U.S. Supreme Court Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707 (1979) Fare v. Michael C. No. 78-334 Argued February 27,
1979 Decided June 20, 1979 442
U.S. 707 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA Syllabus Respondent, at the time 16 1/2 years old, was taken into custody
by Van Nuys, Cal., police on suspicion of murder. Before being
questioned at the station house, he was fully advised of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 . At the outset of the questioning, respondent,
who was on probation to the Juvenile Court, had served a term in a
youth corrections camp, and had a record of prior offenses, asked
to see his probation officer. But when the police denied this
request, respondent stated he would talk without consulting an
attorney, and he then proceeded to make statements and draw
sketches implicating him in the murder. Upon being charged in
Juvenile Court with the murder, he moved to suppress the
incriminating statements and sketches on the ground that they had
been obtained in violation of Miranda in that his request
to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, just as if he had requested the
assistance of an attorney. The court denied the motion, holding
that the facts showed that respondent had waived his right to
remain silent, notwithstanding his request to see his probation
officer. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that
respondent's request for his probation officer was a per
se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in the same way
the request for an attorney was found in Miranda to be,
regardless of what the interrogation otherwise might reveal. This
holding was based on the court's view that a probation officer
occupies a position as a trusted guardian figure in a juvenile's
life that would make it normal for the juvenile to turn to the
officer when apprehended by the police, and was also based on the
state law requirement that the officer represent the juvenile's
interests. Held: 1. The California Supreme Court erred in finding that
respondent's request for his probation officer was a per
se invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda, and
therefore also erred in holding that, because the police did not
cease interrogating respondent the statements and sketches made
during the interrogation should have been suppressed. Pp. 442 U. S.
716 -724. Page 442 U. S. 708 (a) The rule in Miranda that, if an accused indicates
in any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an
attorney, interrogation must cease, was based on the unique role
the lawyer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice. A
probation officer is not in a position to offer the type of legal
assistance necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of an
accused undergoing custodial interrogation that a lawyer can offer.
Pp. 442 U. S.
719 -722.

															(b) The fact that a relationship of trust and cooperation might
exist between a probation officer and a juvenile does not indicate
that the officer is capable of rendering effective legal advice
sufficient to protect the juvenile's rights during police
interrogation, or of providing the other services rendered by a
lawyer. Similarly, the fact that the probation officer has a
statutory duty to protect the juvenile's interests does not make
the officer any more capable of rendering legal assistance to the
juvenile or of protecting his legal rights, especially where the
officer also has a statutory duty to report wrongdoing by the
juvenile and serve the ends of the juvenile court system. Pp. 442 U. S.
722 -723.

															(c) A juvenile's request to speak with his probation officer
does not constitute a per se request to remain silent, nor
is it tantamount to a request for an attorney. Pp. 442 U. S.
723 -724.

															2. Whether the incriminating statements and sketches were
admissible on the basis of waiver was a question to be resolved on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. On
the basis of the record, it is clear that respondent voluntarily
and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights and consented to
continued interrogation, and that the statements and sketches
obtained from him were voluntary, and hence their admission in the
Juvenile Court proceeding was correct. Pp. 442 U. S.
724 -727. 21 Cal. 3d
471 , 579 P.2d 7, reversed and remanded.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 442 U. S. 728 .
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 442 U. S.
732 . Page 442 U. S. 709 MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), this Court established certain procedural
safeguards designed to protect the rights of an accused, under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from compelled
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. The Court
specified, among other things, that, if the accused indicates in
any manner that he wishes to remain silent or to consult an
attorney, interrogation must cease, and any statement obtained from
him during interrogation thereafter may not be admitted against him
at his trial. Id. at 384 U. S.
444 -445, 473-474

															In this case, the State of California, in the person of its
acting chief probation officer, attacks the conclusion of the
Supreme Court of California that a juvenile's request, made while
undergoing custodial interrogation, to see his probation officer is per se an invocation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment
rights as pronounced in Miranda. I Respondent Michael C. was implicated in the murder of Robert
Yeager. The murder occurred during a robbery of the victim's home
on January 19, 1976. A small truck registered in the name of
respondent's mother was identified as having been near the Yeager
home at the time of the killing, and a young man answering
respondent's description was seen by witnesses near the truck and
near the home shortly before Yeager was murdered. Page 442 U. S. 710 On the basis of this information, Van Nuys, Cal., police took
respondent into custody at approximately 6:30 p.m. on February 4.
Respondent then was 16 1/2 years old, and on probation to the
Juvenile Court. He had been on probation since the age of 12.
Approximately one year earlier, he had served a term in a youth
corrections camp under the supervision of the Juvenile Court. He
had a record of several previous offenses, including burglary of
guns and purse snatching, stretching back over several years.

															Upon respondent's arrival at the Van Nuys station house, two
police officers began to interrogate him. The officers and
respondent were the only persons in the room during the
interrogation. The conversation was tape-recorded. One of the
officers initiated the interview by informing respondent that he
had been brought in for questioning in relation to a murder. The
officer fully advised respondent of his Miranda rights.
The following exchange then occurred, as set out in the opinion of
the California Supreme Court, In re Michael
C., 21 Cal. 3d
471 , 473-474, 579 P.2d 7, 8 (1978) (emphasis added by that
court):

															"Q. . . . Do you understand all of these rights as I have
explained them to you?"

															"A. Yeah."

															"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and
talk to us about this murder?"

															"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder."

															"Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to
us about it."

															"A. Yeah, I might talk to you."

															"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney
present here while we talk about it?"

															"A. Can I have my probation officer here? "

															"Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now.
You have the right to an attorney."

															"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell
me he's an attorney? " Page 442 U. S. 711 "Q. Huh?"

															"A. [How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and
tell me he's an attorney?]"

															"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen."

															"A. Yeah."

															"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's
a good chance we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call
him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney
present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to. But if
you want to say something, you can, and if you don't want to say
something, you don't have to. That's your right. You understand
that right?"

															"A. Yeah."

															"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?"

															"A. Yeah I want to talk to you."

															Respondent thereupon proceeded to answer questions put to him by
the officers. He made statements and drew sketches that
incriminated him in the Yeager murder.

															Largely on the basis of respondent's incriminating statements,
probation authorities filed a petition in Juvenile Court alleging
that respondent had murdered Robert Yeager, in violation of
Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 187 (West Supp. 1979), and that respondent
therefore should be adjudged a ward of the Juvenile Court, pursuant
to Cal.Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 602 (West Supp. 1979).
[ Footnote 1 ] App. 4-5.
Respondent thereupon moved to suppress the statements and sketches
he gave the police during the interrogation. He alleged that the
statements had been obtained in violation of Miranda in
that Page 442 U. S. 712 his request to see his probation officer at the outset of the
questioning constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent, just as if he had requested the assistance of an
attorney. Accordingly, respondent argued that, since the
interrogation did not cease until he had a chance to confer with
his probation officer, the statements and sketches could not be
admitted against him in the Juvenile Court proceedings. In so
arguing, respondent relied by analogy on the decision in People
v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 ,
491 P.2d 793 (1971), where the Supreme Court of California had held
that a minor's request, made during custodial interrogation, to see
his parents constituted an invocation of the minor's Fifth
Amendment rights.

															In support of his suppression motion, respondent called his
probation officer, Charles P. Christiansen, as a witness.
Christiansen testified that he had instructed respondent that, if
at any time he had "a concern with his family," or ever had "a
police contact," App. 27, he should get in touch with his probation
officer immediately. The witness stated that, on a previous
occasion, when respondent had had a police contact and had failed
to communicate with Christiansen, the probation officer had
reprimanded him. Id. at 28. This testimony, respondent
argued, indicated that, when he asked for his probation officer, he
was in fact asserting his right to remain silent in the face of
further questioning.

															In a ruling from the bench, the court denied the motion to
suppress. Id. at 41-42. It held that the question whether
respondent had waived his right to remain silent was one of fact to
be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that the facts of this
case showed a "clear waiver" by respondent of that right. Id. at 42. The court observed that the transcript of the
interrogation revealed that respondent specifically had told the
officers that he would talk with them, and that this waiver had
come at the outset of the interrogation, and not after prolonged
questioning. The court noted that Page 442 U. S. 713 respondent was a

															"16 and a half year old minor who has been through the court
system before, has been to [probation] camp, has a probation
officer, [and is not] a young, naive minor with no experience with
the courts." Ibid. Accordingly, it found that, on the facts of the
case, respondent had waived his Fifth Amendment rights,
notwithstanding the request to see his probation officer. [ Footnote 2 ]

															On appeal, the Supreme Court of California took the case by
transfer from the California Court of Appeal and, by a divided
vote, reversed. In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d
471 , 579 P.2d 7 (1978). The court held that respondent's

															"request to see his probation officer at the commencement of
interrogation negated any possible willingness on his part to
discuss his case with the police, [and] thereby invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege." Id. at 474, 579 P.2d at 8. The court based this
conclusion on its view that, because of the juvenile court system's
emphasis on the relationship between a probation officer and the
probationer, the officer was

															"a trusted guardian figure who exercises the authority of the
state as parens patriae and whose duty it is to
implement Page 442 U. S. 714 the protective and rehabilitative powers of the juvenile
court." Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 10. As a consequence, the court
found that a minor's request for his probation officer was the same
as a request to see his parents during interrogation, and thus,
under the rule of Burton, constituted an invocation of the
minor's Fifth Amendment rights.

															The fact that the probation officer also served as a peace
officer, and, whenever a proceeding against a juvenile was
contemplated, was charged with a duty to file a petition alleging
that the minor had committed an offense, did not alter, in the
court's view, the fact that the officer, in the eyes of the
juvenile, was a trusted guardian figure to whom the minor normally
would turn for help when in trouble with the police. 21 Cal. 3d at
476, 579 P.2d at 10. Relying on Burton, the court ruled
that it would unduly restrict Miranda to limit its reach
in a case involving a minor to a request by the minor for an
attorney, since it would be

															"'fatuous to assume that a minor in custody will be in a
position to call an attorney for assistance and it is unrealistic
to attribute no significance to his call for help from the only
person to whom he normally looks -- a parent or guardian.'"

															21 Cal. 3d at 475-476, 579 P.2d at 9, quoting People v.
Burton, 6 Cal 3d at 382, 491 P.2d at 797-798. The court
dismissed the concern expressed by the State that a request for a
probation officer could not be distinguished from a request for
one's football coach, music teacher, or clergyman on the ground
that the probation officer, unlike those other figures in the
juvenile's life, was charged by statute to represent the interests
of the juvenile. 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 10.

															The court accordingly held that the probation officer would act
to protect the minor's Fifth Amendment rights in precisely the way
an attorney would act if called for by the accused. In so holding,
the court found the request for a probation officer to be a per
se invocation of Fifth Amendment rights in the same way the
request for an attorney was found Page 442 U. S. 715 in Miranda to be, regardless of what the interrogation
otherwise might reveal. In rejecting a "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry, the court stated:

															"Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of
considerations of capacity, coercion or voluntariness, per
se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus our
question turns not on whether the [respondent] had the ability,
capacity or willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver, and hence
whether he acted voluntarily, but whether, when he called for his
probation officer, he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege. We
hold that, in doing so, he no less invoked the protection against
self-incrimination than if he asked for the presence of an
attorney." Ibid., 579 P.2d at 111. See also id. at 478 n.
4, 579 P.2d at 11 n. 4. The court went on to conclude that, since
the State had not met its "burden of proving that a minor who
requests to see his probation officer does not intend to assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege," id. at 478, 579 P.2d at 11,
the trial court should not have admitted the confessions obtained
after respondent had requested his probation officer. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 442 U. S. 716 The State of California petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, as Circuit Justice, stayed the
execution of the mandate of the Supreme Court of California, 439 U. S. 1310 (1978). Because the California judgment extending the per
se aspects of Miranda presents an important question
about the reach of that case, we thereafter issued the writ, 439
U.S. 925 (1978), II We note at the outset that it is clear that the judgment of Page 442 U. S. 717 the California Supreme Court rests firmly on that court's
interpretation of federal law. This Court, however, has not
heretofore extended the per se aspects of the Miranda safeguards beyond the scope of the holding in the Miranda case itself. [ Footnote 4 ] We therefore must examine the California
court's decision to determine whether that court's conclusion so to
extend Miranda is in harmony with Miranda's underlying principles. For it is clear that

															"a State may not impose . . . greater restrictions as a matter
of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically
refrains from imposing them." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 , 420 U. S. 719 (1975) (emphasis in original). See North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U. S. 369 (1979).

															The rule the Court established in Miranda is clear. In
order to be able to use statements obtained during custodial
interrogation of the accused, the State must warn the accused prior
to such questioning of his right to remain silent and of his right
to have counsel, retained or appointed, present during
interrogation. 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 473 . "Once [such] warnings have been given,
the subsequent procedure is clear." Ibid. "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to
or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . . If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the Page 442 U. S. 718 individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney
and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the
individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants
one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to
remain silent." Id. at 384 U. S.
473 -474 (footnote omitted). Any statements obtained
during custodial interrogation conducted in violation of these
rules may not be admitted against the accused, at least during the
State's case in chief. Id. at 384 U. S. 479 . Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 , 401 U. S. 224 (1971).

															Whatever the defects, if any, of this relatively rigid
requirement that interrogation must cease upon the accused's
request for an attorney, Miranda's holding has the virtue
of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what
they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing
courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which
benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to
outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miranda imposes
on law enforcement agencies and the courts by requiring the
suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence even
though the confession might be voluntary under traditional Fifth
Amendment analysis. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.
S. 433 , 417 U. S.
443 -446 (1974).

															The California court in this case, however, significantly has
extended this rule by providing that a request by a juvenile for
his probation officer has the same effect as a request for an
attorney. Based on the court's belief that the probation officer
occupies a position as a trusted guardian figure in the minor's
life that would make it normal for the minor to turn to the officer
when apprehended by the police, and based as well on the state law
requirement that the officer represent the interest of the
juvenile, the California decision found that consultation with a
probation officer fulfilled the role for the juvenile that
consultation with an attorney does in general, Page 442 U. S. 719 acting as a " protective [device] . . . to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.'" 21 Cal. 3d at 477,
579 P.2d at 10, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
458 . The rule in Miranda, however, was based on this Court's
perception that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our
legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.
Because of this special ability of the lawyer to help the client
preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client becomes
enmeshed in the adversary process, the Court found that "the right
to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system"
established by the Court. Id. at 384 U. S. 469 .
Moreover, the lawyer's presence helps guard against overreaching by
the police and ensures that any statements actually obtained are
accurately transcribed for presentation into evidence. Id. at 384 U. S.
470 .

															The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on
the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of
criminal justice in this country. Whether it is a minor or an adult
who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as
a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person
in his dealings with the police and the courts. For this reason,
the Court fashioned in Miranda the rigid rule that an
accused's request for an attorney is per se an invocation
of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation
cease.

															A probation officer is not in the same posture with regard to
either the accused or the system of justice as a whole. Often he is
not trained in the law, and so is not in a position to advise the
accused as to his legal rights. Neither is he a trained advocate,
skilled in the representation of the interests of his client before
both police and courts. He does not assume the power to act on
behalf of his client by virtue of his status as adviser, nor are
the communications of the accused to the probation officer shielded
by the lawyer-client privilege. Page 442 U. S. 720 Moreover, the probation officer is the employee of the State
which seeks to prosecute the alleged offender. He is a peace
officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with
his fellow peace officers. He owes an obligation to the State,
notwithstanding the obligation he may also owe the juvenile under
his supervision. In most cases, the probation officer is duty bound
to report wrongdoing by the juvenile when it comes to his
attention, even if by communication from the juvenile himself.
Indeed, when this case arose, the probation officer had the
responsibility for filing the petition alleging wrongdoing by the
juvenile and seeking to have him taken into the custody of the
Juvenile Court. It was respondent's probation officer who filed the
petition against him, and it is the acting chief of probation for
the State of California, a probation officer, who is petitioner in
this Court today. [ Footnote
5 ] Page 442 U. S. 721 In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the probation
officer is able to offer the type of independent advice that an
accused would expect from a lawyer retained or assigned to assist
him during questioning. Indeed, the probation officer's duty to his
employer in many, if not most, cases would conflict sharply with
the interests of the juvenile. For where an attorney might well
advise his client to remain silent in the face of interrogation by
the police, and in doing so would be "exercising [his] good
professional judgment . . . to protect to the extent of his ability
the rights of his client," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
480 -481, a probation officer would be bound to advise
his charge to cooperate with the police. The justices who concurred
in the opinion of the California Supreme Court in this case aptly
noted: "Where a conflict between the minor and the law arises, the
probation officer can be neither neutral nor in the minor's
corner." 21 Cal. 3d at 479, 579 P.2d at 12. It thus is doubtful
that a general rule can be established that a juvenile, in every
case, looks to his probation officer as a "trusted guardian
figure," rather than as an officer of the court system that imposes
punishment.

															By the same token, a lawyer is able to protect his client's
rights by learning the extent, if any, of the client's involvement
in the crime under investigation, and advising his client
accordingly. Page 442 U. S. 722 To facilitate this, the law rightly protects the communications
between client and attorney from discovery. We doubt, however, that
similar protection will be afforded the communications between the
probation officer and the minor. Indeed, we doubt that a probation
officer, consistent with his responsibilities to the public and his
profession, could withhold from the police or the courts facts made
known to him by the juvenile implicating the juvenile in the crime
under investigation.

															We thus believe it clear that the probation officer is not in a
position to offer the type of legal assistance necessary to protect
the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused undergoing custodial
interrogation that a lawyer can offer. The Court in Miranda recognized that "the attorney plays a vital role
in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution."
384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 481 .
It is this pivotal role of legal counsel that justifies the per
se rule established in Miranda, and that
distinguishes the request for counsel from the request for a
probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend. A probation
officer simply is not necessary, in the way an attorney is, for the
protection of the legal rights of the accused, juvenile or adult.
He is significantly handicapped by the position he occupies in the
juvenile system from serving as an effective protector of the
rights of a juvenile suspected of a crime.

															The California Supreme Court, however, found that the close
relationship between juveniles and their probation officers
compelled the conclusion that a probation officer, for purposes of Miranda, was sufficiently like a lawyer to justify
extension of the per se rule. 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 579 P.2d
at 10. The fact that a relationship of trust and cooperation
between a probation officer and a juvenile might exist, however,
does not indicate that the probation officer is capable of
rendering effective legal advice sufficient to protect the
juvenile's rights during interrogation by the police, or of
providing the other services rendered by a lawyer. To find
otherwise Page 442 U. S. 723 would be

															"an extension of the Miranda requirements [that] would
cut this Court's holding in that case completely loose from its own
explicitly stated rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.
S. 341 , 425 U. S. 345 (1976). Such an extension would impose the burdens associated with
the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the
police without serving the interests that rule was designed
simultaneously to protect. If it were otherwise, a juvenile's
request for almost anyone he considered trustworthy enough to give
him reliable advice would trigger the rigid rule of Miranda. Similarly, the fact that the State has created a statutory duty
on the part of the probation officer to protect the interests of
the juvenile does not render the probation officer any more capable
of rendering legal assistance to the juvenile or of protecting his
legal rights, especially in light of the fact that the State has
also legislated a duty on the part of the officer to report
wrongdoing by the juvenile and serve the ends of the juvenile court
system. The State cannot transmute the relationship between
probation officer and juvenile offender into the type of
relationship between attorney and client that was essential to the
holding of Miranda simply by legislating an amorphous
"duty to advise and care for the juvenile defendant." 21 Cal. 3d at
477, 579 P.2d at 10. Though such a statutory duty might serve to
distinguish to some degree the probation officer from the coach and
the clergyman, it does not justify the extension of Miranda to requests to see probation officers. If it did,
the State could expand the class of persons covered by the Miranda per se rule simply by creating a duty to
care for the juvenile on the part of other persons, regardless of
whether the logic of Miranda would justify that
extension.

															Nor do we believe that a request by a juvenile to speak with his
probation officer constitutes a per se request to remain
silent. As indicated, since a probation officer does not fulfill
the important role in protecting the rights of the accused Page 442 U. S. 724 juvenile that an attorney plays, we decline to find that the
request for the probation officer is tantamount to the request for
an attorney. And there is nothing inherent in the request for a
probation officer that requires us to find that a juvenile's
request to see one necessarily constitutes an expression of the
juvenile's right to remain silent. As discussed below, courts may
take into account such a request in evaluating whether a juvenile
in fact had waived his Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.
But, in other circumstances, such a request might well be
consistent with a desire to speak with the police. In the absence
of further evidence that the minor intended in the circumstances to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights by such a request, we decline to
attach such overwhelming significance to this request.

															We hold, therefore, that it was error to find that the request
by respondent to speak with his probation officer per se constituted an invocation of respondent's Fifth Amendment right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination. It therefore was also
error to hold that, because the police did not then cease
interrogating respondent, the statements he made during
interrogation should have been suppressed. III Miranda further recognized that, after the required
warnings are given the accused,

															"[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 475 .
We noted in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 373 ,
that the question whether the accused waived his rights "is not one
of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case." Thus, the determination whether statements obtained during
custodial Page 442 U. S. 725 interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made
upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact
knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
475 -477.

															This "totality of the circumstances" approach is adequate to
determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation
of juveniles is involved. We discern no persuasive reasons why any
other approach is required where the question is whether a juvenile
has waived his rights, as opposed to whether an adult has done so.
The totality approach permits -- indeed, it mandates -- inquiry
into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. This
includes evaluation of the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity
to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. See North Carolina v. Butler, supra. Courts repeatedly must deal with these issues of waiver with
regard to a broad variety of constitutional rights. There is no
reason to assume that such courts -- especially juvenile courts,
with their special expertise in this area -- will be unable to
apply the "totality of the circumstances" analysis so as to take
into account those special concerns that are present when young
persons, often with limited experience and education and with
immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a
juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his
parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent,
the totality approach will allow the court the necessary
flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver
determination. At the same time, that approach refrains from
imposing rigid restraints on police and courts in dealing with an
experienced older juvenile with an extensive prior record who
knowingly and intelligently waives Page 442 U. S. 726 his Fifth Amendment rights and voluntarily consents to
interrogation.

															In this case, we conclude that the California Supreme Court
should have determined the issue of waiver on the basis of all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation of respondent. The
Juvenile Court found that, under this approach, respondent in fact
had waived his Fifth Amendment rights and consented to
interrogation by the police after his request to see his probation
officer was denied. Given its view of the case, of course, the
California Supreme Court did not consider this issue, though it did
hold that the State had failed to prove that, notwithstanding
respondent's request to see his probation officer, respondent had
not intended to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.

															We feel that the conclusion of the Juvenile Court was correct.
The transcript of the interrogation reveals that the police
officers conducting the interrogation took care to ensure that
respondent understood his rights. They fully explained to
respondent that he was being questioned in connection with a
murder. They then informed him of all the rights delineated in Miranda, and ascertained that respondent understood those
rights. There is no indication in the record that respondent failed
to understand what the officers told him. Moreover, after his
request to see his probation officer had been denied, and after the
police officer once more had explained his rights to him,
respondent clearly expressed his willingness to waive his rights
and continue the interrogation.

															Further, no special factors indicate that respondent was unable
to understand the nature of his actions. He was a 16 1/2-year-old
juvenile with considerable experience with the police. He had a
record of several arrests. He had served time in a youth camp, and
he had been on probation for several years. He was under the
full-time supervision of probation authorities. There is no
indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand
the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver
would be. He was not Page 442 U. S. 727 worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy
questioning or by trickery or deceit.

															On these facts, we think it clear that respondent voluntarily
and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Respondent argues,
however, that any statements he made during interrogation were
coerced. Specifically, respondent alleges that the police made
threats and promises during the interrogation to pressure him into
cooperating in the hope of obtaining leniency for his cooperative
attitude. He notes also that he repeatedly told the officers during
his interrogation that he wished to stop answering their questions,
but that the officers ignored his pleas. He argues further that the
record reveals that he was afraid that the police would coerce him,
and that this fear caused him to cooperate. He points out that, at
one point, the transcript revealed that he wept during the
interrogation.

															Review of the entire transcript reveals that respondent's claims
of coercion are without merit. As noted, the police took care to
inform respondent of his rights and to ensure that he understood
them. The officers did not intimidate or threaten respondent in any
way. Their questioning was restrained and free from the abuses that
so concerned the Court in Miranda. See 384 U.S.
at 384 U. S.
445 -455. The police did indeed indicate that a
cooperative attitude would be to respondent's benefit, but their
remarks in this regard were far from threatening or coercive. And
respondent's allegation that he repeatedly asked that the
interrogation cease goes too far: at some points, he did state that
he did not know the answer to a question put to him or that he
could not, or would not, answer the question, but these statements
were not assertions of his right to remain silent. IV We hold, in short, that the California Supreme Court erred in
finding that a juvenile's request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of that juvenile's Fifth Amendment Page 442 U. S. 728 rights under Miranda. We conclude, rather, that whether
the statements obtained during subsequent interrogation of a
juvenile who has asked to see his probation officer, but who has
not asked to consult an attorney or expressly asserted his right to
remain silent, are admissible on the basis of waiver remains a
question to be resolved on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. On the basis of the record in this
case, we hold that the Juvenile Court's findings that respondent
voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights and consented to
continued interrogation, and that the statements obtained from him
were voluntary, were proper, and that the admission of those
statements in the proceeding against respondent in Juvenile Court
was correct.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The petition also alleged that respondent had participated in an
attempted armed robbery earlier on the same evening Yeager was
murdered. The Juvenile Court, however, held that the evidence was
insufficient to support this charge, and it was dismissed. App. 6.
No issue relating to this second charge is before the Court.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The California Court of Appeal, in an opinion reported and then
vacated, affirmed. In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762
(1977). That court noted that, since the Juvenile Court's findings
of fact resolved against respondent his contention that the
confession had been coerced from him by threats and promises, it
would have to

															"conclude that there was a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
minor's Miranda rights unless it can be said that the
request to speak to a probation officer was, in and of itself,
sufficient to invoke"

															respondent's Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 765-766
(footnote omitted). It refused to extend the rule of People v.
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 ,
491 P.2d 793 (1971), to include a request for a probation officer,
finding it difficult to distinguish such a request from a request
to see "one's football coach, music teacher or clergyman." 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 766. Even if the Burton rule were applicable, the
court held, there was sufficient evidence of an affirmative waiver
of his rights by respondent to distinguish Burton, where
the California Supreme Court had noted that there was "nothing in
the way of affirmative proof that defendant did not intend to
assert his privilege." 6 Cal. 3d at 383, 491 P.2d at 798.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Two justices concurred in the court's opinion and judgment. 21
Cal. 3d at 478, 579 P.2d at 11. They expressed concern that a
probation officer's public responsibilities would make it difficult
for him to offer legal advice to a minor implicated in a crime, and
that a minor advised to cooperate with the police, perhaps even to
confess, justifiably could complain later

															"that he had been subjected to a variation of the Mutt-and-Jeff
technique criticized in Miranda: initial interrogating by
overbearing officers, then comforting by a presumably friendly and
gentle peace officer in the guise of a probation officer." Id. at 479, 579 P.2d at 12.

															Two justices dissented. Id. at 48, 579 P.2d at 12. They
would have affirmed respondent's conviction on the basis of the
finding of the Juvenile Court that, in light of all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation of respondent, there
was sufficient affirmative proof that respondent had waived his
privilege.

															The dissenters pointed out that the opinion of the court was
confusing in holding, on the one hand, that the request for a
probation officer was per se an invocation of the minor's
Fifth Amendment rights, and, on the other, that reversal was
required because the State had not carried its burden of proving
that respondent, by requesting his probation officer, did not
intend thereby to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. Ibid., 579 P.2d at 12-13.

															There may well be ambiguity in this regard. See id. at
477-478, 579 P.2d at 11. On the basis of that ambiguity, respondent
argues that the California court did not establish a per
se rule, but held only that, on the facts here, respondent's
request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of
his Fifth Amendment rights. The decision in People v.
Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948 ,
464 P.2d 114 (1970), upon which the California court relied in both Burton and the present case, however, indicates that the
court did indeed establish a per se rule in this case. In Randall, the court stated that, even though a suspect
might have invoked his Fifth Amendment rights by asking for counsel
or by stating he wished to remain silent, it might be possible that
subsequent voluntary statements of the accused, not prompted by
custodial interrogation, would be admissible if the State could
show that they were the product of the voluntary decision of the
accused to waive the rights he had asserted. People v.
Randall, 1 Cal. 3d at 956, and n. 7, 464 P.2d at 119, and n.
7. Randall thus indicates that the per se language employed by the California Supreme Court in this case is
compatible with the finding that the State could have negated the per se effect of the request for a probation officer by
showing that, notwithstanding his per se invocation of his
rights, respondent later voluntarily decided to waive those rights
and volunteer statements. In light of Randall, and in
light of the strong per se language used by the California
Supreme Court in its opinion in this case, see, e.g., 21
Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 10-11, we think that any ambiguity in
that opinion must be resolved in favor of a conclusion that the
court did, in fact, establish a per se rule.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Indeed, this Court has not yet held that Miranda applies with full force to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings,
which, for certain purposes, have been distinguished from formal
criminal prosecutions. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 , 403 U. S.
540 -541 (1971) (plurality opinion). We do not decide
that issue today. In view of our disposition of this case, we
assume, without deciding, that the Miranda principles were
fully applicable to the present proceedings.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															When this case arose, a California statute provided that a
proceeding in juvenile court to declare a minor a ward of the court
was to be commenced by the filing of a petition by a probation
officer. Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code Ann. § 650 (West 1972). This
provision since has been amended to provide that most such
petitions are to be filed by the prosecuting attorney. 1976
Cal.Stats., ch. 1071, § 20. Respondent argues that, whatever the
status of the probation officer as a peace officer at the time this
case arose, the amendment of § 650 indicates that in the future a
probation officer is not to be viewed as a legal adversary of the
accused juvenile. Consequently, respondent believes that any
holding of this Court with regard to respondent's 1976 request for
a probation officer will be mere dictum with regard to a juvenile's
similar request today. Brief for Respondent 9-10, and n. 4.

															We disagree. The fact that a California probation officer in
1976 was responsible for initiating a complaint is only one factor
in our analysis. The fact remains that a probation officer does not
fulfill the role in our system of criminal justice that an attorney
does, regardless of whether he acts merely as a counselor or has
significant law enforcement duties. And in California, as in many
States, the other duties of a probation officer are incompatible
with the view that he may act as a counselor to a juvenile accused
of crime. The very California statute that imposes upon the
probation officer the duty to represent the interests of the
juvenile also provides:

															"It shall be the duty of the probation officer to prepare for
every hearing [of criminal charges against a juvenile] a social
study of the minor, containing such matters as may be relevant to a
proper disposition of the case."

															Cal.Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. § 280 (West Supp. 1979).

															Similarly, a probation officer is required, upon the order of
the juvenile court or the Youth Authority, to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the charge against the minor and to file
written reports and recommendations. §§ 281, 284. And a probation
officer in California continues to have the powers and authority of
a peace officer in connection with any violation of a criminal
statute that is discovered by the probation officer in the course
of his probation activities. § 283; Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 830.5
(West 1970). The duties of a peace officer, like the investigative
and reporting duties of probation officers, are incompatible with
the role of legal adviser to a juvenile accused of crime.

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR.
JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), this Court sought to ensure that the
inherently coercive pressures of custodial interrogation would not
vitiate a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. Noting
that these pressures "can operate very quickly to overbear the will
of one merely made aware of his privilege," id. at 384 U. S. 469 ,
the Court held:

															"If [a suspect in custody] indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. . . . If the
individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation Page 442 U. S. 729 must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 384 U. S.
473 -474 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 384 U. S.
444 -445.

															As this Court has consistently recognized, the coerciveness of
the custodial setting is of heightened concern where, as here, a
juvenile is under investigation. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948), the plurality reasoned that, because a 15 1/2-year-old
minor was particularly susceptible to overbearing interrogation
tactics, the voluntariness of his confession could not "be judged
by the more exacting standards of maturity." Id. at 332 U. S. 599 .
The Court reiterated this point in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49 , 370 U. S. 54 (1962), observing that a 14-year-old suspect could not "be compared
with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of
the consequences of his admissions." The juvenile defendant, in the
Court's view, required

															"the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take
in the predicament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult
relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection
which his own immaturity could not." Ibid. And, in In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1 , 387 U. S. 55 (1967), the Court admonished that "the greatest care must be taken
to assure that [a minor's] admission was voluntary."

															It is therefore critical in the present context that we construe Miranda's prophylactic requirements broadly to accomplish
their intended purpose -- "dispel[ling] the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 458 .
To effectuate this purpose, the Court must ensure that the
"protective device" of legal counsel, id. at 384 U. S.
465 -466, 469, be readily available, and that any
intimation of a desire to preclude questioning be scrupulously
honored. Thus, I believe Miranda requires that
interrogation cease whenever a juvenile requests an adult who is
obligated to represent his interests. Such a Page 442 U. S. 730 request, in my judgment, constitutes both an attempt to obtain
advice and a general invocation of the right to silence. For, as
the California Supreme Court recognized, " [i]t is fatuous to
assume that a minor in custody will be in a position to call an
attorney for assistance,'" 21 Cal. 3d
471 , 475-476, 579 P.2d 7, 9 (1978), quoting People v.
Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375 ,
382, 491 P.2d 793, 797 (1971), or that he will trust the police to
obtain a lawyer for him. [ Footnote
2/1 ] A juvenile in these circumstances will likely turn to his
parents, or another adult responsible for his welfare, as the only
means of securing legal counsel. Moreover, a request for such adult
assistance is surely inconsistent with a present desire to speak
freely. Requiring a strict verbal formula to invoke the protections
of Miranda would "protect the knowledgeable accused from stationhouse coercion
while abandoning the young person who knows no more than to ask for
the . . . person he trusts." Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (CA5 1977)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) .

															On my reading of Miranda, a California juvenile's
request for his probation officer should be treated as a per
se assertion of Fifth Amendment rights. The California Supreme
Court determined that probation officers have a statutory duty to
represent minors' interests and, indeed, are "trusted guardian
figure[s]" to whom a juvenile would likely turn for assistance. 21
Cal. 3d at 476, 579 P.2d at 10. In addition, the court found,
probation officers are particularly well suited to assist a
juvenile "on such matters as to whether or not he should obtain an
attorney" and "how to conduct himself with police." Id. at
476, 477, 579 P.2d at 10. Hence, a juvenile's request Page 442 U. S. 731 for a probation officer may frequently be an attempt to secure
protection from the coercive aspects of custodial questioning.
[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															This Court concludes, however, that, because probation officer
has law enforcement duties, juveniles generally would not call upon
him to represent their interests, and if they did, would not be
well served. Ante at 442 U. S.
721 -722. But that conclusion ignores the California
Supreme Court's express determination that the officer's
responsibility to initiate juvenile proceedings did not negate his
function as personal adviser to his wards. [ Footnote 2/3 ] I decline to second-guess that court's
assessment of state law. See Murdock v.
Memphis , 20 Wall. 590, 87 U. S. 626 (1875); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U. S. 335 , 322 U. S. 337 (1944); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.
S. 207 , 362 U. S. 210 (1960). [ Footnote 2/4 ] Further,
although the majority here speculates Page 442 U. S. 732 that probation officers have a duty to advise cooperation with
the police, ante at 442 U. S. 721 -- a proposition suggested only in the concurring opinion of two
justices blow, 21 Cal. 3d at 479, 579 P.2d at 11-12 (Mosk, J.,
joined by Bird, C.J., concurring) -- respondent's probation officer
instructed all his charges "not to go and admit openly to an
offense, [but rather] to get some type of advice from . . . parents
or a lawyer." App. 30. Absent an explicit statutory provision or
judicial holding, the officer's assessment of the obligations
imposed by state law is entitled to deference by this Court.

															Thus, given the role of probation officers under California law,
a juvenile's request to see his officer may reflect a desire for
precisely the kind of assistance Miranda guarantees an
accused before he waives his Fifth Amendment rights. At the very
least, such a request signals a desire to remain silent until
contact with the officer is made. Because the Court's contrary
determination withdraws the safeguards of Miranda from
those most in need of protection, I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The facts of the instant case are illustrative. When the police
offered to obtain an attorney for respondent, he replied: "How I
know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an
attorney?" Ante at 442 U. S. 710 .
Significantly, the police made no attempt to allay that concern. See 21 Cal. 3d at 476 n. 3, 579 P.2d at 10 n. 3.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court intimates that construing a request for a probation
officer as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege would
undermine the specificity of Miranda's prophylactic rules. Ante at 442 U. S. 718 .
Yet the Court concedes that the statutory duty to "advise and care
for the juvenile defendant," 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 10,
distinguishes probation officers from other adults, such as coaches
and clergymen. Ante at 442 U. S. 723 .
Since law enforcement officials should be on notice of such legal
relationships, they would presumably have no difficulty determining
whether a suspect has asserted his Fifth Amendment rights.

															Although I agree with my Brother POWELL that, on the facts here,
respondent was not "subjected to a fair interrogation free from
inherently coercive circumstances," post at 442 U. S. 734 ,
I do not believe a case-by-case approach provides police sufficient
guidance, or affords juveniles adequate protection.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															In filing the petition and performing the other functions
enumerated ante at 442 U. S.
720 -721, n. 5, the probation officer must act in the
best interests of the minor. See In re Steven
C., 9 Cal. App. 3d
255 , 264-265, 88 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101-102 (1970).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															One thing is certain. The California Supreme Court is more
familiar with the duties and performance of its probation officers
than we are.

															Of course,

															"[i]t is peculiarly within the competence of the highest court
of a State to determine that in its jurisdiction the police should
be subject to more stringent rules than are required as a federal
constitutional minimum." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 , 420 U. S. 728 (1975) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also People v.
Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101 , 545 P.2d 272 (1976) (refusing to follow Harris v. New
York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971)); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977).

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

															Although I agree with the Court that the Supreme Court of
California misconstrued Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966), [ Footnote
3/1 ] I would not reverse the California court's judgment. This
Court repeatedly has recognized that "the greatest care" must be
taken to assure that an alleged confession of a juvenile was
voluntary. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1 , 387 U. S. 55 Page 442 U. S. 733 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S.
49 , 370 U. S. 54 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 , 332 U. S.
599 -600 (1948) (plurality opinion). Respondent was a
young person, 16 years old at the time of his arrest and the
subsequent prolonged interrogation at the station house. Although
respondent had had prior brushes with the law, and was under
supervision by a probation officer, the taped transcript of his
interrogation -- as well as his testimony at the suppression
hearing -- demonstrates that he was immature, emotional, [ Footnote 3/2 ] and uneducated, and therefore
was likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive
style of interrogation to which he was subjected. App. 54-82.

															When given Miranda warnings and asked whether he
desired an attorney, respondent requested permission to "have my
probation officer here," a request that was refused. Id. at 55. That officer testified later that he had communicated
frequently with respondent, that respondent had serious and
"extensive" family problems, and that the officer had instructed
respondent to call him immediately "at any time he has a police
contact, even if they stop him and talk to him on the street." Id. at 26-31. [ Footnote
3/3 ] The reasons given by the probation officer for having so
instructed his charge were substantially the same reasons that
prompt this Court to examine with special care the circumstances
under which a minor's alleged confession was obtained. After
stating that respondent had been "going through problems," the
officer observed that "many times the kids don't understand what is
going on, and what they are supposed to do relative to police. . .
." Id. at 29. This view of the limited understanding of
the average 16-year-old was borne out by respondent's question
when, Page 442 U. S. 734 during interrogation, he was advised of his right to an
attorney: "How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and
tell me he's an attorney?" Id. at 55. It was during this
part of the interrogation that the police had denied respondent's
request to "have my probation officer here." Ibid. The police then proceeded, despite respondent's repeated denial
of any connection to the murder under investigation, see
id. at 56-60, persistently to press interrogation until they
extracted a confession. In In re Gault, in addressing
police interrogation of detained juveniles, the Court stated:

															"If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an
admission was obtained [from a child], the greatest care must be
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not
only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not
the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
or despair."

															387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 55 . It
is clear that the interrogating police did not exercise "the
greatest care" to assure that respondent's "admission was
voluntary." [ Footnote 3/4 ] In the
absence of counsel, and having refused to call the probation
officer, they nevertheless engaged in protracted interrogation.

															Although I view the case as close, I am not satisfied that this
particular 16-year-old boy, in this particular situation, was
subjected to a fair interrogation free from inherently coercive
circumstances. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of
the Supreme Court of California.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The California Supreme Court, purporting to apply Miranda v.
Arizona, stated:

															"Here . . . we face conduct which, regardless of considerations
of capacity, coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the
privilege against self-incrimination." 21 Cal. 3d
471 , 477, 579 P.2d 7, 10 (1978). I agree with the Court's
opinion today that Miranda cannot be read as support for
any such per se rule.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The Juvenile Court Judge observed that he had "heard the tapes"
of the interrogation, and was "aware of the fact that Michael
[respondent] was crying at the time he talked to the police
officers." App. 53.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The Supreme Court of California stated that a

															"probation officer is an official appointed pursuant to
legislative enactment 'to represent the interests' of the juvenile
[and] . . . has borne the duty to advise and care for the juvenile
defendant."

															21 Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 10.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Minors who become embroiled with the law range from the very
young up to those on the brink of majority. Some of the older
minors become fully "street-wise," hardened criminals, deserving no
greater consideration than that properly accorded all persons
suspected of crime. Other minors are more of a child than an adult.
As the Court indicated in In re Gault, 387 U. S.
1 (1967), the facts relevant to the care to be exercised
in a particular case vary widely. They include the minor's age,
actual maturity, family environment, education, emotional and
mental stability, and, of course, any prior record he might
have.

Summary: The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a minor's request to speak to their probation officer is not an automatic invocation of their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, unlike a request for an attorney. The Court held that a probation officer cannot offer the same legal protection as an attorney during police interrogation. Therefore, the minor's statements and sketches implicating them in a murder were admissible, as they had voluntarily waived their right to remain silent.