U.S. Supreme Court Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986) Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson No. 84-1979 Argued March 25, 1986 Decided June 19, 1986 477 U.S.
57 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent former employee of petitioner bank brought an action
against the bank and her supervisor at the bank, claiming that,
during her employment at the bank, she had been subjected to sexual
harassment by the supervisor in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and seeking injunctive relief and damages. At
the trial, the parties presented conflicting testimony about the
existence of a sexual relationship between respondent and the
supervisor. The District Court denied relief without resolving the
conflicting testimony, holding that, if respondent and the
supervisor did have a sexual relationship, it was voluntary, and
had nothing to do with her continued employment at the bank, and
that therefore respondent was not the victim of sexual harassment.
The court then went on to hold that, since the bank was without
notice, it could not be held liable for the supervisor's alleged
sexual harassment. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
Noting that a violation of Title VII may be predicated on either of
two types of sexual harassment -- (1) harassment that involves the
conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors, and (2)
harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a
hostile or offensive working environment -- the Court of Appeals
held that, since the grievance here was of the second type, and the
District Court had not considered whether a violation of this type
had occurred, a remand was necessary. The court further held that
the need for a remand was not obviated by the fact that the
District Court had found that any sexual relationship between
respondent and the supervisor was a voluntary one, a finding that
might have been based on testimony about respondent's "dress and
personal fantasies" that "had no place in the litigation." As to
the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an employer is
absolutely liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel,
whether or not the employer knew or should have known about it. Held: 1. A claim of "hostile environment" sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII. Pp. 477 U. S.
63 -69.

															(a) The language of Title VII is not limited to "economic" or
"tangible" discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines fully support the view that sexual harassment leading to
non-economic Page 477 U. S. 58 injury can violate Title VII. Here, respondent's allegations
were sufficient to state a claim for "hostile environment" sexual
harassment. Pp. 477 U. S.
63 -67.

															(b) The District Court's findings were insufficient to dispose
of respondent's "hostile environment" claim. The District Court
apparently erroneously believed that a sexual harassment claim will
not lie absent an economic effect on the complainant's employment,
and erroneously focused on the "voluntariness" of respondent's
participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The correct inquiry
is whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged
sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her participation in
them was voluntary. Pp. 477 U. S.
67 -68.

															(c) The District Court did not err in admitting evidence of
respondent's sexually provocative speech and dress. While
"voluntariness" in the sense of consent is no defense to a sexual
harassment claim, it does not follow that such evidence is
irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether the
complainant found particular sexual advances unwelcome. Pp. 477 U. S.
68 -69.

															2. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are
always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors. While common law agency principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress'
decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer
evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. In this
case, however, the mere existence of a grievance procedure in the
bank and the bank's policy against discrimination, coupled with
respondent's failure to invoke that procedure, do not necessarily
insulate the bank from liability. Pp. 477 U. S.
69 -73.

															243 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 753 F.2d 141, affirmed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 73 .
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 477 U. S.
74 . Page 477 U. S. 59 JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents important questions concerning claims of
workplace "sexual harassment" brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. I In 1974, respondent Mechelle Vinson met Sidney Taylor, a
vice-president of what is now petitioner Meritor Savings Bank
(bank) and manager of one of its branch offices. When respondent
asked whether she might obtain employment at the bank, Taylor gave
her an application, which she completed and returned the next day;
later that same day, Taylor called her to say that she had been
hired. With Taylor as her supervisor, respondent started as a
teller-trainee, and thereafter was promoted to teller, head teller,
and assistant Page 477 U. S. 60 branch manager. She worked at the same branch for four years,
and it is undisputed that her advancement there was based on merit
alone. In September, 1978, respondent notified Taylor that she was
taking sick leave for an indefinite period. On November 1, 1978,
the bank discharged her for excessive use of that leave.

															Respondent brought this action against Taylor and the bank,
claiming that, during her four years at the bank, she had
"constantly been subjected to sexual harassment" by Taylor in
violation of Title VII. She sought injunctive relief, compensatory
and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank, and attorney's
fees.

															At the 11-day bench trial, the parties presented conflicting
testimony about Taylor's behavior during respondent's employment. * Respondent
testified that, during her probationary period as a teller-trainee,
Taylor treated her in a fatherly way and made no sexual advances.
Shortly thereafter, however, he invited her out to dinner and,
during the course of the meal, suggested that they go to a motel to
have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of what she
described as fear of losing her job, she eventually agreed.
According to respondent, Taylor thereafter made repeated demands
upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during and
after business hours; she estimated that over the next several
years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times. In
addition, respondent testified that Taylor fondled her in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she
went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped
her on several occasions. These activities ceased after 1977,
respondent stated, when she started going with a steady
boyfriend.

															Respondent also testified that Taylor touched and fondled other
women employees of the bank, and she attempted to Page 477 U. S. 61 call witnesses to support this charge. But while some supporting
testimony apparently was admitted without objection, the District
Court did not allow her

															"to present wholesale evidence of a pattern and practice
relating to sexual advances to other female employees in her case
in chief, but advised her that she might well be able to present
such evidence in rebuttal to the defendants' cases." Vinson v. Taylor, 22 EPD � 30,708, p. 14,693, n. 1, 23
FEP Cases 37, 38-39, n. 1 (DC 1980). Respondent did not offer such
evidence in rebuttal. Finally, respondent testified that, because
she was afraid of Taylor, she never reported his harassment to any
of his supervisors and never attempted to use the bank's complaint
procedure.

															Taylor denied respondent's allegations of sexual activity,
testifying that he never fondled her, never made suggestive remarks
to her, never engaged in sexual intercourse with her, and never
asked her to do so. He contended instead that respondent made her
accusations in response to a business-related dispute. The bank
also denied respondent's allegations, and asserted that any sexual
harassment by Taylor was unknown to the bank and engaged in without
its consent or approval.

															The District Court denied relief, but did not resolve the
conflicting testimony about the existence of a sexual relationship
between respondent and Taylor. It found instead that

															"[i]f [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or
sexual relationship during the time of [respondent's] employment
with [the bank], that relationship was a voluntary one having
nothing to do with her continued employment at [the bank] or her
advancement or promotions at that institution." Id. at 14,692, 23 FEP Cases at 42 (footnote omitted).
The court ultimately found that respondent "was not the victim of
sexual harassment and was not the victim of sexual discrimination"
while employed at the bank. Ibid., 23 FEP Cases at 43. Page 477 U. S. 62 Although it concluded that respondent had not proved a violation
of Title VII, the District Court nevertheless went on to address
the bank's liability. After noting the bank's express policy
against discrimination, and finding that neither respondent nor any
other employee had ever lodged a complaint about sexual harassment
by Taylor, the court ultimately concluded that "the bank was
without notice, and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions
of Taylor." Id. at 14,691, 23 FEP Cases, at 42.

															The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. 243 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 753 F.2d 141 (1985). Relying on its
earlier holding in Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 444,
641 F.2d 934 (1981), decided after the trial in this case, the
court stated that a violation of Title VII may be predicated on
either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that involves
the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors,
and harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates
a hostile or offensive working environment. The court drew
additional support for this position from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985), which set out these two types of
sexual harassment claims. Believing that "Vinson's grievance was
clearly of the [hostile environment] type," 243 U.S.App.D.C. at
327, 753 F.2d at 145, and that the District Court had not
considered whether a violation of this type had occurred, the court
concluded that a remand was necessary.

															The court further concluded that the District Court's finding
that any sexual relationship between respondent and Taylor "was a
voluntary one" did not obviate the need for a remand. "[U]ncertain
as to precisely what the [district] court meant" by this finding,
the Court of Appeals held that, if the evidence otherwise showed
that "Taylor made Vinson's toleration of sexual harassment a
condition of her employment," her voluntariness "had no materiality
whatsoever." Page 477 U. S. 63 Id. at 328, 753 F.2d at 146. The court then surmised
that the District Court's finding of voluntariness might have been
based on "the voluminous testimony regarding respondent's dress and
personal fantasies," testimony that the Court of Appeals believed
"had no place in this litigation." Id. at 328, n. 36, 753
F.2d at 146, n. 36.

															As to the bank's liability, the Court of Appeals held that an
employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by
supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should
have known about the misconduct. The court relied chiefly on Title
VII's definition of "employer" to include "any agent of such a
person," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), as well as on the EEOC Guidelines.
The court held that a supervisor is an "agent" of his employer for
Title VII purposes, even if he lacks authority to hire, fire, or
promote, since "the mere existence -- or even the appearance -- of
a significant degree of influence in vital job decisions gives any
supervisor the opportunity to impose on employees." 243
U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 753 F.2d at 150.

															In accordance with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for
further proceedings. A subsequent suggestion for rehearing en banc
was denied, with three judges dissenting. 245 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 760
F.2d 1330 (1985). We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 1047 (1985), and
now affirm, but for different reasons. II Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it

															"an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."

															42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The prohibition against
discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the last
minute on the floor of the House of Representatives. 110 Cong.Rec.
2577-2584 (1964). The principal argument in opposition Page 477 U. S. 64 to the amendment was that "sex discrimination" was sufficiently
different from other types of discrimination that it ought to
receive separate legislative treatment. See id. at 2577
(statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States
Department of Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep.
Green). This argument was defeated, the bill quickly passed as
amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide
us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination
based on "sex."

															Respondent argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that unwelcome
sexual advances that create an offensive or hostile working
environment violate Title VII. Without question, when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex,
that supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex. Petitioner
apparently does not challenge this proposition. It contends instead
that, in prohibiting discrimination with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges" of employment, Congress was
concerned with what petitioner describes as "tangible loss" of "an
economic character," not "purely psychological aspects of the
workplace environment." Brief for Petitioner 30-31, 34. In support
of this claim petitioner observes that, in both the legislative
history of Title VII and this Court's Title VII decisions, the
focus has been on tangible, economic barriers erected by
discrimination.

															We reject petitioner's view. First, the language of Title VII is
not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" evinces a
congressional intent " to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women'" in employment. Los
Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.
S. 702 , 435 U. S. 707 ,
n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). Petitioner has pointed to nothing
in the Act to suggest that Congress contemplated the limitation
urged here. Page 477 U. S. 65 Second, in 1980 the EEOC issued Guidelines specifying that
"sexual harassment," as there defined, is a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. As an "administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency," Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 , 401 U. S.
433 -434 (1971), these Guidelines,

															"'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance,'" General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.
S. 125 , 429 U. S.
141 -142 (1976), quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U. S. 134 , 323 U. S. 140 (1944). The EEOC Guidelines fully support the view that harassment
leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII.

															In defining "sexual harassment," the Guidelines first describe
the kinds of workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title
VII. These include "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985). Relevant to the charges at
issue in this case, the Guidelines provide that such sexual
misconduct constitutes prohibited "sexual harassment," whether or
not it is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo, where

															"such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."

															§ 1604.11(a)(3).

															In concluding that so-called "hostile environment"
( i.e., non quid pro quo ) harassment violates
Title VII, the EEOC drew upon a substantial body of judicial
decisions and EEOC precedent holding that Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. See
generally 45 Fed.Reg. 74676 (1980). Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (CA5 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), was apparently the first case to recognize a cause of
action based upon a discriminatory work environment. In Rogers, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Page 477 U. S. 66 Circuit held that a Hispanic complainant could establish a Title
VII violation by demonstrating that her employer created an
offensive work environment for employees by giving discriminatory
service to its Hispanic clientele. The court explained that an
employee's protections under Title VII extend beyond the economic
aspects of employment:

															"[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in
[Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. . . . One can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers. . . ."

															454 F.2d at 238. Courts applied this principle to harassment
based on race, e.g., Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality
v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-515 (CA8), cert. denied
sub nom. Banta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray
v. Greyhound Lines, East, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 91, 98, 545 F.2d
169, 176 (1976), religion, e.g., Compston v. Borden,
Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157 (SD Ohio 1976), and national origin, e.g.,
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88
(CA8 1977). Nothing in Title VII suggests that a hostile
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment
should not be likewise prohibited. The Guidelines thus
appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the
existing case law.

															Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held,
and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a
hostile or abusive work environment. As the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit wrote in Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 902 (1982): Page 477 U. S. 67 "Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment
is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets." Accord, Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-255 (CA4 1983); Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. at 444-454, 641 F.2d at
934-944; Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F.
Supp. 780 (ED Wis.1984).

															Of course, as the courts in both Rogers and Henson recognized, not all workplace conduct that may be
described as "harassment" affects a "term, condition, or privilege"
of employment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers v.
EEOC, supra, at 238 ("mere utterance of an ethnic or racial
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would
not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant
degree to violate Title VII); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904
(quoting same). For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment." Ibid. Respondent's allegations in this case -- which
include not only pervasive harassment but also criminal conduct of
the most serious nature -- are plainly sufficient to state a claim
for "hostile environment" sexual harassment.

															The question remains, however, whether the District Court's
ultimate finding that respondent "was not the victim of sexual
harassment," 22 EPD � 30,708, at 14,692-14,693, 23 FEP Cases, at
43, effectively disposed of respondent's claim. The Court of
Appeals recognized, we think correctly, that this ultimate finding
was likely based on one or both of two erroneous views of the law.
First, the District Court apparently believed that a claim for
sexual harassment will not lie Page 477 U. S. 68 absent an economic effect on the complainant's employment. See ibid. ("It is without question that sexual harassment
of female employees in which they are asked or required to submit
to sexual demands as a condition to obtain employment or to
maintain employment or to obtain promotions falls within
protection of Title VII") (emphasis added). Since it appears that
the District Court made its findings without ever considering the
"hostile environment" theory of sexual harassment, the Court of
Appeals' decision to remand was correct.

															Second, the District Court's conclusion that no actionable
harassment occurred might have rested on its earlier "finding" that
"[i]f [respondent] and Taylor did engage in an intimate or sexual
relationship . . . that relationship was a voluntary one." Id. at 14,692, 23 FEP Cases, at 42. But the fact that
sex-related conduct was "voluntary," in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not
a defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII. The
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were "unwelcome." 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985). While the
question whether particular conduct was indeed unwelcome presents
difficult problems of proof, and turns largely on credibility
determinations committed to the trier of fact, the District Court
in this case erroneously focused on the "voluntariness" of
respondent's participation in the claimed sexual episodes. The
correct inquiry is whether respondent, by her conduct, indicated
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her
actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.

															Petitioner contends that even if this case must be remanded to
the District Court, the Court of Appeals erred in one of the terms
of its remand. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that
testimony about respondent's "dress and personal fantasies," 243
U.S.App.D.C. at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d at 146, n. 36, which the
District Court apparently admitted Page 477 U. S. 69 into evidence, "had no place in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for this conclusion was that respondent's
voluntariness vel non in submitting to Taylor's advances
was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While
"voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a
claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative
speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining
whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To
the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC
Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the
existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a whole"
and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred." 29 CFR § 1604.11(b) (1985). Respondent's claim that any
marginal relevance of the evidence in question was outweighed by
the potential for unfair prejudice is the sort of argument properly
addressed to the District Court. In this case the District Court
concluded that the evidence should be admitted, and the Court of
Appeals' contrary conclusion was based upon the erroneous,
categorical view that testimony about provocative dress and
publicly expressed sexual fantasies "had no place in this
litigation." 243 U.S.App.D.C. at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d at 146, n.
36. While the District Court must carefully weigh the applicable
considerations in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind,
there is no per se rule against its admissibility. III Although the District Court concluded that respondent had not
proved a violation of Title VII, it nevertheless went on to
consider the question of the bank's liability. Finding that "the
bank was without notice" of Taylor's alleged conduct, and that
notice to Taylor was not the equivalent of notice to the bank, the
court concluded that the bank therefore could not be held liable
for Taylor's alleged actions. The Court of Appeals took the
opposite view, holding that an employer is Page 477 U. S. 70 strictly liable for a hostile environment created by a
supervisor's sexual advances, even though the employer neither knew
nor reasonably could have known of the alleged misconduct. The
court held that a supervisor, whether or not he possesses the
authority to hire, fire, or promote, is necessarily an "agent" of
his employer for all Title VII purposes, since "even the
appearance" of such authority may enable him to impose himself on
his subordinates.

															The parties and amici suggest several different
standards for employer liability. Respondent, not surprisingly,
defends the position of the Court of Appeals. Noting that Title
VII's definition of "employer" includes any "agent" of the
employer, she also argues that, "so long as the circumstance is
work-related, the supervisor is the employer and the employer is
the supervisor." Brief for Respondent 27. Notice to Taylor that the
advances were unwelcome, therefore, was notice to the bank.

															Petitioner argues that respondent's failure to use its
established grievance procedure, or to otherwise put it on notice
of the alleged misconduct, insulates petitioner from liability for
Taylor's wrongdoing. A contrary rule would be unfair, petitioner
argues, since, in a hostile environment harassment case, the
employer often will have no reason to know about, or opportunity to
cure, the alleged wrongdoing.

															The EEOC, in its brief as amicus curiae, contends that
courts formulating employer liability rules should draw from
traditional agency principles. Examination of those principles has
led the EEOC to the view that, where a supervisor exercises the
authority actually delegated to him by his employer, by making or
threatening to make decisions affecting the employment status of
his subordinates, such actions are properly imputed to the employer
whose delegation of authority empowered the supervisor to undertake
them. Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 22.
Thus, the courts have consistently held employers liable for the
discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory
personnel, Page 477 U. S. 71 whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved
of the supervisor's actions. E.g., Anderson v. Methodist
Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (CA6 1972).

															The EEOC suggests that, when a sexual harassment claim rests
exclusively on a "hostile environment" theory, however, the usual
basis for a finding of agency will often disappear. In that case,
the EEOC believes, agency principles lead to

															"a rule that asks whether a victim of sexual harassment had
reasonably available an avenue of complaint regarding such
harassment, and, if available and utilized, whether that procedure
was reasonably responsive to the employee's complaint. If the
employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has
implemented a procedure specifically designed to resolve sexual
harassment claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of
that procedure, the employer should be shielded from liability
absent actual knowledge of the sexually hostile environment
(obtained, e.g., by the filing of a charge with the EEOC
or a comparable state agency). In all other cases, the employer
will be liable if it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if,
considering all the facts of the case, the victim in question had
no reasonably available avenue for making his or her complaint
known to appropriate management officials."

															Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26. As
respondent points out, this suggested rule is in some tension with
the EEOC Guidelines, which hold an employer liable for the acts of
its agents without regard to notice. 29 CFR § 1604.11(c) (1985).
The Guidelines do require, however, an

															"examin[ation of] the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the job [f]unctions performed by the individual in
determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory or
agency capacity." Ibid. Page 477 U. S. 72 This debate over the appropriate standard for employer liability
has a rather abstract quality about it, given the state of the
record in this case. We do not know at this stage whether Taylor
made any sexual advances toward respondent at all, let alone
whether those advances were unwelcome, whether they were
sufficiently pervasive to constitute a condition of employment, or
whether they were "so pervasive and so long continuing . . . that
the employer must have become conscious of [them]," Taylor v.
Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1197-1199 (CA8 1981) (holding employer
liable for racially hostile working environment based on
constructive knowledge).

															We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a
definitive rule on employer liability, but we do agree with the
EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for
guidance in this area. While such common law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress'
decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an
employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place
some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under
Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors. See generally Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237
(1958). For the same reason, absence of notice to an employer does
not necessarily insulate that employer from liability. Ibid. Finally, we reject petitioner's view that the mere existence of
a grievance procedure and a policy against discrimination, coupled
with respondent's failure to invoke that procedure, must insulate
petitioner from liability. While those facts are plainly relevant,
the situation before us demonstrates why they are not necessarily
dispositive. Petitioner's general nondiscrimination policy did not
address sexual harassment in particular, and thus did not alert
employees to their employer's Page 477 U. S. 73 interest in correcting that form of discrimination. App. 25.
Moreover, the bank's grievance procedure apparently required an
employee to complain first to her supervisor, in this case Taylor.
Since Taylor was the alleged perpetrator, it is not altogether
surprising that respondent failed to invoke the procedure and
report her grievance to him. Petitioner's contention that
respondent's failure should insulate it from liability might be
substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to
encourage victims of harassment to come forward. IV In sum, we hold that a claim of "hostile environment" sex
discrimination is actionable under Title VII, that the District
Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's
hostile environment claim, and that the District Court did not err
in admitting testimony about respondent's sexually provocative
speech and dress. As to employer liability, we conclude that the
Court of Appeals was wrong to entirely disregard agency principles
and impose absolute liability on employers for the acts of their
supervisors, regardless of the circumstances of a particular
case.

															Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the
judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. * Like the Court of Appeals, this Court was not provided a
complete transcript of the trial. We therefore rely largely on the
District Court's opinion for the summary of the relevant
testimony.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

															Because I do not see any inconsistency between the two opinions,
and because I believe the question of statutory construction that
JUSTICE MARSHALL has answered is fairly presented by the record, I
join both the Court's opinion and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion. Page 477 U. S. 74 JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.

															I fully agree with the Court's conclusion that workplace sexual
harassment is illegal, and violates Title VII. Part III of the
Court's opinion, however, leaves open the circumstances in which an
employer is responsible under Title VII for such conduct. Because I
believe that question to be properly before us, I write
separately.

															The issue the Court declines to resolve is addressed in the EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, which are entitled to
great deference. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 , 401 U. S.
433 -434 (1971) (EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures of 1966); see also ante at 477 U. S. 65 .
The Guidelines explain:

															"Applying general Title VII principles, an employer . . . is
responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether
the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden
by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine
the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the
job [f]unctions performed by the individual in determining whether
an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity."

															"With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer
is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action."

															29 CFR §§ 1604.11(c),(d) (1985).

															The Commission, in issuing the Guidelines, explained that its
rule was

															"in keeping with the general standard of employer Page 477 U. S. 75 liability with respect to agents and supervisory employees. . .
. [T]he Commission and the courts have held for years that an
employer is liable if a supervisor or an agent violates the Title
VII, regardless of knowledge or any other mitigating factor."

															45 Fed.Reg. 74676 (1980). I would adopt the standard set out by
the Commission.

															An employer can act only through individual supervisors and
employees; discrimination is rarely carried out pursuant to a
formal vote of a corporation's board of directors. Although an
employer may sometimes adopt company-wide discriminatory policies
violative of Title VII, acts that may constitute Title VII
violations are generally effected through the actions of
individuals, and often an individual may take such a step even in
defiance of company policy. Nonetheless, Title VII remedies, such
as reinstatement and backpay, generally run against the employer as
an entity. [ Footnote 1 ] The
question thus arises as to the circumstances under which an
employer will be held liable under Title VII for the acts of its
employees.

															The answer supplied by general Title VII law, like that supplied
by federal labor law, is that the act of a supervisory employee or
agent is imputed to the employer. [ Footnote 2 ] Thus, for example, when a supervisor
discriminatorily fires or refuses to promote a black employee, that
act is, without more, considered the act of the employer. The
courts do not stop to consider whether the employer otherwise had
"notice" of the action, or even whether the supervisor had actual
authority to act as he did. E.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker
Corp., Page 477 U. S. 76 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (CA7 1977); Young v. Southwestern
Savings and Loan Assn., 509 F.2d 140 (CA5 1975); Anderson
v. Methodist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (CA6
1972). Following that approach, every Court of Appeals that has
considered the issue has held that sexual harassment by supervisory
personnel is automatically imputed to the employer when the
harassment results in tangible job detriment to the subordinate
employee. See Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., Div. of Windsor Mobile
Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-606 (CA7 1985); Craig v. Y &
Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (CA3 1983); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255, n. 6 (CA4 1983); Henson v.
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (CA11 1982); Miller v. Bank of
America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (CA9 1979).

															The brief filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the United
States and the EEOC in this case suggests that a different rule
should apply when a supervisor's harassment "merely" results in a
discriminatory work environment. The Solicitor General concedes
that sexual harassment that affects tangible job benefits is an
exercise of authority delegated to the supervisor by the employer,
and thus gives rise to employer liability. But, departing from the
EEOC Guidelines, he argues that the case of a supervisor merely
creating a discriminatory work environment is different because the
supervisor "is not exercising, or threatening to exercise, actual
or apparent authority to make personnel decisions affecting the
victim." Brief for United States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 24. In the latter situation, he concludes, some further notice
requirement should therefore be necessary.

															The Solicitor General's position is untenable. A supervisor's
responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire,
and discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such
actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-day
supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe,
productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the latter
authority should have different consequences than abuse of the
former. In both cases, it is the authority Page 477 U. S. 77 vested in the supervisor by the employer that enables him to
commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is
understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that he is
able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates. There is
therefore no justification for a special rule, to be applied only in "hostile environment" cases, that sexual
harassment does not create employer liability until the employee
suffering the discrimination notifies other supervisors. No such
requirement appears in the statute, and no such requirement can
coherently be drawn from the law of agency.

															Agency principles and the goals of Title VII law make
appropriate some limitation on the liability of employers for the
acts of supervisors. Where, for example, a supervisor has no
authority over an employee, because the two work in wholly
different parts of the employer's business, it may be improper to
find strict employer liability. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(c)
(1985). Those considerations, however, do not justify the creation
of a special "notice" rule in hostile environment cases.

															Further, nothing would be gained by crafting such a rule. In the
"pure" hostile environment case, where an employee files an EEOC
complaint alleging sexual harassment in the workplace, the employee
seeks not money damages, but injunctive relief. See Bundy v.
Jackson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 444, 456, n. 12, 641 F.2d 934, 946,
n. 12 (1981). Under Title VII, the EEOC must notify an employer of
charges made against it within 10 days after receipt of the
complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the charges appear to be
based on "reasonable cause," the EEOC must attempt to eliminate the
offending practice through "informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion." Ibid. An employer whose
internal procedures assertedly would have redressed the
discrimination can avoid injunctive relief by employing these
procedures after receiving notice of the complaint or during the
conciliation period. Cf. Brief for United Page 477 U. S. 78 States and EEOC as Amici Curiae 26. Where a
complainant, on the other hand, seeks backpay on the theory that a
hostile work environment effected a constructive termination, the
existence of an internal complaint procedure may be a factor in
determining not the employer's liability, but the remedies
available against it. Where a complainant without good reason
bypassed an internal complaint procedure she knew to be effective,
a court may be reluctant to find constructive termination, and thus
to award reinstatement or backpay.

															I therefore reject the Solicitor General's position. I would
apply in this case the same rules we apply in all other Title VII
cases, and hold that sexual harassment by a supervisor of an
employee under his supervision, leading to a discriminatory work
environment, should be imputed to the employer for Title VII
purposes regardless of whether the employee gave "notice" of the
offense.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The remedial provisions of Title VII were largely modeled on
those of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 , 422 U. S. 419 ,
and n. 11 (1975); see also Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U. S. 747 , 424 U. S.
768 -770 (1976).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															For NLRA cases, see, e.g., Graves Trucking, Inc. v.
NLRB, 692 F.2d 470 (CA7 1982); NLRB v. Kaiser Agricultural
Chemical, Division of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 473 F.2d 374, 384 (CA5 1973); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America v. NLRB, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 377, 365 F.2d 898, 909
(1966).

Summary:
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986), the United States Supreme Court ruled that sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The case involved a female employee of Meritor Savings Bank who sued the bank and her supervisor, claiming she was subjected to sexual harassment by the supervisor during her employment. The lower court denied her claim, arguing that any sexual relationship was voluntary and unrelated to her employment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, recognizing two types of sexual harassment under Title VII:

1. Harassment involving the conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors; and
2. Harassment that creates a hostile or offensive work environment, even if it does not affect economic benefits.

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that a "hostile environment" sexual harassment claim is valid under Title VII. The Court also clarified that an employer is liable for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel, regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known about it.

This case established an important precedent in recognizing the adverse impact of sexual harassment on employees and holding employers accountable for maintaining a safe and respectful work environment.