U.S. Supreme Court Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987) Colorado v. Bertine No. 85-889 Argued November 10,
1986 Decided January 14,
1987 479
U.S. 367 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
COLORADO Syllabus A Boulder, Colorado, police officer arrested respondent for
driving his van while under the influence of alcohol. After
respondent was taken into custody and before a tow truck arrived to
take the van to an impoundment lot, another officer, acting in
accordance with local police procedures, inventoried the van's
contents, opening a closed backpack in which he found various
containers holding controlled substances, cocaine paraphernalia,
and a large amount of cash. Prior to his trial on charges including
drug offenses, the state trial court granted respondent's motion to
suppress the evidence found during the inventory search. Although
the court determined that the search did not violate respondent's
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, it
held that the search violated the Colorado Constitution. The
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, but premised its ruling on the
Federal Constitution. Held: The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the State
from proving the criminal charges with the evidence discovered
during the inventory search of respondent's van. This case is
controlled by the principles governing inventory searches of
automobiles and of an arrestee's personal effects, as set forth in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 , and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640 , rather than those governing searches of closed
trunks and suitcases conducted solely for the purpose of
investigating criminal conduct. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 ,
distinguished. The policies behind the warrant requirement, and the
related concept of probable cause, are not implicated in an
inventory search, which serves the strong governmental interests in
protecting an owner's property while it is in police custody,
insuring against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property,
and guarding the police from danger. There was no showing here that
the police, who were following standardized caretaking procedures,
acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.
Police, before inventorying a container, are not required to weigh
the strength of the individual's privacy interest in the container
against the possibility that the container might serve as a
repository for dangerous or valuable items. There is no merit to
the contention that the search of respondent's van was
unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the police
discretion to choose between impounding the van and parking Page 479 U. S. 368 and locking it in a public parking place. The exercise of police
discretion is not prohibited so long as that discretion is
exercised -- as was done here -- according to standard criteria and
on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of
criminal activity. Pp. 479 U. S.
371 -376. 706 P.2d
411 , reversed.

															REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which POWELL
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 479 U. S. 376 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 479 U. S.
377 .

															CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															On February 10, 1984, a police officer in Boulder, Colorado,
arrested respondent Steven Lee Bertine for driving while under the
influence of alcohol. After Bertine was taken into custody and
before the arrival of a tow truck to take Bertine's van to an
impoundment lot, [ Footnote 1 ] a
backup officer Page 479 U. S. 369 inventoried the contents of the van. The officer opened a closed
backpack in which he found controlled substances, cocaine
paraphernalia, and a large amount of cash. Bertine was subsequently
charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol, unlawful
possession of cocaine with intent to dispense, sell, and
distribute, and unlawful possession of methaqualone. We are asked
to decide whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the State from
proving these charges with the evidence discovered during the
inventory of Bertine's van. We hold that it does not.

															The backup officer inventoried the van in accordance with local
police procedures, which require a detailed inspection and
inventory of impounded vehicles. He found the backpack directly
behind the front seat of the van. Inside the pack, the officer
observed a nylon bag containing metal canisters. Opening the
canisters, the officer discovered that they contained cocaine,
methaqualone tablets, cocaine paraphernalia, and $700 in cash. In
an outside zippered pouch of the backpack, he also found $210 in
cash in a sealed envelope. After completing the inventory of the
van, the officer had the van towed to an impound lot and brought
the backpack, money, and contraband to the police station.

															After Bertine was charged with the offenses described above, he
moved to suppress the evidence found during the inventory search on
the ground, inter alia, that the search of the closed
backpack and containers exceeded the permissible scope of such a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The Colorado trial court ruled
that probable cause supported Bertine's arrest, and that the police
officers had made the decisions to impound the vehicle and to
conduct a thorough inventory search in good faith. Although noting
that the inventory of the vehicle was performed in a "somewhat
slipshod" manner, the District Court concluded that

															"the search of the backpack was done for the purpose of
protecting the Page 479 U. S. 370 owner's property, protection of the police from subsequent
claims of loss or stolen property, and the protection of the police
from dangerous instrumentalities."

															App. 81-83. The court observed that the standard procedures for
impounding vehicles mandated a "detailed inventory involving the
opening of containers and the listing of [their] contents." Id. at 81. Based on these findings, the court determined
that the inventory search did not violate Bertine's rights under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 83. The court, nevertheless, granted Bertine's
motion to suppress, holding that the inventory search violated the
Colorado Constitution.

															On the State's interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of
Colorado affirmed. 706 P.2d
411 (1986). In contrast to the District Court, however, the
Colorado Supreme Court premised its ruling on the United States
Constitution. The court recognized that, in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), we had held inventory searches of automobiles to be
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and that, in Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983), we had held that the inventory search of personal effects
of an arrestee at a police station was also permissible under that
Amendment. The Supreme Court of Colorado felt, however, that our
decisions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 (1979), and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977),
holding searches of closed trunks and suitcases to violate the
Fourth Amendment, meant that Opperman and Lafayette did not govern this case. [ Footnote 2 ]

															We granted certiorari to consider the important and recurring
question of federal law decided by the Colorado Supreme Page 479 U. S. 371 Court. [ Footnote 3 ] 475 U.S.
1081 (1986). As that court recognized, inventory searches are now a
well defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. See Lafayette, supra, at 462 U. S. 643 ; Opperman, supra, at 428 U. S.
367 -376. The policies behind the warrant requirement are
not implicated in an inventory search, Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 428 U. S. 370 ,
n. 5, nor is the related concept of probable cause:

															"The standard of probable cause is peculiarly related to
criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures. . . .
The probable cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon
the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions,
particularly when no claim is made that the protective procedures
are a subterfuge for criminal investigations." Ibid. See also United States v. Chadwick,
supra, at 433 U. S. 10 , n.
5. For these reasons, the Colorado Supreme Court's reliance on Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, and United States v.
Chadwick, supra, was incorrect. Both of these cases concerned
searches solely for the purpose of investigating criminal conduct,
with the validity of the searches therefore dependent on the
application of the probable cause and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.

															By contrast, an inventory search may be "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a
warrant based upon probable cause. In Page 479 U. S. 372 Opperman, this Court assessed the reasonableness of an
inventory search of the glove compartment in an abandoned
automobile impounded by the police. We found that inventory
procedures serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the
custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or
vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger. In light
of these strong governmental interests and the diminished
expectation of privacy in an automobile, we upheld the search. In
reaching this decision, we observed that our cases accorded
deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and
protect vehicles and their contents within police custody. See
Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 , 386 U. S. 61 -62
(1967); Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234 , 390 U. S. 236 (1968); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 , 413 U. S.
447 -448 (1973). [ Footnote 4 ]

															In our more recent decision, Lafayette, a police
officer conducted an inventory search of the contents of a shoulder
bag in the possession of an individual being taken into custody. In
deciding whether this search was reasonable, we recognized that the
search served legitimate governmental interests similar to those
identified in Opperman. We determined that those interests
outweighed the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, and upheld
the search.

															In the present case, as in Opperman and Lafayette, there was no showing that the police, who were
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the
sole purpose of investigation. In addition, the governmental
interests justifying the inventory searches in Opperman and Lafayette are Page 479 U. S. 373 nearly the same as those which obtain here. In each case, the
police were potentially responsible for the property taken into
their custody. By securing the property, the police protected the
property from unauthorized interference. Knowledge of the precise
nature of the property helped guard against claims of theft,
vandalism, or negligence. Such knowledge also helped to avert any
danger to police or others that may have been posed by the
property. [ Footnote 5 ]

															The Supreme Court of Colorado opined that Lafayette was
not controlling here because there was no danger of introducing
contraband or weapons into a jail facility. Our opinion in Lafayette, however, did not suggest that the station-house
setting of the inventory search was critical to our holding in that
case. Both in the present case and in Lafayette, the
common governmental interests described above were served by the
inventory searches.

															The Supreme Court of Colorado also expressed the view that the
search in this case was unreasonable because Bertine's van was
towed to a secure, lighted facility, and because Bertine himself
could have been offered the opportunity to make other arrangements
for the safekeeping of his property. But the security of the
storage facility does not completely eliminate the need for
inventorying; the police may still wish to protect themselves or
the owners of the lot against false claims of theft or dangerous
instrumentalities. And while giving Bertine an opportunity to make
alternative Page 479 U. S. 374 arrangements would undoubtedly have been possible, we said in Lafayette: "[T]he real question is not what 'could have been achieved,' but
whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps. . .
."

															"The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does
not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative
'less intrusive' means." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 647 (emphasis in original). See Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 413 U. S. 447 ; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 557 ,
n. 12 (1976). We conclude that here, as in Lafayette, reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures,
administered in good faith, satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even
though courts might, as a matter of hindsight, be able to devise
equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure. [ Footnote 6 ]

															The Supreme Court of Colorado also thought it necessary to
require that police, before inventorying a container, weigh the
strength of the individual's privacy interest in the container
against the possibility that the container might serve as a
repository for dangerous or valuable items. We think that such a
requirement is contrary to our decisions in Page 479 U. S. 375 Opperman and Lafayette, and by analogy to our
decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982):

															"Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some
particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect
police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and
subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be
searched and which must be sealed as a unit." Lafayette, supra, at 462 U. S.
648 .

															"When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and
its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or between
glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped
packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest
in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." United States v. Ross, supra, at 456 U. S.
821 .

															We reaffirm these principles here:

															"'[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.'" Lafayette, supra, at 462 U. S. 648 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.
S. 454 , 453 U. S. 458 (1981)).

															Bertine finally argues that the inventory search of his van was
unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the police
officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and
parking and locking it in a public parking place. The Supreme Court
of Colorado did not rely on this argument in reaching its
conclusion, and we reject it. Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of police discretion, so
long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of
criminal activity. Here, the discretion afforded the Boulder police
was exercised in light of Page 479 U. S. 376 standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than
impounding it. [ Footnote 7 ]
There was no showing that the police chose to impound Bertine's van
in order to investigate suspected criminal activity.

															While both Opperman and Lafayette are
distinguishable from the present case on their facts, we think that
the principles enunciated in those cases govern the present one.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado is therefore Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 7-7-2(a)(4) of the Boulder Revised Code authorizes
police officers to impound vehicles when drivers are taken into
custody. Section 7-7-2(a)(4) provides:

															"A peace officer is authorized to remove or cause to be removed
a vehicle from any street, parking lot, or driveway when:"

															"(4) The driver of a vehicle is taken into custody by the police
department."

															Boulder Rev. Code § 7-7-2(a)(4)(1981).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Two justices dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that South Dakota v. Opperman and Illinois v.
Lafayette compel the conclusion that the inventory search of
the backpack found in Bertine's van was permissible under the
Fourth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Since our decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, several
courts have confronted the issue whether police may inventory the
contents of containers found in vehicles taken into police custody. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475 (CA7)
(upholding inventory search of package found in paper bag), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984); United States v.
Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (CA8 1979) (affirming suppression of
evidence found in closed knapsack); People v. Braasch, 122
Ill.App. 3d 747, 461 N.E.2d 651 (1984) (upholding inventory of
paper bag); People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386, 465 N.E.2d
823 (1984) (upholding inventory of paper bag); Boggs v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d
407 (1985) (upholding inventory of boxes and pouch found in
bag), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The Colorado Supreme Court correctly stated that Opperman did not address the question whether the scope of
an inventory search may extend to closed containers located in the
interior of an impounded vehicle. We did note, however, that

															"'when the police take custody of any sort of container [such
as] an automobile . . . it is reasonable to search the container to
itemize the property to be held by the police.'"

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 371 (quoting United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 378 (CA5
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974)).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															In arguing that the latter two interests are not implicated
here, the dissent overlooks the testimony of the backup officer who
conducted the inventory of Bertine's van. According to the officer,
the vehicle inventory procedures of the Boulder Police Department
are designed for the "[p]rotection of the police department" in the
event that an individual later claims that "there was something of
value taken from within the vehicle." 2 Tr. 19. The officer added
that inventories are also conducted in order to check "[f]or any
dangerous items such as explosives [or] weapons." Id. at
20. The officer testified that he had found such items in
vehicles.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court found that the
Police Department's procedures mandated the opening of closed
containers and the listing of their contents. Our decisions have
always adhered to the requirement that inventories be conducted
according to standardized criteria. See Lafayette, 462
U.S. at 462 U. S. 648 ; Opperman, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
374 -375.

															By quoting a portion of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
out of context, the dissent suggests that the inventory here was
not authorized by the standard procedures of the Boulder Police
Department. See post at 479 U. S.
380 -381. Yet that court specifically stated that the
procedure followed here was "officially authorized." 706 P.2d
411 , 413, n. 2 (1985). In addition, the court did not disturb
the trial court's finding that the police procedures for impounding
vehicles required a detailed inventory of Bertine's van. See
id. at 418-419.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In arguing that the Boulder Police Department procedures set
forth no standardized criteria guiding an officer's decision to
impound a vehicle, the dissent selectively quotes from the police
directive concerning the care and security of vehicles taken into
police custody. The dissent fails to mention that the directive
establishes several conditions that must be met before an officer
may pursue the park-and-lock alternative. For example, police may
not park and lock the vehicle where there is reasonable risk of
damage or vandalism to the vehicle or where the approval of the
arrestee cannot be obtained. App. 91-92, 94-95. Not only do such
conditions circumscribe the discretion of individual officers, but
they also protect the vehicle and its contents and minimize claims
of property loss.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, concurring.

															The Court today holds that police officers may open closed
containers while conducting a routine inventory search of an
impounded vehicle. I join the Court's opinion, but write separately
to underscore the importance of having such inventories conducted
only pursuant to standardized police procedures. The underlying
rationale for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not vested with
discretion to determine the scope of the inventory search. See
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 428 U. S.
382 -383 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). This absence of
discretion ensures that inventory searches will not be used as a
purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.
Thus, it is permissible Page 479 U. S. 377 for police officers to open closed containers in an inventory
search only if they are following standard police procedures that
mandate the opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle.
As the Court emphasizes, the trial court in this case found that
the Police Department's standard procedures did mandate the opening
of closed containers and the listing of their contents. See
ante at 479 U. S. 374 ,
n. 6.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.

															Recognizing that "both Opperman and Lafayette are distinguishable from the present case on their facts," ante at 479 U. S. , the majority applies the balancing test enunciated in those cases
to uphold as reasonable the inventory of a closed container in a
car impounded when its driver was placed under arrest. However, the
distinctive facts of this case require a different result. This
search -- it cannot legitimately be labeled an inventory -- was
unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the
inventories in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 (1976), and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983), it was not conducted according to standardized procedures.
Furthermore, the governmental interests justifying the intrusion
are significantly weaker than the interests identified in either Opperman or Lafayette, and the expectation of
privacy is considerably stronger. I As the Court acknowledges, ante at 479 U. S. 374 ,
and n. 6, and 479 U. S.
375 -376, inventory searches are reasonable only if
conducted according to standardized procedures. In both Opperman and Lafayette, the Court relied on the
absence of police discretion in determining that the inventory
searches in question were reasonable. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion in Opperman repeatedly referred to this
standardized nature of inventory procedures. See 428 U.S.
at 428 U. S. 369 , 428 U. S. 372 , 428 U. S. 376 .
JUSTICE POWELL'S concurring opinion in that case also Page 479 U. S. 378 stressed that

															"no significant discretion is placed in the hands of the
individual officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of
the search or its scope." Id. at 428 U. S. 384 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Court in Lafayette emphasized the standardized procedure under which the station-house
inventory was conducted. See 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 646 , 462 U. S. 647 , 462 U. S. 648 ; see also id. at 462 U. S. 649 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment). In assessing the
reasonableness of searches conducted in limited situations such as
these, where we do not require probable cause or a warrant, we have
consistently emphasized the need for such set procedures:

															"standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court
has discerned when, in previous cases, it has insisted that the
discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least
to some extent." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 440 U. S. 661 (1979). See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266 , 413 U. S. 270 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 , 413 U. S. 443 (1973); Harris v. United States, 390 U.
S. 234 , 390 U. S. 235 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.
S. 523 , 387 U. S.
532 -533 (1967).

															The Court today attempts to evade these clear prohibitions on
unfettered police discretion by declaring that

															"the discretion afforded the Boulder police was exercised in
light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than
impounding it." Ante at 479 U. S.
375 -376. This vital assertion is flatly contradicted by
the record in this case. The officer who conducted the inventory,
Officer Reichenbach, testified at the suppression hearing that the
decision not to "park and lock" respondent's vehicle was his "own
individual discretionary decision." Tr. 76. Indeed, application of
these supposedly standardized "criteria" upon which the Court so
heavily relies would have yielded a different result in this case.
Since there was ample public parking adjacent to the intersection
where respondent was stopped, consideration of "feasibility" would
certainly have militated in favor of the "park and lock" Page 479 U. S. 379 option, not against it. I do not comprehend how consideration of
"appropriateness" serves to channel a field officer's discretion;
nonetheless, the "park and lock" option would seem particularly
appropriate in this case, where respondent was stopped for a
traffic offense and was not likely to be in custody for a
significant length of time.

															Indeed, the record indicates that no standardized criteria limit
a Boulder police officer's discretion. According to a departmental
directive, [ Footnote 2/1 ] after
placing a driver under arrest, an officer has three options for
disposing of the vehicle. First, he can allow a third party to take
custody. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Second, the
officer or the driver (depending on the nature of the arrest) may
take the car to the nearest public parking facility, lock it, and
take the keys. [ Footnote 2/3 ]
Finally, the officer can do what was done in Page 479 U. S. 380 this case: impound the vehicle, and search and inventory its
contents, including closed containers. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Under the first option, the police have no occasion to search
the automobile. Under the "park and lock" option,

															"[c]losed containers that give no indication of containing
either valuables or a weapon may not be opened and the contents
searched ( i.e., inventoried)."

															App. 92-93 (emphasis added). Only if the police choose the third
option are they entitled to search closed containers in the
vehicle. Where the vehicle is not itself evidence of a crime,
[ Footnote 2/5 ] as in this case, the
police apparently have totally unbridled discretion as to which
procedure to use. See 706 P.2d
411 , 413, n. 3 (Colo. 1985) ("[T]he Boulder Police Department's
regulations and rules do not require that an automobile be
inventoried and searched in accordance with the procedures followed
in this Page 479 U. S. 381 case"). Consistent with this conclusion, Officer Reichenbach
testified that such decisions were left to the discretion of the
officer on the scene. App. 60.

															Once a Boulder police officer has made this initial completely
discretionary decision to impound a vehicle, he is given little
guidance as to which areas to search and what sort of items to
inventory. The arresting officer, Officer Toporek, testified at the
suppression hearing as to what items would be inventoried:

															"That would I think be very individualistic as far as what an
officer may or may not go into. I think whatever arouses his
suspicious [ sic ] as far as what may be contained in any
type of article in the car." Id. at 78. In application, these so-called procedures
left the breadth of the "inventory" to the whim of the individual
officer. Clearly, "[t]he practical effect of this system is to
leave the [owner] subject to the discretion of the official in the
field." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 387 U. S.
532 .

															Inventory searches are not subject to the warrant requirement
because they are conducted by the government as part of a
"community caretaking" function, "totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 441 .
Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow
exception is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a
warrantless investigative foray. Accordingly, to invalidate a
search that is conducted without established procedures, it is not
necessary to establish that the police actually acted in bad faith,
or that the inventory was in fact a "pretext." By allowing the
police unfettered discretion, Boulder's discretionary scheme, like
the random spot checks in Delaware v. Prouse, is
unreasonable because of the " grave danger' of abuse of
discretion." 440 U.S. at 440 U. S.
662 . II In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 (1976), and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983), both of which Page 479 U. S. 382 involved inventories conducted pursuant to standardized
procedures, we balanced the individual's expectation of privacy
against the government's interests to determine whether the search
was reasonable. Even if the search in this case did constitute a
legitimate inventory, it would nonetheless be unreasonable under
this analysis. A The Court greatly overstates the justifications for the
inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority in Opperman, relied on three
governmental interests to justify the inventory search of an
unlocked glove compartment in an automobile impounded for overtime
parking: (i) "the protection of the owner's property while it
remains in police custody"; (ii) "the protection of the police
against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property"; and (iii)
"the protection of the police from potential danger." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 369 .
The majority finds that "nearly the same" interests obtain in this
case. See ante at 479 U. S. 373 . As JUSTICE POWELL's concurring opinion in Opperman reveals, however, only the first of these
interests is actually served by an automobile inventory search.

															The protection-against-claims interest did not justify the
inventory search either in Opperman, see 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 378 ,
n. 3 (POWELL, J., concurring), or in this case. As the majority
apparently concedes, ante at 479 U. S. 373 ,
the use of secure impoundment facilities effectively eliminates
this concern. [ Footnote 2/6 ] As Page 479 U. S. 383 to false claims,

															"inventories are [not] a completely effective means of
discouraging false claims, since there remains the possibility of
accompanying such claims with an assertion that an item was stolen
prior to the inventory or was intentionally omitted from the police
records."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
378 -379 (POWELL, J., concurring). See also id. at 428 U. S. 391 ,
and nn. 9 and 10 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); 2 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 5.5, p. 360, n. 50 (1978 and Supp. 1986).

															Officer Reichenbach's inventory in this case would not have
protected the police against claims lodged by respondent, false or
otherwise. Indeed, the trial court's characterization of the
inventory as "slipshod" is the height of understatement. For
example, Officer Reichenbach failed to list $150 in cash found in
respondent's wallet or the contents of a sealed envelope marked
"rent," $210, in the relevant section of the property form. Tr.
40-41; App. 41-42. His reports make no reference to other items of
value, including respondent's credit cards, and a converter, a
hydraulic jack, and a set of tire chains, worth a total of $125.
Tr. 41, 62-63. The $700 in cash found in respondent's backpack,
along with the contraband, appeared only on a property form
completed later by someone other than Officer Reichenbach. Id. at 81-82. The interior of the vehicle was left in
disarray, id. at 99, and the officer "inadvertently"
retained respondent's keys -- including his house keys -- for two
days following his arrest. Id. at 116, 133-134.

															The third interest -- protecting the police from potential
danger -- failed to receive the endorsement of a majority of the
Court in OPperman. After noting that "there is little
danger associated with impounding unsearched vehicles," JUSTICE
POWELL recognized that

															"there does not appear to be any effective way of identifying in
advance those circumstances or classes of automobile impoundments
which represent a greater risk."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 378 . See also id. at 428 U. S. 390 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (safety rationale "cannot justify the
search of every car upon the basis of undifferentiated
possibility Page 479 U. S. 384 of harm"). As with the charge of overtime parking in Opperman, there is nothing in the nature of the offense
for which respondent was arrested that suggests he was likely to be
carrying weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items. Cf.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
436 -437 (police reasonably believed that the defendant's
service revolver was in the car). Not only is protecting the police
from dangerous instrumentalities an attenuated justification for
most automobile inventory searches, but opening closed containers
to inventory the contents can only increase the risk. In the words
of the District Court in United States v.
Cooper, 428 F.
Supp. 652 , 654-655 (SD Ohio 1977):

															"The argument that the search was necessary to avoid a possible
boobytrap is . . . easily refuted. No sane individual inspects for
boobytraps by simply opening the container."

															Thus, only the government's interest in protecting the owner's
property actually justifies an inventory search of an impounded
vehicle. See 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 379 (POWELL, J., concurring); id. at 428 U. S. 391 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). While I continue to believe that
preservation of property does not outweigh the privacy and security
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, I fail to see how
preservation can even be asserted as a justification for the search
in this case. In Opperman, the owner of the impounded car
was not available to safeguard his possessions, see id. at 428 U. S. 375 ,
and it could plausibly be argued that, in his absence, the police
were entitled to act for his presumed benefit. See also Cady v.
Dombrowski, supra, at 413 U. S. 436 (comatose defendant). When the police
conducted the inventory in Opperman, they could not
predict how long the car would be left in their possession. See 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 379 (POWELL, J., concurring) ("[M]any owners might leave valuables in
their automobiles temporarily that they would not leave there
unattended for the several days that police custody may last"); cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58 , 386 U. S. 61 (1967) (police retained car for four months pending forfeiture;
length of time considered by the Court in assessing Page 479 U. S. 385 reasonableness of inventory). In this case, however, the owner
was "present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his
belongings," Opperman, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 375 ,
yet the police made no attempt to ascertain whether in fact he
wanted them to "safeguard" his property. Furthermore, since
respondent was charged with a traffic offense, he was unlikely to
remain in custody for more than a few hours. He might well have
been willing to leave his valuables unattended in the locked van
for such a short period of time. See Tr. 110 (had he been
given the choice, respondent indicated at the suppression hearing
that he "would have parked [the van] in the lot across the street
[and] [h]ad somebody come and get it").

															Thus, the government's interests in this case are weaker than in Opperman, but the search here is much more intrusive. Opperman did not involve a search of closed containers or
other items that " touch upon intimate areas of an individual's
personal affairs,'" 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 380 ,
and n. 7 (POWELL, J., concurring) (quoting California Bankers
Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U. S. 21 , 416 U. S. 78 -79
(1974) (POWELL, J., concurring)); nor can the Court's opinion be
read to authorize the inspection of "containers which might
themselves be sealed, removed and secured without further
intrusion." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 388 ,
n. 6 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). To expand the Opperman rationale to include containers in which the owner clearly has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court relies on Illinois
v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 (1983). Such reliance is fundamentally misplaced, however; the
inventory in Lafayette was justified by considerations
which are totally absent in this context. In Lafayette, we upheld a station-house inventory
search of an arrestee's shoulder bag. Notwithstanding the Court's
assertions to the contrary, ante at 479 U. S. 373 ,
the inventory in that case was justified primarily by compelling
governmental interests unique to the station house,
preincarceration context. There is a powerful interest in
preventing the introduction Page 479 U. S. 386 of contraband or weapons into a jail. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															"Arrested persons have also been known to injure themselves --
or others -- with belts, knives, drugs, or other items on their
person while being detained. Dangerous instrumentalities -- such as
razor blades, bombs, or weapons -- can be concealed in
innocent-looking articles taken from the arrestee's
possession."

															462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 646 .
Removing such items from persons about to be incarcerated is
necessary to reasonable jail security; once these items have been
identified and removed, "inventorying them is an entirely
reasonable administrative procedure." Ibid. Although Lafayette also involved the property justifications relied
on in Opperman, I do not believe it can fairly be read to
expand the scope of inventory searches where the pressing security
concerns of the station house are absent. B Not only are the government's interests weaker here than in Opperman and Lafayette, but respondent's privacy
interest is greater. In upholding the search in Opperman, the Court emphasized the fact that the defendant had a diminished
expectation of privacy in his automobile, due to "pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements" and "the obviously public
nature of automobile travel." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 368 . See also id. at 428 U. S. 379 (POWELL, J., concurring); but see id. at 428 U. S.
386 -388 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Lafayette, the Court emphasized the Page 479 U. S. 387 fact that the defendant was in custody at the time the inventory
took place. 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
645 -646.

															Here the Court completely ignores respondent's expectation of
privacy in his backpack. Whatever his expectation of privacy in his
automobile generally, our prior decisions clearly establish that he
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack and
its contents. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 , 442 U. S. 762 (1979) ("[L]uggage is a common repository for one's personal
effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the
expectation of privacy"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 433 U. S. 13 (1977) ("[A] person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage
are substantially greater than in an automobile"). Indeed, the
Boulder police officer who conducted the inventory acknowledged
that backpacks commonly serve as repositories for personal effects.
[ Footnote 2/8 ] Thus, even if the
governmental interests in this case were the same as those in Opperman, they would nonetheless be outweighed by
respondent's comparatively greater expectation of privacy in his
luggage. III In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S.
461 -462 (1971), a plurality of this Court stated: "The
word automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears." By upholding the search in
this case, the Court not only ignores that principle, but creates
another talisman to overcome the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment -- the term "inventory." Accordingly, I dissent. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Subsections 7-7-2(a)(1) and 7-7-2(a)(g) of the Boulder Revised
Code authorize police to impound a vehicle if the driver is taken
into custody or if the vehicle obstructs traffic. A departmental
directive authorizes inventory searches of impounded vehicles. See General Procedure issued from the office of the Chief
of Police, Boulder Police Department, concerning Motor Vehicle
Impounds, effective September 7, 1977, reproduced in App.
89-95.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See id. at 95.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															If the vehicle and its contents are not evidence of a crime and
the owner consents, § III of the General Procedure provides, in
relevant part:

															"A. Upon placing the operator of a motor vehicle in custody,
Officers may take the following steps in securing the
arrestee's vehicle and property. . . :"

															" * * * *" "4. The Officer shall drive the vehicle off the roadway and
legally park the vehicle in the nearest PUBLIC parking area. The
date, time, and location where the vehicle is parked shall be
indicated on the IMPOUND FORM."

															"5. The Officer shall remove the ignition keys, and lock all
doors of the vehicle."

															"6. During the booking process, the arrestee shall be given a
continuation form for his signature which indicates the location of
his vehicle. One copy of the continuation form is to be retained in
the case file." Id. at 93-94 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Section II(A) of the General Procedure establishes the following
impoundment procedures:

															"1. If the vehicle or its contents have been used in the
commission of a crime or are themselves the fruit of a crime, the
Officer shall conduct a detailed vehicle inspection and inventory
and record it upon the VEHICLE IMPOUND FORM."

															"2. Personal items of value should be removed from the vehicle
and subsequently placed into Property for safekeeping."

															"3. The Officer shall request a Tow Truck, and upon its arrival
have the Tow Truck operator sign the IMPOUND FORM, keeping one copy
in his possession, before the Officer releases the vehicle for
impoundment in the City of Boulder impoundment facility." Id. at 90-91. Subsection (B) of the directive provides
that this procedure is also to be followed when a vehicle involved
in a traffic accident is to be held for evidentiary purposes.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Respondent's van was not evidence of a crime within the meaning
of the departmental directive; Officer Reichenbach testified that
it was not his practice to impound all cars following an arrest for
driving while under the influence of alcohol. Tr. 61. The
Memorandum also requires the "approval of the arrestee" before the
police can "park and lock" his car, App. 92. In this case, however,
respondent was never advised of this option, and had no opportunity
to consent. At the suppression hearing, he indicated that he would
have consented to such a procedure. See Tr. 110.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The impoundment lot in South Dakota v. Opperman was
"the old county highway yard. It ha[d] a wooden fence partially
around part of it, and kind of a dilapidated wire fence, a
makeshift fence." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 366 ,
n. 1. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 , 413 U. S. 443 (1973) ("[T]he car was left outside, in a lot seven miles from the
police station to which respondent had been taken, and no guard was
posted over it"). By contrast, in the present case, respondent's
vehicle was taken to a lighted, private storage lot with a locked
6-foot fence. The lot was patrolled by private security officers
and police, and nothing had ever been stolen from a vehicle in the
lot. App. 69-71.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															The importance of this justification to the outcome in Illinois v. Lafayette is amply demonstrated by the Court's
direction on remand:

															"The record is unclear as to whether respondent was to have been
incarcerated after being booked for disturbing the peace. That is
an appropriate inquiry on remand."

															462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 648 ,
n. 3. See also id. at 462 U. S. 649 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) ("I agree that the police do
not need a warrant or probable cause to conduct an inventory search prior to incarcerating a suspect " (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 , 414 U. S. 258 ,
n. 7 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (the justification for
station-house searches is "the fact that the suspect will be placed
in jail").

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															At the suppression hearing, Officer Reichenbach stated: "The
average person on the street . . . carries items of personal value
in the backpacks, wallets, checkbooks, textbooks." Tr. 23.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that evidence obtained during an inventory search of a vehicle is admissible in court, even if the search was not supported by a warrant or probable cause, as long as the search was conducted according to standardized procedures and not for the sole purpose of investigation. This case established that inventory searches serve important governmental interests and do not implicate the same privacy concerns as other types of searches. The Court also upheld the discretion of the police to choose between impounding a vehicle and parking and locking it in a public place, as long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria.