , 419 U. S. 580 (1975). Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons have
become increasingly common Page 469 U. S. 353 among young people, an immediate response frequently is required
not just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to
protect the very safety of students and school personnel.

															Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a
teacher were required to secure a warrant before searching a
student. Nor would it be possible if a teacher could not conduct a
necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable cause
for the search. A teacher has neither the training nor the
day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a
law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a
quick judgment about the existence of probable cause. The time
required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the
observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into
probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other
students, are diverted from the essential task of education. A
teacher's focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping
students, rather than on developing evidence against a particular
troublemaker.

															Education "is perhaps the most important function" of
government, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.
S. 483 , 347 U. S. 493 (1954), and government has a heightened obligation to safeguard
students whom it compels to attend school. The special need for an
immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of
schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself
justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant
and probable cause requirement, and in applying a standard
determined by balancing the relevant interests. I agree with the
standard the Court has announced, and with its application of the
standard to the facts of this case. I therefore concur in its
judgment.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

															I fully agree with Part 469 U. S. Teachers, like all other government officials, must conform
their Page 469 U. S. 354 conduct to the Fourth Amendment's protections of personal
privacy and personal security. As JUSTICE STEVENS points out, post at 469 U. S.
373 -374, 469 U. S.
385 -386, this principle is of particular importance when
applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as
by exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge
teachers with the task of embuing their students with an
understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at
the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to
respect constitutional protections. See Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U. S. 853 , 457 U. S.
864 -865 (1982) (plurality opinion); West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.
S. 624 , 319 U. S. 637 (1943).

															I do not, however, otherwise join the Court's opinion. Today's
decision sanctions school officials to conduct fullscale searches
on a "reasonableness" standard whose only definite content is that
it is not the same test as the "probable cause" standard
found in the text of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this
unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally
applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad
exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of
considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported
neither by precedent nor even by a fair application of the
"balancing test" it proclaims in this very opinion. I Three basic principles underly this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. First, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically delineated and
well-recognized exceptions. See, e.g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967); accord, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.
S. 740 , 466 U. S.
748 -749 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 , 462 U. S. 701 (1983); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.
S. 204 , 451 U. S.
211 -212 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 20 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 13 -14
(1948). Second, full-scale searches -- whether conducted in
accordance with the warrant Page 469 U. S. 355 requirement or pursuant to one of its exceptions -- are
"reasonable" in Fourth Amendment terms only on a showing of
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that
evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be searched. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 379 U. S. 91 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 , 371 U. S. 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 , 338 U. S.
175 -176 (1949). Third, categories of intrusions that are
substantially less intrusive than full-scale searches or seizures
may be justifiable in accordance with a balancing test even absent
a warrant or probable cause, provided that the balancing test used
gives sufficient weight to the privacy interests that will be
infringed. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200 , 442 U. S. 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, supra. Assistant Vice Principal Choplick's thorough excavation of
T.L.O.'s purse was undoubtedly a serious intrusion on her privacy.
Unlike the searches in Terry v. Ohio, supra, or Adams
v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972), the search at issue here encompassed a detailed and minute
examination of respondent's pocketbook, in which the contents of
private papers and letters were thoroughly scrutinized. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Wisely, neither petitioner
nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T.L.O.'s
pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line. To be faithful to the Court's settled doctrine, the inquiry
therefore must focus on the warrant and probable cause
requirements. A I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as
agents of law enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a
search of their students' belongings without first Page 469 U. S. 356 obtaining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is to
say that school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to
constitute an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to be justified, as
the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value through
application of an unguided "balancing test" in which "the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
security" are weighed against "the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order." Ante at 469 U. S. 337 .
The Warrant Clause is something more than an exhortation to this
Court to maximize social welfare as we see fit. It
requires that the authorities must obtain a warrant before
conducting a full-scale search. The undifferentiated governmental
interest in law enforcement is insufficient to justify an exception
to the warrant requirement. Rather, some special governmental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend
lawbreakers is necessary to justify a categorical exception to the
warrant requirement. For the most part, special governmental needs
sufficient to override the warrant requirement flow from "exigency"
-- that is, from the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant
either impossible or hopelessly infeasible. See United States
v. Place, supra, at 462 U. S.
701 -702; Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 437 U. S.
393 -394; Johnson v. United States, supra, at 333 U. S. 15 .
Only after finding an extraordinary governmental interest of this
kind do we -- or ought we -- engage in a balancing test to
determine if a warrant should nonetheless be required. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Page 469 U. S. 357 To require a showing of some extraordinary governmental interest
before dispensing with the warrant requirement is not to undervalue
society's need to apprehend violators of the criminal law. To be
sure, forcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a warrant before
engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from
conducting some searches that they would otherwise like to conduct.
But this is not an unintended result of the Fourth
Amendment's protection of privacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which the Amendment was thought necessary.
Only where the governmental interests at stake exceed those
implicated in any ordinary law enforcement context -- that is, only
where there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved --
is it legitimate to engage in a balancing test to determine whether
a warrant is indeed necessary.

															In this case, such extraordinary governmental interests do exist
and are sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant
requirement. Students are necessarily confined for most of the
schoolday in close proximity to each other and to the school staff.
I agree with the Court that we can take judicial notice of the
serious problems of drugs and violence that plague our schools. As
JUSTICE BLACKMUN notes, teachers must not merely "maintain an
environment conducive to learning" among children who "are inclined
to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct," but must also
"protect the very safety of students and school personnel." Ante at 469 U. S.
352 -353. A teacher or principal could neither carry out
essential teaching functions nor adequately protect students'
safety if required to wait for a warrant before conducting a
necessary search. B I emphatically disagree with the Court's decision to cast aside
the constitutional probable cause standard when assessing the
constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. The Court's
decision jettisons the probable cause standard -- the only standard
that finds support in the text of the Fourth Page 469 U. S. 358 Amendment -- on the basis of its Rohrschach-1ike "balancing
test." Use of such a "balancing test" to determine the standard for
evaluating the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable
innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis. This innovation finds
support neither in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous
weakening of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the
privacy and security of our citizens. Moreover, even if this
Court's historic understanding of the Fourth Amendment were
mistaken and a balancing test of some kind were appropriate, any
such test that gave adequate weight to the privacy and security
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment would not reach the
preordained result the Court's conclusory analysis reaches today.
Therefore, because I believe that the balancing test used by the
Court today is flawed both in its inception and in its execution, I
respectfully dissent. 1 An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that probable
cause is a prerequisite for a full-scale search. In Carroll v.
United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 149 (1925), the Court held that "[o]n reason and authority the true
rule is that, if the search and seizure . . . are made upon
probable cause . . . the search and seizure are valid." Under our
past decisions probable cause -- which exists where

															"the facts and circumstances within [the officials'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief"

															that a criminal offense had occurred and the evidence would be
found in the suspected place, id. at 267 U. S. 162 -- is the constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale
search, regardless of whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant
or, as in Carroll, within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 , 361 U. S. 104 (1959) ( Caroll "merely relaxed the requirements for a
warrant on grounds of practicality," but "did not dispense Page 469 U. S. 359 with the need for probable cause"); accord, Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 51 (1970) ("In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon
probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search
permitted by the Constitution"). [ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Our holdings that probable cause is a prerequisite to a
fullscale search are based on the relationship between the two
Clauses of the Fourth Amendment. The first Clause ("The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . .") states the purpose of the Amendment and its
coverage. The second Clause (". . . and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause . . .") gives content to the word
"unreasonable" in the first Clause.

															"For all but . . . narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite
'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is
embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if
supported by probable cause." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
214 .

															I therefore fully agree with the Court that "the underlying
command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and
seizures be reasonable." Ante at 469 U. S. 337 .
But this "underlying command" is not directly interpreted in each
category of cases by some amorphous "balancing test." Rather, the
provisions of the Warrant Clause -- a warrant and probable cause --
provide the yardstick against which official searches Page 469 U. S. 360 and seizures are to be measured. The Fourth Amendment neither
requires nor authorizes the conceptual free-for-all that ensues
when an unguided balancing test is used to assess specific
categories of searches. If the search in question is more than a
minimally intrusive Terry stop, the constitutional
probable cause standard determines its validity.

															To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause
"ordinarily" is required to justify a full-scale search and that
the existence of probable cause "bears on" the validity of the
search. Ante at 469 U. S.
340 -341. Yet the Court fails to cite any case in which a
full-scale intrusion upon privacy interests has been justified on
less than probable cause. The line of cases begun by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
provides no support, for they applied a balancing test only in the
context of minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law
enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for
instance, was a "limited search of the outer clothing." Id. at 392 U. S. 30 . The
type of border stop at issue in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 880 (1975), usually "consume[d] no more than a minute"; the Court
explicitly noted that "any further detention . . . must be based on
consent or probable cause." Id. at 422 U. S. 882 . See also United States v. Hensley, ante at 469 U. S. 224 (momentary stop); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
706 -707 (brief detention of luggage for canine "sniff"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (brief frisk after stop for traffic violation); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 560 (1976) (characterizing intrusion as "minimal"); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk). In short, all of these cases involved

															"'seizures' so substantially less intrusive than arrests that
the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment
'seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test." Dunaway, supra, at 442 U. S.
210 .

															Nor do the "administrative search" cases provide any comfort for
the Court. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 (1967), the Court held that the probable cause
standard governed even administrative searches. Although Page 469 U. S. 361 the Camara Court recognized that probable cause
standards themselves may have to be somewhat modified to take into
account the special nature of administrative searches, the Court
did so only after noting that "because [housing code] inspections
are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of
evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of
the urban citizen's privacy." Id. at 387 U. S. 537 .
Subsequent administrative search cases have similarly recognized
that such searches intrude upon areas whose owners harbor a
significantly decreased expectation of privacy, see, e.g.,
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 , 452 U. S.
598 -599 (1981), thus circumscribing the injury to Fourth
Amendment interests caused by the search.

															Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of
our citizens counsel strict adherence to the principle that no
search may be conducted where the official is not in possession of
probable cause that is, where the official does not know of "facts
and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent man in believing that
the offense has been committed." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 102 ; see also id. at 361 U. S.
100 -101 (discussing history of probable cause standard).
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against
official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by
some "balancing test" than its intrusion on individual privacy; it
was designed in addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy
whose protections could be breached only where the "reasonable"
requirements of the probable cause standard were met. Moved by
whatever momentary evil has aroused their fears, officials --
perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens -- may be tempted
to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to
assuage the perceived evil. [ Footnote
3/4 ] But the Fourth Amendment Page 469 U. S. 362 rests on the principle that a true balance between the
individual and society depends on the recognition of "the right to
be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 , 277 U. S. 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). That right protects the privacy
and security of the individual unless the authorities can cross a
specific threshold of need, designated by the term "probable
cause." I cannot agree with the Court's assertions today that a
"balancing test" can replace the constitutional threshold with one
that is more convenient for those enforcing the laws but less
protective of the citizens' liberty; the Fourth Amendment's
protections should not be defaced by

															"a balancing process that overwhelms the individual's protection
against unwarranted official intrusion by a governmental interest
said to justify the search and seizure." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 428 U. S. 570 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 2 I thus do not accept the majority's premise that

															"[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches
conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into
the standards governing such searches." Ante at 469 U. S. 337 .
For me, the finding that the Fourth Amendment applies, coupled with
the observation that what is at issue is a full-scale search, is
the end of the inquiry. But even if I believed that a "balancing
test" appropriately replaces the judgment of the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment, I would nonetheless object to the cursory and
shortsighted "test" that the Court employs to justify its
predictable weakening of Fourth Amendment protections. In
particular, the test employed by the Court vastly overstates the
social costs that a probable cause standard entails and, though it
plausibly articulates the serious privacy interests at stake,
inexplicably fails to accord them adequate weight in striking the
balance. Page 469 U. S. 363 The Court begins to articulate its "balancing test" by observing
that "the government's need for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order" is to be weighed on one side of the
balance. Ibid. Of course, this is not correct. It is not
the government's need for effective enforcement methods that should
weigh in the balance, for ordinary Fourth Amendment standards --
including probable cause.-- may well permit methods for maintaining
the public order that are perfectly effective. If that were the
case, the governmental interest in having effective standards would
carry no weight at all as a justification for departing from the probable cause standard. Rather, it is the costs of
applying probable cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard
that should be weighed on the government's side. [ Footnote 3/5 ]

															In order to tote up the costs of applying the probable-cause
standard, it is thus necessary first to take into account the
nature and content of that standard, and the likelihood that it
would hamper achievement of the goal -- vital not just to "teachers
and administrators," see ante at 469 U. S. 339 -- of maintaining an effective educational setting in the public
schools. The seminal statement concerning the nature of the
probable cause standard is found in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). Carroll held that law enforcement authorities have
probable cause to search where

															"the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to Page 469 U. S. 364 warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief"

															that a criminal offense had occurred. Id. at 267 U. S. 162 .
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 (1949), the Court amplified this requirement,
holding that probable cause depends upon "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act." Id. at 338 U. S.
175 .

															Two Terms ago, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 (1983), this Court expounded at some length its
view of the probable cause standard. Among the adjectives used to
describe the standard were "practical," "fluid," "flexible,"
"easily applied," and "nontechnical." See id. at 462 U. S. 232 , 462 U. S. 236 , 462 U. S. 239 .
The probable cause standard was to be seen as a "common-sense" test
whose application depended on an evaluation of the "totality of the
circumstances." Id. at 462 U. S.
238 .

															Ignoring what Gates took such great pains to emphasize,
the Court today holds that a new "reasonableness" standard is
appropriate because it

															"will spare teachers and school administrators the necessity of
schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and permit
them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason
and common sense." Ante at 469 U. S. 343 .
I had never thought that our pre- Gates understanding of
probable cause defied either reason or common sense. But after Gates, I would have thought that there could be no doubt
that this "nontechnical," "practical," and "easily applied" concept
was eminently serviceable in a context like a school, where
teachers require the flexibility to respond quickly and decisively
to emergencies.

															A consideration of the likely operation of the probable cause
standard reinforces this conclusion. Discussing the issue of school
searches, Professor LaFave has noted that the cases that have
reached the appellate courts

															"strongly suggest that in most instances the evidence of
wrong-doing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is
sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable
cause test."

															3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11, Page 469 U. S. 365 pp. 459-460 (1978). [ Footnote
3/6 ] The problems that have caused this Court difficulty in
interpreting the probable cause standard have largely involved
informants, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, supra; Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969); Agilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964); Draper v. United States, 358 U.
S. 307 (1959). However, three factors make it likely
that problems involving informants will not make it difficult for
teachers and school administrators to make probable cause
decisions. This Court's decision in Gates applying a
"totality of the circumstances" test to determine whether an
informant's tip can constitute probable cause renders the test easy
for teachers to apply. The fact that students and teachers interact
daily in the school building makes it more likely that teachers
will get to know students who supply information; the problem of
informants who remain anonymous even to the teachers -- and who are
therefore unavailable for verification or further questioning -- is
unlikely to arise. Finally, teachers can observe the behavior of
students under suspicion to corroborate any doubtful tips they do
receive.

															As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply
the probable cause standard, the amorphous "reasonableness under
all the circumstances" standard freshly coined by the Court today
will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty
among teachers and administrators. Of course, as this Court should
know, an essential purpose of developing and articulating legal
norms is to enable individuals to conform their conduct to those
norms. A school system conscientiously attempting to obey the
Fourth Amendment's dictates under a probable cause standard could,
for example, consult decisions and other legal materials and
prepare a booklet expounding the rough outlines of the concept.
Such a booklet could be distributed to Page 469 U. S. 366 teachers to provide them with guidance as to when a search may
be lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe that the same school
system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the Court's
new "reasonableness" standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when
a search may be permissible. The sad result of this uncertainty may
well be that some teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches
that are fully permissible and even necessary under the
constitutional probable cause standard, while others may intrude
arbitrarily and unjustifiably on the privacy of students. [ Footnote 3/7 ]

															One further point should be taken into account when considering
the desirability of replacing the constitutional probable cause
standard. The question facing the Court is not whether the probable
cause standard should be replaced by a test of "reasonableness
under all the circumstances." Rather, it is whether traditional
Fourth Amendment standards should recede before the Court's new
standard. Thus, although the Court today paints with a broad brush
and holds its undefined "reasonableness" standard applicable to all school searches, I would approach the question with
considerably more reserve. I would not think it necessary to
develop a single standard to govern all school searches, any
more Page 469 U. S. 367 than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable
cause standard to all searches and seizures. For instance,
just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and frisk on
something less than probable cause, so too should teachers be
permitted the same flexibility. A teacher or administrator who had
reasonable suspicion that a student was carrying a gun would no
doubt have authority under ordinary Fourth Amendment doctrine to
conduct a limited search of the student to determine whether the
threat was genuine. The "costs" of applying the traditional
probable cause standard must therefore be discounted by the fact
that, where additional flexibility is necessary and where the
intrusion is minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
itself displaces probable cause when it determines the validity of
a search.

															A legitimate balancing test whose function was something more
substantial than reaching a predetermined conclusion acceptable to
this Court's impressions of what authority teachers need would
therefore reach rather a different result than that reached by the
Court today. On one side of the balance would be the costs of
applying traditional Fourth Amendment standards -- the "practical"
and "flexible" probable cause standard where a full-scale intrusion
is sought, a lesser standard in situations where the intrusion is
much less severe and the need for greater authority compelling.
Whatever costs were toted up on this side would have to be
discounted by the costs of applying an unprecedented and
ill-defined "reasonableness under all the circumstances" test that
will leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to their
authority and will encourage excessive fact-based litigation.

															On the other side of the balance would be the serious privacy
interests of the student, interests that the Court admirably
articulates in its opinion, ante at 469 U. S.
337 -339, but which the Court's new ambiguous standard
places in serious jeopardy. I have no doubt that a fair assessment
of the two Page 469 U. S. 368 sides of the balance would necessarily reach the same conclusion
that, as I have argued above, the Fourth Amendment's language
compels -- that school searches like that conducted in this case
are valid only if supported by probable cause. II Applying the constitutional probable cause standard to the facts
of this case, I would find that Mr. Choplick's search violated
T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. After escorting T.L.O. into his
private office, Mr. Choplick demanded to see her purse. He then
opened the purse to find evidence of whether she had been smoking
in the bathroom. When he opened the purse, he discovered the pack
of cigarettes. At this point, his search for evidence of the
smoking violation was complete.

															Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of
cigarette rolling papers. Believing that such papers were
"associated," see ante at 469 U. S. 328 ,
with the use of marihuana, he proceeded to conduct a detailed
examination of the contents of her purse, in which he found some
marihuana, a pipe, some money, an index card, and some private
letters indicating that T.L.O. had sold marihuana to other
students. The State sought to introduce this latter material in
evidence at a criminal proceeding, and the issue before the Court
is whether it should have been suppressed.

															On my view of the case, we need not decide whether the initial
search conducted by Mr. Choplick -- the search for evidence of the
smoking violation that was completed when Mr. Choplick found the
pack of cigarettes -- was valid. For Mr. Choplick at that point did
not have probable cause to continue to rummage through T.L.O.'s
purse. Mr. Choplick's suspicion of marihuana possession at this
time was based solely on the presence of the package of
cigarette papers. The mere presence without more of such a staple
item of commerce is insufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had violated the law Page 469 U. S. 369 by possessing marihuana and that evidence of that violation
would be found in her purse. Just as a police officer could not
obtain a warrant to search a home based solely on his claim that he
had seen a package of cigarette papers in that home, Mr. Choplick
was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions of
T.L.O. based on the mere presence of a package of cigarette papers.
Therefore, the fruits of this illegal search must be excluded and
the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. III In the past several Terms, this Court has produced a succession
of Fourth Amendment opinions in which "balancing tests" have been
applied to resolve various questions concerning the proper scope of
official searches. The Court has begun to apply a "balancing test"
to determine whether a particular category of searches intrudes
upon expectations of privacy that merit Fourth Amendment
protection. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.
S. 517 , 468 U. S. 527 (1984) ("Determining whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate' or `reasonable' necessarily entails a balancing of
interests"). It applies a "balancing test" to determine whether a
warrant is necessary to conduct a search. See ante at 469 U. S. 340 ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
564 -566. In today's opinion, it employs a "balancing
test" to determine what standard should govern the
constitutionality of a given category of searches. See
ante at 469 U. S.
340 -341. Should a search turn out to be unreasonable
after application of all of these "balancing tests," the Court then
applies an additional "balancing test" to decide whether the
evidence resulting from the search must be excluded. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984). All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the Court
in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court
in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will. Perhaps
this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely Page 469 U. S. 370 a convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree
on a genuine rationale can conceal its differences. Compare
ante p. 469 U. S. 327 (WHITE, J., delivering the opinion of the Court), with
ante p. 469 U. S. 348 (POWELL, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J., concurring), and ante p. 469 U. S. 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). And it may be that the real
force underlying today's decision is the belief that the Court
purports to reject -- the belief that the unique role served by the
schools justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment on their
behalf. If so, the methodology of today's decision may turn out to
have as little influence in future cases as will its result, and
the Court's departure from traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine
will be confined to the schools.

															On my view, the presence of the word "unreasonable" in the text
of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a shifting majority of this
Court the authority to answer all Fourth Amendment
questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good.
Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable cause violate the
Fourth Amendment. I do not pretend that our traditional Fourth
Amendment doctrine automatically answers all of the difficult legal
questions that occasionally arise. I do contend, however, that this
Court has an obligation to provide some coherent framework to
resolve such questions on the basis of more than a conclusory
recitation of the results of a "balancing test." The Fourth
Amendment itself supplies that framework and, because the Court
today fails to heed its message, I must respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															A purse typically contains items of highly personal nature.
Especially for shy or sensitive adolescents, it could prove
extremely embarrassing for a teacher or principal to rummage
through its contents, which could include notes from friends,
fragments of love poems, caricatures of school authorities, and
items of personal hygiene.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Administrative search cases involving inspection schemes have
recognized that

															"if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible
deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential.
In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily
frustrate inspection. . . ." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.
S. 311 , 406 U. S. 316 (1972); accord, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.
S. 594 , 452 U. S. 603 (1981). Cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.
S. 307 (1978) (holding that a warrant is nonetheless
necessary in some administrative search contexts).

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															In fact, despite the somewhat diminished expectation of privacy
that this Court has recognized in the automobile context, see
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 428 U. S.
367 -368 (1976), we have required probable cause even to
justify a warrantless automobile search, see United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891 , 422 U. S. 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion
of privacy. To protect that privacy from official arbitrariness,
the Court always has regarded probable cause as the minimum
requirement for a lawful search") (footnote omitted); Chamers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S.
51 .

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															As Justice Stewart said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 455 (1971):

															"In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict
or fear of internal subversion this basic law and the values that
it represents may appear unrealistic or 'extravagant' to some. But
the values were those of the authors of our fundamental
constitutional concepts."

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the
terminology used by the Court. In my view, this terminology itself
is seriously misleading. The government is charged with protecting
the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is charged with
apprehending those who violate the criminal law. Consequently, the
government has no legitimate interest in conducting a
search that unduly intrudes on the privacy and security of the
citizen. The balance is not between the rights of the government
and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing conceptions of
the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the
government's varied responsibilities.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															It should be noted that Professor LaFave reached this conclusion
in 1978, before this Court's decision in Gates made clear the "flexibility" of the probable cause concept.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															A comparison of the language of the standard ("reasonableness
under all the circumstances") with the traditional language of
probable cause ("facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in believing that a crime had been committed and the
evidence would be found in the designated place") suggests that the
Court's new standard may turn out to be probable cause under a new
guise. If so, the additional uncertainty caused by this Court's
innovation is surely unjustifiable; it would be naive to expect
that the addition of this extra dose of uncertainty would do
anything other than "burden the efforts of school authorities to
maintain order in their schools," ante at 469 U. S. 342 .
If, on the other hand, the new standard permits searches of
students in instances when probable cause is absent -- instances,
according to this Court's consistent formulations, when a person of
reasonable caution would not think it likely that a violation
existed or that evidence of that violation would be found -- the
new standard is genuinely objectionable and impossible to square
with the premise that our citizens have the right to be free from
arbitrary intrusions on their privacy.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, and with whom
JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Part I, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.

															Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T.L.O.'s purse for
evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Because
T.L.O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did not pose a
serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that Choplick's search Page 469 U. S. 371 of her purse was an unreasonable invasion of her privacy and
that the evidence which he seized could not be used against her in
criminal proceedings. The New Jersey court's holding was a careful
response to the case it was required to decide.

															The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first
arguing that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to
searches conducted by school officials, and then contending that
the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the
student's privacy. The Court has accepted neither of these frontal
assaults on the Fourth Amendment. It has, however, seized upon this
"no smoking" case to announce "the proper standard" that should
govern searches by school officials who are confronted with
disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom.
Although I join Part 469 U. S. I
continue to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and
inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question. See 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument order). More
importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's
activism have produced a holding that will permit school
administrators to search students suspected of violating only the
most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior. I The question the Court decides today -- whether Mr. Choplick's
search of T.L.O.'s purse violated the Fourth Amendment -- was not
raised by the State's petition for writ of certiorari. That
petition only raised one question: "Whether the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school
officials and teachers in school." [ Footnote 4/1 ] The State quite properly declined to
submit the former question because "[it] did not wish to present
what might appear to be solely a factual dispute to this Court."
[ Footnote 4/2 ] Page 469 U. S. 372 Since this Court has twice had the threshold question argued, I
believe that it should expressly consider the merits of the New
Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusionary rule
applies.

															The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on this question is
plainly correct. As the state court noted, this case does not
involve the use of evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding;
the juvenile proceedings brought against T.L.O. involved a charge
that would have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult.
[ Footnote 4/3 ] Accordingly, the
exclusionary rule issue decided by that court and later presented
to this Court concerned only the use in a criminal proceeding of
evidence obtained in a search conducted by a public school
administrator.

															Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the
New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases have made it
quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable

															"whether the public official who illegally obtained the evidence
was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle, 387 U. S.
541 [1967]; Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U. S.
523 [1967]; a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S.
499 , 436 U. S. 506 [1978]; or a
school administrator or law enforcement official. [ Footnote 4/4 ]"

															It correctly concluded "that, if an official search violates
constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal
proceedings." [ Footnote 4/5 ]

															When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was
the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator, the
application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of the
principle that

															"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 , 367 U. S. 655 (1961). The practical basis for this principle is, in part, its
deterrent effect, see id. at 367 U. S. 656 ,
and as a general Page 469 U. S. 373 matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court,
that the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the
authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing
their incentive to do so. [ Footnote
4/6 ] In the case of evidence obtained in school searches, the
"overall educative effect" [ Footnote
4/7 ] of the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to
this utilitarian judgment.

															Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great teacher.
It was he who wrote:

															"Our Government is the potent, the onmipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 , 277 U. S. 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Those of us who revere the flag and
the ideals for which it stands believe in the power of symbols. We
cannot ignore that rules of law also have a symbolic power that may
vastly exceed their utility.

															Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to
the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a
self-governing citizenry. [ Footnote
4/8 ] If the Nation's students can be convicted through the use
of arbitrary methods destructive of personal liberty, they cannot
help but feel that they have Page 469 U. S. 374 been dealt with unfairly. [ Footnote
4/9 ] The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal
proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an important
statement to young people that "our society attaches serious
consequences to a violation of constitutional rights," [ Footnote 4/10 ] and that this is a
principle of "liberty and justice for all." [ Footnote 4/11 ]

															Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by
the State's petition for certiorari would have required affirmance
of a state court's judgment suppressing evidence. That result would
have been dramatically out of character for a Court that not only
grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with distressing
regularity, [ Footnote 4/12 ]
but Page 469 U. S. 375 also is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in
order to protect evidence from exclusion. [ Footnote 4/13 ] In characteristic disregard of the
doctrine of judicial restraint, the Court avoided that result in
this case by ordering reargument and directing the parties to
address a constitutional question that the parties, with good
reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial
activism undermines the Court's power to perform its central
mission in a legitimate way, I dissented from the reargument order. See 468 U. S. 1214 (1984). I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent,
but since the majority has brought the question before us, I shall
explain why I believe the Court has misapplied the standard of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment. II The search of a young woman's purse by a school administrator is
a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of privacy. A
purse "is a common repository for one's personal effects and
therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of
privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 , 442 U. S. 762 (1979). Although such expectations must sometimes yield to the
legitimate requirements of government, in assessing the
constitutionality of a warrantless search, our decision must be
guided by the language of the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, Page 469 U. S. 376 papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. . . . " In order to evaluate the
reasonableness of such searches,

															"it is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for
there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 20 -21
(1968) ( quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S. 528 , 387 U. S.
534 -537,(1967)). [ Footnote
4/14 ]

															The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified
by the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 23 , 392 U. S. 25 .
When viewed from the institutional perspective, "the substantial
need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools," ante at 469 U. S. 341 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful, or
seriously disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the
principal function of teaching institutions which is to educate
young people and prepare them for citizenship. [ Footnote 4/15 ] When such conduct occurs amidst a
sizable group of impressionable young people, it creates an
explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective
response.

															Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators
are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes. Page 469 U. S. 377 But the majority's statement of the standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of such searches is not suitably adapted to that
end. The majority holds that

															"a search of a student by a teacher or other school official
will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school. " Ante at 469 U. S.
341 -342. This standard will permit teachers and school
administrators to search students when they suspect that the search
will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school regulation or
precatory guideline for student behavior. The Court's standard for
deciding whether a search is justified "at its inception" treats
all violations of the rules of the school as though they were
fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in
order to enforce the school dress code [ Footnote 4/16 ] is apparently just as important as a
search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang
activity.

															The majority, however, does not contend that school
administrators have a compelling need to search students in Page 469 U. S. 378 order to achieve optimum enforcement of minor school
regulations. [ Footnote 4/17 ] To
the contrary, when minor violations are involved, there is every
indication that the informal school disciplinary process, with only
minimum requirements of due process, [ Footnote 4/18 ] can function effectively without the
power to search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case. In
arguing that teachers and school administrators need the power to
search students based on a lessened standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies heavily on empirical evidence of a
contemporary crisis of violence and unlawful behavior that is
seriously undermining the process of education in American schools.
[ Footnote 4/19 ] A standard better
attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school
administrators to search a student when they have reason to believe
that the search will uncover evidence that the student is
violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously
disruptive of school order, or the educational process. This standard is properly directed at "[t]he sole justification
for the [warrantless] search." [ Footnote 4/20 ] In addition, a standard Page 469 U. S. 379 that varies the extent of the permissible intrusion with the
gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with
common law experience and this Court's precedent. Criminal law has
traditionally recognized a distinction between essentially
regulatory offenses and serious violations of the peace, and
graduated the response of the criminal justice system depending on
the character of the violation. [ Footnote 4/21 ] The application of a similar distinction
in evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless searches and
seizures "is not a novel idea." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 , 466 U. S. 750 (1984). [ Footnote 4/22 ]

															In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a
traffic accident and obtained information indicating that the
driver of the automobile involved was guilty of a first offense
of Page 469 U. S. 380 driving while intoxicated -- a civil violation with a maximum
fine of $200. The driver had left the scene of the accident, and
the officers followed the suspect to his home where they arrested
him without a warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the
warrantless invasion of the home was a clear violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980). In holding that the warrantless arrest for the
"noncriminal, traffic offense" in Welsh was
unconstitutional, the Court noted that

															"application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the
context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been
committed."

															466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 753 .
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in
evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is almost too
clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion on
the persons and privacy of young people that New Jersey asks this
Court to approve, the State must identify "some real immediate and
serious consequences." McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 335 U. S. 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.).
[ Footnote 4/23 ] While school
administrators have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting school
regulations and guidelines for student behavior, the authorization
of searches to enforce them "displays a shocking lack of all sense
of proportion." Id. 335 U. S. 459 .
[ Footnote 4/24 ] Page 469 U. S. 381 The majority offers weak deference to these principles of
balance and decency by announcing that school searches will only be
reasonable in scope "when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction. " Ante at 469 U. S. 342 (emphasis added). The majority offers no explanation why a two-part
standard is necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the
ordinary school search. Significantly, in the balance of its
opinion the Court pretermits any discussion of the nature of
T.L.O.'s infraction of the "no smoking" rule.

															The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the Court's
perception that its standard is overly generous and does not, by
itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator's right to
search and the student's reasonable expectations of privacy. The
Court's standard for evaluating the "scope" of reasonable school
searches is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive
searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively
minor offenses. The Court's effort to establish a standard that is,
at once, clear enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly
every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable
intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in the
extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the
majority's application of its standard in this case -- to permit a
male administrator to rummage through the purse of a female high
school student in order to obtain evidence that she was smoking Page 469 U. S. 382 in a bathroom -- raises grave doubts in my mind whether its
effort will be effective. [ Footnote
4/25 ] Unlike the Court, I believe the nature of the suspected
infraction is a matter of first importance in deciding whether any invasion of privacy is permissible. III The Court embraces the standard applied by the New Jersey
Supreme Court as equivalent to its own, and then deprecates the
state court's application of the standard as reflecting "a somewhat
crabbed notion of reasonableness." Ante at 469 U. S. 343 .
There is no mystery, however, in the state court's finding that the
search in this case was unconstitutional; the decision below was
not based on a manipulation of reasonable suspicion, but on the
trivial character of the activity that promoted the official
search. The New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:

															"We are satisfied that, when a school official has reasonable
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline
and order, the school official has the right to conduct a
reasonable search for such evidence."

															"In determining whether the school official has reasonable
grounds, courts should consider the child's age, history, and
school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in
the school to which the search was Page 469 U. S.
383 directed, the exigency to make the search without
delay, and the probative value and reliability of the information
used as a justification for the search. [ Footnote 4/26 ]"

															The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses on
the character of the rule infraction that is to be the object of
the search.

															In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and
material difference between a search for evidence relating to
violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a
smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that a
no-smoking rule is a matter of minor importance. Rather, like a
rule that prohibits a student from being tardy, its occasional
violation in a context that poses no threat of disrupting school
order and discipline offers no reason to believe that an immediate
search is necessary to avoid unlawful conduct, violence, or a
serious impairment of the educational process.

															A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's standard
explains why that court concluded in T.L.O.'s case that

															"the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds to
believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence of
criminal activity or evidence of activity that would seriously
interfere with school discipline or order. [ Footnote 4/27 ]"

															The importance of the nature of the rule infraction to the New
Jersey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief
explanation of the principal basis for its decision:

															"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents of her
purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school rule or
policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas. The
contents of the handbag had no direct bearing on the
infraction."

															"The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to gather
evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a Page 469 U. S. 384 hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate the
search. [ Footnote 4/28 ]"

															Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case
differently if the Assistant Vice Principal had reason to believe
T.L.O.'s purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of an
activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was,
however, absolutely no basis for any such assumption -- not even a
"hunch."

															In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to be
nothing more than a minor infraction -- a rule prohibiting smoking
in the bathroom of the freshmen's and sophomores' building.
[ Footnote 4/29 ] It is, of course,
true that he actually found evidence of serious wrongdoing by
T.L.O., but no one claims that the prior search may be justified by
his unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking infraction is
concerned, the search for cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a
teacher's eyewitness account of T.L.O.'s violation of a minor
regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into
designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful nor
significantly disruptive of school order or the educational
process, the invasion of privacy associated with the forcible
opening of T.L.O.'s purse was entirely unjustified at its
inception.

															A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by the
Court demonstrates how different this case is from those Page 469 U. S. 385 in which there was indeed a valid justification for intruding on
a student's privacy. In most of them the student was suspected of a
criminal violation; [ Footnote
4/30 ] in the remainder either violence or substantial
disruption of school order or the integrity of the academic process
was at stake. [ Footnote 4/31 ] Few
involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking rule violated by
T.L.0., [ Footnote 4/32 ] The rule
the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth
Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Although I
agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to
maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that authority is
not unlimited. IV The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen
and public official, from schoolteachers to Page 469 U. S. 386 policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they
take with them in life. One of our most cherished ideals is the one
contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the government may not
intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without a warrant
or compelling circumstance. The Court's decision today is a curious
moral for the Nation's youth. Although the search of T.L.O.'s purse
does not trouble today's majority, I submit that we are not dealing
with "matters relatively trivial to the welfare of the Nation.
There are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who
acts under color of law is beyond reach of the Constitution." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S. 638 (1943).

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															Pet. for Cert. i.

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 6.

															[ Footnote 4/3 ] State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 337, nn. 1 and 2,
342, n. 5, 463
A.2d 934 , 937, nn. 1 and 2, 939, n. 5 (1983).

															[ Footnote 4/4 ] Id. at 341, 463 A.2d at 939.

															[ Footnote 4/5 ] Id. at 341-342, 463 A.2d at 939.

															[ Footnote 4/6 ] See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.
S. 465 , 428 U. S. 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 , 428 U. S. 453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S.
347 -348 (1974); Alderman V. United States, 394 U. S. 165 , 394 U. S.
174 -175 (1969).

															[ Footnote 4/7 ] Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
493 .

															[ Footnote 4/8 ] See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.
S. 853 , 457 U. S.
864 -865 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL and
STEVENS, JJ.); id. at 457 U. S. 876 , 457 U. S. 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 , 457 U. S. 221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U. S.
68 , 441 U. S. 76 (1979); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U. S. 503 , 393 U. S. 507 , 393 U. S.
511 -513 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 , 347 U. S. 493 (1954); West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 , 319 U. S. 637 (1943).

															[ Footnote 4/9 ] Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 , 387 U. S. 26 -27
(1967). JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:

															"We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the
police and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities
taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression than
the one her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari
to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment
protects '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures'. . . . Schools cannot expect their students to learn the
lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves
disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our
constitutional freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U. S. 1022 ,
1027-1028 (1981) (dissenting from denial of certiorari).

															[ Footnote 4/10 ] Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
492 .

															[ Footnote 4/11 ]

															36 U.S.C. § 172 (pledge of allegiance to the flag).

															[ Footnote 4/12 ]

															A brief review of the Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal
prosecutions since the October Term, 1982, supports the
proposition. Compare Florida v. Rodriguez, ante p. 469 U. S. 1 (per
curiam); United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984); Segura v. United States, 468 U.
S. 796 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170 (1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984); Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.
S. 727 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U. S. 380 (1984) (per curiam); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032 (1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765 (1983); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640 (1983); United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S. 579 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.
S. 730 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.
S. 1112 (1983) (per curiam); Cardwell v.
Taylor, 461 U. S. 571 (1983) (per curiam), with Thompson v. Louisiana, ante p. 469 U. S. 17 (per
curiam); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.
S. 740 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U. S. 287 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 (1983).

															[ Footnote 4/13 ] E.g. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
719 -721; see also Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. at 468 U. S.
805 -813 (opinion of BURGER, C.J., joined by O'CONNOR,
J.); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.
S. 1028 (1982) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument
order, joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.)

															[ Footnote 4/14 ] See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873 , 422 U. S.
881 -882 (1975); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 , 428 U. S. 567 (1976).

															[ Footnote 4/15 ] Cf. ante at 469 U. S. 353 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment) ("The special need for an
immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of
schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself
justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant
and probable cause requirement"); ante at 469 U. S. 350 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by O'CONNOR, J.) ("Without first
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot
begin to educate their students").

															[ Footnote 4/16 ]

															Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.] H. S. (1979),
Record Doc. S-1, p. 7. A brief survey of school rule books reveals
that, under the majority's approach, teachers and school
administrators may also search students to enforce school rules
regulating:

															"(i) secret societies;"

															"(ii) students driving to school;"

															"(iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours;"

															"(iv) smoking on campus;"

															"(v) the direction of traffic in the hallways;"

															"(vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours
without a pass;"

															"(vii) profanity;"

															"(viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day
of a game, meet or match;"

															"(ix) cafeteria use and cleanup;"

															"(x) eating lunch off-campus; and"

															"(xi) unauthorized absence." See id. at 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor
[Conn.] H. S. (1984); Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student
Responsibilities and Rights (1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly
[Va.] H. S. (1984).

															[ Footnote 4/17 ] Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S.
535 -536 (1967) ("There is unanimous agreement among
those most familiar with this field that the only effective way to
seek universal compliance with the minimum standards required by
municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections of all
structures. . . . [I]f the probable cause standard . . . is
adopted, . . . the reasonable goals of code enforcement will be
dealt a crushing blow").

															[ Footnote 4/18 ] See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 , 419 U. S.
583 -584 (1975).

															[ Footnote 4/19 ]

															"The sad truth is that many classrooms across the country are
not temples of learning teaching the lessons of good will,
civility, and wisdom that are central to the fabric of American
life. To the contrary, many schools are in such a state of disorder
that not only is the educational atmosphere polluted, but the very
safety of students and teachers is imperiled."

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. See
also Brief for National Education Association as Amicus
Curiae 21 ("If a suspected violation of a rule threatens to
disrupt the school or threatens to harm students, school officials
should be free to search for evidence of it").

															[ Footnote 4/20 ] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 29 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
881 -882.

															[ Footnote 4/21 ]

															Throughout the criminal law this dichotomy has been expressed by
classifying crimes as misdemeanors or felonies, malum
prohibitum or malum in se, crimes that do not involve
moral turpitude or those that do, and major or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law § 6
(1972).

															Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of
graduated response by distinguishing between violent, unlawful, or
seriously disruptive conduct, and conduct that will only warrant
serious sanctions when the student engages in repetitive offenses. See, e.g., Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.]
H.S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, pp. 15-16; Student Handbook of South
Windsor [Conn.] H.S. � E (1984); Rules of the Board of Education of
the District of Columbia, Ch. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982). Indeed, at
Piscataway High School a violation of smoking regulations that is
"[a] student's first offense will result in assignment of up to
three (3) days of after school classes concerning hazards of
smoking." Record Doc. S-1, supra, at 15.

															[ Footnote 4/22 ]

															In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S.
582 -583 (emphasis added), the Court noted that similar
considerations require some variance in the requirements of due
process in the school disciplinary context:

															"[A]s a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal
of the student from school. We agree . . ., however, that there are
recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be
insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing
danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting
the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should
follow as soon as practicable. . . ."

															[ Footnote 4/23 ]

															In McDonald police officers made a warrantless search
of the office of an illegal "numbers" operation. Justice Jackson
rejected the view that the search could be supported by exigent
circumstances:

															"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might
justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was
present in this case. . . . Whether there is reasonable
necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought
to be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of
attempting to reach it. . . . [The defendant's] criminal operation,
while a shabby swindle that the police are quite right in
suppressing, was not one which endangered life or limb or the peace
and good order of the community. . . ."

															335 U.S. at 335 U. S.
459 -460.

															[ Footnote 4/24 ]

															While a policeman who sees a person smoking in an elevator in
violation of a city ordinance may conduct a full-blown search for
evidence of the smoking violation in the unlikely event of a
custodial arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 , 414 U. S. 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.
S. 260 , 414 U. S.
265 -266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search of
this kind would be reasonable if the officer only planned to issue
a citation to the offender and depart, see Robinson, 414
U.S. at 414 U. S. 236 ,
n. 6. In any case, the majority offers no rationale supporting its
conclusion that a student detained by school officials for
questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she has violated a school
rule, is entitled to no more protection under the Fourth Amendment
than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.

															[ Footnote 4/25 ]

															One thing is clear under any standard -- the shocking strip
searches that are described in some cases have no place in the
schoolhouse. See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (CA7
1980) ("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude
that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of
constitutional rights of some magnitude"), cert. denied 451 U. S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.
Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977), People v. D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315
N.E.2d 466 (1974); M.J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996
(Fla.App.1981). To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are
ever reasonable outside the custodial context, it surely must only
be to prevent imminent, and serious harm.

															[ Footnote 4/26 ]

															94 N.J. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941-942 ( quoting State v.
McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d
75 , 81, 558 P.2d
781 , 784 (1977)) (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 4/27 ]

															94 N.J. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 4/28 ] Ibid. The court added:

															"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the
purse contained cigarettes, if they were the object of the search.
No one had furnished information to that effect to the school
official. He had, at best, a good hunch. No doubt good hunches
would unearth much more evidence of crime on the persons of
students and citizens as a whole. But more is required to sustain a
search." Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-943. It is this portion of
the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning -- a portion that was not
necessary to its holding -- to which this Court makes its principal
response. See ante, at 469 U. S.
345 -346.

															[ Footnote 4/29 ] See Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N.J.] H.S.
15, 18 (1979), Record Doc. S-1. See also Tr. of Mar. 31,
1980, Hearing 13-14.

															[ Footnote 4/30 ] See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984)
(search for marihuana); M. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham
Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F.
Supp. 288 (SD Ill.1977) (drugs and large amount of money); D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (AlaskaApp.1982) (stolen money); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d
777 , 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (marihuana); In re
G., 11 Cal. App. 3d
1193 , 90 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1970) (amphetamine pills); In re
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 509 , 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) (methedrine pills); State
v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super.1971) (drugs); State v. D.T.W., 425
So. 2d 1383 (Fla.App.1983) (drugs); In re J.A., 85
Ill.App.3d 567, 406 N.E.2d 958 (1980) (marihuana); People v.
Ward, 62 Mich.App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Civ.App.1970)
(marihuana); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d
75 , 558 P.2d
781 (1977) ("speed").

															[ Footnote 4/31 ] See, e.g., In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d
343 (App.1979) (search for knife or razor blade), R.C.M. v.
State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.App.1983) (student with bloodshot
eyes wandering halls in violation of school rule requiring students
to remain in examination room or at home during midterm
examinations).

															[ Footnote 4/32 ] See, e.g., State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (three students searched when they made furtive gestures and
displayed obvious consciousness of guilt), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d
827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher saw him
using it to violate smoking regulations).

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

Case: New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)

Issue: Does the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to searches conducted by public school officials, and what standard should be used to determine the reasonableness of such searches?

Holding: Yes, the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials. The reasonableness of a search by a school official depends on the facts and circumstances, balancing the student's legitimate expectations of privacy against the school's need to maintain order and discipline.

Facts: A teacher caught T.L.O., a 14-year-old student, smoking in the school bathroom, violating school rules. The teacher took T.L.O. to the principal's office, where the assistant vice principal demanded to search her purse. He found cigarettes and rolling papers, commonly associated with marijuana use. He then searched the purse further and discovered marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, money, and evidence of marijuana dealing.

Procedural History: The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and ordered the evidence suppressed.

Reasoning: School officials act as representatives of the state when carrying out searches and are not exempt from the Fourth Amendment. Students have legitimate privacy expectations, but schools have a legitimate need to maintain order and discipline. The Court adopted a standard of reasonableness for school searches, considering the student's privacy interest and the nature of the intrusion, balanced against the school's need to maintain a safe environment.

Conclusion: The Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision, finding that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances and that the evidence found should not be suppressed.