U.S. Supreme Court Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986) Bowsher v. Synar No. 85-1377 Argued April 23, 1986 Decided July 7, 1986 478
U.S. 714 ast|>* 478
U.S. 714 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA Syllabus In order to eliminate the federal budget deficit, Congress
enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 (Act), popularly known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,"
which sets a maximum deficit amount for federal spending for each
of the fiscal years 1986 through 1991 (progressively reducing the
deficit amount to zero in 1991). If in any fiscal year the budget
deficit exceeds the prescribed maximum by more than a specified
sum, the Act requires basically across-the-board cuts in federal
spending to reach the targeted deficit level. These reductions are
accomplished under the "reporting provisions" spelled out in § 251
of the Act, which requires the Directors of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) to submit their deficit estimates and program-by-program
budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General, who,
after reviewing the Directors' joint report, then reports his
conclusions to the President. The President in turn must issue a
"sequestration" order mandating the spending reductions specified
by the Comptroller General, and the sequestration order becomes
effective unless, within a specified time, Congress legislates
reductions to obviate the need for the sequestration order. The Act
also contains in § 274(f) a "fallback" deficit reduction process
(eliminating the Comptroller General's participation) to take
effect if § 251's reporting provisions are invalidated. In
consolidated actions in the Federal District Court, individual
Congressmen and the National Treasury Employees Union (Union) (who,
along with one of the Union's members, are appellees here)
challenged the Act's constitutionality. The court held, inter
alia, that the Comptroller General's role in exercising
executive functions under the Act's deficit reduction process
violated the constitutionally imposed doctrine of separation of
powers because the Comptroller General is removable only by a
congressional Page 478 U. S. 715 joint resolution or by impeachment, and Congress may not retain
the power of removal over an officer performing executive
powers. Held: 1. The fact that members of the Union, one of whom is an
appellee here, will sustain injury because the Act suspends certain
scheduled cost-of-living benefit increases to the members, is
sufficient to create standing under a provision of the Act and
Article III to challenge the Act's constitutionality. Therefore,
the standing issue as to the Union itself or Members of Congress
need not be considered. P. 478 U. S. 721 .

															2. The powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251
violate the Constitution's command that Congress play no direct
role in the execution of the laws. Pp. 478 U. S.
721 -734.

															(a) Under the constitutional principle of separation of powers,
Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an
officer charged with the execution of the laws except by
impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an
officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms,
reserve in Congress control of the execution of the laws. The
structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under
its control what it does not possess. Cf. INS v Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 . Pp. 478 U. S.
721 -727.

															(b) There is no merit to the contention that the Comptroller
General performs his duties independently and is not subservient to
Congress. Although nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative
of Congress. Under controlling statutes, he may be removed not only
by impeachment but also by joint resolution of Congress "at any
time" for specified causes, including "inefficiency," "neglect of
duty," and "malfeasance." The quoted terms, as interpreted by
Congress, could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for any
number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative
will. Moreover, the political realities do not reveal that the
Comptroller General is free from Congress' influence. He heads the
General Accounting Office, which, under pertinent statutes, is "an
instrumentality of the United States Government independent of the
executive departments," and Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. Over
the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed themselves as
part of the Legislative Branch. Thus, because Congress has retained
removal authority over the Comptroller General, he may not be
entrusted with executive powers. Pp. 478 U. S.
727 -732.

															(c) Under § 251 of the Act, the Comptroller General has been
improperly assigned executive powers. Although he is to have "due
regard" for the estimates and reductions contained in the joint
report of Page 478 U. S. 716 the Directors of the CBO and the OMB, the Act clearly
contemplates that, in preparing his report, the Comptroller General
will exercise his independent judgment and evaluation with respect
to those estimates, and will make decisions of the kind that are
made by officers charged with executing a statute. The Act's
provisions give him, not the President, the ultimate authority in
determining what budget cuts are to be made. By placing the
responsibility for execution of the Act in the hands of an officer
who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress, in effect, has
retained control over the Act's execution, and has
unconstitutionally intruded into the executive function. Pp. 478 U. S.
732 -734.

															3. It is not necessary to consider whether the appropriate
remedy is to nullify the 1921 statutory provisions that authorize
Congress to remove the Comptroller General, rather than to
invalidate § 251 of the Act. In § 274(f), Congress has explicitly
provided "fallback" provisions that take effect if any of the
reporting procedures described in § 251 are invalidated. Assuming
that the question of the appropriate remedy must be resolved on the
basis of congressional intent, the intent appears to have been for
§ 274(f) to be given effect as written. Pp. 478 U. S.
734 -736. 626
F. Supp. 1374 , affirmed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court. in which
BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J.,
joined, post, p. 478 U. S. 736 .
WHITE, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 759 ,
and BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 478 U. S. 776 ,
filed dissenting opinions. Page 478 U. S. 717 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The question presented by these appeals is whether the
assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United
States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. I A On December 12, 1985, the President signed into law the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub.L. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III),
popularly known as the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act." The purpose of
the Act is to eliminate the federal budget deficit. To that end,
the Act sets a "maximum deficit amount" for federal spending for
each of fiscal years 1986 through 1991. The size of that maximum
deficit amount progressively reduces to zero in fiscal year 1991.
If in any fiscal year the federal budget deficit exceeds the
maximum Page 478 U. S. 718 deficit amount by more than a specified sum, the Act requires
across-the-board cuts in federal spending to reach the targeted
deficit level, with half of the cuts made to defense programs and
the other half made to nondefense programs. The Act exempts certain
priority programs from these cuts. § 255.

															These "automatic" reductions are accomplished through a rather
complicated procedure, spelled out in § 251, the so-called
"reporting provisions" of the Act. Each year, the Directors of the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) independently estimate the amount of the federal
budget deficit for the upcoming fiscal year. If that deficit
exceeds the maximum targeted deficit amount for that fiscal year by
more than a specified amount, the Directors of OMB and CBO
independently calculate, on a program-by-program basis, the budget
reductions necessary to ensure that the deficit does not exceed the
maximum deficit amount. The Act then requires the Directors to
report jointly their deficit estimates and budget reduction
calculations to the Comptroller General.

															The Comptroller General, after reviewing the Directors' reports,
then reports his conclusions to the President. § 251(b). The
President, in turn, must issue a "sequestration" order mandating
the spending reductions specified by the Comptroller General. §
252. There follows a period during which Congress may by
legislation reduce spending to obviate, in whole or in part, the
need for the sequestration order. If such reductions are not
enacted, the sequestration order becomes effective and the spending
reductions included in that order are made.

															Anticipating constitutional challenge to these procedures, the
Act also contains a "fallback" deficit reduction process to take
effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures
described in section 251 are invalidated." § 274(f). Under these
provisions, the report prepared by the Directors of OMB and the CBO
is submitted directly to a specially Page 478 U. S. 719 created Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, which
must report in five days to both Houses a joint resolution setting
forth the content of the Directors' report. Congress then must vote
on the resolution under special rules, which render amendments out
of order. If the resolution is passed and signed by the President,
it then serves as the basis for a Presidential sequestration
order. B Within hours of the President's signing of the Act, [ Footnote 1 ] Congressman Synar, who had
voted against the Act, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief
that the Act was unconstitutional. Eleven other Members later
joined Congressman Synar's suit. A virtually identical lawsuit was
also filed by the National Treasury Employees Union. The Union
alleged that its members had been injured as a result of the Act's
automatic spending reduction provisions, which have suspended
certain cost-of-living benefit increases to the Union's members.
[ Footnote 2 ]

															A three-judge District Court, appointed pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §
922(a)(5) (1982 ed., Supp. III), invalidated the reporting
provisions. Synar v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374 (DC 1986) (Scalia, Johnson, and Gasch, JJ.). The
District Court concluded that the Union had standing to challenge
the Act, since the members of the Union had suffered actual injury
by suspension of certain benefit increases. The District Court also
concluded that Congressman Synar and his fellow Members had
standing under the so-called "congressional standing" doctrine. See Barnes v. Kline, 245 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 21, 759 F.2d 21,
41 (1985), cert. granted sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 475
U.S. 1044 (1986). Page 478 U. S. 720 The District Court next rejected appellees' challenge that the
Act violated the delegation doctrine. The court expressed no doubt
that the Act delegated broad authority, but delegation of similarly
broad authority has been upheld in past cases. The District Court
observed that, in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.
S. 414 , 321 U. S. 420 (1944), this Court upheld a statute that delegated to an unelected
"Price Administrator" the power "to promulgate regulations fixing
prices of commodities." Moreover in the District Court's view, the
Act adequately confined the exercise of administrative discretion.
The District Court concluded that

															"the totality of the Act's standards, definitions, context, and
reference to past administrative practice provides an adequate
'intelligible principle' to guide and confine administrative
decisionmaking."

															626 F. Supp. at 1389.

															Although the District Court concluded that the Act survived a
delegation doctrine challenge, it held that the role of the
Comptroller General in the deficit reduction process violated the
constitutionally imposed separation of powers. The court first
explained that the Comptroller General exercises executive
functions under the Act. However, the Comptroller General, while
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, is removable not by the President but only by a joint
resolution of Congress or by impeachment. The District Court
reasoned that this arrangement could not be sustained under this
Court's decisions in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935). Under the separation of powers established by the Framers
of the Constitution, the court concluded, Congress may not retain
the power of removal over an officer performing executive
functions. The congressional removal power created a "here-and-now
subservience" of the Comptroller General to Congress. 626 F. Supp.
at 1392. The District Court therefore held that, Page 478 U. S. 721 "since the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part
of the automatic deficit reduction process are executive powers,
which cannot constitutionally be exercised by an officer removable
by Congress, those powers cannot be exercised, and therefore the
automatic deficit reduction process to which they are are central
cannot be implemented." Id. at 1403.

															Appeals were taken directly to this Court pursuant to § 274(b)
of the Act. We noted probable jurisdiction and expedited
consideration of the appeals. 475 U.S. 1009 (1986). We affirm. II A threshold issue is whether the Members of Congress, members of
the National Treasury Employees Union, or the Union itself have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act in question.
It is clear that members of the Union, one of whom is an appellee
here, will sustain injury by not receiving a scheduled increase in
benefits. See § 252(a)(6)(C)(i); 626 F. Supp. at 1381.
This is sufficient to confer standing under § 274(a)(2) and Article
III. We therefore need not consider the standing issue as to the
Union or Members of Congress. See Secretary of Interior v.
California, 464 U. S. 312 , 464 U. S. 319 ,
n. 3 (1984). Cf. Automobile Workers v. Brock, 477 U.
S. 274 (1986); Barnes v. Kline, supra. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the case. III We noted recently that

															"[t]he Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the
new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial." INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 , 462 U. S. 951 (1983). The declared purpose of separating and dividing the powers
of government, of course, was to "diffus[e] power the better to
secure liberty." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson's words echo the
famous warning of Montesquieu, Page 478 U. S. 722 quoted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 47, that
" there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates'. . .
." The Federalist No. 47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed.1961). Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the
influence of Montesquieu's thesis that checks and balances were the
foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty.
The Framers provided a vigorous Legislative Branch and a separate
and wholly independent Executive Branch, with each branch
responsible ultimately to the people. The Framers also provided for
a Judicial Branch equally independent, with "[t]he judicial Power .
. . extend[ing] to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States." Art. III, §
2.

															Other, more subtle, examples of separated powers are evident as
well. Unlike parliamentary systems such as that of Great Britain,
no person who is an officer of the United States may serve as a
Member of the Congress. Art. I, § 6. Moreover, unlike parliamentary
systems, the President, under Article II, is responsible not to the
Congress, but to the people, subject only to impeachment
proceedings which are exercised by the two Houses as
representatives of the people. Art. II, § 4. And even in the
impeachment of a President, the presiding officer of the ultimate
tribunal is not a member of the 1egislative Branch, but the Chief
Justice of the United States. Art. I, § 3.

															That this system of division and separation of powers produces
conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it
was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and open
debate on the great issues affecting the people, and to provide
avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental
power.

															The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for
Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution
of the laws it enacts. The President appoints "Officers of the
United States" with the "Advice and Consent of Page 478 U. S. 723 the Senate. . . ." Art. II, § 2. Once the appointment has been
made and confirmed, however, the Constitution explicitly provides
for removal of Officers of the United States by Congress only upon
impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the
Senate. An impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate can
rest only on "Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." Art. II, § 4. A direct congressional role in the
removal of officers charged with the execution of the laws beyond
this limited one is inconsistent with separation of powers.

															This was made clear in debate in the First Congress in 1789.
When Congress considered an amendment to a bill establishing the
Department of Foreign Affairs, the debate centered around whether
the Congress

															"should recognize and declare the power of the President under
the Constitution to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without
the advice and consent of the Senate." Myers, 272 U.S. at 272 U. S. 114 .
James Madison urged rejection of a congressional role in the
removal of Executive Branch officers, other than by impeachment,
saying in debate:

															"Perhaps there was no argument urged with more success, or more
plausibly grounded against the Constitution, under which we are now
deliberating, than that founded on the mingling of the Executive
and Legislative branches of the Government in one body. It has been
objected, that the Senate have too much of the Executive power
even, by having a control over the President in the appointment to
office. Now, shall we extend this connexion between the Legislative
and Executive departments, which will strengthen the objection, and
diminish the responsibility we have in the head of the
Executive?"

															1 Annals of Cong. 380 (1789). Madison's position ultimately
prevailed, and a congressional role in the removal process was
rejected. This "Decision of 1789" provides "contemporaneous and
weighty evidence" of the Constitution's meaning, since many of the
Members of the Page 478 U. S. 724 First Congress "had taken part in framing that instrument." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 , 463 U. S. 790 (1983). [ Footnote 3 ]

															This Court first directly addressed this issue in Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1925). At issue in Myers was a statute providing that
certain postmasters could be removed only "by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate." The President removed one such
Postmaster without Senate approval, and a lawsuit ensued. Chief
Justice Taft, writing for the Court, declared the statute
unconstitutional on the ground that for Congress to

															"draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove
or the right to participate in the exercise of that power . . .
would be . . . to infringe the constitutional principle of the
separation of governmental powers." Id. at 272 U. S.
161 .

															A decade later, in Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), relied upon heavily by appellants, a Federal Trade
Commissioner who had been removed by the President sought backpay. Humphrey's Executor involved an issue not presented either
in the Myers case or in this case -- i.e., the
power of Congress to limit the President's powers of removal of a
Federal Trade Commissioner. Page 478 U. S. 725 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 630 .
[ Footnote 4 ] The relevant
statute permitted removal "by the President," but only "for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the Court, upheld the statute, holding
that "illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the
President [with respect to Federal Trade Commissioners]." Id. at 295 U. S.
628 -629. The Court distinguished Myers, reaffirming its holding that congressional participation in the
removal of executive officers is unconstitutional. Justice
Sutherland's opinion for the Court also underscored the crucial
role of separated powers in our system:

															"The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three
general departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others has
often been stressed, and is hardly open to serious question. So
much is implied in the very fact of the separation of the powers of
these departments by the Constitution, and in the rule which
recognizes their essential co-equality."

															295 U.S. at 295 U. S.
629 -630. The Court reached a similar result in Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), concluding that, under Humphrey's Executor, the
President did not have unrestrained Page 478 U. S. 726 removal authority over a member of the War Claims
Commission.

															In light of these precedents, we conclude that Congress cannot
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with
the execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the
execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to
Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control
over the execution of the laws. As the District Court observed:

															"Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must
fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey."

															626 F. Supp. at 1401. The structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress
cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not
possess.

															Our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.
S. 919 (1983), supports this conclusion. In Chadha, we struck down a one-House "legislative veto"
provision by which each House of Congress retained the power to
reverse a decision Congress had expressly authorized the Attorney
General to make:

															"Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation -- that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha -- no
less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney
General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one
way: bicameral passage followed by presentment to the President.
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that
delegation is legislatively altered or revoked." Id. at 462 U. S.
954 -955. To permit an officer controlled by Congress to
execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional
veto. Congress could simply remove, or threaten to remove, an
officer for executing the laws in any fashion found to be
unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind of congressional control
over Page 478 U. S. 727 the execution of the laws, Chadha makes clear, is
constitutionally impermissible.

															The dangers of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch
functions have long been recognized.

															"[T]he debates of the Constitutional Convention, and the
Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of fear that the
Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize
itself at the expense of the other two branches." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 129 (1976). Indeed, we also have observed only recently that

															"[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." Chadha, supra, at 462 U. S. 951 .
With these principles in mind, we turn to consideration of whether
the Comptroller General is controlled by Congress. IV Appellants urge that the Comptroller General performs his duties
independently and is not subservient to Congress. We agree with the
District Court that this contention does not bear close
scrutiny.

															The critical factor lies in the provisions of the statute
defining the Comptroller General's office relating to removability.
[ Footnote 5 ] Although the
Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of
three individuals recommended by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the
Senate, see 31 U.S.C. Page 478 U. S. 728 § 703(a)(2), [ Footnote 6 ]
and confirmed by the Senate, he is removable only at the initiative
of Congress. He may be removed not only by impeachment, but also by
joint resolution of Congress "at any time" resting on any one of
the following bases:

															"(i) permanent disability;"

															"(ii) inefficiency;"

															"(iii) neglect of duty;"

															"(iv) malfeasance; or"

															"(v) a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude."

															31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)B. [ Footnote 7 ] This provision was included, as one
Congressman explained in urging passage of the Act, because
Congress

															"felt that [the Comptroller General] should be brought under the
sole control of Congress, so that Congress, at any moment when it
found he was inefficient and was not carrying on the duties of his
office as he should and as the Congress expected, could remove him
without the long tedious process of a trial by impeachment."

															61 Cong.Rec. 1081 (1921).

															The removal provision was an important part of the legislative
scheme, as a number of Congressmen recognized. Representative
Hawley commented:

															"[H]e is our officer, in a measure, getting information for us.
. . . If he does not do his work properly, we, as practically his
employers, ought to be able to discharge him from his office."

															58 Cong.Rec. 7136 (1919). Representative Sisson observed that
the removal provisions would give "[t]he Congress of the United
States . . . absolute control of the man's destiny in office." Page 478 U. S. 729 61 Cong.Rec. 987 (1921). The ultimate design was to "give the
legislative branch of the Government control of the audit not
through the power of appointment, but through the power of
removal." 58 Cong.Rec. 7211 (1919) (Rep. Temple).

															JUSTICE WHITE contends:

															"The statute does not permit anyone to remove the Comptroller at
will; removal is permitted only for specified cause, with the
existence of cause to be determined by Congress following a
hearing. Any removal under the statute would presumably be subject
to post-termination judicial review to ensure that a hearing had in
fact been held and that the finding of cause for removal was not
arbitrary." Post at 478 U.S.
770 . That observation by the dissenter rests on at least two
arguable premises: (a) that the enumeration of certain specified
causes of removal excludes the possibility of removal for other
causes, cf. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.
S. 311 , 189 U. S.
315 -316 (1903); and (b) that any removal would be
subject to judicial review, a position that appellants were
unwilling to endorse. [ Footnote
8 ]

															Glossing over these difficulties, the dissent's assessment of
the statute fails to recognize the breadth of the grounds for
removal. The statute permits removal for "inefficiency," "neglect
of duty," or "malfeasance." These terms are very broad and, as
interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal of a Comptroller
General for any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the
legislative will. The Constitutional Convention chose to permit
impeachment of executive officers only for "Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." It rejected language that
would have permitted impeachment for "maladministration," with
Madison Page 478 U. S. 730 arguing that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during pleasure of the Senate." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787, p. 550 (1911).

															We need not decide whether "inefficiency" or "malfeasance" are
terms as broad as "maladministration" in order to reject the
dissent's position that removing the Comptroller General requires
"a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than that required to
impeach and convict." Post at 478 U. S. 771 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Surely no one would seriously suggest that
judicial independence would be strengthened by allowing removal of
federal judges only by a joint resolution finding "inefficiency,"
"neglect of duty," or "malfeasance."

															JUSTICE WHITE, however, assures us that "[r]ealistic
consideration" of the "practical result of the removal provision," post at 478 U. S. 773 ,
774, reveals that the Comptroller General is unlikely to be removed
by Congress. The separated powers of our Government cannot be
permitted to turn on judicial assessment of whether an officer
exercising executive power is on good terms with Congress. The
Framers recognized that, in the long-term, structural protections
against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty. In
constitutional terms, the removal powers over the Comptroller
General's office dictate that he will be subservient to
Congress.

															This much said, we must also add that the dissent is simply in
error to suggest that the political realities reveal that the
Comptroller General is free from influence by Congress. The
Comptroller General heads the General Accounting Office (GAO), "an
instrumentality of the United States Government independent of the
executive departments," 31 U.S.C. § 702(a), which was created by
Congress in 1921 as part of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
42 Stat. 23. Congress created the office because it believed that
it "needed an officer, responsible to it alone, to check upon the
application of public funds in accordance with appropriations." H.
Mansfield, Page 478 U. S. 731 The Comptroller General: A Study in the Law and Practice of
Financial Administration 65 (1939).

															It is clear that Congress has consistently viewed the
Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch. The
Reorganization Acts of 1945 and 1949, for example, both stated that
the Comptroller General and the GAO are "a part of the legislative
branch of the Government." 59 Stat. 616; 63 Stat. 205. Similarly,
in the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, Congress required the
Comptroller General to conduct audits "as an agent of the
Congress." 64 Stat. 835.

															Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed
themselves as part of the Legislative Branch. In one of the early
Annual Reports of Comptroller General, the official seal of his
office was described as reflecting

															"the independence of judgment to be exercised by the General
Accounting Office, subject to the control of the legislative
branch. . . . The combination represents an agency of the Congress
independent of other authority auditing and checking the
expenditures of the Government as required by law and subjecting
any questions arising in that connection to quasijudicial
determination."

															GAO Ann. Rep. 5-6 (1924). Later, Comptroller General Warren, who
had been a Member of Congress for 15 years before being appointed
Comptroller General, testified:

															"During most of my public life, . . . I have been a member of
the legislative branch. Even now, although heading a great agency,
it is an agency of the Congress, and I am an agent of the
Congress. "

															To Provide for Reorganizing of Agencies of the Government:
Hearings on H.R. 3325 before the House Committee on Expenditures,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1945) (emphasis added). And, in one
conflict during Comptroller General McCarl's tenure, he asserted
his independence of the Executive Branch, stating:

															"Congress . . . is . . . the only authority to which there lies
an appeal from the decision of this office. . . . " Page 478 U. S. 732 ". . . I may not accept the opinion of any official, inclusive
of the Attorney General, as controlling my duty under the law."

															2 Comp.Gen. 784, 786-787 (1923) (disregarding conclusion of the
Attorney General, 33 Op.Atty.Gen. 476 (1923), with respect to
interpretation of compensation statute).

															Against this background, we see no escape from the conclusion
that, because Congress has retained removal authority over the
Comptroller General, he may not be entrusted with executive powers.
The remaining question is whether the Comptroller General has been
assigned such powers in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985. V The primary responsibility of the Comptroller General under the
instant Act is the preparation of a "report." This report must
contain detailed estimates of projected federal revenues and
expenditures. The report must also specify the reductions, if any,
necessary to reduce the deficit to the target for the appropriate
fiscal year. The reductions must be set forth on a
program-by-program basis.

															In preparing the report, the Comptroller General is to have "due
regard" for the estimates and reductions set forth in a joint
report submitted to him by the Director of CBO and the Director of
OMB, the President's fiscal and budgetary adviser. However, the Act
plainly contemplates that the Comptroller General will exercise his
independent judgment and evaluation with respect to those
estimates. The Act also provides that the Comptroller General's
report "shall explain fully any differences between the contents of
such report and the report of the Directors." § 251(b)(2).

															Appellants suggest that the duties assigned to the Comptroller
General in the Act are essentially ministerial and mechanical, so
that their performance does not constitute "execution of the law"
in a meaningful sense. On the contrary, we view these functions as
plainly entailing execution Page 478 U. S. 733 of the law in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law enacted
by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very
essence of "execution" of the law. Under § 251, the Comptroller
General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the
application of the Act. He must also interpret the provisions of
the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are
required. Decisions of that kind are typically made by officers
charged with executing a statute.

															The executive nature of the Comptroller General's functions
under the Act is revealed in § 252(a)(3), which gives the
Comptroller General the ultimate authority to determine the budget
cuts to be made. Indeed, the Comptroller General commands the
President himself to carry out, without the slightest variation
(with exceptions not relevant to the constitutional issues
presented), the directive of the Comptroller General as to the
budget reductions:

															"The [Presidential] order must provide for reductions
in the manner specified in section 251(a)(3), must
incorporate the provisions of the [Comptroller General's]
report submitted under section 251(b), and must be consistent
with such report in all respects. The President may not
modify or recalculate any of the estimates, determinations,
specifications, bases, amounts, or percentages set forth in
the report submitted under section 251(b) in determining the
reductions to be specified in the order with respect to programs,
projects, and activities, or with respect to budget activities,
within an account. . . ."

															§ 252(a)(3) (emphasis added). See also §
251(d)(3)(A).

															Congress, of course, initially determined the content of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, and undoubtedly
the content of the Act determines the nature of the executive duty.
However, as Chadha makes clear, once Congress makes its
choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends. Congress
can thereafter control the execution Page 478 U. S. 734 of its enactment only indirectly -- by passing new legislation. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 958 .
By placing the responsibility for execution of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is
subject to removal only by itself, Congress, in effect, has
retained control over the execution of the Act, and has intruded
into the executive function. The Constitution does not permit such
intrusion. VI We now turn to the final issue of remedy. Appellants urge that,
rather than striking down § 251 and invalidating the significant
power Congress vested in the Comptroller General to meet a national
fiscal emergency, we should take the lesser course of nullifying
the statutory provisions of the 1921 Act that authorizes Congress
to remove the Comptroller General. At oral argument, counsel for
the Comptroller General suggested that this might make the
Comptroller General removable by the President. All appellants urge
that Congress would prefer invalidation of the removal provisions,
rather than invalidation of § 251 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act.

															Severance at this late date of the removal provisions enacted 65
years ago would significantly alter the Comptroller General's
office, possibly by making him subservient to the Executive Branch.
Recasting the Comptroller General as an officer of the Executive
Branch would, accordingly, alter the balance that Congress had in
mind in drafting the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, to say nothing
of the wide array of other tasks and duties Congress has assigned
the Comptroller General in other statutes. [ Footnote 9 ] Thus, appellants' Page 478 U. S. 735 argument would require this Court to undertake a weighing of the
importance Congress attached to the removal provisions in the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as well as in other subsequent
enactments, against the importance it placed on the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

															Fortunately this is a thicket we need not enter. The language of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act itself
settles the issue. In § 274(f), Congress has explicitly provided
"fallback" provisions in the Act that take effect "[i]n the event .
. . any of the reporting procedures described in section
251 are invalidated." § 274(f)(1) (emphasis added). The fallback
provisions are " fully operative as a law,'" Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 108 (quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of
Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 , 286 U. S. 234 (1932)). Assuming that appellants are correct in urging that this
matter must be resolved on the basis of congressional intent, the
intent appears to have been for § 274(f) to be given effect in this
situation. Indeed, striking the removal provisions would lead to a
statute that Congress would probably have refused to adopt. As the
District Court concluded: "[T]he grant of authority to the Comptroller General was a
carefully considered protection against what the House conceived to
be the pro-executive bias of the OMB. It is doubtful that the
automatic deficit reduction process would have passed without such
protection, and doubtful that the protection would have been
considered present if the Comptroller General were not removable by
Congress itself. . . ."

															626 F. Supp. at 1394. Page 478 U. S. 736 Accordingly, rather than perform the type of creative and
imaginative statutory surgery urged by appellants, our holding
simply permits the fallback provisions to come into play. [ Footnote 10 ] VII No one can doubt that Congress and the President are confronted
with fiscal and economic problems of unprecedented magnitude,
but

															"the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives -- or the hallmarks -- of democratic government. . .
." Chadha, supra, at 462 U. S.
944 .

															We conclude that the District Court correctly held that the
powers vested in the Comptroller General under § 251 violate the
command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct role
in the execution of the laws. Accordingly, the judgment and order
of the District Court are affirmed.

															Our judgment is stayed for a period not to exceed 60 days to
permit Congress to implement the fallback provisions. It is so ordered. * Together with No 85-1378, United States Senate v. Synar,
Member of Congress. et al., and No. 85-1379, O'Neill,
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, et al v.
Synar Member of Congress, et al., also on appeal from the same
court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															In his signing statement, the President expressed his view that
the Act was constitutionally defective because of the Comptroller
General's ability to exercise supervisory authority over the
President. Statement on Signing H.J.Res. 372 Into Law, 21 Weekly
Comp. of Pres.Doc. 1491 (1985).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															An individual member of the Union was later added as a
plaintiff. See 475 U.S. 1094 (1986).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The First Congress included 20 Members who had been delegates to
the Philadelphia Convention:

															bwm: I N THE SENATE

															Richard Bassett (Delaware) Rufus King (New York)

															Pierce Butler (South Carolina) John Langdon (New Hampshire)

															Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut) Robert Morris (Pennsylvania)

															William Few (Georgia) William Paterson (New Jersey)

															William Samuel Johnson George Read (Delaware (Connecticut)

															Caleb Strong (Massachusetts) I N THE HOUSE

															Abraham Baldwin (Georgia) Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire)

															Daniel Carroll (Maryland) James Madison (Virginia)

															George Clymer (Pennsylvania) Roger Sherman (Connecticut)

															Thomas FitzSimons (Pennsylvania) Hugh Williamson (North
Carolina)

															Elbridge Gerry (Massachusetts)

															ewm:

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Appellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an
affirmance in this case requires casting doubt on the status of
"independent" agencies, because no issues involving such agencies
are presented here. The statutes establishing independent agencies
typically specify either that the agency members are removable by
the President for specified causes, see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
41 (members of the Federal Trade Commission may be removed by the
President "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office"), or else do not specify a removal procedure, see,
e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Federal Election Commission). This case
involves nothing like these statutes, but rather a statute that
provides for direct congressional involvement over the decision to
remove the Comptroller General. Appellants have referred us to no
independent agency whose members are removable by the Congress for
certain causes short of impeachable offenses, as is the Comptroller
General, see Part IV infra [ Footnote 5 ]

															We reject appellants' argument that consideration of the effect
of a removal provision is not "ripe" until that provision is
actually used. As the District Court concluded,

															"it is the Comptroller General's presumed desire to avoid
removal by pleasing Congress, which creates the here-and-now
subservience to another branch that raises separation of powers
problems." Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 , 1392 (DC 1986). The Impeachment Clause of the
Constitution can hardly be thought to be undermined because of
nonuse.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Congress adopted this provision in 1980 because of "the special
interest of both Houses in the choice of an individual whose
primary function is to provide assistance to Congress." S.Rep. No.
96-570, p. 10.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Although the President could veto such a joint resolution, the
veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress. Thus, the Comptroller General could be removed in the
face of Presidential opposition. Like the District Court, 626 F.
Supp. at 1393, n. 21, we therefore read the removal provision as
authorizing removal by Congress alone.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The dissent relies on Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), as its only Court authority for this point, but the
President did not assert that he had removed the Federal Trade
Commissioner in compliance with one of the enumerated statutory
causes for removal. See id. at 612 (argument of Solicitor
General Reed [omitted in electronic version]); see also Synar
v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1398.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Since 1921, the Comptroller General has been assigned a variety
of functions. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 687 (1982 ed., Supp.
III) (duty to bring suit to require release of impounded budget
authority); 42 U.S.C. § 6384(a) (duty to impose civil penalties
under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975);15 U.S.C. §
1862 (member of Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board); 45
U.S.C. § 711(d)(1)(C) (member of Board of Directors of United
States Railway Association); 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (1982 ed.,
Supp. III) (authority to consider bid protests under Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Because we conclude that the Comptroller General, as an officer
removable by Congress, may not exercise the powers conferred upon
him by the Act, we have no occasion for considering appellees'
other challenges to the Act, including their argument that the
assignment of powers to the Comptroller General in § 251 violates
the delegation doctrine, see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.
S. 414 (1944).

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in
the judgment.

															When this Court is asked to invalidate a statutory provision
that has been approved by both Houses of the Congress and signed by
the President, particularly an Act of Congress that confronts a
deeply vexing national problem, it should only do so for the most
compelling constitutional reasons. I Page 478 U. S. 737 agree with the Court that the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings" Act
contains a constitutional infirmity so severe that the flawed
provision may not stand. I disagree with the Court, however, on the
reasons why the Constitution prohibits the Comptroller General from
exercising the powers assigned to him by § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2)
of the Act. It is not the dormant, carefully circumscribed
congressional removal power that represents the primary
constitutional evil. Nor do I agree with the conclusion of both the
majority and the dissent that the analysis depends on a labeling of
the functions assigned to the Comptroller General as "executive
powers." Ante at 478 U. S.
732 -734; post at 478 U. S.
764 -765. Rather, I am convinced that the Comptroller
General must be characterized as an agent of Congress because of
his longstanding statutory responsibilities; that the powers
assigned to him under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act require him to
make policy that will bind the Nation; and that, when Congress, or
a component or an agent of Congress seeks to make policy that will
bind the Nation, it must follow the procedures mandated by Article
I of the Constitution -- through passage by both Houses and
presentment to the President. In short, Congress may not exercise
its fundamental power to formulate national policy by delegating
that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative committee, or
to an individual agent of the Congress such as the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, or
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983). That principle, I believe, is applicable to the Comptroller
General. I The fact that Congress retained for itself the power to remove
the Comptroller General is important evidence supporting the
conclusion that he is a member of the Legislative Branch of the
Government. Unlike the Court, however, I am not persuaded that the
congressional removal power is either a necessary or a sufficient
basis for concluding that his statutory assignment is invalid. Page 478 U. S. 738 As JUSTICE WHITE explains, post at 478 U.S. 770 -771, Congress does not
have the power to remove the Comptroller General at will, or
because of disagreement with any policy determination that he may
be required to make in the administration of this or any other Act.
The statute provides a term of 15 years for the Comptroller
General; it further provides that he must retire upon becoming 70
years of age, and that he may be removed at any time by impeachment
or by

															"joint resolution of Congress, after notice and an opportunity
for a hearing, only for -- (i) permanent disability; (ii)
inefficiency; (iii) neglect of duty; (iv) malfeasance; or (v) a
felony or conduct involving moral turpitude."

															31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B). Far from assuming that this provision
creates a " here-and-now subservience'" respecting all of the
Comptroller General's actions, ante at 478 U. S. 727 ,
n. 5 (quoting District Court), we should presume that Congress will
adhere to the law -- that it would only exercise its removal powers
if the Comptroller General were found to be permanently disabled
inefficient, neglectful, or culpable of malfeasance, a felony, or
conduct involving moral turpitude. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Page 478 U. S. 739 The notion that the removal power at issue here automatically
creates some kind of "here-and-now subservience" of the Comptroller
General to Congress is belied by history. There is no evidence that
Congress has ever removed, or threatened to remove, the Comptroller
General for reasons of policy. Moreover, the President has long
possessed a comparable power to remove members of the Federal Trade
Commission, yet it is universally accepted that they are
independent of, rather than subservient to, the President in
performing their official duties. Thus, the statute that the Court
construed in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), provided:

															"Any commissioner may be removed by the President for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."

															38 Stat. 718. In upholding the congressional limitations on the
President's power of removal, the Court stressed the independence
of the Commission from the President. [ Footnote 2/2 ] There was no suggestion that the retained
Presidential removal powers -- similar to those at issue here --
created a subservience to the President. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 478 U. S. 740 To be sure, there may be a significant separation of powers
difference between the President's exercise of carefully
circumscribed removal authority and Congress' exercise of
identically circumscribed removal authority. But the Humphrey's
Executor analysis at least demonstrates that it is entirely
proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an office
that it has created, and that the prescription of what might be
termed "dereliction of duty" removal standards does not itself
impair the independence of the official subject to such standards.
[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The fact that Congress retained for itself the power to remove
the Comptroller General thus not necessarily an adequate reason for
concluding that his role in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget
reduction process is unconstitutional. It is however, a fact that
lends support to my ultimate Page 478 U. S. 741 conclusion that, in exercising his functions under this Act, he
serves as an agent of the Congress. II In assessing the role of the Comptroller General, it is
appropriate to consider his already existing statutory
responsibilities. Those responsibilities leave little doubt that
one of the identifying characteristics of the Comptroller General
is his statutorily required relationship to the Legislative
Branch.

															In the statutory section that identifies the Comptroller
General's responsibilities for investigating the use of public
money, four of the five enumerated duties specifically describe an
obligation owed to Congress. The first is the only one that does
not expressly refer to Congress: The Comptroller General shall
"investigate all matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and
use of public money." 31 U.S.C. § 712(1). The other four clearly
require the Comptroller General to work with Congress' specific
needs as his legal duty. Thus, the Comptroller General must

															"estimate the cost to the United States Government of complying
with each restriction on expenditures of a specific appropriation
in a general appropriation law and report each estimate to
Congress with recommendations the Comptroller General
considers desirable."

															§ 712(2) (emphasis added). He must

															"analyze expenditures of each executive agency the Comptroller
General believes will help Congress decide whether public
money has been used and expended economically and efficiently."

															§ 712(3) (emphasis added). He must

															"make an investigation and report ordered by either House of
Congress or a committee of Congress having jurisdiction over
revenue, appropriations, or expenditures."

															§ 712(4) (emphasis added). Finally, he must "give a committee of Congress having jurisdiction over revenue,
appropriations, or expenditures the help and information the
committee requests." § 712(5) (emphasis added). Page 478 U. S. 742 The statutory provision detailing the Comptroller General's role
in evaluating programs and activities of the United States
Government similarly leaves no doubt regarding the beneficiary of
the Comptroller General's labors. The Comptroller General may
undertake such an evaluation for one of three specified reasons:
(1) on his own initiative; (2) "when either House of Congress
orders an evaluation"; or (3) "when a committee of Congress with
jurisdiction over the program or activity requests the evaluation."
31 U.S.C. § 717(b). In assessing a program or activity, moreover,
the Comptroller General's responsibility is to "develop and
recommend to Congress ways to evaluate a program or
activity the Government carries out under existing law." § 717(c)
(emphasis added).

															The Comptroller General's responsibilities are repeatedly framed
in terms of his specific obligations to Congress. Thus, one
provision specifies in some detail the obligations of the
Comptroller General with respect to an individual committee's
request for a program evaluation:

															"On request of a committee of Congress, the Comptroller General
shall help the committee to -- "

															"(A) develop a statement of legislative goals and ways to assess
and report program performance related to the goals, including
recommended ways to assess performance, information to be reported,
responsibility for reporting, frequency of reports, and feasibility
of pilot testing; and"

															"(B) assess program evaluations prepared by and for an
agency."

															§ 717(d)(1). Similarly, another provision requires that, on

															"request of a member of Congress, the Comptroller General shall
give the member a copy of the material the Comptroller General
compiles in carrying out this subsection that has been released by
the committee for which the material was compiled."

															§ 717(d)(2). Page 478 U. S. 743 Numerous other provisions strongly support the conclusion that
one of the Comptroller General's primary responsibilities is to
work specifically on behalf of Congress. The Comptroller General
must make annual reports on specified subjects to Congress. to the
Senate Committee on Finance, to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, to the House Committee on Ways and Means, to
the House Committee on Government Operations, and to the Joint
Committee on Taxation. 31 U.S.C. §§ 719(a), (d). On request of a
committee, the Comptroller General

															"shall explain to and discuss with the committee or committee
staff a report the Comptroller General makes that would help the
committee (1) evaluate a program or activity of an agency within
the jurisdiction of the committee; or (2) in its consideration of
proposed legislation."

															§ 719(i). Indeed, the relationship between the Comptroller
General and Congress is so close that the

															"Comptroller General may assign or detail an officer or employee
of the General Accounting Office to full-time continuous duty with
a committee of Congress for not more than one year."

															31 U.S.C. § 734(a).

															The Comptroller General's current statutory responsibilities on
behalf of Congress are fully consistent with the historic
conception of the Comptroller General's office. The statute that
created the Comptroller General's office -- the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 -- provided that four of the five statutory
responsibilities given to the Comptroller General be exercised on
behalf of Congress, three of them exclusively so. [ Footnote 2/5 ] On at least three occasions since
1921, moreover, Page 478 U. S. 744 in considering the structure of Government. Congress has defined
the Comptroller General as being a part of the Legislative Branch.
In the Reorganization Act of 1945, Congress specified that the
Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office "are a part
of the legislative branch of the Government." 59 Stat. 616.
[ Footnote 2/6 ] In the
Reorganization Act of 1949, Congress again confirmed that the
Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office "are a part
of the legislative branch of the Government." 63 Stat. 205.
[ Footnote 2/7 ] Finally, in the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Congress referred to
the "auditing for the Government, conducted Page 478 U. S. 745 by the Comptroller General of the United States as an agent of
the Congress." 64 Stat. 835. Like the already existing statutory
responsibilities, then, the history of the Comptroller General
statute confirms that the Comptroller General should be viewed as
an agent of the Congress.

															This is not to say, of course, that the Comptroller General has
no obligations to the Executive Branch, or that he is an agent of
the Congress in quite so clear a manner as the Doorkeeper of the
House. For the current statutory responsibilities also envision a
role for the Comptroller General with respect to the Executive
Branch. The Comptroller General must "give the President
information on expenditures and accounting the President requests."
31 U.S.C. § 719(f). Although the Comptroller General is required to
provide Congress with an annual report, he is also required to
provide the President with the report if the President so requires.
§ 719(a). The Comptroller General is statutorily required to audit
the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, and
Firearms (and provide congressional committees with information
respecting the audits). § 713. In at least one respect, moreover,
the Comptroller General is treated like an executive agency: "To
the extent applicable, all laws generally related to administering
an agency apply to the Comptroller General." § 704(a).
Historically, as well, the Comptroller General has had some
relationship to the Executive Branch. As noted, n 5, supra, in the 1921 Act, one of the
Comptroller General's specific responsibilities was to provide
information to the Bureau of the Budget. In fact, when the
Comptroller General's office was created, its functions, personnel,
records, and even furniture derived from a previous executive
office. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Page 478 U. S. 746 Thus, the Comptroller General retains certain obligations with
respect to the Executive Branch. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Obligations to two branches are not,
however, impermissible, and the presence of such dual obligations
does not prevent the characterization of the official with the dual
obligations as part of one branch. [ Footnote 2/10 ] It is at least clear that in most, if
not all, of his statutory responsibilities, the Comptroller General
is properly characterized as an agent of the Congress. [ Footnote 2/11 ] Page 478 U. S. 747 III Everyone agrees that the powers assigned to the Comptroller
General by § 251(b) and § 251(c)(2) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act are extremely important. They require him to exercise
sophisticated economic judgment concerning anticipated trends in
the Nation's economy, projected Page 478 U. S. 748 levels of unemployment, interest rates, and the special problems
that may be confronted by the many components of a vast federal
bureaucracy. His duties are anything but ministerial -- he is not
merely a clerk wearing a "green eyeshade" as he undertakes these
tasks. Rather, he is vested with the kind of responsibilities that
Congress has elected to discharge itself under the fallback
provision that will become effective if and when § 251(b) and §
251(c)(2) are held invalid. Unless we make the naive assumption
that the economic destiny of the Nation could be safely entrusted
to a mindless bank of computers, the powers that this Act vests in
the Comptroller General must be recognized as having transcendent
importance. [ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The Court concludes that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
impermissibly assigns the Comptroller General "executive powers." Ante at 478 U. S. 732 .
JUSTICE WHITE's dissent agrees that "the powers exercised by the
Comptroller under the Act may be characterized as executive' in
that they involve the interpretation and carrying out of the Act's
mandate." Post at 478 U. S. 765 . This conclusion is not only far from
obvious, but also rests on the unstated and unsound premise that
there is a definite line that distinguishes executive power from
legislative power. "The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white." Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U. S. 189 , 277 U. S. 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

															"The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were
practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the
principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny.
But they likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three
branches of Government from one another Page 478 U. S. 749 would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 121 (1976). As Justice Brandeis explained in his dissent in Myers
v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 , 272 U. S. 291 (1926):

															"The separation of the powers of government did not make each
branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure,
dependent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in
some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and
judicial."

															One reason that the exercise of legislative, executive, and
judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed among three
mutually exclusive branches of Government is that governmental
power cannot always be readily characterized with only one of those
three labels. On the contrary, as our cases demonstrate, a
particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the
aspect of the office to which it is assigned. For this reason,
"[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power
the Constitution has delegated to it." INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 462 U. S. 951 .
[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															The Chadha case itself illustrates this basic point.
The governmental decision that was being made was whether a
resident alien who had overstayed his student visa should be Page 478 U. S. 750 deported. From the point of view of the Administrative Law Judge
who conducted a hearing on the issue -- or, as JUSTICE POWELL saw
the issue in his concurrence [ Footnote 2/14 ] -- the decision took on a judicial
coloring. From the point of view of the Attorney General of the
United States, to whom Congress had delegated the authority to
suspend deportation of certain aliens, the decision appeared to
have an executive character. [ Footnote 2/15 ] But, as the Court held, when the House
of Representatives finally decided that Chadha must be deported,
its action "was essentially legislative in purpose and effect." Id. at 462 U. S.
952 .

															The powers delegated to the Comptroller General by § 251 of the
Act before us today have a similar chameleon-like quality. The
District Court persuasively explained why they may be appropriately
characterized as executive powers. [ Footnote 2/16 ] But, when that delegation is held
invalid, the "fallback provision" provides that the report that
would otherwise be issued by the Comptroller General shall be
issued by Congress itself. [ Footnote
2/17 ] Page 478 U. S. 751 In the event that the resolution is enacted, the congressional
report will have the same legal consequences as if it had been
issued by the Comptroller General. In that event, moreover, surely
no one would suggest that Congress had acted in any capacity other
than "legislative." Since the District Court expressly recognized
the validity of what it described as the " fallback' deficit
reduction process," Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 , 1377 (DC 1986), it obviously did not doubt the
constitutionality of the performance by Congress of the functions
delegated to the Comptroller General. Under the District Court's analysis, and the analysis adopted by
the majority today, it would therefore appear that the function at
issue is "executive" if performed by the Comptroller General, but
"legislative" if performed by the Congress. In my view, however,
the function may appropriately Page 478 U. S. 752 be labeled "legislative" even if performed by the Comptroller
General or by an executive agency.

															Despite the statement in Article I of the Constitution that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States," it is far from novel to acknowledge that
independent agencies do indeed exercise legislative powers. As
JUSTICE WHITE explained in his Chadha dissent, after
reviewing our cases upholding broad delegations of legislative
power:

															"[T]hese cases establish that, by virtue of congressional
delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent
agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new
legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law -- the
substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the
operation of government -- made by the agencies has far outnumbered
the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional
process. There is no question but that agency rulemaking is
lawmaking in any functional or realistic sense of the term. The
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), provides that a
'rule' is an agency statement 'designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy.' When agencies are authorized to prescribe
law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation
is not only due deference, but is accorded 'legislative effect.' See, e g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U. S.
34 , 453 U. S. 43 -44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416 (1977). These
regulations bind courts and officers of the Federal Government, may
preempt state law, see, e.g., Fidelity Federal Savings &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982), and grant
rights to and impose obligations on the public. In sum, they have
the force of law."

															462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
985 -986 (footnote omitted).

															Thus, I do not agree that the Comptroller General's
responsibilities under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act must be Page 478 U. S. 753 termed "executive powers," or even that our inquiry is much
advanced by using that term. For, whatever the label given the
functions to be performed by the Comptroller General under § 251 --
or by the Congress under § 274 -- the District Court had no
difficulty in concluding that Congress could delegate the
performance of those functions to another branch of the Government.
[ Footnote 2/18 ] If the delegation
to a stranger is permissible, why may not Congress delegate the
same responsibilities to one of its own agents? That is the central
question before us today. IV Congress regularly delegates responsibility to a number of
agents who provide important support for its legislative
activities. Many perform functions that could be characterized as
"executive" in most contexts -- the Capitol Police can arrest and
press charges against lawbreakers, the Sergeant at Arms manages the
congressional payroll, the Capitol Architect maintains the
buildings and grounds, and its Librarian has custody of a vast
number of books and records. Moreover, the Members themselves
necessarily engage in many activities that are merely ancillary to
their primary lawmaking Page 478 U. S. 754 responsibilities -- they manage their separate offices, they
communicate with their constituents, they conduct hearings, they
inform themselves about the problems confronting the Nation, and
they make rules for the governance of their own business. The
responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller General in the case
before us are, of course, quite different from these delegations
and ancillary activities.

															The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act assigns to the Comptroller General
the duty to make policy decisions that have the force of law. The
Comptroller General's report is, in the current statute, the engine
that gives life to the ambitious budget reduction process. It is
the Comptroller General's report that "provide[s] for the
determination of reductions" and that "contain[s] estimates,
determinations, and specifications for all of the items contained
in the report" submitted by the Office of Management and Budget and
the Congressional Budget Office. § 251(b). It is the Comptroller
General's report that the President must follow and that will have
conclusive effect. § 252. It is, in short, the Comptroller
General's report that will have a profound, dramatic, and immediate
impact on the Government and on the Nation at large.

															Article I of the Constitution specifies the procedures that
Congress must follow when it makes policy that binds the Nation:
its legislation must be approved by both of its Houses and
presented to the President. In holding that an attempt to legislate
by means of a "one-House veto" violated the procedural mandate in
Article I, we explained:

															"We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that
the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve
essential constitutional functions. The President's participation
in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from
Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The
division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that
the legislative power would be exercised Page 478 U. S. 755 only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate
settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was
limited by the power of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to
overrule a veto, thereby precluding final arbitrary action of one
person. . . . It emerges clearly that the prescription for
legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers'
decision that the legislative power of the Federal Government be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 951 .
If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one
of its components, or to one of its agents, it would be able to
evade "the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution." Id. at 462 U. S. 959 .
[ Footnote 2/19 ] That danger --
congressional action that evades constitutional restraints -- is
not present when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the
executive or to an independent agency. [ Footnote 2/20 ]

															The distinction between the kinds of action that Congress may
delegate to its own components and agents and those that require
either compliance with Article I procedures or delegation to
another branch pursuant to defined standards is Page 478 U. S. 756 reflected in the practices that have developed over the years
regarding congressional resolutions. The joint resolution,
which is used for "special purposes and . . . incidental matters,"
7 Deschler's Precedents of the House of Representatives 334 (1977),
makes binding policy and "requires an affirmative vote by both
Houses and submission to the President for approval," id. at 333 -- the full Article I requirements. A concurrent resolution, in contrast, makes no binding policy; it is "a means of
expressing fact, principles, opinions, and purposes of the two
Houses," Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of
Representatives 176 (1983), and thus does not need to be presented
to the President. It is settled, however, that, if a resolution is
intended to make policy that will bind the Nation, and thus is
"legislative in its character and effect," S.Rep. No. 1335, 54th
Cong. .2d Sess., 8 (1897) -- then the full Article I requirements
must be observed. For "the nature or substance of the resolution,
and not its form, controls the question of its disposition." Ibid. In my opinion, Congress itself could not exercise the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings functions through a concurrent resolution.
The fact that the fallback provision in § 274 requires a joint
resolution, rather than a concurrent resolution, indicates that
Congress endorsed this view. [ Footnote 2/21 ] I think it equally clear that Congress
may not simply delegate those functions to an agent such as the
Congressional Budget Office. Since I am persuaded that the
Comptroller General is also fairly deemed to be an agent of
Congress, he too cannot exercise such functions. [ Footnote 2/22 ] Page 478 U. S. 757 As a result, to decide this case, there is no need to consider
the Decision of 1789, the President's removal power, or the
abstract nature of "executive powers." Once it is clear that the
Comptroller General, whose statutory duties define him as an agent
of Congress, has been assigned the task of making policy
determinations that will bind the Nation, the question is simply
one of congressional process. There can be no doubt that the
Comptroller General's statutory duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
do not follow the constitutionally prescribed procedures for
congressional lawmaking. [ Footnote
2/23 ]

															In short, even though it is well settled that Congress may
delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the
Executive, and thereby divest itself of a portion of its lawmaking
power, when it elects to exercise such power itself, it may not
authorize a lesser representative of the Legislative Page 478 U. S. 758 Branch to act on its behalf. [ Footnote 2/24 ] It is for this reason that I believe §
251(b) and § 251(c)(2) of the Act are unconstitutional. [ Footnote 2/25 ]

															Thus, the critical inquiry in this case concerns not the manner
in which executive officials or agencies may act, but the manner in
which Congress and its agents may act. As we emphasized in Chadha, when Congress legislates, when it makes binding
policy, it must follow the procedures prescribed in Article I.
Neither the unquestioned urgency of the national budget crisis nor
the Comptroller General's proud record of professionalism and
dedication provides a justification for allowing a congressional
agent to set policy that binds Page 478 U. S. 759 the Nation. Rather than turning the task over to its agent, if
the Legislative Branch decides to act with conclusive effect, it
must do so through a process akin to that specified in the fallback
provision -- through enactment by both Houses and presentment to
the President.

															I concur in the judgment.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Just as it is "always appropriate to assume that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law," Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 , 441 U. S.
696 -697 (1979), so too is it appropriate to assume that
our elected representatives, like other citizens, will respect the
law. As the proceedings in the United States Senate resulting from
the impeachment of Justice Chase demonstrate, moreover, if that
body were willing to give only lip service to the governing
standard, political considerations, rather than "good behavior"
would determine the tenure of federal judges. See M.
Elsmere, The Impeachment Trial of Justice Samuel Chase 205 (1962);
3 A. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 157-223 (1919). See
also W. Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American
Politics 186-187 (Meridian Books ed., 1956) (quoted in Levi, Some
Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 369, 380
(1976)):

															"'If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this:
that in any business, whether of government or of mere
merchandising, somebody must be trusted, in order that, when things
go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished. . . . Power and strict accountability of its use are the
essential constituents of good government.'"

															(Emphasis in original.)

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 295 U. S.
625 -626 (describing congressional intention to create "a
body which shall be independent of executive authority, except
in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without
the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of
the government") (emphasis in original).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The manner in which President Franklin Roosevelt exercised his
removal power further underscores the propriety of presuming that
Congress, and the President, will not use statutorily prescribed
removal causes as pretexts for other removal reasons. President
Roosevelt never claimed that his removal of Humphrey was for one of
the statutorily prescribed reasons -- inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office. The President's removal letter
merely stated:

															"'Effective as of this date, you are hereby removed from the
office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission.'" See id. at 295 U. S. 619 .
Previously, the President had written to Commissioner Humphrey,
stating:

															"'You will, I know, . . . realize that I do not feel that your
mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the
administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and, frankly. I
think it is best for the people of this country that I should have
a full confidence.'" Ibid. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Indeed, even in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 (1926), in its challenge to the provision requiring
Senate approval of the removal of a postmaster, the Federal
Government assumed that Congress had power to limit the terms of
removal to reasons that relate to the office. Solicitor General
Beck recognized

															"that the power of removal may be subject to such general laws
as do not destroy the exercise by the President of his power of
removal, and which leaves to him the exercise of the power subject
to such general laws as may fairly measure the standard of public
service."

															Substitute Brief for United States on Reargument in No. 2, O.T.
1926, p. 9. At oral argument, the Solicitor General explained his
position:

															"Mr. Beck: Suppose the Congress creates an office and says that
it shall only be filled by a man learned in the law; and suppose it
further provides that, if a man ceases to be member of the bar, he
shall be removed. I am not prepared to say that such a law cannot
be reconciled with the Constitution. What I do say is that, when
the condition imposed upon the creation of the office has no
reasonable relation to the office; when it is not a legislative
standard to be applied by the President, and is not the declaration
of qualifications, but is the creation of an appointing power other
than the President, then Congress has crossed the deadline, for it
has usurped the prerogative of the President."

															272 U.S. at 96-97 [argument of counsel omitted from electronic
version].

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In pertinent part, the 1921 Act provided:

															"SEC. 312(a). The Comptroller General shall investigate, at the
seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the
receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds, and shall
make to the President when requested by him, and to Congress at the
beginning of each regular session, a report in writing of the work
of the General Accounting Office, containing recommendations
concerning the legislation he may deem necessary to facilitate the
prompt and accurate rendition and settlement of accounts and
concerning such other matters relating to the receipt,
disbursement, and application of public funds as he may think
advisable. In such regular report, or in special reports at any
time when Congress is in session, he shall make recommendations
looking to greater economy or efficiency in public
expenditures."

															"(b) He shall make such investigations and reports as shall be
ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee of
either House having jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations or
expenditures. The Comptroller General shall also, at the
request of any such committee, direct assistants from his office to
furnish the committee such aid and information as it may
request."

															"(c) The Comptroller General shall specifically report to
Congress every expenditure or contract made by any department or
establishment in any year in violation of law."

															"(d) He shall submit to Congress reports upon the
adequacy and effectiveness of the administrative examination of
accounts and claims in the respective departments and
establishments and upon the adequacy and effectiveness of
departmental inspection of the offices and accounts of fiscal
officers."

															"(e) He shall furnish such information relating to expenditures
and accounting to the Bureau of the Budget as it may request from
time to time."

															42 Stat. 25-26 (emphases added).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See also H.R.Rep. No. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 12
(1949) ("[T]he Comptroller General of the United States" and "the
General Accounting Office . . . are declared by the bill to be a
part of the legislative branch of the Government").

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See also H.R.Rep. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 11
(1949) ("[T]he Comptroller General of the United States" and "the
General Accounting Office (as in the Reorganization Act of 1945)
are declared by the bill to be a part of the legislative branch of
the Government.").

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See 42 Stat. 23 ("The offices of Comptroller of the
Treasury and Assistant Comptroller of the Treasury are abolished,
to take effect July 21, 1921. . . . [A]ll books, records,
documents, papers, furniture, office equipment and other property
of the office of the Comptroller of the Treasury shall become the
property of the General Accounting Office").

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															The Comptroller General, of course, is also appointed by the
President. 31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1). So too, however, are the
Librarian of Congress, 2 U.S.C. § 136, the Architect of the
Capitol, 40 U.S.C. § 162, and the Public Printer, 44 U.S.C. §
301.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States
Marshals Service, 474 U. S. 34 , 474 U. S. 36 -37,
and n. 1 (1985) (reviewing the Marshals' statutory obligations to
the Judiciary and the Executive Branch, but noting that the
"Marshals are within the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government"). Cf. Report by the Comptroller General, U.S.
Marshals' Dilemma: Serving Two Branches of Government 14 (1982)
("It is extremely difficult for one person to effectively serve two
masters"). Surely no one would suggest that the fact that THE CHIEF
JUSTICE performs executive functions for the Smithsonian
Institution, 20 U.S.C. § 42, affects his characterization as a
member of the Judicial Branch of the Government. Nor does the
performance of similar functions by three Members of the Senate and
three Members of the House, ibid., affect their
characterization as members of the Legislative Branch of the
Government.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															Despite the suggestions of the dissents, post at 478 U. S. 773 n. 12 (WHITE, J., dissenting); post at 478 U. S.
778 -779, n. 1 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), it is quite
obvious that the Comptroller General, and the General Accounting
office, have a fundamentally different relationship with Congress
than do independent agencies like the Federal Trade Commission.
Rather than an independent agency, the Comptroller General and the
GAO are functionally equivalent to congressional agents such as the
Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment,
and the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service. As the
statutory responsibilities make clear, like those congressional
agents, the Comptroller General and the GAO function virtually as a
permanent staff for Congress. Indeed, in creating the Congressional
Budget Office, Congress explicitly required that the GAO provide
extensive services for the CBO -- a fact with some significance for
this case. The CBO statute enumerates the three "congressional
agencies" that must provide assistance to the CBO: "the General
Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, and the Office of
Technology Assessment." 2 U.S.C. § 601(e). These "congressional
agencies" are authorized to provide the CBO with "services,
facilities, and personnel with or without reimbursement," ibid., as well as "information, data, estimates, and
statistics." Ibid. See also Congressional
Quarterly's Guide to Congress 555 (3d ed.1982) ("In addition to
their staffs, committees, facilities and privileges, members of
Congress are backed by a number of other supporting organizations
and activities that keep Capitol Hill running. Among the largest of
these in size of staff are the General Accounting Office (GAO),
with about 5,200 employees; the Library of Congress' Congressional
Research Service (CRS), with 856; the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), with 218; and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),
with 130. . . . To an extent, each of the four legislative agencies
has its own specialized functions. . . . Although each of the four
agencies has been given its own task, their jobs overlap to some
extent. This has led in some cases to duplication and waste and
even to competition among the different groups. . . . The General
Accounting Office is an arm of the legislative branch that was
created to oversee the expenditures of the executive branch").

															Thus, to contend that the Comptroller General's numerous
statutory responsibilities to serve Congress directly are somehow
like an independent agency's obligations to report to Congress and
to implement legislatively mandated standards simply misconceives
the actual duties of the Comptroller General and the GAO. It also
ignores the clear import of the legislative history of these
entities. See, e.g., Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 892-893 (CA3 1986) (Becker, J.,
concurring in part) ("Because the office of the Comptroller General
is created by statute, the Comptroller General's status within the
government is a matter of statutory interpretation which, like all
statutory interpretation, is controlled by legislative intent. . .
. There is copious evidence in the legislative history that the GAO
(and therefore the Comptroller General) was intended to be in the
legislative branch. . . . Because there is no legislative intent to
the contrary, I believe that it is incumbent upon us to hold that
the Comptroller General is within the legislative branch of
government, despite the inconveniences that may attend such a
holding").

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The element of judgment that the Comptroller General must
exercise is evident by the congressional recognition that "there
may be differences between the contents of [his] report and the
report of the Directors" of the Congressional Budget Office and the
Office of Management and Budget. § 251(b)(2).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															"Perhaps as a matter of political science we could say that
Congress should only concern itself with broad principles of
policy, and leave their application in particular cases to the
executive branch. But no such rule can be found in the Constitution
itself, or in legislative practice. It is fruitless, therefore, to
try to draw any sharp and logical line between legislative and
executive functions. Characteristically, the draftsmen of 1787 did
not even attempt doctrinaire definitions, but placed their reliance
in the mechanics of the Constitution. One of their principal
devices was to vest the legislative powers in the two Houses of
Congress, and to make the President a part of the legislative
process by requiring that all bills passed by the two Houses be
submitted to him for his approval or disapproval, his disapproval
or veto to be overridden only by a two-thirds vote of each House.
It is in such checks upon powers, rather than in the
classifications of powers, that our governmental system finds
equilibrium."

															Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv.L .Rev. 569, 571 (1953)
(footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															For JUSTICE POWELL, the critical question in the Chadha case was "whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial
function." 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
963 .

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															"It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his
presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers the Immigration
and Nationality Act." Id. at 462 U. S. 953 ,
n. 16.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															"Under subsection 251(b)(1), the Comptroller General must
specify levels of anticipated revenue and expenditure that
determine the gross amount which must be sequestered, and he must
specify which particular budget items are required to be reduced by
the various provisions of the Act (which are not in all respects
clear), and in what particular amounts. The first of these
specifications requires the exercise of substantial judgment
concerning present and future facts that affect the application of
the law -- the sort of power normally conferred upon the executive
officer charged with implementing a statute. The second
specification requires an interpretation of the law enacted by
Congress, similarly a power normally committed initially to the
Executive under the Constitution's prescription that he 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II, § 3." Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 , 1400 (DC 1986).

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															Section 274(f) of the Act provides, in part:

															"ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES FOR THE JOINT REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTORS"

															"(1) In the event that any of the reporting procedures described
In section 251 are invalidated, then any report of the Directors
referred to in section 251(a) or (c)(1) . . . shall be transmitted
to the joint committee established under this subsection."

															"(2) Upon the invalidation of any such procedure there is
established a Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction,
composed of the entire membership of the Budget Committees of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. . . . The purposes of the
Joint Committee are to receive the reports of the Directors as
described in paragraph (1), and to report (with respect to each
such report of the Directors) a joint resolution as described in
paragraph (3)."

															"(3) No later than 5 days after the receipt of a report of the
Directors in accordance with paragraph (1), the Joint Committee
shall report to the House of Representatives and the Senate a joint
resolution setting forth the contents of the report of the
Directors."

															" * * * *" "(5) Upon its enactment, the joint resolution shall be
deemed to be the report received by the President under section
251(b) or (c)(2) (whichever is applicable)."

															99 Stat. 1100 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															"All that has been left to administrative discretion is the
estimation of the aggregate amount of reductions that will be
necessary, in light of predicted revenues and expenditures, and we
believe that the Act contains standards adequately confining
administrative discretion in making that estimation. While this is
assuredly an estimation that requires some judgment, and on which
various individuals may disagree, we hardly think it is a
distinctively political judgment, much less a political
judgment of such scope that it must be made by Congress itself.
Through specification of maximum deficit amounts, establishment of
a detailed administrative mechanism, and determination of the
standards governing administrative decisionmaking, Congress has
made the policy decisions which constitute the essence of the
legislative function."

															626 F. Supp. at 1391. The District Court's holding that the
exercise of discretion was not the kind of political judgment that
"must be made by Congress itself" is, of course, consistent with
the view that it is a judgment that "may be made by Congress
itself" pursuant to § 274.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Even scholars who would have sustained the one-House veto appear
to agree with this ultimate conclusion. See Nathanson,
Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The
Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev.
1064, 1090 (1981) ("It is not a case where the Congress has
delegated authority to one of its components to take affirmative
steps to impose regulations upon private interests -- an action
which would, I assume, be unconstitutional"). Cf. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 286 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (expressing the opinion that a
one-House veto of agency regulations would be unobjectionable, but
adding that it "would be considerably different if Congress itself
purported to adopt and propound regulations by the action of both
Houses").

															[ Footnote 2/20 ]

															As 1 have emphasized, in this case, the Comptroller General is
assigned functions that require him to make policy determinations
that bind the Nation. I note only that this analysis need not call
into question the Comptroller General's performance of numerous
existing functions that may not rise to this level. See
ante at 478 U. S.
734 -735, n. 9.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															The fact that Congress specified a joint resolution as the
fallback provision has another significance as well. For it reveals
the congressional intent that, if the Comptroller General could not
exercise the prescribed functions, Congress wished to perform them
itself, rather than delegating them, for instance, to an
independent agency or to an Executive Branch official. This choice
shows that Congress intended that the important functions of the
Act be no further from itself than the Comptroller General.

															[ Footnote 2/22 ]

															In considering analogous problems, our state courts have
consistently recognized the importance of strict adherence to
constitutionally mandated procedures in the legislative process. See, e.g., State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 ,
773. 777 (Alaska 1980) ("Of course, when the legislature wishes to
act in an advisory capacity, it may act by resolution. However,
when it means to take action having a binding effect on those
outside the legislature, it may do so only by following the
enactment procedures. Other state courts have so held with virtual
unanimity. . . . The fact that it can delegate legislative power to
others who are not bound by article II does not mean that it can
delegate the same power to itself and, in the process, escape from
the constraints under which it must operate"); People v.
Tremaine, 252 N. Y 27, 44 168 N.E. 817, 822 (1929) ("If the
power to approve the segregation of lump sum appropriations may be
delegated to any one, even to one or two members of the
Legislature, it necessarily follows that the power to segregate
such appropriations may also be conferred upon such delegates. . .
. To visualize an extreme case, one lump sum appropriation might be
made to be segregated by the committee chairmen. Such a delegation
of legislative power would be abhor[r]ent to all our notions of
legislation on the matter of appropriations").

															[ Footnote 2/23 ]

															I have previously noted my concern about the need for a "due
process of lawmaking" even when Congress has acted with
bicameralism and presentment. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 , 448 U. S. 549 ,
and n. 24 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73 , 430 U. S. 98 ,
and n. 11 (1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). When a legislature's
agent is given powers to act without even the formalities of the
legislative process, these concerns are especially prominent.

															[ Footnote 2/24 ] See also Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 983, 1067,
n. 430 (1975) ("A delegation which disperses power is not
necessarily constitutionally equivalent to one which concentrates
power in the hands of the delegating agency"); Ginnane, 66
Harv.L.Rev. at 595 ("It is a non sequitur to say that,
since a statute can delegate a power to someone not bound by the
procedure prescribed in the Constitution for Congress' exercise of
the power, it can therefore delegate' the power to Congress
free of constitutional restrictions on the manner of its
exercise"). [ Footnote 2/25 ]

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN suggests that Congress may delegate legislative
power to one of its own agents as long as it does not retain "tight
control" over that agent. Post at 478 U. S. 779 ,
n. 1. His suggestion is not faithful to the rationale of Chadha, because no component of Congress, not even one of
its Houses, is subject to the "tight control" of the entire
Congress. For instance, the Congressional Research Service, whose
primary function is to respond to congressional research requests,
2 U.S.C. § 166, apparently would not fall within JUSTICE BLACKMUN's
"tight control" test, because Congress has guaranteed the Service
"complete research independence and the maximum practicable
administrative independence consistent with these objectives." §
166(b)(2). I take it, however, that few would doubt the
unconstitutionality of assigning the functions at issue in this
case to the Congressional Research Service. Moreover, Chadha surely forecloses the suggestion that, because
delegation of legislative power to an independent agency is
acceptable, such power may also be delegated to a component or an
agent of Congress. Finally, with respect to JUSTICE BLACKMUN's
emphasis on Presidential appointment of the Comptroller General, post at 478 U. S.
778 -779, n. 1, as I have previously pointed out, other
obvious congressional agents, such as the Librarian of Congress,
the Architect of the Capitol, and the Public Printer are also
appointed by the President. See 478
U.S. 714 fn2/9|>n. 9, supra. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															The Court, acting in the name of separation of powers, takes
upon itself to strike down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, one of
the most novel and far-reaching legislative responses to a national
crisis since the New Deal. The basis of the Court's action is a
solitary provision of another statute that was passed over 60 years
ago and has lain dormant since that time. I cannot concur in the
Court's action. Like the Court, I will not purport to speak to the
wisdom of the policies incorporated in the legislation the Court
invalidates; that is a matter for the Congress and the Executive,
both of which expressed their assent to the statute barely half a
year ago. I will, however, address the wisdom of the Court's
willingness to interpose its distressingly formalistic view of
separation of powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental
objectives through the means chosen by the Congress and the
President in the legislative process established by the
Constitution. Twice in the past four years I have expressed my view
that the Court's recent efforts to police the separation of powers
have rested on untenable constitutional propositions leading to
regrettable results. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 , 458 U. S. 92 -118
(1982) (WHITE, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 , 462 U. S.
967 -1003 (1983) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Today's result
is even more misguided. As I will explain, the Court's decision
rests on a feature of the legislative scheme that is of minimal
practical significance and that presents no substantial threat to
the basic scheme of separation of powers. In attaching dispositive
significance to what should be regarded as a triviality, the Court
neglects what has Page 478 U. S. 760 in the past been recognized as a fundamental principle governing
consideration of disputes over separation of powers:

															"The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring). I The Court's argument is straightforward: the Act vests the
Comptroller General with "executive" powers, that is, powers to
"[i]nterpre[t] a law enacted by Congress [in order] to implement
the legislative mandate," ante at 478 U. S. 733 ;
such powers may not be vested by Congress in itself or its agents, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S.
120 -141 (1976), for the system of Government established
by the Constitution, for the most part, limits Congress to a
legislative, rather than an executive or judicial, role, see
INS v. Chadha, supra; the Comptroller General is an agent of
Congress by virtue of a provision in the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, 43 Stat. 23, 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1), granting Congress the
power to remove the Comptroller for cause through joint resolution;
therefore the Comptroller General may not constitutionally exercise
the executive powers granted him in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act,
and the Act's automatic budget reduction mechanism, which is
premised on the Comptroller's exercise of those powers, must be
struck down.

															Before examining the merits of the Court's argument, I wish to
emphasize what it is that the Court quite pointedly and correctly
does not hold: namely, that "executive" powers of the sort
granted the Comptroller by the Act may only be exercised by
officers removable at will by the President. Page 478 U. S. 761 The Court's apparent unwillingness to accept this argument,
[ Footnote 3/1 ] which has been
tendered in this Court by the Solicitor General, [ Footnote 3/2 ] is fully consistent with the Court's
longstanding recognition that it is within the power of Congress
under the "Necessary and Proper" Clause, Art. I, § 8, to vest
authority that falls within the Court's definition of executive
power in officers who are not subject to removal at will by the
President, and are therefore not under the President's direct
control. See, e.g., Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.
S. 349 (1958). [ Footnote
3/3 ] In an earlier day, in which simpler notions of the role of
government in society prevailed, it was perhaps plausible to insist
that all "executive" officers be subject to an unqualified
Presidential removal power, see Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926); but with the advent and triumph of the administrative state
and the accompanying multiplication of the tasks undertaken by the
Federal Government, the Page 478 U. S. 762 Court has been virtually compelled to recognize that Congress
may reasonably deem it "necessary and proper" to vest some among
the broad new array of governmental functions in officers who are
free from the partisanship that may be expected of agents wholly
dependent upon the President.

															The Court's recognition of the legitimacy of legislation vesting
"executive" authority in officers independent of the President does
not imply derogation of the President's own constitutional
authority -- indeed, duty -- to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, for any such duty is
necessarily limited to a great extent by the content of the laws
enacted by the Congress. As Justice Holmes put it:

															"The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a
duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve
more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." Myers v. United States, supra, at 272 U. S. 177 (dissenting). [ Footnote 3/4 ]
Justice Holmes perhaps overstated his case, for there are
undoubtedly executive functions that, regardless of the enactments
of Congress, must be performed by officers subject to removal at
will by the President. Whether a particular function falls within
this class or within the far larger class that may be relegated to
independent officers "will depend upon the character of the
office." Humphrey's Executor, supra, at 295 U. S. 631 .
In determining whether a limitation on the President's power to
remove an officer performing executive functions constitutes a
violation of the constitutional scheme of separation of powers, a
court must "focu[s] on the extent to which [such a limitation]
prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions." Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, 433 U. S. 425 , 433 U. S. 443 (1977).

															"Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to
promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress." Ibid. This inquiry Page 478 U. S. 763 is, to be sure, not one that will beget easy answers; it
provides nothing approaching a bright-line rule or set of rules.
Such an inquiry, however, is necessitated by the recognition that
"formalistic and unbending rules" in the area of separation of
powers may "unduly constrict Congress' ability to take needed and
innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers." Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, post at 478 U. S.
851 .

															It is evident (and nothing in the Court's opinion is to the
contrary) that the powers exercised by the Comptroller General
under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act are not such that vesting them
in an officer not subject to removal at will by the President would
in itself improperly interfere with Presidential powers.
Determining the level of spending by the Federal Government is not,
by nature, a function central either to the exercise of the
President's enumerated powers or to his general duty to ensure
execution of the laws; rather, appropriating funds is a peculiarly
legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by
Art. I, § 9, which provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." In
enacting Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress has chosen to exercise
this legislative power to establish the level of federal spending
by providing a detailed set of criteria for reducing expenditures
below the level of appropriations in the event that certain
conditions are met. Delegating the execution of this legislation --
that is, the power to apply the Act's criteria and make the
required calculations -- to an officer independent of the
President's will does not deprive the President of any power that
he would otherwise have or that is essential to the performance of
the duties of his office. Rather, the result of such a delegation,
from the standpoint of the President, is no different from the
result of more traditional forms of appropriation: under either
system, the level of funds available to the Executive Branch to
carry out its duties is not within the President's discretionary
control. To be sure, Page 478 U. S. 764 if the budget-cutting mechanism required the responsible officer
to exercise a great deal of policymaking discretion, one might
argue that, having created such broad discretion, Congress had some
obligation based upon Art. II to vest it in the Chief Executive or
his agents. In Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, however, Congress has done no
such thing; instead, it has created a precise and articulated set
of criteria designed to minimize the degree of policy choice
exercised by the officer executing the statute, and to ensure that
the relative spending priorities established by Congress in the
appropriations it passes into law remain unaltered. [ Footnote 3/5 ] Given that the exercise of
policy choice by the officer executing the statute would be
inimical to Congress' goal in enacting "automatic" budget-cutting
measures, it is eminently reasonable and proper for Congress to
vest the budget-cutting authority in an officer who is, to the
greatest degree possible, nonpartisan and independent of the
President and his political agenda, and who therefore may be relied
upon not to allow his calculations to be colored by political
considerations. Such a delegation deprives the President of no
authority that is rightfully his. II If, as the Court seems to agree, the assignment of "executive"
powers under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to an officer not removable at
will by the President would not, in itself, represent a violation
of the constitutional scheme of separated Page 478 U. S. 765 powers, the question remains whether, as the Court concludes,
the fact that the officer to whom Congress has delegated the
authority to implement the Act is removable by a joint resolution
of Congress should require invalidation of the Act. The Court's
decision, as I have stated above, is based on a syllogism: the Act
vests the Comptroller with "executive power"; such power may not be
exercised by Congress or its agents; the Comptroller is an agent of
Congress because he is removable by Congress; therefore the Act is
invalid. I have no quarrel with the proposition that the powers
exercised by the Comptroller under the Act may be characterized as
"executive" in that they involve the interpretation and carrying
out of the Act's mandate. I can also accept the general proposition
that, although Congress has considerable authority in designating
the officers who are to execute legislation, see supra, at 478 U. S.
760 -764, the constitutional scheme of separated powers
does prevent Congress from reserving an executive role for itself
or for its "agents." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S.
120 -141; id. at 424 U. S.
267 -282 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). I cannot accept, however, that the exercise of authority by
an officer removable for cause by a joint resolution of Congress is
analogous to the impermissible execution of the law by Congress
itself, nor would I hold that the congressional role in the removal
process renders the Comptroller an "agent" of the Congress,
incapable of receiving "executive" power.

															In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, the Court held that
Congress could not reserve to itself the power to appoint members
of the Federal Election Commission, a body exercising "executive"
power. Buckley, however, was grounded on a textually based
separation of powers argument whose central premise was that the
Constitution requires that all "Officers of the United States"
(defined as "all persons who can be said to hold an office under
the government," 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 126 )
whose appointment is not otherwise specifically provided for
elsewhere in its text be appointed through the means specified Page 478 U. S. 766 by the Appointments Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 -- that is,
either by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
or, if Congress so specifies, by the President alone, by the
courts, or by the head of a department. The Buckley Court treated
the Appointments Clause as reflecting the principle that "the
Legislative Branch may not exercise executive authority," 424 U.S.
at 424 U. S. 119 (citing Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 (1928)), but the Court's holding was merely that
Congress may not direct that its laws be implemented through
persons who are its agents in the sense that it chose them; the
Court did not pass on the legitimacy of other means by which
Congress might exercise authority over those who execute its laws.
Because the Comptroller is not an appointee of Congress, but an
officer of the United States appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, Buckley neither requires
that he be characterized as an agent of the Congress nor in any
other way calls into question his capacity to exercise "executive"
authority. See 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 128 ,
n. 165.

															As the majority points out, however, the Court's decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), recognizes additional limits on the ability of Congress to
participate in or influence the execution of the laws. As
interpreted in Chadha, the Constitution prevents Congress
from interfering with the actions of officers of the United StateS
through means short of legislation satisfying the demands of
bicameral passage and presentment to the President for approval or
disapproval. Id. at 462 U. S.
954 -955. Today's majority concludes that the same
concerns that underlay Chadha indicate the invalidity of a
statutory provision allowing the removal by joint resolution for
specified cause of any officer performing executive functions. Such
removal power, the Court contends, constitutes a "congressional
veto" analogous to that struck down in Chadha, for it
permits Congress to "remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for
executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory." Ante at 478 U. S. 726 .
The Court concludes Page 478 U. S. 767 that it is "[t]his kind of congressional control over the
execution of the laws" that Chadha condemns. Ante at 478 U. S.
726 -727.

															The deficiencies in the Court's reasoning are apparent. First,
the Court baldly mischaracterizes the removal provision when it
suggests that it allows Congress to remove the Comptroller for
"executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory"; in
fact, Congress may remove the Comptroller only for one or more of
five specified reasons, which,

															"although not so narrow as to deny Congress any leeway,
circumscribe Congress' power to some extent by providing a basis
for judicial review of congressional removal." Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 895 (CA3 1986) (Becker, J., concurring in part).
Second, and more to the point, the Court overlooks or deliberately
ignores the decisive difference between the congressional removal
provision and the legislative veto struck down in Chadha: under the Budget and Accounting Act, Congress may remove the
Comptroller only through a joint resolution, which, by definition,
must be passed by both Houses and signed by the President. See
United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 , 332 U. S. 28 (1947). [ Footnote 3/6 ] In other
words, a removal of the Comptroller under the statute satisfies
the requirements of bicameralism and presentment laid down in
Chadha. The majority's citation of Chadha for the
proposition that Congress may only control the acts of officers of
the United States "by passing new legislation," ante at 478 U. S. 734 ,
in Page 478 U. S. 768 no sense casts doubt on the legitimacy of the removal provision,
for that provision allows Congress to effect removal only through
action that constitutes legislation as defined in Chadha. To the extent that it has any bearing on the problem now before
us, Chadha would seem to suggest the legitimacy of the
statutory provision making the Comptroller removable through joint
resolution, for the Court's opinion in Chadha reflects the
view that the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I
represent the principal assurances that Congress will remain within
its legislative role in the constitutionally prescribed scheme of
separated powers. Action taken in accordance with the "single,
finely wrought, and exhaustively considered, procedure" established
by Art. I, Chadha, supra, at 462 U. S. 951 ,
should be presumptively viewed as a legitimate exercise of
legislative power. That such action may represent a more or less
successful attempt by Congress to "control" the actions of an
officer of the United States surely does not, in itself, indicate
that it is unconstitutional, for no one would dispute that Congress
has the power to "control" administration through legislation
imposing duties or substantive restraints on executive officers,
through legislation increasing or decreasing the funds made
available to such officers, or through legislation actually
abolishing a particular office. Indeed, Chadha expressly
recognizes that, while congressional meddling with administration
of the laws outside of the legislative process is impermissible,
congressional control over executive officers exercised through the
legislative process is valid. 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 955 ,
n.19. Thus, if the existence of a statute permitting removal of the
Comptroller through joint resolution (that is, through the
legislative process) renders his exercise of executive powers
unconstitutional, it is for reasons having virtually nothing to do
with Chadha. [ Footnote
3/7 ] Page 478 U. S. 769 That a joint resolution removing the Comptroller General would
satisfy the requirements for legitimate legislative action laid
down in Chadha does not fully answer the
separation-of-powers argument, for it is apparent that even the
results of the constitutional legislative process may be
unconstitutional if those results are, in fact, destructive of the
scheme of separation of powers. Nixon v.
Administrator of General Page 478 U. S. 770 Services, 433 U. S. 425 (1977). The question to be answered is whether the threat of
removal of the Comptroller General for cause through joint
resolution as authorized by the Budget and Accounting Act renders
the Comptroller sufficiently subservient to Congress that investing
him with "executive" power can be realistically equated with the
unlawful retention of such power by Congress itself; more
generally, the question is whether there is a genuine threat of
"encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 122 .
Common sense indicates that the existence of the removal provision
poses no such threat to the principle of separation of powers.

															The statute does not permit anyone to remove the Comptroller at
will; removal is permitted only for specified cause, with the
existence of cause to be determined by Congress following a
hearing. Any removal under the statute would presumably be subject
to post-termination judicial review to ensure that a hearing had in
fact been held and that the finding of cause for removal was not
arbitrary. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 787 F.2d at 895 (Becker, J., concurring in part).
[ Footnote 3/8 ] These procedural and
substantive limitations on the removal power militate strongly
against the characterization of the Comptroller as a mere agent of
Congress by virtue of the removal authority. Indeed, similarly
qualified grants of removal power are generally deemed to protect
the officers to whom they apply and to establish their independence
from the domination of the possessor of the removal power. See
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. at 295 U. S.
625 -626, 295 U. S.
629 -630. Removal authority limited in such a manner is
more properly viewed as motivating adherence to a substantive
standard established by law than as inducing subservience to the
particular Page 478 U. S. 771 institution that enforces that standard. That the agent
enforcing the standard is Congress may be of some significance to
the Comptroller, but Congress' substantively limited removal power
will undoubtedly be less of a spur to subservience than Congress'
unquestionable and unqualified power to enact legislation reducing
the Comptroller's salary, cutting the funds available to his
department, reducing his personnel, limiting or expanding his
duties, or even abolishing his position altogether.

															More importantly, the substantial role played by the President
in the process of removal through joint resolution reduces to utter
insignificance the possibility that the threat of removal will
induce subservience to the Congress. As I have pointed out above, a
joint resolution must be presented to the President, and is
ineffective if it is vetoed by him, unless the veto is overridden
by the constitutionally prescribed two-thirds majority of both
Houses of Congress. The requirement of Presidential approval
obviates the possibility that the Comptroller will perceive himself
as so completely at the mercy of Congress that he will function as
its tool. [ Footnote 3/9 ] If the
Comptroller's conduct in office is not so unsatisfactory to the
President as to convince the latter that removal is required under
the statutory standard, Congress will have no independent power to
coerce the Comptroller unless it can muster a two-thirds majority
in both Houses -- a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than that
required to impeach and convict. The incremental in
terrorem effect of the possibility of congressional removal in
the face of a Presidential Page 478 U. S. 772 veto is therefore exceedingly unlikely to have any discernible
impact on the extent of congressional influence over the
Comptroller. [ Footnote 3/10 ] Page 478 U. S. 773 The practical result of the removal provision is not to render
the Comptroller unduly dependent upon or subservient to Congress,
but to render him one of the most independent officers in the
entire federal establishment. Those who have studied the office
agree that the procedural and substantive limits on the power of
Congress and the President to remove the Comptroller make
dislodging him against his will practically impossible. As one
scholar put it nearly 50 years ago:

															"Under the statute, the Comptroller General, once confirmed, is
safe so long as he avoids a public exhibition of personal
immorality, dishonesty, or failing mentality."

															H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General 75-76 (1939). [ Footnote 3/11 ] The passage of time has
done little to cast doubt on this view: of the six Comptrollers who
have served since 1921, none has been threatened with, much less
subjected to, removal. Recent students of the office concur
that,

															"[b]arring resignation, death, physical or mental incapacity, or
extremely bad behavior, the Comptroller General is assured his
tenure if he wants it, and not a day more."

															F. Mosher, The GAO 242 (1979). [ Footnote 3/12 ] The threat of "here-and-now
subservience," ante at 478 U. S. 720 ,
is obviously remote indeed. [ Footnote
3/13 ] Page 478 U. S. 774 Realistic consideration of the nature of the Comptroller
General's relation to Congress thus reveals that the threat to
separation of powers conjured up by the majority is wholly
chimerical. The power over removal retained by the Congress is not
a power that is exercised outside the legislative process as
established by the Constitution, nor does it appear likely that it
is a power that adds significantly to the influence Congress may
exert over executive officers through other, undoubtedly
constitutional exercises of legislative power and through the
constitutionally guaranteed impeachment power. Indeed, the removal
power is so constrained by its own substantive limits and by the
requirement of Presidential approval. Page 478 U. S. 775 "that, as a practical matter, Congress has not exercised, and
probably will never exercise, such control over the Comptroller
General that his nonlegislative powers will threaten the goal of
dispersion of power, and hence the goal of individual liberty, that
separation of powers serves." Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d at 895 (Becker, J., concurring in part). [ Footnote 3/14 ] Page 478 U. S. 776 The majority's contrary conclusion rests on the rigid dogma
that, outside of the impeachment process, any "direct congressional
role in the removal of officers charged with the execution of the
laws . . . is inconsistent with separation of powers." Ante at 478 U. S. 723 .
Reliance on such an unyielding principle to strike down a statute
posing no real danger of aggrandizement of congressional power is
extremely misguided and insensitive to our constitutional role. The
wisdom of vesting "executive" powers in an officer removable by
joint resolution may indeed be debatable -- as may be the wisdom of
the entire scheme of permitting an unelected official to revise the
budget enacted by Congress -- but such matters are, for the most
part, to be worked out between the Congress and the President
through the legislative process, which affords each branch ample
opportunity to defend its interests. The Act vesting budget-cutting
authority in the Comptroller General represents Congress' judgment
that the delegation of such authority to counteract ever-mounting
deficits is "necessary and proper" to the exercise of the powers
granted the Federal Government by the Constitution; and the
President's approval of the statute signifies his unwillingness to
reject the choice made by Congress. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 441 .
Under such circumstances, the role of this Court should be limited
to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of authority
among the branches of government as to pose a genuine threat to the
basic division between the lawmaking power and the power to execute
the law. Because I see no such threat, I cannot join the Court in
striking down the Act.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See ante at 478 U. S.
724 -726, and n. 4.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The Solicitor General appeared on behalf of the "United States,"
or, more properly, the Executive Departments, which intervened to
attack the constitutionality of the statute that the Chief
Executive had earlier endorsed and signed into law.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Although the Court in Humphrey's Executor characterized
the powers of the Federal Trade Commissioner whose tenure was at
issue as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," it is clear that
the FTC's power to enforce and give content to the Federal Trade
Commission Act's proscription of "unfair" acts and practices and
methods of competition is in fact "executive" in the same sense as
is the Comptroller's authority under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings -- that
is, it involves the implementation (or the interpretation and
application) of an Act of Congress. Thus, although the Court in Humphrey's Executor found the use of the labels
"quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" helpful in
"distinguishing" its then-recent decision in Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), these terms are hardly of any use in limiting the holding
of the case; as Justice Jackson pointed out,

															"[t]he mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with
confession that all recognized classifications have broken down,
and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion, as
we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470 , 343 U. S.
487 -488 (1952) (dissenting).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] Cf. ante at 478 U. S. 733 ("[U]ndoubtedly the content of the Act determines the nature of the
executive duty").

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															That the statute provides, to the greatest extent possible,
precise guidelines for the officer assigned to carry out the
required budget cuts not only indicates that vesting budget-cutting
authority in an officer independent of the President does not in
any sense deprive the President of a significant amount of
discretionary authority that should rightfully be vested in him or
an officer accountable to him, but also answers the claim that the
Act represents an excessive, and hence unlawful, delegation of
legislative authority. Because the majority does not address the
delegation argument, I shall not discuss it at any length, other
than to refer the reader to the District Court's persuasive
demonstration that the statute is not void under the nondelegation
doctrine.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The legislative history indicates that the inclusion of the
President in the removal process was a deliberate choice on the
part of the Congress that enacted the Budget and Accounting Act.
The previous year, legislation establishing the position of
Comptroller General and providing for removal by concurrent resolution -- that is, by a resolution not
presented to the President -- had been vetoed by President Wilson
on the ground that granting the sole power of removal to the
Congress would be unconstitutional. See 59 Cong.Rec.
8609-8610 (1920). That Congress responded by providing for removal
through joint resolution clearly evinces congressional intent that
removal take place only through the legislative process, with
Presidential participation.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Because a joint resolution passed by both Houses of Congress and
signed by the President (or repassed over the President's Veto) is
legislation having the same force as any other Act of Congress, it
is somewhat mysterious why the Court focuses on the Budget and
Accounting Act's authorization of removal of the Comptroller
through such a resolution as an indicator that the Comptroller may
not be vested with executive powers. After all, even without such
prior statutory authorization, Congress could pass, and the
President sign, a joint resolution purporting to remove the
Comptroller, and the validity of such legislation would seem in no
way dependent on previous legislation contemplating it. Surely the
fact that Congress might at any time pass, and the President sign,
legislation purporting to remove some officer of the United States
does not make the exercise of executive power by all such officers
unconstitutional. Since the effect of the Budget and Accounting Act
is merely to recognize the possibility of legislation that Congress
might at any time attempt to enact with respect to any executive
officer, it should not make the exercise of "executive" power by
the Comptroller any more problematic than the exercise of such
power by any other officer. A joint resolution purporting to remove
the Comptroller, or any other executive officer, might be
constitutionally infirm, but Congress' advance assertion of the
power to enact such legislation seems irrelevant to the question
whether exercise of authority by an officer who might in the future
be subject to such a possibly valid and possibly invalid resolution
is permissible, since the provision contemplating a resolution of
removal obviously cannot in any way add to Congress' power to enact
such a resolution.

															Of course, the foregoing analysis does not imply that the
removal provision of the Budget and Accounting Act is meaningless;
for although that provision cannot add to any power
Congress might have to pass legislation (that is, a joint
resolution) removing the Comptroller, it can limit its
power to do so to the circumstances specified. The reason for this
is that any joint resolution purporting to remove the Comptroller
in the absence of a hearing or one of the specified grounds for
removal would not be deemed an implied repeal of the limits on
removal in the 1921 Act (for such implied repeals are disfavored),
and thus the joint resolution would only be given effect to the
extent consistent with the preexisting law (that is, to the extent
that there was actually cause for removal).

															[ Footnote 3/8 ] Cf. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.
S. 602 (1935), in which the Court entertained a
challenge to Presidential removal under a statute that similarly
limited removals to specified cause.

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															The Court cites statements made by supporters of the Budget and
Accounting Act indicating their belief that the Act's removal
provisions would render the Comptroller subservient to Congress by
giving Congress " absolute control of the man's destiny in
office.'" Ante at 478 U. S. 728 . The Court's scholarship, however, is
faulty: at the time all of these statements were made -- including
Representative Sisson's statement of May 3, 1921 -- the proposed
legislation provided for removal by concurrent resolution, with no
Presidential role. See 61 Cong.Rec. 983, 989-992,
1079-1085 (1921). [ Footnote 3/10 ]

															Concededly, the substantive grounds for removal under the
statute are broader than the grounds for impeachment specified by
the Constitution, see ante at 478 U. S.
729 -730, although, given that it is unclear whether the
limits on the impeachment power may be policed by any body other
than Congress itself, the practical significance of the difference
is hard to gauge. It seems to me most likely that the difficulty of
obtaining a two-thirds vote for removal in both Houses would more
than offset any increased likelihood of removal that might result
from the greater liberality of the substantive grounds for removal
under the statute. And even if removal by Congress alone through
joint resolution passed over Presidential veto is marginally more
likely than impeachment, whatever additional influence over the
Comptroller Congress may thereby possess seems likely to be minimal
in relation to that which Congress already possesses by virtue of
its general legislative powers and its power to impeach. Of course,
if it were demonstrable that the Constitution specifically limited
Congress' role in removal to the impeachment process, the
insignificance of the marginal increase in congressional influence
resulting from the provision authorizing removal through joint
resolution would be no answer to a claim of unconstitutionality.
But no such limit appears in the Constitution: the Constitution
merely provides that all officers of the United States may be
impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and nowhere suggests
that impeachment is the sole means of removing such officers.

															As for the Court's observation that

															"no one would seriously suggest that judicial independence would
be strengthened by allowing removal of federal judges only by a
joint resolution finding 'inefficiency,' 'neglect of duty,' or
'malfeasance,'" ante at 478 U. S. 730 ,
it can only be described as a non sequitur. The issue is
not whether the removal provision makes the Comptroller more
independent than he would be if he were removable only through
impeachment, but whether the provision so weakens the Comptroller
that he may not exercise executive authority. Moreover, the Court's
reference to standards applicable to removal of Art. III judges is
a red herring, for Art. III judges -- unlike other officers of the
United States -- are specifically protected against removal for
other than constitutionally specified cause. Thus, the infirmity of
a statute purporting to allow removal of judges for some other
reason would be that it violated the specific command of Art. III.
In the absence of a similar textual limit on the removal of
nonjudicial officers, the test for a violation of separation of
powers should be whether an asserted congressional power to remove
would constitute a real and substantial aggrandizement of
congressional authority at the expense of executive power, not
whether a similar removal provision would appear problematic if
applied to federal judges.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															The author of this statement was no apologist for the
Comptroller; rather, his study of the office is premised on the
desirability of Presidential control over many of the Comptroller's
functions. Nonetheless, he apparently found no reason to accuse the
Comptroller of subservience to Congress, and he conceded that
"[t]he political independence of the office has, in fact, been one
of its outstanding characteristics." H. Mansfield, The Comptroller
General 75 (1939).

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															Professor Mosher's reference to the fact that the Comptroller is
limited to a single term highlights an additional source of
independence: unlike an officer with a fixed term who may be
reappointed to office, the Comptroller need not concern himself
with currying favor with the Senate in order to secure its consent
to his reappointment.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															The majority responds to the facts indicating the practical
independence of the Comptroller from congressional control by
cataloging a series of statements and materials categorizing the
Comptroller as a part of the "Legislative Branch." Ante at 478 U. S.
730 -732. Such meaningless labels are quite obviously
irrelevant to the question whether in actuality the Comptroller is
so subject to congressional domination that he may not participate
in the execution of the laws.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, for his part, finds that the Comptroller is an
"agent" of Congress, and thus incapable of wielding the authority
granted him by the Act, because his responsibilities under a
variety of statutes include making reports to the Congress. JUSTICE
STEVENS' position is puzzling, to say the least. It seems to rest
on the view that an officer required to perform certain duties for
the benefit of Congress somehow becomes a part of Congress for all
purposes. But it is by no means true that an officer who must
perform specified duties for some other body is under that body's
control or acts as its agent when carrying out other, unrelated
duties. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, see post at 478 U. S.
778 -779, n. 1. duties toward Congress are imposed on a
variety of agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission; and
certainly it cannot credibly be maintained that, by virtue of those
duties, the agencies become branches of Congress, incapable of
wielding governmental power except through the legislative process.
Indeed, the President himself is under numerous obligations, both
statutory and constitutional, to provide information to Congress, see, e.g., Art. II, § 3, cl. 1; surely the President is
not thereby transformed into an arm or agency of the Congress. If,
therefore, as JUSTICE STEVENS concedes, see ante at 478 U. S.
737 -741, the provision authorizing removal of the
Comptroller by joint resolution does not suffice to establish that
he may not exercise the authority granted him under
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, I see no substantial basis for concluding
that his various duties toward Congress render him incapable of
receiving such power.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															Even if I were to concede that the exercise of executive
authority by the Comptroller is inconsistent with the removal
provision, I would agree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN that striking down
the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act vesting the
Comptroller with such duties is a grossly inappropriate remedy for
the supposed constitutional infirmity, and that, if one of the
features of the statutory scheme must go, it should be the removal
provision. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, the mere fact that the
parties before the Court have standing only to seek invalidation of
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings spending limits cannot dictate that the
Court resolve any constitutional incompatibility by striking down
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Nor does the existence of the fallback
provisions in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings indicate the appropriateness of
the Court's choice, for those provisions, by their terms, go into
effect only if the Court finds that the primary budget-cutting
mechanism established by the Act must be invalidated; they by no
means answer the antecedent question whether the Court should take
that step.

															Given the majority's constitutional premises, it is clear to me
that the decision whether to strike down Gramm-Rudman-Hollings must
depend on whether such a choice would be more or less disruptive of
congressional objectives than declaring the removal provision
invalid (with the result that the Comptroller would still be
protected against removal at will by the President, but could also
not be removed through joint resolution). When the choice is put in
these terms, it is evident that it is the never-used removal
provision that is far less central to the overall statutory scheme.
That this is so is underscored by the fact that, under the
majority's theory, the removal provision was never constitutional,
as the Comptroller's primary duties under the 1921 Act were clearly
executive under the Court's definition: the Comptroller's most
important tasks under that legislation were to dictate accounting
techniques for all executive agencies, to audit all federal
expenditures, and to approve or disapprove disbursement of funds. See F. Mosher, The GAO (1979). Surely the Congress in 1921
would have sacrificed its own role in removal rather than allow
such duties to go unfulfilled by a Comptroller independent of the
President. See 59 Cong.Rec. 8611 (1920).

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

															The Court may be correct when it says that Congress cannot
constitutionally exercise removal authority over an official vested
with the budget-reduction powers that § 251 of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 Page 478 U. S. 777 gives to the Comptroller General. This, however, is not because
"the removal powers over the Comptroller General's office dictate
that he will be subservient to Congress," ante at 478 U. S. 730 ;
I agree with JUSTICE WHITE that any such claim is unrealistic.
Furthermore, I think it is clear under Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), that "executive" powers of the kind delegated to the
Comptroller General under the Deficit Control Act need not be
exercised by an officer who serves at the President's pleasure;
Congress certainly could prescribe the standards and procedures for
removing the Comptroller General. But it seems to me that an
attempt by Congress to participate directly in the removal
of an executive officer -- other than through the constitutionally
prescribed procedure of impeachment -- might well violate the
principle of separation of powers by assuming for Congress part of
the President's constitutional responsibility to carry out the
laws.

															In my view, however, that important and difficult question need
not be decided in this litigation, because, no matter how it is
resolved, the plaintiffs, now appellees, are not entitled to the
relief they have requested. Appellees have not sought invalidation
of the 1921 provision that authorizes Congress to remove the
Comptroller General by joint resolution; indeed, it is far from
clear they would have standing to request such a judgment. The only
relief sought in this case is nullification of the automatic
budget-reduction provisions of the Deficit Control Act, and that
relief should not be awarded even if the Court is correct that
those provisions are constitutionally incompatible with Congress'
authority to remove the Comptroller General by joint resolution.
Any incompatibility, I feel, should be cured by refusing to allow
congressional removal -- if it ever is attempted -- and not by
striking down the central provisions of the Deficit Control Act.
However wise or foolish it may be, that statute unquestionably
ranks among the most important federal enactments of the past
several Page 478 U. S. 778 decades. I cannot see the sense of invalidating legislation of
this magnitude in order to preserve a cumbersome, 65-year-old
removal power that has never been exercised and appears to have
been all but forgotten until this litigation. [ Footnote 4/1 ] Page 478 U. S. 779 I The District Court believed it had no choice in this matter.
Once it concluded that the Comptroller General's functions under
the Deficit Control Act were constitutionally incompatible with the
1921 removal provision, the District Court considered itself bound
as a matter of orderly judicial procedure to set aside the statute
challenged by the plaintiffs. See Synar v. United
States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 , 1393 (DC 1986). The majority today does not take
this view, and I believe it is untenable.

															Under the District Court's approach, everything depends on who
first files suit. Because Representative Synar and Page 478 U. S. 780 the plaintiffs who later joined him in this case objected to
budget cuts made pursuant to the Deficit Control Act, the District
Court struck down that statute, while retaining the 1921 removal
provision. But if the Comptroller General had filed suit 15 minutes
before the Congressman did, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
1921 removal power could not constitutionally be exercised in light
of the duties delegated to the Comptroller General in 1985, the
removal provision presumably would have been invalidated, and the
Deficit Control Act would have survived intact. Momentous issues of
public law should not be decided in so arbitrary a fashion. In my
view, the only sensible way to choose between two conjunctively
unconstitutional statutory provisions is to determine which
provision can be invalidated with the least disruption of
congressional objectives.

															The District Court apparently thought differently in large part
because it believed this Court had never undertaken such analysis
in the past; instead, according to the District Court, this Court
has "set aside that statute which either allegedly prohibits or
allegedly authorizes the injury-in-fact that confers standing upon
the plaintiff." 626 F. Supp. at 1393. But none of the four cases
the District Court cited for this proposition discussed the problem
of choice of remedy, and in none of them could a strong argument
have been made that invalidating the other of the inconsistent
statutory provisions would have interfered less substantially with
legislative goals or have been less disruptive of governmental
operations. [ Footnote 4/2 ] Page 478 U. S. 781 More importantly, the District Court ignored what appears to be
the only separation of powers case in which this Court did
expressly consider the question as to which of two incompatible
statutes to invalidate: Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 (1962). The petitioners in that case had received unfavorable
rulings from judges assigned to temporary duty in the District
Court or Court of Appeals from the Court of Claims or the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals; they argued that those rulings should
be set aside because the judges from the specialized courts did not
enjoy the tenure and compensation guaranteed by Article III of the
Constitution. Before the assignments, Congress had pronounced the
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to be
Article III courts, implying that judges on those courts were
entitled to Article III benefits. Older statutes, however, gave
both courts authority to issue advisory opinions, an authority
incompatible with Article III status. Glidden held that
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
were indeed Article III tribunals. With respect to the advisory
opinion jurisdiction, Justice Harlan's opinion for the plurality
noted: "The overwhelming majority of the Court of Claims' business
is composed of cases and controversies." 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 583 .
Since Page 478 U. S. 782 "it would be . . . perverse to make the status of these courts
turn upon so minuscule a portion of their purported functions,"
Justice Harlan reasoned that, "if necessary, the particular
offensive jurisdiction, and not the courts, would fall." Ibid. Justice Clark's opinion concurring in the result for
himself and the Chief Justice similarly concluded that the
"minuscule" advisory opinion jurisdiction of the courts in question
would have to bow to the Article III status clearly proclaimed by
Congress, and not vice versa. Id. at 370 U. S.
587 -589.

															The Court thus recognized in Glidden that it makes no
sense to resolve the constitutional incompatibility between two
statutory provisions simply by striking down whichever provision
happens to be challenged first. A similar recognition has underlain
the Court's approach in equal protection cases concerning statutes
that create unconstitutionally circumscribed groups of
beneficiaries. The Court has noted repeatedly that such a defect
may be remedied in either of two ways: the statute may be nullified
or its benefits may be extended to the excluded class. See,
e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728 , 465 U. S. 738 (1984); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S.
76 , 443 U. S. 89 (1979). Although extension is generally the preferred alternative,
we have instructed lower courts choosing between the two remedies
to

															"'measure the intensity of [legislative] commitment to the
residual policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of
the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to
abrogation.'" Heckler v. Mathews, supra, at 465 U. S. 739 ,
n. 5, quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.
S. 333 , 398 U. S. 365 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). Calculations of this
kind are obviously more complicated when a court is faced with two
different statutes, enacted decades apart, but Glidden indicates that even then the task is judicially manageable. No
matter how difficult it is to determine which remedy would less
obstruct congressional objectives, surely we should make that
determination as best we can, instead of leaving the selection to
the litigants. Page 478 U. S. 783 II Assuming that the Comptroller General's functions under § 251 of
the Deficit Control Act cannot be exercised by an official
removable by joint resolution of Congress, we must determine
whether legislative goals would be frustrated more by striking down
§ 251 or by invalidating the 1921 removal provision. That question
is not answered by the "fallback" provisions of the 1985 Act, which
take effect "[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures
described in section 251 [of the Act] are invalidated." §
274(f)(1), 99 Stat. 1100. The question is whether the reporting
procedures should be invalidated in the first place. The fallback
provisions simply make clear that Congress would prefer a
watered-down version of the Deficit Control Act to none at all;
they provide no evidence that Congress would rather settle for the
watered-down version than surrender its statutory authority to
remove the Comptroller General. The legislative history of the
Deficit Control Act contains no mention of the 1921 statute, and
both Houses of Congress have argued in this Court that, if
necessary, the removal provision should be invalidated, rather than
§ 251. See Brief for Appellant United States Senate 31-43;
Brief for Appellants Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of
United States House of Representatives 49; accord, Brief
for Appellant Comptroller General 33-47. To the extent that the
absence of express fallback provisions in the 1921 statute
signifies anything, it appears to signify only that, if the removal
provision were invalidated, Congress preferred simply that the
remainder of the statute should remain in effect without
alteration. [ Footnote 4/3 ] Page 478 U. S. 784 In the absence of express statutory direction, I think it is
plain that, as both Houses urge, invalidating the Comptroller
General's functions under the Deficit Control Act would frustrate
congressional objectives far more seriously than would refusing to
allow Congress to exercise its removal authority under the 1921
law. The majority suggests that the removal authority plays an
important role in furthering Congress' desire to keep the
Comptroller General under its control. But, as JUSTICE WHITE
demonstrates, see ante at 478 U.S. 770 -773, the removal provision
serves feebly for such purposes, especially in comparison to other,
more effective means of supervision at Congress' disposal. Unless
Congress institutes impeachment proceedings -- a course all agree
the Constitution would permit -- the 1921 law authorizes Congress
to remove the Comptroller General only for specified cause, only
after a hearing, and only by passing the procedural equivalent of a
new public law. Congress has never attempted to use this cumbersome
procedure, and the Comptroller General has shown few signs of
subservience. [ Footnote 4/4 ] If
Congress in 1921 Page 478 U. S. 785 wished to make the Comptroller General its lackey, it did a
remarkably poor job.

															Indeed, there is little evidence that Congress as a whole was
very concerned in 1921 -- much less in 1985 or during the
intervening decades -- with its own ability to control the
Comptroller General. The Committee Reports on the 1921 Act and its
predecessor bills strongly suggest that what was critical to the
legislators was not the Comptroller General's subservience to
Congress, but rather his independence from the President. See,
e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1921);
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1044, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1920); S.Rep. No.
524, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1920); H.R.Rep. No. 362, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1919). The debates over the Deficit Control
Act contain no suggestion that the Comptroller General was chosen
for the tasks outlined in § 251 because Congress thought it could
count on him to do its will; instead, the Comptroller General
appears to have been selected precisely because of his independence
from both the Legislature and the Executive. By assigning the
reporting functions to the Comptroller General, rather than to the
Congressional Budget Office or to the Office of Management and
Budget, Congress sought to create "a wall . . . that takes these
decisions out of the hands of the President and the
Congress. " 131 Cong.Rec. 30865 (1985) (remarks of Rep.
Gephardt) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., id. at 36089
(1985) (remarks of Rep. Weiss); id. at 36367 (1985)
(remarks of Rep. Bedell).

															Of course, the Deficit Control Act was hardly the first statute
to assign new functions to the Comptroller General; a good number
of other duties have been delegated to the Comptroller General over
the years. But there is no reason to believe that, in effecting
these earlier delegations, Congress relied any more heavily on the
availability of the removal Page 478 U. S. 786 provision than it did in passing the Deficit Control Act. In the
past, as in 1985, it is far more likely that Congress was concerned
mainly with the Comptroller General's demonstrated political
independence, and perhaps, to a lesser extent, with his long
tradition of service to the Legislative Branch; neither of these
characteristics depends to any significant extent on the ability of
Congress to remove the Comptroller General without instituting
impeachment proceedings. Striking down the congressional removal
provision might marginally frustrate the legislative expectations
underlying some grants of authority to the Comptroller General, but
surely to a lesser extent than would invalidation of § 251 of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings -- along with all other "executive" powers
delegated to the Comptroller General over the years. [ Footnote 4/5 ] Page 478 U. S. 787 I do not claim that the 1921 removal provision is a piece of
statutory deadwood utterly without contemporary significance. But
it comes close. Rarely if ever invoked even for symbolic purposes,
the removal provision certainly pales in importance beside the
legislative scheme the Court strikes down today -- an
extraordinarily far-reaching response to a deficit problem of
unprecedented proportions. Because I believe that the
constitutional defect found by the Court cannot justify the remedy
it has imposed, I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															For the reasons identified by the District Court, I agree that
the Deficit Control Act does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine. See Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 , 1382-1391 (DC 1986).

															JUSTICE STEVENS concludes that the delegation effected under §
251 contravenes the holding of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.
S. 919 (1983), that Congress may make law only "in
conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's
prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President." Id. at 462 U. S. 958 .
I do not agree. We made clear in Chadha that the
bicameralism and presentation requirements prevented Congress from
itself exercising legislative power through some kind of procedural
shortcut, such as the one-House veto challenged in that case. But
we also made clear that our holding in no way questioned "Congress'
authority to delegate portions of its power to administrative
agencies." Id. at 462 U. S. 953 -954, n. 16. We explained:

															"Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that
might resemble 'legislative' action in some respects is not subject
to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the President, for
the reason that the Constitution does not so require. That kind of
Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the
legislation that authorized it, and, if that authority is exceeded,
it is open to judicial review, as well as the power of Congress to
modify or revoke the authority entirely." Ibid. Although JUSTICE STEVENS seems to agree that the duties
delegated to the Comptroller General under § 251 could be assigned
constitutionally to an independent administrative agency, he argues
that Congress may not give these duties "to one of its own agents." Ante at 478 U. S.
752 -753. He explains that the Comptroller General fits
this description because "most" of his statutory responsibilities
require him to provide services to Congress, and because Congress
has repeatedly referred to the Comptroller General as part of the
Legislative Branch. See ante at 478 U. S.
741 -746. "If Congress were free to delegate its
policymaking authority" to such an officer, JUSTICE STEVENS
contends that "it would be able to evade the carefully crafted
restraints spelled out in the Constitution.'" Ante at 478 U. S. 755 ,
quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 959 .
In his view, "[t]hat danger -- congressional action that evades
constitutional restraints -- is not present when Congress delegates
lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency." Ante at 478 U. S.
755 . I do not think that danger is present here, either. The
Comptroller General is not Congress, nor is he a part of Congress;
"irrespective of Congress' designation," he is an officer of the
United States, appointed by the President. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 128 ,
n. 165 (1976). In this respect, the Comptroller General differs
critically from, for example, the Director of the Congressional
Budget Office, who is appointed by Congress, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 601(a)(2), and hence may not "exercis[e] significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States," Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, at 424 U. S. 126 ; see U.S.Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The exercise of
rulemaking authority by an independent agency such as the Federal
Trade Commission does not offend Chadha, even though the
Commission could be described as an "agent" of Congress because it
"carr[ies] into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute
in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed." Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.
S. 602 , 295 U. S. 628 (1935). I do not see why the danger of "congressional action that
evades constitutional restraints" becomes any more pronounced when
a statute delegates power to a Presidentially appointed agent whose
primary duties require him to provide services to Congress. The
impermissibility of such a delegation surely is not rendered
"obvious" by the fact that some officers who perform services for
Congress have titles such as "librarian," "architect," or
"printer." See ante at 478 U. S. 758 ,
n. 25 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, in
sustaining the constitutionality of the Federal Trade Commission's
independent status, this Court noted specifically that the
Commission "acts as a legislative agency" in "making investigations
and reports thereon for the information of Congress . . . in aid of
the legislative power." 295 U.S. at 295 U. S. 628 .
JUSTICE STEVENS' approach might make some sense if Congress had
delegated legislative responsibility to an officer over whom
Congress could hope to exercise tight control, but even JUSTICE
STEVENS does not claim that the Comptroller General is such an
officer.

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															In Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 (1926), the Court refused to enforce a statute
requiring congressional approval for removal of postmasters. The
Court's analysis suggested that there was no practical way the
duties of the office could have been reformulated to render
congressional participation in the removal process permissible. In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 (1928), the Court removed from office several
Philippine officials exercising executive powers but appointed by
officers of the Philippine Legislature. As in Myers, the
Court concluded that the offices by their very nature were
executive, so the appointments could not have been rendered legal
simply by trimming the delegated duties. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976),
the Court set aside Federal Election Campaign Act provisions
granting certain powers to officials appointed by Congress, but it
structured its remedy so as to interfere as little as possible with
the orderly conduct of business by the Federal Election Commission.
Past acts of the improperly constituted Commission were deemed
valid, and the Court's mandate was stayed for 30 days to allow time
for the Commission to be reconstituted through Presidential
appointment. See id. at 424 U. S.
142 -143. Finally, in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S.
50 (1982), the Court set aside an exercise of judicial
power by a bankruptcy judge, because his tenure was not protected
in the manner required by Article III of the Constitution. To give
Article III protections to bankruptcy judges, the federal
bankruptcy statute would have had to be rewritten completely.

															[ Footnote 4/3 ]

															Although the legislative history on this point is sparse, it
seems reasonably clear that Congress intended the removal provision
to be severable from the remainder of the 1921 statute. An earlier
bill, providing for removal of the Comptroller General only by
impeachment or concurrent resolution of Congress, was vetoed by
President Wilson on the grounds that Congress could not
constitutionally limit the President's removal power or exercise
such power on its own. See 59 Cong.Rec. 8609-8610 (1920).
In the course of an unsuccessful attempt to override the veto,
Representative Pell inquired:

															"If we pass this over the President's veto and then the Supreme
Court should uphold the contention of the President, this bill
would not fail, would it? The bill would continue."

															Representative Blanton answered, "Certainly." Id. at
8611.

															[ Footnote 4/4 ]

															"All of the comptrollers general have treasured and defended the
independence of their office, not alone from the president, but
also from the Congress itself. . . . Like the other Institutions in
the government, GAO depends upon Congress for its powers, its
resources, and its general oversight. But it also possesses
continuing legal powers, of both long and recent standing, that
Congress has granted it and that it can exercise in a quite
independent fashion. And the comptroller general, realistically
speaking, is immune from removal during his fifteen-year term for
anything short of a capital crime, a crippling illness, or
insanity."

															F. Mosher, A Tale of Two Agencies 158 (1984). See also,
e.g., Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 885-887 (CA3 1986); F. Mosher, The GAO 2, 240-244
(1979); H. Mansfield, The Comptroller General 75-76 (1939)

															[ Footnote 4/5 ]

															Many of the Comptroller General's other duties, including those
listed by the majority, see ante at 478 U. S. 734 ,
n. 9, appear to meet the majority's test for plainly "executive"
functions -- i.e., they require the Comptroller General to
"[i]nterpre[t] a law enacted by Congress to implement the
legislative mandate," and to "exercise judgment concerning facts
that affect the application of the [law]." Ante at 478 U. S. 733 .
Indeed, the majority's approach would appear to classify as
"executive" some of the most traditional duties of the Comptroller
General, such as approving expenditure warrants, rendering
conclusive decisions on the legality of proposed agency
disbursements, and settling financial claims by and against the
Government. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3323, 3526-3529, 3702; F
Mosher, A Tale of Two Agencies 159-160 (1984). All three of these
functions were given to the Comptroller General when the position
was created in 1921. See 42 Stat. 20,24-25.

															I do not understand the majority's assertion that invalidating
the 1921 removal provision might make the Comptroller General
"subservient to the Executive Branch." Ante at 478 U. S. 734 .
The majority does not suggest that an official who exercises the
functions that the Deficit Control Act vests in the Comptroller
General must be removable by the President at will. Perhaps the
President possesses inherent constitutional authority to remove
"executive" officials for such politically neutral grounds as
inefficiency or neglect of duty, but if so -- and I am not
convinced of it -- I do not see how that power would be enhanced by
nullification of a statutory provision giving similar authority to
Congress. In any event, I agree with JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE
STEVENS that the power to remove an officer for reasons of this
kind cannot realistically be expected to make an officer
"subservient" in any meaningful sense to the removing authority. Cf. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. at 295 U. S.
629 .

Summary:
Here is a summary of the case:

In *Bowsher v. Synar*, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The Act aimed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by setting maximum deficit amounts for each fiscal year from 1986 to 1991. If the budget deficit exceeded the prescribed maximum, the Act required across-the-board cuts in federal spending.

The case centered on the role of the Comptroller General, who was tasked with reviewing deficit estimates and budget reduction calculations from the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. The Comptroller General's conclusions were then reported to the President, who had to issue a "sequestration" order mandating the specified spending reductions.

The Court held that the powers vested in the Comptroller General under the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution. Specifically, the Court found that the Comptroller General's role in executing the Act's deficit reduction process was unconstitutional because Congress, not the President, had the power to remove the Comptroller General.

The Court also addressed standing, ruling that members of the National Treasury Employees Union had standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality due to the suspension of their scheduled cost-of-living benefit increases.

In conclusion, the Court invalidated the Comptroller General's role in the deficit reduction process, highlighting the importance of maintaining a clear separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of the US government.