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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 10–9646 and 10–9647

															_________________

															EVAN MILLER, PETITIONER

															10–9646 v. ALABAMA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of criminal
appeals of alabama

															KUNTRELL JACKSON, PETITIONER

															10–9647 v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas

															[June 25, 2012]

															Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The two 14-year-old offenders in these cases
were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing
authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment.
State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge
or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant
characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser
sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole)
more appropriate. Such a scheme prevents those meting out
punishment from considering a juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and
greater “capacity for change,” Graham v. Florida , 560
U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 17, 23), and runs afoul of
our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants
facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold that mandatory
life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of
their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel
and unusual punishments.”

															I

															A

															In November 1999, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson,
then 14 years old, and two other boys decided to rob a video store.
En route to the store, Jackson learned that one of the boys,
Derrick Shields, was carrying a sawed-off shotgun in his coat
sleeve. Jackson decided to stay outside when the two other boys
entered the store. Inside, Shields pointed the gun at the store
clerk, Laurie Troup, and demanded that she “give up the money.” Jackson v. State , 359 Ark. 87, 89, 194 S.W.3d 757,
759 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Troup refused. A few
moments later, Jackson went into the store to find Shields
continuing to demand money. At trial, the parties disputed whether
Jackson warned Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,” or instead told his
friends, “I thought you all was playin’.” Id., at 91, 194
S. W. 3d, at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted). When
Troup threatened to call the police, Shields shot and killed her.
The three boys fled empty-handed. See id., at 89–92, 194
S. W. 3d, at 758–760.

															Arkansas law gives prosecutors discretion to
charge 14-year-olds as adults when they are alleged to have
committed certain serious offenses. See Ark. Code Ann.
§9–27–318(c)(2) (1998). The prosecutor here exercised that
authority by charging Jackson with capital felony murder and
aggravated robbery. Jackson moved to transfer the case to juvenile
court, but after considering the alleged facts of the crime, a
psychiatrist’s examination, and Jackson’s juvenile arrest history
(shoplifting and several incidents of car theft), the trial court
denied the motion, and an appellate court affirmed. See Jackson v. State , No. 02–535, 2003 WL 193412, *1
(Ark. App., dateJan. 29, 2003); §§9–27–318(d), (e). A jury later
convicted Jackson of both crimes. Noting that “in view of [the]
verdict, there’s only one possible punishment,” the judge sentenced
Jackson to life without parole. App. in No. 10–9647, p. 55
(hereinafter Jackson App.); see Ark. Code Ann. §5–4–104(b) (1997)
(“A defendant convicted of capital murder or treason shall be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole”).[ 1 ] Jackson did not challenge the
sentence on appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions. See 359 Ark. 87, 194 S.W.3d 757.

															Following Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 (2005), in which this Court invalidated the death penalty
for all juvenile offenders under the age of 18, Jackson filed a
state petition for habeas corpus. He argued, based on Roper ’s reasoning, that a mandatory sentence of life without
parole for a 14-year-old also violates the Eighth Amendment. The
circuit court rejected that argument and granted the State’s motion
to dismiss. See Jackson App. 72–76. While that ruling was on
appeal, this Court held in Graham v. Florida that
life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment when imposed on
juvenile nonhomicide offenders. After the parties filed briefs
addressing that decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the
dismissal of Jackson’s petition. See Jackson v. Norris , 2011 Ark. 49, ___ S. W. 3d ___. The majority
found that Roper and Graham were “narrowly tailored”
to their contexts: “death-penalty cases involving a juvenile and
life-imprisonment-without-parole cases for nonhomicide offenses
involving a juvenile.” Id. , at 5, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___.
Two justices dissented. They noted that Jackson was not the shooter
and that “any evidence of intent to kill was severely lacking.” Id., at 10, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___ (Danielson, J.,
dissenting). And they argued that Jackson’s mandatory sentence ran
afoul of Graham ’s admonition that “ ‘[a]n offender’s
age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure
laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all
would be flawed.’ ” Id. , at 10–11, ___ S. W. 3d,
at ___ (quoting Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
25)).[ 2 ]

															B

															Like Jackson, petitioner Evan Miller was 14
years old at the time of his crime. Miller had by then been in and
out of foster care because his mother suffered from alcoholism and
drug addiction and his stepfather abused him. Miller, too,
regularly used drugs and alcohol; and he had attempted suicide four
times, the first when he was six years old. See E. J. M. v. State , 928 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J., concurring in result); App. in
No. 10–9646, pp. 26–28 (hereinafter Miller App.).

															One night in 2003, Miller was at home with a
friend, Colby Smith, when a neighbor, Cole Cannon, came to make a
drug deal with Miller’s mother. See 6 Record in No. 10–9646, p.
1004. The two boys followed Cannon back to his trailer, where all
three smoked marijuana and played drinking games. When Cannon
passed out, Miller stole his wallet, splitting about $300 with
Smith. Miller then tried to put the wallet back in Cannon’s pocket,
but Cannon awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat. Smith hit Cannon
with a nearby baseball bat, and once released, Miller grabbed the
bat and repeatedly struck Cannon with it. Miller placed a sheet
over Cannon’s head, told him “ ‘I am God, I’ve come to take
your life,’ ” and delivered one more blow. Miller v. State , 63 So. 3d 676, 689 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). The boys
then retreated to Miller’s trailer, but soon decided to return to
Cannon’s to cover up evidence of their crime. Once there, they lit
two fires. Cannon eventually died from his injuries and smoke
inhalation. See id. , at 683–685, 689.

															Alabama law required that Miller initially be
charged as a juvenile, but allowed the District Attorney to seek
removal of the case to adult court. See Ala. Code §12–15–34 (1977).
The D. A. did so, and the juvenile court agreed to the
transfer after a hearing. Citing the nature of the crime, Miller’s
“mental maturity,” and his prior juvenile offenses (truancy and
“criminal mischief”), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. E. J. M. v. State , No. CR–03–0915, pp. 5–7
(dateAug. 27, 2004) (unpublished memorandum).[ 3 ] The State accordingly charged Miller as an
adult with murder in the course of arson. That crime (like capital
murder in Arkansas) carries a mandatory minimum punishment of life
without parole. See Ala. Code §§13A–5–40(9), 13A–6–2(c) (1982).

															Relying in significant part on testimony from
Smith, who had pleaded to a lesser offense, a jury found Miller
guilty. He was therefore sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, ruling
that life without parole was “not overly harsh when compared to the
crime” and that the mandatory nature of the sentencing scheme was
permissible under the Eighth Amendment. 63 So. 3d, at 690; see id., at 686–691. The Alabama Supreme Court denied
review.

															We granted certiorari in both cases, see 565
U. S. ___ (2011) (No. 10–9646); 565 U. S. ___ (2011) (No.
10–9647), and now reverse.

															II

															The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel
and un- usual punishment “guarantees individuals the right not to
be subjected to excessive sanctions.” Roper , 543 U. S.,
at 560. That right, we have explained, “flows from the basic
‘precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned’ ” to both the offender and the offense. Ibid. (quoting Weems v. United States , 217 U.S.
349 , 367 (1910)). As we noted the last time we consid- ered
life-without-parole sentences imposed on juveniles, “[t]he concept
of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.” Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). And we view
that concept less through a historical prism than according to
“ ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.’ ” Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S.
97 , 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S.
86 , 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).

															The cases before us implicate two strands of
precedent reflecting our concern with proportionate punishment. The
first has adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty. See Graham , 560 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 9–10) (listing cases). So, for example, we have held
that imposing the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes against
individuals, or imposing it on mentally retarded defendants,
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S.
407 (2008); Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S.
304 (2002). Several of the cases in this group have specially
focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability.
Thus, Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital
punishment for children, and Graham concluded that the
Amendment also prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole for a child who committed a nonhomicide offense. Graham further likened life without parole for juveniles to
the death penalty itself, thereby evoking a second line of our
precedents. In those cases, we have prohibited mandatory imposition
of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities
consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his
offense before sentencing him to death. See Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U.S.
586 (1978). Here, the confluence of these two lines of
precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth
Amendment.[ 4 ]

															To start with the first set of cases: Roper and Graham establish that children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.
Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects
for reform, we explained, “they are less deserving of the most
severe punishments.” Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 17). Those cases relied on three significant gaps between
juveniles and adults. First, children have a “ ‘lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,’ ”
leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking. Roper , 543 U. S., at 569. Second, children “are more
vulner- able . . . to negative influences and outside
pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have
limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability
to extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character is not as “well formed”
as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less
likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id., at 570.

															Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on
what “any parent knows”—but on science and social science as well. Id., at 569. In Roper , we cited studies showing that
“ ‘[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents’ ”
who engage in illegal activity “ ‘develop entrenched patterns
of problem behavior.’ ” Id., at 570 (quoting Steinberg
& Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)). And in Graham , we noted that “developments in psychology and brain
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile
and adult minds”—for example, in “parts of the brain involved in
behavior control.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
17).[ 5 ] We reasoned that those
findings—of transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability
to assess consequences—both lessened a child’s “moral culpability”
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological
development occurs, his “ ‘deficiencies will be
reformed.’ ” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (quoting Roper , 543 U. S., at 570). Roper and Graham emphasized that
the distinctive at- tributes of youth diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Because
“ ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ ” relates to
an offender’s blameworthiness, “ ‘the case for retribution is
not as strong with a minor as with an adult.’ ” Graham ,
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 20–21) (quoting Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S.
137 , 149 (1987); Roper , 543 U. S., at 571). Nor can
deterrence do the work in this context, because “ ‘the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than
adults’ ”—their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity—make
them less likely to consider potential punishment. Graham ,
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 21) (quoting Roper , 543
U. S., at 571). Similarly, incapacitation could not support
the life-without-parole sentence in Graham : Deciding that a
“juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society” would
require “mak[ing] a judgment that [he] is incorrigible”—but
“ ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.’ ” 560
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22) (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth , 429 S.W.2d 374 , 378 (Ky. App. 1968)). And for the same reason,
rehabilitation could not justify that sentence. Life without parole
“forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.” Graham , 560
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 23). It reflects “an irrevocable
judgment about [an offender’s] value and place in society,” at odds
with a child’s capacity for change. Ibid. Graham concluded from this analysis that
life-without-parole sentences, like capital punishment, may violate
the Eighth Amendment when imposed on children. To be sure, Graham ’s flat ban on life without parole applied only to
nonhomicide crimes, and the Court took care to distinguish those
offenses from murder, based on both moral culpability and
consequential harm. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 18). But
none of what it said about children—about their distinctive (and
transitory) mental traits and en- vironmental vulnerabilities—is
crime-specific. Those features are evident in the same way, and to
the same de- gree, when (as in both cases here) a botched robbery
turns into a killing. So Graham ’s reasoning implicates any
life-without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile, even as its
categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.

															Most fundamentally, Graham insists that
youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of
incarceration without the possibility of parole. In the
circumstances there, juvenile status precluded a
life-without-parole sentence, even though an adult could receive it
for a similar crime. And in other contexts as well, the
characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken rationales for
punishment, can render a life-without-parole sentence
disproportionate. Cf. id., at ___ (slip op., at 20–23)
(generally doubting the penological justifications for imposing
life without parole on juveniles). “An offender’s age,” we made
clear in Graham , “is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,” and
so “criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Id., at
___ (slip op., at 25) . The Chief Justice, concurring in the
judgment, made a similar point. Al- though rejecting a categorical
bar on life-without-parole sentences for juveniles, he acknowledged
“ Roper ’s conclusion that juveniles are typically less
culpable than adults,” and accordingly wrote that “an offender’s
juvenile status can play a central role” in considering a
sentence’s proportionality. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5–6);
see id., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (Graham’s “youth is one
factor, among others, that should be considered in deciding whether
his punishment was unconstitutionally excessive”).[ 6 ]

															But the mandatory penalty schemes at issue here
prevent the sentencer from taking account of these central
considerations. By removing youth from the balance— by subjecting a
juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an
adult—these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing
whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately
punishes a juvenile offender. That contravenes Graham ’s (and
also Roper ’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a
State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed
as though they were not children.

															And Graham makes plain these mandatory
schemes’ defects in another way: by likening life-without-parole
sentences imposed on juveniles to the death penalty itself.
Life-without-parole terms, the Court wrote, “share some
characteristics with death sentences that are shared by no other
sentences.” 560 U. S. , at ___ (slip op., at 19).
Imprisoning an offender until he dies alters the remainder of his
life “by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.” Ibid. (citing Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S.
277 , 300–301 (1983)). And this lengthiest possible
incarceration is an “especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,”
because he will almost inevitably serve “more years and a greater
percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19–20). The
penalty when imposed on a teenager, as compared with an older
person, is therefore “the same . . . in name only.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 20). All of that suggested a
distinctive set of legal rules: In part because we viewed this
ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death penalty, we
treated it similarly to that most severe punishment. We imposed a
categorical ban on the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a
term of imprisonment. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 9); id., at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 7) (“For
the first time in its history, the Court declares an entire class
of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the
categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases
alone”). And the bar we adopted mirrored a proscription first
established in the death penalty context—that the punishment cannot
be imposed for any nonhomicide crimes against individuals. See Kennedy , 554 U.S.
407 ; Coker v. Georgia , 433
U.S. 584 (1977).

															That correspondence— Graham ’s
“[t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital
punishment,” 560 U. S., at ___ (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 5)—makes relevant here a
second line of our precedents, demanding individualized sentencing
when imposing the death penalty. In Woodson , 428 U.S.
280 , we held that a statute mandating a death sentence for
first-degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment. We thought the
mandatory scheme flawed because it gave no significance to “the
character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances” of the offense, and “exclud[ed] from consideration
. . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors.” Id., at 304. Subsequent decisions have elaborated
on the requirement that capital defendants have an opportunity to
advance, and the judge or jury a chance to assess, any mitigating
factors, so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most
culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman , 483 U.S.
66 , 74–76 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S.
104 , 110–112 (1982); Lockett , 438 U. S., at 597–609
(plurality opinion).

															Of special pertinence here, we insisted in these
rulings that a sentencer have the ability to consider the
“mitigating qualities of youth.” Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S.
350 , 367 (1993). Everything we said in Roper and Graham about that stage of life also appears in these
decisions. As we observed, “youth is more than a chronological
fact.” Eddings , 455 U. S., at 115. It is a time of
immaturity, ir- responsibility, “impetuousness[,] and
recklessness.” Johnson, 509 U. S., at 368. It is a
moment and “condition of life when a person may be most susceptible
to influence and to psychological damage.” Eddings, 455
U. S., at 115. And its “signature qualities” are all
“transient.” Johnson , 509 U. S., at 368. Eddings is especially on point. There, a 16-year-old shot a police officer
point-blank and killed him. We invalidated his death sentence
because the judge did not consider evidence of his neglectful and
violent family background (including his mother’s drug abuse and
his father’s physical abuse) and his emotional disturbance. We
found that evidence “particularly relevant”—more so than it would
have been in the case of an adult offender. 455 U. S., at 115.
We held: “[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a
relevant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background
and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant be
duly considered” in assessing his culpability. Id., at
116.

															In light of Graham ’s reasoning, these
decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory
life-without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offenders. Such
mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a sentencer from
taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these
schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every
other—the 17-year-old and the 14-year-old, the shooter and the
accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from a
chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile (including
these two 14-year-olds) will receive the same sentence as the vast
majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses—but really,
as Graham noted, a greater sentence than those adults
will serve.[ 7 ] In meting out
the death penalty, the elision of all these differences would be
strictly forbidden. And once again, Graham indicates that a
similar rule should apply when a juvenile confronts a sentence of
life (and death) in prison.

															So Graham and Roper and our
individualized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he
treats every child as an adult. To recap: Mandatory life without
parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological
age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity,
and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents
taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds
him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter
how bru- tal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected
him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated
with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers
or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to
assist his own attorneys. See, e.g., Graham , 560 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 27) (“[T]he features that distinguish
juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage
in criminal proceedings”); J. D. B. v. North
Carolina , 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5–6)
(discussing children’s responses to interrogation). And finally,
this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of
rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.

															Both cases before us illustrate the problem.
Take Jackson’s first. As noted earlier, Jackson did not fire the
bullet that killed Laurie Troup; nor did the State argue that he
intended her death. Jackson’s conviction was instead based on an
aiding-and-abetting theory; and the appellate court affirmed the
verdict only because the jury could have believed that when Jackson
entered the store, he warned Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,”
rather than told his friends that “I thought you all was playin’.”
See 359 Ark., at 90–92, 194 S. W. 3d, at 759–760; supra, at 2. To be sure, Jackson learned on the way to the
video store that his friend Shields was carrying a gun, but his age
could well have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as
well as his willingness to walk away at that point. All these
circumstances go to Jackson’s culpability for the offense. See Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (“[W]hen
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill
or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability”). And
so too does Jackson’s family background and immersion in violence:
Both his mother and his grandmother had previously shot other
individuals. See Record in No. 10–9647, pp. 80–82. At the least, a
sentencer should look at such facts before depriving a 14-year-old
of any prospect of release from prison.

															That is true also in Miller’s case. No one can
doubt that he and Smith committed a vicious murder. But they did it
when high on drugs and alcohol consumed with the adult victim. And
if ever a pathological background might have contributed to a
14-year-old’s commission of a crime, it is here. Miller’s
stepfather physically abused him; his alcoholic and drug-addicted
mother neglected him; he had been in and out of foster care as a
result; and he had tried to kill himself four times, the first when
he should have been in kindergarten. See 928 So. 2d, at 1081
(Cobb, J., concurring in result); Miller App. 26–28; supra, at 4. Nonetheless, Miller’s past criminal history was limited—two
instances of truancy and one of “second-degree criminal mischief.”
No. CR–03–0915, at 6 (unpublished memorandum). That Miller deserved
severe punishment for killing Cole Cannon is beyond question. But
once again, a sentencer needed to examine all these circumstances
before concluding that life without any possibility of parole was
the appropriate penalty.

															We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Cf. Graham ,
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24) (“A State is not required
to guarantee eventual freedom,” but must provide “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation”). By making youth (and all that accompanies it)
irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison sentence, such a
scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.
Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do not
consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole
for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger. But given all
we have said in Roper , Graham , and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially
so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between “the
juvenile of- fender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.” Roper , 543 U. S., at 573; Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). Although
we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are
different, and how those differences coun- sel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.[ 8 ]

															III

															Alabama and Arkansas offer two kinds of
arguments against requiring individualized consideration before
sen- tencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without possi- bility
of parole. The States (along with the dissents) first contend that
the rule we adopt conflicts with aspects of our Eighth Amendment
caselaw. And they next assert that the rule is unnecessary because
individualized circumstances come into play in deciding whether to
try a juvenile offender as an adult. We think the States are wrong
on both counts.

															A

															The States (along with Justice Thomas) first
claim that Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S.
957 (1991), precludes our holding. The defendant in Harmelin was sentenced to a mandatory life-without-parole
term for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine. The Court
upheld that pen- alty, reasoning that “a sentence which is not
otherwise cruel and unusual” does not “becom[e] so simply because
it is ‘mandatory.’ ” Id., at 995. We recognized that a
different rule, requiring individualized sentencing, applied in the
death penalty context. But we refused to extend that command to
noncapital cases “because of the qualitative difference between
death and all other penalties.” Ibid. ; see id., at
1006 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
According to Alabama, invalidating the mandatory imposition of
life-without-parole terms on juveniles “would effectively overrule Harmelin .” Brief for Respondent in No. 10–9646, p. 59
(hereinafter Alabama Brief); see Arkansas Brief 39.

															We think that argument myopic. Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its
holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. We have by now
held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for
adults may not be so for children. Capital punishment, our
decisions hold, generally comports with the Eighth Amendment—except
it cannot be imposed on children. See Roper , 543 U.S.
551 ; Thompson , 487
U.S. 815 . So too, life without parole is permissible for
nonhomicide offenses—except, once again, for children. See Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24). Nor are
these sentencing decisions an oddity in the law. To the contrary,
“ ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recogni-
tion’ that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.” J. D. B., 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10–11)
(quoting Eddings , 455 U. S., at 115–116, citing
examples from criminal, property, contract, and tort law). So if
(as Harmelin recognized) “death is different,” children are
different too. Indeed, it is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children. In that
context, it is no surprise that the law relating to society’s
harshest punishments recognizes such a distinction. Cf. Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (Roberts, C. J.,
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7) (“Graham’s age places him
in a significantly different category from the defendan[t] in
. . . Harmelin ”). Our ruling thus neither
overrules nor undermines nor con- flicts with Harmelin .

															Alabama and Arkansas (along with The Chief Jus-
tice and Justice Alito) next contend that because many States
impose mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles, we may
not hold the practice unconstitutional. In considering categorical
bars to the death penalty and life without parole, we ask as part
of the analysis whether “ ‘objective indicia of society’s
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice,’ ” show a “national consensus” against a sentence
for a particular class of offenders. Graham , 560 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Roper , 543 U. S., at
563). By our count, 29 jurisdictions (28 States and the Federal
Government) make a life-without-parole term mandatory for some
juveniles convicted of murder in adult court.[ 9 ] The States argue that this number precludes our
holding.

															We do not agree; indeed, we think the States’
argument on this score weaker than the one we rejected in Graham . For starters, the cases here are different from the
typical one in which we have tallied legislative enactments. Our
decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham . Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow
a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty. And in so
requiring, our decision flows straightforwardly from our
precedents: specifically, the principle of Roper, Graham ,
and our individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for
purposes of meting out the law’s most serious punishments. When
both of those circumstances have obtained in the past, we have not
scrutinized or relied in the same way on legislative enactments.
See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman , 483 U.S.
66 (relying on Woodson ’s logic to prohibit the mandatory
death penalty for murderers already serving life without parole); Lockett , 438 U. S., at 602–608 (plurality opinion)
(applying Woodson to require that judges and juries consider
all mitigating evidence); Eddings , 455 U. S., at
110–117 (similar). We see no difference here.

															In any event, the “objective indicia” that the
States offer do not distinguish these cases from others holding
that a sentencing practice violates the Eighth Amendment. In Graham , we prohibited life-without-parole terms for
juveniles committing nonhomicide offenses even though 39
jurisdictions permitted that sentence. See 560 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 11). That is 10 more than impose life without
parole on juveniles on a mandatory basis.[ 10 ] And in Atkins , Roper , and Thompson , we similarly banned the death penalty in
circumstances in which “less than half” of the “States that
permit[ted] capital punishment (for whom the issue exist[ed])” had
previously chosen to do so. Atkins , 536 U. S., at 342
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted); see id., at
313–315 (majority opinion); Roper , 543 U. S., at
564–565; Thompson , 487 U. S., at 826–827 (plurality
opinion). So we are breaking no new ground in these cases.[ 11 ] Graham and Thompson provide
special guidance, because they considered the same kind of statutes
we do and explained why simply counting them would present a
distorted view. Most jurisdictions authorized the death penalty or
life without parole for juveniles only through the combination of
two independent statutory provisions. One allowed the transfer of
certain juvenile offenders to adult court, while another (often in
a far-removed part of the code) set out the penalties for any and
all individuals tried there. We reasoned that in those
circumstances, it was impossible to say whether a legislature had
endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so if presented
with the choice). In Thompson , we found that the statutes
“t[old] us that the States consider 15-year-olds to be old enough
to be tried in criminal court for serious crimes (or too old to be
dealt with effectively in juvenile court), but t[old] us nothing
about the judgment these States have made regarding the appropriate
punishment for such youthful offenders.” 487 U. S., at 826, n.
24 (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted); see also id., at
850 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Roper , 543
U. S., at 596, n. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). And Graham echoed that reasoning: Although the confluence of
state laws “ma[de] life without parole possible for some juvenile
nonhomicide offenders,” it did not “justify a judgment” that many
States actually “intended to subject such offenders” to those
sentences. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).[ 12 ]

															All that is just as true here. Almost all
jurisdictions allow some juveniles to be tried in adult court for
some kinds of homicide. See Dept. of Justice, H. Snyder & M.
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report
110–114 (hereinafter 2006 National Report). But most States do not
have separate penalty provisions for those juvenile offenders. Of
the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for children,
more than half do so by virtue of generally applicable penalty
provisions, imposing the sentence without regard to age.[ 13 ] And indeed, some of those States
set no minimum age for who may be transferred to adult court in the
first instance, thus applying life-without-parole mandates to
children of any age—be it 17 or 14 or 10 or 6.[ 14 ] As in Graham , we think that
“underscores that the statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender
for life without parole does not indicate that the penalty has been
endorsed through deliberate, express, and full legislative
consideration.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). That
Alabama and Arkansas can count to 29 by including these possibly
(or probably) inadvertent legislative outcomes does not preclude
our determination that mandatory life without parole for juveniles
violates the Eighth Amendment.

															B

															Nor does the presence of discretion in some
jurisdictions’ transfer statutes aid the States here. Alabama and
Arkansas initially ignore that many States use mandatory transfer
systems: A juvenile of a certain age who has committed a specified
offense will be tried in adult court, regardless of any
individualized circumstances. Of the 29 relevant jurisdictions,
about half place at least some juvenile homicide offenders in adult
court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek transfer
to juvenile court.[ 15 ]
Moreover, several States at times lodge this decision exclusively
in the hands of prosecutors, again with no statutory mechanism for
judicial reevaluation.[ 16 ]
And those “prosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent
regarding standards, protocols, or appropriate considerations for
decisionmaking.” Dept. of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, P. Griffin, S. Addie, B. Adams, & K.
Firestine, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State
Transfer Laws and Reporting 5 (2011).

															Even when States give transfer-stage discretion
to judges, it has limited utility. First, the decisionmaker
typically will have only partial information at this early,
pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of his
offense. Miller’s case provides an example. As noted earlier, see
n. 3, supra , the juvenile court denied Miller’s request
for his own mental-health expert at the transfer hearing, and the
appeals court affirmed on the ground that Miller was not then
entitled to the protections and services he would receive at trial.
See No. CR–03–0915, at 3–4 (unpublished memorandum). But by then,
of course, the expert’s testimony could not change the sentence;
whatever she said in mitigation, the mandatory life-without-parole
prison term would kick in. The key mo- ment for the exercise of
discretion is the transfer—and as Miller’s case shows, the judge
often does not know then what she will learn, about the offender or
the offense, over the course of the proceedings.

															Second and still more important, the question at
transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at a
post-trial sentencing. Because many juvenile systems require that
the offender be released at a particular age or after a certain
number of years, transfer decisions often present a choice between
extremes: light punishment as a child or standard sentencing as an
adult (here, life without parole). In many States, for example, a
child convicted in juvenile court must be released from custody by
the age of 21. See, e.g., Ala. Code §12–15–117(a) (Cum.
Supp. 2011); see generally 2006 National Report 103 (noting
limitations on the length of juvenile court sanctions).
Discretionary sentencing in adult court would provide different
options: There, a judge or jury could choose, rather than a
life-without-parole sentence, a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a lengthy term of years. It is easy to
imagine a judge deciding that a minor deserves a (much) harsher
sentence than he would receive in juvenile court, while still not
thinking life-without-parole appropriate. For that reason, the
discretion available to a judge at the transfer stage cannot
substitute for discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult
court—and so cannot satisfy the Eighth Amendment.

															IV Graham , Roper , and our
individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances
before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By
requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their
age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes,
the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle
of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. We accordingly reverse the judgments of the
Arkansas Supreme Court and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and
remand the cases for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Jackson was ineligible
for the death penalty under Thompson v. Oklahoma , 487
U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion), which held that capital
punishment of offenders under the age of 16 violates the Eighth
Amendment. 2 For the first time in
this Court, Arkansas contends that Jackson’s sentence was not
mandatory. On its view, state law then in effect allowed the trial
judge to suspend the life-without-parole sentence and commit
Jackson to the Department of Human Services for a “training-school
program,” at the end of which he could be placed on probation.
Brief for Respondent in No. 10–9647, pp. 36–37 (hereinafter
Arkansas Brief) (citing Ark. Code Ann. §12–28–403(b)(2) (1999)).
But Arkansas never raised that objection in the state courts, and
they treated Jackson’s sentence as mandatory. We abide by that
interpretation of state law. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S.
684 , 690–691 (1975). 3 The Court of Criminal
Appeals also affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of Miller’s
request for funds to hire his own mental expert for the transfer
hearing. The court pointed out that under governing Alabama Supreme
Court precedent, “the procedural requirements of a trial do not
ordinarily apply” to those hearings. E. J. M. v. State , 928 So. 2d 1077 (2004) (Cobb, J., concurring in
result) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a separate opinion,
Judge Cobb agreed on the reigning precedent, but urged the State
Supreme Court to revisit the question in light of transfer
hearings’ importance. See id., at 1081 (“[A]lthough later
mental evaluation as an adult affords some semblance of procedural
due process, it is, in effect, too little, too late”). 4 The three dissenting
opinions here each take issue with some or all of those precedents.
See post, at 5–6 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); post , at 1–6 (opinion of Thomas, J.); post, at 1–4
(opinion of Alito, J.). That is not surprising: their authors (and
joiner) each dissented from some or all of those precedents. See, e.g., Kennedy , 554 U. S., at 447 (Alito, J., joined by
Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); Roper , 543 U. S., at 607 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas,
J., dissenting); Atkins , 536 U. S., at 337 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., dissent-ing); Thompson , 487
U. S., at 859 ((Scalia, J., dissenting); Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S.
461 , 487 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (contending that Woodson was wrongly decided). In particular, each disagreed
with the majority’s reasoning in Graham , which is the
foundation stone of our analysis. See Graham , 560
U. S., at ___ (Roberts, C. J., concurring in judgment)
(slip op., at 1); id., at ___ (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia
and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 1–25); id., at ___
(Alito, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). While the dissents seek
to relitigate old Eighth Amendment battles, repeating many
arguments this Court has previously (and often) rejected, we apply
the logic of Roper , Graham , and our individualized
sentencing decisions to these two cases. 5 The evidence presented to
us in these cases indicates that the science and social science
supporting Roper ’s and Graham ’s conclusions have
become even stronger. See, e.g., Brief for American
Psychologi-cal Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3
(“[A]n ever-growing body of research in developmental psychology
and neuroscience continues to confirm and strengthen the Court’s
conclusions”); id., at 4 (“It is increasingly clear that
adolescent brains are not yet fully mature in regions and systems
related to higher-order executive functions such as impulse
control, planning ahead, and risk avoidance”); Brief for J.
Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae 12–28 (discussing
post- Graham studies); id., at 26–27 (“Numerous
studies post- Graham indicate that exposure to deviant peers
leads to increased deviant behavior and is a consistent predictor
of adolescent delinquency” (footnote omitted)). 6 In discussing Graham , the dissents essentially ignore all of this
reasoning. See post, at 3–6 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.); post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.). Indeed, The
Chief Justice ignores the points made in his own concurring
opinion. The only part of Graham that the dissents see fit
to note is the distinction it drew between homicide and nonhomicide
offenses. See post, at 7–8 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.); post, at 4 (opinion of Alito, J.). But contrary to the
dissents’ charge, our decision today retains that distinction: Graham established one rule (a flat ban) for nonhomicide
offenses, while we set out a different one (individualized
sentencing) for homicide offenses. 7 Although adults are
subject as well to the death penalty in many jurisdictions, very
few offenders actually receive that sentence. See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, S. Rosenmerkel, M.
Durose, & D. Farole, Felony Sentences in State Courts
2006—Statistical Tables, p. 28 (Table 4.4) (rev. Nov. 22,
2010). So in practice, the sentencing schemes at issue here result
in juvenile homicide offenders receiving the same nominal
punishment as almost all adults, even though the two classes differ
significantly in moral culpability and capacity for
change. 8 Given our holding, and
the dissents’ competing position, we see a certain irony in their
repeated references to 17-year-olds who have committed the “most
heinous” offenses, and their comparison of those defendants to the
14-year-olds here. See post, at 2 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.) (noting the “17-year old [who] is convicted of
deliberately murdering an innocent victim”); post, at 3
(“the most heinous murders”); post, at 7 (“the worst types
of murder”); post, at 5 (opinion of Alito, J.) (warning the
reader not to be “confused by the particulars” of these two cases); post, at 1 (discussing the “171∕2-year-old who sets off a
bomb ina crowded mall”). Our holding requires factfinders to attend
to exactly such circumstances—to take into account the differences
among defendants and crimes. By contrast, the sentencing schemes
that the dissents find permissible altogether preclude considering
these factors. 9 The States note that 26
States and the Federal Government make life without parole the
mandatory (or mandatory minimum) punishment for some form of
murder, and would apply the relevant provision to 14-year-olds
(with many applying it to even younger defendants). See Alabama
Brief 17–18. In addition, life without parole is mandatory for
older juveniles in Louisiana (age 15 and up) and Texas (age 17).
See La. Child. Code Ann., Arts. 857(A), (B) (West Supp. 2012); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§14:30(C), 14:30.1(B) (West Supp. 2012); Tex.
Family Code Ann. §§51.02(2)(A), 54.02(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2011);
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §12.31(a) (West 2011). In many of these
jurisdictions, life without parole is the mandatory punishment only
for aggravated forms of murder. That distinction makes no
difference to our analysis. We have consistently held that limiting
a mandatory death penalty law to particular kinds of murder cannot
cure the law’s “constitutional vice” of disregarding the
“circumstances of the particular offense and the character and
propensities of the offender.” Roberts v. Louisiana , 428 U.S.
325 , 333 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Sumner v. Shuman , 483 U.S.
66 (1987). The same analysis applies here, for the same
reasons. 10 In
assessing indicia of societal standards, Graham discussed
“ac-tual sentencing practices” in addition to legislative
enactments, noting how infrequently sentencers imposed the
statutorily available penalty. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
11). Here, we consider the constitutional-ity of mandatory
sentencing schemes—which by definition remove a judge’s or jury’s
discretion—so no comparable gap between legislation and practice
can exist. Rather than showing whether sentencers consider life
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders appropriate, the
number of juveniles serving this sentence, see post, at 1,
3–4 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting), merely reflects the number
who have com-mitted homicide in mandatory-sentencing jurisdictions.
For the same reason, The Chief Justice’s comparison of ratios in
this case and Gra-ham carries little weight. He contrasts
the number of mandatorylife-without-parole sentences for juvenile
murderers, relative to the number of juveniles arrested for murder,
with “the corresponding number” of sentences in Graham ( i.e., the number of life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles who committed serious nonhomicide crimes, as compared to
arrests for those crimes). Post , at 4 . But because
the mandatory nature of the sentences here necessarily makes them
more common, The Chief Justice’s figures do not “correspon[d]” at
all. The higher ratio is mostly a function of removing the
sentencer’s discretion. Where mandatory sentencing does not itself
account for the number of juveniles serving life-without-parole
terms, the evidence we have of practice supports our holding.
Fifteen jurisdictions make life without parole discretionary for
juveniles. See Alabama Brief 25 (listing 12 States); Cal. Penal
Code Ann. §190.5(b) (West 2008); Ind. Code §35–50–2–3(b) (2011);
N. M. Stat. §§31–18–13(B), 31–18–14, 31–18–15.2 (2010).
According to available data, only about 15% of all juvenile
life-without-parole sentences come from those 15 jurisdictions,
while 85% come from the 29 mandatory ones. See Tr. of Oral Arg. in
No. 10–9646, p. 19; Human Rights Watch, State Distribution of Youth
Offenders Serv-ing Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), dateOct.
2, 2009, online athttp: // www.hrw.org / news/2009 / 10/02 /
state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole
(as visited dateJune 21, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file). That figure indicates that when given the choice,
sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively
rarely. And contrary to The Chief Justice’s argument, see post , at 5, n. 2, we have held that when judges and
juries do not often choose to impose a sentence, it at least should
not be mandatory. See Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S.
280 , 295–296 (1976) (plurality opinion) (relying on the
infrequency with which juries imposed the death penalty when given
discretion to hold that its mandatory imposition violates the
Eighth Amendment). 11 In
response, The Chief Justice complains: “To say that a sentence may
be considered unusual because so many legislatures approve
it stands precedent on its head.” Post, at 5. To be clear:
That description in no way resembles our opinion. We hold that the
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because, as we have
exhaustively shown, it conflicts with the fundamental principles of Roper , Graham , and our individualized sentencing
cases. We then show why the number of States imposing this
punishment does not preclude our holding, and note how its
mandatory nature (in however many States adopt it) makes use of
actual sentencing numbers unilluminating. 12 The
Chief Justice attempts to distinguish Graham on this point,
arguing that there “the extreme rarity with which the sentence in
question was imposed could suggest that legislatures did not really
intend the inevitable result of the laws they passed.” Post ,
at 6. But neither Graham nor Thompson suggested such
reasoning, presumably because the time frame makes it difficult to
comprehend. Those cases considered what legislators intended when
they enacted, at different moments, separate juvenile-transfer and
life-without-parole provisions—by definition, before they knew or
could know how many juvenile life-without-parole sentences would
result. 13 See
Ala. Code §§13A–5–45(f), 13A–6–2(c) (2005 and Cum. Supp. 2011);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–752 (West 2010), §41–1604.09(I) (West
2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a–35a(1) (2011); Del. Code Ann., Tit.
11, §4209(a) (2007); Fla. Stat. §775.082(1) (2010); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§706–656(1) (1993); Idaho Code §18–4004 (Lexis 2004); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §791.234(6)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2012); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§609.106, subd. 2 (West 2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29–2522 (2008); N.
H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:1–a (West 2007); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§§1102(a), (b), 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6137(a)(1) (Supp. 2012); S. D.
Codified Laws §22-6-1(1) (2006), §24–15–4 (2004); Vt. Stat. Ann.,
Tit. 13, §2311(c)(2009); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.030(1)
(2010). 14 See
Del. Code Ann., Tit. 10, §1010 (1999 and Cum. Supp. 2010), Tit. 11,
§4209(a) (2007); Fla. Stat. §985.56 (2010), 775.082(1); Haw. Rev.
Stat. §571–22(d) (1993), §706–656(1); Idaho Code §§20–508, 20–509
(Lexis Cum. Supp. 2012), §18–4004; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §712A.2d
(West 2009), §791.234(6)(a); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§43–247, 29–2522
(2008); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §6355(e) (2000), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§1102. Other States set ages between 8 and 10 as the minimum for
transfer, thus exposing those young children to mandatory life
without parole. See S. D. Codified Laws §§26–8C–2, 26–11–4
(2004), §22–6–1 (age 10); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 33, §5204 (2011 Cum.
Supp.), Tit. 13, §2311(a) (2009) (age 10); Wash. Rev. Code §§9 A.
04.050, 13.40.110 (2010), §10.95.030 (age 8). 15 See
Ala. Code §12–15–204(a) (Cum. Supp. 2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§13–501(A) (West Cum. Supp. 2011); Conn. Gen. Stat. §46b–127
(2011); Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 705, §§405/5–130(1)(a), (4)(a) (West
2010); La. Child. Code Ann., Art. 305(A) (West Cum. Supp. 2012);
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 119, §74 (West 2010); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§712A.2(a) (West 2002); Minn. Stat. Ann. §260B.007, subd. 6(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 2011), §260B.101, subd. 2 (West 2007); Mo. Rev.
Stat. §§211.021(1), (2) (2011); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§7B–1501(7),
7B–1601(a), 7B–2200 (Lexis 2011); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§169–B:2(IV) (West Cum. Supp. 2011), §169–B:3 (West 2010); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §2152.12(A)(1)(a) (Lexis 2011); Tex. Family Code
Ann. §51.02(2); Va. Code Ann. §§16.1–241(A), 16.1–269.1(B), (D)
(Lexis 2010). 16 Fla.
Stat. Ann. §985.557(1) (West Supp. 2012); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§712A.2(a)(1); Va. Code Ann. §§16.1–241(A), 16.1–269.1(C),
(D). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 10–9646 and 10–9647

															_________________

															EVAN MILLER, PETITIONER

															10–9646 v. ALABAMA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of criminal
appeals of alabama

															KUNTRELL JACKSON, PETITIONER

															10–9647 v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas

															[June 25, 2012]

															Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Sotomayor
joins, concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion in full. I add that,
if the State continues to seek a sentence of life without the
possibil- ity of parole for Kuntrell Jackson, there will have to be
a determination whether Jackson “kill[ed] or intend[ed] to kill”
the robbery victim. Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S.
___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 18). In my view, without such a
finding, the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham forbids sentencing Jackson to such a sentence, regardless of
whether its application is mandatory or discretionary under state
law.

															In Graham we said that “when compared to
an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or
intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.” Ibid. (emphasis added). For one thing, “compared to adults,
juveniles have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility; they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and
their characters are not as well formed.” Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also ibid. (“[P]sychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” making
their actions “less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably
depraved character’ than are the actions of adults” (quoting Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 , 570 (2005))); ante, at 8–9. For another thing, Graham recognized that lack of intent normally dimin- ishes
the “moral culpability” that attaches to the crime in question,
making those that do not intend to kill “categorically less
deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are
murderers.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S.
407 , 434–435 (2008); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S.
782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S.
137 (1987)). And we concluded that, because of this “twice
diminished moral culpability,” the Eighth Amendment forbids the
imposition upon juveniles of a sentence of life without parole for
nonhomicide cases. Graham , supra , at ___, ___ (slip
op., at 18, 32).

															Given Graham’ s reasoning, the kinds of
homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to life without
parole must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither
kills nor intends to kill the victim. Quite simply, if the juvenile
either kills or intends to kill the victim, he lacks “twice
diminished” responsibility. But where the juvenile neither kills
nor intends to kill, both features emphasized in Graham as
extenuating apply. The dissent itself here would permit life
without parole for “juveniles who commit the worst types of
murder,” post, at 7 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.), but
that phrase does not readily fit the culpability of one who did not
himself kill or intend to kill.

															I recognize that in the context of felony-murder
cases, the question of intent is a complicated one. The
felony-murder doctrine traditionally attributes death caused in the
course of a felony to all participants who intended to commit the
felony, regardless of whether they killed or intended to kill. See
2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§14.5(a) and (c) (2d ed.
2003). This rule has been based on the idea of “transferred
intent”; the defendant’s intent to commit the felony satisfies the
intent to kill required for murder. See S. Kadish, S. Schulhofer,
& C. Streiker, Criminal Law and Its Processes 439 (8th ed.
2007); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §147 (15th ed.
1994).

															But in my opinion, this type of “transferred
intent” is not sufficient to satisfy the intent to murder that
could subject a juvenile to a sentence of life without parole. As
an initial matter, this Court has made clear that this artificially
constructed kind of intent does not count as intent for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment. We do not rely on transferred intent in
determining if an adult may receive the death penalty. Thus, the
Constitution forbids imposing capital punishment upon an aider and
abettor in a robbery, where that individual did not intend to kill
and simply was “in the car by the side of the road
. . . , waiting to help the robbers escape.” Enmund , supra, at 788. Cf. Tison, supra, at
157–158 (capital punishment permissi- ble for aider and abettor
where kidnaping led to death because he was “actively involved” in
every aspect of the kidnaping and his behavior showed “a reckless
disregard for human life”). Given Graham, this holding
applies to juvenile sentences of life without parole a fortiori. See ante, at 12–13. Indeed, even
juveniles who meet the Tison standard of “reckless
disregard” may not be eligible for life without parole. Rather, Graham dictates a clear rule: The only juveniles who may
constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole are those
convicted of homicide offenses who “kill or intend to kill.” 560
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18).

															Moreover, regardless of our law with respect to
adults, there is no basis for imposing a sentence of life without
parole upon a juvenile who did not himself kill or intend to kill.
At base, the theory of transferring a defendant’s intent is
premised on the idea that one engaged in a dangerous felony should
understand the risk that the victim of the felony could be killed,
even by a confederate. See 2 LaFave, supra , §14.5(c). Yet
the ability to consider the full consequences of a course of action
and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly is precisely what we know
juveniles lack capacity to do effectively. Ante , at 8–9.
Justice Frankfurter cautioned, “Legal theories and their phrasing
in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncrit-
ically transferred to a determination of a State’s duty to- ward
children.” May v. Anderson , 345
U.S. 528 , 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). To apply the
doctrine of transferred intent here, where the juvenile did not
kill, to sentence a juvenile to life without parole would involve
such “fallacious reasoning.” Ibid. This is, as far as I can tell, precisely the
situation pres- ent in Kuntrell Jackson’s case. Jackson simply went
along with older boys to rob a video store. On the way, he became
aware that a confederate had a gun. He initially stayed outside the
store, and went in briefly, saying something like “We ain’t
playin’ ” or “ ‘I thought you all was playin,’ ”
before an older confederate shot and killed the store clerk. Jackson v. State , 359 Ark. 87, 91, 194 S.W.3d 757,
760 (2004). Crucially, the jury found him guilty of first-degree
murder under a statute that permitted them to convict if, Jackson
“attempted to commit or committed an aggravated robbery, and, in
the course of that of- fense, he, or an accomplice, caused [the
clerk’s] death under circumstance manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life.” Ibid. See Ark. Code Ann.
§5–10–101(a)(1) (1997); ante, at 15. Thus, to be found
guilty, Jackson did not need to kill the clerk (it is conceded he
did not), nor did he need to have intent to kill or even “extreme
indifference.” As long as one of the teenage accomplices in the
robbery acted with extreme indifference to the value of human life,
Jackson could be convicted of capital murder. Ibid. The upshot is that Jackson, who did not kill the
clerk, might not have intended to do so either. See Jackson v. Norris , 2011 Ark. 49, at 10, ___ S. W. 3d ___
(Danielson, J., dissenting) (“[A]ny evidence of [Jackson’s] intent
to kill was severely lacking”). In that case, the Eighth Amendment
simply forbids imposition of a life term without the possibility of
parole. If, on remand, however, there is a finding that Jackson did
intend to cause the clerk’s death, the question remains open
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life
without parole upon a juvenile in those circumstances as well. Ante, at 17. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 10–9646 and 10–9647

															_________________

															EVAN MILLER, PETITIONER

															10–9646 v. ALABAMA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of criminal
appeals of alabama

															KUNTRELL JACKSON, PETITIONER

															10–9647 v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas

															[June 25, 2012]

															Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, dissenting.

															Determining the appropriate sentence for a
teenager con- victed of murder presents grave and challenging ques-
tions of morality and social policy. Our role, however, is to apply
the law, not to answer such questions. The pertinent law here is
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits “cruel
and unusual punishments.” Today, the Court invokes that Amendment
to ban a punishment that the Court does not itself characterize as
un- usual, and that could not plausibly be described as such. I
therefore dissent.

															The parties agree that nearly 2,500 prisoners
are presently serving life sentences without the possibility of pa-
role for murders they committed before the age of 18. Brief for
Petitioner in No. 10–9647, p. 62, n. 80 (Jackson Brief );
Brief for Respondent in No. 10–9646, p. 30 (Alabama Brief ).
The Court accepts that over 2,000 of those prisoners received that
sentence because it was mandated by a legislature. Ante, at
22, n. 10. And it recognizes that the Federal Government and
most States impose such mandatory sentences. Ante, at 19–20.
Put simply, if a 17-year-old is convicted of deliberately murdering
an innocent victim, it is not “unusual” for the murderer to receive
a mandatory sentence of life without parole. That reality should
preclude finding that mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile
killers violates the Eighth Amendment.

															Our precedent supports this conclusion. When
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, this Court
typically begins with “ ‘objective indicia of society’s
standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice.’ ” Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S.
___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 10); see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S.
407 , 422 (2008); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 , 564 (2005). We look to these “objective indicia” to ensure
that we are not simply following our own subjective values or
beliefs. Gregg v. Georgia , 428
U.S. 153 , 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). Such tangible evidence of societal standards enables
us to determine whether there is a “consensus against” a given
sentencing practice. Graham , supra, at ___ (slip op.,
at 10). If there is, the punishment may be regarded as “un- usual.”
But when, as here, most States formally require and frequently
impose the punishment in question, there is no objective basis for
that conclusion.

															Our Eighth Amendment cases have also said that
we should take guidance from “evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.” Ante, at 6
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S.
97 , 102 (1976); internal quotation marks omitted). Mercy toward
the guilty can be a form of decency, and a maturing society may
abandon harsh punishments that it comes to view as unnecessary or
unjust. But decency is not the same as leniency. A decent society
protects the innocent from violence. A mature society may determine
that this requires removing those guilty of the most heinous
murders from its midst, both as protection for its other members
and as a concrete expression of its standards of decency. As judges
we have no basis for deciding that progress toward greater decency
can move only in the direction of easing sanctions on the
guilty.

															In this case, there is little doubt about the
direction of society’s evolution: For most of the 20th century,
American sentencing practices emphasized rehabilitation of the
offender and the availability of parole. But by the 1980’s, outcry
against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the
rehabilitative model, and other factors led many legislatures to
reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing longer
sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent them from
committing more crimes. See, e.g. , Alschuler, The Changing
Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 1–13 (2003); see generally Crime and Public Policy (J. Wilson
& J. Petersilia eds. 2011). Statutes establishing life without
parole sentences in particular became more common in the past
quarter century. See Baze v. Rees , 553 U.S.
35 , 78, and n. 10 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment). And the parties agree that most States have changed
their laws relatively recently to expose teenage murderers to
mandatory life without parole. Jackson Brief 54–55; Alabama Brief
4–5.

															The Court attempts to avoid the import of the
fact that so many jurisdictions have embraced the sentencing
practice at issue by comparing this case to the Court’s prior
Eighth Amendment cases. The Court notes that Graham found a
punishment authorized in 39 jurisdictions unconstitutional, whereas
the punishment it bans today is mandated in 10 fewer. Ante, at 21. But Graham went to considerable lengths to show that
although theoretically allowed in many States, the sentence at
issue in that case was “exceedingly rare” in practice. 560
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). The Court explained that only
123 prisoners in the entire Nation were serving life without parole
for nonhomicide crimes committed as juveniles, with more than half
in a single State. It contrasted that with statistics showing
nearly 400,000 juveniles were arrested for serious nonhomicide
offenses in a single year. Based on the sentence’s rarity despite
the many opportunities to im- pose it, Graham concluded that
there was a national consensus against life without parole for
juvenile nonhomicide crimes. Id., at ___ (slip op., at
13–16).

															Here the number of mandatory life without parole
sentences for juvenile murderers, relative to the number of
juveniles arrested for murder, is over 5,000 times higher than the
corresponding number in Graham . There is thus nothing in
this case like the evidence of national consensus in Graham .[ 1 ]

															The Court disregards these numbers, claiming
that the prevalence of the sentence in question results from the
number of statutes requiring its imposition. Ante, at 21,
n. 10. True enough. The sentence at issue is statutorily
mandated life without parole. Such a sentence can only result from
statutes requiring its imposition. In Graham the Court
relied on the low number of actual sentences to explain why the
high number of statutes allowing such sentences was not
dispositive. Here, the Court excuses the high number of actual
sentences by citing the high number of statutes imposing it. To say
that a sentence may be considered unusual because so many
legislatures approve it stands precedent on its head.[ 2 ]

															The Court also advances another reason for
discounting the laws enacted by Congress and most state legisla-
tures. Some of the jurisdictions that impose mandatory life without
parole on juvenile murderers do so as a result of two statutes: one
providing that juveniles charged with serious crimes may be tried
as adults, and another generally mandating that those convicted of
murder be imprisoned for life. According to the Court, our cases
suggest that where the sentence results from the interaction of two
such statutes, the legislature can be considered to have imposed
the resulting sentences “inadvertent[ly].” Ante, at 22–25.
The Court relies on Graham and Thompson v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S.
815 , 826, n. 24 (1988) (plurality opinion), for the proposition
that these laws are therefore not valid evidence of society’s views
on the punishment at issue.

															It is a fair question whether this Court should
ever assume a legislature is so ignorant of its own laws that it
does not understand that two of them interact with each other,
especially on an issue of such importance as the one before us. But
in Graham and Thompson it was at least plausible as a
practical matter. In Graham , the extreme rarity with which
the sentence in question was imposed could suggest that
legislatures did not really intend the inevitable result of the
laws they passed. See 560 U. S. , at ___ (slip op., at
15–16). In Thompson , the sentencing practice was even
rarer—only 20 defendants had received it in the last century. 487
U. S. , at 832 (plurality opinion). Perhaps under those
facts it could be argued that the leg- islature was not fully aware
that a teenager could re- ceive the particular sentence in
question. But here the widespread and recent imposition of the
sentence makes it implausible to characterize this sentencing
practice as a collateral consequence of legislative
ignorance.[ 3 ]

															Nor do we display our usual respect for elected
officials by asserting that legislators have accidentally required 2,000 teenagers to spend the rest of their lives in jail.
This is particularly true given that our well-publicized decision
in Graham alerted legislatures to the possibility that
teenagers were subject to life with parole only because of
legislative inadvertence. I am aware of no effort in the wake of Graham to correct any supposed legislative oversight.
Indeed, in amending its laws in response to Graham one
legislature made especially clear that it does intend
juveniles who commit first-degree murder to receive mandatory life
without parole. See Iowa Code Ann. §902.1 (West Cum. Supp.
2012).

															In the end, the Court does not actually conclude
that mandatory life sentences for juvenile murderers are un- usual.
It instead claims that precedent “leads to” today’s decision,
primarily relying on Graham and Roper . Ante, at 7. Petitioners argue that the reasoning of those cases “compels”
finding in their favor. Jackson Brief 34. The Court is apparently
unwilling to go so far, asserting only that precedent points in
that direction. But today’s decision invalidates the laws of dozens
of legislatures and Congress. This Court is not easily led to such
a result. See, e.g., United States v. Harris , 106 U.S.
629 , 635 (1883) (courts must presume an Act of Congress is
constitutional “unless the lack of constitutional authority
. . . is clearly demonstrated”). Because the Court does
not rely on the Eighth Amendment’s text or objective evidence of
society’s standards, its analysis of precedent alone must bear the
“heavy burden [that] rests on those who would attack the judgment
of the representatives of the people.” Gregg , 428
U. S., at 175. If the Court is unwilling to say that precedent
compels today’s decision, perhaps it should reconsider that
decision.

															In any event, the Court’s holding does not
follow from Roper and Graham . Those cases undoubtedly
stand for the proposition that teenagers are less mature, less
responsible, and less fixed in their ways than adults—not that a
Supreme Court case was needed to establish that. What they do not
stand for, and do not even suggest, is that legislators—who also
know that teenagers are different from adults—may not require life
without parole for juveniles who commit the worst types of
murder.

															That Graham does not imply today’s result
could not be clearer. In barring life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, Graham stated that “[t]here is a line
‘between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the
individual.’ ” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18)
(quoting Kennedy , 554 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 27)).
The whole point of drawing a line between one issue and another is
to say that they are different and should be treated differently.
In other words, the two are in different categories. Which Graham also said: “defendants who do not kill, intend to
kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are
murderers.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (emphasis
added). Of course, to be especially clear that what is said about
one issue does not apply to another, one could say that the two
issues cannot be compared. Graham said that too: “Serious
nonhomicide crimes . . . cannot be compared to murder.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). A case that
expressly puts an issue in a different category from its own
subject, draws a line between the two, and states that the two
should not be compared, cannot fairly be said to control that
issue. Roper provides even less support for the
Court’s holding. In that case, the Court held that the death
penalty could not be imposed for offenses committed by juveniles,
no matter how serious their crimes. In doing so, Roper also
set itself in a different category than this case, by ex- pressly
invoking “special” Eighth Amendment analysis for death penalty
cases. 543 U. S., at 568–569. But more importantly, Roper reasoned that the death penalty was not needed to
deter juvenile murderers in part because “life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole” was available. Id. , at 572. In a
classic bait and switch, the Court now tells state legislatures
that— Roper ’s promise notwithstanding—they do not have power
to guarantee that once someone commits a heinous murder, he will
never do so again. It would be enough if today’s decision proved
Justice Scalia’s prescience in writing that Roper ’s
“reassurance . . . gives little comfort.” Id., at
623 (dissenting opinion). To claim that Roper actually
“leads to” revoking its own reassurance surely goes too far.

															Today’s decision does not offer Roper and Graham ’s false promises of restraint. Indeed, the Court’s
opinion suggests that it is merely a way station on the path to
further judicial displacement of the legislative role in
prescribing appropriate punishment for crime. The Court’s analysis
focuses on the mandatory nature of the sentences in this case. See ante, at 11–17. But then—although doing so is entirely
unnecessary to the rule it announces—the Court states that even
when a life without parole sentence is not mandatory, “we think
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty will be uncommon.” Ante, at 17. Today’s
holding may be limited to mandatory sentences, but the Court has
already announced that discretionary life without parole for
juveniles should be “uncommon”—or, to use a common synonym,
“unusual.”

															Indeed, the Court’s gratuitous prediction
appears to be nothing other than an invitation to overturn life
without parole sentences imposed by juries and trial judges. If
that invitation is widely accepted and such sentences for juvenile
offenders do in fact become “uncommon,” the Court will have
bootstrapped its way to declaring that the Eighth Amendment
absolutely prohibits them.

															This process has no discernible end point—or at
least none consistent with our Nation’s legal traditions. Roper and Graham attempted to limit their reasoning
to the circumstances they addressed— Roper to the death
penalty, and Graham to nonhomicide crimes. Having cast aside
those limits, the Court cannot now offer a credible substitute, and
does not even try. After all, the Court tells us, “none of what
[ Graham ] said about children . . . is crime-
specific.” Ante, at 10. The principle behind today’s
decision seems to be only that because juveniles are different from
adults, they must be sentenced differently. See ante, at
14–17. There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all
mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as
harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive. Unless
confined, the only stopping point for the Court’s analysis would be
never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as adults. Learning
that an Amendment that bars only “unusual” punishments requires the
abolition of this uniformly established practice would be startling
indeed.

															*  *  *

															It is a great tragedy when a juvenile commits
murder—most of all for the innocent victims. But also for the
murderer, whose life has gone so wrong so early. And for society as
well, which has lost one or more of its members to deliberate
violence, and must harshly punish another. In recent years, our
society has moved toward requiring that the murderer, his age
notwithstanding, be imprisoned for the remainder of his life.
Members of this Court may disagree with that choice. Perhaps
science and policy suggest society should show greater mercy to
young killers, giving them a greater chance to reform themselves at
the risk that they will kill again. See ante, at 8–11. But
that is not our decision to make. Neither the text of the
Constitution nor our precedent prohibits legislatures from
requiring that juvenile murderers be sentenced to life without
parole. I respectfully dissent. Notes 1 Graham stated that
123 prisoners were serving life without parole for nonhomicide
offenses committed as juveniles, while in 2007 alone 380,480
juveniles were arrested for serious nonhomicide crimes. 560
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13–14). I use 2,000 as the number
of prisoners serving mandatory life without parole sentences for
murders committed as juveniles, because all seem to accept that the
number is at least that high. And the same source Graham used reports that 1,170 juveniles were arrested for murder and
nonnegligent homicide in 2009. Dept.of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention,C. Puzzanchera & B. Adams,
Juvenile Arrests 2009, p. 4 (Dec. 2011). 2 The Court’s reference to
discretionary sentencing practices is a distraction. See ante, at 21–22, n. 10. The premise of the Court’s
decision is that mandatory sentences are categorically different
from discretionary ones. So under the Court’s own logic, whether
discretionary sentences are common or uncommon has nothing to do
with whether mandatory sentences are unusual. In any event, if
analysis of discretionary sentences were relevant, it would not
provide objective support for today’s decision. The Court states
that “about 15% of all juvenile life-without-parole
sentences”—meaning nearly 400 sentences—were imposed at the
discretion of a judge or jury. Ante, at 22, n. 10. Thus
the number of discretionary life without parole sentences for
juvenile murderers, relative to the number of juveniles arrested
for murder, is about 1,000 times higher than the corresponding
number in Graham . 3 The Court claims that I
“take issue with some or all of these precedents” and “seek to
relitigate” them. Ante, at 7–8, n. 4. Not so: applying this
Court’s cases exactly as they stand, I do not believe they support
the Court’s decision in this case. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 10–9646 and 10–9647

															_________________

															EVAN MILLER, PETITIONER

															10–9646 v. ALABAMA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of criminal
appeals of alabama

															KUNTRELL JACKSON, PETITIONER

															10–9647 v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas

															[June 25, 2012]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia
joins, dissenting.

															Today, the Court holds that “mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and
unusual punishments.’ ” Ante, at 2. To reach that
result, the Court relies on two lines of precedent. The first
involves the categorical prohibition of certain punishments for
specified classes of offenders. The second requires individualized
sentencing in the capital punishment context. Neither line is
consistent with the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. The Court compounds its errors by combining
these lines of precedent and extending them to reach a result that
is even less legitimate than the foundation on which it is built.
Because the Court upsets the legislatively enacted sentencing
regimes of 29 jurisdictions without constitutional warrant, I
respectfully dissent.[ 1 ]

															I

															The Court first relies on its cases
“adopt[ing] categorical bans on sentencing practices based on
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty.” Ante , at 6–7. Of these categorical
proportionality cases, the Court places particular emphasis on Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S.
___ (2010). In Roper , the Court held that the Constitution
prohibits the execution of an offender who was under 18 at the time
of his offense. 543 U. S., at 578. The Roper Court looked
to, among other things, its own sense of parental intuition and
“scientific and sociological studies” to conclude that offenders
under the age of 18 “cannot with reliability be classified among
the worst offenders.” Id. , at 569. In Graham , the
Court relied on similar considerations to conclude that the
Constitution prohibits a life-without-parole sentence for a
nonhomicide offender who was under the age of 18 at the time of his
offense. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24).

															The Court now concludes that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for duly convicted juvenile murderers
“contraven[e] Graham ’s (and also Roper ’s)
foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s most severe
penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were
not children.” Ante , at 11–12. But neither Roper nor Graham held that specific procedural rules are required for
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders. And, the logic of those
cases should not be extended to create such a requirement.

															The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.” As I have previously explained,
“the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood
as prohibiting torturous methods of punishment—specifically
methods akin to those that had been considered cruel and unusual at
the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.” Graham , supra , at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 3)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).[ 2 ] The clause does not contain a
“proportionality principle.” Ewing v. California , 538 U.S.
11 , 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see
generally Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S.
957 , 975–985 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). In short, it does
not authorize courts to invalidate any punishment they deem
disproportionate to the severity of the crime or to a particular
class of offenders. Instead, the clause “leaves the unavoidably
moral question of who ‘deserves’ a particular nonprohibited method
of punishment to the judgment of the legislatures that authorize
the penalty.” Graham , supra , at ___ (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 5).

															The legislatures of Arkansas and Alabama, like
those of 27 other jurisdictions, ante , at 19–20, have
determined that all offenders convicted of specified homicide
offenses, whether juveniles or not, deserve a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole. Nothing in our
Constitution authorizes this Court to supplant that choice.

															II

															To invalidate mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles, the Court also relies on its cases
“prohibit[ing] mandatory imposition of capital punishment.” Ante , at 7. The Court reasons that, because Graham compared juvenile life-without-parole sentences to the death
penalty, the “distinctive set of legal rules” that this Court has
imposed in the capital punishment context, including the
requirement of individualized sentencing, is “relevant” here. Ante , at 12–13. But even accepting an analogy between
capital and juvenile life-without-parole sentences, this Court’s
cases prohibiting mandatory capital sentencing schemes have no
basis in the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, and,
thus, cannot justify a prohibition of sentencing schemes that
mandate life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.

															A

															In a line of cases following Furman v. Georgia , 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) , this Court prohibited
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. See Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana , 428 U.S.
325 (1976) (same); Sumner v. Shuman , 483 U.S.
66 (1987). Furman first announced the principle that
States may not permit sentencers to exercise unguided discretion in
imposing the death pen- alty. See generally 408
U.S. 238 . In response to Furman , many States passed new
laws that made the death pen- alty mandatory following conviction
of specified crimes, thereby eliminating the offending discretion.
See Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S.
153 , 180–181 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ.). The Court invalidated those statutes in Woodson, Roberts, and Sumner . The Court
reasoned that mandatory capital sentencing schemes were
problematic, because they failed “to allow the particularized
consideration” of “relevant facets of the character and record of
the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense.” Woodson , supra , at 303–304 (plurality
opinion).[ 3 ]

															In my view, Woodson and its progeny were
wrongly decided. As discussed above, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, as originally understood, prohibits “torturous methods of punishment.” See Graham , 560 U. S.,
at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It is not concerned with whether a
particular lawful method of punishment—whether capital or
noncapital—is imposed pursuant to a mandatory or discretionary
sentencing regime. See Gardner v. Florida , 430 U.S.
349 , 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The prohibition
of the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment,
and not to the process by which it is imposed”). In fact, “[i]n the
early days of the Republic,” each crime generally had a defined
punishment “prescribed with specificity by the legislature.” United States v. Grayson , 438 U.S.
41 , 45 (1978). Capital sentences, to which the Court
analogizes, were treated no differently. “[M]andatory death
sentences abounded in our first Penal Code” and were “common in the
several States—both at the time of the founding and throughout the
19th century.” Harmelin , 501 U. S., at 994–995; see
also Woodson , supra , at 289 (plurality opinion) (“At
the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States
uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the
exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses”).
Accordingly, the idea that the mandatory imposition of an
otherwise-constitutional sentence renders that sentence cruel and
unusual finds “no support in the text and history of the Eighth
Amendment.” Harmelin , supra , at 994.

															Moreover, mandatory death penalty schemes were
“a perfectly reasonable legislative response to the concerns
expressed in Furman ” regarding unguided sentencing
discretion, in that they “eliminat[ed] explicit jury discretion and
treat[ed] all defendants equally.” Graham v. Collins , 506
U.S. 461 , 487 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). And, as Justice
White explained more than 30 years ago, “a State is not
constitutionally forbidden to provide that the commission of
certain crimes conclusively establishes that a criminal’s character
is such that he deserves death.” Roberts , supra , at
358 (dissenting opinion). Thus, there is no basis for concluding
that a mandatory capi- tal sentencing scheme is unconstitutional.
Because the Court’s cases requiring individualized sentencing in
the capital context are wrongly decided, they cannot serve as a
valid foundation for the novel rule regarding mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles that the Court
announces today.

															B

															In any event, this Court has already declined
to extend its individualized-sentencing rule beyond the death pen-
alty context. In Harmelin , the defendant was convicted of
possessing a large quantity of drugs. 501 U. S., at 961
(opinion of Scalia, J.). In accordance with Michigan law, he was
sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the
possibility of parole. Ibid. Citing the same line of death
penalty precedents on which the Court relies today, the defendant
argued that his sentence, due to its mandatory nature, violated the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id., at 994–995
(opinion of the Court).

															The Court rejected that argument, explaining
that “[t]here can be no serious contention . . . that a
sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so sim-
ply because it is ‘mandatory.’ ” Id., at 995. In so
doing, the Court refused to analogize to its death penalty cases.
The Court noted that those cases had “repeatedly suggested that
there is no comparable [individualized-sentencing] requirement
outside the capital context, because of the qualitative difference
between death and all other penalties.” Ibid. The Court
observed that, “even where the difference” between a sentence of
life without parole and other sentences of imprisonment “is the
greatest,” such a sentence “cannot be compared with death.” Id. , at 996. Therefore, the Court concluded that the line of
cases requiring individualized sentencing had been drawn at cap-
ital cases, and that there was “no basis for extending it further.” Ibid. Harmelin ’s reasoning logically
extends to these cases. Obviously, the younger the defendant, “the
great[er]” the difference between a sentence of life without parole
and other terms of imprisonment. Ibid. But under Harmelin ’s rationale, the defendant’s age is immaterial to
the Eighth Amendment analysis. Thus, the result in today’s cases
should be the same as that in Harmelin . Petitioners, like
the defendant in Harmelin , were not sentenced to death.
Accordingly, this Court’s cases “creating and clarifying the
individualized capital sentencing doctrine” do not apply. Id., at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															Nothing about our Constitution, or about the
qualitative difference between any term of imprisonment and death,
has changed since Harmelin was decided 21 years ago. What has changed (or, better yet, “evolved”) is this Court’s
ever-expanding line of categorical proportionality cases. The Court
now uses Roper and Graham to jettison Harmelin ’s clear distinction between capital and noncapital
cases and to apply the former to noncapital juvenile
offenders.[ 4 ] The Court’s
decision to do so is even less supportable than the precedents used
to reach it.

															III

															As The Chief Justice notes, ante, at
8–9 (dissenting opinion), the Court lays the groundwork for future
incursions on the States’ authority to sentence criminals. In its
categorical proportionality cases, the Court has considered
“ ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in
legislative enactments and state practice’ to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at
issue.” Graham , 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10)
(quoting Roper , 543 U. S., at 563). In Graham , for
example, the Court looked to “[a]ctual sentencing practices” to
conclude that there was a national consensus against
life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11–14); see also Roper , supra , at 564–565; Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S.
304 , 316 (2002).

															Today, the Court makes clear that, even though
its decision leaves intact the discretionary imposition of
life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, it
“think[s] appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to [life
without parole] will be uncommon.” Ante, at 17. That
statement may well cause trial judges to shy away from imposing
life without parole sentences and embolden appellate judges to set
them aside when they are imposed. And, when a future petitioner
seeks a categorical ban on sentences of life without parole for
juvenile homicide offenders, this Court will most assuredly look to
the “actual sentencing practices” triggered by this case. The Court
has, thus, gone from “merely” divining the societal consensus of
today to shaping the societal consensus of tomorrow.

															*  *  *

															Today’s decision invalidates a
constitutionally permissible sentencing system based on nothing
more than the Court’s belief that “its own sense of morality
. . . pre-empts that of the people and their
representatives.” Graham , supra , at ___ (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 29). Because nothing in the Constitution
grants the Court the authority it exercises today, I respectfully
dissent. Notes 1 I join The Chief
Justice’s opinion because it accurately explains that, even
accepting the Court’s precedents, the Court’s holding in today’s
cases is unsupportable. 2 Neither the Court nor
petitioners argue that petitioners’ sentences would have been among
“the ‘modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel
and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted.’ ” Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 10, n. 3) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S.
399 , 405 (1986)). Nor could they. Petitioners were 14 years old
at the time they committed their crimes. When the Bill of Rights
was ratified, 14-year-olds were subject to trial and punishment as
adult offenders. See Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 , 609, n. 1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Further,
mandatory death sentences were common at that time. See Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S.
957 , 994–995 (1991). It is therefore implausible that a
14-year-old’s mandatory prison sentence—of any length, with or
without parole—would have been viewed as cruel and
unusual. 3 The Court later extended Woodson , requiring that capital defendants be permitted to
present, and sentencers in capital cases be permitted to consider,
any relevant mitigating evidence, including the age of the
defendant. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U.S.
586 , 597–608 (1978) (plurality opinion); Eddings v. Oklahoma , 455 U.S.
104 , 110–112 (1982); Skipper v. South Carolina , 476 U.S.
1 , 4–5 (1986); Johnson v. Texas , 509 U.S.
350 , 361–368 (1993). Whatever the validity of the requirement
that sentencers be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence
when deciding whether to impose a nonmandatory capital
sentence, the Court certainly was wrong to prohibit mandatory capital sentences. See Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S.
461 , 488–500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 4 In support of its
decision not to apply Harmelin to juvenile offenders, the
Court also observes that “ ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws
and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as
miniature adults.’ ” Ante , at 19 (quoting J. D.
B. v. North Carolina , 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip
op., at 10–11) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). That is no
doubt true as a general matter, but it does not justify usurping
authority that rightfully belongs to the people by imposing a
constitutional rule where none exists. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________

															Nos. 10–9646 and 10–9647

															_________________

															EVAN MILLER, PETITIONER

															10–9646 v. ALABAMA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of criminal
appeals of alabama

															KUNTRELL JACKSON, PETITIONER

															10–9647 v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

															on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
arkansas

															[June 25, 2012]

															Justice Alito, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
dissenting.

															The Court now holds that Congress and the
legislatures of the 50 States are prohibited by the Constitution
from identifying any category of murderers under the age of 18 who
must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Even a
17½-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall or guns down a
dozen students and teach- ers is a “child” and must be given a
chance to persuade a judge to permit his release into society.
Nothing in the Constitution supports this arrogation of legislative
authority.

															The Court long ago abandoned the original
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, holding instead that the prohi-
bition of “cruel and unusual punishment” embodies the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S.
86 , 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); see also Graham v. Florida , 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 7); Kennedy v. Louisiana , 554 U.S.
407 , 419 (2008); Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S.
551 , 560–561 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S.
304 , 311–312 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S.
1 , 8 (1992); Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S.
399 , 406 (1986); Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S.
337 , 346 (1981); Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S.
97 , 102 (1976). Both the provenance and philosoph- ical basis
for this standard were problematic from the start. (Is it true that
our society is inexorably evolving in the direction of greater and
greater decency? Who says so, and how did this particular
philosophy of history find its way into our fundamental law? And in
any event, aren’t elected representatives more likely than
unaccountable judges to reflect changing societal standards?) But
at least at the start, the Court insisted that these “evolving
standards” represented something other than the personal views of
five Justices. See Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U.S.
263 , 275 (1980) (explaining that “the Court’s Eighth Amendment
judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective
views of individual Justices”). In- stead, the Court looked for
objective indicia of our society’s moral standards and the
trajectory of our moral “evolution.” See id., at 274–275
(emphasizing that “ ‘judgment should be informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent’ ” (quoting Coker v. Georgia , 433 U.S.
584 , 592 (1977) (plurality opinion))).

															In this search for objective indicia, the Court
toyed with the use of public opinion polls, see Atkins , supra, at 316, n. 21, and occasionally relied on
foreign law, see Roper v. Simmons , supra, at
575; Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S.
782 , 796, n. 22 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S.
815 , 830–831 (1988); Coker , 433 U. S., at 596,
n. 10 (plurality opinion).

															In the main, however, the staple of this inquiry
was the tallying of the positions taken by state legislatures.
Thus, in Coker , which held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an
adult woman, the Court noted that only one State permitted that
practice. Id. , at 595–596. In Enmund , where the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for
ordinary felony murder, both federal law and the law of 28 of the
36 States that authorized the death penalty at the time rejected
that punishment. 458 U. S., at 789.

															While the tally in these early cases may be
characterized as evidence of a national consensus, the evidence
became weaker and weaker in later cases. In Atkins , which
held that low-IQ defendants may not be sentenced to death, the
Court found an anti–death-penalty consensus even though more than
half of the States that allowed capital punishment permitted the
practice. See 536 U. S., at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that less than half of the 38 States that permit capital
punishment have enacted legislation barring execution of the
mentally retarded). The Court attempted to get around this problem
by noting that there was a pronounced trend against this
punishment. See id., at 313–315 (listing 18 States that had
amended their laws since 1986 to prohibit the execution of mentally
retarded persons).

															The importance of trend evidence, however, was
not long lived. In Roper , which outlawed capital punishment
for defendants between the ages of 16 and 18, the lineup of the
States was the same as in Atkins , but the trend in favor of
abolition—five States during the past 15 years—was less impressive. Roper , 543 U. S., at 564–565. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the absence of a strong trend in support of abolition did
not matter. See id., at 566 (“Any difference between this
case and Atkins with respect to the pace of abolition is
thus counterbalanced by the consistent direction of the
change”).

															In Kennedy v. Louisiana , the Court
went further. Holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital
punishment for the brutal rape of a 12-year-old girl, the Court
disregarded a nascent legislative trend in favor of permitting
capital punishment for this narrowly defined and heinous crime.
See 554 U. S., at 433 (explaining that, although “the total
number of States to have made child rape a capital offense
. . . is six,” “[t]his is not an indication of a trend or
change in direction comparable to the one supported by data in Roper ”). The Court felt no need to see whether this trend
developed further—perhaps because true moral evolution can lead in
only one direction. And despite the argument that the rape of a
young child may involve greater depravity than some murders, the
Court proclaimed that homicide is categorically different from all
(or maybe almost all) other offenses. See id., at 438
(stating that nonhomicide crimes, including child rape, “may be
devastating in their harm . . . but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, they
cannot be compared to murder in their severity and irrevocability”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). As the Court had
previously put it, “death is different.” Ford , supra ,
at 411 (plurality opinion).

															Two years after Kennedy , in Graham v. Florida , any pretense of heeding a legislative consensus
was discarded. In Graham , federal law and the law of 37
States and the District of Columbia permitted a minor to be
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide
crimes, but despite this unmistakable evidence of a national
consensus, the Court held that the practice violates the Eighth
Amendment. See 560 U. S., at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 1–3). The Court, however, drew a distinction between
minors who murder and minors who commit other heinous offenses, so
at least in that sense the principle that death is different lived
on.

															Today, that principle is entirely put to rest,
for here we are concerned with the imposition of a term of
imprisonment on offenders who kill. The two (carefully selected)
cases before us concern very young defendants, and despite the
brutality and evident depravity exhibited by at least one of the
petitioners, it is hard not to feel sympathy for a 14-year-old
sentenced to life without the possibility of release. But no one
should be confused by the particulars of the two cases before us.
The category of murderers that the Court delicately calls
“children” (murderers under the age of 18) consists overwhelmingly
of young men who are fast approaching the legal age of adulthood.
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson are anomalies; much more typical
are murderers like Donald Roper, who committed a brutal
thrill-killing just nine months shy of his 18th birthday. Roper , 543 U. S., at 556.

															Seventeen-year-olds commit a significant number
of murders every year,[ 1 ] and
some of these crimes are incredibly brutal. Many of these murderers
are at least as mature as the average 18-year-old. See Thompson , 487 U. S., at 854 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in judgment) (noting that maturity may “vary widely among different
individuals of the same age”). Congress and the legislatures of 43
States have concluded that at least some of these murderers should
be sentenced to prison without parole, and 28 States and the
Federal Government have decided that for some of these offenders
life without parole should be mandatory. See Ante , at 20–21,
and nn. 9–10. The majority of this Court now overrules these
legislative judgments.[ 2 ]

															It is true that, at least for now, the Court
apparently permits a trial judge to make an individualized decision
that a particular minor convicted of murder should be sentenced to
life without parole, but do not expect this possibility to last
very long. The majority goes out of its way to express the view
that the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a
“child” ( i.e., a murderer under the age of 18) should be
uncommon. Having held in Graham that a trial judge with
discretionary sentencing authority may not impose a sentence of
life without parole on a minor who has committed a nonhomicide
offense, the Justices in the majority may soon extend that holding
to minors who commit murder. We will see.

															What today’s decision shows is that our Eighth
Amendment cases are no longer tied to any objective indicia of
society’s standards. Our Eighth Amendment case law is now entirely
inward looking. After entirely disregarding objective indicia of
our society’s standards in Graham , the Court now
extrapolates from Graham . Future cases may extrapolate from
today’s holding, and this process may continue until the majority
brings sentencing practices into line with whatever the majority
views as truly evolved standards of decency.

															The Eighth Amendment imposes certain limits on
the sentences that may be imposed in criminal cases, but for the
most part it leaves questions of sentencing policy to be determined
by Congress and the state legislatures—and with good reason.
Determining the length of imprisonment that is appropriate for a
particular offense and a particular offender inevitably involves a
balancing of in- terests. If imprisonment does nothing else, it
removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him
from committing additional crimes in the outside world. When a
legislature prescribes that a category of killers must be sentenced
to life imprisonment, the legislature, which presumably reflects
the views of the electorate, is taking the position that the risk
that these offenders will kill again outweighs any countervailing
consideration, including reduced culpability due to immaturity or
the possibility of rehabilitation. When the majority of this Court
countermands that democratic decision, what the majority is saying
is that members of society must be exposed to the risk that these
convicted murderers, if released from custody, will murder
again.

															Unless our cases change course, we will continue
to march toward some vision of evolutionary culmination that the
Court has not yet disclosed. The Constitution does not authorize us
to take the country on this journey. Notes 1 Between 2002 and 2010,
17-year-olds committed an average combined total of 424 murders and
nonnegligent homicides per year. See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, §4, Arrests, Age of persons arrested (Table
4.7). 2 As the Court noted in Mistretta v. United States , 488
U.S. 361 , 366 (1989), Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 to eliminate discretionary sentencing and parole because it
concluded that these practices had led to gross abuses. The Senate
Report for the 1984 bill rejected what it called the “outmoded
rehabilitation model” for federal criminal sentencing. S. Rep.
No. 98–225, p. 38 (1983). According tothe Report, “almost everyone
involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that
rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it
is now quite certain that no one can really detect whether or when
a prisoner is rehabilitated.” Ibid. The Report also
“observed that the indeterminate-sentencing system had two
‘unjustifi[ed] and ‘shameful’ consequences. The first was the great
variation among sentences imposed by different judges upon
similarly situated offenders. The second was uncertainty as to the
time the offender would spend in prison. Each was a serious
impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal
justice system.” Mistretta , supra , at 366 (quoting
S. Rep. No. 98–225, at 38, 65 (citation
omitted)).

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles under 18 at the time of their crimes is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment, citing the need for individualized sentencing that considers a juvenile's reduced culpability and capacity for change. This applies to the cases of 14-year-olds Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, who were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole by state laws that did not allow for discretion in sentencing. The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the crimes but emphasized the importance of considering a juvenile's age and its attendant characteristics during sentencing.