U.S. Supreme Court Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975) Brown v. Illinois No. 73-6650 Argued March 18, 1975 Decided June 26, 1975 422
U.S. 590 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS Syllabus Petitioner, who had been arrested without probable cause and
without a warrant, and under circumstances indicating that the
arrest was investigatory, made two in-custody inculpatory
statements after he had been given the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 .
Thereafter indicted for murder, petitioner filed a pretrial motion
to suppress the statements. The motion was overruled and the
statements were used in the trial, which resulted in petitioner's
conviction. The State Supreme Court, though recognizing the
unlawfulness of petitioner's arrest, held that the statements were
admissible on the ground that the giving of the Miranda warnings served to break the causal connection between the illegal
arrest and the giving of the statements, and petitioner's act in
making the statements was "sufficiently an act of free will to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471 ,
486. Held: 1. The Illinois courts erred in adopting a per se rule
that Miranda warnings in and of themselves broke the
causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one induced by
the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was admissible
so long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary and not
coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When
the exclusionary rule is used to effectuate the Fourth Amendment,
it serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it
serves under the Fifth, being directed at all unlawful searches and
seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating
material or testimony as fruits. Thus, even if the statements in
this case were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment issue remains. Wong Sun requires not
merely that a statement meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness
standard, but that it be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge
the primary taint" in light of the distinct policies and interests
of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 422 U. S.
600 -603.

															2. The question whether a confession is voluntary under Wong
Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. Though Page 422 U. S. 591 Miranda warnings are an important factor in resolving
the issue, other factors must be considered; and the burden of
showing admissibility of in-custody statements of persons who have
been illegally arrested rests on the prosecutor. Pp. 422 U. S.
603 -604.

															3. The State failed to sustain its burden in this case of
showing that petitioner's statements were admissible under Wong
Sun. Pp. 422 U. S.
604 -605. 56 Ill. 2d
312 , 307 N.E.2d
356 reversed and remanded.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ.,
joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 422 U. S. 606 .
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which
REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 422 U. S.
606 .

															MR JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case lies at the crossroads of the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendments. Petitioner was arrested without probable cause and
without a warrant. He was given, in full, the warnings prescribed
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Thereafter, while in custody, he made two inculpatory
statements. The issue is whether evidence of those statements was
properly admitted, or should have been excluded, in petitioner's
subsequent trial for murder in state court. Expressed another way,
the issue is whether the statements were to be excluded Page 422 U. S. 592 as the fruit of the illegal arrest, or were admissible because
the giving of the Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated
the taint of the arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). The Fourth Amendment, of course, has been held to be
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). I As petitioner Richard Brown was climbing the last of the stairs
leading to the rear entrance of his Chicago apartment in the early
evening of May 13, 1968, he happened to glance at the window near
the door. He saw, pointed at him through the window, a revolver
held by a stranger who was inside the apartment. The man said:
"Don't move, you are under arrest." App. 42. Another man, also with
a gun, came up behind Brown and repeated the statement that he was
under arrest. It was about 7:45 p.m. The two men turned out to be
Detectives William Nolan and William Lenz of the Chicago police
force. It is not clear from the record exactly when they advised
Brown of their identity, but it is not disputed that they broke
into his apartment, searched it, and then arrested Brown, all
without probable cause and without any warrant, when he arrived.
They later testified that they made the arrest for the purpose of
questioning Brown as part of their investigation of the murder of a
man named Roger Corpus.

															Corpus was murdered one week earlier, on May 6, with a
.38-caliber revolver in his Chicago West Side second-floor
apartment. Shortly thereafter, Detective Lenz obtained petitioner's
name, among others, from Corpus' brother. Petitioner and the others
were identified as acquaintances of the victim, not as suspects.
[ Footnote 1 ] Page 422 U. S. 593 On the day of petitioner's arrest, Detectives Lenz and Nolan,
armed with a photograph of Brown, and another officer arrived at
petitioner's apartment about 5 p.m. App. 77, 78. While the third
officer covered the front entrance downstairs, the two detectives
broke into Brown's apartment and searched it. Id. at 86.
Lenz then positioned himself near the rear door and watched through
the adjacent window which opened onto the back porch. Nolan sat
near the front door. He described the situation at the later
suppression hearing:

															"After we were there for a while, Detective Lenz told me that
somebody was coming up the back stairs. I walked out the front door
through the hall and around the corner, and I stayed there behind a
door leading on to the back porch. At this time I heard Detective
Lenz say, 'Don't move, you are under arrest.' I looked out. I saw
Mr. Brown backing away from the window. I walked up behind him, I
told him he is under arrest, come back inside the apartment with
us." Id. at 42. As both officers held him at gunpoint, the
three entered the apartment. Brown was ordered to stand against the
wall, and was searched. No weapon was found. Id. at 93. He
was asked his name. When he denied being Richard Brown, Detective
Lenz showed him the photograph, informed him that he was under
arrest for the murder of Roger Corpus, id. at 16,
handcuffed him, id. at 93, and escorted him to the squad
car.

															The two detectives took petitioner to the Maxwell Street police
station. During the 20-minute drive, Nolan again asked Brown, who
then was sitting with him in the back seat of the car, whether his
name was Richard Brown and whether he owned a 1966 Oldsmobile.
Brown Page 422 U. S. 594 alternately evaded these questions or answered them falsely. Tr.
74. Upon arrival at the station house, Brown was placed in the
second-floor central interrogation room. The room was bare, except
for a table and four chairs. He was left alone, apparently without
handcuffs, for some minutes while the officers obtained the file on
the Corpus homicide. They returned with the file, sat down at the
table, one across from Brown and the other to his left, and spread
the file on the table in front of him. App. 19.

															The officers warned Brown of his rights under Miranda .
[ Footnote 2 ] Ibid. They then informed him that they knew of an incident that had
occurred in a poolroom on May 5, when Brown, angry at having been
cheated at dice, fired a shot from a revolver into the ceiling.
Brown answered: "Oh, you know about that." Id. at 20. Lenz
informed him that a bullet had been obtained from the ceiling of
the poolroom and had been taken to the crime laboratory to be
compared with bullets taken from Corpus' body. [ Footnote 3 ] Ibid. Brown responded: "Oh,
you know that, too." Id. at 20-21. At this point -- it was
about 8:45 p.m. -- Lenz asked Brown whether he wanted to talk about
the Corpus homicide. Petitioner answered that he did. For the next
20 to 25 minutes Brown answered questions put to him by Nolan, as
Lenz typed. Id. at 21-23.

															This questioning produced a two-page statement in which Brown
acknowledged that he and a man named Page 422 U. S. 595 Jimmy Claggett visited Corpus on the evening of May 5; that the
three for some time sat drinking and smoking marihuana; that
Claggett ordered him at gunpoint to bind Corpus' hands and feet
with cord from the headphone of a stereo set; and that Claggett,
using a .38 caliber revolver sold to him by Brown, shot Corpus
three times through a pillow. The statement was signed by Brown. Id. at 9, 38.

															About 9:30 p.m., the two detectives and Brown left the station
house to look for Claggett in an area of Chicago Brown knew him to
frequent. They made a tour of that area, but did not locate their
quarry. They then went to police headquarters, where they
endeavored, without success, to obtain a photograph of Claggett.
They resumed their search -- it was now about 11 p.m. -- and they
finally observed Claggett crossing at an intersection. Lenz and
Nolan arrested him. All four, the two detectives and the two
arrested men, returned to the Maxwell Street station about 12:15
a.m. Id. at 39.

															Brown was again placed in the interrogation room. He was given
coffee and was left alone, for the most part, until 2 a.m., when
Assistant State's Attorney Crilly arrived.

															Crilly, too, informed Brown of his Miranda rights.
After a half hour's conversation, a court reporter appeared. Once
again the Miranda warnings were given: "I read him the
card." Id. at 30. Crilly told him that he "was sure he
would be charged with murder." Id. at 32. Brown gave a
second statement, providing a factual account of the murder
substantially in accord with his first statement, but containing
factual inaccuracies with respect to his personal background.
[ Footnote 4 ] When the
statement Page 422 U. S. 596 was completed, at about 3 am., Brown refused to sign it. Id. at 57. An hour later, he made a phone call to his
mother. At 9:30 that morning, about 14 hours after his arrest, he
was taken before a magistrate.

															On June 20, Brown and Claggett were jointly indicted by a Cook
County grand jury for Corpus' murder. Prior to trial, petitioner
moved to suppress the two statements he had made. He alleged that
his arrest and detention had been illegal and that the statements
were taken from him in violation of his constitutional rights.
After a hearing, the motion was denied. R. 46.

															The case proceeded to trial. The State introduced evidence of
both statements. Detective Nolan testified as to the contents of
the first, App. 89-92, but the writing itself was not placed in
evidence. The second statement was introduced, and was read to the
jury in full. Tr. 509-528. Brown was 23 at the time of the trial. Id. at 543.

															The jury found petitioner guilty of murder. R. 80. He was
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 15 years nor more than
30 years. Id. at 83.

															On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment
of conviction. 56 Ill. 2d
312 , 307 N.E.2d
356 (1974). The court refused to accept the State's argument
that Brown's arrest was lawful.

															"Upon review of the record, we conclude that the testimony fails
to show that at the time of his apprehension there was probable
cause for defendant's arrest, [and] that his arrest was, therefore,
unlawful." Id. at 315, 307 N.E.2d Page 422 U. S. 597 at 357. But it went on to hold in two significant and
unembellished sentences:

															"[W]e conclude that the giving of the Miranda warnings,
in the first instance by the police officer and in the second by
the assistant State's Attorney, served to break the causal
connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the
statements, and that defendant's act in making the statements was
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
unlawful invasion.' ( Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S.
471 , at 371 U. S. 486 .) We hold,
therefore, that the circuit court did not err in admitting the
statements into evidence." Id. at 317, 307 N.E.2d at 358. Aside from its reliance
upon the presence of the Miranda warnings, no specific
aspect of the record or of the circumstances was cited by the court
in support of its conclusion. The court, in other words, appears to
have held that the Miranda warnings, in and of themselves,
broke the causal chain so that any subsequent statement, even one
induced by the continuing effects of unconstitutional custody, was
admissible so long as, in the traditional sense, it was voluntary,
and not coerced in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

															Because of our concern about the implication of our holding in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963), to the facts of Brown's case, we granted
certiorari. 419 U.S. 894 (1974). II In Wong Sun, the Court pronounced the principles to be
applied where the issue is whether statements and other evidence
obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. In
that case, federal agents elicited an oral statement from defendant
Toy after forcing entry Page 422 U. S. 598 at 6 a.m. into his laundry, at the back of which he had his
living quarters. The agents had followed Toy down the hall to the
bedroom and there had placed him under arrest. The Court of Appeals
found that there was no probable cause for the arrest. This Court
concluded that that finding was "amply justified by the facts
clearly shown on this record." 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 479 .
Toy's statement, which bore upon his participation in the sale of
narcotics, led the agents to question another person, Johnny Yee,
who actually possessed narcotics. Yee stated that heroin had been
brought to him earlier by Toy and another Chinese known to him only
as "Sea Dog." Under questioning, Toy said that "Sea Dog" was Wong
Sun. Toy led agents to a multifamily dwelling where, he said, Wong
Sun lived. Gaining admittance to the building through a bell and
buzzer, the agents climbed the stairs and entered the apartment.
One went into the back room and brought Wong Sun out in handcuffs.
After arraignment, Wong Sun was released on his own recognizance.
Several days later, he returned voluntarily to give an unsigned
confession.

															This Court ruled that Toy's declarations and the contraband
taken from Yee were the fruits of the agents' illegal action, and
should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. Id. at 371 U. S.
484 -488. It held that the statement did not result from
" an intervening independent act of a free will,'" and that it
was not "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. at 371 U. S. 486 .
With respect to Wong Sun's confession, however, the Court held
that, in the light of his lawful arraignment and release on his own
recognizance, and of his return voluntarily several days later to
make the statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and
the statement "had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone
v. United Page 422 U. S. 599 States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S.
341 ." Id. at 371 U. S. 491 .
The Court said:

															"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in
such a case is"

															"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality, or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."

															"Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)." Id. at 371 U. S.
487 -488.

															The exclusionary rule thus was applied in Wong Sun primarily to protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the
Court's paramount concern there. To the extent that the question
whether Toy's statement was voluntary was considered, it was only
to judge whether it "was sufficiently an act of free will
to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Id. at 371 U. S. 486 (emphasis added).

															The Court in Wong Sun, as is customary, emphasized that
application of the exclusionary rule on Toy's behalf protected
Fourth Amendment guarantees in two respects: "in terms of deterring
lawless conduct by federal officers," and by "closing the doors of
the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally
obtained." Ibid. These considerations of deterrence and of
judicial integrity by now have become rather commonplace in the
Court's cases. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, ante at 422 U. S.
535 -538; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 12 -13, 392 U. S. 28 -29
(1968).

															"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose
is to deter -- to compel respect for the Page 422 U. S. 600 constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way --
by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 217 (1960). But,

															"[d]espite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule
has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 348 . See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.
S. 433 , 417 U. S.
446 -447 (1974). [ Footnote 5 ] III The Illinois courts refrained from resolving the question, as
apt here as it was in Wong Sun, whether Brown's statements
were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest. They
assumed that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, assured
that the statements (verbal acts, as contrasted with physical
evidence) were of sufficient free will as to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful arrest. Wong Sun, of course,
preceded Miranda. This Court has described the Miranda warnings as a
"prophylactic rule," Michigan v. Pane, 412 U. S.
47 , 412 U. S. 53 (1973), and as a "procedural safeguard," Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 457 , 384 U. S. 478 ,
employed to protect Fifth Amendment rights against "the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings." Id. at 384 U. S. 458 .
The function of the warnings relates to the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee against coerced self-incrimination, and the exclusion Page 422 U. S. 601 of a statement made in the absence of the warnings, it is said,
serves to deter the taking of an incriminating statement without
first informing the individual of his Fifth Amendment rights.

															Although, almost 90 years ago, the Court observed that the Fifth
Amendment is in "intimate relation" with the Fourth, Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S. 633 (1886), the Miranda warnings thus far have not been
regarded as a means either of remedying or deterring violations of
Fourth Amendment rights. Frequently, as here, rights under the two
Amendments may appear to coalesce, since

															"the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment." Ibid.; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 646 n. 5. The exclusionary rule, however, when utilized to effectuate
the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are
distinct from those it serves under the Fifth. It is directed at
all unlawful searches and seizures, and not merely those that
happen to produce incriminating material or testimony as fruits. In
short, exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth
Amendment, but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the
Fourth. Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a
confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a
Fourth Amendment violation. [ Footnote 6 ]

															Thus, even if the statements in this case were found to be
voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Page 422 U. S. 602 Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal chain between
the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto to be
broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement
meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness, but that it be
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint." 371
U.S. at 371 U. S. 486 . Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement's
admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of
the Fourth Amendment.

															If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to
attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of
how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the
effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.
S. 721 , 394 U. S.
726 -727 (1969). Arrests made without warrant or without
probable cause, for questioning or "investigation," would be
encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could
well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. [ Footnote 7 ] Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment
violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect,
a "cure-all," and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful
searches and seizures could Page 422 U. S. 603 be said to be reduced to "a form of words." See Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S.
648 .

															It is entirely possible, of course, as the State here argues,
that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess,
as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality. But
the Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot
always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to break,
for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the
illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case
that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited. See Westover v. United States, 384 U.
S. 436 , 384 U. S.
496 -497 (1966).

															While we therefore reject the per se rule which the
Illinois courts appear to have accepted, we also decline to adopt
any alternative per se or "but for" rule. The petitioner
himself professes not to demand so much. Tr. of Oral Arg. 12, 45,
47. The question whether a confession is the product of a free will
under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case.
No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are
too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to
permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a
talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important
factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is
obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the
only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest
and the confession, [ Footnote
8 ] the presence of intervening circumstances, Page 422 U. S. 604 see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.
S. 356 , 406 U. S. 365 (1972), and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct, [ Footnote
9 ] are all relevant. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 491 .
The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold requirement. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3501. And the burden of showing
admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution. [ Footnote 10 ] IV Although the Illinois courts failed to undertake the inquiry
mandated by Wong Sun to evaluate the circumstances of this
case in the light of the policy served by the exclusionary rule,
the trial resulted in a record of amply sufficient detail and depth
from which the determination may be made. We therefore decline the
suggestion of the United States, as amicus curiae, see Morales
v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969), to remand the case for further factual findings. We
conclude that the State failed to sustain the burden of showing
that the evidence in question was admissible under Wong
Sun. Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by
less than two hours, and there was no intervening event of
significance whatsoever. In its essentials, his situation is
remarkably like that of James Wah Toy in Wong Sun. [ Footnote 11 ] We could hold
Brown's first statement Page 422 U. S. 605 admissible only if we overrule Wong Sun. We decline to
do so. And the second statement was clearly the result and the
fruit of the first. [ Footnote
12 ]

															The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness.
The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly
acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action
was "for investigation" or for "questioning." [ Footnote 13 ] App. 35, 43, 78, 81, 83, 88, 89,
94. The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory.
The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the
hope that something might turn up. The manner in which Brown's
arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated
to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.

															We emphasize that our holding is a limited one. We decide only
that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered. Page 422 U. S. 606 [ Footnote 1 ]

															The brother, however, when asked at the trial whether any of the
victim's family suggested to the police that petitioner was
possibly responsible for the victim's death, answered: "Nobody
asked." App. 74.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															There is no assertion here that he did not understand those
rights.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															It was stipulated at the trial that, if expert testimony were
taken, it would be to the effect that the bullet eventually was
ascertained to be a "wiped bullet," that is, that its sides were
"clean, and therefore it was not ballistically comparable to any
other bullets, specifically the bullets taken from the body of the
deceased, Roger Corpus." Tr. 543.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															In response to questions from Mr. Crilly, Brown stated that he
was employed at E. I. Guffman Company in Niles, Ill., and that he
was a punch press operator, App. 97, whereas he later conceded that
he worked at Arnold Schwinn Bicycle Company and had never worked at
any other place. Id. at 63. He also remarked in the Crilly
statement that he had completed three years of high school, id. at 96, whereas later he conceded that he "never went
to high school." Id. at 58.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Members of the Court on occasion have indicated disenchantment
with the rule. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 403 U. S. 492 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 403 U. S. 493 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 403 U. S. 510 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 , 403 U. S. 411 (1971) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). Its efficacy has been subject to
some dispute. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S. 348 n. 5 (1974). See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 218 (1960).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Miranda warnings in no way inform a person of his
Fourth Amendment rights, including his right to be released from
unlawful custody following an arrest made without a warrant or
without probable cause.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															A great majority of the commentators have taken the same
position. See, e.g., Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 579, 603-604
(1968); Ruffin, Out on a Limb of the Poisonous Tree: The Tainted
Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 32, 70 (1967); Comment, 1 Fla. St.L.Rev.
533, 539-540 (1973); Note, Admissibility of Confessions Made
Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest: Wong Sun v. United States Revisited, 61 J.Crim.L. 207, 212 n. 58 (1970); Comment, Scope of
Taint Under the Exclusionary Rule of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 114 U.Pa.L.Rev. 570, 574 (1966). But see Comment, Voluntary Incriminating Statements Made
Subsequent to an Illegal Arrest -- A Proposed Modification of the
Exclusionary Rule, 71 Dick.L.Rev. 573, 582-583 (1967).

															[ Footnote 8 ] See United States v. Owen, 492.F.2d 1100, 1107 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974); Hale v.
Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 267-269 (CA6 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974); United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 19-20 (CA10 1972); Leonard v. United States, 391 F.2d 537, 538 (CA9 1968); Pennsylvania ex rel. Craig v.
Marone, 348 F.2d 22, 29 (CA3 1965).

															[ Footnote 9 ] See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (CA2 1970). See also United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myer, 450 F.2d
232, 236 (CA3 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972); United States v. Kilen, 445 F.2d 287, 289 (CA5 1971).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Our approach relies heavily, but not excessively, on the
"learning, good sense, fairness and courage of federal trial
judges." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.
S. 338 , 308 U. S. 342 (1939).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The situation here is thus in dramatic contrast to that of Wong
Sun himself. Wong Sun's confession, which the Court held
admissible, came several days after the illegality, and was
preceded by a lawful arraignment and a release from custody on his
own recognizance. 371 U.S. at 371 U. S.
491 .

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The fact that Brown had made one statement, believed by him to
be admissible, and his cooperation with the arresting and
interrogating officers in the search for Claggett, with his
anticipation of leniency, bolstered the pressures for him to give
the second, or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid
self-incrimination. Cf. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U. S.
85 (1963).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Detective Lenz had been a member of the Chicago police force for
14 years and a detective for 12 years. App. 6. Detective Nolan had
been a detective on the force for 51/2 years. Id. at
87.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.

															Insofar as the Court holds (1) that, despite Miranda warnings, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require the
exclusion from evidence of statements obtained as the fruit of an
arrest which the arresting officers knew or should have known was
without probable cause and unconstitutional, and (2) that the
statements obtained in this case were in this category, I am in
agreement, and therefore concur in the judgment.

															MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins,
concurring in part.

															I join the Court insofar as it holds that the per se rule adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court for determining the
admissibility of petitioner's two statements inadequately
accommodates the diverse interests underlying the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule. I would, however, remand the case for
reconsideration under the general standards articulated in the
Court's opinion and elaborated herein. A The issue presented in this case turns on proper application of
the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, not
on the Fifth Amendment or the prophylaxis added to that guarantee
by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). [ Footnote 2/1 ] The Court
recognized in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963), that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule applies to statements obtained following an illegal arrest
just as it does to tangible evidence seized in a similar manner Page 422 U. S. 607 or obtained pursuant to an otherwise illegal search and seizure. Wong Sun squarely rejected, however, the suggestion that
the admissibility of statements so obtained should be governed by a
simple "but for" test that would render inadmissible all statements
given subsequent to an illegal arrest. Id. at 371 U. S.
487 -488. In a similar manner, the Court today refrains
from according dispositive weight to the single factor of Miranda warnings. I agree with each holding. Neither of
the rejected extremes adequately recognizes the competing
considerations involved in a determination to exclude evidence
after finding that official possession of that evidence was to some
degree caused by a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

															On this record, I cannot conclude as readily as the Court that
admission of the statements here at issue would constitute an
effective overruling of Wong Sun. See ante at 422 U. S.
604 -605. Although Wong Sun establishes the
boundaries within which this case must be decided, the
incompleteness of the record leaves me uncertain that it compels
the exclusion of petitioner's statements. The statements at issue
in Wong Sun were on the temporal extremes in relation to
the illegal arrest. Cf. Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823,
832, 834-836 (CA5 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring). Toy's statement
was obtained immediately after his pursuit and arrest by six
agents. It appears to have been a spontaneous response to a
question put to him in the frenzy of that event, and there is no
indication that the agents made any attempt to inform him of his
right to remain silent. Wong Sun's statement, by contrast, was not
given until after he was arraigned and released on his own
recognizance. Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the station a few
days after the arrest for questioning. His statement was preceded
by an official warning of his right Page 422 U. S. 608 to remain silent and to have counsel if he desired. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The Court rejected the
Government's assertion that Toy's statement resulted from an
independent act of free will sufficient to purge the consequences
of the illegal arrest. Wong Sun's statement, however, was deemed
admissible. Given the circumstances in which Wong Sun's statement
was obtained, the Court concluded that "the connection between the
arrest and the statement had become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.'" 371 U.S. at 371 U. S.
491 . Like most cases in which the admissibility of statements
obtained subsequent to an illegal arrest is contested, this case
concerns statements more removed than that of Toy from the time and
circumstances of the illegal arrest. Petitioner made his first
statement some two hours following his arrest, after he had been
given Miranda warnings. The Court is correct in noting
that no other significant intervening event altered the
relationship established between petitioner and the officers by the
illegal arrest. But the Court's conclusion that admission of this
statement could be allowed only by overruling Wong Sun rests either on an overly restrictive interpretation of the
attenuation doctrine to which I cannot subscribe, or on its view
that the arrest was made for investigatory purposes, a factual
determination that I think more appropriately should have been left
for decision in the first instance by the state courts. B The Court's rejection in Wong Sun of a "but for" test,
reaffirmed today, ante at 422 U. S.
603 -604, recognizes that, in some Page 422 U. S. 609 circumstances strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule imposes greater cost on the legitimate demands of
law enforcement than can be justified by the rule's deterrent
purposes. The notion of the "dissipation of the taint" attempts to
mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal
police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. Application of the Wong Sun doctrine will generate fact-specific cases
bearing distinct differences as well as similarities, and the
question of attenuation inevitably is largely a matter of degree.
The Court today identifies the general factors that the trial court
must consider in making this determination. I think it appropriate,
however, to attempt to articulate the possible relationships of
those factors in particular, broad categories of cases.

															All Fourth Amendment violations are, by constitutional
definition, "unreasonable." There are, however, significant
practical differences that distinguish among violations,
differences that measurably assist in identifying the kinds of
cases in which disqualifying the evidence is likely to serve the
deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule. Cf. United States
v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S.
347 -348 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). In my view, the point at which the
taint can be said to have dissipated should be related, in the
absence of other controlling circumstances, to the nature of that
taint.

															That police have not succeeded in coercing the accused's
confession through willful or negligent misuse of the power of
arrest does not remove the fact that they may have tried. The
impermissibility of the attempt, and the extent to which such
attempts can be deterred by the use of the exclusionary rule, are
of primary relevance in determining whether exclusion is an
appropriate remedy. Page 422 U. S. 610 The basic purpose of the rule, briefly stated, is to remove
possible motivations for illegal arrests. Given this purpose, the
notion of voluntariness has practical value in deciding whether the
rule should apply to statements removed from the immediate
circumstances of the illegal arrest. If an illegal arrest merely
provides the occasion of initial contact between the police and the
accused, and, because of time or other intervening factors, the
accused's eventual statement is the product of his own reflection
and free will, application of the exclusionary rule can serve
little purpose: the police normally will not make an illegal arrest
in the hope of eventually obtaining such a truly volunteered
statement. In a similar manner, the role of the Miranda warnings in the Wong Sun inquiry is indirect. To the
extent that they dissipate the psychological pressures of custodial
interrogation, Miranda warnings serve to assure that the
accused's decision to make a statement has been relatively
unaffected by the preceding illegal arrest. Correspondingly, to the
extent that the police perceive Miranda warnings to have
this equalizing potential, their motivation to abuse the power of
arrest is diminished. Bearing these considerations in mind, and
recognizing that the deterrent value of the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule is limited to certain kinds of police conduct,
the following general categories can be identified.

															Those most readily identifiable are on the extremes: the
flagrantly abusive violation of Fourth Amendment rights, on the one
hand, and "technical" Fourth Amendment violations, on the other. In
my view, these extremes call for significantly different judicial
responses.

															I would require the clearest indication of attenuation in cases
in which official conduct was flagrantly abusive of Fourth
Amendment rights. If, for example, the factors Page 422 U. S. 611 relied on by the police in determining to make the arrest were
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, or if the evidence
clearly suggested that the arrest was effectuated as a pretext for
collateral objectives, cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 , 414 U. S. 237 , 414 U. S. 238 n. 2 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring), or the physical circumstances
of the arrest unnecessarily intrusive on personal privacy, I would
consider the equalizing potential of Miranda warnings
rarely sufficient to dissipate the taint. In such cases, the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most likely to be
effective, and the corresponding mandate to preserve judicial
integrity, see United States v. Peltier, ante, p. 422 U. S. 531 ; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 , 417 U. S. 450 n. 25 (1974), most clearly demands that the fruits of official
misconduct be denied. I thus would require some demonstrably
effective break in the chain of events leading from the illegal
arrest to the statement, such as actual consultation with counsel
or the accused's presentation before a magistrate for a
determination of probable cause, before the taint can be deemed
removed, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.
S. 103 (1975); cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356 , 406 U. S. 365 (1972); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.
S. 790 , 397 U. S. 796 (1970).

															At the opposite end of the spectrum lie "technical" violations
of Fourth Amendment rights where, for example, officers in good
faith arrest an individual in reliance on a warrant later
invalidated [ Footnote 2/3 ] or
pursuant to a statute that subsequently is declared
unconstitutional, see United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d
287 (CA5 Page 422 U. S. 612 1971). As we noted in Michigan v. Tucker, supra at 417 U. S.
447 :

															"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily
assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some
right."

															In cases in which this underlying premise is lacking, the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and
I can see no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution
of reliable and probative evidence. Thus, with the exception of
statements given in the immediate circumstances of the illegal
arrest -- a constraint I think is imposed by existing exclusionary
rule law -- I would not require more than proof that effective Miranda warnings were given and that the ensuing statement
was voluntary in the Fifth Amendment sense. Absent aggravating
circumstances, I would consider a statement given at the station
house after one has been advised of Miranda rights to be
sufficiently removed from the immediate circumstances of the
illegal arrest to justify its admission at trial.

															Between these extremes lies a wide range of situations that defy
ready categorization, and I will not attempt to embellish on the
factors set forth in the Court's opinion other than to emphasize
that the Wong Sun inquiry always should be conducted with
the deterrent purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
sharply in focus. See ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, Art. 150, p. 54 et seq. and Commentary thereon,
p. 375 et seq. (Prop.Off.Draft 1975). And, in view of the
inevitably fact-specific nature of the inquiry, we must place
primary reliance on the "learning, good sense, fairness and
courage" of judges who must make the determination in the first
instance. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.
S. 338 , 308 U. S. 342 (1939). See ante at 422 U. S. 604 n. 10. Page 422 U. S. 613 C On the facts of record as I view them, it is possible that the
police may have believed reasonably that there was probable cause
for petitioner's arrest. Although the trial court conducted
hearings on petitioner's motion to suppress and received his
testimony and that of the arresting officers, its inquiry focused
on determining whether petitioner's statements were preceded by
adequate Miranda warnings and were made voluntarily. The
court did not inquire into the possible justification, actual or
perceived, for the arrest. Indeed, numerous questions addressed to
the circumstances of the arrest elicited the State's objection,
which was sustained. App. 115. The Illinois Supreme Court's
consideration of the factual basis for its ruling similarly failed
to focus on these relevant issues or to rest in any meaningful
sense on the factors set forth in the Court's opinion today. After
determining that the officers lacked probable cause for
petitioner's arrest, the Illinois court concluded simply that
examination of the record persuaded it that "the giving of Miranda
warnings . . . served to break the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and the giving of the statements." 56 Ill. 2d
312 , 317, 307 N.E.2d
356 , 358 (1974).

															I am not able to conclude on this record that the officers
arrested petitioner solely for the purpose of questioning, ante at 422 U. S. 605 ; see also ante at 422 U. S. 606 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). To be sure, there is evidence
suggesting, as the Court notes, an investigatory arrest. The
strongest evidence on that point is the inconclusive testimony by
the arresting officers themselves. But the evidence is conflicting.
Responding to questions as to what they told petitioner upon his
arrest, the officers testified he was advised that the arrest was
for investigation of murder. Responding to more pointed
questions, Page 422 U. S. 614 however, one of the arresting officers stated that he informed
petitioner that he was being arrested for murder. See App.
16. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Moreover, other evidence of record indicates that the police may
well have believed that probable cause existed to think that
petitioner committed the crime of which he ultimately was
convicted. As the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court reveals,
petitioner had been identified as an acquaintance of the deceased,
and the police had been told that petitioner was seen in the
building where the deceased lived on the day of the murder. 56 Ill.
2d at 315, 307 N.E.2d at 357. It is also plain that the
investigation had begun to focus on petitioner. For example, the
police had gone to the trouble of obtaining a bullet that
petitioner had fired in an unrelated incident for the purpose of
comparing it with the bullets that killed the victim. App. 20. The
officers also obtained petitioner's photograph prior to seeking him
out, and the circumstances of petitioner's arrest, indicate that
their suspicions of him were quite pronounced.

															The trial court made no determination as to whether probable
cause existed for petitioner's arrest. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The Illinois Page 422 U. S. 615 Supreme Court resolved that issue, but did not consider whether
the officers might reasonably, albeit erroneously, have thought
that probable cause existed. Rather than decide those matters for
the first time at this level, I think it preferable to allow the
state courts to reconsider the case under the general guidelines
expressed in today's opinions. [ Footnote 2/6 ] I therefore would remand for
reconsideration [ Footnote 2/7 ] with
directions to conduct such further factual Page 422 U. S. 616 inquiries as may be necessary to resolve the admissibility
issue.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Each of these guarantees provides an independent ground for
suppression of statements, and thus may make it unnecessary in many
cases to conduct the inquiry mandated by Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Toy gave a second statement under circumstances similar to those
in Wong Sun's case. The Court did not, however, rule as to the
admissibility of this statement, finding instead that it lacked
corroboration, and was therefore insufficient to support Toy's
conviction. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S.
488 -491.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															I note that this resolution might have the added benefit of
encouraging the police to seek a warrant whenever possible. Cf.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 , 420 U. S. 113 (1975), and sources cited therein.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The majority of the statements cited by the Court are the
officers' responses to questions inquiring as to what the officers
told petitioner upon arresting him, and thus are only indirectly
relevant to the issue whether the officers might reasonably have
thought they then had sufficient evidence to support a probable
cause determination. Moreover, as noted above, that evidence is
contradictory. In only two instances during the trial did the
inquiry relate more directly to whether the officers arrested
petitioner for questioning. App. 83, 94. The officers' responses to
those questions tend to support the Courts conclusion. In view of
the weight of the contrary evidence, however, I think that the
matter should be considered in the first instance by the state
courts.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Petitioner's motion to suppress alleged that the police lacked
reasonable grounds for believing that he committed a crime. But the
testimony at the hearing focused primarily on the issue of the
adequacy of the Miranda warnings and the voluntariness of
petitioner's statements. At the close of the hearing, the trial
court ruled, without elaboration or findings of fact, that the
statements were admissible. Id. at 65. Conceivably the
trial court thought that probable cause existed to support the
arrest. The State argued this point unsuccessfully on appeal.
Equally possible, the trial court might have determined that the
probable cause issue was a close one, and that, viewing the
totality of the circumstances with that fact in mind, the statement
should be admitted.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The Solicitor General has filed a memorandum as amicus
curiae in which he urges the Court to remand the case for
further factual hearings, cf. Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102 (1969). I concur in the Court's rejection of this suggestion,
agreeing that the record is adequate to allow us to rule on the
major issue -- whether advice of Miranda rights
constitutes a per se attenuation of the taint of an
illegal arrest in all cases. I do not agree, however, that the
record is adequate for the Court to rule, in addition, that there
was insufficient attenuation of taint in this case.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Petitioner's second statement, corroborative of the first, was
given more than six hours after his arrest and some five hours
after the initial statement. During this time petitioner --
cooperating with the police -- had made two trips away from the
police headquarters in search of Claggett, whom he had identified
as his confederate in the murder. This second statement was given
to an assistant state's attorney, who again had informed petitioner
of his Miranda rights. The Court deems this statement to
be the fruit of the first one, and thus excludable along with
it.

															I also would leave the question of admissibility of this
statement to the lower Illinois courts. Of course, if the first
statement were ruled admissible under the general guidelines
articulated in today's opinion, it would follow that the second
statement also would be admissible. In any event, the question
whether there was sufficient attenuation between the first and
second statements to render the second admissible in spite of the
inadmissibility of the first presents a factual issue which, like
the factual issue underlying the possible admissibility of the
first statement, has not been passed on by the state courts.

Summary: The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda warnings alone do not automatically break the causal chain between an illegal arrest and a subsequent confession, and that other factors must be considered to determine if the confession was an act of free will. The Court held that the prosecutor has the burden of proving the admissibility of statements made during illegal custody, and that the State did not meet this burden in this case.