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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–144

															_________________

															DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al., PETITIONERS
v. KRISTIN M. PERRY et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2013]

															     Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.

															     The public is currently
engaged in an active political debate over whether same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry. That question has also given rise to
litigation. In this case, petitioners, who oppose same-sex
marriage, ask us to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause
“prohibits the State of California from defining marriage as
the union of a man and a woman.” Pet. for Cert. i.
Respondents, same-sex couples who wish to marry, view the issue in
somewhat different terms: For them, it is whether
California—having previously recognized the right of same-sex
couples to marry—may reverse that decision through a
referendum.

															     Federal courts have
authority under the Constitution to answer such questions only if
necessary to do so in the course of deciding an actual
“case” or “controversy.” As used in the
Constitution, those words do not include every sort of dispute, but
only those “historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S.
83, 95 (1968) . This is an essential limit on our power: It ensures
that we act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly
left to elected representatives.

															     For there to be such a
case or controversy, it is not enough that the party invoking the
power of the court have a keen interest in the issue. That party
must also have “standing,” which requires, among other
things, that it have suffered a concrete and particularized injury.
Because we find that petitioners do not have standing, we have no
authority to decide this case on the merits, and neither did the
Ninth Circuit.

															I

															     In 2008, the
California Supreme Court held that limiting the official
designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution. In re
Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P. 3d 384. Later that
year, California voters passed the ballot initiative at the center
of this dispute, known as Proposition 8. That proposition amended
the California Constitution to provide that “[o]nly marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California.” Cal. Const., Art. I, §7.5. Shortly
thereafter, the California Supreme Court rejected a procedural
challenge to the amendment, and held that the Proposition was
properly enacted under California law. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal.
4th 364, 474–475, 207 P. 3d 48, 122 (2009).

															     According to the
California Supreme Court, Proposition 8 created a “narrow and
limited exception” to the state constitutional rights
otherwise guaranteed to same-sex couples. Id., at 388, 207
P. 3d, at 61. Under California law, same-sex couples have a
right to enter into relationships recognized by the State as
“domestic partnerships,” which carry “the same
rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same
responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law . . .
as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.” Cal. Fam. Code
Ann. §297.5(a) (West 2004). In In re Marriage Cases, the
California Supreme Court concluded that the California Constitution
further guarantees same-sex couples “all of the
constitutionally based incidents of marriage,” including the
right to have that marriage “officially recognized” as
such by the State. 43 Cal. 4th, at 829, 183 P. 3d, at
433–434. Proposition 8, the court explained in Strauss, left
those rights largely undisturbed, reserving only “the
official designation of the term ‘marriage’ for the
union of opposite-sex couples as a matter of state constitutional
law.” 46 Cal. 4th, at 388, 207 P. 3d, at 61.

															     Respondents, two
same-sex couples who wish to marry, filed suit in federal court,
challenging Proposition 8 under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. The complaint named as defendants California’s
Governor, attorney general, and various other state and local
officials responsible for enforcing California’s marriage
laws. Those officials refused to defend the law, although they have
continued to enforce it throughout this litigation. The District
Court allowed petitioners—the official proponents of the
initiative, see Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §342 (West 2003)—to
intervene to defend it. After a 12-day bench trial, the District
Court declared Proposition 8 uncon-stitutional, permanently
enjoining the California officials named as defendants from
enforcing the law, and “directing the official defendants
that all persons under their control or supervision” shall
not enforce it. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
1004 (ND Cal. 2010).

															     Those officials elected
not to appeal the District Court order. When petitioners did, the
Ninth Circuit asked them to address “why this appeal should
not be dismissed for lack of Article III standing.” Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, Civ. No. 10–16696 (CA9, Aug. 16, 2010),
p. 2. After briefing and argument, the Ninth Circuit certified
a question to the California Supreme Court:

															“Whether under Article II, Section 8
of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law,
the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a
particularized interest in the initiative’s valid-ity or the
authority to assert the State’s interest in the
initiative’s validity, which would enable them to defend the
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a
judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials
charged with that duty refuse to do so.” Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 628 F. 3d 1191, 1193 (2011).

															     The California Supreme
Court agreed to decide the certified question, and answered in the
affirmative. Without addressing whether the proponents have a
particularized interest of their own in an initiative’s
validity, the court concluded that “[i]n a postelection
challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, the official
proponents of the initiative are authorized under California law to
appear and assert the state’s interest in the
initiative’s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating
the measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the
measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so.” Perry v.
Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116, 1127, 265 P. 3d 1002, 1007
(2011).

															     Relying on that answer,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing under
federal law to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8.
California, it reasoned, “ ‘has standing to defend
the constitutionality of its [laws],’ ” and States
have the “prerogative, as independent sovereigns, to decide
for themselves who may assert their interests.” Perry v.
Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1070, 1071 (2012) (quoting Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986) ). “All a federal court
need determine is that the state has suffered a harm sufficient to
confer standing and that the party seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to represent
its interest in remedying that harm.” 671 F. 3d, at
1072.

															     On the merits, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court. The court held the
Proposition unconstitutional under the rationale of our decision in
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996) . 671 F. 3d, at
1076, 1095. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, Romer stands for the
proposition that “the Equal Protection Clause requires the
state to have a legitimate reason for withdrawing a right or
benefit from one group but not others, whether or not it was
required to confer that right or benefit in the first place.”
671 F. 3d, at 1083–1084. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that “taking away the official designation” of
“marriage” from same-sex couples, while continuing to
afford those couples all the rights and obligations of marriage,
did not further any legitimate interest of the State. Id., at 1095.
Proposition 8, in the court’s view, violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it served no purpose “but to impose
on gays and lesbians, through the public law, a majority’s
private disapproval of them and their relationships.”
Ibid.

															     We granted certiorari
to review that determination, and directed that the parties also
brief and argue “Whether petitioners have standing under
Article III, §2, of the Constitution in this case.” 568
U. S. ___ (2012).

															II

															     Article III of the
Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to
deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.”
§2. One essential aspect of this requirement is that any
person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate
standing to do so. This requires the litigant to prove that he has
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U. S. 555 –561 (1992). In other words, for a federal
court to have authority under the Constitution to settle a dispute,
the party before it must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible
harm. “The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and
acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art.
III’s requirements.” Diamond, supra, at 62.

															     The doctrine of
standing, we recently explained, “serves to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
political branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 9). In light of this
“overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the
Judiciary’s power within its proper constitu- tional sphere,
we must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the
merits of [an] important dispute and to ‘settle’ it for
the sake of convenience and effi-ciency.” Raines v. Byrd, 521
U. S. 811, 820 (1997) (footnote omitted).

															     Most standing cases
consider whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when
filing suit, but Article III demands that an “actual
controversy” persist throughout all stages of litigation.
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip
op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). That means that
standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review,
just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first
instance.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U. S. 43, 64 (1997) . We therefore must decide whether
petitioners had standing to appeal the District Court’s
order.

															     Respondents initiated
this case in the District Court against the California officials
responsible for enforcing Proposition 8. The parties do not contest
that respondents had Article III standing to do so. Each couple
expressed a desire to marry and obtain “official
sanction” from the State, which was unavailable to them given
the declaration in Proposition 8 that “marriage” in
California is solely between a man and a woman. App. 59.

															     After the District
Court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the
state officials named as defendants from enforcing it, however, the
inquiry under Article III changed. Respondents no longer had any
injury to redress—they had won—and the state officials
chose not to appeal.

															     The only individuals
who sought to appeal that order were petitioners, who had
intervened in the District Court. But the District Court had not
ordered them to do or refrain from doing anything. To have
standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that affects
him in a “personal and individual way.” Defenders of
Wildlife, supra, at 560, n. 1. He must possess a “direct
stake in the outcome” of the case. Arizonans for Official
English, supra, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here,
however, petitioners had no “direct stake” in the
outcome of their appeal. Their only interest in having the District
Court order reversed was to vindicate the constitutional validity
of a generally applicable California law.

															     We have repeatedly held
that such a “generalized grievance,” no matter how
sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant
“raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state
an Article III case or controversy.” Defenders of Wildlife,
supra, at 573–574; see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U. S. 437,
439 (2007) (per curiam) (“Our refusal to serve as a forum for
generalized grievances has a lengthy pedigree.”); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 754 (1984) (“an asserted right to
have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient,
standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court”);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The
party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show
. . . that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.”).

															     Petitioners argue that
the California Constitution and its election laws give them a
“ ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and
‘distinct’ role in the initiative process—one
‘involving both authority and responsibilities that differ
from other supporters of the measure.’ ” Reply
Brief 5 (quoting 52 Cal. 4th, at 1126, 1142, 1160, 265 P. 3d,
at 1006, 1017–1018, 1030). True enough—but only when it
comes to the process of enacting the law. Upon submitting the
proposed initiative to the attorney general, petitioners became the
official “proponents” of Proposition 8. Cal. Elec. Code
Ann. §342 (West 2003). As such, they were responsible for
collecting the signatures required to qualify the measure for the
ballot. §§9607–9609. After those signatures were
collected, the proponents alone had the right to file the measure
with election officials to put it on the ballot. §9032.
Petitioners also possessed control over the arguments in favor of
the initiative that would appear in California’s ballot
pamphlets. §§9064, 9065, 9067, 9069.

															     But once Proposition 8
was approved by the voters, the measure became “a duly
enacted constitutional amendment or statute.” 52 Cal. 4th, at
1147, 265 P. 3d, at 1021. Petitioners have no
role—special or otherwise—in the enforcement of
Proposition 8. See id., at 1159, 265 P. 3d, at 1029
(petitioners do not “possess any official authority
. . . to directly enforce the initiative measure in
question”). They therefore have no “personal
stake” in defending its enforcement that is distinguishable
from the general interest of every citizen of California. Defenders
of Wildlife, supra, at 560–561.

															     Article III standing
“is not to be placed in the hands of ‘concerned
bystanders,’ who will use it simply as a ‘vehicle for
the vindication of value interests.’ ” Diamond,
476 U. S., at 62. No matter how deeply committed petitioners
may be to upholding Proposition 8 or how “zealous [their]
advocacy,” post, at 4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), that is not
a “particularized” interest sufficient to create a case
or controversy under Article III. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U. S., at 560, and n. 1; see Arizonans for Official
English, 520 U. S., at 65 (“Nor has this Court ever
identified ini-tiative proponents as Article-III-qualified
defenders of the measures they advocated.”); Don’t
Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 460 U. S. 1077 (1983) (summarily
dismissing, for lack of standing, appeal by an initiative proponent
from a decision holding the initiative unconstitutional).

															III

															A

															     Without a judicially
cognizable interest of their own, petitioners attempt to invoke
that of someone else. They assert that even if they have no
cognizable interest in appealing the District Court’s
judgment, the State of California does, and they may assert that
interest on the State’s behalf. It is, however, a
“fundamental restriction on our authority” that
“[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief
on the legal rights or inter-ests of third parties.” Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991) . There are “certain,
limited exceptions” to that rule. Ibid. But even when we have
allowed litigants to assert the interests of others, the litigants
themselves still “must have suffered an injury in fact, thus
giving [them] a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of
the issue in dispute.” Id., at 411 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

															     In Diamond v. Charles,
for example, we refused to allow Diamond, a pediatrician engaged in
private practice in Illinois, to defend the constitutionality of
the State’s abortion law. In that case, a group of physicians
filed a con-stitutional challenge to the Illinois statute in
federal court. The State initially defended the law, and Diamond, a
professed “conscientious object[or] to abortions,”
in-tervened to defend it alongside the State. 476 U. S., at
57–58.

															     After the Seventh
Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction against enforcing several
provisions of the law, the State chose not to pursue an appeal to
this Court. But when Diamond did, the state attorney general filed
a “ ‘letter of interest,’ ”
explaining that the State’s interest in the proceeding was
“ ‘essentially co-terminous with the position on
the issues set forth by [Diamond].’ ” Id., at 61.
That was not enough, we held, to allow the appeal to proceed. As
the Court explained, “[e]ven if there were cir-cumstances in
which a private party would have stand- ing to defend the
constitutionality of a challenged statute, this [was] not one of
them,” because Diamond was not able to assert an injury in
fact of his own. Id., at 65 (footnote omitted). And without
“any judicially cognizable interest,” Diamond could not
“maintain the litigation abandoned by the State.” Id.,
at 71.

															     For the reasons we have
explained, petitioners have likewise not suffered an injury in
fact, and therefore would ordinarily have no standing to assert the
State’s interests.

															B

															     Petitioners contend
that this case is different, because the California Supreme Court
has determined that they are “authorized under California law
to appear and assert the state’s interest” in the
validity of Proposition 8. 52 Cal. 4th, at 1127, 265 P. 3d, at
1007. The court below agreed: “All a federal court need
determine is that the state has suffered a harm sufficient to
confer standing and that the party seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court is authorized by the state to represent
its interest in remedying that harm.” 671 F. 3d, at
1072. As petitioners put it, they “need no more show a
personal injury, separate from the State’s indisputable
interest in the validity of its law, than would California’s
Attorney General or did the legislative leaders held to have
standing in Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72 (1987) .” Reply
Brief 6.

															     In Karcher, we held
that two New Jersey state legis-lators—Speaker of the General
Assembly Alan Karcher and President of the Senate Carmen
Orechio—could intervene in a suit against the State to defend
the constitutionality of a New Jersey law, after the New Jersey
attorney general had declined to do so. 484 U. S., at 75,
81–82. “Since the New Jersey Legislature had authority
under state law to represent the State’s interests in both
the District Court and the Court of Appeals,” we held that
the Speaker and the President, in their official capacities, could
vindicate that interest in federal court on the legislature’s
behalf. Id., at 82.

															     Far from supporting
petitioners’ standing, however, Karcher is compelling
precedent against it. The legislators in that case intervened in
their official capacities as Speaker and President of the
legislature. No one doubts that a State has a cognizable interest
“in the continued enforceability” of its laws that is
harmed by a judicial decision declaring a state law
unconstitutional. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137 (1986) .
To vindicate that interest or any other, a State must be able to
designate agents to represent it in federal court. See Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885) (“The State is a
political corporate body [that] can act only through
agents”). That agent is typically the State’s attorney
general. But state law may provide for other officials to speak for
the State in federal court, as New Jersey law did for the
State’s presiding legislative officers in Karcher. See 484
U. S., at 81–82.

															     What is significant
about Karcher is what happened after the Court of Appeals decision
in that case. Karcher and Orechio lost their positions as Speaker
and President, but nevertheless sought to appeal to this Court. We
held that they could not do so. We explained that while they were
able to participate in the lawsuit in their official capacities as
presiding officers of the incumbent legislature, “since they
no longer hold those offices, they lack authority to pursue this
appeal.” Id., at 81.

															     The point of Karcher is
not that a State could authorize private parties to represent its
interests; Karcher and Orechio were permitted to proceed only
because they were state officers, acting in an official capacity.
As soon as they lost that capacity, they lost standing. Petitioners
here hold no office and have always participated in this litigation
solely as private parties.

															     The cases relied upon
by the dissent, see post, at 11–12, provide petitioners no
more support. The dissent’s primary authorities, in fact, do
not discuss standing at all. See Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U. S. 787 (1987) ; United States v.
Providence Journal Co., 485 U. S. 693 (1988) . And none comes
close to establishing that mere authorization to represent a third
party’s interests is sufficient to confer Article III
standing on private parties with no injury of their own.

															     The dissent highlights
the discretion exercised by special prosecutors appointed by
federal courts to pursue contempt charges. See post, at 11 (citing
Young, supra, at 807). Such prosecutors do enjoy a degree of
independence in carrying out their appointed role, but no one would
suppose that they are not subject to the ultimate au-thority of the
court that appointed them. See also Prov-idence Journal, supra, at
698–707 (recognizing further control exercised by the
Solicitor General over special prosecutors).

															     The dissent’s
remaining cases, which at least consider standing, are readily
distinguishable. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 –778 (2000) (justifying
qui tam actions based on a partial assignment of the
Government’s damages claim and a “well nigh
conclusive” tradition of such actions in English and American
courts dating back to the 13th century); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U. S. 149 –164 (1989) (justifying “next friend”
standing based on a similar history dating back to the 17th
century, requiring the next friend to prove a disability of the
real party in interest and a “significant relationship”
with that party); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U. S. 115 –125
(1990) (requiring plaintiff in shareholder-derivative suit to
maintain a financial stake in the outcome of the litigation, to
avoid “serious constitutional doubt whether that plaintiff
could demonstrate the standing required by Article III’s
case-or-controversy limitation”).

															C

															     Both petitioners and
respondents seek support from dicta in Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43 . The plaintiff in Arizonans
for Official English filed a constitutional challenge to an Arizona
ballot initiative declaring English “ ‘the
official language of the State of Arizona.’ ” Id.,
at 48. After the District Court declared the initiative
unconstitutional, Arizona’s Governor announced that she would
not pursue an appeal. Instead, the principal sponsor of the ballot
initiative—the Arizonans for Official English
Committee—sought to defend the measure in the Ninth Circuit.
Id., at 55–56, 58. Analogizing the sponsors to the Arizona
Legislature, the Ninth Circuit held that the Committee was
“qualified to defend [the initiative] on appeal,” and
affirmed the District Court. Id., at 58, 61.

															     Before finding the case
mooted by other events, this Court expressed “grave
doubts” about the Ninth Circuit’s standing analysis.
Id., at 66. We reiterated that “[s]tanding to defend on
appeal in the place of an original defendant . . .
demands that the litigant possess ‘a direct stake in the
outcome.’ ” Id., at 64 (quoting Diamond, 476
U. S., at 62). We recognized that a legislator authorized by
state law to represent the State’s interest may satisfy
standing requirements, as in Karcher, supra, at 82, but noted that
the Arizona committee and its members were “not elected
representatives, and we [we]re aware of no Arizona law appointing
initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend,
in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives
made law of the State.” Arizonans for Official English,
supra, at 65.

															     Petitioners argue that,
by virtue of the California Supreme Court’s decision, they
are authorized to act “ ‘as agents of the
people’ of California.” Brief for Petitioners 15
(quoting Arizonans for Official English, supra, at 65). But that
Court never described petitioners as “agents of the
people,” or of anyone else. Nor did the Ninth Circuit. The
Ninth Circuit asked—and the California Supreme Court
answered—only whether petitioners had “the authority to
assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s
validity.” 628 F. 3d, at 1193; 52 Cal. 4th, at 1124, 265
P. 3d, at 1005. All that the California Supreme Court decision
stands for is that, so far as California is concerned, petitioners
may argue in defense of Proposition 8. This “does not mean
that the proponents become de facto public officials”;
the authority they enjoy is “simply the authority to
participate as parties in a court action and to assert legal
arguments in defense of the state’s interest in the validity
of the initiative measure.” Id., at 1159, 265 P. 3d, at
1029. That interest is by definition a generalized one, and it is
precisely because proponents assert such an interest that they lack
standing under our precedents.

															     And petitioners are
plainly not agents of the State—“formal” or
otherwise, see post, at 7. As an initial matter, petitioners’
newfound claim of agency is inconsistent with their representations
to the District Court. When the proponents sought to intervene in
this case, they did not purport to be agents of California. They
argued instead that “no other party in this case w[ould]
adequately rep-resent their interests as official
proponents.” Motion to Intervene in No. 09–2292 (ND
Cal.), p. 6 (emphasis added). It was their “unique legal
status” as official proponents—not an agency
relationship with the people of California—that petitioners
claimed “endow[ed] them with a significantly protectable
interest” in ensuring that the District Court not
“undo[ ] all that they ha[d] done in obtaining
. . . enactment” of Proposition 8. Id., at 10,
11.

															     More to the point, the
most basic features of an agency relationship are missing here.
Agency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular
interest. “An essential element of agency is the
principal’s right to control the agent’s
actions.” 1 Restatement (Third) of Agency §1.01, Comment
f (2005) (hereinafter Restatement). Yet petitioners answer to no
one; they decide for themselves, with no review, what arguments to
make and how to make them. Unlike California’s attorney
general, they are not elected at regular intervals—or elected
at all. See Cal. Const., Art. V, §11. No provision provides
for their removal. As one amicus explains, “the proponents
apparently have an unelected appointment for an unspecified period
of time as defenders of the initiative, however and to whatever
extent they choose to defend it.” Brief for Walter Dellinger
23.

															     “If the
relationship between two persons is one of agency . . . ,
the agent owes a fiduciary obligation to the principal.” 1
Restatement §1.01, Comment e. But petitioners owe nothing of
the sort to the people of California. Unlike California’s
elected officials, they have taken no oath of office. E.g., Cal.
Const., Art. XX, §3 (prescribing the oath for “all
public officers and employees, executive, legislative, and
judicial”). As the California Supreme Court explained,
petitioners are bound simply by “the same ethical constraints
that apply to all other parties in a legal proceeding.” 52
Cal. 4th, at 1159, 265 P. 3d, at 1029. They are free to pursue
a purely ideological commit- ment to the law’s
constitutionality without the need to take cognizance of resource
constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential ramifications
for other state priorities.

															     Finally, the California
Supreme Court stated that “[t]he question of who should bear
responsibility for any attorney fee award . . . is
entirely distinct from the question” before it. Id., at 1161,
265 P. 3d, at 1031. (emphasis added). But it is hornbook law
that “a principal has a duty to indem-nify the agent against
expenses and other losses incurred by the agent in defending
against actions brought by third parties if the agent acted with
actual authority in taking the action challenged by the third
party’s suit.” 2 Restatement §8.14, Comment d. If
the issue of fees is entirely distinct from the authority question,
then authority cannot be based on agency.

															     Neither the California
Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit ever described the proponents
as agents of the State, and they plainly do not qualify as
such.

															IV

															     The dissent
eloquently recounts the California Supreme Court’s reasons
for deciding that state law authorizes petitioners to defend
Proposition 8. See post, at 3–5. We do not “disrespect[
]” or “disparage[ ]” those reasons. Post, at 12.
Nor do we question California’s sovereign right to maintain
an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to
defend their initiatives in California courts, where Article III
does not apply. But as the dissent acknowledges, see post, at 1,
standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state
law. And no matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a
private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized
grievance cannot override our settled law to the contrary.

															     The Article III
requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal
court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves
vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in our system of
separated powers. “Refusing to entertain generalized
grievances ensures that . . . courts exercise power that
is judicial in nature,” Lance, 549 U. S., at 441, and
ensures that the Federal Judiciary respects “the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a
democratic society,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U. S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
States cannot alter that role simply by issuing to private parties
who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse.

															*  *  *

															     We have never before
upheld the standing of a private party to defend the
constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have
chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time here.

															     Because petitioners
have not satisfied their burden to demonstrate standing to appeal
the judgment of the District Court, the Ninth Circuit was without
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The judgment of the Ninth
Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

															It is so ordered. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–144

															_________________

															DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, et al., PETITIONERS
v. KRISTIN M. PERRY et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 26, 2013]

															     Justice Kennedy, with
whom Justice Thomas, Jus- tice Alito, and Justice Sotomayor join,
dissenting.

															     The Court’s
opinion is correct to state, and the Supreme Court of California
was careful to acknowledge, that a proponent’s standing to
defend an initiative in federal court is a question of federal law.
Proper resolution of the justiciability question requires, in this
case, a threshold determination of state law. The state-law
question is how California defines and elaborates the status and
authority of an initiative’s proponents who seek to intervene
in court to defend the initiative after its adoption by the
electorate. Those state-law issues have been addressed in a metic-
ulous and unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court of California.

															     Under California law, a
proponent has the authority to appear in court and assert the
State’s interest in defending an enacted initiative when the
public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so. The State
deems such an appearance essential to the integrity of its
initiative process. Yet the Court today concludes that this
state-defined status and this state-conferred right fall short of
meeting federal requirements because the proponents cannot point to
a formal delegation of authority that tracks the requirements of
the Restatement of Agency. But the State Supreme Court’s
definition of proponents’ powers is binding on this Court.
And that definition is fully sufficient to establish the standing
and adversity that are requisites for justiciability under Article
III of the United States Constitution.

															     In my view Article III
does not require California, when deciding who may appear in court
to defend an initiative on its behalf, to comply with the
Restatement of Agency or with this Court’s view of how a
State should make its laws or structure its government. The
Court’s reasoning does not take into account the fundamental
principles or the practical dynamics of the initiative system in
California, which uses this mechanism to control and to bypass pub-
lic officials—the same officials who would not defend the
initiative, an injury the Court now leaves unremedied. The
Court’s decision also has implications for the 26 other
States that use an initiative or popular referendum system and
which, like California, may choose to have initiative proponents
stand in for the State when public officials decline to defend an
initiative in litigation. See M. Waters, Initiative and Referendum
Almanac 12 (2003). In my sub- mission, the Article III requirement
for a justiciable case or controversy does not prevent proponents
from having their day in court.

															     These are the premises
for this respectful dissent.

															I

															     As the Court
explains, the State of California sustained a concrete injury,
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III, when a
United States District Court nullified a portion of its State
Constitution. See ante, at 11 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477
U. S. 131, 137 (1986) ). To determine whether justiciability
continues in appellate proceedings after the State Executive
acquiesced in the District Court’s adverse judgment, it is
necessary to ascertain what persons, if any, have “authority
under state law to represent the State’s interests” in
federal court. Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 82 (1987) ; see
also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43,
65 (1997) .

															     As the Court notes, the
California Elections Code does not on its face prescribe in express
terms the duties or rights of proponents once the initiative
becomes law. Ante, at 8. If that were the end of the matter, the
Court’s analysis would have somewhat more force. But it is
not the end of the matter. It is for California, not this Court, to
determine whether and to what extent the Elections Code provisions
are instructive and relevant in determining the authority of
proponents to assert the State’s interest in postenactment
judicial proceedings. And it is likewise not for this Court to say
that a State must determine the substance and meaning of its laws
by statute, or by judicial decision, or by a combination of the
two. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 255 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 84
(1902) . That, too, is for the State to decide.

															     This Court, in
determining the substance of state law, is “bound by a state
court’s construction of a state statute.” Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476, 483 (1993) . And the Supreme Court of
California, in response to the certified question submitted to it
in this case, has determined that State Elections Code provisions
directed to initiative proponents do inform and instruct state law
respecting the rights and status of proponents in postelection
judicial proceedings. Here, in reliance on these statutes and the
California Constitution, the State Supreme Court has held that
proponents do have authority “under California law to appear
and assert the state’s interest in the initiative’s
validity and appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the
public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a
judgment decline to do so.” Perry v. Brown, 52 Cal. 4th 1116,
1127, 265 P. 3d 1002, 1007 (2011).

															     The reasons the Supreme
Court of California gave for its holding have special relevance in
the context of determining whether proponents have the authority to
seek a federal-court remedy for the State’s concrete,
substantial, and continuing injury. As a class, official proponents
are a small, identifiable group. See Cal. Elec. Code Ann.
§9001(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2013). Because many of their
decisions must be unanimous, see §§9001(b)(1), 9002(b),
they are necessarily few in number. Their identities are public.
§9001(b)(2). Their commitment is substantial. See
§§9607–9609 (West Cum. Supp. 2013) (obtaining pe-
tition signatures); §9001(c) (monetary fee);
§§9065(d), 9067, 9069 (West 2003) (drafting arguments for
official ballot pamphlet). They know and understand the purpose and
operation of the proposed law, an important requisite in defending
initiatives on complex matters such as taxation and insurance.
Having gone to great lengths to convince voters to enact an
initiative, they have a stake in the outcome and the necessary
commitment to provide zealous advocacy.

															     Thus, in California,
proponents play a “unique role . . . in the
initiative process.” 52 Cal. 4th, at 1152, 265 P. 3d, at
1024. They “have a unique relationship to the voter-approved
measure that makes them especially likely to be reliable and
vigorous advocates for the measure and to be so viewed by those
whose votes secured the initiative’s enactment into
law.” Ibid.; see also id., at 1160, 265 P. 3d, at 1030
(because of “their special relationship to the ini- tiative
measure,” proponents are “the most obvious and logical
private individuals to ably and vigorously defend the validity of
the challenged measure on behalf of the interests of the voters who
adopted the initiative into law”). Proponents’
authority under state law is not a contrivance. It is not a
fictional construct. It is the product of the California
Constitution and the California Elections Code. There is no basis
for this Court to set aside the California Supreme Court’s
determination of state law.

															     The Supreme Court of
California explained that its holding was consistent with recent
decisions from other States. Id., at 1161–1165, 265
P. 3d, at 1031–1033. In Sportsmen for I–143 v.
Fifteenth Jud. Ct., 2002 MT 18, 308 Mont. 189, 40 P. 3d 400,
the Montana Supreme Court unanimously held that because initiative
sponsors “may be in the best position to defend their
interpretation” of the initiative and had a “direct,
substantial, legally protectable interest in” the lawsuit
challenging that interpretation, they were “entitled to
intervene as a matter of right.” Id., at 194–195, 40
P. 3d, at 403. The Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar
unanimous result in Alaskans for a Common Language Inc., v. Kritz,
3 P. 3d 906 (2000). It noted that, except in extraordinary
cases, “a sponsor’s direct interest in legislation
enacted through the initiative process and the concomitant need to
avoid the appearance of [a conflict of interest] will ordinarily
preclude courts from denying intervention as of right to a
sponsoring group.” Id., at 914.

															     For these and other
reasons, the Supreme Court of California held that the California
Elections Code and Article II, §8, of the California
Constitution afford proponents “the authority . . .
to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the
initiative” when State officials decline to do so. 52 Cal.
4th, at 1152, 265 P. 3d, at 1024. The court repeated this
unanimous holding more than a half-dozen times and in no uncertain
terms. See id., at 1126, 1127, 1139, 1149, 1151, 1152, 1165, 256
P. 3d, at 1006, 1007, 1015, 1022, 1024, 1025, 1033; see also
id., at 1169–1170, 265 P. 3d, at 1036–1037
(Kennard, J., concurring). That should suffice to resolve the
central issue on which the federal question turns.

															II

															A

															     The Court concludes
that proponents lack sufficient ties to the state government. It
notes that they “are not elected,” “answer to no
one,” and lack “ ‘a fiduciary
obligation’ ” to the State. Ante, at 15 (quoting 1
Restatement (Third) of Agency §1.01, Comments e, f (2005)).
But what the Court deems deficiencies in the proponents’
connection to the State government, the State Supreme Court saw as
essential qualifications to defend the initiative system. The very
object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking process
that does not depend upon state officials. In California, the
popular initiative is necessary to implement “the theory that
all power of government ultimately resides in the people.” 52
Cal. 4th, at 1140, 265 P. 3d, at 1016 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The right to adopt initiatives has been described
by the California courts as “one of the most precious rights
of [the State’s] democratic process.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). That historic role for the initiative
system “grew out of dissatisfaction with the then governing
public officials and a widespread belief that the people had lost
control of the political process.” Ibid. The
initiative’s “primary purpose,” then, “was
to afford the people the ability to propose and to adopt
constitutional amendments or statutory provisions that their
elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt.”
Ibid.

															     The California Supreme
Court has determined that this purpose is undermined if the very
officials the initiative process seeks to circumvent are the only
parties who can defend an enacted initiative when it is challenged
in a legal proceeding. See id., at 1160, 265 P. 3d, at 1030;
cf. Alaskans for a Common Language, supra, at 914 (noting that
proponents must be allowed to defend an enacted initiative in order
to avoid the perception, correct or not, “that the interests
of [the proponents] were not being defended vigorously by the
executive branch”). Giving the Governor and attorney general
this de facto veto will erode one of the cornerstones of the
State’s governmental structure. See 52 Cal. 4th, at
1126–1128, 265 P. 3d, at 1006–1007. And in light
of the frequency with which initiatives’ opponents resort to
litigation, the impact of that veto could be substantial. K.
Miller, Direct Democracy and the Courts 106 (2009) (185 of the 455
initiatives approved in Arizona, California, Colorado, Oregon, and
Washington between 1900 and 2008 were challenged in court). As a
consequence, California finds it necessary to vest the re-
sponsibility and right to defend a voter-approved initiative in the
initiative’s proponents when the State Executive declines to
do so.

															     Yet today the Court
demands that the State follow the Restatement of Agency. See ante,
at 15–16. There are reasons, however, why California might
conclude that a conventional agency relationship is inconsistent
with the history, design, and purpose of the initiative process.
The State may not wish to associate itself with proponents or their
views outside of the “extremely narrow and limited”
context of this litigation, 52 Cal. 4th, at 1159, 265 P. 3d,
at 1029, or to bear the cost of proponents’ legal fees. The
State may also wish to avoid the odd conflict of having a formal
agent of the State (the initiative’s proponent) arguing in
favor of a law’s validity while state officials (e.g., the
attorney general) contend in the same proceeding that it should be
found invalid.

															     Furthermore, it is not
clear who the principal in an agency relationship would be. It
would make little sense if it were the Governor or attorney
general, for that would frustrate the initiative system’s
purpose of circumventing elected officials who fail or refuse to
effect the public will. Id., at 1139–1140, 265 P. 3d, at
1016. If there is to be a principal, then, it must be the people of
California, as the ultimate sovereign in the State. See ibid., 265
P. 3d, at 1015–1016 (quoting Cal. Const., Art. II,
§1) (“ ‘All political power is inherent in
the people’ ”). But the Restatement may offer no
workable example of an agent representing a principal composed of
nearly 40 million residents of a State. Cf. 1 Restatement (Second)
of Agency, p. 2, Scope Note (1957) (noting that the
Restatement “does not state the special rules applicable to
public officers”); 1 Restatement (First) of Agency,
p. 4, Scope Note (1933) (same).

															     And if the
Court’s concern is that the proponents are unaccountable,
that fear is neither well founded nor suf- ficient to overcome the
contrary judgment of the State Supreme Court. It must be remembered
that both elected officials and initiative proponents receive their
authority to speak for the State of California directly from the
people. The Court apparently believes that elected officials are
acceptable “agents” of the State, see ante, at
11–12, but they are no more subject to ongoing supervision of
their principal—i.e., the people of the State—than are
initiative proponents. At most, a Governor or attorney general can
be recalled or voted out of office in a subsequent election, but
proponents, too, can have their authority terminated or their
initiative overridden by a subsequent ballot measure. Finally,
proponents and their attor- neys, like all other litigants and
counsel who appear before a federal court, are subject to duties of
candor, deco- rum, and respect for the tribunal and co-parties
alike, all of which guard against the possibility that initiative
proponents will somehow fall short of the appropriate stan- dards
for federal litigation.

															B

															     Contrary to the
Court’s suggestion, this Court’s precedents do not
indicate that a formal agency relationship is necessary. In Karcher
v. May, 484 U. S. 72 (1987) , the Speaker of the New Jersey
Assembly (Karcher) and President of the New Jersey Senate (Orechio)
intervened in support of a school moment-of-silence law that the
State’s Governor and attorney general declined to defend in
court. In considering the question of standing, the Court looked to
New Jersey law to determine whether Karcher and Orechio “had
authority under state law to represent the State’s interest
in both the District Court and Court of Appeals.” Id., at 82.
The Court concluded that they did. Because the “New Jersey
Supreme Court ha[d] granted applications of the Speaker of the
General Assembly and the President of the Senate to intervene as
parties-respondent on behalf of the legislature in defense of a
legislative enactment,” the Karcher Court held that standing
had been proper in the District Court and Court of Appeals. Ibid.
By the time the case arrived in this Court, Karcher and Orechio had
lost their presiding legislative offices, without which they lacked
the authority to represent the State under New Jersey law. This,
the Court held, deprived them of standing. Id., at 81. Here, by
contrast, proponents’ authority under California law is not
contingent on officeholder status, so their standing is unaffected
by the fact that they “hold no office” in
California’s Government. Ante, at 12.

															     Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43 (1997) , is consistent with
the premises of this dissent, not with the rationale of the
Court’s opinion. See ante, at 13–14. There, the Court
noted its serious doubts as to the aspiring defenders’
standing because there was “no Ari- zona law appointing
initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend,
in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives
made law of the State.” 520 U. S., at 65. The Court did
use the word “agents”; but, read in context, it is
evident that the Court’s intention was not to demand a formal
agency relationship in compliance with the Restatement. Rather, the
Court used the term as shorthand for a party whom “state law
authorizes” to “represent the State’s
interests” in court. Ibid.

															     Both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of California were mindful of these
precedents and sought to comply with them. The state court, noting
the importance of Arizonans for Official English, expressed its
understanding that “the high court’s doubts as to the
official initiative proponents’ standing in that case were
based, at least in substantial part, on the fact that the court was
not aware of any ‘Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors
as agents of the people of Arizona to defend . . . the
constitutionality of initiatives made law of the
State.’ ” 52 Cal. 4th, at 1136–1137, 265
P. 3d, at 1013–1014 (quoting 520 U. S., at 65).
Based on this passage, it concluded that “nothing in
[Arizonans for Official English] indicates that if a state’s
law does authorize the official proponents of an initiative to
assert the state’s interest in the validity of a challenged
state initiative when the public officials who ordinarily assert
that interest have declined to do so, the proponents would not have
standing to assert the state’s interest in the
initiative’s validity in a federal lawsuit.” Id., at
1137, 265 P. 3d, at 1014.

															     The Court of Appeals,
too, was mindful of this requirement. Perry v. Brown, 671
F. 3d 1052, 1072–1073 (CA9 2012). Although that panel
divided on the proper resolution of the merits of this case, it was
unanimous in concluding that proponents satisfy the requirements of
Article III. Compare id., at 1070–1075 (majority opinion),
with id., at 1096–1097 (N. R. Smith, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Its central premise, ignored by the
Court today, was that the “State’s highest court [had]
held that California law provides precisely what the Arizonans
Court found lacking in Arizona law: it confers on the official
proponents of an initiative the authority to assert the
State’s interests in defending the constitutionality of that
initiative, where state officials who would ordinarily assume that
responsibility choose not to do so.” Id., at 1072 (majority
opinion). The Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court did not
ignore Arizonans for Official English; they were faithful to
it.

															C

															     The Court’s
approach in this case is also in tension with other cases in which
the Court has permitted individuals to assert claims on behalf of
the government or others. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 42(a)(2) allows a court to appoint a private attorney to
investigate and prosecute potential instances of criminal contempt.
Under the Rule, this special prosecutor is not the agent of the
appointing judge; indeed, the prosecutor’s
“determination of which persons should be targets of the
investigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what
information will be sought as evidence,” whom to charge, and
other “decisions . . . critical to the conduct of a
prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the
court.” Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A.,
481 U. S. 787, 807 (1987) . Also, just as proponents have been
authorized to represent the State of California,
“ ‘[p]rivate attorneys appointed to prosecute a
criminal contempt action represent the United
States,’ ” United States v. Providence Journal
Co., 485 U. S. 693, 700 (1988) . They are “appointed
solely to pursue the public interest in vindication of the
court’s authority,” Young, supra, at 804, an interest
that—like California’s interest in the validity of its
laws—is “unique to the sovereign,” Providence
Journal Co., supra, at 700. And, although the Court dismisses the
proponents’ standing claim because initiative proponents
“are not elected” and “decide for themselves,
with no review, what arguments to make and how to make them”
in defense of the enacted initiative, ante, at 15, those same
charges could be leveled with equal if not greater force at the
special prosecutors just discussed. See Young, supra, at 807.

															     Similar questions might
also arise regarding qui tam actions, see, e.g., Vermont
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U. S. 765 –778 (2000); suits involving “next
friends” litigating on behalf of a real party in interest,
see, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149 –166
(1990); or shareholder-derivative suits, see, e.g., Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U. S. 115 –126 (1991). There is no more of
an agency relationship in any of these settings than in the instant
case, yet the Court has nonetheless permitted a party to assert the
interests of another. That qui tam actions and “next
friend” litigation may have a longer historical pedigree than
the initiative process, see ante, at 12–13, is no basis for
finding Article III’s standing requirement met in those cases
but lacking here. In short, the Court today unsettles its longtime
understanding of the basis for jurisdiction in representative-party
litigation, leaving the law unclear and the District Court’s
judgment, and its accompanying state- wide injunction, effectively
immune from appellate review.

															III

															     There is much irony
in the Court’s approach to justiciability in this case. A
prime purpose of justiciability is to ensure vigorous advocacy, yet
the Court insists upon litigation conducted by state officials
whose preference is to lose the case. The doctrine is meant to
ensure that courts are responsible and constrained in their power,
but the Court’s opinion today means that a single district
court can make a decision with far-reaching effects that cannot be
reviewed. And rather than honor the principle that justiciability
exists to allow disputes of public policy to be resolved by the
political process rather than the courts, see, e.g., Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737 –752 (1984), here the Court
refuses to allow a State’s authorized representatives to
defend the outcome of a democratic election.

															     The Court’s
opinion disrespects and disparages both the political process in
California and the well-stated opinion of the California Supreme
Court in this case. The California Supreme Court, not this Court,
expresses concern for vigorous representation; the California
Supreme Court, not this Court, recognizes the necessity to avoid
conflicts of interest; the California Supreme Court, not this
Court, comprehends the real interest at stake in this litigation
and identifies the most proper party to defend that interest. The
California Supreme Court’s opinion reflects a better
understanding of the dynamics and principles of Article III than
does this Court’s opinion.

															     Of course, the Court
must be cautious before entering a realm of controversy where the
legal community and society at large are still formulating ideas
and approaches to a most difficult subject. But it is shortsighted
to misconstrue principles of justiciability to avoid that subject.
As the California Supreme Court recognized, “the question
before us involves a fundamental procedural issue that may arise
with respect to any initiative measure, without regard to its
subject matter.” 52 Cal. 4th, at 1124, 265 P. 3d, at
1005 (emphasis in original). If a federal court must rule on a
constitutional point that either confirms or rejects the will of
the people expressed in an initiative, that is when it is most
necessary, not least necessary, to insist on rules that ensure the
most committed and vigorous adversary arguments to inform the
rulings of the courts.

															*  *  *

															     In the end, what the
Court fails to grasp or accept is the basic premise of the
initiative process. And it is this. The essence of democracy is
that the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the
government, not the other way around. Freedom resides first in the
people without need of a grant from government. The California
initiative process embodies these principles and has done so for
over a century. “Through the structure of its government, and
the character of those who exercise government authority, a State
defines itself as sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U. S. 452, 460 (1991) . In California and the 26 other States
that permit initiatives and popular referendums, the people have
exercised their own inherent sovereign right to govern themselves.
The Court today frustrates that choice by nullifying, for failure
to comply with the Restatement of Agency, a State Supreme Court
decision holding that state law authorizes an enacted
initiative’s proponents to defend the law if and when the
State’s usual legal advocates decline to do so. The
Court’s opinion fails to abide by precedent and misapplies
basic principles of justiciability. Those errors necessitate this
respectful dissent.

Summary: The Supreme Court dismissed the case, finding that the petitioners did not have legal standing to bring the case to federal court. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, leaving the lower court's decision in place and allowing same-sex marriage in California.