U.S. Supreme Court Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974) Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. No. 72-5847 Argued November 5,
1973 Decided February 19,
1974 415 U.S.
36 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Following discharge by his employer, respondent company,
petitioner, a black, filed a grievance under the collective
bargaining agreement between respondent and petitioner's union,
which contained a broad arbitration clause, petitioner ultimately
claiming that his discharge resulted from racial discrimination.
Upon rejection by the company of petitioner's claims, an
arbitration hearing was held, prior to which petitioner filed with
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission a racial discrimination
complaint which was referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). The arbitrator ruled that petitioner's discharge
was for cause. Following the EEOC's subsequent determination that
there was not reasonable ground to believe that a violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had occurred, petitioner
brought this action in District Court, alleging that his discharge
resulted from a racially discriminatory employment practice in
violation of the Act. The District Court granted respondent's
motion for summary judgment, holding that petitioner was bound by
the prior arbitral decision, and had no right to sue under Title
VII. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: An employee's statutory right to trial de
novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not
foreclosed by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining
agreement. Pp. 415 U. S.
44 -60.

															(a) Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant,
existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination, as may be inferred from the legislative history of
Title VII, which manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue rights under Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes. Pp. 415 U. S.
47 -49.

															(b) The doctrine of election of remedies is inapplicable in the
present context, which involves statutory rights distinctly
separate from the employee's contractual rights, regardless of the
fact that violation of both rights may have resulted from the same
factual occurrence. Pp. 415 U. S.
49 -51. Page 415 U. S. 37 (c) By merely resorting to the arbitral forum, petitioner did
not waive his cause of action under Title VII; the rights conferred
thereby cannot be prospectively waived, and form no part of the
collective bargaining process. Pp. 415 U. S.
51 -52.

															(d) The arbitrator's authority is confined to resolution of
questions of contractual rights, regardless of whether they
resemble or duplicate Title VII rights. Pp. 415 U. S.
52 -54.

															(e) In instituting a Title VII action, the employee is not
seeking review of the arbitrator's decision, and thus getting (as
the District Court put it) "two strings to his bow when the
employer has only one," but is asserting a right independent of the
arbitration process that the statute gives to employees, the only
possible victims of discriminatory employment practices. P. 415 U. S.
54 .

															(f) Permitting an employee to resort to the judicial forum after
arbitration procedures have been followed does not undermine the
employer's incentive to arbitrate, as most employers will regard
the benefits from a no-strike pledge in the arbitration agreement
as outweighing any costs resulting from giving employees an
arbitral antidiscrimination remedy in addition to their Title VII
judicial remedy. Pp. 415 U. S.
54 -55.

															(g) A policy of deferral by federal courts to arbitral decisions
(as opposed to adoption of a preclusion rule) would not comport
with the congressional objective that federal courts should
exercise the final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII and
would lead to: the arbitrator's emphasis on the law of the shop,
rather than the law of the land; factfinding and other procedures
less complete than those followed in a judicial forum; and perhaps
employees bypassing arbitration in favor of litigation. Pp. 415 U. S.
55 -59.

															(h) In considering an employee's claim, the federal court may
admit the arbitral decision as evidence and accord it such weight
as may be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of each
case. Pp. 415 U. S.
59 -60.

															466 F.2d 1209, reversed.

															POWELL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Page 415 U. S. 38 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case concerns the proper relationship between federal
courts and the grievance arbitration machinery of collective
bargaining agreements in the resolution and enforcement of an
individual's rights to equal employment opportunities under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq. Specifically, we must decide under what
circumstances, if any, an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII may be foreclosed by prior
submission of his claim to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement. I In May, 1966, petitioner Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black, was
hired by respondent Gardner-Denver Co. (the company) to perform
maintenance work at the company's plant in Denver, Colorado. In
June, 1968, petitioner was awarded a trainee position as a drill
operator

															He remained at that job until his discharge from employment on
September 29, 1969. The company informed petitioner that he was
being discharged for producing too many defective or unusable parts
that had to be scrapped. Page 415 U. S. 39 On October 1, 1969, petitioner filed a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement in force between the company and
petitioner's union, Local No. 3029 of the United Steelworkers of
America (the union). The grievance stated: "I feel I have been
unjustly discharged, and ask that I be reinstated with full
seniority and pay." No explicit claim of racial discrimination was
made.

															Under Art. 4 of the collective bargaining agreement, the company
retained "the right to hire, suspend or discharge [employees] for
proper cause." [ Footnote 1 ]
Article 5, § 2, provided, however, that "there shall be no
discrimination against any employee on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry," [ Footnote 2 ] and Art. 23, § 6(a), stated that "[n]o
employee will be discharged, suspended or given a written warning
notice except for just cause." Page 415 U. S. 40 The agreement also contained a broad arbitration clause covering
"differences aris[ing] between the Company and the Union as to the
meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement" and
"any trouble aris[ing] in the plant." [ Footnote 3 ] Disputes were to be submitted to a
multi-step Page 415 U. S. 41 grievance procedure, the first four steps of which involved
negotiations between the company and the union. If the dispute
remained unresolved, it was to be remitted to compulsory
arbitration. The company and the union were to select and pay the
arbitrator, and Page 415 U. S. 42 his decision was to be "final and binding upon the Company, the
Union, and any employee or employees involved." The agreement
further provided that

															"[t]he arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or change
any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator's
decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the
provisions of this Agreement."

															The parties also agreed that there "shall be no suspension of
work" over disputes covered by the grievance arbitration
clause.

															The union processed petitioner's grievance through the above
machinery. In the final pre-arbitration step, petitioner raised,
apparently for the first time, the claim that his discharge
resulted from racial discrimination. The company rejected all of
petitioner's claims, and the grievance proceeded to arbitration.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, however, petitioner filed a
charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, which referred the complaint to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission on November 5, 1969.

															At the arbitration hearing on November 20, 1969, petitioner
testified that his discharge was the result of racial
discrimination and informed the arbitrator that he had filed a
charge with the Colorado Commission because he "could not rely on
the union." The union introduced a letter in which petitioner
stated that he was

															"knowledgeable that, in the same plant, others have scrapped an
equal amount and sometimes in excess, but by all logical reasoning
I . . . have been the target of preferential discriminatory
treatment."

															The union representative also testified that the company's usual
practice was to transfer unsatisfactory trainee drill operators
back to their former positions.

															On December 30, 1969, the arbitrator ruled that petitioner had
been "discharged for just cause." He made no reference to
petitioner's claim of racial discrimination. Page 415 U. S. 43 The arbitrator stated that the union had failed to produce
evidence of a practice of transferring, rather than discharging
trainee drill operators who accumulated excessive scrap, but he
suggested that the company and the union confer on whether such an
arrangement was feasible in the present case.

															On July 25, 1970, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
determined that there was not reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e et seq., had occurred. The Commission later notified
petitioner of his right to institute a civil action in federal
court within 30 days. Petitioner then filed the present action in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado,
alleging that his discharge resulted from a racially discriminatory
employment practice in violation of § 703(a)(1) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

															The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the action. 346 F.
Supp. 1012 (1971). The court found that the claim of racial
discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved
adversely to petitioner. [ Footnote
4 ] It then held that petitioner, having voluntarily elected to
pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of the collective bargaining agreement,
was bound by the arbitral decision, and thereby precluded from
suing his employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam on the basis of the District
Court's opinion. 466 F.2d 1209 (1972).

															We granted petitioner's application for certiorari. 410 U.S. 925
(1973). We reverse. Page 415 U. S. 44 II Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., to assure equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that
discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 , 411 U. S. 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.
S. 424 , 401 U. S.
429 -430 (1971). Cooperation and voluntary compliance
were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To
this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and
local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the
Commission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through
conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party
was permitted to file a lawsuit. In the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, Congress
amended Title VII to provide the Commission with further authority
to investigate individual charges of discrimination, to promote
voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII, and to
institute civil actions against employers or unions named in a
discrimination charge.

															Even in its amended form, however, Title VII does not provide
the Commission with direct powers of enforcement. The Commission
cannot adjudicate claims or impose administrative sanctions.
Rather, final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested
with federal courts. The Act authorizes courts to issue injunctive
relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate
to remedy the effects of unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(f) and (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II). Courts retain these
broad remedial powers despite a Commission finding of no reasonable
cause to believe that the Act has been violated. McDonnell-Douglas Page 415 U. S. 45 Corp. v. Green, supra, at 411 U. S.
798 -799. Taken together, these provisions make plain
that federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure
compliance with Title VII.

															In addition to reposing ultimate authority in federal courts,
Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the
enforcement process of Title VII. Individual grievants usually
initiate the Commission's investigatory and conciliatory
procedures. And although the 1972 amendment to Title VII empowers
the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of
action remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement
of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. II). In
such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury,
but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices. Hutchins v. United States
Industries, 428 F.2d 303, 310 (CA5 1970); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (CA7 1969); Jenkins
v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (CA5 1968). See also
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.
S. 400 , 390 U. S. 402 (1968).

															Pursuant to this statutory scheme, petitioner initiated the
present action for judicial consideration of his rights under Title
VII. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held, however,
that petitioner was bound by the prior arbitral decision, and had
no right to sue under Title VII. [ Footnote 5 ] Both courts evidently thought that this result
was Page 415 U. S. 46 dictated by notions of election of remedies and waiver and by
the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor dispute, as
enunciated by this Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), and the Steelworkers trilogy. [ Footnote 6 ] See also Boys Markets
v. Page 415 U. S. 47 Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970); Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 414 U. S. 368 (1974). We disagree. III Title VII does not speak expressly to the relationship between
federal courts and the grievance arbitration machinery of
collective bargaining agreements. It does, however, vest federal
courts with plenary powers to enforce the statutory requirements,
and it specifies with precision the jurisdictional prerequisites
that an individual must satisfy before he is entitled to institute
a lawsuit. In the present case, these prerequisites were met when
petitioner (1) filed timely a charge of employment discrimination
with the Commission, and (2) received and acted upon the
Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-5(b), (e), and (f). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
supra, at 411 U. S. 798 .
There is no suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior
arbitral decision either forecloses an individual's right to sue or
divests federal courts of jurisdiction.

															In addition, legislative enactments in this area have long
evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination. [ Footnote
7 ] In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et
seq., Congress indicated that it considered the policy against
discrimination to be of the "highest priority." Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, supra, at 390 U. S. 402 .
Consistent with this view, Title VII provides for consideration of
employment discrimination claims in several forums. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(c) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (federal courts). And, in
general, submission of a Page 415 U. S. 48 claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to
another. [ Footnote 8 ] Moreover,
the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights
under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal
statutes. [ Footnote 9 ] The
clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement,
rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating Page 415 U. S. 49 to employment discrimination. In sum, Title VII's purpose and
procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his
private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final
arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective
bargaining agreement.

															In reaching the opposite conclusion, the District Court relied
in part on the doctrine of election of remedies. [ Footnote 10 ] That doctrine, which refers to
situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or
factually inconsistent, [ Footnote 11 ] has no application in the present context.
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to
vindicate his contractual right under a collective bargaining
agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an
employee asserts independent statutory Page 415 U. S. 50 rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of
these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely
because both were violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting
both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums. The resulting scheme is somewhat analogous to the procedure
under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, [ Footnote 12 ] where disputed transactions
may implicate both contractual and statutory rights. Where the
statutory right underlying a particular claim may not be abridged
by contractual agreement, the Court has recognized that
consideration of the claim by the arbitrator as a contractual
dispute under the collective bargaining agreement does not preclude
subsequent consideration of the claim by the National Labor
Relations Board as an unfair labor practice charge or as a petition
for clarification of the union's representation certificate under
the Act. Carey v. Westinghouse Corp., 375 U.
S. 261 (1964). [ Footnote 13 ] Cf. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962). There, as here, the relationship between the forums is
complementary, since consideration of the claim by both forums may
promote the policies underlying Page 415 U. S. 51 each. Thus, the rationale behind the election of remedies
doctrine cannot support the decision below. [ Footnote 14 ]

															We are also unable to accept the proposition that petitioner
waived his cause of action under Title VII. To begin, we think it
clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII. It is true, of course, that a union may
waive certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such
as the right to strike. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 (1956); Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.
S. 235 (1970). These rights are conferred on employees
collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may
be exercised or relinquished by the union as collective bargaining
agent to obtain economic benefits for union members. Title VII, on
the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not
majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal
employment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute, and
represent a congressional command that each employee be free from
discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can
form no part of the collective bargaining process, since waiver of
these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights
under Title VII are not susceptible of Page 415 U. S. 52 prospective waiver. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.
S. 427 (1953).

															The actual submission of petitioner's grievance to arbitration
in the present case does not alter the situation. Although
presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title
VII as part of a voluntary settlement, [ Footnote 15 ] mere resort to the arbitral forum to
enforce contractual rights constitutes no such waiver. Since an
employee's rights under Title VII may not be waived prospectively,
existing contractual rights and remedies against discrimination
must result from other concessions already made by the union as
part of the economic bargain struck with the employer. It is
settled law that no additional concession may be exacted from any
employee as the price for enforcing those rights. J. I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 332 , 321 U. S.
338 -339 (1944).

															Moreover, a contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration
is not displaced simply because Congress also has provided a
statutory right against discrimination. Both rights have legally
independent origins, and are equally available to the aggrieved
employee. This point becomes apparent through consideration of the
role of the arbitrator in the system of industrial self-government.
[ Footnote 16 ] Page 415 U. S. 53 As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task is to
effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is
the collective bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and
apply that agreement in accordance with the "industrial common law
of the shop" and the various needs and desires of the parties. The
arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws
that conflict with the bargain between the parties:

															"[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application
of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to
this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of
the award." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U. S. 593 , 363 U. S. 597 (1960). If an arbitral decision is based "solely upon the
arbitrator's view of the requirements of enacted legislation,"
rather than on an interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, the arbitrator has "exceeded the scope of the
submission," and the award will not be enforced. Ibid. Thus, the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions Page 415 U. S. 54 of contractual rights, and this authority remains regardless of
whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative
of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII. IV The District Court and the Court of Appeals reasoned that to
permit an employee to have his claim considered in both the
arbitral and judicial forums would be unfair, since this would mean
that the employer, but not the employee, was bound by the arbitral
award. In the District Court's words, it could not "accept a
philosophy which gives the employee two strings to his bow when the
employer has only one." 346 F.
Supp. at 1019 . This argument mistakes the effect of Title VII.
Under the Steelworkers trilogy, an arbitral decision is
final and binding on the employer and employee, and judicial review
is limited as to both. But in instituting an action under Title
VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's
decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of
the arbitration process. An employer does not have "two strings to
his bow" with respect to an arbitral decision for the simple reason
that Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action
against employees. An employer cannot be the victim of
discriminatory employment practices. Oubichon v. North American
Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 573 (CA9 1973).

															The District Court and the Court of Appeals also thought that to
permit a later resort to the judicial forum would undermine
substantially the employer's incentive to arbitrate, and would
"sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts." 346 F.
Supp. at 1019 . Again, we disagree. The primary incentive for an
employer to enter into an arbitration agreement is the union's
reciprocal promise not to strike. As the Page 415 U. S. 55 Court stated in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S.
248 ,

															"a no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro
quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance
disputes to the process of arbitration."

															It is not unreasonable to assume that most employers will regard
the benefits derived from a no-strike pledge as outweighing
whatever costs may result from according employees an arbitral
remedy against discrimination in addition to their judicial remedy
under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences of a strike may
make an arbitration clause almost essential from both the
employees' and the employer's perspective. Moreover, the grievance
arbitration machinery of the collective bargaining agreement
remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for
resolving a wide range of disputes, including claims of
discriminatory employment practices. Where the collective
bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to
Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular,
arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both
employer and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to make
available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration
which may satisfy an employee's perceived need to resort to the
judicial forum, thus saving the employer the expense and
aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the
employee also has a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and
arbitration may often eliminate those misunderstandings or
discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to
the judicial forum. V Respondent contends that, even if a preclusion rule is not
adopted, federal courts should defer to arbitral decisions on
discrimination claims where: (i) the claim Page 415 U. S. 56 was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit
under Title VII; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on
the claim and to fashion a remedy. [ Footnote 17 ] Under respondent's proposed rule, a court
would grant summary judgment and dismiss the employee's action if
the above conditions were met. The rule's obvious consequence in
the present case would be to deprive the petitioner of his
statutory right to attempt to establish his claim in a federal
court.

															At the outset, it is apparent that a deferral rule would be
subject to many of the objections applicable to a preclusion rule.
The purpose and procedures of Title VII indicate that Congress
intended federal courts to exercise final responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII; deferral to arbitral decisions would be
inconsistent with that goal. Furthermore, we have long recognized
that "the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the
substantive right to be vindicated." U.S. Bulk
Carriers v. Arguelles , 400 U.
S. 351 , 400 U. S.
359 -360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Respondent's
deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption that
arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and
that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to
arbitral decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition
unlikely.

															Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of
contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by
Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the
arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties,
rather than the Page 415 U. S. 57 requirements of enacted legislation. Where the collective
bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitrator must
follow the agreement. To be sue, the tension between contractual
and statutory objectives may be mitigated where a collective
bargaining agreement contains provisions facially similar to those
of Title VII. But other facts may still render arbitral processes
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of
Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized
competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land. United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.
S. 574 , 363 U. S.
581 -583 (1960). [ Footnote 18 ] Parties usually choose an arbitrator because
they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and
norms of industrial relations. On the other hand, the resolution of
statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of
courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary
with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be
given meaning only by reference to public law concepts.

															Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not
equivalent to judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not
apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under Page 415 U. S. 58 oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. See
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.
S. 198 , 350 U. S. 203 (1956); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 346 U. S.
435 -437. And as this Court has recognized,
"[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their
reasons for all award." United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 363 U. S. 598 .
Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it
to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for
dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes
arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title
VII issues than the federal courts. [ Footnote 19 ] It is evident that respondent's proposed
rule would not allay these concerns. Nor are we convinced that the
solution lies in applying a more demanding deferral standard, such
as that adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Rios v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 467 F.2d 54 (1972). [ Footnote 20 ] As Page 415 U. S. 59 respondent points out, a standard that adequately insured
effectuation of Title VII rights in the arbitral forum would tend
to make arbitration a procedurally complex, expensive, and
time-consuming process. And judicial enforcement of such a standard
would almost require courts to make de novo determinations
of the employees' claims. It is uncertain whether any minimal
savings in judicial time and expense would justify the risk to
vindication of Title VII rights.

															A deferral rule also might adversely affect the arbitration
system, as well as the enforcement scheme of Title VII. Fearing
that the arbitral forum cannot adequately protect their rights
under Title VII, some employees may elect to bypass arbitration and
institute a lawsuit. The possibility of voluntary compliance or
settlement of Title VII claims would thus be reduced, and the
result could well be more litigation, not less.

															We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against
discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by
permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the
grievance arbitration clause Page 415 U. S. 60 of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause of action
under Title VII. The federal court should consider the employee's
claim de novo. The arbitral decision may be admitted as
evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate.
[ Footnote 21 ]

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Article 4 of the agreement provided:

															" MANAGEMENT" "The Union recognizes that all rights to manage the Plant, to
determine the products to be manufactured, the methods of
manufacturing or assembling, the scheduling of production, the
control of raw materials, and to direct the working forces,
including the right to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause,
and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack of
work or other legitimate reasons, and the right to maintain order
and efficiency are vested exclusively in the Company."

															"It is understood by the parties that all rights recognized in
this Article are subject to the terms of this Agreement."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Article 5 of the agreement provided:

															" MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY" " Section 1. The parties agree that, during the term of
this Agreement, there shall be no strike, slow-down or other
interruption of production, and that, for the same period there
shall be no lockout, subject to the provisions of Article 26, Term
of Agreement."

															" Section 2. The Company and the Union agree that there
shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry. The Company
further states and the Union approves that no such discrimination
shall be practiced against any applicant for employment."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Article 23, containing the grievance arbitration procedures of
the agreement, provided in relevant part:

															" * * * *" " Section 5. Should differences arise between the
Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the
provisions of this Agreement, or should any trouble arise in the
plant, there shall be no suspension of work, but an earnest effort
shall be made by both the Company and the Union to settle such
differences promptly. Grievances must be presented within five (5)
working days after the date of the occurrence giving rise to the
grievance or they shall be considered waived. Grievances shall be
taken up in the following manner; except that any grievance filed
by the Local Union shall be submitted in writing at Step 3 of the
grievance procedure as set forth herein:"

															" Step 1. An attempt shall first be made by the employee
with or without his assistant grievance committeeman (at the
employee's option), and the employee's foreman to settle the
grievance. The foreman shall submit his answer within one (1)
working day and if the grievance is not settled, it shall be
reduced to writing, signed by the employee and his assistant
grievance committeeman, and the foreman shall submit his signed
answer of such grievance."

															" Step 2. If the grievance is not settled in Step 1, it
shall be presented to the Superintendent, or his representative,
within two (2) working days after the Union has received the
Foreman's answer in Step 1. The Superintendent or his
representative shall submit his signed answer two (2) working days
after receiving the grievance."

															" Step 3. If the grievance is not settled in Step 2, it
shall be presented to the manager of Manufacturing or his
representative within five (5) working days after the Union has
received the Superintendent's answer in Step 2. The Manager of
Manufacturing or his representative shall meet with the
representatives of the Union to attempt to resolve the grievance
within five (5) working days following the presentation of the
grievance. The Manager of Manufacturing or his representative shall
submit his signed answer within three (3) working days after the
date of such meeting."

															" Step 4. If the grievance is not settled in Step 3, it
shall be referred to the Personnel Manager, and/or his
representatives, and the International representative and chairman
of the grievance committee within five (5) working days after the
Union has received the Step 3 answer. Within ten (10) working days
after the grievance has been referred to Step 4, the above
mentioned parties shall meet for the purpose of discussing such
grievance. Within five (5) working days following the meeting, the
Company representatives shall submit their signed answer to the
Union. The Union representatives shall signify their concurrence or
non-concurrence and affix their signatures to the grievance."

															" Step 5. Grievances which have not been settled under
the foregoing procedure may be referred to arbitration by notice in
writing within ten (10) calendar days after the date of the
Company's final answer in Step 4. Within five (5) days after
receipt of referral to arbitration the parties shall select an
impartial arbitrator."

															"Should the parties be unable to agree upon an arbitrator, the
selection shall be made by the Senior Judge of the U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the Company, the Union,
and any employee or employees involved. The expenses and fee of the
arbitrator shall be divided equally between the Company and the
Union. The arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or change
any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator's
decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the
provisions of this Agreement."

															" Section 6. (a) No employee will be discharged,
suspended or given a written warning notice except for just
cause."

															" * * * *" "(g) Should it be determined that the employee has been unjustly
suspended or discharged the Company shall reinstate the employee
and pay full compensation at the employee's basic hourly rate or
earned rate, whichever is the higher, for the time lost."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															In reaching this conclusion, the District Court relied on
petitioner's deposition acknowledging that he had raised the racial
discrimination claim during the arbitration hearing. 346 F. Supp.
at 1014.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The District Court recognized that a conflict of authorities
existed on this issue, but chose to rely on Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332 (CA6 1970), affirmed by an
equally divided Court, 402 U. S. 689 (1971). There, the Sixth Circuit held that, prior submission of an
employee's claim to arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement precluded a later suit under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit
appears to have since retreated in part from Dewey by
suggesting that there is no preclusion where both arbitration and
"court or agency processes" are pursued simultaneously. See
Spann v. Kaywood Division, Joanna Western Mills Co., 446 F.2d
120, 122 (1971). The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
squarely rejected a preclusion rule. See Hutchins v United
States Industries, 428 F.2d 303 (CA5 1970); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (CA7 1969); Oubichon
v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (CA9 1973).

															[ Footnote 6 ] United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593 (1960). In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957), this Court held that a grievance arbitration provision of a
collective bargaining agreement could be enforced against unions
and employers under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court noted that the
congressional policy, as embodied in § 203(d) of the LMRA, 61 Stat.
154, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), was to promote industrial peace, and that
the grievance arbitration provision of a collective agreement was a
major factor in achieving this goal. 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 455 .
In the Steelworkers trilogy, the Court further advanced
this policy by declaring that an order to arbitrate will not be
denied

															"unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., supra, at 363 U. S.
582 -583. The Court also stated that,

															"so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of
the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., supra, at 363 U. S. 599 .
And in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650 (1965), the Court held that grievance arbitration
procedures of a collective bargaining agreement must be exhausted
before an employee may file suit to enforce contractual rights.

															For the reasons stated in Parts III, IV, and V of this opinion,
we hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not
establish that an arbitrator's resolution of a contractual claim is
dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866);
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															For example, Commission action is not barred by "findings and
orders" of state or local agencies. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b) (1970 ed., Supp. II). Similarly, an individual's cause
of action is not barred by a Commission finding of no reasonable
cause to believe that the Act has been violated. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970 ed., Supp. II); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															For example, Senator Joseph Clark, one of the sponsors of the
hill, introduced an interpretive memorandum which stated:

															"Nothing in title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects
rights and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act. .
. . [T]itle VII is not intended to, and does not, deny to any
individual rights and remedies which he may pursue under other
Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate both
title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor
Relations Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction."

															110 Cong Rec. 7207 (1964). Moreover, the Senate defeated an
amendment which would have made Title VII the exclusive federal
remedy for most unlawful employment practices. 110 Cong.Rec.
13650-13652 (1964). And a similar amendment was rejected in
connection with the Equal Employment Opportunity ct of 1972. See H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.Rep. No.
92-238 (1971). See also 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., 2137, 2179, 2181-2182 (1972). The report of
the Senate Committee responsible for the 1972 Act explained that
neither the

															"provisions regarding the individual's right to sue under title
VII, nor any of the other provisions of this bill, are meant to
affect existing rights granted under other laws."

															S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). For a detailed discussion of
the legislative history of the 1972 Act, see Sape &
Har, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, 40
Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 824 (1972).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The District Court adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d at 332, affirmed by an equally divided Court, 402 U.
S. 689 (1971), which was apparently based in part on the
doctrine of election of remedies. See n 5, supra. The Sixth Circuit, however,
later described Dewey as resting instead on the doctrine
of equitable estoppel and on "themes of res judicata and
collateral estoppel." Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743,
747 n. 1 (1971). Whatever doctrinal label is used, the essence of
these holdings remains the same. The policy reasons for rejecting
the doctrines of election of remedies and waiver in the context of
Title VII are equally applicable to the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See generally 5A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1214-1227
(1964 ed. and Supp. 1971). Most courts have recognized that the
doctrine of election of remedies does not apply to suits under
Title VII. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d at 714-715; Hutchings v. United States Industries, 428 F.2d at 314; Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, 156
U.S.App.D.C. 69, 80-81, 478 F.2d 979, 990-991 (1973); Voutsis
v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 893-894 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); Newman v. Avco
Corp., supra, at 746 n. 1; Oubichon v. North American
Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d at 572-573.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. [ Footnote 13 ]

															As the Court noted in Carey: "By allowing the dispute to go to arbitration . . . , those
conciliatory measures which Congress deemed vital to 'industrial
peace' . . . , and which may be dispositive of the entire dispute,
are encouraged. The superior authority of the Board may be invoked
at any time. Meanwhile the therapy of arbitration is brought to
bear in a complicated and troubled area."

															375 U.S. at 375 U. S. 272 .
Should disagreements arise between the Board and the arbitrator,
the Board's ruling would, of course, take precedence as to those
issues within its jurisdiction. Ibid. [ Footnote 14 ]

															Nor can it be maintained that election of remedies is required
by the possibility of unjust enrichment through duplicative
recoveries. Where, as here, the employer has prevailed at
arbitration, there, of course, can be no duplicative recovery. But
even in cases where the employee has first prevailed, judicial
relief can be structured to avoid such windfall gains. See,
e.g., Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., supra; Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra. Furthermore, if the relief
obtained by the employee at arbitration were fully equivalent to
that obtainable under Title VII, there would be no further relief
for the court to grant and hence no need for the employee to
institute suit.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															In this case, petitioner and respondent did not enter into a
voluntary settlement expressly conditioned on a waiver of
petitioner's cause of action under Title VII. In determining the
effectiveness of any such waiver, a court would have to determine
at the outset that the employee's consent to the settlement was
voluntary and knowing. In no event can the submission to
arbitration of a claim under the nondiscrimination clause of a
collective bargaining agreement constitute a binding waiver with
respect to an employee's rights under Title VII.

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and
Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 39 U.Chi.L.Rev.
30, 32-35 (971); Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and
Labor Arbitration, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 545 (1967). As the late Dean
Shulman stated:

															"A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. He
is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior
authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no
general charter to administer justice for a community which
transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties. He serves
their pleasure only, to administer the rule of law established by
their collective agreement."

															Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
Harv.L.Rev. 999, 1016 (1955).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Brief for Respondent 37. Respondent's proposed rule is analogous
to the NLRB's policy of deferring to arbitral decisions on
statutory issues in certain cases. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).

															[ Footnote 18 ] See also Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances
Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U.Pa.L.Rev. 40, 47-48 (1969);
Platt, The Relationship between Arbitration and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 Ga.L.Rev. 398 (1969). Significantly, a
substantial proportion of labor arbitrators are not lawyers. See Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 Yale
L.J. 1191, 1194 n. 28 (1968). This is not to suggest, of course,
that arbitrators do not possess a high degree of competence with
respect to the vital role in implementing the federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the
manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.
S. 650 (1965). In arbitration, as in the collective
bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee may be
subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the
bargaining unit. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.
S. 332 (1944). Moreover, harmony of interest between the
union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed,
especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made. See,
e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.
S. 192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944). And a breach of the union's duty of fair representation may
prove difficult to establish. See Vaca v. Sipes, supra;
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335 , 375 U. S. 342 , 375 U. S.
348 -351 (1964). In this respect, it is noteworthy that
Congress thought it necessary to afford the protections of Title
VII against unions, as well as employers. See 42 U.S.C. §
20002(c).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															In Rios, the court set forth the following deferral
standard:

															"First, there may be no deference to the decision of the
arbitrator unless the contractual right coincides with rights under
Title VII. Second, it must be plain that the arbitrator's decision
is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title
VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In
addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied
that (1) the factual issues before it are identical to those
decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the
collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of
discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing
dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator
actually decided the factual issues presented to the court; (5) the
arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural
infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing these conditions
of limitation will be upon the respondent, as distinguished from
the claimant."

															467 F.2d at 58. For a discussion of the problems posed by
application of the Rios standard, see Note,
Judicial Deference to Arbitrators' Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26
Stan.L.Rev. 421 (1974).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an
arbitral decision, since this must be determined in the court's
discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement that conform substantially with
Title VII, the degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum,
adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of discrimination,
and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an
arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's
Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This
is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact,
specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator
on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be
mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary
to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to
assure the full availability of this forum.

Summary:
Here is a summary of the Supreme Court case Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974):

The case centered around an employee's right to trial under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically addressing whether prior arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's nondiscrimination clause prevents an employee from filing a Title VII claim.

The Court held that an employee's right to a trial under Title VII is not foreclosed by prior submission to arbitration. This decision was based on the understanding that Title VII was designed to supplement existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination. The Court also highlighted the distinct nature of statutory rights under Title VII and contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement, even if both violations arise from the same factual occurrence.

Additionally, the Court emphasized that an arbitrator's authority is limited to resolving contractual rights issues and that an employee does not waive their cause of action under Title VII by participating in arbitration. The Court also noted the importance of providing a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims, as intended by Congress in enacting Title VII.