U.S. Supreme Court INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) INS v. Chadha No. 80-1832 Argued February 22,
1982 Reargued December 7,
1982 Decided June 23, 1983 462
U.S. 919 ast|>* 462
U.S. 919 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act)
authorizes either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate
the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
Appellee-respondent Chadha, an alien who had been lawfully admitted
to the United States on a nonimmigrant student visa, remained in
the United States after his visa had expired and was ordered by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to show cause why he
should not be deported. He then applied for suspension of the
deportation, and, after a hearing, an Immigration Judge, acting
pursuant to § 244(a)(1) of the Act, which authorizes the Attorney
General, in his discretion, to suspend deportation, ordered the
suspension, and reported the suspension to Congress as required by
§ 244(c)(1). Thereafter, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution pursuant to § 244(c)(2) vetoing the suspension, and the
Immigration Judge reopened the deportation proceedings. Chadha
moved to terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2)
is unconstitutional, but the judge held that he had no authority to
rule on its constitutionality, and ordered Chadha deported pursuant
to the House Resolution. Chadha's appeal to the Board of
Immigration Appeals was dismissed, the Board also holding that it
had no power to declare § 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. Chadha then
filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the Court
of Appeals, and the INS joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that § 244(c)(2)
violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, and
accordingly directed the Attorney General to cease taking any steps
to deport Chadha based upon the House Resolution. Page 462 U. S. 920 Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain the INS's appeal in
No. 80-1832 under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which provides that "[a]ny
party" may appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of "any
court of the United States" holding an Act of Congress
unconstitutional in "any civil action, suit, or proceeding" to
which the United States or any of its agencies is a party. A court
of appeals is "a court of the United States" for purposes of §
1252, the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or
proceeding," the INS is an agency of the United States and was a
party to the proceeding below, and the judgment below held an Act
of Congress unconstitutional. Moreover, for purposes of deciding
whether the INS was "any party" within the grant of appellate
jurisdiction in § 1252, the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the
Court of Appeals' decision prohibiting it from taking action it
would otherwise take. An agency's status as an aggrieved party
under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the Executive may
agree with the holding that the statute in question is
unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S.
929 -931.

															2. Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244.
Section 406 of the Act provides that, if any particular provision
of the Act is held invalid, the remainder of the Act shall not be
affected. This gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not
intend the validity of the Act as a whole, or any part thereof, to
depend upon whether the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid.
This presumption is supported by § 244's legislative history.
Moreover, a provision is further presumed severable if what remains
after severance is fully operative as a law. Here, § 244 can
survive as a "fully operative" and workable administrative
mechanism without the one-House veto. Pp. 462 U. S.
931 -935.

															3. Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of §
244(c)(2), since he has demonstrated "injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S.
59 , 438 U. S. 79 .
Pp. 462 U. S.
935 -936.

															4. The fact that Chadha may have other statutory relief
available to him does not preclude him from challenging the
constitutionality of § 244(c)(2), especially where the other
avenues of relief are at most speculative. Pp. 462 U. S.
936 -937.

															5. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the
Act, which provides that a petition for review in a court of
appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial
review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens
within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings"
under § 242(b) of the Act. Section 106(a) includes all matters on
which the final deportation order is contingent, rather than only
those determinations made at the deportation Page 462 U. S. 921 hearing. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or falls on the
validity of the challenged veto, the final deportation order having
been entered only to implement that veto. Pp. 462 U. S.
937 -939.

															6. A case or controversy is presented by these cases. From the
time of the House's formal intervention, there was concrete
adverseness, and prior to such intervention, there was adequate
Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and
Chadha. The INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter
the fact that the INS would have deported him absent the Court of
Appeals' judgment. Moreover, Congress is the proper party to defend
the validity of a statute when a Government agency, as a defendant
charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the
statute is unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S.
939 -940.

															7. These cases do not present a nonjusticiable political
question on the asserted ground that Chadha is merely challenging
Congress' authority under the Naturalization and Necessary and
Proper Clauses of the Constitution. The presence of constitutional
issues with significant political overtones does not automatically
invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three
branches cannot be evaded by the courts simply because the issues
have political implications. Pp. 462 U. S.
940 -943.

															8. The congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. Pp. 462 U. S.
944 -959.

															(a) The prescription for legislative action in Art. I, § 1 --
requiring all legislative powers to be vested in a Congress
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives -- and § 7 --
requiring every bill passed by the House and Senate, before
becoming law, to be presented to the President, and, if he
disapproves, to be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House
-- represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of
the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure. This procedure is an
integral part of the constitutional design for the separation of
powers. Pp. 462 U. S.
944 -951.

															(b) Here, the action taken by the House pursuant to § 244(c)(2)
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect, and thus was
subject to the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, for
legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and
presentation to the President. The one-House veto operated to
overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation. The
veto's legislative character is confirmed by the character of the
congressional action it supplants; i.e., absent the veto
provision of § 244(c)(2), neither the House nor the Senate, or both
acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to
deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of
legislatively Page 462 U. S. 922 delegated authority, had determined that the alien should remain
in the United States. Without the veto provision, this could have
been achieved only by legislation requiring deportation. A veto by
one House under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at
amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of §
244 as applied to Chadha. The nature of the decision implemented by
the one-House veto further manifests its legislative character.
Congress must abide by its delegation of authority to the Attorney
General until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
Finally, the veto's legislative character is confirmed by the fact
that, when the Framers intended to authorize either House of
Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral
legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure
for such action in the Constitution. Pp. 462 U. S.
951 -959.

															634 F.2d 408, affirmed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 462 U. S. 959 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 462 U. S. 967 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J.,
joined, post, p. 462 U. S.
1013 . Page 462 U. S. 923 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed
consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No. 80-1832. Each
presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the provision in §
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 216, as
amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of Congress,
by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch,
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General
of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to
remain in the United States. I Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a
British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United States in
1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30,
1972. On October 11, 1973, the District Director of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he
should not be deported for having "remained in the United States
for a longer time than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), a
deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge on January
11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable for overstaying
his visa, and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an
application for suspension of deportation under § 244(a)(1) of the
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Section 244(a)(1), at the time in
question, provided:

															"As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General
may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in
the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for
suspension of deportation and -- "

															"(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the
provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been
physically present in the United Page 462 U. S. 924 States for a continuous period of not less than seven years
immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that
during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or
to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
[ Footnote 1 ]"

															After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of
deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7,
1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits
submitted with the application, and the results of a character
investigation conducted by the INS, the Immigration Judge, on June
25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The
Immigration Judge found that Chadha met the requirements of §
244(a)(1): he had resided continuously in the United States for
over seven years, was of good moral character, and would suffer
"extreme hardship" if deported.

															Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1), the
Immigration Judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a report of
the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1)
provides:

															"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney
General to meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section
the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of
such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the
provisions of this subsection, a complete and detailed statement of
the Page 462 U. S. 925 facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be
reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such
reports shall be submitted on the first day of each calendar month
in which Congress is in session."

															Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of
Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the
power under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), to veto
[ Footnote 2 ] the Attorney
General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. Section
244(c)(2) provides:

															"(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of this subsection -- "

															"if during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next
following the session at which a case is reported, either the
Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating
in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such
deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien
or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense
under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If,
within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House
of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney
General shall cancel deportation proceedings. " Page 462 U. S. 926 The June 25, 1974, order of the Immigration Judge suspending
Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid order for a
year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the record, Congress
did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under §
244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th Congress. This was
the final session in which Congress, pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could
act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should
not be deported. The session ended on December 19, 1975. 121
Cong.Rec. 42014, 42277 (1975). Absent congressional action,
Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been canceled after
this date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d).

															On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and
International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the granting
of permanent residence in the United States to [six] aliens,"
including Chadha. H.Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; 121 Cong Rec.
40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on
the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged
from further consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary
and submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121
Cong.Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and was not
made available to other Members of the House prior to or at the
time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record before us
shows, the House consideration of the resolution was based on
Representative Eilberg's statement from the floor that

															"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340
cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution [Chadha and five
others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as
it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee that
their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid. Page 462 U. S. 927 The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote.
[ Footnote 3 ] Since the House
action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated
as an Art. I legislative act; it was not Page 462 U. S. 928 submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for his
action.

															After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to allow
Chadha to remain in the United States, the Immigration Judge
reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order
deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to terminate the proceedings on the
ground that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Immigration Judge
held that he had no authority to rule on the constitutional
validity of § 244(c)(2). On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered
deported pursuant to the House action.

															Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals, again contending that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress," and Chadha's appeal was
dismissed. App. 55-56.

															Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), Chadha
filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position before the
Court of Appeals and joined him in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. In light of the importance of the question, the
Court of Appeals invited both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to file briefs amici curiae. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals held
that the House was without constitutional authority to order
Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General
"to cease and desist from taking any steps to deport this alien
based upon the resolution enacted by the House of Representatives."
634 F.2d 408, 436 (1980). The essence of its holding was that §
244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.

															We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and postponed
consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in No. 80-1832,
454 U.S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm. Page 462 U. S. 929 II Before we address the important question of the
constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2),
we first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court
to resolve the issue raised. A Appellate Jurisdiction Both Houses of Congress [ Footnote 4 ] contend that we are without jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832.
Section 1252 provides:

															"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory
or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United
States, the United States District Court for the District of the
Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding
an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or
proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or
any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a
party." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 , 417 U. S. 742 ,
n. 10 (1974), makes clear that a court of appeals is a "court of
the United States" for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear
that the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit, or
proceeding," that the INS is an agency of the United States and was
a party to the proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an
Act of Congress -- namely, the one-House veto provision in §
244(c)(2) --unconstitutional. The express requisites for an appeal
under § 1252, therefore, have been met. Page 462 U. S. 930 In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the congressional parties
[ Footnote 5 ] direct attention,
however, to our statement that "[a] party who receives all that he
has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the
relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty National
Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326 , 445 U. S. 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation of § 244(c)(2), and
the Court of Appeals granted that relief. Both Houses contend that
the INS has already received what it sought from the Court of
Appeals, is not an aggrieved party, and therefore cannot appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.

															The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport Chadha.
As we have set out more fully, supra, at 462 U. S. 928 ,
the INS concluded that it had no power to rule on the
constitutionality of that order, and accordingly proceeded to
implement it. Chadha's appeal challenged that decision, and the INS
presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the
House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to the
Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to comply with
the House action ordering deportation of Chadha. The Court of
Appeals set aside the deportation proceedings and ordered the
Attorney General to cease and desist from taking any steps to
deport Chadha, steps that the Attorney General would have taken
were it not for that decision.

															At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any party"
within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we hold that
the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision
prohibiting it from taking action it would otherwise take. It is
apparent that Congress intended that Page 462 U. S. 931 this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical
prerequisites of § 1252; in other cases where an Act of Congress is
held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in this Court is
available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of the United
States is a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it
administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for
purposes of taking an appeal under § 1252. The agency's status as
an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not altered by the fact that the
Executive may agree with the holding that the statute in question
is unconstitutional. The appeal in No. 80-1832 is therefore
properly before us. [ Footnote
6 ] B Severability Congress also contends that the provision for the one-House veto
in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from § 244. Congress argues that,
if the provision for the one-House veto is held unconstitutional,
all of § 244 must fall. If § 244 in its entirety is violative of
the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no
authority to suspend Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1), and
Chadha would be deported. From this, Congress argues that Chadha
lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the one-House
veto provision, because he could receive no relief even if his
constitutional challenge proves successful. [ Footnote 7 ]

															Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of
a statute are to be severed

															"'[u]nless it is evident that Page 462 U. S. 932 the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which
are within its power, independently of that which is not.'" Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 108 (1976), quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of
Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 , 286 U. S. 234 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on that elusive inquiry,
since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of
severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, note
following 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which provides:

															"If any particular provision of this Act, or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision
to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby. "

															(Emphasis added.) This language is unambiguous, and gives rise
to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the
Act as a whole, or of any part of the Act, to depend upon whether
the veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of the
Act as that language is used in the severability clause. Congress
clearly intended "the remainder of the Act" to stand if "any
particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have
more plainly authorized the presumption that the provision for a
one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of §
244 and the Act of which it is a part. See Electric Bond &
Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 , 303 U. S. 434 (1938).

															The presumption as to the severability of the one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) is supported by the legislative history of
§ 244. That section and its precursors supplanted the
long-established pattern of dealing with deportations like Chadha's
on a case-by-case basis through private bills. Although it may be
that Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over
cancellation of deportations, such reluctance is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption of severability raised by § 406. Page 462 U. S. 933 The Immigration Act of 1924, ch.190, § 14, 43 Stat. 162,
required the Secretary of Labor to deport any alien who entered or
remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a
deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States was to
have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses
and presented to the President pursuant to the procedures set out
in Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution. These private bills were found
intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced by
Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant permanent
residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:

															"It was my original thought that the way to handle all these
meritorious cases was through special bills. I am absolutely
convinced as a result of what has occurred in this House that it is
impossible to deal with this situation through special bills. We
had a demonstration of that fact not long ago when 15 special bills
were before this House. The House consumed 5 1/2 hours considering
four bills, and made no disposition of any of the bills."

															81 Cong.Rec. 5542 (1937). Representative Dies' bill passed the
House, id. at 5574, but did not come to a vote in the
Senate. 83 Cong.Rec. 8992-8996 (1938).

															Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend the
deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act of
1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that an alien
was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's decision to the
contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the
suspension.

															In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of
aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition,
however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to
suspend deportations by providing that the Attorney General could
not cancel a deportation unless both Houses affirmatively voted by
concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. A
ct of July 1, 1948, Page 462 U. S. 934 ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent
resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as private
bills. Just one year later, the House Judiciary Committee, in
support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2), stated in a Report:

															"In the light of experience of the last several months, the
committee came to the conclusion that the requirement of
affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in many thousands
of individual cases which are submitted by the Attorney General
every year is not workable, and places upon the Congress and
particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities
which it cannot assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the
Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution mechanism]
are of purely administrative nature, and they seriously interfere
with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and
would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the
House."

															H.R.Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1949).

															The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the
Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was
incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub.L.
414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. Plainly, Congress' desire to retain a
veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation, but must be
viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of
private immigration bills. This legislative history is not
sufficient to rebut the presumption of severability raised by §
406, because there is insufficient evidence that Congress would
have continued to subject itself to the onerous burdens of private
bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be held
unconstitutional.

															A provision is further presumed severable if what remains after
severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co.
v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, at 286 U. S. 234 .
There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and workable
administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2).
Entirely independent of the one-House veto, the Page 462 U. S. 935 administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the
Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under § 244(a).
Congress' oversight of the exercise of this delegated authority is
preserved, since all such suspensions will continue to be reported
to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent the passage of a bill to the
contrary, [ Footnote 8 ]
deportation proceedings will be canceled when the period specified
in § 244(c)(2) has expired. [ Footnote 9 ] Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable
administrative mechanism without the one-House veto. C Standing We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks standing
because a consequence of his prevailing will advance Page 462 U. S. 936 the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation-of-powers
dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's private
interests. Chadha has demonstrated "injury in fact and a
substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury. . . ." Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S.
59 , 438 U. S. 79 (1978). If the veto provision violates the Constitution, and is
severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be canceled.
Chadha therefore has standing to challenge the order of the
Executive mandated by the House veto. D Alternative Relief It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the
constitutional question presented by these cases because Chadha may
have other statutory relief available to him. It is argued that,
since Chadha married a United States citizen on August 10, 1980, it
is possible that other avenues of relief may be open under §§
201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, and
1255. It is true that Chadha may be eligible for classification as
an "immediate relative" and, as such, could lawfully be accorded
permanent residence. Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the
decision of the Court of Appeals in these cases, Congress enacted
the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, under which
the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then
permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to his
country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race."

															It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a
prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question
presented in these cases. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). If we could perceive merit in
this contention, we might well seek to avoid deciding the
constitutional claim advanced. But, at most, Page 462 U. S. 937 these other avenues of relief are speculative. It is by means
certain, for example, that Chadha's classification an immediate
relative would result in the adjustment Chadha's status from
nonimmigrant to permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present
challenge, he will not be deported, and will automatically become
eligible to apply for citizenship. [ Footnote 10 ] A person threatened with deportation cannot
be denied the right to challenge the constitutional validity of the
process which led to his status merely on the basis of speculation
over the availability of other forms of relief. E Jurisdiction It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction
under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). That section
provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals

															"shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial
review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against aliens
within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings
under section 242(b) of this Act."

															Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by §
244(c)(2) takes place outside the administrative proceedings
conducted under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant
contained in § 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional
challenge.

															In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.
S. 206 , 392 U. S. 216 (1968), this Court held that

															"§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations Page 462 U. S. 938 made during a proceeding conducted under § 242(b), including
those determinations made incident to a motion to reopen such
proceedings."

															It is true that one court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to
preclude appeals similar to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v.
INS, 660 F.2d 880 (CA3 1981). [ Footnote 11 ] However, we agree with the Court of Appeals
in these cases that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes
all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent,
rather than only those determinations actually made at the
hearing." 634 F.2d at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation stands or
falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final order of
deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action
of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was
satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not
have any effect on his decision to suspend deportation, he
appropriately let the controversy take its course through the
courts.

															This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does
not bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation had
been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to stay the
execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien
sought review in the Court of Appeals under § 106(a). This Court's
holding that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction was based on
the fact that the alien "did not attack the deportation order
itself, but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.'" 392
U.S. at 392 U. S. 213 ,
quoting Page 462 U. S.
939 Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here,
in contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself,
and the relief he seeks -- cancellation of deportation -- is
plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to decide these
cases. F Case or Controversy It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy but
"a friendly, nonadversary, proceeding," Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. at 297 U. S. 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass.
This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS take the
same position on the constitutionality of the one-House veto. But
it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice,
a person could be denied access to the courts because the Attorney
General of the United States agreed with the legal arguments
asserted by the individual.

															A case or controversy is presented by these cases. First, from
the time of Congress' formal intervention, see n 5, supra, the concrete
adverseness is beyond doubt. Congress is both a proper party to
defend the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Second, prior to Congress' intervention,
there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only
parties were the INS and Chadha. We have already held that the
INS's agreement with the Court of Appeals' decision that §
244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's
"aggrieved" status for purposes of appealing that decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1252, see supra at 462 U. S.
929 -931. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with
Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the INS would have
deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that

															"Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our decision
will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be
deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), Page 462 U. S. 940 the INS will execute its order and deport him."

															634 F.2d at 419. [ Footnote
12 ]

															Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III,
concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of these cases in the
absence of any participant supporting the validity of § 244(c)(2).
The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any such concerns by
inviting and accepting briefs from both Houses of Congress. We have
long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity
of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged
with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute
is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v.
INS, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 210 ,
n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.
S. 303 (1946). G Political Question It is also argued that these cases present a nonjusticiable
political question, because Chadha is merely challenging Congress'
authority under the Naturalization Clause, U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S.Const., Art. I, §
8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress' Art. I power "To establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization," combined with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation
of aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art.
I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question, but what is Page 462 U. S. 941 challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As
we made clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 (1976):

															"Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has
substantive legislative jurisdiction, McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316 (1819), so long as the
exercise of that authority does not offend some other
constitutional restriction." Id. at 424 U. S.
132 .

															A brief review of those factors which may indicate the presence
of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that our
assertion of jurisdiction over these cases does no violence to the
political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186 , 369 U. S. 217 (1962), a political question may arise when any one of the
following circumstances is present:

															"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question."

															Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability
to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that
Chadha's claim is "an assault on the legislative authority to enact
Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 48. But
if this turns the question into a political question, virtually
every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a
political question. Chadha indeed argues that one House of Congress
cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision to
allow him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the
political question doctrine Page 462 U. S. 942 suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in
concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the
constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts.
[ Footnote 13 ]

															Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this
case. As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards" of Baker for resolving the question presented by these cases.
Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial
"policy determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a
coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted, §
244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that
statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of
"multifarious pronouncements" on this question.

															It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be termed
"political." But the presence of constitutional issues with
significant political overtones does not automatically invoke Page 462 U. S. 943 the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three
branches cannot be evaded by courts because the issues have
political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v.
Madison , 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a
"political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial
commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but
not delivered. But

															"courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy
as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds
constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 369 U. S.
217 .

															In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether

															"a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and by the President of the Senate, presented to and approved by
the President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to
the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does not
become a law of the United States if it had not in fact been passed
by Congress. . . ."

															". . . We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from
the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to
the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of
laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of
the United States extend. On the other hand, we cannot be unmindful
of the consequences that must result if this court should feel
obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an
enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast
magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the public
archives, as an act of Congress, . . . did not become a
law." Id. at 143 U. S.
669 -670 (emphasis in original). H The contentions on standing and justiciability have been fully
examined, and we are satisfied the parties are properly before us.
The important issues have been fully briefed and Page 462 U. S. 944 twice argued, see 458 U.S. 1120 (1982). The Court's
duty in these cases, as Chief Justice Marshall declared in Cohens v.
Virginia , 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U. S. 404 (1821), is clear:

															"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot
avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and
conscientiously to perform our duty." III A We turn now to the question whether action of one House of
Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution.
We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged
statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a
challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be
sustained:

															"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.
We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the
power of veto." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 , 437 U. S.
194 -195 (1978).

															By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to
the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives -- or the hallmarks -- of democratic government, and our
inquiry is sharpened, rather than blunted, by the fact that
congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing
frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and
independent agencies:

															"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law,
295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196
different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes
were affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between 1950-59,
thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year
1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such
provisions Page 462 U. S. 945 were included in eighty-nine laws."

															Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind.L.Rev.
323, 324 (1977). See also Appendix to JUSTICE WHITE's
dissent, post at 462 U. S.
1003 . JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the
proposition that the one-House veto is a useful "political
invention," post at 462 U. S. 972 ,
and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even concede this
utilitarian argument, although the long-range political wisdom of
this "invention" is arguable. It has been vigorously debated, and
it is instructive to compare the views of the protagonists. See, e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and
the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev.
455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible
Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253 (1982). But
policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are
subject to the demands of the Constitution, which defines powers
and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those powers
are to be exercised.

															Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and
of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the precise
terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the resolution
of these cases, we set them out verbatim. Article I provides:

															"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."

															Art. I, § 1. (Emphasis added.)

															"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President of the United States. . . ."

															Art. I, 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added.)

															" Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) Page 462 U. S. 946 shall be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a
Bill."

															Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added.)

															These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the
constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have
recently noted that

															"[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply an
abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven
into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer
of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 124 .
Just as we relied on the textual provision of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2,
to vindicate the principle of separation of powers in Buckley, we see that the purposes underlying the
Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral
requirement of Art. I, § 1, and § 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of
the important question presented in these cases. The very structure
of the Articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II,
and III exemplifies the concept of separation of powers, and we now
turn to Art. I. B The Presentment Clauses The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the
requirement that all legislation be presented to the President
before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the Framers.
[ Footnote 14 ] Presentment to
the President and the Presidential Page 462 U. S. 947 veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took
special pains to assure that these requirements could not be
circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, James
Madison expressed concern that it might easily be evaded by the
simple expedient of calling a proposed law a "resolution" or
"vote," rather than a "bill." 2 Farrand 301-302. As a consequence,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, supra at 462 U. S.
945 -946, was added. 2 Farrand 304-305.

															The decision to provide the President with a limited and
qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was based
on the profound conviction of the Framers that the powers conferred
on Congress were the powers to be most carefully circumscribed. It
is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both
Houses and the President. In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed.
1888), Hamilton focused on the President's role in making laws:

															"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the
legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules
of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach
us that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but
ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of
self-defence." Id. at 458. See also The Federalist No. 51. In
his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same
point. 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 614-615 (3d ed. 1858).

															The President's role in the lawmaking process also reflects the
Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a particular
Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, Page 462 U. S. 948 or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role in the
legislative process was described later during public debate on
ratification:

															"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good,
which may happen to influence a majority of that body."

															". . . The primary inducement to conferring the power in
question upon the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the
secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design."

															The Federalist No. 73, supra, at 458 (A. Hamilton). See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.
S. 655 , 279 U. S. 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 , 272 U. S. 123 (1926). The Court also has observed that the Presentment Clauses
serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national"
perspective is grafted on the legislative process:

															"The President is a representative of the people just as the
members of the Senate and of the House are, and it may be, at some
times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the
people is rather more representative of them all than are the
members of either body of the Legislature, whose constituencies are
local and not countrywide. . . ." Myers v. United States, supra, at 272 U. S.
123 . C Bicameralism The bicameral requirement of Art. I, § § 1, 7, was of scarcely
less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto, and
indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no
law could take effect without the concurrence of the prescribed
majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized
their belief, already remarked Page 462 U. S. 949 upon in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that
legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and
fully considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the
Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral
legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court,
commented:

															"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes, sometimes in an
Executive, sometimes in a military, one. Is there danger of a
Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If
the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither
liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it
within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single
house there is no check but the inadequate one of the virtue &
good sense of those who compose it."

															1 Farrand 254.

															Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single House was
antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitution. Were the
Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for only one legislative
organ, he warned:

															"[W]e shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most
important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our
posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human
infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality that
very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either
are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert."

															The Federalist No. 22, p. 135 (H. Lodge ed. 1888).

															This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the
fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph Story:

															"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally under the
dominion of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable,
and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] Page 462 U. S. 950 feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to
insist upon holding a question long enough under its own view to
see and mark it in all its bearings and relations on society."

															1 Story, supra , at 383-384. These observations are
consistent with what many of the Framers expressed, none more
cogently than Madison in pointing up the need to divide and
disperse power in order to protect liberty:

															"In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily
predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the
legislature into different branches, and to render them, by
different modes of election and different principles of action, as
little connected with each other as the nature of their common
functions and their common dependence on the society will
admit."

															The Federalist No. 51, p. 324 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (sometimes
attributed to "Hamilton or Madison" but now generally attributed to
Madison). See also The Federalist No. 62.

															However familiar, it is useful to recall that, apart from their
fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of
public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not of one
mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states. Those states
feared a commonality of interest among the larger states would work
to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the
other hand, were skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws
favoring a minority of the people. See 1 Farrand 176-177,
484-491. It need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise,
under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the
other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small
states. [ Footnote 15 ] Page 462 U. S. 951 We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that
the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would serve
essential constitutional functions. The President's participation
in the legislative process was to protect the Executive Branch from
Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws. The
division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that
the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for
full study and debate in separate settings. The President's
unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of
two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto, thereby
precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See id. at 99-104. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative
action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that
the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure. IV The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the
new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that
each branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.

															Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 121 , the powers delegated to the three
Branches are functionally identifiable. When any Branch acts, it is
presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated
to it. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 276 U. S. 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, he presumptively acts in an
executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And
when, as here, Page 462 U. S. 952 one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively
acting within its assigned sphere.

															Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless establish
that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to
which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, apply. Not every
action taken by either House is subject to the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Art. I. See infra at 462 U. S. 955 ,
and nn. 20, 21. Whether actions taken by either House are, in law
and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their
form, but upon "whether they contain matter which is properly to be
regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S.Rep. No.
1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).

															Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to §
244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in purpose
and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in Art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House
took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons, including the Attorney
General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the
Legislative Branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one
House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an
individual alien whose deportation otherwise would be canceled
under § 244. The one-House veto operated in these cases to overrule
the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the
House action, Chadha would remain in the United States. Congress
has acted, and its action has altered Chadha's status.

															The legislative character of the one-House veto in these cases
is confirmed by the character of the congressional action it
supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate
contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)(2), either of
them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require
the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General,
in the exercise of legislatively Page 462 U. S. 953 delegated authority, [ Footnote 16 ] had determined the alien should remain in
the United States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2),
this could have been achieved, if at all, only Page 462 U. S. 954 by legislation requiring deportation. [ Footnote 17 ] Similarly, a veto by one House of
Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at
amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(1), or as a repeal of §
244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less
than enactment, must conform with Art. I. [ Footnote 18 ]

															The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in
these cases further manifests its legislative character. After long
experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure,
Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive
Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to
allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain
specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to
delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be
implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art.
I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation -- that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadha -- no
less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney
General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only one
way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the Page 462 U. S. 955 President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority
until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.
[ Footnote 19 ]

															Finally, we see that, when the Framers intended to authorize
either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed
bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the
procedure for such action. There are four provisions in the
Constitution, [ Footnote 20 ]
explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may act alone with the
unreviewable force of law, not subject to the President's veto:

															(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to
initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5;

															(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials
following impeachment on charges initiated by the House, and to
convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6;

															(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to
approve or to disapprove Presidential appointments. Art. II, § 2,
cl. 2;

															(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify
treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, 2, cl. 2.

															Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on
one House, independent of the other House, or of the President,
they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. [ Footnote 21 ] Page 462 U. S. 956 These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and
bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative
functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and
binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution. These
exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of
them authorize the action challenged here. On the contrary, they
provide further support for the conclusion that congressional
authority is not to be implied, and for the conclusion that the
veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the
constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.

															Since it is clear that the action by the House under § 244(c)(2)
was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions
authorizing one House to act alone, and equally Page 462 U. S. 957 clear that it was an exercise of legislative power, that action
was subject to the standards prescribed in Art. I. [ Footnote 22 ] The bicameral requirement, the
Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power to
override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks on each
Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of
power by mandating certain prescribed steps. To preserve those Page 462 U. S. 958 checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully
defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded. To
accomplish what has been attempted by one House of Congress in this
case requires action in conformity with the express procedures of
the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by
a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.
[ Footnote 23 ]

															The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in many
respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the Executive by
Congress of its authority over aliens in this manner is, on its
face, an appealing compromise. In purely practical terms, it is
obviously easier for action to be taken by one House without
submission to the President; but it is crystal Page 462 U. S. 959 clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous
writings, and debates that the Framers ranked other values higher
than efficiency. The records of the Convention and debates in the
states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to
define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers
affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable
expression of a determination that legislation by the national
Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process.

															The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional
Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem
clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were
consciously made by men who had lived under a form of government
that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There
is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for
the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may
be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay,
untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power
subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution. V We hold that the congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is
severable from the Act, and that it is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. * Together with No. 80-2170, United States House of
Representatives v. Immigration and Naturalization Service et
al., and No. 80-2171, United States Senate v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service et al., on certiorari to the same
court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of
the Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his
responsibilities through the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, a division of the Department of Justice. Ibid. [ Footnote 2 ]

															In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the
President's power under Art. I, 7, of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary 1403 (5th ed.1979). It appears,
however, that congressional devices of the type authorized by §
244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as a "veto." See, e.g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the
Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253
(1982); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the
Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind.L.J. 367 (1977). We refer to the
congressional "resolution" authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a
"one-House veto" of the Attorney General's decision to allow a
particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															It is not at all clear whether the House generally, or
Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood
the relationship between H.Res. 926 and the Attorney General's
decision to suspend Chadha's deportation. Exactly one year previous
to the House veto of the Attorney General's decision in this case,
Representative Eilberg introduced a similar resolution disapproving
the Attorney General's suspension of deportation in the case of six
other aliens. H.Res. 1518, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The
following colloquy occurred on the floor of the House:

															"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object,
is this procedure to expedite the ongoing operations of the
Department of Justice, as far as these people are concerned. Is it
in any way contrary to whatever action the Attorney General has
taken on the question of deportation; does the gentleman know?"

															"Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the answer is no to the gentleman's
final question. These aliens have been found to be deportable and
the Special Inquiry Officer's decision denying suspension of
deportation has been reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
We are complying with the law, since all of these decisions have
been referred to us for approval or disapproval, and there are
hundreds of cases in this category. In these six cases, however, we
believe it would be grossly improper to allow these people to
acquire the status of permanent resident aliens."

															"Mr. WYLIE. In other words, the gentleman has been working with
the Attorney General's office?"

															"Mr. EILBERG. Yes."

															"Mr. WYLIE. This bill then is in fact a confirmation of what the
Attorney General intends to do?"

															"Mr. EILBERG. The gentleman is correct insofar as it relates to
the determination of deportability which has been made by the
Department of Justice in each of these cases."

															"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of
objection."

															120 Cong.Rec. 41412 (1974). Clearly, this was an obfuscation of
the effect of a veto under § 244(c)(2). Such a veto in no way
constitutes "a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to
do." To the contrary, such a resolution was meant to overrule and
set aside, or "veto," the Attorney General's determination that, in
a particular case, cancellation of deportation would be appropriate
under the standards set forth in § 244(a)(1).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Nine Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the
position taken in the briefs filed by the Senate and the House of
Representatives, and have filed a brief amici curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in
this case.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case,
S.Res. 40 and H.R.Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on
February 3, 1981, filed motions to intervene and petitioned for
rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motions to intervene.
Both Houses are therefore proper "parties" within the meaning of
that ter, in 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). See Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U. S. 416 , 432 U. S. 424 ,
n. 7 (1977).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In addition to meeting the statutory requisites of § 1252, of
course, an appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy
under Art. III. Such a controversy clearly exists in No. 80-1832,
as in the other two cases, because of the presence of the two
Houses of Congress as adverse parties. See infra at 462 U. S. 939 ; see also Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U. S. 297 , 459 U. S.
302 -305 (1982).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In this case, we deem it appropriate to address questions of
severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 , 424 U. S.
108 -109 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 , 390 U. S. 585 (1968).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Without the provision for one-House veto, Congress would
presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in §
244(c)(2), to enact a law, in accordance with the requirements of
Art. I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's
deportation, unless, of course, other constitutional principles
place substantive limitations on such action. Cf. Attorney
General Jackson's attack on H.R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940),
a bill to require the Attorney General to deport an individual
alien. The Attorney General called the bill

															"an historical departure from an unbroken American practice and
tradition. It would be the first time that an act of Congress
singled out a named individual for deportation."

															S.Rep. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, p. 9 (1940)
(reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18, 1940). See n 17, infra. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Without the one-House veto, § 244 resembles the "report and
wait" provision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U. S. 1 (1941).
The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly
promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

															"shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to
Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular
session thereof and until after the close of such session."

															Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute
did not provide that Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal
Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules
before they became effective, and to pass legislation barring their
effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique
was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to stay, and ultimately
to revise, the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare Act of
Mar. 30, 1973, Pub.L. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, with Act of Jan.
2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-595, 88 Stat.1926.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Depending on how the INS interprets its statutory duty under §
244 apart from the challenged portion of § 244(c)(2), Chadha's
status may be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent
resident as of December 19, 1975 -- the last session in which
Congress could have attempted to stop the suspension of Chadha's
deportation from ripening into cancellation of deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's 5-year
waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a), would have elapsed.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under §
106(a) would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2)
because that issue could not have been tested during the
administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b).
The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United
States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that
required them to report to the District Director of the INS during
the Iranian hostage crisis. The aliens reported and were ordered
deported after a § 242(b) proceeding. The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the
challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation
would have been canceled but for § 244(c)(2).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.
S. 574 (1983). There, the United States agreed with Bob
Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools that certain
Revenue Rulings denying tax-exempt status to schools that
discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its
agreement with the schools, however, the United States was
complying with a court order enjoining it from granting tax-exempt
status to any school that discriminated on the basis of race. Even
though the Government largely agreed with the opposing party on the
merits of the controversy, we found an adequate basis for
jurisdiction in the fact that the Government intended to enforce
the challenged law against that party. See id. at 461 U. S. 585 ,
n. 9.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The suggestion is made that 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from
constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was
passed by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury
v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that
question. The assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a
provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from
judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.
S. 735 , 442 U. S. 740 ,
n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 , 426 U. S. 841 ,
n. 12 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 (1926). See also n 22, infra. In any event, 11 Presidents,
from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with
this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge
congressional vetoes as unconstitutional. See Henry, The
Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16
Harv.J.Legis. 735, 737-738, n. 7 (1979) (collecting citations to
Presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression
on the constitutionality of the congressional veto is found in
Attorney General William D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933,
to President Hoover. 37 Op.Atty.Gen. 56. Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts
which are objectionable on constitutional grounds. For example,
after President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941,
Attorney General Jackson released a memorandum explaining the
President's view that the provision allowing the Act's
authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution was
unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66
Harv.L.Rev. 1353 (1953).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															The widespread approval of the delegates was commented on by
Joseph Story:

															"In the convention there does not seem to have been much
diversity of opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to
the president a negative on the laws. The principal points of
discussion seem to have been whether the negative should be
absolute, or qualified; and if the latter, by what number of each
house the bill should subsequently be passed in order to become a
law; and whether the negative should in either case be exclusively
vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other
department of the government."

															1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 611 (3d ed. 1858). See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 21, 97-104, 138-140 (1911)
(hereinafter Farrand); id. at 73-80, 181, 298,
301-305.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers
that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not
be altered, even by constitutional amendment, except with the
consent of the states affected. See U.S.Const., Art V.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in these
cases will sanction

															"lawmaking by the Attorney General. . . . Why is the Attorney
General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to
the full bicameral process?"

															Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. To be sure, some
administrative agency action -- rulemaking, for example -- may
resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), which defines
an agency's "rule" as

															"the whole or part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . . ."

															This Court has referred to agency activity as being
"quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 , 295 U. S. 628 (1935). Clearly, however,

															"[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 587 (1952). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 123 .
When the Attorney General performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he
does not exercise "legislative" power. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 , 425 U. S.
213 -214 (1976). The bicameral process is not necessary
as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws, because
his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the
statute that created it -- a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art.
I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's
execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only
a question of delegation doctrine. The courts, when a case or
controversy arises, can always "ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 321 U. S. 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, at 343 U. S. 585 ; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 440, 541 F.2d 1,
68 (en banc) (separate statement of Leventhal, J.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the
Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he
administers the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action
under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble
"legislative" action in some respects is not subject to the
approval of both Houses of Congress and the President for the
reason that the Constitution does not so require. That kind of
Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the
legislation that authorized it; and if that authority is exceeded,
it is open to judicial review, as well as the power of Congress to
modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is
clearly legislative in both character and effect, and is not so
checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, is
therefore clear. Congress' authority to delegate portions of its
power to administrative agencies provides no support for the
argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration
of the laws by way of a congressional veto.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would
violate any constitutional provision. See n 8, supra. [ Footnote 18 ]

															During the Convention of 1787, the application of the
President's veto to repeals of statutes was addressed, and the
Framers were apparently content with Madison's comment that,

															"[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was probable that, in
doubtful cases, the policy would soon take place of limiting the
duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal."

															2 Farrand 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal
Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66
Harv.L.Rev. 569, 587599 (1953). There is no provision allowing
Congress to repeal or amend laws by other than legislative means
pursuant to Art. I.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to
"the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers."
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative
Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455, 462 (1977).
The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee
and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact
that Congress ultimately controls administrative agencies in the
legislation that creates them, other means of control, such as
durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting
requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id. at 460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to
Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto," 32
Ad.L.Rev. 667 (1980). See also n 9, supra. [ Footnote 20 ] See also U.S.Const., Art. 11; § 1, and Amdt. 12.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hollingsworth v.
Virginia , 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held
Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional
amendment which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite
two-thirds majority. See U.S.Const., Art. V.

															One might also include another "exception" to the rule that
congressional action having the force of law be subject to the
bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses. Each House has
the power to act alone in determining specified internal matters.
Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and § 5, cl. 2. However, this "exception"
only empowers Congress to bind itself, and is noteworthy only
insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress
not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely
circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated
instances.

															Although the bicameral check was not provided for in any of
these provisions for independent congressional action,
precautionary alternative checks are evident. For example, Art. II,
§ 2, requires that two-thirds of the Senators present concur in the
Senate's consent to a treaty, rather than the simple majority
required for passage of legislation. See The Federalist
No. 64 (J. Jay); The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton); The
Federalist No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the Framers adopted an
alternative protection, in the stead of Presidential veto and
bicameralism, by requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the
Senators present for a conviction of impeachment. Art. I, § 3. We
also note that the Court's holding in Hollingsworth,
supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to
two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must
command the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second,
three-fourths of the states must ratify any amendment.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															JUSTICE POWELL's position is that the one-House veto in this
case is a judicial act, and therefore unconstitutional as beyond
the authority vested in Congress by the Constitution. We agree that
there is a sense in which one-House action pursuant to § 244(c)(2)
has a judicial cast, since it purports to "review" Executive
action. In this case, for example, the sponsor of the resolution
vetoing the suspension of Chadha's deportation argued that Chadha
"did not meet [the] statutory requirements" for suspension of
deportation. Supra at 462 U. S. 926 .
To be sure, it is normally up to the courts to decide whether an
agency has complied with its statutory mandate. See n 16, supra. But
the attempted analogy between judicial action and the one-House
veto is less than perfect. Federal courts do not enjoy a roving
mandate to correct alleged excesses of administrative agencies; we
are limited by Art. III to hearing cases and controversies, and no
justiciable case or controversy was presented by the Attorney
General's decision to allow Chadha to remain in this country. We
are aware of no decision, and JUSTICE POWELL has cited none, where
a federal court has reviewed a decision of the Attorney General
suspending deportation of an alien pursuant to the standards set
out in § 244(a)(1). This is not surprising, given that no party to
such action has either the motivation or the right to appeal from
it. As JUSTICE WHITE correctly notes, post at 462 U. S.
1001 -1002,

															"the courts have not been given the authority to review whether
an alien should be given permanent status; review is limited to
whether the Attorney General has properly applied the statutory
standards for"

															denying a request for suspension of deportation. Foti v.
INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963), relied on by JUSTICE POWELL, addressed only

															"whether a refusal by the Attorney General to grant a suspension
of deportation is one of those 'final orders of deportation' of
which direct review by Courts of Appeals is authorized under §
106(a) of the Act." Id. at 375 U. S. 221 .
Thus, JUSTICE POWELL's statement that the one-House veto in this
case is "clearly adjudicatory," post at 462 U. S. 964 ,
simply is not supported by his accompanying assertion that the
House has "assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal
courts." Post at 462 U. S. 965 .
We are satisfied that the one-House veto is legislative in purpose
and effect, and subject to the procedures set out in Art. I.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the
bicameralism and presentation requirements for the enactment of
future legislation affecting aliens. See Atkins v. United
States, 214 Ct.Cl. 186, 250-251, 556 F.2d 1028, 1063-1064
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978); Brief for
Petitioner in No. 80-2170, p. 40. The explicit prescription for
legislative action contained in Art. I cannot be amended by
legislation. See n 13, supra. JUSTICE WHITE suggests that the Attorney General's action under
§ 244(c)(1) suspending deportation is equivalent to a proposal for
legislation and that, because congressional approval is indicated
"by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the
requirement of bicameral approval." Post at 462 U. S. 997 .
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, that approach "would
analogize the effect of the one house disapproval to the failure of
one house to vote affirmatively on a private bill." 634 F.2d 408,
435 (1980). Even if it were clear that Congress entertained such an
arcane theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2), which JUSTICE WHITE does
not suggest, this would amount to nothing less than an amending of
Art. I. The legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty
formalities; they were designed to assure that both Houses of
Congress and the President participate in the exercise of lawmaking
authority. This does not mean that legislation must always be
preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that it is not
necessary for a legislative body to "articulate its reasons for
enacting a statute." United states Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz, 449 U. S. 166 , 449 U. S. 179 (1980). But the steps required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7, make certain
that there is an opportunity for deliberation and debate. To allow
Congress to evade the strictures of the Constitution and in effect
enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be
squared with Art. I.

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

															The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses, Art. I,
7, cls. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of the
legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one pause.
Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds Page 462 U. S. 960 of statutes, dating back to the 1930's. Congress clearly views
this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of power
to administrative agencies. [ Footnote
2/1 ] One reasonably may disagree with Congress' assessment of
the veto's utility, [ Footnote 2/2 ]
but the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of
Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive
than necessary to decide these cases. In my view, the cases may be
decided on a narrower ground. When Congress finds that a particular
person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for permanent
residence in this country, it has assumed a judicial function in
violation of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I
concur only in the judgment. I A The Framers perceived that

															"[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."

															The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed.1961) (J. Madison).
Theirs was not a baseless fear. Under British rule, the Colonies
suffered the abuses of unchecked executive power that were
attributed, at least popularly, to a hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76
Colum.L.Rev. 369, 374 (1976); The Federalist No. 48. During the
Confederation, Page 462 U. S. 961 the States reacted by removing power from the executive and
placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But many
legislators proved to be little better than the Crown.

															"The supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the
supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities. The
legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money schemes,
[and] suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts."

															Levi, supra, at 374-375.

															One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation was the
exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures. The Framers
were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the
determination of the rights of one person to the "tyranny of
shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that members of the
General Assembly in his native Virginia had not been prevented from
assuming judicial power, and " [t]hey have accordingly in
many instances decided rights which should have been
left to judiciary controversy. '" [ Footnote 2/3 ] The Federalist No. 48, supra, at
336 (emphasis in original) (quoting T. Jefferson, Notes on the
State of Virginia 196 (London ed. 1787)). The same concern also was
evident in the reports of the Council of the Censors, a body that
was charged with determining whether the Pennsylvania Legislature
had complied with the State Constitution. The Council found that,
during this period, "[t]he constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and
powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution. .
. . [C]ases belonging Page 462 U. S. 962 to the judiciary department, frequently [had been] drawn within
legislative cognizance and determination."

															The Federalist No. 48, at 336-337.

															It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the Framers
vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate
branches. Their concern that a legislature should not be able
unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person was
expressed not only in this general allocation of power, but also in
more specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. As the Court recognized in United States v.
Brown, 381 U. S. 437 , 381 U. S. 442 (1965),

															"the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow,
technical . . . prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the
separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative
exercise of the judicial function, or more simply -- trial by
legislature."

															This Clause, and the separation of powers doctrine generally,
reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a legislature lacks the
safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of power. B The Constitution does not establish three branches with
precisely defined boundaries. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 121 (1976) (per curiam). Rather, as Justice Jackson wrote:

															"While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 (1952) (concurring in judgment). The Court thus has been mindful
that the boundaries between each branch should be fixed "according
to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
coordination." J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 276 U. S. 406 (1928). But where one branch has impaired or sought to assume a
power central to another branch, the Page 462 U. S. 963 Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buckley
v. Valeo, supra, at 424 U. S.
123 .

															Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One
branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of
its constitutionally assigned function. See Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.
S. 425 , 433 U. S. 433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.
S. 683 (1974). Alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, supra, at 343 U. S. 587 ; Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 , 277 U. S. 203 (1928). These cases present the latter situation. [ Footnote 2/4 ] II Before considering whether Congress impermissibly assumed a
judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly Congress'
actions. Jagdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya, stayed in this
country after his student visa expired. Although he was scheduled
to be deported, he requested the Immigration and Naturalization
Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory
criteria for permanent residence in this country. After a hearing,
[ Footnote 2/5 ] the Service granted
Chadha's request and sent -- as required by Page 462 U. S. 964 the reservation of the veto right -- a report of its action to
Congress.

															In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it the
names of 339 other persons whose deportations also had been
suspended by the Service. The House Committee on the Judiciary
decided that six of these persons, including Chadha, should not be
allowed to remain in this country. Accordingly, it submitted a
resolution to the House which stated simply that "the House of
Representatives does not approve the granting of permanent
residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter named."
121 Cong.Rec. 40800 (1975). The resolution was not distributed
prior to the vote, [ Footnote 2/6 ]
but the Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law explained to the House:

															"It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases,
that the aliens contained in the resolution did not meet [the]
statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and
it is the opinion of the committee that their deportation should
not be suspended." Ibid. (remarks of Rep. Eilberg). Without further
explanation and without a recorded vote, the House rejected the
Service's determination that these six people met the statutory
criteria.

															On its face, the House's action appears clearly adjudicatory.
[ Footnote 2/7 ] The House did not
enact a general rule; rather, it Page 462 U. S. 965 made its own determination that six specific persons did not
comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type
of decision that traditionally has been left to other branches.
Even if the House did not make a de novo determination,
but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the
federal courts. [ Footnote 2/8 ] See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (providing generally for judicial
review of final agency action); cf. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review
INS decisions denying suspension of deportation). Where, as here,
Congress has exercised a power "that cannot possibly be regarded as
merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress," Page 462 U. S. 966 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S. 138 ,
the decisions of this Court have held that Congress impermissibly
assumed a function that the Constitution entrusted to another
branch, see id. at 424 U. S.
138 -141; cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. at 277 U. S.
202 .

															The impropriety of the House's assumption of this function is
confirmed by the fact that its action raises the very danger the
Framers sought to avoid -- the exercise of unchecked power. In
deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not
subject to any internal constraints that prevent it from
arbitrarily depriving him of the right to remain in this country.
[ Footnote 2/9 ] Unlike the judiciary
or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established
substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards,
such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial
tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency [ Footnote 2/10 ] adjudicates individual
rights. The only effective constraint on Congress' power is
political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it
prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights
of specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a
shifting majority." Page 462 U. S. 967 Chief Justice Marshall observed:

															"It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application of
those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of
other departments." Fletcher v.
Peck , 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 136 (1810). In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to
Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its constitutionally prescribed
authority. I would not reach the broader question whether
legislative vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															As JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion explains, the legislative
veto has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from
bills for executive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. See post at 462 U. S.
968 -972. Whether the veto complies with the Presentment
Clauses may well turn on the particular context in which it is
exercised, and I would be hesitant to conclude that every veto is
unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example presented by
this litigation.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible
Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev. 253 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 218
U.S.App.D.C. 34, 84, 673 F.2d 425, 475 (1982).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Jefferson later questioned the degree to which the constitution
insulates the judiciary. See D. Malone, Jefferson the
President: Second Term, 1805-1809, pp. 304-305 (1974). In response
to Chief Justice Marshall's rulings during Aaron Burr's trial,
Jefferson stated that the judiciary had favored Burr -- whom
Jefferson viewed as clearly guilty of treason -- at the expense of
the country. He predicted that the people " will see then and
amend the error in our Constitution, which makes any branch
independent of the nation.'" Id. at 305 (quoting
Jefferson's letter to William Giles). The very controversy that
attended Burr's trial, however, demonstrates the wisdom in
providing a neutral forum, removed from political pressure, for the
determination of one person's rights. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does
not prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally
assigned function. Even assuming this argument is correct, it does
not address the concern that the Congress is exercising unchecked
judicial power at the expense of individual liberties. It was
precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that the Framers adopted
the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e.g., Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 , 272 U. S. 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the
Department of Justice, administers the Immigration and Nationality
Act on behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary
responsibility for the Act's enforcement. See 8 U.S.C. §
1103. The Act establishes a detailed administrative procedure for
determining when a specific person is to be deported, see § 1252(b), and provides for judicial review of this decision, see § 1105a; Foti v. INS, 375 U.
S. 217 (1963).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before
acting on it, see 121 Cong.Rec. 40800 (1975), but the
statute providing for the legislative veto limits the time in which
Congress may veto the Service's determination that deportation
should be suspended. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2). In this
case Congress had Chadha's report before it for approximately a
year and a half, but failed to act on it until three days before
the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, it was required to
abandon its normal procedures for considering resolutions, thereby
increasing the danger of arbitrary and ill-considered action.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in
character because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its
assigned sphere." Ante at 462 U. S. 952 .
The Court's presumption provides a useful starting point, but does
not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's action
alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see ante at 462 U. S.
952 -954, that the action is legislative, rather than
adjudicative in nature. In determining whether one branch
unconstitutionally has assumed a power central to another branch,
the traditional characterization of the assumed power as
legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 , 277 U. S. 203 (1928). But reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an
act, and the more helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act
in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The Court reasons in response to this argument that the
one-House veto exercised in this case was not judicial in nature,
because the decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
did not present a justiciable issue that could have been reviewed
by a court on appeal. See ante at 462 U. S. 957 ,
n. 22. The Court notes that, since the administrative agency
decided the case in favor of Chadha, there was no aggrieved party
who could appeal. Reliance by the Court on this fact misses the
point. Even if review of the particular decision to suspend
deportation is not committed to the courts, the House of
Representatives assumed a function that generally is entrusted to
an impartial tribunal. In my view, the Legislative Branch, in
effect, acted as an appellate court by overruling the Service's
application of established law to Chadha. And unlike a court or an
administrative agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to
counsel or a hearing before acting. Although the parallel is not
entirely complete, the effect on Chadha's personal rights would not
have been different in principle had he been acquitted of a federal
crime and thereafter found by one House of Congress to have been
guilty.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															When Congress grants particular individuals relief or benefits
under its spending power, the danger of oppressive action that the
separation of powers was designed to avoid is not implicated.
Similarly, Congress may authorize the admission of individual
aliens by special Acts, but it does not follow that Congress
unilaterally may make a judgment that a particular alien has no
legal right to remain in this country. See Memorandum
Concerning H.R. 9766 Entitled "An Act to Direct the Deportation of
Harry Renton Bridges," reprinted in S.Rep. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess., pt. 1, p. 8 (1940). As Attorney General Robert Jackson
remarked, such a practice "would be an historical departure from an
unbroken American practice and tradition." Id. at 9.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															We have recognized that independent regulatory agencies and
departments of the Executive Branch often exercise authority that
is "judicial in nature." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1 , 424 U. S.
140 -141 (1976). This function, however, forms part of
the agencies' execution of public law, and is subject to the
procedural safeguards, including judicial review, provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 551 et
seq. See also 462
U.S. 919 fn2/5|>n. 5, supra. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell
for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has
reserved a "legislative veto." For this reason, the Court's
decision is of surpassing importance. And it is for this reason
that the Court would have been well advised to decide the cases, if
possible, on the narrower grounds of separation of powers, leaving
for full consideration the constitutionality of other congressional
review statutes operating on such varied matters as war powers and
agency rulemaking, some of which concern the independent regulatory
agencies. [ Footnote 3/1 ]

															The prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our
contemporary political system and its importance to Congress can
hardly be overstated. It has become a central Page 462 U. S. 968 means by which Congress secures the accountability of executive
and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto, Congress is
faced with a Hobson's choice: either to refrain from delegating the
necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing
laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or, in the
alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function to the Executive
Branch and independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major
national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks
unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role.
Accordingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto has
been placed in nearly 200 statutes. [ Footnote 3/2 ] The device is known in every field of
governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war
powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the environment,
and the economy.

															The legislative veto developed initially in response to the
problems of reorganizing the sprawling Government structure created
in response to the Depression. The Reorganization Acts established
the chief model for the legislative veto. When President Hoover
requested authority to reorganize the Government in 1929, he
coupled his request that the "Congress be willing to delegate its
authority over the problem (subject to defined principles) to the
Executive" with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed that
the Executive

															"should act upon approval of a joint committee of Congress or
with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some
limited period adequate for its consideration."

															Public Papers of the Presidents, Herbert Hoover, 1929, p. 432
(1974). Congress followed President Hoover's suggestion and
authorized reorganization subject to legislative Page 462 U. S. 969 review. Act of June 30, 1932, § 407, 47 Stat. 414. Although the
reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a
legislative veto provision, the provision returned during the
Roosevelt administration, and has since been renewed numerous
times. Over the years, the provision was used extensively.
Presidents submitted 115 Reorganization Plans to Congress, of which
23 were disapproved by Congress pursuant to legislative veto
provisions. See App. A to Brief for United States Senate
on Reargument.

															Shortly after adoption of the Reorganization Act of 1939, 53
Stat. 561, Congress and the President applied the legislative veto
procedure to resolve the delegation problem for national security
and foreign affairs. World War II occasioned the need to transfer
greater authority to the President in these areas. The legislative
veto offered the means by which Congress could confer additional
authority while preserving its own constitutional role. During
World War II, Congress enacted over 30 statutes conferring powers
on the Executive with legislative veto provisions. [ Footnote 3/3 ] President Roosevelt accepted the veto
as the necessary price for obtaining exceptional authority.
[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Over the quarter century following World War II, Presidents
continued to accept legislative vetoes by one or both Houses as
constitutional, while regularly denouncing provisions by which
congressional Committees reviewed Executive activity. [ Footnote 3/5 ] The legislative veto balanced
delegations of Page 462 U. S. 970 statutory authority in new areas of governmental involvement:
the space program, international agreements on nuclear energy,
tariff arrangements, and adjustment of federal pay rates. [ Footnote 3/6 ]

															During the 1970's, the legislative veto was important in
resolving a series of major constitutional disputes between the
President and Congress over claims of the President to broad
impoundment, war, and national emergency powers. The Page 462 U. S. 971 key provision of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c),
authorizes the termination by concurrent resolution of the use of
armed forces in hostilities. A similar measure resolved the problem
posed by Presidential claims of inherent power to impound
appropriations. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, 31 U.S.C. § 1403. In conference, a compromise was achieved
under which permanent impoundments, termed "rescissions," would
require approval through enactment of legislation. In contrast,
temporary impoundments, or "deferrals," would become effective
unless disapproved by one House. This compromise provided the
President with flexibility, while preserving ultimate congressional
control over the budget. [ Footnote
3/7 ] Although the War Powers Resolution was enacted over
President Nixon's veto, the Impoundment Control Act was enacted
with the President's approval. These statutes were followed by
others resolving similar problems: the National Emergencies Act, §
202, 90 Stat. 1255, 50 U.S.C. § 1622, resolving the longstanding
problems with unchecked Executive emergency power; the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, §
211, 90 Stat. 740, 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b), resolving the problem of
foreign arms sales; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
§§ 303(a), 304(a), 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 130, 134, 137, 138,
144-145, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b), 2158, 2153(d)
(1976 ed., Supp. V), resolving the problem of exports of nuclear
technology.

															In the energy field, the legislative veto served to balance
broad delegations in legislation emerging from the energy crisis of
the 1970's. [ Footnote 3/8 ] In the
educational field, it was found Page 462 U. S. 972 that fragmented and narrow grant programs "inevitably lead to
Executive-Legislative confrontations" because they inaptly limited
the Commissioner of Education's authority. S.Rep. No. 93-763, p. 69
(1974). The response was to grant the Commissioner of Education
rulemaking authority, subject to a legislative veto. In the trade
regulation area, the veto preserved congressional authority over
the Federal Trade Commission's broad mandate to make rules to
prevent businesses from engaging in "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce." [ Footnote
3/9 ]

															Even this brief review suffices to demonstrate that the
legislative veto is more than "efficient, convenient, and useful." Ante at 462 U. S. 944 .
It is an important, if not indispensable, political invention that
allows the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional
and policy differences, assures the accountability of independent
regulatory agencies, and preserves Page 462 U. S. 973 Congress' control over lawmaking. Perhaps there are other means
of accommodation and accountability, but the increasing reliance of
Congress upon the legislative veto suggests that the alternatives
to which Congress must now turn are not entirely satisfactory.
[ Footnote 3/10 ] Page 462 U. S. 974 The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has
not been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize
itself at the expense of the other branches -- the concerns of
Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has been a means of defense,
a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if Congress is to
fulfill its designated role under Art. I as the Nation's lawmaker.
While the President has often objected to particular legislative
vetoes, generally those left in the hands of congressional
Committees, the Executive has more often agreed to legislative
review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be
sure, the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that
could be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a
check on the exercise of delegated authority. II For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's
decision today is regrettable. The Court's Art. I analysis appears
to invalidate all legislative vetoes, irrespective of form or
subject. Because the legislative veto is commonly found as a check
upon rulemaking by administrative agencies and upon broad-based
policy decisions of the Executive Branch, it is particularly
unfortunate that the Court reaches its decision in cases involving
the exercise of a veto over deportation decisions regarding
particular individuals. Courts should always be wary of striking
statutes as unconstitutional; to strike an entire class of statutes
based on consideration of a somewhat atypical and more readily
indictable exemplar of the class is irresponsible. It was for cases
such as these that Justice Brandeis wrote:

															"The Court has frequently called attention to the 'great gravity
and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of an
act of Congress. . . . " * * * * Page 462 U. S.
975 "The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied.' Liverpool, N.Y. & P. S.S. Co. v.
Emigration Commissioners , [ 113 U.S.
33 , 113 U. S. 39 (1885)]." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 345 , 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (concurring opinion). Unfortunately, today's holding is not
so limited. [ Footnote 3/11 ] Page 462 U. S. 976 If the legislative veto were as plainly unconstitutional as the
Court strives to suggest, its broad ruling today would be more
comprehensible. But the constitutionality of the legislative veto
is anything but clear-cut. The issue divides scholars, [ Footnote 3/12 ] courts, [ Footnote 3/13 ] Attorneys General, [ Footnote 3/14 ] and the two other Page 462 U. S. 977 branches of the National Government. If the veto devices so
flagrantly disregarded the requirements of Art. I as the Court
today suggests, I find it incomprehensible that Congress, whose
Members are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, would have
placed these mechanisms in nearly 200 separate laws over a period
of 50 years.

															The reality of the situation is that the constitutional question
posed today is one of immense difficulty over which the Executive
and Legislative Branches -- as well as scholars and judges -- have
understandably disagreed. That disagreement stems from the silence
of the Constitution on the precise question: the Constitution does
not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto. Thus, our
task should be to determine whether the legislative veto is
consistent with the purposes of Art. I and the principles of
separation of powers which are reflected in that Article and
throughout the Constitution. [ Footnote 3/15 ] Page 462 U. S. 978 We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional
authorization for the legislative veto surprising, and I would not
infer disapproval of the mechanism from its absence. From the
summer of 1787 to the present, the Government of the United States
has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers.
Only within the last half century has the complexity and size of
the Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the
Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effective,
if not the only, means to insure its role as the Nation's lawmaker.
But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate that the Nation
would grow and new problems of governance would require different
solutions. Accordingly, our Federal Government was intentionally
chartered with the flexibility to respond to contemporary needs
without losing sight of fundamental democratic principles. This was
the spirit in which Justice Jackson penned his influential
concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case: "The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 635 (1952).

															This is the perspective from which we should approach the novel
constitutional questions presented by the legislative veto. In my
view, neither Art. I of the Constitution nor the doctrine of
separation of powers is violated by this mechanism Page 462 U. S. 979 by which our elected Representatives preserve their voice in the
governance of the Nation. III The Court holds that the disapproval of a suspension of
deportation by the resolution of one House of Congress is an
exercise of legislative power without compliance with the
prerequisites for lawmaking set forth in Art. I of the
Constitution. Specifically, the Court maintains that the provisions
of § 244(c)(2) are inconsistent with the requirement of bicameral
approval, implicit in Art. I, § 1, and the requirement that all
bills and resolutions that require the concurrence of both Houses
be presented to the President, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2 and 3. [ Footnote 3/16 ]

															I do not dispute the Court's truismatic exposition of these
Clauses. There is no question that a bill does not become a law
until it is approved by both the House and the Senate, and
presented to the President. Similarly, I would not hesitate to
strike an action of Congress in the form of a concurrent resolution
which constituted an exercise of original lawmaking authority. I
agree with the Court that the President's Page 462 U. S. 980 qualified veto power is a critical element in the distribution
of powers under the Constitution, widely endorsed among the
Framers, and intended to serve the President as a defense against
legislative encroachment and to check the "passing of bad laws,
through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, p.
458 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamilton). The records of the
Convention reveal that it is the first purpose which figured most
prominently, but I acknowledge the vitality of the second. Id. at 443. I also agree that the bicameral approval
required by Art. I, § 1, 7, "was of scarcely less concern to the
Framers than was the Presidential veto," ante at 462 U. S. 948 ,
and that the need to divide and disperse legislative power figures
significantly in our scheme of Government. All of this, 462 U. S. is
entirely unexceptionable.

															It does not, however, answer the constitutional question before
us. The power to exercise a legislative veto is not the power to
write new law without bicameral approval or Presidential
consideration. The veto must be authorized by statute, and may only
negative what an Executive department or independent agency has
proposed. On its face, the legislative veto no more allows one
House of Congress to make law than does the Presidential veto
confer such power upon the President. Accordingly, the Court
properly recognizes that it "must nevertheless establish that the
challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the kind to which the
procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7, apply," and admits that
"[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to the
bicameralism and presentation requirements of Art. I." Ante at 462 U. S.
952 . A The terms of the Presentment Clauses suggest only that bills and
their equivalent are subject to the requirements of bicameral
passage and presentment to the President. Article I, § 7, cl. 2,
stipulates only that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate Page 462 U. S. 981 shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President"
for approval or disapproval, his disapproval then subject to being
overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. Section 7, cl. 3,
goes further:

															"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on
a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of
the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by
two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to
the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill."

															Although the Clause does not specify the actions for which the
concurrence of both Houses is "necessary," the proceedings at the
Philadelphia Convention suggest its purpose was to prevent Congress
from circumventing the presentation requirement in the making of
new legislation. James Madison observed that, if the President's
veto was confined to bills, it could be evaded by calling a
proposed law a "resolution" or "vote," rather than a "bill."
Accordingly, he proposed that "or resolve" should be added after
"bill" in what is now Clause 2 of 7. 2 M. Farrand, The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 301-302 (1911). After a short
discussion on the subject, the amendment was rejected. On the
following day, however, Randolph renewed the proposal in the
substantial form as it now appears, and the motion passed. Id. at 304-305; 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal
Constitution 431 (1845). The chosen language, Madison's comment,
and the brevity of the Convention's consideration, all suggest a
modest role was intended for the Clause, and no broad restraint on
congressional authority was contemplated. See Stewart,
Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 Harv.J.Legis. 593,
609-611 (1976). This reading is consistent with the historical
background of the Presentment Clause itself, which reveals only
that the Framers were concerned Page 462 U. S. 982 with limiting the methods for enacting new legislation. The
Framers were aware of the experience in Pennsylvania, where the
legislature had evaded the requirements attached to the passing of
legislation by the use of "resolves," and the criticisms directed
at this practice by the Council of Censors. [ Footnote 3/17 ] There is no record that the Convention
contemplated, let alone intended, that these Art. I requirements
would someday be invoked to restrain the scope of congressional
authority pursuant to duly enacted law. [ Footnote 3/18 ] Page 462 U. S. 983 When the Convention did turn its attention to the scope of
Congress' lawmaking power, the Framers were expansive. The
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, vests Page 462 U. S. 984 Congress with the power

															"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [the enumerated powers
of § 8] and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."

															It is long settled that Congress may "exercise its best judgment
in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the
constitutional powers of the government," and "avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its
legislation to circumstances." McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
415 -416, 17 U. S. 420 (1819). B The Court heeded this counsel in approving the modern
administrative state. The Court's holding today that all
legislative-type action must be enacted through the lawmaking
process ignores that legislative authority is routinely delegated
to the Executive Branch, to the independent regulatory agencies,
and to private individuals and groups.

															"The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most
significant legal trend of the last century. . . . They have become
a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our
three-branch legal theories. . . ." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470 , 343 U. S. 487 (1952) (Jackson, J. dissenting). Page 462 U. S. 985 This Court's decisions sanctioning such delegations make clear
that Art. I does not require all action with the effect of
legislation to be passed as a law.

															Theoretically, agencies and officials were asked only to "fill
up the details," and the rule was that "Congress cannot delegate
any part of its legislative power except under the limitation of a
prescribed standard." United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& P. R. Co., 282 U. S. 311 , 282 U. S. 324 (1931). Chief Justice Taft elaborated the standard in J. W.
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 394 , 276 U. S. 409 (1928):

															"If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power."

															In practice, however, restrictions on the scope of the power
that could be delegated diminished and all but disappeared. In only
two instances did the Court find an unconstitutional delegation. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.
S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). In other cases, the "intelligible principle" through which
agencies have attained enormous control over the economic affairs
of the country was held to include such formulations as "just and
reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); "public interest," New York Central Securities Corp. v.
United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932); "public convenience, interest, or necessity," Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 , 289 U. S. 285 (1933); and "unfair methods of competition." FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).

															The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad delegations
are matters that still have not been put to rest. But for present
purposes, these cases establish that, by virtue of congressional
delegation, legislative power can be exercised by independent
agencies and Executive departments without the passage of new
legislation. For some time, the sheer amount of law -- the
substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the
operation of government -- made by Page 462 U. S. 986 the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by
Congress through the traditional process. There is no question but
that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic
sense of the term. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
551(4), provides that a "rule" is an agency statement "designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." When agencies
are authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the
administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is
accorded "legislative effect." See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U. S. 34 , 453 U. S. 43 -44
(1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.
S. 416 (1977). [ Footnote
3/19 ] These regulations bind courts and officers of the Federal
Government, may preempt state law, see, e.g., Fidelity Federal
Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.
S. 141 (1982), and grant rights to and impose
obligations on the public. In sum, they have the force of law.

															If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independent and
Executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Art. I as
prohibiting Congress from also reserving a check on legislative
power for itself. Absent the veto, the agencies receiving
delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may issue
regulations having the force of law without bicameral Page 462 U. S. 987 approval and without the President's signature. It is thus not
apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise of that
legislative power must be subject to a more exacting test. In both
cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations
comply with the Art. I requirements.

															Nor are there strict limits on the agents that may receive such
delegations of legislative authority so that it might be said that
the Legislature can delegate authority to others, but not to
itself. While most authority to issue rules and regulations is
given to the Executive Branch and the independent regulatory
agencies, statutory delegations to private persons have also passed
this Court's scrutiny. In Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S.
1 (1939), the statute provided that restrictions upon
the production or marketing of agricultural commodities was to
become effective only upon the favorable vote by a prescribed
majority of the affected farmers. United States v. Rock Royal
Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533 , 307 U. S. 577 (1939), upheld an Act which gave producers of specified commodities
the right to veto marketing orders issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture. Assuming Currin and Rock Royal Cooperative remain sound law, the Court's decision today suggests
that Congress may place a "veto" power over suspensions of
deportation in private hands or in the hands of an independent
agency, but is forbidden to reserve such authority for itself.
Perhaps this odd result could be justified on other constitutional
grounds, such as the separation of powers, but certainly it cannot
be defended as consistent with the Court's view of the Art. I
presentment and bicameralism commands. [ Footnote 3/20 ] Page 462 U. S. 988 The Court's opinion in the present cases comes closest to facing
the reality of administrative lawmaking in considering the
contention that the Attorney General's action in suspending
deportation under § 244 is itself a legislative act. The Court
posits that the Attorney General is acting in an Art. II
enforcement capacity under § 244. This characterization is at odds
with Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 , 264 U. S. 40 (1924), where the power conferred on the Executive to deport aliens
was considered a delegation of legislative power. The Court
suggests, however, that the Attorney General acts in an Art. II
capacity because

															"[t]he courts, when a case or controversy arises, can always
'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed,' Yakus
v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 , 321 U. S.
425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory
standards." Ante at 462 U. S. 953 ,
n. 16. This assumption is simply wrong, as the Court itself points
out:

															"We are aware of no decision . . . where a federal court has
reviewed a decision of the Attorney General suspending deportation
of an alien pursuant to the standards set out in § 244(a)(1). This
is not surprising, given that no party to such action has either
the motivation or the right to appeal from it." Ante at 462 U. S. 957 ,
n. 22. It is perhaps on the erroneous premise that judicial review
may check abuses of the § 244 power that the Court also submits
that

															"[t]he bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the
Executive's administration of the laws, because his administrative
activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created
it -- a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7." Ante at 462 U. S. 953 ,
n. 16. On the other hand, the Court's reasoning does persuasively
explain why a resolution of disapproval Page 462 U. S. 989 under § 244(c)(2) need not again be subject to the bicameral
process. Because it serves only to check the Attorney General's
exercise of the suspension authority granted by § 244, the
disapproval resolution -- unlike the Attorney General's action --
"cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it -- a
statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I."

															More fundamentally, even if the Court correctly characterizes
the Attorney General's authority under § 244 as an Art. II
Executive power, the Court concedes that certain administrative
agency action, such as rulemaking, "may resemble lawmaking" and
recognizes that

															"[t]his Court has referred to agency activity as being
'quasi-legislative' in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 295 U. S. 602 , 295 U. S.
628 (1935)." Ante at 462 U. S. 953 ,
n. 16. Such rules and adjudications by the agencies meet the
Court's own definition of legislative action for they "alte[r] the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the
Legislative Branch," ante at 462 U. S. 952 ,
and involve "determinations of policy," ante at 462 U. S. 954 .
Under the Court's analysis, the Executive Branch and the
independent agencies may make rules with the effect of law while
Congress, in whom the Framers confided the legislative power, Art.
I, § 1, may not exercise a veto which precludes such rules from
having operative force. If the effective functioning of a complex
modern government requires the delegation of vast authority which,
by virtue of its breadth, is legislative or "quasi-legislative" in
character, I cannot accept that Art. I -- which is, after all, the
source of the nondelegation doctrine -- should forbid Congress to
qualify that grant with a legislative veto. [ Footnote 3/21 ] Page 462 U. S. 990 C The Court also takes no account of perhaps the most relevant
consideration: however resolutions of disapproval under § 244(c)(2)
are formally characterized, in reality, a departure from the status quo occurs only upon the concurrence of opinion
among the House, Senate, and President. Reservations of legislative
authority to be exercised by Congress should be upheld if the
exercise of such reserved authority is consistent with the
distribution of and limits upon legislative power that Art. I
provides. 1 As its history reveals, § 244(c)(2) withstands this analysis.
Until 1917, Congress had not broadly provided for the deportation
of aliens. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 889. The Immigration
Act of 1924 enlarged the categories of Page 462 U. S. 991 aliens subject to mandatory deportation, and substantially
increased the likelihood of hardships to individuals by abolishing
in most cases the previous time limitation of three years within
which deportation proceedings had to be commenced. Immigration Act
of 1924, ch.190, 43 Stat. 153. Thousands of persons, who either had
entered the country in more lenient times or had been smuggled in
as children, or had overstayed their permits, faced the prospect of
deportation. Enforcement of the Act grew more rigorous over the
years, with the deportation of thousands of aliens without regard
to the mitigating circumstances of particular cases. See Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1
Public Administration Review 281 (1941). Congress provided relief
in certain cases through the passage of private bills.

															In 1933, when deportations reached their zenith, the Secretary
of Labor temporarily suspended numerous deportations on grounds of
hardship, 78 Cong.Rec. 11783 (1934), and proposed legislation to
allow certain deportable aliens to remain in the country. H.R.
9725, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The Labor Department bill was
opposed, however, as "grant[ing] too much discretionary authority,"
78 Cong.Rec. 11790 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Dirksen), and it failed
decisively. Id. at 11791.

															The following year, the administration proposed bills to
authorize an interdepartmental committee to grant permanent
residence to deportable aliens who had lived in the United States
for 10 years or who had close relatives here. S. 2969 and H.R.
8163, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). These bills were also attacked
as an "abandonment of congressional control over the deportation of
undesirable aliens," H.R.Rep. No. 1110, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
2, p. 2 (1935), and were not enacted. A similar fate awaited a bill
introduced in the 75th Congress that would have authorized the
Secretary to grant permanent residence to up to 8,000 deportable
aliens. The measure passed the House, but did not come to a vote in
the Senate. H.R. 6391, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 83 Cong.Rec.
8992-8996 (1938). Page 462 U. S. 992 The succeeding Congress again attempted to find a legislative
solution to the deportation problem. The initial House bill
required congressional action to cancel individual deportations, 84
Cong.Rec. 10455 (1939), but the Senate amended the legislation to
provide that deportable aliens should not be deported unless the
Congress, by Act or resolution, rejected the recommendation of the
Secretary. H.R. 5138, § 10, as reported with amendments by S.Rep.
No. 1721, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1940). The compromise solution,
the immediate predecessor to § 244(c), allowed the Attorney General
to suspend the deportation of qualified aliens. Their deportation
would be canceled and permanent residence granted if the House and
Senate did not adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval. S.Rep.
No. 1796, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 5-6 (1940). The Executive Branch
played a major role in fashioning this compromise, see 86
Cong.Rec. 8345 (1940), and President Roosevelt approved the
legislation, which became the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch.
439, 54 Stat. 670.

															In 1947, the Department of Justice requested legislation
authorizing the Attorney General to cancel deportations without
congressional review. H.R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). The
purpose of the proposal was to "save time and energy of everyone
concerned. . . ." Regulating Powers of the Attorney General to
Suspend Deportation of Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 245, H.R. 674, H.R.
1115, and H.R. 2933 before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1947).
The Senate Judiciary Committee objected, stating that "affirmative
action by the Congress in all suspension cases should be required
before deportation proceedings may be canceled." S.Rep. No. 1204,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1948). See also H.R.Rep. No. 647,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947). Congress not only rejected the
Department's request for final authority, but also amended the
Immigration Act to require that cancellation of deportation be
approved Page 462 U. S. 993 by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. President Truman
signed the bill without objection. Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62
Stat. 1206.

															Practice over the ensuing several years convinced Congress that
the requirement of affirmative approval was "not workable . . . and
would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the House."
House Judiciary Committee, H.R.Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 (1949). In preparing the comprehensive Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended
that, for certain classes of aliens, the adjustment of status be
subject to the disapproval of either House; but deportation of an
alien "who is of the criminal, subversive, or immoral classes or
who overstays his period of admission," would be canceled only upon
a concurrent resolution disapproving the deportation. S.Rep. No.
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 610 (1950). Legislation reflecting this
change was passed by both Houses, and enacted into law as part of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 over President Truman's
veto, which was not predicated on the presence of a legislative
veto. Pub.L. 414, § 244(a), 66 Stat. 214. In subsequent years, the
Congress refused further requests that the Attorney General be
given final authority to grant discretionary relief for specified
categories of aliens, and § 244 remained intact to the present.

															Section 244(a)(1) authorizes the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to suspend the deportation of certain aliens who are
otherwise deportable and, upon Congress' approval, to adjust their
status to that of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
In order to be eligible for this relief, an alien must have been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of
not less than seven years, must prove he is of good moral
character, and must prove that he or his immediate family would
suffer "extreme hardship" if he is deported. Judicial review of a
denial of relief may be sought. Thus, the suspension proceeding

															"has two phases: a Page 462 U. S. 994 determination whether the statutory conditions have been met,
which generally involves a question of law, and a determination
whether relief shall be granted, which [ultimately] is confided to
the sound discretion of the Attorney General [and his
delegates]."

															2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure §
7.9a(5), p. 7-134 (rev. ed.1983).

															There is also a third phase to the process. Under § 244(c)(1),
the Attorney General must report all such suspensions, with a
detailed statement of facts and reasons, to the Congress. Either
House may then act, in that session or the next, to block the
suspension of deportation by passing a resolution of disapproval. §
244(c)(2). Upon congressional approval of the suspension -- by its
silence -- the alien's permanent status is adjusted to that of a
lawful resident alien.

															The history of the Immigration and Nationality Act makes clear
that § 244(c)(2) did not alter the division of actual authority
between Congress and the Executive. At all times, whether through
private bills, or through affirmative concurrent resolutions, or
through the present one-House veto, a permanent change in a
deportable alien's status could be accomplished only with the
agreement of the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate. 2 The central concern of the presentment and bicameralism
requirements of Art. I is that, when a departure from the legal status quo is undertaken, it is done with the approval of
the President and both Houses of Congress -- or, in the event of a
Presidential veto, a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This
interest is fully satisfied by the operation of § 244(c)(2). The
President's approval is found in the Attorney General's action in
recommending to Congress that the deportation order for a given
alien be suspended. The House and the Senate indicate their
approval of the Executive's action by not passing a resolution of
disapproval within the statutory period. Thus, a change in the
legal status quo -- the deportability of the alien -- is
consummated only with the approval Page 462 U. S. 995 of each of the three relevant actors. The disagreement of any
one of the three maintains the alien's preexisting status: the
Executive may choose not to recommend suspension; the House and
Senate may each veto the recommendation. The effect on the rights
and obligations of the affected individuals and upon the
legislative system is precisely the same as if a private bill were
introduced but failed to receive the necessary approval.

															"The President and the two Houses enjoy exactly the same say in
what the law is to be as would have been true for each without the
presence of the one-House veto, and nothing in the law is changed
absent the concurrence of the President and a majority in each
House." Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 186, 250, 556 F.2d
1028, 1064 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).

															This very construction of the Presentment Clauses which the
Executive Branch now rejects was the basis upon which the Executive
Branch defended the constitutionality of the Reorganization Act, 5
U.S.C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), which provides that the President's
proposed reorganization plans take effect only if not vetoed by
either House. When the Department of Justice advised the Senate on
the constitutionality of congressional review in reorganization
legislation in 1949, it stated:

															"In this procedure, there is no question involved of the
Congress taking legislative action beyond its initial passage of
the Reorganization Act."

															S.Rep. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1949) (Dept. of
Justice Memorandum). This also represents the position of the
Attorney General more recently. [ Footnote 3/22 ] Page 462 U. S. 996 Thus understood, § 244(c)(2) fully effectuates the purposes of
the bicameralism and presentment requirements. I now briefly
consider possible objections to the analysis.

															First, it may be asserted that Chadha's status before
legislative disapproval is one of nondeportation, and that the
exercise of the veto, unlike the failure of a private bill, works a
change in the status quo. This position plainly ignores
the statutory language. At no place in § 244 has Congress delegated
to the Attorney General any final power to determine which aliens
shall be allowed to remain in the United States. Congress has
retained the ultimate power to pass on such changes in deportable
status. By its own terms, § 244(a) states that whatever power the
Attorney General has been delegated to suspend deportation and
adjust status is to be exercisable only "[a]s hereinafter
prescribed in this section." Subsection (c) is part of that
section. A grant of "suspension" does not cancel the alien's
deportation or adjust the alien's status to that of a permanent
resident alien. A suspension order is merely a "deferment of
deportation," McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.
S. 162 , 340 U. S. 168 (1950), which can mature into a cancellation of deportation and
adjustment of status only upon the approval of Congress -- by way
of silence -- under § 244(c)(2). Only then does the statute
authorize the Attorney General to "cancel deportation proceedings,"
§ 244(c)(2), and "record the alien's lawful admission for permanent
residence. . . ." § 244(d). The Immigration and Naturalization
Service's action, on behalf of the Attorney General, "cannot become
effective without ratification by Congress." 2 C. Gordon & H.
Rosenfield, Immigration Law Page 462 U. S. 997 and Procedure 8.14, p. 8-121 (rev. ed.1983). Until that
ratification occurs, the Executive's action is simply a
recommendation that Congress finalize the suspension -- in itself,
it works no legal change.

															Second, it may be said that this approach leads to the
incongruity that the two-House veto is more suspect than its
one-House brother. Although the idea may be initially
counterintuitive, on close analysis, it is not at all unusual that
the one-House veto is of more certain constitutionality than the
two-House version. If the Attorney General's action is a proposal
for legislation, then the disapproval of but a single House is all
that is required to prevent its passage. Because approval is
indicated by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the
requirement of bicameral approval. The two-House version may
present a different question. The concept that "neither branch of
Congress, when acting separately, can lawfully exercise more power
than is conferred by the Constitution on the whole body," Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 , 103 U. S. 182 (1881), is fully observed. [ Footnote
3/23 ]

															Third, it may be objected that Congress cannot indicate its
approval of legislative change by inaction. In the Court of
Appeals' view, inaction by Congress "could equally imply
endorsement, acquiescence, passivity, indecision, or indifference,"
634 F.2d 408, 435 (1980), and the Court appears to echo this
concern, ante at 462 U. S. 958 ,
n. 23. This objection appears more properly directed at the wisdom
of the legislative veto than its constitutionality. The
Constitution does not and cannot guarantee that legislators will
carefully scrutinize legislation and deliberate before acting. In a
democracy, it is the electorate that holds the legislators
accountable for the wisdom of their choices. It is hard to maintain
that a private bill receives any greater individualized scrutiny
than a resolution Page 462 U. S. 998 of disapproval under § 244(c)(2). Certainly the legislative veto
is no more susceptible to this attack than the Court's increasingly
common practice of according weight to the failure of Congress to
disturb an Executive or independent agency's action. See 462
U.S. 919 fn3/11|>n. 11, supra. Earlier this Term,
the Court found it important that Congress failed to act on bills
proposed to overturn the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation
of the requirements for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U. S. 574 , 461 U. S.
600 -601 (1983). If Congress may be said to have ratified
the Internal Revenue Service's interpretation without passing new
legislation, Congress may also be said to approve a suspension of
deportation by the Attorney General when it fails to exercise its
veto authority. [ Footnote 3/24 ]
The requirements of Art. I are not compromised by the congressional
scheme. IV The Court of Appeals struck § 244(c)(2) as violative of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. It is true that
the purpose of separating the authority of Government is to prevent
unnecessary and dangerous concentration of power in one branch. For
that reason, the Framers saw fit to divide and balance the powers
of Government so that each branch would be checked by the others.
Virtually every part of our constitutional system bears the mark of
this judgment. Page 462 U. S. 999 But the history of the separation of powers doctrine is also a
history of accommodation and practicality. Apprehensions of an
overly powerful branch have not led to undue prophylactic measures
that handicap the effective working of the National Government as a
whole. The Constitution does not contemplate total separation of
the three branches of Government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , 424 U. S. 121 (1976).

															"[A] hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government
from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation
capable of governing itself effectively." Ibid. [ Footnote
3/25 ]

															Our decisions reflect this judgment. As already noted, the
Court, recognizing that modern government must address a formidable
agenda of complex policy issues, countenanced the delegation of
extensive legislative authority to Executive and independent
agencies. J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 276 U. S. 406 (1928). The separation-of-powers doctrine has heretofore led to the
invalidation of Government action only when the challenged action
violated some express provision in the Constitution. In Buckley
v. Valeo, supra, at 424 U. S.
118 -124 (per curiam), and Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), congressional action compromised the appointment power of
the President. See also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189 , 277 U. S.
200 -201 (1928). In United States v.
Klein , 13 Wall. 128 (1872), an Act of Congress was
struck for encroaching upon judicial Page 462 U. S. 1000 power, but the Court found that the Act also impinged upon the
Executive's exclusive pardon power. Art. II, § 2. Because we must
have a workable efficient Government, this is as it should be.

															This is the teaching of Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 433 U. S. 425 (1977), which, in rejecting a separation of powers objection to a
law requiring that the Administrator take custody of certain
Presidential papers, set forth a framework for evaluating such
claims:

															"[I]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions. United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 418 U. S. 711 -712. Only
where the potential for disruption is present must we then
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to
promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress." Id. at 433 U. S.
443 .

															Section 244(c)(2) survives this test. The legislative veto
provision does not "preven[t] the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." First, it
is clear that the Executive Branch has no "constitutionally
assigned" function of suspending the deportation of aliens.
" [O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 , 408 U. S. 766 (1972), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320 , 214 U. S. 339 (1909). Nor can it be said that the inherent function of the
Executive Branch in executing the law is involved. The Steel
Seizure Case resolved that the Art. II mandate for the
President to execute the law is a directive to enforce the law
which Congress has written. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). "The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is
a Page 462 U. S. 1001 duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve
more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 272 U. S. 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 272 U. S. 247 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Here, § 244 grants the Executive only a
qualified suspension authority, and it is only that authority which
the President is constitutionally authorized to execute.

															Moreover, the Court believes that the legislative veto we
consider today is best characterized as an exercise of legislative
or quasi-legislative authority. Under this characterization, the
practice does not, even on the surface, constitute an infringement
of executive or judicial prerogative. The Attorney General's
suspension of deportation is equivalent to a proposal for
legislation. The nature of the Attorney General's role as
recommendatory is not altered because § 244 provides for
congressional action through disapproval, rather than by
ratification. In comparison to private bills, which must be
initiated in the Congress and which allow a Presidential veto to be
overriden by a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Congress, §
244 augments, rather than reduces, the Executive Branch's
authority. So understood, congressional review does not undermine,
as the Court of Appeals thought, the "weight and dignity" that
attends the decisions of the Executive Branch.

															Nor does § 244 infringe on the judicial power, as JUSTICE POWELL
would hold. Section 244 makes clear that Congress has reserved its
own judgment as part of the statutory process. Congressional action
does not substitute for judicial review of the Attorney General's
decisions. The Act provides for judicial review of the refusal of
the Attorney General to suspend a deportation and to transmit a
recommendation to Congress. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139 (1981) (per curiam). But the courts have not been given the
authority to review whether an alien should be given permanent
status; review is limited to whether the Attorney General has
properly Page 462 U. S. 1002 applied the statutory standards for essentially denying the
alien a recommendation that his deportable status be changed by the
Congress. Moreover, there is no constitutional obligation to
provide any judicial review whatever for a failure to suspend
deportation.

															"The power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to
exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country,
may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress
may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested
facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has been made
by Congress to depend." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S.
713 -714 (1893). See also Tutun v. United
States, 270 U. S. 568 , 270 U. S. 576 (1926); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.
S. 160 , 335 U. S.
171 -172 (1948); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S. 590 (1952).

															I do not suggest that all legislative vetoes are necessarily
consistent with separation of powers principles. A legislative
check on an inherently executive function, for example, that of
initiating prosecutions, poses an entirely different question. But
the legislative veto device here -- and in many other settings --
is far from an instance of legislative tyranny over the Executive.
It is a necessary check on the unavoidably expanding power of the
agencies, both Executive and independent, as they engage in
exercising authority delegated by Congress. V I regret that I am in disagreement with my colleagues on the
fundamental questions that these cases present. But even more I
regret the destructive scope of the Court's holding. It reflects a
profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held
by the courts which sanctioned the modern administrative state.
Today's decision strikes down in one fell swoop provisions in more
laws enacted by Congress than the Court has cumulatively
invalidated in its history. I fear it will now be more difficult
to

															"insur[e] that the fundamental policy decisions in our society
will be made not Page 462 U. S. 1003 by an appointed official, but by the body immediately
responsible to the people," Arizona v. California, 373 U.
S. 546 , 373 U. S. 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). I must dissent.

															| 462
U.S. 919 app| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF WHITE, J., DISSENTING STATUTES WITH PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW This compilation, reprinted from the Brief for the United States
Senate, identifies and describes briefly current statutory
provisions for a legislative veto by one or both Houses of
Congress. Statutory provisions for a veto by Committees of the
Congress and provisions which require legislation ( i.e., passage of a joint resolution) are not included. The 55 statutes in
the compilation (some of which contain more than one provision for
legislative review) are divided into six broad categories: foreign
affairs and national security, budget, international trade, energy,
rulemaking and miscellaneous.

															" A" " FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY" "1. Act for International Development of 1961, Pub.L. No.
87-195, § 617, 75 Stat. 424, 444, [as amended,] 22 U.S.C. § 2367
[(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Funds made available for foreign assistance
under the Act may be terminated by concurrent resolution)."

															"2. War Powers Resolution, Pub.L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 555,
556-557 (1973), [as amended,] 50 U.S.C. § 1544 [(1976 ed. and Supp.
V)] (Absent declaration of war, President may be directed by
concurrent resolution to remove United States armed forces engaged
in foreign hostilities.)"

															"3. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974,
Pub.L. No. 93-155, § 807, 87 Stat. 605, 615 (1973), 50 U.S.C. §
1431 (National defense contracts obligating the United States for
any amount in excess of $25,000,000 may be disapproved by
resolution of either House). " Page 462 U. S. 1004 "4. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975,
Pub.L. No. 93-365, § 709(c), 88 Stat. 399, 408 (1974), [as
amended,] 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403-1(c) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)]
(Applications for export of defense goods, technology or techniques
may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"5. H.R.J.Res. 683, Pub.L. No. 94-110, § 1, 89 Stat. 572 (1975),
22 U.S.C. § 2441 note (Assignment of civilian personnel to Sinai
may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"6. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975,
Pub.L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849, 860, [as amended,] 22
U.S.C. § 215m [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Foreign assistance to
countries not meeting human rights standards may be terminated by
concurrent resolution)."

															"7. International Security Assistance and Arms [Export] Control
Act of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-329, §[211(a)], 90 Stat. 729, 743, [as
amended,] 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b) [(1976 ed. and Supp. V)] (President's
letter of offer to sell major defense equipment may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution)."

															"8. National Emergencies Act, Pub.L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90 Stat.
1255 (1976), 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (Presidentially declared national
emergency may be terminated by concurrent resolution)."

															"9. International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub.L. No.
95-75, § 3(d), 91 Stat. 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1602(d) [(1976 ed., Supp.
V)] (Presidential proclamation of International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution)."

															"10. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub.L. No.
95-92, § 16, 91 Stat. 614, 622, 22 U.S.C. § 2753(d)(2) (President's
proposed transfer of arms to a third country may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution)."

															"11. Act of December [28], 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-223, § [207(b)],
91 Stat. 1625, 1628, 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)]
(Presidentially declared national emergency and exercise of
conditional powers may be terminated by concurrent resolution).
" Page 462 U. S. 1005 "12. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95242, §§
[303(a), 304(a)], 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 120, 130, 134, 137-38,
139, 144, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b), [2158] 2153(d)
[(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Cooperative agreements concerning storage
and disposition of spent nuclear fuel, proposed export of nuclear
facilities, materials or technology and proposed agreements for
international cooperation in nuclear reactor development may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															" B" " BUDGET" "13. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,
Pub.L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35, 31 U.S.C. § 1403
(The proposed deferral of budget authority provided for a specific
project or purpose may be disapproved by an impoundment resolution
by either House)."

															" C" " I NTERNATIONAL TRADE"

															"14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76
Stat. 872, 899, 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Tariff or duty recommended by
Tariff Commission may be imposed by concurrent resolution of
approval)."

															"15. Trade Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-618, §§ 203(c), 302(b),
402(d), 407, 88 Stat.1978, 2016, 2043, 2057-60, 2063-64, [as
amended,] 19 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c), 2412(b), 2432, [2437 (1976 ed. and
Supp. V)] (Proposed Presidential actions on import relief and
actions concerning certain countries may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution; various Presidential proposals for waiver
extensions and for extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to
products of foreign countries may be disapproved by simple (either
House) or concurrent resolutions)."

															"16. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-646, §
8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U.S.C. § [635e(b)] (Presidentially
proposed limitation for exports to USSR in Page 462 U. S. 1006 excess of $300,000,000 must be approved by concurrent
resolution)."

															" D" " ENERGY" "17. Act of November 16, 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-153, § 101, 87
Stat. 576, 582, 30 U.S.C. § 185(u) (Continuation of oil exports
being made pursuant to President's finding that such exports are in
the national interest may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution)."

															"18. Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of
1974, Pub.L. No. 93-577, § 12, 88 Stat. 1878, 1892-1893, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5911 (Rules or orders proposed by the President concerning
allocation or acquisition of essential materials may be disapproved
by resolution of either House)."

															"19. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub.L. No. 94163, §
551, 89 Stat. 871, 965 (1975), 42 U.S.C. § 6421(c) (Certain
Presidentially proposed 'energy actions' involving fuel economy and
pricing may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"20. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub.L. No.
94-258, § [201(3)], 90 Stat. 303, 309, 10 U.S.C. § 7422(c)(2)(C)
(President's extension of production period for naval petroleum
reserves may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"22. Department of Energy Act of 1978 -- Civilian Applications,
Pub.L. No. 95-238, §§ 107, 207(b), 92 Stat. 47, 55, 70, 22 U.S.C. §
3224a, 42 U.S.C. § 5919(m) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (International
agreements and expenditures by Secretary of Energy of
appropriations for foreign spent nuclear fuel storage must be
approved by concurrent resolution, if not consented to by
legislation) (plans for such use of appropriated funds may be
disapproved by either House) (financing in excess of $50,000,000
for demonstration facilities must be approved by resolution in both
Houses). " Page 462 U. S. 1007 "23. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub.L. No. 95-372, §§ 205(a), 208, 92 Stat. 629, 641-668, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1337(a), 1354(c) [(1976 ed., Supp. V); (Establishment by
Secretary of Energy of oil and gas lease bidding system may be
disapproved by resolution of either House) (export of oil and gas
may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).]"

															"24. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-621, §§
122(c)(1) and (2), 202(c), 206(d)(2), 507, 92 Stat. 3350, 3370
3371, 3372, 3380, 3406, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3332, 3342(c), 3346(d)(2),
3417 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Presidential reimposition of natural
gas price controls may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)
(Congress may reimpose natural gas price controls by concurrent
resolution) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) amendment
to pass through incremental costs of natural gas, and exemptions
therefrom, may be disapproved by resolution of either House)
(procedure for congressional review established)."

															"25. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub.L. No. 9672, §§
[7(d)(2)(B)] 7(g)(3), 93 Stat. 503, 518, 520, 50 U.S.C. app.
§§2406(d)(2)(B), 2406(g)(3) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (President's
proposal to [export] domestically produce[d] crude oil must be
approved by concurrent resolution) (action by Secretary of Commerce
to prohibit or curtail export of agricultural commodities may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"26. Energy Security Act, Pub.L. No. 96-294, §§ 104 (b)(3),
104(e), 126(d)(2), 126(d)(3), 128, 129, 132(a)(3), 133 (a)(3),
137(b)(5), 141(d), 179(a), 803, 94 Stat. 611, 618, 619, 620,
623-26, 628-29, 649, 650-52, 659, 660, 664, 666, 679, 776 (1980) 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2091-93, 2095, 2096, 2097, 42 U.S.C. 8722, 8724,
8725, 8732, 8733, 8737, 8741, 8779, 6240 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)]
(Loan guarantees by Departments of Defense, Energy and Commerce in
excess of specified amounts may be disapproved by resolution of
either House) (President's proposal to provide loans or guarantees
in excess Page 462 U. S. 1008 of established amounts may be disapproved by resolution of
either House) (proposed award by President of individual contracts
for purchase of more than 75,000 barrels per day of crude oil may
be disapproved by resolution of either House) (President's
proposals to overcome energy shortage through synthetic fuels
development, and individual contracts to purchase more than 75,000
barrels per day, including use of loans or guarantees, may be
disapproved by resolution of either House) (procedures for either
House to disapprove proposals made under Act are established)
(request by Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) for additional time
to submit its comprehensive strategy may be disapproved by
resolution of either House) (proposed amendment to comprehensive
strategy by SFC Board of Directors may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution of either House or by failure of both Houses to pass
concurrent resolution of approval) (procedure for either House to
disapprove certain proposed actions of SFC is established)
(procedure for both Houses to approve by concurrent resolution or
either House to reject concurrent resolution for proposed
amendments to comprehensive strategy of SFC is established)
(proposed loans and loan guarantees by SFC may be disapproved by
resolution of either House) (acquisition by SFC of a synthetic
fuels project which is receiving financial assistance may be
disapproved by resolution of either House) (SFC contract
renegotiations exceeding initial cost estimates by 175% may be
disapproved by resolution of either House) (proposed financial
assistance to synthetic fuel projects in Western Hemisphere outside
United States may be disapproved by resolution of either House)
(President's request to suspend provisions requiring build up of
reserves and limiting sale or disposal of certain crude oil
reserves must be approved by resolution of both Houses)."

															" E" " RULEMAKING" "27. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-380, §
[509(a)], 88 Stat. 484, 567, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) [(1976 ed., Page 462 U. S. 1009 Supp. V)] (Department of Education regulations may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"28. Federal Education Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub.L.
No. 96-187, § 109, 93 Stat. 1339, 1364, 2 U.S.C. � 438(d)(2) [(1976
ed., Supp. V)] (Proposed rules and regulations of the Federal
Election Commission may be disapproved by resolution of either
House)."

															"29. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub.L. No. 93-595, § [2(a)(1)], 88
Stat.1926, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (Proposed amendments by Supreme
Court of Federal Rules of Evidence may be disapproved by resolution
of either House)."

															"30. Act of August 9, 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-88, § 208, 89 Stat.
433, 436-37, 42 U.S.C. § 602 note (Social Security standards
proposed by Secretary of Health and Human Services may be
disapproved by either House)."

															"31. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-504, §
43(f)(3), 92 Stat. 1705, 1752, 49 U.S.C. § 1552(f) [(1976 ed.,
Supp. V)] (Rules or regulations governing employee protection
program may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"32. Education Amendments of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-561, §§ 1138,
[212(b)], 1409, 92 Stat. 2143, 2327, 2341, 2369, 25 U.S.C. § 2018,
20 U.S.C. §§ [927], 1221-3(e) [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and
regulations proposed under the Act may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution)."

															"33. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub.L. No.
96-247, § 7(b)(1), 94 Stat. 349, 352-353 (1980) 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
[(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Attorney General's proposed standards for
resolution of grievances of adults confined in correctional
facilities may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"34. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub.L.
No. 96-252, § 21(a), 94 Stat. 374, 393, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1 [(1976
ed., Supp. V)] (Federal Trade Commission rules may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution)."

															"35 Department of Education Organization Act, Pub.L. No. 96-88,
§ 414(b), 93 Stat. 668, 685 (1979), 20 U.S.C. § 3474 Page 462 U. S. 1010 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules and regulations promulgated with
respect to the various functions, programs and responsibilities
transferred by this Act, may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution)."

															"36. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub.L.
No. 96-364, § 102, 94 Stat. 1208, 1213, 29 U.S.C. § 1322a [(1976
ed., Supp. V)] (Schedules proposed by Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) which requires an increase in premiums must be
approved by concurrent resolution) (revised premium schedules for
voluntary supplemental coverage proposed by PBGC may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution)."

															"37. Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-592,
§508, 94 Stat. 3437, 3450, 12 U.S.C. § [2252 (1976 ed., Supp. V)]
(Certain Farm Credit Administration regulations may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution or delayed by resolution of either
House.)"

															"38. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-510, § 305, 94 Stat. 2767,
2809, 42 U.S.C. § 9655 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Environmental
Protection Agency regulations concerning hazardous substances
releases, liability and compensation may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution or by the adoption of either House of a
concurrent resolution which is not disapproved by the other
House)."

															"39. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980,
Pub.L. No. 96-515, § 501, 94 Stat. 2987, 3004, 16 U.S.C. § 470w-6
[(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Regulation proposed by the Secretary of the
Interior may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"40. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub.L. No.
96-464, § 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067, 16 U.S.C. § 1463a [(1976 ed.,
Supp. V)] (Rules proposed by the Secretary of Commerce may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"41. Act of December 17, 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-539, § 4, 94 Stat.
3194, 3195, 7 U.S.C. § 136w [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Rules or
regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the
Environmental Page 462 U. S. 1011 Protection Agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act may be disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"42. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L. No.
97-35, §§ § 533(a)(2), 1107(d), 1142, 1183(a)(2), 1207, 95 Stat.
357, 453, 626, 654, 659, 695, 718-20, 20 U.S.C. § 1089, 23 U.S.C. §
402(j), 45 U.S.C. §§ 761, 767, 564(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2083, 1276,
1204 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Secretary of Education's schedule of
expected family contributions for Pell Grant recipients may be
disapproved by resolution of either House) (rules promulgated by
Secretary of Transportation for programs to reduce accidents,
injuries and deaths may be disapproved by resolution of either
House) (Secretary of Transportation's plan for the sale of
government's common stock in rail system may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution) (Secretary of Transportation's approval of
freight transfer agreements may be disapproved by resolution of
either House) (amendments to Amtrak's Route and Service Criteria
may be disapproved by resolution of either House) (Consumer Product
Safety Commission regulations may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution of both Houses, or by concurrent resolution of
disapproval by either House if such resolution is not disapproved
by the other House)."

															" F" " MISCELLANEOUS" "43. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Pub.L. No. 81920, § 201,
64 Stat. 1245, 1248, [as amended,] 50 app.U.S.C. § 2281(g) [(1976
ed., Supp. V)] (Interstate civil defense compacts may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution)."

															"44. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub.L. No.
85-568, § [302(c)], 72 Stat. 426, 433, 42 U.S.C. § 2453
(President's transfer to National Air and Space Administration of
functions of other departments and agencies may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution). " Page 462 U. S. 1012 "45. Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-656, §
3, 84 Stat.1946, 1949, 5 U.S.C. § 5305 (President's alternative pay
plan may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"46. Act of October 19, 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-134, § 5, 87 Stat.
466, 468, 25 U.S.C. § 1405 (Plan for use and distribution of funds
paid in satisfaction of judgment of Indian Claims Commission or
Court of Claims may be disapproved by resolution of either
House)."

															"47. Menominee Restoration Act, Pub.L. No. 93-197, § 6, 87 Stat.
770, 773 (1973), 25 U.S.C. § 903d(b) (Plan by Secretary of the
Interior for assumption of the assets [of] the Menominee Indian
corporation may be disapproved by resolution of either House)."

															"48. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 93-198, §§ 303, 602(c)(1) and (2),
87 Stat. 774, 784, 814 (1973) (District of Columbia Charter
amendments ratified by electors must be approved by concurrent
resolution) (acts of District of Columbia Council may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution) (acts of District of Columbia
Council under certain titles of D.C.Code may be disapproved by
resolution of either House)."

															"49. Act of December 31, 1975, Pub.L. No. 94-200, § 102, 89
Stat. 1124, 12 U.S.C. §461 note (Federal Reserve System Board of
Governors may not eliminate or reduce interest rate differentials
between banks insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
associations insured by Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporations without concurrent resolution of approval)."

															"50. Veterans' Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976,
Pub.L. No. 94-502, § 408, 90 Stat. 2383, 2397-98, 38 U.S.C. § 1621
note (President's recommendation for continued enrollment period in
Armed Forces educational assistance program may be disapproved by
resolution of either House). " Page 462 U. S. 1013 "51. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub.L. No.
94-579, §§ 203(c), 204(c)(1), 90 Stat. 2743, 2750, 2752, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1713(c), 1714 (Sale of public lands in excess of two thousand
five hundred acres and withdrawal of public lands aggregating five
thousand acres or more may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution)."

															"52. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension Act of 1977,
Pub.L. No. 95-19, § [401(a)] 91 Stat. 39, 45, 2 U.S.C. § 359 [(1976
ed., Supp. V)] (President's recommendations regarding rates of
salary payment may be disapproved by resolution of either
House)."

															"53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, § 415,
92 Stat. 1111, 1179, 5 U.S.C. § 3131 note [(1976 ed., Supp. V)]
(Continuation of Senior Executive Service may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution)."

															"54. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub.L. No.
95-523, § 304(b), 92 Stat. 1887, 1906, 31 U.S.C. § 1322 [(1976 ed.,
Supp. V)] (Presidential timetable for reducing unemployment may be
superseded by concurrent resolution)."

															"55. District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, Pub.L. No.
96-122, § 164, 93 Stat. 866, 891-92 (1979) (Required reports to
Congress on the District of Columbia retirement program may be
rejected by resolution of either House)."

															"56. Act of August 29, 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-332, § 2, 94 Stat.
1057, 1058, 16 U.S.C. § 1432 [(1976 ed., Supp. V)] (Designation of
marine sanctuary by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution)."

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															As JUSTICE POWELL observes in his separate opinion,

															"the respect due [Congress'] judgment as a coordinate branch of
Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive
than necessary to decide these cases." Ante at 462 U. S. 960 .
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also recognized that

															"we are not here faced with a situation in which the
unforeseeability of future circumstances or the broad scope and
complexity of the subject matter of an agency's rulemaking
authority preclude the articulation of specific criteria in the
governing statute itself. Such factors might present considerations
different from those we find here, both as to the question of
separation of powers and the legitimacy of the unicameral
device."

															634 F.2d 408, 433 (1980) (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															A selected list and brief description of these provisions is 462
U.S. 919 app|>appended to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 Calif.L.Rev. 983, 1089-1090 (1975) (listing
statutes).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The Roosevelt administration submitted proposed legislation
containing veto provisions and defended their constitutionality. See, e.g., General Counsel to the Office of Price
Administration, Statement on Constitutionality of Concurrent
Resolution Provision of Proposed Price Control Bill (H.R. 5479),
reprinted in Price-Control Bill: Hearings on H.R. 5479 before the
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, p. 983 (1941).

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															Presidential objections to the veto, until the veto by President
Nixon of the War Powers Resolution, principally concerned bills
authorizing Committee vetoes. As the Senate Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers found in 1969,

															"an accommodation was reached years ago on legislative vetoes
exercised by the entire Congress or by one House, [while] disputes
have continued to arise over the committee form of the veto."

															S.Rep. No. 91-549, p. 14 (1969). Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
proposed enactment of statutes with legislative veto provisions. See National Wilderness Preservation Act: Hearings on S. 4
before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1963) (President Kennedy's proposals for
withdrawal of wilderness areas); President's Message to the
Congress Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year 1970, 5 Weekly
Comp.Pres.Doc. 70, 73 (1969) (President Johnson's proposals
allowing legislative veto of tax surcharge). The administration of
President Kennedy submitted a memorandum supporting the
constitutionality of the legislative veto. See General
Counsel of the Department of Agriculture, Constitutionality of
Title I of H.R. 6400, 87th Cong., 1st Session (1961), reprinted in
Legislative Policy of the Bureau of the Budget: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Conservation and Credit of the House Committee on
Agriculture, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 27, 31-32 (1966). During the
administration of President Johnson, the Department of Justice
again defended the constitutionality of the legislative veto
provision of the Reorganization Act, as contrasted with provisions
for a Committee veto. See Separation of Powers: Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 206 (1967)
(testimony of Frank M. Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel).

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub.L. 85-568, §
302, 72 Stat. 433 (space program); Atomic Energy Act Amendments of
1958, Pub.L. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 277 (cooperative nuclear
agreements); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-794, § 351, 76
Stat. 899, 19 U.S.C. § 1981 (tariff recommended by International
Trade Commission may be imposed by concurrent resolution of
approval); Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub.L.
90-206, § 255(i)(1), 81 Stat. 644.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															The Impoundment Control Act's provision for legislative review
has been used extensively. Presidents have submitted hundreds of
proposed budget deferrals, of which 65 have been disapproved by
resolutions of the House or Senate with no protest by the
Executive. See App. B to Brief for United States Senate on
Reargument.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															The veto appears in a host of broad statutory delegations
concerning energy rationing, contingency plans, strategic oil
reserves, allocation of energy production materials, oil exports,
and naval petroleum reserve production. Naval Petroleum Reserves
Production Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-258, § 201(3), 90 Stat. 309, 10
U.S.C. § 7422(c)(2)(C); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub.L.
94-163, §§ 159, 201, 401(a), and 455, 89 Stat. 886, 890, 941, and
950, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6239 and 6261, 15 U.S.C. §§ 757 and 760a
(strategic oil reserves, rationing and contingency plans, oil price
controls and product allocation); Federal Nonnuclear Energy
Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. 93-577, § 12, 88 Stat.
1892-1893, 42 U.S.C. § 5911 (allocation of energy production
materials); Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub.L. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat.
582, 30 U.S.C. § 185(u) (oil exports).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Congress found that under the agency's

															"very broad authority to prohibit conduct which is 'unfair or
deceptive' . . . the FTC can regulate virtually every aspect of
America's commercial life. . . . The FTC's rules are not merely
narrow interpretations of a tightly drawn statute; instead, they
are broad policy pronouncements which Congress has an obligation to
study and review."

															124 Cong.Rec. 5012 (1978) (statement by Rep. Broyhill). A
two-House legislative veto was added to constrain that broad
delegation. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, §
21(a), 94 Stat. 393, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-1(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The
constitutionality of that provision is presently pending before us. United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, No.
82-935; United States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade
Commission, No. 82-1044.

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															While Congress could write certain statutes with greater
specificity, it is unlikely that this is a realistic or even
desirable substitute for the legislative veto. The controversial
nature of many issues would prevent Congress from reaching
agreement on many major problems if specificity were required in
their enactments. Fuchs, Administrative Agencies and the Energy
Problem, 47 Ind.L.J. 606, 608 (1972); Stewart, Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1667, 1695-1696 (1975).
For example, in the deportation context, the solution is not for
Congress to create more refined categorizations of the deportable
aliens whose status should be subject to change. In 1979, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service proposed regulations setting
forth factors to be considered in the exercise of discretion under
numerous provisions of the Act, but not including § 244, to ensure
"fair and uniform" adjudication "under appropriate discretionary
criteria." 44 Fed.Reg. 36187 (1979). The proposed rule was canceled
in 1981, because

															"[t]here is an inherent failure in any attempt to list those
factors which should be considered in the exercise of discretion.
It is impossible to list or foresee all of the adverse or favorable
factors which may be present in a given set of circumstances."

															46 Fed.Reg. 9119 (1981).

															Oversight hearings and congressional investigations have their
purpose, but unless Congress is to be rendered a think tank or
debating society, they are no substitute for the exercise of actual
authority. The "delaying" procedure approved in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U. S. 1 , 312 U. S. 15 (1941), while satisfactory for certain measures, has its own
shortcomings. Because a new law must be passed to restrain
administrative action, Congress must delegate authority without the
certain ability of being able to check its exercise.

															Finally, the passage of corrective legislation after agency
regulations take effect or Executive Branch officials have acted
entails the drawbacks endemic to a retroactive response.

															" Post hoc substantive revision of legislation, the only
available corrective mechanism in the absence of postenactment
review, could have serious prejudicial consequences; if Congress
retroactively tampered with a price control system after prices
have been set, the economy could be damaged and private rights
seriously impaired; if Congress rescinded the sale of arms to a
foreign country, our relations with that country would be severely
strained; and if Congress reshuffled the bureaucracy after a
President's reorganization proposal had taken effect, the results
could be chaotic."

															Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative
Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 455, 464 (1977)
(footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															Perhaps I am wrong and the Court remains open to consider
whether certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with
the Art. I requirements. One possibility for the Court and Congress
is to accept that a resolution of disapproval cannot be given legal
effect in its own right, but may serve as a guide in the
interpretation of a delegation of lawmaking authority. The exercise
of the veto could be read as a manifestation of legislative intent,
which, unless itself contrary to the authorizing statute, serves as
the definitive construction of the statute. Therefore, an agency
rule vetoed by Congress would not be enforced in the courts because
the veto indicates that the agency action departs from the
congressional intent.

															This limited role for a redefined legislative veto follows in
the steps of the longstanding practice of giving some weight to
subsequent legislative reaction to administrative rulemaking. The
silence of Congress after consideration of a practice by the
Executive may be equivalent to acquiescence and consent that the
practice be continued until the power exercised be revoked. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.
S. 459 , 236 U. S.
472 -473 (1915). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 , 381 U. S. 11 -12
(1965) (relying on congressional failure to repeal administration
interpretation); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.
S. 280 (1981) (same); Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U. S. 574 (1983) (same); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353 , 456 U. S. 384 (1982) (relying on failure to disturb judicial decision in later
revision of law).

															Reliance on subsequent legislative reaction has been limited by
the fear of overturning the intent of the original Congress and the
unreliability of discerning the views of a subsequent Congress. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102 , 447 U. S.
117 -118 (1980); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304 , 361 U. S. 313 (1960). These concerns are not forceful when the original statute
authorizes subsequent legislative review. The presence of the
review provision constitutes an express authorization for a
subsequent Congress to participate in defining the meaning of the
law. Second, the disapproval resolution allows for a reliable
determination of congressional intent. Without the review
mechanism, uncertainty over the inferences to draw from subsequent
congressional action is understandable. The refusal to pass an
amendment, for example, may indicate opposition to that position,
but could mean that Congress believes the amendment is redundant
with the statute as written. By contrast, the exercise of a
legislative veto is an unmistakable indication that the agency or
Executive decision at issue is disfavored. This is not to suggest
that the failure to pass a veto resolution should be given any
weight whatever.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															For commentary generally favorable to the legislative veto, see Abourezk, Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response
to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind.L.J.
323 (1977); Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the
Constitution, 30 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 467 (1962); Dry, The Congressional
Veto and the Constitutional Separation of Powers, in The Presidency
in the Constitutional Order 195 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis
eds.1981); Javits & Klein, supra, 462
U.S. 919 fn3/10|>n. 10, at 455; Miller & Knapp, The
Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52
Ind. L.J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and
Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the
"Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1064 (1981); Newman &
Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws -- Should
Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 Calif.L.Rev. 565 (1953);
Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function,
23 Kan.L.Rev. 277 (1975); Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive
Action, 5 Seton Hall L.Rev. 489 (1974); Schwartz, Legislative Veto
and the Constitution -- A Reexamination, 46 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 351
(1978); Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and
Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1031
(1955); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13
Harv.J.Legis. 593 (1976).

															For commentary generally unfavorable to the legislative veto, see J. Bolton, The Legislative Veto: Unseparating the
Powers (1977); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90
Harv.L.Rev. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congressional Veto and
Separation of Powers: The Executive On a Leash?, 56 N.C.L.Rev. 423
(1978); FitzGerald, Congressional Oversight or Congressional
Foresight: Guidelines From the Founding Fathers, 28 Ad.L.Rev. 429
(1976); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 569
(1953); Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional
Limits, 16 Harv.J.Legis. 735 (1979); Martin, The Legislative Veto
and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va.L.Rev.
253 (1982); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy For System
Overload, 3 Regulation 19 (Nov.-Dec.1979); Watson, supra, 462
U.S. 919 fn3/3|>n. 3, at 983; Comment, Congressional
Oversight of Administrative Discretion: Defining the Proper Role of
the Legislative Veto, 26 Am.U.L.Rev. 1018 (1977); Note,
Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response
to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 Duke L.J. 285; Recent
Developments, The Legislative Veto in the Arms Export Control Act
of 1976, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1029 (1977).

															[ Footnote 3/13 ] Compare Atkins v. United States, 214 Ct.Cl. 186, 556
F.2d 1028 (1977) (upholding legislative veto provision in Federal
Salary Act, 2 U.S.C. § 351 et seq. ), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), with Consumer Energy Council
of America v. FERC, 218 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 673 F.2d 425 (1982)
(holding unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3342 (1976 ed.,
Supp. V)), appeals docketed, Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020,
81-2151, and 81-2171, and cert. pending, Nos. 82-177 and
82-209.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ] See, e.g., 6 Op.Atty.Gen. 680, 683 (1854); Dept. of
Justice, Memorandum re Constitutionality of Provisions in Proposed
Reorganization Bills Now Pending in Congress, reprinted in S.Rep.
No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1949); Jackson, A
Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1353 (1953); 43
Op.Atty.Gen. No. 10, p. 2 (1977).

															[ Footnote 3/15 ]

															I limit my concern here to those legislative vetoes which
require either one or both Houses of Congress to pass resolutions
of approval or disapproval, and leave aside the questions arising
from the exercise of such powers by Committees of Congress.

															[ Footnote 3/16 ]

															I agree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that Congress did not intend the
one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable. Although
the general rule is that the presence of a saving clause creates a
presumption of divisibility, Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.
S. 210 , 286 U. S. 235 (1932), I read the saving clause contained in § 406 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as primarily pertaining to the
severability of major parts of the Act from one another, not the
divisibility of different provisions within a single section.
Surely, Congress would want the naturalization provisions of the
Act to be severable from the deportation sections. But this does
not support preserving § 244 without the legislative veto, any more
than a saving provision would justify preserving immigration
authority without quota limits.

															More relevant is the fact that, for 40 years, Congress has
insisted on retaining a voice on individual suspension cases -- it
has frequently rejected bills which would place final authority in
the Executive Branch. It is clear that Congress believed its
retention crucial. Given this history, the Court's rewriting of the
Act flouts the will of Congress.

															[ Footnote 3/17 ]

															The Pennsylvania Constitution required that all "bills of [a]
public nature" had to be printed after being introduced, and had to
lie over until the following session of the legislature before
adoption. Pa.Const., § 15 (1776). These printing and layover
requirements applied only to "bills." At the time, measures could
also be enacted as a resolve, which was allowed by the Constitution
as "urgent temporary legislation," without such requirements. A.
Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution 152
(1969). Using this method, the Pennsylvania Legislature routinely
evaded printing and layover requirements through adoption of
resolves. Ibid. A 1784 report of a committee of the Council of Censors, a state
body responsible for periodically reviewing the state government's
adherence to its Constitution, charged that the procedures for
enacting legislation had been evaded though the adoption of
resolves, instead of bills. Report of the Committee of the Council
of Censors 13 (1784). See Nevins, supra, at 190.
When, three years later, the federal Constitutional Convention
assembled in Philadelphia, the delegates were reminded, in the
course of discussing the President's veto, of the dangers pointed
out by the Council of Censors Report. 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the
Federal Constitution 430 (1845). Furthermore, Madison, who made the
motion that led to the Presentment Clause, knew of the Council of
Censors Report, The Federalist No. 50, p. 319 (H. Lodge ed. 1888),
and was aware of the Pennsylvania experience. See The
Federalist No. 48, supra, at 311-312. We have previously
recognized the relevance of the Council of Censors Report in
interpreting the Constitution. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486 , 395 U. S.
529 -530 (1969).

															[ Footnote 3/18 ]

															Although the legislative veto was not a feature of congressional
enactments until the 20th century, the practices of the first
Congresses demonstrate that the constraints of Art. I were not
envisioned as a constitutional straitjacket. The First Congress,
for example, began the practice of arming its Committees with broad
investigatory powers without the passage of legislation. See A. Josephy, On the Hill: A History of the American
Congress 81-83 (1979). More directly pertinent is the First
Congress' treatment of the Northwest Territories Ordinance of 1787.
The Ordinance, initially drafted under the Articles of
Confederation on July 13, 1787, was the document which governed the
territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River. The
Ordinance authorized the Territories to adopt laws, subject to
disapproval in Congress.

															"The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and
publish in the district, such laws of the original states, criminal
and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the
circumstances of the district, and report them to
Congress, from time to time; which laws shall be in force in
the district until the organization of the general assembly
therein, unless disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards
the legislature shall have authority to alter them as they shall
think fit."

															(Emphasis added.)

															After the Constitution was ratified, the Ordinance was reenacted
to conform to the requirements of the Constitution. Act of Aug. 7,
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-51. Certain provisions, such as one
relating to appointment of officials by Congress, were changed
because of constitutional concerns, but the language allowing
disapproval by Congress was retained. Subsequent provisions for
territorial laws contained similar language. See, e.g., 48
U.S.C. § 1478.

															Although at times Congress disapproved of territorial actions by
passing legislation, see, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch.
44, 2 Stat. 444, on at least two occasions one House of Congress
passed resolutions to disapprove territorial laws, only to have the
other House fail to pass the measure for reasons pertaining to the
subject matter of the bills. First, on February 16, 1795, the House
of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution disapproving in
one sweep all but one of the laws that the Governors and judges of
the Northwest Territory had passed at a legislative session on
August 1, 1792. 4 Annals of Cong. 1227. The Senate, however,
refused to concur. Id. at 830. See B. Bond, The
Civilization of the Old Northwest 70-71 (1934). Second, on May 9,
1800, the House passed a resolution to disapprove of a Mississippi
territorial law imposing a license fee on taverns. H.R.Jour., 6th
Cong., 1st Sess., 706 (1826 ed.). The Senate unsuccessfully
attempted to amend the resolution to strike down all laws of the
Mississippi Territory enacted since June 30, 1799. 5 C. Carter,
Territorial Papers of the United States -- Mississippi 94-95
(1937). The histories of the Territories, the correspondence of the
era, and the congressional Reports contain no indication that such
resolutions disapproving of territorial laws were to be presented
to the President or that the authorization for such a
"congressional veto" in the Act of Aug. 7, 1789, was of doubtful
constitutionality.

															The practices of the First Congress are not so clear as to be
dispositive of the constitutional question now before us. But it is
surely significant that this body, largely composed of the same men
who authored Art. I and secured ratification of the Constitution,
did not view the Constitution as forbidding a precursor of the
modern day legislative veto. See J. W. Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394 , 276 U. S. 412 (1928) ("In this first Congress sat many members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. This Court has repeatedly laid
down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of
the Constitution when the founders of our government and framers of
our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs,
long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its
provisions").

															[ Footnote 3/19 ]

															"Legislative, or substantive, regulations are 'issued by an
agency pursuant to statutory authority and . . . implement the
statute, as, for example, the proxy rules issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. . . . Such rules have the force and effect
of law.' U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 30, n. 3 (1947)." Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 425 ,
n. 9.

															Substantive agency regulations are clearly exercises of
lawmaking authority; agency interpretations of their statutes are
only arguably so. But as Henry Monaghan has observed: "Judicial
deference to agency interpretation' of law is simply one way of
recognizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency."
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1,
26 (1983) (emphasis deleted). See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111 (1944); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp., 454 U. S. 170 (1981). [ Footnote 3/20 ]

															As the Court acknowledges, the "provisions of Art. I are
integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of
powers." Ante at 462 U. S. 946 .
But these separation of powers concerns are that legislative power
be exercised by Congress, executive power by the President, and
judicial power by the Courts. A scheme which allows delegation of
legislative power to the President and the departments under his
control, but forbids a check on its exercise by Congress itself,
obviously denigrates the separation-of-powers concerns underlying
Art. I. To be sure, the doctrine of separation of powers is also
concerned with checking each branch's exercise of its
characteristic authority. Section 244(c)(2) is fully consistent
with the need for checks upon congressional authority, infra at 462 U. S.
994 -996, and the legislative veto mechanism, more
generally is an important check upon Executive authority, supra at 462 U. S.
967 -974.

															[ Footnote 3/21 ]

															The Court's other reasons for holding the legislative veto
subject to the presentment and bicameral passage requirements
require but brief discussion. First, the Court posits that the
resolution of disapproval should be considered equivalent to new
legislation because, absent the veto authority of § 244(c)(2),
neither House could, short of legislation, effectively require the
Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General has
determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Ante at 462 U. S.
952 -954. The statement is neither accurate nor
meaningful. The Attorney General's power under the Act is only to
"suspend" the order of deportation; the "suspension" does not
cancel the deportation or adjust the alien's status to that of a
permanent resident alien. Cancellation of deportation and
adjustment of status must await favorable action by Congress. More
important, the question is whether § 244(c)(2), as written, is
constitutional, and no law is amended or repealed by the resolution
of disapproval, which is, of course, expressly authorized by that
section.

															The Court also argues that the legislative character of the
challenged action of one House is confirmed by the fact that,

															"when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress
to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative
role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such
action." Ante at 462 U. S. 955 .
Leaving aside again the above-refuted premise that all action with
a legislative character requires passage in a law, the short answer
is that all of these carefully defined exceptions to the
presentment and bicameralism strictures do not involve action of
the Congress pursuant to a duly enacted statute. Indeed, for the
most part these powers -- those of impeachment, review of
appointments, and treaty ratification -- are not legislative powers
at all. The fact that it was essential for the Constitution to
stipulate that Congress has the power to impeach and try the
President hardly demonstrates a limit upon Congress' authority to
reserve itself a legislative veto, through statutes, over subjects
within its lawmaking authority.

															[ Footnote 3/22 ]

															In his opinion on the constitutionality of the legislative
review provisions of the most recent reorganization statute, 5
U.S.C. § 906(a) (1982 ed.), Attorney General Bell stated that

															"the statement in Article I, § 7, of the procedural steps to be
followed in the enactment of legislation does not exclude other
forms of action by Congress. . . . The procedures prescribed in
Article I § 7, for congressional action are not exclusive."

															43 Op.Atty.Gen. No. 10, pp. 2-3 (1977).

															"[I]f the procedures provided in a given statute have no effect
on the constitutional distribution of power between the legislature
and the executive,"

															then the statute is constitutional. Id. at 3. In the
case of the reorganization statute, the power of the President to
refuse to submit a plan, combined with the power of either House of
Congress to reject a submitted plan, suffices under the standard to
make the statute constitutional. Although the Attorney General
sought to limit his opinion to the reorganization statute, and the
Executive opposes the instant statute, I see no Art. I basis to
distinguish between the two.

															[ Footnote 3/23 ]

															Of course, when the authorizing legislation requires approval to
be expressed by a positive vote, then the two-House veto would
clearly comply with the bicameralism requirement under any
analysis.

															[ Footnote 3/24 ]

															The Court's doubts that Congress entertained this "arcane"
theory when it enacted § 244(c)(2) disregards the fact that this is
the historical basis upon which the legislative vetoes contained in
the Reorganization Acts have been defended, 462
U.S. 919 fn3/22|>n. 22, supra, and that the
Reorganization Acts then provided the precedent articulated in
support of other legislative veto provisions. See, e.g., 87 Cong.Rec. 735 (1941) (Rep. Dirksen) (citing Reorganization Act
in support of proposal to include a legislative veto in Lend-Lease
Act); H.R.Rep. No. 93-658, p. 42 (1973) (citing Reorganization Act
as "sufficient precedent" for legislative veto provision for
Impoundment Control Act).

															[ Footnote 3/25 ]

															Madison emphasized that the principle of separation of powers is
primarily violated "where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department." The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke
ed.1961). Madison noted that the oracle of the separation doctrine,
Montesquieu, in writing that the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers should not be united "in the same person or body of
magistrates," did not mean "that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or control over the acts of
each other." Id. at 325 (emphasis in original). Indeed,
according to Montesquieu, the legislature is uniquely fit to
exercise an additional function: "to examine in what manner the
laws that it has made have been executed." W. Gwyn, The Meaning of
Separation of Powers 102 (1965).

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins,
dissenting.

															A severability clause creates a presumption that Congress
intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force when
one part is found to be invalid. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U. S. 238 , 298 U. S. 312 (1936); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of
Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 , 286 U. S.
235 Page 462 U. S. 1014 (1932). A severability clause does not, however, conclusively
resolve the issue. "[T]he determination, in the end, is reached by"
asking "[w]hat was the intent of the lawmakers," Carter,
supra, at 298 U. S. 312 ,
and "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of such a clause." United States v. Jackson, 390 U.
S. 570 , 390 U. S. 585 ,
n. 27 (1968). Because I believe that Congress did not intend the
one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2) to be severable, I
dissent.

															Section 244(c)(2) is an exception to the general rule that an
alien's deportation shall be suspended when the Attorney General
finds that statutory criteria are met. It is severable only if
Congress would have intended to permit the Attorney General to
suspend deportations without it. This Court has held several times
over the years that exceptions such as this are not severable
because,

															"by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature . . .
the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never
meant. It confers upon the statute a positive operation beyond the
legislative intent, and beyond what anyone can say it would have
enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions." Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90 , 118 U. S. 95 (1886).

															By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court permits suspension of
deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated that
suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should expand the
statute in this way without some clear indication that Congress
intended such an expansion. As the Court said in Davis v.
Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 , 257 U. S.
484 -485 (1922):

															"Where an excepting provision in a statute is found
unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does not
work an enlargement of the scope or operation of other provisions
with which that provision was enacted and which was intended to
qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed
is illustrated in State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20
Ohio St. 167, 174. In dealing with a contention that a statute Page 462 U. S. 1015 containing an unconstitutional provision should be construed as
if the remainder stood alone, the court there said:"

															"This would be to mutilate the section and garble its meaning.
The legislative intention must not be confounded with their power
to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and
vitality to a provision of law is one thing, and to refuse to read
it is a very different thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that
we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is 'stricken
out.' For all the purposes of construction, it is to be regarded as
part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must be gathered
from all that they have said, as well from that which is
ineffectual for want of power, as from that which is authorized by
law."

															"Here the excepting provision was in the statute when it was
enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legislature intended
that the meaning of the other provisions should be taken as
restricted accordingly. Only with that restricted meaning did they
receive the legislative sanction which was essential to make them
part of the statute law of the State; and no other authority is
competent to give them a larger application." See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U. S. 515 , 278 U. S. 525 (1929).

															The Court finds that the legislative history of § 244 shows that
Congress intended § 244(C)(2) to be severable because Congress
wanted to relieve itself of the burden of private bills. But the
history elucidated by the Court shows that Congress was unwilling
to give the Executive Branch permission to suspend deportation on
its own. Over the years, Congress consistently rejected requests
from the Executive for complete discretion in this area. Congress
always insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by
concurrent resolution, as in the 1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as
in the present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be
willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could retain
some sort of veto. Page 462 U. S. 1016 It is doubtless true that Congress has the power to provide for
suspensions of deportation without a one-House veto. But the Court
has failed to identify any evidence that Congress intended to
exercise that power. On the contrary, Congress' continued
insistence on retaining control of the suspension process indicates
that it has never been disposed to give the Executive Branch a free
hand. By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court has " confounded'"
Congress' "`intention'" to permit suspensions of deportation "`with
their power to carry that intention into effect.'" Davis,
supra, at 257 U. S. 484 ,
quoting State ex rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167,
174 (1870). Because I do not believe that § 244(c)(2) is severable, I would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Summary: In the case of INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that allowed one House of Congress to veto the decision of the Executive Branch to allow a deportable alien to remain in the country was unconstitutional as it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Court also held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the legislative history indicated that Congress intended to retain control over the suspension of deportation process.