OPINION OF THE COURT MARYLAND V. PRINGLE 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 02-809 MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH JERMAINE
PRINGLE

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of
maryland

															[December 15, 2003]

															   Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court.

															   In the early morning hours a
passenger car occupied by three men was stopped for speeding by a
police officer. The officer, upon searching the car, seized $763 of
rolled-up cash from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies
of cocaine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat.
After all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the
officer arrested each of them. We hold that the officer had
probable cause to arrest Pringle—one of the three men.

															   At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore
County Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding. There
were three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow, the driver and
owner, respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, and Otis
Smith, the back-seat passenger. The officer asked Partlow for his
license and registration. When Partlow opened the glove compartment
to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large
amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment. The officer
returned to his patrol car with Partlow’s license and registration
to check the computer system for outstanding violations. The
computer check did not reveal any violations. The officer returned
to the stopped car, had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral
warning.

															   After a second patrol car arrived, the officer
asked Partlow if he had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.
Partlow indicated that he did not. Partlow then consented to a
search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the glove
compartment and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine
from behind the back-seat armrest. When the officer began the
search the armrest was in the upright position flat against the
rear seat. The officer pulled down the armrest and found the drugs,
which had been placed between the armrest and the back seat of the
car.

															   The officer questioned all three men about the
ownership of the drugs and money, and told them that if no one
admitted to ownership of the drugs he was going to arrest them all.
The men offered no information regarding the ownership of the drugs
or money. All three were placed under arrest and transported to the
police station.

															   Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
and gave an oral and written confession in which he acknowledged
that the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were
going to a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or
“[u]se it for sex.” App. 26. Pringle maintained that the other
occupants of the car did not know about the drugs, and they were
released.

															   The trial court denied Pringle’s motion to
suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding
that the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. A jury
convicted Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years’
incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 141 Md. App. 292, 785
A. 2d 790 (2001).

															   The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided
vote, reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to show
Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, “the
mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a
front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is
insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for
possession.” 370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1027 (2002). We
granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 921 (2003),
and now reverse.

															   Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961),
the people are “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, … and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause … .” U. S.
Const., Amdt. 4. Maryland law authorizes police officers to execute
warrantless arrests, inter alia , for felonies committed in
an officer’s presence or where an officer has probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed or is being committed in
the officer’s presence. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §594B (1996)
(repealed 2001). A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public
place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s
presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is
supported by probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 , 424
(1976); see Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318 , 354
(2001) (stating that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense
in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender”).

															   It is uncontested in the present case that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies
containing suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a
felony had been committed. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §287 (1996)
(repealed 2002) (prohibiting possession of controlled dangerous
substances). The sole question is whether the officer had probable
cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   The long-prevailing standard of probable cause
protects “citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,” while giving “fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 176 (1949). On many
occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a
“ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ ” that deals with
“ ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175–176); see, e.g. , Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 , 695
(1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 , 7–8 (1989).
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates ,
462 U. S., at 232.

															   The probable-cause standard is incapable of
precise definition or quantification into percentages because it
deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances. See ibid.; Brinegar , 338 U. S., at
175. We have stated, however, that “[t]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt,” ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with
respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 , 91 (1979).
In Illinois v. Gates, we noted:

															“As early as Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall
observed, in a closely related context: ‘[T]he term “probable
cause,” according to its usual acceptation, means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation … . It imports a
seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.’ More
recently, we said that ‘the quanta … of proof ’
appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to
the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U. S., at
173. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials,
have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.” 462 U. S., at
235.

															   To determine whether an officer
had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, amount to” probable cause, Ornelas , supra , at 696.

															   In this case, Pringle was one of three men
riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up
cash in the glove compartment directly in front of
Pringle.[ Footnote 2 ] Five
plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat
armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the
three men failed to offer any information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or the money.

															   We think it an entirely reasonable inference
from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable
cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of
cocaine, either solely or jointly.

															   Pringle’s attempt to characterize this case as
a guilt-by-association case is unavailing. His reliance on Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, and United
States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948), is
misplaced. In Ybarra , police officers obtained a warrant
to search a tavern and its bartender for evidence of possession of
a controlled substance. Upon entering the tavern, the officers
conducted patdown searches of the customers present in the tavern,
including Ybarra. Inside a cigarette pack retrieved from Ybarra’s
pocket, an officer found six tinfoil packets containing heroin. We
stated:

															“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 62–63
(1968). Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure
of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the
premises where the person may happen to be.” 444 U. S., at 91.

															We held that the search warrant did not permit body
searches of all of the tavern’s patrons and that the police could
not pat down the patrons for weapons, absent individualized
suspicion. Id. , at 92.

															   This case is quite different from Ybarra . Pringle and his two companions were in a
relatively small automobile, not a public tavern. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295 (1999), we
noted that “a car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra —will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or
the evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id., at 304–305. Here
we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common
enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in
the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to
which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with
the potential to furnish evidence against him.    In Di Re , a federal investigator had been told by an
informant, Reed, that he was to receive counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons from a certain Buttitta at a particular place. The
investigator went to the appointed place and saw Reed, the sole
occupant of the rear seat of the car, holding gasoline ration
coupons. There were two other occupants in the car: Buttitta in the
driver’s seat and Di Re in the front passenger’s seat. Reed
informed the investigator that Buttitta had given him counterfeit
coupons. Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched. After
noting that the officers had no information implicating Di Re and
no information pointing to Di Re’s possession of coupons, unless
presence in the car warranted that inference, we concluded that the
officer lacked probable cause to believe that Di Re was involved in
the crime. 332 U. S., at 592–594. We said “[a]ny inference that
everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must disappear if
the Government informer singles out the guilty person.” Id. , at 594. No such singling out occurred in this case;
none of the three men provided information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or money.

															   We hold that the officer had probable cause to
believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a
controlled substance. Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contravene
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 Maryland law defines “possession” as “the
exercise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing
by one or more persons.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §277(s) (1996)
(repealed 2002). Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland dismissed
the $763 seized from the glove compartment as a factor in the
probable-cause determination, stating that “[m]oney, without more,
is innocuous.” 370 Md. 524, 546, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1028 (2002).
The court’s consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as
a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light
of our precedents. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 230–231 (1983) (opining
that the totality of the circumstances approach is consistent with
our prior treatment of probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 175–176 (1949)
(“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been
or is being committed”). We think it is abundantly clear from the
facts that this case involves more than money alone.

Summary: The Supreme Court held that a police officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle, one of three men in a car where cocaine and a large amount of cash were found, as it was reasonable to infer that Pringle knew about and was intentionally involved with the cocaine. The Court reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.


OCTOBER TERM, 2000

															Syllabus

															ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR

															CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FOURTH
DISTRICT

															No. 99-1132. Argued November 1, 2000-Decided February 20,
2001

															Police officers, with probable cause to believe that respondent
McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented him from
entering the home unaccompanied by an officer for about two hours
while they obtained a search warrant. Once they did so, the
officers found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested
McArthur. He was subsequently charged with misdemeanor possession
of those items. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground
that it was the "fruit" of an unlawful police seizure, namely, the
refusal to let him reenter his home unaccompanied. The Illinois
trial court granted the motion, and the State Appellate Court
affirmed. Held: Given the nature of the intrusion and the law
enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises
was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 330-337.

															(a) The Amendment's central requirement is one of
reasonableness.

															Although, in the ordinary case, personal property seizures are
unreasonable unless accomplished pursuant to a warrant, United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 , 701, there
are exceptions to this rule involving special law enforcement
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, and
the like, see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938 ,
940-941. The circumstances here involve a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need. Cf., e. g.,
United States v. Place, supra, at 701. Moreover, the
restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time
and scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29-30, and
avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 585.
Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of
unreasonableness, the Court must balance the privacy-related and
law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion here
was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 654. In
light of the following circumstances, considered in combination,
the Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and hence
lawful. First, the police had probable cause to believe that
McArthur's home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs.
Second, they had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, he
would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant.
Third, they 327 made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs
with the demands of personal privacy by avoiding a warrantless
entry or arrest and preventing McArthur only from entering his home
unaccompanied. Fourth, they imposed the restraint for a limited
period, which was no longer than reasonably necessary for them,
acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Pp. 330-333.

															(b) The conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds
significant support in this Court's case law. See, e. g.,
Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 ; United
States v. Place, supra, at 706. And in no case has this
Court held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by
probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence
while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable
period. But cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 , 754.
Pp.333-334.

															(c) The Court is not persuaded by the countervailing
considerations raised by the parties or lower courts: that the
police proceeded without probable cause; that, because McArthur was
on his porch, the police order that he stay outside his home
amounted to an impermissible "constructive eviction"; that an
officer, with McArthur's consent, stepped inside the home's doorway
to observe McArthur when McArthur reentered the home on two or
three occasions; and that Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra, at 742, 754, offers direct support for McArthur's position. Pp.
334-336.

															304 Ill. App. 3d 395, 713 N. E. 2d 93, reversed and
remanded.

															BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS,
and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 337. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 338. Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued
the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James E.
Ryan, Attorney General, and William L. Browers and Colleen M. Griffin, Assistant Attorneys General.

															Matthew D. Roberts argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben, and Deborah Watson. 328 Deanne Fortna Jones argued the cause for respondent.

															With her on the brief was Jeff Justice. *

															JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. Police
officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden
marijuana in his home, prevented that man from entering the home
for about two hours while they obtained a search warrant. We must
decide whether those officers violated the Fourth Amendment. We
conclude that the officers acted reasonably. They did not violate
the Amendment's requirements. And we reverse an Illinois court's
holding to the contrary.

															I A

															On April 2, 1997, Tera McArthur asked two police officers to
accompany her to the trailer where she lived with her husband,
Charles, so that they could keep the peace while she removed her
belongings. The two officers, Assistant Chief John Love and Officer
Richard Skidis, arrived with

															* A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for
the State of Ohio et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney
General of Ohio, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, and Robert C. Maier and Matthew D. Miko, Assistant
Solicitors, and by the Attorneys General for their respective
States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Janet
Napolitano of Arizona, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of
Minnesota, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Philip
McLaughlin of New Hampshire, John J. Farmer, Jr., of New Jersey, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del
Papa of Nevada, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles M. Condon of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of
South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, Christine O. Gregoire of Washington, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, D. Michael
Fisher of Pennsylvania, and Mark L. Earley of
Virginia.

															Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Lisa B.
Kemler; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W
Whitehead and Steven H. Aden. 329 Tera at the trailer at about 3:15 p.m. Tera went inside, where
Charles was present. The officers remained outside.

															When Tera emerged after collecting her possessions, she spoke to
Chief Love, who was then on the porch. She suggested he check the
trailer because "Chuck had dope in there." App. 15. She added (in
Love's words) that she had seen Chuck "slid[e] some dope underneath
the couch." Id., at 19.

															Love knocked on the trailer door, told Charles what Tera had
said, and asked for permission to search the trailer, which Charles
denied. Love then sent Officer Skidis with Tera to get a search
warrant.

															Love told Charles, who by this time was also on the porch, that
he could not reenter the trailer unless a police officer
accompanied him. Charles subsequently reentered the trailer two or
three times (to get cigarettes and to make phone calls), and each
time Love stood just inside the door to observe what Charles
did.

															Officer Skidis obtained the warrant by about 5 p.m.

															He returned to the trailer and, along with other officers,
searched it. The officers found under the sofa a marijuana pipe, a
box for marijuana (called a "one-hitter" box), and a small amount
of marijuana. They then arrested Charles.

															B

															Illinois subsequently charged Charles McArthur with unlawfully
possessing drug paraphernalia and marijuana (less than 2.5 grams),
both misdemeanors. See Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 720, §§ 550/4(a),
600/3.5(a) (1998). McArthur moved to suppress the pipe, box, and
marijuana on the ground that they were the "fruit" of an unlawful
police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter the trailer
unaccompanied, which would have permitted him, he said, to "have
destroyed the marijuana." App.27.

															The trial court granted McArthur's suppression motion.

															The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, 304 Ill. App. 3d 330 395, 713 N. E. 2d 93 (1999), and the Illinois Supreme Court
denied the State's petition for leave to appeal, 185 Ill. 2d 651,
720 N. E. 2d 1101 (1999). We granted certiorari to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the kind of temporary
seizure at issue here.

															II A

															The Fourth Amendment says that the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U. S.
Const., Amdt. 4. Its "central requirement" is one of
reasonableness. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 739
(1983). In order to enforce that requirement, this Court has
interpreted the Amendment as establishing rules and presumptions
designed to control conduct of law enforcement officers that may
significantly intrude upon privacy interests. Sometimes those rules
require warrants. We have said, for example, that in "the ordinary
case," seizures of personal property are "unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment," without more, "unless ...
accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant," issued by a neutral
magistrate after finding probable cause. United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 , 701 (1983).

															We nonetheless have made it clear that there are exceptions to
the warrant requirement. When faced with special law enforcement
needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or
the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual,
circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure
reasonable. See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938 ,
940-941 (1996) (per curiam) (search of automobile supported
by probable cause); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.
S. 444 , 455 (1990) (suspicionless stops at drunk driver
checkpoint); United States v. Place, supra, at 706
(temporary seizure of luggage based on reasonable suspicion); Michigan v. 331 Summers, 452 U. S. 692 , 702-705
(1981) (temporary detention of suspect without arrest warrant to
prevent flight and protect officers while executing search
warrant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 27 (1968)
(temporary stop and limited search for weapons based on reasonable
suspicion).

															In the circumstances of the case before us, we cannot say that
the warrantless seizure was per se unreasonable. It involves
a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement
need, i. e., "exigent circumstances." Cf., e. g., United States v. Place, supra, at 701 ("[T]he
exigencies of the circumstances" may permit temporary seizure
without warrant); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 ,
298-299 (1967) (warrantless search for suspect and weapons
reasonable where delay posed grave danger); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 , 770-771
(1966) (warrantless blood test for alcohol reasonable where delay
would have led to loss of evidence). Moreover, the restraint at
issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope,
cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29-30, and avoiding
significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445
U. S. 573 , 585 (1980) (" '[T]he chief evil against which the
... Fourth Amendment is directed' " is warrantless entry and search
of home) (quoting United States v. United States Dist.
Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297 , 313
(1972)). Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule
of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law
enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 ,654 (1979)
(determining lawfulness by balancing privacy and law enforcement
interests); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873 , 878 (1975)
(same).

															We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and
hence lawful, in light of the following circumstances, which we
consider in combination. First, the police had probable cause to
believe that McArthur's trailer home contained evidence of a crime
and contraband, namely, unlawful 332 drugs. The police had had an opportunity to speak with Tera
McArthur and make at least a very rough assessment of her
reliability. They knew she had had a firsthand opportunity to
observe her husband's behavior, in particular with respect to the
drugs at issue. And they thought, with good reason, that her report
to them reflected that opportunity. Cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.
S. 727 , 732-734 (1984) (per curiam) (upholding search
warrant issued in similar circumstances).

															Second, the police had good reason to fear that, unless
restrained, McArthur would destroy the drugs before they could
return with a warrant. They reasonably might have thought that
McArthur realized that his wife knew about his marijuana stash;
observed that she was angry or frightened enough to ask the police
to accompany her; saw that after leaving the trailer she had spoken
with the police; and noticed that she had walked off with one
policeman while leaving the other outside to observe the trailer.
They reasonably could have concluded that McArthur, consequently
suspecting an imminent search, would, if given the chance, get rid
of the drugs fast.

															Third, the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law
enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy. They
neither searched the trailer nor arrested McArthur before obtaining
a warrant. Rather, they imposed a significantly less restrictive
restraint, preventing McArthur only from entering the trailer
unaccompanied. They left his home and his belongings intact-until a
neutral Magistrate, finding probable cause, issued a warrant.

															Fourth, the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of
time, namely, two hours. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
28 (manner in which police act is "vital ... part of ... inquiry").
As far as the record reveals, this time period was no longer than
reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to
obtain the warrant. Compare United 333 States v. Place, 462 U. S., at 709-710 (holding
90-minute detention of luggage unreasonable based on nature of
interference with person's travels and lack of diligence of
police), with United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 , 253 (1970)
(holding 29-hour detention of mailed package reasonable given
unavoidable delay in obtaining warrant and minimal nature of
intrusion). Given the nature of the intrusion and the law
enforcement interest at stake, this brief seizure of the premises
was permissible.

															B

															Our conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds significant
support in this Court's case law. In Segura v. United
States, 468 U. S.
796 (1984), the Court considered the admissibility of drugs
which the police had found in a lawful, warrant-based search of an
apartment, but only after unlawfully entering the apartment and
occupying it for 19 hours. The majority held that the drugs were
admissible because, had the police acted lawfully throughout, they
could have discovered and seized the drugs pursuant to the validly
issued warrant. See id., at 799, 814-815 (citing Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920)).
The minority disagreed. However, when describing alternative lawful
search and seizure methods, both majority and minority assumed, at
least for argument's sake, that the police, armed with reliable
information that the apartment contained drugs, might lawfully have
sealed the apartment from the outside, restricting entry into the
apartment while waiting for the warrant. Compare Segura v. United States, 468 U. S., at 814 ("Had police never entered
the apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout to
prevent anyone from entering ... and destroying evidence, the
contraband ... would have been ... seized precisely as it was
here"), with id., at 824, n. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("I
assume impoundment would be permissible 334 even absent exigent circumstances when it occurs 'from the
outside' -when the authorities merely seal off premises pending the
issuance of a warrant but do not enter"); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U. S. 385 , 394 (1978) (exigent circumstances do not justify
search where police guard at door could prevent loss of evidence); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 , 52 (1951)
(same).

															In various other circumstances, this Court has upheld temporary
restraints where needed to preserve evidence until police could
obtain a warrant. See, e. g., United States v. Place,
supra, at 706 (reasonable suspicion justifies brief detention
of luggage pending further investigation); United States v. Van Leeuwen, supra, at 253 (reasonable suspicion justifies
detaining package delivered for mailing). Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520
U. S. 385 , 395 (1997) (no need to "knock and announce" when
executing a search warrant where officers reasonably suspect that
evidence might be destroyed); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S.
132 , 153 (1925) (warrantless search of automobile
constitutionally permissible ).

															We have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful a
temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was
designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police
diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time. But
cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 , 754 (1984)
(holding warrantless entry into and arrest in home unreasonable
despite possibility that evidence of noncriminal offense would be
lost while warrant was being obtained).

															C

															Nor are we persuaded by the countervailing considerations that
the parties or lower courts have raised. McArthur argues that the
police proceeded without probable cause. But McArthur has waived
this argument. See 304 Ill. App. 3d, at 397, 713 N. E. 2d, at 95
(stating that McArthur 335 does not contest existence of probable cause); Brief in
Opposition 7 (acknowledging probable cause). And, in any event, it
is without merit. See supra, at 331-332.

															The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the police could
not order McArthur to stay outside his home because McArthur's
porch, where he stood at the time, was part of his home; hence the
order "amounted to a constructive eviction" of McArthur from his
residence. 304 Ill. App. 3d, at 402, 713 N. E. 2d, at 98. This
Court has held, however, that a person standing in the doorway of a
house is "in a 'public' place," and hence subject to arrest without
a warrant permitting entry of the home. United States v. Santana, 427 U.
S. 38 , 42 (1976). Regardless, we do not believe the difference
to which the Appellate Court points-porch versus, e. g.,
front walk-could make a significant difference here as to the
reasonableness of the police restraint; and that, from the Fourth
Amendment's perspective, is what matters.

															The Appellate Court also found negatively significant the fact
that Chief Love, with McArthur's consent, stepped inside the
trailer's doorway to observe McArthur when McArthur reentered the
trailer on two or three occasions. 304 Ill. App. 3d, at 402-403,
713 N. E. 2d, at 98. McArthur, however, reentered simply for his
own convenience, to make phone calls and to obtain cigarettes.
Under these circumstances, the reasonableness of the greater
restriction (preventing reentry) implies the reasonableness of the
lesser (permitting reentry conditioned on observation).

															Finally, McArthur points to a case (and we believe it is the
only case) that he believes offers direct support, namely, Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra. In Welsh, this
Court held that police could not enter a home without a warrant in
order to prevent the loss of evidence (namely, the defendant's
blood alcohol level) of the "nonjailable traffic offense" of
driving while intoxicated. 466 U. S., at 742, 754. McArthur
notes 336 that his two convictions are for misdemeanors, which, he says,
are as minor, and he adds that the restraint, keeping him out of
his home, was nearly as serious.

															We nonetheless find significant distinctions. The evidence at
issue here was of crimes that were "jailable," not "nonjailable."
See Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998); ch. 730, §
5/5-8-3(3) (possession of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana
punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 600/ 3.5; ch. 730,
§ 5/5-8-3(1) (possession of drug paraphernalia punishable by up to
one year in jail). In Welsh, we noted that, "[g]iven that
the classification of state crimes differs widely among the States,
the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to
provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's
interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing that
offense." 466 U. S., at 754, n. 14. The same reasoning applies
here, where class C misdemeanors include such widely diverse
offenses as drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a
railroad platform, bribery by a candidate for public office, and
assault. See, e. g., Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4-8-2
(1998); ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11-504; ch. 720, §
5/12-l.

															And the restriction at issue here is less serious. Temporarily
keeping a person from entering his home, a consequence whenever
police stop a person on the street, is considerably less intrusive
than police entry into the home itself in order to make a
warrantless arrest or conduct a search. Cf. Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S., at 585 (the Fourth Amendment's central concern
is the warrantless entry and search of the home).

															We have explained above why we believe that the need to preserve
evidence of a "jailable" offense was sufficiently urgent or
pressing to justify the restriction upon entry that the police
imposed. We need not decide whether the circumstances before us
would have justified a greater restriction for this type of offense
or the same restriction were only a "nonjailable" offense at
issue. 337 III

															In sum, the police officers in this case had probable cause to
believe that a home contained contraband, which was evidence of a
crime. They reasonably believed that the home's resident, if left
free of any restraint, would destroy that evidence. And they
imposed a restraint that was both limited and tailored reasonably
to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy interests.
In our view, the restraint met the Fourth Amendment's demands.

															The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring.

															I join the Court's opinion subject to this afterword on two
points: the constitutionality of a greater intrusion than the one
here and the permissibility of choosing impoundment over immediate
search. Respondent McArthur's location made the difference between
the exigency that justified temporarily barring him from his own
dwelling and circumstances that would have supported a greater
interference with his privacy and property. As long as he was
inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe that
he had illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported and that with
any sense he would flush them down the drain before the police
could get a warrant to enter and search. This probability of
destruction in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies the kind of
present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances
exception to the general warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 , 770-771
(1966). That risk would have justified the police in entering
McArthur's trailer promptly to make a lawful, warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38 , 42-43
(1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 298-299
(1967). When McArthur stepped 338 outside and left the trailer uninhabited, the risk abated and so
did the reasonableness of entry by the police for as long as he was
outside. This is so because the only justification claimed for
warrantless action here is the immediate risk, and the limit of
reasonable response by the police is set by the scope of the risk.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 ,25-26
(1968).

															Since, however, McArthur wished to go back in, why was it
reasonable to keep him out when the police could perfectly well
have let him do as he chose, and then enjoyed the ensuing
opportunity to follow him and make a warrantless search justified
by the renewed danger of destruction? The answer is not that the
law officiously insists on safeguarding a suspect's privacy from
search, in preference to respecting the suspect's liberty to enter
his own dwelling. Instead, the legitimacy of the decision to
impound the dwelling follows from the law's strong preference for
warrants, which underlies the rule that a search with a warrant has
a stronger claim to justification on later, judicial review than a
search without one. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102 ,
106 (1965); see also 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.2(b), p.
38 (3d ed. 1996) ("[M]ost states follow the rule which is utilized
in the federal courts: if the search or seizure was pursuant to a
warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the police
acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on the
prosecution"). The law can hardly raise incentives to obtain a
warrant without giving the police a fair chance to take their
probable cause to a magistrate and get one.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															The Illinois General Assembly has decided that the possession of
less than 2.5 grams of marijuana is a class C misdemeanor. See Ill.
Compo Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998). In so classifying the
offense, the legislature made a concerted policy judgment that the
possession of small amounts of 339 marijuana for personal use does not constitute a particularly
significant public policy concern. While it is true that this
offense-like feeding livestock on a public highway or offering a
movie for rent without clearly displaying its rating 1_ may warrant
a jail sentence of up to 30 days, the detection and prosecution of
possessors of small quantities of this substance is by no means a
law enforcement priority in the State of Illinois.2

															Because the governmental interest implicated by the particular
criminal prohibition at issue in this case is so slight, this is a
poor vehicle for probing the boundaries of the government's power
to limit an individual's possessory interest in his or her home
pending the arrival of a search warrant. Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984)
(seven Justices decline to address this issue because case does not
require its resolution). Given my preference, I would, therefore,
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

															Compelled by the vote of my colleagues to reach the merits, I
would affirm. As the majority explains, the essential inquiry in
this case involves a balancing of the "privacy-

															1 See Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 605, § 5/9-124.1 (1998) (making
feeding livestock on a public highway a class C misdemeanor); ch.
720, §§ 395/3-395/4 (making it a class C misdemeanor to sell or
rent a video that does not display the official rating of the
motion picture from which it is copied). Other examples of offenses
classified as class C misdemeanors in Illinois include camping on
the side of a public highway, ch. 605, § 5/9-124, interfering with
the "lawful taking of wild animals," ch. 720, § 125/2, and
tattooing the body of a person under 21 years of age, ch. 720, §
5/12-10.

															2 Nor in many other States. Under the laws of many other States,
the maximum penalty McArthur would have faced for possession of 2.3
grams of marijuana would have been less than what he faced in
Illinois. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §
11357(b) (West 1991) ($100 fine); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-18-406(1)
(1999) ($100 fine); Minn. Stat. § 152.027(4) (2000) ($200 fine and
drug education); Miss. Code Ann. §41-29-139(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999)
($100-$250 fine); Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-416(13) (1995) ($100 fine and
drug education); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31-23(B) (1997) ($50-$100
fine and 15 days in jail); N. Y. Penal Law §221.05 (McKinney 2000)
($100 fine); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (Supp. 1998) ($100
fine). 340 related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the
intrusion was reasonable." Ante, at 331. Under the specific
facts of this case, I believe the majority gets the balance wrong.
Each of the Illinois jurists who participated in the decision of
this case placed a higher value on the sanctity of the ordinary
citizen's home than on the prosecution of this petty offense. They
correctly viewed that interest-whether the home be a humble
cottage, a secondhand trailer, or a stately mansion-as one meriting
the most serious constitutional protection.3 Following their
analysis and the reasoning in our decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 (1984) (holding that some offenses
may be so minor as to make it unreasonable for police to undertake
searches that would be constitutionally permissible if graver
offenses were suspected), I would affirm.

															3 Principled respect for the sanctity of the home has long
animated this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e. g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 , 610 (1999)
("The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of
respect for the privacy of the home"); Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S.
573 , 601 (1980) (emphasizing "the overriding respect for the
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 ,
393 (1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum
simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law").

Summary: Police officers prevented the respondent from entering his home unaccompanied while they obtained a search warrant. The Supreme Court held that the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, considering the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake.