U.S. Supreme Court Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) Buckley v. Valeo No. 75-436 Argued November 10,
1975 Decided January 30, 1976 424 U.S.
1 ast|>* 424 U.S.
1 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), as amended in
1974, (a) limits political contributions to candidates for federal
elective office by an individual or a group to $1,000 and by a
political committee to $5,000 to any single candidate per election,
with an over-all annual limitation of $25,000 by an individual
contributor; (b) limits expenditures by individuals or groups
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" to $1,000 per
candidate per election, and by a candidate from his personal or
family funds to various specified annual amounts depending upon the
federal office sought, and restricts over-all general election and
primary campaign expenditures by candidates to various specified
amounts, again depending upon the federal office sought; (c)
requires political committees to keep detailed records of
contributions and expenditures, including the name and address of
each individual contributing in excess of $10, and his occupation
and Page 424 U. S. 2 principal place of business if his contribution exceeds $100,
and to file quarterly reports with the Federal Election Commission
disclosing the source of every contribution exceeding $100 and the
recipient and purpose of every expenditure over $100, and also
requires every individual or group, other than a candidate or
political committee, making contributions or expenditures exceeding
$100 "other than by contribution to a political committee or
candidate" to file a statement with the Commission; and (d) creates
the eight-member Commission as the administering agency with
recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigatory functions and
extensive rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers, and
consisting of two members appointed by the President pro
tempore of the Senate, two by the Speaker of the House, and
two by the President (all subject to confirmation by both Houses of
Congress), and the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the
House as ex officio nonvoting members. Subtitle H of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), as amended in 1974, provides
for public financing of Presidential nominating conventions and
general election and primary campaigns from general revenues and
allocates such funding to conventions and general election
campaigns by establishing three categories: (1) "major" parties
(those whose candidate received 25% or more of the vote in the most
recent election), which receive full funding; (2) "minor" parties
(those whose candidate received at least 5% but less than 25% of
the votes at the last election), which receive only a percentage of
the funds to which the major parties are entitled; and (3) "new"
parties (all other parties), which are limited to receipt of
post-election funds or are not entitled to any funds if their
candidate receives less than 5% of the vote. A primary candidate
for the Presidential nomination by a political party who receives
more than $5,000 from private sources (counting only the first $250
of each contribution) in each of at least 20 States is eligible for
matching public funds. Appellants (various federal officeholders
and candidates, supporting political organizations, and others)
brought suit against appellees (the Secretary of the Senate, Clerk
of the House, Comptroller General, Attorney General, and the
Commission) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
above statutory provisions on various constitutional grounds. The
Court of Appeals, on certified questions from the District Court,
upheld all but one of the statutory provisions. A three-judge
District Court upheld the constitutionality of Subtitle H. Held: Page 424 U. S. 3 1. This litigation presents an Art. III "case or controversy,"
since the complaint discloses that at least some of the appellants
have a sufficient "personal stake" in a determination of the
constitutional validity of each of the challenged provisions to
present

															"a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.
S. 227 , 300 U. S. 241 .
Pp. 424 U. S.
11 -12

															2. The Act's contribution provisions are constitutional, but the
expenditure provisions violate the First Amendment. Pp. 424 U. S.
12 -59.

															(a) The contribution provisions, along with those covering
disclosure, are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality
or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of
candidates on large campaign contributions, and the ceilings
imposed accordingly serve the basic governmental interest in
safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without
directly impinging upon the rights of individual citizens and
candidates to engage in political debate and discussion. Pp. 424 U. S.
23 -38.

															(b) The First Amendment requires the invalidation of the Act's
independent expenditure ceiling, its limitation on a candidate's
expenditures from his own personal funds, and its ceilings on
over-all campaign expenditures, since those provisions place
substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates,
citizens, and associations to engage in protected political
expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.
Pp. 424 U. S.
39 -59.

															3. The Act's disclosure and recordkeeping provisions are
constitutional. Pp. 424 U. S.
60 -84.

															(a) The general disclosure provisions, which serve substantial
governmental interests in informing the electorate and preventing
the corruption of the political process, are not overbroad insofar
as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent
candidates. No blanket exemption for minor parties is warranted,
since such parties, in order to prove injury as a result of
application to them of the disclosure provisions, need show only a
reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's
contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals in violation of their First Amendment associational
rights. Pp. 424 U. S.
64 -74.

															(b) The provision for disclosure by those who make
independent Page 424 U. S. 4 contributions and expenditures, as narrowly construed to apply
only (1) when they make contributions earmarked for political
purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his agent to
some person other than a candidate or political committee and (2)
when they make an expenditure for a communication that expressly
advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
is not unconstitutionally vague and does not constitute a prior
restraint, but is a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of
furthering First Amendment values by public exposure of the federal
election system. Pp. 424 U. S.
74 -82.

															(c) The extension of the recordkeeping provisions to
contributions as small as those just above $10 and the disclosure
provisions to contributions above $100 is not, on this record,
overbroad, since it cannot be said to be unrelated to the
informational and enforcement goals of the legislation. Pp. 424 U. S.
82 -84.

															4. Subtitle H of the IRC is constitutional. Pp. 424 U. S.
85 -109.

															(a) Subtitle H is not invalid under the General Welfare Clause
but, as a means to reform the electoral process, was clearly a
choice within the power granted to Congress by the Clause to decide
which expenditures will promote the general welfare. Pp. 424 U. S.
90 -92.

															(b) Nor does Subtitle H violate the First Amendment. Rather than
abridging, restricting, or censoring speech, it represents an
effort to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process. Pp. 424 U. S.
92 -93.

															(c) Subtitle H, being less burdensome than ballot access
regulations and having been enacted in furtherance of vital
governmental interests in relieving major party candidates from the
rigors of soliciting private contributions, in not funding
candidates who lack significant public support, and in eliminating
reliance on large private contributions for funding of conventions
and campaigns, does not invidiously discriminate against minor and
new parties in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Pp. 424 U. S.
93 -108.

															(d) Invalidation of the spending limit provisions of the Act
does not render Subtitle H unconstitutional, but the Subtitle is
severable from such provisions, and is not dependent upon the
existence of a generally applicable expenditure limit. Pp. 424 U. S.
108 -109.

															5. The Commission's composition as to all but its investigative
and informative powers violates Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. With respect
to the Commission's powers, all of which are ripe for review, Page 424 U. S. 5 to enforce the Act, including primary responsibility for
bringing civil actions against violators, to make rules for
carrying out the Act, to temporarily disqualify federal candidates
for failing to file required reports, and to authorize convention
expenditures in excess of the specified limits, the provisions of
the Act vesting such powers in the Commission and the prescribed
method of appointment of members of the Commission to the extent
that a majority of the voting members are appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House, violate the Appointments Clause, which provides, in
pertinent part, that the President shall nominate, and, with the
Senate's advice and consent, appoint, all "Officers of the United
States," whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, but
that Congress may vest the appointment of such inferior officers as
it deems proper in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments. Hence (though the Commission's past acts are
accorded de facto validity and a stay is granted
permitting it to function under the Act for not more than 30 days),
the Commission, as presently constituted, may not, because of that
Clause, exercise such powers, which can be exercised only by
"Officers of the United States" appointed in conformity with the
Appointments Clause, although it may exercise such investigative
and informative powers as are in the same category as those powers
that Congress might delegate to one of its own committees. Pp. 424 U.S.
1 09 -143.

															No. 75-36, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821, affirmed in part
and reversed in part; No. 75-437, 401
F. Supp. 1235 , affirmed.

															Per curiam opinion, in the "case or controversy" part of which
(post, pp. 424 U. S. 11 -12)
all participating Members joined; and as to all other Parts of
which BRENNAN, STEWART, and POWELL, JJ., joined; MARSHALL, J.,
joined in all but Part I-C-2; BLACKMUN, J., joined in all but Part
I-B; REHNQUIST, J., joined in all but Part III-B-1; BURGER, C.J.,
joined in Parts I-C and IV (except insofar as it accords de
facto validity for the Commission's past acts); and WHITE, J.,
joined in Part III. BURGER, C.J., post, p. 424 U. S. 235 ,
WHITE, J., post, p. 424 U. S. 257 ,
MARSHALL, J., post, p. 424 U. S. 286 ,
BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 424 U. S. 290 ,
and REHNQUIST, J., post, p. 424 U. S. 290 ,
filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. STEVENS,
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. Page 424 U. S. 6 PER CURIAM.

															These appeals present constitutional challenges to the key
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), and
related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all as
amended in 1974. [ Footnote
1 ] Page 424 U. S. 7 The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the legislation in large
part against various constitutional challenges, [ Footnote 2 ] viewed it as "by far the most
comprehensive reform legislation [ever] passed by Congress
concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and
members of Congress." 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 182, 519 F.2d 821, 831
(1975). The statutes at issue, summarized in broad terms, contain
the following provisions: (a) individual political contributions
are limited to $1,000 to any single candidate per election, with an
over-all annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor;
independent expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a
clearly identified candidate" are limited to $1,000 a year;
campaign spending by candidates for various federal offices and
spending for national conventions by political parties are subject
to prescribed limits; (b) contributions and expenditures above
certain threshold levels must be reported and publicly disclosed;
(c) a system for public funding of Presidential campaign activities
is established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code;
[ Footnote 3 ] and (d) a Federal
Election Commission is established to administer and enforce the
legislation.

															This suit was originally filed by appellants in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs
included a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, a
United States Senator who is a candidate for reelection, a
potential contributor, the Page 424 U. S. 8 Committee for a Constitutional Presidency -- McCarthy '76, the
Conservative Party of the State of New York, the Mississippi
Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the New York Civil
Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the
Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc. The defendants
included the Secretary of the United States Senate and the Clerk of
the United States House of Representatives, both in their official
capacities and as ex officio members of the Federal
Election Commission. The Commission itself was named as a
defendant. Also named were the Attorney General of the United
States and the Comptroller General of the United States.

															Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and
2202, and § 315(a) of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1970 ed., Supp.
IV). [ Footnote 4 ] The complaint
sought both a Page 424 U. S. 9 declaratory judgment that the major provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional and an injunction against enforcement of those
provisions. Appellants requested the convocation of a three-judge
District Court as to all matters and also requested certification
of constitutional questions to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to
the terms of § 315(a). The District Judge denied the application
for a three-judge court and directed that the case be transmitted
to the Court of Appeals. That court entered an order stating that
the case was "preliminarily deemed" to be properly certified under
§ 315(a). Leave to intervene was granted to various groups and
individuals. [ Footnote 5 ] After
considering matters regarding factfinding procedures, the Court of
Appeals entered an order en banc remanding the case to the District
Court to (1) identify the constitutional issues in the complaint;
(2) take whatever evidence was found necessary in addition to the
submissions suitably dealt with by way of judicial notice; (3) make
findings of fact with reference to those issues; and (4) certify
the constitutional questions arising from the foregoing steps to
the Court of Appeals. [ Footnote
6 ] On remand, the District Page 424 U. S. 10 Judge entered a memorandum order adopting extensive findings of
fact and transmitting the augmented record back to the Court of
Appeals.

															On plenary review, a majority of the Court of Appeals rejected,
for the most part, appellants' constitutional attacks. The court
found "a clear and compelling interest," 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 192,
519 F.2d at 841, in preserving the integrity of the electoral
process. On that basis, the court upheld, with one exception,
[ Footnote 7 ] the substantive
provisions of the Act with respect to contributions, expenditures,
and disclosure. It also sustained the constitutionality of the
newly established Federal Election Commission. The court concluded
that, notwithstanding the manner of selection of its members and
the breadth of its powers, which included nonlegislative functions,
the Commission is a constitutionally authorized agency created to
perform primarily legislative functions. [ Footnote 8 ] Page 424 U. S. 11 The provisions for public funding of the three stages of the
Presidential selection process were upheld as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the General Welfare Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 8.

															In this Court, appellants argue that the Court of Appeals failed
to give this legislation the critical scrutiny demanded under
accepted First Amendment and equal protection principles. In
appellants' view, limiting the use of money for political purposes
constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First
Amendment, since virtually all meaningful political communications
in the modern setting involve the expenditure of money. Further,
they argue that the reporting and disclosure provisions of the Act
unconstitutionally impinge on their right to freedom of
association. Appellants also view the federal subsidy provisions of
Subtitle H as violative of the General Welfare Clause, and as
inconsistent with the First and Fifth Amendments. Finally,
appellants renew their attack on the Commission's composition and
powers.

															At the outset, we must determine whether the case before us
presents a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Art. III of
the Constitution. Congress may not, of course, require this Court
to render opinions in matters which are not "cases or
controversies." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 , 300 U. S.
240 -241 (1937). We must therefore decide whether
appellants have the "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy" necessary to meet the requirements of Art. III. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). It is clear that Congress, in enacting Page 424 U. S. 12 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1970 ed., Supp. IV), [ Footnote 9 ] intended to provide judicial review to the
extent permitted by Art. III. In our view, the complaint in this
case demonstrates that at least some of the appellants have a
sufficient "personal stake" [ Footnote 10 ] in a determination of the constitutional
validity of each of the challenged provisions to present

															"a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, supra at 300 U. S. 241 .
[ Footnote 11 ] I . CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS

															The intricate statutory scheme adopted by Congress to regulate
federal election campaigns includes restrictions Page 424 U. S. 13 on political contributions and expenditures that apply broadly
to all phases of and all participants in the election process. The
major contribution and expenditure limitations in the Act prohibit
individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a single year or
more than $1,000 to any single candidate for an election campaign
[ Footnote 12 ] and from
spending more than $1,000 a year "relative to a clearly identified
candidate." [ Footnote 13 ]
Other provisions restrict a candidate's use of personal and family
resources in his campaign [ Footnote 14 ] and limit the over-all amount that can be
spent by a candidate in campaigning for federal office. [ Footnote 15 ]

															The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal
elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the
parties in this case. [ Footnote
16 ] Thus, the critical constitutional Page 424 U. S. 14 questions presented here go not to the basic power of Congress
to legislate in this area, but to whether the specific legislation
that Congress has enacted interferes with First Amendment freedoms
or invidiously discriminates against nonincumbent candidates and
minor parties in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. A. General Principles The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order "to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." Roth v. United
States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 484 (1957). Although First Amendment protections are not confined to
"the exposition of ideas," Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 , 333 U. S. 510 (1948),

															"there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs, . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of
candidates. . . ." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 , 384 U. S. 218 (1966). This no more than reflects our "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S. 270 (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability
of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates Page 424 U. S. 15 for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a
nation. As the Court observed in Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U. S. 265 , 401 U. S. 272 (1971),

															"it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political office."

															The First Amendment protects political association as well as
political expression. The constitutional right of association
explicated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.
S. 449 , 357 U. S. 460 (1958), stemmed from the Court's recognition that

															"[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association."

															Subsequent decisions have made clear that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee " freedom to associate with
others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas,'"
a freedom that encompasses "`[t]he right to associate with the
political party of one's choice.'" Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 , 414 U. S. 56 , 414 U. S. 57 (1973), quoted in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.
S. 477 , 419 U. S. 487 (1975). It is with these principles in mind that we consider the primary
contentions of the parties with respect to the Act's limitations
upon the giving and spending of money in political campaigns. Those
conflicting contentions could not more sharply define the basic
issues before us. Appellees contend that what the Act regulates is
conduct, and that its effect on speech and association is
incidental, at most. Appellants respond that contributions and
expenditures are at the very core of political speech, and that the
Act's limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment
liberty that are both gross and direct.

															In upholding the constitutional validity of the Act's
contribution and expenditure provisions on the ground Page 424 U. S. 16 that those provisions should be viewed as regulating conduct,
not speech, the Court of Appeals relied upon United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). See 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 191, 519 F.2d at 840. The O'Brien case involved a defendant's claim that the First
Amendment prohibited his prosecution for burning his draft card
because his act was " symbolic speech'" engaged in as a
"`demonstration against the war and against the draft.'" 391 U.S.
at 391 U. S. 376 .
On the assumption that "the alleged communicative element in
O'Brien's conduct [was] sufficient to bring into play the First
Amendment," the Court sustained the conviction because it found "a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element" that was "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression" and that had an "incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms . . . no greater than [was] essential to
the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 391 U. S.
376 -377. The Court expressly emphasized that O'Brien was not a case "where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct
arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral
to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." Id. at 391 U. S.
382 .

															We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and
expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on
conduct upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply
cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card.
Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and
spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct
primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this
Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on
the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech
element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.
S. 809 , Page 424 U. S. 17 421 U. S. 820 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 376 U. S. 266 .
For example, in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.
S. 559 (1965), the Court contrasted picketing and
parading with a newspaper comment and a telegram by a citizen to a
public official. The parading and picketing activities were said to
constitute conduct "intertwined with expression and association,"
whereas the newspaper comment and the telegram were described as a
"pure form of expression" involving "free speech alone," rather
than "expression mixed with particular conduct." Id. at 379 U. S.
563 -564.

															Even if the categorization of the expenditure of money as
conduct were accepted, the limitations challenged here would not
meet the O'Brien test because the governmental interests
advanced in support of the Act involve "suppressing communication."
The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices of
people and interest groups who have money to spend and reducing the
over-all scope of federal election campaigns. Although the Act does
not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups subject to
its regulations, it is aimed in part at equalizing the relative
ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by placing a
ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and
groups. Unlike O'Brien, where the Selective Service
System's administrative interest in the preservation of draft cards
was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication, it
is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged
"conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some measure
because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is
itself thought to be harmful." 391 U.S. at 391 U. S.
382 .

															Nor can the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations be
sustained, as some of the parties suggest, by reference to the
constitutional principles reflected in such Page 424 U. S. 18 decisions as Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966); and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.
77 (1949). Those cases stand for the proposition that
the government may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations, which do not discriminate among speakers or ideas, in
order to further an important governmental interest unrelated to
the restriction of communication. See Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 , 422 U. S. 209 (1975). In contrast to O'Brien, where the method of
expression was held to be subject to prohibition, Cox,
Adderley, and Kovacs involved place or manner
restrictions on legitimate modes of expression -- picketing,
parading, demonstrating, and using a sound truck. The critical
difference between this case and those time, place, and manner
cases is that the present Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political
communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and
political parties in addition to any reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations otherwise imposed. [ Footnote 17 ] Page 424 U. S. 19 A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend
on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached. [ Footnote
18 ] This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.
The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails
printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies
generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The
electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other
mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes
of communication indispensable instruments of effective political
speech.

															The expenditure limitations contained in the Act represent
substantial, rather than merely theoretical, restraints on the
quantity and diversity of political speech. The $1,000 ceiling on
spending "relative to a clearly identified candidate," 18 U.S.C. §
608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), would appear to exclude all
citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the
institutional press [ Footnote
19 ] from any significant use of the most Page 424 U. S. 20 effective modes of communication. [ Footnote 20 ] Although the Act's limitations on
expenditures by campaign organizations and political parties
provide substantially greater room for discussion and debate, they
would have required restrictions in the scope of a number of past
congressional and Presidential campaigns [ Footnote 21 ] and would operate to constrain
campaigning by candidates who raise sums in excess of the spending
ceiling.

															By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political
expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person or
group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails
only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to
engage in free communication. Page 424 U. S. 21 A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying
basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the
contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size
of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of
the contributor's support for the candidate. [ Footnote 22 ] A limitation on the amount of money
a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus
involves little direct restraint on his political communication,
for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may
result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an
association to present views to the voters, the transformation of
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone
other than the contributor.

															Given the important role of contributions in financing political
campaigns, contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on
political dialogue if the limitations prevented candidates and
political committees from amassing the resources necessary for
effective advocacy. There is no indication, however, that the
contribution limitations imposed by the Act would have any dramatic
adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political
associations. [ Footnote 23 ]
The over-all effect of the Act's contribution Page 424 U. S. 22 ceilings is merely to require candidates and political
committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to
compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than
the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political
expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money
potentially available to promote political expression.

															The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations also impinge
on protected associational freedoms. Making a contribution, like
joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a
candidate. In addition, it enables like-minded persons to pool
their resources in furtherance of common political goals. The Act's
contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating
with a candidate or committee, but leave the contributor free to
become a member of any political association and to assist
personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates.
And the Act's contribution limitations permit associations and
candidates to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective
advocacy. By contrast, the Act's $1,000 limitation on independent
expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" precludes
most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First
Amendment protection of the freedom of association. See NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 460 .
The Act's constraints on the ability of independent associations
and candidate campaign organizations to expend resources on
political expression "is simultaneously an interference with the
freedom of [their] adherents," Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 , 354 U. S. 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). See Cousins v. Page 424 U. S. 23 Wigoda, 419 U.S. at 419 U. S.
487 -488; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.
S. 415 , 371 U. S. 431 (1963).

															In sum, although the Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests,
its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe
restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and
association than do its limitations on financial contributions. B. Contribution Limitations 1. The $1,000 Limitation on Contributions by Individuals and
Groups to Candidates and Authorized Campaign Committees

															Section 608(b) provides, with certain limited exceptions,
that

															"no person shall make contributions to any candidate with
respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate,
exceed $1,000."

															The statute defines "person" broadly to include "an individual,
partnership, committee, association, corporation or any other
organization or group of persons." § 591(g). The limitation reaches
a gift, subscription, loan, advance, deposit of anything of value,
or promise to give a contribution, made for the purpose of
influencing a primary election, a Presidential preference primary,
or a general election for any federal office. [ Footnote 24 ] §§ 591(e)(1), (2). The Page 424 U. S. 24 $1,000 ceiling applies regardless of whether the contribution is
given to the candidate, to a committee authorized in writing by the
candidate to accept contributions on his behalf, or indirectly via
earmarked gifts passed through an intermediary to the candidate. §§
608(b)(4), (6). [ Footnote
25 ] The restriction applies to aggregate amounts contributed to
the candidate for each election -- with primaries, runoff
elections, and general elections counted separately, and all
Presidential primaries held in any calendar year treated together
as a single election campaign. § 608(b)(5).

															Appellants contend that the $1,000 contribution ceiling
unjustifiably burdens First Amendment freedoms, employs overbroad
dollar limits, and discriminates against candidates opposing
incumbent officeholders and against minor party candidates in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. We address each of these claims
of invalidity in turn. (a) As the general discussion in Part 424 U.
S. supra, indicated, the primary First
Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is
their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of
political association. Page 424 U. S. 25 The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish
that the right of association is a "basic constitutional freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 57 ,
that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which,
like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 , 364 U. S. 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.
S. 516 , 361 U. S.
522 -523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 357 U. S.
460 -461; NAACP v. Button, supra at 371 U. S. 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the
right to associate, governmental "action which may have the effect
of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest
scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 357 U. S.
460 -461. Yet, it is clear that "[n]either the right to
associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute." CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.
S. 548 , 413 U. S. 567 (1973). Even a " significant interference' with protected rights
of political association" may be sustained if the State
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra at 419 U. S. 488 ; NAACP v. Button, supra at 371 U. S. 438 ; Shelton v. Tucker, supra at 364 U. S.
488 . Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign
contributions are justified by three governmental interests.
According to the parties and amici, the primary interest
served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is
the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption
spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large
financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their
actions if elected to office. Two "ancillary" interests underlying
the Act are also allegedly furthered by the $1,000 limits on
contributions. First, the limits serve to mute the voices of
affluent persons and groups in the election Page 424 U. S. 26 process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all
citizens to affect the outcome of elections. [ Footnote 26 ] Second, it is argued, the ceilings
may to some extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of
political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political system
more widely to candidates without access to sources of large
amounts of money. [ Footnote
27 ]

															It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose -- to
limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from
large individual financial contributions -- in order to find a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000
contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of
elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth
must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the
resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. The
increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated
mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make
the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential
ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our
system of Page 424 U. S. 27 representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of
such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the
deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. [ Footnote 28 ]

															Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.
In CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, the Court found that the
danger to "fair and effective government" posed by partisan
political conduct on the part of federal employees charged with
administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to
justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan
political association. Here, as there, Congress could legitimately
conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence
"is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent." 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 565 .
[ Footnote 29 ]

															Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be
invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure
requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with
"proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws
making criminal Page 424 U. S. 28 the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most blatant
and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental
action. And while disclosure requirements serve the many salutary
purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion, [ Footnote 30 ] Congress was surely entitled to
conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that
contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to
deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a
system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the
identities of the contributors and the amounts of their
contributions are fully disclosed.

															The Act's $1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on
the problem of large campaign contributions -- the narrow aspect of
political association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to
engage in independent political expression, to associate actively
through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but
nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and
committees with financial resources. [ Footnote 31 ] Significantly, the Page 424 U. S. 29 Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to
any material degree the potential for robust and effective
discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual
citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and
political parties.

															We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established
by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are
sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment
freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling. (b) Appellants' first overbreadth challenge to the contribution
ceilings rests on the proposition that most large contributors do
not seek improper influence over a candidate's position or an
officeholder's action. Although the truth of that proposition may
be assumed, it does not Page 424 U. S. 30 undercut the validity of the $1,000 contribution limitation. Not
only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions but, more
importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest
in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that
the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large
monetary contributions be eliminated.

															A second, related overbreadth claim is that the $1,000
restriction is unrealistically low because much more than that
amount would still not be enough to enable an unscrupulous
contributor to exercise improper influence over a candidate or
officeholder, especially in campaigns for state-wide or national
office. While the contribution limitation provisions might well
have been structured to take account of the graduated expenditure
limitations for congressional and Presidential campaigns, [ Footnote 32 ] Congress' failure to
engage in such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation. As
the Court of Appeals observed,

															"[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is
necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000
ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 193, 519 F.2d at 842. Such distinctions in
degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to
differences in kind. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51 (1973), with Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.
S. 752 (1973). (c) Apart from these First Amendment concerns, appellants argue that
the contribution limitations work such an invidious discrimination
between incumbents Page 424 U. S. 31 and challengers that the statutory provisions must be declared
unconstitutional on their face. [ Footnote 33 ] In considering this contention, it is
important at the outset to note that the Act applies the same
limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of their
present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations.
Absent record evidence of invidious discrimination against
challengers as a class, a court should generally be hesitant to
invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded
restrictions. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.
S. 137 (1971). Page 424 U. S. 32 There is no such evidence to support the claim that the
contribution limitations in themselves discriminate against major
party challengers to incumbents. Challengers can and often do
defeat incumbents in federal elections. [ Footnote 34 ] Major party challengers in federal
elections are usually men and women who are well known and
influential in their community or State. Often such challengers are
themselves incumbents in important local, state, or federal
offices. Statistics in the record indicate that major party
challengers as well as incumbents are capable of raising large sums
for campaigning. [ Footnote
35 ] Indeed, a small but nonetheless significant number of
challengers have in recent elections outspent their incumbent
rivals. [ Footnote 36 ] And,
to the extent that incumbents generally are more likely than
challengers to attract very large contributions, the Act's $1,000
ceiling has the practical effect of benefiting challengers as a
class. [ Footnote 37 ]
Contrary to the broad generalization Page 424 U. S. 33 drawn by the appellants, the practical impact of the
contribution ceilings in any given election will clearly depend
upon the amounts in excess of the ceilings that, for various
reasons, the candidates in that election would otherwise have
received and the utility of these additional amounts to the
candidates. To be sure, the limitations may have a significant
effect on particular challengers or incumbents, but the record
provides no basis for predicting that such adventitious factors
will invariably and invidiously benefit incumbents as a class.
[ Footnote 38 ] Since the
danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption apply with
equal force to challengers and to incumbents, Congress had ample
justification for imposing the same fundraising constraints upon
both.

															The charge of discrimination against minor party and independent
candidates is more troubling, but the record provides no basis for
concluding that the Act invidiously disadvantages such candidates.
As noted above, the Act, on its face treats, all candidates equally
with regard to contribution limitations. And the restriction would
appear to benefit minor party and independent candidates relative
to their major party opponents, because major party candidates
receive far more money in large contributions. [ Footnote 39 ] Although there is some Page 424 U. S. 34 force tax appellants' response that minor party candidates are
primarily concerned with their ability to amass the resources
necessary to reach the electorate, rather than with their funding
position relative to their major party opponents, the record is
virtually devoid of support for the claim that the $1,000
contribution limitation will have a serious effect on the
initiation and scope of minor party and independent candidacies.
[ Footnote 40 ] Moreover, any
attempt Page 424 U. S. 35 to exclude minor parties and independents en masse from
the Act's contribution limitations overlooks the fact that minor
party candidates may win elective office or have a substantial
impact on the outcome of an election. [ Footnote 41 ]

															In view of these considerations, we conclude that the impact of
the Act's $1,000 contribution limitation on major party challengers
and on minor party candidates does not render the provision
unconstitutional on its face.

															2. The $5,000 Limitation on Contributions by Political
Committees

															Section 608(b)(2) permits certain committees, designated as
"political committees," to contribute up to $5,000 to any candidate
with respect to any election for federal office. In order to
qualify for the higher contribution ceiling, a group must have been
registered with the Commission as a political committee under 2
U.S.C. § 433 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) for not less than six months,
have received contributions from more than 50 persons, and, except
for state political party organizations, have contributed to five
or more candidates for federal office. Appellants argue that these
qualifications unconstitutionally discriminate against ad
hoc organizations in favor of established interest groups and
impermissibly burden free association. The argument is without
merit. Rather than undermining freedom of association, the basic
provision enhances the opportunity of bona fide groups to
participate in the election process, and the registration,
contribution, and candidate conditions serve the permissible
purpose of preventing individuals Page 424 U. S. 36 from evading the applicable contribution limitations by labeling
themselves committees.

															3. Limitations on Volunteers' Incidental Expenses

															The Act excludes from the definition of contribution

															"the value of services provided without compensation by
individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf
of a candidate or political committee."

															§ 591(e)(5)(A). Certain expenses incurred by persons in
providing volunteer services to a candidate are exempt from the
$1,000 ceiling only to the extent that they do not exceed $500.
These expenses are expressly limited to (1) "the use of real or
personal property and the cost of invitations, food, and beverages,
voluntarily provided by an individual to a candidate in rendering
voluntary personal services on the individual's residential
premises for candidate-related activities," § 591(e)(5)(B); (2)
"the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in a
candidate's campaign at a charge [at least equal to cost but] less
than the normal comparable charge," § 591(e)(5)(C); and (3) "any
unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an individual who
on his own behalf volunteers his personal services to a candidate,"
§ 591(e)(5)(D).

															If, as we have held, the basic contribution limitations are
constitutionally valid, then surely these provisions are a
constitutionally acceptable accommodation of Congress' valid
interest in encouraging citizen participation in political
campaigns while continuing to guard against the corrupting
potential of large financial contributions to candidates. The
expenditure of resources at the candidate's direction for a
fundraising event at a volunteer's residence or the provision of
in-kind assistance in the form of food or beverages to be resold to
raise funds or consumed by the participants in such an event
provides material financial assistance to a candidate. The
ultimate Page 424 U. S. 37 effect is the same as if the person had contributed the dollar
amount to the candidate and the candidate had then used the
contribution to pay for the fundraising event or the food.
Similarly, travel undertaken as a volunteer at the direction of the
candidate or his staff is an expense of the campaign and may
properly be viewed as a contribution if the volunteer absorbs the
fare. Treating these expenses as contributions when made to the
candidate's campaign or at the direction of the candidate or his
staff forecloses an avenue of abuse [ Footnote 42 ] without limiting actions voluntarily
undertaken by citizens independently of a candidate's campaign.
[ Footnote 43 ] Page 424 U. S. 38 4. The 25,000 Limitation on Total Contributions During any
Calendar Year

															In addition to the $1,000 limitation on the nonexempt
contributions that an individual may make to a particular candidate
for any single election, the Act contains an over-all $25,000
limitation on total contributions by an individual during any
calendar year. § 608(b)(3). A contribution made in connection with
an election is considered, for purposes of this subsection, to be
made in the year the election is held. Although the
constitutionality of this provision was drawn into question by
appellants, it has not been separately addressed at length by the
parties. The over-all $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate
restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which
an individual may associate himself by means of financial support.
But this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity
serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by
a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to
a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions
to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or
huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited,
additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the
over-all ceiling is thus no more than a corollary of the basic
individual contribution limitation that we have found to be
constitutionally valid. Page 424 U. S. 39 C. Expenditure Limitations The Act's expenditure ceilings impose direct and substantial
restraints on the quantity of political speech. The most drastic of
the limitations restricts individuals and groups, including
political parties that fail to place a candidate on the ballot,
[ Footnote 44 ] to an
expenditure of $1,000 "relative to a clearly identified candidate
during a calendar year." § 608(e)(1). Other expenditure ceilings
limit spending by candidates, § 608(a), their campaigns, § 608(c),
and political parties in connection with election campaigns, §
608(f). It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure
limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by
individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while
neutral as to the ideas expressed, limit political expression "at
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23 , 393 U. S. 32 (1968).

															1. The $1,000 Limitation on Expenditures "Relative to a Clearly
Identified Candidate"

															Section 608(e)(1) provides that

															"[n]o person may make any expenditure . . . relative to a
clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when
added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year
advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds
$1,000. [ Footnote 45 ]"

															The plain effect of § 608(e)(1) is to Page 424 U. S. 40 prohibit all individuals, who are neither candidates nor owners
of institutional press facilities, and all groups, except political
parties and campaign organizations, from voicing their views
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" through means that
entail aggregate expenditures of more than $1,000 during a calendar
year. The provision, for example, would make it a federal criminal
offense for a person or association to place a single one-quarter
page advertisement "relative to a clearly identified candidate" in
a major metropolitan newspaper. [ Footnote 46 ]

															Before examining the interests advanced in support of §
608(e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling, consideration must be given to
appellants' contention that the provision is unconstitutionally
vague. [ Footnote 47 ] Close
examination of the Page 424 U. S. 41 specificity of the statutory limitation is required where, as
here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area
permeated by First Amendment interests. See Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 , 415 U. S. 573 (1974); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.
S. 278 , 368 U. S.
287 -288 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 , 361 U. S. 151 (1959). [ Footnote 48 ] The
test is whether the language of § 608(e)(1) affords the
"[p]recision of regulation [that] must be the touchstone in an area
so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S.
438 .

															The key operative language of the provision limits "any
expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate."
Although "expenditure," "clearly identified," and "candidate" are
defined in the Act, there is no definition clarifying what
expenditures are "relative to" a candidate. The use of so
indefinite a phrase as "relative to" a candidate fails to clearly
mark the boundary between permissible and impermissible speech,
unless other portions of § 608(e)(1) make sufficiently explicit the
range of expenditures Page 424 U. S. 42 covered by the limitation. The section prohibits "any
expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during
a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures . .
. advocation the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds
$1,000." (Emphasis added.) This context clearly permits, if indeed
it does not require, the phrase "relative to" a candidate to be
read to mean "advocating the election or defeat of" a candidate.
[ Footnote 49 ]

															But while such a construction of § 608(e)(1) refocuses the
vagueness question, the Court of Appeals was mistaken in thinking
that this construction eliminates the problem of unconstitutional
vagueness altogether. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 204, 519 F.2d at 853. For
the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in
practical application. Candidates, especially incumbents, are
intimately tied to public issues involving legislative proposals
and governmental actions. Not only do candidates campaign on the
basis of their positions on various public issues, but campaigns
themselves generate issues of public interest. [ Footnote 50 ] In an analogous Page 424 U. S. 43 context, this Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 (1945), observed:

															"[W]hether words intended and designed to fall short of
invitation would miss that mark is a question both of intent and of
effect. No speaker, in such circumstances, safely could assume that
anything he might say upon the general subject would not be
understood by some as an invitation. In short, the supposedly
clear-cut distinction between discussion, laudation, general
advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstances
wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and
consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent
and meaning."

															"Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In
these conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said.
It compels the speaker to hedge and trim." Id. at 323 U. S. 535 . See also United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.
S. 567 , 352 U. S.
595 -596 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U. S. 652 , 268 U. S. 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

															The constitutional deficiencies described in Thomas v.
Collins can be avoided only by reading § 608(e)(1) as limited
to communications that include explicit words of advocacy of
election or defeat of a candidate, much as the definition of
"clearly identified" in § 608(e)(2) requires that an explicit and
unambiguous reference to the candidate appear as part of the
communication. [ Footnote 51 ]
This Page 424 U. S. 44 is the reading of the provision suggested by the nongovernmental
appellees in arguing that "[f]unds spent to propagate one's views
on issues without expressly calling for a candidate's election or
defeat are thus not covered." We agree that, in order to preserve
the provision against invalidation on vagueness grounds, §
608(e)(1) must be construed to apply only to expenditures for
communications that, in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.
[ Footnote 52 ]

															We turn then to the basic First Amendment question -- whether §
608(e)(1), even as thus narrowly and explicitly construed,
impermissibly burdens the constitutional right of free expression.
The Court of Appeals summarily held the provision constitutionally
valid on the ground that "section 608(e) is a loophole-closing
provision only" that is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
contribution limitations. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 204, 519 F.2d at 853.
We cannot agree.

															The discussion in 424 U. S. supra, explains why the Act's expenditure limitations
impose far greater restraints on the freedom of speech and
association than do its contribution limitations. The markedly
greater burden on basic freedoms caused by § 608(e)(1) thus cannot
be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the
effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations.
Rather, the constitutionality of § 608(e)(1) turns on whether the
governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting
scrutiny applicable to limitations Page 424 U. S. 45 on core First Amendment rights of political expression.

															We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify §
608(e)(1)'s ceiling on independent expenditures. First, assuming, arguendo, that large independent expenditures pose the
same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements as do large contributions, § 608(e)(1) does not
provide an answer that sufficiently relates to the elimination of
those dangers. Unlike the contribution limitations' total ban on
the giving of large amounts of money to candidates, § 608(e)(1)
prevents only some large expenditures. So long as persons and
groups eschew expenditures that, in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free
to spend as much as they want to promote the candidate and his
views. The exacting interpretation of the statutory language
necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness thus undermines the
limitation's effectiveness as a loophole-closing provision by
facilitating circumvention by those seeking to exert improper
influence upon a candidate or officeholder. It would naively
underestimate the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and
groups desiring to buy influence to believe that they would have
much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the restriction
on express advocacy of election or defeat, but nevertheless
benefited the candidate's campaign. Yet no substantial societal
interest would be served by a loophole-closing provision designed
to check corruption that permitted unscrupulous persons and
organizations to expend unlimited sums of money in order to obtain
improper influence over candidates for elective office. Cf.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
220 .

															Second, quite apart from the shortcomings of § 608(e)(1) Page 424 U. S. 46 in preventing any abuses generated by large independent
expenditures, the independent advocacy restricted by the provision
does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions. The parties defending § 608(e)(1) contend that it is
necessary to prevent would-be contributors from avoiding the
contribution limitations by the simple expedient of paying directly
for media advertisements or for other portions of the candidate's
campaign activities. They argue that expenditures controlled by or
coordinated with the candidate and his campaign might well have
virtually the same value to the candidate as a contribution and
would pose similar dangers of abuse. Yet such controlled or
coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions, rather than
expenditures under the Act. [ Footnote 53 ] Section 608(b)'s Page 424 U. S. 47 contribution ceilings, rather than § 608(e)(1)'s independent
expenditure limitation, prevent attempts to circumvent the Act
through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to
disguised contributions. By contrast, 608(e)(1) limits expenditures
for express advocacy of candidates made totally independently of
the candidate and his campaign. Unlike contributions, such
independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign, and indeed may prove counterproductive. The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with
the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the
expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate. Rather than preventing
circumvention of the contribution limitations, § 608(e)(1) severely
restricts all independent advocacy despite its substantially
diminished potential for abuse.

															While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve
any substantial governmental interest in stemming Page 424 U. S. 48 the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral
process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression. For
the First Amendment right to " speak one's mind . . . on all
public institutions'" includes the right to engage in "`vigorous
advocacy' no less than `abstract discussion.'" New York Times
Co. v Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 376 U. S. 269 ,
quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.
S. 252 , 314 U. S. 270 (1941), and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 429 .
Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office
is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than
the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the
passage or defeat of legislation. [ Footnote 54 ] It is argued, however, that the ancillary
governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves
to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or
defeat of candidates imposed by § 608(e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling.
�But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in Page 424 U. S. 49 order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment, which was designed "to secure `the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources,'" and "`to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra at 376 U. S. 266 , 376 U. S. 269 ,
quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S.
1 , 326 U. S. 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 484 .
The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of
free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's
financial ability to engage in public discussion. Cf. Eastern
R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U. S. 127 , 365 U. S. 13 (1961). [ Footnote 55 ] Page 424 U. S. 50 The Court's decisions in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.
S. 214 (1966), and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), held that legislative restrictions on advocacy of the
election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with
the guarantees of the First Amendment. In Mills, the Court
addressed the question whether

															"a State, consistently with the United States Constitution, can
make it a crime for the editor of a daily newspaper to write and
publish an editorial on election day urging people to vote
a certain way on issues submitted to them."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 215 (emphasis in original). We held that "no test of reasonableness can
save [such] a state law from invalidation as a violation of the
First Amendment." Id. at 384 U. S. 220 .
Yet the prohibition of election day editorials invalidated in Mills is clearly a lesser intrusion on constitutional
freedom than a $1,000 limitation on the amount of money any person
or association can spend during an entire election year in
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate for public office.
More recently, in Tornillo, the Court held that Florida
could not constitutionally require a newspaper Page 424 U. S. 51 to make space available for a political candidate to reply to
its criticism. Yet, under the Florida statute, every newspaper was
free to criticize any candidate as much as it pleased so long as it
undertook the modest burden of printing his reply. See 418
U.S. at 418 U. S.
256 -257. The legislative restraint involved in Tornillo thus also pales in comparison to the limitations
imposed by § 608(e)(1). [ Footnote 56 ]

															For the reasons stated, we conclude that § 608(e)(1)'s
independent expenditure limitation is unconstitutional under the
First Amendment.

															2. Limitation on Expenditures by Candidates from Personal or
Family Resources

															The Act also sets limits on expenditures by a candidate "from
his personal funds, or the personal funds of his immediate family,
in connection with his campaigns during any calendar year." §
608(a)(1). These ceilings vary from $50,000 for Presidential or
Vice Presidential candidates to $35,000 for senatorial candidates,
and $25,000 for most candidates for the House of Representatives.
[ Footnote 57 ] Page 424 U. S. 52 The ceiling on personal expenditures by candidates on their own
behalf, like the limitations on independent expenditures contained
in § 608(e)(1), imposes a substantial restraint on the ability of
persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression.
[ Footnote 58 ] The candidate,
no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to
engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and
tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other
candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates
have the unfettered Page 424 U. S. 53 opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may
intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their
positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on
election day. Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation that, in our
country "public discussion is a political duty," Whitney v.
California, 274 U. S. 357 , 274 U. S. 375 (1927) (concurring opinion), applies with special force to
candidates for public office. Section 608(a)'s ceiling on personal
expenditures by a candidate in furtherance of his own candidacy
thus clearly and directly interferes with constitutionally
protected freedoms.

															The primary governmental interest served by the Act -- the
prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political
process -- does not support the limitation on the candidate's
expenditure of his own personal funds. As the Court of Appeals
concluded:

															"Manifestly, the core problem of avoiding undisclosed and undue
influence on candidates from outside interests has lesser
application when the monies involved come from the candidate
himself or from his immediate family."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 206, 519 F.2d at 855. Indeed, the use of
personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside
contributions, and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and
attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution
limitations are directed. [ Footnote 59 ] Page 424 U. S. 54 The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial
resources of candidates competing for elective office, therefore,
provides the sole relevant rationale for § 608(a)'s expenditure
ceiling. That interest is clearly not sufficient to justify the
provision's infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.
First, the limitation may fail to promote financial equality among
candidates. A candidate who spends less of his personal resources
on his campaign may nonetheless outspend his rival as a result of
more successful fundraising efforts. Indeed, a candidate's personal
wealth may impede his efforts to persuade others that he needs
their financial contributions or volunteer efforts to conduct an
effective campaign. Second, and more fundamentally, the First
Amendment simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon the
freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on behalf
of his own candidacy. We therefore hold that § 608(a)'s restriction
on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional.

															3. Limitations on Campaign Expenditures

															Section 608(c) places limitations on over-all campaign
expenditures by candidates seeking nomination for election and
election to federal office. [ Footnote 60 ] Presidential candidates may spend
$10,000,000 in seeking nomination for office, and an additional
$20,000,000 in the general election campaign. §§ 608(c)(1)(A), (B).
[ Footnote 61 ] Page 424 U. S. 55 The ceiling on senatorial campaigns is pegged to the size of the
voting-age population of the State, with minimum dollar amounts
applicable to campaigns in States with small populations. In
senatorial primary elections, the limit is the greater of eight
cents multiplied by the voting-age population or $100,000, and, in
the general election, the limit is increased to 12 cents multiplied
by the voting-age population, or $150,000. §§ 608(c)(1)(C), (D).
The Act imposes blanket $70,000 limitations on both primary
campaigns and general election campaigns for the House of
Representatives, with the exception that the senatorial ceiling
applies to campaigns in States entitled to only one Representative.
§§ 608(c)(1)(C)(E). These ceilings are to be adjusted upwards at
the beginning of each calendar year by the average percentage rise
in the consumer price index for the 12 preceding months. § 608(d).
[ Footnote 62 ]

															No governmental interest that has been suggested is sufficient
to justify the restriction on the quantity of political expression
imposed by § 608(c)'s campaign expenditure limitations. The major
evil associated with rapidly increasing campaign expenditures is
the danger of candidate dependence on large contributions. The
interest in alleviating the corrupting influence of large
contributions is served by the Act's contribution limitations and
disclosure provisions, rather than by § 608(c)'s campaign
expenditure ceilings. The Court of Appeals' assertion that the
expenditure restrictions are necessary to reduce the incentive to
circumvent direct contribution limits is not persuasive. See 171 U.S.App.D.C. Page 424 U. S. 56 at 210, 519 F.2d at 859. There is no indication that the
substantial criminal penalties for violating the contribution
ceilings, combined with the political repercussion of such
violations, will be insufficient to police the contribution
provisions. Extensive reporting, auditing, and disclosure
requirements applicable to both contributions and expenditures by
political campaigns are designed to facilitate the detection of
illegal contributions. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, the
Act permits an officeholder or successful candidate to retain
contributions in excess of the expenditure ceiling, and to use
these funds for "any other lawful purpose." 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1970
ed., Supp. IV). This provision undercuts whatever marginal role the
expenditure limitations might otherwise play in enforcing the
contribution ceilings.

															The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates
competing for federal office is no more convincing a justification
for restricting the scope of federal election campaigns. Given the
limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial
resources available to a candidate's campaign, like the number of
volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and
intensity of the candidate's support. [ Footnote 63 ] There is nothing invidious, improper, or
unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the
candidate's message to the electorate. [ Footnote 64 ] Moreover, the equalization of permissible
campaign expenditures Page 424 U. S. 57 might serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates,
but to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition
or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.

															The campaign expenditure ceilings appear to be designed
primarily to serve the governmental interests in reducing the
allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns. Appellees and
the Court of Appeals stressed statistics indicating that spending
for federal election campaigns increased almost 300% between 1952
and 1972 in comparison with a 57.6% rise in the consumer price
index during the same period. Appellants respond that, during these
years, the rise in campaign spending lagged behind the percentage
increase in total expenditures for commercial advertising and the
size of the gross national product. In any event, the mere growth
in the cost of federal election campaigns, in and of itself,
provides no basis for governmental restrictions on the quantity of
campaign spending and the resulting limitation on the scope of
federal campaigns. The First Amendment denies government the power
to determine that spending to promote one's political views is
wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our
Constitution, it is not the government, but the people --
individually, as citizens and candidates, and collectively, as
associations and political committees -- who must retain control
over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign. [ Footnote
65 ] Page 424 U. S. 58 For these reasons, we hold that § 608(c) is constitutionally
invalid. [ Footnote 66 ]

															In sum, the provisions of the Act that impose a $1,000
limitation on contributions to a single candidate, § 608(b)(1), a
$5,000 limitation on contributions by a political committee to a
single candidate, § 608(b)(2), and a $25,000 limitation on total
contributions by an individual during any calendar year, §
608(b)(3), are constitutionally valid. These limitations, along
with the disclosure provisions, constitute the Act's primary
weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence
stemming from the dependence of candidates on large campaign
contributions. The contribution ceilings thus serve the basic
governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the
electoral process without directly impinging upon the rights of
individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate
and discussion. By contrast, the First Amendment requires the
invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, §
608(e)(1), its limitation on a candidate's expenditures from his
own personal funds, § 608(a), and its ceilings on over-all campaign
expenditures, § 608(e). These provisions place substantial and
direct restrictions Page 424 U. S. 59 on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to
engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the
First Amendment cannot tolerate. [ Footnote 67 ] Page 424 U. S. 60 II . REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

															Unlike the limitations on contributions and expenditures imposed
by 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), the disclosure
requirements of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV), [ Footnote 68 ] are
not challenged by appellants as per se unconstitutional
restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms of speech
and association. [ Footnote
69 ] Indeed, appellants argue that "narrowly drawn disclosure
requirements are the proper solution to virtually all of the evils
Congress sought to remedy." Brief for Appellants 171. The
particular requirements Page 424 U. S. 61 embodied in the Act are attacked as overbroad -- both in their
application to minor party and independent candidates and in their
extension to contributions as small as $11 or $101. Appellants also
challenge the provision for disclosure by those who make
independent contributions and expenditures, § 434(e). The Court of
Appeals found no constitutional infirmities in the provisions
challenged here. [ Footnote
70 ] We affirm the determination on overbreadth and hold that §
434(e), if narrowly construed, also is within constitutional
bounds.

															The first federal disclosure law was enacted in 1910. Act of
June 25, 1910, c. 392, 36 Stat. 822. It required political
committees, defined as national committees and national
congressional campaign committees of parties, and organizations
operating to influence congressional elections in two or more
States, to disclose names of all contributors of $100 or more;
identification of recipients of expenditures of $10 or more was
also required. §§ 1, 5-6, 36 Stat. 822-824. Annual expenditures of
$50 or more "for the purpose of influencing or controlling, in two
or more States, the result of" a congressional election had to be
reported independently if they were not made through a political
committee. § 7, 36 Stat. 824. In 1911, the Act was revised to
include pre-nomination transactions such as those involved in
conventions and primary campaigns. Act of Aug.19, 1911, § 2, 37
Stat. 26. See United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. at 352 U. S.
575 -576.

															Disclosure requirements were broadened in the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 (Title III of the Act of Feb. 28, 1925), 43
Stat. 1070. That Act required political committees, defined as
organizations that accept contributions or make expenditures "for
the purpose of Page 424 U. S. 62 influencing or attempting to influence" the Presidential or Vice
Presidential elections (a) in two or more States or (b) as a
subsidiary of a national committee, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070, to
report total contributions and expenditures, including the names
and addresses of contributors of $100 or more and recipients of $10
or more in a calendar year. § 305(a), 43 Stat. 1071. The Act was
upheld against a challenge that it infringed upon the prerogatives
of the States in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.
S. 534 (1934). The Court held that it was within the
power of Congress "to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard [a
Presidential] election from the improper use of money to influence
the result." Id. at 290 U. S. 545 .
Although the disclosure requirements were widely circumvented,
[ Footnote 71 ] no further
attempts were made to tighten them until 1960, when the Senate
passed a bill that would have closed some existing loopholes. S.
2436, 106 Cong.Rec. 1193. The attempt aborted because no similar
effort was made in the House.

															The Act presently under review replaced all prior disclosure
laws. Its primary disclosure provisions impose reporting
obligations on "political committees" and candidates. "Political
committee" is defined in § 431(d) as a group of persons that
receives "contributions" or makes "expenditures" of over $1,000 in
a calendar year. "Contributions" and "expenditures" are defined in
lengthy parallel provisions similar to those in Title 18,
discussed Page 424 U. S. 63 above. [ Footnote 72 ] Both
definitions focus on the use of money or other objects of value
"for the purpose of . . . influencing" the nomination or election
of any person to federal office. §§ 431(e)(1), (f)(1)

															Each political committee is required to register with the
Commission, § 433, and to keep detailed records of both
contributions and expenditures, §§ 432(c), (d). These records must
include the name and address of everyone making a contribution in
excess of $10, along with the date and amount of the contribution.
If a person's contributions aggregate more than $100, his
occupation and principal place of business are also to be included.
§ 432(c)(2). These files are subject to periodic audits and field
investigations by the Commission. § 438(a)(8).

															Each committee and each candidate also is required to file
quarterly reports. § 434(a). The reports are to contain detailed
financial information, including the full name, mailing address,
occupation, and principal place of business of each person who has
contributed over $100 in a calendar year, as well as the amount and
date of the contributions. § 434(b). They are to be made available
by the Commission "for public inspection and copying." § 438(a)(4).
Every candidate for federal office is required to designate a
"principal campaign committee," which is to receive reports of
contributions and expenditures made on the candidate's behalf from
other political committees and to compile and file these reports,
together with its own statements, with the Commission. §
432(f).

															Every individual or group, other than a political committee or
candidate, who makes "contributions" or "expenditures" of over $100
in a calendar year "other than Page 424 U. S. 64 by contribution to a political committee or candidate" is
required to file a statement with the Commission. § 434(e). Any
violation of these recordkeeping and reporting provisions is
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or a prison term of
not more than a year, or both. § 441(a). A. General Principles Unlike the over-all limitations on contributions and
expenditures, the disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on
campaign-related activities. But we have repeatedly found that
compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy
of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment. E.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.
S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.
S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.
S. 449 (1958).

															We long have recognized that significant encroachments on First
Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure imposes
cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate
governmental interest. Since NAACP v. Alabama, we have
required that the subordinating interests of the State must survive
exacting scrutiny. [ Footnote
73 ] We also have insisted that there be a "relevant
correlation" [ Footnote 74 ]
or "substantial relation" [ Footnote 75 ] between the governmental interest and the
information required to be disclosed. See Pollard v.
Roberts, 283 F.
Supp. 248 , 257 (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U. S. 14 (1968) Page 424 U. S. 65 (per curiam). This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any
deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises
not through direct government action, but indirectly, as an
unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in
requiring disclosure. NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 357 U. S. 461 . Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S.
57 -58.

															Appellees argue that the disclosure requirements of the Act
differ significantly from those at issue in NAACP v.
Alabama and its progeny, because the Act only requires
disclosure of the names of contributors, and does not compel
political organizations to submit the names of their members.
[ Footnote 76 ]

															As we have seen, group association is protected because it
enhances "[e]ffective advocacy." NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 357 U. S. 460 .
The right to Join together "for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas," ibid., is diluted if it does not include the right
to pool money through contributions, for funds are often essential
if "advocacy" is Page 424 U. S. 66 to be truly or optimally "effective." Moreover, the invasion of
privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought
concerns the giving and spending of money as when it concerns the
joining of organizations, for "[f]inancial transactions can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs." California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S.
21 , 416 U. S. 78 -79
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring). Our past decisions have not drawn
fine lines between contributors and members, but have treated them
interchangeably. In Bates, for example, we applied the
principles of NAACP v. Alabama and reversed convictions
for failure to comply with a city ordinance that required the
disclosure of "dues, assessments, and contributions paid, by whom
and when paid." 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 518 . See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S.
41 (1953) (setting aside a contempt conviction of an
organization official who refused to disclose names of those who
made bulk purchases of books sold by the organization).

															The strict test established by NAACP v. Alabama is
necessary because compelled disclosure has the potential for
substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights.
But we have acknowledged that there are governmental interests
sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement,
particularly when the "free functioning of our national
institutions" is involved. Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U. S. 1 , 367 U. S. 97 (1961).

															The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by the
disclosure requirements are of this magnitude. They fall into three
categories. First, disclosure provides the electorate with
information "as to where political campaign money comes from and
how it is spent by the candidate" [ Footnote 77 ] in order to aid the voters in evaluating
those Page 424 U. S. 67 who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each
candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often
possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.
The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter
to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive, and thus facilitate predictions of future performance
in office.

															Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and
avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions
and expenditures to the light of publicity. [ Footnote 78 ] This exposure may discourage those
who would use money for improper purposes either before or after
the election. A public armed with information about a candidate's
most generous supporters is better able to detect any post-election
special favors that may be given in return. [ Footnote 79 ] And, as we recognized in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. at 290 U. S. 548 ,
Congress could reasonably conclude that full disclosure during an
election campaign tends "to prevent the corrupt use of money to
affect elections." In enacting these requirements, it may have been
mindful of Mr. Justice Brandeis' advice:

															"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.
[ Footnote 80 ]"

															Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, Page 424 U. S. 68 and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering
the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution
limitations described above.

															The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve
substantial governmental interests. In determining whether these
interests are sufficient to justify the requirements, we must look
to the extent of the burden that they place on individual
rights.

															It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions
to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who
otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even
expose contributors to harassment or retaliation. These are not
insignificant burdens on individual rights, and they must be
weighed carefully against the interests which Congress has sought
to promote by this legislation. In this process, we note and agree
with appellants' concession [ Footnote 81 ] that disclosure requirements -- certainly in
most applications -- appear to be the least restrictive means of
curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that
Congress found to exist. [ Footnote 82 ] Appellants argue, however, that the balance
tips against disclosure when it is required of contributors to
certain parties and candidates. We turn now to this contention. B. Application to Minor Parties and Independents Appellants contend that the Act's requirements are overbroad
insofar as they apply to contributions to minor Page 424 U. S. 69 parties and independent candidates because the governmental
interest in this information is minimal, and the danger of
significant infringement on First Amendment rights is greatly
increased.

															1. Requisite Factual Showing

															In NAACP v. Alabama, the organization had

															"made an uncontroverted showing that, on past occasions,
revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members [had]
exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
hostility,"

															357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 462 ,
and the State was unable to show that the disclosure it sought had
a "substantial bearing" on the issues it sought to clarify, id. at 357 U. S. 464 .
Under those circumstances, the Court held that "whatever interest
the State may have in [disclosure] has not been shown to be
sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections." Id. at 357 U. S.
465 .

															The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' suggestion that this
case fits into the NAACP v. Alabama mold. It concluded
that substantial governmental interests in "informing the
electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process"
were furthered by requiring disclosure of minor parties and
independent candidates, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 218, 519 F.2d at 867,
and therefore found no

															tenable rationale for assuming that the public interest in
minority party disclosure of contributions above a reasonable
cutoff point is uniformly outweighed by potential contributors'
associational rights, id. at 219, 519 F.2d at 868. The court left open the
question of the application of the disclosure requirements to
candidates (and parties) who could demonstrate injury of the sort
at stake in NAACP v. Alabama. No record of harassment on a
similar scale was found in this case. [ Footnote 83 ] We agree with Page 424 U. S. 70 the Court of Appeals' conclusion that NAACP v. Alabama is inapposite where, as here, any serious infringement on First
Amendment rights brought about by the compelled disclosure of
contributors is highly speculative.

															It is true that the governmental interest in disclosure is
diminished when the contribution in question is made to a minor
party with little chance of winning an election. As minor parties
usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be
less need to inform the voters of the interests that specific
candidates represent. Major parties encompass candidates of greater
diversity. In many situations, the label "Republican" or "Democrat"
tells a voter little. The candidate who bears it may be supported
by funds from the far right, the far left, or any place in between
on the political spectrum. It is less likely that a candidate of,
say, the Socialist Labor Party will represent interests that cannot
be discerned from the party's ideological position.

															The Government's interest in deterring the "buying" of elections
and the undue influence of large contributors on officeholders also
may be reduced where contributions to a minor party or an
independent candidate are concerned, for it is less likely that the
candidate will be victorious. But a minor party sometimes can play
a significant role in an election. Even when a minor party
candidate has little or no chance of winning, he may be encouraged
by major party interests in order to divert votes from other major
party contenders. [ Footnote
84 ] Page 424 U. S. 71 We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the
associational interests of the minor parties and their members and
to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements
are less likely to have a sound financial base, and thus are more
vulnerable to fall-offs in contributions. In some instances, fears
of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement
cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result
comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free
circulation of ideas both within [ Footnote 85 ] and without [ Footnote 86 ] the political arena.

															There could well be a case, similar to those before the Court in NAACP v. Alabama and Bates, where the threat to
the exercise of First Amendment rights is so serious, and the state
interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial, that the Act's
requirements cannot be constitutionally applied. [ Footnote 87 ] But no appellant in this case
has tendered record evidence of the sort proffered in NAACP v.
Alabama. Instead, appellants primarily rely on "the clearly
articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the political
process." Brief for Appellants 173. At Page 424 U. S. 72 best they offer the testimony of several minor party officials
that one or two persons refused to make contributions because of
the possibility of disclosure. [ Footnote 88 ] On this record, the substantial public
interest in disclosure identified by the legislative history of
this Act outweighs the harm generally alleged.

															2. Blanket Exemption

															Appellants agree that "the record here does not reflect the kind
of focused and insistent harassment of contributors and members
that existed in the NAACP cases." Ibid. They argue,
however, that a blanket exemption for minor parties is necessary
lest irreparable injury be done before the required evidence can be
gathered.

															Those parties that would be sufficiently "minor" to be exempted
from the requirements of § 434 could be defined, appellants
suggest, along the lines used for public financing purposes, see 424 U. S. infra, as those who received less than 25% of the vote in
past elections. Appellants do not argue that this line is
constitutionally required. They suggest as an alternative defining
"minor parties" as those that do not qualify for automatic ballot
access under state law. Presumably, other criteria, such as current
political strength (measured by polls or petition), age, or degree
of organization, could also be used. [ Footnote 89 ]

															The difficulty with these suggestions is that they reflect only
a party's past or present political strength, and Page 424 U. S. 73 that is only one of the factors that must be considered. Some of
the criteria are not precisely indicative of even that factor. Age,
[ Footnote 90 ] or past
political success, for instance, may typically be associated with
parties that have a high probability of success. But not all
long-established parties are winners -- some are consistent losers
-- and a new party may garner a great deal of support if it can
associate itself with an issue that has captured the public's
imagination. None of the criteria suggested is precisely related to
the other critical factor that must be considered, the possibility
that disclosure will impinge upon protected associational
activity.

															An opinion dissenting in part from the Court of Appeals'
decision concedes that no one line is "constitutionally required."
[ Footnote 91 ] It argues,
however, that a flat exemption for minor parties must be carved
out, even along arbitrary lines, if groups that would suffer
impermissibly from disclosure are to be given any real protection.
An approach that requires minor parties to submit evidence that the
disclosure requirements cannot constitutionally be applied to them
offers only an illusory safeguard, the argument goes, because the
"evils" of "chill and harassment . . . are largely incapable of
formal proof." [ Footnote 92 ]
This dissent expressed its concern that a minor party, particularly
a Page 424 U. S. 74 new party, may never be able to prove a substantial threat of
harassment, however real that threat may be, because it would be
required to come forward with witnesses who are too fearful to
contribute but not too fearful to testify about their fear. A
strict requirement that chill and harassment be directly
attributable to the specific disclosure from which the exemption is
sought would make the task even more difficult.

															We recognize that unduly strict requirements of proof could
impose a heavy burden, but it does not follow that a blanket
exemption for minor parties is necessary. Minor parties must be
allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a
fair consideration of their claim. The evidence offered need show
only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a
party's contributors' names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or
private parties. The proof may include, for example, specific
evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their
associational ties, or of harassment directed against the
organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific
manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties
that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer
evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or
organizations holding similar views.

															Where it exists, the type of chill and harassment identified in NAACP v. Alabama can be shown. We cannot assume that
courts will be insensitive to similar showings when made in future
cases. We therefore conclude that a blanket exemption is not
required. C. Section 434(e) Section 434(e) requires "[e]very person (other than a political
committee or candidate) who makes contributions Page 424 U. S. 75 or expenditures" aggregating over $100 in a calendar year "other
than by contribution to a political committee or candidate" to file
a statement with the Commission. [ Footnote 93 ] Unlike the other disclosure provisions, this
section does not seek the contribution list of any association.
Instead, it requires direct disclosure of what an individual or
group contributes or spends.

															In considering this provision, we must apply the same strict
standard of scrutiny, for the right of associational privacy
developed in NAACP v. Alabama derives from the rights of
the organization's members to advocate their personal points of
view in the most effective way. 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 458 , 357 U. S. 460 . See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S.
429 -431; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S.
250 .

															Appellants attack § 434(e) as a direct intrusion on privacy of
belief, in violation of Talley v. California, 362 U. S.
60 (1960), and as imposing "very real, practical burdens
. . . certain to deter individuals from making expenditures for
their independent political speech" analogous to those held to be
impermissible in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 (1945).

															1. The Role of § 434(e)

															The Court of Appeals upheld § 434(e) as necessary to enforce the
independent expenditure ceiling imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV). It

															"If . . . Congress has both the authority and a compelling
interest to regulate independent expenditures under section 608(e),
surely it can require that there be disclosure to prevent misuse of
the spending channel."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 220 519 F.2d at 869. We have found that §
608(e)(1) unconstitutionally in Page 424 U. S. 76 fringes upon First Amendment rights. [ Footnote 94 ] If the sole function of § 434(e) were to
aid in the enforcement of that provision, it would no longer serve
any governmental purpose.

															But the two provisions are not so intimately tied. The
legislative history on the function of § 434(e) is bare, but it was
clearly intended to stand independently of § 608(e)(1). It was
enacted with the general disclosure provisions in 1971 as part of
the original Act, [ Footnote
95 ] while § 608(e)(1) was part of the 1974 amendments.
[ Footnote 96 ] Like the other
disclosure provisions, § 434(e) could play a role in the
enforcement of the expanded contribution and expenditure
limitations included in the 1974 amendments, but it also has
independent functions. Section 434(e) is part of Congress' effort
to achieve "total disclosure" by reaching "every kind of political
activity" [ Footnote 97 ] in
order to insure that the voters are fully informed and to achieve
through publicity the maximum deterrence to corruption and undue
influence possible. The provision is responsive to the legitimate
fear that efforts would be made, as they had been in the past,
[ Footnote 98 ] to avoid the
disclosure requirements by routing financial support of candidates
through avenues not explicitly covered by the general provisions of
the Act.

															2. Vagueness Problems

															In its effort to be all-inclusive, however, the provision raises
serious problems of vagueness, particularly treacherous where, as
here, the violation of its terms carries criminal penalties
[ Footnote 99 ] and fear of
incurring these sanctions Page 424 U. S. 77 may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment
rights.

															Section 434(e) applies to "[e]very person. . . who makes
contributions or expenditures." "Contributions" and "expenditures"
are defined in parallel provisions in terms of the use of money or
other valuable assets "for the purpose of . . . influencing" the
nomination or election of candidates for federal office. [ Footnote 100 ] It is the ambiguity
of this phrase that poses constitutional problems.

															Due process requires that a criminal statute provide adequate
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated
conduct is illegal, for "no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to
be proscribed." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.
S. 612 , 347 U. S. 617 (1954). See also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972). Where First Amendment rights are involved, an even "greater
degree of specificity" is required. Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. at 415 U. S. 573 . See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.
S. 104 , 408 U. S. 109 (1972); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.
S. 290 (1951).

															There is no legislative history to guide us in determining the
scope of the critical phrase "for the purpose of . . .
influencing." It appears to have been adopted without comment from
earlier disclosure Acts. [ Footnote 101 ] Congress "has voiced its wishes in [most]
muted strains," leaving us to draw upon "those common sense
assumptions that must be made in determining direction without a
compass." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.
S. 397 , 397 U. S. 412 (1970). Where the constitutional requirement of definiteness is at
stake, we have the further obligation to construe the statute, Page 424 U. S. 78 if that can be done consistent with the legislature's purpose,
to avoid the shoals of vagueness. United States v. Harriss,
supra at 347 U. S. 618 ; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. at 345 U. S.
45 .

															In enacting the legislation under review, Congress addressed
broadly the problem of political campaign financing. It wished to
promote full disclosure of campaign-oriented spending to insure
both the reality and the appearance of the purity and openness of
the federal election process. [ Footnote 102 ] Our task is to construe "for the purpose
of . . . influencing," incorporated in § 434(e) through the
definitions of "contributions" and "expenditures," in a manner that
precisely furthers this goal.

															In 424 U. S. we
discussed what constituted a "contribution" for purposes of the
contribution limitations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV). [ Footnote 103 ]
We construed that term to include not only contributions made
directly or indirectly to a candidate, political party, or campaign
committee, and contributions made to other organizations or
individuals but earmarked for political purposes, but also all
expenditures placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a
candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate.
The definition of "contribution" in § 431(e), for disclosure
purposes, parallels the definition in Title 18 almost word for
word, and we construe the former provision as we have the latter.
So defined, "contributions" have a sufficiently close relationship
to the goals of the Act, for they are connected with a candidate or
his campaign.

															When we attempt to define "expenditure" in a similarly narrow
way, we encounter line-drawing problems Page 424 U. S. 79 of the sort we faced in 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp.
IV). Although the phrase, "for the purpose of . . . influencing" an
election or nomination, differs from the language used in §
608(e)(1), it shares the same potential for encompassing both issue
discussion and advocacy of a political result. [ Footnote 104 ] The general requirement
that "political committees" and candidates disclose their
expenditures could raise similar vagueness problems, for "political
committee" is defined only in terms of amount of annual
"contributions" and "expenditures," [ Footnote 105 ] and could be interpreted to reach
groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The lower courts have
construed the words "political committee" more narrowly. [ Footnote 106 ] To fulfill the
purposes of the Act, they need only encompass organizations that
are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which
is the nomination or election of a candidate. Expenditures of
candidates and of "political committees," so construed, can be
assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by
Congress. They are, by definition, campaign-related.

															But when the maker of the expenditure is not within these
categories -- when it is an individual other than a candidate or a
group other than a "political committee" [ Footnote 107 ] Page 424 U. S. 80 -- the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the
Act may be too remote. To insure that the reach of § 434(e) is not
impermissibly broad, we construe "expenditure" for purposes of that
section in the same way we construed the terms of § 608(e) -- to
reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate
[ Footnote 108 ] the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. This reading
is directed precisely to that spending that is unambiguously
related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate.

															In summary, § 434(e), as construed, imposes independent
reporting requirements on individuals and groups that are not
candidates or political committees only in the following
circumstances: (1) when they make contributions earmarked for
political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or his
agent, to some person other than a candidate or political
committee, and (2) when they make expenditures for communications
that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate.

															Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), § 434(e), as
construed, bears a sufficient relationship to a substantial
governmental interest. As narrowed, § 434(e), like § 608(e)(1),
does not reach all partisan discussion, for it only requires
disclosure of those expenditures that expressly advocate a
particular election result. This might have been fatal if the only
purpose of § 434(e) Page 424 U. S. 81 were to stem corruption or its appearance by closing a loophole
in the general disclosure requirements. But the disclosure
provisions, including § 434(e), serve another, informational
interest, and, even as construed, § 434(e) increases the fund of
information concerning those who support the candidates. It goes
beyond the general disclosure requirements to shed the light of
publicity on spending that is unambiguously campaign-related, but
would not otherwise be reported because it takes the form of
independent expenditures or of contributions to an individual or
group not itself required to report the names of its contributors.
By the same token, it is not fatal that § 434(e) encompasses purely
independent expenditures uncoordinated with a particular candidate
or his agent. The corruption potential of these expenditures may be
significantly different, but the informational interest can be as
strong as it is in coordinated spending, for disclosure helps
voters to define more of the candidates' constituencies.

															Section 434(e), as we have construed it, does not contain the
infirmities of the provisions before the Court in Talley v.
California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960), and Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 (1945). The ordinance found wanting in Talley forbade all distribution of handbills that did not
contain the name of the printer, author, or manufacturer, and the
name of the distributor. The city urged that the ordinance was
aimed at identifying those responsible for fraud, false
advertising, and libel, but the Court found that it was "in no
manner so limited." 362 U.S. at 362 U. S. 64 .
Here, as we have seen, the disclosure requirement is narrowly
limited to those situations where the information sought has a
substantial connection with the governmental interests sought to be
advanced. Thomas held unconstitutional a prior restraint
in the form of a registration requirement for labor organizers. Page 424 U. S. 82 The Court found the State's interest insufficient to justify the
restrictive effect of the statute. The burden imposed by § 434(e)
is no prior restraint, but a reasonable and minimally restrictive
method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic
processes of our federal election system to public view. [ Footnote 109 ] D. Thresholds Appellants' third contention, based on alleged overbreadth, is
that the monetary thresholds in the recordkeeping and reporting
provisions lack a substantial nexus with the claimed governmental
interests, for the amounts involved are too low even to attract the
attention of the candidate, much less have a corrupting
influence.

															The provisions contain two thresholds. Records are to be kept by
political committees of the names and addresses of those who make
contributions in excess of $10, § 432(c)(2), and these records are
subject to Commission audit, § 438(a)(8). If a person's
contributions to a committee or candidate aggregate more than $100,
his name and address, as well as his occupation and principal place
of business, are to be included in reports filed by committees and
candidates with the Commission, § 434(b)(2), and made available for
public inspection, § 438(a)(4).

															The Court of Appeals rejected appellants' contention that these
thresholds are unconstitutional. It found the challenge on First
Amendment grounds to the $10 threshold to be premature, for it
could "discern no basis in the statute for authorizing disclosure
outside the Commission . . . ; Page 424 U. S. 83 and hence no substantial inhibitory effect' operating upon"
appellants. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 216, 519 F.2d at 865. The $100
threshold was found to be within the "reasonable latitude" given
the legislature "as to where to draw the line." Ibid. We
agree. The $10 and $100 thresholds are indeed low. Contributors of
relatively small amounts are likely to be especially sensitive to
recording or disclosure of their political preferences. These
strict requirements may well discourage participation by some
citizens in the political process, a result that Congress hardly
could have intended. Indeed, there is little in the legislative
history to indicate that Congress focused carefully on the
appropriate level at which to require recording and disclosure.
Rather, it seems merely to have adopted the thresholds existing in
similar disclosure laws since 1910. [ Footnote 110 ] But we cannot require Congress to
establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold. The
line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the context
of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. We cannot
say, on this bare record, that the limits designated are wholly
without rationality. [ Footnote 111 ]

															We are mindful that disclosure serves informational functions,
as well as the prevention of corruption and the enforcement of the
contribution limitations. Congress is not required to set a
threshold that is tailored only to the latter goals. In addition,
the enforcement Page 424 U. S. 84 goal can never be well served if the threshold is so high that
disclosure becomes equivalent to admitting violation of the
contribution limitations.

															The $10 recordkeeping threshold, in a somewhat similar fashion,
facilitates the enforcement of the disclosure provisions by making
it relatively difficult to aggregate secret contributions in
amounts that surpass the $100 limit. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that there is no warrant for assuming that public
disclosure of contributions between $10 and $100 is authorized by
the Act. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether
information concerning gifts of this size can be made available to
the public without trespassing impermissibly on First Amendment
rights. Cf. California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
at 416 U. S. 56 -57.
[ Footnote 112 ]

															In summary, we find no constitutional infirmities in the
recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provisions of the Act.
[ Footnote 113 ] Page 424 U. S. 85 III . PUBLIC FINANCING OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

															A series of statutes [ Footnote 114 ] for the public financing of Presidential
election campaigns produced the scheme now found in § 6096 and
Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Page 424 U. S. 86 Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6096, 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV). [ Footnote 115 ]
Both the District Court, 401
F. Supp. 1235 , and the Court of Appeals, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at
229-238, 519 F.2d at 878-887, sustained Subtitle H against a
constitutional attack. [ Footnote 116 ] Appellants renew their challenge here,
contending that the legislation violates the First and Fifth
Amendments. We find no merit in their claims and affirm. A. Summary of Subtitle H Section 9006 establishes a Presidential Election Campaign Fund
(Fund), financed from general revenues in the aggregate amount
designated by individual taxpayers, under § 6096, who on their
income tax returns may authorize payment to the Fund of one dollar
of their tax liability in the case of an individual return or two
dollars in the case of a joint return. The Fund consists of three
separate accounts to finance (1) party nominating conventions, §
9008(a), (2) general election campaigns, § 9006(a), and (3) primary
campaigns, § 9037(a). [ Footnote 117 ] Page 424 U. S. 87 Chapter 95 of Title 26 which concerns financing of party
nominating conventions and general election campaigns,
distinguishes among "major," "minor," and "new" parties. A major
party is defined as a party whose candidate for President in the
most recent election received 25% or more of the popular vote. §
9002(6). A minor party is defined as a party whose candidate
received at least 5% but less than 25% of the vote at the most
recent election. § 9002(7). All other parties are new parties, §
9002(8), including both newly created parties and those receiving
less than 5% of the vote in the last election. [ Footnote 118 ]

															Major parties are entitled to $2,000,000 to defray their
national committee Presidential nominating convention expenses,
must limit total expenditures to that amount, § 9008(d), [ Footnote 119 ] and may not use any
of this money to benefit a particular candidate or delegate, §
9008(c). Page 424 U. S. 88 A minor party receives a portion of the major party entitlement
determined by the ratio of the votes received by the party's
candidate in the last election to the average of the votes received
by the major parties' candidates. § 9008(b)(2). The amounts given
to the parties and the expenditure limit are adjusted for
inflation, using 1974 as the base year. § 9008(b)(5). No financing
is provided for new parties, nor is there any express provision for
financing independent candidates or parties not holding a
convention.

															For expenses in the general election campaign, § 9004(a)(1)
entitles each major party candidate to $20,000,000. [ Footnote 120 ] This amount is also
adjusted for inflation. See § 9004(a)(1). To be eligible
for funds the candidate [ Footnote 121 ] must pledge not to incur expenses in
excess of the entitlement under § 9004(a)(1) and not to accept
private contributions except to the extent that the fund is
insufficient to provide the full entitlement. § 9003(b). Minor
party candidates are also entitled to funding, again based on the
ratio of the vote received by the party's candidate in the
preceding election to the average of the major party candidates. §
9004(a)(2)(A). Minor party candidates must certify that they will
not incur campaign expenses in excess of the major party
entitlement and Page 424 U. S. 89 that they will accept private contributions only to the extent
needed to make up the difference between that amount and the public
funding grant. § 9003(c). New party candidates receive no money
prior to the general election, but any candidate receiving 5% or
more of the popular vote in the election is entitled to
post-election payments according to the formula applicable to minor
party candidates. § 9004(a)(3). Similarly, minor party candidates
are entitled to post-election funds if they receive a greater
percentage of the average major party vote than their party's
candidate did in the preceding election; the amount of such
payments is the difference between the entitlement based on the
preceding election and that based on the actual vote in the current
election. § 9004(a)(3). A further eligibility requirement for minor
and new party candidates is that the candidate's name must appear
on the ballot, or electors pledged to the candidate must be on the
ballot, in at least 10 States. § 9002(2)(b).

															Chapter 96 establishes a third account in the Fund, the
Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account. § 9037(a). This
funding is intended to aid campaigns by candidates seeking
Presidential nomination "by a political party," § 9033(b)(2), in
"primary elections," § 9032(7). [ Footnote 122 ] The threshold eligibility requirement is
that the candidate raise at least $5,000 in each of 20 States,
counting only the first $250 from each person contributing to the
candidate. §§ 9033(b)(3), (4). In addition, the candidate must
agree to abide by the spending limits in § 9035. See §
9033(b)(1). [ Footnote
123 ] Funding is Page 424 U. S. 90 provided according to a matching formula: each qualified
candidate is entitled to a sum equal to the total private
contributions received, disregarding contributions from any person
to the extent that total contributions to the candidate by that
person exceed $250. § 9034(a). Payments to any candidate under
Chapter 96 may not exceed 50% of the over-all expenditure ceiling
accepted by the candidate. § 9034(b). B. Constitutionality of Subtitle H Appellants argue that Subtitle H is invalid (1) as "contrary to
the general welfare,'" Art. I, § 8, (2) because any scheme of
public financing of election campaigns is inconsistent with the
First Amendment, and (3) because Subtitle H invidiously
discriminates against certain interests in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We find no merit in these
contentions. Appellants' "general welfare" contention erroneously treats the
General Welfare Clause as a limitation upon congressional power. It
is rather a grant of power, the scope of which is quite expansive,
particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Necessary
and Proper Clause. M'Culloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 420 (1819). Congress has power to regulate Presidential elections and
primaries, United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299 (1941); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934); and public financing of Presidential elections as a means
to reform the electoral process was clearly a choice within the
granted power. It is for Congress to decide which expenditures will
promote the general welfare:

															"[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public
moneys for public purposes is not Page 424 U. S. 91 limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution." United States v. Butler, 297 U. S.
1 , 297 U. S. 66 (1936). See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.
S. 619 , 301 U. S.
640 -641 (1937). Any limitations upon the exercise of
that granted power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution. In
this case, Congress was legislating for the "general welfare" -- to
reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our
political process, to facilitate communication by candidates with
the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of
fundraising. See S.Rep. No. 9689, pp. 1-10 (1974). Whether
the chosen means appear "bad," "unwise," or "unworkable" to us is
irrelevant; Congress has concluded that the means are "necessary
and proper" to promote the general welfare, and we thus decline to
find this legislation without the grant of power in Art. I, §
8.

															Appellants' challenge to the dollar check-off provision (§ 6096)
fails for the same reason. They maintain that Congress is required
to permit taxpayers to designate particular candidates or parties
as recipients of their money. But the appropriation to the Fund in
§ 9006 is like any other appropriation from the general revenue
except that its amount is determined by reference to the aggregate
of the one- and two-dollar authorization on taxpayers' income tax
returns. This detail does not constitute the appropriation any less
an appropriation by Congress. [ Footnote 124 ] The fallacy of appellants' argument is
therefore apparent; Page 424 U. S. 92 every appropriation made by Congress uses public money in a
manner to which some taxpayers object. [ Footnote 125 ] Appellants next argue that, "by
analogy" to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, public
financing of election campaigns, however meritorious, violates the
First Amendment. We have, of course, held that the Religion Clauses
-- "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" -- require
Congress, and the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, to
remain neutral in matters of religion. E.g., Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S.
222 -226 (1963). The government may not aid one religion
to the detriment of others or impose a burden on one religion that
is not imposed on others, and may not even aid all religions. E.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 15 -16
(1947). See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 96 (1961). But the analogy is patently
inapplicable to our issue here. Although "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,"
Subtitle H is a congressional effort not to abridge, restrict, or
censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
enlarge public Page 424 U. S. 93 discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals
vital to a self-governing people. [ Footnote 126 ] Thus, Subtitle H furthers, not abridges,
pertinent First Amendment values. [ Footnote 127 ] Appellants argue, however, that as
constructed public financing invidiously discriminates in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. We turn therefore to that argument.

															Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment. Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 , 420 U. S. 638 n. 2 (1975), and cases cited. In several situations concerning the
electoral process, the principle has been Page 424 U. S. 94 developed that restrictions on access to the electoral process
must survive exacting scrutiny. The restriction can be sustained
only if it furthers a "vial" governmental interest, American
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 , 415 U. S.
780 -781 (1974), that is

															"achieved by a means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily
burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's
equally important interest in the continued availability of
political opportunity." Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 , 415 U. S. 716 (1974). See American Party of Texas v. White, supra, at 415 U. S. 780 ; Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724 , 415 U. S.
729 -730 (1974). These cases, however, dealt primarily
with state laws requiring a candidate to satisfy certain
requirements in order to have his name appear on the ballot. These
were, of course, direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability
to run for office, but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary
issues. In contrast, the denial of public financing to some
Presidential candidates is not restrictive of voters' rights and
less restrictive of candidates'. [ Footnote 128 ] Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate
from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote for the
candidate of his choice; the inability, if any, of minor party
candidates to wage effective campaigns will derive not from lack of
public funding but from their inability to Page 424 U. S. 95 raise private contributions. Any disadvantage suffered by
operation of the eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus
limited to the claimed denial of the enhancement of opportunity to
communicate with the electorate that the formulae afford eligible
candidates. But eligible candidates suffer a countervailing denial.
As we more fully develop later, acceptance of public financing
entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure ceiling. Noneligible
candidates are not subject to that limitation. [ Footnote 129 ] Accordingly, we conclude
that public financing is generally less restrictive of access to
the electoral process than the ballot-access regulations dealt with
in prior cases. [ Footnote
130 ] In any event, Congress enacted Subtitle H in furtherance
of sufficiently important governmental interests and has Page 424 U. S. 96 not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political opportunity
of any party or candidate.

															It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a means of
eliminating the improper influence of large private contributions
furthers a significant governmental interest. S.Rep. No. 93-689,
pp. 4-5 (1974). In addition, the limits on contributions
necessarily increase the burden of fundraising, and Congress
properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of
relieving major party Presidential candidates from the rigors of
soliciting private contributions. See id. at 5. The States
have also been held to have important interests in limiting places
on the ballot to those candidates who demonstrate substantial
popular support. E.g., Storer v. Brown, supra at 415 U. S. 736 ; Lubin v. Panish, supra at 415 U. S.
718 -719; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.
S. 431 , 403 U. S. 442 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 31 -33.
Congress' interest in not funding hopeless candidacies with large
sums of public money, S.Rep. No. 93-689, supra at 7,
necessarily justifies the withholding of public assistance from
candidates without significant public support. Thus, Congress may
legitimately require "some preliminary showing of a significant
modicum of support," Jenness v. Fortson, supra at 403 U. S. 442 ,
as an eligibility requirement for public funds. This requirement
also serves the important public interest against providing
artificial incentives to "splintered parties and unrestrained
factionalism." Storer v. Brown, supra at 415 U. S. 736 ;
S.Rep. No. 93-689, supra at 8; H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 13
(1974). Cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 , 405 U. S. 145 (1972).

															At the same time Congress recognized the constitutional
restraints against inhibition of the present opportunity of minor
parties to become major political entities if they obtain
widespread support. S.Rep. No. 93-689, supra at 424 U. S. 8 -10;
H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, supra, at 13. As Page 424 U. S. 97 the Court of Appeals said,

															"provisions for public funding of Presidential campaigns . . .
could operate to give an unfair advantage to established parties,
thus reducing, to the nation's detriment, . . . the 'potential
fluidity of American political life.'"

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 231, 519 F.2d at 880, quoting from Jenness v. Fortson, supra at 403 U. S.
439 .

															1. General Election Campaign Financing

															Appellants insist that Chapter 95 falls short of the
constitutional requirement in that its provisions supply larger,
and equal, sums to candidates of major parties, use prior vote
levels as the sole criterion for pre-election funding, limit new
party candidates to post-election funds, and deny any funds to
candidates of parties receiving less than 5% of the vote. These
provisions, it is argued, are fatal to the validity of the scheme,
because they work invidious discrimination against minor and new
parties in violation of the Fifth Amendment. We disagree. [ Footnote 131 ]

															As conceded by appellants, the Constitution does not require
Congress to treat all declared candidates the same for public
financing purposes. As we said in Jenness v. Fortson, "there are obvious differences in kind between the needs and
potentials of a political party with historically established broad
support, on the one hand, and a new or small political organization
on the other. . . . Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie
in treating Page 424 U. S. 98 things that are different as though they were exactly alike, a
truism well illustrated in Williams v. Rhodes, supra. "

															403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
441 -442. Since the Presidential elections of 1856 and
1860, when the Whigs were replaced as a major party by the
Republicans, no third party has posed a credible threat to the two
major parties in Presidential elections. [ Footnote 132 ] Third parties have been
completely incapable of matching the major parties' ability to
raise money and win elections. Congress was, of course, aware of
this fact of American life, and thus was justified in providing
both major parties full funding and all other parties only a
percentage of the major party entitlement. [ Footnote 133 ] Identical treatment of all
parties, on the other hand, "would not only make it easy to raid
the United States Treasury, it would also artificially foster the
proliferation of splinter parties." 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 231, 519
F.2d at 881. The Constitution does not require the Government to
"finance the efforts of every nascent political group," American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 794 ,
merely because Congress chose to finance the efforts of the major
parties.

															Furthermore, appellants have made no showing that Page 424 U. S. 99 the election funding plan disadvantages nonmajor parties by
operating to reduce their strength below that attained without any
public financing. First, such parties are free to raise money from
private sources, [ Footnote
134 ] and, by our holding today, new parties are freed from any
expenditure limits, although admittedly those limits may be a
largely academic matter to them. But since any major party
candidate accepting public financing of a campaign voluntarily
assents to a spending ceiling, other candidates will be able to
spend more in relation to the major party candidates. The relative
position of minor parties that do qualify to receive some public
funds because they received 5% of the vote in the previous
Presidential election is also enhanced. Public funding for
candidates of major parties is intended as a substitute for private
contributions; but for minor party candidates [ Footnote 135 ] such assistance may be
viewed as a supplement to private contributions since these
candidates may continue to solicit private funds up to the
applicable spending limit. Thus, we conclude that the general
election funding system does not work an invidious discrimination
against candidates of nonmajor parties.

															Appellants challenge reliance on the vote in past elections as
the basis for determining eligibility. That challenge is
foreclosed, however, by our holding in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
439 -440, that popular vote totals in the last election
are a proper measure of public support. Page 424 U. S. 100 And Congress was not obliged to select instead from among
appellants' suggested alternatives. Congress could properly regard
the means chosen as preferable, since the alternative of petition
drives presents cost and administrative problems in validating
signatures, and the alternative of opinion polls might be thought
inappropriate, since it would involve a Government agency in the
business of certifying polls or conducting its own investigation of
support for various candidates, in addition to serious problems
with reliability. [ Footnote
136 ]

															Appellants next argue, relying on the ballot access decisions of
this Court, that the absence of any alternative means of obtaining
pre-election funding renders the scheme unjustifiably restrictive
of minority political interests. Appellants' reliance on the ballot
access decisions is misplaced. To be sure, the regulation sustained
in Jenness v. Fortson, for example, incorporated
alternative means of qualifying for the ballot, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 440 ,
and the lack of an alternative was a defect in the scheme struck
down in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 718 .
To Page 424 U. S. 101 suggest, however, that the constitutionality of Subtitle H
therefore hinges solely on whether some alternative is afforded
overlooks the rationale of the operative constitutional principles.
Our decisions finding a need for an alternative means turn on the
nature and extent of the burden imposed in the absence of available
alternatives. We have earlier stated our view that Chapter 95 is
far less burdensome upon and restrictive of constitutional rights
than the regulations involved in the ballot access cases. See
supra at 424 U. S. 94 -95.
Moreover, expenditure limits for major parties and candidates may
well improve the chances of nonmajor parties and their candidates
to receive funds and increase their spending. Any risk of harm to
minority interests is speculative due to our present lack of
knowledge of the practical effects of public financing and cannot
overcome the force of the governmental interests against use of
public money to foster frivolous candidacies, create a system of
splintered parties, and encourage unrestrained factionalism.

															Appellants' reliance on the alternative means analyses of the
ballot access cases generally fails to recognize a significant
distinction from the instant case. The primary goal of all
candidates is to carry on a successful campaign by communicating to
the voters persuasive reasons for electing them. In some of the
ballot access cases, the States afforded candidates alternative
means for qualifying for the ballot, a step in any campaign that,
with rare exceptions, is essential to successful effort. Chapter 95
concededly provides only one method of obtaining pre-election
financing; such funding is, however, not as necessary as being on
the ballot. See n 128, supra. Plainly, campaigns can be
successfully carried out by means other than public financing; they
have been up to this date, and this avenue is still open to all
candidates. And, after all, the important achievements of
minority Page 424 U. S. 102 political groups in furthering the development of American
democracy [ Footnote 137 ]
were accomplished without the help of public funds. Thus, the
limited participation or nonparticipation of nonmajor parties or
candidates in public funding does not unconstitutionally
disadvantage them.

															Of course, nonmajor parties and their candidates may qualify for
post-election participation in public funding and in that sense the
claimed discrimination is not total. Appellants contend, however
that the benefit of any such participation is illusory due to §
9004(c), which bars the use of the money for any purpose other than
paying campaign expenses or repaying loans that had been used to
defray such expenses. The only meaningful use for post-election
funds is thus to repay loans; but loans, except from national
banks, are "contributions" subject to the general limitations on
contributions, 18 U.S.C. § 591(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Further,
they argue, loans are not readily available to nonmajor parties or
candidates before elections to finance their campaigns.
Availability of post-election funds therefore assertedly gives them
nothing. But, in the nature of things, the willingness of lenders
to make loans will depend upon the pre-election probability that
the candidate and his party will attract 5% or more of the voters.
When a reasonable prospect of such support appears, the party and
candidate may be an acceptable loan risk, since the prospect of
post-election participation in public funding will be good.
[ Footnote 138 ] Page 424 U. S. 103 Finally, appellants challenge the validity of the 50% threshold
requirement for general election funding. They argue that, since
most state regulations governing ballot access have threshold
requirements well below 50%, and because, in their view, the 50%
requirement here is actually stricter than that upheld in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431 (1971), [ Footnote 139 ]
the requirement is unreasonable. We have already concluded that the
restriction under Chapter 95 is generally less burdensome than
ballot access regulations. Supra at 424 U. S. 94 -95.
Further, the Georgia provision sustained in Jenness required the candidate to obtain the signatures of 70% of all
eligible voters, without regard to party. To be sure, the public
funding formula does not permit anyone who voted for another party
in the last election to be part of a candidate's 5%. But, under
Chapter 95, a Presidential candidate needs only 5% or more of the
actual vote, not the larger universe of eligible voters. As a
result, we cannot say that Chapter 95 is numerically more, or less,
restrictive than the regulation in Jenness. In any event,
the choice of the percentage requirement that best accommodates the
competing interests involved was for Congress to make. See
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S.
32 , 277 U. S. 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); n 111, supra. Without any doubt, a range of
formulations would sufficiently protect the public fisc and not
foster factionalism, and would also recognize the public interest
in the fluidity of our political Page 424 U. S. 104 affairs: we cannot say that Congress' choice falls without the
permissible range. [ Footnote
140 ]

															2. Nominating Convention Financing

															The foregoing analysis and reasoning sustaining general election
funding apply in large part to convention funding under Chapter 95
and suffice to support our rejection of appellants' challenge to
these provisions. Funding of party conventions has increasingly
been derived from large private contributions, see H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 14 (1974), and the governmental interest
in eliminating this reliance is as vital as in the case of private
contributions to individual candidates. The expenditure limitations
on major parties participating in public financing enhance the
ability of nonmajor parties to increase their spending relative to
the major parties; further, in soliciting private contributions to
finance conventions, parties are not subject to the $1,000
contribution limit pertaining to candidates. [ Footnote 141 ] We therefore conclude that
appellants' constitutional challenge to the Page 424 U. S. 105 provisions for funding nominating conventions must also be
rejected.

															3. Primary Election Campaign Financing

															Appellants' final challenge is to the constitutionality of
Chapter 96, which provides funding of primary campaigns. They
contend that these provisions are constitutionally invalid (1)
because they do not provide funds for candidates not running in
party primaries [ Footnote
142 ] and (2) because the eligibility formula actually increases
the influence of money on the electoral process. In not providing
assistance to candidates who do not enter party primaries, Congress
has merely chosen to limit at this time the reach of the reforms
encompassed in Chapter 96. This Congress could do without
constituting the reforms a constitutionally invidious
discrimination. The governing principle was stated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 , 384 U. S. 657 (1966):

															"[I]n deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations
in such a reform measure, we are guided by the familiar principles
that a 'statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it
might have gone farther than it did,' Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S.
337 , 279 U. S. 339 , that a
legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S.
608 , 294 U. S. 610 , and that
'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483 , 348 U. S. 489 . [ Footnote 143 ] Page 424 U. S. 106 The choice to limit matching funds to candidates running in
primaries may reflect that concern about large private
contributions to candidates centered on primary races and that
there is no historical evidence of similar abuses involving
contributions to candidates who engage in petition drives to
qualify for state ballots. Moreover, assistance to candidates and
nonmajor parties forced to resort to petition drives to gain ballot
access implicates the policies against fostering frivolous
candidacies, creating a system of splintered parties, and
encouraging unrestrained factionalism."

															The eligibility requirements in Chapter 96 are surely not an
unreasonable way to measure popular support for a candidate,
accomplishing the objective of limiting subsidization to those
candidates with a substantial chance of being nominated. Counting
only the first $250 of each contribution for eligibility purposes
requires candidates to solicit smaller contributions from numerous
people. Requiring the money to come from citizens of a minimum
number of States eliminates candidates whose appeal is limited
geographically; a President is elected not by popular vote, but by
winning the popular vote in enough States to have a majority in the
Electoral College. [ Footnote
144 ] Page 424 U. S. 107 We also reject as without merit appellants' argument that the
matching formula favors wealthy voters and candidates. The thrust
of the legislation is to reduce financial barriers [ Footnote 145 ] and to enhance the
importance of smaller contributions. [ Footnote 146 ] Some candidates undoubtedly could raise
large sums of money, and thus have little need for public funds,
but candidates with lesser fundraising capabilities will gain
substantial benefits from matching funds. In addition, one
eligibility requirement for Page 424 U. S. 108 matching funds is acceptance of an expenditure ceiling, and
candidates with little fundraising ability will be able to increase
their spending relative to candidates capable of raising large
amounts in private funds.

															For the reasons stated, we reject appellants' claims that
Subtitle H is facially unconstitutional. [ Footnote 147 ] C. Severability The only remaining issue is whether our holdings invalidating 18
U.S.C. §§ 608(a), (c), and ()(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) require the
conclusion that Subtitle H is unconstitutional. There is, of
course, a relationship between the spending limits in § 608(c) and
the public financing provisions; the expenditure limits accepted by
a candidate to be eligible for public funding are identical to the
limits in § 608(c). But we have no difficulty in concluding that
Subtitle H is severable.

															"Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have
enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently
of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is
left is fully operative as a law." Champlin Page 424 U. S. 109 Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.
S. 210 , 286 U. S. 234 (1932). Our discussion of "what is left" leaves no doubt that the
value of public financing is not dependent on the existence of a
generally applicable expenditure limit. We therefore hold Subtitle
H severable from those portions of the legislation today held
constitutionally infirm. IV . THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

															The 1974 amendments to the Act create an eight-member Federal
Election Commission (Commission) and vest in it primary and
substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act.
The question that we address in this portion of the opinion is
whether, in view of the manner in which a majority of its members
are appointed, the Commission may, under the Constitution, exercise
the powers conferred upon it. We find it unnecessary to parse the
complex statutory provisions in order to sketch the full sweep of
the Commission's authority. It will suffice for present purposes to
describe what appear to be representative examples of its various
powers.

															Chapter 14 of Title 2. [ Footnote 148 ] makes the Commission the principal
repository of the numerous reports and statements which are
required by that chapter to be filed by those engaging in the
regulated political activities. Its duties under § 438(a) with
respect to these reports and statements include filing and
indexing, making them available for public inspection,
preservation, and auditing and field investigations. It is directed
to "serve as a national clearinghouse for information in respect to
the administration of elections." § 438(b). Page 424 U. S. 110 Beyond these recordkeeping, disclosure, and investigative
functions, however, the Commission is given extensive rulemaking
and adjudicative powers. Its duty under § 438(a)(10) is "to
prescribe suitable rules and regulations to carry out the
provisions of . . . chapter [14]." Under § 437d(a)(8), the
Commission is empowered to make such rules "as are necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act." [ Footnote 149 ] Section 437d(a)(9) authorizes it to
"formulate general policy with respect to the administration of
this Act" and enumerated sections of Title 18's Criminal Code,
[ Footnote 150 ] as to all
of which provisions the Commission "has primary jurisdiction with
respect to [their] civil enforcement." § 437c(b). [ Footnote 151 ] The Commission is
authorized under § 437f(a) to render advisory opinions with respect
to activities possibly violating the Act, the Title 18 sections, or
the campaign funding provisions of Title 26, [ Footnote 152 ] the effect of which is that,

															"[n]otwithstanding Page 424 U. S. 111 any other provision of law, any person with respect to whom an
advisory opinion is rendered . . . who acts in good faith in
accordance with the provisions and findings [thereof] shall be
presumed to be in compliance with the [statutory provision] with
respect to which such advisory opinion is rendered."

															§ 437f(b). In the course of administering the provisions for
Presidential campaign financing, the Commission may authorize
convention expenditures which exceed the statutory limits. 26
U.S.C. § 9008(d)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															The Commission's enforcement power is both direct and
wide-ranging. It may institute a civil action for (i) injunctive or
other relief against "any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of this Act," § 437g(a)(5); (ii)
declaratory or injunctive relief "as may be appropriate to
implement or con[s]true any provisions" of Chapter 95 of Title 26,
governing administration of funds for Presidential election
campaigns and national party conventions, 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV); and (iii) "such injunctive relief as is
appropriate to implement any provision" of Chapter 96 of Title 26,
governing the payment of matching funds for Presidential primary
campaigns, 26 U.S.C. § 9040(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). If, after the
Commission's post-disbursement audit of candidates receiving
payments under Chapter 95 or 96, it finds an overpayment, it is
empowered to seek repayment of all funds due the Secretary of the
Treasury. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(b), 9040(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). In no
respect do the foregoing civil actions require the concurrence of
or participation by the Attorney General; conversely, the decision
not to seek judicial relief in the above respects would appear to
rest solely with the Commission. [ Footnote 153 ] With respect to the Page 424 U. S. 112 referenced Title 18 sections, § 437g(a)(7) provides that, if,
after notice and opportunity for a hearing before it, the
Commission finds an actual or threatened criminal violation, the
Attorney General, "upon request by the Commission . . . , shall
institute a civil action for relief." Finally, as "[a]dditional
enforcement authority," § 456(a) authorizes the Commission, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, to make "a finding that a
person . . . while a candidate for Federal office, failed to file"
a required report of contributions or expenditures. If that finding
is made within the applicable limitations period Page 424 U. S. 113 for prosecutions, the candidate is thereby

															"disqualified from becoming a candidate in any future election
for Federal office for a period of time beginning on the date of
such finding and ending one year after the expiration of the term
of the Federal office for which such person was a candidate.
[ Footnote 154 ]"

															The body in which this authority is reposed consists of eight
members. [ Footnote 155 ]
The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives are ex officio members of the Commission
without the right to vote. Two members are appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate "upon the
recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate and the
minority leader of the Senate." [ Footnote 156 ] Two more are to be appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, likewise upon the
recommendations of its respective majority and minority leaders.
The remaining two members are appointed by the President. Each of
the six voting members of the Commission must be confirmed by the
majority of both Houses of Congress, and each of the three
appointing authorities is forbidden to choose both of their
appointees from the same political party. A. Ripeness Appellants argue that given the Commission's extensive powers
the method of choosing its members under § 437c(a)(1) runs afoul of
the separation of powers embedded in the Constitution, and urge
that, as presently constituted, the Commission's "existence be held
unconstitutional by this Court." Before embarking on this or
any Page 424 U. S. 114 related inquiry, however, we must decide whether these issues
are properly before us. Because of the Court of Appeals' emphasis
on lack of "ripeness" of the issue relating to the method of
appointment of the members of the Commission, we find it necessary
to focus particularly on that consideration in this section of our
opinion.

															We have recently recognized the distinction between
jurisdictional limitations imposed by Art. III and "[p]roblems of
prematurity and abstractness" that may prevent adjudication in all
but the exceptional case. Socialist Labor Party v.
Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 , 406 U. S. 588 (1972). In Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 , 419 U. S. 140 (1974), we stated that "ripeness is peculiarly a question of
timing," and therefore the passage of months between the time of
the decision of the Court of Appeals and our present ruling is, of
itself, significant. We likewise observed in the Reorganization
Act Cases: "Thus, occurrence of the conveyance allegedly violative of Fifth
Amendment rights is in no way hypothetical or speculative. Where
the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain
individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a
justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the
disputed provisions will come into effect." Id. at 419 U. S.
143 .

															The Court of Appeals held that of the five specific certified
questions directed at the Commission's authority, only its powers
to render advisory opinions and to authorize excessive convention
expenditures were ripe for adjudication. The court held that the
remaining aspects of the Commission's authority could not be
adjudicated, because, "[in] its present stance, this litigation
does not present the court with the concrete facts that are
necessary Page 424 U. S. 115 to an informed decision." [ Footnote 157 ] 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 244, 519 F.2d at
893.

															Since the entry of judgment by the Court of Appeals, Page 424 U. S. 116 the Commission has undertaken to issue rules and regulations
under the authority of § 438(a)(10). While many of its other
functions remain as yet unexercised, the date of their all but
certain exercise is now closer Page 424 U. S. 117 by several months than it was at the time the Court of Appeals
ruled. Congress was understandably most concerned with obtaining a
final adjudication of as many issues as possible litigated pursuant
to the provisions of § 437h. Thus, in order to decide the basic
question whether the Act's provision for appointment of the members
of the Commission violates the Constitution, we believe we are
warranted in considering all of those aspects of the Commission's
authority which have been presented by the certified questions.
[ Footnote 158 ]

															Party litigants with sufficient concrete interests at stake may
have standing to raise constitutional questions of separation of
powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their
rights. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.
S. 389 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.
S. 433 (1939). In Glidden, of course, the
challenged adjudication had already taken place, whereas in this
case appellants' claim is of impending future rulings and
determinations by the Commission. But this is a question of
ripeness, rather than lack of case or controversy under Art. III,
and, for the reasons to which we have previously Page 424 U. S. 118 adverted we hold that appellants' claims as they bear upon the
method of appointment of the Commission's members may be presently
adjudicated. B. The Merits Appellants urge that, since Congress has given the Commission
wide-ranging rulemaking and enforcement powers with respect to the
substantive provisions of the Act, Congress is precluded under the
principle of separation of powers from vesting in itself the
authority to appoint those who will exercise such authority. Their
argument is based on the language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the
Constitution, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

															"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments."

															Appellants' argument is that this provision is the exclusive
method by which those charged with executing the laws of the United
States may be chosen. Congress, they assert, cannot have it both
ways. If the Legislature wishes the Commission to exercise all of
the conferred powers, then its members are, in fact, "Officers of
the United States," and must be appointed under the Appointments
Clause. But if Congress insists upon retaining the power to
appoint, then the members of the Commission may not discharge those
many functions of the Commission which can be performed only by
"Officers of Page 424 U. S. 119 the United States," as that term must be construed within the
doctrine of separation of powers.

															Appellee Commission and amici in support of the
Commission urge that the Framers of the Constitution, while mindful
of the need for checks and balances among the three branches of the
National Government, had no intention of denying to the Legislative
Branch authority to appoint its own officers. Congress, either
under the Appointments Clause or under its grants of substantive
legislative authority and the Necessary and Proper Clause in Art.
I, is, in their view, empowered to provide for the appointment to
the Commission in the manner which it did because the Commission is
performing "appropriate legislative functions."

															The majority of the Court of Appeals recognized the importance
of the doctrine of separation of powers which is at the heart of
our Constitution, and also recognized the principle enunciated in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 (1928), that the Legislative Branch may not
exercise executive authority by retaining the power to appoint
those who will execute its laws. But it described appellants'
argument based upon Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 as "strikingly
syllogistic," and concluded that Congress had sufficient authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I of the Constitution
not only to establish the Commission but to appoint the
Commission's members. As we have earlier noted, it upheld the
constitutional validity of congressional vesting of certain
authority in the Commission, and concluded that the question of the
constitutional validity of the vesting of its remaining functions
was not yet ripe for review. The three dissenting judges in the
Court of Appeals concluded that the method of appointment for the
Commission did violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Page 424 U. S. 120 We do not think appellants' arguments based upon Art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, of the Constitution may be so easily dismissed as did the
majority of the Court of Appeals. Our inquiry, of necessity,
touches upon the fundamental principles of the Government
established by the Framers of the Constitution, and all litigants
and all of the courts which have addressed themselves to the matter
start on common ground in the recognition of the intent of the
Framers that the powers of the three great branches of the National
Government be largely separate from one another.

															James Madison, writing in the Federalist No. 47, [ Footnote 159 ] defended the work
of the Framers against the charge that these three governmental
powers were not entirely separate from one another in the proposed
Constitution. He asserted that, while there was some admixture, the
Constitution was nonetheless true to Montesquieu's well known maxim
that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments ought to
be separate and distinct:

															"The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a
further demonstration of his meaning. 'When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person or body,' says
he,"

															"there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical
manner."

															"Again:"

															"Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control,
for the judge would then be the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with all the violence of an oppressor. "

															"Some of these reasons Page 424 U. S. 121 are more fully explained in other passages; but, briefly stated
as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we
have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
[ Footnote 160 ]"

															Yet it is also clear from the provisions of the Constitution
itself, and from the Federalist Papers, that the Constitution by no
means contemplates total separation of each of these three
essential branches of Government. The President is a participant in
the lawmaking process by virtue of his authority to veto bills
enacted by Congress. The Senate is a participant in the appointive
process by virtue of its authority to refuse to confirm persons
nominated to office by the President. The men who met in
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen,
experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of separation of
powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw that
a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively.

															Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court in Hampton
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928), after stating the general principle of separation of powers
found in the United States Constitution, went on to observe:

															"[T]he rule is that, in the actual administration of the
government, Congress or the Legislature should exercise the
legislative power, the President or the State executive, the
Governor, the executive power, and the Courts or the judiciary the
judicial power, and in carrying out that constitutional division
into three branches, it is a breach of the National fundamental law
if Congress gives up its legislative power Page 424 U. S. 122 and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or
if, by law, it attempts to invest itself or its members with either
executive power or judicial power. This is not to say that the
three branches are not coordinate parts of one government, and that
each, in the field of its duties, may not invoke the action of the
two other branches insofar as the action invoked shall not be an
assumption of the constitutional field of action of another branch.
In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another
branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed
according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental coordination." Id. at 276 U. S.
406 .

															More recently, Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the opinion
and the judgment of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 (1952), succinctly characterized this understanding:

															"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity."

															The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built
into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch
at the expense of the other. As Madison put it in Federalist No.
51:

															"This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the
defect of better motives might be traced through the whole system
of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the Page 424 U. S. 123 several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence
cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers
of the State. [ Footnote
161 ]"

															This Court has not hesitated to enforce the principle of
separation of powers embodied in the Constitution when its
application has proved necessary for the decisions of cases or
controversies properly before it. The Court has held that executive
or administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed
on judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution. United States v.
Ferreira , 13 How. 40 (1852); Hayburn's
Case , 2 Dall. 409 (1792). The Court has held that
the President may not execute and exercise legislative authority
belonging only to Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, supra. In the course of its opinion in that case, the
Court said:

															"In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to
see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he
is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute. The first section of the first article says that
'All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . . .'"

															343 U.S. at 343 U. S.
587 -588. Page 424 U. S. 124 More closely in point to the facts of the present case is this
Court's decision in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 (1928), where the Court held that the legislature of the Philippine
Islands could not provide for legislative appointment to executive
agencies.

															2. The Appointments Clause

															The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract
generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the
document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.
Article I, § 1, declares: "All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." Article II, §
1, vests the executive power "in a President of the United States
of America," and Art. III, § 1, declares that

															"The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."

															The further concern of the Framers of the Constitution with
maintenance of the separation of powers is found in the so-called
"Ineligibility" and "Incompatibility" Clauses contained in Art. I,
§ 6:

															"No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office."

															It is in the context of these cognate provisions of the document
that we must examine the language of Art. II. § 2, cl. 2, which
appellants contend provides the only authorization for appointment
of those to whom substantial executive or administrative authority
is given Page 424 U. S. 125 by statute. Because of the importance of its language, we again
set out the provision:

															"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments."

															The Appointments Clause could, of course, be read as merely
dealing with etiquette or protocol in describing "Officers of the
United States," but the drafters had a less frivolous purpose in
mind. This conclusion is supported by language from United
States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508 , 99 U. S.
509 -510 (1879):

															"The Constitution, for purposes of appointment, very clearly
divides all its officers into two classes. The primary class
requires a nomination by the President and confirmation by the
Senate. But foreseeing that, when offices became numerous, and
sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was
provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially
mentioned, Congress might, by law, vest their appointment in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of
departments. That all persons who can be said to hold an office
under the government about to be established under the Constitution
were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes
of appointment there can be but little doubt. "

															(Emphasis supplied.) We think that the term "Officers of the
United States," Page 424 U. S. 126 as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be
said to hold an office under the government" in United States
v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive
meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is
an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be
appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that
Article.

															If "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the
government about to be established under the Constitution were
intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of
appointment," United States v. Germaine, supra, it is
difficult to see how the members of the Commission may escape
inclusion. If a postmaster first class, Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte
Hennen , 13 Pet. 230 (1839), are inferior officers
of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause,
as they are, surely the Commissioners before us are, at the very
least, such "inferior Officers" within the meaning of that Clause.
[ Footnote 162 ]

															Although two members of the Commission are initially selected by
the President, his nominations are subject to confirmation not
merely by the Senate, but by the House of Representatives as well.
The remaining four voting members of the Commission are appointed
by the President pro tempore of the Senate and by the
Speaker of the House. While the second part of the Clause Page 424 U. S. 127 authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of the officers
described in that part in "the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments," neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro tempore of the Senate comes within this language.

															The phrase "Heads of Departments," used as it is in conjunction
with the phrase "Courts of Law," suggests that the Departments
referred to are themselves in the Executive Branch or at least have
some connection with that branch. While the Clause expressly
authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of certain officers in
the "Courts of Law," the absence of similar language to include
Congress must mean that neither Congress nor its officers were
included within the language "Heads of Departments" in this part of
cl. 2.

															Thus, with respect to four of the six voting members of the
Commission, neither the President, the head of any department, nor
the Judiciary has any voice in their selection.

															The Appointments Clause specifies the method of appointment only
for "Officers of the United States" whose appointment is not
"otherwise provided for" in the Constitution. But there is no
provision of the Constitution remotely providing any alternative
means for the selection of the members of the Commission or for
anybody like them. Appellee Commission has argued, and the Court of
Appeals agreed, that the Appointments Clause of Art. II should not
be read to exclude the "inherent power of Congress" to appoint its
own officers to perform functions necessary to that body as an
institution. But there is no need to read the Appointments Clause
contrary to its plain language in order to reach the result sought
by the Court of Appeals. Article I, § 3, cl. 5, expressly
authorizes the selection of the President pro tempore of
the Senate, and § 2, cl. 5, of that Article provides Page 424 U. S. 128 for the selection of the Speaker of the House. Ranking
nonmembers, such as the Clerk of the House of Representatives, are
elected under the internal rules of each House, [ Footnote 163 ] and are designated by
statute as "officers of the Congress." [ Footnote 164 ] There is no occasion for us to decide
whether any of these member officers are "Officers of the United
States" whose "appointment" is otherwise provided for within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause, since, even if they were such
officers, their appointees would not be. Contrary to the fears
expressed by the majority of the Court of Appeals, nothing in our
holding with respect to Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, will deny to Congress
"all power to appoint its own inferior officers to carry out
appropriate legislative functions." [ Footnote 165 ]

															Appellee Commission and amici contend somewhat
obliquely that, because the Framers had no intention of relegating
Congress to a position below that of the coequal Judicial and
Executive Branches of the National Government, the Appointments
Clause must somehow be read to include Congress or its officers as
among those Page 424 U. S. 129 in whom the appointment power may be vested. But the debates of
the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are
replete with expressions of fear that the Legislative Branch of the
National Government will aggrandize itself at the expense of the
other two branches. [ Footnote
166 ] The debates during the Convention, and the evolution of
the draft version of the Constitution, seem to us to lend
considerable support to our reading of the language of the
Appointments Clause itself.

															An interim version of the draft Constitution had vested in the
Senate the authority to appoint Ambassadors, public Ministers, and
Judges of the Supreme Court, and the language of Art. II as finally
adopted is a distinct change in this regard. We believe that it was
a deliberate change made by the Framers with the intent to deny
Congress any authority itself to appoint those who were "Officers
of the United States." The debates on the floor of the Convention
reflect at least in part the way the change came about.

															On Monday, August 6, 1787, the Committee on Detail to which had
been referred the entire draft of the Constitution reported its
draft to the Convention, including the following two articles that
bear on the question before us: [ Footnote 167 ]

															"Article IX, § 1: 'The Senate of the United States shall have
power . . . to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme
Court.'"

															"Article X, § 2: '[The President] shall commission all Page 424 U. S. 130 the officers of the United States, and shall appoint officers in
all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution.'"

															It will be seen from a comparison of these two articles that the
appointment of Ambassadors and Judges of the Supreme Court was
confided to the Senate, and that the authority to appoint -- not merely nominate, but to actually appoint -- all other
officers was reposed in the President.

															During a discussion of a provision in the same draft from the
Committee on Detail which provided that the "Treasurer" of the
United States should be chosen by both Houses of Congress, Mr Read
moved to strike out that clause, "leaving the appointment of the
Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive."
[ Footnote 168 ] Opposition
to Read's motion was based not on objection to the principle of
executive appointment, but on the particular nature of the office
of the "Treasurer." [ Footnote
169 ]

															On Thursday, August 23, the Convention voted to insert after the
word "Ambassadors" in the text of draft Art. IX the words "and
other public Ministers." Immediately afterwards, the section as
amended was referred to the "Committee of Five." [ Footnote 170 ] The following day, the
Convention took up Art. X. Roger Sherman objected to the draft
language of § 2 because it conferred too much power on the
President, and proposed to insert after the words "not otherwise
provided for by this Constitution" the words "or by law." This
motion was defeated by a vote of nine States to one. [ Footnote 171 ] On September Page 424 U. S. 131 3, the Convention debated the Ineligibility and Incompatibility
Clauses which now appear in Art. I, and made the Ineligibility
Clause somewhat less stringent. [ Footnote 172 ]

															Meanwhile, on Friday, August 31, a motion had been carried
without opposition to refer such parts of the Constitution as had
been postponed or not acted upon to a Committee of Eleven. Such
reference carried with it both Arts. IX and X. The following week,
the Committee of Eleven made its report to the Convention, in which
the present language of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, dealing with the
authority of the President to nominate is found, virtually word for
word, as § 4 of Art. X. [ Footnote 173 ] The same Committee also reported a revised
article concerning the Legislative Branch to the Convention. The
changes are obvious. In the final version, the Senate is shorn of
its power to appoint Ambassadors and Judges of the Supreme Court.
The President is given not the power to appoint public officers of
the United States, but only the right to nominate them, and a
provision is inserted by virtue of which Congress may require
Senate confirmation of his nominees.

															It would seem a fair surmise that a compromise had been made.
But no change was made in the concept of the term "Officers of the
United States," which, since it had first appeared in Art. X, had
been taken by all concerned to embrace all appointed officials
exercising responsibility under the public laws of the Nation.

															Appellee Commission and amici urge that, because of
what they conceive to be the extraordinary authority reposed in
Congress to regulate elections, this case stands on a different
footing than if Congress had exercised its legislative authority in
another field. There is, of course, no doubt that Congress has
express authority to regulate Page 424 U. S. 132 congressional elections, by virtue of the power conferred in
Art. I, § 4. [ Footnote
174 ] This Court has also held that it has very broad authority
to prevent corruption in national Presidential elections. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.
S. 534 (1934). But Congress has plenary authority in all
areas in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, M'Culloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), so long as the
exercise of that authority does not offend some other
constitutional restriction. We see no reason to believe that the
authority of Congress over federal election practices is of such a
wholly different nature from the other grants of authority to
Congress that it may be employed in such a manner as to offend well
established constitutional restrictions stemming from the
separation of powers.

															The position that, because Congress has been given explicit and
plenary authority to regulate a field of activity, it must
therefore have the power to appoint those who are to administer the
regulatory statute is both novel and contrary to the language of
the Appointments Clause. Unless their selection is elsewhere
provided for, all officers of the United States are to be appointed
in accordance with the Clause. Principal officers are selected by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior
officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone,
by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class or type
of officer is excluded because of its special functions. The
President appoints judicial, as well as executive, officers.
Neither has it been disputed -- and apparently Page 424 U. S. 133 it is not now disputed -- that the Clause controls the
appointment of the members of a typical administrative agency even
though its functions, as this Court recognized in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 , 295 U. S. 624 (1935), may be "predominantly quasi -judicial and quasi -legislative," rather than executive. The Court in
that case carefully emphasized that, although the members of such
agencies were to be independent of the Executive in their
day-to-day operations, the Executive was not excluded from
selecting them. Id. at 295 U. S.
625 -626.

															Appellees argue that the legislative authority conferred upon
the Congress in Art. I, § 4, to regulate "the Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives" is
augmented by the provision in § 5 that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members." Section 5 confers, however, not a general legislative
power upon the Congress, but rather a power "judicial in character"
upon each House of the Congress. Barry v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597 , 279 U. S. 613 (1929). The power of each House to judge whether one claiming
election as Senator or Representative has met the requisite
qualifications, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.
S. 486 (1969), cannot reasonably be translated into a
power granted to the Congress itself to impose substantive
qualifications on the right to so hold such office. Whatever power
Congress may have to legislate, such qualifications must derive
from § 4, rather than § 5, of Art. I.

															Appellees also rely on the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution
insofar as the authority of the Commission to regulate practices in
connection with the Presidential election is concerned. This
Amendment provides that certificates of the votes of the electors
be "sealed [and] Page 424 U. S. 134 directed to the President of the Senate," and that the
"President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes
shall then be counted." The method by which Congress resolved the
celebrated disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, reflected in 19
Stat. 227, supports the conclusion that Congress viewed this
Amendment as conferring upon its two Houses the same sort of power
"judicial in character," Barr v. United States ex rel.
Cunningham, supra at 279 U. S. 613 ,
as was conferred upon each House by Art. I, § 5, with respect to
elections of its own members.

															We are also told by appellees and amici that Congress
had good reason for not vesting in a Commission composed wholly of
Presidential appointees the authority to administer the Act, since
the administration of the Act would undoubtedly have a bearing on
any incumbent President's campaign for reelection. While one cannot
dispute the basis for this sentiment as a practical matter, it
would seem that those who sought to challenge incumbent Congressmen
might have equally good reason to fear a Commission which was
unduly responsive to members of Congress whom they were seeking to
unseat. But such fears, however rational, do not, by themselves,
warrant a distortion of the Framers' work.

															Appellee Commission and amici finally contend, and the
majority of the Court of Appeals agreed with them, that, whatever
shortcomings the provisions for the appointment of members of the
Commission might have under Art. II, Congress had ample authority
under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I to effectuate this
result. We do not agree. The proper inquiry when considering the
Necessary and Proper Clause is not the authority of Congress to
create an office or a commission, which is broad indeed, but rather
its authority to provide Page 424 U. S. 135 that its own officers may make appointments to such office or
commission.

															So framed, the claim that Congress may provide for this manner
of appointment under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. I
stands on no better footing than the claim that it may provide for
such manner of appointment because of its substantive authority to
regulate federal elections. Congress could not, merely because it
concluded that such a measure was "necessary and proper" to the
discharge of its substantive legislative authority, pass a bill of
attainder or ex post facto law contrary to the
prohibitions contained in § 9 of Art. I. No more may it vest in
itself, or in its officers, the authority to appoint officers of
the United States when the Appointments Clause, by clear
implication, prohibits it from doing so.

															The trilogy of cases from this Court dealing with the
constitutional authority of Congress to circumscribe the
President's power to remove officers of the United States
is entirely consistent with this conclusion. In Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), the Court held that Congress could not, by statute, divest
the President of the power to remove an officer in the Executive
Branch whom he was initially authorized to appoint. In explaining
its reasoning in that case, the Court said:

															"The vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the
President, alone and unaided, could not execute the laws. He must
execute them by the assistance of subordinates. . . . As he is
charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed,
the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words,
was that, as part of his executive power, he should select those
who were Page 424 U. S. 136 to act for him under his direction in the execution of the
laws."

															" * * * *" "Our conclusion on the merits, sustained by the arguments before
stated, is that Article II grants to the President the executive
power of the Government, i.e., the general administrative
control of those executing the laws, including the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers -- a conclusion
confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. . . ." Id. at 272 U. S. 117 , 272 U. S.
163 -164.

															In the later case of Humphrey's Executor, where it was
held that Congress could circumscribe the President's power to
remove members of independent regulatory agencies, the Court was
careful to note that it was dealing with an agency intended to be
independent of executive authority " except in its
selection. " 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 625 (emphasis in original). Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), which applied the holding in Humphrey's Executor to a member of the War Claims Commission, did not question in any
respect that members of independent agencies are not independent of
the Executive with respect to their appointments.

															This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Mr. Justice
Sutherland, the author of the Court's opinion in Humphrey's
Executor, likewise wrote the opinion for the Court in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 (1928), in which it was said:

															"Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted
or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft
executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to
usurp the power of appointment by indirection; though the case
might be different if the additional duties Page 424 U. S. 137 were devolved upon an appointee of the executive." Id. at 277 U. S.
202 .

															3. The Commission's Powers

															Thus, on the assumption that all of the powers granted in the
statute may be exercised by an agency whose members have
been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause,
[ Footnote 175 ] the
ultimate question is which, if any, of those powers may be
exercised by the present voting Commissioners, none of whom was
appointed as provided by that Clause. Our previous description of
the statutory provisions, see supra at 424 U.S.
1 09 -113, disclosed that the Commission's powers fall
generally into three categories: functions relating to the flow of
necessary information -- receipt, dissemination, and investigation;
functions with respect to the Commission's task of fleshing out the
statute -- rulemaking and advisory opinions; and functions
necessary to ensure compliance with the statute and rules --
informal procedures, administrative determinations and hearings,
and civil suits.

															Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially
of an investigative and informative nature, falling in the same
general category as those powers which Congress might delegate to
one of its own committees, there can be no question that the
Commission as presently constituted may exercise them. Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881); McGrain v.
Daugherty , Page 424 U. S. 138 273 U. S. 135 (1927); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975). As this Court stated in McGrain, supra, at 273 U. S.
175 :

															"A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
-- which not infrequently is true -- recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere requests for
such information often are unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All
this was true before and when the Constitution was framed and
adopted. In that period, the power of inquiry -- with enforcing
process -- was regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate
attribute of the power to legislate -- indeed, was treated as
inhering in it."

															But when we go beyond this type of authority to the more
substantial powers exercised by the Commission, we reach a
different result. The Commission's enforcement power, exemplified
by its discretionary power to seek judicial relief, is authority
that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the
legislative function of Congress. A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy
for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the
Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Art. II, § 3

															Congress may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause
create "offices" in the generic sense and provide such method of
appointment to those "offices" as it chooses. But Congress' power
under that Clause Page 424 U. S. 139 is inevitably bounded by the express language of Art. II, § 2,
cl. 2, and, unless the method it provides comports with the latter,
the holders of those offices will not be "Officers of the United
States." They may, therefore, properly perform duties only in aid
of those functions that Congress may carry out by itself, or in an
area sufficiently removed from the administration and enforcement
of the public law as to permit their being performed by persons not
"Officers of the United States."

															This Court observed more than a century ago with respect to
litigation conducted in the courts of the United States:

															"Whether tested, therefore, by the requirements of the Judiciary
Act, or by the usage of the government, or by the decisions of this
court, it is clear that all such suits, so far as the interests of
the United States are concerned, are subject to the direction, and
within the control of, the Attorney General." Confiscation
Cases , 7 Wall. 454, 74 U. S.
458 -459 (1869).

															The Court echoed similar sentiments 59 years later in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. at 277 U. S. 202 ,
saying:

															"Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is
the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the
agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are
executive functions. It is unnecessary to enlarge further upon the
general subject, since it has so recently received the full
consideration of this Court. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 ."

															"Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or
incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive
duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the
power of appointment by indirection, though the Page 424 U. S. 140 case might be different if the additional duties were devolved
upon an appointee of the executive."

															We hold that these provisions of the Act, vesting in the
Commission primary responsibility for conducting civil litigation
in the courts of the United States for vindicating public rights,
violate Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. Such functions
may be discharged only by persons who are "Officers of the United
States" within the language of that section.

															All aspects of the Act are brought within the Commission's broad
administrative powers: rulemaking, advisory opinions, and
determinations of eligibility for funds and even for federal
elective office itself. These functions, exercised free from
day-to-day supervision of either Congress [ Footnote 176 ] or the Executive Branch, are
more legislative and judicial in nature than are the
Commission's Page 424 U. S. 141 enforcement powers, and are of kinds usually performed by
independent regulatory agencies or by some department in the
Executive Branch under the direction of an Act of Congress.
Congress viewed these broad powers as essential to effective and
impartial administration of the entire substantive framework of the
Act. Yet each of these functions also represents the performance of
a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law.
While the President may not insist that such functions be delegated
to an appointee of his removable at will, Humphrey's Executor
v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), none of them operates merely in aid of congressional
authority to legislate or is sufficiently removed from the
administration and enforcement of public law to allow it to be
performed by the present Commission. These administrative functions
may therefore be exercised only by persons who are "Officers of the
United States." [ Footnote
177 ] Page 424 U. S. 142 It is also our view that the Commission's inability to exercise
certain powers because of the method by which its members have been
selected should not affect the validity of the Commission's
administrative actions and determinations to this date, including
its administration of those provisions, upheld today, authorizing
the public financing of federal elections. The past acts of the
Commission are therefore accorded de facto validity, just
as we have recognized should be the case with respect to
legislative acts performed by legislators held to have been elected
in accordance with an unconstitutional apportionment plan. Connor v. Williams, 404 U. S. 549 , 404 U. S.
559 -551 (1972). See Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d
430, 431-432 (CA10 1963); Schaefer v.
Thomson, 251 F.
Supp. 450 , 453 (Wyo.1965), aff'd sub nom. Harrison v.
Schaeffer, 383 U. S. 269 (1966). Cf. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 , 422 U. S. 379 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). We also draw on the Court's
practice in Page 424 U. S. 143 the apportionment and voting rights cases and stay, for a period
not to exceed 30 days, the Court's judgment insofar as it affects
the authority of the Commission to exercise the duties and powers
granted it under the Act. This limited stay will afford Congress an
opportunity to reconstitute the Commission by law or to adopt other
valid enforcement mechanisms without interrupting enforcement of
the provisions the Court sustains, allowing the present Commission
in the interim to function de facto in accordance with the
substantive provisions of the Act. Cf. Georgia v. United
States, 411 U. S. 526 , 411 U. S. 541 (1973); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.
S. 231 , 385 U. S. 235 (1966); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.
S. 656 , 377 U. S.
675 -676 (1964). CONCLUSION In summary, [ Footnote
178 ] we sustain the individual contribution limits, the
disclosure and reporting provisions, and the public financing
scheme. We conclude, however, that the limitations on campaign
expenditures, on independent expenditures by individuals and
groups, and on expenditures by a candidate from his personal funds
are constitutionally infirm. Finally, we hold that most of the
powers conferred by the Act upon the Federal Election Commission
can be exercised only by "Officers of the United States," appointed
in conformity with Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and
therefore cannot be exercised by the Commission as presently
constituted.

															In No. 75-436, the judgment of the Court of Appeals Page 424 U. S. 144 is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the
District Court in No. 75-437 is affirmed. The mandate shall issue
forthwith, except that our judgment is stayed, for a period not to
exceed 30 days, insofar as it affects the authority of the
Commission to exercise the duties and powers granted it under the
Act. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of these cases.

															| 424 U.S.
1 app| APPENDIX TO PER CURIAM OPINION* TITLE 2. THE CONGRESS CHAPTER 14 -- FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS SUBCHAPTER I. -- DISCLOSURE OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN
FUNDS § 431. Definitions.

															When used in this subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter
--

															(a) "election" means --

															(1) a general, special, primary, or runoff election;

															(2) a convention or caucus of a political party held to nominate
a candidate;

															(3) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a
national nominating convention of a political party; and

															(4) a primary election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the office of
President; Page 424 U. S. 145 (b) "candidate" means an individual who seeks nomination for
election, or election, to Federal office, whether or not such
individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an
individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or
election, if he has

															(1) taken the action necessary under the law of a State to
qualify himself for nomination for election, or election, to
Federal office; or

															(2) received contributions or made expenditures, or has given
his consent for any other person to receive contributions or make
expenditures, with a view to bringing about his nomination for
election, or election, to such office;

															(c) "Federal office" means the office of President or Vice
President of the United States; or of Senator or Representative in,
or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the United
States;

															(d) "political committee" means any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount
exceeding $1,000;

															(e) "contribution" --

															(1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money or anything of value made for the purpose of --

															(A) influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any
person to Federal office or for the purpose of influencing the
results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to a
national nominating convention of a political party; or

															(B) influencing the result of an election held for the
expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for
election to the office of President of the United States; Page 424 U. S. 146 (2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, expressed or
implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution
for such purposes;

															(3) means funds received by a political committee which are
transferred to such committee from another political committee or
other source;

															(4) means the payment, by any person other than a candidate or a
political committee, of compensation for the personal services of
another person which are rendered to such candidate or political
committee without charge for any such purpose; but

															(5) does not include

															(A) the value of services provided without compensation by
individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf
of a candidate or political committee;

															(B) the use of real or personal property and the cost of
invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an
individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services
on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related
activities;

															(C) the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in a
candidate's campaign at a charge less than the normal comparable
charge, if such charge for use in a candidate's campaign is at
least equal to the cost of such food or beverage to the vendor;

															(D) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an
individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services
to a candidate;

															(E) the payment by a State or local committee of a political
party of the costs of preparation, Page 424 U. S. 147 display, or mailing or other distribution incurred by such
committee with respect to a printed slate card or sample ballot, or
other printed listing, of three or more candidates for any public
office for which an election is held in the State in which such
committee is organized, except that this clause shall not apply in
the case of costs incurred by such committee with respect to a
display of any such listing made on broadcasting stations, or in
newspapers, magazines, or other similar types of general public
political advertising; or

															(F) any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation or
a labor organization which, under the provisions of the last
paragraph of section 610 of Title 18, would not constitute an
expenditure by such corporation or labor organization;

															to the extent that the cumulative value of activities by any
individual on behalf of any candidate under each of clauses (B),
(C), and (D) does not exceed $500 with respect to any election;

															(f) "expenditure" --

															(1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made for the
purpose of --

															(A) influencing the nomination for election, or the election, of
any person to Federal office, or to the office of presidential and
vice-presidential elector; or

															(B) influencing the results of a primary election held for the
selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a
political party or for the expression of a preference for Page 424 U. S. 148 the nomination of persons for election to the office of
President of the United States;

															(2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, express or implied,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make any expenditure;

															(3) means the transfer of funds by a political committee to
another political committee; but

															(4) does not include --

															(A) any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through
the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or
controlled by any political party, political committee, or
candidate;

															(B) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to
register to vote or to vote;

															(C) any communication by any membership organization or
corporation to its members or stockholders, if such membership
organization or corporation is not organized primarily for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of
any person to Federal office;

															(D) the use of real or personal property and the cost of
invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an
individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services
on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related
activities if the cumulative value of such activities by such
individual on behalf of any candidate do [ sic ] not exceed
$50 with respect to any election;

															(E) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an
individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services
to a candidate if the cumulative amount for such individual
incurred with respect to such candidate Page 424 U. S. 149 does not exceed $500 with respect to any election;

															(F) any communication by any person which is not made for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of
any person to Federal office; or

															(G) the payment by a State or local committee of a political
party of the costs of preparation, display, or mailing or other
distribution incurred by such committee with respect to a printed
slate card or sample ballot, or other printed listing, of three or
more candidates for any public office for which an election is held
in the State in which such committee is organized, except that this
clause shall not apply in the case of costs incurred by such
committee with respect to a display of any such listing made on
broadcasting stations, or in newspapers, magazines or other similar
types of general public political advertising; or

															(H) any payment made or obligation incurred by a corporation or
a labor organization which, under the provisions of the last
paragraph of section 610 of Title 18, would not constitute an
expenditure by such corporation or labor organization;

															(g) "Commission" means the Federal Election Commission;

															(h) "person" means an individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation, labor organization, and any other
organization or group of persons;

															(i) "State" means each State of the United States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States; Page 424 U. S. 150 (j) "identification" means --

															(1) in the case of an individual, his full name and the full
address of his principal place of residence; and

															(2) in the case of any other person, the full name and address
of such person;

															(k) "national committee" means the organization which, by virtue
of the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the
day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level,
as determined by the Commission;

															(1) "State committee" means the organization which, by virtue of
the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day
operation of such political party at the State level, as determined
by the Commission;

															(m) "political party" means an association, committee, or
organization which nominates a candidate for election to any
Federal office, whose name appears on the election ballot as the
candidate of such association, committee, or organization; and

															(n) "principal campaign committee" means the principal campaign
committee designated by a candidate under section 432(f)(1) of this
title.

															§ 432. Organization of political committees.

															(a) Chairman; treasurer; vacancies; official
authorizations. Every political committee shall have a
chairman and a treasurer. No contribution and no expenditure shall
be accepted or made by or on behalf of a political committee at a
time when there is a vacancy in the office of chairman or treasurer
thereof. No expenditure shall be made for or on behalf of a
political committee without the authorization of its chairman or
treasurer, or their designated agents.

															(b) Account of contributions; segregated funds. Page 424 U. S. 151 Every person who receives a contribution in excess of $10 for a
political committee shall, on demand of the treasurer, and in any
event within 5 days after receipt of such contribution, render to
the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the amount of
the contribution and the identification of the person making such
contribution, and the date on which received. All funds of a
political committee shall be segregated from, and may not be
commingled with, any personal funds of officers, members, or
associates of such committee.

															(c) Recordkeeping. It shall be the duty of the
treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and exact
account of --

															(1) all contributions made to or for such committee;

															(2) the identification of every person making a contribution in
excess of $10, and the date and amount thereof and, if a person's
contributions aggregate more than $100, the account shall include
occupation, and the principal place of business (if any);

															(3) all expenditures made by or on behalf of such committee;
and

															(4) the identification of every person to whom any expenditure
is made, the date and amount thereof and the name and address of,
and office sought by, each candidate on whose behalf such
expenditure was made.

															(d) Receipts; preservation. It shall be the duty of the
treasurer to obtain and keep a receipted bill, stating the
particulars, for every expenditure made by or on behalf of a
political committee in excess of $100 in amount, and for any such
expenditure in a lesser amount, if the aggregate amount of such
expenditures to the same person during a calendar year exceeds
$100. The treasurer Page 424 U. S. 152 shall preserve all receipted bills and accounts required to be
kept by this section for periods of time to be determined by the
Commission.

															(e) Unauthorized activities; notice. Any political
committee which solicits or receives contributions or makes
expenditures on behalf of any candidate that is not authorized in
writing by such candidate to do so shall include a notice on the
face or front page of all literature and advertisements published
in connection with such candidate's campaign by such committee or
on its behalf stating that the committee is not authorized by such
candidate and that such candidate is not responsible for the
activities of such committee.

															(f) Principal campaign committees; one candidate limitation;
office of President: national committee for candidate;
duties. (1) Each individual who is a candidate for Federal office (other
than the office of Vice President of the United States) shall
designate a political committee to serve as his principal campaign
committee. No political committee may be designated as the
principal campaign committee of more than one candidate, except
that the candidate for the office of President of the United States
nominated by a political party may designate the national committee
of such political party as his principal campaign committee. Except
as provided in the preceding sentence, no political committee which
supports more than one candidate may be designated as a principal
campaign committee.

															(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, each
report or statement of contributions received or expenditures made
by a political committee (other than a principal campaign
committee) which is required to be filed with the Commission under
this subchapter shall be filed instead with the principal
campaign Page 424 U. S. 153 committee for the candidate on whose behalf such contributions
are accepted or such expenditures are made.

															(3) It shall be the duty of each principal campaign committee to
receive all reports and statements required to be filed with it
under paragraph (2) of this subsection and to compile and file such
reports and statements, together with its own reports and
statements, with the Commission in accordance with the provisions
of this subchapter.

															§ 433. Registration of political committees.

															(a) Statements of organization. Each political
committee which anticipates receiving contributions or making
expenditures during the calendar year in an aggregate amount
exceeding $1,000 shall file with the Commission a statement of
organization, within 10 days after its organization or, if later,
10 days after the date on which it has information which causes the
committee to anticipate it will receive contributions or make
expenditures in excess of $1,000. Each such committee in existence
at the date of enactment of this Act shall file a statement of
organization with the Commission at such time as it prescribes.

															(b) Contents of statements. The statement of
organization shall include --

															(1) the name and address of the committee;

															(2) the names, addresses, and relationships of affiliated or
connected organizations;

															(3) the area, scope, or jurisdiction of the committee;

															(4) the name, address, and position of the custodian of books
and accounts;

															(5) the name, address, and position of other principal officers,
including officers and members of the finance committee, if
any; Page 424 U. S. 154 (6) the name, address, office sought, and party affiliation of
--

															(A) each candidate whom the committee is supporting; and

															(B) any other individual, if any, whom the committee is
supporting for nomination for election, or election, to any public
office whatever; or, if the committee is supporting the entire
ticket of any party, the name of the party;

															(7) a statement whether the committee is a continuing one;

															(8) the disposition of residual funds which will be made in the
event of dissolution;

															(9) a listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes, or other
repositories used;

															(10) a statement of the reports required to be filed by the
committee with State or local officers, and, if so, the names,
addresses, and positions of such persons; and

															(11) such other information as shall be required by the
Commission.

															(c) Information changes; report. Any change in
information previously submitted in a statement of organization
shall be reported to the Commission within a 10-day period
following the change.

															(d) Disbanding of political committees or contributions and
expenditures below prescribed ceiling; notice. Any committee
which, after having filed one or more statements of organization,
disbands or determines it will no longer receive contributions or
make expenditures during the calendar year in an aggregate amount
exceeding $1,000 shall so notify the Commission.

															(e) Filing reports and notifications with appropriate
principal campaign committees. In the case of a political Page 424 U. S. 155 committee which is not a principal campaign committee, reports
and notifications required under this section to be filed with the
Commission shall be filed instead with the appropriate principal
campaign committee.

															§ 434. Reports by political committees and candidates.

															(a) Receipts and expenditures; completion date,
exception. (1) Except as provided by paragraph (2), each treasurer of a
political committee supporting a candidate or candidates for
election to Federal office, and each candidate for election to such
office, shall file with the Commission reports of receipts and
expenditures on forms to be prescribed or approved by it. The
reports referred to in the preceding sentence shall be filed as
follows:

															"(A)(i) In any calendar year in which an individual is a
candidate for Federal office and an election for such Federal
office is held in such year, such reports shall be filed not later
than the 10th day before the date on which such election is held
and shall be complete as of the 15th day before the date of such
election; except that any such report filed by registered or
certified mail must be postmarked not later than the close of the
12th day before the date of such election."

															(ii) such reports shall be filed not later than the 30th day
after the day of such election and shall be complete as of the 20th
day after the date of such election.

															(B) In any other calendar year in which an individual is a
candidate for Federal office, such reports shall be filed after
December 31 of such calendar year, but not later than January 31 of
the following calendar year and shall be complete as of the close
of the calendar year with respect to which the report is filed. Page 424 U. S. 156 (C) Such reports shall be filed not later than the 10th day
following the close of any calendar quarter in which the candidate
or political committee concerned received contributions in excess
of $1,000, or made expenditures in excess of $1,000, and shall be
complete as of the close of such calendar quarter; except that any
such report required to be filed after December 31 of any calendar
year with respect to which a report is required to be filed under
subparagraph (b) shall be filed as provided in such
subparagraph.

															(D) When the last day for filing any quarterly report required
by subparagraph (C) occurs within 10 days of an election, the
filing of such quarterly report shall be waived and superseded by
the report required by subparagraph (A)(i).

															Any contribution of $1,000 or more received after the 15th day,
but more than 48 hours, before any election shall be reported
within 48 hours after its receipt.

															(2) Each treasurer of a political committee which is not a
principal campaign committee shall file the reports required under
this section with the appropriate principal campaign committee.

															(3) Upon a request made by a presidential candidate or a
political committee which operates in more than one State, or upon
its own motion, the Commission may waive the reporting dates set
forth in paragraph (1) (other than the reporting date set forth in
paragraph (1)(b)), and require instead that such candidate or
political committee file reports not less frequently than monthly.
The Commission may not require a presidential candidate or a
political committee operating in more than one State to file more
than 12 reports (not counting any report referred to in paragraph
(1)(B)) during any calendar year. If the Commission acts on its own
motion Page 424 U. S. 157 under this paragraph with respect to a candidate or a political
committee, such candidate or committee may obtain judicial review
in accordance with the provisions of chapter 7 of Title 5.

															(b) Contents of reports. Each report under this section
shall disclose --

															(1) the amount of cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting
period;

															(2) the full name and mailing address (occupation and the
principal place of business, if any) of each person who has made
one or more contributions to or for such committee or candidate
(including the purchase of tickets for events such as dinners,
luncheons, rallies, and similar fundraising events) within the
calendar year in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100,
together with the amount and date of such contributions;

															(3) the total sum of individual contributions made to or for
such committee or candidate during the reporting period and not
reported under paragraph (2);

															(4) the name and address of each political committee or
candidate from which the reporting committee or the candidate
received, or to which that committee or candidate made, any
transfer of funds, together with the amounts and dates of all
transfers;

															(5) each loan to or from any person within the calendar year in
an aggregate amount or value in excess of $100, together with the
full names and mailing addresses (occupations and the principal
places of business, if any) of the lender, endorsers, and
guarantors, if any, and the date and amount of such loans;

															(6) the total amount of proceeds from -- Page 424 U. S. 158 (A) the sale of tickets to each dinner, luncheon, rally, and
other fundraising event;

															(B) mass collections made at such events; and

															(C) sales of items such as political campaign pins, buttons,
badges, flags, emblems, hats, banners, literature, and similar
materials;

															(7) each contribution, rebate, refund, or other receipt in
excess of $100 not otherwise listed under paragraphs (2)
through(6);

															(8) the total sum of all receipts by or for such committee or
candidate during the reporting period, together with total
expenditures less transfers between political committees which
support the same candidate and which do not support more than one
candidate;

															(9) the identification of each person to whom expenditures have
been made by such committee or on behalf of such committee or
candidate within the calendar year in an aggregate amount or value
in excess of $100, the amount, date, and purpose of each such
expenditure and the name and address of, and office sought by, each
candidate on whose behalf such expenditure was made;

															(10) the identification of each person to whom an expenditure
for personal services, salaries, and reimbursed expenses in excess
of $100 has been made, and which is not otherwise reported,
including the amount, date, and purpose of such expenditure;

															(11) the total sum of expenditures made by such committee or
candidate during the calendar year, together with total receipts
less transfers between political committees which support the same
candidate and which do not support more than one candidate; Page 424 U. S. 159 (12) the amount and nature of debts and obligations owed by or
to the committee, in such form as the supervisory officer may
prescribe and a continuous reporting of their debts and obligations
after the election at such periods as the Commission may require
until such debts and obligations are extinguished, together with a
statement as to the circumstances and conditions under which any
such debt or obligation is extinguished and the consideration
therefor; and

															(13) such other information as shall be required by the
Commission.

															(c) Cumulative reports for calendar year; amounts for
unchanged items carried forward; statement of inactive status. The reports required to be filed by subsection (a) of this section
shall be cumulative during the calendar year to which they relate,
but where there has been no change in an item reported in a
previous report during such year, only the amount need be carried
forward. If no contributions or expenditures have been accepted or
expended during a calendar year, the treasurer of the political
committee or candidate shall file a statement to that effect.

															(d) Members of Congress; reporting exemption. This
section does not require a Member of the Congress to report, as
contributions received or as expenditures made, the value of
photographic, matting, or recording services furnished to him by
the Senate Recording Studio, the House Recording Studio, or by an
individual whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate or
the Clerk of the House of Representatives and who furnishes such
services as his primary duty as an employee of the Senate or House
of Representatives, or if such services were paid for by the
Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the
Democratic National Congressional Page 424 U. S. 160 Committee, or the National Republican Congressional Committee.
This subsection does not apply to such recording services furnished
during the calendar year before the year in which the Member's term
expires.

															(e) Reports by other than political committees. Every
person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes
contributions or expenditures, other than by contribution to a
political committee or candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess
of $100 within a calendar year shall file with the Commission a
statement containing the information required by this section.
Statements required by this subsection shall be filed on the dates
on which reports by political committees are filed but need not be
cumulative.

															§ 437a. Reports by certain persons; exemptions.

															Any person (other than an individual) who expends any funds or
commits any act directed to the public for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of an election, or who publishes or
broadcasts to the public any material referring to a candidate (by
name, description, or other reference) advocating the election or
defeat of such candidate, setting forth the candidate's position on
any public issue, his voting record, or other official acts (in the
case of a candidate who holds or has held Federal office), or
otherwise designed to influence individuals to cast their votes for
or against such candidate or to withhold their votes from such
candidate shall file reports with the Commission as if such person
were a political committee. The reports filed by such person shall
set forth the source of the funds used in carrying out any activity
described in the preceding sentence in the same detail as if the
funds were contributions within the meaning of section 431(e) of
this title, and payments of such funds in the same detail as if
they were expenditures within the meaning of section 41(f) of this
title. The provisions Page 424 U. S. 161 of this section do not apply to any publication or broadcast of
the United States Government or to any news story, commentary, or
editorial distributed through the facilities of a broadcasting
station or a bona fide newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication. A news story, commentary, or editorial is not
considered to be distributed through a bona fide newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication if --

															(1) such publication is primarily for distribution to
individuals affiliated by membership or stock ownership with the
person (other than an individual) distributing it or causing it to
be distributed, and not primarily for purchase by the public at
newsstands or paid by subscription; or

															(2) the news story, commentary, or editorial is distributed by a
person (other than an individual) who devotes a substantial part of
his activities to attempting to influence the outcome of elections,
or to influence public opinion with respect to matters of national
or State policy or concern.

															§ 437c. Federal Election Commission.

															(a) Establishment; membership; term of office; vacancies;
qualifications; compensation; chairman and vice chairman. (1) There is established a commission to be known as the Federal
Election Commission. The Commission is composed of the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, ex
officio and without the right to vote, and six members appointed as
follows:

															(A) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority
of both Houses of the Congress, by the President pro tempore of the
Senate upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the
Senate and the minority leader of the Senate; Page 424 U. S. 162 (B) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority
of both Houses of the Congress, by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, upon the recommendations of the majority leader of
the House and the minority leader of the House; and

															(C) two shall be appointed, with the confirmation of a majority
of both Houses of the Congress, by the President of the United
States.

															A member appointed under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) shall not
be affiliated with the same political party as the other member
appointed under such paragraph.

															(2) Members of the Commission shall serve for terms of 6 years,
except that of the members first appointed --

															(A) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1)(A) shall be
appointed for a term ending on the April 30 first occurring more
than 6 months after the date on which he is appointed;

															(B) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1)(B) shall be
appointed for a term ending 1 year after the April 30 on which the
term of the member referred to in subparagraph (A) of this
paragraph ends;

															(C) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1)(C) shall be
appointed for a term ending 2 years thereafter;

															(D) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1)(A) shall be
appointed for a term ending 3 years thereafter;

															(E) one of the members appointed under paragraph (1)(B) shall be
appointed for a term ending 4 years thereafter; and

															(F) one of the members appointed under paragraph Page 424 U. S. 163 (1)(C) shall be appointed for a term ending 5 years
thereafter.

															An individual appointed to fill a vacancy occurring other than
by the expiration of a term of office shall be appointed only for
the unexpired term of the member he succeeds. Any vacancy occurring
in the membership of the Commission shall be filled in the same
manner as in the case of the original appointment.

															(3) Members shall be chosen on the basis of their maturity,
experience, integrity, impartiality, and good judgment and shall be
chosen from among individuals who, at the time of their
appointment, are not elected or appointed officers or employees in
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of
the United States.

															(4) Members of the Commission (other than the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives) shall receive
compensation equivalent to the compensation paid at level IV of the
Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5315).

															(5) The Commission shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman
from among its members (other than the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House of Representatives) for a term of one year.
No member may serve as chairman more often than once during any
term of office to which he is appointed. The chairman and the vice
chairman shall not be affiliated with the same political party. The
vice chairman shall act as chairman in the absence or disability of
the chairman, or in the event of a vacancy in such office.

															(b) Administration, enforcement, and formulation of policy;
primary jurisdiction of civil enforcement. The Commission shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with,
and formulate policy with respect to this Act and sections 608,
610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, Page 424 U. S. 164 and 617 of Title 18. The Commission has primary jurisdiction
with respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions.

															(c) Voting requirement; nondelegation of function. All decisions of the Commission with respect to the exercise of
its duties and powers under the provisions of this subchapter shall
be made by a majority vote of the members of the Commission. A
member of the Commission may not delegate to any person his vote or
any decisionmaking authority or duty vested in the Commission by
the provisions of this subchapter.

															(d) Meetings. The Commission shall meet at least once each month and also at
the call of any member.

															(e) Rules for conduct of activities; seal, judicial notice;
principal office. The Commission shall prepare written rules for the conduct of
its activities, shall have an official seal which shall be
judicially noticed, and shall have its principal office in or near
the District of Columbia (but it may meet or exercise any of its
powers anywhere in the United States).

															(f) Staff director and general counsel; appointment and
compensation; appointment and compensation of personnel and
procurement of intermittent services by staff director; use of
assistance, personnel, and facilities of Federal agencies and
departments. (1) The Commission shall have a staff director and a general
counsel who shall be appointed by the Commission. The staff
director shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic
pay in effect for level IV of the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C.
5315). The general counsel shall be paid at a rate not to exceed
the rate of basic pay in effect for level V of the Executive
Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5316). With the approval of the Page 424 U. S. 165 Commission; the staff director may appoint and fix the pay of
such additional personnel as he considers desirable.

															(2) With the approval of the Commission, the staff director may
procure temporary and intermittent services to the same extent as
is authorized by section 3109(b) of Title 5, but at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate
of basic pay in effect for grade GS-15 of the general schedule (5
U.S.C. 5332).

															(3) In carrying out its responsibilities under this Act, the
Commission shall, to the fullest extent practicable, avail itself
of the assistance, including personnel and facilities, of other
agencies and departments of the United States Government. The heads
of such agencies and departments may make available to the
Commission such personnel, facilities, and other assistance, with
or without reimbursement, as the Commission may request.

															§ 437d. Powers of Commission.

															(a) Specific enumeration. The Commission has the power --

															(1) to require, by special or general orders, any person to
submit in writing such reports and answers to questions as the
Commission may prescribe; and such submission shall be made within
such a reasonable period of time and under oath or otherwise as the
Commission may determine;

															(2) to administer oaths or affirmations;

															(3) to require by subpoena, signed by the chairman or the vice
chairman, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of all documentary evidence relating to the execution of
its duties;

															(4) in any proceeding or investigation, to order testimony to be
taken by deposition before any person who is designated by the
Commission and has Page 424 U. S. 166 the power to administer oaths and, in such instances, to compel
testimony and the production of evidence in the same manner as
authorized under paragraph (3) of this subsection;

															(5) to pay witnesses the same fees and mileage as are paid in
like circumstances in the courts of the United States;

															(6) to initiate (through civil proceedings for injunctive,
declaratory, or other appropriate relief), defend, or appeal any
civil action in the name of the Commission for the purpose of
enforcing the provisions of this Act, through its general
counsel;

															(7) to render advisory opinions under section 437 of this
title;

															(8) to make, amend, and repeal such rules, pursuant to the
provisions of chapter 5 of Title 5, as are necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act;

															(9) to formulate general policy with respect to the
administration of this Act and sections 608, 610, 611, 613, 614,
615, 616, and 617 of Title 18;

															(10) to develop prescribed forms under subsection (a)(1) of this
section; and

															(11) to conduct investigations and hearings expeditiously, to
encourage voluntary compliance, and to report apparent violations
to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.

															(b) Judicial orders for compliance with subpoenas and orders
of Commission; contempt of court. Any United States district court within the jurisdiction of
which any inquiry is carried on may, upon petition by the
Commission, in case of refusal to obey a subpoena or order of the
Commission issued under subsection (a) of this section, issue an
order requiring compliance therewith. Any failure to obey the order
of the Page 424 U. S. 167 court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

															(c) Civil liability for disclosure of information. No person shall be subject to civil liability to any person
(other than the Commission or the United States) for disclosing
information at the request of the Commission.

															(d) Transmittal to Congress: Budget estimates or requests
and legislative recommendations; prior transmittal to Congress:
legislative recommendations. (1) Whenever the Commission submits any budget estimate or
request to the President of the United States or the Office of
Management and Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy of
such estimate or request to the Congress.

															(2) Whenever the Commission submits any legislative
recommendations, or testimony, or comments on legislation,
requested by the Congress or by any Member of the Congress, to the
President of the United States or the Office of Management and
Budget, it shall concurrently transmit a copy thereof to the
Congress or to the Member requesting the same. No officer or agency
of the United States shall have any authority to require the
Commission to submit its legislative recommendations, testimony, or
comments on legislation, to any office or agency of the United
States for approval, comments, or review, prior to the submission
of such recommendations, testimony, or comments to the
Congress.

															§ 437e. Reports to President and Congress.

															The Commission shall transmit reports to the President of the
United States and to each House of the Congress no later than March
31 of each year. Each such report shall contain a detailed
statement with respect to the activities of the Commission in
carrying out its duties under this subchapter, together with
recommendations Page 424 U. S. 168 for such legislative or other action as the Commission considers
appropriate.

															§ 437f. Advisory opinions.

															(a) Written requests; written opinions within reasonable
time; specific transactions or activities constituting violations
of provisions. Upon written request to the Commission by any individual holding
Federal office, any candidate for Federal office, or any political
committee, the Commission shall render an advisory opinion, in
writing, within a reasonable time with respect to whether any
specific transaction or activity by such individual, candidate, or
political committee would constitute a violation of this Act, of
chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26 or of section 608, 610, 611,
613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18.

															(b) Presumption of compliance with provisions based on good
faith actions. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person with
respect to whom an advisory opinion is rendered under subsection
(a) of this section who acts in good faith in accordance with the
provisions and findings of such advisory opinion shall be presumed
to be in compliance with the provision of this Act, of chapter 95
or chapter 96 of Title 26, or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614,
615, 616, or 617 of Title 18, with respect to which such advisory
opinion is rendered.

															(c) Requests made public; transmittal to Commission of
comments of interested parties with respect to such
requests. Any request made under subsection (a) shall be made public by
the Commission. The Commission shall, before rendering an advisory
opinion with respect to such request, provide any interested party
with an opportunity to transmit written comments to the Commission
with respect to such request. Page 424 U. S. 169 § 437g. Enforcement.

															(a) Violations; complaints and referrals; notification and
investigation by Commission: venue, judicial orders; referral to
law enforcement authorities: civil actions by Attorney General:
venue, judicial orders, bond; subpoenas; review by courts of
appeals: time for petition, finality of judgment; review by Supreme
Court; docket: advancement and priorities. (1)(A) Any person who believes a violation of this Act or of
section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 has
occurred may file a complaint with the Commission.

															(B) In any case in which the Clerk of the House of
Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate (who receive reports
and statements as custodian for the Commission) has reason to
believe a violation of this act or section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614,
615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 has occurred, he shall refer such
apparent violation to the Commission.

															(2) The Commission, upon receiving any complaint under paragraph
(1)(A), or a referral under paragraph (1)(b), or if it has reason
to believe that any person has committed a violation of any such
provision, shall notify the person involved of such apparent
violation and shall --

															(A) report such apparent violation to the Attorney General;
or

															(B) make an investigation of such apparent violation.

															(3) Any investigation under paragraph (2)(B) shall be conducted
expeditiously and shall include an investigation of reports and
statements filed by any complainant under this subchapter, if such
complainant is a candidate. Any notification or investigation made
under paragraph (2) shall not be made public by the Commission or
by Page 424 U. S. 170 any other person without the written consent of the person
receiving such notification or the person with respect to whom such
investigation is made.

															(4) The Commission shall, at the request of any person who
receives notice of an apparent violation under paragraph (2),
conduct a hearing with respect to such apparent violation.

															(5) If the Commission determines, after investigation, that
there is reason to believe that any person has engaged, or is about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will
constitute a violation of this Act, it may endeavor to correct such
violation by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. If the Commission fails to correct the violation
through informal methods, it may institute a civil action for
relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or any other appropriate order in the district court of the
United States for the district in which the person against whom
such action is brought is found, resides, or transacts business.
Upon a proper showing that such person has engaged or is about to
engage in such acts or practices, the court shall grant a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.

															(6) The Commission shall refer apparent violations to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities to the extent that
violations of provisions of chapter 29 of Title 18 are involved, or
if the Commission is unable to correct apparent violations of this
Act under the authority given it by paragraph (5), or if the
Commission determines that any such referral is appropriate.

															(7) Whenever in the judgment of the Commission, after affording
due notice and an opportunity for a hearing, any person has engaged
or is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of any provision of this Act or of
section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18, Page 424 U. S. 171 upon request by the Commission the Attorney General on behalf of
the United States, shall institute a civil action for relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order,
or any other appropriate order in the district court of the United
States for the district in which the person is found, resides, or
transacts business. Upon a proper showing that such person has
engaged or is about to engage in such acts or practices, a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order shall be granted without bond by such court.

															(8) In any action brought under paragraph (5) or (7) of this
subsection, subpoenas for witnesses who are required to attend a
United States district court may run into any other district.

															(9) Any party aggrieved by an order granted under paragraph (5)
or (7) of this subsection may, at any time within 60 days after the
date of entry thereof, file a petition with the United States court
of appeals for the circuit in which such order was issued for
judicial review of such order.

															(10) The judgment of the court of appeals affirming or setting
aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the district court
shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in
section 1254 of Title 28.

															(11) Any action brought under this subsection shall be advanced
on the docket of the court in which filed, and put ahead of all
other actions (other than other actions brought under this
subsection or under section 437h of this title).

															(b) Reports of Attorney General to Commission respecting
action taken; reports of Commission respecting status of
referrals. In any case in which the Commission refers an apparent violation
to the Attorney General, the Attorney Page 424 U. S. 172 General shall respond by report to the Commission with respect
to any action taken by the Attorney General regarding such apparent
violation. Each report shall be transmitted no later than 60 days
after the date the Commission refers any apparent violation, and at
the close of every 30-day period thereafter until there is final
disposition of such apparent violation. The Commission may from
time to time prepare and publish reports on the status of such
referrals.

															§ 437h. Judicial review.

															(a) Actions, including declaratory judgments, for
construction of constitutional questions; eligible plaintiffs;
certification of such questions to courts of appeals sitting en
banc. The Commission, the national committee of any political party,
or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office
of President of the United States may institute such actions in the
appropriate district court of the United States, including actions
for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the
constitutionality of any provision of this Act or of section 608,
610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18. The district
court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality
of this Act or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617
of Title 18, to the United States court of appeals for the circuit
involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.

															(b) Appeal to Supreme Court; time for appeal. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any decision on a
matter certified under subsection (a) of this section shall be
reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Such appeal shall be brought no later than 20 days after
the decision of the court of appeals.

															(c) Advancement on appellate docket and expedited deposition
of certified questions. Page 424 U. S. 173 It shall be the duty of the court of appeals and of the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite
to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter
certified under subsection (a) of this section.

															§ 438. Administrative and judicial provisions

															(a) Federal Election Commission; duties. It shall be the duty of the Commission --

															(1) Forms. To develop and furnish to the person
required by the provisions of this Act prescribed forms for the
making of the reports and statements required to be filed with it
under this subchapter;

															(2) Manual for uniform bookkeeping and reporting
methods. To prepare, publish, and furnish to the person
required to file such reports and statements a manual setting forth
recommended uniform methods of bookkeeping and reporting;

															(3) Filing, coding, and cross-indexing system. To
develop a filing, coding, and cross-indexing system consonant with
the purposes of this subchapter;

															(4) Public inspection; copies; sale or use
restrictions. To make the reports and statements filed with it
available for public inspection and copying, commencing as soon as
practicable but not later than the end of the second day following
the day during which it was received, and to permit copying of any
such report or statement by hand or by duplicating machine, as
requested by any person, at the expense of such person: Provided, That any information copied from such reports
and statements shall not be sold or utilized by any person for the
purpose of soliciting contributions or for any commercial
purpose;

															(5) Preservation of reports and statements. To preserve
such reports and statements for a period of Page 424 U. S. 174 10 years from date of receipt, except that reports and
statements relating solely to candidates for the House of
Representatives shall be preserved for only 5 years from the date
of receipt;

															(6) Index of reports and statements; publication in Federal
Register. To compile and maintain a cumulative index of
reports and statements filed with it, which shall be published in
the Federal Register at regular intervals and which shall be
available for purchase directly or by mail for a reasonable
price;

															(7) Special reports; publication. To prepare and
publish from time to time special reports listing those candidates
for whom reports were filed as required by this subchapter and
those candidates for whom such reports were not filed as so
required;

															(8) Audits; investigations. To make from time to time
audits and field investigations with respect to reports and
statements filed under the provisions of this subchapter, and with
respect to alleged failures to file any report or statement
required under the provisions of this subchapter;

															(9) Enforcement authorities; reports of violations. To
report apparent violations of law to the appropriate law
enforcement authorities; and

															(10) Rules and regulations. To prescribe suitable rules
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter, in
accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this
section.

															(b) Commission; duties: national clearinghouse for
information; studies, scope, publication, copies to General public
at cost. It shall be the duty of the Commission to serve as a
national clearinghouse for information in respect to the
administration of elections. In carrying out its duties under this
subsection, the Commission shall enter into contracts for the
purpose of conducting independent Page 424 U. S. 175 studies of the administration of elections. Such studies shall
include, but shall not be limited to, studies of --

															(1) the method of selection of, and the type of duties assigned
to, officials and personnel working on boards of elections;

															(2) practices relating to the registration of voters; and

															(3) voting and counting methods.

															Studies made under this subsection shall be published by the
Commission and copies thereof shall be made available to the
general public upon the payment of the cost thereof.

															(c) Proposed rules or regulations; statement, transmittal to
Congress; Presidential elections and Congressional elections;
"legislative days" defined. (1) The Commission, before prescribing any rule or regulation
under this section, shall transmit a statement with respect to such
rule or regulation to the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection. Such statement shall set forth the proposed rule or
regulation and shall contain a detailed explanation and
justification of such rule or regulation.

															(2) If the appropriate body of the Congress which receives a
statement from the Commission under this subsection does not,
through appropriate action, disapprove the proposed rule or
regulation set forth in such statement no later than 30 legislative
days after receipt of such statement, then the Commission may
prescribe such rule or regulation. In the case of any rule or
regulation proposed to deal with reports or statements required to
be filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of
President Page 424 U. S. 176 of the United States, and by political committees supporting
such a candidate, both the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have the power to disapprove such proposed rule or
regulation. The Commission may not prescribe any rule or regulation
which is disapproved under this paragraph.

															(3) If the Commission proposes to prescribe any rule or
regulation dealing with reports or statements required to be filed
under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of Senator, and
by political committees supporting such candidate, it shall
transmit such statement to the Senate. If the Commission proposes
to prescribe any rule or regulation dealing with reports or
statements required to be filed under this subchapter by a
candidate for the office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner, and by political committees supporting such
candidate, it shall transmit such statement to the House of
Representatives. If the Commission proposes to prescribe any rule
or regulation dealing with reports or statements required to be
filed under this subchapter by a candidate for the office of
President of the United States, and by political committees
supporting such candidate, it shall transmit such statement to the
House of Representatives and the Senate.

															(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "legislative days"
does not include, with respect to statements transmitted to the
Senate, any calendar day on which the Senate is not in session, and
with respect to statements transmitted to the House of
Representatives, any calendar day on which the House of
Representatives is not in session, and with respect to statements
transmitted to both such bodies, any calendar day on which both
Houses of the Congress are not in session. Page 424 U. S. 177 (d) Rules and regulations; issuance; custody of reports and
statements; Congressional cooperation. (1) The Commission shall prescribe suitable rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this subchapter,
including such rules and regulations as may be necessary to require
that --

															(A) reports and statements required to be filed under this
subchapter by a candidate for the office of Representative in, or
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the United
States, and by political committees supporting such candidate,
shall be received by the Clerk of the House of Representatives as
custodian for the Commission;

															(B) reports and statements required to be filed under this
subchapter by a candidate for the office of Senator, and by
political committees supporting such candidate, shall be received
by the Secretary of the Senate as custodian for the Commission;
and

															(C) the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary
of the Senate, as custodians for the Commission, each shall make
the reports and statements received by him available for public
inspection and copying in accordance with paragraph (4) of
subsection (a) of this section, and preserve such reports and
statements in accordance with paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of
this section.

															(2) It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the House of
Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate to cooperate with
the Commission in carrying out its duties under this Act and to
furnish such services and facilities as may be required in
accordance with this section. Page 424 U. S. 178 § 439. Statements filed with State officers.

															(a) "Appropriate State" defined. A copy of each
statement required to be filed with the Commission by this
subchapter shall be filed with the Secretary of State (or, if there
is no office of Secretary of State, the equivalent State officer)
of the appropriate State. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"appropriate State" means --

															(1) for reports relating to expenditures and contributions in
connection with the campaign for nomination for election, or
election, of a candidate to the office of President or Vice
President of the United States, each State in which an expenditure
is made by him or on his behalf, and

															(2) for reports relating to expenditures and contributions in
connection with the campaign for nomination for election, or
election, of a candidate to the office of Senator or Representative
in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress of the
United States, the State in which he seeks election.

															(b) Duties of State officers. It shall be the duty of
the Secretary of State, or the equivalent State officer, under
subsection (a) of this section --

															(1) to receive and maintain in an orderly manner all reports and
statements required by this subchapter to be filed with him;

															(2) to preserve such reports and statements for a period of 10
years from date of receipt, except that reports and statements
relating solely to candidates for the House of Representatives
shall be preserved for only 5 years from the date of receipt;

															(3) to make the reports and statements filed with him available
for public inspection and copying during regular office hours,
commencing as soon Page 424 U. S. 179 as practicable but not later than the end of the day during
which it was received, and to permit copying of any such report or
statement by hand or by duplicating machine, requested by any
person, at the expense of such person; and

															(4) to compile and maintain a current list of all statements or
parts of statements pertaining to each candidate.

															§ 439a. Use of contributed amounts for certain purposes; rules
of Commission.

															Amounts received by a candidate as contributions that are in
excess of any amount necessary to defray his expenditures, and any
other amounts contributed to an individual for the purpose of
supporting his activities as a holder of Federal office, may be
used by such candidate or individual, as the case may be, to defray
any ordinary and necessary expenses incurred by him in connection
with his duties as a holder of Federal office, may be contributed
by him to any organization described in section 170(c) of Title 26,
or may be used for any other lawful purpose. To the extent any such
contribution, amount contributed, or expenditure thereof is not
otherwise required to be disclosed under the provisions of this
subchapter, such contribution, amount contributed, or expenditure
shall be fully disclosed in accordance with rules promulgated by
the Commission. The Commission is authorized to prescribe such
rules as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.

															§ 441. Penalties for violations.

															(a) Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
subchapter shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both. Page 424 U. S. 180 (b) In case of any conviction under this subchapter, where the
punishment inflicted does not include imprisonment, such conviction
shall be deemed a misdemeanor conviction only. SUBCHAPTER II. -- GENERAL PROVISIONS § 454. Partial invalidity.

															If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the
remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to other
persons and circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

															§ 456. Additional enforcement authority.

															(a) Findings, after notice and hearing, or failure to file
timely reports; disqualification for prescribed period from
candidacy in future Federal elections. In any case in which the Commission, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance with section
554 of Title 5, makes a finding that a person who, while a
candidate for Federal office, failed to file a report required by
subchapter I of this chapter, and such finding is made before the
expiration of the time within which the failure to file such report
may be prosecuted as a violation of such subchapter I, such person
shall be disqualified from becoming a candidate in any future
election for Federal office for a period of time beginning on the
date of such finding and ending one year after the expiration of
the term of the Federal office for which such person was a
candidate.

															(b) Judicial review of findings. Any finding by the Commission under subjection (a) of this
section shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with the
provisions of chapter 7 of Title 5. Page 424 U. S. 181 TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CHAPTER 29 -- ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES § 591. Definitions.

															Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this
section and in sections 597, 599, 600, 602, 608, 610, 611, 614,
615, and 617 of this title

															(a) "election" means --

															(1) a general, special, primary, or runoff election,

															(2) a convention or caucus of a political party held to nominate
a candidate,

															(3) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a
national nominating convention of a political party, or

															(4) a primary election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the office of
President;

															(b) a "candidate" means an individual who seeks nomination for
election, or election, to Federal office, whether or not such
individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an
individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or
election, to Federal office, if he has --

															(1) taken the action necessary under the law of a State to
qualify himself for nomination for election, or election, or

															(2) received contributions or made expenditures, or has given
his consent for any other person to receive contributions or make
expenditures, with a view to bringing about his nomination for
election, or election, to such office;

															(c) "Federal office" means the office of President or Vice
President of the United States, or Senator Page 424 U. S. 182 or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to,
the Congress of the United States;

															(d) "political committee" means any committee, club,
association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an aggregate amount
exceeding $1,000;

															(e) "contribution" --

															(1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money or anything of value (except a loan of money by a national or
State bank made in accordance with the applicable banking laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business, which shall be
considered a loan by each endorser or guarantor, in that proportion
of the unpaid balance thereof that each endorser or guarantor bears
to the total number of endorsers or guarantors), made for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of
any person to Federal office or for the purpose of influencing the
results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to a
national nominating convention of a political party or for the
expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for
election to the office of President of the United States;

															(2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, express or implied,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for such
purposes;

															(3) means funds received by a political committee which are
transferred to such committee from another political committee or
other source; Page 424 U. S. 183 (4) means the payment, by any person other than a candidate or a
political committee, of compensation for the personal services of
another person which are rendered to such candidate or political
committee without charge for any such purpose; but

															(5) does not include --

															(A) the value of services provided without compensation by
individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf
of a candidate or political committee;

															(B) the use of real or personal property and the cost of
invitations, food, and bevererages, voluntarily provided by an
individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services
on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related
activities;

															(C) the sale of any food or beverage by a vendor for use in a
candidate's campaign at a charge less than the normal comparable
charge, if such charge for use in a candidate's campaign is at
least equal to the cost of such food or beverage to the vendor;

															(D) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an
individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services
to a candidate; or

															(E) the payment by a State or local committee of a political
party of the costs of preparation, display, or mailing or other
distribution incurred by such committee with respect to a printed
slate card or sample Page 424 U. S. 184 ballot, or other printed listing, of three or more candidates
for any public office for which an election is held in the State in
which such committee is organized, except that this clause shall
not apply in the case of costs incurred by such committee with
respect to a display of any such listing made on broadcasting
stations, or in newspapers, magazines or other similar types of
general public political advertising; to the extent that the
cumulative value of activities by any person on behalf of any
candidate under each of clauses (B), (C), and (D) does not exceed
$500 with respect to any election;

															(f) "expenditure" --

															(1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value (except a loan of
money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the
applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course
of business), made for the purpose of influencing the nomination
for election, or election, of any person to Federal office or for
the purpose of influencing the results of a primary held for the
selection of delegates to a national nominating convention of a
political party or for the expression of a preference for the
nomination of persons for election to the office of President of
the United States;

															(2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, express or implied,
whether or not legally enforceable, to make any expenditure;
and

															(3) means the transfer of funds by a political committee to
another political committee; but Page 424 U. S. 185 (A) any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed through
the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or
other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or
controlled by any political party, political committee, or
candidate;

															(B) nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals to
register to vote or to vote;

															(C) any communication by any membership organization or
corporation to its members or stockholders, if such membership
organization or corporation is not organized primarily for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of
any person to Federal office;

															(D) the use of real or personal property and the cost of
invitations, food, and beverages, voluntarily provided by an
individual to a candidate in rendering voluntary personal services
on the individual's residential premises for candidate-related
activities;

															(E) any unreimbursed payment for travel expenses made by an
individual who on his own behalf volunteers his personal services
to a candidate;

															(F) any communication by any person which is not made for the
purpose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of
any person to Federal office;

															(G) the payment by a State or local committee of a political
party of the costs of Page 424 U. S. 186 preparation, display, or mailing or other distribution incurred
by such committee with respect to a printed slate card or sample
ballot, or other printed listing, of three or more candidates for
any public office for which an election is held in the State in
which such committee is organized, except that this clause shall
not apply in the case of costs incurred by such committee with
respect to a display of any such listing made on broadcasting
stations, or in newspapers, magazines or other similar types of
general public political advertising;

															(H) any costs incurred by a candidate in connection with the
solicitation of contributions by such candidate, except that this
clause shall not apply with respect to costs incurred by a
candidate in excess of an amount equal to 20 percent of the
expenditure limitation applicable to such candidate under section
608(c) of this title; or

															(I) any costs incurred by a political committee (as such term is
defined by section 608(b)(2) of this title) with respect to the
solicitation of contributions to such political committee or to any
general political fund controlled by such political committee,
except that this clause shall not apply to exempt costs incurred
with respect to the solicitation of contributions to any such
political committee made through broadcasting stations, newspapers,
magazines, out-door advertising facilities, and Page 424 U. S. 187 other similar types of general public political advertising;

															to the extent that the cumulative value. of activities by any
individual on behalf of any candidate under each of clauses (D) or
(E) does not exceed $500 with respect to any election;

															(g) "person" and "whoever" mean an individual, partnership,
committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or
group of persons;

															(h) "State" means each State of the United States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States;

															(i) "political party" means any association, committee, or
organization which nominates a candidate for election to any
Federal office whose name appears on the election ballot as the
candidate of such association, committee, or organization;

															(j) "State committee" means the organization which, by virtue of
the bylaws of a political party, is responsible for the day-to-day
operation of such political party at the State level, as determined
by the Federal Election Commission;

															(k) "national committee" means the organization which, by virtue
of the bylaws of the political party, is responsible for the
day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level,
as determined by the Federal Election Commission established under
section 437c(a) of Title 2; and

															( l ) "principal campaign committee" means the principal
campaign committee designated by a candidate under section
432(f)(1) of Title 2.

															§ 608. Limitations on contributions and expenditures.

															(a) Personal funds of candidate and family. (1) No candidate may make expenditures from Page 424 U. S. 188 his personal funds, or the personal funds of his immediate
family, in connection with his campaigns during any calendar year
for nomination for election, or for election, to Federal office in
excess of, in the aggregate --

															(A) $50,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of
President or Vice President of the United States;

															(B) $35,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of
Senator or for the office of Representative from a State which is
entitled to only one Representative; or

															(C) $25,000, in the case of a candidate for the office of
Representative, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner, in any other
State.

															For purposes of this paragraph, any expenditure made in a year
other than the calendar year in which the election is held with
respect to which such expenditure was made is considered to be made
during the calendar year in which such election is held.

															(2) For purposes of this subsection, "immediate family" means a
candidate's spouse, and any child, parent, grandparent, brother, or
sister of the candidate, and the spouses of such persons.

															(3) No candidate or his immediate family may make loans or
advances from their personal funds in connection with his campaign
for nomination for election, or for election, to Federal office
unless such loan or advance is evidenced by a written instrument
fully disclosing the terms and conditions of such loan or
advance.

															(4) For purposes of this subsection, any such loan or advance
shall be included in computing the total amount of such
expenditures only to the extent Page 424 U. S. 189 of the balance of such loan or advance outstanding and
unpaid.

															(b) Contributions by persons and committees. (1) Except as otherwise provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), no
person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to
any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$1,000.

															(2) No political committee (other than a principal campaign
committee) shall make contributions to any candidate with respect
to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed
$5,000. Contributions by the national committee of a political
party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate
for the office of President of the United States shall not exceed
the limitation imposed by the preceding sentence with respect to
any other candidate for Federal office. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "political committee" means an organization
registered as a political committee under section 433, Title 2,
United States Code, for a period of not less than 6 months which
has received contributions from more than 50 persons and, except
for any State political party organization, has made contributions
to 5 or more candidates for Federal office.

															(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than
$25,000 in any calendar year. For purposes of this paragraph, any
contribution made in a year other than the calendar year in which
the election is held with respect to which such contribution was
made, is considered to be made during the calendar year in which
such election is held.

															(4) For purposes of this subsection --

															(A) contributions to a named candidate made Page 424 U. S. 190 to any political committee authorized by such candidate, in
writing, to accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered
to be contributions made to such candidate, and

															(B) contributions made to or for the benefit of any candidate
nominated by a political party for election to the office of Vice
President of the United States shall be considered to be
contributions made to or for the benefit of the candidate of such
party for election to the office of President of the United
States.

															(5) The limitations imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election,
except that all elections held in any calendar year for the office
of President of the United States (except a general election for
such office) shall be considered to be one election.

															(6) For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all
contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on
behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are
in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary
or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as contributions
from such person to such candidate. The intermediary or conduit
shall report the original source and the intended recipient of such
contribution to the Commission and to the intended recipient.

															(c) Limitations on expenditures. (1) No candidate shall make expenditures in excess of --

															(A) $10,000,000, in the case of a candidate for nomination for
election to the office of President of the United States, except
that Page 424 U. S. 191 the aggregate of expenditures under this subparagraph in any one
State shall not exceed twice the expenditure limitation applicable
in such State to a candidate for nomination for election to the
office of Senator, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, as the case
may be;

															(B) $20,000,000, in the case of a candidate for election to the
office of President of the United States;

															(C) in the case of any campaign for nomination for election by a
candidate for the office of Senator or by a candidate for the
office of Representative from a State which is entitled to only one
Representative, the greater of --

															(i) 8 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
(as certified under subsection (g)); or

															(ii) $100,000;

															(D) in the case of any campaign for election by a candidate for
the office of Senator or by a candidate for the office of
Representative from a State which is entitled to only one
Representative, the greater of --

															(i) 12 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the
State (as certified under subsection (g)); or

															(ii) $150,000;

															(E) $70,000, in the case of any campaign for nomination for
election, or for election, by a candidate for the office of
Representative in any other State, Delegate from the District of
Columbia, or Resident Commissioner; or

															(F) $15,000, in the case of any campaign for nomination for
election, or for election, by Page 424 U. S. 192 a candidate for the office of Delegate from Guam or the Virginia
Islands.

															(2) For purposes of this subsection --

															(A) expenditures made by or on behalf of any candidate nominated
by a political party for election to the office of Vice President
of the United States shall be considered to be expenditures made by
or on behalf of the candidate of such party for election to the
office of President of the United States; and

															(B) an expenditure is made on behalf of a candidate, including a
vice-presidential candidate, if it is made by --

															(i) an authorized committee or any other agent of the candidate
for the purposes of making any expenditure; or

															(ii) any person authorized or requested by the candidate, an
authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the
candidate, to make the expenditure.

															(3) The limitations imposed by subparagraphs (C), (D), (E), and
(F) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall apply separately with
respect to each election.

															(4) The Commission shall prescribe rules under which any
expenditure by a candidate for presidential nomination for use in 2
or more States shall be attributed to such candidate's expenditure
limitation in each such State, based on the voting age population
in such State which can reasonably be expected to be influenced by
such expenditure.

															(d) Adjustment of limitations based on price index. (1) At the beginning of each calendar year (commencing in 1976),
as there become available necessary Page 424 U. S. 193 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of
Labor, the Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Commission and
publish in the Federal Register the per centum difference between
the price index for the 12 months preceding the beginning of such
calendar year and the price index for the base period. Each
limitation established by subsection (c) and subsection (f) shall
be increased by such per centum difference. Each amount so
increased shall be the amount in effect for such calendar year.

															(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) --

															(A) the term "price index" means the average over a calendar
year of the Consumer Price Index (all items -- United States city
average) published monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics;
and

															(B) the term "base period" means the calendar year 1974.

															(e) Expenditure relative to clearly identified
candidate. (1) No person may make any expenditure (other than an
expenditure made by or on behalf of a candidate within the meaning
of subsection (c)(2)(b)) relative to a clearly identified candidate
during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures
made by such person during the year advocating the election or
defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.

															(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) --

															(A) "clearly identified" means --

															(i) the candidate's name appears;

															(ii) a photograph or drawing of the candidate appears; or Page 424 U. S. 194 (iii) the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous
reference; and

															(B) "expenditure" does not include any payment made or incurred
by a corporation or a labor organization which, under the
provisions of the last paragraph of section 610, would not
constitute an expenditure by such corporation or labor
organization.

															(f) Exceptions for national and State committees. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to
limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, the
national committee of a political party and a State committee of a
political party, including any subordinate committee of a State
committee, may make expenditures in connection with the general
election campaign of candidates for Federal office, subject to the
limitations contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
subsection.

															(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any
expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of any
candidate for President of the United States who is affiliated with
such party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by
the voting age population of the United States (as certified under
subsection (g)). Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in
addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a political
party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate
for the office of President of the United States.

															(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State
committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee
of a State committee, may not make any expenditure in connection
with the general election campaign of a candidate for Page 424 U. S. 195 Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party
which exceeds --

															(A) in the case of a candidate or election to the office of
Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to
only one Representative, the greater of --

															(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
(as certified under subsection (g)); or

															(ii) $20,000; and

															(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of
Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other
State, $10,000.

															(g) Voting age population estimates. During the first
week of January, 1975, and every subsequent year, the Secretary of
Commerce shall certify to the Commission and publish in the Federal
Register an estimate of the voting age population of the United
States, of each State, and of each congressional district as of the
first day of July next preceding the date of certification. The
term "voting age population" means resident population, 18 years of
age or older.

															(h) Knowing violations. No candidate or political
committee shall knowingly accept any contribution or make any
expenditure in violation of the provisions of this section. No
officer or employee of a political committee shall knowingly accept
a contribution made for the benefit or use of a candidate, or
knowingly make any expenditure on behalf of a candidate, in
violation of any limitation imposed on contributions and
expenditures under this section.

															(i) Penalties. Any person who violates any provision of
this section shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both. Page 424 U. S. 196 § 610. Contributions or expenditures by national banks,
corporations or labor organizations.

															It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation
organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any
political office, or in connection with any primary election or
political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor
organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election at which presidential and vice-presidential
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices,
or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to
accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.

															Every corporation or labor organization which makes any
contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shall be
fined not more than $25,000; and every officer or director of any
corporation, or officer of any labor organization, who consents to
any contribution or expenditure by the corporation or labor
organization, as the case may be, and any person who accepts or
receives any contribution, in violation of this section, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined not more
than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.

															For the purposes of this section, "labor organization" means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exist
for the purpose, Page 424 U. S. 197 in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.

															As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or
expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or any
services, or anything of value (except a loan of money by a
national or State bank made in accordance with the applicable
banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of
business) to any candidate, campaign committee, or political party
or organization, in connection with any election to any of the
offices referred to in this section; but shall not include
communications by a corporation to its stockholders and their
families or by a labor organization to its members and their
families on any subject; nonpartisan registration and
get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its
stockholders and their families, or by a labor organization aimed
at its members and their families; the establishment,
administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate
segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation or labor organization: Provided, That it shall
be unlawful for such a fund to make a contribution or expenditure
by utilizing money or anything of value secured by physical force,
job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force,
job discrimination, or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or
other monies required as a condition of membership in a labor
organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained
in any commercial transaction.

															§ 611. Contributions by Government contractors.

															Whoever --

															(a) entering into any contract with the United States or any
department or agency thereof either Page 424 U. S. 198 for the rendition of personal services or furnishing any
material, supplies, or equipment to the United States or any
department or agency thereof or for selling any land or building to
the United States or any department or agency thereof, if payment
for the performance of such contract or payment for such material,
supplies, equipment, land, or building is to be made in whole or in
part from funds appropriated by the Congress, at any time between
the commencement of negotiations for and the later of --

															(1) the completion of performance under, or

															(2) the termination of negotiations for, such contract or
furnishing of material, supplies, equipment, land or buildings,

															directly or indirectly makes any contribution of money or other
thing of value, or promises expressly or impliedly to make any such
contribution, to any political party, committee, or candidate for
public office or to any person for any political purpose or use;
or

															(b) knowingly solicits any such contribution from any such
person for any such purpose during any such period;

															shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than
5 years, or both.

															This section does not prohibit or make unlawful the
establishment or administration of, or the solicitation of
contributions to, any separate segregated fund by any corporation
or labor organization for the purpose of influencing the nomination
for election, or election, of any person to Federal office, unless
the provisions of section 610 of this title prohibit or make
unlawful the establishment or administration of, or the
solicitation of contributions to, such fund.

															For purposes of this section, the term "labor organization" Page 424 U. S. 199 has the meaning given it by section 610 of this title. TITLE 26. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 6096. Designation by individuals.

															(a) In general. Every individual (other than a
nonresident alien) whose income tax liability for the taxable year
is $1 or more may designate that $1 shall be paid over to the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund in accordance with the
provisions of section 9006(a). In the case of a joint return of
husband and wife having an income tax liability of $2 or more, each
spouse may designate that $1 shall be paid to the fund.

															(b) Income tax liability. For purposes of subsection
(a), the income tax liability for an individual for any taxable
year is the amount of the tax imposed by chapter 1 on such
individual for such taxable year (as shown on his return), reduced
by the sum of the credits (as shown in his return) allowable under
sections 33, 37, 38, 40, and 41.

															(c) Manner and time of designation. A designation under
subsection (a) may be made with respect to any taxable year --

															(1) at the time of filing the return of the tax imposed by
chapter 1 for such taxable year, or

															(2) at any other time (after the time of filing the return of
the tax imposed by chapter 1 for such taxable year) specified in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.

															Such designation shall be made in such manner as the Secretary
or his delegate prescribes by regulations except that, if such
designation is made at the time of filing the return of the tax
imposed by chapter 1 for such taxable year, such designation shall
be made either on the Page 424 U. S. 200 first page of the return or on the page bearing the taxpayer's
signature. CHAPTER 9 -- PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN FUND § 9001. Short title.

															This chapter may be cited as the "Presidential Election Campaign
Fund Act."

															§ 9002. Definitions.

															For purposes of this chapter --

															(1) The term "authorized committee" means, with respect to the
candidates of a political party for President and Vice President of
the United States, any political committee which is authorized in
writing by such candidates to incur expenses to further the
election of such candidates. Such authorization shall be addressed
to the chairman of such political committee, and a copy of such
authorization shall be filed by such candidates with the
Commission. Any withdrawal of any authorization shall also be in
writing and shall be addressed and filed in the same manner as the
authorization.

															(2) The term "candidate" means, with respect to any presidential
election, an individual who --

															(A) has been nominated for election to the office of President
of the United States or the office of Vice President of the United
States by a major party, or

															(B) has qualified to have his name on the election ballot (or to
have the names of electors pledged to him on the election ballot)
as the candidate of a political party for election to either such
office in 10 or more States.

															For purposes of paragraphs (6) and (7) of this section and
purposes of section 9004(a)(2), the term "candidate" means, with
respect to any preceding presidential Page 424 U. S. 201 election, an individual who received popular votes for the
office of President in such election.

															(3) The term "Commission" means the federal Election Commission
established by section 437c(a)(1) of Title 2, United States
Code.

															(4) The term "eligible candidates" means the candidates of a
political party for President and Vice President of the United
States who have met all applicable conditions for eligibility to
receive payments under this chapter set forth in section 9003.

															(5) The term "fund" means the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund established by section 9006(a).

															(6) The term "major party" means, with respect to any
presidential election, a political party whose candidate for the
office of President in the preceding presidential election
received, as the candidate of such party, 25 percent or more of the
total number of popular votes received by all candidates for such
office.

															(7) The term "minor party" means, with respect to any
presidential election, a political party whose candidate for the
office of President in the preceding presidential election
received, as the candidate of such party, 5 percent or more but
less than 25 percent of the total number of popular votes received
by all candidates for such office.

															(8) The term "new party" means, with respect to any presidential
election, a political party which is neither a major party nor a
minor party.

															(9) The term "political committee" means any committee,
association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which
accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of
influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election
of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective
public office. Page 424 U. S. 202 (10) The term "presidential election" means the election of
presidential and vice-presidential electors.

															(11) The term "qualified campaign expense" means an expense
--

															(A) incurred --

															(i) by the candidate of a political party for the office of
President to further his election to such office or to further the
election of the candidate of such political party for the office of
Vice President, or both,

															(ii) by the candidate of a political party for the office of
Vice President to further his election to such office or to further
the election of the candidate of such political party for the
office of President, or both, or

															(iii) by an authorized committee of the candidates of a
political party for the offices of President and Vice President to
further the election of either or both of such candidates to such
offices;

															(B) incurred within the expenditure report period (as defined in
paragraph (12)), or incurred before the beginning of such period to
the extent such expense is for property, services, or facilities
used during such period; and

															(C) neither the incurring nor payment of which constitutes a
violation of any law of the United States or of the State in which
such expense is incurred or paid.

															An expense shall be considered as incurred by a candidate or an
authorized committee if it is incurred by a person authorized by
such candidate or such committee, as the case may be, to incur such
expense on behalf of such candidate or such committee. If an
authorized committee of the candidates of a political party for Page 424 U. S. 203 President and Vice President of the United States also incurs
expenses to further the election of one or more other individuals
to Federal, State, or local elective public office, expenses
incurred by such committee which are not specifically to further
the election of such other individual or individuals shall be
considered as incurred to further the election of such candidates
for President and Vice President in such proportion as the
Commission prescribes by rules or regulations.

															(12) The term "expenditure report period" with respect to any
presidential election means --

															(A) in the case of a major party, the period beginning with the
first day of September before the election, or, if earlier, with
the date on which such major party at its national convention
nominated its candidate for election to the office of President of
the United States, and ending 30 days after the date of the
presidential election; and

															(B) in the case of a party which is not a major party, the same
period as the expenditure report period of the major party which
has the shortest expenditure report period for such presidential
election under subparagraph (A).

															§ 9003. Condition for eligibility for payments.

															(a) In General. In order to be eligible to receive any
payments under section 9006, the candidates of a political party in
a presidential election shall, in writing --

															(1) agree to obtain and furnish to the Commission such evidence
as it may request of the qualified campaign expenses of such
candidates;

															(2) agree to keep and furnish to the Commission such records,
books, and other information as it may request; and

															(3) agree to an audit and examination by the Page 424 U. S. 204 Commission under section 9007 and to pay any amounts required to
be paid under such section.

															(b) Major parties. In order to be eligible to receive
any payments under section 9006, the candidates of a major party in
a presidential election shall certify to the Commission, under
penalty of perjury, that --

															(1) such candidates and their authorized committees will not
incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate
payments to which they will be entitled under section 9004; and

															(2) no contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses have
been or will be accepted by such candidates or any of their
authorized committees except to the extent necessary to make up any
deficiency in payments received out of the fund on account of the
application of section 9006(d), and no contributions to defray
expenses which would be qualified campaign expenses but for
subparagraph (C) of section 9002(11) have been or will be accepted
by such candidates or any of their authorized committees.

															Such certification shall be made within such time prior to the
day of the presidential election as the Commission shall prescribe
by rules or regulations.

															(c) Minor and new parties. In order to be eligible to
receive any payments under section 9006, the candidates of a minor
or new party in a presidential election shall certify to the
Commission, under penalty of perjury, that --

															(1) such candidates and their authorized committees will not
incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate
payments to which the eligible candidates of a major party are
entitled under section 9004; and Page 424 U. S. 205 (2) such candidates and their authorized committees will accept
and expend or retain contributions to defray qualified campaign
expenses only to the extent that the qualified campaign expenses
incurred by such candidates and their authorized committees
certified to under paragraph (1) exceed the aggregate payments
received by such candidates out of the fund pursuant to section
9006.

															Such certification shall be made within such time prior to the
day of the presidential election as the Commission shall prescribe
by rules or regulations.

															§ 9004. Entitlement of eligible candidates to payments.

															(a) In General. Subject to the provisions of this
chapter --

															(1) The eligible candidates of each major party in a
presidential election shall be entitled to equal payments under
section 9006 in an amount which, in the aggregate, shall not exceed
the expenditure limitations applicable to such candidates under
section 608(c)(1)(B) of Title 18, United States Code.

															(2)(A) The eligible candidates of a minor party in a
presidential election shall be entitled to payments under section
9006 equal in the aggregate to an amount which bears the same ratio
to the amount allowed under paragraph (1) for a major party as
number of popular votes received by the candidate for President of
the minor party, as such candidate, in the preceding presidential
election bears to the average number of popular votes received by
the candidates for President of the major parties in the preceding
presidential election.

															(B) If the candidate of one or more political parties (not
including a major party) for the office of President was a
candidate for such office in the preceding presidential election
and received 5 percent Page 424 U. S. 206 or more but less than 25 percent of the total number of popular
votes received by all candidates for such office, such candidate
and his running mate for the office of Vice President upon
compliance with the provisions of section 9003(a) and (c), shall be
treated as eligible candidates entitled to payments under section
9006 in an amount computed as provided in subparagraph (A) by
taking into account all the popular votes received by such
candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential
election. If eligible candidates of a minor party are entitled to
payments under this subparagraph, such entitlement shall be reduced
by the amount of the entitlement allowed under subparagraph
(A).

															(3) The eligible candidates of a minor party or a new party in a
presidential election whose candidate for President in such
election receives, as such candidate, 5 percent or more of the
total number of popular votes cast for the office of President in
such election shall be entitled to payments under section 9006
equal in the aggregate to an amount which bears the same ratio to
the amount allowed under paragraph (1) for a major party as the
number of popular votes received by such candidate in such election
bears to the average number of popular votes received in such
election by the candidates for President of the major parties. In
the case of eligible candidates entitled to payments under
paragraph (2), the amount allowable under this paragraph shall be
limited to the amount, if any, by which the entitlement under the
preceding sentence exceeds the amount of the entitlement under
paragraph (2).

															(b) Limitations. The aggregate payments to which the
eligible candidates of a political party shall be entitled Page 424 U. S. 207 under subsections (a)(2) and (3) with respect to a presidential
election shall not exceed an amount equal to the lower of --

															(1) the amount of qualified campaign expenses incurred by such
eligible candidates and their authorized committees, reduced by the
amount of contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses
received and expended or retained by such eligible candidates and
such committees; or

															(2) the aggregate payments to which the eligible candidates of a
major party are entitled under subsection (a)(1), reduced by the
amount of contributions described in paragraph (1) of this
subsection.

															(c) Restrictions. The eligible candidates of a
political party shall be entitled to payments under subsection (a)
only --

															(1) to defray qualified campaign expenses incurred by such
eligible candidates or their authorized committees; or

															(2) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray
such qualified campaign expenses, or otherwise to restore funds
(other than contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses
received and expended by such candidates or such committees) used
to defray such qualified campaign expenses.

															§ 9005. Certification by Commission.

															(a) Initial certifications. Not later than 10 days
after the candidates of a political party for President and Vice
President of the United States have met all applicable conditions
for eligibility to receive payments under this chapter set forth in
section 9003, the Commission shall certify to the Secretary for
payment to such eligible candidates under section 9006 payment in
full of amounts to which such candidates are entitled under section
9004. Page 424 U. S. 208 (b) Finality of certifications and determinations. Initial certifications by the Commission under subsection (a), and
all determinations made by it under this chapter shall be final and
conclusive, except to the extent that they are subject to
examination and audit by the Commission under section 9007 and
judicial review under section 9011.

															§ 9006. Payments to eligible candidates.

															(a) Establishment of campaign fund. There is hereby
established on the books of the Treasury of the United States a
special fund to be known as the "Presidential Election Campaign
Fund." The Secretary shall, from time to time, transfer to the fund
an amount not in excess of the sum of the amounts designated
(subsequent to the previous Presidential election) to the fund by
individuals under section 6096. There is appropriated to the fund
for each fiscal year, out of amounts in the general fund of the
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, an amount equal to the amounts
so designated during each fiscal year, which shall remain available
to the fund without fiscal year limitation.

															(b) Transfer to the General fund. If, after a
Presidential election and after all eligible candidates have been
paid the amount which they are entitled to receive under this
chapter, there are moneys remaining in the fund, the Secretary
shall transfer the moneys so remaining to the general fund of the
Treasury.

															(c) Payments from the fund. Upon receipt of a
certification from the Commission under section 9005 for payment to
the eligible candidates of a political party, the Secretary shall
pay to such candidates out of the fund the amount certified by the
Commission. Amounts paid to any such candidates shall be under the
control of such candidates.

															(d) Insufficient amounts in fund. If at the time of
a Page 424 U. S. 209 certification by the Commission under section 9005 for payment
to the eligible candidates of a political party, the Secretary or
his delegate determines that the moneys in the fund are not, or may
not be, sufficient to satisfy the full entitlements of the eligible
candidates of all political parties, he shall withhold from such
payment such amount as he determines to be necessary to assure that
the eligible candidates of each political party will receive their
pro rata share of their full entitlement. Amounts withheld by
reason of the preceding sentence shall be paid when the Secretary
or his delegate determines that there are sufficient moneys in the
fund to pay such amounts, or portions thereof, to all eligible
candidates from whom amounts have been withheld, but, if there are
not sufficient moneys in the fund to satisfy the full entitlement
of the eligible candidates of all political parties, the amounts so
withheld shall be paid in such manner that the eligible candidates
of each political party receive their pro rata share of their full
entitlement.

															§ 9007. Examinations and audits; repayments.

															(a) Examinations and audits. After each presidential
election, the Commission shall conduct a thorough examination and
audit of the qualified campaign expenses of the candidates of each
political party for President and Vice President.

															(b) Repayments. (1) If the Commission determines that any portion of the
payments made to the eligible candidates of a political party under
section 9006 was in excess of the aggregate payments to which
candidates were entitled under section 9004, it shall so notify
such candidates, and such candidates shall pay to the Secretary an
amount equal to such portion.

															(2) If the Commission determines that the eligible candidates of
a political party and their authorized Page 424 U. S. 210 committees incurred qualified campaign expenses in excess of the
aggregate payments to which the eligible candidates of a major
party were entitled under section 9004, it shall notify such
candidates of the amount of such excess and such candidates shall
pay to the Secretary an amount equal to such amount.

															(3) If the Commission determines that the eligible candidates of
a major party or any authorized committee of such candidates
accepted contributions (other than contributions to make up
deficiencies in payments out of the fund on account of the
application of section 9006(d)) to defray qualified campaign
expenses (other than qualified campaign expenses with respect to
which payment is required under paragraph (2)), it shall notify
such candidates of the amount of the contributions so accepted, and
such candidates shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to such
amount.

															(4) If the Commission determines that any amount of any payment
made to the eligible candidates of a political party under section
9006 was used for any purpose other than --

															(A) to defray the qualified campaign expenses with respect to
which such payment was made; or

															(B) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used, or otherwise
to restore funds (other than contributions to defray qualified
campaign expenses which were received and expended) which were used
to defray such qualified campaign expenses,

															it shall notify such candidates of the amount so used, and such
candidates shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to such
amount.

															(5) No payment shall be required from the eligible Page 424 U. S. 211 candidates of a political party under this subsection to the
extent that such payment, when added to other payments required
from such candidates under this subsection, exceeds the amount of
payments received by such candidates under section 9006.

															(c) Notification. No notification shall be made by the
Commission under subsection (b) with respect to a presidential
election more than 3 years after the day of such election.

															(d) Deposit of repayments. All payments received by the
Secretary under subsection (b) shall be deposited by him in the
general fund of the Treasury.

															§ 9008. Payments for presidential nominating conventions.

															(a) Establishment of accounts. The Secretary shall
maintain in the fund, in addition to any account which he maintains
under section 9006(a), a separate account for the national
committee of each major party and minor party. The Secretary shall
deposit in each such account an amount equal to the amount which
each such committee may receive under subsection (b). Such deposits
shall be drawn from amounts designated by individuals under section
6096, and shall be made before any transfer is made to any account
for any eligible candidate under section 9006(a).

															(b) Entitlement to payments from the fund. (1) Major parties. Subject to the provisions of this
section, the national committee of a major party shall be entitled
to payments under paragraph (3), with respect to any presidential
nominating convention, in amounts which, in the aggregate, shall
not exceed $2 million.

															(2) Minor parties. Subject to the provisions of this
section, the national committee of a minor party Page 424 U. S. 212 shall be entitled to payments under paragraph (3), with respect
to any presidential nominating convention, in amounts which, in the
aggregate, shall not exceed an amount which bears the same ratio to
the amount the national committee of a major party is entitled to
receive under paragraph (1) as the number of popular votes received
by the candidate for President of the minor party, as such
candidate, in the preceding presidential election bears to the
average number of popular votes received by the candidates for
President of the United States of the major parties in the
preceding presidential election.

															(3) Payments. Upon receipt of certification from the
Commission under subsection (g), the Secretary shall make payments
from the appropriate account maintained under subsection (a) to the
national committee of a major party or minor party which elects to
receive its entitlement under this subsection. Such payments shall
be available for use by such committee in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (c).

															(4) Limitation. Payments to the national committee of a
major party or minor party under this subsection from the account
designated for such committee shall be limited to the amounts in
such account at the time of payment.

															(5) Adjustment of entitlements. The entitlements
established by this subsection shall be adjusted in the same manner
as expenditure limitations established by section 608(c) and
section 608(f) of Title 18, United States Code, are adjusted
pursuant to the provisions of section 608(d) of such title.

															(c) Use of funds. No part of any payment made under
subsection (b) shall be used to defray the expenses Page 424 U. S. 213 of any candidate or delegate who is participating in any
presidential nominating convention. Such payments shall be used
only --

															(1) to defray expenses incurred with respect to a presidential
nominating convention (including the payment of deposits) by or on
behalf of the national committee receiving such payments; or

															(2) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used to defray
such expenses, or otherwise to restore funds (other than
contributions to defray such expenses received by such committee)
used to defray such expenses.

															(d) Limitation of expenditures. (1) Major parties. Except as provided by paragraph (3),
the national committee of a major party may not make expenditures
with respect to a presidential nominating convention which, in the
aggregate, exceed the amount of payments to which such committee is
entitled under subsection (b)(1).

															(2) Minor parties. Except as provided by paragraph (3),
the national committee of a minor party may not make expenditures
with respect to a presidential nominating convention which, in the
aggregate, exceed the amount of the entitlement of the national
committee of a major party under subsection (b)(1).

															(3) Exception. The Commission may authorize the
national committee of a major party or minor party to make
expenditures which, in the aggregate, exceed the limitation
established by paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) of this subsection.
Such authorization shall be based upon a determination by the
Commission that, due to extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances
such expenditures are necessary Page 424 U. S. 214 to assure the effective operation of the presidential nominating
convention by such committee.

															(e) Availability of payments. The national committee of
a major party or minor party may receive payments under subsection
(b)(3) beginning on July l of the calendar year immediately
preceding the calendar year in which a presidential nominating
convention of the political party involved is held.

															(f) Transfer to the fund. If, after the close of a
presidential nominating convention and after the national committee
of the political party involved has been paid the amount which it
is entitled to receive under this section, there are moneys
remaining in the account of such national committee, the Secretary
shall transfer the moneys so remaining to the fund.

															(g) Certification by Commission. Any major party or
minor party may file a statement with the Commission in such form
and manner and at such times as it may require, designating the
national committee of such party. Such statement shall include the
information required by section 433(b) of Title 2, United States
Code, together with such additional information as the Commission
may require. Upon receipt of a statement filed under the preceding
sentences, the Commission promptly shall verify such statement
according to such procedures and criteria as it may establish and
shall certify to the Secretary for payment in full to any such
committee of amounts to which such committee may be entitled under
subsection (b). Such certifications shall be subject to an
examination and audit which the Commission shall conduct no later
than December 31 of the calendar year in which the presidential
nominating convention involved is held.

															(h) Repayments. The Commission shall have the same
authority to require repayments from the national Page 424 U. S. 215 committee of a major party or a minor party as it has with
respect to repayments from any eligible candidate under section
9007(b). The provisions of section 9007(c) and section 9007(d)
shall apply with respect to any repayment required by the
Commission under this subsection.

															§ 9009. Reports to Congress; regulations.

															(a) Reports. The Commission shall, as soon as
practicable after each presidential election, submit a full report
to the Senate and House of Representatives setting forth --

															(1) the qualified campaign expenses (shown in such detail as the
Commission determines necessary) incurred by the candidates of each
political party and their authorized committees;

															(2) the amounts certified by it under section 9005 for payment
to eligible candidates of each political party;

															(3) the amount of payments, if any, required from such
candidates under section 9007, and the reasons for each payment
required;

															(4) the expenses incurred by the national committee of a major
party or minor party with respect to a presidential nominating
convention;

															(5) the amounts certified by it under section 9008(g) for
payment to each such committee; and

															(6) the amount of payments, if any, required from such
committees under section 9008(h), and the reasons for each such
payment.

															Each report submitted pursuant to this section shall be printed
as a Senate document.

															(b) Regulations, etc. The Commission is authorized to
prescribe such rules and regulations in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (c), to conduct such Page 424 U. S. 216 examinations and audits (in addition to the examinations and
audits required by section 9007(a)), to conduct such
investigations, and to require the keeping and submission of such
books, records, and information, as it deems necessary to carry out
the functions and duties imposed on it by this chapter.

															(c) Review of regulations. (1) The Commission, before prescribing any rule or regulation
under subsection (b), shall transmit a statement with respect to
such rule or regulation to the Senate and to the House of
Representatives, in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection. Such statement shall set forth the proposed rule or
regulation and shall contain a detailed explanation and
justification of such rule or regulation.

															(2) If either such House does not, through appropriate action,
disapprove the proposed rule or regulation set forth in such
statement no later than 30 legislative days after receipt of such
statement, then the Commission may prescribe such rule or
regulation. The Commission may not prescribe any rule or regulation
which is disapproved by either such House under this paragraph.

															(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "legislative days"
does not include any calendar day on which both Houses of the
Congress are not in session.

															§ 9010. Participation by Commission in judicial proceedings.

															(a) Appearance by counsel. The Commission is authorized
to appear in and defend against any action filed under section
9011, either by attorneys employed in its office or by counsel whom
it may appoint without regard to the provisions of Title 5, United
States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service,
and Page 424 U. S. 217 whose compensation it may fix without regard to the provisions
of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title.

															(b) Recovery of certain payments. The Commission is
authorized through attorneys and counsel described in subsection
(a) to appear in the district courts of the United States to seek
recovery of any amounts determined to be payable to the Secretary
as a result of examination and audit made pursuant to section
9007.

															(c) Declaratory and injunctive relief. The Commission
is authorized through attorneys and counsel described in subsection
(a) to petition the courts of the United States for declaratory or
injunctive relief concerning any civil matter covered by the
provisions of this subtitle or section 6096. Upon application of
the Commission, an action brought pursuant to this subsection shall
be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance
with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28, United States
Code, and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. It shall be
the duty of the judges designated to hear the case to assign the
case for hearing at the earliest practicable date, to participate
in the hearing and determination thereof, and to cause the case to
be in every way expedited.

															(d) Appeal. The Commission is authorized on behalf of
the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court
for certiorari to review, judgments or decrees entered with respect
to actions in which it appears pursuant to the authority provided
in this section.

															§ 9011. Judicial review.

															(a) Review of certification, determination, or other action
by the Commission. Any certification, determination, or other
action by the Commission made or taken pursuant to the provisions
of this chapter shall be subject to review by the United States
Court of Appeals for Page 424 U. S. 218 the District of Columbia upon petition filed in such Court by
any interested person. Any petition filed pursuant to this section
shall be filed within 30 days after the certification,
determination, or other action by the Commission for which review
is sought.

															(b) Suits to implement chapter. (1) The Commission, the national committee of any political
party, and individuals eligible to vote for President are
authorized to institute such actions, including actions for
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, as may be appropriate to
implement or construe* any provisions of this chapter.

															(2) The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection
and shall exercise the same without regard to whether a person
asserting rights under provisions of this subsection shall have
exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided
at law. Such proceedings shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284
of Title 28, United States Code, and any appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court. It shall be the duty of the judges designated to
hear the case to assign the case for hearing at the earliest
practicable date, to participate in the hearing and determination
thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way expedited.

															§ 9012. Criminal penalties.

															(a) Excess expenses. (1) It shall be unlawful for an eligible candidate of a
political party for President and Vice President in a presidential
election or any of his authorized committees knowingly and
willfully to incur qualified Page 424 U. S. 219 campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate payments to which
the eligible candidates of a major party are entitled under section
9004 with respect to such election. It shall be unlawful for the
national committee of a major party or minor party knowingly and
willfully to incur expenses with respect to a presidential
nominating convention in excess of the expenditure limitation
applicable with respect to such committee under section 9008(d),
unless the incurring of such expenses is authorized by the
Commission under section 9008(d)(3).

															(2) Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not
more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. In
the case of a violation by an authorized committee, any officer or
member of such committee who knowingly and willfully consents to
such violation shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both.

															(b) Contributions. (1) It shall be unlawful for an eligible candidate of a major
party in a presidential election or any of his authorized
committees knowingly and willfully to accept any contribution to
defray qualified campaign expenses, except to the extent necessary
to make up any deficiency in payments received out of the fund on
account of the application of section 9006(d), or to defray
expenses which would be qualified campaign expenses but for
subparagraph (C) of section 9002(11).

															(2) It shall be unlawful for an eligible candidate of a
political party (other than a major party) in a presidential
election or any of his authorized committees knowingly and
willfully to accept and expend or retain contributions to defray
qualified Page 424 U. S. 220 campaign expenses in an amount which exceeds the qualified
campaign expenses incurred with respect to such election by such
eligible candidate and his authorized committees.

															(3) Any person who violates paragraph (1) or (2) shall be fined
not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both.
In the case of a violation by an authorized committee, any officer
or member of such committee who knowingly and willfully consents to
such violation shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both.

															(c) Unlawful use of payments. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person who receives any payment
under section 9006, or to whom any portion of any payment received
under such section is transferred, knowingly and willfully to use,
or authorize the use of, such payment or such portion for any
purpose other than --

															(A) to defray the qualified campaign expenses with respect to
which such payment was made; or

															(B) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used, or otherwise
to restore funds (other than contributions to defray qualified
campaign expenses which were received and expended) which were
used, to defray such qualified campaign expenses.

															(2) It shall be unlawful for the national committee of a major
party or minor party which receives any payment under section
9008(b)(3) to use, or authorize the use of, such payment for any
purpose other than a purpose authorized by section 9008(c).

															(3) Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall Page 424 U. S. 221 be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.

															(d) False statements, etc. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully
--

															(A) to furnish any false, fictitious, or fraudulent evidence,
books, or information to the Commission under this subtitle, or to
include in any evidence, books, or information so furnished any
misrepresentation of a material fact, or to falsify or conceal any
evidence, books, or information relevant to a certification by the
Commission or an examination and audit by the Commission under this
chapter; or

															(B) to fail to furnish to the Commission any records, books, or
information requested by it for purposes of this chapter.

															(2) Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.

															(e) Kickbacks and illegal payments. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully
to give or accept any kickback or any illegal payment in connection
with any qualified campaign expense of eligible candidates or their
authorized committees. It shall be unlawful for the national
committee of a major party or minor party knowingly and willfully
to give or accept any kickback or any illegal payment in connection
with any expense incurred by such committee with respect to a
presidential nominating convention.

															(2) Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both. Page 424 U. S. 222 (3) In addition to the penalty provided by paragraph (2), any
person who accepts any kickback or illegal payment in connection
with any qualified campaign expense of eligible candidates or their
authorized committees, or in connection with any expense incurred
by the national committee of a major party or minor party with
respect to a presidential nominating convention, shall pay to the
Secretary, for deposit in the general fund of the Treasury, an
amount equal to 125 percent of the kickback or payment
received.

															(f) Unauthorized expenditures and contributions. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful
for any political committee which is not an authorized committee
with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for
President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly
and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such
candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if
incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.

															(2) This subsection shall not apply to --

															(A) expenditures by a broadcaster regulated by the Federal
Communications Commission, or by a periodical publication, in
reporting the news or in taking editorial positions; or

															(B) expenditures by any organization described in section 501(c)
which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) in communicating to
its members the views of that organization.

															(3) Any political committee which violates paragraph (1) shall
be fined not more than $5,000, and any officer or member of such
committee who knowingly and willfully consents to such violation
and Page 424 U. S. 223 any other individual who knowingly and willfully violates
paragraph (1) shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both.

															(g) Unauthorized disclosure of information. (1) It shall be unlawful for any individual to disclose any
information obtained under the provisions of this chapter except as
may be required by law.

															(2) Any person who violates paragraph (1) shall be fined not
more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. CHAPTER 9 -- PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY MATCHING PAYMENT ACCOUNT § 9031. Short title.

															This chapter may be cited as the "Presidential Primary Matching
Payment Account Act."

															§ 9032. Definitions.

															For the purposes of this chapter --

															(1) The term "authorized committee" means, with respect to the
candidates of a political party for President and Vice President of
the United States, any political committee which is authorized in
writing by such candidates to incur expenses to further the
election of such candidates. Such authorization shall be addressed
to the chairman of such political committee, and a copy of such
authorization shall be filed by such candidates with the
Commission. Any withdrawal of any authorization shall also be in
writing and shall be addressed and filed in the same manner as the
authorization.

															(2) The term "candidate" means an individual who seeks
nomination for election to be President of the United States. For
purposes of this paragraph, Page 424 U. S. 224 an individual shall be considered to seek nomination for
election if he

															(A) takes the action necessary under the law of a State to
qualify himself for nomination for election;

															(B) receives contributions or incurs qualified campaign
expenses; or

															(C) gives his consent for any other person to receive
contributions or to incur qualified campaign expenses on his
behalf.

															(3) The term "Commission" means the Federal Election Commission
established by section 437c(a)(1) of Title 2, United States
Code.

															(4) Except as provided by section 934(a), the term
"contribution" --

															(A) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money, or anything of value, the payment of which was made on or
after the beginning of the calendar year immediately preceding the
calendar year of the presidential election with respect to which
such gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money, or
anything of value, is made for the purpose of influencing the
result of a primary election;

															(B) means a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not
legally enforceable, to make a contribution for any such
purpose;

															(C) means funds received by a political committee which are
transferred to that committee from another committee; and

															(D) means the payment by any person other than a candidate, or
his authorized committee, of compensation for the personal services
of another person which are rendered to the candidate or committee
without charge; but Page 424 U. S. 225 (E) does not include --

															(i) except as provided in subparagraph (D), the value of
personal services rendered to or for the benefit of a candidate by
an individual who receives no compensation for rendering such
service to or for the benefit of the candidate; or

															(ii) payments under section 9037.

															(5) The term "matching payment account" means the Presidential
Primary Matching Payment Account established under section
9037(a).

															(6) The term "matching payment period" means the period
beginning with the beginning of the calendar year in which a
general election for the office of President of the United States
will be held and ending on the date on which the national
convention of the party whose nomination a candidate seeks
nominates its candidate for the office of President of the United
States, or, in the case of a party which does not make such
nomination by national convention, ending on the earlier of --

															(A) the date such party nominates its candidate for the office
of President of the United States; or

															(B) the last day of the last national convention held by a major
party during such calendar year.

															(7) The term "primary election" means an election, including a
runoff election or a nominating convention or caucus held by a
political party, for the selection of delegates to a national
nominating convention of a political party, or for the expression
of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the
office of President of the United States. Page 424 U. S. 226 (8) The term "political committee" means any individual,
committee, association, or organization (whether or not
incorporated) which accepts contributions or incurs qualified
campaign expenses for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to
influence, the nomination of any person for election to the office
of President of the United States.

															(9) The term "qualified campaign expense" means a purchase,
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or
of anything of value --

															(A) incurred by a candidate, or by his authorized committee, in
connection with his campaign for nomination for election; and

															(B) neither the incurring nor payment of which constitutes a
violation of any law of the United States or of the State in which
the expense is incurred or paid.

															For purposes of this paragraph, an expense is incurred by a
candidate or by an authorized committee if it is incurred by a
person specifically authorized in writing by the candidate or
committee, as the case may be, to incur such expense on behalf of
the candidate or the committee.

															(10) The term "State" means each State of the United States and
the District of Columbia.

															§ 9033. Eligibility for payments.

															(a) Conditions. To be eligible to receive payments
under section 9037, a candidate shall, in writing --

															(1) agree to obtain and furnish to the Commission any evidence
it may request of qualified campaign expenses;

															(2) agree to keep and furnish to the Commission any records,
books, and other information it may request; and

															(3) agree to an audit and examination by the Page 424 U. S. 227 Commission under section 9038 and to pay any amounts required to
be paid under such section.

															(b) Expense limitation; declaration of intent; minimum
contributions. To be eligible to receive payments under
section 9037, a candidate shall certify to the Commission that
--

															(1) the candidate and his authorized committees will not incur
qualified campaign expenses in excess of the limitation on such
expenses under section 9035;

															(2) the candidate is seeking nomination by a political party for
election to the office of President of the United States;

															(3) the candidate has received matching contributions which, in
the aggregate, exceed $5,000 in contributions from residents of
each of at least 20 States; and

															(4) the aggregate of contributions certified with respect to any
person under paragraph (3) does not exceed $250.

															§ 9034. Entitlement of eligible candidates to payments.

															(a) In general. Every candidate who is eligible to
receive payments under section 9033 is entitled to payments under
section 9037 in an amount equal to the amount of each contribution
received by such candidate on or after the beginning of the
calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year of the
presidential election with respect to which such candidate is
seeking nomination, or by his authorized committees, disregarding
any amount of contributions from any person to the extent that the
total of the amounts contributed by such person on or after the
beginning of such preceding calendar year exceeds $250. For
purposes of this subsection and section 9033(b), the term
"contribution" means a gift of money made by a written instrument
which identifies Page 424 U. S. 228 the person making the contribution by full name and mailing
address, but does not include a subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit of money, or anything of value or anything described in
subparagraph (B), (C), or (D) of section 9032(4).

															(b) Limitations. The total amount of payments to which
a candidate is entitled under subsection (a) shall not exceed 50
percent of the expenditure limitation applicable under section
608(c)(1)(A) of Title 18, United States Code.

															§ 9035. Qualified campaign expense limitation.

															No candidate shall knowingly incur qualified campaign expenses
in excess of the expenditure limitation applicable under section
608(c)(1)(A) of Title 18, United States Code.

															§ 9036. Certification by Commission.

															(a) Initial certifications. Not later than 10 days
after a candidate establishes his eligibility under section 9033 to
receive payments under section 9037, the Commission shall certify
to the Secretary for payment to such candidate under section 9037
payment in full of amounts to which such candidate is entitled
under section 9034. The Commission shall make such additional
certifications as may be necessary to permit candidates to receive
payments for contributions under section 9037.

															(b) Finality of determinations. Initial certifications
by the Commission under subsection (a), and all determinations made
by it under this chapter, are final and conclusive, except to the
extent that they are subject to examination and audit by the
Commission under section 9038 and judicial review under section
9041.

															§ 9037. Payments to eligible candidates.

															(a) Establishment of account. The Secretary shall
maintain in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Page 424 U. S. 229 established by section 9006(a), in addition to any account which
he maintains under such section, a separate account to be known as
the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account. The Secretary
shall deposit into the matching payment account, for use by the
candidate of any political party who is eligible to receive
payments under section 9033, the amount available after the
Secretary determines that amounts for payments under section
9006(c) and for payments under section 9008(b)(3) are available for
such payments.

															(b) Payments from the matching payment account. Upon
receipt of a certification from the Commission under section 9036,
but not before the beginning of the matching payment period, the
Secretary or his delegate shall promptly transfer the amount
certified by the Commission from the matching payment account to
the candidate. In making such transfers to candidates of the same
political party, the Secretary or his delegate shall seek to
achieve an equitable distribution of funds available under
subsection (a), and the Secretary or his delegate shall take into
account, in seeking to achieve an equitable distribution, the
sequence in which such certifications are received.

															§ 9038. Examinations and audits; repayments.

															(a) Examinations and audits. After each matching
payment period, the Commission shall conduct a thorough examination
and audit of the qualified campaign expenses of every candidate and
his authorized committees who received payments under section
9037.

															(b) Repayments. (1) If the Commission determines that any portion of the
payments made to a candidate from the matching payment account was
in excess of the aggregate amount of payments to which such
candidate was entitled under section 9034, it shall Page 424 U. S. 230 notify the candidate, and the candidate shall pay to the
Secretary or his delegate an amount equal to the amount of excess
payments.

															(2) If the Commission determines that any amount of any payment
made to a candidate from the matching payment account was used for
any purpose other than --

															(A) to defray the qualified campaign expenses with respect to
which such payment was made; or

															(B) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used, or otherwise
to restore funds (other than contributions to defray qualified
campaign expenses which were received and expended) which were
used, to defray qualified campaign expenses;

															it shall notify such candidate of the amount so used, and the
candidate shall pay to the Secretary or his delegate an amount
equal to such amount.

															(3) Amounts received by a candidate from the matching payment
account may be retained for the liquidation of all obligations to
pay qualified campaign expenses incurred for a period not exceeding
6 months after the end of the matching payment period. After all
obligations have been liquidated, that portion of any unexpended
balance remaining in the candidate's accounts which bears the same
ratio to the total unexpended balance as the total amount received
from the matching payment account bears to the total of all
deposits made into the candidate's accounts shall be promptly
repaid to the matching payment account.

															(c) Notification. No notification shall be made by the
Commission under subsection (b) with respect to a matching payment
period more than 3 years after the end of such period. Page 424 U. S. 231 (d) Deposit of repayments. All payments received by the
Secretary or his delegate under subsection (b) shall be deposited
by him in the matching payment account.

															§ 9039. Reports to Congress; regulations.

															(a) Reports. The Commission shall, as soon as
practicable after each matching payment period, submit a full
report to the Senate and House of Representatives setting forth
--

															(1) the qualified campaign expenses (shown in such detail as the
Commission determines necessary) incurred by the candidates of each
political party and their authorized committees;

															(2) the amounts certified by it under section 9036 for payment
to each eligible candidate; and

															(3) the amount of payments, if any, required from candidates
under section 9038, and the reasons for each payment required.

															Each report submitted pursuant to this section shall be printed
as a Senate document.

															(b) Regulations, etc. The Commission is authorized to
prescribe rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions
of subsection (c), to conduct examinations and audits (in addition
to the examinations and audits required by section 938(a)), to
conduct investigations, and to require the keeping and submission
of any books, records, and information, which it determines to be
necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this chapter.

															(c) Review of regulations. (1) The Commission, before prescribing any rule or regulation
under subsection (b), shall transmit a statement with respect to
such rule or regulation to the Senate and to the House of
Representatives, Page 424 U. S. 232 in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. Such
statement shall set forth the proposed rule or regulation and shall
contain a detailed explanation and justification of such rule or
regulation.

															(2) If either such House does not, through appropriate action,
disapprove the proposed rule or regulation set forth in such
statement no later than 30 legislative days after receipt of such
statement, then the Commission may prescribe such rule or
regulation. The Commission may not prescribe any rule or regulation
which is disapproved by either such House under this paragraph.

															(3) For purposes of this subsection, the term "legislative days"
does not include any calendar day on which both Houses of the
Congress are not in session.

															§ 9040. Participation by Commission in judicial proceedings.

															(a) Appearance by counsel. The Commission is authorized
to appear in and defend against any action instituted under this
section, either by attorneys employed in its office or by counsel
whom it may appoint without regard to the provisions of Title 5,
United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
service, and whose compensation it may fix without regard to the
provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such
title.

															(b) Recovery of certain payments. The Commission is
authorized, through attorneys and counsel described in subsection
(a), to institute actions in the district courts of the United
States to seek recovery of any amounts determined to be payable to
the Secretary or his delegate as a result of an examination and
audit made pursuant to section 9038. Page 424 U. S. 233 (c) Injunctive relief. The Commission is authorized,
through attorneys and counsel described in subsection (a), to
petition the courts of the United States for such injunctive relief
as is appropriate to implement any provision of this chapter.

															(d) Appeal. The Commission is authorized on behalf of
the United States to appeal from, and to petition the Supreme Court
for certiorari to review, judgments or decrees entered with respect
to actions in which it appears pursuant to the authority provided
in this section.

															§ 9041. Judicial review.

															(a) Review of agency action by the Commission. Any
agency action by the Commission made under the provisions of this
chapter shall be subject to review by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upon petition filed in
such court within 30 days after the agency action by the Commission
for which review is sought.

															(b) Review procedures. The provisions of chapter 7 of
Title 5, United States Code, apply to judicial review of any agency
action, as defined in section 551(13) of Title 5, United States
Code, by the Commission.

															§ 9042. Criminal penalties.

															(a) Excess campaign expenses. Any person who violates
the provisions of section 9035 shall be fined not more than
$25,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. Any officer
or member of any political committee who knowingly consents to any
expenditure in violation of the provisions of section 9035 shall be
fined not more than $25,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.

															(b) Unlawful use of payments. (1) It is unlawful for any person who receives any payment under
section 9037, or to whom any portion Page 424 U. S. 234 of any such payment is transferred, knowingly and willfully to
use, or authorize the use of, such payment or such portion for any
purpose other than --

															(A) to defray qualified campaign expenses; or

															(B) to repay loans the proceeds of which were used, or otherwise
to restore funds (other than contributions to defray qualified
campaign expenses which were received and expended) which were
used, to defray qualified campaign expenses.

															(2) Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (1)
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.

															(c) False statements, etc. (1) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully --

															(A) to furnish any false, fictitious, or fraudulent evidence,
books, or information to the Commission under this chapter, or to
include in any evidence, books, or information so furnished any
misrepresentation of a material fact, or to falsify or conceal any
evidence, books, or information relevant to a certification by the
Commission or an examination and audit by the Commission under this
chapter; or

															(B) to fail to furnish to the Commission any records, books, or
information requested by it for purposes of this chapter.

															(2) Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (1)
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.

															(d) Kickbacks and illegal payments. (1) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and willfully to
give or accept any kickback or any illegal Page 424 U. S. 235 payment in connection with any qualified campaign expense of a
candidate, or his authorized committees, who receives payments
under secting 9037.

															(2) Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (1)
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.

															(3) In addition to the penalty provided by paragraph (2), any
person who accepts any kickback or illegal payment in connection
with any qualified campaign expense of a candidate or his
authorized committees shall pay to the Secretary for deposit in the
matching payment account, an amount equal to 125 percent of the
kickback or payment received.

															* Together with No. 75-437, Buckley et al. v. Valeo,
Secretary of the United States Senate, et al., on appeal from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by
the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat.
1263. The pertinent portions of the legislation are set forth in
the 424 U.S.
1 app|>Appendix to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821 (1975).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Revenue Act of 1971, Title VIII, 85 Stat. 562, as amended,
87 Stat. 138, and further amended by the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, § 403 et seq., 88 Stat. 1291. This
Subtitle consists of two parts: Chapter 95 deals with funding
national party conventions and general election campaigns for
President, and Chapter 96 deals with matching funds for
Presidential primary campaigns.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															§ 437h. Judicial review.

															"(a) . . ."

															"The Commission, the national committee of any political party,
or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office
of President of the United States may institute such actions in the
appropriate district court of the United States, including actions
for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the
constitutionality of any provision of this Act or of section 608,
610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18. The district
court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality
of this Act or of section 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617
of Title 18, to the United States court of appeals for the circuit
involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc."

															"(b) . . ."

															"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any decision on a
matter certified under subsection (a) of this section shall be
reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Such appeal shall be brought no later than 20 days after
the decision of the court of appeals."

															"(c) . . ."

															"It shall be the duty of the court of appeals and of the Supreme
Court of the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite
to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any matter
certified under subsection (a) of this section."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Center for Public Financing of Elections, Common Cause, the
League of Women Voters of the United States, Chellis O'Neal
Gregory, Norman F. Jacknis, Louise D. Wides, Daniel R. Noyes, Mrs.
Edgar B. Stern, Charles P. Taft, John W. Gardner, and Ruth
Clusen.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Court of Appeals also suggested in its en banc order that
the issues arising under Subtitle H (relating to the public
financing of Presidential campaigns) might require, under 26 U.S.C.
§ 9011(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), a different mode of review from the
other issues raised in the case. The court suggested that a
three-judge District Court should consider the constitutionality of
these provisions in order to protect against the contingency that
this Court might eventually hold these issues to be subject to
determination by a three-judge court, either under § 9011(b), or 28
U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284. 171 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 170, 519 F.2d 817, 819
(1975). The case was argued simultaneously to both the Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, and a three-judge District Court. The
three-judge court limited its consideration to issues under
Subtitle H. The three-judge court adopted the Court of Appeals'
opinion on these questions in toto, and simply entered an
order with respect to those matters. 401 F.
Supp. 1235 . Thus, two judgments are before us -- one from each
court -- upholding the constitutionality of Subtitle H, though the
two cases before the Court will generally be referred to
hereinafter in the singular. Since the jurisdiction of this Court
to hear at least one of the appeals is clear, we need not resolve
the jurisdictional ambiguities that occasioned the joint sitting of
the Court of Appeals and the three-judge court.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The court held one provision, § 437a, unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad on the ground that the provision is

															"'susceptible to a reading necessitating reporting by groups
whose only connection with the elective process arises from
completely nonpartisan public discussion of issues of public
importance.'"

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 183, 519 F.2d at 832. No appeal has been
taken from that holding.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The court recognized that some of the powers delegated to the
Commission, when exercised in a concrete context, may be
predominantly executive or judicial or unrelated to the
Commission's legislative function; however, since the Commission
had not yet exercised most of these challenged powers,
consideration of the constitutionality of those grants of authority
was postponed. See n. 157 infra. [ Footnote 9 ] See n 4, supra. [ Footnote 10 ]

															This Court has held, for instance, that an organization "may
assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be
protected from compelled disclosure . . . of their affiliation." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 , 357 U. S. 458 (1958). See also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.
S. 516 , 361 U. S. 523 n. 9 (1960). Similarly, parties with sufficient concrete interests
at stake have been held to have standing to raise constitutional
questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency
designated to adjudicate their rights. Palmore v. United
States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.
S. 530 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.
S. 433 (1939).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Accordingly, the two relevant certified questions are answered
as follows:

															1. Does the first sentence of § 315(a) of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV),
in the context of this action, require courts of the United States
to render advisory opinions in violation of the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article III, § 2, of the Constitution
of the United States? NO.

															2. Has each of the plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury to his
constitutional rights enumerated in the following questions to
create a constitutional "case or controversy" within the judicial
power under Article III? YES.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b)(1), (3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV),
set forth in the Appendix, infra at 424 U. S. 189 .
An organization registered as a political committee for not less
than six months which has received contributions from at least 50
persons and made contributions to at least five candidates may give
up to $5,000 to any candidate for any election. 18 U.S.C. §
608(b)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth in the Appendix, infra at 424 U. S. 189 .
Other groups are limited to making contributions of $1,000 per
candidate per election.

															[ Footnote 13 ] See 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth
in the Appendix, infra at 424 U. S.
193 -194.

															[ Footnote 14 ] See 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth
in the Appendix, infra at 424 U. S.
187 -189.

															[ Footnote 15 ] See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), set forth
in the Appendix, infra at 424 U. S.
190 -192.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Article I, § 4, of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate elections of members of the Senate and House of
Representatives. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.
S. 355 (1932); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.
S. 651 (1884). Although the Court at one time indicated
that party primary contests were not "elections" within the meaning
of Art. I, § 4, Newberry v. United States, 256 U.
S. 232 (1921), it later held that primary elections were
within the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress. United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299 (1941). The Court has also recognized broad
congressional power to legislate in connection with the elections
of the President and Vice President. Burroughs v. United
States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934). See 424 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 17 ]

															The nongovernmental appellees argue that, just as the decibels
emitted by a sound truck can be regulated consistently with the
First Amendment, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S.
77 (1949), the Act may restrict the volume of dollars in
political campaigns without impermissibly restricting freedom of
speech. See Freund, Commentary in A. Rosenthal, Federal
Regulation of Campaign Finance: Some Constitutional Questions 72
(1971). This comparison underscores a fundamental misconception.
The decibel restriction upheld in Kovacs limited the manner of operating a sound truck, but not the extent of its proper use. By contrast, the Act's dollar
ceilings restrict the extent of the reasonable use of virtually
every means of communicating information. As the Kovacs Court emphasized, the nuisance ordinances only barred sound trucks
from broadcasting "in a loud and raucous manner on the streets,"
336 U.S. at 336 U. S. 89 ,
and imposed "no restriction upon the communications of ideas or
discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by
pamphlets, by dodgers," or by sound trucks operating at a
reasonable volume. Ibid. See Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 , 334 U. S.
561 -562 (1948).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Being free to engage in unlimited political expression subject
to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an
automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of
gasoline.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Political parties that fail to qualify a candidate for a
position on the ballot are classified as "persons," and are subject
to the $1,000 independent expenditure ceiling. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 591(g), (i), 608(e)(1), (f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
Institutional press facilities owned or controlled by candidates or
political parties are also subject to expenditure limits under the
Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 591(f)(4)(A), 608(c)(2)(b), (e)(1)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent statutory citations
in Part I of this opinion are to Title 18 of the United States
Code, 1970 edition, Supplement IV.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															The record indicates that, as of January 1, 1975, one full-page
advertisement in a daily edition of a certain metropolitan
newspaper cost $6,971.04 -- almost seven times the annual limit on
expenditures "relative to" a particular candidate imposed on the
vast majority of individual citizens and associations by §
608(e)(1).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															The statistical findings of fact agreed to by the parties in the
District Court indicate that 17 of 65 major-party senatorial
candidates in 1974 spent more than the combined primary election,
general election, and fund-raising limitations imposed by the Act.
§§ 591(f)(4)(H), 608(c)(1)(C), (D). The 1972 senatorial figures
showed that 18 of 66 major party candidates exceeded the Act's
limitations. This figure may substantially underestimate the number
of candidates who exceeded the limits provided in the Act, since
the Act imposes separate ceilings for the primary election, the
general election, and fund-raising, and does not permit the limits
to be aggregated. § 608(c)(3). The data for House of
Representatives elections are also skewed, since statistics reflect
a combined $168,000 limit instead of separate $70,000 ceilings for
primary and general elections with up to an additional 20%
permitted for fund-raising. §§ 591(f)(4)(H), 608(c)(1)(E). Only 22
of the 810 major-party House candidates in 1974 and 20 of the 816
major party candidates in 1972 exceeded the $168,000 figure. Both
Presidential candidates in 1972 spent in excess of the combined
Presidential expenditure ceilings. §§ 608(c)(1)(A), (B).

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Other factors relevant to an assessment of the "intensity" of
the support indicated by a contribution include the contributor's
financial ability and his past contribution history.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Statistical findings agreed to by the parties reveal that
approximately 5.1% of the $73,483,613 raised by the 1,161
candidates for Congress in 1974 was obtained in amounts in excess
of $1,000. In 1974, two major-party senatorial candidates, Ramsey
Clark and Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., operated large-scale
campaigns on contributions raised under a voluntarily imposed $100
contribution limitation.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The Act exempts from the contribution ceiling the value of all
volunteer services provided by individuals to a candidate or a
political committee and excludes the first $500 spent by volunteers
on certain categories of campaign-related activities. §§
591(e)(5)(A)-(D). See infra at 424 U. S.
36 -37.

															The Act does not define the phrase -- "for the purpose of
influencing" an election -- that determines when a gift, loan, or
advance constitutes a contribution. Other courts have given that
phrase a narrow meaning to alleviate various problems in other
contexts. See United States v. National Comm. for
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1139-1142 (CA2 1972); American
Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F.
Supp. 1041 , 1055-1057 (DC 1973) (three-judge court), vacated as moot sub nom. Staats v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). The use of the phrase presents
fewer problems in connection with the definition of a contribution
because of the limiting connotation created by the general
understanding of what constitutes a political contribution. Funds
provided to a candidate or political party or campaign committee
either directly or indirectly through an intermediary constitute a
contribution. In addition, dollars given to another person or
organization that are earmarked for political purposes are
contributions under the Act.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Expenditures by persons and associations that are "authorized or
requested" by the candidate or his agents are treated as
contributions under the Act. See n 53, infra. [ Footnote 26 ]

															Contribution limitations alone would not reduce the greater
potential voice of affluent persons and well financed groups, who
would remain free to spend unlimited sums directly to promote
candidates and policies they favor in an effort to persuade
voters.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															Yet, a ceiling on the size of contributions would affect only
indirectly the costs of political campaigns by making it relatively
more difficult for candidates to raise large amounts of money. In
1974, for example, 94.9% of the funds raised by candidates for
Congress came from contributions of $1,000 or less, see n 23, supra. Presumably, some or all of the contributions in excess of $1,000
could have been replaced through efforts to raise additional
contributions from persons giving less than $1,000. It is the Act's
campaign expenditure limitations, § 608(c), not the contribution
limits, that directly address the over-all scope of federal
election spending.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case discussed a number of
the abuses uncovered after the 1972 elections. See 171
U.S.App.D.C. at 190-191, and nn. 36-38, 519 F.2d at 839-840, and
nn. 36-38.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															Although the Court in Letter Carriers found that this
interest was constitutionally sufficient to justify legislation
prohibiting federal employees from engaging in certain partisan
political activities, it was careful to emphasize that the
limitations did not restrict an employee's right to express his
views on political issues and candidates. 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 561 , 413 U. S. 568 , 413 U. S.
575 -576, 413 U. S. 579 . See n 54, infra. [ Footnote 30 ]

															The Act's disclosure provisions are discussed in 424 U.
S. infra. [ Footnote 31 ]

															While providing significant limitations on the ability of all
individuals and groups to contribute large amounts of money to
candidates, the Act's contribution ceilings do not foreclose the
making of substantial contributions to candidates by some major
special interest groups through the combined effect of individual
contributions from adherents or the proliferation of political
funds each authorized under the Act to contribute to candidates. As
a prime example, § 610 permits corporations and labor unions to
establish segregated funds to solicit voluntary contributions to be
utilized for political purposes. Corporate and union resources
without limitation may be employed to administer these funds and to
solicit contributions from employees, stockholders, and union
members. Each separate fund may contribute up to $5,000 per
candidate per election so long as the fund qualifies as a political
committee under § 608(b)(2). See S.Rep. No. 93-1237, pp.
50-52 (1974); Federal Election Commission, Advisory Opinion
1975-23, 40 Fed.Reg. 56584 (1975).

															The Act places no limit on the number of funds that may be
formed through the use of subsidiaries or divisions of
corporations, or of local and regional units of a national labor
union. The potential for proliferation of these sources of
contributions is not insignificant. In 1972, approximately
1,824,000 active corporations filed federal income tax returns.
Internal Revenue Service, Preliminary Statistics of Income 1972,
Corporation Income Tax Returns, p. 1 (Pub. 159 (11-74)). (It is not
clear whether this total includes subsidiary corporations where the
parent filed a consolidated return.) In the same year, 71,409 local
unions were chartered by national unions. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and
Employee Associations 1973, p. 87 (1974).

															The Act allows the maximum contribution to be made by each
unit's fund provided the decision or judgment to contribute to
particular candidates is made by the fund independently of control
or direction by the parent corporation or the national or regional
union. See S.Rep. No. 93-1237, pp. 51-52 (1974).

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															The Act's limitations applicable to both campaign expenditures
and a candidate's personal expenditures on his own behalf are
scaled to take account of the differences in the amounts of money
required for congressional and Presidential campaigns. See §§ 608(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)-(E)

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															In this discussion, we address only the argument that the
contribution limitations alone impermissibly discriminate against
nonincumbents. We do not address the more serious argument that
these limitations, in combination with the limitation on
expenditures by individuals and groups, the limitation on a
candidate's use of his own personal and family resources, and the
over-all ceiling on campaign expenditures invidiously discriminate
against major party challengers and minor party candidates.

															Since an incumbent is subject to these limitations to the same
degree as his opponent, the Act, on its face, appears to be
evenhanded. The appearance of fairness, however, may not reflect
political reality. Although some incumbents are defeated in every
congressional election, it is axiomatic that an incumbent usually
begins the race with significant advantages. In addition to the
factors of voter recognition and the status accruing to holding
federal office, the incumbent has access to substantial resources
provided by the Government. These include local and Washington
offices, staff support, and the franking privilege. Where the
incumbent has the support of major special interest groups which
have the flexibility described in n 31, supra, and is further supported by the
media, the over-all effect of the contribution and expenditure
limitations enacted by Congress could foreclose any fair
opportunity of a successful challenge.

															However, since we decide in 424 U. S. infra that the ceilings on independent expenditures, on
the candidate's expenditures from his personal funds, and on
over-all campaign expenditures are unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, we need not express any opinion with regard to the
alleged invidious discrimination resulting from the full sweep of
the legislation as enacted.

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															In 1974, for example, 40 major party challengers defeated
incumbent members of the House of Representatives in the general
election. Four incumbent Senators were defeated by major party
challengers in the 1974 primary and general election campaigns.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															In the 1974 races for the House of Representatives, three of the
22 major party candidates exceeding the combined expenditure limits
contained in the Act were challengers to incumbents and nine were
candidates in races not involving incumbents. The comparable 1972
statistics indicate that 14 of the 20 major party candidates
exceeding the combined limits were nonincumbents.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															In 1974, major party challengers outspent House incumbents in
22% of the races, and 22 of the 40 challengers who defeated House
incumbents outspent their opponents. In 1972, 24% of the major
party challengers in senatorial elections outspent their incumbent
opponents. The 1974 statistics for senatorial contests reveal
substantially greater financial dominance by incumbents.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Of the $3,781,254 in contributions raised in 1974 by
congressional candidates over and above a $1,000-per-contributor
limit, almost twice as much money went to incumbents as to major
party challengers.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															Appellants contend that the Act discriminates against
challengers, because, while it limits contributions to all
candidates, the Government makes available other material resources
to incumbents. See n 33, supra. Yet, taking cognizance of the
advantages and disadvantages of incumbency, there is little
indication that the $1,000 contribution ceiling will consistently
harm the prospects of challengers relative to incumbents.

															[ Footnote 39 ]

															Between September 1, 1973, and December 31, 1974, major party
candidates for the House and Senate raised over $3,725,000 in
contributions over and above $1,000 compared to $55,000 raised by
minor party candidates in amounts exceeding the $1,000 contribution
limit.

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															Appellant Libertarian Party, according to estimates of its
national chairman, has received only 10 contributions in excess of
$1,000 out of a total of 4,000 contributions. Even these 10
contributions would have been permissible under the Act if the
donor did not earmark the funds for a particular candidate and did
not exceed the over-all $25,000 contribution ceiling for the
calendar year. See § 608(b). Similarly, appellants
Conservative Victory Fund and American Conservative Union have
received only an insignificant portion of their funding through
contributions in excess of $1,000. The affidavit of the executive
director of the Conservative Victory Fund indicates that, in 1974,
a typical fund-raising year, the Fund received approximately
$152,000 through over 9,500 individual contributions. Only one of
the 9,500 contributions, an $8,000 contribution earmarked for a
particular candidate, exceeded $1,000. In 1972, the Fund received
only three contributions in excess of $1,000, all of which might
have been legal under the Act if not earmarked. And between April
7, 1972, and February 28, 1975, the American Conservative Union did
not receive any aggregate contributions exceeding $1,000. Moreover,
the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency -- McCarthy '76,
another appellant, engaged in a concerted effort to raise
contributions in excess of $1,000 before the effective date of the
Act, but obtained only five contributions in excess of $1,000.

															Although appellants claim that the $1,000 ceiling governing
contributions to candidates will prevent the acquisition of seed
money necessary to launch campaigns, the absence of experience
under the Act prevents us from evaluating this assertion. As
appellees note, it is difficult to assess the effect of the
contribution ceiling on the acquisition of seed money since
candidates have not previously had to make a concerted effort to
raise start-up funds in small amounts.

															[ Footnote 41 ]

															Appellant Buckley was a minor party candidate in 1970 when he
was elected to the United States Senate from the State of New
York.

															[ Footnote 42 ]

															Although expenditures incidental to volunteer services would
appear self-limiting, it is possible for a worker in a candidate's
campaign to generate substantial travel expenses. An affidavit
submitted by Stewart Mott, an appellant, indicates that he
"expended some $50,000 for personal expenses" in connection with
Senator McGovern's 1972 Presidential campaign.

															[ Footnote 43 ]

															The Act contains identical, parallel provisions pertaining to
incidental volunteer expenses under the definitions of contribution
and expenditure. Compare §§ 591(e)(5)(B)-(D) with §§
591(f)(4)(D), (E). The definitions have two effects. First,
volunteer expenses that are counted as contributions by the
volunteer would also constitute expenditures by the candidate's
campaign. Second, some volunteer expenses would qualify as
contributions whereas others would constitute independent
expenditures. The statute distinguishes between independent
expenditures by individuals and campaign expenditures on the basis
of whether the candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate,
or an agent of the candidate "authorized or requested" the
expenditure. See §§ 608(c)(2)(B)(ii), (e)(1); S.Rep. No.
93-689, p. 18 (1974); H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 6 (1974). As a
result, only travel that is "authorized or requested" by the
candidate or his agents would involve incidental expenses
chargeable against the volunteer's contribution limit and the
candidate's expenditure ceiling. See n 53, infra. Should a person
independently travel across the country to participate in a
campaign, any unreimbursed travel expenses would not be treated as
a contribution. This interpretation is not only consistent with the
statute and the legislative history, but is also necessary to avoid
the administrative chaos that would be produced if each volunteer
and candidate had to keep track of amounts spent on unsolicited
travel in order to comply with the Act's contribution and
expenditure ceilings and the reporting and disclosure provisions.
The distinction between contributions and expenditures is also
discussed at n 53, infra and in 424 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 44 ] See n 19, supra. [ Footnote 45 ]

															The same broad definition of "person" applicable to the
contribution limitations governs the meaning of "person" in §
608(e)(1). The statute provides some limited exceptions through
various exclusions from the otherwise comprehensive definition of
"expenditure." See § 591(f). The most important exclusions
are: (1) "any news story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities
are owned or controlled by any political party, political
committee, or candidate," § 591(f)(4)(A), and (2) "any
communication by any membership organization or corporation to its
members or stockholders, if such membership organization or
corporation is not organized primarily for the purpose of
influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any person
to Federal office," § 591(f)(4)(C). In addition, the Act sets
substantially higher limits for personal expenditures by a
candidate in connection with his own campaign, § 608(a),
expenditures by national and state committees of political parties
that succeed in placing a candidate on the ballot, §§ 591(i),
608(f), and total campaign expenditures by candidates, §
608(c).

															[ Footnote 46 ]

															Section 608(i) provides that any person convicted of exceeding
any of the contribution or expenditure limitations "shall be fined
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both."

															[ Footnote 47 ]

															Several of the parties have suggested that problems of ambiguity
regarding the application of § 608(e)(1) to specific campaign
speech could be handled by requesting advisory opinions from the
Commission. While a comprehensive series of advisory opinions or a
rule delineating what expenditures are "relative to a clearly
identified candidate" might alleviate the provision's vagueness
problems, reliance on the Commission is unacceptable because the
vast majority of individuals and groups subject to criminal
sanctions for violating § 608(e)(1) do not have a right to obtain
an advisory opinion from the Commission. See 2 U.S.C. §
437f (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Section 437f(a) of Title 2 accords only
candidates, federal officeholders, and political committees the
right to request advisory opinions and directs that the Commission
"shall render an advisory opinion, in writing, within a reasonable
time" concerning specific planned activities or transactions of any
such individual or committee. The powers delegated to the
Commission thus do not assure that the vagueness concerns will be
remedied prior to the chilling of political discussion by
individuals and groups in this or future election years.

															[ Footnote 48 ]

															In such circumstances, vague laws may not only "trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning" or foster "arbitrary and
discriminatory application," but also operate to inhibit protected
expression by inducing "citizens to steer far wider of the
unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas
were clearly marked.'" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 , 408 U. S.
108 -109 (1972), quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 , 377 U. S. 372 (1964), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.
S. 513 , 357 U. S. 526 (1958). "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.
S. 415 , 371 U. S. 433 (1963). [ Footnote 49 ]

															This interpretation of "relative to a clearly identified
candidate" is supported by the discussion of § 608(e)(1) in the
Senate Report S.Rep. No. 93-689, p. 19 (1974), the House Report
H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 7 (1974), the Conference Report,
S.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1237, pp. 56-57 (1974), and the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 203-204, 519 F.2d at
852-853.

															[ Footnote 50 ]

															In connection with another provision containing the same
advocacy language appearing in § 608(e)(1), the Court of Appeals
concluded:

															"Public discussion of public issues which also are campaign
issues readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their
positions, their voting records and other official conduct.
Discussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to
influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to
exert some influence on voting at elections."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 226, 519 F.2d at 875.

															[ Footnote 51 ]

															Section 608(e)(2) defines "clearly identified" to require that
the candidate's name, photograph or drawing, or other unambiguous
reference to his identity appear as part of the communication. Such
other unambiguous reference would include use of the candidate's
initials ( e.g., FDR), the candidate's nickname
( e.g., Ike), his office ( e.g., the President or
the Governor of Iowa), or his status as a candidate ( e.g., the Democratic Presidential nominee, the senatorial candidate of
the Republican Party of Georgia).

															[ Footnote 52 ]

															This construction would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1)
to communications containing express words of advocacy of election
or defeat, such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your
ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat,"
"reject."

															[ Footnote 53 ]

															Section 608(e)(1) does not apply to expenditures "on behalf of a
candidate" within the meaning of § 608(c)(2)(B). The latter
subsection provides that expenditures "authorized or requested by
the candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an
agent of the candidate" are to be treated as expenditures of the
candidate and contributions by the person or group making the
expenditure. The House and Senate Reports provide guidance in
differentiating individual expenditures that are contributions and
candidate expenditures under § 608(c)(2)(b) from those treated as
independent expenditures subject to the § 608(e)(1) ceiling. The
House Report speaks of independent expenditures as costs "incurred
without the request or consent of a candidate or his agent."
H.R.Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 6 (1974). The Senate Report addresses the
issue in greater detail. It provides an example illustrating the
distinction between "authorized or requested" expenditures excluded
from § 608(e)(1) and independent expenditures governed by §
608(e)(1):

															"[A] person might purchase billboard advertisements endorsing a
candidate. If he does so completely on his own, and not at the
request or suggestion of the candidate or his agent's,
[ sic ] that would constitute an 'independent expenditure on
behalf of a candidate' under section 614(c) of the bill. The person
making the expenditure would have to report it as such."

															"However, if the advertisement was placed in cooperation with
the candidate's campaign organization, then the amount would
constitute a gift by the supporter and an expenditure by the
candidate -- just as if there had been a direct contribution
enabling the candidate to place the advertisement, himself. It
would be so reported by both."

															S.Rep. No. 93-689, p. 18 (1974). The Conference substitute
adopted the provision of the Senate bill dealing with expenditures
by any person "authorized or requested" to make an expenditure by
the candidate or his agents. S.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1237, p. 55 (1974).
In view of this legislative history and the purposes of the Act, we
find that the "authorized or requested" standard of the Act
operates to treat all expenditures placed in cooperation with or
with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized
committee of the candidate as contributions subject to the
limitations set forth in § 608(b).

															[ Footnote 54 ]

															Appellees mistakenly rely on this Court's decision in CSC v.
Letter Carriers as supporting § 608(e)(1)'s restriction on the
spending of money to advocate the election or defeat of a
particular candidate. In upholding the Hatch Act's broad
restrictions on the associational freedoms of federal employees,
the Court repeatedly emphasized the statutory provision and
corresponding regulation permitting an employee to " [e]xpress
his opinion as an individual privately and publicly on political
subjects and candidates.'" 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 579 ,
quoting 5 CFR § 733.111(a)(2). See 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 561 , 413 U. S. 568 , 413 U. S.
575 -576. Although the Court "unhesitatingly" found that
a statute prohibiting federal employees from engaging in a wide
variety of "partisan political conduct" would "unquestionably be
valid," it carefully declined to endorse provisions threatening
political expression. See id. at 413 U. S. 556 , 413 U. S.
579 -581. The Court did not rule on the constitutional
questions presented by the regulations forbidding partisan campaign
endorsements through the media and speechmaking to political
gatherings, because it found that these restrictions did not "make
the statute substantially overbroad and so invalid on its face." Id. at 413 U. S.
581 . [ Footnote 55 ]

															Neither the voting rights cases nor the Court's decision
upholding the Federal Communications Commission's fairness doctrine
lends support to appellees' position that the First Amendment
permits Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in
political expression in order to enhance the relative voice of
other segments of our society.

															Cases invalidating governmentally imposed wealth restrictions on
the right to vote or file as a candidate for public office rest on
the conclusion that wealth "is not germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process," and is
therefore an insufficient basis on which to restrict a citizen's
fundamental right to vote. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 383 U. S. 668 (1966). See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.
S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U. S. 204 (1970). These voting cases and the reapportionment decisions serve
to assure that citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for
their representatives regardless of factors of wealth or geography.
But the principles that underlie invalidation of governmentally
imposed restrictions on the franchise do not justify governmentally
imposed restrictions on political expression. Democracy depends on
a well informed electorate, not a citizenry legislatively limited
in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues.

															In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.
S. 367 (1969), the Court upheld the political editorial
and personal attack portions of the Federal Communications
Commission's fairness doctrine. That doctrine requires broadcast
licensees to devote programing time to the discussion of
controversial issues of public importance and to present both sides
of such issues. Red Lion "makes clear that the broadcast
media pose unique and special problems not present in the
traditional free speech case," by demonstrating that

															"'it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish.'" Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Comm., 412 U. S.
94 , 412 U. S. 101 (1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co., supra, at 395 U. S. 388 . Red Lion therefore undercuts appellees' claim that §
608(e)(1)'s limitations may permissibly restrict the First
Amendment rights of individuals in this "traditional free speech
case." Moreover, in contrast to the undeniable effect of §
608(e)(1), the presumed effect of the fairness doctrine is one of
"enhancing the volume and quality of coverage" of public issues.
395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
393 .

															[ Footnote 56 ]

															The Act exempts most elements of the institutional press,
limiting only expenditures by institutional press facilities that
are owned or controlled by candidates and political parties. See § 591(f)(4)(A). But whatever differences there may be
between the constitutional guarantees of a free press and of free
speech, it is difficult to conceive of any principled basis upon
which to distinguish § 608(e)(1)'s limitations upon the public at
large and similar limitations imposed upon the press
specifically.

															[ Footnote 57 ]

															The $35,000 ceiling on expenditures by candidates for the Senate
also applies to candidates for the House of Representatives from
States entitled to only one Representative. § 608(a)(1)(b).

															The Court of Appeals treated § 608(a) as relaxing the $1,000 per
candidate contribution limitation imposed by § 608(b)(1) so as to
permit any member of the candidate's immediate family -- spouse,
child, grandparent, brother, sister, or spouse of such persons to
contribute up to the $25,000 over-all annual contribution ceiling
to the candidate. See 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 205, 519 F.2d at
854. The Commission has recently adopted a similar interpretation
of the provision. See Federal Election Commission,
Advisory Opinion 1975-65 (Dec. 5, 1975), 40 Fed.Reg. 58393.
However, both the Court of Appeals and the Commission apparently
overlooked the Conference Report accompanying the final version of
the Act which expressly provides for a contrary interpretation of §
608(a):

															"It is the intent of the conferees that members of the immediate
family of any candidate shall be subject to the contribution
limitations established by this legislation. If a candidate for the
office of Senator, for example, already is in a position to
exercise control over funds of a member of his immediate family
before he becomes a candidate, then he could draw upon these funds
up to the limit of $35,000. If, however, the candidate did not have
access to or control over such funds at the time he became a
candidate, the immediate family member would not be permitted to
grant access or control to the candidate in amounts up to $35,000,
if the immediate family member intends that such amounts are to be
used in the campaign of the candidate. The immediate family member
would be permitted merely to make contributions to the candidate in
amounts not greater than $1,000 for each election involved."

															S.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1237, p. 58 (1974).

															[ Footnote 58 ]

															The Court of Appeals evidently considered the personal funds
expended by the candidate on his own behalf as a contribution,
rather than an expenditure. See 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 205,
519 F.2d at 854. However, unlike a person's contribution to a
candidate, a candidate's expenditure of his personal funds directly
facilitates his own political speech.

															[ Footnote 59 ]

															The legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that §
608(a) was not intended to suspend the application of the $1,000
contribution limitation of § 608(b)(1) for members of the
candidate's immediate family. See n 57, supra. Although the risk of
improper influence is somewhat diminished in the case of large
contributions from immediate family members, we cannot say that the
danger is sufficiently reduced to bar Congress from subjecting
family members to the same limitations as nonfamily
contributors.

															The limitation on a candidate's expenditure of his own funds
differs markedly from a limitation on family contributions both in
the absence of any threat of corruption and the presence of a
legislative restriction on the candidate's ability to fund his own
communication with the voters.

															[ Footnote 60 ]

															Expenditures made by an authorized committee of the candidate or
any other agent of the candidate, as well as any expenditure by any
other person that is "authorized or requested" by the candidate or
his agent, are charged against the candidate's spending ceiling. §
608(c)(2)(b).

															[ Footnote 61 ]

															Expenditures made by or on behalf of a Vice Presidential
candidate of a political party are considered to have been made by
or on behalf of the party's Presidential candidate. §
608(c)(2)(A).

															[ Footnote 62 ]

															The campaign ceilings contained in § 608(c) would have required
a reduction in the scope of a number of previous congressional
campaigns and substantially limited the over-all expenditures of
the two major party Presidential candidates in 1972. See n 21, supra. [ Footnote 63 ]

															This normal relationship may not apply where the candidate
devotes a large amount of his personal resources to his
campaign.

															[ Footnote 64 ]

															As an opinion dissenting in part from the decision below
noted:

															"If a senatorial candidate can raise $1 from each voter, what
evil is exacerbated by allowing that candidate to use all that
money for political communication? I know of none."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 268, 519 F.2d at 917 (Tamm, J.).

															[ Footnote 65 ]

															For the reasons discussed in 424 U. S. infra, Congress may engage in public financing of election
campaigns, and may condition acceptance of public funds on an
agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of
the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo
private fundraising and accept public funding.

															[ Footnote 66 ]

															Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code also established
separate limitations for general election expenditures by national
and state committees of political parties, § 608(f), and for
national political party conventions for the nomination of
Presidential candidates. 26 U.S.C. § 9008(d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
Appellants do not challenge these ceilings on First Amendment
grounds. Instead, they contend that the provisions discriminate
against independent candidates and regional political parties
without national committees, because they permit additional
spending by political parties with national committees. Our
decision today holding § 608(e)(1)'s independent expenditure
limitation unconstitutional and § 608(c)'s campaign expenditure
ceilings unconstitutional removes the predicate for appellants'
discrimination claim by eliminating any alleged advantage to
political parties with national committees.

															[ Footnote 67 ]

															Accordingly, the answers to the certified constitutional
questions pertaining to the Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations are as follows:

															3. Does any statutory limitation, or do the particular
limitations in the challenged statutes, on the amounts that
individuals or organizations may contribute or expend in connection
with elections for federal office violate the rights of one or more
of the plaintiffs under the First, Fifth, or Ninth Amendment or the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States ?

															(a) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it forbids a candidate or the members of his
immediate family from expending personal funds in excess of the
amounts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (1970 ed., Supp.
IV)?

															Answer: YES.

															(b) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it forbids the solicitation, receipt or making of
contributions on behalf of political candidates in excess of the
amounts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)?

															Answer: NO.

															(c) Do 18 U.S.C. §§ 591(e) and 608(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
violate such rights, in that they limit the incidental expenses
which volunteers working on behalf of political candidates may
incur to the amounts specified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 591(e) and 608(b)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV)?

															Answer: NO.

															(d) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it limits to $1,000 the independent (not on behalf
of a candidate) expenditures of any person relative to an
identified candidate?

															Answer: YES.

															(e) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it limits the expenditures of national or state
committees of political parties in connection with general election
campaigns for federal office?

															Answer: NO, as to the Fifth Amendment challenge advanced by
appellants.

															(f) Does § 9008 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 violate
such rights, in that it limits the expenditures of the national
committee of a party with respect to presidential nominating
conventions?

															Answer: NO, as to the Fifth Amendment challenge advanced by
appellants.

															(h) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it excludes from the definition of "political
committee" committees registered for less than the period of time
prescribed in the statute?

															Answer: NO.

															4. Does any statutory limitation, or do the particular
limitations in the challenged statutes, on the amounts that
candidates for elected federal office may expend in their campaigns
violate the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under the First
or Ninth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment?

															(a) Does 18 U.S.C. § 608(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it forbids expenditures by candidates for federal
office in excess of the amounts specified in 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV) ?

															Answer: YES.

															[ Footnote 68 ]

															Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations in 424 U. S. 1970
edition, Supplement IV.

															[ Footnote 69 ]

															Appellants do contend that there should be a blanket exemption
from the disclosure provisions for minor parties. See Part
II-2, infra. [ Footnote 70 ]

															The Court of Appeals' ruling that § 437a is unconstitutional was
not appealed. See n 7, supra. [ Footnote 71 ]

															Past disclosure laws were relatively easy to circumvent, because
candidates were required to report only contributions that they had
received themselves or that were received by others for them with
their knowledge or consent. § 307, 43 Stat. 1072. The data that
were reported were virtually impossible to use, because there were
no uniform rules for the compiling of reports or provisions for
requiring corrections and additions. See Redish, Campaign
Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 900, 905
(1971).

															[ Footnote 72 ] See 424 U. S. supra. The relevant provisions of Title 2 are set forth in
the Appendix to this opinion, infra at 424 U. S. 144 et seq. [ Footnote 73 ] NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 463 . See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.
S. 539 , 372 U. S. 546 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 438 ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. at 361 U. S.
524 .

															[ Footnote 74 ] Id. at 361 U. S.
525 .

															[ Footnote 75 ] Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra at 372 U. S.
546 .

															[ Footnote 76 ]

															The Court of Appeals held that the applicable test for
evaluating the Act's disclosure requirements is that adopted in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.
S. 367 (1968), in which " speech' and `nonspeech'
elements [were] combined in the same course of conduct." Id. at 391 U. S. 376 . O'Brien is appropriate, the Court of Appeals found,
because the Act is directed toward the spending of money, and money
introduces a nonspeech element. As the discussion in 424 U.
S. supra, indicates, O'Brien is
inapposite, for money is a neutral element not always associated
with speech, but a necessary and integral part of many, perhaps
most, forms of communication. Moreover, the O'Brien test
would not be met, even if it were applicable. O'Brien requires that "the governmental interest [be] unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." Id. at 391 U. S. 377 .
The governmental interest furthered by the disclosure requirements
is not unrelated to the "suppression" of speech insofar as the
requirements are designed to facilitate the detection of violations
of the contribution and expenditure limitations set out in 18
U.S.C. § 608 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). [ Footnote 77 ]

															H.R.Rep. No. 92-564, p. 4 (1971).

															[ Footnote 78 ] Ibid.; S.Rep. No. 93-689, p. 2 (1974).

															[ Footnote 79 ]

															We have said elsewhere that "informed public opinion is the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment." Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 297 U. S. 250 (1936). Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.
S. 612 , 347 U. S. 625 (1954) (upholding disclosure requirements imposed on lobbyists by
the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Title III of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839).

															[ Footnote 80 ]

															L. Brandeis, Other People's Money 62 (National Home Library
Foundation ed.1933).

															[ Footnote 81 ] See supra at 424 U. S. 60 .

															[ Footnote 82 ]

															Post-election disclosure by successful candidates is suggested
as a less restrictive way of preventing corrupt pressures on
officeholders. Delayed disclosure of this sort would not serve the
equally important informational function played by pre-election
reporting. Moreover, the public interest in sources of campaign
funds is likely to be at its peak during the campaign period; that
is the time when improper influences are most likely to be brought
to light.

															[ Footnote 83 ]

															Nor is this a case comparable to Pollard v.
Roberts, 283 F.
Supp. 248 (ED Ark.) (three-judge court), aff'd, 393 U. S. 14 (1968), in which an Arkansas prosecuting attorney sought to obtain,
by a subpoena duces tecum, the records of a checking
account (including names of individual contributors) established by
a specific party, the Republican Party of Arkansas.

															[ Footnote 84 ] See Developments in the Law -- Elections, 88
Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1247 n. 75 (1975).

															[ Footnote 85 ] See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S.
23 , 393 U. S. 32 (1968) ("There is, of course, no reason why two parties should
retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote for or
against them. Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at
the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.
S. 234 , 354 U. S.
250 -251 (1957) (plurality opinion).

															[ Footnote 86 ] Cf. Talley v. California, 362 U. S.
60 , 362 U. S. 64 -65
(1960).

															[ Footnote 87 ]

															Allegations made by a branch of the Socialist Workers Party in a
civil action seeking to declare the District of Columbia disclosure
and filing requirements unconstitutional as applied to its records
were held to be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss in Doe v. Martin, 404 F.
Supp. 753 (1975) (three-judge court). The District of Columbia
provisions require every political committee to keep records of
contributions of $10 or more and to report contributors of $50 or
more.

															[ Footnote 88 ]

															For example, a campaign worker who had solicited campaign funds
for the Libertarian Party in New York testified that two persons
solicited in a Party campaign "refused to contribute because they
were unwilling for their names to be disclosed or published." None
of the appellants offers stronger evidence of threats or
harassment.

															[ Footnote 89 ]

															These criteria were suggested in an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part from the decision below. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at
258 n. 1, 519 F.2d at 907 n. 1 (Bazelon, C.J.).

															[ Footnote 90 ]

															Age is also underinclusive, in that it would presumably leave
long-established but unpopular parties subject to the disclosure
requirements. The Socialist Labor Party, which is not a party to
this litigation but which has filed an amicus brief in
support of appellants, claims to be able to offer evidence of
"direct suppression, intimidation, harassment, physical abuse, and
loss of economic sustenance" relating to its contributors. Brief
for Socialist Labor Party as Amicus Curiae 6. The Party
has been in existence since 1877.

															[ Footnote 91 ]

															171 U.S.App.D.C. at 258, 519 F.2d at 907 n. 1 (Bazelon
C.J.).

															[ Footnote 92 ] Id. at 260, 519 F.2d at 909. See also Developments in the Law -- Elections, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111,
1247-1249 (1975).

															[ Footnote 93 ] See Appendix to this opinion, infra at 424 U. S.
160 .

															[ Footnote 94 ] See 424 U. S. supra. [ Footnote 95 ]

															§ 305, 86 Stat. 16.

															[ Footnote 96 ]

															88 Stat. 1265.

															[ Footnote 97 ]

															S.Rep. No. 92-229, p. 57 (1971)

															[ Footnote 98 ] See n. 71 supra. [ Footnote 99 ]

															Section 441(a) provides:

															"Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
subchapter shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both."

															[ Footnote 100 ]

															§§ 431(e), (f). See Appendix to this opinion, infra at 424 U. S.
145 -149. See supra at 424 U. S.
61 -63.

															[ Footnote 101 ]

															S.Rep. No. 92-96, p. 33 (1971); S.Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 1-2
(1974).

															[ Footnote 102 ] See supra at 424 U. S.
61 -63.

															[ Footnote 103 ] See n 53, supra. [ Footnote 104 ] See 424 U. S. supra. [ Footnote 105 ]

															Section 431(d) defines "political committee" as

															"any committee, club, association, or other group of persons
which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a
calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000."

															[ Footnote 106 ]

															At least two lower courts, seeking to avoid questions of
unconstitutionality, have construed the disclosure requirements
imposed on "political committees" by § 434(a) to be nonapplicable
to nonpartisan organizations. United States v. National Comm.
for Impeachment, 469 F.2d at 1139-1142; American Civil
Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. at 1055-1057. See also 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 214 n. 112, 519 F.2d at 863
n. 112.

															[ Footnote 107 ]

															Some partisan committees -- groups within the control of the
candidate or primarily organized for political activities -- will
fall within § 434(e) because their contributions and expenditures
fall in the $100-to-$1,000 range. Groups of this sort that do not
have contributions and expenditures over $1,000 are not "political
committees" within the definition in § 431(d); those whose
transactions are not as great as $100 are not required to file
statements under § 434(e).

															[ Footnote 108 ] See n 52, supra. [ Footnote 109 ]

															Of course, independent contributions and expenditures made in
support of the campaigns of candidates of parties that have been
found to be exempt from the general disclosure requirements because
of the possibility of consequent chill and harassment would be
exempt from the requirements of § 434(e).

															[ Footnote 110 ] See supra at 424 U. S.
61 -63.

															[ Footnote 111 ]

															"Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it
the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as
well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen
that a line or point there must be, and that there is no
mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of
the legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very
wide of any reasonable mark." Louisville as Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S.
32 , 277 U. S. 41 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 112 ]

															Appellants' final argument is directed against § 434(d), which
exempts from the reporting requirements certain "photographic,
matting, or recording services" furnished to Congressmen in
nonelection years. See Appendix to this opinion, infra at 424 U. S. 159 .
Although we are troubled by the considerable advantages that this
exemption appears to give to incumbents, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that, in the absence of record evidence of misuse or undue
discriminatory impact, this provision represents a reasonable
accommodation between the legitimate and necessary efforts of
legislators to communicate with their constituents and activities
designed to win elections by legislators in their other role as
politicians.

															[ Footnote 113 ]

															Accordingly, we respond to the certified questions, as
follows:

															7. Do the particular requirements in the challenged statutes
that persons disclose the amounts that they contribute or expend in
connection with elections for federal office or that candidates for
such office disclose the amounts that they expend in their
campaigns violate the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under
the First, Fourth, or Ninth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment?

															(a) Do 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(b), (c), and (d) and 438(a)(8) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV) violate such rights, in that they provide, through
auditing procedures, for the Federal Election Commission to inspect
lists and records required to be kept by political committees of
individuals who contribute more than $10?

															Answer: NO.

															(b) Does 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b)(1)-(8) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate
such rights, in that it requires political committees to register
and disclose the names, occupations, and principal places of
business (if any) of those of their contributors who contribute in
excess of $100?

															Answer: NO.

															(c) Does 2 U.S.C. § 434(d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it neither requires disclosure of nor treats as
contribution to or expenditure by incumbent officeholders the
resources enumerated in 2 U.S.C. § 434(d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)?

															Answer: NO.

															(d) Does 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate such
rights, in that it provides that every person contributing or
expending more than $100 other than by contribution to a political
committee or candidate (including volunteers with incidental
expenses in excess of $600) must make disclosure to the Federal
Election Commission ?

															Answer: NO.

															[ Footnote 114 ]

															The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, Title IV of
Pub.L. 89-909, §§ 301-305, 80 Stat. 1587, was the first such
provision. This Act also initiated the dollar check-off provision
now contained in 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act was
suspended, however, by a 1967 provision barring any appropriations
until Congress adopted guidelines for the distribution of money
from the Fund. Pub.L. 90-26, § 5, 81 Stat. 58. In 1971, Congress
added Subtitle H to the Internal Revenue Code. Pub.L. 92-178, §
801, 85 Stat. 562. Chapter 95 thereof provided public financing of
general election campaigns for President; this legislation was to
become effective for the 1976 election and is substantially the
same as the present scheme. Congress later amended the dollar
check-off provision, deleting the taxpayers' option to designate
specific parties as recipients of their money. Pub.L. 93-53, § 6,
87 Stat. 138. Finally, the 1974 amendments added to Chapter 95
provisions for financing nominating conventions and enacted a new
Chapter 96 providing matching funds for campaigns in Presidential
primaries. Pub.L. 93-443, §§ 403-408, 88 Stat. 1291.

															[ Footnote 115 ]

															Unless otherwise indicated all statutory citations in this 424 U. S. Title
26 of the United States Code, 1970 edition, Supplement IV.

															[ Footnote 116 ] See n 6, supra. [ Footnote 117 ]

															Priorities are established when the Fund is insufficient to
satisfy all entitlements in any election year: the amount in the
Fund is first allocated to convention funding, then to financing
the general election, and finally to primary matching assistance. See §§ 9008(a), 9037(a). But the law does not specify how
funds are to be allocated among recipients within these categories. Cf. § 9006(d).

															[ Footnote 118 ]

															Independent candidates might be excluded from general election
funding by Chapter 95. See §§ 9002(2)(B), 9003(a), (c),
9004(a)(2), (c), 9005(a), 9006(c). Serious questions might arise as
to the constitutionality of excluding from free annual assistance
candidates not affiliated with a "political party" solely because
they lack such affiliation. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.
S. 724 , 415 U. S.
745 -746 (1974). But we have no occasion to address that
question in this case. The possibility of construing Chapter 95 as
affording financial assistance to independent candidates was
remarked by the Court of Appeals. 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 238, 519 F.2d
at 887. The only announced independent candidate for President
before the Court -- former Senator McCarthy -- has publicly
announced that he will refuse any public assistance. Moreover, he
is affiliated with the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency --
McCarthy '76, and there is open the question whether it would
qualify as a "political party" under Subtitle:.

															[ Footnote 119 ]

															No party to this case has challenged the constitutionality of
this expenditure limit.

															[ Footnote 120 ]

															This amount is the same as the expenditure limit provided in 18
U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Court of Appeals
viewed the provisions as "complementary stratagems." 171
U.S.App.D.C. at 201, 519 F.2d at 850. Since the Court today holds §
608(c)(1) to be unconstitutional, the question of the severability
of general election funding as now constituted arises. We hold that
the provisions are severable for the reasons stated in 424 U.
S. infra. [ Footnote 121 ]

															No separate pledge is required from the candidate's party, but
if the party organization is an "authorized committee" or "agent,"
expenditures by the party may be attributed to the candidate. 18
U.S.C. § 608(c)(2)(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See §
608(b)(4)(A).

															[ Footnote 122 ]

															As with Chapter 95, any constitutional question that may arise
from the exclusion of independent candidates from any assistance,
such as funds to defray expenses of getting on state ballots by
petition drives, need not be addressed in this case. See n 118, supra. [ Footnote 123 ]

															As with general election funding, this limit is the same as the
candidate expenditure limit of 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV). See n 120, supra, and 424 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 124 ]

															The scheme involves no compulsion upon individuals to finance
the dissemination of ideas with which they disagree, Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U. S. 820 , 367 U. S. 871 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 367 U. S. 882 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 , 367 U. S. 778 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 367 U. S.
788 -792 (Black, J., dissenting). The § 6096 check-off is
simply the means by which Congress determines the amount of its
appropriation.

															[ Footnote 125 ]

															Some proposals for public financing would give taxpayers the
opportunity to designate the candidate or party to receive the
dollar, and § 6096 initially offered this choice. See n 114, supra. The voucher system proposed by Senator Metcalf, as amicus
curiae here, also allows taxpayers this option. But Congress
need not provide a mechanism for allowing taxpayers to designate
the means in which their particular tax dollars are spent. See n 124, supra. Further, insofar as these proposals are offered as
less restrictive means, Congress had legitimate reasons for
rejecting both. The designation option was criticized on privacy
grounds, 119 Cong.Rec. 22598, 22396 (1973), and also because the
identity of all candidates would not be known by April 15, the
filing day for annual individual and joint tax returns. Senator
Metcalf's proposal has also been criticized as possibly leading to
black markets and to coercion to obtain vouchers, and as
administratively impractical.

															[ Footnote 126 ]

															Appellants voice concern that public funding will lead to
governmental control of the internal affairs of political parties,
and thus to a significant loss of political freedom. The concern is
necessarily wholly speculative and hardly a basis for invalidation
of the public financing scheme on its face. Congress has expressed
its determination to avoid the possibility. S.Rep. No. 93-689, pp.
910 (1974).

															[ Footnote 127 ]

															The historical bases of the Religion and Speech Clauses are
markedly different. Intolerable persecutions throughout history led
to the Framers' firm determination that religious worship -- both
in method and belief -- must be strictly protected from government
intervention.

															"Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an
awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established
religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 432 (1962) (footnote omitted). See Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 8 -15
(1947). But the central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was
to assure a society in which "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive,
for only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy
flourish. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 , 376 U. S. 270 (1964). Legislation to enhance these First Amendment values is the
rule, not the exception. Our statute books are replete with laws
providing financial assistance to the exercise of free speech, such
as aid to public broadcasting and other forms of educational media,
47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399, and preferential postal rates and antitrust
exemptions for newspapers, 39 CFR § 132.2 (1975); 15 U.S.C. §§
1801-1804.

															[ Footnote 128 ]

															Appellants maintain that denial of funding is a more severe
restriction than denial of access to the ballot, because write-in
candidates can win elections, but candidates without funds cannot.
New parties will be unfinanced, however, only if they are unable to
get private financial support, which presumably reflects a general
lack of public support for the party. Public financing of some
candidates does not make private fundraising for others any more
difficult; indeed, the elimination of private contributions to
major party Presidential candidates might make more private money
available to minority candidates.

															[ Footnote 129 ]

															Appellants dispute the relevance of this answer to their
argument on the ground that they will not be able to raise money to
equal major party spending. As a practical matter, however,
Subtitle H does not enhance the major parties' ability to campaign;
it substitutes public funding for what the parties would raise
privately and additionally imposes an expenditure limit. If a party
cannot raise funds privately, there are legitimate reasons not to
provide public funding, which would effectively facilitate hopeless
candidacies.

															[ Footnote 130 ]

															Our only prior decision dealing with a system of public
financing, American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.
S. 767 (1974), also recognized that such provisions are
less restrictive than regulation of ballot access. Texas required
major parties -- there called "political parties" -- to nominate
candidates by primaries, and the State reimbursed the parties for
some of the expenses incurred in holding the primaries. But Texas
did not subsidize other parties for the expenses involved in
qualifying for the ballot, and this denial was claimed to be a
denial of equal protection of the laws. We said that we were

															"unconvinced . . . that this financing law is an 'exclusionary
mechanism' which 'tends to deny some voters the opportunity to vote
for a candidate of their choosing' or that it has 'a real and
appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise.'" Id. at 415 U. S. 794 ,
quoting from Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 144 .
That the aid in American Party was provided to parties and not to
candidates, as is most of the Subtitle H funding, is
immaterial.

															[ Footnote 131 ]

															The allegations of invidious discrimination are based on the
claim that Subtitle H is facially invalid; since the public
financing provisions have never been in operation, appellants are
unable to offer factual proof that the scheme is discriminatory in
its effect. In rejecting appellants' arguments, we of course do not
rule out the possibility of concluding in some future case, upon an
appropriate factual demonstration, that the public financing system
invidiously discriminates against nonmajor parties.

															[ Footnote 132 ]

															In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt ran as the candidate of the
Progressive Party, which had split off from the Republican Party,
and he received more votes than William H. Taft, the Republican
candidate. But this third-party "threat" was short-lived; in 1916,
the Progressives came back into the Republican Party when the party
nominated Charles Evans Hughes as its candidate for the Presidency.
With the exception of 1912, the major party candidates have
outpolled all others in every Presidential election since 1856.

															[ Footnote 133 ]

															Appellants suggest that a less discriminatory formula would be
to grant full funding to the candidate of the party getting the
most votes in the last election and then give money to candidates
of other parties based on their showing in the last election
relative to the "leading" party. That formula, however, might
unfairly favor incumbents, since their major party challengers
would receive less financial assistance. See S.Rep. No.
93-689, p. 10 (1974).

															[ Footnote 134 ]

															Appellants argue that this effort to "catch up" is hindered by
the contribution limits in 18 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
and that therefore the public financing provisions are
unconstitutional. Whatever merit the point may have, which is
questionable on the basis of the record before the Court, it is
answered in our treatment of the contribution limits. See 424 U. S. supra. [ Footnote 135 ]

															There will, however, be no minor party candidates in the 1976
Presidential election, since no 1972 candidate other than those of
the major parties received 5% of the popular vote.

															[ Footnote 136 ]

															Another suggested alternative is Senator Metcalf's voucher
scheme, but we have previously mentioned problems presented by that
deice. See 424 U. S. 125, supra. The United States suggests that a matching formula
could be used for general election funding, as it is for funding
primary campaigns, in order to relate current funding to current
support more closely. Congress could readily have concluded,
however, that the matching formula was inappropriate for the
general election. The problems in determining the relative strength
of candidates at the primaries stage of the campaign are far
greater than after a candidate has obtained the nomination of a
major party. See S.Rep. No. 93 689, p. 6 (1974). It might
be eminently reasonable, therefore, to employ a matching formula
for primary elections related to popular support evidenced by
numerous smaller contributions, yet inappropriate for general
election financing as inconsistent with the congressional effort to
remove the influence of private contributions and to relieve
candidates of the burden of fundraising. Ibid. [ Footnote 137 ] Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 , 393 U. S. 31 -32
(1968); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.
S. 234 , 354 U. S.
250 -251 (1957) (plurality opinion). Cf. Talley v.
California, 362 U. S. 60 , 362 U. S. 64 (1960).

															[ Footnote 138 ]

															Apart from the adjustment for inflation, and assuming a major
party entitlement of $20,000,000, a candidate getting 5% of the
popular vote, when the balance is divided between two major
parties, would be entitled to a post-election payment of more than
$2,100,000 if that sum remains after priority allocations from the
fund.

															[ Footnote 139 ]

															It is also argued that Storer v. Brown, 415 U.
S. 724 (1974), is a better analogy than Jenness. In Storer, a candidate could qualify for
the ballot by obtaining the signatures of 5% of the voters, but the
signatures could not include any voters who voted for another
candidate at the primary election. 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 739 .
The analogy, however, is no better than Jenness. The
Chapter 95 formula is not more restrictive than that sustained in
the two cases, since for the reasons stated earlier, supra at 424 U. S. 94 -95,
it burdens minority interests less than ballot access
regulations.

															[ Footnote 140 ]

															On similar grounds, we sustain the 10-state requirement in §
9002(2). Success in Presidential elections depends on winning
electoral votes in States, not solely popular votes, and the
requirement is plainly not unreasonable in light of that fact.

															[ Footnote 141 ]

															As with primary campaigns, Congress could reasonably determine
that there was no need for reforms as to minor party conventions. See infra at 424 U. S.
105 -106. This contribution limit applies to
"contributions to any candidate," 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV), and thus would not govern gifts to a party for general
purposes, such as convention funding. Although "contributions to a
named candidate made to any political committee" are within §
608(b)(1) if the committee is authorized in writing by a candidate
to accept contributions, § 608(b)(4)(A), contributions to a party
not for the benefit of any specific candidate would apparently not
be subject to the $1,000 ceiling. Moreover, § 608(b)(4)(A) governs
only party organizations authorized by a candidate in writing to
accept contributions.

															[ Footnote 142 ]

															With respect to the denial of funds to candidates who may not be
affiliated with a "political party" for the purposes of public
financing, see n 118, supra. [ Footnote 143 ]

															Appellants argue that this reasoning from Katzenbach v.
Morgan is inapplicable to this case involving First Amendment
guarantees. But the argument as to the denial of funds to certain
candidates primarily claims invidious discrimination and hence
presents Fifth Amendment questions, though with First Amendment
overtones, as in Katzenbach v. Morgan. [ Footnote 144 ]

															Appellants contend that the 20-state requirement directly
conflicts with Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.
S. 814 (1969), but that case is distinguishable. Only 7%
of the Illinois voters could have blocked a candidate from
qualifying for the ballot, even though the state-wide elections
were decided by straight majority vote. The clear purpose was to
keep any person from being nominated without support in downstate
counties making up only 7% of the vote, but those same voters could
not come close to defeating a candidate in the general election.
There is no similar restriction here on the opportunity to vote for
any candidate, and the 20-state requirement is not an unreasonable
method of measuring a candidate's breadth of support. See
supra at 424 U. S.
103 -105.

															[ Footnote 145 ]

															The fear that barriers would be reduced too much was one reason
for rejecting a matching formula for the general election financing
system. See n 136, supra. [ Footnote 146 ]

															By offering a single hypothetical situation, appellants try to
prove that the matching formula gives wealthy contributors an
advantage. Taxpayers are entitled to a deduction from ordinary
income for political contributions up to $100, or $200 on a joint
return. § 218. Appellants note that a married couple in the 70% tax
bracket could give $500 to a candidate and claim the full deduction
allowed by § 218, thus reducing their tax liability by $140. The
matching funds increase the effective contribution to $1,000, and
the total cost to the contributors is $360. But the appellants have
disregarded a myriad of other possibilities. For example, taxpayers
also have the option of claiming a tax credit up to $25, or $50 on
a joint return, for one-half of their political contributions. §
41. Any married couple could give $100 to a candidate, claim the
full $50 credit, and matching thus allows a contribution of $200 at
a cost of only $50 to the contributors. Because this example and
others involve greater subsidization -- 75% against 64% -- of
smaller contributions than is involved in appellants' hypothesis,
one cannot say that the matching formula unfairly favors wealthy
interests or large contributors. Moreover, the effect noted by
appellants diminishes as the size of individual contributions
approaches $1,000.

															Finally, these examples clearly reveal that §§ 41 and 218 afford
public subsidies for candidates, but appellants have raised no
constitutional challenge to the provisions, either on First or
Fifth Amendment grounds.

															[ Footnote 147 ]

															Our responses to the certified constitutional questions
pertaining to public financing of Presidential election campaigns
are:

															5. Does any statutory provision for the public financing of
political conventions or campaigns for nomination or election to
the Presidency or Vice Presidency violate the rights of one or more
of the plaintiffs under the First or Ninth Amendment, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States?

															Answer: NO.

															6. Do the particular provisions of Subtitle H and § 6096 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 deprive one or more of the plaintiffs
of such rights under the First or Ninth Amendment or Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 1, in that they provide federal tax money to
support certain political candidates, parties, movements, and
organizations or in the manner that they so provide such federal
tax money?

															Answer: NO.

															[ Footnote 148 ]

															Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations in 424 U. S. 1970 edition, Supplement
IV, the relevant provisions of which are set forth in the 424 U.S.
1 app|>Appendix to this opinion, infra at
144144-180.

															[ Footnote 149 ]

															In administering Chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26, which provide
for funding of Presidential election and primary campaigns,
respectively, the Commission is empowered, inter alia, "to
prescribe such rules and regulations . . . as it deems necessary to
carry out the functions and duties imposed on it" by each chapter.
26 U.S.C. § 9009(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). See also 26
U.S.C. § 9039(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 150 ]

															The sections from Title 18, incorporated by reference into
several of the provisions relating to the Commission's powers, were
either enacted or amended by the 1971 Act or the 1974 amendments.
They are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615,
616, and 617 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) (hereinafter referred to as Title
18 sections).

															[ Footnote 151 ]

															Section 437c(b) also provides, somewhat redundantly, that the
Commission "shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and
formulate policy with respect to this Act" and the Title 18
sections.

															[ Footnote 152 ]

															The Commission is charged with the duty under each Act to
receive and pass upon requests by eligible candidates for campaign
money and certify them to the Secretary of the Treasury for the
latter's disbursement from the Fund. See 26 U.S.C. §§
9003-9007, 9033-9038 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 153 ]

															This conclusion seems to follow from the manner in which the
subsections of § 437g interrelate. Any person may file, and the
Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate shall refer,
believed or apparent civil or criminal violations to the
Commission. Upon receipt of a complaint or referral, as the case
may be, the Commission is directed to notify the person involved
and to report the violation to the Attorney General or to make an
investigation. § 437g(a)(2). The Commission shall conduct a hearing
at that person's request. § 437g(a)(4). If, after its
investigation, the Commission "determines . . . that there is
reason to believe" that a "violation of this Act," i.e., a
civil violation, has occurred or is about to occur, it "may
endeavor to correct such violation by informal methods," failing
which, the Commission "may institute a civil action for relief." §
437g(a)(5). Finally, paragraph (6) provides as follows:

															"The Commission shall refer apparent violations to the
appropriate law enforcement authorities to the extent that
violations of provisions of chapter 29 of Title 18 are involved, or if the Commission is unable to correct apparent
violations of this Act under the authority given it by
paragraph (5), or if the Commission determines that any such
referral is appropriate."

															§ 437g(a)(6) (emphasis added). While it is clear that the
Commission has a duty to refer apparent criminal violations either
upon their initial receipt or after an investigation, it would
appear at the very least that the Commission, which has "primary
jurisdiction" with respect to civil enforcement, § 437c(b), has the
sole discretionary power "to determine" whether or not a civil
violation has occurred or is about to occur, and consequently
whether or not informal or judicial remedies will be pursued.

															[ Footnote 154 ]

															Such a finding is subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. [ Footnote 155 ]

															§ 437c(a)(1), set forth in the Appendix to this opinion, infra at 424 U. S.
161 -162.

															[ Footnote 156 ]

															§ 437c(a)(1)(A)

															[ Footnote 157 ]

															The Court of Appeals, following the sequence of the certified
questions, adopted a piecemeal approach to the six questions,
reproduced below, concerning the method of appointment and powers
of the Commission. Its basic holding, in answer to question 8(a),
was that "Congress has the constitutional authority to establish
and appoint [the Commission] to carry out appropriate legislative
functions." 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 244, 519 F.2d at 890. Appellants'
claim, embodied in questions 8(b) through 8(f), that the
Commission's powers go well beyond "legislative functions" and are
facially invalid was, in an overarching sense, not ripe, since

															"[w]hether particular powers are predominantly executive or
judicial, or insufficiently related to the exercise of appropriate
legislative power is an abstract question . . . better decided in
the context of a particular factual controversy." Id. at 243, 519 F.2d at 892. While some of the
statutory grants such as civil enforcement and candidate
disqualification powers (questions 8(c) and 8(e)) raised, in the
court's view, "very serious constitutional questions," only the
power of the Commission to issue advisory opinions under § 437f(a)
was ripe in the context of an attack on Congress' method of
appointment. Even then, beyond the Commission's power to inform the
public of its interpretations, the question whether Congress under
§ 437f(b) could validly give substantive effect to the
Commission's opinions in later civil and criminal enforcement
proceedings should, the Court of Appeals held, await a case in
which a defense based on § 437f(b) was asserted. Finally, the
question of the Commission's power under 26 U.S.C. § 9008(d)(3)
(1970 ed., Supp. IV) to authorize nominating convention
expenditures in excess of the statutory limits (question 8(f)) was
found ripe because appellants had not challenged it in relation to
the method of appointment, but had asserted only that 26 U.S.C. §
9008(d)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) vested excessive discretion in the
Commission. The Court of Appeals found that Congress had provided
sufficient guidelines to withstand that attack.

															The Court of Appeals accordingly answered the six certified
questions as follows:

															"8. Do the provisions in the challenged statutes concerning the
powers and method of appointment of the Federal Election Commission
violate the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under the
constitutional separation of powers, the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, or Ninth Amendment, Article I, Section 2, Clause 6, Article
I, Section 5, Clause 1, or Article III?"

															"(a) Does 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) violate such rights by the method
of appointment of the Federal Election Commission? . . ."

															"Answer: NO"

															"(b) Do 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d and 437g violate such rights, in that
they entrust administration and enforcement of the FECA to the
Federal Election Commission? . . ."

															"Answer: NO as to the power to issue advisory opinions; UNRIPE
as to all else."

															"(c) Does 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) violate such rights, in that it
empowers the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General
to bring civil actions (including proceedings for injunctions)
against any person who has engaged or who may engage in acts or
practices which violate the Federal Election Campaign Act, as
amended, or §§ 608, 610, 611, 613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title
18? . . ."

															"Answer: UNRIPE FOR RESOLUTION"

															"(d) Does 2 U.S.C. § 438(c) violate such rights, in that it
empowers the Federal Election Commission to make rules under the
FECA in the manner specified therein? . . ."

															"Answer: UNRIPE FOR RESOLUTION"

															"(e) Does 2 U.S.C. § 456 violate such rights, in that it imposes
a temporary disqualification on any candidate for election to
federal office who is found by the Federal Election Commission to
have failed to file a report required by Title III of the Federal
Election Campaign Act, a amended . . ."

															"Answer: UNRIPE FOR RESOLUTION"

															"(f) Does § 9008 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 violate
such rights, in that it empowers the Federal Election Commission to
authorize expenditures of the national committee of a party with
respect to presidential nominating conventions in excess of the
limits enumerated therein? . . ."

															"Answer: NO"

															[ Footnote 158 ]

															With respect to the Commission's power under 26 U.S.C. §
9008(d)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) to authorize excessive convention
expenditures (question 8(f)), the fact that appellants in the Court
of Appeals may have focused their attack primarily or even
exclusively upon the asserted lack of standards attendant to that
power, see 424 U. S. 157, supra, does not foreclose them from challenging that power
in relation to Congress' method of appointment of the Commission's
members. Question 8(f) asks whether vesting the Commission with
this power under 26 U.S.C. § 9008 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violates
"such rights," which, by reference to question 8, includes "the
rights of [appellants] under the constitutional separation of
powers." Since the certified questions themselves provide our
jurisdictional framework, § 437h(b), the separation of powers
aspect of appellants' attack on 26 U.S.C. § 9008(d)(3) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV) is properly before this Court.

															[ Footnote 159 ]

															The Federalist No. 47, p. 299 (G. P. Putnam's Sons ed.1908).

															[ Footnote 160 ] Id. at 302-303 (emphasis in original).

															[ Footnote 161 ]

															The Federalist No. 51, pp. 323-324 (G. P. Putnam's Sons
ed.1908).

															[ Footnote 162 ]

															" Officers of the United States " does not include all
employees of the United States, but there is no claim made that the
Commissioners are employees of the United States, rather than
officers. Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to
officers of the United States, see Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310 , 137 U. S. 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S.
508 (1879), whereas the Commissioners, appointed for a
statutory term, are not subject to the control or direction of any
other executive, judicial, or legislative authority.

															[ Footnote 163 ]

															Rule II of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the
earliest form of which was adopted in 1789, provides for the
election by the House, at the commencement of each Congress of a
Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Doorkeeper, Postmaster, and Chaplain, each
of whom, in turn, is given appointment power over the employees of
his department. Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of
Representatives §§ 635-636. While there is apparently no equivalent
rule on the Senate side, one of the first orders of business at the
first session of the Senate, April, 1789, was to elect a Secretary
and a Doorkeeper. Senate Journal 10 (1st & 2d Congress
1789-1793).

															[ Footnote 164 ]

															2 U.S.C. § 60-1(b).

															[ Footnote 165 ]

															Appellee Commission has relied for analogous support on the
existence of the Comptroller General, who, as a "legislative
officer," had significant duties under the 1971 Act. § 308, 86
Stat. 16. But irrespective of Congress' designation, cf. 31 U.S.C. § 65(d), the Comptroller General is appointed by the
President in conformity with the Appointments Clause. 31 U.S.C. §
42.

															[ Footnote 166 ]

															2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp.
74, 76 (1911); The Federalist No. 48, pp. 308-310 (G. P. Putnam's
Sons ed.1908) (J. Madison); The Federalist No. 71, pp. 447 448 (G.
P. Putnam's Sons ed.1908) (A. Hamilton). See generally Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 983, 1029-1048 (1975).

															[ Footnote 167 ]

															J. Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787,
p. 385 (Ohio Univ. Press ed.1966).

															[ Footnote 168 ] Id. at 472 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 169 ]

															"Col. Mason in opposition to Mr. Read's motion desired it might
be considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the
legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of
it." Ibid. [ Footnote 170 ] Id. at 521

															[ Footnote 171 ] Id. at 527.

															[ Footnote 172 ] Id. at 571-573.

															[ Footnote 173 ] Id. at 575

															[ Footnote 174 ]

															"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators."

															[ Footnote 175 ]

															Since, in future legislation that may be enacted in response to
today's decision, Congress might choose not to confer one or more
of the powers under discussion to a properly appointed agency, our
assumption is arguendo only. Considerations of ripeness
prevent us from deciding, for example, whether such an agency
could, under § 456, disqualify a candidate for federal election
consistently with Art. I, § 5, cl. 1. With respect to this and
other powers discussed infra this page and 424 U.S.
1 38 -141, we need pass only upon their nature in relation
to the Appointments Clause, and not upon their validity vel
non. [ Footnote 176 ]

															Before a rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission under
§ 438(a)(10) may go into effect, it must be transmitted either to
the Senate or House of Representatives together with "a detailed
explanation and justification of such rule or regulation." § 438
(G)(1). If the House of Congress to which the rule is required to
be transmitted disapproves the proposed regulation within the
specified period of time, it may not be promulgated by the
Commission. Appellants make a separate attack on this qualification
of the Commission's rulemaking authority, which is but the most
recent episode in a long tug of war between the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Federal Government respecting the
permissible extent of legislative involvement in rulemaking under
statutes which have already been enacted. The history of these
episodes is described in Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66
Harv.L.Rev. 569 (1953); in Newman & Keaton, Congress and the
Faithful Execution of Laws -- Should Legislators Supervise
Administrators?, 41 Calif.L.Rev. 565 (1953); and in Watson, supra, n 166.
Because of our holding that the manner of appointment of the
members of the Commission precludes them from exercising the
rulemaking powers in question, we have no occasion to address this
separate challenge of appellants.

															[ Footnote 177 ]

															The subsidiary questions certified by the District Court
relating to the composition of the Federal Election Commission,
together with our answers thereto, are as follows:

															Question 8(a). Does 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
violate [the rights of one or more of the plaintiffs under the
constitutional separation of powers, the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, or Ninth Amendment, Art. I, § 2, cl. 6, Art. I, § 5, cl. 1,
or Art. III] by the method of appointment of the Federal Election
Commission?

															With respect to the powers referred to in Questions 8(b)-8(f),
the method of appointment violates Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the
Constitution.

															Question 8(b). Do 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d and 437g (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
violate such rights, in that they entrust administration and
enforcement of the FECA to the Federal Election Commission?

															Question 8(c). Does 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
violate such rights, in that it empowers the Federal Election
Commission and the Attorney General to bring civil action
(including proceedings for injunctions) against any person who has
engaged or who may engage in acts or practices which violate the
Federal Election Campaign Act, as amended, or §§ 608, 610, 611,
613, 614, 615, 616, or 617 of Title 18 (1970 ed., Supp. IV)?

															Question 8(d). Does 2 U.S.C. § 438(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV)
violate such rights in that it empowers the Federal Election
Commission to make rules under the FECA in the manner specified
therein?

															Question 8(e). Does 2 U.S.C. § 456 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate
such rights, in that it imposes a temporary disqualification on any
candidate for election to federal office who is found by the
Federal Election Commission to have failed to file a report
required by Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act, as
amended?

															Question 8(f). Does § 9008 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
violate such rights, in that it empowers the Federal Election
Commission to authorize expenditures of the national committee of a
party with respect to Presidential nominating conventions in excess
of the limits enumerated therein?

															The Federal Election Commission, as presently constituted, may
not, under Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, exercise the
powers referred to in Questions 8(b)-8(f).

															[ Footnote 178 ]

															We have not set forth specific answers to some of the certified
questions. Question 9, dealing with alleged vagueness in several
provisions, 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 252, 519 F.2d at 901 (Appendix A),
is resolved in the opinion to the extent urged by the parties. We
need not respond to questions 3(g), 3(i), 4(b), and 7(f), id. at 250-251, 519 F.2d at 899-900 (Appendix A), to
resolve the issues presented.

															* Based upon Federal Election Campaign Laws, compiled by the
Senate Library for the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of
the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (1975).

															* So in original.

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															For reasons set forth more fully later, I dissent from those
parts of the Court's holding sustaining the statutory provisions
(a) for disclosure of small contributions, (b) for limitations on
contributions, and (c) for public financing of Presidential
campaigns. In my view, the Act's disclosure scheme is impermissibly
broad and violative of the First Amendment as it relates to
reporting contributions in excess of $10 and $100. The contribution
limitations infringe on First Amendment liberties and suffer from
the same infirmities that the Court correctly sees in the
expenditure ceilings. The system for public financing of
Presidential campaigns is, in my judgment, an impermissible
intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private
political process.

															More broadly, the Court's result does violence to the intent of
Congress in this comprehensive scheme of campaign finance. By
dissecting the Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the
Court fails to recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than
the sum of its parts. Page 424 U. S. 236 Congress intended to regulate all aspects of federal campaign
finances, but what remains after today's holding leaves no more
than a shadow of what Congress contemplated. I question whether the
residue leaves a workable program. (1) DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS Disclosure is, in principle, the salutary and constitutional
remedy for most of the ills Congress was seeking to alleviate. I
therefore agree fully with the broad proposition that public
disclosure of contributions by individuals and by entities --
particularly corporations and labor unions -- is an effective means
of revealing the type of political support that is sometimes
coupled with expectations of special favors or rewards. That
disclosure impinges on First Amendment rights is conceded by the
Court, ante at 424 U. S. 666 ,
but, given the objectives to which disclosure is directed, I agree
that the need for disclosure outweighs individual constitutional
claims.

															Disclosure is, however, subject to First Amendment limitations
which are to be defined by looking to the relevant public
interests. The legitimate public interest is the elimination of the
appearance and reality of corrupting influences. Serious dangers to
the very processes of government justify disclosure of
contributions of such dimensions reasonably thought likely to
purchase special favors. These fears have been at the root of the
Court's prior decisions upholding disclosure requirements, and I
therefore have no disagreement, for example, with Burroughs v.
United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934).

															The Court's theory, however, goes beyond permissible limits.
Under the Court's view, disclosure serves broad informational
purposes, enabling the public to be fully informed on matters of
acute public interest. Forced disclosure of one aspect of a
citizen's political activity, Page 424 U. S. 237 under this analysis, serves the public right to know. This
open-ended approach is the only plausible justification for the
otherwise irrationally low ceilings of $10 and $100 for anonymous
contributions. The burdens of these low ceilings seem to me
obvious, and the Court does not try to question this. With
commendable candor, the Court acknowledges:

															"It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions
to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals who
otherwise might contribute." Ante at 424 U. S. 68 .
Examples come readily to mind. Rank-and-file union members or
rising junior executives may now think twice before making even
modest contributions to a candidate who is disfavored by the union
or management hierarchy. Similarly, potential contributors may well
decline to take the obvious risks entailed in making a reportable
contribution to the opponent of a well entrenched incumbent. This
fact of political life did not go unnoticed by the Congress:

															"The disclosure provisions really have, in fact, made it
difficult for challengers to challenge incumbents."

															120 Cong.Rec. 34392 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Long). See
Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.
Supp. 248 (ED Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U. S.
14 (1968).

															The public right to know ought not be absolute when its exercise
reveals private political convictions. Secrecy, like privacy, is
not per se criminal. On the contrary, secrecy and privacy
as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental in a
free society. For example, one of the great political reforms was
the advent of the secret ballot as a universal practice. Similarly,
the enlightened labor legislation of our time has enshrined the
secrecy of choice of a bargaining representative for Page 424 U. S. 238 workers. In other contexts, this Court has seen to it that
governmental power cannot be used to force a citizen to disclose
his private affiliations, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.
S. 415 (1963), even without a record reflecting any
systematic harassment or retaliation, as in Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). For me it is far too late in the day to recognize an
ill-defined "public interest" to breach the historic safeguards
guaranteed by the First Amendment.

															We all seem to agree that, whatever the legitimate public
interest in this area, proper analysis requires us to scrutinize
the precise means employed to implement that interest. The
balancing test used by the Court requires that fair recognition be
given to competing interests. With respect, I suggest the Court has
failed to give the traditional standing to some of the First
Amendment values at stake here. Specifically, it has failed to
confine the particular exercise of governmental power within limits
reasonably required.

															"In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised as
not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the
protected freedom." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 310 U. S. 304 (1940). "Unduly" must mean not more than necessary, and, until
today, the Court has recognized this criterion in First Amendment
cases:

															"In the area of First Amendment freedoms, government has the
duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are
adequate for the purpose." Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.
S. 301 , 381 U. S. 310 (1965) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the
Court has said:

															"[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate Page 424 U. S. 239 and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must
be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, supra at 364 U. S.
488 .

															In light of these views, [ Footnote
2/1 ] it seems to me that the threshold limits fixed at $10 and
$100 for anonymous contributions are constitutionally impermissible
on their face. As the Court's opinion notes, ante at 424 U. S. 83 ,
Congress gave little or no thought, one way or the other, to these
limits, but rather lifted figures out of a 65-year-old statute.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] As we are all
painfully aware, the 1976 dollar is not what it used to be and is
surely not the dollar of 1910. Ten dollars in 1976 will, for
example, purchase only what $1.68 would buy in 1910. United States
Dept. of Labor, Handbook of Labor Statistics 1975, p. 313
(Dec.1975). To argue that a 1976 contribution of $10 or $100
entails a risk of corruption or its appearance is simply too
extravagant to be maintained. No public right to know justifies the
compelled disclosure of such contributions, at the risk of
discouraging them. There is, in short, no relation whatever between
the means used and the legitimate goal of ventilating possible
undue influence. Congress has used a shotgun to kill wrens as well
as hawks. Page 424 U. S. 240 In saying that the lines drawn by Congress are "not wholly
without rationality," the Court plainly fails to apply the
traditional test:

															"Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching on our most precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 , 371 U. S. 438 (1938). See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389 U.
S. 258 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
supra. The Court's abrupt departure [ Footnote 2/3 ] from traditional standards is wrong;
surely a greater burden rests on Congress than merely to avoid
"irrationality" when regulating in the core area of the First
Amendment. Even taking the Court at its word, the particular dollar
amounts fixed by Congress that must be reported to the Commission
fall short of meeting the test of rationality when measured by the
goals sought to be achieved.

															Finally, no legitimate public interest has been shown in forcing
the disclosure of modest contributions that are the prime support
of new, unpopular, or unfashionable political causes. There is no
realistic possibility that such modest donations will have a
corrupting influence, especially on parties that enjoy only "minor"
status. Major parties would not notice them; minor parties need
them. Furthermore, as the Court candidly recognizes, ante at 424 U. S. 70 ,
minor parties and new parties tend to be sharply ideological in
character, and the public can readily discern where such parties
stand, without resorting to the indirect device of recording the
names of financial supporters. To hold, as the Court has, that
privacy must sometimes yield to congressional investigations of
alleged subversion is quite different from making domestic
political Page 424 U. S. 241 partisans give up privacy. Cf. Estland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. 491 (1975). In any event, the dangers to First Amendment rights here
are too great. Flushing out the names of supporters of minority
parties will plainly have a deterrent effect on potential
contributors, a consequence readily admitted by the Court, ante at 424 U. S. 71 , 424 U. S. 83 , and
supported by the record. [ Footnote
2/4 ]

															I would therefore hold unconstitutional the provisions requiring
reporting of contributions of more than $10 and to make a public
record of the name, address, and occupation of a contributor of
more than $100. (2) CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITS I agree fully with that part of the Court's opinion that holds
unconstitutional the limitations the Act puts on campaign
expenditures which

															"place substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of
candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected
political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot
tolerate." Ante at 424 U. S. 58 -59.
Yet when it approves similarly stringent limitations on
contributions, the Court ignores the reasons it finds so persuasive
in the context of expenditures. For me, contributions and
expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin.

															By limiting campaign contributions, the Act restricts the amount
of money that will be spent on political activity Page 424 U. S. 242 -- and does so directly. Appellees argue, as the Court notes,
that these limits will "act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of
political campaigns," ante at 424 U. S. 26 . In
treating campaign expenditure limitations, the Court says that
the

															"First Amendment denies government the power to determine that
spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive,
or unwise." Ante at 424 U. S. 57 .
Limiting contributions, as a practical matter, will limit
expenditures and will put an effective ceiling on the amount of
political activity and debate that the Government will permit to
take place. The argument that the ceiling is not, after all, very
low as matters now stand gives little comfort for the future, since
the Court elsewhere notes the rapid inflation in the cost of
political campaigning. [ Footnote
2/5 ] Ante at 424 U. S. 57 .

															The Court attempts to separate the two communicative aspects of
political contributions -- the "moral" support that the gift itself
conveys, which the Court suggests is the same whether the gift is
$10 or $10,000, [ Footnote 2/6 ] and
the Page 424 U. S. 243 fact that money translates into communication. The Court
dismisses the effect of the limitations on the second aspect of
contributions: "[T]he transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor." Ante at 424 U. S. 21 . On
this premise -- that contribution limitations restrict only the
speech of "someone other than the contributor" -- rests the Court's
justification for treating contributions differently from
expenditures. The premise is demonstrably flawed; the contribution
limitations will, in specific instances, limit exactly the same
political activity that the expenditure ceilings limit, [ Footnote 2/7 ] and at least one of the
"expenditure" Page 424 U. S. 244 limitations the Court finds objectionable operates precisely
like the "contribution" limitations. [ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The Court's attempt to distinguish the communication inherent in
political contributions from the speech aspects of political
expenditures simply "will not wash." We do little but engage in
word games unless we recognize that people -- candidates and
contributors -- spend money on political activity because they wish
to communicate ideas, and their constitutional interest in doing so
is precisely the same whether they or someone else utters the
words.

															The Court attempts to make the Act seem less restrictive by
casting the problem as one that goes to freedom of association,
rather than freedom of speech. I have long thought freedom of
association and freedom of expression were two peas from the same
pod. The contribution limitations of the Act impose a restriction
on certain forms of associational activity that are, for the most
part, as the Court recognizes, ante at 424 U. S. 29 harmless in fact. And the restrictions are hardly incidental in
their effect upon particular campaigns. Judges are ill-equipped to
gauge the precise impact of legislation, but a law that impinges
upon First Amendment rights requires us to make the attempt. It is
not simply speculation to think that the limitations on
contributions will foreclose some candidacies. [ Footnote 2/9 ] The limitations will also alter the
nature of some electoral contests drastically. [ Footnote 2/10 ] Page 424 U. S. 245 At any rate, the contribution limits are a far more severe
restriction on First Amendment activity than the sort of "chilling"
legislation for which the Court has shown such extraordinary
concern in the past. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971); see also cases reviewed in Miller v.
California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.
S. 767 (1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966). If such restraints can be justified at all, they must be
justified by the very strongest of state interests. With this much
the Court clearly agrees; the Court even goes so far as to note
that legislation cutting into these important interests must employ
"means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms." Ante at 424 U.S. 25 .

															After a bow to the "weighty interests" Congress meant to serve,
the Court then forsakes this analysis in one sentence:

															"Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was
only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings were a
necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or
appearance of corruption. . . ." Ante at 424 U. S. 28 . In
striking down the limitations on campaign expenditures, the Court
relies in part on its conclusion that other means -- namely,
disclosure and contribution ceilings -- will adequately serve the
statute's aim. It is not clear why the same analysis is not also
appropriate in weighing the need for contribution ceilings in
addition to disclosure requirements. Congress may well be Page 424 U. S. 246 entitled to conclude that disclosure was a "partial measure,"
but I had not thought until today that Congress could enact its
conclusions in the First Amendment area into laws immune from the
most searching review by this Court.

															Finally, it seems clear to me that, in approving these
limitations on contributions, the Court must rest upon the
proposition that "pooling" money is fundamentally different from
other forms of associational or joint activity. But see
ante at 424 U. S. 66 . I
see only two possible ways in which money differs from volunteer
work, endorsements, and the like. Money can be used to buy favors,
because an unscrupulous politician can put it to personal use;
second, giving money is a less visible form of associational
activity. With respect to the first problem, the Act does not
attempt to do any more than the bribery laws to combat this sort of
corruption. In fact, the Act does not reach at all, and certainly
the contribution limits do not reach, forms of "association" that
can be fully as corrupt as a contribution intended as a quid
pro quo -- such as the eleventh-hour endorsement by a former
rival, obtained for the promise of a federal appointment. This
underinclusiveness is not a constitutional flaw, but it
demonstrates that the contribution limits do not clearly focus on
this first distinction. To the extent Congress thought that the
second problem, the lesser visibility of contributions, required
that money be treated differently from other forms of associational
activity, disclosure laws are the simple and wholly efficacious
answer; they make the invisible apparent. (3) PUBLIC FINANCING I dissent from 424 U. S. Since the turn of this century, when the idea of Government Page 424 U. S. 247 subsidies for political campaigns first was broached, there has
been no lack of realization that the use of funds from the public
treasury to subsidize political activity of private individuals
would produce substantial and profound questions about the nature
of our democratic society. The Majority Leader of the Senate,
although supporting such legislation in 1967, said that "the
implications of these questions . . . go to the very heart and
structure of the Government of the Republic." [ Footnote 2/11 ] The Solicitor General, in his amicus curiae brief, states that "the issues involved here
are of indisputable moment." [ Footnote 2/12 ] He goes on to express his view that
public financing will have "profound effects in the way candidates
approach issues and each other." [ Footnote 2/13 ] Public financing, he notes,

															"affects the role of the party in campaigns for office, changes
the role of the incumbent government vis-a-vis all
parties, and affects the relative strengths and strategies of
candidates vis-a-vis each other and their party's leaders.
[ Footnote 2/14 ]"

															The Court chooses to treat this novel public financing of
political activity as simply another congressional appropriation
whose validity is "necessary and proper" to Congress' power to
regulate and reform elections and primaries, relying on United
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), and Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.
S. 534 (1934). No holding of this Court is directly in
point, because no federal scheme allocating public funds in a
comparable manner has ever been before us. The uniqueness of the
plan is not relevant, of course, to whether Congress has power to
enact it. Indeed, I do not question the power of Congress to
regulate elections; nor do I Page 424 U. S. 248 challenge the broad proposition that the General Welfare Clause
is a grant, not a limitation, of power. M'Culloch
v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 420 (1819); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 , 297 U. S. 66 (1936).

															I would, however, fault the Court for not adequately analyzing
and meeting head on the issue whether public financial assistance
to the private political activity of individual citizens and
parties is a legitimate expenditure of public funds. The public
monies at issue here are not being employed simply to police the
integrity of the electoral process or to provide a forum for the
use of all participants in the political dialogue, as would, for
example, be the case if free broadcast time were granted. Rather,
we are confronted with the Government's actual financing, out of
general revenues, a segment of the political debate itself. As
Senator Howard Baker remarked during the debate on this
legislation:

															"I think there is something politically incestuous about the
Government financing and, I believe, inevitably then regulating,
the day-to-day procedures by which the Government is selected. . .
. "

															"I think it is extraordinarily important that the Government not
control the machinery by which the public expresses the range of
its desires, demands, and dissent."

															120 Cong.Rec. 8202 (1974). If this "incest" affected only the
issue of the wisdom of the plan, it would be none of the concern of
judges. But, in my view, the inappropriateness of subsidizing, from
general revenues, the actual political dialogue of the people --
the process which begets the Government itself -- is as basic to
our national tradition as the separation of church and state also
deriving from the First Amendment, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 612 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 , 397 U. S.
668 -669 (1970), Page 424 U. S. 249 or the separation of civilian and military authority, see
Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 , 345 U. S. 93 -94
(1953), neither of which is explicit in the Constitution, but both
of which have developed through case-by-case adjudication of
express provisions of the Constitution.

															Recent history shows dangerous examples of systems with a close,
"incestuous" relationship between "government" and "politics"; the
Court's opinion simply dismisses possible dangers by noting
that:

															"Subtitle H is a congressional effort not to abridge, restrict,
or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and
enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral
process, goals vital to a self-governing people." Ante at 424 U. S. 92 -93.
Congress, it reassuringly adds by way of a footnote, has expressed
its determination to avoid such a possibility. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Ante at 424 U. S. 93 n.
126. But the Court points to no basis for predicting that the
historical pattern of "varying measures of control and
surveillance," Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra at 403 U. S. 621 ,
which usually accompany grants from Government will not also follow
in this case. [ Footnote 2/16 ] Up
to now, the Court has always been extraordinarily sensitive, when
dealing with First Amendment rights, to the risk that the "flag
tends to follow the dollars." Yet, here, where Subtitle H
specifically requires the auditing of records of political parties
and candidates by Government inspectors, [ Footnote 2/17 ] the Court shows Page 424 U. S. 250 little sensitivity to the danger it has so strongly condemned in
other contexts. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
Up to now, this Court has scrupulously refrained, absent claims of
invidious discrimination, [ Footnote
2/18 ] from entering the arena of intraparty disputes concerning
the seating of convention delegates. Graham v. Fong
Eu, 403 F. Supp.
37 (ND Cal.1975), summarily aff'd, 423 U.S. 1067
(1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.
S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U. S.
1 (1972). An obvious underlying basis for this
reluctance is that delegate selection and the management of
political conventions have been considered a strictly private
political matter, not the business of Government inspectors. But
once the Government finances these national conventions by the
expenditure of millions of dollars from the public treasury, we may
be providing a springboard for later attempts to impose a whole
range of requirements on delegate selection and convention
activities. Does this foreshadow judicial decisions allowing the
federal courts to "monitor" these conventions to assure compliance
with court orders or regulations?

															Assuming, arguendo, that Congress could validly
appropriate public money to subsidize private political activity,
it has gone about the task in Subtitle H in a manner which is not,
in my view, free of constitutional infirmity. [ Footnote 2/19 ] I do not question that Congress has
"wide discretion in the manner of prescribing details of
expenditures" in some contexts, Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U. S. 308 , 301 U. S. 321 (1937). Here, however, Congress has not itself appropriated a
specific sum to attain the ends of the Act, but has delegated to a
limited group Page 424 U. S. 251 of citizens those who file tax returns -- the power to allocate
general revenue for the Act's purposes -- and of course only a
small percentage of that limited group has exercised the power.
There is nothing to assure that the "fund" will actually be
adequate for the Act's objectives. Thus, I find it difficult to see
a rational basis for concluding that this scheme would, in fact,
attain the stated purposes of the Act when its own funding scheme
affords no real idea of the amount of the available funding.

															I agree with MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST that the scheme approved by
the Court today invidiously discriminates against minor parties.
Assuming, arguendo, the constitutionality of the over-all
scheme, there is a legitimate governmental interest in requiring a
group to make a "preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.
S. 431 , 403 U. S. 442 (1971). But the present system could preclude or severely hamper
access to funds before a given election by a group or an individual
who might, at the time of the election, reflect the views of a
major segment or even a majority of the electorate. The fact that
there have been few drastic realignments in our basic two-party
structure in 200 years is no constitutional justification for
freezing the status quo of the present major parties at
the expense of such future political movements. Cf. discussion ante at 424 U. S. 73 .
When and if some minority party achieves majority status, Congress
can readily deal with any problems that arise. In short, I see
grave risks in legislation, enacted by incumbents of the major
political parties, which distinctly disadvantages minor parties or
independent candidates. This Court has, until today, been
particularly cautious when dealing with enactments that tend to
perpetuate those who control legislative power. See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , 377 U.S. 570 (1964).

															I would also find unconstitutional the system of Page 424 U. S. 252 matching grants which makes a candidate's ability to amass
private funds the sole criterion for eligibility for public funds.
Such an arrangement can put at serious disadvantage a candidate
with a potentially large, widely diffused -- but poor --
constituency. The ability of a candidate's supporters to help pay
for his campaign cannot be equated with their willingness to cast a
ballot for him. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.
S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972). (4) I cannot join in the attempt to determine which parts of the Act
can survive review here. The statute as it now stands is unworkable
and inequitable.

															I agree with the Court's holding that the Act's restrictions on
expenditures made "relative to a clearly identified candidate,"
independent of any candidate or his committee, are
unconstitutional. Ante at 424 U. S. 39 -51.
Paradoxically, the Court upholds the limitations on individual
contributions, which embrace precisely the same sort of
expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate" if those
expenditures are "authorized or requested" by the "candidate or his
agents." Ante at 424 U. S. 24 n.
25. The Act, as cut back by the Court, thus places intolerable
pressure on the distinction between "authorized" and "unauthorized"
expenditures on behalf of a candidate; even those with the most
sanguine hopes for the Act might well concede that the distinction
cannot be maintained. As the Senate Report on the bill said:

															"Whether campaigns are funded privately or publicly . . .
controls are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful limits
on direct contributions. Otherwise, wealthy individuals limited to
a $3,000 direct contribution [$1,000 in the bill as finally
enacted] could also purchase one hundred thousand Page 424 U. S. 253 dollars' worth of advertisements for a favored candidate. Such a
loophole would render direct contribution limits virtually
meaningless."

															S.Rep. No. 93-689, p. 18 (1974). Given the unfortunate record of
past attempts to draw distinctions of this kind, see ante at 424 U. S. 61 -62,
it is not too much to predict that the Court's holding will invite
avoidance, if not evasion, of the intent of the Act, with
"independent" committees undertaking "unauthorized" activities in
order to escape the limits on contributions. The Court's effort to
blend First Amendment principles and practical politics has
produced a strange offspring.

															Moreover, the Act -- or so much as the Court leaves standing --
creates significant inequities. A candidate with substantial
personal resources is now given by the Court a clear advantage over
his less affluent opponents, who are constrained by law in
fundraising, because the Court holds that the "First Amendment
cannot tolerate" any restrictions on spending. Ante at 424 U. S. 59 .
Minority parties, whose situation is difficult enough under an Act
that excludes them from public funding, are prevented from
accepting large single-donor contributions. At the same time the
Court sustains the provision aimed at broadening the base of
political support by requiring candidates to seek a greater number
of small contributors, it sustains the unrealistic disclosure
thresholds of $10 and $100 that I believe will deter those
hoped-for small contributions. Minor parties must now compete for
votes against two major parties whose expenditures will be vast.
Finally, the Act's distinction between contributions in money and
contributions in services remains, with only the former being
subject to any limits. As Judge Tamm put it in dissent from the
Court of Appeals' opinion:

															"[T]he classification created only regulates certain Page 424 U. S. 254 types of disproportional influences. Under section 591(e)(5),
services are excluded from contributions. This allows the housewife
to volunteer time that might cost well over $1000 to hire on the
open market, while limiting her neighbor who works full-time to a
regulated contribution. It enhances the disproportional influence
of groups who command large quantities of these volunteer services,
and will continue to magnify this inequity by not allowing for an
inflation adjustment to the contribution limit. It leads to the
absurd result that a lawyer's contribution of services to aid a
candidate in complying with FECA is exempt, but his first amendment
activity is regulated if he falls ill and hires a replacement."

															171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 266, 519 F.2d 821, 915 (1975). One need
not call problems of this order equal protection violations to
recognize that the contribution limitations of the Act create grave
inequities that are aggravated by the Court's interpretation of the
Act.

															The Court's piecemeal approach fails to give adequate
consideration to the integrated nature of this legislation. A
serious question is raised, which the Court does not consider:
[ Footnote 2/20 ] when central
segments, key operative provisions, of this Act are stricken, can
what remains function in anything like the way Congress intended?
The incongruities are obvious. The Commission is now eliminated,
yet its very purpose was to guide candidates and campaign workers
-- and their accountants and lawyers -- through an intricate
statutory maze where a misstep can lead to imprisonment. All
candidates can now spend freely; affluent candidates, after today,
can spend their own money without limit; yet, contributions for the
ordinary Page 424 U. S. 255 candidate are severely restricted in amount -- and small
contributors are deterred. I cannot believe that Congress would
have enacted a statutory scheme containing such incongruous and
inequitable provisions.

															Although the statute contains a severability clause, 2 U.S.C. §
454 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), such a clause is not an "inexorable
command." [ Footnote 2/21 ] Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 , 264 U. S. 290 (1924). The clause creates a rebuttable presumption that
" eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been
satisfied with what remained.'" Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333 , 398 U. S. 364 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring, quoting from Champlin Rfg. Co.
v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210 , 286 U. S. 235 (1932)). Here, just as the presumption of constitutionality of a
statute has been overcome to the point that major proportions and
chapters of the Act have been declared unconstitutional, for me,
the presumption of severability has been rebutted. To invoke a
severability clause to salvage parts of a comprehensive, integrated
statutory scheme, which parts, standing alone, are unworkable and
in many aspects unfair, exalts a formula at the expense of the
broad objectives of Congress. Finally, I agree with the Court that the members of the Federal
Election Commission were unconstitutionally appointed. However, I
disagree that we should give blanket de facto validation
to all actions of the Commission undertaken until today. The issue
is not before us, and we cannot know what acts we are ratifying. I
would leave this issue to the District Court to resolve if and when
any challenges are brought.

															In the past two decades, the Court has frequently Page 424 U. S. 256 spoken of the broad coverage of the First Amendment, especially
in the area of political dialogue:

															"[T]o assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people," Roth v. United States, 354 U.
S. 476 , 354 U. S. 484 (1957); and

															"[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs . . . [including] discussions of candidates .
. . ," Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 , 384 U. S. 218 (1966); and again:

															"[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee
[of the First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent
application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.
S. 265 , 401 U. S. 272 (1971). To accept this generalization, one need not agree that the
Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application" only in the
political area, for others would think religious freedom is on the
same or even a higher plane. But I doubt that the Court would
tolerate for an instant a limitation on contributions to a church
or other religious cause; however grave an "evil" Congress thought
the limits would cure, limits on religious expenditures would most
certainly fall as well. To limit either contributions or
expenditures as to churches would plainly restrict "the free
exercise" of religion. In my view, Congress can no more ration
political expression than it can ration religious expression; and
limits on political or religious contributions and expenditures
effectively curb expression in both areas. There are many prices we
pay for the freedoms secured by the First Amendment; the risk of
undue Page 424 U. S. 257 influence is one of them, confirming what we have long known:
freedom is hazardous, but some restraints are worse.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The particular verbalization has varied from case to case. First
Amendment analysis defies capture in a single, easy phrase. The
basic point of our inquiry, however expressed, is to determine
whether the Government has sought to achieve admittedly important
goals by means which demonstrably curtail our liberties to an
unnecessary extent.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The 1910 legislation required disclosure of the names of
recipients of expenditures in excess of $10.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Ironically, the Court seems to recognize this principle when
dealing with the limitations on contributions. Ante at 424 U.S. 25 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The record does not show systematic harassment of the sort
involved in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.
S. 449 (1958). But uncontradicted evidence was adduced
with respect to actual experiences of minor parties indicating a
sensitivity on the part of potential contributors to the prospect
of disclosure. See, e.g., District Court findings of fact,
affidavits of Wertheimer (� 6) and Reed (� 8), 2B App. 736, 742.
This evidence suffices when the governmental interest in putting
the spotlight on the sources of support for minor parties or
splinter groups is so tenuous.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Court notes that 94.9% of the funds raised by congressional
candidates in 1974 came in contributions of less than $1,000, ante at 424 U. S. 26 n.
27, and suggests that the effect of the contribution limitations
will be minimal. This logic ignores the disproportionate influence
large contributions may have when they are made early in a
campaign; "seed money" can be essential, and the inability to
obtain it may effectively end some candidacies before they begin.
Appellants have excerpted from the record data on nine campaigns to
which large, initial contributions were critical. Brief for
Appellants 132-138. Campaigns such as these will be much harder,
and perhaps impossible, to mount under the Act.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Whatever the effect of the limitation, it is clearly arbitrary
-- Congress has imposed the same ceiling on contributions to a New
York or California senatorial campaign that it has put on House
races in Alaska or Wyoming. Both the strength of support conveyed
by the gift of $1,000 and the gift's potential for corruptly
influencing the recipient will vary enormously from place to place.
Seven Senators each spent from $1,000,000 to $1,300,000 in their
successful 1974 election campaigns. A great many congressional
candidates spent less than $25,000. 33 Cong. Quarterly 789-790
(1975). The same contribution ceiling would seem to apply to each
of these campaigns. Congress accounted for these tremendous
variations when it geared the expenditure limits to voting
population; but it imposed a flat ceiling on contributions without
focusing on the actual evil attacked or the actual harm the
restrictions will work.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Suppose, for example, that a candidate's committee authorizes a
celebrity or elder statesman to make a radio or television address
on the candidate's behalf, for which the speaker himself plans to
pay. As the Court recognizes, ante at 424 U. S. 24 n.
25, the Act defines this activity as a contribution and subjects it
to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions and the $5,000
limit on contributions by political committees -- effectively
preventing the speech over any substantial radio or television
station. Whether the speech is considered an impermissible
"contribution" or an allowable "expenditure" turns not on whether
speech by "someone other than the contributor" is involved, but on
whether the speech is "authorized" or not. The contribution
limitations directly restrict speech by the contributor himself. Of
course, this restraint can be avoided if the speaker makes his
address without consulting the candidate or his agents. Elsewhere,
I suggest that the distinction between "independent" and
"authorized" political activity is unrealistic and simply cannot be
maintained. For present purposes I wish only to emphasize that the
Act directly restricts, as a "contribution," what is clearly speech
by the "contributor" himself.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The Court treats the Act's provisions limiting a candidate's
spending from his personal resources as expenditure limits, as
indeed the Act characterizes them, and holds them unconstitutional.
As MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL points out, post at 424 U. S. 287 ,
by the Court s logic, these provisions could as easily be treated
as limits on contributions, since they limit what the candidate can
give to his own campaign.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Candidates who must raise large initial contributions in order
to appeal for more funds to a broader audience will be handicapped. See 424 U.S.
1 fn2/5|>n. 5, supra. It is not enough to say that
the contribution ceilings "merely . . . require candidates . . . to
raise funds from a greater number of persons," ante at 424 U. S. 22 ,
where the limitations will effectively prevent candidates without
substantial personal resources from doing just that.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															Under the Court's holding, candidates with personal fortunes
will be free to contribute to their own campaigns as much as they
like, since the Court chooses to view the Act's provisions in this
regard as unconstitutional "expenditure" limitations, rather than
"contribution" limitations. See 424 U.S.
1 fn2/8|>n. 8, supra. [ Footnote 2/11 ]

															113 Cong.Rec. 12165 (1967)

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															Brief for Appellee Attorney General and for United States as Amicus Curiae 93.

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] Id. at 94.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ] Id. at 93.

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Such considerations have never before influenced the Court's
evaluation of the risks of restraints on expression.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															The Court's opinion demonstrates one such intrusion. While the
Court finds that the Act's expenditure limitations
unconstitutionally inhibit a candidate's or a party's First
Amendment rights, it imposes, by invoking the severability clause
of Subtitle H, such limitations on qualifying for public funds.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ] See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9007, 9033, 9038 (1970
ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ] Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649 (1944).

															[ Footnote 2/19 ] See generally remarks of Senator Gore, 112 Cong.Rec.
28783 (1966).

															[ Footnote 2/20 ]

															The problem is considered only in the limited context of
Subtitle H.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															Section 454 provides that, if a "provision" is invalid, the
entire Act will not be deemed invalid. More than a provision, more
than a few provisions, have been held invalid today. Section 454
probably does not even reach such extensive invalidation.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															I concur in the Court's answers to certified questions 1, 2,
3(b), 3(C), 3(e), 3(f), 3(h), 5, 6, 7(a), 7(b), 7(C), 7(d), 8(a),
8(b), 8(C), 8(d), 8(e), and 8(f). I dissent from the answers to
certified questions 3(a), 3(d), and 4(a). I also join in 424 U. S. S.
23|>I-B, 424 U. S. and 424 U. S. I It is accepted that Congress has power under the Constitution to
regulate the election of federal officers, including the President
and the Vice President. This includes the authority to protect the
elective processes against the "two great natural and historical
enemies of all republics, open violence and insidious corruption," Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 , 110 U. S. 658 (1884); for,

															"[i]f this government is anything more than a mere aggregation
of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which
is superior to the general government, it must have the power to
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence
and corruption,"

															the latter being the consequence of "the free use of money in
elections, arising from the vast growth of recent wealth. . . ." Id. at 110 U. S.
657 -658, 110 U. S. 667 .

															This teaching from the last century was quoted at length and
reinforced in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.
S. 534 , 290 U. S.
546 -548 (1934). In that case, the Court sustained the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, Title III of the Act of Feb.
28, 1925, 43 Stat. 1070, which, among other things, required
political committees to keep Page 424 U. S. 258 records and file reports concerning all contributions and
expenditures received and made by political committees for the
purposes of influencing the election of candidates for federal
office. The Court noted the conclusion of Congress that public
disclosure of contributions would tend to prevent the corrupt use
of money to influence elections; this, together with the
requirement "that the treasurer's statement shall include full
particulars in respect of expenditures," made it "plain that the
statute as a whole is calculated to discourage the making and use
of contributions for purposes of corruption." 290 U.S. at 290 U. S. 548 .
Congress clearly had the power to further as it did that
fundamental goal:

															"The power of Congress to protect the election of President and
Vice President from corruption being clear, the choice of means to
that end presents a question primarily addressed to the judgment of
Congress. If it can be seen that the means adopted are really
calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the
extent to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the
relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained,
are matters for congressional determination alone." Id. at 290 U. S.
547 -548.

															Pursuant to this undoubted power of Congress to vindicate the
strong public interest in controlling corruption and other
undesirable uses of money in connection with election campaigns,
the Federal Election Campaign Act substantially broadened the
reporting and disclosure requirements that so long have been a part
of the federal law. Congress also concluded that limitations on
contributions and expenditures were essential if the aims of the
Act were to be achieved fully. In another major innovation, aimed
at insulating candidates from the time-consuming and entangling
task of raising huge sums of Page 424 U. S. 259 money, provision was made for public financing of political
campaigns for federal office. A Federal Election Commission (FEC)
was also created to administer the law.

															The disclosure requirements and the limitations on contributions
and expenditures are challenged as invalid abridgments of the right
of free speech protected by the First Amendment. I would reject
these challenges. I agree with the Court's conclusion and much of
its opinion with respect to sustaining the disclosure provisions. I
am also in agreement with the Court's judgment upholding the
limitations on contributions. I dissent, however, from the Court's
view that the expenditure limitations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(c) and
(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate the First Amendment.

															Concededly, neither the limitations on contributions nor those
on expenditures directly or indirectly purport to control the
content of political speech by candidates or by their supporters or
detractors. What the Act regulates is giving and spending money,
acts that have First Amendment significance not because they are
themselves communicative with respect to the qualifications of the
candidate, but because money may be used to defray the expenses of
speaking or otherwise communicating about the merits or demerits of
federal candidates for election. The act of giving money to
political candidates, however, may have illegal or other
undesirable consequences: it may be used to secure the express or
tacit understanding that the giver will enjoy political favor if
the candidate is elected. Both Congress and this Court's cases have
recognized this as a mortal danger against which effective
preventive and curative steps must be taken.

															Since the contribution and expenditure limitations are neutral
as to the content of speech and are not motivated by fear of the
consequences of the political speech Page 424 U. S. 260 of particular candidates or of political speech in general, this
case depends on whether the nonspeech interests of the Federal
Government in regulating the use of money in political campaigns
are sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that the
limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of candidates
and their supporters.

															Despite its seeming struggle with the standard by which to judge
this case, this is essentially the question the Court asks and
answers in the affirmative with respect to the limitations on
contributions which individuals and political committees are
permitted to make to federal candidates. In the interest of
preventing undue influence that large contributors would have or
that the public might think they would have, the Court upholds the
provision that an individual may not give to a candidate, or spend
on his behalf if requested or authorized by the candidate to do so,
more than $1,000 in any one election. This limitation is valid
although it imposes a low ceiling on what individuals may deem to
be their most effective means of supporting or speaking on behalf
of the candidate -- i.e., financial support given directly
to the candidate. The Court thus accepts the congressional judgment
that the evils of unlimited contributions are sufficiently
threatening to warrant restriction regardless of the impact of the
limits on the contributor's opportunity for effective speech and,
in turn, on the total volume of the candidate's political
communications by reason of his inability to accept large sums from
those willing to give.

															The congressional judgment, which I would also accept, was that
other steps must be taken to counter the corrosive effects of money
in federal election campaigns. One of these steps is § 608(e),
which, aside from those funds that are given to the candidate or
spent at his Page 424 U. S. 261 request or with his approval or cooperation, limits what a
contributor may independently spend in support or denigration of
one running for federal office. Congress was plainly of the view
that these expenditures also have corruptive potential; but the
Court strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more
insight as to what may improperly influence candidates than is
possessed by the majority of Congress that passed this bill and the
President who signed it. Those supporting the bill undeniably
included many seasoned professionals who have been deeply involved
in elective processes and who have viewed them at close range over
many years.

															It would make little sense to me, and apparently made none to
Congress, to limit the amounts an individual may give to a
candidate or spend with his approval but fail to limit the amounts
that could be spent on his behalf. Yet the Court permits the former
while striking down the latter limitation. No more than $1,000 may
be given to a candidate or spent at his request or with his
approval or cooperation; but otherwise, apparently, a contributor
is to be constitutionally protected in spending unlimited amounts
of money in support of his chosen candidate or candidates.

															Let us suppose that each of two brothers spends $1 million on TV
spot announcements that he has individually prepared and in which
he appears, urging the election of the same named candidate in
identical words. One brother has sought and obtained the approval
of the candidate; the other has not. The former may validly be
prosecuted under § 608(e); under the Court's view, the latter may
not, even though the candidate could scarcely help knowing about
and appreciating the expensive favor. For constitutional purposes,
it is difficult to see the difference between the two situations. I
would take the word of those who know -- that limiting Page 424 U. S. 262 independent expenditures is essential to prevent transparent and
widespread evasion of the contribution limits.

															In sustaining the contribution limits, the Court recognizes the
importance of avoiding public misapprehension about a candidate's
reliance on large contributions. It ignores that consideration in
invalidating § 608(e). In like fashion, it says that Congress was
entitled to determine that the criminal provisions against bribery
and corruption, together with the disclosure provisions, would not,
in themselves, be adequate to combat the evil and that limits on
contributions should be provided. Here, the Court rejects the
identical kind of judgment made by Congress as to the need for and
utility of expenditure limits. I would not do so.

															The Court also rejects Congress' judgment manifested in § 608(c)
that the federal interest in limiting total campaign expenditures
by individual candidates justifies the incidental effect on their
opportunity for effective political speech. I disagree both with
the Court's assessment of the impact on speech and with its narrow
view of the values the limitations will serve.

															Proceeding from the maxim that "money talks," the Court finds
that the expenditure limitations will seriously curtail political
expression by candidates and interfere substantially with their
chances for election. The Court concludes that the Constitution
denies Congress the power to limit campaign expenses; federal
candidates -- and, I would suppose, state candidates, too -- are to
have the constitutional right to raise and spend unlimited amounts
of money in quest of their own election.

															As an initial matter, the argument that money is speech and that
limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First
Amendment proves entirely too much. Compulsory bargaining and the
right to strike, both provided for or protected by federal law,
inevitably have Page 424 U. S. 263 increased the labor costs of those who publish newspapers, which
are, in turn, an important factor in the recent disappearance of
many daily papers. Federal and state taxation directly removes from
company coffers large amounts of money that might be spent on
larger and better newspapers. The antitrust laws are aimed at
preventing monopoly profits and price-fixing, which gouge the
consumer. It is also true that general price controls have from
time to time existed, and have been applied to the newspapers or
other media. But it has not been suggested, nor could it be
successfully, that these laws, and many others, are invalid because
they siphon off or prevent the accumulation of large sums that
would otherwise be available for communicative activities.

															In any event, as it should be unnecessary to point out, money is
not always equivalent to or used for speech, even in the context of
political campaigns. I accept the reality that communicating with
potential voters is the heart of an election campaign, and that
widespread communication has become very expensive. There are,
however, many expensive campaign activities that are not themselves
communicative or remotely related to speech. Furthermore, campaigns
differ among themselves. Some seem to spend much less money than
others, and yet communicate as much as or more than those supported
by enormous bureaucracies with unlimited financing. The record
before us no more supports the conclusion that the communicative
efforts of congressional and Presidential candidates will be
crippled by the expenditure limitations than it supports the
contrary. The judgment of Congress was that reasonably effective
campaigns could be conducted within the limits established by the
Act, and that the communicative efforts of these campaigns would
not seriously suffer. In this posture Page 424 U. S. 264 of the case, there is no sound basis for invalidating the
expenditure limitations, so long as the purposes they serve are
legitimate and sufficiently substantial, which, in my view, they
are.

															In the first place, expenditure ceilings reinforce the
contribution limits and help eradicate the hazard of corruption.
The Court upholds the over-all limit of $25,000 on an individual's
political contributions in a single election year on the ground
that it helps reinforce the limits on gifts to a single candidate.
By the same token, the expenditure limit imposed on candidates
plays its own role in lessening the chance that the contribution
ceiling will be violated. Without limits on total expenditures,
campaign costs will inevitably and endlessly escalate. Pressure to
raise funds will constantly build, and, with it, the temptation to
resort in "emergencies" to those sources of large sums, who,
history shows, are sufficiently confident of not being caught to
risk flouting contribution limits. Congress would save the
candidate from this predicament by establishing a reasonable
ceiling on all candidates. This is a major consideration in favor
of the limitation. It should be added that many successful
candidates will also be saved from large, overhanging campaign
debts which must be paid off with money raised while holding public
office and at a time when they are already preparing or thinking
about the next campaign. The danger to the public interest in such
situations is self-evident.

															Besides backing up the contribution provisions, which are aimed
at preventing untoward influence on candidates that are elected,
expenditure limits have their own potential for preventing the
corruption of federal elections themselves. For many years, the law
has required the disclosure of expenditures as well as
contributions. As Burroughs indicates, the corrupt use of
money by candidates Page 424 U. S. 265 is as much to be feared as the corrosive influence of large
contributions. There are many illegal ways of spending money to
influence elections. One would be blind to history to deny that
unlimited money tempts people to spend it on whatever money can buy
to influence an election. On the assumption that financing illegal
activities is low on the campaign organization's priority list, the
expenditure limits could play a substantial role in preventing
unethical practices. There just would not be enough of "that kind
of money" to go around.

															I have little doubt in addition that limiting the total that can
be spent will ease the candidate's understandable obsession with
fundraising, and so free him and his staff to communicate in more
places and ways unconnected with the fundraising function. There is
nothing objectionable -- indeed, it seems to me a weighty interest
in favor of the provision -- in the attempt to insulate the
political expression of federal candidates from the influence
inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large
sums of money. I regret that the Court has returned them all to the
treadmill.

															It is also important to restore and maintain public confidence
in federal elections. It is critical to obviate or dispel the
impression that federal elections are purely and simply a function
of money, that federal offices are bought and sold, or that
political races are reserved for those who have the facility -- and
the stomach -- for doing whatever it takes to bring together those
interests, groups, and individuals that can raise or contribute
large fortunes in order to prevail at the polls.

															The ceiling on candidate expenditures represents the considered
judgment of Congress that elections are to be decided among
candidates none of whom has overpowering advantage by reason of a
huge campaign war chest. At least so long as the ceiling placed
upon the candidates Page 424 U. S. 266 is not plainly too low, elections are not to turn on the
difference in the amounts of money that candidates have to spend.
This seems an acceptable purpose and the means chosen a common
sense way to achieve it. The Court nevertheless holds that a
candidate has a constitutional right to spend unlimited amounts of
money, mostly that of other people, in order to be elected. The
holding perhaps is not that federal candidates have the
constitutional right to purchase their election, but many will so
interpret the Court's conclusion in this case. I cannot join the
Court in this respect.

															I also disagree with the Court's judgment that § 608(a), which
limits the amount of money that a candidate or his family may spend
on his campaign, violates the Constitution. Although it is true
that this provision does not promote any interest in preventing the
corruption of candidates, the provision does, nevertheless, serve
salutary purposes related to the integrity of federal campaigns. By
limiting the importance of personal wealth, § 608(a) helps to
assure that only individuals with a modicum of support from others
will be viable candidates. This, in turn, would tend to discourage
any notion that the outcome of elections is primarily a function of
money. Similarly, § 608(a) tends to equalize access to the
political arena, encouraging the less wealthy, unable to bankroll
their own campaigns, to run for political office.

															As with the campaign expenditure limits, Congress was entitled
to determine that personal wealth ought to play a less important
role in political campaigns than it has in the past. Nothing in the
First Amendment stands in the way of that determination.

															For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the Court's
answers to certified questions 3(a), 3(d), and 4(a). Page 424 U. S. 267 II I join the answers in Part IV of the Court's opinion, ante at 424 U. S.
141 -142, n. 177, to the questions certified,by the
District Court relating to the composition and powers of the FEC, i.e., questions 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), 8(d) (with the
qualifications stated infra at 424 U. S.
282 -286), 8(e), and 8(f). I also agree with much of that
part of the Court's opinion, including the conclusions that these
questions are properly before us and ripe for decision, that the
FEC's past acts are de facto valid, that the Court's
judgment should be stayed, and that the FEC may function de
facto while the stay is in effect.

															The answers to the questions turn on whether the FEC is
illegally constituted because its members were not selected in the
manner required by Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, the Appointments Clause. It
is my view that, with one exception, Congress could endow a
properly constituted commission with the powers and duties it has
given the FEC. [ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Section 437c creates an eight-member FEC. Two members, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, are ex officio members Page 424 U. S. 268 without the right to vote or to hold an FEC office. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Of the remaining six, two are
appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon
the recommendation of the majority and minority leaders of that
body; two are similarly appointed by the Speaker of the House; and
two are appointed by the President of the United States. The
appointment of each of these six members is subject to confirmation
by a majority of both Houses of Congress. § 437c(a)(1). Each member
is appointed for a term of years; none can be an elected or
appointed officer or employee of any branch of the Government at
the time of his appointment. §§ 437c(a)(2), (3). The FEC is
empowered to elect its own officers, § 437c(a)(5), and to appoint a
staff director and general counsel. § 437c(f). Decisions are by a
majority vote. § 437c(c).

															It is apparent that none of the members of the FEC is selected
in a manner Art. II specifics for the appointment of officers of
the United States. The Appointments Clause provides:

															"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. [ Footnote 3/3 ]"

															Although two of the members of the FEC are initially selected by
the President, his nominations are subject to confirmation by both
Houses of Congress. Neither Page 424 U. S. 269 he, the head of any department, nor the Judiciary has any voice
in the selection of the remaining members of the FEC. The challenge
to the FEC, therefore, is that its members are officers of the
United States the mode of whose appointment was required to, but
did not, conform to the Appointments Clause. That challenge is well
taken.

															The Appointments Clause applies only to officers of the United
States whose appointment is not "otherwise provided for" in the
Constitution. Senators and Congressmen are officers of the United
States, but the Constitution expressly provides the mode of their
selection. [ Footnote 3/4 ] The
Constitution also expressly provides that each House of Congress is
to appoint its own officers. [ Footnote
3/5 ] But it is not contended here that FEC members are officers
of either House selected pursuant to these express provisions, if
for no other reason, perhaps, than that none of the Commissioners
was selected in the manner specified by these provisions -- none of
them was finally selected by either House acting alone as Art. I
authorizes.

															The appointment power provided in Art. II also applies only to
officers, as distinguished from employees, [ Footnote 3/6 ] of the United States, but there is no
claim the Commissioners are employees of the United States, rather
than officers. That the Commissioners are among those officers of
the United States referred to in the Appointments Clause of Art. II
is evident from the breadth of their Page 424 U. S. 270 assigned duties and the nature and importance of their assigned
functions.

															The functions and duties of the FEC relate to three different
aspects of the election laws: first, the provisions of the Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 608-617 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), which establish
major substantive limitations on political contributions and
expenditures by individuals, political organizations, and
candidates; second, the reporting and disclosure provisions
contained in 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437b (1970 ed., Supp. IV), these
sections requiring the filing of detailed reports of political
contributions and expenditures; and third, the provisions of 26
U.S.C. §§ 9001-9042 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) with respect to the public
financing of Presidential primary and general election campaigns.
From the "representative examples of [the FEC's] various powers"
the Court describes, ante at 424 U.S.
1 09 -113, it is plain that the FEC is the primary agency
for the enforcement and administration of major parts of the
election laws. It does not replace or control the executive
agencies with respect to criminal prosecutions, but, within the
wide zone of its authority, the FEC is independent of executive as
well as congressional control except insofar as certain of its
regulations must be laid before and not be disapproved by Congress.
§ 438(c); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9009(c), 9039(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). With
duties and functions such as these, members of the FEC are plainly
"officers of the United States" as that term is used in Art. II, §
2, cl. 2.

															It is thus not surprising that the FEC, in defending the
legality of its members' appointments, does not deny that they are
"officers of the United States" as that term is used in the
Appointments Clause of Art. II. [ Footnote 3/7 ] Instead, Page 424 U. S. 271 for reasons the Court outlines, ante at 424 U. S.
131 -132, 424 U. S.
133 -134, its position appears to be that, even if its
members are officers of the United States, Congress may
nevertheless appoint a majority of the FEC without participation by
the President. [ Footnote 3/8 ] This
position that Congress may itself appoint the members of a body
that is to administer a wide-ranging statute will not withstand
examination in light of either the purpose and history of the
Appointments Clause or of prior cases in this Court.

															The language of the Appointments Clause was not mere
inadvertence. The matter of the appointment of officers of the new
Federal Government was repeatedly debated by the Framers, and the
final formulation of the Clause arrived at only after the most
careful debate and consideration of its place in the over-all
design of government. The appointment power was a major building
block fitted into the constitutional structure designed to avoid
the accumulation or exercise of arbitrary power by the Federal
Government. The basic approach was that official power should be
divided among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Departments.
The separation of powers principle was implemented by a series of
provisions, among which was the knowing decision that Congress was
to have no power whatsoever to appoint federal officers, except for
the power of each House to appoint its own officers serving in the
strictly legislative Page 424 U. S. 272 processes and for the confirming power of the Senate alone.

															The decision to give the President the exclusive power to
initiate appointments was thoughtful and deliberate. The Framers
were attempting to structure three departments of government so
that each would have affirmative powers strong enough to resist the
encroachment of the others. A fundamental tenet was that the same
persons should not both legislate and administer the laws.
[ Footnote 3/9 ] From the very
outset, provision was made to prohibit members of Congress from
holding office in another branch of the Government while also
serving in Congress. There was little if any dispute about this
incompatibility provision which survived in Art. I, § 6, of the
Constitution as finally ratified. [ Footnote 3/10 ] Today, no person may serve in Congress
and at the same time be Attorney General, Secretary of State, a
member of the judiciary, a United States attorney, or a member of
the Federal Trade Commission or the National Labor Relations
Board.

															Early in the 1787 Convention, it was also proposed that members
of Congress be absolutely ineligible during the term for which they
were elected, and for a period thereafter, for appointment to any
state or federal office. [ Footnote
3/11 ] But to meet substantial opposition to so stringent a
provision, ineligibility for state office was first eliminated,
[ Footnote 3/12 ] and, under the
language ultimately adopted, Congressmen Page 424 U. S. 273 were disqualified from being appointed only to those offices
which were created, or for which the emoluments were increased,
during their term of office. [ Footnote 3/13 ] Offices not in this category could be
filled by Representatives or Senators, but only upon
resignation.

															Immediately upon settling the ineligibility provision, the
Framers returned to the appointment power which they had several
times before debated and postponed for later consideration.
[ Footnote 3/14 ] From the outset,
there had been no dispute that the Executive alone should appoint,
and not merely nominate, purely executive officers, [ Footnote 3/15 ] but, at one stage,
judicial officers were to be selected by the entire Congress.
[ Footnote 3/16 ] This provision
was subsequently changed to lodge the power to choose judges in the
Senate, [ Footnote 3/17 ] which was
later also given the power to appoint ambassadors and other public
ministers. [ Footnote 3/18 ] But
following resolution of the dispute over the ineligibility
provision, which served both to prevent members of Congress from
appointing themselves to federal office and to limit their being
appointed to federal office, it was determined that the appointment
of all principal officers, whether executive or not, should
originate with the President, and that the Senate should have only
the power of advice and consent. [ Footnote 3/19 ] Inferior officers Page 424 U. S. 274 could be otherwise appointed, but not by Congress itself.
[ Footnote 3/20 ] This allocation
of the appointment power, in which, for the first time, the
Executive had the power to initiate appointment to all principal
offices and the Senate was empowered to advise and consent to
nominations by the Executive, [ Footnote 3/21 ] was made possible by adoption of the
ineligibility provisions, and was formulated as part of the
fundamental compromises with respect to the composition of the
Senate, the respective roles of the House and Senate, and the
placement of the election of the President in the electoral
college.

															Under Art. II, as finally adopted, law enforcement authority was
not to be lodged in elected legislative officials subject to
political pressures. Neither was the Legislative Branch to have the
power to appoint those who were to enforce and administer the law.
Also, the appointment power denied Congress and vested in the
President was not limited to purely executive officers, but reached
officers performing purely judicial functions, as well as all other
officers of the United States.

															I thus find singularly unpersuasive the proposition that,
because the FEC is implementing statutory policies with respect to
the conduct of elections, which policies Congress has the power to
propound, its members may be appointed by Congress. One might as
well argue that the exclusive and plenary power of Congress over
interstate commerce authorizes Congress to appoint the members of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and of many other regulatory
commissions; that its exclusive power to provide for patents and
copyrights would permit the administration of the patent laws to be
carried out by a congressional committee; or that the exclusive
power of the Federal Government to establish post offices
authorizes Page 424 U. S. 275 Congress itself or the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate to appoint postmasters and to
enforce the postal laws.

															Congress clearly has the power to create federal offices and to
define the powers and duties of those offices, Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 , 272 U. S. 129 (1926), but no case in this Court even remotely supports the power
of Congress to appoint an officer of the United States aside from
those officers each House is authorized by Art. I to appoint to
assist in the legislative processes.

															In Myers, a postmaster of the first class was removed
by the President prior to the expiration of his statutory four-year
term. Challenging the President's power to remove him contrary to
the statute, he sued for his salary. The challenge was rejected
here. The Court said that, under the Constitution, the power to
appoint the principal officers of the Executive Branch was an
inherent power of the President:

															"[T]he reasonable implication, even in the absence of express
words, was that as part of his executive power [the President]
should select those who were to act for him under his direction in
the execution of the laws." Id. at 272 U. S. 117 .
Further, absent express limitation in the Constitution, the
President was to have unrestricted power to remove those
administrative officers essential to him in discharging his duties.
These fundamental rules were to extend to those bureau and
department officers with power to issue regulations and to
discharge duties of a quasi -judicial nature -- those
members of "executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing
affect interests of individuals." Id. at 272 U. S. 135 .
As for inferior officers such as the plaintiff postmaster, the same
principles were to govern if Congress chose to place the
appointment in the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, as Page 424 U. S. 276 was the case in Myers. Under the Appointments Clause,
Congress could -- but did not in the Myers case -- permit
the appointment of inferior officers by the heads of departments,
in which event, the Court said, Congress would have the authority
to establish a term of office and limit the reasons for their
removal. But in no circumstance could Congress participate in the
removal:

															"[T]he Court never has held, nor reasonably could hold, although
it is argued to the contrary on behalf of the appellant, that the
excepting clause enables Congress to draw to itself, or to either
branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in
the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the
words and implications of that clause and to infringe the
constitutional principle of the separation of governmental
powers." Id. at 272 U. S.
161 . Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.
S. 602 (1935), limited the reach of the Myers case. There, the President attempted to remove a member of the
Federal Trade Commission prior to the expiration of his statutory
term and for reasons not specified in the statute. The Court ruled
that the Presidential removal power vindicated in Myers related solely to "purely executive officers," 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 628 ,
from whom the Court sharply distinguished officers, such as the
members of the Federal Trade Commission, who were to be free from
political dominance and control, whose duties are "neither
political nor executive, but predominantly quasi -judicial
and quasi -legislative." Id. at 295 U. S. 624 .
Contrary to the dicta in Myers, such an officer was
thought to occupy "no place in the executive department," to
exercise "no part of the executive power vested by the Constitution
in the President," 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 628 ,
and to be immune from removal by the President except on terms
specified by Congress. The Commissioners were described as
being Page 424 U. S. 277 in part an administrative body carrying out legislative policies
and in part an agency of the Judiciary, ibid.; such a body
was intended to be

															"independent of executive authority, except in its
selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the leave
or hindrance of any other official or any department of the
government." Id. at 295 U. S.
625 -626. (Emphasis in original.)

															The holding in Humphrey's Executor was confirmed in Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), but the Court did not question what Humphrey's
Executor had expressly recognized -- that members of
independent agencies are not independent of the Executive with
respect to their appointments. Nor did either Wiener or Humphrey's Executor suggest that Congress could not only
create the independent agency, specify its duties, and control the
grounds for removal of its members, but could also itself appoint
or remove them without the participation of the Executive Branch of
the Government. To have so held would have been contrary to the
Appointments Clause as the Myers case recognized.

															It is said that, historically, Congress has used its own
officers to receive and file the reports of campaign expenditures
and contributions as required by law, and that this Court should
not interfere with this practice. But the Act before us creates a
separate and independent campaign commission with members, some
nominated by the President, who have specified terms of office, are
not subject to removal by Congress, and are free from congressional
control in their day-to-day functions. The FEC, it is true, is the
designated authority with which candidates and political committees
must file reports of contributions and expenditures, as required by
the Act. But the FEC may also make rules and regulations with
respect to the disclosure requirements, may investigate reported
violations, issue subpoenas, hold its own hearings Page 424 U. S. 278 and institute civil enforcement proceedings in its own name.
Absent a request by the FEC, it would appear that the Attorney
General has no role in the civil enforcement of the reporting and
disclosure requirements. The FEC may also issue advisory opinions
with respect to the legality of any particular activities so as to
protect those persons who in good faith have conducted themselves
in reliance on the FEC's opinion. These functions go far beyond
mere information gathering, and there is no long history of lodging
such enforcement powers in congressional appointees.

															Nor do the FEC's functions stop with policing the reporting and
disclosure requirements of the Act. The FEC is given express power
to administer, obtain compliance with, and "to formulate general
policy" [ Footnote 3/22 ] with
respect to 18 U.S.C. §§ 608-617, so much so that the Act expressly
provides that "[t]he Commission has primary jurisdiction with
respect to the civil enforcement of such provisions." [ Footnote 3/23 ] Following its own
proceedings, the FEC may request the Attorney General to bring
civil enforcement proceedings, a request which the Attorney General
must honor. [ Footnote 3/24 ] And
good faith conduct taken in accordance Page 424 U. S. 279 with the FEC's advisory opinions as to whether any transaction
or activity would violate any of these criminal provisions "shall
be presumed to be in compliance with" these sections. [ Footnote 3/25 ] § 437f(b). Finally, the
FEC has the central role in administering and enforcing the
provisions Page 424 U. S. 280 of Title 26 contemplating the public financing of political
campaigns. [ Footnote 3/26 ]

															It is apparent that the FEC is charged with the enforcement of
the election laws in major respects. Indeed, except for the conduct
of criminal proceedings, it would appear that the FEC has the
entire responsibility for enforcement of the statutes at issue
here. By no stretch of the imagination can its various functions in
this respect be considered mere adjuncts to the legislative process
or to the powers of Congress to judge the election and
qualifications of its own members.

															It is suggested, without accounting for the President's role in
appointing some of its members, that the FEC would be willing to
forgo its civil enforcement powers, and that, absent these
functions, it is left with nothing that purely legislative officers
may not do. The difficulty is that the statute invests the FEC not
only with the authority, but with the duties that unquestionably
make its members officers of the United States, fully as much as
the members of other commissions charged with the major
responsibility for administering statutes. What is more, merely
forgoing its authority to bring suit would still leave the FEC with
the power to issue rules and regulations, its advisory opinion
authority, and primary duties to enforce the Act. Absent notice and
hearing by the FEC and a request on its part, it would not appear
that the Executive Branch of the Government would have any
authority under the statute to institute civil enforcement
proceedings with respect to the reporting and disclosure
requirements or the relevant provisions of Titles 18 and 26.

															There is no doubt that the development of the administrative Page 424 U. S. 281 agency in response to modern legislative and administrative need
has placed severe strain on the separation of powers principle in
its pristine formulation. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 , 103 U. S. 191 (1881). Any notion that the Constitution bans any admixture of
powers that might be deemed legislative, executive, and judicial
has had to give way. The independent agency has survived attacks
from various directions: that it exercises invalidly delegated
legislative power, Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); that it invalidly exercises judicial power, ibid.; and that its functions are so executive in nature that its members
must be subject to Presidential control, Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Until now, however, it has not been insisted that the
commands of the Appointments Clause must also yield to permit
congressional appointments of members of a major agency. With the
Court, I am not convinced that we should create a broad exception
to the requirements of that Clause that all officers of the United
States be appointed in accordance with its terms. The provision
applies to all officers, however their duties may be classified;
and even if some of the FEC's functions, such as rulemaking, are
purely legislative, I know of no authority for the congressional
appointment of its own agents to make binding rules and regulations
necessary to or advisable for the administration and enforcement of
a major statute where the President has not participated either in
the appointment of each of the administrators or in the fashioning
of the rules or regulations which they propound.

															I do not dispute the legislative power of Congress coercively to
gather and make available for public inspection massive amounts of
information relevant to the legislative process. Its own officers
may, as they have Page 424 U. S. 282 done for years, receive and file contribution and expenditure
reports of candidates and political committees. Arguably, the
Commissioners, although not properly appointed by the President,
should at least be able to perform this function. But the members
of the FEC are appointed for definite terms of office, are not
removable by the President or by Congress, and, even if their
duties were to be severely limited, they would appear to remain
Art. II officers. In any event, the task of gathering and
publishing campaign finance information has been one of the
specialties of the officers of the respective Houses, and these
same officers, under the present law, continue to receive such
information, and to act as custodians for the FEC, at least with
respect to the Senate and House political campaigns. They are also
instructed to cooperate with the FEC. § 438(d).

															For these reasons, I join in the Court's answers to certified
questions 8(a), 8(b), 8(c), 8(e) and 8(f), and with the following
reservations to question 8(d).

															Question 8(d) asks whether § 438(c) violates the constitutional
rights of one or more of the plaintiffs in that "it empowers the
Federal Election Commission to make rules under the F.E.C.A. in the
manner specified therein." Section 438(c) imposes certain
preconditions to the effectiveness of "any rule or regulation under
this section . . . ," but does not itself authorize the issuance of
rules or regulations. That authorization is to be found in §
438(a)(10), which includes among the duties of the FEC the task of
prescribing "rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
this subchapter, in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(c)." The "subchapter" referred to is the subchapter dealing with
federal election campaigns and the reports of contributions and
expenditures required to be filed with the FEC. [ Footnote 3/27 ] Subsection Page 424 U. S. 283 (c), which is the provision expressly mentioned in question
8(d), requires that any rule or regulation prescribed by the FEC
under § 438 shall be transmitted to the Senate or the House, or to
both, as thereafter directed. After 30 legislative days, [ Footnote 3/28 ] the rule or regulation
will become effective unless (1) either House has disapproved the
rule if it relates to reports by Presidential candidates or their
supporting committees; (2) the House has disapproved it if it
relates to reports to be filed by House candidates or their
committees; or (3) the Senate has disapproved it if the rule
relates to reports by Senate candidates or their related
committees.

															By expressly referring to subsection (c), question 8(d) appears
to focus on the disapproval requirement; but the Court's answer is
not responsive in these terms. Rather, the Court expressly
disclaims holding that the FEC's rules and regulations are invalid
because of the requirement that they are subject to disapproval by
one or both Houses of Congress. Ante at 424 U. S. 140 n.
176. As I understand it, the FEC's rules and regulations, whether
or not issued in compliance with § 438(c), are invalid because the
members of the FEC have not been appointed in accordance with Art.
II. To the extent that this is the basis for the Court's answer to
the question, I am in agreement.

															If the FEC members had been nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate as provided in Art. II, Page 424 U. S. 284 nothing in the Constitution would prohibit Congress from
empowering the Commission to issue rules and regulations without
later participation by, or consent of, the President or Congress
with respect to any particular rule or regulation or initially to
adjudicate questions of fact in accordance with a proper
interpretation of the statute. Sunshine Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); RFC v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.
S. 163 (1943); Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). The President must sign the statute creating the rulemaking
authority of the agency or it must have been passed over his veto,
and he must have nominated the members of the agency in accordance
with Art. II; but agency regulations issued in accordance with the
statute are not subject to his veto even though they may be
substantive in character and have the force of law.

															I am also of the view that the otherwise valid regulatory power
of a properly created independent agency is not rendered
constitutionally infirm, as violative of the President's veto
power, by a statutory provision subjecting agency regulations to
disapproval by either House of Congress. For a bill to become law,
it must pass both Houses and be signed by the President or be
passed over his veto. Also, "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to
which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives
may be necessary . . . " is likewise subject to the veto power.
[ Footnote 3/29 ] Under § 438(c),
the FEC's regulations are subject to disapproval; but, for a
regulation to become effective, neither House need approve it, pass
it, or take any action at all with respect to it. The regulation
becomes effective by nonaction. This no more invades the
President's powers than does a regulation not required to be laid
before Congress. Congressional influence over the substantive
content of agency regulation may be enhanced, Page 424 U. S. 285 but I would not view the power of either House to disapprove as
equivalent to legislation or to an order resolution, or vote
requiring the concurrence of both Houses. [ Footnote 3/30 ]

															In terms of the substantive content of regulations and the
degree of congressional influence over agency lawmaking, I do not
suggest that there is no difference between the situation where
regulations are subject to disapproval by Congress and the
situation where the agency need not run the congressional gauntlet.
But the President's veto power, which gives him an important role
in the legislative process, was obviously not considered an
inherently executive function. Nor was its principal aim to provide
another check against poor legislation. The major purpose of the
veto power appears to have been to shore up the Executive Branch
and to provide it with some bargaining and survival power against
what the Framers feared would be the overweening power of
legislators. As Hamilton said, the veto power was to provide a
defense against the legislative department's intrusion on the
rights and powers of other departments; without such power, "the
legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended
in the same hands." [ Footnote
3/31 ]

															I would be much more concerned if Congress purported to usurp
the functions of law enforcement, to control the outcome of
particular adjudications, or to preempt the President's appointment
power; but, in the Page 424 U. S. 286 light of history and modern reality, the provision for
congressional disapproval of agency regulations does not appear to
transgress the constitutional design, at least where the President
has agreed to legislation establishing the disapproval procedure or
the legislation has been passed over his veto. It would be
considerably different if Congress itself purported to adopt and
propound regulations by the action of both Houses. But here no
action of either House is required for the agency rule to go into
effect, and the veto power of the President does not appear to be
implicated.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															That is, if the FEC were properly constituted, I would answer
questions 8(b), 8(C), 8(d) ( see infra at 424 U. S.
282 -286), and 8(f) in the negative. With respect to
question 8(e), I reserve judgment on the validity of 2 U.S.C. § 456
(1970 ed., Supp. IV) which empowers the FEC to disqualify a
candidate for failure to file certain reports. Of course, to the
extent that the Court invalidates the expenditure limitations of
the FECA, Part I-C, ante at 424 U. S. 39 -59,
the FEC, however appointed, would be powerless to enforce those
provisions.

															Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations in this part
of the opinion are to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, §§
301-311, 86 Stat. 11, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1974, §§ 201-407, 88 Stat. 1272, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															References to the "Commissioners," the "FEC," or its "members"
do not include these two ex officio members.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															U.S.Const., Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] Id. Art. I, §§ 2, 3, and the Seventeenth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															"The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers. . . ." U.S.Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5.

															"The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but . . . [t]he Senate shall chuse their other
Officers, and also a President pro tempore in the Absence of the
Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President
of the United States."

															§ 3, cls. 4, 5.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The distinction appears ante at 424 U. S. 126 n.
162.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Indeed the FEC attacks as "erroneous" appellants' statement that
the Court of Appeals ruled that

															"the FEC commissioners are not officers of the United States.
Rather, it held that the grant of power to the President to appoint
civil officers of the United States is not to be read as preclusive
of Congressional authority to appoint such officers to aid in the
discharge of Congressional responsibilities."

															Brief for Appellee Federal Election Commission 16 n.19
(hereafter FEC Brief).

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															How Congress may both appoint officers itself and condition
appointment of the President's nominees on confirmation by a
majority of both Houses of Congress is not explained.

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 983, 1042-1043 (1975).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															U.S.Const., Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2, provides in part:

															"[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, pp. 379-382 (1911) (hereafter Farrand); 2 Farrand 483.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															1 Farrand 20.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ] Id. at 210-211, 217, 219, 221, 222, 370, 375-377,
379-382, 383, 384, 419, 429, 435; 2 Farrand 180.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ] Id. at 487. As ratified, the Ineligibility Clause
provides:

															"No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time.
. . ."

															U.S.Const., Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															Farrand 116, 120, 224, 233; 2 Farrand 37-38, 41-44, 71-72, 116,
138.

															[ Footnote 3/15 ]

															1 Farrand 63, 67.

															[ Footnote 3/16 ] Id. at 21-22.

															[ Footnote 3/17 ] Id. at 224, 233.

															[ Footnote 3/18 ]

															2 Farrand 183, 383, 394.

															[ Footnote 3/19 ] Id. at 533

															[ Footnote 3/20 ] Id. at 627.

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 641-642 (1947).

															[ Footnote 3/22 ]

															§ 437d(a)(9).

															[ Footnote 3/23 ]

															§ 437c(b).

															[ Footnote 3/24 ]

															Section 437g(a)(7) provides:

															"Whenever in the judgment of the Commission, after affording due
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, any person has engaged or
is about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or
will constitute a violation of any [relevant] provision . . . upon
request by the Commission the Attorney General on behalf of the
United States shall institute a civil action for relief. .
. ."

															(Emphasis supplied.) The FEC argues that

															""there is no showing in this case of a convincing legislative
history that would enable us to conclude that shall' was
intended to be the `language of command.'"" FEC Brief 62 n. 52, quoting 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 244 n.191, 519
F.2d 821, 893 n.191 (1975). The contention is that the FEC's
enforcement power is not exclusive, because the Attorney General
retains the traditional discretion to decline to institute legal
proceedings. However this may be, the FEC's civil enforcement
responsibilities are substantial. Moreover it is authorized under
26 U.S.C. §§ 9010, 9040 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), to appear in and to
defend actions brought in the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit under §§ 9011, 9041, to review the FEC's actions
under Chapters 95 and 96 of Title 26, and to appear in district
court to seek recovery of amounts repayable to the Treasury under
§§ 9007, 9008, 9038.

															[ Footnote 3/25 ]

															Although the FEC resists appellants' attack on its position that
it has "no general substantive rulemaking authority with regard to
Title 18 spending and contribution limitations" (FEC Brief 49), it
agrees "that there is inevitably some interplay between Title 2 and
Title 18." ( Id. at 55.) It seeks to minimize the
importance of the interplay by noting that its definitions of what
is to be disclosed and reported would not be binding in judicial
proceedings to determine whether substantive provisions of the Act
had been violated, but would simply be extended a measure of
deference as administrative interpretations. Appellants' reply is
the practical one that, whether the FEC's power is substantive or
not, persons violating its regulations do so at their peril. To
illustrate the extent to which the FEC's regulations implicate the
provisions of Title 18, appellants point to the FEC's interim
guidelines for the New Hampshire and Tennessee special elections, 4
Fed.Reg. 40668, 43660 (1975), and its regulations, rejected by the
Senate, providing that funds contributed to and expended from the
"office accounts" of Members of Congress were contributions or
expenditures "subject to the limitations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 608, 610,
611, 613, 614 and 615." See notice of proposed rulemaking, id. at 32951. Unless the FEC's regulations are to be given
no weight in criminal proceedings, it seems plain that, through
those regulations, the FEC will have a significant role in the
implementation and enforcement of criminal statutes.

															[ Footnote 3/26 ]

															The FEC itself cannot fashion coercive relief by, for example,
issuing cease and desist orders. To obtain such relief, it must
apply to the courts itself or through the Attorney General.

															[ Footnote 3/27 ]

															The same preconditions are imposed with respect to regulations
issued under the public financing provisions of the election laws.
26 U.S.C. §§ 9009 and 9039 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). No such
requirement appears to exist with respect to the FEC's power to
make "policy" with respect to the enforcement of the criminal
provisions in Title 18 or with respect to any power it may have to
issue rules and regulations dealing with the civil enforcement of
those provisions. See also § 439a.

															[ Footnote 3/28 ]

															Section 438(c)(4) defines "legislative day." See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 9009(c)(3), 9039(c)(3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV).

															[ Footnote 3/29 ]

															U.S.Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 3.

															[ Footnote 3/30 ]

															Surely the challengers to the provision for congressional
disapproval do not mean to suggest that the FEC's regulations must
become effective despite the disapproval of one House or the other.
Disapproval nullifies the suggested regulation and prevents the
occurrence of any change in the law. The regulation is void.
Nothing remains on which the veto power could operate. It is as
though a bill passed in one House and failed in another.

															[ Footnote 3/31 ]

															The Federalist No. 3, pp. 46469 (Wright ed.1961).

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															I join in all of the Court's opinion except 424 U.
S. which deals with 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1970 ed., Supp.
IV). That section limits the amount a candidate may spend from his
personal funds, or family funds under his control, in connection
with his campaigns during any calendar year. See ante at 424 U. S. 51 -52,
n. 57. The Court invalidates § 608(a) as violative of the
candidate's First Amendment rights. "[T]he First Amendment," the
Court explains, "simply cannot tolerate § 608(a)'s restriction upon
the freedom of a candidate to speak without legislative limit on
behalf of his own candidacy." Ante at 424 U. S. 54 . I
disagree.

															To be sure, § 608(a) affects the candidate's exercise of his
First Amendment rights. But, unlike the other expenditure
limitations contained in the Act and invalidated by the Court --
the limitation on independent expenditures relative to a clearly
identified candidate, § 608(e), and the limitations on over-all
candidate expenditures, § 608(c) -- the limitations on expenditures
by candidates from personal resources contained in § 608(a) need
never prevent the speaker from spending another Page 424 U. S. 287 dollar to communicate his ideas. Section 608(a) imposes no
over-all limit on the amount a candidate can spend; it simply
limits the "contribution" a candidate may make to his own campaign.
The candidate remains free to raise an unlimited amount in
contributions from others. So long as the candidate does not
contribute to his campaign more than the amount specified in §
608(a), and so long as he does not accept contributions from others
in excess of the limitations imposed by § 608(b), he is free to
spend without limit on behalf of his campaign.

															It is significant, moreover, that the ceilings imposed by §
608(a) on candidate expenditures from personal resources are
substantially higher than the $1,000 limit imposed by § 608(e) on
independent expenditures by noncandidates. Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidates may contribute $50,000 of their own money
to their campaigns, Senate candidates $35,000, and most House
candidates $25,000. Those ceilings will not affect most candidates.
But they will admittedly limit the availability of personal funds
for some candidates, and the question is whether that limitation is
justified.

															The Court views "[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the
relative financial resources of candidates" as the relevant
rationale for § 608(a), and deems that interest insufficient to
justify § 608(a). Ante at 424 U. S. 54 . In
my view, the interest is more precisely the interest in promoting
the reality and appearance of equal access to the political arena.
Our ballot access decisions serve as a reminder of the importance
of the general interest in promoting equal access among potential
candidates. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.
S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.
S. 134 (1972). While admittedly those cases dealt with
barriers to entry different from those we consider here, the
barriers to which § 608(a) is directed Page 424 U. S. 288 are formidable ones, and the interest in removing them
substantial.

															One of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is
that money is essential for effective communication in a political
campaign. It would appear to follow that the candidate with a
substantial personal fortune at his disposal is off to a
significant "headstart." Of course, the less wealthy candidate can
potentially overcome the disparity in resources through
contributions from others. But ability to generate contributions
may itself depend upon a showing of a financial base for the
campaign or some demonstration of preexisting support, which, in
turn, is facilitated by expenditures of substantial personal sums.
Thus, the wealthy candidate's immediate access to a substantial
personal fortune may give him an initial advantage that his less
wealthy opponent can never overcome. And even if the advantage can
be overcome, the perception that personal wealth wins elections may
not only discourage potential candidates without significant
personal wealth from entering the political arena, but also
undermine public confidence in the integrity of the electoral
process. [ Footnote 4/1 ]

															The concern that candidacy for public office not become, or
appear to become, the exclusive province of the wealthy assumes
heightened significance when one considers the impact of § 608(b),
which the Court today upholds. That provision prohibits
contributions from individuals and groups to candidates in excess
of $1,000, and contributions from political committees in excess of
$5,000. While the limitations on contributions are neutral in the
sense that Page 424 U. S. 289 all candidates are foreclosed from accepting large
contributions, there can be no question that large contributions
generally mean more to the candidate without a substantial personal
fortune to spend on his campaign. Large contributions are the less
wealthy candidate's only hope of countering the wealthy candidate's
immediate access to substantial sums of money. With that option
removed, the less wealthy candidate is without the means to match
the large initial expenditures of money of which the wealthy
candidate is capable. In short, the limitations on contributions
put a premium on a candidate's personal wealth.

															In view of § 608(b)'s limitations on contributions, then, §
608(a) emerges not simply as a device to reduce the natural
advantage of the wealthy candidate, but as a provision providing
some symmetry to a regulatory scheme that otherwise enhances the
natural advantage of the wealthy. [ Footnote 4/2 ] Regardless of whether the goal of
equalizing access would justify a legislative limit on personal
candidate expenditures standing by itself, I think it clear that
that goal justifies § 608(a)'s limits when they are considered in
conjunction with the remainder of the Page 424 U. S. 290 Act. I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court's
invalidation of § 608(a).

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															"In the Nation's seven largest States in 1970, 11 of the 15
major senatorial candidates were millionaires. The four who were
not millionaires lost their bid for election."

															117 Cong.Rec. 42065 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Macdonald).

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															Of course, § 608(b)'s enhancement of the wealthy candidate's
natural advantage does not require its invalidation. As the Court
demonstrates, § 608(b) is fully justified by the governmental
interest in limiting the reality and appearance of corruption. Ante at 424 U. S.
26 -29.

															In addition to § 608(a), § 608(c), which limits over-all
candidate expenditures in a campaign, also provides a check on the
advantage of the wealthy candidate. But we today invalidate that
section, which, unlike § 608(a), imposes a flat prohibition on
candidate expenditures above a certain level, and which is less
tailored to the interest in equalizing access than § 608(a). The
effect of invalidating both § 608(c) and § 608(a) is to enable the
wealthy candidate to spend his personal resources without limit,
while his less wealthy opponent is forced to make do with whatever
amount he can accumulate through relatively small
contributions.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															I am not persuaded that the Court makes, or indeed is able to
make, a principled constitutional distinction between the
contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure
limitations, on the other, that are involved here. I therefore do
not join 424 U. S. S.
14|>Part I-A that are consistent with Part I-B. As to those, I
dissent.

															I also dissent, accordingly, from the Court's responses to
certified questions 3(b), (c), and (h). I would answer those
questions in the affirmative.

															I do join the remainder of the Court's opinion and its answers
to the other certified questions.

															MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															I concur in Parts I, II, and IV of the Court's opinion. I concur
in so much of Part III of the Court's opinion as holds that the
public funding of the cost of a Presidential election campaign is a
permissible exercise of congressional authority under the power to
tax and spend granted by Art. I, but dissent from 424 U.
S. which holds that certain aspects of the statutory
treatment of minor parties and independent candidates are
constitutionally valid. I state as briefly as possible my reasons
for so doing.

															The limits imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments on
governmental action may vary in their stringency depending on the
capacity in which the government is acting. The government as
proprietor, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S.
39 (1966), is, I believe, Page 424 U. S. 291 permitted to affect putatively protected interests in a manner
in which it might not do if simply proscribing conduct across the
board. Similarly, the government as employer, Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968), and CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.
S. 548 (1973), may prescribe conditions of employment
which might be constitutionally unacceptable if enacted into
standards of conduct made applicable to the entire citizenry.

															For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.
S. 250 , 343 U. S.
288 -295 (1952), and by Mr. Justice Harlan in his
dissenting opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.
S. 476 , 354 U. S.
500 -503 (1957), I am of the opinion that not all of the
strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are
carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, but,
rather, that it is only the "general principle" of free speech, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 , 268 U. S. 672 (1925) (Holmes J., dissenting), that the latter incorporates. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.
S. 319 , 302 U. S.
324 -325 (1937).

															Given this view, cases which deal with state restrictions on
First Amendment freedoms are not fungible with those which deal
with restrictions imposed by the Federal Government, and cases
which deal with the government as employer or proprietor are not
fungible with those which deal with the government as a lawmaker
enacting criminal statutes applying to the population generally.
The statute before us was enacted by Congress not with the aim of
managing the Government's property, nor of regulating the
conditions of Government employment, but, rather, with a view to
the regulation of the citizenry as a whole. The case for me, then,
presents the First Amendment interests of the appellants at their
strongest, and the legislative authority of Congress in the
position where it is most vulnerable to First Amendment
attacks. Page 424 U. S. 292 While this approach undoubtedly differs from some of the
underlying assumptions in the opinion of the Court, opinions are
written not to explore abstract propositions of law, but to decide
concrete cases. I therefore join in all of the Court's opinion
except 424 U. S. which
sustains, against appellants' First and Fifth Amendment challenges,
the disparities found in the congressional plan for financing
general Presidential elections between the two major parties, on
the one hand, and minor parties and candidacies, on the other.

															While I am not sure that I agree with the Court's comment, ante at 424 U. S. 95 ,
that "public financing is generally less restrictive of access to
the electoral process than the ballot access regulations dealt with
in prior cases," in any case, that is not, under my view, an
adequate answer to appellants' claim. The electoral laws relating
to ballot access which were examined in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U. S. 709 , 415 U. S. 716 (1974); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.
S. 767 , 415 U. S. 780 (1974); and Storer v. Brown, 415 U.
S. 724 , 415 U. S.
729 -730 (1974), all arose out of state efforts to
regulate minor party candidacies and the actual physical size of
the ballot. If the States are to afford a republican form of
government, they must, by definition, provide for general elections
and for some standards as to the contents of the official ballots
which will be used at those elections. The decision of the state
legislature to enact legislation embodying such regulations is,
therefore, not in any sense an optional one; there must be some
standards, however few, which prescribe the contents of the
official ballot if the popular will is to be translated into a
choice among candidates. Dealing thus by necessity with these
issues, the States have strong interests in "limiting places on the
ballot to those candidates who demonstrate substantial popular
support," ante at 424 U. S. 96 . They have a like interest in
discouraging Page 424 U. S. 293 "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism" which might
proliferate the number of candidates on a state ballot so as to
make it virtually unintelligible to the average voter. Storer
v. Brown, supra at 415 U. S.
736 .

															Congress, on the other hand, while undoubtedly possessing the
legislative authority to undertake the task if it wished, is not
obliged to address the question of public financing of Presidential
elections at all. When it chooses to legislate in this area, so
much of its action as may arguably impair First Amendment rights
lacks the same sort of mandate of necessity as does a State's
regulation of ballot access.

															Congress, of course, does have an interest in not "funding
hopeless candidacies with large sums of public money," ante at 424 U. S. 96 , and
may for that purpose legitimately require

															"'some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support,' Jenness
v. Fortson , [ 403 U.S.
431 , 403 U. S. 442 (1971),] as an
eligibility requirement for public funds." Ante at 424 U. S. 96 . But
Congress, in this legislation, has done a good deal more than that.
It has enshrined the Republican and Democratic Parties in a
permanently preferred position, and has established requirements
for funding minor party and independent candidates to which the two
major parties are not subject. Congress would undoubtedly be
justified in treating the Presidential candidates of the two major
parties differently from minor party or independent Presidential
candidates, in view of the long demonstrated public support of the
former. But because of the First Amendment overtones of the
appellants' Fifth Amendment equal protection claim, something more
than a merely rational basis for the difference in treatment must
be shown, as the Court apparently recognizes. I find it impossible
to subscribe to the Court's reasoning that, because no third party
has posed a credible threat to the two major parties in
Presidential Page 424 U. S. 294 elections since 1860, Congress may by law attempt to assure that
this pattern will endure forever.

															I would hold that, as to general election financing, Congress
has not merely treated the two major parties differently from minor
parties and independents, but has discriminated in favor of the
former in such a way as to run afoul of the Fifth and First
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Summary: In *Buckley v. Valeo*, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its 1974 amendments, which imposed limits on political contributions and expenditures, as well as disclosure requirements. The Court also addressed public financing for presidential elections, finding that Congress could require candidates to demonstrate a "significant modicum of support" to access public funds. However, Justice Marshall, in a separate opinion, disagreed with the Court's reasoning on public financing, arguing that Congress had discriminated in favor of the Republican and Democratic Parties, violating the First and Fifth Amendments.